DOCSLIB.ORG

Nimroz Rapid Drought Assessment Zaranj, Kang and Chakhansoor Districts Conducted August 21St-22Nd 2013

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Nimroz Rapid Drought Assessment Zaranj, Kang and Chakhansoor Districts Conducted August 21St-22Nd 2013 Nimroz Rapid Drought Assessment Zaranj, Kang and Chakhansoor Districts Conducted August 21st-22nd 2013 Figure 1 Dead livestock in Kang district Figure 2 Nimroz district map Relief International in Nimroz Relief International (RI) is a humanitarian, non‐profit, non‐sectarian agency that provides emergency relief, rehabilitation, and development interventions throughout the world. Since 2001, RI has supported a wide array of relief and development interventions throughout Afghanistan. RI programs focus on community participation, ensuring sustainability and helping communities establish a sense of ownership over all stages of the project cycle. Relief International has been working in Nimroz province since 2007, when RI took over implementation of the National Solidarity Program, as well as staff and offices, from Ockenden International. Through more than five years of work in partnership with Nimroz communities, RI has formed deep connections with communities, government, and other stakeholders such as UN agencies. RI has offices and is currently working in all districts of Nimroz, except for the newly added Delaram district (formerly belonging to Farah Province). RI has recently completed an ECHO WASH and shelter program and a DFID funded local governance program , and is currently implementing the National Solidarity Program and a food security and livelihoods program in the province. Nimroz General Information related to Drought Nimroz province is the most South Westerly Province of Afghanistan bordering Iran and Pakistan. The provincial capital is Zaranj, located in the west on the Iranian border. The population is estimated at 350,000 although, as for the rest of Afghanistan, no exact demographic data exists.1 There has been a flow of returnees from Iran over the last years, and the provincial capital has also grown due to internal migration. Nimroz is a province facing numerous challenges due to physical and social factors, with a difficult climate, harsh desert conditions and limited availability of water. Nimroz is both susceptible to prolonged droughts and to yearly spring floods. In addition Nimroz regularly has sand storms during the dry season. When there is a drought, these sand storms become stronger as vegetation is reduced and as soil is dried out. These sand storms damage water sources, getting into the wells and damaging the inside parts of wells, and also fill canals and other irrigation infrastructure. (Please see annex 1 for further information). However, while Nimroz always suffers from water scarcity particularly during the dry season July – October the drought declared this year can be considered exceptional. There has not been one of the same level for over a decade in the province. Nimroz has limited water sources. The main sources of water are the Helmand River flowing from the south through Charburjack and Zaranj provinces where it is running along the border with Iran, and from the North West the Khash Rod River ending in Kang district. The rivers and canals are dry for much of the year, and flow of the most important water source, the Helmand River is influenced by sometimes political decisions on opening the Kajaki dam in Helmand and also on influence from neighbouring Iran. There are limited options for well digging, shallow wells are the most common but often dry up or become brackish. There are limited deep well digging options in the province as well. The context and needs also vary greatly between the different districts within Nimroz itself, regarding water availability, sources and quality. 1 This is an estimate RI arrived at through discussions with government departments and other actors in the province. Some actors estimate the population to be larger than that, while the official figures are much lower. Nimroz is isolated in relation to central government and has limited ability to leverage support, as can be seen in the dilapidated infrastructure. The relatively sparse population, geographical distance, and compared to other southern provinces, relatively better security situation, have contributed towards a lack of interest in the province from both Kabul and the donor community, there has been no response to the drought within the province, and there are a very limited number of actors present. Droughts are affecting communities in Nimroz on a broad level. For example migration of families due to lack of water can lead to multiple vulnerabilities for communities, including deterioration of security, and difficulty for the remaining population to maintain water sources such as wells, and irrigation infrastructures such as canals with the reduced manpower and resources. In addition drought has a strong impact on women and children. With reduced livelihood opportunities and fewer people to work children are often taken out of school in order to work and help with household chores, while Nimroz already has a high rate of child labor with about 28%2. In addition malnutrition tends to worsen through droughts, and already about 34% of the population in Nimroz is calorie deficient3. Figure 3 Nimroz map with water sources Figure 4 Well in a dried river bed in Kang 2 Afghanistan provincial briefs, June 2011 WB and GOA. 3 Ibid. Drought Assessment Date: 21st and 22nd August 2013 Conducted by: RI field team under Zabihullah Honar the Provincial Program Coordinator Objective: Assess the impact of the drought in selected villages and use as basis to propose required response activities Province, Districts: Nimroz Province (Zaranj, Chakhansoor and Kang districts) Number of villages: 54 villages surveyed (32 Zaranj, 11 Chakhansoor and 11 Kang) Methodology: A sampling methodology was used based on a list of affected villages provided to RI by Rural Rehabilitation Department (RRD) of Nimroz, based on an RI request. This list was cross checked with feedback from RI staff and the most vulnerable villages selected as a sample. The survey was adapted from ERF format to assess villages at the community level, and was responded to by the Community Development Councils (CDCs) of each village. The figures for health, for reasons of greater accuracy, are from local clinics in each district. Population: In surveyed villages 5,813 HH are affected with an estimated total population of nearly 30,000. Summary of Findings All three surveyed districts of Nimroz have been severely impacted by the drought, though it has affected each one in different ways according to their context and coping strategies, which needs to be considered when putting together an appropriate response. Water Availability The figures below show that water availability, severely exacerbated by the drought, is not enough to meet the needs of the population, severely impacting livelihoods and health (as discussed later) Has water availability in Nimroz Province decreased due to the drought? 100% 50% 0% Yes No Is there enough water available for drinking? Kang Chakansoor Yes Zaranj No 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Is there enough water available for drinking AND washing? Kang Chakansoor Yes Zaranj No 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Water Sources and cost Each of the districts relies on different sources for their water, which each bring their own set of problems. Zaranj has always been nearly fully reliant on water tankering (except for some areas of Zaranj city, where piped water is available coming from Iran) and since the drought began relies solely on this as no other sources are functioning/available. Due to increased pressure and water shortages the price of water in Zaranj has doubled since the drought to almost 20 AFN per 20 litre jerry can, and all are paying for water. In Chakansoor there is no tankering at all at village level, so communities are forced to look further afield when their other sources (wells/streams) fail. The price of water has not increased but the number of those paying for water has increased by 300% since the drought began. In Kang there is very limited tankering, especially outside of the surroundings of the district centre so when water sources fail communities are forced to look further afield to try and find water, or to abandon their homes altogether and move in search of water. The number paying has decreased, but for those who currently have to pay for water the price has increased by 167% since the drought began. Accesible village water Sources for communities (before drought) 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% Zaranj 20% 10% Chakansoor 0% Kang % of sources - wells/ rivers/ ponds/ springs currently functioning (excluding tankering) 100% 80% % of wells/ rivers/ ponds/ 60% springs currently 40% functioning 20% (excluding tankering) 0% Zaranj Chakansoor Kang Cost of water Zaranj Cost per Chakansoor 20 litre currently? Kang (Afhs) Total Average 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 Changes in numbers paying for water Change in price (%) Change in number Total paying for… Average Kang Paying for water now Chakansoor (%) Paying for Zaranj water in the past (%) -25% 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 225% 250% 275% 300% Do people have to travel further to collect water since the drought?* Zaranj Chakansoor No Yes Kang 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% * In Zaranj, due to the reliance on water tankering, the increased distances are not so marked. However in Chakansoor average distance required to get water now stands at 5.8km. In Kang the problem is more severe and average distance is now around 15km. Figure 5 Water transport in Chakhansoor Figure 6 Water fetching in Kang Impact on Health As can be seen from the data collected from BRAC administered District Health clinics, there has been a marked increase in cases of diarrhea since the period when the impacts of the drought were just starting to be felt. With watery diarrhea figures more than doubling in Kang and Chakansoor as communities are forced to try and identify alternative water sources due to the drought.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Afghan Force Development
    The Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, NW • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: +1-202-775-3270 • Fax: +1-202-457-8746 Web: www.csis.org/burke Winning in Afghanistan: Afghan Force Development Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair Revised: December 14, 2006 Introduction ! This briefing is based on a trip to Afghanistan in November 2006. ! Most of the material is adapted, or taken directly, from expert briefings provided on an unclassified level. The opinions are the author’s. ! The rise in threat activity is serious, but must be kept in context. ! The challenges to be overcome a far less serious than in Iraq. ! The US and NATO scored important victories in 2006. ! The Bush Administration is already considering major increases in military and economic aid and limited increases in US forces. ! NATO commanders understand the problems and weaknesses in current NATO forces and rules of engagement, and are seeking to overcome them. 2 !"#$%&&'()*+(,-./)(0).-123.4(),5../6(3257(8/95): !;<(=53/6(56/5) !;<(><5)3.-7/?(@57A.<>B/A !C<D7364(A-E-A/A(F4(32/(G-7AD(HD)2(I<D735-7( J571/ !G5)(5(><,K5653-E/.4(L/63-./(56/5(-7(32/(7<632 !M./E53-<7(L6<,(&###N 3<($&%###N 5F<E/()/5(./E/. !C5K-35.(<L(H5FD.(-)(53(O###N 57A(-)(-7(5(E5../4 3 The Challenge of Afghanistan vs. Iraq AFGHANISTAN ! Land Mass – 647,500 sq km ! Population – 31,056,947 people ! Land locked, primarily agrarian AFGHANISTAN economy ! Lacks both transportation and TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES information infrastructure ~32,000 ! Restrictive terrain dominates the country IRAQ ! Land Mass – 432,162 sq km ! Population – 26,783,383 people ! Economy dominated by the oil sector and fertile river valleys ! Comparatively developed transportation and information infrastructure IRAQ TOTAL US AND COALITION FORCES ~162,000 4 Key Trends ! Development of effective government and economy will take at least 5-10 years; no instant success is possible.
    [Show full text]
  • 19 October 2020 "Generated on Refers to the Date on Which the User Accessed the List and Not the Last Date of Substantive Update to the List
    Res. 1988 (2011) List The List established and maintained pursuant to Security Council res. 1988 (2011) Generated on: 19 October 2020 "Generated on refers to the date on which the user accessed the list and not the last date of substantive update to the list. Information on the substantive list updates are provided on the Council / Committee’s website." Composition of the List The list consists of the two sections specified below: A. Individuals B. Entities and other groups Information about de-listing may be found at: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson (for res. 1267) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/delisting (for other Committees) https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/list (for res. 2231) A. Individuals TAi.155 Name: 1: ABDUL AZIZ 2: ABBASIN 3: na 4: na ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻌﺰﻳﺰ ﻋﺒﺎﺳﯿﻦ :(Name (original script Title: na Designation: na DOB: 1969 POB: Sheykhan Village, Pirkowti Area, Orgun District, Paktika Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: Abdul Aziz Mahsud Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: na Passport no: na National identification no: na Address: na Listed on: 4 Oct. 2011 (amended on 22 Apr. 2013) Other information: Key commander in the Haqqani Network (TAe.012) under Sirajuddin Jallaloudine Haqqani (TAi.144). Taliban Shadow Governor for Orgun District, Paktika Province as of early 2010. Operated a training camp for non- Afghan fighters in Paktika Province. Has been involved in the transport of weapons to Afghanistan. INTERPOL- UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/How-we-work/Notices/View-UN-Notices- Individuals click here TAi.121 Name: 1: AZIZIRAHMAN 2: ABDUL AHAD 3: na 4: na ﻋﺰﯾﺰ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﺎن ﻋﺒﺪ اﻻﺣﺪ :(Name (original script Title: Mr Designation: Third Secretary, Taliban Embassy, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates DOB: 1972 POB: Shega District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Good quality a.k.a.: na Low quality a.k.a.: na Nationality: Afghanistan Passport no: na National identification no: Afghan national identification card (tazkira) number 44323 na Address: na Listed on: 25 Jan.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan National Railway Plan and Way Forward
    Afghanistan National Railway Plan and Way Forward MOHAMMAD YAMMA SHAMS Director General & Chief Executive Officer Afghanistan Railway Authority Nov 2015 WHY RAILWAY IN AFGHANISTAN ? → The Potential → The Benefits • Affinity for Rail Transportation Pioneer Development of Modern – Primary solution for landlocked, Afghanistan developing countries/regions – At the heart of the CAREC and Become Part of the International ECO Program Rail Community – 75km of railroad vs 40,000 km of – Become long-term strategic partner road network to various countries – Rich in minerals and natural – Build international rail know-how resources – rail a more suitable (transfer of expertise) long term transportation solutions Raise Afghanistan's Profile as a than trucking. Transit Route • Country Shifting from Warzone – Penetrate neighbouring countries to Developing State Rail Market including China, Iran, Turkey and countries in Eastern – Improved connection to the Europe. community and the region (access – Standard Gauge has been assessed to neighbouring countries) as the preferred system gauge. – Building modern infrastructure – Dual gauge (Standard and Russian) in – Facilitate economic stability of North to connect with CIS countries modern Afghanistan STRATEGIC LOCATION OF AFGHANISTAN Kazakhstan China MISSING LINKS- and ASIAN RAILWAY TRANS-ASIAN RAILWAY NETWORK Buslovskaya St. Petersburg RUSSIAN FEDERATION Yekaterinburg Moscow Kotelnich Omsk Tayshet Petropavlovsk Novosibirsk R. F. Krasnoe Syzemka Tobol Ozinki Chita Irkutsk Lokot Astana Ulan-Ude Uralsk
    [Show full text]
  • The Future of Afghanistan
    Thier The Future of Afghanistan The of Afghanistan Future J Alexander Thier editor United States Institute of Peace The Future of Afghanistan Thier-Afghanistan-2a rev.indd 1 12/17/08 11:24:43 AM Thier-Afghanistan-2a rev.indd 2 12/17/08 11:24:43 AM The Future of Afghanistan J Alexander Thier editor UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE Was H in G ton , D.C. Thier-Afghanistan-2a rev.indd 3 12/17/08 11:24:43 AM The views expressed in this book are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace. UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 1200 17th Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20036-3011 www.usip.org © 2009 by the Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace. All rights reserved. First published 2009 To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials for course use, contact the Copyright Clearance Center at www.copyright.com. For print, electronic media, and all other subsidiary rights, e-mail: [email protected]. Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standards for Information Science—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. Thier-Afghanistan-2a rev.indd 4 12/17/08 11:24:43 AM Contents Acknowledgments v Map of Afghanistan vi 1. Introduction: Building Bridges 1 J Alexander Thier 2. The Transformation of the Afghan State 13 Barnett R. Rubin 3. The Future of Security Institutions 23 Ali A. Jalali 4.
    [Show full text]
  • The Essence of Progress British and Afghan Troops Take on Insurgency In
    Nawa: The essence of progress Story and photos by Marine Cpl. Jeff Drew CAMP LEATHERNECK, Helmand province, Afghanistan - Extensive improvements in Nawa district and exceptional Afghan leadership has transformed the once improvised explosive device-laden area into a peaceful paragon of progress during the last year. Residents walk casually along roads and waterways, confident in local Afghan security forces to keep them safe. The growth of illegal drugs has been nearly eradicated as citizens have begun to see the benefits of growing legal crops. Interest in education is on the rise, ensuring a brighter future for the people of Nawa. The people are happy, healthy and hopeful. "Over the past 30 years Nawa lost everything, but now the government system is active," said Haji Abdul Manaf, the district governor of Nawa. "There was no rule, but now there is; there was no education, but now there is; there was no security, but now there is; there were no human rights, but now there is; there was poppy, but now it has been eradicated. The people laid down their weapons, and there was peace." (Read the STORY) British and Afghan troops take on insurgency in Gereshk U.K. Defence News Nearly 1,000 British and Afghan soldiers have taken part in a major operation to increase security around a vital town in Helmand province. More than 280 British troops joined forces with 690 warriors from the Afghan National Army (ANA) and patrolmen from the Afghan National Police to clear insurgents from the area north of the bustling town of Gereshk in Nahr-e Saraj district.
    [Show full text]
  • 302 272,868 Border Monitoring Update
    Afghanistan BORDER MONITORING UPDATE COVID-19 RESPONSE 26 APRIL – 2 May 2020 CHA staff (UNHCR partner) deployed to Islam Qala reception center 24 March 2020 CHA/ E. Karimi 302 Since 01 January, UNHCR assisted the return of over 300 Afghan refugees from Iran, Pakistan and other countries under its facilitated voluntary repatriation programme. As of 04 March, UNHCR AFGHAN REFUGEES RETURNED suspended the return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan, Iran and other countries as a precautionary TO AFGHANISTAN measure linked to COVID-19. According to MoRR/IOM, during the week of 26 April – 2 May, the total number of undocumented returnees from Iran was 5,801 and since 01 January, the total number of undocumented returnees is 272,868 individuals, including 271,035 from Iran and 1,833 from Pakistan. On 01 May 2020, the 272,868 Government of Pakistan announced that Torkham and Spin Boldak crossing points will be opened five UNDOCUMENTED AFGHANS days a week (Monday – Friday) for commercial purposes (both for Afghan transit trade and bilateral RETURNED FROM IRAN AND trade). Pedestrian movement of stranded Afghans and Pakistanis will be allowed once a week PAKISTAN (Saturday), and a maximum of 500 persons will be allowed to cross into Pakistan through Torkham and 300 individuals through Spin Boldak crossing point. UNHCR is aware of reports of the abusive treatment of a group of Afghans following their irregular entry into Iran, and of allegations of resulting loss of lives. According to initial information in media reports, a group of 57 Afghans who had irregularly crossed Afghanistan’s border with Iran on Friday 1 May, were reportedly apprehended and beaten by Iranian border authorities and subsequently thrown into the Harirud River (shared by Afghanistan, Iran and Turkmenistan).
    [Show full text]
  • Here the Taleban Are Gaining Ground
    Mathieu Lefèvre Local Defence in Afghanistan A review of government-backed initiatives EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Given events happening in Afghanistan and in the of the Government to provide stability and region, as well as domestic pressures building in strengthen development through community the United States and Europe regarding further security.’ A pilot project that started in Wardak in engagement in Afghanistan, decision makers are March 2009 is ongoing. To date 1,100 men – more under pressure to find new solutions to restore than the number of provincial police – have been security in large parts of the country. Against this recruited in Wardak, mainly through direct backdrop, the Afghan government and its patronage by elders, local power brokers and international supporters are giving in to a cyclical prominent jihadi commanders, bypassing the temptation of working with informal armed groups intended shura-based mechanism. Many of the to provide security, particularly in remote rural problems that had plagued the ANAP came back to areas where the Taleban are gaining ground. haunt AP3. The program has not been considered successful enough to replicate in other provinces The first initiative examined in this paper is the but a similar program (the Afghanistan Public Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), Protection Force) has been included in the overall launched by the Ministry of Interior with MoI police strategy. international support in 2006 to provide a ‘community policing’ function. Recruits were The most recent and most experimental of the selected, trained, armed, equipped and deployed three programs is the Local Defence Initiatives in provinces mainly in the south and southeast.
    [Show full text]
  • Länderinformationen Afghanistan Country
    Staatendokumentation Country of Origin Information Afghanistan Country Report Security Situation (EN) from the COI-CMS Country of Origin Information – Content Management System Compiled on: 17.12.2020, version 3 This project was co-financed by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund Disclaimer This product of the Country of Origin Information Department of the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum was prepared in conformity with the standards adopted by the Advisory Council of the COI Department and the methodology developed by the COI Department. A Country of Origin Information - Content Management System (COI-CMS) entry is a COI product drawn up in conformity with COI standards to satisfy the requirements of immigration and asylum procedures (regional directorates, initial reception centres, Federal Administrative Court) based on research of existing, credible and primarily publicly accessible information. The content of the COI-CMS provides a general view of the situation with respect to relevant facts in countries of origin or in EU Member States, independent of any given individual case. The content of the COI-CMS includes working translations of foreign-language sources. The content of the COI-CMS is intended for use by the target audience in the institutions tasked with asylum and immigration matters. Section 5, para 5, last sentence of the Act on the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum (BFA-G) applies to them, i.e. it is as such not part of the country of origin information accessible to the general public. However, it becomes accessible to the party in question by being used in proceedings (party’s right to be heard, use in the decision letter) and to the general public by being used in the decision.
    [Show full text]
  • Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 2004 (Act No
    STAATSKOERANT, 26 SEPTEMBER 2012 No. 35713 3 PROCLAMATION by the President of the Republic of South Africa No. 57, 2012 NOTIFICATION BY PRESIDENT IN RESPECT OF ENTITIES IDENTIFIED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL: SECTION 25 OF THE PROTECTION . OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORIST AND RELATED ACTIVITIES ACT~ 2004 I. Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma, President of the Republic of South Africa, hereby, in terms of section 25 of the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 2004 (Act No. 33 of 2004), give notice that the Security Council of the United Nations, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has amended the Lists reflected in the Annexures in respect of entities which have been identified as being - (a) entities who commit, or attempt to commit, any terrorist and related activity or participate in or facilitate the commission of any terrorist and related activity; or (b) entities against whom Member States of the United Nations must take the actions specified in the Resolutions of the said Security Council, in order to combat or prevent terrorist and related activities. 4 No. 35713 GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, 26 SEPTEMBER 2012 This Proclamation and the Annexure thereto, shall also be published on the South African Police Service Internet website: http://www.s<;Ws.gov.za The United Nations Security Council regularly updates the lists in respect of additions and deletions. The updated lists and key thereto are electronically available on the following websites on the Internet: http:J/www.un .org/sclcommittees/1267/AQiist.html htte :/lwww.un.orQ/sc/committees/1988/List.
    [Show full text]
  • End of Year Report (2018) About Mujahideen Progress and Territory Control
    End of year report (2018) about Mujahideen progress and territory control: The Year of Collapse of Trump’s Strategy 2018 was a year that began with intense bombardments, military operations and propaganda by the American invaders but all praise belongs to Allah, it ended with the neutralization of another enemy strategy. The Mujahideen defended valiantly, used their chests as shields against enemy onslaughts and in the end due to divine assistance, the invaders were forced to review their war strategy. This report is based on precise data collected from concerned areas and verified by primary sources, leaving no room for suspicious or inaccurate information. In the year 2018, a total of 10638 attacks were carried out by Mujahideen against invaders and their hirelings from which 31 were martyr operations which resulted in the death of 249 US and other invading troops and injuries to 153 along with death toll of 22594 inflicted on Kabul administration troops, intelligence operatives, commandos, police and Arbakis with a further 14063 sustaining injuries. Among the fatalities 514 were enemy commanders killed and eliminated in various attacks across the country. During 2018 a total of 3613 vehicles including APCs, pickup trucks and other variants were destroyed along with 26 aircrafts including 8 UAVs, 17 helicopters of foreign and internal forces and 1 cargo plane shot down. Moreover, a total of 29 district administration centers were liberated by the Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate over the course of last year, among which some were retained
    [Show full text]
  • Three Ports Under China's Gaze Kulshrestha, Sanatan
    www.ssoar.info Three Ports Under China's Gaze Kulshrestha, Sanatan Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Kulshrestha, S. (2017). Three Ports Under China's Gaze. IndraStra Global, 8, 1-7. https://nbn-resolving.org/ urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-53427-9 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non- Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, transferable, individual and limited right to using this document. persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses This document is solely intended for your personal, non- Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. all copyright information and other information regarding legal Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie document in public. dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder conditions of use. anderweitig nutzen. Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an. Three Ports Under China’s Gaze indrastra.com/2017/08/Three-Ports-Under-China-s-Gaze-003-08-2017-0050.html By Rear Admiral Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile Sports
    Number 11 7 April 0 3, 2008 India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile Sports India and Pakistan share deep cultural and historic ties with charge s Afghanistan’s government with turning a blind eye to Afghanistan but have for decades had competing strategic the arms and drug trad e, Afghanistan charge s that the Taliban agendas there. For India, Afghanistan was an imp ortant operate s out of safe havens in Pakistan. albeit passive geopolitical constraint on Pakistan, as well as the gateway to Central Asia. Pakistan saw Afghanistan as For India, a friend in the West and a bridge to Central part of a threatening Indian pincer movement, a source of fuel Asia: India, on the other hand, has wanted to protect and for Pashtun separatism inside Pakistan , and during the expand its stake in Afghanistan in order to prevent the Taliban yea rs, a source of “strategic depth” against the con solidation of an anti -India bloc extending westward from Indian threat. These mutual suspicions make it difficult to get Pakistan. It had been blindsided by the Soviet decision to Afghanistan’s neighbors to pull together in stabilizing the invade Afghanistan in 1979 and was determined to remain country. With a new government in Pakistan determined to closely involved and avoid another unpleasant surprise. It convince its people that Paki stan is defending its own opened consulates in Hera t, Mazar -e-Sharif , Kandahar , and interests rather than following a U.S. lead, U.S. policy will Jalalabad, participated (as did Pakistan) in the Bonn need to respect the Pakistan government’s need for political conference that established the new government, and took an space.
    [Show full text]