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Afghanistan Security Situation Update

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Afghanistan Security Situation Update RUNNING TITLE — 1 Afghanistan Security situation update Country of Origin Information Report September 2021 1 [Month] 2019 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu) PDF ISBN 978-92-9485-547-3 doi: 10.2847/43523 BZ-09-21-367-EN-N © European Asylum Support Office, 2020 Cover photo, C – 17 carrying passengers out of Afghanistan © US Air Force, Wikimedia Commons, 6785986, 15 August 2021 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not under the EASO copyright, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders. 2 Country of origin information report | Afghanistan: Security situation Acknowledgements EASO would like to acknowledge the following external expert as the co-drafter of this report, together with EASO: Ms Elizabeth Williams, Country of Origin Information (COI) expert The following departments and organisations have reviewed the report: Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, Cedoca (Centre for Documentation and Research) France, Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless persons (OFPRA), Information, Documentation and Research Division (DIDR) It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO. 3 Country of origin information report | Afghanistan: Security situation Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 3 Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 4 Disclaimer ................................................................................................................................................ 4 Glossary and abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... 5 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 6 Methodology ....................................................................................................................................... 6 Reference period ............................................................................................................................ 6 Sources ............................................................................................................................................ 6 Structure and use of the report .......................................................................................................... 9 1 General description of the security situation ............................................................................... 11 1.1 Taliban’s take-over of Afghanistan following withdrawal of US and international forces (until 31 August 2021) ................................................................................................................................ 11 1.1.1 Final advance and the fall of Kabul .................................................................................. 11 1.1.2 Government formation under the Taliban ...................................................................... 11 1.1.3 Reactions by the public and responses by the Taliban .................................................... 13 1.1.4 Reports on acts of retaliation and violence against certain profiles ............................... 14 1.2 Prior peace negotiations and political developments ......................................................... 17 1.3 Actors ................................................................................................................................... 19 1.3.1 US and other international forces ................................................................................... 19 1.3.2 Involvement of new international actors ........................................................................ 21 1.3.3 Taliban .............................................................................................................................. 23 1.3.4 Pro-government armed groups, warlords and their militias ........................................... 24 1.3.5 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISKP) ....................................... 25 1.3.6 Foreign fighters ................................................................................................................ 25 1.4 Recent security trends and armed confrontations .............................................................. 27 1.4.1 General ............................................................................................................................ 27 1.4.2 Number of security incidents .......................................................................................... 31 1.4.3 Trends in the nature of the violence and methods ......................................................... 33 1.4.4 Impact of the violence on the civilian population ........................................................... 34 1.4.5 Conflict-induced displacement ........................................................................................ 35 2 Regional description of the security situation in Afghanistan ...................................................... 36 2.1 Kabul City ............................................................................................................................. 36 4 Country of origin information report | Afghanistan: Security situation 2.2 Badakhshan .......................................................................................................................... 40 2.3 Badghis ................................................................................................................................. 43 2.4 Baghlan ................................................................................................................................ 45 2.5 Balkh..................................................................................................................................... 48 2.6 Bamyan ................................................................................................................................ 51 2.7 Daykundi .............................................................................................................................. 53 2.8 Farah .................................................................................................................................... 55 2.9 Faryab .................................................................................................................................. 57 2.10 Ghazni .................................................................................................................................. 60 2.11 Ghor ..................................................................................................................................... 63 2.12 Helmand ............................................................................................................................... 66 2.13 Herat .................................................................................................................................... 70 2.14 Jawzjan ................................................................................................................................. 74 2.15 Kabul province ..................................................................................................................... 77 2.16 Kandahar .............................................................................................................................. 79 2.17 Kapisa ................................................................................................................................... 84 2.18 Khost .................................................................................................................................... 86 2.19 Kunar .................................................................................................................................... 89 2.20 Kunduz ................................................................................................................................. 91 2.21 Laghman ............................................................................................................................... 95 2.22 Logar .................................................................................................................................... 97 2.23 Nangarhar .......................................................................................................................... 100 2.24 Nimroz ................................................................................................................................ 103 2.25 Nuristan .............................................................................................................................. 105 2.26 Paktika ................................................................................................................................ 107 2.27 Paktya ................................................................................................................................
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