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Contents The ISIL’s Theft of WMD

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The ISIL’s Theft of WMD Components Components in in Iraq By Stephen Hummel By Stephen Hummel

Reports 4 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s Role in Attacks in By Anne Stenersen 8 Swiss Foreign Fighters Active in Syria By Daniel Glaus and Lorenzo Vidino 11 Dutch Foreign Fighters Continue to Travel to Syria By Samar Batrawi and Ilona Chmoun 15 , the Chibok Abductions and Nigeria’s Counterterrorism Strategy By J.N.C. Hill 18 Contrasting the Leadership of Mullah Fazlullah and Khan Said Sajna in Pakistan By Daud Khattak

20 Recent Highlights in Political Violence 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

Rebels from the Islamic Front, Syria’s largest rebel coalition, clash with the ISIL near Aleppo on July 13, 2014. - Ahmed Deeb/AFP/Getty he control of radioactive al-Muthanna project site located 60 materials and chemical weapons miles north of Baghdad near the town has long been safely in the hands of Samarra where the “remnants of T 1 of state actors. Recent world events, the former [Iraqi] chemical weapons however, illustrate a contemporary program were kept.”4 environment where non-state actors, specifically terrorist organizations, The al-Muthanna site is a 100-square- have acquired such materials. In June kilometer complex that has been the About the CTC Sentinel 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and the center of Iraq’s chemical weapons The Combating Terrorism Center is an Levant (ISIL)2 reportedly seized control program since the 1970s. Before independent educational and research of nuclear material controlled by the 1986, the site was known as the State institution based in the Department of Social Iraqi government at the University Establishment for Pesticide Production Sciences at the Military Academy, of Mosul.3 The ISIL also entered the (SEPP), a front company dedicated to the West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses production of chemical weapons. During the Center’s global network of scholars and the 1980s, the site produced hundreds of practitioners to understand and confront 1 There are a few exceptions to this rule, but the sheer ex- tons of Sarin, VX, and mustard agents.5 contemporary threats posed by terrorism and pense of developing and maintaining such materials and Aerial bombing during Desert Storm other forms of political violence. weapons has been prohibitive to anyone but state actors. destroyed the research and production 2 In June 2014, the ISIL shortened its name to the “Islamic State.” This article, however, still refers to the group by its The views expressed in this report are those of more common name, the ISIL. Security Council, 2014. the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 3 Ambassador Mohamed Ali Alhakim, “Letter Dated 30 4 Ibid. the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to 5 “Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex,” Central the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,” Intelligence Agency, April 23, 2007.

1 july 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 7 facilities at al-Muthanna and ended its The lack of control of radioactive it is considered a “fertile” material, ability to produce chemical weapons. materials and former chemical weapons meaning it can absorb neutrons and The exact contents of the two bunkers agents in Iraq is a concern, but the transmute into uranium-233.13 This that the ISIL entered are not generally requisites to make the stolen materials artificially produced uranium can then known, but according to Michael into a weapon of mass destruction be chemically separated from thorium Luhan, the communications chief for (WMD) are currently lacking. This and used as nuclear fuel.14 Uranium- the Organization for the Prohibition of article provides important technical 233 produced from thorium was used Chemical Weapons (OPCW), “the two context surrounding the capture of bunkers contained chemical weapons radioactive materials and the possible “A dirty bomb laced with which are pre-1991.”6 theft of decaying chemical weapons by the ISIL in Iraq. It finds that while the materials stolen by The ISIL’s entry into al-Muthanna such incidents are a threat in the the ISIL would be akin appears to have been an isolated immediate and long term in the Middle incident, and the lack of security East, the potential for mass casualties to blowing up a ceramic around a remote chemical weapons is currently low due to scientific and brick. The initial explosion site in Iraq pales in comparison to technical challenges faced by the ISIL. the ready accessibility of radioactive would cause damage, materials. Radioactive materials are Are the Stolen Materials WMD Capable? but the effects of the used in a variety of research fields The stolen radioactive and chemical and medical treatments globally. weapons materials clearly pose a radioactive material would Such materials are generally potential threat, but could the ISIL be extremely limited.” tightly controlled and monitored at easily transform them into a WMD? institutions such as hospitals, which are required to undergo inspections Uranium is relatively inert despite the and report radioactivity. These fear the name often instills. This fear with plutonium-U-233 devices tested measures alone, however, do not always stems from the role uranium plays in in 1955.15 The yield of the detonation ensure the security of the materials. In nuclear weaponry and the destruction was less than anticipated.16 The process December 2013, for example, a truck demonstrated when “Little Boy” was of transmuting thorium and then carrying radioactive waste from a detonated on August 6, 1945, over separating the produced uranium-233 is hospital in Tijuana to a storage site near Hiroshima with the equivalent of 16,000 complex and not one that the ISIL would Mexico City was stolen.7 The material tons of TNT. “Little Boy” contained 64 easily be able to accomplish while on on the truck was cobalt-60, which kilograms of uranium-235.11 The process the move in Iraq. emits both beta and gamma radiation. to separate the uranium isotopes during The radioactivity levels that make World War II was accomplished through By definition, the chemical weapons cobalt-60 a source of radiotherapy gaseous diffusion, an extensive process and precursor material stolen from the also make the material a potential that required nearly one-seventh of the al-Muthanna site are already WMD, candidate for use in a dirty bomb.8 The electrical power in the United States at but the current state of the material is radioactive material in Mexico was the time.12 questionable. Even in ideal conditions, rapidly recovered by Mexican security such as those in specially equipped forces and its theft was attributed to Thorium is more abundant than “igloos” that maintain temperature, “common crime and not related to uranium, and like uranium is only humidity, and pressure, chemical terrorism.”9 In Iraq, however, the slightly radioactive. Thorium itself weapons leak as seals decay. Conditions state does not control the nearly 40 is not a fissile material; however, at the al-Muthanna site for the past two kilograms (88 pounds) of uranium decades have been far from ideal. In or 0.125 kilograms (0.28 pounds) of al,” United Nations Security Council, 2014. conjunction with the damage sustained thorium stolen from the University 11 Uranium naturally occurs in three isotopes: uranium- during both Operation Desert Storm of Mosul, and the thieves are part of a 234, uranium-235 and uranium-238. Uranium-235 is the and Operation Iraqi Freedom, as well known terrorist organization.10 fissile (material capable of sustaining nuclear fission) as the inability of the government to isotope (form) of uranium yet composes only one percent rebuild the complex due to United 6 Awad Mustafa, “Experts Assessing ISIL’s Seizure of of the naturally occuring isotopes. To have enough fissile Nations sanctions, it seems likely that Iraqi Weapons Facility,” DefenseNews, July 2, 2014. uranium to form a nuclear weapon, the one percent of the the chemical weapons were stored in 7 Randal C. Archibold and Paulina Villegas, “6 Arrested uranium is separated from the other 99% of the isotopes bunkers that were not temperature or in Theft of Truck with Radioactive Waste,” New York in a complex process commonly referred to as enrich- humidity controlled. Times, December 6, 2013. ment. There are additionally 26 artificially made isotopes 8 A dirty bomb is a combination of radioactive material of uranium. 13 Transmutation is the process of changing from one and explosives such that the radioactive material is dis- 12 This vast amount of energy was required to power the element to another through nuclear bombardment or persed over a large area and exposes a large number of Y-12 where workers used calutrons to refine uranium disintegration. people to its damaging effects. and at the K-25 plant where the uranium was enriched. 14 “Thorium,” World Nuclear Association, March 2014. 9 Archibold and Villegas. At the height of production during World War II, nearly 15 Oliver Tickell, “The Promise and Perils of Thorium,” 10 Ambassador Mohamed Ali Alhakim, “Letter Dated 100,000 workers toiled to produce the material used in James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Octo- 08 July 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan. See Alan Tay- ber 31, 2012. to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-Gener- lor, “The Secret City,” Atlantic, June 25, 2012. 16 Ibid.

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Chemical weapons agents are according to the Institute for Energy of 5% per month at 71 degrees celsius,23 frequently found as liquids and and Environmental Research, the most hence two decades or 240 months in a stored either in ammunition rounds abundant isotope of uranium, U-238, non-environmentally controlled bunker or rockets for immediate use, or in emits both alpha particles and weak would leave little, if any, chemical separate containers. The colligative gamma rays. As a result, as long as agent. The destructiveness of the device properties of the viscous liquid are the isotope is not inhaled or ingested, would be limited to the explosive nature designed to absorb heat and protect there is little to no effect on humans.19 of the device itself and not the remnants the function group of the agent when The risks of thorium exposure and of the chemical weapon agent. the rounds detonate.17 The liquid of radiation poisoning are similar to that a chemical weapon is analogous to a of uranium.20 As long as the materials If the chemical weapons were in better glass of salt water—left in the open, are not ingested or inhaled, there is little condition than assumed, long distance the water will evaporate leaving behind to no increased risk for the population transport of the weapons would be remnants of the original solutes. The since these naturally occurring elements difficult. Seals on the chemical weapons harsh environmental conditions in Iraq are present in everyday life. Both containers would naturally degrade and likely left the chemical weapon rounds elements are also dense. If released into break down, making transport difficult empty with the exception of a residue the air via a dirty bomb, they would and a danger to those moving the immediately covering the rounds. In rapidly resettle to the ground, limiting weapons. If the ISIL sought to transport the absence of the viscous liquid, the the potential for inhalation exposure. the weapons via aircraft, the pressure chemical agents would be subject to change would push the agent through chemical reactions that could potentially Consequently, a dirty bomb laced with whatever seal remained. Transporting make the agent inert. Reconstituting the materials stolen by the ISIL would the weapons via ground would also the chemical agents would require be akin to blowing up a ceramic brick. cause similar problems as the jarring tremendous effort to include tightly The initial explosion would cause transport of a truck along unpaved and controlled laboratory conditions and a damage, but the effects of the radioactive pothole-filled roads would likely cause plethora of reagents. material would be extremely limited.21 the degraded seals to leak, affecting those transporting the weapons. What Are The Potential Uses? Similar to the radioactive dirty bomb, Modifying the radioactive materials an explosive device containing the What Are The Immediate Risks? and chemical weapons into a functional remnants of the chemical weapons from As the fighting continues in Iraq and WMD would require materials, specific the al-Muthanna project site would Syria, the risk of the stolen chemical laboratory conditions, and technical have almost no chemical agent fallout. and radioactive materials being turned expertise currently not available to the Since the viscous protective fluid that into a WMD is extremely low. Perhaps ISIL. Despite ostensibly controlling a is used in chemical weapons has likely the greatest threat to civilians would large swath of land across Iraq, the ISIL evaporated over the past two decades, be if the ISIL attempts to poison or does not possess the infrastructure to any effects of the agent in an explosive contaminate water or food supplies. create WMD using limited resources. device would likely be insignificant.22 To employ such a tactic, the ISIL If the ISIL actively sought to convert VX, for example, decomposes at a rate would need to attack a specific target the materials into a WMD, they would or group since such a method of attack likely smuggle them into Syria where, on a reservoir or large water source despite the ongoing civil war, a greater of a radioactive substance to disintegrate. Uranium, for would simply dilute the material. If the level of expertise and infrastructure— example, has a half-life of 4.45 billion years. For details, material were too diluted, then there especially near the universities—exists. see “Uranium: Its Uses and Hazards,” Institute for En- would be no noticeable effect. It could ergy and Environmental Research, December 2011. cause a higher long-term rate of cancer Immediate uses, however, reside in 19 Ibid. in the affected population, but it would the form of chemical or radioactive 20 “Thorium,” Environmental Protection Agency, Feb- not be debilitating or impact the ISIL’s dirty bombs. A dirty bomb laced with ruary 28, 2014. fight either in Iraq or Syria. radioactive material would not detonate 21 The detonation would cause the brick to fragment like a nuclear weapon; instead, the and then settle back to the ground. The stolen materials The most dangerous course of action unconventional dirty bomb would would act in a similar fashion. The remnants of the chem- is not enveloped in the immediate uses disperse radioactive material over a ical weapons agents would be destroyed in the explosion and risks of the stolen materials. If the detonation area. Moreover, uranium instead of aerosolized. The stolen radioactive materials materials are smuggled out of Iraq and and thorium have relatively long half- would not cause a secondary explosion or radioactive likely into Syria, then the ISIL could lives, which means that the dispersed plume. The dust and pieces of the material generated in begin the slow purification process material would remain radioactive for the explosion would settle and be indistinguishable to the of the radioactive material or attempt 18 a longer period of time. Nevertheless, eye from other debris. to regenerate the deadly properties 22 The chemical weapons potentially stolen from the of the remnants of the chemical 17 The viscous solution contains particles designed to al-Muthanna site are likely highly degraded due to the weapon agents. Reconstituting the alter the boiling point, vapor pressure and other proper- difficulty in maintaining the weapons and the difficulty chemical weapons is scientifically and ties of the solution so that it can absorb heat. The solution in ensuring the proper environment, especially through and its colligative properties are akin to coolant in a car bombings and wars. According to the CIA, the site sus- 23 “Potential Military Chemical / Biological Agents and radiator. tained heavy damage over the years. For more details, see Compounds,” Field Manual 3-11.9, U.S. Army, Marine 18 A half-life is the time required for one half of the atoms “Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex.” Corps, Navy, Air Force, January 2005, pp. II-27

3 july 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 7 technically easier than the radioactive The Islamic Movement foreigners and have no choice.”4 A few material, but still not trivial. Both studies suggest that the IMU’s original require expertise, chemical reagents, of Uzbekistan’s Role in aims and goals have been diluted and and, perhaps most importantly, they Attacks in Pakistan the organization has been dispersed, require time. due to heavy targeting of the IMU’s By Anne Stenersen leadership since 2009.5 The existing Conclusion literature, however, fails to explore the The theft of the radioactive material in the evening hours of June 8, 2014, role played by the IMU in recent high- and chemical weapons agents mostly 10 gunmen attacked the old terminal profile attacks in Pakistan. illustrates the ISIL’s bold aggression of Jinnah International Airport in in the Middle East. Despite raising . They were armed with rifles, This article seeks to fill this gap. It safety concerns and the unsettling rockets, grenades and suicide vests. critically examines claims of the IMU’s notion of the ISIL controlling any They carried backpacks with food and involvement during the Karachi airport components from WMD, the reality is water, indicating they were prepared attack and other high-profile militant that the ISIL’s members put themselves for a long operation. They battled operations against hard targets in at risk of exposure via inhalation with security forces for five hours, set Pakistan. It is based on press reports, and ingestion in the acquisition, buildings ablaze and forced a temporary official statements and the IMU’s storage, and transportation of the shutdown of international air traffic. own propaganda. These sources are material. The psychological effects of The attack left 34 people dead, including often biased, but together they may detonating a dirty bomb laced with the 10 assailants.1 paint a fuller picture than has been either the chemical weapon agents or provided so far.6 The article finds that the radioactive materials would also Tehrik-i- Pakistan (TTP) claimed the strength and cohesiveness of the be minimal since there would be little the attack, but it soon emerged that the IMU in Pakistan tends to be conflated. to no visible evidence of the materials’ Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) The IMU has a small footprint outside presence in those people affected by the had provided the assault team for the of its traditional sanctuary in the blast. operation. Uzbek militants have been Federally Administered Tribal Areas implicated in a string of similar attacks (FATA), and it is dependent on local There are two great lingering concerns in Pakistan, most notably on Mehran networks to operate in places such as regarding the stolen materials. What Naval Base in May 2011, Minhas Airbase Sindh and Punjab. There are so far few is the ISIL planning to do with the at Kamra in August 2012 and indications that IMU officials have been material since their immediate effects Airbase in December 2012.2 This raises involved in masterminding attacks on in Iraq and perhaps Syria are limited? the question of whether the IMU has Pakistani soil. Their role seems limited What other materials are vulnerable in become a strategic asset to the TTP, to recruiting and training suicide either Iraq or Syria that could be used with the capability to strike high-value squads,7 while local commanders from to greater effect? targets in urban centers of Pakistan. the TTP, former Kashmiri networks, or occasionally al-Qa`ida select targets and Radioactive materials such as uranium The IMU’s role in Pakistan has so far timing for attacks. This does not mean and thorium are “dual purpose” in the only been superficially treated in the that the IMU should be dismissed as a sense that they can be used for good in existing literature. Recent studies tend efforts such as medical treatment, or to focus on the potential threat from the 4 Fitz, p. 11; Peter Sinnott, “Peeling the On- for ill in their conversion to a deadly IMU against Central Asia and the West ion: Central Asians in Armed Islamist Movements in unconventional weapon. Assessing after NATO forces leave in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” China and Eurasia Forum 3 and ensuring the security of these 2014. There is general agreement that Quarterly 7:4 (2009): p. 47. materials is paramount, and should be a the IMU keeps supporting Pakistani 5 Ibid.; Matthew Stein, “The Goals of the Islamic Move- concern not only in Iraq and Syria, but militant groups because they are ment of Uzbekistan and its Impact on Central Asia and throughout the region. dependent on the sanctuaries provided the United States,” Foreign Military Studies Office,Janu - to them by the TTP and because “they are ary 2013. Captain Stephen Hummel is a FA52 officer 6 Press reports may not distinguish accurately between and currently serving as an instructor 1 “Karachi Airport Attack Signals Tactical Shift by Tali- the IMU, al-Qa`ida and other militant groups in Pakistan. teaching in the Chemistry and Life Science ban,” Reuters, June 12, 2014. Pakistani authorities may have an interest in conflating Department at the U.S. Military Academy, 2 “TTP Using Uzbeks to Conduct Terrorist Attacks,” The the role of the IMU and other external actors to achieve West Point. CPT Hummel previously News International, December 18, 2012. popular support for military campaigns in FATA. The served in both Iraq and Afghanistan and 3 Luke Falkenburg, “On the Brink: The Resurgence of IMU’s own publications are an invaluable and rather as the USAREUR CBRN plans officer. Militant Islam in Central Asia,” Small Wars & Insurgencies under-exploited source of information, but must be read 24:3 (2013): pp. 375-393; David Witter, “Uzbek Militancy as strategic communication, the aim being to attract new The views presented are those of the author in Pakistan’s Tribal Region,” Institute for the Study of recruits and financing to the organization. and do not necessarily represent the views of War, January 27, 2011; Jacob Zenn, “The Indigenization 7 In this article, suicide squads refer to both suicide the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,” Terrorism Moni- bombers (fighters who wear suicide vests and whoin- or any of its subordinate commands. tor 10:2 (2012); Duncan Fitz, “Central Asian Militancy: A tend to blow themselves up during battle), and “fidayin” Primary Source Examination,” Center for Strategic and (fighters who are not wearing suicide vests, but who International Studies, May 2014; “Pakistan’s ‘Fanatical’ nevertheless expect to die during a confrontation with Uzbek Militants,” BBC, June 11, 2014. security forces).

4 july 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 7 serious threat in the future. The IMU presumably to aircraft.11 This would would signal a dramatic evolution in the has demonstrated its capability to carry follow the pattern of previous attacks IMU’s role and importance in Pakistani out deadly and relatively sophisticated on military bases in Pakistan. In the militancy. While the IMU is known attacks compared with many other attack on Mehran Naval Base in Karachi to provide manpower and training to groups operating in the same theater. in 2011, two P3-C Orion surveillance operations planned by other groups, The IMU’s primary weakness in Pakistan aircraft were destroyed.12 The attack there has so far been little open source is not its lack of capability, but its lack on Minhas Airbase in Punjab in 2012 evidence that they contribute on the of coherent leadership and dependence also resulted in damage to aircraft level of strategic planning. on local networks to operate. worth millions of dollars.13 Moreover, operational planners must have known The allegations about Almani, however, The Karachi Airport Attack that any attack on the airport, even the could not be independently verified. The Karachi airport attack was old terminal, would lead to a temporary The only information in the case comes ambitious, well-planned and relatively shutdown of international air traffic from anonymous sources in the Pakistan well-executed, compared to similar to and from Pakistan’s busiest airport, Army, who stated that Almani was killed attacks claimed by the TTP in the past. causing economic damage and great in an air raid against militant hideouts The attackers entered the airport from embarrassment to the country’s political in North Waziristan Agency on June 15, at least two sides, wearing uniforms leadership. In that sense the attack was 2014.18 It should be noted that the claim and using fake identification cards to a success, although the militants likely about Almani’s death came in the midst pose as Airport Security Force (ASF) hoped for the siege to last longer than of a state-run propaganda campaign to personnel.8 Once inside the airport, five hours. gather popular support for Operation they reportedly operated in pairs.9 The Zarb-e-Azb—a long-awaited, but large number of weapons and other Both the TTP and the IMU issued controversial military operation against equipment found on the dead militants statements claiming responsibility militant hideouts in North Waziristan. speaks to the high ambitions of the for the Karachi airport attack. They The media also could not agree on the attack. were not competing claims—rather, it exact role played by “Almani” (the was presented as a joint operation.14 nickname suggests he is of German The fighting took place in and around The IMU’s statement of responsibility origin)—he was variably described as an old terminal building, which is rarely contained pictures of 10 individuals a “key commander,” “mastermind,” used for civilian air traffic. This led claimed to be the assault team.15 This or “expert on improvised explosive some observers to claim that the attack was supported by eyewitnesses in the devices.”19 had failed because the assailants did not Karachi airport who stated that the manage to reach the civilian passenger attackers looked like Uzbeks or other The IMU has so far not commented on terminal. The original aim of the attack, Central Asians.16 the claim. The only individual in the however, is not known. The TTP’s and IMU known to use the nickname “Abdur the IMU’s own statements about the Who Was The Karachi Mastermind? Rehman” appeared in a propaganda objectives of the attack differ, and in The claim that the IMU provides video about a joint TTP-IMU attack on any case cannot be taken at face value.10 manpower for suicide attacks in prison in April 2012.20 If this is The large number of petrol bombs Afghanistan and Pakistan is not new. the same individual who the Pakistan carried by the militants indicates they More interesting, however, is the Army claimed to have killed on June were going to cause material damage, identity of the mastermind behind the 15, he can hardly be described as a attack. Initially, some Pakistani media “mastermind.” The individual in the 8 Some reports indicated that they were not successful claimed that the mastermind was an video presented himself as a foot soldier in deceiving security guards, and that they therefore had IMU member with the nom de guerre Abu and cameraman in the prison raid, and 17 to enter the airport by force. According to one source, the Abdur Rehman Almani. If true, it did not appear to possess any of the militants raised suspicion because they were wearing the skills necessary to plan high-profile 21 wrong type of shoes. See “Karachi Airport Attack Signals 11 This view was also presented by the interior minister attacks on behalf of the TTP. Tactical Shift by Taliban”; “Assault on Pakistan Airport in a press conference shortly after the attack. See “Seven Signals Taliban’s Reach and Resilience,” New York Times, Bodies Recovered From Karachi Airport’s Cold-Storage ziristan: Sources,” Dawn, June 15, 2014. June 9, 2014; “At Least 18 Killed by Assailants Facility,” Dawn, June 10, 2014. 18 The Pakistan Army’s official statement said that the Who Stormed Karachi Airport,” Washington Post, June 9, 12 “10 Pakistani Troops Killed in Gun Battle at Naval air raid had killed “foreign and local terrorists” who were 2014. Base,” CNN, May 23, 2011. linked to the planning of the Karachi airport attack. See 9 “More Than Two Dozen Dead as Taliban Assault Paki- 13 “Tax-Payers Kept in the Dark about Loss of Plane ibid.; “Press Release No PR123/2014-ISPR,” Inter Ser- stan’s Main Airport,” Reuters, June 9, 2014. Worth $250m,” The News International, February 9, vices Public Relations, June 15, 2014. 10 The TTP said that the goal of the attack was to hijack 2013. 19 “Karachi Airport Attack Mastermind Killed in N Wa- aircraft and hold passengers hostage, while the IMU’s 14 “Statement Regarding the Martyrdom Operation in ziristan: Sources”; “Troops Chasing Panicked Militants statement said that the operation targeted “fighter jets, Karachi Airport”; “Assault on Pakistan Airport Signals in Far and Wide of NW Agency,” Pakistan Observer, June American drones and other military planes” in a special Taliban’s Reach and Resilience.” 19, 2014. section of the airport, and that it did not intend to tar- 15 “Statement Regarding the Martyrdom Operation in 20 “Operation Bannu-Jail,” Jundullah, May 2012. get civilian passengers. See “Statement Regarding the Karachi Airport.” 21 In the video, Abdur Rehman claims that he was not Martyrdom Operation in Karachi Airport,” Jamia Hafsa 16 “As it Happened: Karachi Airport Attack,” BBC, un- informed of the attack plan beforehand. When describ- forum, June 10, 2014; “What’s Behind Karachi Airport dated. ing the attack, he made repeated references to his “com- Attack?” CNN, June 9, 2014. 17 “Karachi Airport Attack Mastermind Killed in N Wa- mander,” indicating that he himself played a subordinate

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Others have suggested that Adnan high-level strategic planner due to his ur-Rehman Lakhvi, the operational Rasheed, a former Pakistani Air Force lack of operational experience, except commander of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LeT) airman who was freed in the Bannu for what he might have gained in FATA and the purported mastermind behind prison break, was the mastermind since his escape in mid-2012. the Mumbai attacks in 2008, had of the Karachi airport attack.22 After extensive guerrilla warfare experience Rasheed’s escape in April 2012, there On the other hand, Rasheed fits dating back to the Afghan-Soviet war.32 were fears that he would plan attacks perfectly into the TTP’s and the for the TTP against Pakistani Air Force IMU’s strategic messaging campaigns. It cannot be ruled out that the IMU bases across the country.23 There were The plight of Muslim prisoners is a might have such candidates among at least two such attacks after Rasheed’s recurrent theme in jihadist militant their ranks. The IMU is known escape—against the Kamra Airbase in propaganda and freeing a relatively to recruit people from Russia and August 2012 and Peshawar Airbase well-known figure like Adnan Rasheed the former Soviet Union.33 It is not in December the same year. Media from jail must be seen as a victory. The unthinkable that their ethnic and speculated that Rasheed was involved IMU did not hesitate to exploit this fact linguistic profile may attract people in both of these attacks.24 This seems in their propaganda. In their highly with a Russian/Soviet Army or even to be based on the assumption that as a publicized video about the Bannu background, as claimed former airman, he must have had insider prison break, Rasheed stated that he by some media reports.34 The IMU’s knowledge of Pakistani Air Force bases. specifically requested the IMU to free military commander Juma Namangani, Rasheed may have contributed with him.28 Yet the IMU’s role in the prison who was killed in Afghanistan advice to operational planners, but break should not be overstated. There in 2001, was himself a former it is questionable how operationally are clear indications that the operation paratrooper in the Soviet Army.35 An valuable his information would be after was planned and largely executed by individual named Eldar Magomedov, an eight-year absence from these bases. local Taliban militants, not by the arrested on terrorism charges in Moreover, the Peshawar Airbase attack IMU. Even the IMU’s own propaganda Spain in 2012, was described as a in 2012 was a tactical failure—hardly acknowledges this fact.29 former Russian special forces soldier testimony to Rasheed’s operational who traveled in Waziristan in 2008- genius, if he was at all involved.25 Adnan Rasheed’s appointment in 2011. He was linked to al-Qa`ida February 2013 as leader of Ansar al- and the Islamic Union, an IMU There is reason to treat claims of Adnan Aseer, a TTP-IMU unit tasked with offshoot.36 It is impossible to confirm, Rasheed’s operational role in the TTP freeing militants from jail, should be however, whether this is a widespread and IMU with some skepticism. Rasheed viewed in the same strategic messaging phenomenon. If the IMU possessed was radicalized while working as an context.30 While he appears to be the such a critical capability, they would airman in the Pakistani Air Force in the perfect public face for such a unit, it does be unlikely to reveal it in official late 1990s. He was arrested in 2003 due not necessarily make him an important propaganda. to his involvement in an assassination strategic planner. attempt against General Pervez An examination of the IMU’s role in Musharraf. From jail, he largely acted The planner of the Karachi airport the Karachi airport attack seems to as an activist and propagandist.26 He attack is more likely to be a person leave more questions than answers, in has continued in this role after his unknown to the public—someone with particular with regards to the strategic release, for example by authoring extensive guerrilla warfare experience planning capacity of the IMU. It is a highly publicized letter to Malala or someone who worked as a special therefore necessary to look at the IMU’s Yousafzai, the schoolgirl who was forces commando in the past. This is a role in other high-profile attacks in shot by the Taliban in Swat in October common characteristic of high-ranking Pakistan. 2012.27 He does not fit the profile of a operational planners who previously worked with Pakistani militants. Ilyas role. Kashmiri, who probably masterminded 22 Amir Mir, “Khaki-Turned-Jihadi Adnan Rasheed the Mehran Naval Base attack in 2011, Masterminded Karachi Attack,” The News International, was a former special forces commando 31 June 11, 2014. trained by the Pakistan Army. Zaki 23 Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari, “Pakistan’s New Most Commando,” The Long War Journal, September 20, Wanted: A Short Sketch of Adnan Rasheed,” Militant nan Rasheed Regrets Assault On Pakistani Teen,” Huff- 2009. Leadership Monitor 3:5 (2012). ington Post, July 17, 2013. 32 Wilson John, The Caliphate’s Soldiers: The Lashkar-e- 24 “Chechen Militants Behind Peshawar Airport At- 28 “Operation Bannu-Jail.” Tayyeba’s Long War (New Delhi: Amaryllis, 2011), p. 144. tack,” Pakistan Today, December 26, 2012 29 The IMU cameraman interviewed in the IMU’s video, 33 See, for example, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbeki- 25 The attack was a tactical failure because the militants Abu Abdurahman, said that the operation was planned stan: The Martyrs of the Year 1431H,” Jamia Hafsa fo- failed to breach the perimeter wall of the base, despite by the ansar (supporters)—a common way for foreign rum, December 25, 2010. having access to several suicide bombers and at least one fighters to refer to local militants. See “Operation Bannu- 34 “Pakistan’s ‘Fanatical’ Uzbek Militants,” BBC, June vehicle-borne improvised explosive device. See “Uzbek Jail.” 11, 2014. Militants Behind Peshawar Airport Attack,” The Nation, 30 , “Taliban, IMU Form Ansar al Aseer to 35 Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Cen- December 17, 2012. Free Jihadist Prisoners,” The Long War Journal, February tral Asia (New Haven: Yale Nota Bene, 2002), p. 138. 26 Bukhari. 5, 2013. 36 “3 Suspected Islamist Terrorists Arrested in France,” 27 “Malala Yousufzai Attack: Taliban Commander Ad- 31 Bill Roggio, “ was a Pakistani Army CNN, March 1, 2013.

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The IMU’s Role in Previous Attacks in On August 16, 2012, nine militants of the TTP. The attack was poorly Pakistan dressed as airmen attacked the Minhas planned and executed, compared with The IMU may have been involved in Airbase at Kamra (PAF Kamra). The the other attacks outlined above. This three key operations claimed by the TTP base is situated in Punjab Province, fits the theory that the assault team during the last five years: the attack on some 50 miles west of . The was from a breakaway faction and not Mehran Naval Base in May 2011, Minhas attack resulted in a two-hour gun battle from the IMU proper.50 Airbase in August 2012 and Peshawar in which two security force members Airbase in December 2012. In all three were killed.42 More importantly, the In sum, there are few patterns cases, media speculated that “Uzbeks” attackers succeeded in destroying with regards to the IMU’s actual or other foreigners had been involved a Saab 2000 aircraft with Airborne involvement in the three attacks. There in the execution of the attack.37 A closer Warning and Control System (AWACS) are indications that Uzbeks or other examination, however, suggests that capability.43 Reports differ with regards Central Asians were indeed part of the there is no clear pattern regarding the to the perpetrators, but most local IMU’s involvement, either on a tactical media as well as official sources stated “It does not appear that or a strategic level. they were Pakistani nationals, rather than Uzbeks.44 Investigation into the the IMU has become an The attack on Mehran Naval Base (PNS incident focused on arresting suspects essential strategic asset Mehran) in Karachi occurred on May in Punjab Province.45 22, 2011. It started in the late evening, to the TTP. The IMU and lasted for around 16 hours. Four On December 15, 2012, there was an continues to have a small attackers entered the base by climbing a attempt to attack Peshawar Airbase. perimeter wall. The ensuing gun battle A group of militants fired rockets at footprint outside its resulted in the deaths of 10 soldiers and the airport, which killed a total of sanctuaries in FATA, and the destruction of two P3-C Orion patrol five people. There was an attempt aircraft.38 While several militant outfits to explode a car bomb, but this they are dependent on local were blamed, it appears, in the end, that apparently failed.46 The attack lasted networks to operate.” it was masterminded by the notorious around three hours.47 In the morning Pakistani militant Ilyas Kashmiri, who after the attack, police carried out a at the time worked with al-Qa`ida and raid on an apartment in Peshawar the banned militant group Harkat-ul- that resulted in the deaths of five assault teams in the Mehran Naval Base Jihad-al-Islam (HUJI).39 Al-Qa`ida’s more militants who were described attack and the Peshawar Airbase attack. media agency al-Sahab later issued a as part of the attack cell.48 Several It is unclear, however, whether these video showing the perpetrators of the sources claimed that the attackers militants belonged to the IMU, fought attack.40 Their real identities were were Russian or Central Asian.49 One under other Central Asian commanders, never revealed but they were described source said that a group led by Abdul or were simply freelancers. The IMU as foreigners or Uzbeks by media and Samad Shishani (the name indicated did not issue any official claims of eyewitnesses. It was later discovered a Chechen background) had carried responsibility in any of the three cases. that the TTP may have provided out the attack, presumably on behalf the attackers with a safe house in The IMU have claimed involvement 41 Karachi. 42 “10 Killed in Pakistani Air Base Attack,” CNN, Au- in other attacks in Pakistan. Their gust 16, 2012; “Taliban Claim Attack on Minhas Base; most publicized claim was their role 37 “TTP Using Uzbeks to Conduct Terrorist Attacks,” Nine Militants Killed,” Dawn, August 16, 2012. in the attack on Bannu prison on April The News International, December 18, 2012; “Chechen 43 “Tax-Payers Kept in the Dark about Loss of Plane 15, 2012, in which several hundred Militants Behind Peshawar Airport Attack”; Jacob Zenn, Worth $250m.” inmates were freed. As noted above, it “The Growing Alliance Between Uzbek Extremists and 44 “Pakistani Military Improve Security, Observers is questionable whether the IMU played the Pakistani Taliban,” Terrorism Monitor 11:5 (2013). Say,” Central Asia Online, August 29, 2012; “Kamra At- a leading role in the attack. It was likely 38 “10 Pakistani Troops Killed in Gun Battle at Naval tack: 3 Attackers Identified, PCNS Told,” Express Tri- planned by militants from the Mehsud 51 Base,” CNN, May 23, 2011. bune, September 7, 2012; “All Terrorists in Kamra Attack faction of the TTP. Another attack 39 “Al-Qaeda Had Warned of Pakistan Strike,” Asia Were Pakistanis: Malik,” The News International, August often attributed to the IMU is the attack Times Online, May 27, 2011. 19, 2012. on the Dera prison in 52 40 “New Al-Qaeda Video Urges Rebellion In Pakistani 45 “Kamra Airbase Attack Suspects Picked Up,” Dawn, 2013. The two prison breaks had many Army, Reiterates: Dr. Warren Weinstein Kidnapped to September 26, 2012. similarities. Both attacks were carried Secure Release of Dr. ,” Middle East Me- 46 “Uzbek Militants Behind Peshawar Airport Attack,” out by a large group of fighters (more dia Research Institute, March 13, 2012. Some reports also The Nation, December 17, 2012. than 100) and succeeded in freeing suggest that al-Qa`ida’s Saif al-Adl was involved in the 47 “5 Militants Wanted in Fatal Airport Attack Killed in attack: “Pakistan: Involvement of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in Pakistan Police Raid,” CNN, December 17, 2012. 50 “Chechen Militants Behind Peshawar Airport At- Mehran Naval Base Attack Suspected,” Karachi Ummat, 48 “Assault on PAF Base Peshawar: Six of 10 Attackers tack.” May 25, 2011. Were Foreigners, PA Told,” Dawn, December 18, 2012; 51 Bill Roggio, “Pakistani Taliban Release Video of Ban- 41 “Woman Confesses to Involvement in Mehran Base “Heretics Liable to be Slain, Says Note Found on Mili- nu Jailbreak,” The Long War Journal, May 17, 2012. Attack,” Dawn, December 14, 2011; “Punjabi Taliban Be- tant’s Body,” Dawn, December 18, 2012. 52 Sarah Khan, “Taliban’s Attack on D.I.Khan Prison hind Major Attacks,” The News International, December 49 “Heretics Liable to be Slain, Says Note Found on Mili- Was Not Possible Without Pakistan Army’s Conniv- 15, 2011. tant’s Body.” ance,” Let Us Build Pakistan blog, August 2, 2013.

7 july 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 7 hundreds of prisoners. The jailbreaks Switzerland possesses an adequate legal appeared well-planned, suggesting that Swiss Foreign Fighters framework to mitigate this threat. the operational planners had access to Active in Syria insider information. The assault group A Small, Underdeveloped Scene was divided into several teams, each By Daniel Glaus and Lorenzo Vidino Throughout the 1990s, small networks with their specialized task. It is possible of mostly North African militants used that the IMU participated in the attacks, switzerland has traditionally Swiss territory to raise funds, spread performing one or several specialized experienced little domestic jihadist propaganda and provide other support functions. Due to the large participation activity. Unlike other Western European activities to organizations operating of local fighters, however, it is unlikely countries, no successful terrorist outside of Europe.3 The largely laissez- that they played an overall planning or attack of jihadist inspiration has been faire attitude of Swiss authorities coordinating role. perpetrated on its territory and there (an approach, it should be noted, not is no publicly available information dissimilar to that of most European Conclusion indicating that concrete plans for an countries at the time) and convenient It does not appear that the IMU has attack in Switzerland were ever made.1 geographic position at the heart of become an essential strategic asset to Less than a dozen individuals have been Europe made the country an ideal the TTP. The IMU continues to have a tried for terrorism-related crimes, all of permanent or temporary location for small footprint outside its sanctuaries in them involving non-violent activities of jihadists. FATA, and they are dependent on local material support and propaganda. The networks to operate. The IMU continues number of Swiss residents who have The attacks of September 11, 2001, to be a fragmented organization, traveled abroad to join jihadist groups is changed the Swiss government’s operating as a loose network of also estimated to be significantly lower approach toward jihadist networks. criminals, urban terrorist cells and than in other European countries. While still correctly assessing that religiously motivated insurgents. While Switzerland was not a likely target for the IMU has some strategic value to the Yet Swiss authorities are not attacks and did not have a large jihadist TTP, it would be wrong to view the IMU complacent, and they argue that presence, authorities began to monitor as a potent threat to Pakistani national “Switzerland is not an island.”2 jihadist activities in the country more security. Counterterrorism officials have closely and, in some cases, took action.4 consistently warned that there is Yet throughout the mid-2000s, Swiss The IMU in Pakistan, however, ample evidence suggesting that some authorities experienced difficulties should not be dismissed. The IMU are of the same radicalization trends with successfully bringing terrorism vehemently opposed to negotiations that have long characterized other charges against members of networks with the Pakistani government. They are Western European countries also exist they suspected to be funding various willing to support groups in Pakistan in Switzerland, albeit on a smaller scale. terrorist groups through petty crime.5 who do not follow “mainstream” Recent developments, for example, Given the challenge of bringing charges militancy, such as the TTP or other indicate that a small contingent of Swiss against them for any terrorism-related breakaway factions. In spite of being citizens and residents have traveled to offense, Swiss authorities often opted heavily targeted in recent years, the Syria to join various militant groups. to charge them with regular criminal IMU has the potential to re-emerge in offenses or, more frequently, deported the region after NATO withdraws from This article first provides a general them.6 Afghanistan in 2014. Moreover, the overview of the jihadist scene in

Karachi airport attack demonstrated Switzerland. It then analyzes a 3 “DAP Annual Report,” Swiss Service for Analysis and that the IMU has the potential to act as number of known cases of Swiss-based Prevention, 2002, p. 38. a spoiler in future peace processes in individuals who have fought in Syria. 4 Ibid. Pakistan. The article finds that, as authorities 5 The first such case was the so-called “affaire Saoud,” have long claimed, a comparatively an operation triggered by the discovery that various Anne Stenersen, Ph.D., is a Research small but, by Swiss standards, Swiss phone numbers had been in possession of one of Fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research alarmingly large number of citizens the masterminds of the May 12, 2003, bombings in Ri- Establishment (FFI) in Norway. and residents have recently traveled yadh, Saudi Arabia. Swiss authorities subsequently to Syria. These subjects appear to be uncovered a sophisticated document-forging network mostly “homegrown,” with a sizeable led by a Biel-based Yemeni businessman that smuggled percentage of them tracing their roots into Switzerland illegal immigrants including, it was sus- to the Balkans. It is debatable whether pected, terrorists. Yet the terrorism charges against the network largely fell apart in court, and the members of 1 Potentially the only exception could be the plans dis- the network were only convicted for minor illegal immi- cussed by a cluster of Swiss-based North African mili- gration violations. See “Summary of Legal Proceedings,” tants to attack Israeli El Al aircraft at Zurich airport in Dossier SK.2006.15, Federal Criminal Tribunal, Bellin- 2005. The militants reportedly conducted surveillance of zona, 2006. the airport, but it is debatable whether their preliminary 6 That was the case, for example, with a network of activities could be qualified as a plot. North African militants involved in theft to fund the 2 Christiane Imsand, “La Suisse n’Est pas une Ile,” Le Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) and Nouvelliste, June 22, 2012. suspected of potentially planning to blow up an El Al

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The only exception is the conviction of in which online social networks were groups and recruiters with roots in the Moez Garsallaoui and Malika el-Aroud in their infancy, their sites played a Middle East (Kurdish Ansar al-Islam,13 in 2007.7 Garsallaoui was a Tunisian- crucial role in connecting like-minded Turkish Hizb Allah14), East Africa born member of Hizb al-Tahrir who French-speaking individuals, spawning (al-Shabab) and North Africa have a received asylum in Switzerland in an informal community of militants presence in the country. Clusters of 1997. He met el-Aroud, the widow of that has operational implications homegrown activists sympathizing today, almost 10 years after the pair’s with jihadist or militant Salafist “In May 2014, the Swiss demise.10 ideology are active in Switzerland, often organizing events throughout the intelligence agency publicly By the late 2000s, Swiss authorities country and frequenting online jihadist stated that it believes that began to observe that an increasing forums and social media.15 number of terrorism-related activities up to 15 Swiss residents involved individuals who were either Despite these actions, the number of have gone to Syria to fight, born or at least had grown up in the Swiss-based jihadist sympathizers country, replicating the homegrown and the intensity of their activities although it could only dynamic seen throughout Europe. This are substantially smaller than in confirm five cases.” phenomenon gained the attention of the most Western European countries, Swiss public with the case of Majd N., including those with a comparably a 19-year-old high school student from sized population. The Swiss “mini- Biel who was arrested in May 2012 in scene” is also split along linguistic Abdessatar Dahmane—the al-Qa`ida Kenya and accused of having fought lines, as French- and German-speaking militant who killed Afghan Northern with the al-Qa`ida-linked al-Shabab.11 militants do not seem to frequently Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud interact with one another.16 Rather, two days before the September 11, 2001, The case reinforced the argument each milieu draws inspiration from attacks—in a chat room.8 After getting long made by Swiss authorities that the more developed scenes in France married, the two began running various Switzerland is “not an island,” but and Germany. Swiss-based activists jihadist websites out of an apartment rather experiences radicalization seeking to develop their intellectual near Fribourg.9 Operating in an era dynamics similar to those of or operational involvement, in fact, neighboring countries, just on a often travel to other countries or invite 12 airliner in Zurich. See Sebastian Rotella, “Theft, Fraud significantly lower scale. Structured foreign personalities to Switzerland. in Europe Fund Terrorist Group, Police Say,” Los Angeles The radicalizing elements from , April 1, 2007; Sylvain Besson, “Cellule Terroriste 10 Several individuals who met through the sites created en Suisse: Le Parcours d’un Delinquant Devenu Islamiste by el-Aroud and Garsallaoui have been involved in ter- ence: 1) lack of an “infecting cluster”: Switzerland never Radical,” Le Temps, July 3, 2006; “DAP Annual Report,” rorist activities during the last 10 years. In several cases, hosted an openly jihadist mosque or high profile jihad- Swiss Service for Analysis and Prevention, 2007, p. 16; their mobilization took place through connections first ists, elements that in other countries have been crucial in “Swiss Deport Last Suspect Held in Plot to Blow up Is- made on said sites. For an Italian example, see Lorenzo spreading jihadist ideology; 2) good degree of social, eco- raeli Airliner,” , July 16, 2007. Vidino, Home-Grown in Italy: Birth, Development nomic and cultural integration of most Muslims living in 7 The couple did not serve time in Switzerland and and Radicalization Dynamics (Milan: Istituto per gli studi Switzerland, rendering them more resilient to extremist moved to Belgium, where they were soon charged with di politica internazionale, 2014), p. 52. For connections in narratives; 3) demographic characteristics of the Swiss recruiting local young Muslims to travel to Pakistan. the French-speaking world, see Sylvain Besson, “Fin de Muslim population: some 80% to 90% of Swiss Muslims In the subsequent trial, a Belgian court sentenced both Parcours pour Garsalloui, ex-Refugie en Suisse Tue par trace their origins to the Balkans or Turkey, where the el-Aroud and Garsallaoui to eight years for recruiting un Drone,” Le Temps, October 18, 2012; Benjamin Ducol, vast majority of Muslims traditionally espouse forms of for al-Qa`ida, although the latter only in absentia as he “Uncovering the French-speaking Jihadisphere: An Ex- Islam that are more tolerant and apolitical; 4) Switzer- had managed to flee the country before Belgian authori- ploratory Analysis,” Media, War & Conflict 5:1 (2012). land’s foreign policy, whose largely neutral stance does ties could swoop in. Garsallaoui continued his activities 11 Daniel Glaus and Marie Maurisse, “La Descente aux not provide a source of grievances. While these concur- from the tribal areas of Pakistan. In 2008, he published Enfers de Majd N., le Biennois Apprenti Terroriste,” Le rently operating factors can potentially explain the low an open letter inviting Swiss people, government and se- Matin Dimanche, November 18, 2012; Daniel Glaus and levels of jihadist radicalization in Switzerland, none of curity forces to convert to Islam, and threatening revenge Marie Maurisse, “Le Dangereux Voyage de Majd pour them is a guarantee. Each, in fact, presents weaknesses against them. He also became involved in Jund al-Khilafa Devenir Combattant Islamiste,” Le Matin Dimanche, No- and exceptions. and other jihadist groups operating in the Pakistani tribal vember 25, 2012; Quand Al Qaida Recrute en Suisse, RTS, 13 “DAP Annual Report,” Swiss Service for Analysis and areas, providing training in various weapons, bombmak- November 8, 2012; Samuel Jaberg, “Un aller sans Retour Prevention, 2005, p. 31; “DAP Annual Report,” Swiss ing, document forging and use of the internet. Thanks to pour la Guerre Sainte,” Swissinfo, July 4, 2012; “Un Gym- Service for Analysis and Prevention, 2006, p. 31. his skills, Garsallaoui became one of the top trainers and nasien de Bienne Inculpe pour Liens avec les Shebab,” Le 14 Martin Stoll, “Geheimdienst observiert Basler Mo- handlers for recruits coming from the West and particu- Temps, March 25, 2004; “Abu Sa’ad al-Urduni or the Im- schee,” Sonntagszeitung, September 2, 2012. larly from the French-speaking world. According to var- probable Matches - Episode II,” Geneva Centre for Train- 15 Lorenzo Vidino, Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland ious French media reports, Mohammed Merah had been ing and Analysis of Terrorism, December 5, 2011. (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2013). one of his recruits. Garsallaoui was killed in a U.S. drone 12 As in any other Western European country, radi- 16 These details are based on the monitoring of online strike in October 2012. calization by jihadist inspiration seems to affect only social media activities of Swiss Salafists carried out by 8 “L’Islamiste Refugie a Fribourg Tue par un Drone au a statistically marginal segment of the Swiss Muslim both authors independently since June 2012. This analy- Pakistan,” Le Temps, October 18, 2012. population. But radicalization in Switzerland appears to sis has been confirmed by interviews with officials in the 9 “Summary of Legal Proceedings,” Dossier SK.2007.4, be a limited phenomenon also when compared to other Swiss Federal Intelligence Service (NDB) and the Swiss Federal Criminal Tribunal, Bellinzona, 2006. European countries. Four factors can explain this differ- Federal Police.

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Balkans are particularly influential— day he obtained his license, he posted After nearly three months of silence, an area to which some 60% of Swiss a message saying: “If all things are Mathieu resurfaced online on March 16, Muslims trace their roots.17 destroyed…there still is The Creator of 2014.26 Back in Switzerland, he gave an all things. We do not need anything else anonymous interview to Swiss national Swiss Foreign Fighters in Syria but Allah, he is our best guarantor.”22 television station RTS in which he In May 2014, the Swiss intelligence Days later, he left France for Turkey claimed to regret his decision to travel agency Nachrichtendienst des Bundes to Syria.27 “At the time, for me it was (Federal Intelligence Service, NDB) a legitimate jihad, to fight against the publicly stated that it believed that “Clusters of homegrown regime of Bashar who used chemical up to 15 Swiss residents have gone to activists sympathizing weapons to massacre his people,” he fight in Syria, although it could only explained. He recounted how he lodged confirm five cases. Of those five, stated with jihadist or militant in a house with “80 to 150 jihadists” NDB Director Markus Seiler, one has Salafist ideology are in which “the upper floor was for the returned and two have died.18 These future fighters, the ground floor for numbers are smaller than for most active in Switzerland, those who wished to blow themselves European countries, even in relative often organizing events up. They were about 15, did not get terms. Yet they constitute a disturbing military training and were treated trend for Switzerland, as they are higher throughout the country better.”28 Mathieu did not specify than any comparable mobilization the and frequenting online which group ran the house and claimed country has witnessed in the past. not to be involved in any fighting. An jihadist forums and social investigation on Mathieu has reportedly One of the confirmed cases is that of media.” been opened, but no charges have yet Mathieu, a 29-year-old convert from been filed against him.29 He appears to a prominent Catholic family from be continuing his paragliding activities Lausanne. In his early 20s, Mathieu in the Alps.30 worked odd jobs and developed a keen with two fellow aspiring jihadists, interest in paragliding. In 2012, he one of whom was a 17-year-old French A bloody incident on March 20, 2014, unsuccessfully ran for elections in the citizen of North African descent whose brought to light the case of another small municipality in the Valais canton smartphone was tracked to Turkey.23 jihadist fighting in Syria with Swiss where he lived in a small chalet.19 In On December 21, he wrote his parents links. Three individuals linked to the May 2013, he converted to Islam at a an e-mail with the telling subject line Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant local mosque, and by early fall he was “New life. Hard news for you. Terribly (ISIL)31 responded to a routine security chatting via Facebook with individuals sorry.”24 In the e-mail, he stated that check by Turkish authorities near the apparently belonging to armed Islamist “in order to best follow Allah’s path, I Hatay border crossing by opening fire groups in Syria. have decided, because I feel able to both and throwing a hand grenade, killing physically…and mentally (even though I a policeman, a non-commissioned In lightning speed evolution from know it won’t be easy always), to leave gendarmerie officer and a truck new convert to aspiring jihadist, by to accomplish the jihad in Syria.”25 driver.32 One of the three attackers who early December 2013 Mathieu told had crossed from Syria and was heading

Facebook contacts that he was planning 22 Ibid. The original reads: “Si toute chose et détruite…Il to Istanbul was Cendrim, a native of 20 to soon leave for Syria. He went to reste Le Créateur de toute chose. Allah nous suffit il est notre Kosovo who had moved at the age of neighboring France and took a test to meilleure garant.” The post was accompanied by a pic- pilot Ultra-Light Motorized Airplanes ture showing a bearded and apparently screaming man ment (bien que je sais que ce ne sera pas facile tous les jours !), 21 (ULM) on December 18. On the same standing in front of a heavily destroyed and burning de partir pour accomplir le Jihad en Syrie.” house stretching his arms to the sky. 26 Glaus and Haederli. 17 Dialogue avec la Population Musulmane 2010 (Bern: 23 Ibid. On December 21, 2013, Mathieu wrote his par- 27 There are indications that he crossed the border in Federal Department of Justice and Police, 2011), p. 29. ents that he had parked his vehicle by Lyon’s airport, Akçakale and was stopped by Turkish authorities. It 18 “NDB Annual Press Conference,” Swiss Federal Intel- where they could pick it up. He also wrote: “I am about to does not appear that he was expelled from Turkey, but ligence Service, May 15, 2014. return to Syria, traveling with two French brothers and that he returned to Switzerland voluntarily. 19 Daniel Glaus and Alexandre Haederli, “Vom Chalet in others who arrived last night. I have many contacts with 28 19.30 le Journal, Radio Television Suisse Romande, den Jihad,” SonntagsZeitung, April 6, 2014. French jihadists who are already in Syria and who will April 4, 2014. 20 Ibid. The authors were able to save most of Mathieu’s facilitate our arrival!” (“Je suis actuellement sur le point de 29 E-Mail Statement by Spokesperson of the Office of the Facebook interactions before he erased the more incrimi- rentrer en Syrie, voyageant donc avec deux frères français, et Attorney General (OAG), April 2, 2014. nating content. One former Facebook friend confirmed d’autres arrivés hier soir. J’ai beaucoup de contacts avec des 30 These pictures were posted on his Facebook page. Mathieu mentioned “fighting in Syria.” djihadistes français déjà en Syrie, qui nous faciliteront notre Apparently he moved from his chalet in Lower Valais 21 Ibid. Mathieu wrote his parents: “I took my ULM arrivée”). See also: “Jihad en Syrie: l’inquétante dispari- back to his parents’ address in Lausanne. The website of exam in Lyon on Wednesday and it went well” (“Je me tion de Brahim, 17 ans,” Le Parisien, January 18, 2014. his paragliding instruction company is still online. suis rendu à mon examen ULM à Lyon mercredi, qui s’est bien 24 Ibid. The subject line in French read: “Nouvelle vie. 31 In June 2014, the ISIL shortened its name to the “Is- passé”). Pictures published on his Facebook page indicate Dure nouvelle pour vous. Milles excuses.” lamic State.” This article, however, still refers to the he trained on a Zodiac 650-type ULM with a maximum 25 Original text: “De plus, toujours pour suivre au mieux le group by its more common name, the ISIL. speed of 260 km/h. There are no indications that his chemin d’Allah, j’ai décidé, car je m’en estime capable, tant 32 “Syria Back on Turkey’s Agenda,” al-Monitor, March training with ULM was related to his militant interests. physiquement [ma hanche va vraiment mieux !] que mentale- 21, 2014.

10 july 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 7 seven to Brugg, in canton Aargau.33 militants who call themselves “Team From a young age, Cendrim engaged in of Shock.”39 Reportedly a naturalized Dutch Foreign Fighters various criminal activities, including Swiss citizen of North African descent Continue to Travel to Syria armed robbery and assault. In 2011, from canton Vaud, Suleyman told one he was imprisoned for 24 months and, of the authors that he was “the official By Samar Batrawi and Ilona Chmoun upon release, deported to Kosovo.34 recruiter of Al-Qa`ida in Switzerland.” Some reports indicate that Cendrim’s He asked for money to further elaborate as the war in syria continues, the radicalization might have begun during on this claim—something the author Netherlands faces a number of his incarceration.35 In June 2013, shortly declined.40 challenges in monitoring Dutch foreign after his deportation to Kosovo, he fighters. In a worrying note published traveled to Syria, where he reportedly Conclusion in June 2014 by the Dutch General joined the ISIL.36 The number of Swiss jihadists in Syria Intelligence and Security Service is small when compared to most other (AIVD), the agency claimed that budget Another Swiss-based individual who European countries, including those cuts paired with “new dynamics” in apparently joined the ISIL in Syria is with a similarly sized population. the jihadist movement have triggered Valdes, a 33-year-old from the town of Yet the presence of an undetermined a serious capacity crisis.1 The AIVD Kriens, near Luzern.37 Valdes married number of its citizens and residents teams in charge of tracking jihadists into a family that plays a central role fighting in Syria is a relatively new are barely coping with the workload, in the Bosnian Islamist networks in phenomenon for Switzerland. It and additional planned budget cuts Switzerland. His wife is an activist demonstrates that Switzerland suffers will reportedly force the agency to drop for various Islamist causes, and his from radicalization dynamics similar several of these teams. Nevertheless, father-in-law is well-known for his to its neighbors, albeit on a smaller the dynamics of the radicalization connections to militants in Bosnia.38 scale. and recruitment of jihadists in the Until April 2014, Valdes was highly Netherlands are continuously evolving. active on Facebook, posting pictures Moreover, the issue of foreign fighters apparently from Syria before deleting might be particularly problematic for This article addresses recent his profile. Switzerland, whose legislation does not developments among the Dutch foreign possess extensive and precise provisions fighter contingent in Syria. It examines A six-month-long monitoring of the covering the phenomenon. As of July a manifesto that describes the motives online jihadist sympathizer scene 2014, Swiss authorities have not filed and goals of the Dutch fighters, reviews in Switzerland carried out by Swiss any criminal cases against individuals these fighters’ visibility on social media weeklies SonntagsZeitung and Le Matin suspected of having fought in Syria, and profiles two of them, and concludes Dimanche revealed the existence of including in a case like Mathieu’s in with an analysis of the measures taken other individuals apparently fighting which evidence of his ties to jihadist by the Dutch government. It finds that in Syria who seem to be Swiss citizens activity is strong. the visibility of and popular concern or residents, but whose real identities surrounding Dutch jihadists in Syria cannot be fully verified. Many of Daniel Glaus is a reporter for the Swiss has increased, while the government’s them appear to have an Albanian or weeklies SonntagsZeitung/Le Matin response remains tepid. Bosnian background. Several of the Dimanche. apparent Swiss jihadists use their The Dutch Foreign Fighter Manifesto home country as part of their kunya, Lorenzo Vidino, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow Through social media, the Dutch press calling themselves “al-Suisri” or at the Center for Security Studies, ETH and information released by Dutch “As-Swissry.” An individual calling Zurich. authorities, the authors have identified himself Abou Suleyman Suissery is 37 Dutch individuals who have fought in tagged in a photo smiling and holding Syria. This means that an additional 17 a gun in the company of other armed people have been identified since October 2013,2 including three women and two 3 33 “Radikalisiert durch Balkan-Prediger,” SonntagsZei- minors. The general composition of the tung, March 30, 2014. 17 newly identified fighters does not 34 “Aargau muss Genugtuung an Dschihadisten zahl- differ significantly from the 20 fighters en,” Schweizer Radio und Fernsehen, May 14, 2014. 35 “Reaktionen zum Brugger Terroristen Cendrim R.” 1 “New dynamics” refers to the shift from forums and Solothurner Zeitung, March 30, 2014; “Der gewalttätige preachers to the more dynamic platform of social media Gotteskrieger aus Brugg,” Tages-Anzeiger/Der Bund, as the foundation of homegrown radicalization. For more March 27, 2014; “Er war renitent und unzufrieden,“ 39 These details are based on the authors’ analysis of details, see “Veiligheidsdienst AIVD verliest zicht op es- Blick, March 31, 2014. Facebook pages. Originally published in French, the calerend jihadisme,” NRC Handelsblad, June 20, 2014. 36 “Der gewalttätige Gotteskrieger aus Brugg,” Tages- photo caption read, “L’équipe de choc... un renouveau et 2 See the author’s previous article on the Dutch foreign Anzeiger/Der Bund, March 27, 2014. un nouveau départbi idhnillah.” It was published on April fighter contingent in Syria: Samar Batrawi, “The Dutch 37 These details are based on the authors’ analysis of 11, 2014, by a French jihadist (also tagged as being in the Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria,” CTC Sentinel 6:10 Valdes’ Facebook account in 2013 and 2014. picture). (2013). 38 Daniel Glaus and Ursula Zenger, “Im Netzwerk des 40 This conversation occurred in a Facebook chat with 3 For the full interview, see www.eenopeen.incontxt.nl/ Attentäters,” SonntagsZeitung, November 20, 2011. the author on March 30, 2014. seizoenen/2014/afleveringen/10-04-2014.

11 july 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 7 identified in the CTC Sentinel in October among others, Abu Fidaa’, the man Social Media Presence 2013. The main component is Dutch- who called himself the spokesperson of Dutch fighters have become more Moroccan, while other backgrounds Dutch jihadists in Syria until his death visible in social media and in the Dutch include Turkish, Iraqi, Kurdish, the in November 2013.12 The book opened press, especially those who joined the Balkans, and at least one person with a with a rejection of Western capitalism. ranks of the Islamic State in Iraq and Somali background. Among these names Happiness, the manifesto stated, is the Levant (ISIL).13 The ISIL and its are two Dutch converts: Anwar Abu merely a paradoxical illusion, as the rate Dutch fighters also seem to be slightly Ibrahiem al-Rumi4 from the Hague, and of suicides, prisoners and childhood more active than the al-Qa`ida affiliate Victor D. “Zakaria al-Holandi”5 from depression is higher in the West than Jabhat al-Nusra in spreading Dutch- Heeten, both of whom are in Aleppo. anywhere else. Islam is presented as the language propaganda.14 As part of The average age of the additional 17 solution to these problems, but also as this larger charm offensive, a group fighters based on the authors’ dataset the solution to the moral bankruptcy of Dutch jihadists under the name is 22-years-old. Most of the fighters are and double standards of the West, of “Fighting Journalists” uploaded a from the Hague, Zoetermeer, Delft and exemplified by U.S. school shootings, promotional video on YouTube titled Arnhem. According to an AIVD report, the abuse at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Oh Oh Aleppo Spookstad on June 24, which out of a total of 100-150 Dutch jihadists Ghurayb, and the general mistreatment was distributed on the popular Dutch in Syria,6 two have committed suicide of women. jihadist hubs De Ware Religie and attacks in Syria and Iraq7; twelve Dutch Shaam Al Ghareeba. In the video, fighters have died in Syria8; and at The next chapters discussed recent jihadists walked through the rubble of least 30 fighters9 have returned to the political events, which have, in the Aleppo, and spoke to the viewers while Netherlands. Approximately 20 Dutch eyes of the authors, deprived Muslims women10 are currently in Syria, most of Islamic law. The book claimed that “The ISIL and its Dutch of whom are thought to have followed Western countries, spearheaded by their husbands to the battlefield. the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), fighters also seem to be have given the tacit U.S. ally Bashar al- slightly more active than In October 2013, a 150-page manifesto Assad the green light to kill Muslims called De Banier11 was published by, using any means necessary. As the the al-Qa`ida affiliate resistance against al-Assad can mainly Jabhat al-Nusra in be ascribed to foreign fighters and 4 Anwar Abu Ibrahiem al-Rumi is a Dutch convert from spreading Dutch-language the Hague fighting with the ISIL who posts a mix of Ara- Syrian mujahidin, the authors claimed bic and Dutch information on his Facebook page, where that they are the fighters on which propaganda.” a picture of him is shown with another Dutch ISIL fighter the Syrian people can rely. Based on a from the Hague called Abou Hatim La Haye. In Dutch- collection of ahadith (Islamic scriptures), language comments on several pictures, friends call them the authors expect the Syrian conflict “the lions of the umma from the Hagueistan.” For more to become a legendary, decisive war shooting from and being shot at in an details, see www.facebook.com/abu.ibrahiem.96. that might trigger a third World War. abandoned apartment. The overtone of 5 Abdelkarim honing - Interview met Zakariya al Hollandi An alternative to Western democracy is the video seemed to be both opposition deel 1, April 2, 2013, available at www.youtube.com/ presented in a 13-point chapter, which to the Syrian Arab Army, described watch?v=QjK_j3OrjCc. included topics like economic stability, as inhumane slaughterers, and the 6 “Ruim 100 Nederlandse jihadstrijders zijn naar Syrië freedom of religion and women’s persuasion that jihad in Syria is worth gereisd,” Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau, July 27, rights, all of them based on traditional the effort. On the former, the jihadists 2014. Islamic principles. The overtone of this repeatedly expressed their anger 7 “Annual Report 2013,” Dutch General Intelligence and alternative is the return of society to the and frustration at Muslims getting Security Service, 2013. early days of Islam, opposing not only killed by al-Assad while the Muslim 8 These twelve are: Mourad M. (21-years-old) from Delft; Shi`a Muslims, but “corrupted” and society remained inactive. Jihadists, Soufian E. (20) from Delft; Yasine B. (23) from Zoeter- status quo Sunnis as well. they argued, are the protectors of the meer; Choukri M. (26) from Delft (Mourad’s older broth- innocent. On the latter point, they gave er); Saddek S. (26); Ibrahim A.; Soufian H. (19) from the the impression of a close, brotherly Hague; Abu Fidaa’ (also known as Abu Jandal) (26) from community of jihadists who support 15 Delft; Moerad Ö. (“Ibrahim the Turk”) from the Hague; each other when under fire. Abu Obayda al-Holandi; Abu Hamza; and Abu Usama al-Holandi al-Maghribi from the Hague. 13 In June 2014, the ISIL shortened its name to the “Is- 9 According to the AIVD, as quoted in: “Primeur: jihadist ist Liberalism; 2) Neocolonial Despotism; 3) The Legend- lamic State.” This article, however, still refers to the gepakt na reis naar Syrië,” De Volkskrant, April 29, 2014. ary Conflict; 4) The Shifting Balance of Power; 5) The Fu- group by its more common name, the ISIL. 10 The Dutch newspaper Trouw interviewed Fatima’s fa- ture Alternative; 6) The Ethical Fundament; and 7) The 14 This text can be found on the picture at www.face- ther in March 2014, who expressed great concern about Ideological Front. book.com/photo.php?fbid=247442092112391&set=a.10 Fatima’s sister who wanted to follow her sister to Syria. 12 Abu Fidaa’ was the spokesperson whose interview 6652169524718.1073741828.100005398058758&type=1 For the interview, see Perdiep Ramesar, “‘Had ik Fatima with the Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant was quoted in &theater. maar thuis gehouden,’” Trouw, March 4, 2014. Batrawi. He was a 26-year-old Dutch businessman from 15 The full version of the controversial video that shows 11 An online PDF copy of De Banier can be found at www. Delft. His death was announced by the radical Dutch a glimpse into the lives of Dutch jihadists in Syria is alminara.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/de-banier3.pdf. website De Ware Religie and later confirmed by his fam- called Oh Oh Aleppo de Spookstad (Oh Oh Aleppo the The document is divided into seven chapters: 1) Capital- ily. Ghost Town), a reference to the popular Dutch song

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This interactive approach became all locking the door to his room and ceased Profile II: Robbin, the Returned Convert19 the more evident in an announced attending the family’s mosque, saying Robbin van D., at 18-years-old, found questions and answers session via it was full of infidels. His father tried Islam through his Muslim friends in YouTube published on June 26, 2014, to take him to different imams and gave Arnhem, but gradually started to take in which viewers could have their him names of Muslim scholars who could an interest in more radical Muslim questions answered by fighters in benefit Ashraf, but his son refused any figures such as Malcolm X. He struggled Syria. The aim of this session was dialogue. Farid also tried to connect his to decide what he wanted to do with to debunk the image of the fighters son with an Islamic psychologist, but his life. He rapped a lot with his friend that counterterrorism experts have Ashraf never showed up to meetings. painted.16 Ashraf became so estranged from his “On June 20, the city of Profile I: Ashraf, the Underage Fighter17 father that he started calling him an the Hague allowed a pro- Ashraf, a 16-year-old Dutch-Moroccan infidel and a devil. One day, Farid boy, became known to the Dutch public noticed a bearded man in a car waiting ISIL demonstration to take after his father held an emotional plea outside his house. Farid wanted to know place because it saw ‘no on Dutch television. His father, Farid, who was influencing his son and started was open about the process that resulted following him. He followed Ashraf to a ground’ to prevent it—even in his son’s travel to Syria in December house where a group of people gathered though the ISIL is listed as 2013. Ashraf’s doctor, his school youth on a regular basis. After the first gathering, his son exited the house with a terrorist organization by the same bearded man that Farid had the United Nations.” “On March 28, 2014, Ashraf seen outside their home. Farid notified was online in Turkey, near the police of this address immediately. He confronted the man, who insisted the Syrian border, where they were only discussing some verses Marouane, another Dutch fighter in his father suspects he from the Qur’an. Syria. He stopped seeing his non-Muslim friends after he converted to Islam, received training before Ashraf refused to eat meat anymore— and, halfway through 2013, Robbin and crossing into Syria.” claiming it was not halal enough—and Marouane stopped rapping about girls to be in the same room as women. He and started rapping exclusively about began criticizing his sisters and telling Islam. They scored a YouTube hit with them what to wear. He grew his hair the song Ramadan.20 protection services, the city council and beard. Farid tried to prevent his and the police were all involved by son from going outside, afraid that Robbin, Marouane and another friend the request of his father in an attempt he would not return. Once, when named Hakim21 often went to the Al to deradicalize him, yet Ashraf still Ashraf left his computer to use the Fath mosque in Arnhem to pray.22 succeeded in sneaking out of the house restroom, Farid went into his son’s The authors of an article on the three in the middle of the night. room and accessed his computer. He friends from Arnhem claimed that found many radical websites, videos they discovered flyers announcing According to an extensive media of beheadings and pictures of dead sermons by Dutch Salafist preachers in interview with Ashraf’s father, Ashraf bodies. Farid shut off the internet, and the mosque, such as Abou Sayfoullah was a polite yet social boy.18 His father after Farid found out that Ashraf was and Al Khattab. Robbin and Marouane raised him as a Muslim. Ashraf wanted still connecting to other networks, he also took Arabic lessons at the Omar to become a police officer or work with broke his computer. Al Khattab Foundation in Arnhem.23 the Dutch Ministry of Defense. Three The director of that foundation, Anoire months before Ashraf’s departure to On the day that Ashraf left for Syria, Rharssisse, claims to fully oppose Syria, he started to change. His father he had agreed with his father to see the fighting in Syria, although he preaches first noticed this when Ashraf started police and the city council. His father quite the opposite in social media under insisted that he hand his passport to the name Aboe Nusaybah.24 Oh Oh Den Haag (Oh Oh The Hague) and the more re- them, but Ashraf refused. The police cent Oh Oh Cherso, the Dutch version of the MTV series and the city council promised to keep 19 This profile is largely based on a detailed report about Jersey Shore. For the video, see www.youtube.com/ an eye on him but did not force him three jihadist friends from Arnhem. See “Van vrolijke watch?v=miqGbVdj2xQ. to hand over his passport. He fled the rapper tot jihadist Dag mam, ik ga naar Syrië!” NRC, De- 16 A video titled Vraag het een Syriëganger! (Ask a Syr- house that same evening and never cember 28, 2013. ian Foreign Fighter) was published to announce a returned. On March 28, 2014, Ashraf 20 Their music video is available at www.youtube.com/ Q&A session. For details, see www.youtube.com/ was online in Turkey, near the Syrian watch?v=BtXP_9nv1d0. watch?v=kUbuYrRgfsY. border, where his father suspects he 21 Hakim attempted to travel to Syria but was stopped in 17 This profile is based on the interview held with received training before crossing into his car in Germany. Ashraf’s father in April 2014. For the full interview, see Syria. 22 “Van vrolijke rapper tot jihadist Dag mam, ik ga naar Farid - vader van minderjarige Syrië-strijder, Een op Een, Syrië!” April 10, 2014. 23 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 24 Ibid.

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Robbin and Marouane spent a lot of The NCTV has attempted to force the One preventive measure that was time in Marouane’s room, praying and extremist website De Ware Religie— announced in the Dutch press in reading the Qur’an. Images of suffering one of the most important platforms February was the denial of passports Syrians touched them, according for Dutch jihadists—offline, so far to 10 men and women who were to Marouane’s mother. The friends without success.28 Despite the fear of suspected of planning to travel to Syria received pictures from an older friend the ISIL in particular, on June 20 the for jihad.32 The legal basis for this was who was already in Syria, and who article 23 of the passport law33 of the they considered a role model. The boys Netherlands, which makes it possible started consulting the Qur’an about “As the Netherlands to withdraw someone’s passport or the concept of Holy War, and began struggles to agree upon deny the renewal of it if the person in reading books on the topic as well as question wants to go abroad to engage manuscripts such as those from Abu a unified approach to the in activities that would endanger the Muhammad al-Maqdisi. They read fighters, it expresses great Netherlands or other friendly states. everything on De Ware Religie, a Dutch A different measure was taken against extremist website. They also listened concern about its future two suspected jihadists from Arnhem to speeches by Fouad Belkacem, the security, while insisting in February 2014 who were caught in leader of Sharia4Belgium, and became Germany while they were allegedly on convinced that they were useless for not on upholding a tolerant their way to Syria. The charges against helping out their Muslim brothers. and inclusive approach—a them were dropped on the condition that they wear ankle bracelets, stay in the Robbin and his friend Marouane balance which may be Netherlands and refrain from coming crossed the border between Turkey impossible to achieve.” near airports.34 and Syria in November 2013 and both spent time in Aleppo. Robbin returned There have also been individual to the Netherlands in March 2014. His measures against fighters who remain activities since his return are unknown, city of the Hague allowed29 a pro-ISIL in Syria. In June, the social welfare of although he seems apologetic about his demonstration to take place because it “tens” of Dutch jihadists was stopped.35 decision and claims he fled Syria in saw “no ground” to prevent it—even In the same month, it was announced secret.25 Marouane remains in Syria.26 though the ISIL is listed as a terrorist that fighters receiving any student organization by the United Nations. benefits from the Dutch government Government Measures Against (Returned) will have those benefits revoked.36 Fighters The Dutch government promised Khalid K., a Dutch jihadist who posed Thus far, in the absence of a collective an increase in cooperation between with the decapitated heads of five approach, the Dutch government different branches to enhance internal Jabhat al-Nusra fighters, was denied has only pushed through a few security, and a recent report claims that entry to the Netherlands for 20 years, measures against Dutch jihadists. the AIVD shared a list of names with and if he does decide to return after this Most concerning is the reported the Turkish security services to prevent period, the Dutch Public Prosecution lack of adequate budgeting for the flow of these people into Syria from will attempt to charge him with crimes intelligence gathering. The Dutch Turkey.30 Yet Turkey’s willingness to against humanity.37 National Coordinator for Security act on the list is questionable. A visa and Counterterrorism (NCTV) has is not required to cross the Turkish- expressed its concern about Dutch Syrian border, and the border is easily 32 “NCTV: tien paspoorten jihadgangers geweigerd,” De jihadists in Syria and has warned about passed with the aid of recruiters who Volkskrant, February 21, 2014. the possibility of new generations of are present in abundance in Turkey’s 33 See the website of the Dutch government at http://wet- 31 fighters, resulting in a sustainable southern province of Hatay. ten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005212/geldigheidsdatum_20- threat to Europe. Because of the ISIL’s 06-2014. recent advancements, the NCTV fears 34 “‘Syriëgangers’ onder voorwaarden vrij, maar moeten that the popularity of jihadist factions enkelband dragen,” De Volkskrant, February 4, 2014. will only increase among radicalized 35 “Uitkeringen tientallen Nederlandse jihadstrijders Dutch youth. It recognizes that the ers. See “Actueel dreigingsniveau,” National Coordinator stopgezet,” Het Parool, June 17, 2014. Netherlands is not immune to attacks for Security and Counterterrorism, June 30, 2014. 36 As stated in a written response to parliamentary in- similar to the one in Brussels on May 28 “Antiterreurbaas treedt op tegen jihadsite,” De quiries about the student benefits that jihadists in Syria 24, 2014, which was committed by a Telegraaf, June 19, 2014; “Providers gevraagd jihadsites receive. For the statement, see “Onderwerp Antwoorden 27 returned Syrian foreign fighter. te wissen,” De Telegraaf, June 18, 2014. kamervragen over studiefinanciering voor jihadstri- 29 “ISIS-demonstratie Den Haag mag,” NOS Journaal, jders,” Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, June 16, 25 Bart Olmer, “Polderjihadist vlucht voor geweld,” De June 17, 2014. 2014. Telegraaf, March 13, 2014. 30 “‘AIVD geeft Turkije namen Nederlandse Syriëgang- 37 Suspected individuals appear in a special register 26 For more details, see www.facebook.com/ ers,’” Novum, June 16, 2014. which is visible to border security and the city council, MaruOne026?fref=pb&hc_location=friends_tab. 31 It is possible to travel from the Netherlands to Syria both of which can withdraw the passport or choose to 27 Periodical updates on the threat level in the Nether- in 48 hours when using the Turkey route. For more de- reject its renewal. For details, see “Nederlandse jihadist lands are given by the NCTV. This level is mainly deter- tails, see “Binnen 48 uur van Nederland naar Syrië,” De van gruwelfoto mag land niet meer in,” De Volkskrant, mined by developments surrounding Dutch foreign fight- Telegraaf, June 30, 2014. April 3, 2014.

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In November 2013, it was reported that Boko Haram, the Chibok confusion with north-south political the Dutch city councils were attempting rivalries. to help rather than punish returned Abductions and Nigeria’s fighters. Delft currently supervises a Counterterrorism Strategy Boko Haram and its Continued Development group of young ex-fighters that it aims to The kidnappings offer important reintegrate into Dutch society by helping By J.N.C. Hill insights into both Boko Haram and them find employment or education Nigeria’s counterterrorism strategy. and stimulating them to engage in during the past three months, hundreds Since its renaissance as a fighting force local activities.38 The idea behind this, of people, mainly women and girls, in late 2010, Boko Haram has been according to the city councils, is to have been abducted from villages in a state of perpetual evolution. It avoid further radicalization through across Nigeria’s northeastern state has actively embraced innovation and isolation and repression.39 This does of Borno. To date, only a minority of adaptation by constantly changing what not mean that the police and the those kidnapped have regained their it does, where and to whom. Abductions justice department will not prosecute liberty, often as a result of their own were added to its repertoire only a few individuals if any evidence of criminal efforts to escape. The kidnappers, years ago, and its early victims were activity is found; it merely means that who have identified themselves as mainly European and North American on a social level the city councils opt for members of the terrorist group Boko citizens living and working in northern reintegration.40 Haram, have been widely condemned Nigeria.3 Ransoms were demanded both at home and abroad. Yet so has which, depending on the nationalities of As rapidly as knowledge about Dutch Nigeria’s federal government. Its those who were seized, were sometimes jihadists in Syria has grown in the past failure to protect the inhabitants of paid.4 These kidnappings were similar six months, it is far from complete. these villages, slow and ineffective to those carried out in the south of the With the recent developments in Syria efforts to secure the victims’ release, country by groups like the Movement and Iraq, the problem of Dutch foreign unsympathetic and heavy-handed for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta fighters will continue to escalate. As response to the demonstrations of (MEND).5 the Netherlands struggles to agree upon solidarity organized in Abuja,1 and a unified approach to the fighters, it unwillingness to accept international The mass abductions of the past few expresses great concern about its future assistance or work with foreign months, however, are a new activity security, while insisting on upholding partners have all served to tarnish its not only in the north, but in the whole a tolerant and inclusive approach—a already battered reputation. country. Never before have so many balance which may be impossible to individuals been snatched all at once, achieve. With the capacity problems Indeed, the unprecedented global nor have the victims been ordinary faced by the intelligence services, the campaign to find and free the 250 girls people.6 Unlike earlier kidnappings, Netherlands is in danger of falling taken from the village of Chibok was in these abductions are motivated less by behind the curve. part directed at the federal authorities. money since none of the friends and The inexplicable withdrawal of the families of those who have been taken Samar Batrawi is a freelance researcher soldiers guarding the school from can afford to pay significant ransoms. and Ph.D. candidate at King’s College which they were taken, Abuja’s Precedents for these kinds of attacks London, where she studies the development reluctant and week-late admission do exist elsewhere. In a number of of clandestine groups in Lebanon. She is that they had been kidnapped, and the the author of The Dutch Foreign Fighter security forces abject failure to pursue 3 Doubts remain over who carried out this abduction. Contingent in Syria, which appeared in the what leads they had in a timely fashion One of the prime suspects is the Islamist terrorist group October 2013 issue of the CTC Sentinel. gave rise to serious doubts about the Ansaru. According to the International Crisis Group, federal government’s competence and Ansaru is one of six factions which together make up 2 Ilona Chmoun is a Syrian-born MSc student desire to save the girls. Boko Haram. See “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The in International Relations and Diplomacy Boko Haram Insurgency,” International Crisis Group, at Radboud University Nijmegen, where This article considers what these April 3, 2014, p. 22; “Italian Abducted in Nigeria Freed,” she is writing on U.S. foreign policy during kidnappings reveal about Boko BBC, June 2, 2012. the 2013 chemical weapons crisis in Syria. Haram and the federal government’s 4 “Nigerian Kidnappers ‘Received Ransom Downpay- counterterrorism strategy. It finds ment,’” Guardian, March 11, 2012; “Italian Priests, Ca- that Abuja’s failure to defeat or even nadian Nun Kidnapped in Cameroon,” Reuters, April 5, significantly contain the group is due, 2014. at least in part, to four significant flaws 5 Although the survival rate of victims seized in the north in its strategy: its overly kinetic focus, was lower than for those taken in the south, these abduc- limited potential for further escalation, tions were similar as they were motivated, to a significant low level of regional cooperation and degree, by the kidnappers’ desire to extract ransom pay- ments. See James Bridger, “Kidnapping Resurgent in the 38 The original report can be found at “Teruggekeerde 1 “Nigerian Police Arrest Protest Leader for Girls Ab- Gulf of Guinea Piracy,” USNI News, March 14, 2014. jihadi’s niet opgepakt maar geholpen,” EenVandaag, No- ducted by Boko Haram Militants,” Guardian, May 5, 6 Most recently more than 60 women and children were vember 6, 2013. 2014. taken in a series of raids mounted by suspected Boko 39 Ibid. 2 “Nigeria Refused Help to Search for Kidnapped Girls,” Haram militants. See “Nigeria’s Boko Haram ‘Seizes 40 Ibid. Washington Post, May 11, 2014. Women’ in Borno,” BBC, June 24, 2014.

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African countries, young men have been about this relationship that remains government has not only acceded to rounded up and pressured into service unknown including the true extent of one of Boko Haram’s core demands in guerrilla groups.7 In Algeria in the AQIM’s influence and the precise forms and, in so doing, compromised the 1990s and early 2000s, in a perversion it takes.11 education of thousands of students, of the religious laws on sex and but it has also severed the main means marriage, women and girls were forced The Weaknesses of Nigeria’s of communication for millions of to temporarily marry insurgents before Counterterrorism Strategy people. In such circumstances, there being discarded once the husbands’ In contrast, more concrete conclusions is little the armed forces can do other conjugal rights had been satisfied.8 can be drawn about Nigeria’s than attempt to crush Boko Haram counterterrorism strategy. Based militarily. Indeed, it was the federal The parallels between what took place on what the federal government has authorities’ sustained failure to better in Algeria and what is now happening attempted and what has taken place address the north’s numerous, serious in Nigeria provide circumstantial since the introduction of the states of socioeconomic problems that at least evidence of al-Qa`ida in the Islamic emergency in Adamawa, Borno and contributed to the emergence and Maghreb’s (AQIM) growing influence Yobe just over a year ago, four sobering radicalization of Boko Haram in the over Boko Haram.9 Indeed, and deductions can be made.12 first place.15

The first is that Abuja’s The second concern is over Abuja’s “There is a more worrying counterterrorism strategy focuses ability to further escalate its campaign reason why the federal overwhelmingly on kinetic actions. if it needs to. In addition to its There are a range of reasons for declaration of the states of emergency, government’s response this. The most significant is simple the federal government has increased to Boko Haram is mainly expediency. The introduction of the defense spending significantly over states of emergency confirmed the the past eight years with most of the kinetic: it possesses federal authorities’ own doubts about neither the means nor the their ability to effectively confront “This question makes Boko Haram within the existing inclination to respond in legal framework. Abuja’s recourse to the federal government’s other ways.” special measures highlighted its fears unwillingness to work that the group was growing more, not less, dangerous (as some senior officers more closely with the and politicians had claimed), while its United States and the when considered alongside other decision to continue them for another developments in Boko Harm’s six months suggests that, despite its even more campaign—the expansion of its area extraordinary efforts, the faction still concerning since these of operations, the escalation in the poses a significant threat. In these frequency of its attacks, its successful circumstances, the federal government and other international prosecution of more sophisticated has little choice but to try to reassert its partners could provide assaults, and ever greater presence control. outside of Nigeria’s borders—AQIM’s valuable if not decisive effect appears to be both inspirational Yet there is a more worrying reason assistance.” and material. It is now beyond doubt why the federal government’s that there are links between the response to Boko Haram is mainly groups.10 Nevertheless, there is much kinetic: it possesses neither the means nor the inclination to respond extra money spent on the counter Boko 16 7 Alcinda Honwana, Child Soldiers in Africa (Philadel- in other ways. This much has been Haram campaign. While this action phia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), p. 5. confirmed by its decision to close provides further confirmation of the 13 8 Marina Lazreg, “Consequences of Political Liber- many of northern Nigeria’s schools, government’s determination to confront alisation and Sociocultural Mobilisation for Women in and periodically suspend the the group, the palpable lack of progress 14 Algeria, Egypt and Jordan,” in Anne-Marie Goetz, Gov- region’s mobile phone network. By is concerning. Not only have the erning Women: Women’s Political Effectiveness in Contexts responding in these ways, the federal bolstered security forces failed to gain of Democratisation and Governance Reform (New York: a decisive advantage, but they have also Routledge/UNRISD, 2009), p. 47. 11 Kirk Ross, “Why Boko Haram Wages War Against failed to greatly reduce Boko Haram’s 9 Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram and the Kidnapping of the Western Education,” USNI News, May 16, 2014. freedom to act or ability to continue Chibok Schoolgirls,” CTC Sentinel 7:5 (2014), p. 5. 12 The states of emergency were declared and renewed developing its armed campaign. With 10 “Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Home- in accordance with section 305 of the 1999 constitution: defense spending set to now fall, what land,” U.S. House of Representatives Committee on “Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999,” Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism Federal Republic of Nigeria, May 5, 1999, section 305. 15 Akinola Olojo, “Nigeria’s Trouble North: Interrogat- and Intelligence, November 30, 2011, p. 2; “Boko Haram: 13 “Life for Schoolgirls in the North,” al-Jazira, May 15, ing the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram,” ICCT Growing Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” U.S. House of 2014. Research Paper, October 2013, p. 6. Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Sep- 14 “Nigeria: ‘Cut Off’ Under Emergency Rule,” BBC, May 16 “Nigerian Defence Spending to Fall for the First Time tember 13, 2013, p. 3. 27, 2013. in a Decade,” IHS Jane’s 360, January 8, 2014.

16 july 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 7 more can Abuja do to turn the tide of exploit national borders has enabled At the very least, therefore, this north- war in its favor?17 This question makes its leaders and forces to plan, prepare south rivalry undermines trust between the federal government’s unwillingness and recuperate in relative safety, and the presidency and the northern state to work more closely with the United avoid detection and neutralization by governors and military commanders.26 States and the United Kingdom even Nigeria’s security forces. Yet there are more concerning since these and other three major impediments to greater Conclusion regional collaboration. The first are During the past three months, hundreds “Boko Haram is not on the inadequate capabilities of some of people have been kidnapped from countries. Niger, for example, is their homes in a series of raids mounted the cusp of defeat but poorly equipped to meet the threat.21 by Boko Haram. The abductions have continues to mount attacks The second is the absence of properly generated a great deal of international developed mechanisms to enable such concern, not least because they raise and evolve. Without a clear collaboration to occur.22 The third serious questions about the efficacy and consistent political and is cultural: the proven reluctance of of the Nigerian federal government’s Nigeria’s various agencies to work with counterterrorism strategy. Indeed, military strategy, Nigeria’s each other, let alone with those of other and contrary to at least some official forces will struggle at the countries.23 reports, the war against Boko Haram is not going well. Boko Haram is not on the operational and tactical The final significant flaw in the federal cusp of defeat but continues to mount levels.” government’s counterterrorism strategy attacks and evolve. Without a clear is its confusion with Nigeria’s north- and consistent political and military south politics. Since the restoration of strategy, Nigeria’s forces will struggle civilian rule in 1999, political life has at the operational and tactical levels. international partners could provide been guided by the unconstitutional valuable if not decisive assistance.18 convention of power-sharing and Dr. J.N.C. Hill is Reader in Postcolonialism One of the ways in which these powers rotation.24 According to this agreement, and the Maghreb in the Defence Studies could help Abuja is by facilitating closer the president and other senior Department at King’s College London regional collaboration. government members must be replaced based at the UK’s Joint Services Command by candidates from other parts of the and Staff College. He has published widely The third major concern is the low level country. Yet ever since President Umaru on Algeria, the Maghreb and Nigeria. of security cooperation between Nigeria Yaradua’s untimely death in May 2010, His book Nigeria since Independence: and its immediate neighbors. Over the this convention has been in disarray to Forever Fragile? was a winner of the past four years, Boko Haram units have the considerable unhappiness of many CHOICE Outstanding Academic Titles for been actively engaged in Cameroon, northerners who feel that one of their 2013. Mali and Niger, and the group continues own should be president rather than to recruit new members from each of the southerner Goodluck Jonathan.25 these countries.19 Indeed, it is believed Domestic analysis of and official that some of the missing Chibok statements about Boko Haram cannot be schoolgirls are being held in northern separated from northern opposition to Cameroon.20 Boko Haram’s ability to Jonathan’s presidency, as events like the abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls are 17 Ibid. heavily politicized to attack or defend 18 It is not entirely clear why Abuja is unwilling to work President Jonathan’s administration. more closely with either the United States or the United Kingdom. Likely reasons include national pride and a 21 “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram possible reluctance to expose the Nigerian military’s Insurgency,” p. i. operating practices to closer scrutiny. Certainly Nige- 22 Mechanisms such as properly established and re- ria’s army has been heavily criticized on occasion for its sourced headquarters and their necessary staff. heavy and indiscriminate use of force. See “Nigeria: Mili- 23 “Army, Police Clash in Minna,” Daily Times, Decem- tary Raid Destroys Villages and Kills Rebels, Witnesses ber 20, 2013. Say,” New York Times, December 24, 2013. Nevertheless, 24 The rotation of power between politicians from differ- the Nigerian armed forces have, in the past, proved their ent regions is established practice but is not required by willingness to work with international partners espe- the constitution. In fact, it is anti-constitutional as Nige- cially other African states. See Jon Hill, “To Survive or rian voters should be free to select whomever they chose Lead? The Two Sides of Nigeria’s National Security,” in regardless of which region they come from. See J.N.C. Andrew M. Dorman and Joyce P. Kaufman, Providing for Hill, Nigeria Since Independence: Forever Fragile? (Basing- National Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, stoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 58-59. 2014). 25 This regional divide also mirrors Nigeria’s main re- 19 “Fears in Cameroon of Boko Haram Recruitment,” In- ligious divide as the northerners are predominantly 26 These tensions have been fueled by accusations of tegrated Regional Information Networks, April 16, 2014. Muslim and southerners Christian. There are, however, collusion between northern politicians, most notably Ali 20 “Chibok Abductions: Nigeria Girls ‘Taken Abroad,’” significant numbers of Christians living in the north and Modu Sheriff, and Boko Haram. See “Curbing Violence BBC, April 29, 2014. Muslims in the south. in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency,” p. 11.

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Contrasting the disapproval by withdrawing from in Afghanistan’s mountainous eastern Leadership of Mullah TTP operations.4 In early 2014, Khan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan.8 Said’s faction engaged in clashes Fazlullah and Khan Said and retaliatory assassinations with A staunch critic of the Pakistani Sajna in Pakistan Fazlullah loyalists, including some government, Mullah Fazlullah often Taliban members from the Mehsud denounced the Pakistani state, its By Daud Khattak tribe led by Shehriyar Mehsud.5 In a political system and politicians, called bid to put an end to months of TTP the Pakistani military an “army of since its formation in 2007, Tehrik-i- infighting and to prevent Khan Said infidels,” and supported the use of Taliban Pakistan (TTP), often referred from tightening his grip over the violence to implement Shari`a law in to as the Pakistani Taliban, has Mehsud Taliban, Fazlullah formally Pakistan. Fazlullah boldly claimed executed hundreds of domestic attacks sacked Khan Said and handed over responsibility for killing the commander in Pakistan. Internal differences have the command of both North and South for the Swat Valley, Major-General long existed within the TTP over issues Waziristan to TTP Mohmand chief Sanaullah Khan Niazi, in a roadside of clan, tribe, ideology and negotiations Omar Khalid Khurasani, another bomb in September 2013.9 Fazlullah’s with the Pakistani government. These non-Mehsud TTP commander, in May aide and chief of the TTP in Mohmand differences remained private while the 2014.6 tribal district, Abdul Wali (also known TTP’s founder, , was as Omar Khalid Khurasani), regularly in command. Yet when a U.S. drone On May 28, 2014, Khan Said’s faction issues statements stressing the need for strike killed Baitullah in August 2009, officially announced their withdrawal armed struggle to remove Pakistan’s some of the TTP’s private disputes from the TTP. Khan Said’s spokesman “infidel” rulers. became public after two TTP leaders— denounced the TTP for their attacks on and Waliur Rahman civilians, kidnappings, extortion, and Khan Said, on the other hand, Mehsud—temporarily clashed over the for targeting Pakistani government recently condemned the Fazlullah- issue of succession.1 Eventually, the installations. Since this formal split, led TTP for its attacks against the Afghan Taliban reportedly intervened,2 the Fazlullah-led TTP derives the Pakistani government and security and the two leaders agreed to share majority of its support from the tribal forces. Although Khan Said was the power, with Waliur Rahman relegated areas and cities, but Khan Said has alleged mastermind of the spectacular to Hakimullah’s deputy. gained control of the core base of jailbreak in Dera Ismail Khan city and supporters in the Waziristan region.7 the attack on a In 2013, a U.S. killed both base in Karachi in 2011,10 he has Waliur Rahman Mehsud and Hakimullah This article focuses on the broader not executed any similar attacks in Meshed in a six-month period. As a implications of this split by discussing Pakistan since he took over leadership result, internal divisions within the the positions of Fazlullah and Khan of the Mehsud faction of the TTP in TTP reemerged. After Waliur Rahman’s Said on Pakistan and Afghanistan, 2013—in what many view as a change death in May 2013, Khan Said “Sajna,” their policy toward negotiations with in targeting strategy. After Khan Rahman’s deputy, declared himself Pakistan, and their affiliation with Said condemned the TTP for killings, the leader of Rahman’s faction, yet he groups such as al-Qa`ida, the Haqqani kidnappings, extortion and announced reportedly took this action without network, and sectarian jihadist his separation from the TTP umbrella the consent of TTP chief Hakimullah outfits. outfit in May 2014, some considered Mehsud.3 After Hakimullah’s own his group relative moderates who death later that year, the Khan Said Position on Afghanistan/Pakistan favor peace talks with the Pakistani faction expected to take over the reins After escaping the massive Pakistani government.11 Khan Said’s predecessor, of the TTP leadership, but the TTP’s military operation in Swat in 2009, Waliur Rahman, who was a member of shura (council) instead appointed Mullah Mullah Fazlullah, also known as the religious party Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlullah, a prominent non-Mehsud “FM Mullah” for his illegal FM radio (JUI) before taking up arms with the Pakistani Taliban commander, in channel, has reportedly been hiding Pakistani Taliban, was also considered November 2013. a relative moderate compared to others 12 4 Personal interview, Sailab Mehsud, Waziristan-based in the TTP leadership. Fazlullah’s elevation to the top position journalist, June 7, 2014. Sailab Mehsud belongs to the in the TTP proved the final straw for same Mehsud tribe and is respected among Taliban cir- 8 Qasim Nauman and Safdar Dawar, “Militants Attack Khan Said and his supporters. TTP cles as a result of his more than three decades of reporting Pakistani Troops,” Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2014; fighters from the Mehsud tribe, who from the area. Declan Walsh, “Pakistani Taliban Pick Hard-Liner as mostly supported Khan Said’s bid 5 “Finally, Taliban Split into Factions,” Daily Times, May Leader, Imperiling Proposed Peace Talks,” New York for TTP leadership, showed their 29, 2014. Times, November 7, 2013. 6 “Fazlullah Sacks Top Commander to Stop Tribal In- 9 Amir Mir, “Fazlullah Has Mulla Omar’s Backing,” The 1 “Wali ur-Rehman: Senior Taliban Commander,” Inde- fighting,” Reuters, May 10, 2014; “Fazlullah Sacks Sajna News International, November 8, 2013. pendent, June 1, 2013. as TTP Chief of SWA,” The News International, May 10, 10 “Sources: Pakistani Taliban Chooses New Second-In- 2 Personal interview, Mushtaq Yusufzai, Peshawar- 2014. Command,” RFE/RL, May 30, 2013. based journalist, June 8, 2014. 7 The TTP draws most of its support from the Mehsud 11 M. Ilyas Khan, “Pakistan Violence: Mehsud Faction 3 Nader Buneri, “Taliban Infighting Picks Up,” The Na- tribe, and since Khan Said is also from the Mehsud (un- Walks Out of Taliban,” BBC, May 28 2014. tion, April 11, 2014. like Fazlullah), he enjoys more support within the TTP. 12 “Wali-ur-Rehman to Replace Hakimullah Mehsud as

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Although Mullah Fazlullah was one of was seen as a deliberate move on part of militants belonging to al-Qa`ida as well 10,000 volunteers who crossed into Omar Khalid to scuttle the peace talks. as leaders of the were Afghanistan to fight U.S.-led forces in targeted in U.S. drone strikes in North support of the Taliban in late 2001, he On the Pakistan Army’s list of so- Waziristan, an area under the control has not issued any statements against called “bad Taliban,” commanders like of the TTP and commanders like Khan the Afghan government or the U.S. Mullah Fazlullah and Omar Khalid Said and Hafiz Gul Bahadar. Moreover, presence in Afghanistan since he was are considered the most dangerous. others have suggested that the Haqqani forced to flee Pakistan in mid-2009 Although the Pakistan Army, under network has provided funding to Khan during a major Pakistani military pressure from the elected government, Said’s faction, as the Haqqanis hope to operation in Swat. Fazlullah’s recent had agreed to the now failed peace talks recruit more Mehsud fighters for the silence on the issue, and his reported with the TTP, the military leadership war in neighboring Afghanistan.22 base in eastern Afghanistan, is one had serious reservations about reason that Pakistan’s government has Mullah Fazlullah, an official source in Fazlullah also hosted al-Qa`ida leaders alleged that the Afghan government Islamabad told this author. “Fazlullah and sympathizers during his days in is providing sanctuaries and support and Omar Khalid were not going to get Swat before 2009. Yet since it is believed to Mullah Fazlullah.13 In several amnesty even if the government and he now operates across the border in meetings that took place between top Taliban had agreed for a hand-shake as Afghanistan, and allegedly with the Pakistani and Afghan officials in June a result of the now failed peace talks,” tacit support of Afghan intelligence,23 it 2014, one of the key demands from the said the official.18 seems unlikely that he would have al- Pakistani side was for their Afghan Qa`ida leaders in his circles due to the counterparts to take action against Khan Said and his faction, on the other risks involved in operating in Afghan Mullah Fazlullah.14 hand, have been in favor of peace territory. Fazlullah’s commander in the talks and recently opposed attacks on Mohmand area, Omar Khalid Khurasani, In contrast to Fazlullah, Khan Said’s Pakistani security forces, government however, has openly called Usama bin group supports attacks in Afghanistan, and civil and military installations.19 In Ladin his leader and has called for and has joined hands with other groups a statement in May 2014, a spokesman international jihadist attacks.24 such as the Haqqani network, Hafiz Gul for Khan Said’s group, Azam Tariq, Bahadar’s faction, and some factions in said that “we consider the bombing of Both leaders are hardline , the Punjabi Taliban to carry out attacks public places, extortion and kidnapping but Fazlullah is more inclined toward inside Afghanistan.15 un-Islamic, and since the TTP leaders Salafism, apparently due to the continued with these practices, we influence of his father-in-law, the Peace Talks with Pakistan decided we should not share the cleric Sufi Muhammad, who founded Despite the fact that Fazlullah’s branch responsibility.”20 the hardliner group Tehreek-e-Nafaz- of the TTP engaged in negotiations with e-Shariat- e-Mohammadi (Movement the Pakistani government through pro- Position on Al-Qa`ida, the Haqqani Network for the Enforcement of Shari`a Law, Taliban cleric Samiul Haq earlier in and Sectarian Militant Groups TNSM) in the Malakand region in 2014, Fazlullah himself never issued a After the U.S.-led invasion of northern Pakistan in the early 1990s.25 public statement supporting the talks. Afghanistan in 2001, the Mehsud Sufi Muhammad led a rag-tag army Instead, his close aide Omar Khalid, who tribesmen in Pakistan played host to of volunteers to fight alongside the was against the talks from the start,16 al-Qa`ida and later militant groups Taliban following the U.S.-led attack issued statements opposing the peace such as the Haqqani network in North on Afghanistan in late 2001. Many of talks while the process was underway. and South Waziristan. After the his fighters were killed, others were Fazlullah’s TTP even violated the so- TTP was formed in 2007, the group captured by the forces of the Northern called month-long cease-fire by killing provided these fighters support and Alliance, while Sufi Muhammad and his nearly two dozen kidnapped Pakistani sanctuaries. Yet years of successive son-in-law Fazlullah were arrested by paramilitary soldiers, showing their U.S. drone strikes have reduced al- 17 beheaded bodies on camera. The act Qa`ida’s presence in the Waziristan do not carry out attacks inside Pakistan, as their focus area. is Afghanistan. For more, see Qaiser Butt, “Situationer: TTP Head,” Reuters, December 6, 2012. Sajna’s Departure Likely to Exacerbate Divisions within 13 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Mullah Fazlullah’s Rise Compli- Khan Said and his group have close TTP,” Express Tribune, May 29, 2014. cates Ties Between Kabul, Islamabad,” Wall Street Jour- ties to the Haqqani network and 22 Declan Walsh, “Fractured State of Pakistani Taliban 21 nal, November 13, 2013. the Punjabi Taliban. Several Arab Calls Peace Deal into Question,” New York Times, April 14 “Winning the War,” Express Tribune, June 28, 2014; K. 20, 2014. Iqbal, “Border Management: The Right Focus,” The Na- 18 Personal interview, Pakistani government official, 23 Michael Georgy and Matthew Green, “Pakistan Ac- tion, July 7, 2014. July 2014. cuses Afghanistan of Backing Taliban Enemy,” Reuters, 15 Saeed Shah, “Pakistani Taliban Faction Condemns 19 Khan August 5, 2012. Violence, Breaks Away,” Wall Street Journal, May 28, 20 Sailab , “Key Group Breaks Away from TTP,” 24 Amir Mir, “Journalist-Turned-Militant Khurasani 2014. Dawn, May 29, 2014. Wants to Seize Nukes, Topple Govt,” The News Interna- 16 The talks still proceeded because several TTP shura 21 After parting ways with the TTP, Khan Said came into tional, February 18, 2014. members wanted to engage in peace talks. the fold of the so-called “good Taliban.” The Haqqani 25 Hassan Abbas, “The Black-Turbaned Brigade: The 17 Zahir Shah Sherazi, “Mohmand Taliban Claim Killing network and Gul Bahadar are also considered members Rise of TNSM in Pakistan,” Terrorism Monitor 4:23 23 FC Men,” Dawn, February 17, 2014. of the “good Taliban,” from Pakistan’s perspective. They (2006).

19 july 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 7 the Pakistani security forces upon their Fazlullah continues to enjoy the reentry into Pakistani territory. support of the TTP core leadership Recent Highlights in in Mohmand, Orakzai and Bajaur Political Violence Both Fazlullah and Khan Said have tribal agencies, besides several cities never denounced sectarian killings and in Pakistan, including Peshawar, June 1, 2014 (): Philippine both leaders have supported sectarian Mardan, Swabi and Malakand. Khan security forces arrested Miraji Bairullah leaders and groups in the past. Said’s support base is mostly among (also known as Mahang), who was the Mehsud Taliban in parts of North wanted for killing two U.S. servicemen Grassroots Support and South Waziristan and the nearby in a roadside bomb on Jolo island in Khan Said has strong roots in the districts of Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu September 2009. Bairullah was believed Mehsud tribe in Waziristan, a territory and Tank. Moreover, despite Khan to be a member of the Moro National that serves as the headquarters for Said’s separation from the TTP, Liberation Front (MNLF). – Reuters, June various militant groups. Khan Said, some Mehsud tribesmen under the 2 though a veteran of the Afghan jihad, leadership of Shehriyar Mehsud are never enjoyed the charisma of his still supporting Fazlullah’s faction. June 1, 2014 (NIGERIA): Suspected rival, Fazlullah. In fact, very few Boko Haram gunmen opened fire on a people outside Waziristan knew his The now-failed peace talks, initiated church service in the remote Attangara name before he succeeded Waliur by the Pakistani government in March village in northeastern Nigeria, killing Rahman in May 2013. 2014, further highlighted the differences nine people. – Reuters, June 2 between these groups, as the Hakimullah Unlike Khan Said, Fazlullah is from group opposed the talks while Khan June 2, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A Swat, a well-developed city and tourist Said’s faction was supportive. Pakistani suicide bomber killed three Turkish region in Pakistan. Mullah Fazlullah government efforts to engage in dialogue construction workers in Nangarhar is considered to be a media-savvy with these groups, combined with tribal Province. – Washington Post, June 2 commander. During his days in Swat, rivalries over leadership, played a role Fazlullah interacted on a regular basis in the final division of the TTP. June 2, 2014 (TURKEY): Turkey with the local media. listed Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist The Khan Said faction is now part of organization. The United States Fazlullah ran a radio show while living the so-called “good Taliban,” from the listed Jabhat al-Nusra as a terrorist in Swat from 2007 until 2009, and perspective of the Pakistani government, organization in December 2012. became a local household name. As a as he is presently focused on attacks – Hurriyet Daily News, June 3 result of his charismatic Islamic sermons in Afghanistan and elsewhere abroad. and demagogy, he accrued thousands of Other militant factions part of the June 2, 2014 (SAUDI ARABIA): Al- supporters. These individuals, who were “good Taliban” include the Haqqanis, Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) not connected to militants or violent the Hafiz Gul Bahadar group and some said that they executed four men accused jihad, donated money at Fazlullah’s factions in the Punjabi Taliban, as they of putting electronic tracking chips request to construct a large religious are mostly focused on Afghanistan or in vehicles to help U.S. drone aircraft complex in Mam Dheri, Fazlullah’s India. Since Mullah Fazlullah is hiding identify targets. According to Reuters, native village, on the riverside in Swat.26 in Afghanistan and managing most of “The 28-minute video showed what Following his escape from the region in the “bad Taliban,” some analysts have AQAP said were four spies confessing 2009, he is believed to have lost a great suggested that the U.S. withdrawal from that they had planted devices in vehicles deal of local support. Afghanistan could trigger a limited which resulted in the deaths of AQAP proxy war between Afghanistan and fighters two years ago in the southern Conclusion Pakistan, with each country leveraging Shabwa Province.” – Reuters, June 2 Although several Pakistani militant groups against the other’s analysts have interpreted the recent interests.28 June 2, 2014 (NIGERIA): Boko Haram fragmentation of the TTP as the militants wearing military uniforms beginning of the end for the group, Daud Khattak is Senior Editor for Radio reportedly killed at least 200 civilians termination of the organization is Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Mashaal in three villages in the Gwoza local unlikely because Khan Said is only Radio in Prague. Before joining the government district in Borno State leading the Mehsud Taliban, while the language service of RFE/RL, Mr. Khattak in northeastern Nigeria. As reported rest of the TTP is still united under worked for the Sunday Times London, The by the Associated Press, “The the leadership of Mullah Fazlullah.27 News International and the Daily Times militants arrived in Toyota Hilux in Peshawar and Pajhwok Afghan News in pickup trucks—commonly used by Kabul. He wrote a research paper for the the military—and told the civilians New America Foundation on the roots of they were soldiers ‘and we are here to 26 These details are based on the author’s own reporting insurgency in Pakistan’s Swat region. The protect you all,’ the same tactic used in the region throughout the years. paper was recently republished by Oxford by the group when they kidnapped 27 That being said, since the majority of the TTP is from University Press in Talibanistan. more than 300 girls from a school in the Mehsud tribe, Khan Said likely enjoys more support the town of Chibok on April 15. After than Fazlullah in Waziristan, as Khan Said is a Mehsud, 28 Trofimov; Walsh, “Fractured State of Pakistani Tali- people gathered in the center on the while Fazlullah is not. ban Calls Peace Deal into Question.” orders of the militants, ‘they begin to

20 july 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 7 shout Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar on June 5, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A suspected June 9, 2014 (IRAQ): The Islamic top of their voices, then they begin to suicide bomber injured four people State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), fire at the people continuously for a very outside a mosque in Karachi. – The News which used to be part of al-Qa`ida, long time until all that gathered were all International, June 5 seized control of Mosul, Iraq’s second- dead,’ said the witness who didn’t want largest city. According to RFE/RL, to be named for fear for his safety.” June 6, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A Iraqi “officials said dozens of heavily – AP, June 5 suicide bomber targeted a convoy of armed insurgents seized the provincial vehicles carrying one of the candidates capital’s headquarters, occupied police June 3, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber in Afghanistan’s presidential runoff stations, overran the airport, and freed killed Mohammed Khamis Abu Risha, election. The explosion killed six people, prisoners from jails. The governor of one of the leaders of Iraq’s pro- but the candidate, Abdullah Abdullah, the northern province of Ninawa, Athil government Sunni tribal fighters, in was not injured. The attack occurred as al-Nujaifi, said the military and police Ramadi, Anbar Province. According to Abdullah was traveling between hotels forces abandoned their positions.” Reuters, he was “touring a checkpoint in Kabul. The Afghan government Residents of the city said that black flags manned by his fighters in Ramadi when alleged that “an intelligence agency of associated with jihadist groups were a suicide bomber hugged him, said a foreign country and LeT [Lashkar-i- now flying from buildings in Mosul. one of his men. Four of Abu Risha’s Tayyiba]” were involved in the attack. – RFE/RL, June 10 bodyguards were killed in the blast.” He – New York Times, June 6; Reuters, June 8 was the nephew of Ahmed Abu Risha, June 9, 2014 (IRAQ): A roadside bomb who is the formal leader of all pro- June 7, 2014 (IRAQ): At least 52 exploded at a police checkpoint in Tuz government Sunni fighters in Anbar people were killed after a series of car Khurmato in northern Iraq. A suicide Province. – Reuters, June 3 bombs exploded across largely Shi`a bomber then detonated an explosives- neighborhoods in Baghdad. – Associated laden truck in the same location. The two June 4, 2014 (GERMANY): German Press, June 7 blasts, which occurred near the office prosecutors brought terrorism charges of President Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic against two Lebanese brothers and a June 7, 2014 (IRAQ): The Islamic State in Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party, killed German man who are accused of being Iraq and the Levant entered a university 28 people. – Channel News Asia, June 9 involved with the Islamic State in Iraq in Ramadi, killing three policemen. The and the Levant. According to the New York militants rounded up students and staff, June 9, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A suicide Times, “German authorities believe some but they were forced to withdraw after bomber rammed a truck into a military 300 people have left Germany for Syria they came under attack by the Iraqi checkpoint in North Waziristan Agency since the conflict began there, and the military. – Telegraph, June 7 in the Federally Administered Tribal authorities worry that the dozen people Areas, killing four soldiers. – The News who they say have returned radicalized June 8, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber International, June 10 pose a threat of increased terrorism. parked an explosives-laden vehicle near Officials have said those who have the headquarters of the Patriotic Union June 10, 2014 (IRAQ): Two bombs returned are capable of building bombs of Kurdistan (PUK) party in Diyala exploded near a funeral procession in and carrying out attacks, although they Province. After the car bomb exploded, Ba`quba, Diyala Province, killing 20 have no indications of concrete plans.” the bomber entered the PUK building people. – Independent, June 10 – New York Times, June 4 and detonated his explosives vest. At least 18 people were killed. The Islamic June 10, 2014 (PAKISTAN): Taliban June 4, 2014 (LIBYA): A suicide State in Iraq and the Levant, which took militants attacked security forces at bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle responsibility for the attack, claimed Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, tried to assassinate Khalifa Haftar, a that two suicide bombers were involved. the second time in two days. According rogue Libyan general who is leading an – Reuters, June 8 to , “the assault, in offensive against Islamist militias, in which at least two gunmen opened fire Benghazi. The explosion failed to injure June 8, 2014 (NIGERIA): A female on a guard post at the airport perimeter, Haftar. – AP, June 4 suicide bomber killed a Nigerian caused no casualties and ended with the soldier outside an army barracks in gunmen fleeing into a nearby slum. By June 4, 2014 (IRAQ): A car bomb killed Gombe, located in northeastern Nigeria. contrast, at least 36 people died in the at least 14 people near a hospital in the – Reuters, June 8 first attack on Sunday [June 8], which predominately Shi`a Muslim city of lasted through the night.” – New York Hilla. – Reuters, June 4 June 8-9, 2014 (PAKISTAN): Times, June 10 Approximately 10 gunmen disguised June 4, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A suicide as police attacked a terminal at Jinnah June 11, 2014 (IRAQ): The Islamic State bomber targeted a military vehicle near International Airport in Karachi, in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) took control Islamabad, killing five people. Two Pakistan’s busiest airport. The five- of Tikrit, the hometown of former Iraqi senior army officers were among the hour siege killed at least 24 people. All leader Saddam Hussein. The move dead. – AFP, June 4 10 militants were also killed. Tehrik-i- comes just two days after the ISIL Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility. seized control of Mosul, Iraq’s second- – AP, June 8; CBS News, June 9 largest city. According to the Los Angeles Times, the ISIL has “pushed deeper into

21 july 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 7 the heart of the country, threatening to June 15, 2014 (EGYPT): An Egyptian at the facility said, “Due to the recent create an extremist ‘proto-state’ in the court began proceedings against 68 attacks of militants by mortars, the Middle East, something that U.S. forces Islamists, including al-Qa`ida chief refinery administration decided to fought for eight years to prevent.” – Los Ayman al-Zawahiri’s brother, on evacuate foreign workers for their Angeles Times, June 11 terrorism-related charges. Muhammad safety and also to completely shut down al-Zawahiri and the other defendants production units to avoid extensive June 11, 2014 (IRAQ): The Islamic State are accused of establishing a terrorist damage that could result.” Shortly after in Iraq and the Levant seized 49 Turks group to attack Egyptian security forces the announcement, the ISIL laid siege from the Turkish Consulate in Mosul, and members of the Christian minority, to the refinery, targeting it with mortar including special forces soldiers, as well as other terrorist operations. shells. – CBS News, June 17; Los Angeles Times, diplomats and children. – Reuters, June 17 – Gulf News, June 15 June 18

June 11, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber June 15, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber June 17, 2014 (NIGERIA): A suicide detonated explosives among a gathering killed at least nine people outside a store bomber on a tricycle taxi targeted a of people inside a tent in Baghdad’s selling army fatigues on a busy road World Cup viewing venue in Damaturu Shi`a slum of Sadr city, killing at least near Tahrir Square in central Baghdad. in northern Nigeria, killing at least 14 16 people. – Reuters, June 11 – Independent, June 15 people. – Los Angeles Times, June 18

June 11, 2014 (LIBYA): A suicide bomber June 16, 2014 (SPAIN): Spanish police June 18, 2014 (UNITED STATES): in an explosives-laden vehicle attacked arrested eight suspected Islamist Rahatul Ashikim Khan and Michael an army checkpoint outside Benghazi, militants in Madrid. The militants Todd Wolfe were arrested in Texas and wounding six people. The checkpoint are accused of recruiting and sending separately charged with terrorism- was manned by fighters loyal to Khalifa foreign fighters to join the Islamic State related offenses. Khan, who was born Haftar, a rogue Libyan general who is in Iraq and the Levant, which is fighting in Bangladesh, allegedly wanted to join leading an offensive against Islamist in Syria and Iraq. Spanish officials said Somalia’s al-Shabab, while Wolfe, from militias. – Chicago Tribune, June 11 that the leader of the cell had been Houston, wanted to fight in Syria. Khan detained in Afghanistan in 2001 and became a U.S. citizen in 2002 and is a June 11, 2014 (MALI): A car bomb killed later held at the U.S. military prison at full-time student at the University of four United Nations peacekeepers in Guantanamo Bay. – CNN, June 16 Texas-Austin. – ABC News, June 18 the northern Malian town of Aguelhoc. As explained by Reuters, “Mali was June 16, 2014 (IRAQ): The United June 18, 2014 (IRAQ): Iraqi Foreign thrown into chaos in 2012 when al- States is sending up to 275 U.S. military Minister Hoshyar Zebari requested that Qa`ida-linked Islamist fighters taking personnel to Iraq to “provide support the United States conduct airstrikes advantage of a military coup in the and security for U.S. personnel and against Islamic State in Iraq and the capital Bamako hijacked a Tuareg the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.” The Levant (ISIL) militants who have separatist rebellion to seize the West U.S. government also said that they recently seized control of a number of African nation’s desert north. A French- might send approximately 100 special cities in Iraq. – RFE/RL, June 18 led military intervention pushed them operations troops as well, to advise the back last year, but Islamist fighters Iraqi military as it fights against the June 19, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): Four are blamed for continuing sporadic Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Taliban militants attacked a NATO post violence, including attacks on vehicles – Los Angeles Times, June 16 in eastern Afghanistan’s Nangarhar with improvised landmines.” – Reuters, Province, reportedly damaging 37 June 11 June 16, 2014 (IRAQ): The Islamic NATO supply trucks. – Reuters, June 19 State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) June 11, 2014 (PHILIPPINES): Philippine seized control of Tal Afar, the latest June 19, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A suicide security forces arrested Khair Mundos, city in Iraq to fall to the militant group. bomber attacked the residence of an a senior leader who was on As explained by the Los Angeles Times, anti-Taliban militia leader, injuring a U.S. government terrorist list. – Sun “Over the last week, ISIL fighters have five people. The incident occurred Star, June 11 captured oil-rich Mosul, Iraq’s second- in the Matan Adezai area of Khyber largest city, and seized Tikrit, Saddam Pakhtunkhwa Province. – AFP, June 19 June 14-15, 2014 (LIBYA): U.S. Special Hussein’s hometown. Better equipped Operations Forces apprehended Ahmed and numerically superior Iraqi army June 20, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): An Abu Khatalla south of Benghazi, quickly and police units abandoned their posts improvised explosive device killed transporting him out of Libya to a U.S. and fled. Other areas fell with a similar three U.S. soldiers and a military dog in warship. Khatalla is accused of being lack of resistance as ISIL fighters swept Helmand Province. – RFE/RL, June 21 a ringleader in the attack on the U.S. to within 50 miles of Baghdad.” – Los Consulate in Benghazi in September Angeles Times, June 16 June 20, 2014 (IRAQ): The Islamic State 2012 that killed four Americans. in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) reportedly – Washington Post, June 17 June 17, 2014 (IRAQ): The Islamic seized control of al-Qaim, a border State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) post on the Iraq-Syria frontier. As forced Iraq’s largest oil refinery in explained by Reuters, “Al-Qaim and its Baiji to shut down. A senior engineer neighboring Syrian counterpart Albu

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Kamal are on a strategic supply route. June 23, 2014 (TUNISIA): Tunisia’s 10.” In other parts of Syria, the two A three-year-old civil war in Syria has interior minister said that at least 2,400 groups continue to clash. – Reuters, June left most of eastern Syria in the hands of Tunisian jihadists are fighting in Syria, 25 Sunni militants, now including the Albu mostly on behalf of the Islamic State in Kamal-Qaim crossing. The Albu Kamal Iraq and the Levant. – AFP, June 24 June 25, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber gate [in Syria] is run by al-Qa`ida’s killed at least six people, including two official Syria branch, the Nusra Front, June 23, 2014 (SOMALIA): The African Kurdish security personnel, in Kirkuk. which has clashed with ISIL but has Union said that Kenyan fighter jets – RFE/RL, July 26 sometimes agreed to localized truces attacked two al-Shabab bases in the when it suits both sides.” – Reuters, June Lower Jubba region of Somalia, killing June 25, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber 21 at least 80 militants. It did not specify detonated explosives at an outdoor when the attacks were carried out. market in the predominately Shi`a June 20, 2014 (SYRIA): The bullet- – Reuters, June 23 Mahmudiya area of Baghdad, killing 13 riddled bodies of three officers in the people. – AP, June 25 Free Syrian Army were found two June 24, 2014 (SYRIA/IRAQ): U.S. days after they were kidnapped by the officials said that the Syrian government June 25, 2014 (LEBANON): A suicide Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. launched airstrikes against the Islamic bomber detonated explosives at the – AFP, June 21 State in Iraq and the Levant in western Duroy Hotel near the Saudi Embassy Iraq. – AP, June 25 in Beirut, wounding three security June 20, 2014 (LEBANON): A suicide officers. The bomber was reportedly a bomber tried to assassinate Lebanese June 24, 2014 (LEBANON): A suicide Saudi national. The Islamic State in Iraq security chief Major General Abbas bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle and the Levant claimed responsibility. Ibrahim at a Lebanese security killed one security officer near a – Reuters, June 26 checkpoint in the eastern Bekaa Valley. Lebanese army checkpoint in Beirut. Ibrahim was unharmed, but one security The attack occurred in a mainly Shi`a June 25, 2014 (NIGERIA): A car bomb officer died in the blast. – al-Jazira, June area of the capital. – BBC, June 24 killed at least 21 people outside an 20 upscale shopping mall in Abuja, the June 24, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A suicide Nigerian capital. – Wall Street Journal, June June 21, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A bomber in a vehicle killed at least two 25 suicide bomber attacked High Peace soldiers and a civilian in Spinwam Council adviser Mohammad Massom village of North Waziristan Agency June 26, 2014 (PAKISTAN): The U.S. Stanikzai in western Kabul. The adviser in the Federally Administered Tribal State Department listed the charity was unharmed, but one civilian was Areas. The militant group Ansar al- Jama`at-ud-Da`wa as a foreign terrorist killed in the blast. – Reuters, June 21 Mujahidin claimed responsibility. organization. The charity is widely – AFP, June 24 considered a front organization for June 21, 2014 (CHINA): A suicide the terrorist group Lashkar-i-Tayyiba. bomber in a vehicle reportedly drove June 25, 2014 (GLOBAL): The U.S. – Reuters, June 26 into a police station in Kashgar in Treasury Department designated China’s contentious Xinjiang region. the finance chief and a senior public June 26, 2014 (YEMEN): Militants Police returned fire and killed a group relations official with Lashkar-i- attacked an airport in the eastern of 13 Uighur separatists. – Australian, June Tayyiba (LeT) as “global terrorists.” Yemeni city of Sayun, killing at least 21 They were identified as Muhammad one soldier. At approximately the Hussein Gill and Nazir Ahmad same time, a suicide bomber drove an June 22, 2014 (IRAQ): The Islamic State Chaudhry, respectively. The U.S. explosives-laden vehicle into an army in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) attacked government already recognizes the base in Hadramawt Province, killing rival opposition fighters in northern LeT as a foreign terrorist organization. four Yemeni soldiers. – Reuters, June 26 Syria, using U.S.-made military vehicles – AFP, June 26 that they recently captured from June 26, 2014 (JORDAN): A Jordanian neighboring Iraq. – Reuters, June 22 June 25, 2014 (SYRIA/IRAQ): Jabhat military court acquitted radical preacher al-Nusra fighters in the Syrian border Abu Qatada of terrorism charges over June 23, 2014 (NIGERIA): A bomb tore town of Albu Kamal pledged loyalty his alleged role in a 1999 plot to attack through a college campus in Kano, to the rival group the Islamic State in an American school in Amman. The killing at least eight people. – Guardian, Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). According court postponed its decision on an June 23 to Reuters, “The central leadership additional set of terrorism charges of al-Qa`ida has disowned ISIL and against Qatada, which involve plots in June 23, 2014 (UNITED ARAB proclaimed Jabhat al-Nusra as its 2000 to attack Americans, Israelis and EMIRATES): A court convicted six official Syrian affiliate. Controlling other Westerners in Jordan. – Globe and Arabs of forming an al-Qa`ida cell and parts of Syria’s Deir al-Zor Province, Mail, June 26 raising money for Jabhat al-Nusra, al- where Albu Kamal is located, could Qa`ida’s affiliate in Syria. They were help ISIL link up its territorial gains June 26, 2014 (PHILIPPINES): The sentenced to seven years in prison. across Syria and Iraq, where it overran United States will disband its anti- – AFP, June 23 the main northern city of Mosul on June terrorism task force that was established

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in the Philippines more than 10 years earlier this month. These forces are CTC Sentinel Staff ago. A U.S. official said that the United separate from the up to 300 military States would work with Filipino advisers the president authorized to Editor-in-Chief authorities to implement a transition assist Iraq as it battles an invading Erich Marquardt plan that will ensure that “violent army of jihadists that has taken over Senior Editor, CTC extremist organizations don’t regain a major cities and threatens the capital foothold in the southern Philippines.” in Baghdad. The latest announcement Editorial Board – Slate, June 26 will bring to nearly 800 the number COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. of U.S. forces in Iraq.” - , Department Head June 28, 2014 (IRAQ): An Iraqi military June 30 Department of Social Sciences (West Point) counteroffensive pushed the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from June 30, 2014 (IRAQ): The Islamic COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. the center of Tikrit, a city which fell to State in Iraq and the Levant struck Deputy Department Head the ISIL on June 11. – New York Times, June the perimeter of the al-Askari mosque, Department of Social Sciences (West Point) 28 one of Shi`a Islam’s holiest shrines, in Samarra. A mortar round landed at the MAJ(P) Bryan Price, Ph.D. June 28, 2014 (YEMEN): Suspected perimeter, killing a number of people. Director, CTC al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula – Time, July 1 gunmen opened fire on an army position in Hadramawt Province, killing two June 30, 2014 (SOMALIA): A car soldiers. – AFP, June 28 bomb ripped through a busy market in Mogadishu, killing two people. June 29, 2014 (IRAQ/SYRIA): The – Guardian, June 30 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) declared itself an Islamic Contact caliphate and called on Muslims Combating Terrorism Center everywhere to pledge their allegiance. U.S. Military Academy The ISIL also announced that they 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall have shortened their name to the West Point, NY 10996 “Islamic State,” and that their leader, Phone: (845) 938-8495 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, is the new Email: [email protected] caliph. According to the statement, Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ “It is incumbent upon all Muslims to pledge allegiance to [al-Baghdadi] * For Press Inquiries: (845) 938-8495 and support him…The legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the khalifa’s authority and arrival of its troops to their areas.” – Reuters, June 29 support The Combating Terrorism Center would June 30, 2014 (UNITED STATES): Sinh like to express its gratitude to its financial Vinh Ngo Nguyen, of Garden Grove, supporters, for without their support and California, was sentenced to 13 years in shared vision of the Center products like the federal prison for attempting to provide CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you material support to a designated are interested in learning more about how foreign terrorist organization. Nguyen to support the Combating Terrorism Center, had told an undercover FBI agent please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call that he wanted to engage in jihad and Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association planned to travel to Pakistan to train of Graduates at 845-446-1561. al-Qa`ida fighters. – AP, June 30

June 30, 2014 (UNITED STATES): The White House will send an additional 200 troops to Iraq to increase security at the U.S. Embassy and Baghdad’s international airport. The views expressed in this report are those of The new deployment will also the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, include helicopters and unmanned the Department of the Army, or any other agency aerial drones. According to Voice of of the U.S. Government. America, the troops “will join the 275 troops sent to protect the embassy

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