v^-T~ l A,R UNIVERSITY

MAY-JUNE 1966 R ev iew

THE PROFESSIONAl JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

T he Bir d ’s-Eye Vlew of Arms Control and Disa r m a m e n t ...... 2 Lt. Gen. Fred M. Dean, usaf

E xercise DEEP FURROW 6 5 ...... 12 Lt. Gen. Benjamin J. Webster, usaf

T he Ch .alle.vge of the Per for ma n c e Spec t r u m for Mil it a r y Air c r a f t ...... 30 Hans Multhopp

T he Jolvt Chiefs of Staff and Defen se Policy F ormulation...... 40 Vlaj. Lawrence B. Tatum, usaf

T he Rise and Fall of the Stuka Div e Bomber...... 46 Col. William F. Scott, usaf

T he \'ext Dec a de in Computer Devel o pmen t ...... 64 Lt. Col. James E. Hughes, usaf

Rellability Analysis...... 71 Dr. James A. Fraser

NATO T actical Air Exercise, Chaumont...... 76 Lt. Col. Jack E. Barth, usaf Air Force Review Sel l ing Value En c ineer inc —T he USAF Road Show Appr o a c h ...... 81 Col. Stanley E. Allen, usaf In Mv Opinion Promotio.v : A Vie w from the Bottom...... 85 First Lt. Richard W. Elder, usaf

T he Junior Officer and His Supervisoh...... 91 First Lt. Charles P. McDowelI, usaf Books and Ideas T he Per il of Mispl a c ed Loyalties...... 93 Maj. Ray L. Bowers, usaf

A JOURNALIST Looics AT THE F l T U R E ...... 97 Dr. Elizabeth Hartsook

T he Contrlbutors...... 101

the cover Address manuscripts to the Editor, Air Uni- In September 1965 personnel of all four U.S. cersity Review, Aerospace Studies Institute, military Services joined Greek and Turkish Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. Printed by the Government Prinhng Office. Washington. forces in NATO’s Exercise DEEP FURROW D.C. Subscríptions are sold by the Air Uni- 65. Lieutenant General Benjamin J. Webster, versity Book Department. Maxwell Air Force who as Commander, AIlied Air Forces South­ Base, Ala.: yearly $4.50. badt isxues 75 ern Europe, played a significant role in the cents. USAF ascinutotc pu b l ic a t io s 50-2. joint exercise, describes it from its incep- tion through the air and amphibious assault phases in Turkey and Greece and offers an Vol. X V n No. 4 May-June 1966 estimate of overall exercise effectiveness. THE BIRD’S-EYE VIEW OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

L ie u t e n a n t Gen er a l Fred M. D ea n N MATTERS of defense and foreign affairs, third kind of bird among the hawks and the it has become popular to describe policv doves. This one is best described as the “eagle.” Iproposals and recommendations as being And this is a peculiarly American species of polarized around t\vo general outlooks. The eagle. for seized in its talons are both the olive proponents of these two outlooks have come branch of peace and the arrows of armed to be described as “hawks” and “doves.” But, strength. In general terms, the eagles turn out like most collective terms that attempt to gener­ to be much less bellicose than the hawks and alize or oversimplify, these sobriquets are sub- far tougher than the doves. ject to inaccurate if not misleading definition. general outlooks At one extreme, the hawks are depicted as soar- ing boldly in the updrafts from the brink of Before taking up the United States arms war, crying stridently for forceful, positive ac- control and disarmament goals and objectives, tions or responses, wings poised for the plunge. I shall survey briefly what seem to be the gen­ On the other band, the doves are usually con- eral outlooks of the birds on this subject, as I ceived of as fluttering along a timid path have come to understand them. through a thicket of abstract ideas, such as the Generally, the hawks call for “peace U.S. image, world opinion, and intemational through strength.” They are convinced that Iegalities, while uttering gentle cooing calls for military power is the only common, meaning- delicacy of approach, negotiation, and concilia- ful language of intemational relations and that tion—and occasionally resting on a moral pereh. overwhelming superiority of such power is the These are, of course, extreme portravals, only thing that keeps Communist aggression in for the most part greatly overdrawn as well as check. They hold that war is a historie social unflattering and sometimes unfair to the sincer- institution rising from clashes of national self- ity and motives of those to whom the labeis interests among contending nation-states; as may be attached. But these appellations do such, war cannot be abolished, so the best to be serve as useful devices with which to isolate hoped for is to deter it. pros and cons and to identify competing voices, They point with concern to the historie both in and out of the government, that seek failure of previous U.S. and intemational dis­ to influence the course of events. armament efforts and the inadequacy of the This hyperbole of the birds is also apposite League of Nations and United Nations to deal in matters of arms control and disarmament, successfully with security problems, especially because such matters impinge upon both de­ when the interests of the major powers were fense and foreign policy concems. This im- involved. pingement has resulted in the emergence of a In sum, the hawk Outlook is that the pros- 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW pects for any serious measures on arms control bring the world down. They also consider it and disarmament are of very low probability important that we not overbuild our defensive- for the foreseeable future. Even limited meas­ offensive capabilities to the detriment of other ures may, in fact, be quite dangerous to our components of our national strength, i.e., eco- national seeurity. nomic, social, and political. But they also have What of the doves? Their main premise serious reservations concerning Communist is that the very existence of armaments, par- motives and intentions. With all this, there is tieularly the nuclear arsenais, creates fear and the eonviction that balanced, adequate U.S. intemational tensions which keep the world on strength is indispensable as a basis for any the knife-edge of the “balance of terror.” They hopeful prospects of arms control negotiations contend that fear causes war and that the with the Communist States. At the same time, causes of fear must be sharply reduced before the eagles are willing for the United States to a meaningful solution to intemational differ- negotiate arms control and disarmament possi- ences can materialize. The doves’ approach to bilities whenever our adversaries are willing to alleviation of such causes favors experimenta- talk meaningfully on a rational, quid pro quo tion. basis. At the outer reaches of the dovecote can In essence, the eagles believe that a con- even be heard calls for world govemment as tinuing dialogue should be sustained by the the only wav of resolving conflict between U.S. with its adversaries. The purpose would nation-states, with all military power central- be both to determine the nature of their motives ized under supranational control to police a and intent and to convey to them, as well as rapidly disarmed world. The more thoughtful to friendly and neutral nations, the United and serious-minded doves, however, do not States’ eonviction and sincerity of purpose in press this far but do urge deliberate speed for working for a lessening of tensions and for a changes in the world system to eliminate war slowing down of the arms race through bal­ and reliance upon military power as the arbiter anced, verifiable agreements. in intemational relations. From the discussion thus far, it should be To summarize, the doves hold that, under clear that the eagles represent the collective the urgencies of modern conditions brought on views and actions of the U.S. Govemment. Yet by the collapse of time and space and the vast the reader should not be misled into thinking destructiveness of weapons created by tech- that during the formulation of policy and nology, nations and peoples can and must recommendations the eagles are therefore a change. They argue that the “unthinkable” monolithic body of opinion and judgments, consequences of war at thermonuelear leveis speaking with one voice. It cannot be over- are so exigent that a bold intemational pro- looked that within the span of the govemment gram, led by the United States, must be there are those individuais specifically charged launched to dismantle the modem instruments with responsibility for the size and number of of war. Otherwise, they mournfully conclude, arrows the eagle carries, whereas others are time may run out and, through fear, insecurity, much more involved in the cultivation and ap- and miscalculation by nuclear-armed nations, plication of the olive branch. the world may end in radioactive ruins. Thus, the differenees of views expressed Thus, it would appear that the outlooks of by the various eagles stem from their differing the hawks and the doves are as divergent with responsibilities and their perspectives on the respect to the approach to arms control and hoic and the tchen of arms control and disarma­ disarmament as they are in regard to other ment, rather than the ichat and the why. This defense and foreign policy questions. Let us, is as it should be; otherwise the President then, consider the eagles’ views. would be denied the range of alternatives and Collectively, the eagles agree on and em- choice of options which he needs to formulate phasize the need to work for alternatives to sound decisions on arms control and disarma­ huge arsenais of weapons which, if used, could ment policy. ARA/S CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 5

Once these executive decisions are made, foreign policy, must be consistent with national of course, the views of all those who advise the security policy as a whole. President tend to merge in support of a single In pursuance of this ultimate goal and in position: that of the official eagle of the United accordance with the above policy, the United States, poised in balance between the olive States seeks to achieve the following arms con­ branch and the sheaf of arrows. trol and disarmament objectives: The foregoing notwithstanding, the Amer­ • A stable international environment ican tradition of debating public policv remains conducive to arms control and disarmament a very active one. The nrgent cries of the hawks • Nonproliferation among nations of and the insistent cooings of the doves continue. weapons of mass destruction, delivery vehieles, They swoop and flutter about the U.S. eagle, and conventional weapons the one tugging to loose his arrows, the other pressing him to lift higher the olive branch. • No outbreak of hostilities; if hostilities Small wonder that the old bird gets a little occur, reduction of their destructiveness, and ruffled from time to time in maintaining his containment and termination of them balanced perch on arms control and disarma- • Limitation and reduction of armed ment matters! forces, armaments, and military expenditures. Moving now from the general to the spe- Additionally, in striving for these objec­ cific, we shall first state the structure of na- tives, the L^nited States must plan for the eco- tional goals and supporting objectives vvhich nomic consequences of reduced defense spend- shape the United States efforts in arms control ing, both in the United States and abroad, and disarmament, then examine the respective resulting from arms control and disarmament bird’s-eye views on the major issues relative to measures, and for the constructive use of the these goals and objectives. I hope in this way resources thus released. to provide the reader with a framework of un- derstanding and a selection of perspectives the bird's-eye views on major Issues which will contribute to the formulation of his own position and personal views on this con- The significant major issues in arms con­ troversial but vital and contemporary subject. trol and disarmament take shape when the general outlooks of the hawks, doves, and national goals, policy, and objectives eagles are focused specifically on the U.S. arms control and disarmament objectives. The pull- The first type of question one might log- ing and hauling relative to these objectives de­ ically ask when initially considering arms con­ volve from the differing views held as to their trol and disarmament is: “What is the United priorities and how best to go about attaining States trying to achieve and what is the funda­ them. mental policy which guides its efforts in arms To a considerable extent. the question of control and disarmament?” priority of objectives conditions the views of The answer can be found in the law of the each group with respect to the major issues. land, specifically Public Law 87-297, “The For example, the hawk conviction is that until Arms Control and Disarmament Act,” which the objective of a stable international environ­ States, in substance, that an ultimate goal of ment (as they understand it) is achieved, the United States is a world which is free from efforts toward obtaining the other objectives the scourge of war and the danger and burdens do not make much sense, or may be damaging of armaments, in which the use of force has to U.S. national security. The doves, on the been subordinated to the rule of law, and in other hand, place overriding priority on the which International adjustments to a changing objective of limiting and reducing armaments world are achieved peacefully. In seekmg to as the indispensable key to progress on the achieve this ultimate goal, arms control and other objectives stated. But the eagles do not disarmament policy, as an important aspect of accept either of these rigid priorities. They hold 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW that the United States should pursue parallel Soviets view arms control and disarmament lines of action, advancing toward all four ob- purely as a propaganda ploy to keep the U.S. jectives on a broad front, retaining the flexibil- off balance and to c-ast us in the role of imperial- ity to adjust priorities among them to exploit ist warmongers in the eyes of the so-called opportunities or to respond to the exigencies unaligned nations or lesser developed coun- of the world situation. tries, especially those that are likely Commu­ nist targets for subversion and “just wars of national liberation.” The hawk-like conclusion is that, since we are on top in the strategic T hese respective attitudes toward priorities should be kept in mind in the follow- picture, our best hope for a stable international ing discussion of major issues, set within the environment is to convince the U.S.S.R. we context of the U.S. arms control and disarma- intend to stay there. Tinis, any arms control ment objectives. agreement which the U.S. might undertake must have as its basic premise the maintenance of this superior position while reducing the Soviet threat to the United States and Europe. “u stable environment The doves, to the contrary, urge that we cotulucive to arms control . . must open a dialogue on arms control and dis­ armament with Communist China now, else all The major issues related to this objective prospects of international stability will wither. revolve around two questions. First, are mean- They maintain that bringing the Chinese Com­ ingful arms control and disarmament negotia- munists into such a dialogue, with the status tions and international agreements possible of a recognized member of the international without participation of Communist China? eommunity, would have a civilizing effect on And, second, in view of current and foreseeable their bellicose attitudes toward the U.S. and world conditions is it possible for the United China’s neighbor nations. The doves insist that, States to enter into significant agreements with at the very least, such a dialogue would give the Soviet Union without detriment to our na- insight into Red Chinas intentions and clarify tional security? problems, thus soothing its frustrations and The view of the hawks is that Red China security fears to the point where it might be should continue to be isolated politically and possible to bring the Red Chinese nuclear effort contained militarily as a bandit nation. They under control. are concerned about the Chinese Communists’ With regard to the U.S.S.R., the doves ad- primitive nuclear capability but feel that a vance the view that significant changes have strategic threat to the United States is still well been and are occurring in that countrys Out­ off into the future. The hawks do consider, look. As a result the Soviet Union is no longer however, that should this threat develop more seriously oriented toward world revolution and rapidly than anticipated and if Red China con­ ultimate Communist domination or toward in- tinues its present belligerent course toward the evitable war. Rather, she is far more concerned U.S., we would then be justified in destroying about her relationships with Red China and her nuclear and industrial capabilities. In hawk the other Communist States and with serious idiom, this has been described as “returning internai problems in economics, industry, and Communist China to the Stone Age.” agriculture. Deeply worried about her security, Meanwhile, according to the hawks, the she is apprehensive of United States strategic major threat to the U.S., Europe, and the rest capabilities and intentions and the dangers of of the free world continues to be the Soviet nuclear war. From this, the doves conclude that Union. They voice strong doubts, if not down- the U.S.S.R. is no longer the major active threat right disbelief, of any serious intentions on the to the U.S. and our allies, providing that we do part of the latter toward arms control and dis­ not destabilize the international environment armament. Some hawks will argue that the or upset the military balance by developing ARMS CONTROL AND P1SARMAMENT 7

and deploving additional new and advanced and policies to the extent held by the doves, weaponry. but they are willing to agree that the Soviets The doves put forth that, as the most pow- do have their problems, mostly of their own erful nation, the United States should consider creation. The eagles consider that these prob­ and accommodate the ehanged outlooks and lems, taken in eonjunction with U.S. determina- fears of the Soviets as a first step in improving tion and obvious capability to act at the time of the intemational environment. From our posi- the Cuban crisis, led to the limited détente tion of great power, \ve should not insist on wherein we were able to make some progress arms control measures which are obviously to on arms control with the U.S.S.R. Now the the U.S. advantage and which serve only to eagles are concemed that this détente is deteri- heighten the Soviets’ sense of strategic inferi- orating into a new chili in U.S.-U.S.S.R. rela- ority and give rise to their fears. Moreover, say tions, which the latter blames on the U.S. the doves, a positive U.S. gesture in this direc- actions in Vietnam. The eagles, however, sense tion would signal the beginnings of a real dé- that the real source of this new freeze is Soviet tente between the super powers, making frustration at not being able to influence the possible the first real tum dovvnward in the situation in Vietnam in the face of American arms race. Some doves seem to think it might power and determination and Communist even be possible that the U.S.S.R. would see Chinas obstreperousness. Meanwhile, the the advantages of working with the U.S. to eagles are firm in their view that the United tame Red China into peaceful ways and to States should continue the arms control and dampen outbreaks of violence such as the disarmament dialogue with the U.S.S.R., both India-Pakistan clash. to determine if there are indeed any prospects The eagles’ attitude is one of guarded for a serious change in her outlooks and inten- watchfulness, strongly conditioned by the tions and to convince the Soviets that our in- United States commitment in Vietnam. The tentions toward them are not aggressive. outcome of Red Chinas attitudes and actions The eagles do not consider that the U.S. there and elsewhere will be the key factor in should attempt to tell the U.S.S.R. how to solve any change in the current U.S. views of Com- her problems, even if she would listen. munist China, one way or the other. Mean- At the same time, through the continuing while, the eagles do not see any evidence that dialogue, the eagles sense that even the Soviets the Chinese Communists are interested in im­ might eventually be able to see the advantages proving the intemational situation or joining that would accrue to them in stabilizing the the community of nations except under condi- intemational environment and leveling off, tions to the marked disadvantage of the United then tuming down the arms race. States and the free world. The eagles also feel that the Chinese discomfiture over their recent “nonproliferation of weapons . . .” setbacks in the lesser developed countries and in the India-Pakistan confrontation, coupled The significant major issue at present re- with their worsening philippic with the lated to the U.S. arms control objec-tive of pre- U.S.S.R., indicates a very low probability of venting proliferation of weapons of mass de- any interest on their part in participating in an struction is how the U.S. should deal with the arms control and disarmament dialogue. In uncompromising Soviet attitude toward a fact, recent statements by high Communist nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Chinese leaders are to the effect that U.S. arms The hawk view of this issue is based on control and disarmament proposals are simply the premise that nuclear hardware sharing in an imperialist aggressor plot to disarm poor but Europe, such as a Multilateral Nuclear Force/ honest Communist China and divide the world Atlantic Nuclear Force ( ml f/anf) type of ar- into American and Soviet spheres of control. rangement, is an overriding political and mili- The eagles are not convinced that the tary necessity. The hawks point out that, U.S.S.R. has been transformed in its outlooks without such an arrangement, the Federal 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Republic of Germany could become dissociated of adequate arrangements for the planning, from the nato alliance and seek to develop her targeting, and coordinated control of nuclear own nuclear capabilities. The hawks urge that weapons is indispensable to the defense of our the U.S.S.R. must be brought to accept that nato partners, including the F.R.G. The U.S. nuclear hardware sharing can be arranged so finds it unacceptable that the Soviets should that it does not constitute nuclear spread but dictate what these arrangements may or may in fact is the best way of attaining nonprolifera- not be. In fact, the eagles point out that the tion in Europe. In any event, conclude the U.S. and nato would be greatly interested in hawks, nato must have an ml f/anf type of knowing what arrangements the U.S.S.R. has arrangement in face of the menacing Soviet instituted in the Warsaw Pact military structure nuclear posture of hundreds of mh bms based for the control of nuclear weapons. With the in the western U.S.S.R. and targeted on West background of recent delivery of tactical nu­ Germany. clear systems to Warsaw Pact forces, the Soviet As for the doves’ views on the question of reply to this question has been one of dead Soviet attitudes toward a nonproliferation silence. treaty, they emphasize that the U.S.S.R. has The eagles take a global view of both the very genuine apprehensions concerning the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the Federal Republic of Germanys gaining any urgency of preventing it, as compared with form of access to nuclear weapons. They point the seemingly exclusive Soviet focus on West out that the Soviet polemics about West Ger- Germany. Therefore, the eagles believe that man “revanchism” are not just propaganda but the major task ahead for the United States is indeed represent deep-seated Soviet anxieties to persuade the Soviets of the importance of as to future German intentions, which the U.S. the global problem and to convince them that. should treat more empathicallv. within this context, nato nuclear control ar- The doves argue that U.S. policy should rangements will contribute to reducing the urge the F.R.G. to accept something much less worldwide proliferation possibilities posed by than the ml f/anf (which they note other such nations as índia, Sweden, Israel, and European nations do not like either) in order Japan. to remove the major obstacle to attaining a nonproliferation treaty with the U.S.S.R. now, “prevention, containment, before the nuclear dam breaks. Since it is termination of hostilities . . American power which guarantees European and German securitv in any event, they feel The major issues at controversy among the that revision of the West German position on hawks, doves, and eagles concerning the U.S. nato nuclear sharing arrangements is a must objective of preventing, containing, and termi- if we are to see any modification of the unbend- nating hostilities stem from the differing views ing Soviet attitude. on the East-West confrontation and the U.S. In countering the importunities of both role in relation to the lesser developed, emerg- hawks and doves concerning the Soviet stand ing nations in the world. on a nonproliferation treaty, the eagles advance The hawks contend that the overriding two main points. needs of the emerging nations are stable gov- First, the United States does not hold that emment and the arms and forces to defend the ml f is the only solution to nato nuclear themselves against Communist subversion and arrangements. To the contrarv, the idea was the related “just wars of national liberation. first introduced by the U.S. in order to stimulate Instability among the lesser developed coun- European thinking on this problem. The U.K. tries can directlv affect U.S. securitv interests proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force was the in key world areas, according to the hawks. only substantial response in this respect. Therefore, the proper course for the United Next. as long as the Soviet mrbm threat to States is to help build the shield of military Western Europe exists and grows, some form strength within these countries and back it ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 9

with U.S. power while assisting them with their surest way to attain and maintain the stability política] and economic difficulties. necessary to national independence and viabil- The hawks tend to stress the relative in- ity in the lesser developed countries. But this efFectnalness of the United Nations as a peace- balance ean be maintained only if the country keeping or conflict-resolving agency when the concemed is not subjected to the disruption differing interests of the major powers are en- of Communist-inspired and-directed violence. gaged. Hence, they insist, if Communist- The eagles consider that such threats endanger inspired or -directed hostilities break out in the not just the nation and region so attacked but lesser developed countries and are to be con- the ultimate security of the United States and tained and terminated to the advantage of U.S. the rest of the free world. Thus, although the and free world security, the United States had eagles look hopefully for assistance from U.S. better be ready to do the job, quickly and well. allies that have interests in the endangered On the problems of the lesser developed area, military support by the United States may countries, the doves tend to be quite criticai. be the only means of preventing, containing, or They complain that U.S. policy is dominated terminating hostilities brought on by Soviet or by military considerations vvhich contribute to Chinese Communist cat’s-paws clawing at the instability and to the outbreak of hostilities in vitais of an emerging nation. As in Vietnam, these areas, rather than prevent them. They the scope and pervasiveness of the armed urge that the best way to prevent these con- struggle against Communist aggression can flicts would be for the United States to support cause the military aspects of U.S. support to efforts to tackle, as the fírst priority, the political overshadow the other kinds of assistance in and economic difficulties of these countries on response to a developing nation’s needs. But, a regional basis. These efforts should be insti- the eagles insist, these other needs would be- tutionalized through intemational organiza- come completely academic if the United States tion and participation, to minimize the condi- did not provide the necessary military aid to tions which lead to friction and the outbreak bolster a smaller nations efforts to excise the of war in these areas. With this, the doves Communist enemy. exhort the U.S. to seek ways and means to While desiring that the United States do achieve agreement among the major powers to all it can to work through and strengthen the stem the flow of arms into the lesser developed United Nations and the efficacy of intemational countries, c-onduding that, if the tools of war law, the eagles somberly view the perspective are denied, the dangers of conflict are propor- of the past twenty years. What they see tells tionately diminished. them that the rule of law among the nations Finally, the doves plead for much more of the world has not prevailed. While continu- attention and support for the United Nations ing to strive toward that hoped-for goal through as the best hope for peace-keeping in troubled the United Nations, the eagles maintain that areas. They urge that the U.S. take the lead in the United States must reserve the prerogative obtaining agreements on setting up a perma- of employing its power in the protection of its nent U.N. force, as visualized in the U.N. Char­ smaller allies and its own security interests. ter, and such other U.N. organizations as a Meanwhile, with his olive branch held forward, Peace Observer Corps. the eagle invites all nations to join with the These latter views relate to the doves’ United States in searching for peaceful ways apparent conviction that the unilateral exercise of preventing, containing, or terminating hos­ of U.S. military power is essentially provocative tilities, wherever they may occur. and may lead to a direet confrontation with the U.S.S.R. or Communist China, with the attend- “limitation and reduction of ant danger of a rapid escalation into nuclear armed forces and armaments . . .” disaster. The eagles aver that balaneed military, The salient issue which stems from the political, and socioeconomic assistance is the differing views on these arms control and dis- 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW armament objectives relates to the matter of a edge that no advantage accrues to the United freeze on the numbers and characteristics of States from overbuilding these weapons be- strategic nuclear delivery vehicles ( sn dv) and yond its essential security needs of deterrence an ultimate reduction in their numbers. and damage limitation. Although the gap be- The hawks seem to think that the idea of tween U.S. and U.S.S.R. sn dv capabilities has a freeze and reduction of sn dv’s borders on the narrowed slightly, the present and planned absurd. Thev stress that it is patently illogical U.S. deployments provide a significant strategic for a nation like the U.S.S.R. to negotiate and superiority. However, the eagles believe that a agree to a condition of present and future in- freeze and reduction of sn dvs which would not feriority in strategic capabilities. The hawks disturb the relative strategic balance could be contend further that, even should the Soviets worthwhile as a stabilizing element. They do make such an agreement, they would only do see some problems with the verification aspects so for the purpose of evading it while they of any possible agreement, but they consider worked to close the strategic gap, as they are that verification could be accomplished with probably doing even now. Moreover, it is the adequate reliability. hawk view that verification of such an agree- On the other hand, the eagles point out rnent with any acceptable degree of reliability that the greatest obstacle to discussing or nego- would probably be impossible. A hard-pressed tiating an sn dv freeze and reduction agreement hawk argument is that with a growing war on remains the fact that the U.S.S.R. simply shows its hands in Vietnam the United States needs no interest in doing so. all the strategic nuclear capabilities available, both to sustain the deterrence of nuclear war and to deal with Communist China, if neces- sary. So, the hawks conclude, the best thing for I n an article of this length it is impossible to the U.S. to do is to keep building and improv- do more than touch selectively upon the high- ing upon our sxdv capabilities, to convince the lights and the most outstanding issues stem- Soviets that they are in a losing game. ming from the many viewpoints on the complex The doves plead that there are so many field of arms control and disarmament. As any sn dvs available to both sides that they make well-informed Citizen or student of defense and the present danger of nuclear war intolerably foreign affairs will be quick to see, there are high. From this they postulate that an im- many other related or subordinate issues which mediate freeze at current leveis, followed by have not even been touched upon here. (In early reductions of significant numbers of fact, there are sufficient other major issues and sn dvs, would not detract from the essential related differing viewpoints which have not securitv needs of either side. As a result, the been discussed here to provide the basis for doves claim. a marked reduction in East-West another treatise as long as this one!) To men- tensions could be expected, laying the founda- tion but a few of these omitted matters, there tion for a true détente and contributing to the is first the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test possibility of real political Solutions to other ban versus the so-called “threshold” test ban questions. proposal, or the question of whether the U.S. The doves foresee no great problems in should even venture to extend the present verification of an agreement on sn dv freeze and limited nuclear test ban with its built-in safe- reduction, through a combination of unilateral guards. Next, there is the question of the means and the witnessing of weapons destroyed deployment of anti-ballistic-missile ( abm ) rather than those remaining. And, they con­ defenses relative to our arms control and dis- clude, even with significant reductions, the armament objectives and whether this deploy­ United States would still have more than ment would or would not be a destabilizing enough capacity to handle any threat from Red influence on the international environment. China in the foreseeable future. Then there is the matter of what can be done On the sn dv question, the eagles acknowl- in the arms control and disarmament field to ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 11 ease the East-West confrontation in Europe. ing or contradictory importance in the eye of And. to conclude this sample listing, there is the beholder. Thus, there are no readily avail- the issue which centers on the impact that the able, pat answers offering quick, easy reso- nuclear nonproliferation and test ban efforts lutions. might have on the future peaceful uses of • Second, the hawks, the doves, and the nuclear explosions; for instance, nuclear exea- eagles sometimes appear inconsistent in their vation of a sea-level Isthmian canal. I think respective positions from one issue to another, that the reader can be assured that the compet- because of the differences of view and approach ing views and voices of the various avian pro- to the objectives, their priorities, and the re- tagonists are just as animated and diverse on lated issues. these issues as on those which I have discussed • And, finally, the many voices compet- here. ing to be heard generate a great temptation to It does seem to me, however, that there associate oneself with those who urge “Do are three points which can be fairly well sum- something!” Yet, to identify the right things to marized from this discourse on the bird’s-eye do, to avoid the wrong decisions which could view of arms c-ontrol and disarmament and the irrevocablv commit the United States to a fatal U.S. national goals and objectives therein. course of action—this is what the reader must • First, there are many facets to every find for himself among the arguments of the issue involved, and each of these assumes vary- hawks, the doves, and the eagles. U.S. Arms Control ò- Disarmament Agencij DEEP FURROW 65

L ie u t e n a n t Gen er a l Ben ja mix J. W ebst er

> ** XERCISE deep furrow 65 was several portion. High overhead a Tactical Air Com­ hours under way vvhen the long cara- mand C-130 transport orbited, serving as an E van of staff cars and buses swung airbome command post. Expected momentar- into a grassy parking area near the provincial ily was the first C-130 troop carrier aircraft with Turkish city of Adapazari. In the still early a pathfinding U.S. Strike Command Combat dawn, xa to military and civilian observers Control Team and its protector, an Army As- converged on the tented observation post over- sault Team. looking a wide valley. A one-hour delay was announced because From there they would witness the start of the fog. of the ground phase; however, it was soon In the meantime, 250 miles to the west in apparent that it was going to be other than the Aegean Sea, naval task forces from the U.S. routine because the flags of natos 15 nations Sixth Fleet and the Royal Hellenic Navy were were hanging limply on the standards fronting deploving and forming for amphibious assault the reviewing stands. The rising sun confirmed maneuvers that would immediately follow the the worst fears of the directing staff—fog. Al- Turkish phase. In all, nearly 60,000 soldiers, ready airbome were over 2000 United States sailors, marines, and airmen were poised. Over and Turkish paratroopers and their equipment. 50 naval vessels were participating, and 400 This fog-blanketed valley was their drop zone jet aircraft were airbome or alerted on Turkish ( dz). and Hellenic airfields and carriers at sea for After nearly a year of planning, a large- the exercise. scale nato exercise was once again being con- The fullness of dawn revealed the static ducted in the Southern Region. The observers display and observation area where the Su- were there to witness the joint U.S.-Turkish preme Allied Commander, Europe ( sa c eur ), airbome assault, the kick-off of the live-play General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, usa, had joined S, £ %° B s Tb r;a c e Ç •Bolu rf » |í 1 -riisa AB ^AEGEAN .Topei AB • Ankara S£4 0cT j* v ' .: SK.YROS Cigli AB O » lzmir

*Kusadasi PELpPONNESUS Incirlik AB Adana • C* Malea

RHODES

CRETE KASOS ** CYPRUS / 7\

*N SEA

the Commander in Chief. Allied Forces. South­ C-130 departed its holding pattern and closed ern Europe ( cincsouth), Admirai Charles D. in on the dz. Griffin. usx, civilian dignitaries, and other mili- tary leaders to witness the airdrop. Admirai planning Griffin was the overall commander for deep furrow 65. With him were Lieutenant General The pattern of events had been fonning John H. Michaelis. usa, Commander of n'ato for more than a year. land forces in Greece and Turkey, and myself, A Southern Region command post exer- Commander of nato air forces in Italy, Creece, cise was scheduled for the period 14—18 Sep- and Turkey. Also on hand was Major General tember, involving those forces of Greece, Italy, Clyde Box, usaf, Commander of the Sixth Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United Allied Tactical Air Force, which is composed States earmarked for nato’s wartime use. As­ of Royal Hellenic Air Force, Turkish Air Force. sociated with this command post exercise Roval Air Force, and United States Air Force ( cpx), called dense crop 65, were two follow- contributions to the nato defense of Creece on training exereises: Dia mo n d bl u e, a combi- and Turkey and surrounding seas. nation cpx-ftx (field training exercise), to be Thick ground fog is an ankle-huster and conducted in northern Italv by Southern Re­ unloved hv airborne troops. In peacetime train- gion land, sea, and air forces; and deep furrow, ing exereises it is treated with even greater an ftx, to be conducted in and around Greece respect for safety reasons. Of course the exer- and Turkey by the combined land, air, and sea cise plans allowed for delays such as this, but forces of xta t o plus externai forces from the we were anxious to get under way. Fortunately, United States Strike Command and the United in 30 minutes the solid blanket of fog began States Atlantic Fleet. to break, and 70 miles to the southeast the lead The basic scenario for these three exereises Allied Forces, Southern Europe

Hq Fifth Allied Tocticol Hq Sixfh Allied Tocticol Air Force (5 ATAF| Air Force (6 ATAF)

V»c*nxa( ftoty limir( Twrkíy

provided for a situation where an aggressor. the and defeat the enemy forces remaining in Orange bloc, began hostilities against the Greece and Turkey. The training aims were to Southern Region countries: Greece, Italy, and provide nato and externai forces live practice Turkey. This offensive stalled. and the enemy in large-scale joint and combined operations initiated general nuclear war, which resulted while testing Southern Region defense plans in a massive nuclear exchange between Orange and procedures. forces and nato forces, known as bl u e. After Detailed planning for deep furrow began the aggressor recovered from nato nuclear with a conference at Headquarters Allied Land retaliation. Orange forces launched a large- Forces Southeastern Europe ( landsoutheast) scale ground attack in Hellenic and Turkish in Izmir, Turkey, during January 1965. The Thrace. coupled with an amphibious and air- conference was attended by representatives bome invasion of the Kocaeli Península of Tur­ from all interested Southern Region national key. Blue forces mounted delaying and de- and nato staflFs as vvell as the externai com- fensive actions, which blunted the enemy mands of st r ic o m, ma t s, and usafe. The seena- thmsts. By about D —20. externai forces con- rio was presented, and basic agreement was sisting of an airbome task force and an am­ reached on participating units and the concepts phibious task force had arrived in the Southern for deployment. employment, and redeploy- Region and were made available to cincsouth. ment of forces. W ith the addition of these forces the situation In February a combination planning con­ was considered favorable for a Blue counter- ference and reconnaissance was held in Thes- offensive. The stage was set for deep furrow. salonike, Greece, for the purpose of determin- The overall objective was for Southern ing the exact location for the amphibious Region nato forces, supported by externai air­ landings and airdrop zone, as vvell as the scena- bome and amphibious forces, to counterattack rio and methods for exercise play in Greece. 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

This conference was attended by representa- U.S. Marines and Hellenic troops, would con- tives from afsouth, laxdsoutheast, airsouth, duct an amphibious assault in the Struma River st r ikf o r so u t h , 6th ataf, and the Hellenic area of Hellenic Thrace, with the mission of National Defense General Staff. securing a beachhead and preparing for the in- In March a second planning conference troduetion of laxdsoutheast follow-up forces. was held in Izmir, with all participating staffs The third phase of deep furrow would represented. Several problems were resolved, consist of an over-the-beach logistical opera­ particularly c-oncerning the reception and stag- tion, with off-landing of supplies and move­ ing areas for the st r ic o m forces at Incirlik and ment overland to support the fighting on the Cigli Air Bases in Turkey. Kocaeli Península. In June a reconnaissance of the drop zone For the airborne operation in Turkey, a and proposed redeployment airfields in Turkey Joint Task Force ( jt f ) was formed. As part was carried out by a team headed by st r ic o m. of the overall laxdsoutheast counteroffensive, usafe, ma t s, airsouth, 6th ataf, usareur, the jt f would have the mission of conducting laxdsoutheast, and Turkish representatives the airborne assault. surveyed the proposed redeployment airfield Command during the airborne operation at Topei, Turkey, and the drop zone at Ada- would involve the commanders of the Joint pazari. Of particular concern to the team were Task Force, of laxdsoutheast, and of air­ the suitability of these two areas and the exter­ so ut h . nai support which would be required for the National authorities were made responsi- operation. ble for the movement of their forces to the A final deep furrow planning conference reception bases in Turkey. cixcsouth would was held in Izmir during the last week of July. assume operational command of the forces at At this time detailed plans were coordinated, the reception bases for the duration of the exer­ and all major unresolved problems were settled. cise. Upon completion of the exercise, opera­ tional command of the forces would revert to national authorities. concept of operations cixcsouth directed comlaxdsoutheast In cixcsouths Exercise Operation Order to coordinate the planning and execution of deep furrow, three simultaneous live phases the airborne operation. This entailed conduct­ were planned in the time frame of 21-26 days ing operations to support the land phases of after the beginning of general war: the operation and, upon termination of the air­ borne operations, assuming operational control Phase I—Defense against a seaborne and of the Armv element of the Joint Task Force. an airbome landing on Tur- Hq airsouth was directed to coordinate key’s Kocaeli Península the air operations of the Joint Task Force dur­ Phase II—Defense against the enemy ing airborne assault operations and to provide thrust in Hellenic Thrace air support as requested by the Commander, Phase III—Movement of supplies across Joint Task Force, through the Commander, 6th the beaches in western Tur­ ataf, whose headquarters at Sirinyer, Turkey, key. is adjacent to Izmir and the Joint Command In Phase I the concept for employment Operations Center (jcoc). called for a force of U.S. and Turkish airbome The Commander, Joint Task Force, was troops to land at the base of the Kocaeli Penin- designated as the overall commander within sula with the mission of sealing off the penín­ the airborne objective area. He would exercise sula, assisting the movements of other Turkish operational control over forces not a part of the ground forces into the area, and then fighting Joint Task Force, except air defense forces, as part of the Turkish First Army until relieved. when such forces were operating within the In Phase II an amphibious task force com- airhead. This control would be assumed at posed of U.S. and Hellenic naval units, plus 0300Z prior to take-off of the airlift forces as- EXERCISE DEEP FURROXV 65 17

signed to the airborne assault. When such tratively and link up vvith Hellenic forces in forces were merely passing through the objec- the vicinity of Serrai. This would terminate tive area. control vvould be exercised only to the operation. the extent of preventing and minimizing mutual The date selected as D-day for deep fur- interference. rovv was 21 September, but preparations and Other air operations in support of the movements began much earlier. Joint Task Force, to include air operations con- ducted over the objective area, vvould be STR1COM foice deployment and support coordinated vvith the Commander. Joint Task Force, in accordance vvith established joint usst r ic o ms deployed force consisted of command and control procedures. The jt f the jt f headquarters staff plus a Strike Com­ vvould maintain representation in the jc o c to munications Support Element and the Army insure continuous close coordination. Forces, Strike Command ( arstrike) and Air Upon termination of the airborne opera- Force Forces, Strike Command (afstrike). tion the Army and Air Forces elements of the st r ike jt f vvas commanded by Major Gen­ Joint Task Force vvould pass to the operational eral Jamie Gough, usaf, Director of Plans at control of the nato ground and air commanders Hq st r ic o m and also commander of one of two until released for redeployment. permanent Strike Joint Task Force Headquar­ For the live-play operations in Greece, an ters staffs. His deputy vvas Brigadier General Amphibious Task Force vvas to be formed and Richard G. Ciccolella, usa, st r ic o m’s Director become a part of the overall landsoutheast of Personnel. counteroffensive. This task force vvould have arstrike, jt f deep furrow Army forces, the mission of conducting the amphibious consisted of one airborne brigade composed of assault. Counteroffensive operations vvould in­ two infantry battalions and one artillery battery volve three commanders: Commander st r ik- from the 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg forsouth, Vice Admirai W. E. Ellis, comland- \orth Carolina, commanded by Brigadier so ut h ea st , and comairsouth. General Edward P. Smith, Assistant Com­ comlaxdsoutheast vvould have opera- mander of the 82d. tional control of the Hellenic First Army and afstrike, jt f deep furrow Air Force airborne forces operating in conjunction vvith forces, were commanded by Brigadier General the amphibious forces, but not vvithin the am­ Robert L. Delashaw, Deputy Commander, phibious objective area ( aoa ). Nineteenth Air Force. They included the C-130 The Commander, Amphibious Task Force, airlift force from the 314th Troop Carrier Wing, vvould exercise control of all forces operating Sevvart afb, Tennessee, and the 464th Troop vvithin the aoa beginning on the day prior to Carrier Wing, Pope afb, North Carolina, plus the initial amphibious landing. The concept the 613th Tactical Fighter Squadron of 18 F- vvas for an amphibious task force, consisting 100’s from England afb, Louisiana, which were of a U.S. Marine division vving team and a refueled en route by KC-135 tankers of the Hellenic landing force, to assault and seeure a Strategic Air Command. Communications sup­ beachhead. port carne from the 507th Combat Control This landing vvould be in conjunction vvith Group, Shaw afb, South Carolina. a battalion-size Hellenic airborne operation in During the deployment/redeployment, 45 the vicinity of Serrai, 20 miles northvvest of the ma t s aircraft (19 C-124 Clobemasters, 25 C- selected beaches, and a Hellenic First Army 130 Hercules, one C-135) and 70 Tactical Air attack from the west, both of which were out- Command C-130’s provided airlift for the side the aoa. Tactic-al fighters of 6th ataf st r ic o m forces, composed of over 3000 Army vvould provide air support to landsoutheast and Air Force personnel and 250 tons of cargo. forces outside the aoa. The first ma t s C-130 load of airborne troopers Once the beachhead was seeure, a land­ departed Pope afb on 15 September. so ut h ea st follow-up force would land adminis- The main body of the Joint Task Force 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW headquarters established itself at Sirinyer in preposition and deposition support equipment close proximity to Hq landsoutheast and 6th from bases in Central Europe and North África ATAF. With it was the jointly manned Air to exercise bases in Turkey, the 322d Air Divi- Force/Army Communications Support Ele- sion ( usafe) also added 25 C-130 sorties for ment ( cse), which consisted of t\vo field units the training and airdropping of the Turkish and a support element. Capable of providing Presidential Airborne Battalion, an element of the necessary Communications for Hq Joint the Presidential Airborne Brigade. Twenty C- Task Force to operate independently through- 130 sorties were flown by the 322d Air Division out the area, the cse packaged part of its equip- for the training and airdropping of a Hellenic ment aboard a C-130 aircraft to provide voice parachutist battalion in Greece. Two tac Rota- and wireless communication for airborne com- tional Squadrons from Evreux Air Base, France, mand post operations. and the ma t s Rotational Squadron from Rhein- During the deployment / establishment Main Air Base, Germany, supplied the aircraft period, an advance echelon of the st r ic o m jt f for the usafe airlift. Nearly 3,300,000 pounds staff set up operations at the Incirlik staging of equipment and supplies were moved by base. This jt f , headed by the Deputy Com- usafe airlift. mander, Brigadier General Ciccolella, would parachute into the dz with the first of the air­ borne forces on the morning of the assault. operations in Turkey Activities at Incirlik Air Base near Adana, Turkey, increased rapidly with the arrival of By 20 September (D-)-20) the Orange Hq arstrike. All the paratroopers were at In­ forces, by their attack in Turkish Thrace, were cirlik by 20 September. Personnel at this South­ endangering the strategic Dardanelles. The ern Turkey base were billeted in a tent city Bosporus, splitting Istanbul and Europe from located north of the airfield, while the C-130’s Asia, was an obvious objective. The Orange were parked in dispersed hardstands around bloc force on the Kocaeli Península, some 60 the perimeter of the field. miles east of Istanbul, thus posed a serious Responsibility for providing support for threat to nato defending forces. the jt f fell primarily on usafe. usafes area Some 30 miles Southwest of the Kocaeli support organization, the United States Logis- area are the Gulf of Izmit and the Sea of Mar- tics Group in Turkey ( tusloc) was given a mara. Capture of this strategic area would stringent test with the requirement for billet- isolate Istanbul from the rest of Turkey. The ing, messing, and other support for an influx loss of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles would of over 3000 personnel. open the Mediterranean to Orange naval forces In addition to the logistical support pro- in the Black Sea. vided at Incirlik, extensive support was pro- cincsouth directed that airborne rein- vided by usafe at Topei, the redeployment forcements join a Turkish First Armv force airfield. Topei is a “bare base,” i.e., without rushing to meet the invaders. A valley 15 miles permanent-party personnel or facilities. usafe northwest of Adapazari was selected for the dz. provided Communications, weather, and navi- Plans called for the airborne force of 1600 U.S. gational facilities, including a mobile tower, and 500 Turkish paratroopers, plus heavy tacan, weather interceptor van, and beacon. equipment, to drop at dawn on 21 September Communications were also provided between and link up with the Turkish First Army. Under Izmir, Incirlik, and Cigli Air Base. A Casualty landsoutheast command, the combined force Staging Flight, with attached Aeromedical would push forward and drive the invaders into Evacuation Control Team, was established at the sea. Topei to furnish medicai facilities for the opera- Weather naturally was a key factor. A tion. frontal system pushing towards Turkey from usafe was also active in the airlift role. Europe threatened to delay the drop by 24 Flying over 120 C-130 and C-124 sorties to hours, but the front slowed its movement S £

uibul KOCAELI PENÍNSULA

JTF ( AOVON)

BOE 82 ABN OIV

TURKISH

Kocaeli Península region, Turkeij—site of the airborne counteroffensive

enough for a “Go” decision to be made at mid- fly over 250 close-support sorties during the night, 20 September. exercise. The objective area was a dry lake bed, Before dawn at Incirlik, all the afstrike covered by recently harvested fields. At 0630Z C-130’s, loaded with S2d Airborne Division on D-day. 21 September, afstrike F-100s com- paratroopers and equipment, taxied out to the menced simulated fighter strikes in the objec­ runway on schedule. The first C-130 took off tive area, to soften it up as a prelude to the at 0425 local, carrving the Combat Control airborne assault. Team ( cct) and Airborne Assault Team ( aat). During this assault all close-air-support Take-off was on schedule, and vfr condi- and troop-carrier-escort missions called for tions were excellent over the entire route of were successfully completed by the 613th Tac- flight except for the local fog condition in the tic-al Fighter Squadron operating from Cigli drop zone. Air Base. Above 20,000 feet in the drop area, The stream of 68 afstrike C-130’s en route Turkish Air Force jets provided air defense. to the drop zone flew at low levei at 250 knots, In addition to this support. 6th ataf jets would to avoid radar detection as long as possible. 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Rendezvous with the Turkish airborne force All observers considered the airborne took place at Ankara. Staging out of Murted Air operation professionally executed. Only six Base near Ankara, a flight of nine C-130’s joined minor and no major injuries were reported out up at the end of the stream, completing the of 2037 troops jumping into an unfamiliar dz. entire jt f deep furrow Airborne Assanlt Force Only three of the 102 vehicles dropped were in one of the criticai maneuvers of the exercise. damaged as a result of aerial delivery malfunc- Six of these nine C-130’s were from usafe (one tions. of them was rigged for equipment drop), and After completion of the airborne assault, three were from the Turkish Air Force. the AFSTRiKE C-130’s retumed to Incirlik. At 0750, the first C-130 executed the “pop- Twenty-two of these aircraft were then re- up” maneuver, climbing swiftly from 200 feet cycled, and they airlifted 49 vehicles and 24 to 1250 feet over the drop zone, then slowing trailers to Topei Air Base. After being airland- down to 125 knots before disgorging the Com- ed, the vehicles joined the Army forces of bat Control Team and Army Assault Team. The Strike Command that afternoon. assault team rapidly deployed while the control Link-up with the Turkish First Army ele- team quickly set up its navigational equipment ments on the right was attained at 0920, and and rádios, marked the drop zone with smoke, all airhead objectives were aggressively seized. and prepared to guide the main airborne as­ At 1243, all conditions established as prerequi- sault force into the target area. sites to the transfer of operational control had The main force, which had been directed been met: the airhead was secure; link-up had into a holding pattern at Bolu, 70 miles east of been effected with the Turkish First Army; the drop zone, received orders to proceed. The liaison officers and forward air controllers had orders to hold and proceed were issued by the been exchanged; and effective Communications jt f Combat Control Team. At 0805, after a had been established with the Turkish XV one-hour-and-fíve-minute delay, the main force Corps. At 1500, operational control of the flew over the drop zone in offset in-trail forma- Strike jt f ’s Army forces passed to comland- tion. so ut h ea st , and simultaneously operational The first 43 aircraft dropped heavy equip­ control of the jt f ’s Air Force units passed to ment and supplies into the partially foggy val- the 6th ataf commander. ley. They were followed by 34 C-130’s dropping Blue forces initiated a counterattack to- the 82d Airborne Division and Turkish Presi- ward the Orange invaders at 0700Z on 23 Sep- dential Battalion paratroopers. Within 24 min­ tember, and Turkish lst Corps troops captured utes all drops had been completed. two bridges over the Sakarya River. With all Aboard the C-130 airborne command post objectives achieved by 1000Z, the jt f forces orbiting high over the objective area, jt f Com- were retumed to operational control of the jt f mander General Gough monitored and con- Commander at 1027, 23 September, and prepa- trolled the entire operation. ration for redeplovment was initiated by all To insure complete coordination during forces. this joint and combined operation, liaison offi- The focus of interest shifted now to Hel- eers had been positioned at the Turkish First lenic Thrace and the threat by Orange forces Army Air Support Operations Center, the Tur­ to split the nato forces of Greece and Turkey kish First Tactical Air Force Operations Center, by a thrust to the Aegean Sea. and the jt f Direct Air Support Center. Positive radar control was maintained over all flights by the Combat Reporting Center at Izmit and/or by joint Turkish/U.S. Air Control Teams. A Over 2000 U.S. and Turkish Blues jumped mobile tacan had been positioned at Adapa- to attack Orange forces near Adapazari, zari to provide a further positive fix in the ob­ Turkey, on 21 Septem ber, and NATO Exer- jective area. cise DEEP FURROW 65 ivas under way. fr Turkish Air Force pilota in F-100D Super Sabres pre- pare to take off on a ground support mission. . . . General Irfan Tansel, Chief, Turkish Air Force, and Major General Clijde Box. Commander, Sixth Allied Tactical Air Foree, discuss NATO defense exercise. Camouflaged paratroops of the 82d Airbome Divi- sion man a jeep-mounted 106-mm recoilless rifle.

A gun cretc of the 82d removes a 105-mrn hoicitzer that was palletized and airdropped battle-ready.

A squad leader issues orders to recenthj landed paratroopers of the 82d Airbome, part of Strike Command Joint Task Forces airlifted from ConUS for the exercise. . ), plus

usn lst supported by supported consisted of attack of consisted , usn F. G. Bennett, Bennett, F. G.

Roosevelt) radm ), and a landing ship tank ( tank ( ship landing a ), and

lsd The Amphibious Task Force, commanded TaskThe Force, Amphibious commanded Participating forces consisted of an Attack ParticipatingAttack an of forces consisted Marine ExpeditionaryProvi- Headquarters, a augmented by Royal Hellenicnaval The units. Expeditionary Unit, would consist U.S. of a dock ( dock ( U.S. Landing Force, simulated by Marine a escortingdestroyers, minesweepers, other and vessels. TheAmphibious Task Force be would transports, cargo a transport, ships landing commanded by by commanded Carrier Striking Group composed of one attack attack one of composed Group Carrier Striking carrier (USS D. F. escorting destroyers. This group would be by Captain N. Almgren, Almgren, N. Captain by force was a force of Hellenic force of a minesweepers. was force

rhn site of thesite amphibiouslanding AIR UNIVERSITYAIR REVIEW east of Skyros Island.Attack An Carrier While taking was the airborne assault

s ’ Force, which departed Malta on 17 Septeniber, Septeniber, 17 on Maltadeparted Force, which lst making passage between Kasos Island and Crete.joining therapidlyAlso buildingnaval of 22 September steamed and theto scheduled Navy destroyerNavy group east Capeof task Malea, place Turkey, U.S.in a Task Amphibious Navy rendezvous with the AmphibiousTask Force, day the task group rendezvoused group day thetask with Taskmoming departed Group the Rhodes in the Southern tip ofPeloponnesus. The follovving Clialcidice Península region, ClialcidiceGreece— region, Península was nearing was objective its area. On Septem- 19 ber it had rendezvoused with a HellenicRoyal a with had rendezvoused ber it operations in Greece in operations 24

Axiiis EXERCISE DEEP FURROW 65 25

sional Marine Air Group, a Marine Attack seize the vital Nigrita bridge across the Struma Squadron, a helicopter detachment, and a Bat­ River. talion Landing Team. The Hellenic Landing At 0900Z the 9000-man Hellenic X Infantry Force would consist of a Regimental Combat Division initiated its attack to smash the enemy Team plus a raiding force of one infantry bat- front and link up with the airhead. Carrier air­ talion. craft and land-based Royal Hellenic Air Force On 21 September advance force operations and U.S. Marine tactical air contributed close- began with the landing of a Hellenic raiding support sorties into this objective area. The force on the Chalcidice Península. The next day smooth-working international force quickly at- the Hellenic XX Armored Division moved to a tained its objectives, and by 1500Z the aoa was position on the west flank of the Axius River. declared secure and responsibility for air de- Bv 23 September the carrier aircraft, the Ma­ fense operations in the aoa was retumed to rine Squadron deployed ashore at Larissa Air Commander, 6th ataf. The attack aircraft car­ Base, and 6th ataf air units had isolated the rier ( cva) force continued close air support landing beaches. The Royal Hellenic Amphibi- for the beachhead during the transition. ous Group rendezvoused with the Amphibious At 1000Z 26 September, the advancing Task Force during this activity. Blue forces linked up with the airhead in the Thus on L-dav, 24 September, the stage Xigrita area, and comlandsoutheast issued was set for the amphibious assault operation. termination instructions. The Hellenic XX Division during the night of In the midst of redeplovment and back- 23 September and morning of the 24th crossed loading of troops, the final live phase of Exer- the .Axius River, sec-ured criticai terrain, and cise deep furrow 65 was taking place on a established contact with the main enemv force western Turkish beach. west of the Struma River. The Hellenic Am­ phibious Raiding Battalion during this period over-the-beach operation moved inland and struck enemy positions and installations in the strategic Redina Pass. On 19 September at 0S00Z the British LST The umbrella of power was opened for the Empire Fui mar had arrived in Izmir, ready to classic beach assault operation bv coordinated load cargo. By 0400Z 22 September loading land, sea, and air power. Assured of control of operations had been completed, and at 0800Z the air through the efforts of U.S. Navy and the ship sailed for the Sea of Marmara, to ren- Marine and Royal Hellenic tactical air power, dezvous with an Allied Forces, Mediterranean the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force ( afmed) task force on 23 September. activated the Amphibious Objective Area. Con­ They anchored off Kusadasi at 0600Z on trol of all air power in the sector was through the 25th, and successful unloading operations the Task Force Tactical Air Control Centers were conducted and the ship was retumed to ( tacc) on the cruisers USS Albany and USS British control at 1600Z 27 September. This Springfield, flagship of comstrikforsouth, who signaled the termination of live play for deep directed the overall assault. At 0500Z 24 Sep­ furrow 65. tember nearly 3000 Hellenic troops were land- ed on the beaches to the west of the Struma River followed 2'A hours later by the 1900-man W it h the conclusion of the exercise in Hellenic U.S. Marine assault force, which landed to the Thrace, deep furrow 65 rapidly became a mat- east of the Struma River. These troops estab­ ter of history. Even while the amphibious lished the beachhead and blockaded avenues operations were under way in the Struma of approach to the Thessalonike-Kavalla area. River area, across the Sea of Marmara at Topei At 0500Z of the next morning a Hellenic para- Air Base the massive deployment of st r ic o m chute battalion, airlifted from Elefsis Air Base, forces was reversing itself, and afstrike C- dropped from five C-130’s of the usafe’s 322d 130’s and ma t s C-130’s and C-124’s were air- Air Division into an area north of the aoa to lifting the jt f Army forces back to Fort Bragg.

SACEUR General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA, (eenter) confers with General Georgc Antonàkos, Cliief <>f Staff of the Roíjal Hellenic Air Force, (left) and Admirai Sptjros Avgeris of llw Roíjal Hellenic Navij.

to 1

Ground forces get close air support by RHAF F-84.

Amphibious craft converge on Struma River beaches.

U.S. Marines charge onto the beach to join Greek comrades in counterattacking the aggressor forces. Airclrop by AFSTRIKE C-130 a.ssists the ground operation.

Other participating forces and support units part of both the U.S. and Turkish forces. They were flown back to their home bases from In- worked closely and harmoniously and meas- cirlik and Cigli. By 30 September the st r ic o m ured up to the highest standards. force had closed in the ConUS, and the U.S. Deep furrow 65 was a proving ground as Sixth Fleet units retumed to normal training well as training ground in conducting joint and operations in the Mediterranean. combined operations. The exercise was of great Both sides, the Commiinist Orange and value in evaluating joint task force operational the nato Blue. began evaluating and comput- procedures under field conditions, which are of ing the results. This assessment will go on for course the most valid measure of adequacy. rnonths. But already refinements are being While language problems were of some im- made in procedures, and tactics are being re- portance, the exercise clearly proved that lan­ fined under certain conditions. These are the guage was not a limiting factor. The exchange everyday, tangible results accruing from such of forward air eontrollers, for example, showed a massive exercise, but they are of necessity conclusively that nato forces can act in concert classified. without losing stride. An obvious answer was forthcoming with The exercise was a long-awaited oppor- regard to st r ic o ms capability to provide aug- tunity to test support facilities and the ability mentation forces to reinforce the Southern Re- of commands in Europe to provide for a large gion. It could and did perform its mission as influx of U.S. augmentation forces to the South­ planned. Further, the participation by st r ic o m ern Region and to determine through actual was visible proof of the intention of the United use the adequacy of logistical and other sup­ States to provide forces when and where need- port. ed by its nato allies. Operationally, the air forces involved per- The st r ic o m forces were able to answer formecí as well as or better than expected. The another question with confidence when it capability of the Turkish and Hellenic Air showed that it could operate on the ground and Forces, already known to us in the Southern in the air with Turkish forces. The operations Region, was clearly demonstrated to the aug­ were marked by high professional ability on the mentation forces. The hard and diligent work Redeployment—Paratroops of the 82d Airborne Divisions 3d Brigade Task Force board a MATS C-130 aircraft at Topei Air Base, Turkey, for return stateside.

on standardization that has consumed so mueh region have again been clearly defined and in efFort in the past paid enormous dividends in most cases Solutions and procedures further the live-plav phase. A typical example was the developed. . . . the readiness posture of the flawless rendezvous of the mixed Turkish— Southern Region has been considerably en- usaf force of transports with the main body of hanced.” airlift forces over Ankara and the subsequent To the press, Admirai Griffin summed up pop-up maneuver by all the forces. the general consensus: “The test of otir defenses Admirai Griffin, cincsouth, in his general in Greece and Turkey showed an increased comments to sa c eur , stated that deep furrow capabilitv to combine allied forces in the de- 65 was considered the most profitable and fense of this crucial Southern Region of nato. meaningful fíeld training exercise conducted to Field tests show w ere not perfect, but we date in the Southern Region. “Valuable train­ deliver the goods when necessary.” ing was achieved in planning the exercise. In The final conclusion: Exercise deep fur­ particular the problems and preparations in- row 65—all objectives attained. volved in introducing externai forces into the Hq Allied Air Forces Southern Europe THE CHALLENGE OF THE PERFORMANCE SPECTRUM FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFT

H axs Multhopp

EVELOPMENT of the aircraft was in a very impressive and continuous fashion, so probably the greatest step in the long much indeed that speed, more than every other D history of transportation technology. capability of the aircraft, has been the main The ability to flv above any kind of terrain or yardstick for progress in aviation. over small and large bodies of water has led However, nothing continues to grow for- to a degree of mobility of which past genera- ever. We have reaehed nowadays the point that tions of mankind could only dream. Moreover, any speed is technically feasible that can be the speeds of the modem aircraft are one or achieved and sustained in the earth’s atmos- two orders of magnitude above those of other phere, up to and beyond orbital speed. This means of transportation. brings about the inconvenience that the old The military significance of the capabilities yardstick for progress is no longer automati- of the aircraft was soon enough realized, and cally applicable. With regard to speed it means the pace of its development has been very high, that we have a ehoice, and we have to decide, thanks to this appreciation by the military. In therefore, what the best speed for a specific particular, the speed of airplanes has increased class of airplane really is. For there are reasons PERFORMANCE SPECTRUM FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFT 31

now why speed is not the only aspect to be away than from supersonic fighter-bombers eonsidered; there are others, like cost effective- several hundred miles away. ness and operational convenience, whieh enter Cost eftectiveness, whieh must also be the pictnre. This achievement is basically a sign eonsidered, does not automatically favor the of maturity and should be appreciated proper- fastest airplane available for a specific task. If ly. It means also that, in the future, aircraft unit cost difterences are not too large, the faster development is losing much of its glamour; it airplane can accomplish more missions in a becomes a business like many others. given time period and is, therefore, an easy choice. If, however, the faster airplane is con- basic value of speed siderably more expensive, a given budget will buy considerably more airplanes of the slower The first and foremost value of the speed kind. There is then a greater probability that of any vehicle is the ability to reach a desired these will be closer to the place where action place in the shortest possible time. Time spent is needed simply because of their larger num- in transit is usually lost time. This is evident in ber and also more easily assigned on request commercial transportation. Von Karman and because of their greater availability. Gabrielli in a paper published 15 years ago showed that different systems of transportation speed and range or endurance can compete with one another if their price per ton-mile is approximately proportional to their Usually the purpose of a flight is to get speed; i.e., the faster mode of transportation from one place to another rather quickly. Since can charge a considerably higher price. time spent in transit is lost time, ideally one In militar)' operations the value of speed would want to fly faster, the farther he intends is frequently even greater than in commercial to go. Unfortunately, this desire is not too com- affairs. Gaining the initiative in a conflict or patible with today’s technical capabilities. At reacting quickly to a threatening buildup has present, and probably for a long future, the often prevented the growth of a local disturb- best range is attainable at speeds slightly below ance into a major war. Once a vvar is on, the the speed of sound in the mach number region faster, more mobile side can usually choose the from .75 to about .9, provided the airplane and time and site of battle and gain local superiority its power plant are properly chosen for these in force strength or firepower. “To git thar speeds. At slower speeds we can obtain almost fustest with the mostest” has been one of the the same range for a comparable weight eflFort, most important stratagems of all times. There- but there is nothing to be gained in doing so, fore, the desire of the military to increase the since the utilization of the airplane and the speed of their fastest vehicles ( namely, their crew suffers with decreasing speed. airplanes) is quite understandable. As is well known, the range of an aircraft There are, however, a few finer points is determined by the propulsion efficiency ex- whieh should not be overlooked. What is want- pressed by the ratio of velocity to specific fuel ed is short action or reaction time. This means consumption, the ratio of lift to drag, and the not only the time spent in flight; the time fuel-weight fraetion. It is worth noting that needed in preparation of the flight, including almost all progress in long-range airplanes in the command decision process, counts just as the past 15 years has been made in the propul­ much. Frequently, higher speed is bought with sion system; development of the airframe has longer fueling time, more time for preflight been rather stagnant for no good reason. Sail- checkout or for rearming, etc. Quite often the planes have long ago reached lift-drag ratios higher speed is achieved with longer take-off between 30 and 40, without boundary layer and with landing distances that require operat- control, by the use of higher aspect-ratio wings. ing bases farther away from the combat area. In view of the improvements in structural ma­ A field unit in need of air support might get teriais in recent years, it seems reasonable to help sooner from helicopters based 30 miles expect that the next generation of long-range 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW aircraft will have lift-drag ratios near 30, vvhich fraction and the avoidance of aerodynamic would make possible large transport airplanes heating on the way up. The faster we go, the with radii of 6000 to 8000 nautical miles. The greater is the distance down while accelerating race for global supremacy between the West­ or in the ballistic or glide descent, and the less ern and the Communist worlds in the next important is the constant-speed portion of the decade may well depend on the capabilitv to Hight. reaeh quicklv and with an adequate force It is well within the present state of the the many unstable, underdeveloped countries, art to design and produce hypersonic transport which unfortunatelv are mostlv far away from aircraft with excellent landing capabilities the U.S.A. which can reaeh any place on earth within Long-range capabilities in the supersonic about an hour from take-off. Such transports speed regime are rather limited in spite of the would be a valuable addition to the heavy improving friction-drag situation and the in- transonic long-range transports of the C-5 or crease in overall engine efficiency. The main subsequent class, to be used in emergencies handicap against efficient flving at supersonic or in such assignments as to secure airfields for speeds is the enormously high induced drag at big transports or to suppress hostile uprisings these speeds in comparison to subsonic induced before they really get under way. drag. Even if all possibilities of minimizing the If endurance rather than range is the induced drag are carefullv exploited, the range prime performance objective, as it is in sur- of high-density configurations (bomber, tank- veillanee and in early-warning and antisub- er) in the mach-2 to -3 region will hardly reaeh marine missions, speeds should be either very half what is possible at high subsonic speeds. low or near orbital; nothing in between is of With transport aircraft the wave drag due to much use. At the low-speed end we have the the larger volumetric requirements cuts range best endurance possibilities with propeller- capabilities down even more. driven aircraft having straight, modestly load- More promising again is the Outlook for ed wings of high aspect ratio. To provide such long range in the hypersonic speed regime. airplanes with a high-speed dash performance Although the lift-to-drag ratio continued to go for immediate kills does not seem very promis­ down with increasing mach numbers, less aero- ing. Missiles or parasite fighter airplanes for dvnamic lift is needed because more and more this purpose are much more practical. weight is balanced by centrifugai forces. The performance possibilities of hyper­ speed and maneuverability sonic air-breathing power plants are still not sufficiently clear, and much research work in What makes an aircraft differ from a mis- thi§ area is still needed before we can count sile on a preset course is the pilots ability to on them. But even without air-breathing power change its flight path in adaption to changing it is definitely feasible to reaeh any place on eonditions related to the flight objective. The our globe with boost-glide vehicles, and it is ability to change the flight direction (i.e., the not unlikely that this technique will remain in maneuverability of the airplane) is very much the lead as far as the hypersonic speed regime a function of speed; generally, maneuverability is concerned. The main elements in this tech­ sufters badly at the higher speeds. This was nique—the rocket for the acceleration and not always so; in the earlier days of aviation, climb phase and the ablative heat shield, pref- maneuverability was limited by maximum lift, erably, for the glide phase—are really quite a modest amount of excess power, and the lag- simple and could become fairly economical if ging response of the airplane due to its inertia suffieient numbers were produeed. What the and damping characteristics. The faster and modem rocket may lack in specific fuel con- more powerful aircraft was, therefore, usually sumption, compared to air-breathing power more responsive to the pilots steering efforts. plants with supersonic combustion, is at least Today the radius of the tightest tum is partly compensated for by their very good mass mostlv limited by the acceleration normal to PERFORMANCE SPECTRUM FOR M1LITARY AIRCRAFT 33

the flight path or load factor that eitlier the __ V-'» i n I. n n„ airframe or the pilot can sustain. In general, f in i n the tuming radius of a fixed-wing aircraft in ê Vn-„, ax — 1 a horizontal tum is described by a curve like 2W ______n,„ax that in Figure 1. At low speeds, the limitation comes from the maximum lift that can be gen- /„ inux 5 \^H~iiiax - erated, which is measured by the coefficient V*mi ii With Ctl0to of the airplane (usually with the flaps which is only slightly more than up): Umax values usually in the range between 3 and 6, V, is mostly between 1.7 and 2.5 times the r > ______i ______stall speed, which is, at lower altitudes at least, toa much below the cruise or combat speeds of [Win V4 modem aircraft. We are, therefore, mostly con- cemed with the limit set by the load factor. 2W with V,,,,,, — being the stall speed What is the militarv signifieance of the pSCi, niax tuming radius? For noncombat airplanes like (flaps up). At higher speeds the maximum ac- transports it means verv little unless thev try ceptable load factor nmax sets the limit to fly close to the ground to avoid detection. The best contour following is usually done at V = \^3 V„lin because negative load factors H max 1 bevond — 1 are not tolerated for long. At The absolutely smallest tuming radius oc- greater speeds, the contour flving over wavv curs when these two unit curves intersect at terrain becomes more and more an enveloping V , = V lnin V n max; t h e t u m i n g r a d i u s t h e n is course over the peaks along the wav; the height 34 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW drop into the valley betwen two subsequent weapons are used to make up for lower hit peaks which are the distance L apart is limited probabilities, h° has to grow roughly with the to square root of the weapon vield; or if the de- livery inaccuracy dictates the safety distance h°, we are back to the situation in a dive attack, i.e., the hit probability is roughly pro­ For example, an airplane flying at inach 1.2 on portional to — . the deck ( a popular number ir» today’s require- ments) over terrain with a “wave length” of In modem tactical air warfare another about half a mile can dip down about 15 feet problem arises from the diffieulty of detecting betvveen peaks. Since the airplane usually targets. Practically everybodv has learned by clears these peaks by more than that, it remains now that exposure to attack from the air is not practically alvvays vvithin radar sight, whereas too healthy. Hiding, using all the possibilities at 300 knots it eould dip over 100 feet into the a terrain can offer plus plenty of camouflage, valleys. dispersing by splitting up forces into very small For combat aircraft, especially in the tac- units, hardening either by digging in or by the tical fíeld. maneuverabilitv is very often the use of vehicle armor—these tactics have be- kev to success or failure. In dive attacks the come much more fashionable than they were pullout radius alone determines the release in World War II. In addition, active defense distance for almost all weapons. The hit prob- with ground-to-air weapons, automatic small- ability against a small target is thus essentiallv and médium-caliber guns, modest-caliber (30- to 57-mm) antiair artillery, and surface-to-air proportional to ~r and, therefore, to -^ , down missiles has increased by more than an order to the speed at which the pullout maneuver is of magnitude in all major armed forces. Very down at the maximum lift coefficient. few rewarding interdiction targets have been In very shallow or essentially low-level left because nobody wants to make the use of attacks the situation is not much better. The tactical nuclear weapons too attractive. limit distance for weapons release is mostly de- As a result, targets for air-to-ground weap­ termined by the safety distance h° by which ons are hard to find, often fleeting or very small, one wants to clear either the target itself or so that fast action and high accuracv follow- the ground. The minimum weapon release dis­ ing detection of a target become a necessity. tance is then Even with the help of a forward air controller, the target is usually not exactly on the flight L r Illin = \/h°(r + 2h°) ^ \/2Pr course, and after its detection a fast turn maneuver is needed so as to line up the airplane The hit probability is, thus, proportional to with the target. Figure 2 shows the location of 1o“ with-.u r _— ------V 2 — if the evasive maneuver the targets at the moment of their discovery h~r (n~ l)g by the pilot, while they can still be attacked V- is made in a vertical plane or r = - directly; the limit lines give the closest target V n- — 1 g positions as a funetion of speed, assuming a if a lateral evasive maneuver is attempted. This 4-g maneuver to line up with the target, a looks somewhat better for high-speed aircraft straight pass at the target of 2.5 seconds’ dura- than the dive attack because the hit probability tion, and a final 4-g breakaway maneuver so as to miss a collision with the target by 200 decreases only with However, the safe feet. These are fairlv optimistic assumptions. clearance distance h ° can depend either on the One can see at once that only truly outstanding danger presented by the targets blowing up targets can still be tackled by very fast air- or on the lethalitv of the delivered weapon. planes. The first case applies mostly to targets like Of course, the pilot can flv by and attack tanks and supplv trucks. Whenever heavier after turning around if the target stands still Figure 2. Location of targets thut cun he direcíly attacked after they have been detected: position limits os. speed in 4-g maneuvers at sea levei

in the meantime. Chances are that he loses it has a high lift-to-drag ratio, it pays to dip into again at least temporarily while tuming and the atmosphere in order to save some power; that he faces all the antiaircraft fire around the fuel requirements for a speciflc tum go the target that the enemy can pour out, where- down bv a factor . But even so, as in the first pass one frequently has the sur- \Al + (L/D f prise factor. When \ve add up all these factors it is a joke to compare the maneuvering capa- conceming the aircraft maneuverability, we bilities in space with those to which we are see quickly how important it is to fly fairly aceustomed in the aviation field. slowly during attacks on small tactical targets. With supersonic and hypersonic speeds, maneuverability beeomes more and more a speed and survival farce. Tuming times are so large that high load factors cannot be maintained through a Every new weapon that ever amounted complete tum. At mach 3 a 45° banked tum to more than a minor nuisance led to the devel- describes a circle 100 miles in diameter, and opment of counterweapons. As long as these a good deal of power must be spent just on are lacking or very imperfect, the new weapon this maneuver. At mach 10 a 180° tumabout enjoys a dominant position. Progress in the costs as much fuel as about 2000 nautical miles’ development of antiweapons may eliminate the flight range; it is highly questionable whether new weapon altogether or establish for it a it still makes sense to attack a target and fly more balanced position, rendering it still im­ back rather than to go on to another landing site. portant but no Ionger decisive. Even at this At near orbital speeds the 1-g tuming radius point it can be of eonsiderable value, sinee it equals the earth radius, and impulse require- ties up a good deal of the enemys strength in ments for just a few degrees’ change in flight maintaining antiweapons. direction are very high. If the orbiting aircraft The military aircraft has been on this 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

course for quite a while. It is. therefore, neces- detected and tracked goes up also, and the sary to analvze its chances against the modern reduced maneuverability of the faster airplane antiaircraft weapons carefully. One of the ma­ makes it much easier for the defense to predict jor factors, but definitely not the only one that its future flight path. concems the survival of the airplane in the face A most annoying by-produet of higher and of antiaircraft weapons, is its speed. Many higher speeds is the accompanying infrared specifíc performance requirements have been radiation. At lower speeds it is mainly the largely dictated by a strong belief in the invul- power plant that emits plenty of radiation in nerability of the faster airplane. How well the wave bands preferred by the simpler infra­ justified is this belief? red sensors; this radiation goes mostly out to In general there is a good deal of truth in the rear and thus helps the weapons that attack it, particularlv if the antiweapon is another from behind. At higher speeds, however, the aireraft that operates in the classical fashion airplane begins to glow all over, and the in- of a pursuit fighter. It takes the interceptor tensity of the surface radiation grows very some time to build up to the energy levei rapidlv with speed. At mach 2 it is sufficiently noticeable that good infrared sensors detect ^ ^ + h ^ of the intruder aireraft. Thus, the it within 5 to 10 miles; at mach 3 the airplane higher this energy levei is, the lower is the is visible over many hundred miles to the most chance of its being intercepted. Unfortunately, primitive infrared sensors. This radiation is the interceptors attack more and more on a colli- best possible aid one can give to a collision- sion course, which can be flown frequently course intercept, which needs excellent angular without matching or exceeding the intruders position information. The military value of speed. higher supersonic speeds for airplanes that The significant speed of the intruding air- have to penetrate deeply into the territory of a craft is that during and before the encounter, well-equipped enemy is, therefore, open to which might not be the same as its advertised considerable doubt. Rather heavy use of elec- top speed. Not too seldom this high-speed tronic countermeasures, saturation of the local capability exists only for the “clean” aireraft defense, and the gradual destruetion of the air without its military load. A popular concept defense installations appear more promising. for many aireraft missions is the subsonic- Equally questionable is the value of the cruise/supersonic-dash flight profile, which is “supersonic dash” of an airplane that normally an attempt to “have a cake and eat it too.” flies subsonie. The power plants for such sub- Whatever advantage is achieved with the high sonic-cruise/supersonic-dash missions have to speed of the dash phase exists only for a rather use afterbuming quite heavily for the super- small fraction of the flight time, and only if the sonic portion of their flight, which is just what opponent was not alerted already during the the infrared guided missile needs. We would preceding cruise phase. be better off with power plants optimized for Ground-based antiaircraft weapons have supersonic cruise, because, in addition to bet­ become a much more formidable threat to mili­ ter fuel economy, they can have a fairly cool tary aireraft than the interceptor, which nowa- exhaust and do not have to pour out much days serves more in a secondary role than as infrared radiation. Of course these engines are the primary air defense weapon. Because of not overlv efficient at subsonie flying. In spite the state of the art in detection and tracking of all the ingenuity that is presentlv spent on techniques and the high degree of readiness of multipurpose airplanes, it is hard to see what modern air-to-surface missiles, speed and alti­ the military merits of a limited supersonic-dash tude are no longer much of a protection. Sur­ capability are; if we eannot afford to go super­ vival against these weapons depends largely sonic all the way out and most of the way back, on bypassing the sensing devices. Since the best we had better improve the survival chance usable altitude regime goes up with speed, the elsewhere. distance at which an incoming airplane can be The present strength of antiaircraft weap- PERFORMANCE SPEC.TRUM FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFT 37

ons at high and médium altitudes has made analysis of the hit probability per unit time flving at very low altitudes quite attractive. of randomly distributed ground fire from the The short range of all sensors, the masking most frequently used 14.5-mm machine gun. from ground obstructions, and the muc-h higher This analysis establishes that ground fire is noise levei picked up by the radar receiver indeed a very serious challenge to the battle- make the defense job very diffieult. Here speed field use of aircraft. It is orders of magnitude is one of the most significant assets of the in- more serious than the threat from enemy inter- truding airplane, because it can exploit the ceptors, and it will remain so even if absolute greatest weakness of all defense systems: the air superiority is an accomplished fact. Aircraft finite time it takes to convert a detection into speed is quite a strong survival factor against a Idll. Again, this can be carried too far; it is hard to see why anyone would want to shake up a sleepy defense with a supersonic boom. Over irregular terrain too much speed forces Figure 3. Unit hit probability from random ground fire the airplane higher above the ground. thus (14.5-mm antiaircraft machine gun). Target in air- increasing the range capabilities of the ground- craft = one square foot. Fire density = one round based weaponry. (This range is roughly pro- per square foot per second. Hits per second = p°. portional to the square root of the flight alti­ tude. Analysis of the maneuvering capability indicates that the flight altitude goes roughly with the square of the velocity; i.e., the detec­ tion range is about proportional to the aircraft speed, and no gain is realized in alert time.) The faster aircraft still has the possible ad- vantage of outpacing slovver defense missiles, in particular, if it does not cooperate with their homing techniques. A reasonable natural speed limit is the transonic drag rise; the power re- quirements increase considerably if we try to push temporarily supersonic speeds on the deck, and this is hard to do without very sig­ nificant inc-reases in infrared radiation. The protective value of flying low is also consid­ erably weakened if the high speed leads to continuous use of terrain-clearance and Dop- pler navigation radar or other active electronic systems. Where the enemy is alert and has the technical capability, the use of such devices should be rçstricted to bad weather situations if and when other means of navigation fail. In tactical warfare, i.e., wherever the air­ craft has to fight against hostile ground forces, we have to consider very seriously the threat from small-arms ground fire, w'hich is no longer just a nuisance. Since the days of World W ar II and the Korean conflict, most major ground forces have increased the number of antiair- craft machine guns by an order of magnitude and have devoted considerable training to their proper use. Figure 3 shows the results of an 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ground fire, and it should be utilized fully with considerable sweep were required for vvhenever possible. Altitudes above 5000 feet supersonic performance; earlier the jet engines or so are relatively safe from ground fire but had rather modest thrusts at lower speeds ideal for antiaircraft artillery and missiles; compared to the propeller engines, which used therefore these altitudes are usable only after to develop thrust in an inverse relation to the such systems have been mostly destroyed. Un- speed. However, since those early days of jet fortunately it is hard to accomplish much propulsion, engine weight has been reduced against the relatively small, dispersed, and considerably. So we jump from one extreme to camouflaged targets in modem war threats un- another, from two-mile runways to vertical less the aircraft slows down to speeds at which take-offs and landings ( vtol ). Surely the tech­ the pilot can detect and destroy them effective- nical means of producing lift out of power ly. The ratio of target kills to airplane losses become more and more available; the best one, from ground fire still is best at the speeds at namely the rotary wing of the helicopter, has which the airplane is most maneuverable. It is been with us for several decades, but unfor- therefore most advisable to seek a reduction of tunatelv it lacked high-speed capabilities. the aircraft vulnerabilitv to small-arms fire by The wide variety of lift engines allows other means than speed alone; for instance, by many arrangements of the propulsion system so armor protection for the most vital parts, pre- that speeds much above those of the helicop- vention of fuel leakage and fire, redundant sub- ters can be attained, with a tolerable weight systems and structure, and ease of repair. Such effort suitable for all but the most ambitious improvements do not come about without a aircraft missions. Undesirable are the effect of serious technical effort. They are almost impos­ the high-energy exhaust on the ground environ- sible to accomplish by installation of a modifi- ment and the rather long transition zone be- cation kit. They require sacrifices in other air­ tween hovering on engine thrust and the craft capabilities, and the easiest to abandon minimum speed for fully aerodynamic lift. still seems the unrealistic one of super speed. It might be useful to point out occasional- With regard to aircraft operations fairly ly that there are considerable possibilities be- close to an enemy, it is worth remembering that tween the two extremes—the two-mile-plus both sides realize that air superiority is most runway and the vtol launch platform. A look easily established by the destruction of aircraft at existing airfield facilities in a few areas of on the ground, where they are most of the time, the world for which we had the information rather than in the air, where they operate only available showed uniformly the same trend: for short periods of time and usually in a not the number of available airfíelds was roughly too predictable fashion. The airplanes speed inversely proportional to their length. It was has no direct relation to its vulnerability on the not possible to extend this statistic to runways ground but indirectly can influence it consid- below 2000 feet because such short ones were erably, e.g., if it entails long paved runways, hardly ever under consideration as airfíelds, large Service facilities, ground-based radio since there are too few aircraft around that communication and flight control installations, eould use them. For example, there exist in large and complicated logistics. most parts of the world, outside the U.S.A., soccer fields near every medium-sized village, loiv-speed end of the spectrum many of which eould serve between games as about 500-foot runways. W e are beginning to discover again the In the general rush to attain pure vtol value of very low speeds. For quite a while the performance we overlook too easily the possi- development of aircraft towards higher speeds bilities of generating unusually high aerody­ and greater range had resulted in longer and namic lift forces by a more intimate marriage longer runways for a number of different rea- of the wing and the propulsion system. With sons: higher wing loadings meant less surface the high power levei needed and available in friction drag; wings of modest aspect ratio but modem aircraft, lift coefficients of an order of PERFORMANCE SPECTRUM FOR M1L1TARY A1RCRAFT 39 magnitude can be reached which were con- ments. Where speed is essential for fast action sidered quite fantastic not too many years ago or reaction, we shoidd go to extremes; and in —say 5 to 10 or more. These lift forces involve such applications we should aim towards hy- such devices as blown or jet-augmented flaps, personic rather than supersonic speeds, i.e., high degrees of propeller or ducted fan slip- depending on range requirements, the speed stream deflection, tilted powered wings, etc. regime from about mach 10 to over 20, rather If \ve do similar things to the tail and other than mach 2 to 3 or 4. On the other hand, a control surfaces, we can have a single continu- short-time high-speed capability is just an ex- ous control system down to the lowest flight pensive embellishment; it adds little of military speed and avoid most of the difficulties and value and may actually reduce it. A multipur- hazards of the wide transition regime between pose aircraft may appear impressive in its hovering and wing-supported flight. If abso- paper performance; if we realize that its quoted lutelv no forward speed is permitted, all aero- speed, range, payload, etc., are not present dvnamic efiFort is in vain. At zero speed, even a together but attainable only one at a time, we lift coefficient of 10 or 100 still means zero lift. shall soon find that it will be hopelessly inferior in each specific class to an airplane that is built for one or two of these tasks only. If we W e ake today technically in a position where need high speed in military aircraft, we need we can develop airplanes for any speed be­ it during the cruise out much more than in the tween zero and orbital. The optimum usable action area. Supersonic or hypersonic cruise speed depends now mostly on the desired func- plus subsonic combat capability makes much tion of the aircraft, and we should cultivate a better sense than anything the other way more utilitarian attitude toward speed require- around—and is technically an easier task. Baltimore, Marijland X

THE JOINT OF STAFF AND DEFENSE POLI FORMULATION

M ajor Lawrence B. T atum

ANY prominent writers on military has joined in criticizing McNamara for what affairs are gravely disturbed about the Washington Post has called “The Closed M “the excessive influence of civilians” Door Policy of the Defense Department.” Blue in the field of defense policy-making. The fol- suits and brown alike have charged that, as lowing statements are illustrative. the Armij, Navy, Air Force Journal put it, “the professional military leadership of the nation . . . the Secretary [Secretary of Defense is being short-circuited in the current decision- McNamara] has penetrated deep into fields making process at the Pentagon.”1 once reserved for the military. He has barked shins throughout the countrys polity and In stmctural terms, the military establishment economy. A stream of complaints has flowed mav be one of the tripods of a “power elite,” from the Armed Services and their friends and but in sociological fact the military officers clients. Carl Vinson, the powerful chairman feel dispossessed. . . . Since the end of World of the House Armed Services committee, has War II, the military has been involved in a semipublicly “wamed” the Secretary against number of battles to defend its elite position, abridging the independence of the Services beginning in 1945 with the young physicists and their Secretaries. Virtually the whole press and nuclear scientists, down to the present THE JCS AND DEFENSE POLICY FORMULATION 41

action against the “technipols” (the military’s dures which ensure that the military is poorly decisive term for technicians and political the- equipped to provide meaningful strategic ad­ orists whom Secretary McNamara has brought vice. But these are matters to be dealt with later. into the Department of Defense).2 In common \vith many other military men, ac­ tive and retired. I am profoundlv apprehensive The Civilian’s Role in of the pipe-smoking, tree-full-of-o\vls tvpe of Defense Policy Formulation so-called professional defense intellectuals who have been brought into this Nations Capital. Prior to World War II, American attitudes I don’t believe a lot of these over-coafident, toward war and peace were clear-cut. Nor- sometimes arrogant voung professors, mathe- mallv, thought Americans, States were at peace maticians and other theorists have sufficient with one another. Relations with other nations worldliness or motivation to stand up to the were conducted by the State Department, uti- land of enemy we face. . . . it seems to me the old strengths still applv. In my opinion the lizing principally the instrument of diplomacy. t\vo that count for most in the nuclear space War was thought to be an aberration, a tem- age, regardless of academic cerebrations, are porarv deviation from normality. Moreover, national determination and military forces Americans thought war justified only when an designed to achieve victory, not tailored to immoral or insane aggressor compelled a state obtain compromise. Professional military train- to use force in self-defense. When driven to ing teaches the philosophy of victory whereas take up arms, the total defeat of the aggressor politics is based on compromise.3 became the only possible—and moral—objec- tive of war. Do civilians have inordinate power in Thus, according to American tradition, the strategy-making field? If thev do, is it be- peace and war were entirely different phe- cause of the energetic personality and man- nomena. During peace, force or the threat of agement philosophy of our present Secretary force was not a usable instrument of foreign of Defense?4 policy; the formulation of defense policy could It is a thesis of this article that a variety be of little or no concem to the nation as a of civilian groups have begun to play and— whole. To whatever degree prewar planning barring a large-scale war situation—will con­ and strategy-making were deemed essential— tinue to play a major role in the determination and that was certainlv not to a great degree— of strategy and military policy.5 Moreover, they were the exclusive domain of a small Secretary McNamara did not create the phe- group of military professionals. On the other nomenon of civilian influence.® At most, the hand, whenever war was thrust upon the Secretary’s energetic implementation of an ac- United States, the goal had to be total victory. tivist management philosophy has accelerated During war, military needs became paramount an existing trend—and exacerbated the debate and “generais and admirais moved from politi­ over its desirability and consequences. cal isolation into the seats of power.’’7 A subsequent and more important thesis Américas attitude in the era since World of this article will be that civilian participation War II has become more sophisticated. The in defense policy formulation—vvhile inevitable old traditions die hard, but slogans like “cold and to a large extent desirable—has, in recent war,” “neither war nor peace,” “peaceful co- years, tended to overwhelm the military input existence” have relegated more categorical de- to strategy-making. This has happened, it will scriptions of U.S. policy into the background. be argued, because the military, erroneously, The principie of political primacy and its cor- has assumed that its advice will be ineffective ollary, the economy of force, have become unless all military suborganizations appear prevailing national coneepts.8 “Political pri­ united behind specific policy proposals. This macy” asserts that the only legitimate purpose erroneous assumption has resulted in present of military force is to serve the nation’s political Joint Chiefs of Staff organizational proce- objectives. This principie declares that force 42 AIR UNIVERSO’ REVIEW

or the threat of it can be of no practical use are permanent rather than transitory charac- in itself. Attainable, concrete, specific political teristics. I make this statement because some objectives must guide the threat or the use of observers, though astute enough to understand military power to ensure a practical and dis- why the civilian has “invaded” the strategy cemible relationship between ends and means. domain, seem to believe the present civilian Political primacy as a principie is espe- “occupation” may be temporary.10 cially pertinent to an age when the principal One reason why there is now a furor over protagonists hold nuclear weapons. In addi- civilian dominance of strategy-making is that tion, strategy considerations must adhere to a comparison with the immediate past presents the principie of economy of force—the use of a remarkable contrast. As I have already indi- only that amount of military force absolutely cated, World War II military leaders had an necessary to accomplish a given political objec- unusual amount of influence in policy formu­ tive; the more force applied, the more difficult lation. When events in the postwar era made its control and, consequentlv, the maintenance it clear that the United States could not again of political primacy. sliirk intemational responsibilities, govemment States which follow the principies of polit­ agencies were unable to find sufficient numbers ical primacy and economy of force do not re- of competent civilians to man important na- gará peace and war as entirely separate orders tional security posts. As a result, “military of existence. Given proper circumstances, force officers were appointed to key State Depart­ or the threat of force becomes an acceptable ment offices, ambassadorial posts and positions foreign policy instrument, whereas diplomacy in other foreign affairs agencies.”" Thus, and political primacy are vitally necessary throughout the late Forties, military men occu- throughout an actual conflagration so that force pied many of the prominent positions in both mav be limited and controlled. the foreign and defense branches of the na- Wherever the principies of political pri­ tional security policy structure. macy and economy of force prevail, the argu- It was inevitable that Administrations ment that the politician sets goals and the would change this situation as circumstances military man decides means must be regarded permitted. Under Presidents Eisenhower and as outmoded. Under these twin principies, hoth Kennedy the overall participation of military the politician and the military man ought to officers in civil office declined until very few participate in setting goals and determining professional military officers have been ap­ means because ends and means are inti- pointed to top civil governmental positions mately connected—indeed, frequently insepa- during the 1961-65 Kennedy and Johnson Ad­ rable. The present intemational situation, in ministrations.1- Even in the defense policy area which great powers are, primarily, adversaries itself, each political party had, by the early —but still believe they cannot resort to total Sixties, built up a reservoir of men knowledge- war to settle differences—only reinforces the able and experienced in military affairs to man conclusion that civilians must be involved in t o p p o s i t i o n s i n t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f D e f e n s e . 13 the planning of force utüization. The present modus operandi undoubtedly is Of all the reasons whv defense policy is more logical and relevant to the American po­ no longer the exclusive domain of the military, litical system than the practice followed in the I judge the primary one to be that American immediate postwar era. strategists are guided—and will continue to Therefore, the clamor against civilian strat­ be guided—by the principies of political pri­ egists is in part due to fond memories of a macy and economy of force.9 yestervear unusual in the degree of military There are, however, many other reasons occupancy of important national security posi­ whv defense policy formulation is no longer tions. A far more significant factor, however, just the military s bailiwick. I will briefly dis- is that civilian influence has been introduced cuss some of them without belaboring the ob- into heretofore sacrosanct military arenas. vious. Most, if not all, the reasons discussed As Professor S. P. Huntington savs, three THE JCS AND DEFENSE POL1CY FORMULATION 43

groups of civilians have “invaded" the strategy of the armed forces has been practically pre- domain. The first group is composed of the empted by the executive branch. Reflection “defense intellectuals.” seems to indicate that this development was inevitable and is irrevocable. Congress is not Most of the significant writings on strategy produeed after World War II were produced organized to formulate the strategic decisions by civilians. . . . Experts such as Brodie, Kauf- at the heart of force-structure determination. man, Kissinger, Wohlstetter, Schelling, and Still, diminution of congressional influence in Kahn took the lead in articulating theories of military affairs has removed one of the military stabilized deterrence, Limited war, taetical nu­ strategists power sources. Congress may heed clear war, arms control and civil defense. . . . plaintive cries of service advocates and appro- Traditionallv, the professional military officer priate additional military funds—but almost is supposed to be contemptuous of the ignor- without exception the President has effectively ance of civilians on military problems and “vetoed” the legislative action by impounding strategy. One striking aspect of the McNamara the funds.10 Pentagon, however, has been the allegation that the civilian “whiz kids” are unduly con­ Many of the traditional, heretofore mun- temptuous of the military officers for their dane, problems of military affairs are no longer backwardness and ignorance.1'1 handled exclusively by military professionals. Here is another area of civilian invasion of the The second civilian group is comprised of the defense policy field. For instance, choices of natural scientists. modem weapon systems involve extremely long In the [defense policy] debates of the late lead times in planning, testing, procurement, 1950’s and the early 1960’s conceming tech- and production. With choices now involving nology, space activides, nuclear testíng, arms billions of dollars, civilian participation has be- control, disarmament and even weapons de- come routine, especially since “unnecessary” velopment, the role of the scientists was as monies spent on defense may increase the na­ important or more important than that of the tional debt, intensify the balance of payments soldiers.15 problem, decrease amounts spent on foreign The Department of Defense civil servants make aid, poverty programs, etc. Moreover, with up a final civilian group which, quite unosten- political primacy demanding interrelated de­ tatiously, has gained povver and influence. fense and foreign policies, civilians naturally Military men normally rotate through top staff are concemed with what types of weapon sys­ positions. Many top civil servants have been tems are being planned, produced, and made with dod since 1947. Their experience, knowl- operational. edge, contacts, and power permit them to re- Finally, because of cost and other factors strict and control many defense policy matters. such as the increasing rate of technological These three groups are, I think, permanent obsolescence, only a few weapon systems now occupiers of the strategy domain. Given the become operational. The ideal pattem seems complexity of modem strategic planning, the to be a single, long-lasting weapon system for cost of new weapon systems, and—most each combat function. For example, dod wants important—the absolutely crucial requirement the Navy and the Air Force to use the same that defense policy contribute maximally to aircraft throughout the 1970’s to fill their tacti- national security, then the defense intellectual, cal fighter needs.17 the natural scientist, and the dod civil servant It is evident that civilians are entering the are welcome additions to the strategy team. weapon systems decision-making process quite Another important cause of the decline of forcefully. The argument that “we must have the military’s input into defense policy-making this particular weapon system as soon as is the changing nature of the political process possible”—a contention which, if accepted, through which strategic decisions are made. maximizes military control of weapon system The role of Congress in determining the mili­ decisions—will carry much less weight than it tary budget, force leveis, weapons, and uses has in the past. Civilian dod leaders feel that 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

there is time to make a fully staffed study be- search and development. Defense-wide agen­ fore making decisions on weapon system selec- cies have been established to unite common tion and management problems—and that their supply and Service functions and to reduce participation in these decisions is not only pos- Service duplication. sible but essential. Consequently, if civilians These defense organizational trends have are going to participate in decisions on weapon unmistakably led to increased centralization svstems, thev are normally going to be in- and functionalism and to decreased authority volved in the strategic analysis which usually of the military professionals in strategy areas. precedes the production of armaments. Or- As one commentator observed: dinarily, one asks what defense policv one As a result of the expansion of the unified com- wishes to adopt before asking what kinds of mand concept, the authority of the Service tec-hnically and financially possible weapon Chief as an individual has been supplanted by systems are desirable. the corporate authority of the Joint Chiefs, Changes in defense organization have while the authority of the Chiefs of Staff has greatly accentuated the trend toward civilian been reduced through the creation of the elabo- dominance of the strategy-making process. rate superstructure for defense policy-making Much water has gone over the organizational in Washington.1' dam since the National Seeurity Act of 1947 Moreover, Secretary McXamara and his created the office of Secretary of Defense and predecessors have acted fully within legisla- vaguely instructed the Secretary “to preside” ti\'ely permitted limits,'' though perhaps Con- over the National Military Establishment. gress did not intend for Defense Secretaries to Through various organizational acts, the De­ utilize their powers as activelv as they have.20 partment of Defense has been given increasing I have indicated why civilians now play power and control over the separate Services a role in the defense policy-making process. and the military professionals. Unified and spec- Civilian participation in strategy-making is no ified i.e., operationali commands have been transitory phenomenon. Years ago, French created. Today these are directly responsible Premier Clemenceau said wars were too im- to the President and the Secretary of Defense. portant to be left to generais. Now the same In regard to forces assigned to unified and can be said for defense policy: specified commands, military departments are accountable only for their training, support, War is no longer a question of victory or defeat and administration. Functional oflBces at the on the field of battle. With the advent of nu­ clear weapons and strategic delivery systems, Assistant Secretary of Defense levei have been we have reached the stage where peacetime expanded in both numbers and powers. For preparedness is likely to determine the out- instance, since the office of the Director of come of a major nuclear war. Thus not only Research and Engineering was created in 1958, war but also peacetime defense becomes too the Director has supervised all military re- serious a matter to be left to the generais.21 United States Air Force Academy

-VotM 1. Joseph Kraft, "McXamara and His Enemíes,” Harper’> active role providing aggressíve ieadership—questiomng. Magazine, August 1961, p. 41. suggesting altrmatives, proposing objectives and stimulating 2. Daniel Bell, "The Dispossessed—1962,” Columbia Uni- progress. This active role represents my ow i philoviphy of vernty Forum, 5 ( Fali 1962 . p. 6. management.”— From Robert S. McNamara, ‘‘McXamara 3. General Th ornas D. White. “Strategy and the Defense Defines His Job,” .Vete York Timet Magazine. 26 Apnl Inte..çctuals,” Saturday Ezening Fort, 2-36 4 May 1963), pp. 1964. p. 13. Contrast Secretary McNamara'! approach with that of one 4. Secretary McXamara has been quite explícit in statinz of his predecessors, Secretary McElroy, as indicated by the fol- his management phílosophy: lcrwing comment: “When I became Secretary of Defense in 1961. I felt that “The conflicting pressures on him TMcElroy] from the Army eíther of two broad philosophies of management could be and the Air Force were to great that he finally thret* up his followed by the man at the bead of this great establishment. hands and asked Congrett to decide which of the two He could play an essentially passíve role—a judicial role. In Services' competmg and almost identical missiles—Júpiter or this role the Secretary would make the decisions required of Thor—should be put into production.”—From Julius Duscha. him by Iaw by approving recornmendatíons made to him. “Arms and the Big Money Men.” Harper’t Magazine, March On the other hand, the Secretary of Defense could play an 1964. p. 41. THE JCS AND DEFENSE POLICY FORMULATION 45

5. \Vtaen I refer to civilians and/or military men having analyses. He should use the results of the analysis of the an input to defense policy- or strategy-making, I imply that the military as one of the factors bearing on his total problem.” input—by whomcver given—involves the considerations of ends —From "The Challenge to the Military," Foreign Affairs, as well ás means. As explained later, I believe ends and mt-ans January 1964, p. 266. are practically inseparable. No one should tell a militaiy strate- Unless otherwise cited, reasons for contemporary civilian input gist that he should analyze only means and leave consideration into military affairs subsequent to this footnote are drawn either of ends to the civilian policy-maker. from this article by Colonel Ginsburgh, pp. 255-68, or from 6. As one prominent writer on militar>' affairs says: Huntington, pp. 793-801. “Militar.- Ieaders and military institutions were less powerful 11. Huntington, p. 797. For instance. General Marshall in the Truman administration than they were during World served altemately as Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. War II. They were less powerful under Eísenhower than 12. Ibid. they were under Truman. They are less powerful now under Keiinedy than they were under Eisenhower. This constant 13. One author notes that, at the end of the Eisenhower decline in power and influence of the military profession is Administration, “most civilian Ieaders in the Fentagon had spent the single most important trend in civil-miütary relations periods of 4 to 8 years in defense work, if not in the same post.” during the past fifteen years."—From Samuel P. Huntington, —From Gene M. Lyons, “The New Civil-Militaiy Relations." "Power, Expertise and the Military Profession,” Daedalus, American Political Science Reticw, 55 (March 1961), p. 57. Fali 1963, pp. 795-96. The Kennedv and Johnson Administrations tumed quite often to executives like Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of De­ 7. World War II directly reflected American attitudes fense, 1961-64, who had held responsible DOD positions under toward peace and war. During the war the President and the Truman. oint Chiefs of Staif formulated strategy. The Secretaries of tate, War, and Xavy played marginal roles. In 1945 Admirai 14. Huntington, p. 798. Leahy deciared that the Joint Chiefs were “under no civilian 15. Ibid., p. 799. control whatever.”—Noted in Huntington, p. 795. 16. One of the more recent of a growing series of “veto" 8. Robert E. Osgood, in his book Limited War (Chicago: instances is the Congress-Administration fight over the RS-70. University of Chicago Press, 1957), has brilliantlv formulated At this writing, only two prototype RS-70’s are contemplated. these two principies and drawn what he considers to be the nec- and even the Air Force has given up hope of getting the plane essary consequences for U.S. foreign policy. The following dis- into operational production. cussion of these principies is centered on Osgood's presentation. 17. The TFX (F-111) fighter airplane is DOD’s answer to 9. A necessary and most important concomitant idea is the tactical fighter problem. The degree to which civilians now that the very nature of strategy is no longer—if it ever .was— participate in weapon Systems procurement is dramatically indi- even primarily military. This is especially true in the absence of cated in the history of the TFX. See Richard W . Smith, “The major war situations, as Walter Millis says: $7-Billion Contract that Changed the Rules," Fortune, March 1963, pp. 97-101, 182-88, and April 1963, pp. 110-11. “In the absence of major war, the problems of high com- 191-94, 199-200. mand are much more organizational, technical, diplomatic— political in the larger sense of the word—than strategic. Even 18. Ginsburgh, p. 257. where 'little wars’ are under way, as in Vietnam, it is coming 19. The following is typical of the conclusions of experts on to be realized that military strategy itself involves a much the Defense Secretary's organizational and operating activities: larger political factor than was once supposed.”— From “ Final approval of centralization and functionalism carne in “Puzzle of the 'Military Mind,’ ” New York Times Magazine, 1958—from Congress in the express words of the National 18 November 1962, p. 158. Security Act amendments, not from the President or from 10. For instance, Colonel Robert N. Ginsburgh, after out- DOD. And it carne, moreover, at the behest of the Eisen­ lining many of the reasons whv civilians are making most of the hower, not of the Kennedy, Administration.”—Captain Gerald present defense policy inputs, had this to say: Garvey, “The Changing Management Role of the Military Departments Reconsidered,” Air University Review, XV, 3 “The statesman needs soimd military advice; the military (Mareh-April 1964). 47. professional needs firm policy guidance. Each must, of course, understand the problems of the other. The military 20. A 1962 report of Representative Carl Vinson's Special man should be aware of the political, economic, social and Subcommittee on Defense Agencies argues that "Congress has other factors which affect national security, but it is not his lost control of the organization of the Defense Department” business to evaluate them. He should limit himself to a but even it does not argue that secretarial actions have been consideration of military aspects which are within his area illegal.—Report of Special Subcommittee ou Defense Agencies, of competente. The civilian authorities, both executíve and Committee on Anmed Services, House of Representatives, 87th legislative, should assist him in exercising self-restraint by Congress, 2d Session, 13 August 1963. p. 6635. The subcom­ not requiring his comments on nonmilitary matters. Simi- mittee merely wished to amend the National Security Act so larly. the statesman who is concerned with a political prob- that no additional agency consolidation could occur without lem must recognize that it may have important military specific congressional approval. implications but he should refrain from making military 21. Ginsburgh. pp. 258-59.

This firsl instailment of Major Tatum’s two-part article has focused on the role of civilians in formulation of l'.S . defense policy. In lhe installment to appear in our July- August issue, he will discuss the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in policy formulation.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE STUKA DIVE BOMBER A Wa r n i n g f or Today

COLONEL WlLLIAM F. SCOTT

E FE AT,’’ we are told by Admirai writing to justify their own roles in the con- Alfred Thayer Mahan, “cries aloud flict. The “multitude of sins” that these success D for explanation, whereas success, stories may cover is seldom touched upon, and like charity, covers a multitude of sins.” The the “records of the beaten side” are virtually famed historian and strategist went on to state ignored. that “it is from the records of the beaten side Of what value could a study and analysis that we are most surely able to draw instruc- of World War II German doctrine and weapon tion. . . . The naval practice of courtmartialing systems be to the military professional today? a defeated general or admirai has been most Have not the thermonuclear weapons, ballistic productive of the material which history, and missiles, space, and 25 years of advancing tech- the art of war, both require for their treat- nology made obsolete any lessons that might ment.”1 The trials of the defeated German gen­ have been learned from the last world con- erais and admirais after World War II were flict? Fifteen years ago, in Korea, a limited war not for the purpose of determining the mis- was fought—limited both in objectives and in takes in their military doctrine. Little interpre- the weapon systems used. In the mid-Sixties tation or analysis of the reasons for Germanys there is another type of war, a sublimited war, defeat are available in the United States. On almost as different from Korea as that war was the other hand, the book market has been different from World War II. Aside from a saturated by victorious generais and admirais purely historical or academic interest, are there 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

any worthwhile lessons that can be gained To keep Germany from becoming a military from studying the defeated side in a war that power, France concentrated her efforts on pre- began a quarter of a century ago? venting the buildup of a German army and A major difference between World War II navy. and more recent wars, such as the limited and After the Paris Air Agreement, Germany sublimited engagements of Korea and South built up her civil air line, Lufthansa, with its Vietnam, has been the fight for air superiority. supporting facilities of airfields, aircraft indus­ Since the European Theater D-Day of 5 June try, and schools for pilots. A military air force 1944, much of our military thinking has as- was developed concurrently with civil aviation, sumed that air free of enemy aircraft is the but in secret. Military pilots were trained in normal state of warfare. Current military plan- sections of commercial flying schools and in ning appears to reflect that assumption. Since military schools for regular officers established “it is from . . . the beaten side that we are most in Rússia. Aircraft manufacturing plants were surely able to draw instruction,” it might be established in friendly foreign nations. Insofar well to analyze briefly an air weapon system as potential air power was concerned, Germany and a concept that took for granted control had circumvented the provisions of Versailles, of the air. and until Hitler carne to power, Britain and The Ju-87 aircraft, the famed Stuka dive France rested secure in their belief in the bomber, vvas developed under such a concept. supremacy of their surface forces. This aircraft made a tremendous impression In 1935 the fact of German military air upon the public mind during the German vie- power was announced to the world. Hitlers tories from 1939 to 1941 and influeneed the strong supporter, Goering, became commander planning of United States military leaders prior in chief of the new air force, an independent to and after Pearl Harbor. Hovvever, by the part of the German armed forces. An Air Staff time of the invasion of the Continent by Allied College was established, and an antiaircraft ground forces, the Stuka was an extreme rarity. force was begun, which was subordinate to the What caused its rapid rise to intemational Luftwaffe. At this time, four years before the fame, and why did it disappear from the bat- beginning of World War II, the strength of tlefields of Europe? The studv of this weapon the Luftwaffe was approximately 1888 aircraft system and of the thinking that led to its crea- and 20.000 officers and men. By 1936 aircraft tion must start with the earlv days of the Luft- production averaged over 300 per month, mak- waffe. ing one year’s production greater than the total number of aircraft then in the inventory of the United States Army Air Corps.2 Developm ent of a Concept With the formal creation of the German Air Force or Luftwaffe, its leaders held to a After World War I, the victorious powers concept of strategic air power similar to the attempted to ensure that Germany would re- concepts of the leaders of the Royal Air Force main militarilv impotent. Clauses in the Treaty and rebels in the United States Army Air of Versailles were designed to preclude any Corps. The only significant difference was that resurrection of the German Flying Corps. Ger­ at this time, 1935, when both the raf and the many was required to surrender all her military U.S. Army Air Corps were asking for designs aircraft and engines. In 1922 restrictions were for a four-engine bomber, the Luftwaffe was placed on the size of civil aircraft that she still requesting two-engines. Still, the overall could construct, but these restrictions were concepts for employment were basicallv the withdrawn entirely by the Paris Air Agreement same. of 1926. The French, with a firm belief in fixed Less than 18 months after the establish- ground defenses as a result of their experience ment of the Luftwaffe, a civil war in Spain be­ in the war, were not overly concerned about came a testing area for air concepts and equip- the buildup of an aircraft industry in Germany. ment. In August 1936, the first German force In an early phase of the evolution of dive-bombing technique, the Heinkel 51 proved too slow as an escort fighter during the Spanish Civil War, but in low-level attacks on ground positions its success was considerable, estab- lishing a pattem later followed in the German blitzkriegs of World War II. The Me-109 toas introduced in Spain and soon gained air superiority over Loyalist fighter opposi- tion. Early in World War II the Me-109 (seen over the English Channel) voas an able adver- sary of RAF Hurricanes and Spitfres, but the Luftwaffe did not have enough 109’s for them to play a decisive role in the Battle of Britain. RISE AND FALL OF THE STUKA DIVE BOMBER 51

for this limited war vvas dispatched to the aid a total range of 370 miles. The second aircraft, of General Franco. The force was too small the Hs-123, did not prove successful and was to be of any real value, and the He-51 escort later dropped from production. fighter “was soon found to be inferior in per­ The Ju-87, or the “Stuka” as it was popu- formance to the Russian and American fighters larly called, was an instantaneous success. being used by the Republican forces.”3 With a remarkable accuracy achieved in a In March 1937, the He-51 was involved dive angle exceeding 60 degrees, it was the in an experiment that was to have a significant infantryman’s answer to long-range artillery. effect on the future of the German Air Force The pilot could put out a new device called and indirectly on the outcome of World War II. dive brakes and control his rate of descent as These aircraft proved to be too slow as escort desired. Attacking ground forces no longer fighters and so were equipped as fighter- had to await the arrival of slow and cumber- bombers. each carrying six 22-pound bombs. some artillery pieces. By the use of newly They were used in low-level attacks against developed radio control, the dive bombers fortified ground positions, and the success could work in close cooperation with the achieved exceeded all expectations. “This at- ground forces. tack marked the first close-support opera- With the victory of General Franco, the tions,”4 and the pattern developed at the time Condor Legion had completed its task and was followed throughout the future German returned to Germany in March 1939. The campaigns against Poland, Norway, France, Spanish testing under conditions of limited and the Low Countries. warfare had made a lasting impression on In watching the success of the He-51 as both the LuftwafFe and Wehrmacht leaders. a dive bomber, the German air leaders did not They abandoned the old concept of an air neglect the requirement for air superiority. A force as an independent strategic force. The new fighter, the Me-109, was dispatched to the operations conducted by the bombers in Spain “Legion Condor,” as the force in Spain was had been largely limited to tactical support called. This aircraft, considered at the time of the Army. The members of the Condor one of the world’s best operational fighters, Legion went back to their units imbued with rapidlv made obsolete the equipment of Amer­ the possibilities of employing the LuftwafFe ican and Russian design in the hands of the in direct support of ground forces, the dive Loyalists. It gained air superiority in the sum- bomber to play a leading role. mer of 1937, and with this mission completed Of importance almost equal to the new the Legion Condor was free to accomplish tactical concept was the development of fu­ other tasks. Franco’s forces, lacking heavy ar- ture air leaders in the Spanish Civil War. The tillery, were in need of a substitute for guns. first commander of the Condor Legion was In the land battle for Madrid, air bombardment Hugo Sperrle, who later rose to be the joint demonstrated that an excellent substitute had leader with Kesselring in the Battle of Brit- been found. This success, together with the ain. Another Condor Legion commander was experience that had been gained in March, Wolfram von Richthofen, who was to gain a paved the way for the establishment of three reputation as the foremost exponent of inten- squadrons of He-51 aircraft for close-support sive close-support operations. Richthofen, as operations. a result of his Spanish Civil War experience, In the latter part of 1937 txvo specialized wanted to create “a separate tactical air force dive-bomber aircraft were sent to Spain for for participation in land battles; it was to be testing. These aircraft had been undergoing an adjunct to, and not a substitute for a stra­ final trials in March 1936 and were new to tegic air force.”5 Despite his failure to obtain operational squadrons. The first was the Ju- official sanction for his ideas, Richthofen 87, designed to carry 1100 pounds of bombs, created ground attack squadrons in the face armed with three machine guns, possessing a of the opposition of the High Command. top speed of 210 miles per hour and having Richthofen’s and Sperrle’s ideas were shared 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW by other officers who had been in the Spanish on the battle for air superiority. Less than 25 campaign, and since only the most promising percent of the total operational force con- officers had been sent to Spain, the results of sisted of fighter aircraft, and there were no the limited war were felt throughout the Luft- four-engine bombers either in squadrons or waíFe. in procurement.9 Thus the German basic belief in air With this newly developed concept of power as a supporting arm for the Army was ground support and with equipment strongly largely the result of the limited-war test and weighted in favor of such a concept, the Luft­ the concurrent experience of the air leaders. waffe was assigned the task of carrying out But other factors had entered into the chang- the designs of Hitler. This force was paraded ing concept as well. The concept of the new at Munich, where it won a great victory— weapon system, centered around the tank and “perhaps the greatest victory of its entire the dive bomber, was further stimulated by existence.”10 Britain and France were cowed, visits of German air leaders to the United and only a few optimistic men on either side States. As a result of the visits, “instead of the of the Atlantic thought that such a force could commitment of major forces and area opera- ever meet its match. By 1 September 1939 the tions, small forces with pinpoint accuracy of total strength of the Luftwaffe had increased fire became the slogan.”'1 Apparently the dis- to 3750 aircraft. The percentage of dive tinguished German visitors were guests of bombers had shown a slight decrease and now ground leaders and took back with them stood at 8.9 percent of the total strength. How- copies of United States Army Field Manuais ever, the concept of employment as developed containing the viewpoint of the Army General during and following the Spanish Civil War Staff for the employment of air units. The was unchanged. Would this “limited war” ex­ Luftwaffe visitors did not realize that “control perience prove valid for the future? over the formulation and dissemination of combat doctrines [in the U.S.] was vested in a General Staff composed of ground officers Justification of a Concept and the air manuais had to be denatured to suit their taste.”7 In fact, “most of the manuais The first major test of the Luftwaffe published before 1935 were actually an- started 1 September 1939, and within the tagonistic to the most advanced thought in the space of 28 days Poland had been defeated. Air Corps.”8 The leaders of the Allied powers then began The effect of this changed German con­ to review their concepts of air power. Liddell cept of air weapons and operations had its Hart, the noted British exponent of tank war- inevitable influence in aircraft programming. fare, saw his prewar theories, which had been In 1935, Milch, the deputy to Goering, had scorned by his own nation, win success after planned for 51 dive bombers out of a total of success. The weapons were somewhat differ- 1863 operational aircraft, which carne to 3.3 ent from the concentration of tanks that Lid­ percent of the total number. By 1 August dell Hart had anticipated, but the theory was 1938, at the time of the Munich conference, the same: lightning thrusts of armored col- dive bombers and ground support aircraft umns before enemy resistance could be numbered 380, or approximately 13 percent stabilized. The determination of the Poles had of the total strength of 2928. Of equal im- availed little against the overwhelming power portance, the bomber force of 1157 aircraft of the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht. was thought of primarily as ground support In this campaign, the Ju-87 Stuka stood weapon carriers. The ease with which air out above any other type of aircraft employed. superiority had been gained in Spain, together The entire German dive-bomber force had with the relatively fast speed of the bombers been used against Poland. with its initial at- in comparison to the fighter opposition, had tacks being against airfields. The Polish Air resulted in decreased emphasis being placed Force had consisted of approximately 900 first- The burning barracks at the fortification of Modlin, Poland, are ample testimony to the ac- curacy of Sazi dive bombing.

line and 600 second-line aircraft, all of whieh holding both Denmark and Norway, he was were inferior to those of the Germans.11 With ready for an attack against France. The Ger­ both superior equipment and numbers, the man plan called for armored forces to make Luftwaffe quicldy gained air superiority. The rapid advances and breakthroughs, spearhead- Stuka delivered its attack almost without oppo- ed by a moving artillery barrage laid down by sition, and the demoralizing effect of its bomb­ aircraft. Air support operations were conceived ing was a major factor in the rapid capitulation by Von Richthofen, who would put into further of the Polish Army. Of particular significance use the lessons learned in Spain and Poland. was the reaction of the civilian populace, whieh The Stuka dive bombers were to be employed virtually panicked whenever the Stuka ap- in full strength, and at the time they numbered peared. 380 of a total of 3530 German aircraft avail- After the “phony war” period of the winter able.12 of 1940, the next German objective was Nor- In France, from the very beginning of the way. In this campaign, whieh started 9 April battle, the work accomplished by the Stukas 1940, the Stuka played a lesser role. Only some was out of proportion to their actual numbers. 40 were employed, and their limited range did As many as nine sorties a day were flown by not permit them to take part in the first attaeks. a single aircraft. A strong point or a resistance Little opposition was encountered, the small center. located either by air reconnaissance or Norwegian Air Force having been taken by by ground forces, was quickly overcome by surprise and destroyed on the.ground. Later, concentrations of Stukas. A new chapter in the when the British attempted to re-establish a history of warfare was written. The millions foothold in Norway, the Stukas did excellent spent on the Maginot Line, the centuries spent Service by bombing frozen lakes and other sites in developing a tradition—both were overshad- whieh the British attempted to use as airstrips. owed by an investment of 380 aircraft drop- Once Hitler had secured his right flank by ping bombs from a 60-degree dive. The Concept Tested

The Junkers 87 Stuka received first testing under battle conditions with lhe Legion Condor in Spain late in 1937 and performed brilliantly. But whether it could perform as well under other than “limited war” conditions remained for World W ar II to prove. One can all but hear its terrifying screani as it angles down and dive-bombs an isolated Frencb tank. The Stuka in flight . . . A covey of Stukas when the bird was in its prime 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Air opposition to the Luftwaffe was for losses were heavy. Nevertheless, the sum total the most part ineffectual. The French had not of the Stuka’s accomplishments between 1 Sep- more than 600 modem aircraft, supplemented tember 1939 and Dunkirk negated any concern by approximately 160 bombers and 130 fighters over its future battles. from the Roval Air Force.13 Against such limit- ed opposition the Luftwaffe again was able to gain decisive air superiority. Once air superior- TTie Concept Re-exam ined ity was gained, the Stuka added to its legendary reputation. It played an important role “in the With the evacuation of the British forces demoralization of the French infantry,”14 and at Dunkirk, the German High Command be- with its extreme coneentration of striking gan preparations for the invasion of England. power, it “paralyzed the British and French The first task was to defeat the Royal Air armies to a degree that was a revelation even Force. The implications of the forthcoming to the Germans themselves.”15 battle were fully recognized. Churchill was of The significance of this revolutionary air­ the opinion that “there was alvvays the possi- craft was felt throughout the military forces of bility that victory over Britain in the air would the world. The United States Military Attaché bring about the end of the British resistance, in Paris gave as a reason for France’s defeat and that actual invasion, even if it became that “there is no French airplane designed, as practicable, would also become unnecessary, was the Junkers 87, primarily for dive bombing except for the occupying of a defeated coun- and sea levei tactics.”1'-’ T h e n o t e d U n i t e d try.”20 States Army historian and analyst Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall reported to the the Western Front American public that “the role of the German dive bomber had been roughly guessed at, but German aircraft were eoncentrated on its accuracy and its efficiency as a destroyer of bases in the area between Hamburg and Brest. both morale and materiais proved one of the Because of the range limitations of the Stuka, great tactical surprises of the war.”17 Marshall part of the dive-bomber force initially was closed his report with a warning of “the length- withdrawn to Germany to rest and to be re- ened shadow of the airplane over the fielcí of fitted for the actual invasion that would fol- battle. . . . The battle is still the infantry, not low. Of the total force of 2600 aircraft assigned infantry in the 1914-15 sense of the soldier who to defeat the Royal Air Force, only 280 were slogs along on foot, but infantry in its pristine Stukas. Their limited radius of action restricted meaning of ‘the tme servant.’ For only he who their use to only a small portion of the British makes good use of the weapons on the ground Isles, but they could cover large areas of the can achieve the final victory in the new age of English Channel. warfare.’ 18 Another Marshall, the Chief of StaflF W hile full-scale battles were being of the United States Army in 1941, would not planned against the Royal Air Force, Stukas approve the Army Air Forces 84-group pro- made harassing attacks against British shipping gram until he could see “the successes of the and ports. On 8 August one wave of 57 Stukas Stuka reflected in these 84 Groups.”10 The dive and another of 82 bombed convoys off the Isle bomber had come of age. of Wight.21 A few flights were made against There was still one cause for concern. Coastal targets, including airfields, but such Until Dunkirk. air superiority had been main- efforts were on a small scale. tained by the German fighters. However, as The initial phase of the primary attack the British were evacuating the European con- started 10 August 1940. Here, for the first time, tinent (26 May-4 June 1940), Fighter Com- the Stuka encountered significant opposition. mand of the Royal Air Force made its first ma­ Its limited performance turned into a great jor appearance in the war. At this time the drawback; with an externally suspended bomb Stuka met its first real air opposition, and its load its speed in a dive was only 150 miles per RISE AND FALL OF THE STUKA DIVE BOMBER 57 hour. “At the required altitude for the dive, the revolution in Belgrade and the unexpected between 10,000 and 15,000 feet, these Stukas resistance of Yugoslavia, an additional 600 air­ attracted Spitfíres and Hurricanes as honey craft, of whic-h approximately 100 were Stukas, attracts flies.”-- The British pilots quicklv real- were brought in from the Western Front and ized that the Stukas were practically defense- the Mediterranean. Organized resistance in less. The Me-109 attempting to fly escort could Yugoslavia was quickly broken, and the Stuka not slow down sufficiently to stay vvith the regained a part of its legend in attacks over Stuka in its dive, so Stuka losses rose steadily. Belgrade. Afterwards, support was given to the Somehow, the lessons gained in the “limit- Greek campaign, and again the Luftwaffe ed” war in Spain did not apply to the Battle of never had more than weak opposition. The Britain. The Stuka, vvhich had previously Stukas again were able to demonstrate the ef- proved itself as a tactical weapon in support of fectiveness they had shown in Spain, Poland, the .Army, was of little value. According to and France. By the latter part of April 1941, Galland, “in the Battle of Britain it proved dis- all Greece was under German control. astrous.”23 On 19 August 1940, less than ten The next operation was to capture Crete. days after the Battle of Britain had started, 220 Some 530 Ju-52 transports, 150 Stukas, and 500 of the remaining Stukas were pulled out of the other aircraft were assemhled for the under- battle. The Stuka had failed to play a role in taking. Air opposition to the Germans was so the gaining of air superiority, and it had re­ light that only 90 single-engine fighters were quired huge escorts of fighters in its attacks used in the battle. The small Royal Air Force against shipping; consequently, it was moved contingent was quickly destroyed, while the hack as an ancillary of the army. With the army local commander, surveying the attack from his it had started its career and won its reputation, open-cockpit “Tiger Moth” training airplane, and to the army it was retumed. was powerless.24 Against such air opposition As its unsuccessful Battle of Britain was the Stuka did excellent work. Even the British drawing to a close, the German High Com- Naval Commander, Admirai Andrew Cunning- mand was making plans for the Balkan area. ham, afterwards indicated that Crete could Forces were being concentrated for an attack have been saved by two squadrons of long- on Greece. By March 1941, some 490 Ger­ range fighters. man aircraft were located in the Bulgarian- Following the fali of Crete, a small force Romanian zone. Of this force 120 aircraft, or of Stukas was used against Malta. They took over 24 percent of the total, were Stukas. With part in attacks against convoys trying to reach

The Stuka, which had served so effectively in Spain, Poland, and France where fighter opposition was negligible, was easij prey to the agile and pluckij British Spitfre, seen here on the line at lst Combat Crew Replacement Center, AAF Station 112, England. 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

that island, and on one occasion 40 dive bomb- superiority as the Germans did enjoy was ers made attacks against the British aircraft greatly aided by the United States military doc- carrier Illustrious. Losses were heavy but no trine at the time, which gave a local army com- definite results were achieved. Neither was mander control of an air unit. Malta completely knocked out, and when addi- Again, as in the Battle of Britain, the Ger­ tional fighter reinforcements were flown in, the mans found that the use of the Stuka was im­ dive-bomber attacks were called off. possible in the face of Allied air superiority. A In November 1941, the British opened Royal Air Force pilot flying an obsolete P-40 their first offensive in North África. Here the shot down four dive bombers on one mission; Germans had an air strength of 190 aircraft, the pilot of a P-38, which had greater endur- of which 70 were Stnkas. Some 100 additional ance than the P-40, shot down seven.2G In the aircraft were brought in after the offensive words of Major General O. A. Anderson, “We started, and further assistance was given by would make aces by the gross if we only had 320 Italian aircraft. The Germans could not to kill a Stuka.”27 As Allied air superiority in­ gain air superioFity, and the Stukas lost heavily creased, the Stuka became more and more an as a result. This was despite the fact that the operational liability until finally it faded from British aircraft were largely second-hand the theater. equipment, with a considerable influx of vari- ous United States P-40 models, which could the Eastern Front not live in the air in western Europe. The British offensive carne to a halt at the end of In June 1941, with the Luftwaffe leading their long supply lines, and from January to the assault, the German High Command July 1942 the Axis launched two counter- launched an attack against the Soviet Union. offensives. In May 1942, at the opening of the second counteroffensive, the Stukas averaged 100 sorties per day during the first week of opera- tions. This was made possible by some aircraft averaging 2 to 3 sorties per day. However, losses were heavy, and the German armor ad- vanced more rapidly than airfields could be built. The Luftwaffe in this eampaign concen- trated its attacks against British armored col- umns. These attacks were not decisive, and air superiority was not gained. In one day alone, 40 Stukas were shot down.25 By November 1942 the dive-bomber forces had fallen to a strength of 30 aircraft. In December 1942, with the Allied land- ings in North África, the Luftwaffe strength in the Mediterranean was increased by the trans- fer of units from Norway, Finland, the Russian front, and France. Of this increase of over 600 aircraft, approximately 55 were Stukas. Ger­ The Stuka was again successful in the lightly con- man air forces operating in this theater were at te st ed invasion of Crete, where it accompanied tha a disadvantage, being outnumbered and with Ju-52 transport (above) and other Luftwaffe aircraftj supply lines badly damaged. The air superi­ But in the North África eampaign of 1941-42, Allied ority of the Allies was never seriously threat- air superiority once more overpotvered the Ju-871 ened, except in isolated cases where the Ger­ Abancloned by the Germans during their North África mans concentrated their efforts. Such local air retreat, the Stuka arouses more curiosity than /ear| RISE AND FALL OF THE STUKA DIVE BOMBER 59

The Luftwaffe, following elassical doctrine, losses to the German dive-bomber units. had as its first task the defeat of the Soviet Air During the German Eastern offensive in Force. By virtue of the surprise attack, the July 1942, Stukas again were used to spearhead Stnka was able to operate against Soviet air- the ground advances. Once the Don River was fields. Communications, and troop concentra- crossed, the wide dispersai required of the tions. The width of the front affected all air Luftwaffe curtailed any high degree of close operations. In the campaign against France ground support. An exception was in the and the Low Countries. the Luftwaffe had sup- Stalingrad area, where Stukas often carried ported a relatively narrow front with approxi- out four or five sorties per day. By September mately 3500 aircraft; now the same number 1942, the Russian Air Force had general air were required to operate over a distance of superiority. By November the Luftwaffe could 1000 miles, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. mass but a small defensive force of 70 to 80 The main offensive was against the cen­ aircraft to cover a front of some 300 miles in tral sector, in the vicinitv of Moscow. Here the Stalingrad zone. As the German offensive were concentrated 1320 aircraft. of which 400 bogged down, heavy armament was put on a were Stukas.2* This stripped other fronts, es- number of the Stukas, and they were formed pecially in the close-support aircraft category. into antitank units in an attempt to destroy With this concentration of power, the Luft­ Russian tanks breaking through the German waffe was able to achieve local air superiority lines.29 However. the Luftwaffe was so over- for a limited period, but by the time winter extended that innovations could not have any arrived the Germans had failed to achieve a appreciable effect upon the overall battle. decision. Air superiority gradually passed to The Luftwaffe showed a strength of 270 the Russians, resulting in the inevitable heavy Stukas at the end of December 1942, in con- 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW trast to the 335 that had been in operational role for the Luftwaffe. During the North Afri- units on 1 September 1939. In direct support can campaign and later in the Russian cam- of troops on the battlefield. vvhere modern paign, units of Fw-190 fighters had been artillery was used, the Stuka was becoming converted into bomb carriers for use on the more and more vulnerable. When enemy air­ battlefield. Sueli employment, without air su­ craft vvere in the area, it could not be employed periority, was of little value. Nevertheless, without exorbitant losses. Hitler could not abandon the idea of the dive To replace the Stuka in the close-support bomber. In 1943, during a demonstration of role, hopes had been placed on the Hs-126 and the Me-262 jet fighter, the Fiihrer stated: the Me-210. The greatest hope had been placed In the aircraft you present to me as a fighter on the latter, but in the opinion of Luftwaffe plane I see the “Blitz Bomber,” with which I pilots this proved to be “the most unsatisfactory will repel the invasion in its first and weakest aircraft Germany ever built.”30 The result of phase. Regardless of the enemy’s air umbrella these failures was retention of the Ju-87, which it will strike the recently landed mass of ma­ up to that time the Germans had planned to terial and troops creating panic, death and drop from their aircraft program. Therefore, in destruetion.3- spite of the growing difficulties of the Stuka The Me-262 was no more decisive in a against any kind of opposition, either from the ground support role than the Stuka had been. ground or in the air, production was continued. Had it been employed by air leaders under an By the late summer of 1943, the Luftwaffe air concept, the results might have been dif- High Command was beginning to realize that ferent. a policy of support for the German Army could The diary of the famed commander of the not be continued in the face of Soviet air su- Afrika Korps, Field Marshal Rommel, shows periority. Ideally, the High Command would the changing pattern of the Luftwaffes power. have preferred to pursue a strategic role and In May 1941, Rommel believed that “one thing destroy industrial targets behind the Urais. This could not be done because the Luftwaffe was designed and trained for army coopera- tion. Insufficient time and resources and pres- sures on the various fronts prevented any alteration of its previous roles. Once again in the Kursk offensive of June-July 1943 The Luftwaffe made a final effort to the Luftwaffe and Stuka seemed formidable, but by achieve local air superiority against the Soviets midsummer the Russians had gaincd air superiority. in June 1943, when 1000 first-line aircraft were concentrated for the Kursk offensive.31 For a few days of the offensive, the Stukas flew as many as five or six missions per day. By July the Russians had gone to the counteroffensive and had regained general air superiority. With this, the Germans had no choice but to start their long and bitter retreat. From that point on, any appearance of the Stuka over a battle­ field was an isolated and unusual occurrence.

Epilogue Even with the eclipse of the Stuka, the German High Command still clung to its basic concept of the primacy of a ground support The Henschel 126 (above) and Mes- serschmitt 210 (left) for a time re- placed the Stuka, but neither was satisfactonj and the Stuka was re- tained. The Me-210 was underpowered and soon gave way to the Me-410. Luftwaffe superiority was a myth after late summer of 1943, and the Stuka became an increasingly rare sight, particularly in battle zone. This one, which landed at an advance Ninth Air Force base of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Group on 8 May 1945, was part of the exodus from Czechoslovakia ahead of the Russian sweep westward.

that worked very seriously against us was the same handicaps and with the same chances of fact that the Luftwaffe in África was not sub- success.”35 ordinate to the Afrika Korps.”33 Approximately Later, when home on leave from the Nor- one year later, in June 1942, Rommel was mandy front in August 1944, Rommel discussed concemed with the fact that Kesselring, the with his son Manfred the possibility of a future Luftwaffe commander, could not prevent war with Rússia on one side and America hcavy fosses of aircraft.34 By September 1942 and Britain on the other. His son was of the Rommel was not concemed with who con- opinion that the West would quickly lose, since trolled the Luftwaffe but with the idea that “Russia’s land forces are on an altogether dif- “anyone who has to fíght, even with the most ferent scale from those of the West.’ Rommel s modem weapons, against an enemy in com­ answer was, “That isn’t what will decide the plete control of the air, fights like a savage issue. Have our better tanks and elite divisions against modem European troops, under the in Normandy been of any avail? No, young RISE AND FALL OF THE STUKA DIVE BOMBER 63

man. the Americans have got command of the few sporadic raids by a retreating Luftwaffe. air and theyll keep it. That is a sentence of The military fame of those generais in Europe death for any land army, however, that has to rests on victories achieved under conditions ol fight without adequate air cover. . . ,”3

Notes 1. AUan Westcott, ed., Mahan on Naval Warfare, Selec- 25. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, tions from the Writtngs of Rear Admirai Alfred T. Mahan ed. B. H. Liddell Hart (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Com­ (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1942), pp. 256-57. pany, 1953). 2. The Control of Germany by Air and Other Means, 26. From a lecture given by Wing Coinmander AUen Project Control Report FCR, 3.2, Air University, 1954, p. 21. Wright, RAF, to cadets at the RAF College, Cranwell, England, Hereafter referTed to as Control. 1952. 3. Air Ministrv. The Rise and Fali of the German Air 27. Anderson, op. cit. Force. 1933 to 1945 (London: A.C.A.C. [1], 1948), p. 13. 28. Air Ministry, p. 171. 4. Ibid., p. 14. 29. Asher Lee, The German Air Force (New York: Harper 5. Ibid., p. 17. and Brothers, 1946), p. 281. 6. Adolf Galland, "Defeat of the Luftwaffe: Fundamental 30. Air Ministry, p. 212. Causes," Air University Quarterly Reciew , VI, 1 (Spring 1953), 31. For a Soviet account of this battle, see Lt. Col. I. V. 23. Timokhovich, Sovietskaya Aviatsiya Bitve Pod Kurskom (Soviet 7. James L. Cate, “Development of Air Doetrine, 1917- Aviation in the Battle of Kursk) (Moscow: Military Publishing 41," Air University Quarterly Review, I, 3 (Winter 1947), 13. House, Ministry of Defense, 1959). The author States that in 8. Ibid. June 1943 the Germans had 2000 aircraft in the area and the 9. Air Ministry, p. 20. Soviets over 3000. On 11 July 1943, on the eve of the battle, 10. Edward Mead Earle, "The Influence of Air Power the German aircraft strengtn was 560 bombers, 350 fighters, and upon History,” United States Views on Air Power (London: 200 reconnaissance aircraft. This writer claims that the Germans Air Ministrv. 1948). Originally published in The Tale Review, lost 2000 aircraft in the Kursk salient and that the Soviets flew XXXV. 4 (Summer 1946), 577-93. 90,000 sorties. For a contrast to this account, see Alan Clark, lí. Control, p. 40. The British Air Ministry’s Rise and Barbarossa—The Russian-German Conflict, 1941—45 (New York: Fali of the Cerman Air Force places the Polish Air Force “at no William Morrow and Company, 1965). Clark devotes some more than 400 to 500 first-line aircraft” (p. 54). twelve pages to the Kursk battle and does not mention the use 12. Air Ministry, p. 66. of aircraft a single time. Another writer, Alexander Werth, in 13. The Campaign in the West, Department of Military Rússia at War, 1941-45 (New York: Dutton, 1964), also largely Art and Engineering, ÜSMA, West Point, N.Y., pp. 1, 9. ignores the role of the Soviet Air Force in World War II. For 14. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. a brief account of Werth's treatment of Soviet Air Forces during II, Their Finest Hour (London: Cassell ítCo., Ltd., 1949), p. 31. World War II, see William F. Scott, “The View from Moscow,” 15. Air Ministry. p. 70. Orbis, Winter 1965, p. 984. 16. United States Army Attaché, Paris, “Major Air Opera- 32. Galland, pp. 333-34. tions, Theory of Combat," Report No. 25. 756-W, 6 June 1940. 33. Rommel, p. 134. 17. S. L. A. Marshall. Blitzkrieg, Its History, Strategy, 34. Ibid., p. 218. Economics, and the Challenge to America (New York: William 35. Ibid., p. 285. Morrow ir Company, 1940), pp. 180-81. 36. Ibid., pp. 498-99. 18. Ibid., p. 181. 19. Major General Orvil A. Anderson, USAF, Retired, “Air Force Concept of Air Power,” transcribed from a tape recording of a lecture given to the Field Officer Course, Air Command and Staff School, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 16 October 1952. 20. Churchill, p. 283. 21. Air Ministry. p. 80. Acknowledgment: The Editor wishes to thank the following 22. Adolf Galland. The First and the La.st: The Rise and for assistance in locating illustrations for this article: Mr. Harry Fali of the German Fighter Forces, 1938-1945 (New York: R. Fletcher, Histórica! Studies Braneh, USAF Historical Divi- Henry Holt and Company, 1954), p. 28. 23. Ibid., p. 29. sion, Aerospace Studies Institute; Mr. Royal D. Frey, Air Force 24. From a personal story by Air Marshal George Bemish, Museum, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; and Mr. John who at the time commanded the RAF unit in Crete. told at the Cary and Mrs. Virgínia G. Fincik, Aeronautical Chart and In­ RAF College, Cranwell, England, in 1951. formation Center. THE NEXT DECADE IN COMPUTER DEVELOPMENT

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel James E. Hughes ITH IN the next decade the Com­ • It is an on-line, interactive, multi- puter will become an integrated access system. Users communicate directly Wpart of day-to-day operations and with the system, the system responds rapidly management activities of the Air Force. The and in understandable terms, and many users staff ofiBcer will be able to accomplish his job are served at once. in close partnership with the Computer. A com- • It is a readilv changed and extended mon sight in a major command headquarters system. It permits the user to change his ap­ in the 1970’s will be the staff ofiBcer sitting in plication easilv and pennits the system pro- front of a Computer terminal, interaeting with grammer to extend the system itself by adding his program. He mav be largely ignorant of a new program or subsystem. the inner worldngs of the remotelv located • It is a time-sharing system. Computer; he may not have laid out in detail the procedure for solving the problem he is • It is an off-line, multiprogrammed, addressing or even clearlv formulated it. He batch-processing system, for those operations wiU go through several or manv steps of plan- that involve mueh computing and little user/ ning, formulating, calculating, evaluating— system interaction. sometimes progressing, sometimes bogging While many present and past attempts to down—before hitting upon a path that leads utilize the broad capabilities of the general- to a satisfactory result. purpose Computer in the direct support of A logistics specialist may be using the command and control, planning, and resource Computer system to determine the materiais management operations have been expensive necessary to support a tactical squadron in disappointments, there is impressive evidence Europe for 60 davs and to schedule and order that the impending availabilitv of relatively their shipment from diverse locations. At the cheap logical power and the concurrent easing same time a Communications specialist may of presently diflficult programming will make be attempting to construct a Communications systems such as the one described technically plan for a combined operation in the arctic. and economicallv feasible. User-oriented Proc­ Simultaneously an intelligence specialist, start- essing systems in which the staff specialist is ing with a set of observations of an enemys on-line with the Computer, interaeting in a actions, may be attempting to applv a multi- conversational way with the operating pro­ variate technique of analysis to permit inter- gram, will make it possible for computers to polation of unobserved actions leading to a be used in direct support of human decision- prediction of the enemv’s intent. Each is on­ making at all leveis of Air Force operations. line with the Computer in a dvnamic interac- It is interesting to examine the tasks in tion environment, controlling the progress of addition to arithmetic operations that are his program in a language congenial to him, clearly relevant to the decision process that that is, using essentially natural language syn- the digital Computer is capable of performing: tax and a vocabulary pertinent to his problem. information storage The machine is cycling through the various collation and correlation of information user programs, plus a background program to information display in various forms absorb time when the on-line users are idle. simulation This picture implies several characteris- extrapolation. tics of the Computer system of the future; The value of the Computer in carrying out • It is a generalized, user-oriented sys­ these tasks is generallv considered to lie in the tem. Consequently, it can handle a wide variety speed with which it can process information of different applications, yet using it is easy and hence the large amount of information enough that a nonprogrammer can specify his with which it can deal. This view tends to over- own application with very little specialized look the orders-of-magnitude advantage in training. speed of the Computer over hand computation, 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW the speed advantage making possible analyti- which, if properlv supported, converge on a cal approaches to decision-making that could single choice. There is considerable room for never be undertaken by unaided humans. individual style in such a process, and the se­ Far from downgrading the staff officer, the quence of data acquisition and the formation Computer vvill place a higher premium on his and testing of the hypotheses vvill, of course, abilities. Intelligent and imaginative humans vary from occasion to occasion and from indi­ excel in setting goals, generating hvpotheses, vidual to individual. The process is highly de- and selecting c-riteria. These are the problem- pendent on the training and prior knowledge solving phases in which the guidelines are laid of the decision-maker, and it is imperative that do\vn, approaches chosen, and judgments ex- he be kept in the problem-solving loop. ercised. This is the heuristic aspect of problem In a sense, every application of a Computer solving—the contribution of the user to the is a simulation. Properlv planned and under- man./computer partnership. The computers stood, it can provide insights that would be contribution is in the algorithmic aspect of costly to obtain by other means. The Commu­ problem solving—the ability to execute rapidly nications specialist attempting to construct a and very accurately procedures that have been Communications plan for combined operations defined explicitly and in detail. A Computer in the arctic is in reality constructing models system is only as valuable as the man using it. and testing them. He very likely will test sev- No data-processing system can by itself ensure eral altemative system configurations, frequen- efficient management or optimal decisions. Nor cies, etc., and the one he finally selects will be can it solve problems in tactics or strategy. It more than just feasible—it will be optimal by can only support such decision-making by some criteria. accomplishing its tasks under the direction of In the next decade, economical, large, on­ a knowledgeable user. line, user-oriented Computer systems for the For the military officer, decision-making direct support of command and management may simply involve making a choice between will have an important by-product in the facili- tvvo or more possible courses of action in re­ ties and resources for simulation and war- sponse to a given set of facts. It is the func- gaming on a vast scale made available to the tion of the Computer system to make certain professional military man. The need for special that the appropriate facts are available in groups and organizations whose sole mission usable form when they are required. The com- is to apply those analytical techniques that plexitv in such decision-making arises from the must substitute for experience in military mat- diversitv of information that must be correlated ters will lessen if not entirely disappear. With or otherwise manipulated, in order to derive proper planning, simulation and war-gaming the requisite facts, and the unpredictability of can be meshed with the day-to-day operations the type and sequence of operations involved. and become an important function of the In another type of decision-making not organization. involving such well-structured information The digital Computer and automatic data Processing, making the decision is more prop- Processing are today inextricably woven into erly regarded as an extended process involving Air Force operations and management, but the information retrieval, verification, hypothesis Computer enters hardly at all into the day-to- formation, and hypothesis testing. It can be day operations of the staff officer. With the thought of as a series of questions and answers advent of direct support systems and on-line Computer operation, however, practically all staff personnel will require a working familiar- Continuing the analysis series that appeared ity with computers and data-processing tech­ in the January-February and March-April is- sues, Air llniversity Revieic now presents this niques. A very powerful tool will be put in the artiele by Colonel Hughes and lhe succeeding hands of the Air Force officer. Just how pow­ one by Dr. Fraser on reliability analysis. erful that tool will be will depend on the degree of sophistication he develops in its use. THE NEXT DECADE IN COMPUTER DEVELOPMENT 67

Today, high programming costs and pro- which require extensive interaction with the gramming lead times pose a serious threat to analyst. Finallv the programmer is ready to future electronic data processing ( edp) applica- encode in some language a set of statements tions in the Air Force. While the price for a unit collectively conveying to the machine the in- of computational power has decreased a hun- tent of his flow charts. dredfold over the past decade, the cost of de- This is the first point in the overall pro­ signing and installing equipment, writing and gramming process at which the programmer maintaining programs. and training personnel uses a language for communication to the ma­ has risen. Programming represents a major por- chine. Heretofore, his dialogue has been with tion of system costs, and for many apphcations himself or the analyst. The programmer now it exceeds the cost of the hardware. Equally as may write short sections of the routine for the costly and time consuming is the reprogram- purpose of testing mathematical techniques or ming required as a result of changing work- other ideas that he wishes to exploit. At this loads and operational procedures. However, point he needs access to a machine in order in the large svstems, many of the activities now to run test cases on the small detailed issues. considered a part of the programming process Gradually he builds up larger and larger seg- might more properlv be considered operations ments of a routine which will implement his research chargeable to general overhead. The original flow charts. Because of the complexity intensive examination of the organization’s inherent in a large problem, more than likely goals, functions, and operational procedures he will test pieces of his routine by running that is required in order to effectively apply selected test cases on the machine. It should automation usually provides a pavoff that is be noted that he may have to write special independent of questions of automation itself. routines which will not be part of the final The programming process is widely mis- problem-solving routine but which serve only understood. Only a small part of the program­ to exercise the selected parts that he is trying ming process (and the cost) is involved with to check out or debug. actually writing routines for the Computer, that Finallv, he gets the whole routine assem- is, with “programming the problem.” bled and can run larger test cases, and, ulti- There are many stages in the preparation mately, he can produce genuine answers. It of a problem for solution by a Computer. First, may tum out that the answers are incorrect the problem must be analyzed. This is largely because (1) the analyst did not understand the an intellectual activity involving study of the original problem sufficiently well or correctly, situation surrounding the problem and of the or (2) the analyst failed to communicate some problem itself. Only after the analyst under- essential detail to the programmer, or (3) the stands the problem does he attempt to describe programmer overlooked some detail in his flow it to the professional programmer, who under- charting or in writing the routine, or (4) the stands such languages as Fortran, Jovial, etc. mathematical techniques were not adequate There is usually an extended dialogue between for the situation. So the dialogue may start the man with the problem (the analyst) and over again—at the beginning or at some inter- the programmer. The analyst is seldom able to mediate stage. answer all the questions which the programmer Thus in this process, where cost is mea- asks. sured not only in money but in time to im­ Eventually the programmer understands plement a system, limitations on operational the problem well enough to start constructing capability in response to the requirement, and an outline for its solution. As the programmer inflexibility of response to changes in require- formulates his ideas for handling the problem, ments, the high cost of programming is attrib- he constructs flow charts to depict graphicallv utable to (1 ) lack of methodology for systems the flow of information as it will take place in analysis, (2) the communication problem, and the machine. Gradually, as he works out the de- (3) technological problems inherent in Com­ tails of the flow charts, questions usually arise puter design. Today conceptual toolsforanalyz- 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

ing management information needs and for problems which occur between system pro- devising information systems are virtually non- grams and user programs. They attempt to existent. There is no way to estimate with pre- provide linkages between system and user pro­ cision the real current and future information grams without reference to specific systems or needs of an organization. users. Generalized programming techniques at­ For the military organization, a satisfac- tempt to anticipate the numerous housekeep- tory solution can only be found through a ing functions required by complex program complete overhaul of current notions of Com­ configurations regardless of the content of puter design, programming, and operation. The particular programs. Generalized program­ military organization needs to enhance its ming techniques endow computers with great information-processing systems by improving power, flexibility, and generality by providing the ease with which the system can be under- them with programs capable of manipulating stood and applied by the user; by minimizing other programs in the same way that more the size of the first steps required in introdue- conventional programs manipulate data. ing automatic data processing; and by increas- • Functional systems are those which ing the systems versatility and extendability have been designed to perform a large and so that it can be applied rapidly to new situa- complicated but nonetheless well-delineated tions. Fortunately, selective development and job function, i.e., information retrieval. The ul- integration of technologies now in the labora- timate criterion for design decisions is whether tories can provide such improvements. or not a particular alternative will contribute to Let us look at the technological develop- the performance of the system in that function ments in software and hardware that will be which it would exercise more than any other. the building blocks for the Computer systems • Man/machine interface systems con­ of the next decade. centra te on the enhancement of man/machine communication through the development of software various types of response techniques. Systems in this category contribute to man/machine The existence of programming systems is interface techniques either by introducing a fundamental to efficient use of electronic data- new dimension along which communication processing equipment. The user is seldom a can occur or else by developing new' tech­ professional programmer. The user is more niques for improving the communication along likelv to be a military man, manager, or en- familiar dimensions. In these systems the de­ gineer interested in using the Computer as a signer has in mind a wide class of users oper- tool in his principal job. The Computer can be ating in a broad spectrum of problem areas. placed at his disposal through the use of a Thus, the techniques introduced are quite gen­ programming system, often called software. eral in nature and of wide potential use. The programming system or software consists • Special-purpose problem-oriented lan- of a program which can be used for building, guages illustrate an approach to problem solv- controlling, and modifying the complex se- ing which gains in flexibility and ease of use quence of problem-solving procedures re­ precisely because the problem areas addressed quired in sophisticated Computer applications. are extremely narrow and highly specific. It has been said that software is to the Com­ The fact that the problem area is highly con- puter what education is to the child. strained, coupled with the vdllingness on the No analysis in depth of programming sys­ part of the designer to sacrifice generality for tems has ever been conducted, but a recent the sake of ease of use by the problem solver, survey found it useful to group them into six enables designers of problem-oriented lan- categories: guage systems to provide extremely satisfac- • Gcneral-purpose programming and tory tooís for specific classes of users. It is not executivo systems address those interfacing surprising that, in light of the extreme specific- THE NEXT DECADE IN COMPUTER DEVELOPMENT 69

ity of each problem-oriented language, there hardware is little or no carrv-over from one problem class Memories are the pacing item in present- to another. day Computer systems, both economically and • Time-sharing systems inake a comput- functionally. Future developments in storage ing facilitv available to a multiplieity of users techniques will have a greater influence on simultaneously. The notion of time-sharing per- Computer design than any other single faetor. mits the combination of maximnm throughput The speed of todays computers is limited with a tight coupling between the user and his by the speed of memory access because the programmed process. In a time-sharing system, speed of the associated electronies can be made a number of consoles are available to users, substantially greater than presently available and each user interacts with his program at his memories. Magnetie film memories promise a own pace, the machine cycling through the notable step in Computer memory develop­ various programs—possibly including a back- ment. It is estimated that verv compact mag- ground program that absorbs time when all netic film memories with access times in the on-line users are idle. Time-sharing systems 100-nanosecond (.0000001 second) range, cost- have been built with widely different proper- ing less than half a cent per bit, can be available ties and features, and the determination of the in the next decade. This technology will most suitable set of features for a system must support development of very large-capacity be made without regard to whether or not the memories. system will be made to time-share. The Outlook for auxiliary memories is a Among the major concems of the time- less happy one. The speed at which memory sharing designer are the development of proper can be accessed paces the entire processing algorithms for scheduling, the development of operation, and memory access time is the over- routines capable of restoring programs inter- riding concem in the design of an information rupted at some prior stage to their proper place store for the central processor. Speed, how- in the Computer upon being recalled by the ever, is expensive and will remain so. For large user, the development of sufficiently sophisti- bulk storage it will be necessary to resort to cated executive routines to minimize the time auxiliary memories, and it is expected that delay experienced by the user between his the orders-of-magnitude discrepancy between input and the systems response. Thus, the retrieval times associated with internai and time-sharing designer is concerned with gen- auxiliary memories will be alleviated to some eralization of his Computer in the sense in extent; but no completelv satisfactory solution which it is available to a large number of users to this problem can be foreseen at this time. simultaneously. Over the next ten years the problem of match- • Generalized data management Sys- ing large data bases to fast processors will very tems represent an approach to software devel­ likely continue to stretch the ingenuity of the opment that can best be described as general- system designer. izations of the preceding points of view. The Mierocircuit technology, an extension of designers of generalized data management the semiconductor art, will have a major im- systems attempt to construct within the con­ pact on computers. Microcircuits are not new fines of one Computer system environment pro­ devices or new circuit techniques. The revo- grams which incorporate the sophistication lutionary faetor is size. Potential factors are and power of general-purpose executive rou­ reduced cost, increased reliability, and in- tines, the job specific concentration exhibited creased performance. Within ten years we can by the functional systems, the flexibility and expect to see extensive applications of digital power of user on-line systems, the narrow-band computers and complex digital processing specificity of problem-oriented languages, and, where today’s cost and size constraints are to some extent, the specific sense of generality prohibitive. implied by time-sharing. Advances in display technology per se will 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

have primarily an economic impact on data- rial as the user without heavy transcription processing system development. The more re- penalty. cent advances in display devices, particularly

dynamic displays, have been achieved primar­ To su m m a r ize, hardware development of mag- ily through the availability of cheaper buffer netic film devices and integrated circuitry memory and digital control logic. It is expected promises to make available greatly increased that the same sorts of cheap logic and memory memory and information-processing capacity that spur the availability of digital computers at a moderate cost. Experimental programming will also provide improved, cheaper displays. systems are now being used that have solved Displays having the follovving properties will many programming problems by simplifying find use in future systems: procedures for defíning data and parameters, • Individually operated visual displays creating and displaying files, allocating stor- providing a rapid and dynamic means for the age, monitoring execution of programs, and Computer to generate lines, points, characters facilitating Solutions of particular classes of in format, and position detennined by the Com­ problems through special problem-oriented puter program and the user languages. However, the programming tech- niques have not, for the most part, been re- • Pointing devices, such as the light duced to practice in the sense that they are pen, to allow the user precise and flexible feed- available to machine configurations different back to the Computer from those for which they were developed. • Keyboard and handprinting or writ- They have been developed independently, and ing devices to permit flexible, rapid entry of no attempt has been made to integrate them. words, definitions, and instructions The mere accumulation of a large number of these programming aids within a single ma­ • Page printing devices to provide hard chine complex provides no solution: accumula­ copy for operator use and for distribution away tion in a nonsystematic, nonintegrated fashion from the machine, capable of reproducing any- would soon overload any machine. The tech- thing that the operator can request and view nological challenge of the next decade is the on the visual display extension, refinement, and integration of these • Page reading devices, the converse of techniques into systems capable of providing the page printing devices, giving the automatic eíficient support to users working on real prob­ machinery the ability to read the same mate­ lems of a substantive nature. Hq Air Force Systems Command RELIABILITY I

High reliability, like so many goods things, systems. In the past our designers had the luxury carnes a price tag—if it’s not dollars, it’s time, cn of unlimited weight, or space—as in the design of weight, or space. The high cost of reliability forces bridges. No one criticized the bridge designer so us to be selective in our applications of high re- long as the bridge was safe. If there was a little liability. We cannot afford to spread the sweet more Steel than was required to do the job, few icing of reliability over the entire cake. We must criticized—few even knew about it! The bridge reserve it for the most criticai components and was a good bridge. But not so in the missile or Systems, so there is an increasing need for analysis space vehicle of today. The analysis of trade-offs of the trade-offs of reliability, dollar-cost, time, must provide us with the precise balance of re- tveight, and space. Unfortunately, all of these liability with weight, cost and other factors for characteristics have limitations in todays weapon every component of our modem weapon systems. —Maj. Cen. Gerald F. Keeling, DCS/Procurement and Production, Air Force Systems Command

HEN FAILURE of a system space operations qualify: they carry not onlv would be catastrophic, reliability men but also the national prestige of the United Wwhich approaches 100 percent is States and perhaps of the free world. Aircraft a mandatory requirement. Space systems de- on long-mission airbome alert qualify. The signed for long-term operation without repair power supplies and the gyroscope subsystem or replacement of failed subsystems are one of ballistic missiles qualify, as they frequently example, provided, of course, that the space must operate continuously without failure for system is sufficiently important. Most manned very extended times. Fuze systems for nuclear 72 AIR UMIVERSITY REVIEXV weapons qualify because, even when their op­ Thus we may say that a fuze is a proper if the era ting time is short, their failure could negate distribution of its fuzing positions corresponds counterforce strategy and imperil the whole to the design expectancy. If the distribution is free world. assumed to be Gaussian, then a proper may be In weapons employment, decisions are defined as one that operates within plus or based upon analvsis of operational systems. minus three standard deviations of the desired One factor in this analvsis is the System relia- point of operations. If this definition is ac- bility. Its accurate measurement is criticai to cepted, then an “early” is simply a fuze whieh the analvsis. Its optimization involves the operates at a point preceding this range. A magnitude of force structure required for “late” is one whieh functions at a point follow- preservation of peace or for prevailing in war. ing this range, and a “dud” is one that does not In September-October 1965 issue of the Air function at all. Since these four categories in- University Review, the author of this artiele clude all that can happen, the probabilitv of discussed the meaning of reliability and ex- an early -f- the probability of a proper + the plained how it can be measured. The purpose probabilitv of a late + the probability of a of the present artiele is to open the Pandoras dud = 1. box of optimizing reliability. Opening that box Suppose two fuzes are connected in par- does not and should not involve an encyclo- allel, with the hope of increasing reliability. If pedic listing of all the methods of optimizing this were the simple case where the component reliability. In fact, the ingenuity of engineers either worked or failed, reliability would be is so great that such a listing would be impos­ increased as shown in my previous artiele; but, sible. Instead. onlv one method vvill be ex- since four things can happen, the analysis is plained, analvzed, and discussed. This method more complicated. Let F be the probability of is redundancy. a proper for each fuze; The word “redundancy” designates a de- E sign method whereby increased reliability is — the probability of an early achieved by using more than the minimum L — the probability of a late required number of functionally identical com- D — the probability of a dud. ponents in a subsvstem or svstem. It also re- With a two-fuze redundant svstem, earlies quires consideration of the ways in whieh the could result if: extra components are combined. (1) both functioned early The principies of analysis vvill be illus- (2) one was an early and one a proper (2 trated by a fuze in an armament subsvstem. ways for this to happen) A fuze may perform in one of four ways with (3) one was an early and one a dud (2 ways respect to time of operation. First, it may per­ for this to happen) form properly, according to the desires of the (4) one was an early and one a late (2 ways design engineer. It may perform too earlv. It for this to happen). may perform too late. Finally, it may fail to That is, the probability of the system function- perform at all and be a dud. At first glance, ing early is: these categories seem to be mutuallv exclusive, but they are not unless further definition is E2 + 2 EP + 2 ED + 2 EL made. A fuze need not operate at a precise = E (E + 2P + 2D + 2L) location relative to the target in order to be = E (1 + P + D + L), since E + P + called a “proper.” It is not possible to build D + L — 1 a supply of fuzes that are identical in every = E (1 + 1 — E), since P + D + L respect. Guidance systems vary. Operating = 1 - E conditions vary. These and other variables pro- = E (2 — E ). Note: (2 — E) is always duce a distribution or dispersion of fuzing po- greater than 1 be­ sitions. The dispersion is normally taken into cause E is always account when the fuze svstem is designed. a fraction. RELIAB1LITY ANALYSIS 73

Now compare this with E, the probability of of propers obtained, the use of two fuzes in an earlv, when there is one fuze. Since the parallel may actually reduce reliability. This, factor (2 — £) is alwavs greater than 1, the of course, raises a question regarding what parallel redundant fuze system always in- would happen if two fuzes were used in series. creases the probability of earlies. Consequently, this design will be analyzed Next we shall analvze the probability of next. propers. The system would operate properly If the two fuzes are conneeted in series, if: both must operate to cause a detonation. Thus, (1) both fuzes operated properly earlies can occur only if both fuzes are early. (2) one was a proper and one a dud (2 ways Hence, the probability of the system’s for this to happen) functioning early equals When this is com- (3) one was a proper and one was a late pared with E, the probability of an early with (2 ways for this to happen). one fuze, it is clear that the two-fuze series Thus, the probability of the system operating design always decreases the probability of the properly is: systems functioning early. Tuming now to the most important analy­ P- + 2PD 4 2PL = P (P 4 2D 4 2L) sis, the probability of propers, it is evident that = P (1 — E + D + L), the system will function properly if: since P+D+L = l — E. (1) both fuzes are proper Compare this with P, the probability of a (2) one is proper and one early (2 ways for proper when one fuze is used, and the results this to happen). are surprising. Reliabilitv may be increased, Thus, the probability of proper is: unchanged, or decreased depending upon P- + 2 PE magnitude of E, D, and L. = P (P 4 2E) Continuing the analysis, we now examine = P (1 4 E - D - L), the probability of a late in the redundant sys­ since P 4 £ — 1 — D — L. tem. Late system operation could occur if: (1) both fuzes were late Hence, two fuzes in series may increase the (2) one fuze was a late and one a dud (2 incidence of proper, or may leave it unchanged, ways for this to happen). or may decrease it, depending on the relation- Thus, the probability of the system operating ship between E, D, and L. late is: The system will operate late if: L- + 2DL = L (L 4 2D). (1) both fuzes are late (2) one is early and one late (2 ways for this Hence, in most practical systems, parallel re- to happen) dundancy will decrease the probability of lates. (3) one is proper and one is late (2 ways for In the rare case where dud probability was this to happen). sufficiently high to make the factor (L 4- 2D) Thus, the probability of the system operating greater than one, parallel redundancy would late is: increase the probability of lates. Finally, examination of dud probability L- 4 2EL 4 2PE shows that the only way the parallel redundant = L (L 4 2E 4 2P) system can result in a dud is for both fuzes to = L (L 4 2 — 2L — 2D), since 2£ 4 dud. Thus: 2P = 2 — 2(L 4 D) Probability of system dud = D-. = L (2 - L - 2D). This means that parallel redundancy always Hence, series operation of two fuzes in all prac­ decreases the probability of duds. tical systems will always increase the proba­ The surprise in this analysis is that if reli- bility of lates. The only exception is the un- ability is understood to mean the percentage likely case where the probability of single-fuze 74i-t A AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW late operation plus twice the probability of estimates. Thus, the true frequency distribu­ single-fuze dud is equal to or greater than 1. tion may never be known. If this is the ex- The series svstem vvill be a dud if: pected situation, the type of failure analysis (1) both fuzes are duds illustrated above can be eontinued to consider (2) one fuze is earlv and one a dud (2 ways three, four, or more fuzes; or redundancy can for th is to happen) be abandoned in favor of some other method (3) one fuze is proper and one a dud (2 ways for improving reliability. At any rate, it is for th is to happen) amply clear that an analysis based upon how a (4) one fuze is late and one a dud (2 ways system may fail is very necessary before a de­ for this to happen). signer makes decisions regarding redundancy. Thus, probability of system dud is: Since the major theme of this article is D + 2 ED + 2PD + 2 LD optimizing reliability through redundancy, it is now appropriate to analvze other methods of = D (D + 2E + 2P + 2L) applying redundancy. Let us consider a two- = D(1 + E + P + L), component type of redundancy where only one since E + P + L + D = l. component operates and the other is activated This means that series operation always in- by a switch, if the first component fails. This creases the probability of a dud. can be called “standbv” redundancy and can The next thing to consider is the question be analyzed by comparing it with the usual of which arrangement is best: parallel two-component redundancy. (1) one fuze Standbv redundancy can be illustrated (2) two fuzes in parallel with two amplifiers in parallel but with only (3) two fuzes in series. amplifier A operating at first. When A fails, a The answer is not clean-cut: It depends decision device triggers a switch, which in tum upon the relative values of E, P, L, and D. activates amplifier B. This system appears to Reliability of the system will be improved onlv have advantages in that amplifier B is not wear- when the probability of propers is improved. ing out due to operation until after amplifier In series operation, the system probability of A fails. Indeed, this is so, but there is more to propers is increased only if E is greater than it. Let us analyze the system by looking for the sum of D and L. In parallel operation, sys­ modes of successful operation rather than fail­ tem probability of propers is increased only if ure modes, as was done in the fuze example. E is less than the sum of D and L. If E is equal The system will be a success up to a spec- to the sum of D and L, a single fuze would be ified time, T, if: just as reliable as two fuzes. (1) amplifier A operates successfully until This, of course, leaves the system designer time T and the switching device does not make in some difficulty. He cannot know what is a false decision until time T, or best, unless he has knowledge gained from past (2) amplifier A fails at time T and the switch­ experience regarding the frequencv distribu- ing device operates properly, thus substituting tion of earlies, propers, lates, and duds. If this amplifier B for A and amplifier B operates frequencv distribution can be found only by properly, or flying manv fuzes under battle conditions, en- (3) amplifier A operates correctly and is con- gineering judgment will have to substitute for tinuing to operate correctly when the switching test information. device gives a false signal; however, amplifier Fortunately, there are other altematives. B is switched in properly and operates properly First, frequency distributions from simulated until time T. battle conditions may give a sufficiently good The probabilities associated with each of approximation of what will actually occur in these successful modes of operation could now battle. However, countermeasure activity by be analyzed in much the same manner we em- the enemy may cause duds, earlies, and lates ployed with the fuze example. However, this that could not be accourited for in predesign has already been done very well by Nathan RELIAB1L1TY ANALYSIS 75

Lichter and Gilbert Friedenreich.1 Some of operation is a necessary prelude to redundancy their conclusions are as follows: design decisions. (1) The terms involving the time at which Still another reliability analysis available the switching device makes a false decision in the recent literature is that by Muth.- His drop out of the equation. This indicates that analysis is particularly pertinent to this pres- the reliabilitv of a standby redundant svstem entation because it discusses what appears to with two identical channels is independent of be an excellent method of improving reliability the time at which the switching device makes when failure would be catastrophic. The idea a false decision. is the obvious one of having spare parts im- (2) The reliabilitv of the standby redimdant mediately available so that repair can be made svstem will never be less than that of a single quickly if failure occurs. Muth’s analysis shows channel. that the benefit of repair capability can vary (3) For standby redundancy to be more from being negligible to being comparable to reliable than theoretical independent active re­ that of additional standby units, depending dundancy, the probability of successful switch- upon the failure rate of the component part over must be greater than the reliabilitv of an and the mean time to repair of a part that has individual channel. failed. Thus, the intuitive expectation of increased Thus, the analysis indicates that if a Sys­ reliabilitv from the fact that the standby am- tem must operate continuouslv without failure, plifier is not wearing out is revealed by analvsis very long mean times to failure for the com­ to be possible but not certain. The criticai ponent parts are required. Further, it shows factor tums out to be the probability of suc­ that the ability to make repairs is not neces- cessful switeh-over. sarily sufficient to prevent catastrophe to the Other factors in this analysis include: system. It all depends upon how often the (1) The fact that the employment of active system is likely to fail and the speed with which redundancy may reduce the failure rate of both repair can be accomplished. amplifiers because of load sharing. (2) The fact that failure of the amplifiers In conclusion, when very high reliability of a may occur through short circuits or through system is required and redundancy is proposed open circuits. as a design method for obtaining the goal, it is Readers interested in the details of these necessary to analyze the proposed system in de- analyses are referred to the Lichter-Frieden­ tail. Depending upon the mode of failure, or reich articie. Enough has been said to illustrate the mode of success, the effect on reliability the fact that sometimes analysis of a system may be quite different from the obvious expec­ from the standpoint of successful modes of tation of increase. Warfare Systems School

Bibliography 1. Lichter, Nathan, and Friedenreich, Gilbert. "Rclia- neering, 1962, p. 227. bility Analysis of Redundancy Meehanisms,” report of the 2. Muth, Eginhard J. ‘'Reliability of a System Having Seventh Milítary-Industry Missile and Space Reliability Sym- Standby Spare Plus Multiple-Repair Capability,” IEEE Inter­ posium, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engi- national Convention Record, Part 10, March 1965. NATO TACTICAL AIR EXERCISE, CHAUMONT

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Jack E. Barth

I-N June 1965, near the medieval city of Chaumont, France, jet pilots, their mechanics, and ground crews from seven NATO nations gathered to compete in the largest tactical air exercise of the year. For two Meeks Chaumont Air Base, a U.S. Air Force ‘'dispersed operating base” that normally functions with a minimum of assigned personnel, was a “beehive” of activity. As in the past, the top scoring team would be awarded the coveted Broadhurst Trophy. Named in honor of a former commander of Allied Air Forces Central Europe, Sir Harry Broadhurst, the trophy Mas presented for the first tim e in 1962. Since then one of AIRCENT’s two major subcoinmands, the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force Mith headquarters at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, has won each of the eompetitive tactical events. General chairman of 1965’s weapons meet, Air Commodore E. B. Hale, RCAF, Chief of Plans and Policy, AIRCENT, and Colonel Rufus Causev, ESAF, Commander, Chaumont Air Base, welcomed the NATO aircrews and international officials on opening day. Immediately after the Melcoming, jet mechanics and other maintenance specialists prepared aircraft of the seven nations for their low-level familiarizaiion flights to Suippes Range. The range, located near Reims, Mas partially manned by Chaumont's permanent range specialists, along M-ith judges and NATO ofFicials from as far away as Italy and NorM,ay. A salute to the colors of the seven nations of AIRCENT, NATO’s largest air arm, assembled at Chaumont for the 1965 tactical air xveapons competition for the Broadhurst Trophy

Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force team captain, Wing Command- er W. H. Bliss, RCAF, accepts Broadhurst Trophy from General Jean Crépin, Commander, Allied Forces Central Europe.

During the two-week meet almost all aircraft, vehicles, and buildings at Chaumont sported the red bee. Skilled jet crews from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States were on hand to fly daily competition in skip homhing, rocketry, and strafing. More than 250 firound speeialists haeked up the flight teams, which Hew F-105’s, F-104's, Canberras, F-100's, and F-84’s. Oniy one spare aircraft was availahle to eaeh of the seven countries competiu};, which made round-the- clock m aintenance essential to meet the tight scheduling of continuous low-level sorties. Not one aircraft faiied to make its take-ofT time during the entire two-week period. When military professionals get together to test their skills on a daily hasis, strin- gent flight requirements create considerable stress.The usual—or unusual—bit of humor tends to relieve the strain. Among others, the hright red humhle bees helped by being there. We couldn’t feel their sting or hear them scatter from the hives, but everyone at Chaumont felt their presence. The hees were painted or stenciled on just about every vehicle, building, and aircraft in sight. Ground crews from Royal Air Force Squadron Number 213, based at RAF Bruggen, Germany, moved about the base at night with large buckets of red paint, an assortment of paint brushes, and fluorescent decais. In the pinch, it was the red bee that gave everyone a little laugh and relieved the tension. During the first week of the annual meet, 16 airerews from AIRCENT’s major sub- commands, Second and Fourth Allied Tactical Air Forces, competed daily with each otlier. These first airerews were then replaced by 16 additional teams. The weekly rotation alTorded opportunity for a larger num ber of NATO crews to improve their low- level skip-bomhing, strafing, and rocketry techniques. Air Chief Marshal Sir Edniund Hudleston, AIRCE.NT commander, had initially stressed that crew safety was of paramount importanee. Tight scheduling moved out sorties every few m inutes during the day, so that detailed coordination between the tower operators, operations training personnel, and range supervisors was vital not only for safety of flight hut also for development of maximum combat training proficiency. One didn’t need an alarm clock at Chaumont. The runup of jet engines eommenced each morning at six o’clock, and sinee the barracks were located within a few hundred

French military commanders of the Chaumont area keep up with progress of the weapons meet. German Air Force F-104 takes off on a skip-bombing ission over Suippes Range, near the cittj of Reims.

An F-84 sends its rockets streaking for the target. Vi m' L , r JL'À A fiight crew of RAF Squadron 231 (“Bee Squad- ron”) returns from a skip-bombing sortie over Suippes Range, and the ground crew is puzzled by the number of write-ups on the aircraft. French Air Force mechanics make an engine change to keep their F-100 flying in the tactical exercise.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Edmund Hudleston, Commander, AIRCENT, and Lieutenant General Johannes Steinhoff, Chief of Staff, review the operations scoreboard.

yards of the hangar, the shrill whine of turbines soon crescendoed into a roar that awakened even the soundest sleeper. M aintenance m en normally ran their preflights at this early hour to insure suflfi- cient time for repair of maifunetions or replacement of vital parts if needed. The sorties were scheduled every ten minutes, which allowed a minimum of time for maintenance during the flying periods. Take-oflf deviations of more than plus or minus three minutes automatically downgraded the score. The Allied Tactical Air Forces ran a close race throughout the meet. There was seldom more than a few points' dilTerence in the total score. At the end of the first week Fourth ATAF, commanded by General Gabriel Disosway, held only a 36-point lead. At the close of the competition and after several rechecks by NATO judges and officials, the final score added up to a total of 3383 points. The Fourth ATAF team, captained by Wing Commander W. H. Bliss, RCAF, was declared the eventual winner by a margin of 123 points. During the final ceremony General Jean Crépin, Commander- in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe, noted that AIRCENT's 1965 tactical weapons meet was the most competitive ever held. Hq Allied Air Forces Central Europe Air Force Review

SELLING VALUE ENGINEERING The USAF Road Show Approach

C olo.vel Stanley E. Allen

OR SH EER brevity, nothing beats the tary mission.” The key, he asserted, is value F professional language of the value engi- engineering. Seeing savings as high as $500 mil- neer—at its lowest common denominator, noun- lion annually by fy 67, Secretary McNamara verb-noun. Pencils make marks, wives spend said he has authorized the hiring of 265 addi- money, and sooner or later officers write arti- tional full-time ve specialists “who, by simpli- cles. A value engineer, from force of habit, fying our weapons and equipment, will pay for would reduce the title of this piece to a sparse themselves many times over.” “usaf Sells ve.” If he is a skeptic (and almost This, of course, is a move to bolster in- all are), he might add a parenthetical “maybe.” house ve capability by the Services. And from Now, noun-verb-noun articulation seldom the beginning of the program, the Air Force eams the value engineer a reputation for spar- has far outstripped the ve efforts of its con- kling repartee. Inevitably, though, he is known tractors. Now, however, we can see signs that as a no-nonsense man who gets to the point. industry value engineers may give their re- I feel I should do no less. inforced military counterparts a run for their In today’s environment there are no money. “mavbes,” parenthetical or otherwise, in To help industry realize the full potential industry-Air Force liaison in the value engi- in the ve challenge, the San Antonio Air Mate- neering field. Secretary McNamara in a recent riel Area has emphasized three points that I’d report to the President on dod cost reduction like to highlight: said: “VVe must make certain \ve do not specify First, the “Road Show,” which sa a ma is standards of performance, reliability or dura- pioneering for the Air Force Logistics Com- bility higher than those required by the mili- mand, traveis across the country making an 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

aggressive, educational “hard sell” for value its contractors, and aflc bought the concept. engineering, directly at the contractors plant. The Road Show team visits an industrial plant Second, sa a ma Road Show specialists are and sits down with company management, going into finite detail on the concept of shar- supervisors, and production people for a shirt- ing ve savings, a unique dod incentive without sleeve session on value engineering. precedent in defense production. Make no mistake—this is a “selling” job. Third, sa a ma , fully aware that nothing VVe try to project value engineering in practical can dampen enthusiasm like long delays in terms, directly related to items currently under evaluation, is telling industrv how it puts every contract and hardware expected to be built value engineering change proposal (vecp) on a later. W e explain exactly how and where a tight time schedule. value engineering change proposal is submit- The flving Road Show is aflcs answer to ted for evaluation; we go over the time in- a perplexing problem, the lack of industrial volved to process a vecp, its impact on Air response when dod announced its ve program. Force logistics worldwide, the method of In April 1962 the Defense Department author- computing savings, and the procedures for ized a new clause in military contracts, for the payment. first time permitting its contractors to share ve During one of our early Road Show calls savings. dod sent representatives to attend in- last year, we discussed value engineering with dustry symposiums to explain ve dollar incen­ one of the nations top defense contractors. tives and at the same time published consider- Company management had assigned a bright able material on the subject. young executive to handle the program, his Initiallv, the program drew little reaction brochures on the subject were beautiful, and from industrv. Companies that constantly his training setup elaborate. The ve program, value-engineered their commercial products as he beamed, was extremely active in his plant. a competitive way of life showed little inclina- Our natural response was: Fine. How many tion to apply the same philosophy to military vecp s has your company submitted, and how hardware. Our defense contractors simply much does your share of the savings amount weren t buying an opportunity to expand dol­ to? His answers were respectively: None and lar margins on military contracts. Why? Per- nothing! Very simply, he didn’t understand haps they didn t understand that the military that we were willing to split ve savings with would share ve savings. Maybe they were his coqioration. The operation was a complete wary of delay, dismissing the ve clause as just success—but the patient was in rigor and very another piece of contract boiler plate. Perhaps near mortis! they weren’t absolutely convinced that this At another Road Show presentation at one would be a long-range program, backed by of sa a ma s largest producers, the board chair- highest-level authority. Whatever the reason, man cited the group for its plain practicality. industrv wasn t buying the military value en­ He left no doubt that dollar-sharing incentives gineering program. were “incenting,” that there were dollars as Still, the Air Force was convinced that the well as cents in incentives. ve concept was sound and that dollar incen­ VVe visit both large and small firms that tives could make significant reductions in the are currently building or servicing military cost of military hardware. hardware—little outfits like Lockley Machine So what do you do when you have an Company (practice bombs) and giants like excellent product that sells poorlv? Well, one General Dynamics. The Road Show has visited solution was as obvious as door-to-door sales. 24 such plants since it took to the air in Decem- You get out, push doorbells, and sell your cus- ber 1963, indoctrinating more than 600 con- tomers face-to-face in their own executive tractor personnel in value engineering. Before suites. we re through, we hope to call on many more sa a ma saw the Road Show as a pretested firms. Yankee technique to sell value engineering to Incidentally, we don t consider the matter AIR FORCE REVIEW 83 closed after a Road Show visit. We follow up closer, smoother cooperation between the Air with letters to companv management, pointing Force and its defense contractors in the ve out changes in policv, revisions in dollar incen­ field. tive computation, and other matters new to From the start of the ve program in April militarv value engineering. 1962 until sa a ma put the show on the road 21 Right now were beginning to see a much months later, the depot had received onlv 22 better understanding, a new awareness, and vecp s , virtually the entire aflc total. Since the

Cracked collector cases from the giant R-4360 aircraft engine are no longer discarded. After welding, they are reused. The contractor that proposed the reclamation procedure, Aerodex, I n c o f Xliarni, Florida, split the savings of $176,350 with the U.S. Air Force. 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Road Show took to the air, however, we have tractor to the day the Air Force accepts, rejects, received 103 vecps, and submissions are rising. or retums it for further study. VVe feel that the increase is related directly to One other thing could slow the momen- our “traveling salesmen.” tum of the ve program, a pinchpenny reluc- Although Air Force in-house value engi- tance to share savings fairly with contractors neering still exceeds that of industry, I believe who submitted the vecps. On this score, dod the situation may be reversed. The market is has been eminently fair and generous. Defense there; incentive dollar-sharing has just been Procurement Circular No. 11 authorizes a con­ expanded, and the atmosphere for industry-Air tractor to share “downstream” savings for as Force cooperation is as crystal clear as a Texas long as three years. Too, dod emphasizes that moming. a ve incentive reward merits special considera- This is the way Air Force value engineer- tion and weight in proceedings before the con- ing shaped up in fy 65: sa a ma received 59 tract renegotiation board. value engineering change proposals from in­ Experience at sa a ma is proving Defense dustry and approved 25; aflc received 132 Procurement Circular No. 11 to be a powerful vecps from its contractors and approved 60; stimulus. For example, Standard Manufactur- usaf as a whole received 379 vecps from in­ ing Company, a Dallas small business, has sub­ dustry and approved 215. The combined ve mitted seven vecp’s on the MJ-1 bomb-lift savings from in-house and contractor value under the new downstream incentive clause engineering efforts during fy 65 were $31.5 incorporated in its contract. Of these seven, million for sa a ma , $64.6 million for aflc, and four have been accepted, one is in evaluation, $130 million for usaf. and two have been rejected. This is no isolated Although Air Force ve specialists are still case—other contractors also are submitting sig- outperforming their industrial counterparts, nificant numbers of vecps for evaluation under we can almost plot the progress of industry DPC-11 criteria. attitude regarding the ve program: polite in- At a recent Road Show presentation, I got difference, quizzical interest, cautious partici- into an animated discussion with an executive pation, and now the beginning of confident from General Dynamics. Finallv he grinned efFort. and said, “Pardon me, Colonel, but your en- As soon as American industry begins to thusiasm is showing.” I have to plead guilty. show the same ingenuity it has used to improve I believe that the military and industry, to- and trim the cost on everything from color tv gether, are ready to show sharp, dramatic to refrigerators, I am confident that actual sav­ progress in an exciting new field: value- ings will surpass the $500-million ve goal set engineering defense goods and Services. by Secretary McNamara. If the usaf Road Today, the incentive echoes as loud as the Show can speed full acceptance of value en- challenge. Our Road Show salesmen still have gineering by two years, one year, or even six calls to make, but theyre getting a warmer re- months, its “salesmen” will have done an in- ception all the time, and usaf ve “sales charts” valuable service to the nation’s economy and are climbing. The Air Force, I feel, is on the military posture. verge of declaring some extra ve dividends for However, although things are looking up its “stockholders,” i.e., the American taxpavers. for the ve program, nothing could bring it to In the parlance of the value engineer, “ve a halt faster than long delays in evaluating the makes sense.” Spell it “cents” or pronounce it vecp s that industry submits. So sa a ma has set “dollars,” it still adds up to an exciting new era a 49-day target for processing a vecp, i.e., 49 in defense production. days from the day it is received from a con­ San Antnnio Air Materiel Area PROMOTION: A VI EW FROM THE BOTTOM

F ir st Lieu t en a n t Ric h a r d W. E lder

Only Fifty Percent of Those Eligible Promoted to Captain

W ashington, D.C.—Headquarters USAF announced yesterday that of the 5600 First Lieutenant line officers eligible for promotion only 2800 or 50% were pro- moted to the ronk of Captoin. Of those promoted, 140 or 5% were promoted in the secondary zone (3'/2 years TAFCSD), the remainder being promoted upon the completion of 4>/2 years' commissioned service. Those officers promoted who do not hold a regular commission will be offered one immediafely. The young officers who were promoted have every reason to be proud, for they have been elected for membership into the elite middle management of foday's aerospace force. Selection was extremely difficult and competitive, with only the best qualified being promoted. Best wishes and congratulations are extended to each new Captain for continued success in his Air Force career.

T COULD never happen; not conceivable; high leadership levei is to be maintained in not possible. the United States Air Force. I The purpose of this article is to propose Who is the young officer of today? What that selective promotion to captain is not only are his goals? What motivates him? Perhaps conceivable under the present promotion struc- most important, though, what makes him dif- ture but absolutely essential if a continued ferent from his predecessors? Every year many 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW hundreds of college graduates enter the Air tivation not in terms of a series of drives but Force to pursue careers as operations or staff rather in terms of a hierarchy with certain officers. Then, vvithin four or fíve years approxi- “higher” needs becoming activated to the same mately 55 percent of these men will have vol- extent to which certain “lower” ones become untarily resigned in order to seek employment satisfied.1 The principie is summarized by the with industrial organizations or retum to accompanying illustration. school. Those who can face the realities and Generally, members of the service will complexities of Service life remain in the Air agree that an officer’s physiological and safety Force. needs are satisfied and that it is the social, ego, For rather obvious reasons the Air Force and self-fulfillment needs with which we must has recently placed special emphasis on college be most actively concemed. Increased pay, education—not as a guarantee of outstanding additional collateral benefíts, and early retire- job performance but rather as an additional ment might have an effect on the top three selection tool for ascertaining the base of officer needs, but it is an extremely limited one. Pro- intelligence and aptitude. The college degree motion, on the other hand, clearly activates a is an important index of an individuais capac- man’s feeling of achievement and self-develop- ity to leam. By eliminating nondegree com- ment. Most studies indicate that the desire to missioning programs such as Officer Candi­ make money is certainly a compelling force but date School and Aviation Cadets, the Air that it is rarely the dominating one. After a Force is tightening entrance requirements in certain point, salary increments cease to moti- an attempt to raise the educational levei of the vate; promotion then holds the real magic. With officer corps and enhance its professional expanded opportunities for faster promotion, status. As evidenced by numerous studies, the a double-barrel impact can be achieved. Faster result of this contracting selection process has promotion will provide not only an increase in been to increase the intellectual and educa­ financial remuneration but also faster career tional leveis of the young officers entering on progression. The challenge is provided by the active duty. Through the Air Force Academy, daily activities; the problem is to afford the Airman Education and Commissioning Pro- challenge to the proper individuais. Does cur- gram, rotc, and ots programs a number of rent Air Force promotion policy provide for highly qualified college graduates are being this? commissioned. Regardless of the reason prompting these young men to join the Air current polictj Force, the majority of them are selecting the Air Force and a four- or five-year active duty Current Air Force directives are designed obligation probably with the idea of making to ensure that regular and reserve Air Force the service a career. They are willing to spend officers compete for temporary promotion on at least four years, rather than take a short an equitable basis. For the regular officer, tem­ three- or tvvo-year Navy or Army tour, in an porary promotion is an active duty promotion honest attempt to determine if the Air Force in advance of permanent promotion to the has something to offer. same grade. For the reserve officer on extended active duty, temporary promotion is the only motivating factors means by which he may be advanced in his active duty grade. John Ruskin once said, “In order that peo- Under the present system, lieutenants are ple may be happy in their work three things considered for temporary' promotion to captain are needed: They must be fit for it; they must early enough that promotion will be effective not do too much of it; and they must have a at the 432-year commissioned service point, and sense of success in it.” A. H. Maslow elaborated captains with 12 years’ promotion list service on this principie by constructing a “need hier- date ( pl sd ) are eligible for primarv-zone con- archy concept.” He views an individual’s mo- sideration for temporary promotion to major. IN MY OPINION 87

pl sd is the principal criterion used for regular by the major air commands or Hq usaf are ofBcers. Although the primary criterion con- considered by the board. The board, however, sidered is selection date, other variables are may not exceed the percentage determined by introduced into the system. These variables the Secretary of the Air Force. Currently this are dependent upon the existing oflBcer grade percentage has been a minimal five percent. As structure plus Air Force requirements and are has been evidenced by recent promotion cycles, normallv announced when each new change, the present system has a few shortcomings.

addition, or deletion occurs. Under existing mediocrity stressed by present system regulations, selection boards use the “best qualified” method to nominate and select of- By virtue of the very fact that the Air ficers for promotion to major, while the boards Force ean promote 100% of its lieutenants to use the “fully qualified” method to select of- captain, a system of perpetuai mediocrity is ficers for promotion to-captain. Eligible oflBcers established. The officer who is eventually re- are considered by these boards either as a re- leased from the service for failure to be pro­ sult of being in a primary zone of consideration moted to major has been carried by the Air or, in the case of captain to major, meeting the Force unnecessarily for seven to nine long secondary-zone eligibility criteria for nomina- years. In all faimess to both the Air Force and tion by the major air command of assignment. the individual, elimination of this type of indi­ For promotion to captain, all eligible first vidual at the four-year point would be most lieutenants are considered. As the “fully quali­ appropriate. Some may say you can’t deter­ fied” method is used, there is no limitation on mine a rnans full potential in just four years. the number selected. For promotion to major, This is an old wives’ tale which psychologists all eligible officers in the primary zone are have long since disproved. Under the present considered. The Secretary of the Air Force rating structure a very definite evaluation can determines the quota for all grades. The sec- be made to determine if an individual possesses ondary zone provides a vvay for the exception- the growth potential required for steady pro- ally well-qualified officer with less Service than gression in an Air Force career. As a monetary those in the primary zone to be promoted be- consideration, early release of a below-average fore his contemporaries. All who are nominated officer not on flying status would save the gov- 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

emment approximately $85,000 in salary alone promotion system defeats rather than utilizes between the four-year mark and the fourteen- the very qualities that make the young officer year mark vvhen he vvould be passed over a valuable—“his education and his youthful en- second time. If this individual^ Services are thusiasm and idealism.” terminated early enough, he is still easily em- ployable and has little reason to feel that “I officer force by default gave the best years of my life to the Service and now they kick me out.” Certainly not In 1964, 65.1% of the rated officer corps everyone is suited to a military career, and were retained, while only 27% of the nonrated those who are not should not be permitted to personnel chose to remain in the Service.4 The stay in the Service for long periods of time. resultant overall rate of 46% is a little shy of Every effort should be made at the earliest pos- the desired 50 to 55% retention rate; however, sible date to eliminate those who are not suited it is expected to increase as a result of con- or qualifíed for truly professional careers. tinued emphasis on officer career motivation. The problem is not so much in the quantity self-defeating pattern as in the quality of the remaining officers. How many times have you heard the following or In a recent article Edgar H. Schein stated: similar comment? “Well, I’ve invested four “When the expectations and needs of the col- years, already have two children. It will be lege graduate and the expectations and needs difficult to get started on the outside, so I may of the organization are suffieiently out of line as well stay in—beats working for a living.” Not with each other a considerable danger exists all officers electing to remain express this atti- of both parties landing in the trap of a self- tude, but many do. The result is an officer corps defeating induction and training program. The maintained by default. Why not initiate a organization for a variety of reasons has to system that will produce such comments as take the initiative to prevent a self-defeating “Youre dam right I’m remaining in the Air p attern from em erging. . . . T h e ch a lle n g e is Force. My opportunities for recognition and to recognize the great potential of the college promotion are comparable to any in civilian graduate and to create organizational circum- life. The Air Force very definitely provides stances for him that will utilize rather than to the young, aggressive officer who is will- defeat the verv qualities which make him ing to exert the effort ample opportunity to valuable—his education and his youthful en- become a true professional with increasing thusiasm and idealism.”2 responsibility.” A 13-point policy letter from Air Force A system whereby lieutenants are pro- Chief of Staff General John P. McConnell fur- moted to captain on a “best qualffied” rather ther elaborated on this point: “Most young than a “fully qualffied” basis would provide officers are highly educated, full of ambition the needed impetus for changing attitudes con- and energy, eager and imbued with hope but ceming officer retention. In other words, in- too many are poorly received, poorly treated, augurate a system that would produce only inadequately counseled and ignored to a de- 50% promotions to captain rather than the gree which frustrates their ambitions and present 100%. The basic reason for the current voids their good intentions. Commanders will policy of promoting lieutenants to captain ap­ make certain they know all their officers and proximately a year prior to the completion of that each is kept fully informed on career 4/á years’ commissioned service is to promote opportunities.”3 the young officer early in an attempt to sway Although, as evidenced by General Mc- his decision, before he makes up his mind con- Connells statement, efforts are being made ceming a service career. The end result has for the Air Force to “take the initiative,” the been just the opposite. What kind of promotion officer promotion system still remains a most system provides for 100% of the eligibles to be formidable obstacle. In its present form the promoted? There is no feeling of accomplish- IN MY OPINION 89 ment in these percentages. Whv not inaugu- Air Force. Competition would remain keen to rate a real selectior» process and make it as the majority levei by an increase in secondary- selective for promotion to captain as it pres- zone promotions to ten percent. Although the ently is for promotion to major?—a process number of captains would be reduced, the wherebv well-qualified officers who are chosen quality would increase by such a degree as to bv well-qualified officers will choose additional more than offset any numerical strength loss. well-qualified officers. These officers would be more than able to assume the additional responsibilities. When this group becomes eligible for promotion to selecticity for survival major, still on a “best qualified” basis, approxi- In light of this criticai analysis of the young mately 80 to 90$ would be promoted, since the officer in relation to current promotion prac- real selection process would have occurred tices, does it appear logical that the promotion many years earlier. The end result of this phas­ system in its present form would attract young ing would be approximately the same number officers to stay in the Air Force? No, in mv of majors as are presently on duty, without opinion it does not! What would attract them? forced attrition at the middle point of a man’s Since we know the type of educational baclc- career. The resultant financial and manpower ground they possess, their levei of work expe- savings would be tremendous. rience, and the levei of their career goals, we Critics of this program will undoubtedly can very easily develop the final determination say that after a man is selected for captain —that of an equitable and challenging promo­ there will be no incentive for continued maxi- tion package. First, the program must provide mum productivity; however, if the men are for highly selective promotion opportunity carefullv screened initially, each in an attempt and for forced attrition. The ideal program to achieve maximum self-development will would have primary-zone phasing and also continually seek additional responsibility. The below-the-zone promotion opportunities for quest for more and more success and promo­ the exceptionally well qualified. The promotion tions will normally be sufficient stimulus for emphasis should be based upon the capacities highly selected executive personnel. of individuais rather than upon categorical job descriptions. Promotions must be highly retrogression selective, otherwise the full significance of the upgrading process loses its meaning. “He’s too young—no experience—impetu- The ideal career progression program for ous!” Need we remind the critics that they too officers would provide for the following: were inexperienced but accepted a challenge (1) Combining regular augmentation and far greater—a world war; 24-year-old colonels, temporarv promotion to captain. This would 18-year-old lieutenants; all instrumental seg- alleviate the problems presently experienced ments of our fighting force. The times have by conducting a dual-structured promotion changed, but the quest for continued freedom and augmentation program. AD those individu­ remains the same. Like his earlier counterpart, ais selected for captain could plan on a full todays young officer, with a natural bent for professional career, not one that will be termi- self-assessment, will scrutinize his own future nated because of the “reserve officer” enigma. prospects. In his brief moments of introspec- (2) Promoting lieutenants to captain on the tion, he gives little thought to the coveted “best qualified” basis and not on the “fully “silver star” but does concem himself with the qualified” basis as is presently done. Also, next promotion. The pragmatic here and now; establishing a secondary-zone promotion to the future is too flexible and undetermined. captain at the 31í-year mark for the exception­ What he seeks is challenge, an opportunity ally well qualified would create an elite middle that tests his intelligence and demands his best management and an esprit de corps of military efforts. As long as the daily problems increase professionals never before experienced in the and as long as they promise to increase in scope 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW as his experience increases, he will respond to The organization that is known mainly as the challenge. In retum for his giving, how- stable, solid and set in its ways will easily ever, he demands a great deal. As has been attract more people than it needs of the kind proved by many career motivation surveys and who will keep it in the groove. It will have studies, his allegiance is complex and condi- trouble, however, in getting and holding men who have the ability, the tum of minei, the tionai. When dLsappointed in his expectations determination to pioneer.3 of compensation, he terminates his relation- ship quickly and with finality. The program as presented here is cer- Since two factors in the equation—the tainly no assurance of instant success, but I do individual officer and the Air Force—are con- feel that it is an honest, realistic, and workable stantly changing, as is the field that lies be- solution to a very pressing problem. The very tween them, each should examine the goals presence of conscientious, aggressive individ­ and objectives in relation to the other. Not a uais who insist that every step forward carry rose-colored evaluation, but rather an attempt the promise of yet another step will speed up at a realistic appraisal of their respective needs. the change necessitated by the complex aero- The young officers are continually attempting space age. As the needs of the Air Force be- an honest appraisal; however, the Air Force, come more fluid, more open for innovation, although easily capable of projecting men into young officers possessing a high degree of space, is unable or at best unwilling to initiate imagination and self-reliance are a survival a new and modem promotion system. The re- must. Selective retention earlier in their careers sultant effect can be best summarized by the will contribute to this necessity. following statement: 51 st Combat Support Group

Notes 3. “McConnell Sets Forth Improvement Program,” Air 1. A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Force Times, 2 June 1965, p. 43. Harper and Brothers, 1954). 4. USAF Military Personnel Center, “Semi-Annual Career 2. Edgar H. Schein, "How to Break in the College Gradu- Motivation Letter,” 20 August 1964, AFPMPBC. ate,” Harvard Business Review, XLII, 6 (Novembei^December 5. Frederick R. Kappel, Vitality in a Business Enterprise 1964), 68. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 19. THE JUNIOR OFFICER AND HIS SUPERVISOR

F ir st Lie u t e n a n t Charles P. M c D owell

NE OF THE most readily obvious prob- will certainly be influenced by the atmosphere O lems of anv militarv organization is the of the group in which he works; and the at­ procurement and retention of highly compe- mosphere of the group will depend largely on tent and viable officers. These officers, the pro- the major or lieutenant colonel who runs the fessional militarv men, are the main source of group. All too often these field-graders have leadership and control of the militarv structure. been out of the junior officer category for a It has long been demonstrated that pro- number of years and are likely to have become curing oflBcers is not nearly as difficult as re- less and less aware of the attitudes and feelings taining them. The normal attrition rate of Air of the young lieutenant. The lieutenant nor- Force officers at the end of their required duty mally has a vast supply of energy and en- period presents an extremely expensive loss, thusiasm. But this energy and enthusiasm are both in terms of what it costs to train them often without direction—not due to anything (and those who will replace them) and of time. more than a lack of experience in the practical When the sênior first lieutenant is released application of both his job and his officership. from active duty at the end of his four years, It is this lack of practical experience which he takes with him needed experience and a forces many a junior officer to rely heavily on degree of potential that cannot be measured. his experienced noncommissioned officers and It is therefore very much in the interest which frequentlv motivates his superior to of the Air Force to determine why these people limit his responsibilities. It goes without saying elect to leave the service and, more important, that an experienced nco is a valuable member what can be done to retain them. Of course of the team; but the young officer should leam there are many answers to the first question— from him, not use him as a crutch in making lack of parity between military and civilian decisions. On the other hand, the young lieu- pay, continuai reassignment, etc. It is the tenants lack of experience is sometimes ig- second question which demands priority in nored, and he is given too much responsibility answering. too soon. Either situation—being without a It is my contention that the junior officers boat or adrift at sea—is not likely to be the desire to remain in the Air Force may in large best basis for a positive career orientation. measure be a function of his relationship The junior officer is apt to be reluctant to with his immediate supervisors, primarily those take his problems to his boss because he has officers in the major and lieutenant colonel been taught that he is supposed to be helping groups. These are the men who not only super­ the commander, not fumishing him with new vise the young officer but give him direction problems. It is a rare lieutenant who will go and motivation. The junior officer’s behavior to his chief and say, “Major, I must be a real 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW knucklehead; I have vvhat I am sure is a simple guidance and counseling session every few problem, but I am stumped!” His problem months; counseling should be a continuous and may indeed be simple—for the major—and if subtle part of the supervisors workday. brought to his attention it could readily be Good officers are not bom; they are made. solved. At the same time it could give the They are the product of patience. They grow major a good opportunity to demonstrate his in quality as they are given quality guidance interest in the lieutenants problems. Even and leadership. Each superior has an obliga- though it takes time, this type of interest may tion first to identify his junior officers and then make the difference between leadership and to leam their capabilities. These capabilities headship and be the seedbed of team spirit. If must then be matched with responsibility, so the junior officer is discouraged from approach- that they can be expanded and refined. In ing his chief when he needs guidance, then doing this the supervisor not only will get a most likely the chief is not going to be aware better product in retum for his time but also of the need and, therefore, cannot help him. will be contributing to the worth of the officer In this connection it should be pointed out that and the quality of the Air Force. This, in my it is no more desirable for the junior officer to opinion, can only lead to a greater apprecia- use his superior as a crutch than for him to tion of and interest in the Air Force by the rely too heavily on his NCOS. The point is that young lieutenant. And it logically follows that the field-grade supervisor must be available to the junior officer will be more positively in- his junior officers and must be willing to lend clined not only to remain in the Air Force but them a sympathetic ear when it is needed. The in tum to become a better field-grade officer counseling of these young officers should not himself. be placed on a too rigid basis, such as one OS/ Detachment 7016 M ajor Ray L. B owers Basil H. Liddell Hart

R ITISH military policy during the dec- Basil H. Liddell Hart, the latter functioning B ades before the Second World War re= outside the army since his retirement in 1927 mained almost uniformly dismal. The nation’s from war injuries. Fuller and Liddell Hart be- population, beset by economic woes and dis- came the spokesmen for new methods of war- heartened by the terrible losses of 1914-18, had fare, methods developed around the mobility little zest for the problems of military organ- of modem armored and motorized armies. ization, problems intensified by accelerating Their books became vastly influential abroad, technological advance. Reform and modem- leading Nazi Germany and, for a time, the ization of the military system rested ultimately Soviet Union to organize their forces about the in the hands of a military profession rendered concept of mobile, mechanized warfare. Suc- peculiarly complacent by the recollection of cessful application of the new ideas by the victory in 1918. Britain possessed in these years German Army made possible the blitzkrieg the worlds two foremost theorists on military victories early in World War II. In Britain, affairs in Major General J. F. C. Fuller and meanwhile, official doctrine and policy only 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

gradually absorbed the ideas of the nations to military discipline”! Fuller was convinced famous theorists, so that in 1939 Britain and that Liddell Harts wish to remain on active her French ally stood gravely inferior in mod­ Service had been denied not for medicai rea- em vvar capabilities. The closed-mindedness sons but because Liddell Hart was a writer. whieh blocked acceptance of Liddell Hart’s Professional orthodoxy blocked the suggestion and Fullers views was widespread, and central that Fuller be restored to active service, in to the closed-mindedness was the existence concem for “upsetting the tum of promotion,” within the British officer corps of misplaced even though Fuller’s was “the best brain in the concepts of loyalty. Army.” Military officers respond to a host of some- Resistance to theories of mechanization times overlapping loyalties. Every soldier feels was strongest among officers in the cavalry. loyalty toward his men, toward his country Theirs was a misplaced loyalty to outmoded and cause, to his superiors, to morality, and to weapons, stemming from sentiment, delusion, his personal honor. The ultimate ethic of pro- and self-interest, moving Liddell Hart to ob­ fession involves, however imconsciously, an serve painfully that “the early battles of World arranging of these allegiances into a useful War II were lost in the Cavalry Club.” The spectrum. It is here, in grasping toward an reformers had little patience with Lord Haig, arrangement of loyalties, that the British mili­ who insisted that the airplane and the tank tary profession largely failed between the wars. were but accessories to the man and the horse In retrospect, mistaken loyalties appear to have —the “well-bred” horse—and with other con- been widespread among British officers. servative officers who called tanks “those smelly Loyalty meant one thing to General Sir things.” In 1936 Montgomery-Massingberd Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, who in urged that the Army provide two horses for the late Twenties violently abused Fullers each tank officer, since “hunting taught quick- writings. To him, Fullers appeals for new ness of decision.” In presenting the Estimates methods represented a lack of “loyalty,” whieh for 1934-35, the War Office spokesman dwelt was a “far more important quality for a soldier on “the importance of cavalry in modem war.” to possess” than “brains.” Criticism, it would The amount earmarked for forage was three seem, constituted disloyalty. Fuller at the time and a half times that for motor fuel. was still on active Service, but the harass- Opposition in the cavalry to mechaniza­ ment by his powerful foe and others like him tion remained stubbom. A persistent but use- led to Fullers premature retirement soon after- less idea was that of using tanks and horses in wards. Montgomery-Massingberd served as combination, thereby prolonging the role of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff during the latter. The War Office apologized for the cav­ mid-Thirties, where he thoroughly obstrueted alry’s “great sacrifice” in slowly yielding to the movement for mechanization. Enraged modem mobility: “It is like asking a great when he leamed that books by Fuller and musical períormer to throw away his violin Liddell Hart were prescribed for study in and to devote himself in future to the gramo- preparation for the officers’ promotion exami- phone.” Such nonsense was finally junked, and nation, he had that part of the examination tank expansion was accelerated in 1937, but canceled. His was a misplaced loyalty to pro- only through the relativelv inefficient method fessional orthodoxy. of converting the cavalry rather than by ex- Unconventional soldiers like Fuller and panding the Tank Corps—one last concession Liddell Hart seethed in such an environment. to vested position. Liddell Harts superior officer pronounced that Throughout the period between the wars, “writing on military subjects does not justify a narrow loyalty to branch of service remained accelerated promotion.” Fuller was refused strong. The chronic wrangling among the permission to publish a book and was told that Chiefs of Staff over shares of the budget led “no officer on the active list should be allowed to the suspicion that the result was mere com- to write any military book, as it was detrimental promise, not sound military policy. Both the Army and the Navy sensed that the expanding possibilities of air power meant a declining / role for themselves, and they sought to cut dovvn raf responsibilities, sometiines urging that the separate air force be abandoned and aviation retumed to themselves. The Navy, working hard to refute the idea that ships were vulnerable to air attack, installed heavier deck armor and antiaircraft batteries and practiced against radio-controlled target planes. At one trial staged for the King, the target plane re- mained undamaged, so it vvas flown into the sea anvwav as if it had been hit—seeminglv an expensive deception. The air leaders them­ selves held doctrines for independent and stra- tegic employment of air power and exhibited neither enthusiasm nor energy for operations in tactical support of ground forces. The close tank-and-air partnership skillfully practiced bv the Germans was wholly lacking in the British forces. A coherent and sound answer to the nations defense problems remained impossible amid the centrifugai outlooks of the separate Services. Strong through these years was a seem- ingly instinctive tendency among offieers to accept uncritically the mistakes of the last war. This loyalty to past mistakes led to hasty re- jection of many of the reformers’ contentions. In a lecture in 1931 Liddell Hart argued that Britain, in deploying a massive land army on the continent of Europe in 1914-18, had broken with her historie strategic poliey; in the discus- sion following the lecture all the Army offieers present upheld the actual strategy from every viewpoint, as if they felt obliged to defend the earlier decisions. The later volumes of the British Official History whitewashed countless errors, according to Liddell Hart, out of mis- amount of time spent by rising offieers in placed loyalty to friends and profession. The analvzing their promotion prospects from the report of the Kirke Committee, which had been Army List. One officer who eventually reached set up to examine the tactical lessons of the highest rank carefully kept a ledger of all his war, was restricted to very limited circulation rivais, recording their assignments, perform­ by Montgomery-Massingberd, and thus young ance, and health. Intermediate infantry and offieers who lacked the experience of war were cavalry offieers who lacked mechanical bent, hindered from leaming from the mistakes of sensing that mechanization meant declining their predecessors. career prospects for themselves, opposed the Another kind of prevalent misplaced loy­ movement for reform. One high official hitherto alty was excessive concern for personal ad- interested in military progress became, out of vancement. Liddell Hart was amazed at the political expediency, an advocate of curtailed 96 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

spending. Another refused to approve adminis- Liddell Harts superb autobiography. Though trative reforms because he sensed that men often disillusioned by mediocrity in others, of ability would move close to his position and Liddell Hart yet was never long embittered; he therefore become rivais. still found greatness in men, particularly in the Perhaps most dangerous of all was the persons of Lloyd George and T. E. Lawrence. error of loyalti/ to preconceivecl ideas. The Ultimate loyalty, to Liddell Hart, re- Ardennes region of southeastem Belgium and mained always the pursuit of true knowledge Luxembourg consisted of heavily vvooded, roll- through perception and contemplation. No in­ ing eountrvside, traversed by a network of dividual was of such vast prestige, no idea so narrow and twisting roads. Military profes- well established, no tradition so hallowed as sionals regarded the Ardennes as impassable to to be exempt from Liddell Hart’s inquiring modem armies, a delusion which had been serutiny. His current pen, scarcely mellowed uncritically accepted for generations. Foch had by the years, stings even the venerated described it as an “almost impenetrable mas- Winston Churchill. Unfortunate Montgomery- sif,” and the Allied planners of 1918 assumed Massingberd emerges considerably less glori- that the region was “almost impassable.” The ous. Yet Liddell Hart’s many books are not British General Staff view in the Thirties held works of muckraking; always his aim has been that “the Ardennes were impassable to tanks,” constructive—to expose the fallacies of the past a view also accepted by the French. The fatal and achieve honest assessment of the present. alignment of the Allied armies in the West in The contributions of Liddell Hart to mod­ 1940 was based on this assumption, and the em military thought are of vast dimension and German armor moved through the Ardennes scope. As a theorist of annored warfare, he without serious difficulty, to crash across the put forward the idea of deep strategic pene­ Meuse through the thinnest sector of Allied tration, suggested by his intensive study of resistance. Liddell Hart, who had traveled the Mongol cavalry armies of the thirteenth through the Ardennes, repeatedly wamed in century and of Sherman’s generalship in the the Thirties that the region offered few obsta- American Civil War. His reassessment of Brit­ cles to mechanized forces and that ample op- ish strategy in the First World War reminded portunitv existed for deploying off the roads his nation of its historie role in warfare, based when necessary. War games among the British upon sea power, commercial wealth, and land- high command in 1936 pointed to the possi- sea operations peripheral to the main conti­ bility of German penetration of the Ardennes. nental campaigns. His comprehensive theory Still the false preconceptions prevailed. At of the “indirect approach” to strategy bril- that, the lesson of 1940 was ineompletely liantly captured the essence of generalship, far íeamed, for in December 1944 the Ardennes better than the traditional principies of war. was again weakly posted—this time by the He used history to show that geographic or Americans—inviting Hitlers last gamble. psychological directness usually led to stiffen- The long-awaited first volume of the ing resistance by the enemy and that decisive Memoirst of Liddell Hart appeared in its victorv occurred only when the opponent was American edition late in 1965, to the gain of first unbalanced by some unexpected or “in­ this countrys historians and practitioners of direct” move. Liddell Hart grasped early the military affairs. Here is the history of one implications of the air weapon, and during the man’s lifelong quest for the truth, in the face of Thirties repeatedly pointed out the strategic the manifold false loyalties of others. All the uselessness of the Navy’s grand battle fleet in examples of misplaced loyalties mentioned the face of the increasing range of aircraft. here, along with many others, are recounted in Constantly he pressed the vital role of tactical

fBasil H. Liddell Hart, The Liddell Hart Memoirs, 1895- 1938 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1965, $7.50), 434 pp. BOOKS AND IDEAS 97

air power as the true partner of the tank in thoughtfully through it, perhaps reading only modem mechanized warfare. a single chapter at a sitting. Many of the per- His imaginative ideas on disarmament at- sonalities encountered will be unfamiliar to tracted wide enthusiasm* in the Thirties; he Americans; as the reader proceeds he should proposed eliminating “offensive” weapons— make a few jottings on each new character, heavv artillery and his cherished tanks. This for many appear again and again. The reward was a most practical solution, being relativelv for the serious reader of Liddell Hart’s Memoirs simple to enforce and making aggressive wars is a matchless one—an intimacy with this cen- virtually impossible against the defensive turys most brilliant and Creative thinker on weapons thus rendered dominant. Shortlv be- militarv subjects. The book’s essential signifi- fore World War II, he tumed his vigor toward cance for today’s officer is profound. For, of the immediate problems of preparedness. It is the many darting and provocative insights here that this first volume closes; the reader which fill the pages, central to all remains will eagerly await the sequel. the lesson of misplaced loyalty, a peril to This is an important vet easily digested which Captain Liddell Hart himself has never book. The professional officer should proceed succumbed. United States Air Force Academy

A JOURNALIST LOOKS AT THE FUTURE

Dr . E lezabeth Hartsook

S FOREIGN correspondent for the New War II.” He is convinced that “America will A l.York Times in Europe since 1942, Drew emerge from her preoccupations with South- Middleton, author of The Atlantic Commu- east Asia to fínd that the foundations of her nity, f has been in a good position to observe the policy, and her security, in Europe have been many new developments that have occurred in eroded to the point where they cannot be re- Europe during recent years, particularly in re- stored.” He attributes this State of affairs to spect to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- “the failure of the policy of the Forties and tion and the Common Market. His book traces Fifties to meet the vastly different problems of events in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and today,” to the tendency of successive U.S. ad- the Soviet bloc during this period and relates ministrations to base U.S. European policy on them to United States policies and interests in “the belief that the United States, by virtue Europe. of unrivalled military and economic strength, Middleton’s main concem, as he notes in is the leader of the West”—whereas, in his his preface, is that “the present situation [in view, leadership on that basis cannot be recon- Europe] and the American attitude to it repre- ciled with the Europe of today. He perceives sent a juncture more dangerous for the future Americans as clinging to a dangerously out- of the West than any since the end of World dated view of Europe, not grasping yet how

fDrew Middleton, The Atlantic Community: A Study in Unity and Disunity (New York: David McKay Company, 1965, $5.95), 303 pp. 98 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

far and how fast recovery has taken Europe ganization, that will respond to this challenge, or the degree to which this prosperity influ- that will do for the World what nato did for ences national political outlooks. Instead, they Europe in the Fifties, is needed.” Middleton are often “convinced that this prosperity is due concedes that the purely political difficulties entirely to U.S. aid, and seek gratitude where in establishing the kind of global alliance de- intemational cooperation is the most that can manded by the world situation are stagger- be expected.” What the United States has to ing, but he insists it must be done and gives do is “consider the way things are, not the directions: way we would like them to be, and frame new The first step toward forming this greater alli­ policies to meet the new conditions in every ance for progress should be the creation of a country in Western Europe. nato, for example, council of ministers of all potential member must be remade, not revived—it is inapplicable govemments ... to assemble and coordinate in its original form in 1965 . . . America must the information of the various govemments on in fact almost start all over again, this time not the economic and political situations in those with impoverished, shell-shocked client na- countries—Tanzania, Burma, and the Congo— tions as our partners but with a group of States where the conflict with Communism is at or with stable govemments and remarkable con- near a crisis and where a united non- fidence in their economic future.” Communist effort is urgently needed. This Besides the economic resurgence, Middle- would be accomplished by a general review of the whole of the battlefront, from Southeast ton notes several other factors as explaining Asia westward across the world to South and Europes new attitude towards U.S. leadership: Central America. the growth of nationalism in all Western Euro- pean countries; the decline in the Soviet mili- By the assemblage and publication of such in­ tary threat; increasing decentralization within formation, a Western world grown tired of overseas aid would be taught the seriousness the Communist bloc; the change, since the of the situation and the urgent need for action. late Fifties, in the U.S./U.S.S.R. strategic bal­ The peoples, as well as the govemments, must ance, and questions conceming the U.S. mili- realize that there is not much time to lose. tary commitment to Europe; European fears of being swamped by a U.S. economic and Once the objectives have been agreed to, the resources must be identified, country by cultural “invasion”; their indifference, after country, and the strategy for their use planned. having lost their colonial interests, to overseas This is a point where national interests will problems such as Southeast Asia. clash. No government wants to make available Middleton s recommendations as to what large sums or resources of men and material if to do about this situation are tied in with his they are to be used generally by an alliance larger recommendation for a tighter global and, as will prove necessary occasionally, dis- effort on the pari of the whole Western world tributed by another country whose position in in trying to contain Communism. As he sees the criticai area is unsullied by memories of it, the containment of the Communist bloc in colonialism or neoimperialism. Europe is not the end of the conflict with Com­ The burden of establishing the alliance will munism but only a temporary armistice on one require enlightened statesmanship, especially battleground of that conflict. The new theater in Washington. The United States will have to of operations is not Central Europe, but África, play a major role, although she must expect Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. This assistance from some countries whose overseas means a united, integrated Europe must join aid in the past has been limited as well as from those immediately concemed. . . . The major its efforts with those of the U.S. throughout the roadblock the U.S. will face on this path back world in assuming the responsibilities of lead­ to union and stability in the West is psycho- ership vis-à-vis the underdeveloped countries logical, centering upon the conviction that the and the Communist world. In order to exploit United States will not join in any intemational the economic, political, and military strength enterprise unless it is to be the acknowledged of the West, “clearly a new intemational or- leader. . . . If the alliance is to function effi- BOOKS AND IDEAS 99

ciently, it will be important that the U.S. ap- “bold and imaginative” scheme which has great pear as one partner, not as a leader. For a value as a cooperative concept in bringing number of reasons, some of them good, Ameri­ about the kind of united Western effort he can leadership is under a cloud in Europe. And desires. He believes that the logic for American it is in Europe that the new alliance must levy leadership in this process is stronger now than on govemments for help. it was five years ago when Secretary of State It is as the first step toward this needed Christian Herter first mooted the need for such global effort that Middleton perceives the ur- a force, and he considers that the U.S. decision gencv of a united Europe closely allied with not to push the mlf reflected a profound lack the United States in an Atlantic Community. of understanding of the European situation. As he puts it, “the future of the human race Kissinger, by contrast, believes the mlf was an may rest upon the amount of cooperation that ill-thought-out scheme which gravely compro- can be estabhshed within the Atlantic Com­ mised U.S. prestige when it was found to be munity.” Middleton is very much alarmed over unworkable and had to be abandoned. Not the growing “nationalism” in Europe, particu- only the Soviet Union and eastem Europe but larly exemplified by France but, as he observes, western Europe as well were bound to have incipient and increasing in all the countries. If opposed its aim of providing Germany with it should thus grow, he is afraid this could some form of nuclear weapons control. Instead lead to the development of an independent of strengthening nato, as it was hoped mlf Europe which, “believing itself to be the third would do, it probably would have given nato power and following its own policy in its re- the coup de gràce. Certainly Germanys own lations with the Communist bloc, África, Asia, prime objective of reunification would have or Latin America, could destroy the founda- been stymied by it. Finally, the mlf would only tions of Western partnership.” have provided the illusion of a European share There are, of course, two major schools of in nuclear control, and Kissinger thinks the thinking in regard to Europe’s future and the Europeans could not have been expected to U.S. relationship to it—the one to which Mid­ take seriously and as permanent “an arrange- dleton belongs, calling for an integrated, fed- ment where, in retum for an expenditure of up- erated Europe closely bound to the United ward of three billion dollars they would obtain States in an Atlantic Community, and another a veto over some three per cent of our nuclear one which takes less of a tight, organizational force while we retained complete freedom of approach and which assumes that Europe will action with respect to the remainder.” probably develop along fairly independent On the “German problem,” Middleton be­ lines. Representative of the latter school is lieves that the United States did the right thing Henry Kissinger, whose recent book, The in rearming Germany and that we should help Troubled Partnership, was reviewed in these it to some control over nuclear weapons in pages by General Noel Parrish.0 To throw fur- order to keep it from acquiring them on its ther light on the important controversy, it own or from tuming to the Soviet Union. Be- might be useful to compare Middletons views cause of her economic power, Germany is the on some of the major European issues with potential strong leader in Europe, and every- those of Kissinger. thing should be done to keep her tightly on the In line with his belief in the need for more side of the Atlantic Community. The United unified Atlantic alliance efforts to fight Com- States should use its power to insist on German munism, Middleton is a strong advocate of the reunification because without a unified Ger­ multilateral force ( mlf) proposal recently fa- many there can be no united Europe or Atlantic vored by the United States. He sees it as a Community. Kissinger is not sure that rearm­ ing Germany was the wise thing to do. He is opposed to giving her nuclear weapons and ... "Brigadier General Noel F. Parrish, USAF (Bet), “Rough thought it was a “grave error” for the United Weather over the North Atlantic Alliance," Air University Review, XVI. 6 (September-October 1965), 86-69. States to assume in the mlf proposal that this 100 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW could be clone by a unilateral decision. “For this reflects his great worry that Europe may the long-term stability and cohesiveness of unite and develop policies independent of the Europe, it would be better for Germany to United States. join an institution in which France and Britain Kissinger questions whether there is only are the sênior partners, than for the latter two one reliable method of bringing about Euro­ to seek membership in a grouping—as in mlf— pean unity, “whether either our national or where Germany would be the largest European Atlantic interests require our passionate com- contributor and in which ultimately it would mitment to a supranational structure for Eu­ likely represent the ‘European’ point of view.” rope.” He thinks the Fouchet Plan (De Gaulle’s Efforts to apply united Western and nato “confederation” concept), calling for institu- power to settling the German reunification tionalized meetings of foreign ministers and problem have not worked in the past and are subcabinet offícials, is not the least plausible not likely to now. The long-term hope for Ger­ road to unity and is the one most consistent man imity therefore resides in the unity of with British participation in a future Europe Europe. As nations lose their former signifi- —Britain being just as opposed to an integrated, cance within such a framework, the fear of any supranational Europe as France has been. He one state will diminish and the existing divid- finds it natural that France and Britain, which ing lines may seem less crucial. have the longest history as national states and As to the future organization of Europe no need for trying to escape their past (as in and the United States’ relationship to it, Mid- the case of Germany and Italy), should prefer dleton sees a federated, integrated Europe, a confederation over a federation. Kissinger whereby the individual nations give up their believes an effective Europe cannot be built sovereignty in favor of a supranational govem- without the wholehearted support of Britain, ment, as the only path to a united Europe and and he says this suggests “that the future of a thence to its close alignment with the United united Europe depends more on developments States in an Atlantic Community. He does not in London, Paris and Bonn than on strictures acknowledge De Gaulles long efforts to unite from Washington.” He cautions the United Europe in a confederation—with the nations States not to resurrect old national rivalries in cooperating but retaining their identity and the name of atlanticism or single out one ally sovereignty—as a form of unification; rather he as its special partner but to leave the internai insists that in favoring cooperation instead of evolution of Europe to the European countries integration De Gaulle is thwarting European and concentrate its efforts on the elaboration unity and fostering “old fashioned nationalism.” of Atlantic relationships. In doing so, the Although Middleton mainly blames the nation­ United States should bear in mind that a wise alism of France for delaving progress toward Alliance policy will not expect that common a federated Europe, he concedes that national­ positions can be developed on a global basis. ism is present to some degree in all the westem “We have sought to combine a supranational European States. Actually, he is afraid that Europe with a closely integrated Atlantic Com­ even a federated Europe will tum out to be munity under American leadership, but these “highlv restrictive” rather than the “basis of objectives are likely to prove incompatible. a new intemational group that will enable the Indeed, the United States will have to rec- West to meet the problems of the future”—a oncile itself to the fact that no matter what group that ought to include Britain, Norway, structure emerges in Europe, a difference in Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and Áustria perspective with the United States is probable, in order really to represent the Continent in particularlv about policies outside Europe.’ the kind of unified effort he wants.° Again, To sum up, both Middleton and Kissinger are in favor of an Atlantic Community; both "Paradoxically, Middleton blames France for this "restric- want nato preserved. But Middleton would tiveness,” whereas De Gaulle has suggested the eventual taking in of additional members such as Spain and, contrary to Middle- achieve this by a further building of organiza- ton's repeated assertions, has always wanted Britain in, pro- vided she would give real priority to European interests. tions and alliances joined in ever closer co- BOOKS AND IDEAS 101

operation: a federated Europe, an Atlantic larger cooperative free world effort. But three Communitv, and a still broader alliance, to thoughts come to this reviewer’s mind: (1) include the rest of the free world. He wants the almost insurmouritable problems in trying a whole new, larger intemationally organized to coordinate such efforts in the past when the fight against Communism, giving first priority Communist threat was much more apparent, to enlisting close European cooperation with when the United States had undisputed lead- the United States in this effort. Kissinger would ership, and when a much smaller group of strive for a similar but more limited result. He nations was involved; (2) the growing evi- thinks that if Atlantic policy is completely cen- dence, throughout the world, of polycentrism tralized, it may grow stagnant, able to agree and tendencies away from larger cooperative only on doing nothing, and that overemphasis efforts and toward more independent nation- on either unitv or diversity destroys the deli- alism or toward regional groupings; (3) the cate balance of creativity. He thinks that what apparently genuine desire of the United States the West can mean to others depends in great and the most powerful Communist country, part on what it ineans to itselí—in other words, the U.S.S.R., to achieve better relations with on its example. each other. The reader will have to judge for himself Alexandria, Virgínia the merits of Middletons proposal for a new,

The Contributors

L ie u t e n a n t Gen er a l Fred M. D ea n (USMA) since January 1964 has bcen Assistant Director for Weapons Evaluation and Control, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington. D.C. He completed flying training in 1939, and from January 1942 until July 1943 he served in the European Theater as Commander, 40th Pursuit Squadron. and as Executive Officer and Commander, 31st Fighter Group. He was next assigned to the Advisory Council for the Com- manding General, Army Air Forces, and in January 1944 became Chief of the council and General Amold's Executive Assistant, participating in the Cairo, Malta, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences. In April 1946 he was appointed to the Joint United States-Brazil Military Commission in Rio de Janeiro. Other assignments have been in the Office of the DCS/Operations, Hq USAF, November 1948—March 1950; as Chief, Analysis Division, Office of the Assistant for Programming, DCS/O, to August 1952; student, National W'ar College, to June 1933; as Commander, Webb AFB, Texas, to April 1934; as student, Manpower Management Course, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., to November 1954; as Vice Commander. Flying Training Air Force, Waco, Texas, to April 1957; as Chief, Air Force Section, MAAG, Taiwan, and Commander, Air Task Force 13 (Prov), PACAF, to September 1960; as Director of Operations, J-3, Joint Staff of the JCS, Washington, D.C., to August 1962; and as Deputy Commander, Twelfth Air Force, Waco, Texas, to July 1963, then Commander to November 1963. L ie u t e .nant C en er a e Ben jamin J. W ebst er (USM A) is Commander, Allied Air Forces Southern Europe. He completed flying training in 1933 and served with the 6th Pursuit Squadron in Hawaii until 1937, when he became a flying instructor, Kelly Field, Texas. He was an instructor in physics, USMA, until 1942, then at Stewart Field, New York, was Director of Flying, Base Operations Officer, and Director of Training. After assignment to the European Theatre in December 1943, he served as Executive Officer, 67th Fighter Wing, Eighth Air Force; as Acting Chief of Staff and Commander, V III Fighter Command. In June 1945 he assumed command of Stewart Field. Other assignments have been as student, Air War College, 1947-48; Assistant Chief of Staff/Operations, 7th Air Division, Hawaii, then Director of Operations and Training, Pacific Air Command, until July 1949; Deputy Director of Program Standards and Cost Control, later Director of Man­ agement Analysis, Office of the Comptroller, Hq USAF; student, National War College, 1951-52; Chief, Air Force Croup, Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, until 1955; Commander, 30th Air Division ( Def), Willow Run Air Force Station, Michigan, to August 1957; Director of Programs, DCS/Plans and Programs, Hq USAF, to June 1960; DCS/O, Hq Air Defense Command, Ent AFB, Colorado, to June 1961; and Chief of Staff, Hq ADC, until his present assignment in June 1964.

H a .vs Multhopp is the principal scientist, Advanced Design, Martin Company, Baltimore Division. After attending lhe Technische Hochschule in Hannover and the University of Goettingen, Germany, he worked for four years in the Aero- dynamische Versuchsanstalt Goettingen, in the field of experimental aerodynamics. During World W ar II he headed the aerodynamics and new design departments of Focke-Wulf Flugzeuban, Bremen, where he planned the single-jet fighter design from which the Mig-15 and -19 were copied. At the end of the war he carne under British control and in 1946 went to the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Famborough, England, where he worked on general supersonic aerodynamics, thermodynamics of jet propulsion, and preliminary design of transonic research aircraft. From 1948 to 1950 he was with the Aeronautical Institute of the Imperial College of London University, developing subsonic and supersonic wing theory methods. In 1950 Mr. Multhopp joíned Martin Company, where he has been working the entire speed regime, from low-speed V/STOL aircraft to hypersonic aerospace vehicles.

C olonel William F. S cott ( USMA; M.A., Georgetown University) is on exchange duty with the Department of State. After graduation at West Point in 1943, he served with the 398th Bomb Group. Eighth Air Force. From 1947 to 1950 he was assigned to the Strategic Intelligence School, War Department General Staff, first as a student, then on the faculty. He next served as an exchange officer at the RAF College, Cranwell, England, instructing in bomber operations. He attended Air Command and Staff College in 1952 and afterwards taught air operations at Air University. Subsequent assignments have been as Chief. Electronics Division, ACS/Intel- ligence; U.S. Air Attaché, Moscow, 1962-64; and Research Associate, Foreign Policy Research Insti­ tute, University of Pennsylvania. Colonel Scott’s master’s thesis, "An Analysis of Time Factors in the Development and Production of Air Weapon Systems,” was used during the hearings conducted by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, during its 1957 inquiry into satellite and mis- sile problems. He has been a contributor to Orbis.

M ajor Lawrence B. T atum (USMA; Ph.D., Syracuse University) is a flight commander, lst Air Commando Squadron (A -1E), Vietnam. After graduation from flying training in 1954, he flew F -8 6 ’s and F -100's in tactical fighter units in Texas (1954-56) and Japan (1956-58). On the faculty of the U.S. Air Force Academy 1961-65, he taught international relations, defense policy, Soviet foreign policy, and a graduate course in government and politics in the U.S.S.R. In 1963 he served a TDY tour in the office of the Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Arms Control. Maj'or Tatum has contributed a chapter, ‘‘Arms Control: Relevance, Approaches and Problems,” to Defense Policy ( Col. W. W . Posvar and Capt. John C. Ries, ed., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1965). L ie u t e n a n t Colonel James E. H ughes (M.B.A., Western Reserve University) is a member of the Analysis and Long Range Planning Division, Headquarters Air Force Sys­ tems Command. During World War II he served with the Airways and Air Communica­ tions Service in the China-Burma-India Theater. Recalled to active duty in 1947, he served in a planning capacity with Hq AACS. He attended the Air Force Institute of Technology 1948-50, and subsequent assignments have been as a project officer, Communications and Navigation Laborutory, 1950-52; Assistant Chief, Communications Division, Hq Air Re­ search and Development Command, 1953-57; and as Air Force Field Development Repre- sentative at Bell Telephone Laboratory, 1957-61. In his present assignment Colonel Hughes is concemed with the development of planning factors and guidelines for future applications, design, development, and procurement of Air Force data-processing Systems.

Dr . J ames A. F raser ( Ph.D., Columbia Uni­ versity) has been Professor of Physical Science, Warfare Systems School, Air University, since 1955. After teaching in U.S. and Canadian schools from 1927 to 1941, he enlisted with the Royal Canadian Air Force, was commis- sioned, and served as a navigation instructor and ground instructor for pilots until his release in 1945. Subsequent positions have been as Dean, Ferris Institute, Big Rapids, Michigan, 1945-46; professor and head of Science De­ partment. State Teachers College, Troy, Ala- bama; researcher and writer, Eastman Kodak Company, Rochester, New York, 1947-48; and reserve officer on active duty with the Evalua- tion Staff, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, 1951-53. Dr. Fraser has served as professorial lecturer in the George Washington University Center at Maxwell AFB since 1962. He retains his commission as a colonel in the USAF Re­ serve with assignment to the Office of Aero- space Research, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. He is a graduate of the Air Tactical School, Air Weapons Course, and Air War College.

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Jack E. B arth (M.A., Southern Illinois University) is Deputy Chief of Public Information, Hq Allied Air Forces Central Europe (A IRCEN T). Other assignments have been as Chief of the Information Operations Division, Hq Fifteenth Air Force; with the United Nations in Korea on special projects, Operations and Training Division; and as a radar navigator for eight years on Strategic Air Command B -29’s, B-36’s, and B-47’s. Colonel Barth has completed the Air Command and Staff College course by correspondence.

C olonel Stanley E. A llen (B .S ., Indiana University) is Director of Procurement and Production, San Antonio Air Materiel Area, Air Force Logistics Command. He entered the RCAF in 1941, transferred to the American air arm in 1942, and served in both the Pacific and European Theaters during World War II. For the past 16 years he has held various procurement positions, including Chief of the Procurement Inspection Division, Inspector General Office, Hq Air Force Logistics Command. Long an advocate of value engineering, Colonel Allen has headed the SAAMA Value Engineering Road Show on its "sales” trips to industry across the country. F ir s t Lie u t e n a n t Ric h a r d W. E lder (B.S., University of Virgínia) is Chief, Data Control Branch, Directorate of Personnel, Naha Air Base, Okinawa. Upon commission- ing from OTS in 1963, he attended the Per­ sonnel Oificers School at Greenville Air Force Base, Mississippi. He was then assigned as Chief, Airman Assignments Branch, Ita- zuke Air Base, Japan. In addition to his Air Force duties, he serves as an instructor in algebra with the U.S. Amied Forces Institute. Prior to entering the Air Force, Lieutenant Elder was employed as Director of Personnel, George Washington University, Washing­ ton, D.C.

F ih s t Lie u t e n a n t Charles P. Mc - D owell ( B.S., North Texas State Uni­ versity ) is Commander, OSI Detachment 7016, Wunstorf Air Base, Germany. From 1963 until his current assignment in April 1965, he was a Special Agent, Personnel Security Division, 2d District OSI (IG ), New York, N.Y. He has completed the Industrial College of the Armed Forces correspondence course, “The Economics of National Security."

D r . E lizabeth Schroeder Hart- so o k (Ph.D., University of Illinois) is a Research Analyst, Long Range Planning Division, Deputy Director­ ate for Advanced Planning, Director­ ate of Plans, Hq USAF. Previous M ajor Ray L. B owers (USNA; M.A., Uni­ positions have been in military intelli- versity of Wisconsin) is Associate Professor gence, European Command and U.S. of History at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Military Government, 1946—49; as He flew as navigator-bombardier in the 47th Research Analyst, Human Resources Bombardment Wing (B -45), completing a Research Office, George Washington three-year tour in the U.K. in 1955. He par- University, 1953-55; and in the Di­ ticipated in the testing of the B-66 aircraft rectorate of Intelligence, Hq USAF, at Edwards AFB in 1955—56 and served with until the present position in 1956. the 17th Bombardment Wing (B -6 6 ) during Dr. Hartsook has written extensively 1956-58, successively as aircrew member, about the cold war, U.S. foreign rela- air targets officer, and wing special weapons tions, NATO, overkill, etc. officer.

The Air University Review Awards Committee has se- lected “China—The Nuclear Threat” bv Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Fix III, USA, as the outstanding article in the March-April 1966 issue of Air University Review. EDITORIAL STAFF

L ie u t e n a n t C olonel E ldon W. D owns, USAF, Editor

J ack H. Mooney, Managing Editor

M ajor R obert G. S pa r k m a n , USAF, Chief, Acquisition Branch

E dmund O. Barker, Financial and Administrative Manager

J ohn A. W est c o t t , J r ., Art Director and Production Manager

E nrique G aston, P h .D .. Assoe iate Editor, Spanish Language Edition

L. M id o si M ay Patterson, Assistant Editor, Portuguesa Language Edition

M atthew H. P aclllo, lllustrator

ADVISERS

C olonel G len W. C lark, Hq Air Defense Command

C olonel Robert B. G ood, Hq Air Force Logistics Command

C olonel J oseph A. S tuart, J r ., Hq Military Airlift Command

C olonel K en n et h F. G antz, USAF (Ret), Historical Adviser

L ie u t e n a n t C olonel J ack R ose, Hq United States Strike Command

L ie u t e n a n t C olonel J ames F. S underman, Hq Pacific Air Forces

D r . H arold H el fma n , Hq Air Force Systems Command

L a V er n e E. W oods, Hq Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories

ATTENTION

Air Umversity Review is published to stimulate professional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, factics, and related techniques. Its contents re- flect the opinions of its authors or the investigations and conclusions of its edi- tors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Depart- ment of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW