AFRICtt. vol 19 0 no 3 0 1989 ISSN 0256 - 2804 ) 0 1 0 2 d e t a d ( r e h s i l b u P e h t y b d e t n a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d o r p e R Africa Insight is an independent publication which Annual subscription endeavours to promote insight into the process of change Rand Monetary Area R30,00 and development in Africa. Elsewhere $30,00 Airmail rates on application. The Institute does not necessarily subscribe to the opinions of contributors. Each volume corresponds with a calendar year and con sists of four numbers. © Copyright reserved.
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Cover by William Steyn
Comment Towards a more dynamic and stable economic relationship between Mozambique and South Africa - Dr Prakash Ratilal 122
International relations South Africa and black Africa - Prof P Smit 125 British policies towards South Africa: The regional context - Dr Simon Baynham 130
• Politics Waiting for a negotiated settlement: South Africans in a changing world - Mark Swilling and Frederick van Zyl Slab bert 138 ) 0 1 0 2 Economics d e
t Zimbabwe's economy: Problems and prospects - Dr Erich Leistner 147 a d (
r e
h Ports and harbours s i l The ports and oil terminals of Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon - Denis Fair 153 b u P
e h
t Land tenure
y
b Tenancy and black freehold: Dimensions of history and authority in Natal - C R Cross and E M Preston-Whyte 160
d e t n
a Development r g The Bushmen of Botswana - From desert dwellers to world citizens - A J G M Sanders 174 e c n e c i l Bookshetf 183 r e d n u
y Africa monitor a - Jenny Macgregor w 185 e t
a - G
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d e c u d o r p e R Comment ------______-
Towards a more dynamic and stable economic relationship between Mozambique and South Africa
Dr Prakash Ratilal, Co-ordinator of Mozambique's National Executive Commis sion for the Emergency, comments on the possibilities for greater co-operation between South Africa and Mozambique. .J )
0 I
A 1 wind of change is blowing through awareness of the need to respect the and the condition of regional under every0 continent. The ending of the Cold norms of peaceful coexistence among development which has prevailed for 2
Ward and of regional conflicts, and the the states of the region. centuries. e beginningt of a new era of bilateral and Experience of international relations Southern Africa as a whole occupies a multilaterald contact and co-operation bears out the fact that differences in poli an important geostrategic position and (
arer manifestations of a climate in which tical, ideological, economic and social enjoys potential access to a vast market e
tensionh is easing and dialogue and ideas do not nullify links, geographic for exports vital to the world economy. s i understandingl between the super continuity or contiguity, nor do they im The viable exploitation of its resources is b
powersu and the military blocs are pose conditions on relationships or upon of interest to many countries. P becoming ever more prominent. the enlargement of economic and com The immense mineral resources and e
h The values of peace, democracy and mercial ties. the strategic sea route round the t development are spreading throughout Each of the region's economies is fac southern tip of the African continent y b domestic and international societies and ing its own particular difficulties. They could contribute even more towards d
economies.e Today the world is charac are affected by the instability prevailing stimulating international economic t
terizedn increasingly by globalization and in the whole region and by the negative relations and making them more balan a interdependencer in economic and finan effects of deteriorating international ced. The capacities and resources avail g cial relations and by the continuing terms of trade, rising interest rates, able in each country could be applied to e expansionc of technology and of informa diminishing international credit, spiral great advantage in a variety of viable n e
tionc and communications systems on a ling inflation and growing external debt. economic activities in association with i l worldwide scale. Co-operation is con In the face of modest economic perfor resources available in third countries. r sistentlye replacing confrontation. mance, solutions must be found to pro Changes in the geopolitics of the d
n The winds of progress are also blow mote higher rates of economic growth region which occurred after the inde u ing towards peace and democratization and development and stable and varied pendence of Mozambique, Angola and y in a Southern Africa. These are times of economic cooperation. Zimbabwe brought about profound w
greate hope - the end of colonialism in Southern Africa's potential is well changes in economic and commercial t
Namibiaa is at hand, there are prospects known. All the countries of the sub relations in the region. The establish G for broad democratization in South continent possess immense resources of ment of the Southern African Develop t
Africa,e there is progress in various pro interest not only to the region but also to ment Co-ordination Conference n cessesi of reconciliation and national har the world economy. There is a major (SADCC) provides a broad economic b monization,a especially in Angola and contradiction, however, between the framework for the extension of regional S
Mozambique,y and there is a growing scale of those fabulous natural resources co-operation to benefit its nine member b
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122d Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 o r p e R I ------Comment
countries. The SADCC promotes effec tive and realistic interdependence among the region's economies. The suc cesses achieved are already visible, particularly in the rehabilitation and operation of its rail and port systems, three of which are in Mozambican terri tory - the Beira, Limpopo and Nacala Corridors. There has been broad parti cipation and investment in the Mozam bican corridors by a number of coun tries, notably Canada, Sweden, Nor way, Great Britain, Holland and the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as other European Community countries, the United States and Japan. These in vestments are contributing towards the growing interdependence of the econo mies of the SADCC's members. A fourth corridor, which could be called the "Nkomati Corridor", linking Komatipoort and Ressano Garcia to Maputo is arousing enormous interest in business circles and on the part of the authorities in Mozambique and South The leader of the National Party, now President of South Africa, F W de Kleri<, and Minister of Foreign Africa. Affairs Pik Botha with President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, in Maputo, July 1989 Mozambique and South Africa have had economic and commercial relations taking into account the different levels agriculture, since the area to be irrigated for several decades. These relations of economic development. covers 70 thousand hectares.
were) seriously strained by the prevailing The promotion of bilateral and regio In this context, the development of 0
climate1 of instability in the region resul nal co-operation implies the definition farming enterprises, cattle ranching, 0
ting2 from destabilization. This policy of projects and programmes for the cor agribusinesses and other light industries
causedd death and the destruction of rect use and exploitation of existing re has also been regarded as a priority by e infrastructuret on a massive scale in sources and a clear and consistent foreign corporations, through direct in a
Mozambiqued and other SADCC coun strategy aimed at complementary eco vestment or in association with local (
tries.r The promotion of economic, trade nomic interdependence among the companies. e
andh investment relations among the various countries. Projects in the chemical, engineering, s i countriesl of Southern Africa, and parti The Mozambican government's pro metallurgical and construction indus b
cularlyu with South Africa, demands the motion of economic, technical and tries are under study or are at the im P indispensable prerequisites for stable, scientific exchange and its encourage plementation phase in order to utilize e
longh term relations - good neighbourli ment of foreign investment and trade the resources that exist, including iron, t
ness,y security and stability in interstate with other parts of the world is well bauxite, coal, hydroelectric power, b relations. known. natural gas and construction materials. d
e Full implementation of the Nkomati Mozambique itself has enormous Several foreign firms have established t
Accordn is, without a doubt, the only potential, which has been exploited enterprises in the service sector, parti a
adequater alternative. This would con through bilateral agreements or with cularly in fields related to international g
stitutee a strategic contribution to further third countries, particularly in agri trade and to port and other shipping c
improvementn in trade and the promo culture, cattle farming, fisheries, fores activities. e
tionc of investment among economic try, prospecting and production of gold, There are several other areas in which i l agencies in Mozambique and South coal, oil, gas and other minerals, and the concrete action has taken place both in r Africa,e based on equality, long-term development of tourism. terms of private investment and of joint d
prospectsn and the reciprocity of The country's varied climate provides ventures in association with Mozambi u benefits. agriculture with the opportunity to pro can firms. Direct investment, participa y
a In order to overcome its under duce both for export and the domestic tion in joint ventures or financing for w
development,e Mozambique is co-opera market throughout the year. This is the productive enterprises have come from t
tinga with all the countries of the region case with cotton, sisal, sugar, rice, firms in many countries, notably Japan, G and with those of other continents, re Great Britain, Portugal, Spain, the t maize, soya beans, oil seeds and gardlesse of their economic and social tobacco. Two new dams recently com USA, the German Democratic Repub n i
systems,b on the basis of respect and non pleted in Maputo province, close to the lic and the Soviet Union, under the a
interferenceS in the internal affairs of border with South Africa, provide excel terms of an attractive investment law
eachy country and of mutual benefits, lent opportunities for investment in passed by the Mozambican Government. b
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Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 o 123 r p e I R Comment------
In this context, the undertakings must at ensuring complementary economic growing for greater use of Maputo port be viable, they must generate wealth, relations should consolidate peace, and to stabilize the road and rail links transfer technology, train Mozambi promote development, increase trade between Komatipoort and Maputo. cans, produce enough to break even and relations and provide incentives for In this context, the business com earn sufficient foreign exchange to allow investment. One of the aims of the munity, intellectuals, politicians, diplo for the repayment of external borrowing Nkomati Accord is precisely to increase mats and academics should play an and the transfer of profits and dividends. the complementary nature of relations active part to bring an effective end to In order to promote economic between neighbouring states, seek eco terrorism in Mozambique, with the aim recovery and development, Mozam nomic interdependence and provide of consolidating and broadening under bique's economic relations with coun mutual benefits. This interdependence standing and strengthening economic tries throughout the world are growing would also help towards strengthening and trade relations, in order to share in in a variety of ways. These relations also good neighbourliness between the two the benefits of Mozambique's economic play an important role in bringing bene countries. potential and the prospective opening fits to the countries of Southern Africa. Despite some critical moments, re towards greater bilateral co-operation Among its most important economic presentatives of the two governments across the whole of Southern Africa. partners are the Scandinavian countries, remain open and ready for the chance to By helping to remove destabilization Italy, France, Holland, Great Britain, seek secure paths that will facilitate activities effectively, the business com the USA and the Soviet Union. In the economic and technical co-operation to munity will help to make co-operation context of its Economic Recovery Pro serve both their countries and the viable, and will be able to draw benefit gramme being implemented with sup Southern African region as a whole. and advantage from it. port from the IMF and the World Bank, The Songo meeting between the By establishing a democracy that Mozambique is receiving substantial presidents of South Africa and Mozam respects the principle of equal rights for foreign aid, with contributions from dif bique in September last year marks this all South Africans and acting within the ferent countries and international and new phase. The spirit of the Nkomati principles of the coexistence of states, non-governmental organizations in the Accord was revived. In order to streng South Africa could play an active role in form of grants, concessionary loans and then it through practical action, the further developing interdependence and • bank credit. Despite continuing destabi Security Commission was revitalized complementary economies in the whole lization and other exogenous factors. and a Commission on Economic Co of Southern Africa. Mozambique's GDP grew by 4 per cent operation was created, both of which The scenario that we would like to see
in ) 1987 and by 4,6 per cent in 1988, a have been meeting regularly, with excit in our region in the future depends in the 0 last analysis on South Africans, on trend1 that is forecast to continue this ing prospects for the future. 0 Among work already undertaken, the Mozambicans, it depends on each coun year.2
d South Africa could participate in this recent agreement on preferential try and on the decisions of each of the e growtht and in the economic recovery customs tariffs between the two coun peoples of the region. The future of the a andd development of Mozambique. This tries, an agreement on fisheries and the region depends above all on the deci (
wasr one of the aims of the Nkomati implementation of plans to rehabilitate sions of all the states in the region. e
Accord.h Stability, tranquillity and the transmission lines from Cahora The promotion of development, s i co-operationl are as important to Bassa are notable. Several South stable co-operation and harmonious b progress is possible with peace, tranquil Mozambiqueu as they are to South African companies - such as Anglo P
Africa. Financial, material and tech American, Manica Freight Services, lity and interdependence. Economic e nologicalh resources could be channelled South African Transport Services, relations should be conceived to pro t mote equality among nations and intoy production in the sectors already Eskom, Premier Milling and Barlow b mentioned, which are being developed Rand - are in contact with Mozambi among people and should at the same d to e the mutual benefit of various coun can bodies with the aim of restarting or time build and consolidate peace among t triesn and several international organi expanding their activities in Mozam countries. a zationsr such as the World Bank, the bique. At the same time, a growing Peace and understanding in the region g necessarily go hand in hand with the IDA,e the Lome Convention and the number of Mozambicans is being recrui c balanced, just and equitable develop bankingn community. ted to work in the mines, farms and e
c The development of activities aimed factories in South Africa. Contacts are ment of all its constituent states. i l
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124o r p e R I ------International relations
South Africa and black Africa
On 10 August 1989 the Africa Institute presented a seminar in Pretoria, to coincide with its Annual General Meeting, on the theme "South Africa, black Africa and the West". The Chairman of the Institute's Council, Prof P Smit, presented a paper sketching the evolution of South Africa's relations with Black Africa and the new pattern of intra-regional relations emerging in Southern Africa, and outlining a strategy to promote constructive interaction between South Africa and the rest of the continent.
An opportune time for external forces affecting their country, development. Nevertheless, the attitude pondering South Africa's no less than the available means and the of the independent African countries stance options realistically open to them. was generally hostile and confronta tional. Many South Africans ascribe this South Africa is today undergoing hostility to their country's racial policies
change) both at home and in its relations only. It is important, however, to under
r 0
with1 the outside world. New vistas on stand that the external manifestations of 0 South Africa coming to terms
relations2 with the rest of Africa in par South African domestic policy, too, with Africa ticulard have been opened up by the tri have significantly fomented this hos e t
partitea accord on southwestern Africa It is not by chance that the dismantling of tility. South Africa's behaviour convin d
signed( in New York last December. the apartheid policy at home coincides ced African leaders that it was motiva
Mostr analyses of major trends in with the emergence of a new relation ted by racist arrogance and the desire to e h
Southerns Africa made prior to that ship between South Africa and the rest perpetuate white rule in Africa at any i eventl look somewhat off-beam and of the continent. While apartheid had cost. Thus: b
datedu today. 1 been white South Africa's attempt to - South Africa turned down the invita P A multitude of political, economic. shield itself against the African reality tion to the first Conference of Inde e h
militaryt and other factors, both domes within its own borders, its Africa policies pendent African States in Accra in
ticy and international, are responsible for were aimed at establishing a regional 1958 on the grounds that colonial b the fluid situation facing South Africa at environment consonant with its per- powers like Britain and France should d e
present.t However, underlying every ceived security requirements also have been invited;4
thingn is a new sense of realism. This ap "making Africa safe for apartheid", as - South Africa decided not to parti a r 2 cipate in the inaugural meeting of the
pliesg to South Africa's perception of the Sam Nolutshungu bitingly called it.
threate to its security posed by the Soviet During the 1950s, Dr 0 F Malan had United Nations Economic Commis c
Union,n as well as to the latter's realiza expressed a widely held South African sion for Africa in ] 959;5 e
c - in 1962, when the Nigerian Prime tioni that it has overextended itself in viewpoint when he opposed as prema l
Africa.r Likewise, South Africa, no less ture Britain's decision to grant indepen Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa e Balewa offered to visit South Africa thand other African states, has become dence to its African territories. His
painfullyn aware of the constraints which African Charter (conceived in the and exchange ambassadors, he was u
limitedy resources impose on any coun 1940s) essentially sought to prolong considered "presumptuous,,;6 try'sa freedom of choice. Africa and the Western control over Africa through the - when just prior to Zambia's indepen w
e colonial powers acting in conjunction dence in 1964 Dr Kaunda indicated
outsidet world, in turn, have begun to
appreciatea South Africa's resourceful with South Africa. 3 his willingness to establish diplomatic G
nesst and resilience. However, the principle of ultimate in links with South Africa, the response e was negative;7 n If South Africans are to make the dependence for the peoples of Africa i
mostb of the opportunities proffered by was never at issue for South Africa, and - in 1967 Foreign Minister Hilgard Mul a
thisS new situation, they must dis successive governments emphasized the Ier stated that Lesotho's wish for
passionatelyy assess the internal and country's desire to promote Africa's diplomatic relations could not be b
d e c u d
Africao Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 125 r p e I R International relations ------..
granted and that modern air and tele South Africa's position is not entirely A new pattern of intra-regional phone links provided adequate means dissimilar: relations in Southern Africa of communication;H - Pressing socio-economic and socio - South Africa missed an important op political demands at home, accompa The negotiations between South Africa, portunity when it failed to respond to nied by growing financial stringency Angola and Cuba on southwestern the positive messages contained in the and international pressures, have Africa and their culmination in the New Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969;9 compelled the country to reconsider York agreement of 22 December 1988 - by actively assisting Portugal and many entrenched positions. The fol were a watershed in South Africa's rela Rhodesia against African liberation lowing are cases in point: tions with its neighbours. Not only these movements, South Africa confirmed • South Africa's agreement to the neighbours but also serious observers African leaders in their conviction implementation of UNSC Resolu elsewhere began to reassess the accep that it was "supporting White supre tion 435 (1978) providing for ted view of South Africa as the un macy outside its own borders purely Namibian independence; scrupulous regional bully. on the grounds of race."IO • the acknowledged urgency of In the eyes of the world the signing of The enumeration of these unfortu entering into talks with all relevant the Nkomati Accord of March 1984 had nate decisions serves, firstly, to explain internal groupings about South strengthened rather than changed that Africa's hostility towards South Africa Africa's future political order; unpleasant image because Mozambique and, secondly, to highlight the extent to • the awareness that it is not in South was generally perceived as a defenceless which South African thinking about Africa's interest if it is universally country giving in to the machinations of Africa has changed in the recent past. It believed to be pursuing a policy of a ruthless and militarily superior power. also helps us to understand why African deliberately destabilizing and im In a recent talk, South African Direc hostility became so intense that Prime poverishing its neighbours. tor-General of Foreign Affairs, Mr Neil Minister Vorster's so-called outward - Also in recent years, more and more van Heerden has stated that, "For movement (1967-1970) and detente South Africans have come to accept: various reasons our credibility had been policy (1974-1975) failed to achieve • that relations with neighbouring all but destroyed resulting in a great deal meaningful results other than the esta countries are a crucial factor bear of mutual suspicion between our neigh blishment of diplomatic relations with ing on South Africa's international bours and ourselves on the subconti Malawi in 1967. standing; nent." II It had been almost universally In recent years, however, South • that harmonious relations with the assumed that South Africa was deter
Africa,) no less than the rest of Africa, mined to maintain its control over South
0 SADCC are preferable to a hostile has1 found itself compelled to revise stance; West Africa at practically any price. The 0
firmly2 entrenched viewpoints. To name overturning of this long established • that black Africa is important as a butd a few: assumption was bound to enhance e trading partner and - in view of - Thet African states came to realize South Africa's credibility. In the eyes of a international trade boycotts - as a d
that( neither international isolation its neighbours in particular, South
conduit for South Africa's over andr punitive economic measures nor African declarations of goodwill and its e seas trade; domestich black unrest would lead to readiness to promote peace and pros s
i • that the ideological commitment thel collapse of South Africa's esta perity in the region suddenly appeared b to Marxism-Leninism on the part blishedu order. of states like Mozambique, An in a new light. P - At the same time, most of these states This new perception was strengthen e gola or Congo is not nearly as
becameh increasingly distracted by ed by South Africa's scrupulous obser t strong as had been assumed and is,
theiry own growing economic and in any event, being whittled away vance of the New York agreement, b social predicament, while simulta which was further highlighted by
d by economic realities.
neouslye acknowledging the failure of Swapo's generally censured breach of its t
SADCCn to diminish the economic de The economic pressures exerted by undertakings in the form of an armed in a
pendencer of neighbouring states on Western countries, together with the op vasion on 1 April this year. g
Southe Africa. portunism and duplicity often displayed The New York agreement on the im c
- Harshn experience has increasingly dis by representatives of these countries vis plementation of Resolution 435 and the e
illusionedc African countries with a-vis South Africa, have no doubt withdrawal of Cuban troops from An i l gola has notably improved the circum socialismr as a guide to economic pro played a major role in orientating South e
gress,d and is compelling ever more of Africa towards Africa. stances for seeking a settlement between
themn to implement the market The upshot of all these developments the MPLA government in Luanda and u
oriented,y though politically hazar is that South Africans are increasingly the Unita movement. Efforts in this dous,a remedies prescribed by the IMF realizing how closely their own destinies direction initiated in 1988, culminated in w
e are linked to those of black Africa. the Gbadolite meeting of 18 African andt World Bank.
- Ina view of their growing predicament, Paternalism and unconcern are increas heads of state on 22 June 1989, when G
moret and more African leaders have ingly being superseded by empathy for President Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas e
swallowedn their principles and ig the people of Africa in general and a Savimbi shook hands and undertook to i
noredb the OAU's injunctions by esta sense of responsibility and commitment negotiate for peace. a
blishingS trade and aid relationships with regard to the destiny of Southern It is still early days in the quest for an
withy South Africa. Africa in particular. end to the Angolan civil war. What gives b
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126o Africa Insight, vo119, no 3, 1989 r p e R I ------Intemationalrelations
hope, however, is that many outside forces have a strong interest in a success ful and speedy outcome. Foremost among these are Zaire and Zambia, who are anxious to have the Benguela rail way line reopened. For both countries, and also for the Congo and Gabon as well as more distant African countries, peace in the region is a precondition for foreign investment and economic pro gress. Powerful Western mining inte rests envisage major projects in Angola and Zaire once stability returns. South Africa as well as the two superpowers have already demonstrated their earnest desire for a settlement. Whereas South Africa has given proof of its bona fides over the SW AlNamibia issue, the world has yet to be convinced that South Africa is no longer aiding or at least abetting Renamo. In the eyes of the world, Mozambique is the critical outstanding test of South Africa's credi bility in regional affairs. To quote Van Heerden once more: Mr F W de Klerk's meeting with President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia in August this year precipitated a As a regional power South Africa must political drama in South Africa and the resignation of President P W Botha be seen to be constructively assisting the finding of a peaceful solution to the Malawi. Prospects for attracting over The neighbouring countries tacitly human tragedy on its Eastern flank. If seas iIwestors to the region would im acknowledge this vital interdependence ) we are not actively engaged in this pro prove. And all this would create greater 0 by either warning against sanctions on 1 cess we will be viewed as giving our tacit opportunities not only for the sale of South Africa or at least not seeking 0 consent to the ongoing turmoil and strife 2
South African goods and services but them, with the exception of Zimbabwe
d . . . once again our credibility is at
e 12 would generally stimulate intra- as well and Zambia whose advocacy is, how
t stake.
a as extra-regional exchange. ever, patently only rhetorical. Whatever d
( With the partial exception of Bot There have been increasing signs in misgivings they might harbour against r recente weeks that the Frelimo govern swana, South Africa's neighbours are South Africa, all the governments of h ments and Renamo are inching towards also afflicted by the same economic and neighbouring countries, again excluding i l
negotiationsb and it is clear that South other predicaments as the rest of black Zimbabwe, are maintaining open lines Africau as well as the United States and Africa - explosive population growth, of communication with the South P
Portugale are actively promoting this pro mounting unemployment, falling per African authorities. Yet even Mr h cess.t The visit of Ministers F W de KJerk capita incomes and food production, Mugabe may be mellowing slightly, be andy Pik Botha to Maputo on 19 July this declining standards of health and other cause in an interview given in Paris on 12 b
yeard obviously was part of South social services, growing foreign July this year, he conceded for the first e
Africa'st efforts in this regard. indebtedness and lack of foreign ex time ever that South Africa's domestic n
a For South Africa, not only its credibi change, and so forth. policy had changed in the recent past. 15 r lityg but also its morality and sense of Increasingly, it is being acknowledged He had also reacted favourably to the
e
decencyc are at stake in Mozambique. that the countries of the SADCC - except meeting between President Botha and
Substantialn actual and potential econo Angola and Tanzania - have no chance e Mr Nelson Mandela a few days earlier. c mici interests are at issue as well. to reduce significantly their economic A clear indication of African states' l
r Maputo is the natural outlet to the sea linkage with South Africa. As a recent growing readiness to associate more e ford the southern and northern Trans publication by The Economist Intelli openly with South Africa, was the visit n
vaal.u As yet, Mozambique's mineral and gence Unit observes on the SADCC, of the Zairean foreign minister, Mr
othery natural resources are barely ex "Essentially it does little more than Karl-i-Bond, to Pretoria early in June plored,a and offer a natural field of ac coordinate the presentation to donors of 1989; the meeting of Presidents w e tivityt for South African business and projects, most of them national, a few Chissano and P W Botha at Songo in financiala interests. Given the three serving a group of member countries." 13 September 1988; the visits of P W Botha G
majort transit routes to Maputo, Beira The study concludes that, "There are no to Cote d'Ivoire and Zaire a few weeks e andn Nacala, peace and stability in low cost, short term options beyond later; and his amiable exchanges with i
Mozambiqueb would immediately have a mere exhortation to promote reduced the heads of state of Togo and Niger a S
beneficial impact on the economies of trade or migrant labour interdepen when they met at the funeral of Bavarian y dence with South Africa." 14 Swaziland,b Zimbabwe, Zambia and Prime Minister Franz-Joseph Strauss in
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Africao Insight, vo119, no 3, 1989 127 r p e R International relations ------•
October 1988. South African Airways is cannot possibly function in Africa at the investment, loan capital, tourism, intra landing in Abidjan, Cairo and Kinshasa; present stage of economic and political regional power, transport and tele South Africa has trade missions in seven development. Yet even today the concept communications schemes, joint African countries and representatives in of a common market, modelled on the research and training projects are in several others. European Community, and encompas operation even now, but could be ex At the time of writing, there is specu sing South Africa and its neighbours, is panded, especially projects which rely lation that only Zimbabwe is still resist still favoured by many in South Africa. on exchanges of technology rather than ing South Africa's proposal for a The reasons why this is unrealistic on large amounts of money or man regional conference of Southern African cannot be elaborated in the present con hours. states. If> Such a conference, with South text. However, a brief glance at the Naturally, this does not preclude aid African participation, would herald the serious - and still growing - economic schemes such as those already being pro beginning of a new era in the history of imbalance between the RSA on the one vided by South Africa in several African the region and, indeed, of modem hand and the former homelands on the countries in respect of health, housing, Africa. other, suffices to indicate the immense training, and animal husbandry. Mr Herman Cohen, the Bush Admi difficulties facing underdeveloped and South Africa cannot be realistically nistration's Assistant Secretary of State unsophisticated economies which have expected to uplift the whole region for African Affairs, alluded to these pos to compete for investments and skills singlehanded. It can merely help to sibilities in the course of his interview on with a vastly more advanced economy. create a favourable "climate" and W orldnet on 22 June 1989, when he Even today, South Africa is often ac opportunities which, however, must be referred to "some interesting conversa cused of hampering the economic deve utilized first of all by the inhabitants of tions with southern African leaders such lopment of its neighbours. In a fully the neighbouring countries themselves, as President Chissano" who told him integrated regional market, this would but also by outside business and public that "if South Africa fulfills its respon in fact be inevitable given these coun organizations. sibilities under U.N. Resolution 435, tries' present unequal stages of deve Given the long-standing interests in and brings Namibia to independence, lopment. Southern Africa of powers such as . . . then all sorts of agreements with It should be obvious that instead of Britain, the Federal Republic of Ger ,j I South Africa are possible, in the area of striving for an integrated regional many and Portugal, as well as the more regional cooperation."17 Mr Cohen market, Southern Africa should first recent involvement of Italy, France, the added: "I think things are coming concentrate on ways and means of deal Netherlands and the Scandinavian )
together0 very nicely and South Africa's ing with common problems and on ef countries, and given also the generally expertise1 is needed in the region." 18 He forts to economize on human, financial disappointing results of Western aid 0 2 went on to instance the Lesotho High and other resources. The workings of efforts throughout Africa, sound eco d landse Water Project, the Sua Pan soda the Organization for Economic Coope nomic considerations clearly demand t asha project in Botswana, and joint trans ration and Development should be care that the European Community reconsi d ( port projects in Mozambique. fully studied, and there is a great deal in der its approach to South and Southern r
e It is becoming a truism that Southern the original conception of the SADCC Africa if it seriously seeks to promote h
Africas has no chance of a stable and which could be utilized for a more com the material well-being of the region. i l
prosperousb future unless stability and prehensive regional design for Southern First of all this would entail that the prosperityu prevail in South Africa and Africa. EC recognizes the crucial role of South P
theree is harmonious intra-regional inter Much pertinent experience has, of Africa as the regional engine of growth, h
t and, secondly, that instead of boycotting change at all levels. No doubt. the time course, already been gained through hasy come, or is at least close at hand, for bodies such as Sarccus (The Southern South Africa and actively discouraging b
Southd Africans to give more substance African Regional Council for the economic interaction between South e tot the responsible role of the leading Conservation and Utilization of the Africa and its neighbours, the EC n
regionala power which they have claimed Soil), the Southern African Tourism should encourage such interaction. r forg more than four decades. Council (Sartoc) and especially Secosaf South African government spokes
e
c - the Secretariat for Multilateral Co men have, accordingly, begun to pro
n pagate the concept of positive Western
e operation in Southern Africa, in which c
i the RSA and the TBVC countries are participation in the form of trilateral l
r joined. regional cooperation, that is, joint Southe Africa's strategy for d Given South Africa's enormous endeavours by European countries, regionaln development South Africa and the other countries of u socio-economic and socio-political tasks
Regionaly economic groupings have for at home and the limited resources at its Southern Africa in order to stabilize and a disposal, it clearly cannot spare for the develop the economies of the region. longw been viewed as an essential precon e ditiont for the development of Africa's rest of the region anything like the vast Needless to say, such a far-reaching generallya small and fragile economies. resources of finance and manpower re-orientation on the part of Western G
Thet almost endless list of African being dispensed by the World Bank or European countries is unlikely, at least e
n the European Community. Its contribu until such time as South Africa can con
regionali schemes that have failed, or neverb even got off the ground, leaves no tion must principally lie in the promo vince them that it is irrevocably moving a S doubt that groupings which entail a not tion of commercial exchanges between towards a non-racial and democratic y political order. ableb curtailment of national sovereignty itself and African countries. Trade,
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128o Africa Insight, vo119, no 3, 1989 r p e R I • ------Internauonalremuons
In the meantime, South Africans risk analysis. London: Economist Intelli X G C Olivier. op cit. pp 147-14X. must strive to formulate imaginative gence Unit. 19X8. 9 See Denis Venter. "Black Africa and the concepts to guide them in planning for 2 Sam C Nolutshungu. South Africa in Africa: apartheid issue: A South African response", their country's growing participation in A study in ideology and foreign policy. Man Journal of Contemporary African Studies, chester: Manchester University Press. 1975. regional affairs. vol I, no I, October 19RI. pp R9 et seq. p 29X et passim. 10 Ariston Chambati, op cit. p 23. Approached in the right spirit, their 3 Ibid. pp 45 ff; G C Olivier, Suid-Afrika se II N P van Heerden, "Address at the Business active participation in uplifting the buitelandse beleid. Pretoria & Kaapstad: Achievement Award Banquet". Sandton, countries of Southern Africa will help to Academica. 1977, pp 127-129. 19 June 19X9. (roneo) p R. restore to South Africans a sense of 4 Ariston Chambati. "South Africa in 12 Ibid, pp 8-9. direction and a feeling of security which African politics". in Denis Venter (ed). 13 Roger Martin. op cit, p IIX. so many of them are lacking at present. South Africa and the world: political and 14 Ibid. P 125. strategic realities, Johannesburg: South 15 The Star. 13 July 19R9. P 6. African Institute of International Affairs. 16 Business Day. 13 July 1989, P 1. References 1976. pp 10-11. 17 US I nformation Service. "Cohen discusses 5 Sam C Nolutshungu. op cit. p 79. U.S. Southern Africa policy". undated Sec. for example. Roger Martin. Southern 6 Ariston Chambati. op cit. p II. press release. p 3. Africa: The price of apartheid: A political 7 Ibid. IR Ibid. P 4. ) 0 1 0 2
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Africad Insight, vo119, no 3, 1989 o 129 r p e I R Internationalrelations ------
British policies towards South Africa: The regional context
Dr Simon Baynham, Senior Researcher at the Africa Institute, presented this paper at the Institute's Annual General Meeting on 10 August 1989. He places relations between Britain and South Africa in their regional context and speculates on the options open to both parties in the wake of the general election.
Introduction: the international significance in economic and geopoliti has had a profound and abiding impact setting cal terms: I on the continent it occupies with fifty or - its total area is roughly that of so other states - especially those in It is axiomatic that a nation's foreign Australia; Southern Africa.
policy) will be influenced in part by - its population of 100 million puts it in Both economically and in military 0
domestic1 political considerations and the same league as Bangladesh or terms, South Africa is the giant - and to 0
trends.2 The Republic of South Africa.
Nigeria; many the ogre - of Africa, its heartbeat
however,d is confronted with the - the value of the region's international and footsteps reverberating across the e t
dilemmaa that its own internal arrange trade is about $40-45 billion (ranking continent's land-mass. It is not my inten d
ments( are invariably viewed as the with Brazil, China or Singapore) in a tion now to provide an exhaustive pro
r
cruciale determinant in the foreign policy global total of $5 000 billion; file of this dominance; for the present a h
responsess of international state and non - its total GOP is roughly on a par with few facts and figures will suffice. i statel actors. Such a perspective has been that of Argentina, Belgium or Militarily, the Republic's Defence b
crystalu clear in the virtually universal Sweden, about half that of Brazil and Force is by far the most powerful in the P condemnation of apartheid dating from only 3,5 percent of the USA's; region, not so much numerically but in e h
thet early 1960s and in the exchange of - and, finally, the combined active terms of effectiveness, experience and
well-establishedy but increasingly sterile armed forces of the region marginally operational serviceability. And this is b arguments about the merits and deme outnumber those of Thailand and in despite the UN arms embargo which has d e
ritst of economic and other sanctions. number are equal to only a quarter of had the unintentional consequence of
Thus,n in the wake of decolonization, the Vietnam's. making South Africa largely self-reliant a r
seeminglyg intractable problems of South in armaments procurement - an
Africae and the subcontinent are high on But for all of the above, the subconti impressive, though costly, achievement c
then agenda of national and world nent "consistently attracts a higher level from a technological and logistical e c
debate,i dividing legislatures and of attention from the international com standpoint. l
intergovernmentalr organizations and munity than any other Third World area South Africa's regional dominance, e
alliancesd alike. except the Middle East. The reasons are economically, is illustrated by a few n Yet for some observers the question complex, and owe more to politics than choice statistics: u
ofy why a region of apparently second to economics.,,2 - Botswana is dependent upon South ranka importance (Southern Africa) The politics of course, are rooted in Africa for 90 per cent of its transporta w e
shouldt attract as much or more attention the RSA's domestic condition and con tion requirements, 40 per cent of its as a a region of first-rank interest (the stitution and in the "spill-over" effect of electricity and all of its oil; G
Middlet East) remains both a puzzle and internal developments in the region. - Malawi relies on South Africa for 40 e
a fascinating-subjectn for speculation. As Thus, while South Africa's 470000 per cent of its imports; i
a recentb report published by the Econo square miles of territory may appear at - Zaire ships more than two-fifths of its a
S first glance to merit merely second-tier mineral exports through the Re
mist Intelligence Unit notes, the sub continenty is of some, though limited, status in world terms, in fact the country pUblic; b
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130o Africa Insight, vo119, no 3,1989 r p e R I ------Intemationalrelations
- some two-thirds of Zambia's imports and a third of its exports are routed through South Africa; - Lesotho is completely dependent on South Africa for transport, marketing and electricity, and remittances from Basotho miners in South Africa ac count for half of its GNP; - South Africa is Zimbabwe's major trading partner; and - 90 per cent of Swaziland's imports and 20 per cent of its exports are shipped via South Africa. More widely, South Africa produces 40 per cent of Africa's manufactured ex ports, generates 70 per cent of the conti nent's electricity and transports three quarters of Africa's railed goods. For all these reasons - and because the RSA's influence has been intimately associated with the security situation in especially Angola, Namibia and Mozambique - South Africa has warranted more than casual attention in the chanceries of the West and, mainly for historical reasons, nowhere more so than in Britain. 0 ) 0 1
British0 interests in Southern 2
Africad e t
Bya virtue of its long-standing association d with( South Africa, the United Kingdom Mr F W de Klerk's visit to 10 Downing Street led to a great deal of speculation about the future relation r
hase interests in, and connections with, ship between the British and South African govemments h
thes Republic and the subcontinent i whichl exceed those of any other state in speech in Cape Town and the Sharpe world's population, and one of the big b theu international community. These ville shootings in 1960, and South four in the European Community, the P
linkse can be traced back to the colonial Africa's withdrawal from the Com United Kingdom is constantly and un h erat and to the imperial and Common monwealth in March 1961. avoidably in the international firing line.
wealthy ties which continued after South More recently - and especially since Before dealing with London's current b Africa effectively gained its indepen the September 1984 inauguration of a response to this dilemma, however, a d e dencet from Britain in 1910. At that time, tricameral legislature (which, by incor more detailed assessment of British con then UK's interests included: firstly, those porating coloureds and Indians whilst cerns in the region is required. a r
Britonsg who remained in South Africa excluding blacks, precipitated an explo British interests in South Africa and
(togethere with the "kith and kin" blood sion of violence in the Vaal Triangle and the subcontinent have not, of course, re c tiesn associated with those families); an unprecedented security clampdown mained static. They have been shaped e c
secondly,i Britain's trade and investment culminating in the national Sate of by a changing cocktail of domestic, trad l
inr the territory - which began with Emergency since 12 June 1986)3 - the ing and strategic ingredients. The rela e
commitmentsd forged during the deve threat and reality of sanctions against tive salience of these components have lopmentn of the gold and diamond mining Pretoria has placed Britain under con changed over time. Nevertheless, these u
industriesy in the nineteenth century; and siderable pressure to follow suit. can be distilled into four overlapping thirdly,a the value of the Union as an ally Throughout these years the policy elements: w e
int the First and Second World Wars. options open to Whitehall have been - firstly, where it concerns British pass a Relations with South Africa did not narrow and unpalatable. They have also port holders; G
immediatelyt alter with the National been complicated by competing inte - secondly, in the fields of investment e
Party'sn electoral victory in 1948 but rests and objectives elsewhere in Africa and trade; i ratherb after international opposition to and further afield. As a leading member - thirdly, with regard to South Africa's a apartheidS gathered momentum follow of a 49-member multiracial Common military importance to Britain and her
ingy Macmillan's "Winds of change" wealth, which embraces a quarter of the allies; and b
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Africao Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 131 r p e R Intemationalrelations ------•
- fourthly, with reference to the Re Before the Second World War, the UK times that of its nearest rival, Nigeria public's strategic - as opposed to provided almost half of South Africa's (£391 million). UK imports from the purely economic - mineral signifi imports. In 1964, Britain's exports to RSA were also higher, up 22,7 per cent cance to the United Kingdom. South Africa constituted only a twen to £808 million, producing a trade sur I intend to deal with each of these four tieth of her total exports, while repre plus for London of £262 million.') Never issues in turn. senting a third of the total value of the theless, the danger for Britain of black RSA's imports. By 1976, the UK's African retaliation for too close an UK passport holders market share of South African imports association with the Republic is ever The first of these issues is relatively easy had declined to 17 ,6 per cent. n present. For instance, in 1979 Nigeria to explain. There are roughly 750 ()()() Today, the Republic is only the seven nationalized British Petroleum, osten South Africans who hold, or who are en teenth largest market for British ex sibly because a tanker chartered by the titled to hold, UK passports. There are ports, although Britain is South Africa's company, but South African-owned, also approximately 80 000 British third largest supplier of imports after the had called at a Nigerian port. British citizens in Zimbabwe and another Federal Republic of Germany and the policy towards the RSA can not, there 30 ()()() in Zambia. In one major sense, USA.7 This decline in market share is fore, be divorced from London's other these passport holders constitute the fairly easily explained, but it has arisen international trading commitments - biggest single issue confronting any largely because of Britain's membership especially those with the Common British government. To put it bluntly, of the European Community, which has wealth countries. However, it should be Whitehall has a nightmare vision that diverted goods away from the RSA into said that Nigeria's economic position one day these people could arrive at Europe and led to concerted efforts on has weakened appreciably in the past Heathrow airport on a one-way ticket, the part of South Africa to widen the decade, not to mention that of the rest of with a suitcase in one hand and precious pattern of its supply of goods and ser Africa. vices, particularly with West Germany little in the other. When one remembers Military and strategic considerations that on I July this year Sir Geoffrey and the USA.s Pretoria has also diver Howe was handed a petition which sified its trade outlets. Thus, in 1970,29 During the 1950s and the 1960s, South urged Britain to grant over 3 million per cent of South Africa's non-gold ex Africa was viewed by Britain as an im Hong Kong people the right of residence ports went to the UK whereas by 1985 portant link in its chain of defence for in the UK as 1997 looms on the horizon, this had declined to 6 per cent. the East of Suez role and as a bastion for the immensity of this issue is not difficult British investments in South Africa the defence of the sea routes around the ) Cape of Good Hope. Without the use of to 0 understand. "The South African have also declined as a proportion of 1 total foreign investment. In 1965, over South African port facilities, British Britons0 do not directly influence British 2 policy towards South Africa, but do so 60 per cent of foreign investment came capacity to deploy effectively East of d
e from Britain; by 1975, this had fallen to Suez was seen as likely to be under indirectlyt by contributing, through their
a around 40 per cent. However, direct mined. These perceptions were given
contactsd in the UK, both to a pro-white
( expression in the Simonstown Agree South African lobby, and to a high level British investment in the Republic only r of e popular and media interest in South generated some 5 per cent of the UK's ment of 1955 - which was not, of h
s total invisible earnings in 1978. Given course, a formal defensive alliance and Africai (which cuts both ways)."4 The l
impactb of these passport holders on cur the decline of the South African ruled out any obligation by Britain to u economy during the past decade, both support South Africa should it be in rentP British policy (and the same goes
fore Portugal) has been summarized by these figures are likely to be smaller volved in defending itself from external h
t military attack. one British diplomat who served in today. Nevertheless, most estimates put y the current value of British investments However the growing clamour of b
Harare as follows: " ... in South Africa
d in South Africa at around £6 billion (R27 international hostility to naval co
thee major British and Portuguese inte t billion). operation, 10 together with London's vir
restn in respect of their citizens is that
a While Britain's trading relations with tual abandonment of an East of Suez
politicalr change should not take so
g South Africa have declined in relative role and growing doubts about the value traumatic a form as to provoke a massive e of defending the Cape Route, led to influxc of possibly destitute and almost terms, in the rest of Africa trade has n Harold Wilson's Labour government certainlye indigestible refugees.,,5 been on the increase, with exports to the c
i Organization of African Unity (OAU) unilaterally terminating the Agreement l
r countries exceeding those to South in 1975, four years before Mrs Thatcher e
Investmentd and trade Africa. However last year (1988), the came to office. And two years later, in n October 1977, the UN Security Council Withu regard to the second of the UK's RSA was far and away the UK's biggest
broady interests in South Africa - in trading partner in Africa, with exports passed a mandatory arms embargo on a and imports up in spite of the sanctions the RSA. This effectively prevented any vestmentw and trade - the first point to e
stresst is that South Africa is far more de climate. future British Conservative administra pendenta on Britain than Britain is on the In its recently released report for tion - all of them in the event headed by G
Republic.t South Africa traditionally 1988, the London Chamber of Com Margaret Thatcher - from resuming e
n merce reveals that UK exports to South arms supplies to the country. lookedi to London as its chief market and
sourceb of supply, whereas for Britain Africa rose 13,2 per cent to £1 ,07 billion In the past at least, Pretoria placed a S
South Africa was, and is, only one (R4,8 billion). That put South Africa in great emphasis on its value to the free y world as a shipping route, stressing that marketb for its goods and investments. the top slot with a figure of more than 2,5
d e c u d
o Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989
132r p e R I • ------Intemavonalre~vons
65 per cent of Western Europe's oil Strategic minerals engines.) Besides the USSR, which comes around the Cape of Good Hope. The strategic value of South Africa's holds 46 per cent of global reserves, Until the mid-1970s this particular argu mineral wealth poses a much tougher alternative sources exist in Australia, ment reinforced those who upheld the problem than the geostrategic issue for Canada, Chile, Finland, Japan and value of defending the Cape Route British and other Western policy Norway. against possible Soviet attack (2 300 makers. The Republic's strategic mine Finally in this brief statistical over vessels pass around the Cape every ral significance to the UK rests essen view, it should be noted that the 12- month). However, the discovery of tially on four commodities and their member European Community is also North Sea oil and growing doubts that alloys: chromium, manganese, vana highly dependent as a body on South the USSR could either choose South dium and the platinum group of metals. Africa. In 1986, the last year for which African waters rather than the Straits of South Africa argues, with some con full figures are available, the RSA sup Hormuz or another point off the African siderable statistical backing, that in this plied one-third of the Community's coast for an interdiction of shipping, or respect at least it is more important to manganese and zirconium, more than launch what would amount to a naval the UK than vice versa. 12 Moreover, this half of its chromium and nearly 70 per attack on the West at such a distance from vulnerability is enhanced by the fact that cent of its vanadium. 13 the Soviet Union, undermined the British the USSR is often the main alternative It is evident from the above that South case for defending the Cape Route. supplier. Within the wider context of the Africa's mineral resources are of con Pretoria, for its part, emphasized the West's dependence on South Africa, siderable strategic value to the UK and threat posed to African governments Britain's own vulnerability to any cut-off to the European Community. Any and Western shipping by an increased in supply requires a brief assessment interruption of supply, for whatever Soviet naval presence in the Indian here. reason, might be remedied in the short ocean. Military chiefs in London, how term by alternative supplies (where - Britain imports about two-thirds of its ever, remain sceptical that a naval ac available), by different uses of the pro chromium requirements from South cord with South Africa would effectively duct (platinum, for instance, could be Africa. (Chromium's principal use is counter such a presence. Indeed, the wholly diverted to industrial use), or by in the manufacture of stainless steel, very nature of such an agreement with stockpiling and recycling. essential to the aerospace industry.) the Republic could confer on the Soviets However, a political judgement on And with the RSA and Zimbabwe a considerable propaganda weapon. the security of supply, and an assess together holding more than 94 per This in turn, it is argued, might increase ment of other British interests and cent of known resources and Harare
Moscow's) influence with African and responses, must rest essentially on the
0 still highly dependent on South predicted future of South Africa. In other1 Third World regimes. African transport, the degree of long 0 To summarize this section on British creasingly, the wider question of the 2
term dependence on South African
militaryd interests: whereas immediately direction of the Republic's domestic
e supplies is self-evident. aftert the Second World War South policies, and the role of the West in a - Again, Britain receives roughly half Africad was valued not only for its geo effecting change, has become intimately (
of its manganese imports from the Re politicalr position but also as a respected connected with international and bi e public. (The mineral in alloy form as
memberh of the Western Alliance -- and lateral sanctions. And it is to this area- s
i ferromanganese is an essential non herel I am thinking of Pretoria's contri and more especially to the British re
b substitutable ingredient in steel
butionu to the Berlin Airlift of 1948-49 sponse under Prime Minister Thatcher
P making.) Unlike chrome, however,
and the despatch soon afterwards of a -- that the next part of this paper will be e there are alternative suppliers outside
fighterh squadron to Korea -- today addressed. t
Southern Africa: Australia, Brazil
Southy Africa is a relatively low area of
b and Gabon, for example, are major priority for UK defence policy, a policy
d producers. whiche remains rooted in Europe's cen t British regional policy: A
traln front and in Britain's contribution to - About one-third of Britain's platinum
a twin-track strategy ther Nato alliance. supplies come direct from South g Africa. (The metal's principal indus It e One military footnote that deserves is far too simplistic to conclude that mentionc at least, relates to Pretoria's trial use is as a catalyst in the car Western policy-makers have moved to n
e making, chemical, electronics and nuclearc status. South Africa's uranium wards sanctions solely because of ethical i l
enrichment programme is sufficiently petroleum-refining industries.) But, antipathy to apartheid. And it is naive to r
advancede to merit serious British and both in its production and as a propor accept that such measures are neces d
Westernn concern. The Republic may tion of global reserves, the Soviet sarily adopted because states believe u possess tactical nuclear warheads Union is the only significant alterna that they are the only or the best method y
already;a if it does not, most informed tive supplier. of attaining desirable objectives. The w
observerse have little doubt that South - However, it must be said that in con West's links with the RSA provide an t
Africaa could assemble a thermonuclear trast to the minerals noted already, acute dilemma for the governments G
device in a relatively short space of time the UK's dependence on vanadium is involved. For, on the one hand, the t --e especially given recent reports that a slight. (Vanadium is used in its alloy countries concerned operate "on the n i reasonable assumption that a major
medium-rangeb ballistic missile may soon form to manufacture light-weight
bea test-fired at the Arniston range in the high-strength steels, especially impor political transformation in South Africa S
Capey Province. 11 tant in civil and military aircraft cannot be postponed indefinitely", 14 b
d e c u
Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 133 o r p e I R International relations ------
and that in the long term they have little encouraged to expand, the black As noted earlier, the anti-sanctions to gain by supporting Pretoria uncon majority would be in a position to track of Mrs Thatcher's dual policy goes ditionally. On the other hand, however, seek opportunities for self hand in hand with a parallel policy of the West has legitimate strategic, politi improvement. In short, economic financial and security assistance to cal and economic interests "in preserv growth and black economic em Pretoria's neighbours. To her many ing a high degree of stability in Southern powerment are seen as indivisible critics, this dimension of Mrs Thatcher's Africa, and there exists great uncer from political empowerment. delicate high-wire act - in which the ob tainty as to which course of action would As the Sixth Report from the jective is to keep seemingly irreconcil best achieve this objective. ,,15 Because Foreign Affairs Committee conclu able regional interests and respon of these uncertainties, Western policy ded in 1986, "The Government have sibilities in some sort of equilibrium - is has often appeared to be indecisive, long held the view that demographic viewed as a blatant attempt to buy de directionless and equivocal. trends, the increasing dependence of facto acquiescence from black Africa Thus, by way of illustration, the pre the South African economy on the and the Commonwealth. sent British administration has re black workforce and the growing But as the former Minister of State for mained profoundly sceptical about the economic power of the black popula Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, efficacy of sanctions in promoting fun tion are major levers for political Mrs Lynda Chalker, said last year: damental change in South Africa, yet - change." 16 Thus, a ban on coal imports "Britain has long been involved in work largely as a result of international pres was averted after the strong opposi ing to strengthen the economies of sures - it has introduced a number of tion of the West German Chancellor, SADCC states, to reduce their econo limited economic sanctions. But be supported by Mrs Thatcher, who mic dependence on South Africa and, cause London's interests in the region stated: "I don't believe sanctions will through the SADCC organisation, to re are greater than those of any other in help bring Apartheid to an end. They store the natural pattern of transport in dustrialized state, and because of the may, however, bring starvation and the region by rehabilitation of reiional Commonwealth connection, the United poverty to many thousands of black routes through Mozambique. ,,1 She Kingdom is uniquely susceptible to South Africans." went on to say that from 1980 to 1986 the attacks at home and abroad for support - In the second and third place, sanc UK gave over £800 million (more than ing Pretoria. Indeed, the British govern tions are also opposed because of the R3,5 billion) in bilateral aid to these ment has gained a reputation - and in difficulty of enforcement, the pos countries. my view one thoroughly undeserved - sibilities of evasion and the financial, And at another venue soon after as the appeaser of apartheid. strategic and employment damage wards, the Minister added that "because )
It0 can be argued, however, that that would result for the UK. of the grave security situation in 1
British0 policy towards South Africa and - At the same time, and fourthly, it is Mozambique the effort to rehabilitate 2
thed region is the most consistent and argued that turning the screws on Pre the transport routes requires parallel e coherentt in the subcontinent, in contra toria would stiffen, rather than measures of military assistance .... a
distinctiond to the policies of the other weaken, the resolve of the South We are therefore making a considerable (
majorr players. It has not been suffi African authorities to resist outside effort to provide targetted military train e
cientlyh recognized that London's refusal interference. ing, and we are now supplementing this s i
to l apply comprehensive mandatory - Finally, in opposing comprehensive with a related package of non-lethal sanctionsb has a "flip-side". Mrs sanctions, London argues that it is, in defence equipment for those countries u P
Thatcher's steadfast, and sometimes fact, serving the interests of the Front directly involved in protecting the trans abrasive,e opposition to economic sanc port routes ... ".19 h line States. The dependency on South t tions gives her a leverage over Pretoria Africa of these countries in trade and As I noted last year, in a lecture at the y b
which no other country can muster, and transport terms means that the RSA Africa Institute on Western and Eastern d
is e also countered by Britain's leading would be able to transmit the costs of bloc security assistance to the region,20 t
rolen in providing substantial economic sanctions to its neighbours, who are the UK is currently providing profes a
andr military support for the Frontline extremely vulnerable to the damage sional military training for eight of the g States and their near neighbours. Before that would be caused by South nine SADCC states. e examiningc the extent of this support in African counter-retaliation. - In the former colony of Rhodesia, a n moree detail, however, an outline of Mrs The fact is, of course, that the FLS's
c large British Military Advisory Train i l
Thatcher's anti-sanctions position routine calls for sanctions are a rhetori ing Team (BMA TT) has been operat r woulde be in order. cal and meaningless distraction - a ing in the country since Independence d
Veryn briefly the argument from point privately accepted by the Front in 1980. The team helps to run the u Downing Street goes as follows: line leaders, who are fully aware of the Staff College but much more impor y
- Firstly,a given the power of the South disaster sanctions would bring to the tant is the training given to the w
Africane state and the improbability of region in terms of South African retalia Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) at t
aa successful revolutionary transfer of tion. Thus, as The Spectator put it quite the Nyanga Battle School. Most of the G
power (an assessment now supported recently, "The game now is to pitch ZNA troops are subsequently deploy t bye Moscow), sanctions and disinvest higher and higher, to ask for universal ed in operations against the MNR in n menti are' a prescription for extensive mandatory sanctions, so that you are not
b neighbouring Mozambique.
blacka unemployment and impoverish obliged to impose any sanctions at all - Since 1986, Mozambican troops have S
ment.y If, instead, the economy is until everyone agrees.,,17 also been trained at a separate wing b
d e c u
134d Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 o r p e R I ------Internaffonalre~ffons
within the Nyanga complex. It is inte expected for Namibia when the territory Such developments would permit the resting to note that Mozambique is achieves independence, almost certainly UK to push for a greater South African the only non-Commonwealth African under Swapo leadership, sometime in role in promoting peace in the subconti country receiving such training on the 1990. nent - a state of affairs which, if continent. However, the agreement However, before moving to the final realized, would win considerable inter between London and Maputo (as well part of my paper, I would like to slot in national kudos for both London as the as the one between the UK and some additional thoughts about a facilitator and for Pretoria as the Zimbabwe) prohibits British military number of bilateral relationships and Iynchpin for constructive cooperation. personnel from being deployed ope developments influencing British Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and rationally. It is also significant that foreign policy in the region. These refer Malawi: The former British High Com when Margaret Thatcher met Presi not only to individual countries in the mission Territories, the so-called BLS dent Chissano at Nyanga this March, subcontinent but also to non-state states - as well as Malawi (a long it was agreed that the Mozambican actors, and chiefly to the ANC. standing advocate of dialogue) - have intake would be doubled, from 400 to Zimbabwe: Because of its relative remained on exceptionally friendly 800 per annum - an increase in economic and military strengths, and terms with London since Independence British military assistance which I because Margaret Thatcher's first major in the 1960s. Malawi, and especially anticipated at my November lecture foreign policy success was in the role of Botswana, remain two of Africa's eco last year. midwife to Zimbabwe's independence, nomic success stories, from which - There are also small British training Harare is pivotal to Britain's regional British business has done well. While teams in all three BLS (Botswana, strategy. Anglo-Zimbabwean relations these four states have little clout indi Lesotho and Swaziland) states. As are viewed by both sides as special, and vidually, together they represent nearly with the teams training the Zimbab links between the two states have half of the SADCC membership. As weans and Mozambicans, the costs re proved rather stronger than the threats such, Whitehall assiduously cultivates flect foreign policy initiatives rather to them. The demolition of UDI re their support for British initiatives in the than British defence interests. For this mains an indisputable success in Mrs subcontinent. reason, it is the Foreign Office and not Thatcher's record and she has esta Zambia and Tanzania: Relations be the Ministry of Defence which foots blished a suprising rapport with Presi tween London and both Lusaka and Dar the bill. dent Mugabe over the years. es Salaam have been somewhat mercu - Finally, military personnel from all Mozambique: British relations with rial throughout this decade. The rela
) five states mentioned already, but Mozambique have steadily improved as tionship between Britain and Zambia in 0
1 also from Malawi, Tanzania and Maputo switches from socialist to free particular was unhinged by the public 0
2 Zambia, regularly attend officer cadet market policies and lessens its depen dressing-down Sir Geoffrey Howe re
d and staff training courses in the dence on the Eastern bloc. Apart from ceived at the hands of President Kaunda e t United Kingdom. the reasons already explained, especi in 1986. As a consequence, Zambia was a
d Meanwhile it is significant that Bot ally the country's position as the geo unambiguously excluded from Mrs (
swanar has recently (early 1988) acquired graphical focus for the SADCC's trans Thatcher's Southern Africa safari e
nineh warplanes from Britain. The jet port aspirations, British interest and earlier this year. However Kaunda's s i
fightersl - each capable of carrying assistance is linked to Mozambique's apparently new-found conciliatory ap b
scoresu of rockets and eight bombs - are help in bringing Zimbabwe to indepen proach to Pretoria suggests that British P
the Botswana Defence Force's (BDFs) dence. Today London is the foremost Zambian relations may become e
firsth combat aircraft, apparently ac Western supporter of Frelimo's war warmer. t
quiredy to strengthen Botswana's de against Renamo, a state of affairs South African extra-parliamentary b fences against South African cross greatly appreciated by President groups: Finally, London's evolving re d
bordere raids. At the same time, rumours Chissano's government. It is quite pos lationship with South Africa's extra t
persistn that Zimbabwe may be on the sible that Mozambique - which already parliamentary groupings, especially the a
verger of acquiring either Harrier jump regards itself as the cousin of the Com African National Congress and the g
jete fighters from Britain or a sophisti monwealth - could become a member United Democratic Front, calls for more c
catedn MiG and ground-based air de of that organization in time. than passing attention. At the Van e
fencec system from Soviet Russia or com Angola and Namibia: The December couver Commonwealth Heads of i l munist China. The acquisition of such 22 New York peace accords, and subse Government Meeting (CHOGM) two r high-performancee equipment would quent developments in southwestern years ago in 1987, Mrs Thatcher labelled d
furthern tilt the regional military balance Africa, are naturally viewed very the ANC as a "terrorist organization". u favourably in the United Kingdom. Mrs But this nomenclature does not reflect
againsty the RSA.
a To summarize the above: these levels Thatcher's regional strategy is cautious the British government's current posi w
ofe military, technical and economic aid ly optimistic that the implementation of tion. In fact, London has for long main t
area seen by London - and by the Front Resolution 435 will have a domino effect tained contacts with a broad spectrum of G
linet States - as a more practical and in Angola and Mozambique, and that South African political opinion; and the e this, in turn, will create a favourable Foreign Office has a stated policy of realisticn option than sanctions for help i
ingb South Africa's neighbours, seven of regional climate as a backdrop for nego "hearing all sides of the story". How a
whichS are Commonwealth members. tiations between the South African ever, the growing increase in the stature
Similary scales of assistance can be government and its domestic opponents. and prestige of Pretoria's opponents b
d e c u d
Africao Insight, vol 19, no3, 1989 135 r p e R I Internationalrelations------
within the Republic - as exemplified in worth taking. Unless substantial moves For, as Herman Cohen, the new Assis the stream of delegations to ANC head are initiated towards fundamental tant Secretary of State for African quarters in Lusaka; President Botha's change within the next 12-15 months, Affairs, recently stated: "We welcome historic and highly symbolic Tuynhuys London's ability to fight off the clamour British leadership in this problem". meeting with Mr Mandela; and, more for comprehensive sanctions will rapidly Meanwhile British policy-makers are recently, the reception accorded to diminish. fully aware of the limits of their leverage UDF leaders by heads of government in Although there is little public clarity on Pretoria. While pushing for con Europe and the United States - has en among Western administrations as to cessions that will pave the way for talks, hanced the legitimacy of the extra what, precisely, Mr de Klerk is expected London is not so feather-brained as to parliamentary opposition. In tum, these to do, most analysts agree that the in believe that the South African autho events have had international repercus coming government in Pretoria would rities are on the verge of handing over sions, not least in the United Kingdom. have to introduce at least some of the office to a majority government. This is Indeed, as the prospects for a negotia following measures, and within months why some observers believe "that ted settlement on South Africa's future rather than years: Whitehall could be envisaging a negotia loom ever larger on the domestic and - the end of detentions without trial; ted 'solution' which falls short of one international agenda, the ANC and - restoration of the right of peaceful person-one-vote in a unitary non-racial other extra-parliamentary parties are protest; democracY".21 Indeed it is currently likely to find themselves being courted - concrete moves to begin negotiations being alleged that Mrs Thatcher accepts by the West (but also by Moscow) in a with extra-parliamentary organiza Pretoria's concept of "group protec manner and with a frequency unthink tions and acknowledged black leaders tion" - and, for the moment at least, able only two years ago. on a new constitution for representa there is no evidence to suggest that Mr The question remains, however, - tive government; de Klerk has jettisoned groups (includ and it is, par excellence, the critical issue - lifting the state of emergency; ing the emergence of a "non-racial" in the minds of British policy-makers - the unconditional release of Mr Man- group) as the cornerstone and non with regard to South Africa - will the dela to participate in the political negotiable bottom-line for South Nationalist administration, expected to process. Africa's political future,z2 take office after next month's election, Of course Whitehall does not expect After next month's election, the West be able to fulfil the international hopes unilateral or one-sided action from the will allow the new administration time to that have been raised by Frederick de South African government. If Mrs settle into its new job and take stock.
Klerk's) promises of "drastic reforms"? Thatcher is able to deploy her persua But Western leaders will want to see 0
It is1 to this large question mark, and to sive powers on Pretoria, then London concrete action rather than hear ambi 0 2
some of the consequences for Britain believes that the Soviets are now willing guous words and they want to see that andd South Africa if these heady expec to put pressure on the ANC. This would e action sooner rather than later. Earlier I t
tationsa are not fulfilled, that the last part involve the ANC suspending, but not at referred to a time-frame of some 12-15 d of ( my paper will be addressed. first renouncing, its stated commitment months in which action is expected. That
r
e to "armed struggle". It is now generally make-or-break time-scale is not offered h
s accepted that Mrs Thatcher - who is arbitrarily. It is simply London's calibra i l perhaps the one major international ted assessment of how long Mrs Conclusionsb u politician of stature respected by Pre Thatcher will be able to withstand being P toria - does have some influence with Foure weeks from today, the result of the labelled the appeaser of apartheid. h
tricameralt parliamentary elections will the South African authorities. If she is At the Commonwealth Heads of
be y known. That the Nationalists will successful in pushing Pretoria into mak Government Meeting in Kuala Lumpur b emerge as the largest party in the White ing concessions, Moscow would be this coming October, Mrs Thatcher will d e
Houset of Assembly is not in my view in better placed to press the ANC towards point to Pretoria's meticulous adhe doubt.n But the decreased size of its a negotiated settlement. Today the rence to the Namibian agreement as a a r
overallg majority - especially if seats are Soviet Union - which has been the tangible fruit of dialogue as an alterna
loste mainly to the CP - could act as a ANC's foremost patron and arms sup tive to sanctions. Also, a desire by the c leg-ironn on F W de Klerk's room for plier - does not regard the armed international community not to take ac e c manoeuvre.i Nevertheless it is the Presi struggle as a central plank of the strategy tions which could derail the Namibian l
dent-in-waitingr himself - admittedly to undermine the political system. In Independence process has provided e underd great pressure from London and fact, armed struggle is now viewed by Pretoria with a breathing-space. n
Washingtonu - who has raised the Moscow as historically obsolete. After that, however, the time-frame
spectrey of a quantum leap forward by his This means that the foreign policy of begins to shorten. By the middle of 1990 a
promisew of "drastic and speedy Britain and its Western allies on the one - and possibly even sooner - the anti e changes".t But promissory notes are no side and the Soviets on the other have to apartheid movements and the sanc longera sufficient to satisfy an inter some extent converged. The major tioneers will be crying for action against G
nationalt community accustomed to powers now have a common interest and South Africa. Initially, their focus will e
"Pretoriaspeak".n If Mrs Thatcher is not commitment in pushing their respective
i be on South Africa's Achilles' heel, its to b stand isolated as the world closes clients into negotiations. And for the foreign debt, a large part of which (some a S ranks against her on sanctions, Mr de moment at least, Washington is content $12 billion) Pretoria hopes to reschedule y
Klerkb wi~l have to prove that he is a risk to let London make most of the running. in a year's time. But, if the West's
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136o Africa Insight, vol 19, no3, 1989 r p e R I ------Internalionalrelalions
expectations are disappointed and dashed, rearguard battles. In any case, in two Simonstown Agreement is regarded as im Margaret Thatcher will no longer be years time, Margaret Thatcher may portant ... we must obviously continue to able, or willing, to shield South Africa. have vacated 10 Downing Street to be prepared to provide arms . . . for the The European election result in June make way for a Labour administration self-defence of the country." Quoted in Dennis Austin, Britain and South Africa, which saw a marked swing to the left under Mr Neil Kinnock. London: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp has put Mrs Thatcher on the defensive 131-132. abroad. Meanwhile at home, Conserva 11 For further discussion on South Africa's tive by-election setbacks, and opinion nuclear status, see Richard Betts, "A diplo polls that have put the Labour Party up matic bomb for South Africa?", Inter to 14 points ahead of the Tories, have References national Security, vol 4, no 2, Fall 1979, p 91. 12 This dimension of South Africa's relations placed Mrs Thatcher in an exposed posi Roger Martin, Southern Africa: The price of with the West, and Western dependency on tion. That vulnerability also extends to apartheid, London: Economist Intelligence the RSA for strategic minerals, is made the moderate government of West Ger Unit, 1988, p 1. much of by Pretoria - and with consider many's Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, who 2 Ibid. able impact. For further details, see Dennis faces the prospect of defeat, from an 3 Simon Baynham, "Political violence and Austin, South Africa 1984, London: The SDP-Green alliance in early 1990. Thus, the security response", in Jesmond Royal Institute of International Affairs and unless Mr de Klerk can satisfy the ex Blumenfeld (ed), South Africa in crisis, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985, pp 64-{j5. London: Croom Helm and The Royal Insti 13 Figures supplied by Mr Martin Bangemann, pectations which he himself has raised tute of International Affairs, 1987, p 109. European Community internal market "American pressure on Europe and 4 Roger Martin, op cit, p 99. commissioner. Reported in The Pretoria European pressure on Mrs Thatcher to 5 Ibid. News, 6 July 1989. show a united front on South Africa will 6 James Barber, The uneasy relationship: 14 Jesmond Blumenfeld, "Economic relations mount - and will meet with decreasing Britain and South Africa, London: Heine ... ", op cit, P 36. resistance. For while she will remain op mann, 1983, p 30. 15 Ibid. 7 South Africa, observations by the govern 16 South Africa, observations by the govern- posed to sanctions in principle, her op ment: Sixth report from the Foreign Affairs ment, op cit, p 5. position will no longer be as loud or as Committee, London: HMSO, 1986, P 3. 17 The Spectator, 27 September 1986. resolute. Simply put, in terms of her own 8 Jesmond Blumenfeld, "Economic relations 18 Hansard, 3 February 1988, col 640. political interests, South Africa will no and political leverage", in J Barber, J 19 Speech given to the Southern African longer be worth the candle".23 Blumenfeld and C Hill (eds), The West and Association, London, 1 March 1988, South Africa, London: The Royal. Institute London Press Service, Central Office of In short, if F W de Klerk has sold him of International Affairs and Routledge & Information, London, 1 March 1988. self) too high - and if Mrs Thatcher's 0 Kegan Paul, 1982, p 44. 20 Simon Baynham, "Military assistance to the increasingly1 urgent entreaties for reform· 9 Figures reproduced in Business Day, 14 Southern African Development Co-ordina 0
2 April 1989. tion Conference (SADCC)", revised and fall on deaf ears - Pretoria's credit with
d 10 Prior to 1975, the Simonstown Agreement published as "SADCC security issues",
Londone will run out. If that happens, t had also been criticized because successive Africa Insight, vol 19, no 2,1989.
Mrsa Thatcher will be rendered defence
d Conservative governments had viewed 21 The Weekly Mail, 21 July 1989.
less( against her domestic and overseas British arms sales to South Africa as an 22 James Selfe, "De Klerk: Reformer or r
critics.e Then there will be no Canute to essential corollary of the Agreement. Thus, enigma", Front File, vol 3, no 7, June 1989, h
stems the rising tide of sanctions, no Mr Butler, as Foreign Secretary, told the p 2. i Britishl Boadicea to fight Pretoria's House of Commons in June 1964 that "if the 23 The Sunday Times, 18 June 1989. b u P
e h t
y b
d e t n a r g
e c n e c i l
r e d n u
y a w e t a G
t e n i b a S
y b
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Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3,1989 o 137 r p e I R Pofiilcs------
Waiting for a negotiated settlement: South Africans in a changing world
Mark Swilling, of the Centre for Policy Studies, University of the Witwatersrand, and Frederick van Zyl Slab bert, of the Graduate School of Business Administra tion, University of the Witwatersrand, provide an analysis of the changing inter national context within which the participants in the South African political arena will have to search for a negotiated settlement.
The election of President Bush, the the South African state has, since 1909, black leaders, certain sectors of busi
settlement) of the Namibian conflict, the been regarded internationally as legal ness, and the liberal opposition. 0
withdrawal1 of the Cubans from Angola and sovereign. Yet this does not mean 0
and2 the "New Thinking" in the Soviet that external parties no longer have a
Uniond are some of the developments role to play in facilitating a negotiated e alreadyt leading to a substantial foreign settlement to the South African conflict. a The National Party: On the policyd rethink about relations between We believe that for South Africa the (
edge of the constitutional
Southr Africa and the world. Signifi most constructive international policy e precipice cantly,h this rethink coincides with ten would be an international convergence s i sionsl and pressures within the South based on an acceptance of the following The introduction of the 1983 Constitu b
Africanu ruling elite that could result in "negotiation principles": tion marked a decisive turning point for P the long run in a process of dismantling * South Africans must take the lead in the National Party (NP). Prior to this, e
theh white political power structure. resolving their own problems within the NP had subscribed to the Verwoer t
y It is our contention that the realign internationally acceptable para dian doctrine that defined the state b ment of international forces will directly meters; purely in terms of the hegemony of the d affecte the way current tensions within * These parameters must be premised white nation. But the 1983 Constitution t then white political system play them on the "release, unban, dismantle, redefined the relationship between the a selvesr out. The convergence of inter negotiate" framework - release poli white minority and the state: the new g
nationale approaches to the South tical prisoners, unban banned or "nation" thus created comprised a com c
Africann question will contribute signifi ganizations, dismantle repressive munity of cultural groups bound e cantlyc to the creation of a positive en apartheid laws, and negotiations be together by a "consociational contract" i l vironment for the negotiated resolution tween all parties. that defined the state as the arbiter of r ofe the South African conflict. If, how The major superpowers will need to "group rights" in a "power-sharing" d ever,n this results in an approach based converge on a foreign policy approach framework. Notwithstanding talk at the u on a "negotiation formula" imposed on that derives from the internal dynamics time of a fourth chamber, the African y thea South African parties, then the re of the South African situation. Here lies majority were excluded on the grounds w sulte will be counter-productive. The the significance of the "release, unban, that they had their "own states". t transitiona formulae for the Rhodesia dismantle, negotiate" framework, for In 1986 the NP convened a Federal G Zimbabwe and South West Africa Congress to pass a motion that in es t this has emerged as a basic cornerstone Namibiae settlements were externally de of policy for a range of organizations sence committed the government to a n i
signedb because the domestic states in stretching from banned organizations on constitutional policy premised on the a
theseS countries enjoyed an ambiguous the left, through to the legal extra view that the 1983 Constitution had
internationaly legal status. In contrast, parliamentary movement, moderate been a failure because it excluded the b
d e c u
d Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 138o r p e R I ------PoHffcs
African majority. From this point on, approach to the South African conflict, These moves away from the "renun the NP committed itself to extending the plus Margaret Thatcher's interventio ciation of violence" principle reflect "consociational contract". And to nist diplomacy, have all contributed to a shifts in the Afrikaner establishment achieve this objective, it committed mounting sense of urgency in govern that would have been unthinkable even itself to negotiating the naturE of this ment circles. a year ago. It is in this sense that the new constitutional dispensation. The starting point must be the South significance of the Law Commission's Since 1986, the NP has been unable to African government's accepting that re findings should be understood. The implement this policy. Uncovering the form will not work. Professor Willie National Party MP in Bermuda openly reason for this failure will reveal the Esterhuyse, an Afrikaner academic who suggested that the findings of this Com dilemmQ at the heart of NP policy. is still linked to those wielding power in mission could be a useful starting point During the period 1986--89, state the executive, came to the following for deliberations on a new constitutional strategy was based on a political contra conclusion in Bermuda: "It is a personal dispensation. These findings may well diction. On one hand the NP govern conviction that reform, as understood go down in history as marking the start ment committed itself to the objective of by the authorities, will not save the day of a qualitative break in the collective a new constitution which would include for South Africa .... On South mind-set of the Afrikaner intellectual all groups and be created via negotia Africa's present political agenda is not establishment. It is the first intellectually tion. On the other hand the security the abolition of racially discriminatory rigorous proposal emanating from quar establishment responded to black resis measures per se, but the abolition of ters very close to the government and tance by declaring a State of Emergency white domination and the initiation of a with significant support in NP ranks that and activating a set of policies that bargaining process to that end." contains elements of a constitutional defined most of the representatives of The first hurdle the government must framework not fundamentally different the black majority as enemies of the get over concerns the question of vio from those contained in the ANC's Con state. In other words, the state commit lence. Since the scuttling of the EPG stitutional Guidelines. ted itself to security-designed means Mission in May 1986, the government These shifts and signs of movement that contradicted government-inspired has insisted on the principle that the within the white political system must ends. ANC must "renounce violence". Dur not be misinterpreted. They do not re Although the security establishment ing the first three months of 1989 three flect a fundamental re-orientation of the argued that repression was designed to significant signs pointed to a movement political framework of the NP. Nor do facilitate negotiations, this was not, in away from this principle. In January the they imply that the State Security Coun
reality,) what happened, the inner con Transvaal branch of the NP held a week cil (SSC) and the cabinet officially agree 0
tradiction1 inflamed the festering crises end "dinkskrum" chaired by Gerrit with these viewpoints. They do, how 0
which2 lay at the root of the South Viljoen and F W de Klerk. On the fol ever, reflect how key think-tanks and
Africand conflict. As repression inten lowing Monday the newspaper Beeld opinion-makers in the white establish e sifiedt in order to "eliminate the revo ran an editorial which said: "Are talks ment are beginning to bend their minds a
lutionaries",d the more radical and between the government and an African around a contradiction that lies at the (
moderater black leaders refused to enter National Congress delegation under the heart of the white political system. This e
intoh national constitutional negotia leadership of free Nelson Mandela contradiction consists of the following: s i tions;l and as the chances of constitu really so unthinkable? ... We should the NP has, in the face of massive black b
tionalu negotiations became more re begin to think of giving the ANC a resistance to white minority rule, conce P
mote, so did repression again intensify. chance to show whether they are serious ded the principle of "one state". But it e
h The government is under enormous when they say they want a political has yet to concede the principle of "one t
internationaly and internal pressure from solution. " nation" in all its manifestations, includ b all quarters to agree to a negotiation In early March, Johan Heyns, Mode ing a renunciation of the "general d
processe that includes the African Natio rator of the NG Kerk, reiterated the affairs"/"own affairs" distinction. The t
naln Congress (ANC). As far as the position he articulated in a 1988 article most that can be said is that the NP has a
Sovietsr are concerned, the bogey of a which suggested that "a rejection of vio now adopted the notion of a multi-group g
"totale onslaught" engineered by a dia lence should be the result of negotia nation in a single state. c
bolicaln coterie of agitators in Moscow tions, not a pre-condition for negotia The Conservative Party is correct e
hasc virtually disappeared from South tions". The significance of this state when it argues that if it is accepted that i l African government rhetoric. The ment is that it came after a meeting South Africa comprises a multiplicity of r Deputye Minister of the Soviet Foreign between Heyns and the NP caucus. "nations", then it follows that each d
Ministry,n Anatoly Adamishin, recently At the Bermuda Conference, a "nation" must constitute its "own" u visited Cape Town, and he has dis National Party MP told a plenary session state. The NP recently floated the y
cussed,a at length, the prospects of nego that "there are ways around the question notion of "concurrent majorities" as a w
tiationse with Pik Botha in various parts of renunciation of violence". He later con possible constitutional method for orga t
ofa the world over the past twelve firmed that the caucus no longer sees this nizing a marriage between a single state G months. Pik Botha himself said during a as a non-negotiable precondition for talks. and a multiplicity of constitutionally en t BBCe interview in March that he believes Significantly, the NP "Action Plan" re trenched "groups". The internal incon n i
theb Soviets are now "part of the vealed at the Federal Congress in June this sistency on which this view rests is that a
solution".S year does not contain the "renunciation of the NP believes such a marriage can be
y The prospects of a joint superpower violence" pre-condition. achieved through apartheid structures b
d e c u
Africad Insight, vol 19, no3,1989 o 139 r p e I R Pofiffcs------
systematically designed to create sepa contributor to the debate that it should formulation here: the ANC is saying rate "nation states". be accepted that the position might be that it and its supporters are not just It must be noted that the NP, at least described as "a stalemate". The writer's "willing" but also "ready" for nego judging by its rhetoric, is committed to sophisticated analysis echoed the words tiations. "negotiating" with black leadership the of the late Moses Mabhida, sometime In previous statements on the subject, final constitutional form this "multi general secretary of the SACP. Mabhida ANC leaders have argued that nego group" state will take. This does not was quoted in the African Communist in tiations should be entered into only if mean, however, that it has in mind the 1985 as saying that "the revolution they are aimed at "transferring power to full spectrum of black leadership, parti cannot topple Pretoria, but Pretoria the people" or to the "representatives of cularly those leaders located in extra cannot eliminate the revolution." the majority". This has been interpreted constitutional politics. Nor is there any The Sechaba article argued that the by detractors as a pre-condition imply evidence, as we write, that the NP in concept of a "negotiated settlement" ing the wholesale capitulation of the NP tends abandoning the notion that has been introduced as "a new element" government and the transfer of power to "group rights" are an innate sociological by the ANC and that "in any closed the ANC. In the October 1987 state reality which must, by its very nature, be system, once a new element is intro ment, the ANC argued that negotiations the basis for a .new constitutional dis duced, we must assume a changed rela should be "aimed at the transformation pensation. tionship within the elements of this of our country into a united and non Interviewed by one of the authors in system." One consequence of this, the racial democracy". August 1987, Minister Heunis said: author argues, may be the need to To give content to what it has in mind "You only negotiate when you have no "review the strategy of people's war". when it talks about a "united and non options left, and there are still people in There are, however, positions within racial democracy", in 1988 the ANC my government who think we have op the ANC opposed to this view. In the issued its Constitutional Guidelines tions." It is for this reason that the NP April 1989 edition of Sechaba, a contri which commit the ANC to, among other still has a long way to go before it accepts butor rejects the viewpoint set out above things, a unitary state, one person one in full the "release, unban, dismantle, and forcefully argues that: vote, a Bill of Rights, a multi-party negotiate" framework. The most we can ... the mass democratic movement has system, mixed economy, land reform, expect for the moment is the release of not been crushed, and we have no extensive rights for workers and women, Mandela, the unbanning of the organi reason to surrender or settle for partial and the protection of the family and zations banned in terms of the State of victories. Our people are striving to act other private formations in civil society. in unity through organisation and to Emergency) in 1988, the dismantling of On the question of violence, the 0 organise through united action, for certain1 aspects of apartheid (such as Statement rejects out of hand the de
0 people's power, and not for partial victo
Group2 Areas) and negotiations with mand that it "unilaterally" renounce or ries. Our people's army, Umkhonto We "moderate"d leaders. suspend violence. Instead, with a clear e Sizwe, is growing in quality, and our t
a Although these steps fall short of the military operations reflect this fact. Our reference to the need for "pre-negotia d
pre-conditions( for a genuine negotiated army is transforming its military opera tions" on conditions for negotiations, settlement,r they may trigger far-reach tions into a generalised people's war for the ANC suggests that "[a]ny cessation e
h an armed seizure of power.
ings unintended consequences which the of hostilities would have to be negotia i governmentl may well be unable to con In reality, the ANC's formal position ted and entail agreed action by both b trol.u And it is here that the international is an amalgam of these two positions. On sides as part of the process of the crea P factor becomes important. It is our view 9 October 1987 the ANC published a tion of a democratic South Africa." e thath the international community with document entitled "Statement of the The ANC has been accused of insist t
influencey on South Africa should ensure National Executive of the African ing that it be regarded as the "sole repre b that only one internationally acceptable National Congress on the question of sentative" of the black majority and that d e
optiont is encouraged, a negotiated set negotiations". This document expresses a negotiated settlement would involve tlementn that includes all parties -- with a position enjoying wide support across itself and the government and no-one a ther NP and African National Congress the black political spectrum and which is else. The Statement refutes this by first g
(ANC)e as the two principal protago not substantially different from the posi defining the conflict in terms of a c nists.n Any steps designed to thwart, stall tions articulated by Inkatha, UMSA and struggle between the "forces of national e c
ori distort this process should be roundly various bantustan leaders, for example, liberation and democracy on the one l
denounced.r Enos Mabuza. This position was reitera hand and those of racism and reaction e
d ted at both the Leverkusen and Ber on the other." It then proposes that a
n muda conferences by Thabo Mbeki, the plurality of parties be present at the u
y current director of the ANC's Inter negotiations: "[a]ny negotiations would a national Department. have to be conducted by these two forces Africanw National Congress: e
t The October 1987 Statement insists at as represented by their various orga Towardsa negotiations? the outset that "the ANC has never been nisational formations. " G
Thet journals and publications of the opposed to a negotiated settlement". It The Statement then sets out specific e
ANCn have reflected a wide-ranging de goes on to argue that the "ANC and the steps the government would have to i bateb on the nature of the current balance masses of our people as a whole are take in order to "demonstrate its a
S ready and willing to enter into genuine seriousness" and "create a climate con of conflicting forces. In the August 1988 editiony of Sechaba it was argued by one negotiations". It is important to note the ducive for such negotiations". These b
d e c u d
140o Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 r p e R I ------Pofiljcs
steps are: leading all the major world powers to • there is moderate support in (1) all political prisoners and detainees wards a convergence of policy positions Washington for a joint US-Soviet must be released and all treason vis-a-vis South Africa. The basic indica position on South Africa. trials halted; tors are the following: During the early 1980s, the Reagan (2) the State of Emergency must be lif • withdrawal of South African troops Administration adopted Chester ted, police and troops withdrawn from Angola and moves towards Crocker's "Constructive Engagement" from the townships and confined to national reconciliation 10 that policy. This was based on the assump barracks; country; tion that change in South Africa could (3) all "repressive legislation" must be • independence for Namibia; proceed in a gradual unilinear direction, repealed, i.e. laws that limit free • the new Soviet foreign policy managed by enlightened reformers in dom of assembly, speech, associa approach; control of the state. Using various pres tion and the press must be scrapped. • a new US administration with prag sures and incentives, the Administration It is significant to note that the state matists, not ideologues, at the helm; believed that the South African govern ment does not call specifically for the • an assertive British thrust centred ment would agree to gradually dis unbanning of banned organizations. around Margaret Thatcher; mantle apartheid from above -- leading Presumably this is because this is sub • Soviet-US co-operation towards ultimately to some sort of multi-racial sumed in point 3 above; the repeal of the Southern Africa; plural democracy. A negotiated settle Internal Security Act would ipso facto • a new role for the Frontline States ment was not specifically excluded from lift the ban on organizations such as the and the OAU; this conception; but it was by no means ANC and PAC. • a possible Japanese entry into the the centrepiece of the envisaged process The ANC's response to changing international political debate about of change. international conditions has been to South Africa; The "Constructive Engagement" welcome suggestions of a joint US • a possible social democratic election policy broke down primarily because it Soviet approach. However, arising from victory in Germany in 1990. failed to realize that a series of quantita the Leverkusen Conference, and con tive shifts away from apartheid could not firmed at Bermuda, the ANC has moun The United States of America have resulted in a qualitatively perma ted a strategy designed to prevent its The US Administration's policy on nent resolution of the problem. The being a mere pawn with no control over South Africa is in the process of being reasons for this are simply that the shifts the evolution of this approach. This drawn up. Congress will only settle upon in question were implemented on terms
strategy) has as its goal the passing of a its own policy once the Administration dictated by the white minority. Without 0
UN1 Security Council Resolution that has revealed its cards. The chances of a a fundamental qualitative break from
will0 become for South Africa what 435 significant shift from the Reagan the old political order by negotiated 2
wasd to Namibia, an international Administration's approach are general settlement with the representatives of e
benchmark.t ly regarded as high. There are a number the black majority located outside the a
d The ANC has also committed itself to of pointers: system, real change could not have been (
ar diplomatic strategy aimed at reaching • the new Secretary of State, James achieved. e
outh to the white community. The ANC's Baker, has emphasized the necessity It was in response to this contradiction s i
assessmentl of the white community for a "bilateral" approach between that US policy changed direction: Con changedb after the Dakar meeting. u the Administration and Congress to gress overrode a Presidential veto and P
Realizing that negotiations would be im South Africa; passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apart e
possibleh until a critical mass of white • the replacement of Chester Crocker heid Act that called for sanctions; and t supporters of transformation has been
y with Herman Cohen as Assistant the 1987 report of the Secretary of b
created, the ANC initiated dozens of Secretary for Africa -- Cohen is re State's Advisory Committee on South d
meetingse with white groups. This has garded as a pragmatist and rejects the Africa rejected reform from above in t
contributedn significantly to the creation old Cold War approach to Southern favour of the complete abolition of a
ofr a "negotiation climate", since these Africa; apartheid. This could only be achieved, g meetings help to de-demonize the ANC e • James Baker has phased out many the committee concluded, through inc the white community. More impor State Department personnel and re genuine negotiations with legitimate n e
tantly,c however, this strategy effectively placed them with a group that inclu black leaders -- and with the ANC in i l
means that the ANC has begun to nego des significant liberal Democrats and particular because this organization en r
tiatee the future with significant sectors of others who have been involved in the joyed "widespread and undeniable d
then white community without the NP building of US-Soviet relations in popular support". Any attempts to ex u government. recent years; clude it "will be perceived as efforts to y
a • the Democratic Party has signifi avoid fundamental change", the report w
e cantly increased its majority in both argued. t
a the House and the Senate; In certain black political circles this G
• the current Administration has in shift in US policy has been interpreted Convergingt international e herited the legitimacy generated by as a cynical attempt by the USA to n trendsi the previous Administration's role in avoid the further radicalization of an b
Wea will show in this section that there ensuring the success of peace settle already radical mass-resistance move S
arey emerging international tendencies ments in Namibia and Angola; ment. In this view, US policy-makers b
d e c u
Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 141 o r p e I R PoHffcs------
have calculated that a negotiated settle by American delegates to the Bermuda sanctions; she is regarded as an ally by ment with built-in compromises is Conference. the National Party; and she has become clearly preferable to a prolonged armed On relations with Pretoria, there is increasingly interventionist over the last struggle followed by an "armed seizure evidence of significant support in ten months. Out of step with the of power" that installs a radical Washington as a whole for the ANC's Commonwealth, the USA and the revolutionary movement. proposal at Bermuda that the Admini Soviet Union, she is determined to hold The Administration will put together stration adopt a policy of "equidistance" on to the diplomatic initiative in its South Africa policy with four assump from all the major players. This would Southern Africa. This is reflected in the tions in mind: entail the Administration's acting, in views of her advisors and was a strong (1) Sanctions are there to stay. The de Thabo Mbeki's words, as an "honest theme at meetings between Thatcher bate is no longer whether sanctions broker" by, for example, meeting all the and the Frontline States and at the last should be imposed or not, but players at top level on a regular basis in Wilton Park Conference. whether they should be made more order to pressurize and cajole them into Before going further, it is essential to severe or left at their present level. accepting the need for a negotiated point out that, in comparison to the (2) There are pressures in Congress, in settlement. USA, the British Executive has exten the UN and from the Soviet Union As an alternative to outright align sive control of foreign policy positions. calling for a joint US-Soviet ap ment with either side, this "equidis The British parliament does not have proach -- an idea to which Herman tance" proposal has the greatest chance nearly as much influence over foreign Cohen is not averse (when he is talk of success. It was, in effect, the un policy as does the US Congress. Even ing to liberals or radicals). spoken policy approach adopted by the the influence of the Foreign Office has (3) An all-party negotiated settlement Administration during the settlement declined from the high level it enjoyed which includes the ANC is the negotiations on southwestern Africa. It during the Lancaster House negotiation primary objective. is also perfectly consistent with the processes which resulted in indepen (4) UN Security Council Resolution requirements of a joint US-Soviet dence for Zimbabwe. London's policy 435 must run its course in Namibia strategy. on South Africa today is shaped by non before action on South Africa can It is unclear, however, how the policy government think-tanks and indivi be taken (a view shared by the key of "equidistance" can be coupled to a duals. Three people are now the crucial movers in the House and Senate). sanctions policy, since support for the decision-makers: Charles Powell, Secretary Baker's commitment to a latter automatically defines it as hostile Thatcher's foreign policy advisor;
"bilateral") approach with Congress is a to the South African government. The Ambassador Renwick; and Margaret 0
reflection1 of the relative political weak unintended way out may well lie in Con Thatcher. (Patrick Fairweather, the 0
ness2 of the Bush Administration com gress tightening the screws, while the Middle-East and African desk officer in
paredd to the strength Reagan enjoyed Administration gives the appearance of the Foreign Office is not insignificant, e aftert his first landslide election victory. being reluctantly pressurized into a but is very much the junior partner.) a
Mored importantly, Congress has a per policy it opposes -- a very effective way Thatcher is faced with a range of (
spectiver on South Africa shaped by of increasing the pain level without los pressures: e
grassrootsh views of the American people ing credibility in Pretoria. • The Commonwealth Conference this s i
andl in particular the mobilized black In the final analysis, South Africa is a October will be the forum where b
lobby.u The Bush Administration simply low priority for the Bush Administra Commonwealth countries will bring P
cannot ignore this, especially in view of tion. What is more, the stakes get lower to bear unprecedented pressures on e
theh incumbent's need for more black as American interests in the region de Britain to accept sanctions. The t
andy liberal votes if he wants to be a cline -- a tendency strengthened by Commonwealth secretariat has com b second-term President. sanctions. A counter-tendency may re pleted the most thorough sanctions d
Theree are no clear indications what sult from the fact that South Africa's study to date and its conclusions sup t
then final outcome of the Administra priority rating may increase a few port the pro-sanctions lobby. a
tion'sr policy review will be. There are notches if it is seen as a useful issue • If a joint US-Soviet position mate g
twoe issues at stake: sanctions, and the around which to strengthen US-Soviet rializes, based on a policy with which c
Administration'sn relationship with Pre relations and/or mobilize the sympathies Britain disagrees, this might leave e toria.c On sanctions, we agree with the of liberal and black voters. It follows, Britain, internationally, in a difficult i l conclusion reached by Stephen Davis of therefore, that the USA has an interest position. r thee Investor Responsibility Research in a low-cost approach that has high • The German general election in 1990 d
Centern in a talk he gave to the Centre for moral appeal within the USA and is not may result in a Social Democratic vic u Policy Studies in February: "Contrary to inconsistent with the approaches adop tory which may, in tum, bring Ger y
thea reports I have read that assert that ted by the other world powers. many round to accepting a Scan w
USe policy-makers are becoming disillu dinavian approach to South Africa. t sioneda with sanctions, I believe that the And if this were to carry France along G inauguration of George Bush marks in Britain t with it, then Britain could be out Washingtone a new acceptance of sanc Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher manoeuvred in the European Com n i
tionsb as a legitimate and necessary tool enjoys a special status in the emerging munity. a
of AmericanS foreign policy toward South international realignments. Her govern • The swing to the left in the elections
Africa."y This was confirmed repeatedly ment is conspicuously opposed to for the European Parliament in June b
d e c u
142d Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 o r p e R I ------PoHucs
1989 underscores the weakness of contradicted her refusal to talk to the her hand, Thatcher and her advisors Britain's Tories in a rapidly changing IRA, she responded by saying the two have already held discussions with the Europe. cannot be compared because Irish new Bush Administration on how the • Japan's Foreign Ministry has signal Catholics have the vote whereas black two superpowers will relate on this mat led its sensitivity to the black caucus South Africans do not.) ter. It is clear that although the two and trade union lobbies in the USA. Thatcher's acceptance of the cen governments disagree on sanctions, they These could use Japan's ties with trality of a negotiated settlement means agree on the necessity for a negotiated South Africa to support their anti that British policy is not simply the settlement. The question, now, is how Japanese protectionist policy. (The "Crocker Doctrine" revived. It may be their different strategies will converge Japanese trade representatives in "Constructive Engagement", but it does and complement one another. If the South Africa do not share these sen not rest on the premise that apartheid USA introduces harsher sanctions and sitivities. ) can be dismantled incrementally, from the British oppose sanctions to increase • If the OAU succeeds in tabling a above, by the state. There have been their leverage on Pretoria, then it is "435-type" resolution on South suggestions that this means the British arguable that the best combination of Africa at the UN, this could also out have a "Lancaster House" model in pressures will result: the USA carries manoeuvre Britain, especially if such mind. In our view this interpretation is the stick and the British dangle the a resolution were backed by the excluded by South Africa's position - carrot. There is, however, no guarantee Commonwealth, OAU, Japan and the model could only work when all the that this will move the South African significant European Community parties to the Zimbabwean settlement government. If it fails, then Thatcher countries. recognized, or were forced to recognize, may well need to re-evaluate her Thatcher's trump card is the enor Britain as the "colonial power". This, in strategy. The month between the South mous leverage she has in Pretoria be turn, made it possible for Britain to de African general election in September cause of her anti-sanctions stand. The sign a "negotiation formula" which all and the Commonwealth Conference in Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign the parties were persuaded in various October will be when the most impor and Commonwealth office admitted to ways to accept. tant signals will emerge, including the one of the authors recently that the ex Britain's policy in South Africa, then, possible release of Mandela. tent of this leverage increases as the will amount to a general insistence that Much here will depend on how the international sanctions campaign all parties must negotiate a settlement. Soviet Union intends working with the gathers momentum. Without inter In particular, Thatcher intends using her other influential powers. The USA and )
national0 sanctions, British leverage on prestige to influence the new NP leader the Soviets have already co-operated Pretoria1 would be weakened. and urge him into accepting this. During successfully at the highest level to secure 0 2
Thatcher's weakest suit is the charac her African visit, Thatcher insisted that the Angola-Namibian settlements. The d
tere of her contact with and respect for the political stabilization of the region British are only in the early stages of t
thea black opposition. Her remarks in was conducive to a negotiated settle building an understanding on Southern d (
Canada that the ANC is a terrorist orga ment in South Africa. She argued for African issues with the Soviets. Accord r
nization,e British opposition to sanc two pre-conditions to prepare the way: ing to one Foreign Office source, the h
tions,s Howe's hostile reception of the the South African government must re highest level contact between the British i l
Canaanb Banana delegation in February, lease Mandela; and the ANC must sus and the Soviets on South Africa took andu Britain's serious image problems in pend, not renounce, violence (a revival place during the Wilton Park Confe P
thee eyes of the extra-parliamentary of the EPG distinction). Thatcher has rence in March, when Patrick Fair h
t weather met Yuri Yukalev, head of the movement, all contribute to the general also argued that Mandela must be re viewy in black political circles that Britain leased "into a negotiation process" and Africa desk in the Soviet Foreign Minis b
is d not tough enough on the NP govern not into a vacuum - a view which try. Some Soviet officials have indicated e
ment.t (Defenders of Thatcher's policy Ambassador Renwick strongly shares. that what is attractive about Thatcher is n
responda to this view by pointing out that Although some African leaders seem her leverage on Pretoria. r
Britaing is the only Western country to willing to accept Thatcher's minimalist There is no evidence at this point,
e
havec committed military support to programme, Mugabe remains sceptical, however, that the Soviets will move
n closer to the British, given the latter's Frelimo'se fight against South African suspecting that regional destabilization c
i by South Africa is not over yet. Chissano poor image in the eyes of black political backedl rebels in Mozambique.)
r The off-the-cuff dismissal of the ANC and the Mozambican Foreign Ministry organizations. That is why the Soviets e
ind Canada by Thatcher did not reflect are far more optimistic because they feel more comfortable with the Ameri n
Britishu policy. Britain is a signatory to operate on the assumption that cans. Nor is there any reliable evidence
they 1985 Nassau Declaration of the Thatcher's strategy will exacerbate divi that the Bush Administration intends a using Southern Africa as another test Commonwealthw which echoed the sions within the South African state be e
Shultzt report by clearly stating that no tween the "hard-liners" and "soft case of giving the Russians too much solutiona in South Africa was possible liners" . credit for resolving a high-profile politi G
withoutt a negotiated settlement that in Thatcher's ability to retain the diplo cal conflict. e
cludesn the ANC. (When an Afrikaans matic initiative depends on how quickly It is in this context that Thatcher's i
newspaperb put it to her during an inter the South African government moves attempt to win the support of the Front a S
view that she should not insist that Pre towards accepting the principle of a line States should be understood. y
toriab talk with the ANC because this negotiated settlement. To strengthen Rather than go for a superpower alliance,
d e c u d
Africao Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 143 r p e I R Pouvcs------
Thatcher may well go for a joint The new concept of foreign policy was conflict in the region as a whole. This is a approach with sub-Saharan Africa. Her presented in detail at the 27th Congress view strongly shared by the Cubans and message to these states boils down to the of the CPSU. As you know, this concept East Germans. Full attention can now proposal that they must support the proceeds from the idea that for all the be given, they believe, to resolving the British initiative and in return she will profound contradictions of the contem South African problem. They are, how porary world, for all the radical diffe deliver Pretoria. In her meetings with ever, under no illusions about the com rences among the countries that com South African cabinet members no prise it, it is inter-related, inter plexities of the South African situation. doubt her message was blunt: if they do dependent and integral. The reasons for As far as the elimination of apartheid not make clear progress towards nego this include the internationalisation of in South Africa is concerned, three op tiations, she will not be able to hold back the world's economic ties, the com tions are under discussion: (1) reform the more hostile international coalition prehensive scope of the scientific and from above; (2) the violent revolutio pressing for sanctions. At the Bermuda technological revolution, the essentially nary overthrow of the regime; or (3) a Conference, the NP said they were well novel role played by the mass media, the political compromise reached by the aware that they needed to give Thatcher state of the Earth's resources, the principal parties. Assessments of the something to use to strengthen her posi common environmental danger, and the likelihood of each of these outcomes, of crying social problems of the developing tion at the Commonwealth meeting in the post-apartheid consequences of each world which affect us all. The main October. This was the subject of the dis reason, however, is the problem of and of how the Soviet Union and the cussion held between Thatcher and Pik human survival. This problem is now non-Soviet world can influence the Botha in March. Interviewed that night with us, because the development of course of events, are the substance of on British television, Pik Botha said: nuclear weapons and the threatening current discussions among Soviet policy "The season of violence is over". His prospect for their use have called into makers and experts. views on Mandela were later described question the very existence of the human A recent influential paper by A A by Thatcher during a radio interview in race .... The most important thing is Makarov, a senior Foreign Ministry offi the following terms: "He himself wished that our concept and our firm dedication cial, provided a well-informed review of to see the release of Mr Mandela and he to peace are reflected in practical action, the enormously complex reform policies in all our internationalist moves, and in too thought it would open the way to introduced by the P W Botha admini the very style of our foreign policy and negotiations" . diplomacy, which are permeated with a stration and of the subsequent patterns British strategy essentially boils down commitment to dialogue. of rebellion and resistance that chal to threats and actions aimed at increas lenged these policies. Makarov con )
ing0 the political (and maybe later the This starting point has redical impli cludes that apartheid will not be easily 1
material)0 costs to the South African cations for the way in which the Soviet removed either by reforms from above 2 government of not moving towards Union relates to regional conflicts and or revolution from below. He states this d e
negotiations.t This anti-sanctions stand how it co-operates with other super as follows: hasa less to do with promoting economic powers. In this sense "perestroika" is of d Today the balance of forces in the ( growth in order to ease reform than it enormous importance to all South country is characterised by relative r hase to do with ensuring that Britain Africans. stability: organisationally, politically h
s and militarily the anti-racist resistance maintainsi its leverage on Pretoria. More importantly, however, the l
(Anotherb factor may be a belief that it Soviets insist that, to quote a Lever movement is not yet ready to topple the u regime and capture power, while the re
hasP a special responsibility for those kusen delegate, "[t]he root cause of the gime is no longer capable of curbing the Africane states which South Africa can changing character of Soviet actions re h growth. of resistance. t
hold economic hostage.) The release of garding South Africa does not lie in the y
Mandelab and the lifting of the State of thorough revision of the foreign policy Makarov then proceeds to examine
Emergencyd are Britain's immediate de of the Soviet Union as some peple four possible future scenarios: "re e mands.t Predictions of what happens attempt to present it, but above all in the forms", "consolidation of reaction", n
aftera that are, at this stage, premature. changing situation inside South Africa." "revolutionary overthrow of the re r g
It is in this sense that the Soviet analy gime" and "talks". In the matter of e
c sis of the prospects for change in South reforms, he accepts that the NP govern n
e Africa is important. It would be a mistake ment will go ahead with its repressive c
Thei Soviet Approach l to assume, however, that there is one reform programme. However, he con
r
Thee Soviet representatives at the Lever single Soviet analysis. Different inte cludes his assessment by saying that kusend Conference started their exposi rests within and without the state have these reforms will at most "rationalize" n u
tion of the Soviet Union's policy towards developed different analyses. The key the existing system of political power. Southy Africa (as they saw it) with an a actors are: the Foreign Ministry; the aca They will not eliminate apartheid's poli elaborationw of the Communist Party of demics located in and outside the Africa tical power structure. e thet Soviet Union's (CPSU) general re Institute; and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Makarov argues that the prospects for a
thinkG on foreign policy after Mikhai.1 Committee, which is probably closest to a violent revolutionary seizure of power
t
Gorbachev'se re-election as General the Central Committee of the CPSU. are slim because the state's coercive n
Secretary.i The Soviet representatives' There is wide agreement among power is too great, black opposition is b
papera quoted from Gorbachev's key Soviet experts that the settlements in not sufficiently cohesive and organized, S November 1987 speech on foreign southwestern Africa signal a major step incidents of mass action are too sponta y b
policy: towards a complete settlement of the neous and limited, and there is no single d e c u d o
144r Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 p e R ------Pofiucs
united leadership centre. Furthermore political solution via a negotiated settle It remains to be seen whether the the ANC's underground is too weak, ment. According to V I Tikhomirov, an Bush Administration will be prepared to Umkhonto we Sizwe is no match for the Africa Institute scholar, "[t]he only go this far. It is our opinion that this is SADF, and the ANC's programme for a alternative [to a settlement] is the fan unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, the post-apartheid South Africa has not ning of internal contradictions and their USA seems more interested in exploring been clearly spelt out. development into a large-scale war, the benefits of an Anglo-American alli In conclusion Makarov states that, which will and already does affect both ance that excludes the Soviets as direct given "the existing balance of forces, the RSA and neighbouring countries. and active partners. Secondly, there is a talks about the political set-up of a Such developments will jeopardise uni view in ANC circles that the Soviets future South Africa are regarded as the versal peace and security and, objec should stay out of a formal joint ap most probable alternative solution of tively, run counter to the interests of the proach because this will make it easier to the conflict." However, he has no illu USSR and USA." discredit the Anglo-American initiative sions about the prospects of this happen A convergence of approaches to if it goes in the wrong direction. ing in the near future. He is well aware of wards South Africa does not, however, For some months now there has been the fact that the "ruling elite is clearly imply that short of comprehensive man world-wide speculation that the Soviet reluctant to give in or even share power" datory sanctions the superpowers can do Union is abandoning the ANC and the and the "ANC and its allies do not have very much to influence the course of armed struggle. This conclusion is yet enough force to compel the regime events. The Soviets (and the Cubans) arrived at deductively and is based on a to begin meaningful talks." accept that South Africa is a sovereign serious misunderstanding. The argu The Soviets usually guard against pre state - not one the legal status of which ment rests on the assumption that the mature talks that might result in an un can be internationalized (as was ANC conceives of change in terms of an stable and short-lived compromise. Namibia's), or re-colonialized (as was "armed seizure of power", that is, the They would, then, prefer to see the Zimbabwe). The settlement, therefore, armed struggle taken to its logical con South African regime come under will have to be internally structured and clusion. It follows, on this view, that if greater international and domestic poli possibly even brokered. There is, how the Soviet Union starts talking about the tical pressures in order to exacerbate the ever, in the minds of some Soviet ana limits of the armed struggle and the need "internal contradictions" to a point at lysts, the possibility of a joint approach for a negotiated settlement, it must which the representatives of the white that could express more formally the mean that it is distancing itself from the establishment agree to participate in convergence of interests. Tikhomirov ANC. This argument has not taken into meaningful) negotiations on the coun has suggested a joint US-Soviet declara account two things: firstly, the ANC 0 try's1 constitutional future. tion: statement in October 1987 which stated 0
2 This analysis reflects an important its commitment to a negotiated settle The declaration could identify the follow strandd in the current Soviet debate on ment. Since then, ANC spokespersons e ing principles and objectives, repeatedly changet in South Africa. There are other have repeatedly reiterated their support a and publicly supported by the leaders of d
views( that express much less confidence the two: for a "political solution". Armed
inr the prospects of the mass democratic • Apartheid must be eliminated; struggle is just one of many strategies to e movement'sh (MDM) mounting suffi • Africans should be granted political reach this goal and not the method of s i rights; cientl pressure to force the government transferring power. Secondly, the b • Neither the USSR nor the USA intend u It to the bargaining table. is from these to establish their domination in Soviets have never given any attention P quarters that talk of guarantees for to the particular mechanisms for trans e Southern Africa; whiteh minority rights and capitalism forming South Africa. When they did,
t • South Africans themselves should
havey come. They do not, however, carry determine the character and structure they simply adopted the ANC position b more weight than the Makarov view. of the future state; - a political solution via a negotiated d e The most that can be said is that • Neither the USSR nor the USA intend settlement. This was the message com t to interfere with the process of settling Sovietn analysts have now accepted that, municated by Yuri Yikalov in a recent a this conflict with the RSA and they be atr some point in the future, there will be a edition of Moscow News when he said: g lieve that this settlement should be of a
negotiatede settlement to the South peaceful nature. The two powers are "The Soviet Union prefers a political c
Africann problem. There is no serious prepared to do their utmost for the solution to the question of dismantling e positionc that advocates the armed achievement of this settlement if so re apartheid. The ANC leadership adheres i l quired by the South Africans; to the same opinion". seizurer of power. And this means two things:e that there is no need for an esca • The USSR and the USA reject all The ANC leadership was in Moscow d attempts to establish priority of an lationn in the Soviet Union's military early in March to lodge its most recent u external force in Southern Africa and
commitmentsy to the region; and that an express their readiness to recognise the request for military assistance. This was alliancea with the NP government in the future democratic South Africa as a granted in full. This is further evidence w hopee of accelerating reform from above non-aligned nation and to maintain of continued Soviet support for the t isa futile. broad political, economic, cultural and ANC, and it calls into question reports G
other relations with it;
t It is in this context that Soviet policy that the Soviets are jettisoning the e • The USSR and the USA declare the in
makersn are seriously assessing the issue armed struggle. Nor does this contradict
i admissibility of interference by any ofb international co-operation in order to country and, therefore, express their the Soviet and ANC commitment to a a increaseS pressure on the South African readiness to act as guarantors of the political solution; the small-scale arma
governmenty to accept the need for a security system in Southern Africa. ments granted to the ANC in March b d e c u d
Africao Insight, vol 19, no3, 1989 145 r p e R PoUtics------
cannot be regarded by any stretch of the ever, may be too all-encompassing; and ANC, MDM and other groups to the left imagination as part of a grand plan to not specific enough, either, on what, for of the Charterist camp. launch a major insurgency offensive. example, should be dismantled and how • The de facto rather than de jure un There is no fundamental difference a negotiation process should be orga banning of the ANC. between Soviet policy and ANC nized. How the ANC positions itself in In conclusion, it is no longer a ques strategy. In the final analysis, the Soviets future will depend on which interpreta tion of whether a negotiated settlement are well aware of the fact that, given tion of the utility of negotiations gains will take place or not, but rather when their limited economic and military the upper hand. The debate on this issue and on whatterms. In our view, the opti assets in South Africa, their only long inside the country, within the ranks of mists are incorrect when they talk about term guarantee of a role in Southern the MDM, will be the most powerful in a problem-free unravelling of a negotia Africa lies in strengthening their alliance fluence on the final policy adopted. ting process following upon the release with the ANC. The chances of the In designing its policy approaches to of Nelson Mandela. More internal con Soviets abandoning the ANC are, at South Africa, the international com flict rooted in communities and work most, very slim indeed. munity is going to have to take note and places, much greater international pres reckon with the internal developments sure and a deepening awareness within we have mapped out. If this is achieved the NP of the need for a settlement will through the acceptance of the "release, have to make themselves felt before we unban, dismantle, negotiate" frame move from the current pre-negotiation, Conclusion work, then the emerging international position-bargaining phase into a The ANC and Pan-Africanist Congress convergence of approaches to South genuine negotiation process that leads (PAC) were banned nearly thirty years Africa will help facilitate rather than to a settlement. The choice of how long ago. Since then, South Africans and the hinder a negotiated settlement to the this takes and what damage it causes to world they live in have changed funda South African conflict. our economy lies firmly in the hands of mentally. White supremacy reached its Although the actual details of this the National Party government. apogee and began its decline; a new framework will be refined and change in generation of black movements emer emphasis over time in response to chan ged to articulate black resistance; Africa ging conditions, the four fundamental Endnote went through its "independence" era; elements of the framework we have indi 1 The authors wrote this paper on the basis of and the international balance of power cated should remain the cornerstone of discussions held with representatives of dif
was) transformed by new global forces. all international approaches. Different ferent organizations and governments in the 0 course of a number of conferences and meet Now,1 at the tum of another decade, ·powers may find it necessary of course to
0 ings inside South Africa, in various parts of
South2 Africans are facing head-on what deploy different strategies to pressurize Africa, and in Europe, North America and it willd take to negotiate a settlement to different parties (and in particular the e the Soviet Union. The international con theirt world-famous conflict. South African government) into nego a ferences and meetings that were attended
d tiation. It would, however, be extremely This( article has argued that the inter include:
nationalr community has a role to play in destructive should any foreign power e Europe creatingh a climate conducive to a nego choose to endorse a programme pur s i tiatedl settlement between the internal sued by the NP that deviated from the • Numerous conferences in West Germany b organized by the Friederich Naumann
u "release, unban, dismantle, negotiate" South African parties. Their role, how Foundation, the Friederich Ebert Stiftung P ever, must be limited to setting the para framework. In our view some of the
e and the Foundation for Science and Politics. metersh for a settlement rather than most negative courses of action the
t • Wilton Park conferences organized by the
interveningy to force the opposing parties government is most likely to ask the British Foreign Office. b to accept anyone cut and dried "nego world to endorse would be: • A conference at Leverkusen, West Ger d many, of Soviet experts, South African aca tiatione formula". • Releasing political prisoners into a t demics and the African National Congress. Internally,n we argued, both the NP vacuum rather than into a negotia a andr the ANC find themselves in situa tion process.
g United States of America
tionse where, for different reasons, they • Releasing Mandela and not the other • Numerous meetings and conferences orga c
aren having to formulate negotiation political prisoners. nized by the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie e positions.c The NP has given up the Foundations.
i • Retaining the State of Emergency; or l
• Various meetings organized by the Council
principler of a divided state and conceded lifting it, but simultaneously achiev
e on Foreign Relations.
thatd a new constitutional dispensation ing the same level of control through mustn be negotiated with "black existing or new legislation. Other u
leaders".y It has not, however, accepted • Diplomatic involvement in sub-con • A visit to the Soviet Union hosted by the thea framework of a non-racial demo tinental "peace initiatives" and Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. w e
cracy,t nor is it prepared to formally con "development work" as a way of • A multi-party conference held in Bermuda sidera at this stage the legitimacy of the winning Western sympathy. hosted by the USA-based Aspen Institute. G
• The Dakar meeting. ANCt as a negotiating partner. • New rhetorical commitments design e • The Harare Lawyers' Conference.
Then ANC, on the other hand, is pre ed to help the NP buy time and hence i • A conference in Harare with academics paredb to enter into a negotiated settle delay the negotiation process. from ten African countries and ANC repre a mentS subject to certain pre-conditions • The setting up of "moderate" black nego sentatives entitled "Dynamics of Change in beingy met. These pre-conditions, how- tiation partners in order to exclude the Southern Africa". b
d e c u d
146o Africa Insight, vol19, no 3, 1989 r p e R I ------Econornics
Zimbabwe's economy: Problems and prospects
Dr Erich Leistner, Director of the Africa Institute of South Africa, discusses the outlook for Zimbabwe's economy.
Zimbabwe's socialist dispensation is will be under political control in order to given to employees, all profit is regarded often held up as a model for an indepen bring about a drastic redistribution of as evil, and payment of dividends to dent Namibia and a "post-apartheid" wealth from whites to blacks; to raise foreign shareholders is viewed in a very South Africa. Since April 1980 Zim standards of living; to become indepen negative light. babwe has marched under the banner of dent of capitalists -- especially foreign On the other hand, Zimbabwe is Marxism-Leninism, and the experiences capitalists; to put an end to Zimbabwe's under pressure from businessmen, of that country are evidently of more dependence on South Africa; and last, economists and international bodies,
than) academic interest to South but not least, to consolidate and streng such as the World Bank, to create a 0
Africans1 and Namibians. then his own position. more posItive private investment 0
2 Naturally it would be unreasonable to After the long and bloody war against climate; to abolish highly irritating
expectd Mugabe's government to trans the Rhodesian government, the sup measures, such as control over wages, e t
forma the capitalist economy of Rhodesia porters of Zanu (and Zapu) naturally prices, conditions of service, etc, to do d
into( a functioning socialist dispensation expected concrete rewards, such as away with subsidies to loss-making
withinr nine years -- in any event, there land, profitable employment and a government corporations; to balance its e
h better life in general. The substantial budget and to rely more on market iss no such thing as a functioning socialist i economy.l increase in the number of pupils; the forces in general. b
u The problems experienced by Zim extension of rural health services; the However, hesitant steps taken by P babwe and other socialist states in programme for the resettlement of Mugabe in this direction immediately e
h 162 000 families on farms previously evoke practical and ideological protests. Africat basically arise from their inability
toy establish a "humane" economic occupied by whites; the considerable In December 1988, for example, the b system with a "just distribution of growth in public sector employment and Secretary-General of the Zimbabwe d e
wealth"t without sinking the economy. government control over wages, prices, Congress of Trade Unions, Mr Morgan
Inn other words, they are attempting in etc, must all be viewed in the light of Tsvangirayi, strongly criticized the a vainr to reconcile economic progress with these expectations. Mugabe has reason government for its alleged desertion of g
theire ideas on economic justice. to fear the political consequences that socialism. According to him, 1988 c
n would result from a significant reduction showed an alarming reversal towards e c
i in current benefits and a failure to meet capitalism, and the alliance between l
r expectations in general. "reactionary blacks" and "former colo e
Mugabe'sd dilemma: The state True to his Marxist convictions, nial capitalists" is the source of current n Mugabe tends to search for the answer corruption, regionalism, tribalism and u
cannot create prosperity
y to his increasing economic problems in the revival of racism. He believes that Onea may accept that President Mugabe stricter, more comprehensive control by workers are increasingly being sold out w
e government, rather than in market to oppression and exploitation by
ist serious in professing his belief in socia
lisma and that he is trying to bring it to oriented policies. Mugabe and his co capitalists. G
realizationt for ideological as well as ideologues condemn the profit motive One suspects that ideological ob e
practical,n political reasons. and competition, and harbour a para jections to capitalist deviations often i
b He aims to establish a Marxist noic suspicion towards private enter come from leaders who abuse their posi a
LeninistS dispensation where decision prise and, especially, multi-national tion of power to their own material
makingy on all crucial economic matters companies. Unless re-invested and/or benefit and are therefore especially b
d e c u d
Africao Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 147 r p e I R Econornics------anxious to exhibit ideological purity. hope still exists that President Mugabe expenditure increased more than five In addition to all this, the basic igno will heed the serious warnings of econo times, from Z$1 049,8 million to an rance of most of the political leaders mists, businessmen and institutions such estimated Z$5 361 million. In 1979/80 with regard to fundamental economic as the World Bank. government expenditure amounted to facts must be borne in mind. To quote a In some respects, the country cer 34 per cent of the GDP; by 1986/87 it few examples: tainly has done well in the recent past: amounted to 43 per cent. - In July 1987, Dr Elisha Mushayaka the 1987/88 export values of agriculture An increase in taxation was unavoid rara, Permanent Secretary in the and mining rose considerably as against able. Total income, including loans and Ministry of Finance, announced that the previous year --the former by about grants, increased six-fold from Z$674,8 Zimbabwe was capable of establish 35 per cent to an estimated Z$1 250 mil million in 1979/80 to an estimated ing high-technology industry without lion, I and the latter by 25 per cent to Z$4 211 million in 1988/89. In 1980 taxes foreign assistance, but that problems Z$814 million; in 1987, exports of manu amounted to 22 per cent of the GDP; by might arise if Zimbabwe decided to factured goods rose by an estimated 40 1986/87 this figure had risen to 31 per manufacture nuclear bombs. per cent as against 1986; from 1983 to at cent. - Mr Christopher Ushewokunze, a least 1987 the economy showed a surplus The gap between income and expen leading advisor on sanctions and the on its foreign trade balance; early in diture widened from one year to the next severing of commercial ties with 1988 inflation was down to 8 per cent -- from Z$375 million in 1979/80 to South Africa, in July 1988 reaffirmed after standing at 12 per cent in 1987; the Z$896 million in 1987/88 and an esti the official opinion that international service on foreign debt amounted to an mated Z$1 150 million in 1988/89 -- an corporations are sabotaging progress estimated 35 per cent of the GNP in increase of 28 per cent as against the pre in Zimbabwe. On the same occasion a 1987, but is likely to drop to 23 per cent vious year. Expressed as a percentage of senior party leader of Zanu (PF), Mr in 1989; the annual population growth is the GDP, the shortage was 9 per cent in Nelson Mawema, declared that officially quoted at "just under 3 per 1987/88. At present it is put at 10 per appointments in the civil service cent" compared with 3,6 per cent a few cent, which is generally considered to be would in future be made on the years ago; in 1988 there were 2,22 mil excessive. grounds of candidates' political back lion primary school pupils -- 35,8 per Shortages mainly resulted from ground and not on merit. cent more than in 1980 -- and 0,65 mil expenditure on education, defence, sub - President Mugabe rejects a basic truth lion secondary school pupils -- nearly sidies and debt service. In 1988/89 these it took the Soviet Union 70 years to eight times more than in 1980. four items were responsible for an esti
learn:) decisions by government on Closer inspection, however, reveals a mated 72 per cent of total current 0
wages,1 prices and the supply of goods less rosy picture. Mugabe attempted to expenditure. The military force kept in 0
and2 services can by no means increase achieve too much in too short a time, Mozambique for the protection of the
wealthd and production, even if drastic with inappropriate means and insuffi Beira Corridor alone is alleged to cost e punishmentst and an army of bureau cient manpower and other resources. Zimbabwe between Z$0,5 and Z$I,O a
cratsd are employed. This has plunged the economy into a million per day. High current expendi (
Onlyr by taking these political, social structural crisis: practically uncontrolled ture is accompanied by exceptionally e andh personal backgrounds into account, current government spending and a low capital expenditure by central s i is itl possible to comprehend, to some ex serious shortage of foreign exchange government, namely 2 to 3 per cent of b
tent,u the immense obstacles preventing compound one another. But, as already the GDP. P a country like Zimbabwe from following indicated, the obvious economic course National debt increased four-fold, e theh economic policy which non-socialists to be followed entails a political and a from Z$1843,3 million in 1979/80 to t
regardy as indispensable or, at least, social price Mugabe is not prepared to Z$6 999,3 million in June 1988. At pre b realistic. pay. sent it amounts to 25 per cent of the d
Becausee of his inability to reconcile The economy is indeed deteriorating. GDP. This increase brought about a t then conflicting demands of economic After the short-lived boom of 1980/81, drastic rise in interest payments -- from a progressr and socialist ideals, Mugabe's the mean real economic growth rate was Z$140 million in 1981182 to Z$764 mil g
economice policy is unsatisfactory and only 1,7 per cent per year whereas the lion in 1988/89, a growth of 446 per cent c
lackingn in direction. The facts presented annual population growth rate was within seven years. Foreign debt in e belowc leave little doubt that a continua approximately 3 per cent. creased nearly seven-fold between 1979/ i l
tionr of current trends will plunge 80 and June 1988: from Z$414,8 million Zimbabwee ever deeper into trouble. to Z$2 825 million. d
n Zimbabwe's budget deficits and, u
y more particularly, the way in which cur a Government finance - rent expenditure is financed by means of w
e A vicious circle Positivet and negative aspects loans, contribute substantially to infla a It was unavoidable that the faith of Zanu tion. Debts thus incurred do not in
- G Quantitative increases and
t (PF) in the state as sole guarantor of crease the country's productive assets bottleneckse
n social justice and economic progress and are consequently not self-redeem i
Zimbabweb has of course not yet reached would bring about a significant increase ing. As a result, debts have to be ser a
theS catastrophic position of, for in government spending. Between 1979/ viced from current income and export
example,y Mozambique or Zambia, and 80 and 1988189 total government revenues -- to the detriment of the b
d e c u d
148o Africa Insight, vol 19, no3, 1989 r p e R ------Econornics
productive sectors of the economy prohibiting a rise in prices regardless of 80 and 90 per cent, depending on the whose revenue-generating capacity is increasing costs, government often value of the assets. seriously impaired by this devolution of causes enterprises to suffer extensive Local as well as foreign businessmen scarce resources. losses. The fact that even totally have for a long time urged the govern The shortages of goods and services unsatisfactory employees may only be ment to revise the conditions governing created in this way, lead to an infla dismissed with ministerial approval foreign investment and generally to tionary rise in prices and weaken the naturally also dampens employers' improve the climate for private enter exchange rate of the Zimbabwean enthusiasm. prise. Promises in this regard had dollar. The consequent rise in import Thirdly, present investment con already been made for quite some time costs also fuels inflation. Zimbabwe is ditions appear most unattractive to by Dr Bernard Chidzero, Minister of therefore caught in a vicious circle of foreign business. These conditions in Finance, Economic Planning and Deve budget deficits, inflation and a lack of clude, inter alia, regulations governing lopment. However, the government's foreign exchange. An inflation rate of at the repatriation of capital, transfer of ideological aversion to private enter least 15 per cent is expected for 1989. dividends, tax on dividends, limitations prise, together with resistance from on loans, draconian control over foreign trade unions, students and ideologues exchange, the absence of tax incentives delayed any action up to May 1989, and Zimbabwe's firm refusal to become when an important investment confe Investment - Ideological a member of OPIC (Overseas Private rence compelled the government to take Investment Corporation). (Ironically, a stand. That conference, under the aversion to free enterprise Zimbabwe requires Mozambique to auspices of the British Confederation of Already during the UDI period, sign guarantee agreements before Industries, had already been postponed Zimbabwe's infrastructure of roads, Zimbabweans are allowed to invest in once on account of the government's railways, telecommunications, etc, as Mozambique. ) wavering attitude. well as machinery and equipment in the Because of the fear that a class of The new Zimbabwean investment agricultural, mining, manufacturing and black capitalists may be created, even guidelines released just prior to the con construction sectors had steadily dete small businessmen come up against a ference, were welcomed by business but riorated because, due to the shortage of negative attitude. condemned by the country's trade foreign exchange, no spares could be As a result of all this, new investments unions and others. The London Finan purchased and outdated equipment are rare and, on balance, disinvestment cial Times described them as "a modest could not be replaced. is actually taking place. For example, it step in the right direction, though one )
0 After 1980 foreign exchange was in has been calculated that the assets of the that will achieve little on its own." Busi 1
even0 shorter supply and this, together mining sector have decreased at an ave nessmen in general were agreed that the 2 with numerous other factors, has sub rage real rate of 3 per cent per year since measures are an improvement on the d e
stantiallyt contributed to the decline of 1981, and that, if this trend continues, 1982 investment code but that the
grossa investment in fixed assets from 20 the mining industry will disappear with government still had to prove its earnest d ( per cent of the GDP in the early 1980s to in 20 years. Foreign exchange problems by the way it implemented both the r thee current 15 per cent. These are, how in particular play an important role in measures and its promises to revise the h s
ever,i mainly investments to replace ob this regard. The production losses con current price, wage, trade and other l
soleteb assets. In the mid-1980s net, sequently suffered by this industry in controls. u
whichP is to say new, investment was es 1987 are estimated at Z$50 million. The Students' Representative Coun
timatede at only 4 per cent of the GDP. In addition, there is a constant out cil of the University of Zimbabwe des h t
In order to achieve a satisfactory flow of private capital. For the past two cribed the new code as "an entrench y
growthb of the national product, net capi years this is estimated at Z$100 million, ment of capitalism, a sell-out move that
tald formation should equal at least 25 per compared with a total inflow of private has heavily compromised the ideological e centt of the GDP. Without economic capital of Z$50 million since 1980. It is standpoint of the government and hence n
growtha there can be no increase in expected that the drastic measures an signalling the complete shelving of the r g
employment. nounced by the government early in socialist agenda." e
c Numerous other factors, apart from 1989 to curb this outflow will have the Three significant improvements in the n
foreigne exchange shortages, deter in desired effect, but will also make the new guidelines may be noted. These are c i
vestors.l Firstly, the official attitude to prospect of investing in Zimbabwe even the decision to establish a one-stop In
r
wardse private and especially foreign in less attractive. vestment Centre designed to streamline vestmentsd is negative. The tortuous and Foreign investors who owned assets in the process of investment approvals; the n u
indifferent bureaucratic process, to the country prior to September 1979, es decision to join the World Bank's Multi y lateral Investment Guarantee Agency gethera with the hostility towards private pecially, suffer great losses when they
investmentsw often expressed in official withdraw. If they want to pull out over a (Miga) and negotiate bilateral invest e statements,t suffice to deter interested period of six years, they have to sell their ment protection agreements with a
parties.G assets at a discount of between 33V3 and foreign governments; and a range of
t
e Secondly, the broad spectrum of 80 per cent of the net value and invest minor measures aimed at relaxing finan n
governmenti regulation of prices, wages the proceeds in special bonds at 4 per cial constraints. b
anda employment conditions entail great cent per annum. In case of shorter with The Zimbabwean government seeks to S and incalculable risks for producers. By drawal (,eriods, the discount is between reassure investors that their investments y b
d e c u
Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 149 o r p e I R Econornics------will be secure and profitable. Thus, Dr cent) and West Germany (8,3 per cent). mainstay of the economy, accounting Chidzero has stated that "There is no The coincidence of stagnant exports for about 28 per cent of exports and pro inherent contradiction between socia and particularly large payments on viding a livelihood for the majority of lism and market forces", or that the foreign debt from 1986 to 1988 led to an the population. Nearly 25 per cent of the announcement of the new investment acute shortage of foreign exchange and work force in a modem economy finds guidelines "is not an event but the forced the government to cut back dras employment in this sector. beginning of a process". Mr Mugabe tically on imports. This had a negative More than 40 per cent of arable land is himself has publicly acknowledged that influence especially on imported equip worked by 4500 commercial farmers, of his incomes and prices policy had contri ment, spare parts and other materials whom all but a few hundred are whites. buted to the slow economic growth and required by the manufacturing industry. More than half the population -- high levels of unemployment, and that In addition to those referred to above, 800 000 families or approximately 5 mil his government recognized "the need a few other consequences of foreign ex lion people --find a livelihood in the so for a more rational and market-oriented change shortages can be mentioned. In called communal sector. This sector method of determining prices and 1988 there was a 25 per cent shortage of compares poorly with the commercial incomes." essential medicines countrywide, which sector in respect of soil quality, rainfall However, all this fails to dispel the in the rural areas was as high as 48 per and communication links. aura of ambivalence surrounding Zim cent and contributed substantially to a The gross value of production in the babwe's economic policy, not least be serious malaria epidemic. (In July 1988 commercial sector was Z$1 313 million cause the government is still clearly alone the epidemic resulted in more in 1985 as against the Z$614 million of anxious to control the economy and con than 200 deaths.) These shortages were the communal sector, which produces tinues to create new and overlapping a major contributing factor in the un mainly for own use. Sales from the com state enterprises and institutions. precedented strike of about 300 hospital munal sector's cattle herd of 3,66 million doctors in June 1989. animals in 1986 amounted to only A general shortage of sugar in shops Z$24,4 million -- about a tenth of the was caused by insufficient importation Z$224,3 million yielded by commercial Economic relations with the of packaging material. The inability of fanners' sales from a herd of 1,91 million outside world - Curtailment of factories to import spare parts leads to animals. imports results in an acute shortages of bricks, cement and other The extent to which black commercial building materials. In 1988 the insuf fanners contribute a growing share of shortage of commodities ficient importation of calcium carbide total output is one of the success stories )
The0 economic well-being of Zimbabwe resulted in a shortage of acetylene. of Zimbabwe. These farmers now 1 is 0 largely dependent on foreign trade, All Zimbabweans who are able to visit supply more than half the cotton crop 2 which amounts to about 50 per cent of its South Africa or Botswana do their shop and sales of maize, and are also produc d e
GDP.t The country's major exports are ping in these countries. In 1988, 140 008 ing increasing amounts of tobacco. This a
primaryd products, especially tobacco, persons spent Z$63,2 million on these is mainly the result of attractive pro ( sugar, cotton, gold, asbestos, ferro shopping trips, compared with the ducer prices and a substantial increase in r alloys,e nickel, iron and steel. Gold plays Z$36,4 million spent by 80 807 persons credit facilities and extension services. h s a leadingi role and represented Z$439,9 in 1987. The majority of the shoppers In contrast, the growing number of l million,b or 18,6 per cent, of total exports were women. people and animals in the communal u
in P 1987. Manufactured articles are also All sectors of the economy are direct sector leads to progressive depletion and exportede on a relatively large scale and ly influenced by the shortage of loco overgrazing of the soil, and hence to h t amounted to 39 per cent of the total motives and goods carriages, of which a serious soil erosion and deforestation. y exportsb for 1987. big percentage is out of order because of Attempts to ease the pressure by re
Totald exports in 1987 amounted to a lack of spare parts and qualified locating 162 000 families on farms pre e Z$2,37t billion, an increase of 9,3 per mechanics. Tobacco exports are expec viously owned by whites, have until now n centa as against the previous year. In 1988 ted to decline in 1989 as a result of the led to the resettlement of only some r g exports increased by approximately 20 inability of the railways to deliver the 50000 families, but have been respon e perc cent, but this was largely the result of coal required for the tobacco drying sible for spreading subsistence fanning n an e 80 per cent increase in the price of kilns. over a greater area. c i l
tobacco and better prices for metals. In In normal rainfall years Zimbabwe is r reale terms there was no significant in self-sufficient with regard to foodstuffs d
creasen in exports since 1980. and is able to export food. It is, however, u
With its contribution of 20,8 per cent prone to the same problems as South
y Agriculture - The rise of the to Zimbabwe'sa total imports in 1987, the small farmer Africa: droughts, insect and other pests, RSAw was by far the most important fickle markets, and so forth. e t
supplier,a compared with the 11,5 per The contribution of agriculture and G
cent of Britain, the 9,4 per cent of the forestry to the GDP dropped from 15,2 t
USAe and the 8,7 per cent of the Gennan per cent in 1985 to 10,9 per cent in 1987.
n Mining - A dwindling asset Federali Republic. With regard to Zim However, apart from the manufacturing b babwe'sa exports, the RSA came third industry (which contributed 31,2 per Mining contributes about one-third of S
withy 8 per cent, after Britain (10,5 per cent of the GDP in 1987), it remains the total exports, but its share in the GDP is b
d e c u
150d Africa Insight, vol 19, no3, 1989 o r p e R ------Economics
only 5,5 per cent (1987 figure). Since in average capacity of between 60 and 70 Z$l 906,2 million. Expressed per capita dependence, production has stagnated per cent. In the packaging industry, it was a drop of nearly 29 per cent, from or declined, largely as a result of produc which imports 72 per cent of its inputs, Z$315 to Z$224. It is interesting that the tion problems caused by shortages of capacity utilization is as low as 50 per consumer price index for urban families foreign exchange as well as the un cent. State controls on some 7 000 dif in the lower income groups showed a favourable investment climate which ferent products often squeeze the profit greater increase since 1980 than that for discourages prospecting and new deve margins of manufacturers. more affluent urbanites in the same lopments. This state of affairs creates uncer period, that is, 284,4 (1980 = 100) as If the output volume of 1980 is taken tainty, undermines confidence among against 266,2, in July 1988. as 100, the production of asbestos in the employers and employees, leads to inef The inability of the economy to pro first quarter of 1988 equalled 75,9; that ficiency, poor quality products, waste, vide paid employment for the growing of gold 123,6; chrome ore 94,2; coal increased production costs and dimi population is one of Zimbabwe's most 160,1; copper 55,3; nickel 56,8; and the nished profits. A publication of a pressing problems. Apart from an esti total for all minerals 96,0. Rising world Zimbabwean bank recently warned that mated one million communal farmers, market prices and the declining ex the country's reputation on the inter between 900 000 and one million per change rate of the Zimbabwean dollar national market will be under an in sons out of a total work-force of more did, however, result in an increase in the creasing threat unless production capa than 3 million are unemployed. Where value of mineral production (of which 90 city is brought to a satisfactory level by as only eight to ten thousand new job per cent is exported), from Z$414,8 mil means of considerable investments. opportunities are created each year, the lion in 1980 to Z$699,4 million in 1986. It is understandable - but also ironic number of school leavers increase sub During 1987/88 sales of the official - that numerous industrialists resist a stantially. In 1988 there were 100 000 Mineral Marketing Corporation reduction of protective measures which school leavers, a figure set to rise to amounted to Z$814 million - an in would expose them to foreign competi 300 000 per annum in the early 1990s, crease of 25,2 per cent compared with tion. In this regard they are therefore including 156 000 persons in possession the previous year. well in step with the socialist policy of of a Higher or Lower Cambridge the government. Certificate. In September 1985 (most recent pub lished figures), 1 036400 people were Manufacturing industry - employed in all sectors, compared with ) Employment and standard of 1050200 in 1975. However, this virtu Operating0 below capacity
1 ally unchanged figure conceals a de
0 living - Long-term
Apart2 from South Africa, Zimbabwe crease of about 99 000 in agriculture, retrogression hasd the biggest, most advanced and 7 000 in mining and 24 000 in domestic e diversifiedt manufacturing sector in sub Socialists claim that the capitalist system service. The same period saw the follow a
Saharand Africa. Since 1970 this sector benefits only a small minority, to the ing increases: 44 000 in public admini (
hasr been responsible for more than a detriment of the majority of the popula stration, 55 000 in education and 17 000 e quarterh of the GDP. The UDI era, espe tion, and that only socialism can ensure in the manufacturing industry. Total s i cially,l led to a spectacular extension of prosperity and a decent existence by employment figures for sectors other b
localu manufacturing. Thanks to drastic assuring a just distribution of wealth. than agriculture were 818 200 in March P protective measures the number of Whatever the reasons - and there 1987 compared with an average of e
locallyh manufactured industrial pro are and have been many problems - the 682900 in 1980, which indicates an ave t
ductsy increased from 600 in 1965 to fact remains that today, after nine years rage increase of about 19300 per b about 6 000 in 1982. of socialism, the average Zimbabwean is annum. d e In 1984 it was estimated that local pro economically worse off than during the Prospects for job creation are of t ductsn accounted for 96 per cent of the Smith administration. Real average course closely related to the rate of a country'sr total consumption, whereas wages have fallen and unemployment investment in productive assets. It has g
consumptione goods constituted on ave exceeds 20 per cent. already been indicated how the un c
ragen 20 per cent and investment goods In 1986 (the most recent available favourable investment climate has led to e
50c per cent of imported products. A figures) the real GNP per capita, ex the almost complete cessation of new i l wide range of goods is exported, includ pressed in constant 1980 prices was investments. r inge textiles, clothing, footwear, furni Z$476, Z$lO less than ten years pre On the positive side, the significant d ture,n machinery, radios, television sets, viously, when it was Z$486. This drop increases in the number of pupils attend u batteries, electric cables, cement, iron, was the result of a 31 per cent popUlation ing school or other educational insti y steela and pharmaceutical products. increase (6,49 million in 1976; 8,5 mil tutions, should be mentioned. Between w e This sector is particularly hard hit by lion in 1986) as against a 28 per cent in 1980 and 1988, registrations at primary t foreigna exchange shortages and the un crease in real GNP (Z$3 159 million in schools increased by 35,8 per cent to G favourable investment climate. Because 1976; Z$4 046 million in 1986). 2,22 million, at secondary schools by t ofe the serious shortage of imported Expressed in absolute terms, the total 771,5 per cent to 653 000, at colleges of n i education by 457,7 per cent to 15 750, at spares,b inputs and machinery, but also real consumer spending of private indi a viduals even dropped between 1976 and technical colleges by 623,7 per cent to
asS a result of the shortage of skilled man
power,y the sector is operating at an 1986, from Z$2046,9 million to 25 104, and at the University of b d e c u
Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 151 o r p e R Econom~s------
Zimbabwe by 311,0 per cent to 7699. In addition, there are more and more Against this must be viewed the rela Teachers' training, however, has not revelations of leading personalities en tively large variety and scope of kept pace with the increase in pupils, riching themselves through bribery and Zimbabwe's agricultural and mineral with the result that the number of pupils other unethical practices. The so-called products, its comparatively diversified per teacher has increased significantly Willowgate scandal, which involved manufacturing sector, and its small but whereas the standard of education has ministers and other prominent figures competent numbers of commercial far dropped. who obtained new motorcars at a mers, entrepreneurs, technicians and Although health services have seen favourable price and sold them illegally professionals. Ultimately the significant considerable physical extension since at a much inflated price, was the most expansion of education and training is 1980, standards have seriously declined recent manifestation of increasing arro bound to contribute towards alleviating and it is still largely the urban population gance and abuse of power. Add to this the shortage of trained manpower. that does benefit. Services are provided the government's inability to meet its Much depends on government policy free of charge for those with a monthly promise to resettle 162000 families and and, more specifically, on whether or income of Z$150 or less. (In 1988 the it becomes clear that Mugabe has reason not sober economic insight will gain the general statutory wages were Z$182 per to be concerned. upper hand over socialist ideology. If month and those for domestic workers this were to happen, the problems out were Z$100.) In 1988/89, Z$293,3 mil lined above would not simply vanish, lion or 5,8 per cent of the budget was but they would be addressed much more allocated to health services, compared effectively than at present. with the Z$984,8 million or 19,6 per cent Prospects - A change in However, the prospect of economic allocated to education. realism cannot be viewed too optimistic According to the Zimbabwean Medi official orientation is needed ally because, as Mr Jaycox, the World cal Association, there has been a mas The Zimbabwean economy probably Bank's Vice-President for Africa, has sive loss of doctors since independence, holds the best development potential of recently remarked, it is extremely dif and nearly all who graduated between all black African countries. But if the ficult to get African countries to identify 1980 and 1987 have left the country. current unfavourable investment cli the likely course of events well in ad This, together with maladministration mate persists there is no hope of signifi vance and to act accordingly. Meaning and inefficiency in the administration of cantly exploiting this potential. On the ful measures are usually only taken once hospitals, as well as the shortage of contrary, indications are that if current the country has hit a crisis. To quote his foreign) exchange, have created a dete trends continue, the vast majority of the words: "In almost every case, a country 0 riorating1 situation. population will be facing increased has gone right to the edge, or even fallen 0 2
Life expectancy rose from 51 years in poverty --with unpredictable social and over the edge, before it has taken an d
1970e to 57 years in 1985, whereas the in political consequences. The main eco adequate structural adjustment program." t
fanta mortality rate of 103 per 1 000 live nomic problems can be summarized as It will certainly be to the advantage of d births( in 1965 dropped to 77 per 1 000 in follows: South Africa too if a neighbouring
r
1985.e Until recently, population growth High population growth and increas country and valuable trading partner h fors the period 1985-1990 was estimated ing unemployment, a political climate such as Zimbabwe approaches its prob i at l 3,5 per cent per annum, but it is now discouraging private investment, dete lems realistically, instead of destroying b officiallyu put at 2,8 per cent per annum riorating physical infrastructure, an its economy through misplaced ideologi P
fore 1987 and 1988 although some obser obsolete manufacturing industry, in cal fervour. h verst give 3 per cent. auspicious long-term prospects for raw In this respect, Zimbabwe's an
y However, the progress made with material exports, a shortage of highly nouncement earlier in 1989 that it in b regard to education and health does not skilled manpower, the limited market tends to buy a sophisticated air control d e compensatet for the deteriorating econo for manufactured articles in other system with missiles, fighter planes and micn position of the population at large. African countries, an inert and increas radar equipment valued well in excess of a r
Increasingg discontent prevails among ingly inefficient civil service, serious Z$200 million from Red China, is not
thee unemployed youth, former guerilla shortages of foreign exchange and built encouraging. c fightersn and students experiencing in inflationary pressure. The fact that e c financiali problems, leading to anti Zimbabwe is landlocked and is further l
governmentr demonstrations and open more experiencing serious problems
e 1 The mean rand equivalent of Z$1 was as criticism.d According to recent estimates with its transport routes through follows: 1986: R,3144; 1987: Rl,1611; Sep n
fiveu out of every seven former guerilla Mozambique complicates matters yet tember 1988: Rl,280S.
fightersy are unemployed. further. a w e t a G
t e n i b a S
y b
d e c u d
152o Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 r p e R I ------Porlsandharoou~
The ports and oil terminals of Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon
Denis Fair, Senior Research Fellow at the Africa Institute, describes the ports and oil terminals of the west coast of Africa.
The story of oil in the fortunes of those Great Britain in 1960. Its political his slumped in 1986 to $6,6 billion, or to countries along the west coast of Africa tory since then has been marked by five one-quarter of what they were in 1980. from Angola to Nigeria has been a re coups, a civil war (1967-70) and both Nevertheless, in 1987 oil still accounted markable but fickle one - raising hopes civil and military governments. Its inter for 94 per cent of Nigeria's export excessively at one time and bringing dis national trade links are wide-ranging. earnings and for 75 per cent of federal appointment at another. Moreover, a For all three countries crude oil is the revenue. Consequently, comments Abe new dualism has entered into the pattern major source of both their export earn cor, the domestic economy is "under
) of maritime traffic in these countries. ings and government revenue, both ris severe pressure . . . . and the inter 0
1 The older general cargo seaports are ing to unprecedented levels when the national oil market will continue to 0
2 now matched by a new set of oil ter world price of oil reached $35 a barrel in dominate economic prospects".
d minals, both onshore and offshore, 1982, but suffering severe economic set e
t Oil production
a which handle export volumes far sur backs when it fell to $14 and less in 1986 d
( passing the traffic passing through the and 1987. By early 1989 the price had re Nigeria's 158 oil fields and some 600 oil
r covered somewhat, with Nigeria's well wells are scattered throughout the Niger e older ports. Of the three countries dealt h
s with here, Nigeria ranks first as sub known Bonny Light crude fetching $18 a delta and immediately offshore. Of 73,2 i l Saharan Africa's chief oil producer, with barrel. million tons of crude produced in 1985, b
u Gabon and Cameroon third and fourth, 22,5 million, or 31 per cent, came from P respectively, after Angola. In terms of offshore fields. Development of these e h
t popUlation, Nigeria is the giant with an resources has been difficult and costly, Nigeria y estimated 108 million people in 1988 partly due to the complex geology and b compared with Cameroon's 11 million Oil was first produced in Nigeria in 1958, the relatively low productivity per well. d e
t and Gabon's 1,25 million. and by 1974 foreign export earnings had Moreover, the civil war seriously retar
n Gabon and Cameroon were both part nearly doubled with oil accounting for ded both exploration and output. How a r ever, the oil is of high quality, Bonny
g of the former French Equatorial Africa 92 per cent of the total. Oil prices on
e and gained their independence in 1960. world markets quadrupled in the early Light being particularly well known, and c
n In 1961 the southern part of neighbour 1970s and real growth in the Nigerian has a competitive advantage over many e c
i ing British Cameroon was added to the economy reached 29 per cent per year in other producing areas in its comparative l
r French territory, which is now the Re the period 1974-1978. Oil export earn proximity to its main markets in Europe e
d public of Cameroon. Politically, both ings reached a peak of $25,7 billion in and North America.
n Gabon and Cameroon have been rela 1980 following a peak output of 2,3 mil Present oil reserves and those anti u
y tively stable. They still maintain close lion barrels per day (bid), or about 115 cipated from new exploration give a a economic links with France and are million tons per year, in 1979. Since total of about 20 billion barrels, or ap w
e then, however, with increasing competi proximately 2,5 billion tons, meaning a
t members of the French franc zone. They
a have, however, widened their contacts tion from other sources, notably North life of some 30 years at current rates of G
t with other western countries and, as Sea oil, and the dramatic fall in oil prices, production. Natural gas also occurs in e
n signatories to the Lome Convention, production has declined more recently vast quantities, but apart from some i
b with the European Economic Com to a steady 1,2 million to 1,5 million domestic use and a new pipeline supply a
S munity (EEC). bid, or about 60 million to 75 million tons ing the gas turbines of the Egbin power
y Nigeria gained its independence from per year. Foreign earnings accordingly station near Lagos, most of this goes to b
d e c u d
o Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 153 r p e I R Ponsandhanbou~------
waste. However, other uses are con vessel, the Olibiri of 272 535 dwt. General cargo ports templated, notably a liquefied natural The fourth is the Brass terminal, 22 Lagos and Port Harcourt established an gas (LNG) plant at Bonny near Port km off the coast from the town of that early dominance over their hinterlands Harcourt. The state-owned Nigerian name. It takes tankers of up to 300 000 in the history of port development in National Petroleum Corporation dwt loading from floating hoses. It is Nigeria. The building of the western (NNPC) oversees the country's hydro operated by the Nigeria Agip Oil Com railway line, now reaching beyond Kano carbon sector and has equity sharing pany and was opened in 1973. The fifth in the north, was commenced from arrangements with numerous foreign oil and sixth terminals are the Bonny in Lagos in 1895. The original breakwaters companies, which assist both in oil pro shore and offshore points. The largest at the entrance to the harbour were con duction and exploration. The Shell com volumes of Nigerian crude are loaded structed between 1907 and 1916. In 1916 pany accounts for about half of output here from tank farms connected by pipe the eastern line was started from Port while the American companies Chev line to the oilfields and operated by Harcourt, itself established in 1912, and ron, Mobil, Gulf, Phillips and Texaco as Shell. The inshore terminal, originally joined to the western line in 1927. In well as the French Elf and Italian Agip opened in 1961, is close to the port of more recent times roads have come to companies are well represented. Bonny on the east side of the river of that playa much greater part in the transport name. A 32-km submarine line from the of Nigeria's goods and passengers - so shore connects to two offshore loading much so that 95 per cent of this traffic points which take tankers of up to goes by road, with the focus mainly on The oil tenninals 300 000 dwt. The Qua Iboe (or Kwa the two major ports. Before the oil boom Nigeria's economy Ibo) terminal was completed in 1971 and Like Abidjan in Cote d'lvoire, Lagos and international trade were primarily enabled six new offshore fields to be harbour is situated on a lagoon sheltered agriculturally based, with its traditional opened up. It is operated by the Mobil behind an offshore sandbar. Access to commodities, cocoa, palm produce, Producing Nigeria Company. The load the sea is through a narrow gap in the bar groundnut produce, cotton and rubber ing point lies 36 km offshore of a storage and the entrance is protected by two constituting the bulk of exports. Exports tank farm. breakwaters or moles. The port com and imports passed through Lagos and Since drilling rigs and production plat prises two main dock areas. The first, Port Harcourt and five minor ports, forms also occur offshore, particularly in Apapa, lies adjacent to the Apapa in Sapele, Burutu, Warri, Degema and the neighbourhood of the Escravos, dustrial estate and has direct rail and Calabar. After 1958, however, it was the Bonny and Qua Iboe terminals, tankers road connections with the rest of the rise) of the oil terminals which came to have to proceed with caution and re country. Some cargo in transit to and 0 dominate1 as outlets of maritime trade. quire pilots to board them as they ap from neighbouring Niger, Chad and 0 2
Numerous pipelines carry the oil from proach the loading terminals. Interest Cameroon passes through the port. The d
bothe the onshore and offshore fields to ing is the fact that some of the old "oil Apapa quays have been expanded over t refineries,a storage areas and to export rivers" ports such as Bonny, Brass and time and now have a total length of over d
( Forcados which derive their name from 4 000 metres. They are capable of ac terminals. In 1985 out of a total produc r
tione of 73,2 million tons of crude, 56,2 exporting palm oil in the early days are commodating up to 20 general cargo h millions tons, or 77 per cent, were expor now Nigeria's main mineral oil export vessels at one time and in addition have i l
ted.b There are seven terminals where ing centres. substantial berthing and handling faci tankersu load. Like other Nigerian ports, Two oil refineries in the delta are lities for container and roll-on roll-off P
alle are controlled by the Nigerian Ports situated at the waterside. The one at ships. Tanker terminals and a new oil h
Authority.t From west to east, the first Okrika near Port Harcourt was com jetty provide facilities for bunkering and
terminaly is off the mouth of the Escravos pleted in 1965 and damaged during the the distribution of petroleum products b river and is operated by the Gulf Oil civil war. A second was built at Warri in while coal, gypsum, clinker and fer d e
Company.t One mooring point in shal 1978 and a third at Kaduna in northern tilizers are handled at ore and bulk cargo lowern water accommodates tankers of Nigeria was commissioned in 1983. All berths. In the 1970s the expansion of the a r
upg to 20 000 dwt while a second in the refineries are owned by the NNPC. economy necessitated a major extension
deepere water takes vessels of up to At the two delta refineries coastal and of the port to Tin Can Island, situated c
350n 000 dwt. The second terminal is For small ocean-going tankers are able to immediately west of Apapa on one of e c cados,i operated by Shell Petroleum and come alongside for loading. About 9 per the many creeks associated with the l
Developmentr Company of Nigeria. A cent (6,5 million tons in 1986) of crude lagoon system. Ten berths are available e
22-kmd pipeline extends out to sea from oil production is retained at these plants here for ocean-going vessels, three of then coast to a production platform and for domestic use but, since they are ope which handle container and roll-on roll u
thencey to two moorings from which rating below capacity, substantial off cargoes. Lagos harbour also has a vesselsa of between 45 000 dwt and amounts of crude are refined abroad in large dockyard and a modern floating w e
254000t can load. The third terminal is order to meet domestic needs. In view of dock with a lifting capacity of 4 000 tons Pennington,a located some 30 km off the this shortfall, extensions to the Warri re available for ship repairs. Expansion of G
moutht of the Fishtown river, one of the finery are in progress. In addition, a these facilities is envisaged. e
Nigern distributaries. It is operated by the fourth refinery opened near Port Har Port Harcourt is situated on the i
Texacob Overseas (Nigeria) Petroleum court in early 1989 for the local supply as Bonny river estuary 65 km from the sea. a
Company.S Tankers of up to 250 000 dwt well as the export of petroleum Passage to the harbour is kept dredged
loady by hose from a floating storage products. and is well marked with buoys and b
d e c u d
154o Africa Insight, vol 19, no3,1989 r p e R I ------Porlsandhamou~
I \ I \ I \ / ( .. / ... -...... -... '"'~ .. , .1 CHAD .. - "\.. ... \ . .. " \ .. Z .! ._" Z\ / I ... ../ w / NgaoundelrE3 .. .. .J CCI .r ... ./ or··· \. \ ..-' ) '" CAR
'. Limbe (] \ BIOKO ".
) o Offshore oil terminals 0 I 1 _ ... _ ... _ ... --f ... - ... .". ... - .. >...... ~ ... -... : 0 2 PRINCIPE EQUATORI~L ( _ ... _ ... "I...} d
e D t GUINEA I \.r ... _...... : a d
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e Moandae Franceville ... .,.. t
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Kinshasa y a w e t 100 300 500km a o
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t e n i b a S
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d e c u d
Africao Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 155 r p e I R Porlsandhanbours------
beacons. The quays with 13 berths have at Nigeria's ports reached critical pro and Gabon which have tended to neglect a total length of some 1 800 metres and portions in the mid-1970s. In 1975-76, this sector since the advent of the oil era. include berths for general cargo, for over a period of seven months, no loading coal and palm oil and for petro less than 200 ships daily were waiting leum products and bunkering. Transit for berths at Lagos. Riding on that Oil production and export traffic to and from Chad and Niger boom, government invested heavily in Oil production commenced only in passes through the port. Port Harcourt the late 1970s and early 1980s in its 1977, after the French Elf Serepca com was originally established to handle coal roads, railways, airports and seaports, pany discovered a payable deposit in the from the Enugu field 200 km to the north seen for example in the Apapa and Tin offshore Kole field in the Rio del Rey but the oil era transformed it into a Can Island extensions to Lagos harbour basin near the Nigerian border. By 1982 modern general cargo port and Nigeria's and new projects at Port Harcourt, output reached 4,7 million tons and third largest industrial centre. Warri, Sapele and Calabar. However, when further fields were opened up by In 1950 the dominance of Lagos and after 1980 government began to cut Elf and other companies it reached a Port Harcourt was such that they down on imports and controlled more peak of 9,2 million tons in 1985. A fall to handled 63 and 17 per cent, respectively, rigidly the number of ships calling at its 8,4 million tons was registered in 1987 of all Nigeria's incoming and outgoing ports and, especially after 1983, when with production little changed in 1988. maritime tonnage. By 1960 Lagos was the economy began to deteriorate, acti Identified unexploited reserves are esti handling 72 per cent of all import traffic vity at the ports subsided further. The mated at about 74 million tons, which at and 34 per cent of exports, the latter number of foreign ships calling fell from current and projected levels of exploita being mainly cocoa, groundnuts, palm 3 664 in 1983 to 1 949 in 1986. More tion will last ten years at most. The state kernels and cotton. However, as the over, there have recently been no major hydrocarbons corporation (SNH) offers Nigerian economy came to depend additions to the capacity of the ports and foreign oil companies incentives much more and more on oil, the export of agri rehabilitation work and some major less attractive than those offered by cultural commodities declined absolute projects have been postponed or aban Cameroon's neighbours. Elf, for in ly and all non-oil exports fell to only doned. A proposal for a new federal sea stance, receives only 18 per cent of the 671 000 tons in 1986 compared with an port east of Lagos has been dropped. A output from its production-sharing oil export of 56 million tons. Lagos's new ocean terminal was commenced at agreement with SNH compared with 92 contribution fell to less than one per cent Onne near Port Harcourt but construc and 77 per cent, respectively, received in of all oil and non-oil exports. In fact, in tion has been halted. New dry docks Gabon and Congo. Until a more favour
one) month export cargo through the envisaged at Port Harcourt and Burutu able incentive from the Cameroon 0
Apapa1 docks at Lagos fell from 340 000 have been postponed. It is to be expec government is forthcoming, exploration 0
tons2 in February 1988 to only 21 000 in ted that economic fortunes will change and development by foreign oil com
March.d when dependence on a commodity as panies is likely to remain minimal. e t By contrast, as the economy streng volatile as oil becomes excessive, but The Kole loading terminal for Came a
thenedd in the oil era Nigeria's imports also in Nigeria's case, the Economist In roon's oil is about 50 km offshore. Single (
swelledr from 2,7 million tons in 1960 to telligence Unit comments, many oppor buoy mooring in a depth of 30 metres is e
15,4h million in 1983, with Lagos ac tunities created by the surge in oil wealth available to tankers of up to 250 000 s i
countingl for 80 per cent of that total. in the 1970s have been wasted. dwt, although the more usual size is b
Sinceu then, collapsing oil prices have so 120000 dwt. Loading is done from two P depressed the economy that total im floating storage tankers by a floating e portsh fell by 40 per cent to 9,2 million hose line. Cameroon exports 80-85 per t
tonsy in 1986. Of this reduced total some cent of the oil produced, so that export b 75 per cent continue to enter through the volumes have steadily increased from d Cameroon porte of Lagos. 4,9 million tons in 1982/83 to over 7 mil t
n Of Nigeria's smaller ports, Sapele is Cameroon's oil output in a peak year lion in 1987. The remaining output, 1,5 a ther site of the African Timber and Ply such as 1985 was only one-eighth that of million tons in 1987, is taken by the g
woode company's plant; Warri handles Nigeria's. But its importance to the national oil refinery (SONARA) loca c
muchn of the import needs of the oil country's economy, nevertheless, is ted at Cape Lomboh, near Limbe. It e industryc and is close to the Aladja steel such that export earnings from oil commenced production in 1981, runs at i l works; and a new port was built in 1979 reached $1,43 million, or 67 per cent of
r about 75 per cent of its capacity and at e Calabar, on the river of that name 67 the total, in that year. Unfortunately,
d meets most of Cameroon's domestic re kmn from the sea. The new port serves with the slump in oil prices, earnings fell quirements for petroleum products, u
they local area and has six berths totalling heavily to $783 million, or to 52 per cent with spare output available for export to 860a metres capable of handling ocean of the total, in 1986. Cameroon's other the neighbouring states of Chad and the w goinge vessels. The Niger river and its main exports are coffee, cocoa, timber
t Central African Republic. tributarya the Benue are navigable as far and aluminium. To its government's Oil has also been discovered onshore G
as t the Kainji dam and the town of credit it has used its income from oil, to the south at Edea, while gas has been e
Makurdi,n respectively, and a river fleet representing 23 per cent of government found in the north and in the south off i servesb those towns and districts ac receipts in 1987, to maintain and to shore of Douala and of Kribi. Plans were a cessibleS to the river ports. develop other sectors of the economy, prepared some years ago to establish a
y Resulting from the oil boom, congestion particularly agriculture, unlike Nigeria plant for the manufacture of liquefied b
d e c u d
156o Africa Insight, vo119, no 3, 1989 r p e R I ------PorlsandhamOUffl
natural gas (LNG) at Kribi, but the pro per cent was exports (0,983 million be improved, the fishing fleet expanded ject has been shelved since reserves are tons), nearly half of which was logs and and a canning and processing factory not as large as previously thought and sawn timber and the rest mainly cocoa, built. The work should be completed in the cost is unjustified in the present coffee, cotton and aluminium, reflecting three years and most of the output will economic climate. with other commodities Cameroon's be for the domestic market. fairly diversified export economy. Im Cameroon has one river port, Garoua Douala ports comprised 75 per cent of the total on the Benue river, in the north of the Douala is Central Africa's largest and traffic and included a wide variety of country. Being on a tributary of the busiest port. It accounts for 97 per cent commodities including petroleum pro Niger, the port's traffic is entirely with of Cameroon's seaborne traffic, with a ducts and clinker. Nigeria. Between 1980 and 1985 traffic number of small secondary ports ac Douala is served by two main railway came to a halt as a result of drought and counting for the remainder. It is situated lines. One is a short line of 172 km which the closure of the border with Nigeria, on the estuary of the Wouri river and is taps the coffee and banana growing but it picked up again to 3 500 tons in joined by bridge to the adjacent banana areas of West Cameroon. The other is 1987. The port operates only during the port of Bonaberi. Douala can accommo the central line, or Transcameroon, rainy season. date the largest cargo vessels used in the running through Yaounde, the capital, Ambitious plans were put forward in West African trade. The port is well and on to Ngaoundere 886 km from recent years to develop a new deepwater equipped. It has a quay frontage of 4 000 Douala. Until 1964 the line ran only to harbour at Grand Batanga just south of metres, including 9 general cargo Yaounde, and the 623 km extension to Kribi. The idea was to exploit iron ore berths, a coastwise shipping berth, and a the present terminus was constructed in reserves in the vicinity and to establish berth for handling aluminium and coke. the ten years to 1974. More recently the the LNG plant. In addition, a 1 100 km There is also a timber dock and substan difficult escarpment section between railway from the new harbour to the tial fish-loading and refrigeration faci Douala and Yaounde was realigned and neighbouring landlocked Central Afri lities. It is the only Central African much of it rebuilt. This has cut travel can Republic was also envisaged. How Atlantic port between Luanda and Port time between the two towns to three ever, these projects have little chance of Harcourt with full container and roll-on hours and has facilitated the transport of implementation in view of the current roll-off facilities, allowing three vessels heavy goods - cotton and other com economic climate and their questionable to be accommodated. It has a two-berth modities from the pastoral north, timber economic viability, although the govern tanker terminal for the off-loading and and cocoa from southern Cameroon, ment continues with feasibility studies
storage) of petroleum products and a imported bauxite to, and aluminium on the harbour project and with a pos 0
berth1 for companies involved in offshore from, the smelter at Edea situated a little sible rail link from Grand Batanga and 0
oil2 research and drilling. inland from Douala, and fuel for dis Kribi to the Douala-Yaounde line. For
d Recent developments at the port in tribution to the interior. In addition to the foreseeable future recent and pre e cludet a new ship repair yeard and a float the improvements to the railway, a new sent improvements and expansion at a
d bitumenized highway between the port Douala should be able to cope with the
ing( dock with a capacity of 10 000 tons.
Westr Germany assisted in the funding of and the capital was completed in 1985. bulk of Cameroon's seaborne trade. e
theh dock, which came into operation at These developments have been com s i thel end of 1988. There are only limited plemented by the opening in 1987 of a b
facilitiesu for ship repair between Dakar new railway station at Douala capable of P in Senegal and Cape Town in South handling 12 000 passengers a day and e
Africa,h so this new development will be meeting freight demands up to the year t Gabon
ofy considerable importance to West 2000. b African shipping. A major expansion Gabon's dependence on oil as its chief d
programmee was commenced at the port Secondary ports source of revenue is as great as that of t
inn 1980, aimed at raising its capacity to 7 Cameroon's two small seaports handled Cameroon. In 1984 export earnings a
millionr tons per year. only 134300 tons, or 3,5 per cent of the from oil reached $1,7 million, or 84 per g cent of the total, but fell by half to $0,87 e Traffic through Douala doubled in the country's seaborne trade, in 1987. Of c million in 1987, or 69 per cent of the periodn 1975 to 1985 to 4,4 million tons. the total, the overwhelming bulk was e total, even though output remained con Inc 1985 part of the upsurge in traffic was timber exported from Kribi, 150 km i l caused by the importation of large quan south of Douala. Limbe, west of stant at around 8 million tons per year. r titiese of food destined for Cameroon's Douala, handled mainly the Cameroon This fall in the oil price had a serious d
drought-strickenn neighbours, Chad and Development Corporation's export of effect on government earnings, with its u the Central African Republic. Since palm oil, but this traffic has fallen off receipts from oil falling from 57 per cent y
1985a traffic through the port has stag heavily in recent years. Of the 1 750 tons of its total income in 1985 to only 30 per w cent in 1987. natede due to the termination of the food handled in 1987 most was fish. How t
aida programme and to the government's ever, the development of a deepwater G
Oil production
restrictiont on imports following the port at Limbe has been talked about for downturne in the economy as a result of some years, although of immediate in Oil was first exported from Gabon in n i
fallingb oil revenues. Thus in 1986 ton terest has been the establishment there 1957. Offshore fields account for 95 per a
nageS handled was 4,23 million tons and of an industrial fishing project with cent of output. Production reached a
iny 19873,7 million. Of this traffic only 25 Italian financial backing. The port is to peak of 11,3 million tons in 1973 but has b
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Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 157 o r p e I R Porlsandharboum------
since remained at the more modest level of 7,5--9,0 million tons per year, of which 90--95 per cent is exported. Continuing exploration both offshore and onshore and the opening of new fields should raise output to more than 10 million tons in the 1990s. Fields recently discovered now place Gabon's proven recoverable reserves at between a conservative 60 million tons and a more optimistic 140 million, giving the oil industry a life of at least ten years. In 1982 Gabon instituted equity shar ing agreements with foreign oil com panies and at present production is con centrated in four main areas. The first is the Port Gentil region, operated by Elf Gabon, comprising the French Elf Aquitane company with 54 per cent of the equity and the state of Gabon with 25 per cent. This area accounted for 76 per cent of the country's crude oil pro Ughters unloading cargo at Ubreville, Gabon duction in 1987. Company profits fell by more than 60 per cent in 1986 as the of up to 250 000 dwt can be accommo being floated down the Ogooue river price of oil sank. The second area is dated. A network of pipelines feeds to and either exported or manufactured centred on Sette Cama and Gamba the terminal from the offshore fields. into veneer and plywood. Cargo where Shell Gabon is the main operator Two other terminals at Gamba and handled by Port Gentil is small com producing 8 per cent of output in 1987. Lucina (Mayumba) are situated 270 and pared with the tonnage exported The third, also Shell Gabon, at Mayum 290 km south, respectively, of Cap through Cap Lopez. In 1986 only
ba) produces 7 per cent and the fourth Lopez. At Gamba a submarine pipeline 145 000 tons was loaded for export and 0
area,1 operated by Amoco Gabon, is at connects the terminal to an offshore 165 000 tons unloaded. 0
Oguendjo2 producing 9 per cent. mooring, where tankers of up to 130 000 Libreville, the capital, with a popula
d Exploration by numerous foreign dwt can load. At Lucina tankers of un tion of 250000, is situated on the e companiest continues in both onshore limited draft are loaded via a submarine northern shore of the Gabon river es a
andd offshore locations. A large new on pipeline from a 75 000 dwt floating tuary. Its harbour is small and used only (
shorer area bounded by the coastal towns storage tanker. When in production, oil for coastwise trade, river barges and e
ofh Omboue and Sette Cama and the in from the newly discovered field inland trawlers. Ocean-going ships are ac s i landl town of Mandji has yielded promis of Omboue and Sette Cama will be commodated at Owendo, 16 km up b
ingu results. One section, the Rabi pumped by pipelines, on the one hand, stream. Construction of a deepwater P Echira-Kounga field, commenced pro 210 km northwards to Elf Gabon's Cap port at Owendo commenced only in e
ductionh in early 1989. It is the largest Lopez terminal and, on the other, 130 1969 and foreign cargo ships used the t
deposity ever discovered in Gabon and km southwards to Shell Gabon's Gamba new port for the first time in 1974. How b will be worked jointly by Elf Gabon and terminal. The Cap Lopez pipeline is now ever, the volume of cargo handled at d
Shelle Gabon. It will not only raise completed and the terminal is being Owendo has been modest. In 1985 only t
Gabon'sn recoverable reserves substanti enlarged. 448 000 tons of exports were loaded, a
allyr but it will also compensate for mainly timber and timber products, and· g Port Gentil and Owendo steadilye falling reserves at Gamba and only 704 000 tons of imports unloaded. c
Mayumba.n Moreover, onshore explora Port Gentil, Gabon's oldest port, now But Owendo has taken on a new signifi e
tionc is also proceeding in the north of the has a population of some 60 000. It was cance as the port for the new Trans i l country southwards from the border previously a shallow-water lighterage gabon railway, which was opened in r withe Equatorial Guinea to a line through harbour, but new deepwater berths have 1986. The railway links Owendo to the d
Portn Gentil and Lambarene. since been built which can take vessels of Moanda manganese mines near France u up to 20 000 dwt. A main function of the ville in eastern Gabon. The total export y
Thea oil terminals port is the servicing of the oil industry. of the mineral of some 250 000 tons per w
Gabon'se main loading terminal for oil is An oil refinery is also located here, pro year is at present transported by aerial t ata Cap Lopez at the tip of the peninsula cessing 515 000 tons of crude in 1986 and cableway, 76 km in length, across the G of that name and a few kilometres north supplying petroleum products to the border to Mbinda in neighbouring t ofe the town and commercial harbour of domestic market as well as limited Congo Republic. From there it goes via n i
Portb Gentilwhich overlooks Cap Lopez amounts to neighbouring African mar the Congo-Ocean railway to the port of a kets. The port has long been important Pointe Noire for shipment overseas. bay.S In 1986 some 6 million tons of oil
wasy loaded at Cap Lopez, where tankers also as a timber loading centre, logs However, a minerals loading facility b
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158d Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 o r p e R I ------Portsandharbou~
has now been built at Gwendo for hand the Transgabon railway at Hooue. The South; Africa south of the Sahara 1989 ling Gabon's manganese exports. The project, however, is unlikely to be eco (Europa Publications, UK). project has been underwritten by Gabo nomically feasible for some years in view W A Hance, The geography of modern Africa, nese and international interests. This of the cost and the unattractive prices at New York: Columbia University Press, 1975. development will transform the port present for iron ore on world markets. MyU:ne Remy, Gabon today. Paris: Editions significantly and in time will raise the In fact, 15 years ago Gabon considered Jeune Afrique. 1984. total traffic handled to over 3 million building an entirely new minerals port at K M Barbour, Nigeria in maps, London: Hod tons annually. In the immediate future, Santa Clara on the coast northwest of der and Stoughton, 1982. however, it is unlikely that the export of Libreville to handle the ore from Be M T W Morgan, Nigeria, London: Longman, manganese via Pointe Noire will sum linga. But the rail link from Booue to 1983. SO Olayide, Economic survey of Nigeria marily cease. Agreement has been Belinga was never built and the develop 1960-1975, Ibadan: Aromolaran, 1976. reached between the two governments ment of the port and the mine was aban M Simmons and Ad'Obe Obe, Nigerian hand to continue routing possibly half of the doned. book 1982-1983, London: Collins, 1982. manganese via that port, at least for the United Nations, Economic Commission for time being. Gwendo will become in Africa, United Nations transport and com creasingly important also as a timber munications decade in Africa 1978-1988, loading port since the building of the Vol. IV, Approved programme of action for Sources Phase II 1984-1988, New York: United railway has opened up new areas of Nations, 1984. forest in eastern Gabon. Africa Economic Digest (UK); Africa Research P Vennetier. "Problems of port development in A project which could have a con Bulletin (UK); African Business (UK); Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville", in B S siderable impact on the growth of Abecor - Country reports (Barclays Bank, Hoyle and D Hilling. Seaports and develop Gwendo is the development of the Be UK); BFAI Market Information (West Ger ment in tropical Africa, London: Macmillan, many); 1970. linga iron ore deposit in the northeast. The Courier (UN, NY); Economist Intelli The Chinese have shown an interest in gence Unit (UK) - Country profiles building a branch line to Belinga from (annual), Country reports (quarterly); ) 0 1 0 2
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d Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 159 o r p e I R Landtenure------
Tenancy and black freehold: Dimensions of history and authority in Natal
C R Cross, Lecturer in the Department of Development Administration and Poli tics at the University of South Africa, and Prof E M Preston-Whyte, of the Centre for Applied Social Sciences: Department of African Studies University of Natal, Durban, examine the historical background to black freehold and tenancy in Natal and speculate on the extent to which tenant-landlord relations and expectations may have contributed to the 1985 violence in Durban's shack communities. )
Discussion0 of land reform in South black landlordlblack tenant residential for members of families presently exist 1
Africa0 I has begun to sharpen its focus as tenancy in both urban and rural com ing on over-crowded reserve semi-urban 2 settlements. ~
thed prospect of abolishing the Group munities in many parts of the country. In e
Areast Act draws increasing debate. One addition to the huge informal settle a
issued clearly within its field of view is that ments of the Transvaal which partly Tenancy arrangements in Third ( World contexts are usually seen as ofr tenancy, the practice of renting land determine the outlines of Mabin's dis ore accommodation from a landlord. His cussion, a vast horseshoe of informal potentially or actually unjust, and rural h s
i tenancy structures have often provided torically,l tenancy played a major role in black settlements surrounds Durban, theb brief ascendancy of the black agri with a dense population now rising to a the occasion for land reform. In South u culturalP sector in South Africa, but land million or more. Others are found in the Africa landlord-tenant relations have lord-tenante relations today are over Cape. A high percentage of these peri often been tense, and in the last five h t whelmingly residential rather than agra urban people are site-renting or room years have contributed to violent unrest y rian.b In his thought-provoking discus renting tenants of black or Indian land in the shack communities around
siond of future prospects for the lords. Numerous other black South Durban. Set against this, the principle of e t freehold land reform is popular with
restructuringn of land access in South Africans live as tenants in so-called
a both black and white interests, and is
Africa,r Alan Mabin comments, "black spots", rural properties now or g The prospect is before South Africa of formerly in black ownership that are widely seen as carrying the potential for e
c large areas of land both in and outside usually densely occupied. justice in any resolution of the land n
e the bantustans being brought into new Mabin comments that the pattern of question. c i
l patterns of private ownership .... That
ownership most likely to emerge from This argument is likely to prove over r prospect probably means the spread of e any repeal of the Land Acts in present simplified. Freehold and tenancy are
d tenancy at rent, kind, and labour over a
n conditions of land ownership could well closely connected; their relationship substantial area ... ".2 u
result in a widespread reversion to therefore needs to be fully debated in its y
a Mabin further notes that despite the tenancy as large numbers of black local significance, and the entire process widespreadw assumption that labour and citizens regain access on this basis to of tenancy as a type of settlement system e
t 3
renta tenancy is dead, it is in fact reap what is presently "white" land. He needs analysis. Past accounts have laid G pearing in the Transvaal; while in Natal adds, stress on the role of the state and its t it seemse never to have wholly disappear From the point of view of the low white constituencies -- acting through n ed.i At the same time, present tenancy the notorious Land Acts and other legis
b waged, un- and underemployed, the ona white farms is probably insignificant possibility exists that tenancy on private lation -- in creating and promoting S
wheny compared to the extent of the owned land will provide the only relief tenancy by restricting independent b
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160d Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 o r p e R • ------Landtenure
black access to land and agricultural connection has its roots in the past, in Department was instructed to refuse all markets. On the other hand, it is pos historic patterns of land distribution and African bids at sales of Crown Land sible that if the system is closely studied agrarian enterprise. It is here that resi " R it may turn out to contain other ele dential tenancy has its roots, in private The results were inevitable. The SPP ments. Tenancy, even of the residentiaL black land originally bought for agri continues: black landlord/black tenant variety. is cultural production, but now almost en From the l890s the pace of purchases probably not entirely a product of popu tirely rented to tenants who support began to slacken and then fall off. with lation pressure on the limited land avail their families by wage work. foreclosures on sales of African-owned able to blacks: likewise, more may be Any consideration of how this transi lands to whites beginning to equal new involved in the transaction between tion took place needs to begin by asking purchases. This relative decline in tenant and landowner than the rental why landowners began to take on African land ownership coincides with contract and profits from rent. tenants in the first place, and also why the decline in the fortunes of the African peasantry of which it was a part.Y Tenancy of the residential type also they continued to do so beyond the point appears as a part of the total pattern of at which it began to interfere with their From this situation, however, there black settlement systems in South own agricultural operations. emerged the black landowning class, a Africa, and it is suggested here that Black freehold land in South Africa highly dynamic element in the unfolding tenancy between black tenants and came into being when the black peasan history of African settlement. At the black landowners assumes an unspoken try, the class of market-oriented small same time, with the African peasantry social contract. For the landlord, the producers originally described by collapsing. the landlord-tenant relation acceptance of tenants can establish a Bundy;' took on depth. As such peasant quickly became dominant on black free personal following and create micro farmers, whose output served the white hold farms. political questions of authority relations. popUlation of colonial Natal in particu On the freehold lands a new kind of But to the tenant, the pre-existing lar, took over a share of the produce landlord-tenant relationship was deve understandings that cluster around land market and accumulated money and loping within African society. It seems and settlement in black South African assets, the opportunities associated with that already by the early 20th Century society may imply that he. the tenant, is full control of the means of production African landowners were taking on rent paying tenants in lieu of producing agri entitled to make certain claims on the seem to have led an entrepreneurial few cultural goods for an elusive market. landlord. And as some or all of these to move out of tenant status. or off tradi There were two inter-related factors at social understandings are disallowed by tionalland, into the property market. A work - the inability of black farmers to either side as the tenancy relation moves small percentage emerged as land compete on the market ... and the ) further0 into the modern sphere and be owners. often with the support of mis growing pressure on land within the 1 comes0 formally contractual. new contra sionaries who enabled their communi reserves. which was driving more and 2 dictions can reveal hidden tensions and cants to take up mission land on a free more landless people to look for alterna d
e III h tives elsewhere .... thet potential for violence. hold basis. a Focussing on black/black residential According to the Surplus People's The authors of the SPP report calculate, d ( tenancy. this article examines some of Project. some 0,24 per cent of the free on the basis of 1916 Beaumont Commis r thee historical data on landlord-tenant hold land allocated in Natal was in sion figures, that tenants and their h s relationsi and attempts to relate this African ownership by 1870. The SPP families made up roughly two-thirds of l materialb to the prevailing expectations authors comment that this land, minute the people living on black freehold land u
heldP under different settlement systems. ly small in area, was the basis for a at that time, and note that the "extreme
Bye looking at two case studies of tenancy "radically different form of land tenure subdivision that characterizes many h t systems under severe stress - Roos within African society". It was this land black spots today" had not yet appear y boomb at the time the community was re ed, so that agricultural production for that became the asset base of a new 7 moved.d and Inanda during the violent African landowning c1ass sale and for subsistence was probably e disorderst of 1985 - it may be possible to still the main activity of these farms. n
a They doubt that by 1916 this still held locater more exactly tenancy's inherent
g Black landowners and peasants in points of conflict. From this analysis, true. e authorityc relations and tenant expecta the 19th Century In addition, SPP comment draws n tionse emerge as possible contributory The trend to African land purchase attention to the increasing pace and c i
l could not continue. As white farmers scale of evictions of black tenants from causes of the 1985 unrest in Durban's r
shacke communities. and the colonial government moved white farms which began during the last d against this new and successful black part of the 19th Century and continued n u
farming class, the land-buying process with irregularly rising fervour into the y 20th - and to the growing population a was first slowed and then stopped.
w Natal's white settlers "... finally density in the inadequate black reserves. e
Historicalt insights: The roots of achieved responsible government in The SPP interpretation suggests that tenancya G 1893 and immediately began to use their acting as a "catchment" for the increas
t
Thee Natal data suggest that there is a new political clout to restrict Africans' ing numbers of the black dispossessed n significanti link between black freehold access to land .... In the 1890s the mis was becoming one of the chief roles of b landa and the widespread appearance of sion reserves were closed to individual black freehold land. S the landlord-tenant relationship. This ownership and in 1903 the Lands Beinart, and also Beinart and Delius y b
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Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3,1989 161 o r p e R Landfenure·------
writing jointly in their recent compila Table 1 tion Putting a plough to the ground,11 POPULATION DENSITY ON VARIOUS CATEGORIES OF AFRICAN LAND, also comment on black landlord-tenant 1916 relations on black freehold land. Dis cussing the origins of black freehold, Reserves 'Mission Native- Crown Beinart and Delius do not specifically lands owned land link tenancy to the collapse of the Population per sq. mile 50,08 88,3 67,11 32,89 African peasant venture: Morgen per unit occupied 6 3,4 4,5 9,1 African land purchase was a highly varied phenomenon. There were few Source: Beaumont Commission Report, p 5, reproduced in Surplus People's Project op cit, p 35. who could purchase whole farms, or sizeable portions; outright, although ... there is evidence of investment in small number of black landowner more dispersed, landowners also took farms by the wealthier salaried members farmers in the district as "an aristocracy on rent tenants - a secure means of of the African population. More often, among the other Natives", and adds that income with which to pay interest even land was purchased through chiefs, who the magistrate" ... was probably apply in bad years. Some of the wealthier raised money from their people and held ing the term for its connotations of class African landowners did retain consider able areas for their own use and ope the land in trust, or through a mis rather than blood" because, while some rated as large-scale peasant producers or sionary. Alternatively, a group of of these headmen came from chiefly wealthier families would combine re small labour-employing farmers. But families, many were self-made men - pressure on them to give sites for new sources to purchase land and distribute it and very wealthy. 14 Here class in its in unsurveyed, undivided shares. What settlers, as well as pressure to pay back ever the method of purchase, the ten economic connotation may not have mortgages, began to change the nature dency was for African landowners to let been the magistrate's only meaning; of their enterprise. Immigrants were their land to tenants and claim rent, power relations in an almost feudal allowed in because they had to pay a rather than to farm extensive tracts sense would be consistent with the pic settlement fee. IS themselves. 12 ture he draws. Land ownership and resi In other words, Beinart sees tenancy dence rights were evidently elements in as a strategy on the part of black land Speaking of East Griqualand, Beinart the total context of authority arising owners to obtain a source of income also comments that whether freehold from blacklblack tenancy. Beinart's dis more consistently reliable than farming, land was bought by individuals or small cussion of East Griqualand suggests that and relates it particularly to the demand
groups,) the landowning position was such landowners probably enjoyed sub
0 and risk created by freehold mortgages: linked to political authority and stand 1 stantial personal followings among the "The total number of farms purchased ing.0 Some farms were bought by small 2
families under their official and unoffi by Africans through these years is dif
groupsd of immigrants, who usually had
e cial control. ficult to assess and some had to forfeit ort acquired followers or dependants, a Beinart comments on the economic property when they failed to meet mort andd others by chiefs or "headmen" for ( processes that gave rise to the landlord! gage repayments.,,16
theirr followers.
e tenant situation in a light somewhat dif Beinart's analysis, however, opens up
h But Beinart also defines a third major
s ferent from that in which it is seen by the further possibilities. i categoryl of land buyer: private buyers
b Surplus People's Project authors; and his who purchased land either as individuals u information on the settlement process
P Inside the black peasantry: Tenancy or individual families, or in a partnership
e also illuminates the relations between dynamics
arrangementh with a small number of
t settlement and power. While farms held associates. Some of these men, Beinart Beinart's discussion, taken together y by chiefs "were communalized fairly b
observes, were "established headmen" rapidly", effectively passing into tradi with the data collected by the Surplus d
ase well as landowner-farmers. In the People's Project, sets the stage for a con
t tional indigenous tenure, those held,
examplesn he quotes, these men were sideration of the structural dynamics of
a ... by a small number of individuals wellr in with the colonial administration, tenancy under South African conditions
g soon became quite densely populated. which paid them for official duties, and past and present. Structural-historical e Such land was usually parcelled into 'un hadc also involved themselves in a determinants, both economic and n divided shares' - that is, shares that did numbere of profitable activities including c not involve a full subdivision registered social, but perhaps broader in scope i l both farming and transport. Drawing on at the deeds office, but made by private than some prior accounts have sugges r ane official communication by the Um agreement which might at least later be ted, may be coming into focus. There is d
zimkulun magistrate, Beinart notes that noted and surveyed by a local surveyor. little question that the evictions and u the magistrate implies that such land These shares could initially be large, removals documented by the Surplus y covering some hundreds of morgen, ownersa ". . . were keen to maintain People's Project, dating from a time
w with very much more land available to
theire positions as headmen, no doubt be when more than half of Natal's black t the owners than to the occupiers of com causea this gave them political authority population lived on "white" land in the munal tenure locations. But room had to G as well as additional income from trying mid-19th Century, were the immediate t be found for sons, and African land pettye offenses and claiming settlement driving force behind the very dense
n owners also sought to raise cash for feesi ...".\3 occupation of black freehold land. But b mortgage repayments by selling further a Beinart further observes that the land as undivided shares. Moreover, at analytically distinct questions concern S
Mounty Currie magistrate referred to the the same time as ownership became ing the underlying determinants of the b
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162d Africa Insight, vo119, no3, 1989 o r p e R ------Landtenure
tenancy phenomenon also emerge. Tenancy of the sort we have described to systems of land use and control: that The data reviewed here seem to on black freehold farms in the 19th Cen is, the land ethic. It is possible that land suggest that tenancy did not wait for the tury may at the time have been econo holders may not have been able to make peasantry to enter decline before mak mically effective and rational in terms of purely economic decisions on whether ing its appearance. Beinart's account of current arable farming risks. But the or not to accept ever more would-be East Griqualand in particular would residential tenancy system which tenants. Beinart, for one, mentions appear to open up the possibility of emerged carried the seeds of arable "pressure" on landowners to give land there being other contributing factors in farming's destruction. As black farms for new settlers. lH And the existence of a tenancy's spread on black freehold land. became increasingly dominated by resi large floating population of the dis Over-generalizing for the purposes of dential tenancy, arable production was possessed is clear from all sources. analysis, the points made by these crowded out. White farmers taking on The nature of this pressure deserves authors suggest that black South black tenants boosted production; but further consideration. We need to know Africans were buying land on one of two black farmers doing the same thing were more of the tacit understandings under general systems: in the long run cutting down their pro which it was exerted. Under the con - For residential purposes chiefly, as ductive opportunities. ditions prevailing at the time, such pres tribes, groups, or syndicates, when Tenancy as a solution to agricultural sure from society may have given the the resulting form of tenure quickly risk was therefore rational for black move to tenancy an urgency of its own. came to resemble the traditional peasant farmers only up to a point. That And this in tum raises questions of how system of indigenous settlement and it persisted and increased past this point completely even the richer freehold far occupation. seems to have been only partly because of mers or peasants were able to separate - For farming primarily, as individuals agrarian problems. It suggests that tenancy themselves from the societal roots of the and/or small groups operating as inde also had internal dynamics of its own. pre-industrial land system. Further de pendent family units, when successful Over time, this second system of black tailed work will certainly be needed to farming operations often resulted - private landholding also moved closer to illuminate more fully the extent to which but when, at the same time, residen the principles of traditional settlement, tenancy took hold only on peasant farms tial tenancy (or at least clientship finally becoming a residential settlement which were already losing their econo arrangements) may also have occur system run on informal lines. But it re mic viability; and to set this against the red in some form or other from an mained different at base: it continued to possibility of tenancy's having itself con early stage. depend mainly on private cash relations tributed to the black peasantry's decline
) On private freehold land, underlying rather than on alliance or fealty. - and alternatively, in its earlier stages, conditions0 appear to have been present Many of the historical reasons for this to the black peasantry's survival. 1 for0 creating a settlement system dif having happened are clear from some of The question is potentially important 2
ferentd from that under the traditional the excellent discussions of the period in the light of Mabin's argument that e formt of tenure. It is possible that eco now available. 17 For the most part, such tenancy systems may dominate South a
nomicd factors may have encouraged accounts seem to relate the increase of African production in a post-apartheid (
somer tenancy from the outset. From residential tenancy on black freehold context. If he is right, the blacklblack e
earlyh on, successful landowner-farmers farms to the action taken by the South tenancy systems which had their origins s i mayl have tended to become local "big African government of the day to coun in the later 19th Century appear likely to men"b in the sociological sense, able to ter the success of black farming and the have a very significant bearing on the u P
dispense patronage and perhaps em competitive threat it posed to the future destiny of the South African land e
ployment,h and use these resources to attempts of white farmers to enter and system. In particular, the relation of t build up clientships or followings which dominate arable production, and to the tenancy to questions of social institu y b might in some ways become economic economic decline of black production tionalization and authority relations d
allye productive. Starting from a totally for the market which resulted. But it can looms significantly somewhere in the t
differentn base but facing the same popu also be suggested that, white farmer pro not too distant future. The following a lationr pressures, and operating on the tection aside, conditions were clearly section begins to examine the proposi g edge of the older land ethic, the system ripe for the development of a rental tion that residential tenancy systems e whichc emerged was in some respects the market in residential land for blacks. may be both attractive and inherently n e
shadowc opposite of the white version of Black freehold was virtually the only unstable in terms of authority relations. i l
"farming with people". Where on white land available to support such a market, And, likewise, that future appraisals of r farmse black tenants were taken on to do so rental uses would inevitably come black tenancy need to take into account d
then actual work of production, on black into conflict with arable farming de not only economic and demographic but u freehold farms tenants may have been mands. The eventual victory of residen also sociological factors rooted in the life y admitteda in order to serve as an econo tial uses would then be almost inescap worlds of landlords and tenants alike. w
mice balance wheel compensating against able in terms of land use economics - t thea risks of the arable farming carried on the relative returns from renting and G by the landowner as the family enter from farming. t Tenancy on black freehold in prise:e that is, as an alternative regular Of course, the issue may not be so n
i modem Natal: Power relations cash source helping to offset the risks of clear in actual fact. Additional questions b mortgagea demands and of crop failure arise concerning the expectations of the Leaving the historic origins of the land S
byy bringing in settlement fees and rent. black popUlation of the time in relation lord-tenant situation and coming to the b
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Africad Insight, vol 19, no3, 1989 163 o r p e R Landtenure------
problems of the present day, certain wish to return to the land to work it is Table 2 questions arise. What characteristics sometimes not realized. ,,22 TENURE FORMS ENCOUNTERED IN mark the relationship between black Whether this is in fact the chief reason SHACK AREAS landlords and tenants, and what are its for the spread of tenancy, or merely the implications? most presentable reason when dealing Church-allocated freehold land It needs to be remembered that this with an investigating committee, is an Informal purchase of house and type of tenure is demonstrably very open question. Turning to areas close to land 2'10 widespread today in black freehold Durban, Jenkins and his associates Informal purchase of land only 13% areas, and particularly, but not ex found tenancy dominating the freehold 'Squatting' 5% clusively, in densely-settled moderniz areas investigated: at Amawoti 70 per Traditional tenure 27% Site-rental tenancy ing areas. Bundy quotes estimates of cent of respondents were renting, and at ( tenancy-at-will) 47% some 350 "black spots" in South Africa Georgedale 88 per cent. Of Amawoti, n=669% in the 1960s: 250 of them, covering some they explain, " ... landlords who have half million acres, were in Natal. Bundy illegally subdivided their land enhance confirms the tendency of title-holders to their position and status in relation to study also shows that tenancy-at-will is subdivide their land and lease to residential power which is measured by so uncommon in areas under "tribal" or tenants, citing figures showing that nine the number of people who owe allegiance traditional tenure as to be "insignifi "black spots" in Natal in 1958 " ... car or fall into a patron-client relationship. ,,23 cant". In other words, site-rental ried about 30 000 people, of whom some Further, "Land in Amawoti is thus tenancy only occurs on freehold land, 1 100 were title-holders, and the primarily used for shack-farming, and and not to any major degree on land majority tenants".I'! In 1982, the SPP has been a source of wealth generation under the modernizing forms of indige counted 231 surviving black freehold for both legal and illegal landowners. ,,24 nous tenure. properties, but did not note the number For Georgedale, they trace shack While this situation is undoubtedly of tenants. Indian-owned land also has farming back at least to the early 1940s, related to population pressure in the many tenants, and church-owned lands and add, "The apparent reason for en freehold dense-settlement areas, in Natal carry considerable numbers. couraging the growth of shack dwellers McCarthy also notes the sizeable profit Daphne and Davidson report that some in the area was in order to supply a potential of urban tenancy?R and thing like 30 per cent of church-owned market for the local stores owned by the Preston-Whyte reports that rents on land is utilized by tenants - altogether freehold landlords. ,,25 On the landlord freehold land at Indaleni are rising 2D about) 4000 people. tenant relationship at Georgedale, they sharply, and are now well above the
0 2
1 In written evidence laid before the state again: costs of obtaining "communal" land. ,! 0
Buthelezi2 Commission in 1981, C R The same trends regarding landlords ac At the same time, the fact that this land
Crossd discussed an unpublished CASS quiring power are observed here as in lord-tenant relation was not normally e studyt of a freehold community in the Amawoti. The landlord has replaced the found in the densely-settled areas under a
Shongwenid area: induna and is consulted by his tenants modernizing indigenous tenure also (
r What is reported .... is that the actual for help in solving various problems. The suggests that population pressure is not e importance of the landlord is enhanced h title deeds to plots of freehold land only the entire picture - that the underlying s
i by the number of people he controls. l rarely changed hands through sale. In form of legal tenure is a major factor in b stead, freed of any concern over possible The more land he owns, the more tenants u defining the way informal tenures will be occupying the land, thus the more P expropriation or any other form of ef 26 develop. e fective community pressure, landowners rent, the greater power acquired.
h Both in urban shack areas and the t
leased out their land to tenants in such a
y Drawing on data from the 1983 rural context, landlords seem to func way as to produce a profit-yielding b Inkatha Institute survey, Fourie reports tion in an authority role, but the impli
d model of the classical neighbourhood
e that for the entire region of shack settle cations of this situation are not simple. t cluster, while bequeathing their land
n holdings to their heirs in much the same ment covered by the sample (which in As McCarthy notes, the authority role a
r way as under 'communal' tenure. Inter cluded both freehold and traditional of landlords did not maintain order or g
e views carried out in connection with our tenure areas) site-rental tenancy, tech suppress outbreaks of violence and in c own project, with respondents who were n nically "tenancy at will", is the most timidation in the recent unrest in e born and raised on privately-owned 3D c common of the prevailing informal Durban's shack communities. The ef i l black farms confirm the trend of the tenures (Table 2).2 fectiveness of authority relations be r 21 e Shongweni data. On these figures, the outright pur tween tenants and landowners may be d
n Similarly, the Interim Report of the chase of a residential site, even as an contingent on a number of factors; and it u Select committee on Land Tenure in y informal transaction, is not the rule in appears that considerable tension and KwaZulua remarks generally of private densely-settled areas; it is relatively un strain also enter into the relationship. w
blacke farms held in freehold, " ... many common at 15 per cent overall. Outright t
havea degenerated into overpopulated purchase is less frequently encountered G
A case study in tenancy under
squattert camps .... It has been argued than some form of traditional land right bye most owners that due to the lack of stress: Landlords and tenants in the n (27 per cent) and is far less frequent than i Roosboom removals fundsb to invest . . . he finds himself tenancy of the site-rental type, which a
forcedS to take on a few squatters in order appears as the more or less dominant Elliot Mngadi, an upright man, a long
toy make ends meet ... until his original form of tenure in these areas today. The time opponent of removals and injustice b
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164o Africa Insight, vo119, no 3,1989 r p e R ------Landrenure
and himself a landowner, throws some leave their lands, won't raise their continuing mutual obligation is esta light on the landlord-tenant relationship hands. But the rest - the majority - blished, and if not cancelled the transfer when he writes of the removal of his own do, and in a democracy they say, of rights slowly jells into permanency", majority rules. So then the authorities freehold community at Roosboom near 3 thus automatically providing a client Ladysmith, and the internal tensions start to go ahead with the removals. ] family with independent land rights that were part of the process: Mngadi's account in effect puts the after an understood lapse of time.3~ The As a result of what happened, because of case from the landlord's standpoint. implication would appear to be that the Local Health Commission, a rift was From their viewpoint, landlords are ex tenants may resent not only their sub caused between landowners and tending help to the tenants out of sym ordinate position, but also that on free tenants. Seeing that the tenants had no pathy, and receiving little in return. hold land this situation will be continued stake in the land, as far as they were con When a crisis arises and tenants respond permanently, across generations. As cerned it was better to go than to stay at a in terms of their own interests just at the Mngadi's account confirms, the point place where they could not make exten point when the landlords feel in need of about not obtaining sovereign land sions for their children. For them - the quicker they went, the better: the sooner support and a united front, the landlords rights is important: it helps to locate they were removed, the better. feel betrayed. But seen through the eyes potential landlord-tenant tension in the For the sake of those who are not clear of the tenants the situation is very dif issue of expectations and entitlements, about tenants, let me explain how that ferent. The comments of one of Cross's as well as in authority relations. This comes about. In fact, you will find that respondents on the landowner on whose issue will reappear later in our analysis. on any African-owned land there are farm she had been born expressed re At this point, it would seem to lead the more tenants than landowners. The sentment (to put it mildly) at being so discussion to another issue raised by reason is this: for instance, I am Mngadi completely in his power: "Our land McCarthy, that concerning the possible and I own, let's say, 50 acres of land. I owner! We respected that man the same establishment and perpetuation of an in have my house and my fields, I plough as God! We went on our knees to him equitable class structure under urban the land and I keep a few cattle. Then along comes an evicted farmworker ... and had to do whatever he said.,':12 This freehold. he has nowhere to go so he comes to me: tenant's remarks, and those of others The authors of the Surplus People's "Please brother, if you can just give me from the same freehold area, suggested Project concur implicitly with Mngadi, an acre at the corner of your farm". Out that the behaviour of the entire land attributing the spread of tenancy on of sympathy I do that. owning family had appeared to the black freehold land to the historic role of Instead of looking for an alternative tenants as authoritarian and extreme. black freehold in South Africa as a
) farmer to take him on, this man goes to In addition to asserting that profit as "catchment" for dispossessed people; as 0
1 Johannesburg to work ... and I have no such was a relatively minor factor in noted above, they describe this function 0 way of kicking him out. This man is just rural blacklblack tenancy, Mngadi's ac as "one of the most significant charac 2 there - and that's how these people get d count also implies that such rifts be teristics of contemporary black spots". e
t on to our farms. They are not invited to tween landlords and tenants of the type By implication, however, Beinart, a come. A question of making business d described were a regular occurrence. Cross, McCarthy, and Jenkins et al (
from them does not come into it at all.
r The SPP sup~lies specific confirmation might not wholly agree, as they cite
e For instance, the rent at Roosboom was
h on this point.· 3 additional economic and micro-political
s R 12 a year. This continues until you find i l yourself on this 50-acre farm with 20 Cross comments that in a tenancy reasons why tenancy may also have b taken hold on privately-owned black u tenants, each paying you Rl2 a year. context on freehold land a landowner P
You are not making any money out of may be able to: land. These issues of authority and e
h them: they have deprived you of your ... operate in the authority role of a patron-client relations, in relation to the t land. You can't make a living there, so in chief, rather than a neighbourhood expectations of the tenants, may turn y b
turn, you also go to Johannesburg to cluster head ... he is also able to behave out to be significant in determining the d work. more arbitrarily and obtain extreme e subjective content of landlord-tenant t That's why on any African-owned forms of respect. should he wish to do n relations. By extension, they may also
a land there are more tenants than land so, as a function of his absolute title to
r underlie some of the stress that seems to
g owners. For instance, at a meeting I the land he rents to his clients and fol occur. e attended at Jononoskop last year, I was
c lowers. At the same time these clients do
n surprised to find that there are about 300 not enjoy the same independence and e
c to 400 households in the area, but only
i security under private leasehold that l 17 of them are landowners. When the land holders do under 'communal' r
e government removes the people, they tenure: some families were reported to
d Tenancy and violence in
n usc this division. The authorities call a have lived on these farms for three gene
u modern Natal: Social attitudes
meeting without differentiating between rations without obtaining private land of y tenants and landlords. They simply ask: in Inanda a their own.3~
w "Are you happy here')" If the tenants
e This problem of ultimately acquiring The question of authority relations t have had trouble with their landlord:
a ownership does not seem to be serious again introduces the 1985 violence in "No, no, we're not happy". "All right, G
under indigenous tenure regimes. In the Durban's shack communities. These in t we've come to offer you a good farm e indigenous system," continued formal communities have been studied
n elsewhere. Now, those who would like i occupation of a leased or rented plot twice: first by Schlemmer and his asso b to go there raise your hands". I've a already explained, 300 against 17. The tends to gradually transfer control to the ciates two years before the distur S
y 17 landowners, since they don't want to occupier under traditional tenure ... a bances,36 and again by Sutcliffe and b
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Africad InSight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 165 o r p e R Landtenure------
Wellings, who were requested by local account for most of the force of anger previously been accustomed to, in their landlords to look specifically at land and desperation fuelling the violence. rural situation, may still have structured lord-tenant relations in the six weeks im Yet McCarthy makes it clear that violence their expectations as to what would be or mediately before unrest broke out. 37 was in fact directed against landlords, should be present in their new urban The disagreements between the two and Beinart, Delius, Cross, and Jenkins situation. studies are puzzling, largely because et at all present data indicating strongly Evidence from Japan suggests that they are not much greater than they in that landlords may actually operate in a this may be true not only of people who fact appear to be. power context as authority figures - have fairly recently arrived in an urban Schlemmer found the shack commu sometimes competitively, in terms of the environment, but even after many gene nities very deeply frustrated at matters numbers of tenants acquired as fol rations of urban life. In Japan, modem such as housing and their environment, lowers. Foreshadowed perhaps in neighbourhood-level urban organiza but not militant, and not issue-focussed Beinart's data from the 1880s, such a tion is derived from village organization. in a political context. Schlemmer inter relationship takes a fairly classical Primordial village-type organization preted this response as suggesting a patron-client form, with landlords likely even in the modem city was still so somewhat passive shack population pos to be asked to help tenants solve their strong in 1968 that houses usually had no sibly seeing themselves as better off than problems. number or street addresses: members of they might be, and argued from this that The Inanda disturbances, then, offer the close urban-village community are shack communities could be seen as a very striking test case for the tenancy supposed to know who and where their "safety valves" in the rural-urban nexus. relationship, and by implication for the neighbours are, and those who do not Sutcliffe and Wellings' later inquiry connection between freehold and land know must be outsiders with no legiti found frustration - presumably the lord-tenant relations. Likewise, Sut mate claim to this information. same frustration - at living conditions, cliffe and Wellings' important study of At ground level, Japanese cities are and finally attributed the intervening the situation in the period directly be divided up into urban wards, bounded, unrest to this frustration. Although un fore the violence offers an opportunity inward-looking, self-contained commu employment had worsened in the period of looking more closely at other factors nities which are, functionally speaking, between the two studies and may have that might be behind the frustration. analogues of villages, with their own contributed to a higher crime rate, the From here, the analysis can proceed authority structure and services. 40 In data do not seem to have pointed to any along two lines to explore other sources some cases at least, the urban wards may one particular factor foreshadowing the of frustration in Inanda besides bad represent the gradual migration of rural
explosion) that ended the study. material and economic conditions. The villages, in whole or in part, to the urban 0
1 The main difference between these first line is to investigate the structure of environment. In other instances, they 0
studies2 may have been in interpretation: expectations among the tenants, and the seem to derive directly from actual
Schlemmerd saw the mood in the shack second approach, in the light of these ex villages which were swallowed up by e areast as one of patience, while Sutcliffe pectations, is to take another look at some expanding urban area. Either way, a
andd Wellings' interpretation, written Sutcliffe and Wellings' meticulously re they are stable structures, manifesting (
afterr the violence, drew attention to evi ported results - not in any attempt to great solidarity, based on residence by e
denth dissatisfaction and potential anger. try to answer the question of what might birth, multiple social ties, and face-to s i Neitherl study pinpointed any particular have led to the violence, but for what face relations. These urban-village b
causeu for the violence other than un directed violence against the landlords sub-communities are organized into P
employment, harsh conditions on the whom people said they liked. chonaikai, ward associations, which e
urbanh fringe, and the general blight of have a number of functions in preserving t
Southy African politics. Even with hind and promoting the welfare of their
b Japan, the USA, and points East: sight, without further direct study it is citizens. d Rural settlement models in the urban clearlye impossible to explain the dis This pattern of the persistence of t context turbancesn as a whole. On the other primordial attitudes in structuring a
hand,r there must be other contributing If it is true that there was more to the modem-sector perceptions occurs more g
factors,e especially in connection with the desperation that lay behind the 1985 often in the industrial world than is c
otherwisen unexplained violence directed violence than the usual deprivation of generally realized. As Nakamura points e
againstc landlords. poverty and the frustration of the urban out, similar primordial structures persist i l Schlemmer reports that landlords shack environment, then it is worth tak significantly in the ethnic neighbour r 41 weree resented,38 while Sutcliffe and ing a closer look at the gap between hoods of the United States. Neigh d
Wellingsn specifically report that tenants people's expectations and what they bourhood organization in the older u liked them, and had few problems with were actually receiving. British cities is even more strongly loca y
them.a 39 These findings appear to contra One way to investigate frustration lized and rooted. European cities in the w dicte each other: if people liked their would be to consider at what point or Middle Ages were often divided into t landlords,a then why tum on them? It is points tenants' pre-existing expectations separate residential quarters based on G difficult to quarrel with Sutcliffe and may have been violated. This would en association through guild, occupation, t Wellings'e major conclusion - that the tail looking at what people expected religion, area of origin, or language n i
mainb cause of the unrest was urban their local neighbourhood structure to group; and the same holds true for a
fringeS frustration, deprivation, and dis be like, and what they expected or China, India, and other Far Eastern
enfranchisement.y These factors must wanted from it. And what they had nations in the past, and to some extent b
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166d Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 o r p e R ------Landrenure
today. In many cities such local resi relations. Factor analysis of attitudes to though it may take more than one gene dential groupings had their own recog settlement in peri-urban KwaZulu indi ration. Settlement clusters work on a nized heads and internal civil organiza cates that the key to its cohesion and queuing model: each time the neigh tion. persistence is the sense of internal safety bourhood cluster becomes too large to Similarly, West African cities in pre and trust experienced against what are operate it splits internally, with the next industrial times based their organization seen as the uncontrolled dangers of the most senior family automatically ad on a residential pattern shaped around world outside.43 People thus see their vancing to sovereign status at the head clusters of related people; and many of settlement cluster as a haven of safety, of the new cluster alongside the old the attitudes then involved appear to and as a storehouse of the social and one.44 persist today. Finding a continuum in economic resources upon which its resi This kind of settlement structure is attitudes to settlement running from the dents rely to survive. The neighbour clearly based on inequality of the rural to the urban context in modem hood-cluster closes out outsiders, or lets patron-client type. But it is an inequality black South Africa should therefore them in as residents only after very care with strict limits: first, it is not perma come as no surprise. ful vetting. Internally, neighbours nent; and second, in principle at least, it This introduces the question of per should feel able to relax and trust each guarantees certain basic rights to sub ceptual models of primordial settlement other; and stress is laid on a strong ethic ordinate families. Land once allocated in this country. Having previously of mutual aid. Partially structured on cannot be taken away except for serious tracked the transformations of settle patron-client lines, this primordial sub misconduct, nor used by others without ment models from their r:re-industrial community is the basic model for legiti permission. More, the land ethic puts origins to the edge of town, 2 we can now mate local-level authority relations. strong pressure on families with unused suggest, as a hypothesis for further re In classical land-based organization, a land to agree to accommodate those in search, that some of the settlement settlement cluster comes into being need. All families are supposed to be attitudes may have persisted as well - when empty land is claimed and settled able to claim their basic rights to enough and may in fact have been affecting the by several individual families related in land to support themselves, and also to landlord-tenant question in 1985. the male line. These first-settler families enough land to settle their children so Modernized versions of classical settle assume authority through seniority, and that they can establish and protect ment organization may have defined the proceed to grant land to other families themselves as a family line. Under clas basic character of the neighbourhood related to them by marriage. In the clus sical organization, no social contract anticipated, and/or have determined the ter which then forms, the later-arriving can exist without these rights: if the
forms) of organization wanted or expec families defer, and the senior man of the neighbourhood cluster cannot satisfy 0
ted1 as people moved from rural settle first-settling family exercises authority. these claims, the deprived family would ment0 forms into urban. If the Japanese In consultation with the local normally leave and join another group 2
modeld applies in Natal, then the settle assembly of household heads, he over which can provide for them. e mentt cluster, the core unit of rural local sees new land grants, adjusts bounda As Mngadi's account indicated, it is at a organization,d may provide the concep ries, mediates quarrels, arranges help this point that the tenancy relation (
45 tualr model that people apply to the loca for those who cannot secure it for them breaks apart. For tenants, by the very e
lized,h land-based patron-client grouping selves, and generally sees that the nature of their rent-paying relationship s i formedl by a given landlord's rent group's affairs run smoothly. The cluster to freehold land, never obtain rights to b
tenants.u If so, there are implications for head also represents his group collec settle their children, and never obtain P rental tenancy on freehold land. tively in the larger political arena, and in sovereign equality of standing with the e
h rural districts today still usually ranks as landowner. As Mngadi put it, they have t South Africa's reserves: Cognitive
y a tribal councillor. His role, then, forms no stake in the land - though by right of modelsb of rural settlement the focus of authority in this close local long residence they may, in accordance d
Ine rural black districts, people's idea of community; tribal councillors are seen with the land ethic, feel entitled to lay t then neighbourhood level of community as men who protect the people against claim to it. It follows simply that both a hasr three core elements: external rela arbitrary or unfair action by chiefs or landlords and tenants are frustrated in g
tionse with the outside world, horizontal indunas. their attempts to work out a new system c of mutual loyalties, and Mngadi's story, relationsn with neighbours, and vertical In rural districts, authority thus en e
authorityc relations. These last establish joys legitimacy because it grows from confirmed by SPP data, suggests that i l the conventions for patterns of authority the ground up, attaching to whoever their relationship breaks up time and r ate the local level. They may then also holds pre-existing land rights. Leader again in hostility. d establishn the framework for the way in ship is supposed to operate in consulta u which residential tenancy is likely to be tion with all resident families, with their y Natal's urban fringe: Tenants' perceiveda even in the modem urbanite consent and active support. These ex w expectations and the landlord settlement.e pectations are possible because both t a Under primordial rural organization, authority figures and subordinates have Freehold rent tenancies, then, may G the local, named neighbourhood or a permanent common interest in pro resemble rural neighbourhood organi t settlemente cluster is a highly cohesive tecting the integrity of their territory zations closely enough for people to be n unit.i Horizontally, such a neighbour against the outside world. Finally, client able to move into them easily. But the b hood-levela group provides for mutual families can eventually expect to see resemblance is probably false and S
aid;y vertically it provides for authority their subordinate standing rectified, deceptive. Once in, the new tenant b d e c u
Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 167 o r p e R Landrenure------
seems to find few, if any, of the internal giving way to emergent informal insti up leaves open the question of why conditions of settlement that he/she ex tutions with strong political structure. violence should have been directed pected to acquire along with the right to And in the vast circum-urban informal against the landowners. If nearly reside. The interests of landlord and shack communities, landlords seem to everyone in the sample at Inanda felt as tenant are basically in opposition, since form the focus of authority in many positively toward their landlords as they the landlord's freehold rights preclude areas. insisted they did, why should the fami the tenants from ever obtaining control liar hardship, frustration and uncer of land resources. Likewise, the First tainty of black urban life in South Africa World landlord-tenant relation is not suddenly be taken out upon the land designed to provide trustworthy leader owners when a political spark - the ship. The patronlleadership role of the brutal killing of Victoria Mxenge - lit landowner - which, as Mngadi indi The Inanda violence: the tinder of discontent? cates, may be genuinely felt - is essen Conflicting expectations? Against this backdrop of burning tially rooted in private self-interest settlements and smoky, unclear motiva flavoured with a profit motive, not in This construction of tenants' expec tion on the part of the Inanda people mutual protection. By its legal charter, tations returns the analysis to the 1985 involved, the apparent contradiction of freehold land is safe from theft or violence in the Durban shack areas. research findings on the landlord question encroachment by neighbours, and the Sutcliffe and Wellings introduce the stands out sharply and may carry landlord's position does not depend on situation and the violence that ended considerable significance for our inter the tenants' support. Marginalized by their Inanda study: pretation of the tenancy option. But by the rental relation, tenants by the nature On Tuesday 6 August 1985 a number of backing off a little and taking popular of tenancy can never find the safety, the black peri-urban areas in the greater attitudes and expectations into account, support, the loyalty or the equality Durban metropolitan region literally ex it is at least possible to theorize that both which they may have expected residen ploded .... During the unrest Inanda interpretations - Schlemmer's earlier tial affiliation to give them. was one of the areas hit earliest and attribution of resentment to the tenants, hardest. Normally very quiet, the settle and Sutcliffe and Wellings' reporting of Any or all of these contradictions be ments in Inanda were transformed into tween the rural land ethic and the places where looting, violence, and in positive feelings toward landlords modem landlord-tenant relation are timidation had become the order of the were simultaneously correct. likely to generate friction and anxiety. day. The transformation was extremely
This) tension may normally be suppres rapid and almost beyond comprehen 0 sion .... Within a few days there were Tracing attitude change: Differences sed:1 tenants are aware of and bound to accept0 the overt conditions of their ren over 70 reported deaths, thousands were between Inanda sub-samples 2 left homeless, thousands were wounded tald contract. But if contradictions persist Looking at the question this way, a pos e beneatht the surface, then cognitive and in the raging battles, and untold damage sible key may be found in the differences a was done to shops, cars, and the like sociald strain may lead to suppressed between named local-area subsamples
( " 47
anger.r In particular, the evidence of to which the authors correctly draw e
bothh history and the shack surveys Sutcliffe and Wellings add that unrest attention. Between these subsamples s i suggestsl that landlords may be seen by and intimidation were still continuing at some anomalies occur which may sug b
today'su tenants as exercising more their time of writing two months later. gest contradictions in the underlying P power, or claiming more authority than Though the authors do not particularly dynamics in the landlord-tenant rela e
theh heads of classical settlement clusters, mention attacks against landlords in so tionship at Inanda. Sutcliffe and t while at the same time giving less in re y many words, among the "worst affected Wellings remark on these contradic b turn and continually feathering their groups" listed by Sutcliffe and Wellings tions, but do not interpret them.50 d owne nests at the tenants' expense. were "traders, Indians living the Inanda What might be taken as the model t
n At the other end of the rural-urban area" and "countless persons in leader pattern for most of the Inanda squatter a continuum,r classical settlement organi ship positions". 48 communities in the 1985 sample runs as g
zatione spontaneously transforms itself In 1985, just prior to the unrest, 327 follows (compare Table 3): byc stages into urbanite patterns along at Inanda people (an overwhelming majo * The great majority - 92 per cent of n
e 46 leastc three routes. In transitional peri rity) in the Sutcliffe and Wellings sample tenant families sampled - were black i l urban areas, there seems to emerge an claimed to "like" their landlords, and (African), while the landlord grouping r open-modeme form of tenure organiza denied bad relations, problems or bitter was somewhat more mixed at 79 per d tionn which allows people to move in and ness with them. Noting that the Durban cent African and included a significant u out of it much more easily than under shack communities were very heteroge number of Indians. y classicala tenure, but appears to suffer neous, with great differences in attitudes * People on average "liked" their land w frome a gap in authority and leadership as prevailing from one locality to the next, lords (83 per cent), and the great t thea older neighbourhood-cluster be the authors finally concluded that" ... majority did not report having prob G comes too weak to administer local the desperate socio-economic, infra lems with, or feeling "bitterness" to t affairs.e In the black urban areas them structural, and housing conditions found wards, their landlords (16 per cent, 10 n i
selves,b local administration through ap in Inanda must have played some part in per cent). pointed,a intermediately-modem leader * Landlords "were generally seen as
S forcing usually law-abiding people to loot
shipy in the form of izibonda seems to be shops and homes". 49 But this summing sympathetic in allowing tenants to fall b
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168d Africa Insight, vol 19, no3,1989 o r p e R ------Landtenure
Table 3 area, then, the more people denied ATTITUDES TOWARDS LANDLORDS51 having problems with their landlords, the less they seemed to like them. SOB MIS CON AFR HLU MAM AMA UAH Total Though it is not possible to be sure without an item analysis, the discrep Do you have any problems with ancy might suggest that respondents your landlord? % YES 26 19 13 13 3 31 12 6 16 were ducking when asked if they had Do you like your landlord? problems; and ducking a question about % YES 70 79 96 92 65 78 88 100 83 landlord problems might be anticipated Do you have any bitterness particularly if landlord-tenant relations towards your landlord? % YES 15 5 6 13 13 9 8 6 10 were important, but very tense or in Do you think that landlords are some way contradictory. interested in improving your This interpretation has some surface living conditions? % YES 28 46 31 21 16 22 18 40 28 plausibility. With hindsight, and seeing it as emanating from the period directly before violence broke out against land behind in rent payments without evic usual swings between positive and nega lords, the tendency to deny problems ting them", and reported evictions tive responses on questions relating may actually indicate desperation, or were not very common at 17 per cent directly to landlord-tenant relations. represent an attempt to achieve cogni of the sample as a whole. Such inconsistency of attitude may tive distance from suppressed tension or These attitudes can certainly be taken suggest underlying contradictions giving anxiety. That is, it may reflect a highly as favourable to landlords in the Inanda rise to ambivalence and tension. If this is ambivalent attitude, or even a fear of area, and to the landlord-tenant rela so, Hlungwane may represent the oppo conflict. If so, this one anomalous re tionship generally. On the other hand, site (negative or alienated) pole in sponse may call the rest into question: there were also several negative findings regard to tenure and tenancy attitudes. more particularly, taking the Inanda from the sample as a whole: Under the social consensus of the land tenants' responses to the questions "Do * Most respondents denied that their ethic, positive feeling towards the clus you like your landlord? - yes/no" and landlords were interested in improv ter head is the socially correct attitude. "Do you have any problems with your ing tenants' living conditions (72 per But if this socially stipulated relationship landlord - yes/no" at face value may be cent). is called into question by other, incon unwise. What these responses may )
* 0 A sizeable minority of tenants were sistent replies, a possibility of contradic really mean is that people felt they 1
0 dissatisfied with the rent they paid (43 tion and conflict arises. should be loyal to their landlords as 2
d per cent overall). At the outset, both the Hlungwane quasi-cluster heads and/or rally round e
t Against this general profile, some and the UrnzinyatiiAmatikwe sub them if challenged. Inanda tenants at a
patternsd in the separate profiles for samples reported almost no problems the time may actually have been torn (
somer of the area subsamples might be with landlords - only 3 per cent and 6 both ways and under significant strain. e
interpretedh as suggesting that not all the per cent respectively admitted that any In possible confirmation of our argu s i
favourablel findings can be taken at face thing was wrong. The overall mean for ment, other item responses at Hlung value.b Areas of particular interest are the whole Inanda sample was only 16 per wane also appear peppered with contra u
Hlungwane,P a comparatively cosmo cent - still so low on the eve of landlord dictions. In addition to liking landlords politane area where most tenants were directed violence that with benefit of least, the Hlungwane group had the h t African and the majority of landlords hindsight it might give rise to suspicion. lowest percentage of agreement that y b
appeared to be Indian, and Umzinyati/ With hardly any reported landlord landlords wished to help tenants im d
Amatikwe,e the most outlying area, tenant problems, a very positive attitude prove their living conditions - 16 per t
wheren both landlords and tenants were should be adopted towards landlords. cent, against a mean of 28 per cent for a
nearlyr all African and which Sutcliffe At conservative UmzinyatiiAmatikwe, the entire enquiry. In contrast, the out g and Wellings identify as relatively rural this was actually the reading: 100 per lying semi-rural area U mzinyatil Ama e inc its general outlook. cent of this conservative-thinking tikwe showed a very high reading on this n
e As might be anticipated, the sub sample of rural tenants said they liked item, 40 per cent imputing helpful inten c i l sample for Umzinyati/ Amatikwe their landlords. The general liking for tions to landlords, a figure consistent r appearse to preserve many of the atti landlords at Inanda was lower, but still with their expressed liking for them. d overwhelming at 83 per cent. But the In the matter of the landlords' actual tudesn associated with rural tenure and u the rural land ethic. As it would be with Hlungwane urbanites went the other behaviour, Hlungwane people also re y
rurala settlement-cluster heads, the pat way, and produced the lowest recorded ported being treated more strictly when ternw of response for different items positive response (65 per cent) to the in arrears with their rent than did tenants e t question: "Do you like your landlord?" in other areas. While it appears usual for seemsa to indicate a generally positive
G The comparatively cool landlord Inanda landlords to allow their tenants
and consistent attitude in relation to t landlords.e In contrast, the highly urba tenant relations reflected in the figures very reasonable leeway with problems in n nizedi Hlungwane subsample displayed a collected for Hlungwane contrast with paying rent on time - a mean of 52 per b patterna of response which seemed rela the area's strong denial of actual land cent said the landlord did allow them to S tively inconsistent, with wider than lord-tenant problems. In the Hlung-wane fall behind - the Hlungwane subsample y b
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Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 169 o r p e R Landtenure------
came in with only 24 per cent. There oriented UmzinyatiJAmatikwe sub most often had Indian landlords, were at may also have been other minor dis sample may have had more positive rela least as willing as any other subsample to crepancies in Hlungwane responses re tions with landlords than the average for have Indians as neighbours, apparently lated to the period of grace allowed be Inanda. If so, it is perhaps significant preferring Indians to whites or fore eviction might follow - apparently that this group, with its rural background, coloureds. They were also the most tole shorter for Hlungwane than for other seemed to have preserved more of the rant towards people of other race groups areas; and yet others in responses positive, mutual feelings of the settle being allowed to remain at Inanda. It related to ever having been evicted or ment cluster for its internal authority was UmzinyatiJAmatikwe that reported knowing anyone who had - generally figures. If this is true, then Hlungwane the greatest resistance to living next denied by the Hlungwane respondents, forms the opposite side of the equation door to cultural strangers and was least but sometimes admitted for unspecified - positive feelings have either declined willing to allow non-Africans to stay at acquaintances. or become a subject of internal conflict. Inanda. Finally, 43 per cent of Inanda tenants The Hiungwane subsample was apparently Looking elsewhere, a major cause of astonished Sutcliffe and Wellings some not dissatisfied over rent. In fact repor the high apparent ambivalence in the what - they would not, presumably, ted rents for this area averaged well area of tenant-landlord relations at have astonished Mngadi, for whom a below the mean for the Inanda sample as Hlungwane might be found in the lack of ties was the hallmark of the a whole. greater tendency of Indian landlords to tenant group - by claiming to be willing It now needs to be asked whether this depart from the land ethic of rural NataV to move to another area to make way for apparently stressed and conflicting view KwaZulu and apply First World condi development. However, for the Hlung of landlord-tenant relations may not be tions to the landlord-tenant relation wane subsample, 74 per cent were un related to the combination of African ship. The relatively short period of grace willing to take a position "yes" or "no" tenants and Indian landlords. for late payment reported for Hlung on this item. On this question the overall wane suggests that this group of Hlung percentage falling into this category of Explanatory factors: Ethnic wane landlords may have been conduct "don't know non-response" was only 28 antagonism and tenants' ing relations with their tenants within a per cent, so that the very high 74 per cent expectations relatively impersonal framework. non-response at Hlungwane may in fact Although Sutcliffe and Wellings' data If so, then it would be consistent with reflect a highly ambivalent attitude seem to reflect a negative preference on the proposition that the landlord-tenant towards going or staying. the part of Inanda tenants for Indian authority-dependence relation is seen
) While most of them minor in them landowners (Indian landlords were favourably as far as it conforms to the 0 selves,1 these repeated small contradic ranked last in preference for all sub mutual-support ethic of primordial local 0
tions2 to the overall pattern of responses samples) it would certainly appear that organization, but runs into stress and
comingd from urbanite Hlungwane seem Sutcliffe and Wellings are correct in conflict whenever circumstances make it e tot suggest a greater underlying contra arguing that ethnic antagonism was not obvious that landlords and tenants are a diction.d This subsample may have been the root factor here. For instance, the structurally unable to have enduring (
labouringr under more ambivalence than Hlungwane respondents, who lived common interests or permanent rela e theh others, and, conversely, the rural- close to two Indian settlement areas and tions. The analysis so far has indicated s i l b
Tableu 4 P RURAL VS URBAN ASSESSMENTS OF LANDLORDS AT INANDA PRIOR TO VIOLENCE, 1985 e h
SUMMARYt OF RESPONSES FOR TWO SUBSAMPLES
y b Question Area Rural-Oriented Cosmopolitan, Interpretations d
e UmzinyatilAmatikwe Hlungwane t n
1.a Reported problems with Very low problems with Very low problems with in agreement with social ethic of r g
landlords landlords (warm, positive) landlords (warm, positive) mutual commitment e
2.c Attitude towards landlords Highest liking for landlords Lowest reported liking for contradiction in tenants attitudes n
e (warm, consistent with I) landlords (cool, inconsistent c
i w/l) l
3.r Perception of landlords High agreement landlords want Lowest agreement landlords contradiction in perceptions of e
d attitude to help (mutalist new consistent want to help (alienated view, landlords commitment to tenants
n w/l) inconsistent w/l) u 4. Reported landlord treatment Average lenienry with arrears Very strict with arrears differential in landlords reported y
a of tenants (arrears) (reciprocol relations) (impersonal context) behaviour to tenants
5.w Tenants attitude towards Average willingness to move
e Highest percent unable to reply accumulated contradictions block t
a moving (relative satisfaction, no ties) (high conflict, ambivalence) response
AgreementG between questions Positive and consistent Inconsistent, apparent conflict contradictions between mutualist
t
e social expectations and landlords n
i perceived impersonal response.
b Generate potential anger a S
Source:y Sutcliffe and Wellings, op cit b
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170d Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 o r p e R ------Landtenure
that a residential cluster run by a land variable, it may well reach a point at remarks, "the marginal or emergent lord has a permanently unequal power which it can feed violence and/or turn to working class, the lower working class, structure and permanently antagonistic victimization. Any rise in anxiety may and a socio-economic underclass of lum interior interests. As Mngadi's account then break the entire contradictory penproletariat" ,52 people without the suggests, the chief source of submerged situation apart, forcing people to resources and connections needed to friction may be the permanent advan confront the underlying structural enter the formal townships. For people tage of the landlords. Their freehold inequalities. on the move without alternatives, join claim to retain control of the land and ing a rent-tenancy clients hip grouping continue charging rent comes at the per may partly represent an attempt to find a manent expense of the tenants' long community. term interests. Conclusions: Residential If this is so, it is important to under If the East Griqualand reports of the tenancy and the urbanization stand what it is that people expect to get 1880s are looked at in the light of when they agree to their rental contract. Mngadi's story, a strong possibility process And if tenancy arrangements are part of emerges that landlords operating as The rise and expansion of black land an effort by both landlords and tenants "headmen" would have been under lord-tenant relations on freehold land to create a new form of organization to pressure from the land ethic to take in appear to constitute an enormously serve the needs of a marginal popula more and more tenants. As heads of widespread and significant tenurial tion, and if there is a basic contradiction communities and also as rich men who event, so much so that an adequate in designed into existing informal tenan had relatively vast individual holdings of vestigation of the real determinants of cies, the relationship is likely to remain unoccupied land, they could easily have tenancy is likely to be integral to the potentially explosive even where it is not been subject to continual niggling re whole issue of tenure reform. Tenancy's directly exploitative. One lesson of the minders from society to validate their association with black freehold at pre 1985 violence may be that rental-tenan authority by granting more and more sent is so strong as to be undeniable. It is cy areas themselves may need some kind land to descendants of clients and to possible that means may need to be of safety valve. homeless families. While pity for the dis found to break this link before freehold The classical safety valve in primor possessed may have played a strong role reform can be safely recommended. dial organization is the act of moving in many cases, and is certainly the Alternatively, it may be that tenancy can out. A number of authors have drawn "correct" attitude in terms of the land be acceptable, even under marginal attention to the importance of the prin ethic,) repeated grants that cut into the Third World conditions, if the asso ciple of choice, and the need to provide a 0 landowner's1 own chances of making ciated conditions are tolerable. range of different types of accommoda 0
even2 a subsistence living may actually Whether or not a general conversion tion. Unfortunately, unlike share
haved been promoted or even forced on of black land to freehold can then be ex tenancy farming contracts, which have e landownerst by the weight of the land pected to reduce the pressure on urban
a often allowed sharecroppers to accumu
d land resources - and ease the position ethic( in the rural black life-world. While late enough capital to build their own
incomer from rent may be a major of people who are presently tenants and ladder out of poverty, residential tenan e inducementh in the modern context of unable to get land of their own - then cies in themselves offer no route to eco s i veryl dense peri-urban occupation, becomes an important question. Much nomic advancement. What choice al b
Mngadi'su story - and other accounts of may then depend on whether landlord ready exists among the different shack P relatively low rural tenant rents in the tenant relations are wholly determined communities may be all that is realistic e earlyh and middle 20th Century - may by the severe restrictions placed on ally available - and this has clearly not t
createy some doubt that either direct black landowning by the 1913 Land Act been enough to resolve tenant anger. b profit or even the lure of a steady reli and its successors, or whether in fact Residential tenancies may carry within d ablee income were the only factors in other social and economic processes as themselves a continuing cnSlS of t volvedn once the property was secure. well may make a major contribution to expectations. a
r If there is potential for conflict here, it establishing the institution of tenancy. Living under urban-fringe tenancy g
maye easily tie in with Sutcliffe and The evidence we have reviewed here conditions today violates deeply-held c
Wellings'n explanation that the Durban suggests that the institution of resi values concerning settlement and safety e shackc violence was traceable to the dential tenancy is not determined en in other ways as well. Under disorderly i l stress of competition for scarce urban tirely by black population pressure and conditions of settlement, people find r resources.e This kind of urban stress the scarcity of living sites created by themselves unable to trust their neigh d betweenn individuals or communities apartheid legislation. Tenancy is an bours. In addition, the characteristically u may normally remain dormant. If, how economic enterprise. But it seems to be chaotic household structure of shack y ever,a it channels more of its energy something more as well: it can be read as communities noted by Sutcliffe and w throughe the tense landlord-tenant rela an attempt to create organization. As Wellings makes it problematic even for t tionshipa with its conflicting expecta the Surplus People's Project has noted, people within the home to rely on each G tions, the level of tenant-landlord hos rural areas under tenancy have always other. 53 In this kind of environment, t tilitye may ratchet up several notches. given refuge to people who have lost people find themselves not knowing n i
Andb whether or not this tension is then their homes and have nowhere else to where to turn, unable to depend on real attracteda to ethnic differences as the go. Similarly, urban-fringe shack com mutual support either within their resi S
mosty convenient and salient explanatory munities accommodate, as Schlemmer dential neighbourhood or within their b
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Africad Insight, vo119, no 3, 1989 171 o r p e R Landtenure ------
residential family. This kind of atomistic develop together in such a way that on the South African Agrarian Question, society can be tolerated for freedom settlement can recreate a stable, liveable University of the Witwatersrand, Johannes and/or economic advantage, but it is social order as well as a physically burg, 1987; idem, "An historical overview adequate environment. of land policy and tenure in South Africa's bound to be a source of tension and in black areas", in C R Cross and R J Haines security, existing as it does in violation of (eds), op cit; S Trapido, "Putting a plough the principles of legitimate social order. to the ground: A history of tenant produc The anxiety generated is likely to be an tion on the Vereeniging Estates 1897- unrecognized source of frustration, con 1920", in W Beinart, P Delius and S Trapido tributing to the generalized demonstra References (eds), op cit; N Etherington, op cit; H Slater, "The changing pattern of economic tions of anger that shocked and dis An earlier version of this article appears in relationships in rural Natal, 1838-1914", in C R Cross and R J Haines (eds), Towards turbed the investigators during the S Marks and A Atmore (eds), Economy and freehold: Options for land and development shack-settlement unrest. society in pre-industrial South Africa, in South Africa's black rural areas, Cape While Sutcliffe and Wellings are London: Longmans, 1980. Town: Juta, 1988. clearly correct in drawing attention to 18 W Beinart, op cit, p 284. 2 Alan Mabin, "Land ownership and the 19 C Bundy, The rise andfall ... op cit, P 235. the hard and dangerous environmental prospects for land reform in the Transvaal: 20 P Daphne and J Davidson, The utilization of conditions endured by the urban shack A preliminary view", in C R Cross and R J rural lands owned by the Catholic Church in communities, finding a way to provide Haines, op cit, p 139. Natal, Durban: University of Natal, 1986. 3 Ibid, P 143. improved physical conditions in avail 21 C R Cross, "Land tenure, labour migrancy. 4 Ibid, P 144. able areas is probably addressing only and the options for development in 5 C Bundy, "The emergence and decline of a part of the problem. There is also a need KwaZulu", report submitted in evidence to South African peasantry", African Affairs. the Buthelezi Commission, Centre for Ap to enable people to get settlement going vol 71, no 285; idem, The rise and fall of the plied Social Sciences, University of Natal, for them as a resource -- that is, to pro South African peasantry. London: Heine Durban, 1981. vide settlement conditions such that mann, 1979. 22 Select Committee on Land Tenure in 6 Cf N Etherington. Preachers, peasants and people can sort out their own residential KwaZulu, Final report of the Select Com politics in South East Africa, 1835-1880, affiliation, and build stable forms of mittee on Land Tenure in KwaZulu, Ulundi: London: Royal Historical Society, 1978; organization back up from ground level. KwaZulu Government Printer, 1976. Eleanor Preston-Whyte, "Mission land at 23 DJenkins, DScogings,CFourie,M Y G H One of the most destructive aspects of Indaleni: What to do with a scarce re Margeot and P Perkin, "Investigation of the South Africa's management of the source", in C R Cross and R J Haines, op emerging patterns of Zulu land tenure and urbanization process through the late cit. the implications for the establishment of ef 20th) century has been the extent to 7 Surplus People's Project, Forced removals
0 fective land information and administration
1 in South Africa, volume 4. Natal, Cape which people entering the urban systems", Department of Surveying and 0 Town and Pietermaritzburg: SPP 1983. P environment2 have been prevented, by Mapping, University of Natal, Durban. 24. endlessd restrictions and centralized 1986, p 51. e 8 Ibid. P 25. administrativet procedures, from doing a 9 Ibid, P 24. 24 Ibid, P 55.
d 25 Ibid. this.( To what extent it can be done at all 10 Ibid, P 27.
underr a tenancy regime is not clear at 11 W Beinart and P Delius, "Introduction" in 26 Ibid, P 57. e present.h W Beinart, P Delius and S Trapido (eds), 27 C Fourie. 'The impact of urbanization on s i l In addition, the urbanization process Putting a plough to the ground: Accumula land tenure and administration in the peri b tion and dispossession in rural South Africa: urban area around Durban". paper deliver doesu not necessarily have to take this
P 1850-1930, Johannesburg: Ravan Press, ed at the Conference of the Development form. The point of Japan's urban-neigh e 1986. Society of South Africa, Cape Town, Sep bourhoodh settlement system is that it t 12 Ibid, pp 44-45. tember, 1986.
seemsy to have transferred rural villagers 13 W Beinart, "Settler accumulation in East 28 J J McCarthy, "African land tenure as a b into town with least dislocation and pre Griqualand: From the demise of the Griqua popular issue and power relation in South d to the Natives' Land Act", in W Beinart, P servede great stability through the transi African urban and peri-urban areas", in t Delius and S Trapido, op cit, p 282. C R Cross and R J Haines (eds), op cit. tion,n while the South African system has a 14 Ibid. 29 EM Preston-Whyte, "Mission land at In guaranteedr the most possible disrup g 15 Ibid, P 284. daleni: What should be done with a scarce
tion.e The marginal tenancy regimes of 16 Ibid, P 283. resource?", in C R Cross and R J Haines c
then urban fringe and impoverished rural 17 These include D Welsh, The roots of segre (eds), op cit. e districtsc may be part of the pain of gation: Native policy in colonial Natal, 30 J J McCarthy, op cit. i l urbanization in this country. 1845-19/0, Cape Town: Oxford University 31 E Mngadi, "The removal of Roosboom". r e Attention needs to be given to urban Press, 1971; T R H Davenport and K S Occasional Paper no 5, Association for d Hunt, The right to the land, Cape Town: Rural Advancement. Pieterrnaritzburg, residentialn tenancy not only in terms of
u David Philip, 1974; T Keegan, Rural trans 1981.
physicaly structures and political em formations in industrialising South Africa, 32 C R Cross, "Land tenure, labour migrancy powerment,a but at the middle level, in Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986; idem, ... ", op cit, P 19. w termse of the settlement process itself, "The dynamics of rural accumulation in 33 Surplus People's Project, op cit, p 493. t whicha creates either stable or chaotic South Africa: Historical and comparative 34 C R Cross, "Land tenure, labour migrancy G
perspectives", Comparative Studies in ... ", op cit, P 19.
communities.t We need to know more
e Society and History, vol 28, no 4, 1986; 35 Ibid.
aboutn different types of tenancy and the
i idem, Facing the storm, Cape Town: David 36 L Schlemmer, "Squatter commumtles: kindb of community they create. Urban Philip, 1988; R J Haines and C R Cross, Safety valves in the rural-urban nexus", in H a orS rural, the system needs to be geared "Tenure and the decline of black agri Giliomee and L Schlemmer (eds), Up
toy allow tenancy and ownership to culture", paper delivered to the Workshop against the fences: Poverty, passes and privi- b
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172o Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 r p e R ------Landtenure
lege in South Africa, Cape Town: David 44 Ibid; C R Cross et aI, Zulu land tenure ... , 4 Africa Village (AFR) N = 63 Philip, 1985. op cit. 5 Hlungwane (HLU) N = 31 37 M Sutcliffe and P Wellings, "Inanda: The 45 E Mngadi, op cit. 6 Mamba (MAM) N = 37 context for unrest?" Built Environment 46 C R Cross, et aI, Zulu land tenure ... , op 7 Amawoti (AMA) N = 25 Support Group, University of Natal, cit. 8 Umzinyatil Amatikwe (UAH) N = 32. Durban, 1985. 47 M Sutcliffe and P Wellings, op cit, p 1. A more complete breakdown of the statisti 38 L Schlemmer, op cit, p 177. 48 Ibid, P 3. cal data presented in this initial 1985 report 39 M Sutcliffe and P Wellings, op cit, pp 18-22. 49 Ibid, P 41. was to appear in the second survey report 40 H Nakamura, "Urban ward associations in 50 Ibid, P 22. for the Inanda investigation. Unfortu Japan", in R E Pahl (ed), Readings in urban 51 Sutcliffe and Wellings' 1985 survey divided nately, at the time of writing it has not sociology, London: Pergamon, 1968. Inanda into eight regions, based on named proved possible to obtain a copy of this 41 Ibid. and localized communities, for the purpose second report. Some of the conclusions ten 42 C R Cross, C J Bacon, C Fourie, H Jenkins of sampling. The abbreviations used in tatively offered here clearly might have to and D Scogings, Zulu land tenure and deve Table 3 refer to these sampling localities, as be revised in the light of this more detailed lopment: The adaptation of contemporary follows: statistical treatment. institutions, Durban: CASS, Department 1 Shembe's Village/ Dube's Village/ Bam 52 L Schlemmer, op cit, p 188. of Surveying and Mapping, University of bayi (SDB) N = 43 53 Cf C R Cross and E M Preston-Whyte, op Natal, 1982. 2 Mtshebenil Inanda Seminary (MIS) cit. 43 C R Cross, "If you have not got land ...", N = 43 op cit. 3 Congo Village (CON) N = 53 ) 0 1 0 2 d e t a d ( r e h s i l b u P e h t y b d e t n a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d
o Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 173 r p e R Dev~opment------
The Bushmen of Botswana From desert dwellers to world citizens
A J G M Sanders, Principal Researcher in the Institute of Foreign and Compara tive Law, and Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law ofthe University of South Africa, looks at the traditional Bushmen, their position in Botswana and their posi tion in the international law and comes to the conclusion that only through consul tation will it be possible to ascertain and provide for the Bushmen's particular needs. ) 0 1 0
Introduction2
Unfortunately, a derogatory association hunted with bow and poisoned arrow d
When,e in the seventeenth century of the is often the fate of any appellation of a and on gathered wild foods. Their pre t
Europeana calendar, the Dutch colonists marginal group, even when in its origi sent habitat is confined to the most arid d
( nal form it was merely descriptive and of the Cape of Good Hope first met the part of the central Southern African r hunter-gathererse who lived on the meant no harm. savannah: the Kalahari Desert. h savannahs or bosveld, they called these In this article the hunter-gatherers of The Bushman languages, characte i l
peopleb Bosjesmannen. By that time Southern Africa will be referred to as rized by the frequent use of c1ick
Bantu-speakingu pastoralists and cul Bushmen. This term need not carry any consonants, constitute yet another P
tivatorse had already penetrated the cen stigma of contempt and, despite acade feature which sets the Bushmen apart h tralt Southern African savannah from the mic attempts to popularize the word from their neighbours, with the excep
North,y and the Tswana among them San, has remained the one most widely tion of the Khoi-Khoi. b called the hunter-gatherers Sarwa, an used. Bushman rock paintings bear authen d e adaptationt from the Hottentot word The Bushmen have inhabited tic witness to Bushman physiognomy. San.n It was, in fact, the Khoi-Khoi (pro Southern Africa for longer than any These multicoloured, realistic minia a r
nouncedg khwe-khwe) or Hottentotten as other surviving group. At present they tures, painted on the walls of rock
thee Dutch called them (because of the number about 50 000, of whom 30 000 shelters overlooking the plains of tradi c stutteringn sound of the Khoi-Khoi live in Botswana and 20 000 in Namibia. tional Bushman lands, relate in a most e c
language),i who had been the first out They are the last remnants of a Stone fascinating way the Bushmen's tradi l
sidersr to come into contact with the Age people who were once scattered all tional life-style, their encounters with e
hunter-gatherersd of Southern Africa, over East, Central and Southern Africa foreign invaders, and their own distinc whomn they collectively called San, and, according to recent archeological tive physique. In these paintings the u
meaningy "food-gatherers". San is also data, were this region's sole inhabitants Bushmen depicted themselves as wiry thea appellation currently in vogue for at least 30 000 years. and, in comparison with their Negroid w e
amongt the handful of academics who Their history, life-style, language and and Caucasoid invaders, small in dedicatea themselves to the study of the physical appearance distinguish the stature. However, since then, the gene G
hunter-gathererst of Southern Africa. Bushmen sufficiently, in their own tic line between the Bushmen and their e
Theyn feel that the term Bushmen has minds as well as the minds of others, as a neighbours has become blurred as a re i acquiredb too much of a pejorative con recognizable ethnic group. sult of intermixing, and in most regions a notation.S However, the same now Traditionally, the Bushmen operate the physical Bushman type has disap
holdsy true of the terms San and Sarwa. in small bands, and subsist on game peared to such an extent that only b
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174o Africa Insight, vol 19, no3, 1989 r p e R ------Deve0pment
language and life-style remain as clearly distinguishing Bushman features. What is left of authentic Bushman society operates under severe alien pres sure. Only the Bushmen in Botswana's Central Kalahari Reserve - which is a game reserve, not a "Bushmanstan" - still subsist exclusively on game and wild plants. The overwhelming majority of the Bushman population of Botswana, however, live a sedentary life on land that is no longer theirs, and commer cialization is turning more and more of them into squatters. Interestingly, there has been little acculturation between these sedentary Bushmen and their commercial overlords. Hence the cen tral government's " Bushman problem". In order to grasp the nature and size of the "Bushman problem", which has re cently also assumed an international dimension, it is imperative first to have a closer look at the cultural traits of tradi tional Kalahari Bushman society.
Traditional Kalahari Bushman society ) 0
Archeological1 and linguistic evidence 0
indicates2 that today's Kalahari Bushmen
ared the descendants of local Bushmen e rathert than of Bushmen refugees driven a fromd other parts of Southern Africa into (
ther Kalahari by European and Bantu e speakingh African settlers. It is therefore s i possiblel to speak of an aboriginal Kala b
hariu Bushman culture. P
The Bushmen of the central Kalahari e
Deserth are present-oriented, and live a t
thoroughlyy pragmatic life in their quest b for survival as hunter-gatherers. d
e Subsistence hunting and gathering re t quiresn mobility and group formation . In band forms a closed community. In fact, through organized economic, ritual or a a r habitat as barren as the central Kala the average band is a rather fluid group other social activities. g
harie Desert, the groups or bands, as they which fragments and realigns continu Each band has its own rather ill c
aren known in the literature, are neces ously, and it is often difficult to distin defined area within which it moves. It is e
sarilyc small in size and highly mobile, guish between migrants and visitors. not the area itself that the members of i l seldom numbering more than fifty Major factors inducing migration or pro the band think of as theirs, but the right r peoplee . tracted visits are food supply, marriage, to use its resources. People from neigh d
n Each band consists of several inter and the alleviation of tense social bouring bands will need permission to u related families. The band constitutes relationships. hunt and gather in the area or to draw y thea largest social unit, but the family is Despite frequent social interaction water there. Permission will usually w
thee most cohesive and enduring social between individual members and house have to be obtained from the founder t unit.a The family is also the basic unit of holds of the various band societies, and members of the band, their eldest des G inter-band migration and the formation the total absence of inter-band warfare, cendants or long-standing members who t ofe new bands. no society embracing the individual act as spokesmen for the band. n i The formation of a new band is a com bands exists. Each band considers itself The band has no chief or leader. b parativelya rare event, but inter-band to be complete and autonomous, and Traditional Bushman society simply S
migrationy is a common occurrence. No the separate bands do not interact does not lend itself to a centralized, b
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Africad Insight, vol19, no 3, 1989 175 o r p e R ~v~opment------
the above-mentioned relatives who need or want to accompany him . In this way , whole segments of bands join other bands. Marriages are generally arranged by the couples themselves, but parental approval is required in respect of young people. Bushmen do not conclude matrimonial property settlements. A person may marry either within or out side the band, but because of the strict taboo on incest, marriage partners are often selected from other bands. Although polygamy occurs, it is not common. Levirate and sororate are also practised. Divorce is accomplished by the unilateral decision of either spouse or by mutual consent - the only sem blance of formality is the act of parting. Incompatibility and adultery are the main causes of marital break-up. After divorce the father takes custody of the children, but as long as a child is still Areas where rock paint breast-fed it remains with the mother. D ings and engravings are to be found The band regrets divorce but attaches no o 400 800km social stigma or legal impediments. (;]1 Divorce is not uncommon among young couples, but overall marriages are Distribution of rock paintings and engravings in Southem Africa (Source: Thomas Tlou & Alec Campbell, notably stable.
History) of Botswana, Gaborone: Macmillan, 1984) Property law: In a society where per 0 sonal belongings are few, property law 1
hierarchical0 structure with specialized instrumental in settling disputes and for revolves around the use of the common 2
personneld and roles. Decisions affecting mulating decisions. With regard to dan wealth. In Bushman society it is rain e
thet social life of the band are reached cing, the Bushmen's trance dance de water, waterholes, patches of wild plant a
throughd discussion, in which all adult serves special mention, for it is their food and wild animals which constitute (
andr near-adult members of the band major ritual and involves the entire common wealth. e
mayh participate, and in which women band. With the support of the women, Rainwater belongs to no one, but the s i
havel an equal say. Discussion is in who sit in a circle around the fire , clap permanent and semi-permanent water b holes are band property.
formal,u is not conducted in any special ping and singing, the male dancers work P
place, and seldom takes the form of a themselves into a state of transcendence Wild plant foods, which constitute 60 e
single,h set-piece debate. and enter the realm of the supernatural to 80 per cent of the Bushmen's subsis t tence base, are also considered to be the
y Although status plays a role within the to plead for the health of individuals and b
family and there is a division of labour the community. The trance dance is per property of the band, but once collected d
accordinge to sex - women doing the formed at night, may last for hours on belong to the collector. The women t
foragingn and men the hunting - there end and is the focus of religious life daily collect wild plants to feed family a
arer no classes within the band. Band among the Bushmen. and visitors. g society is basically egalitarian. Not only is there a minimum of reli Game belongs to no-one until it is e c This egalitarian character finds ex gion, as Europeans know it , in Bushman killed. Small animals become the pro n
e perty of the man who killed them, and pressionc in, and is preserved by, the society, there is also a minimum of law. i l
sociability of its members. Bushmen Family law: The parent-child rela are consumed by his family. Large ani r
attache great value to giving and receiv tionship is the only relationship in Bush mals are hunted by a party and belong to d
ingn , borrowing and lending, and enter man society in which authority is the owner of the first arrow to penetrate u tainment in the form of visiting, talking inherent. Parental duties, however, are the animal sufficiently for its poison to y
anda dancing. Their sociability is more considered to be more important than take effect. As a result of the common
w practice of borrowing and lending, the
thane just a valued end in itself; it also parental rights. t
playsa a pragmatic role. Sharing posses A man's familial duties extend owner of the arrow need not be one of G
sions, for example, not only strengthens beyond the parental sphere and include the hunters and, indeed, may be male or t
thee sense of feIJowship, but also pro a duty to support his own and his wife's female. The owner has to distribute the n motesi the mobility of the band. Talking parents, siblings, and other dependent meat, as large animals are shared with b
keepsa them in touch with one another's close relatives. Should a man decide to everyone in the band, visitors included , S according to definite rules. Whoever feelings,y releases tensions, and IS migrate, he takes with him those among b
d e c u
176d Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3,1989 o r p e R ------Developrnent
receives, later gives in turn, so that . 1 1 everybody gets some meat. 1 1 1 Hunting parties seldom consist of 1 1 more than four or five men and have no ,,1 formal leader. Once an animal has been , ,, 1 1 1 , wounded, the hunters may follow it into 1 I , I the territory of a neighbouring band. , I Should neighbours cross the hunters' Khoi-Khoi before 2000 years ago l' track, they will be given a present of ", meat, but no tribute is obligatory. ,,,,' Law of succession: As personal pro perty is extremely scarce in Bushman ./""" ", ° 0 society, and of neither great nor lasting , ...... value, succession to interests in gift giving partnerships is the only important
issue. In order to ensure the continua occupied all of tion of major partnerships, older Bush Southern Africa men, on becoming less mobile and less productive, will gradually pass their partnerships on to their children or younger siblings. If a partnership has not A,C Bushmen People been disposed of by the deceased, his B,D,E Khoi-Khoi People B Khoi-speaking people children or siblings may ask the remain with Bushmen way of life ing partners to continue the relationship by offering them his possessions. D Bushmen language areas
Contract law: Without a social con _ Khoi language areas tract, there would be no band society. o 400 BOO km However, the need for private contracts LI__ -'..1 __ --', - contracts between individual band (;]1 )
members0 on individual matters, is less
1 Distribution of Bushmen and Khoi-speaking peoples, 1960 (Source: Thomas T10u & Alec Campbell,
apparent.0 Certain forms of contract are History of Botswana, Gaborone: Macmillan, 1984) 2 frowned upon, notably commercial con d
tractse , as bargaining is seen as likely to t Alien inroads on Kalahari of Good Hope in 1652, considerable createa social tension.
d hostility existed between the Khoi-Khoi
( Bushman society Social wrongdoing: The small, face r and the Bushmen. to-facee and indeed "footprint-to-foot
h Traditional Kalahari Bushman society It was approximately 2 000 years ago s
print"i community of the Bushman band l lacked the resources to resist the incur that Bantu-speakers first appeared in isb generally at peace, as there is little sions of the Khoi-Khoi, Bantu-speakers Southern Africa. They were an Iron Age u
inclinationP or scope for antisocial action.
and Europeans. people who lived a sedentary life as Thee wrongdoings which are most fear
h The Khoi-Khoi emerged in Southern farmers-cum-pastoralists, and were t ed, occur least - namely physical vio African some 4 000 years ago. Entering grouped in chiefdoms, and later even y
lence,b incest, flagrant adultery, and from the West they gradually spread kingdoms headed by a paramount chief. theft.d Most disputes concern the dis
e over a wide area, the core of which today The first Bantu-speakers to arrive in tributiont of food. n is the Cape Province of the Republic of Southern Africa entered via the east a
r Settlement of disputes: Disputes South Africa. The Khoi-Khoi were coast, and settled in what is today Swazi g among individual members of the band Stone Age nomads who kept herds of land, Natal, Transkei and Ciskei . These e arec judged by band opinion and con cattle and sheep in addition to being migrants were given the name of Nguni, n
trollede by band action, rather than being hunter-gatherers. They moved around after their particular Bantu dialect. The c i l
settled by the parties concerned. As vio in groups, each with its own leader. second wave of Bantu-speaking settlers r
lencee is greatly feared, the band will For a long time the Khoi-Khoi and the consisted of people using the Sotho dia d
maken every effort to solve a dispute Bushmen lived in peace, so much so that lect, of which Tswana forms a subgroup. u
through discussion which, in appro their contact resulted in the emergence They entered inland and concentrated in y
priatea cases, may take the form of public of remarkable physical and linguistic present-day Botswana, Transvaal,
shamingw and ridicule. If a dispute cannot resemblances. But as the herds of the Orange Free State and Lesotho. e t
bea resolved in this manner and the offen Khoi-Khoi increased, the resources of The Bantu-speaking tribes and the G
der is unwilling to leave the band, he will the Bushmen came under pressure, with Bushmen certainly did not clash when t
bee "eased out". However, an offender's the result that the Bushmen sometimes they first met. In fact, all the evidence n departurei could be more harmful to the preyed upon the Khoi-Khoi's domesti points towards considerable intermixing b
banda than his original offence. Everyef cated animals. Historical records show over a long period. Early rock paintings S that when the Dutch settled at the Cape depict scenes of peaceful coexistence; fort,y therefore, is made to avoid conflict. b
d e c u
Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 177 o r p e R Oev&opment------
Bushman features, such as a light skin colour, almond-shaped eyes, thin lips .. .- ...) ZAMBIA and high cheekbones, are common .-', ./" . ,/ .- ... ~~ ... - / among the Bantu-speakers of Southern ~" \ Africa; and "click" phonemes were in !Kung corporated by the Swazi, the Zulu, the ::; ~" ZIMBABWE Xhosa and the Southern Sotho into their co languages. ~ However, as the Bantu-speaking ofd Bantu-speaking masters. Living on e thet fringes of Bantu village society, the a Central Kalahari Game Reserve d I::: :::-J Bushman( serfs would hunt for skins, (;]1 lookr after stock, clear agricultural fields, e andh do domestic work in return for pro s Distribution of Bushmen in Botswana (Source: Jiro Tanaka, The San - Hunter-gatherers of the Kala i tectionl and a constant supply of food . hari, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1980) b Amongu the Bantu-speakers in the P western part of Southern Africa, the could no longer be legally held in post-independence elite of prominent e Tswanah in particular have made, and "slavery". Nothing, however, was done cattle-owners has become rather sophis t stilly make, use of Bushman labour in this to alleviate the economic plight of the ticated and ranks among its members b fashion. Bushmen concerned, They were left in the country's leading politicians, civil d e These days, the Bushmen in Tswana the hands of their masters, who not only servants, entrepreneurs, and other lead t societyn are treated humanely, but they continued to exploit their labour but ing wage-earners. Certainly, commer a arer still denied tribal membership and also attracted additional Bushman tri cial beef production along capitalist lines g cane therefore not lay claim to the use of butary labour as they extended the per is uppermost in their minds. c tribaln land or access to the tribal courts. manent grazing area for their herds Indeed, it was in order to promote e Intermarriagec is rare, especially be further into the Kalahari. This extension commercial beef production that the i l tween Bantu women and Bushman was made possible by drilling boreholes Botswana government launched its r men.e -- a technique introduced by the Euro "National Policy on Tribal Grazing d n It used to be the tribal chiefs and other peans -- which made it possible for live Land" in 1975. This policy brought u prominent members of the tribe who stock to stay in the Kalahari throughout about fundamental changes in the exist y owneda Bushman serfs. Serfs and their the year. ing system of tribal land tenure. Im w descendantse were permanently attached Whereas hitherto Botswana's leading plemented by Land Boards, the policy t toa the households of their masters. In tribal cattle-owners have accommoda divides the country's tribal land into G termst of Tswana tribal law they could be ted the local Bushmen, they are now in three different types: traditional com inheritede , and could be sold, lent or creasingly regarding their arrangement munal zones, in respect of which the n i givenb away. In 1936, under the British with the Bushmen as a liability, in that customary system of land tenure is re a administration,S the Bushman serfs were the Bushmen's consumption is said to tained; new commercial zones to be formallyy freed , in the sense that they outweigh their productivity. Botswana's leased to and be fenced by individual b d e c u 178d Africa Insight, vol 19, n03, 1989 o r p e R ------Development owners of large herds, for commercial ranching; and additional reserves to be set aside for the future as a safeguard for the "poorer members of the population" . However, it soon became apparent that the policy had been based on a mirage. Botswana simply does not have the vast tracts of land promised for com mercial ranching or as a future safeguard for the poor. The pressure on over grazed communal lands has not been alleviated, and the change from cattle herding around cattle-posts to commer cial cattle-ranching within fenced lands is bound to hurt the Bushmen in parti cular. Apart from the detrimental effect of fences on the hunting and gathering economy of the Bushmen, leaseholders may resort to an "exclusive" mode of land tenure, easing out, if not ordering off the land, all unwanted people. Lite rally thousands of Bushmen, among others, could be dispossessed in this way, and their fate will be similar to that of the Bushman squatters in the Ghanzi district. Ghanzi lies in the central-western Kalahari, not far from Botswana's bor der with Namibia. Until the turn of this century,) Ghanzi was Bushman country. 0 Today1 , the Bushmen of Ghanzi, of 0 whom2 there are approximately 5 000, ared merely squatters on a block of free e t holda ranches. The Ghanzi farm block is d a( relic of the infamous European "Scrambler for Africa". In 1898, in order e toh prevent German expansion from s i Southl West Africa (Namibia) east b wards,u Cecil John Rhodes' British South P African Company settled some twenty e impoverishedh Boer families - mostly t fromy the defunct Republic of Goshen in b the western Transvaal - as leasehold d e rancherst in the Ghanzi area. n These early European settlers sank a wellsr but did not fence their lands, using g Bushmane labour to herd their cattle. c Then mode of land tenure of the early e settlersc was '''inclusive'' in the sense that i l over and above the rations the Bushmen r receivede in return for farm and domestic d labour,n they were aI/owed, albeit grudg u ingly, to hunt and gather on the farms. control, converted the system of land Bushmen" were reduced to the status of y Gradually,a a class of "farm Bushmen" tenure in respect of the Ghanzi farming squatters. The days of casual, inter w developed,e consisting of numerous block from leasehold to freehold. New mittent, unskilled labour interspersed t smalla groups, more or less permanently ranches were proclaimed and put up for with periods of hunting and gathering G attached to the European ranches. sale. Many were acquired by outsiders. were gone. With the ranches fenced in , t However,e this arrangement between One condition of sale was that the pur modem ranching techniques were intro n i ranchersb and Bushmen was not to last. chaser must erect boundary fences. As duced and trucks were used to transport a S In 1959, the country's central admini cattle-breeding became increasingly cattle to the abattoir in Lobatse instead stration,y which was still under British sophisticated, more and more "farm of trekking cattle across the Kalahari. b d e c u Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 179 o r p e R Deve/oprnent------ Many Bushman herdsmen became re culture. and their own inherited lack of embarked upon an international inquiry dundant. Cash wages were introduced self-esteem. into slavery, the British government. and attracted Bantu-speakers. who are through its High Commissioner in South regarded by the ranchers as more skilled Africa. issued a declaration to the effect farm labourers and are employed more that it was opposed to the practice of readily than Bushmen. This is true parti The position of the Bushmen compulsory labour in the Bechuanaland cularly of the big ranches. most of which under the national law of Protectorate. In 1936. upon further are now run by companies in order to pressure from the International Labour gain tax benefits and comply with Botswana Organization. the High Commissioner government policy that the ranches be The colonial government (1885-1966) issued two proclamations: the Native Botswana-owned. regarded the Tswana tribes as its prin Labourers' (Protection) Proclamation At present. an estimated 90 per cent cipal concern. for Britain had extended and the Affirmation of the Abolition of of the Bushmen in the Ghanzi district its jurisdiction to "Bechuanaland" at the Slavery Proclamation. The first of these are unemployed squatters on the request of the Tswana chiefs. who de regulated the conditions under which ranches and the Ghanzi commonage. sired protection against Boer incursions. "natives" could be employed as ser They beg for food and resort to stock Committed to a policy of preserving vants; the second "affirmed" that "the theft as game and wild plant foods are tribal political organization in principle, legal status of slavery does not exist, and suddenly no longer found in the area. the colonial government set up a system that slavery in any form whatsoever is Economic deprivation has been accom of indirect rule. with tribal Tswana unlawful". panied by serious social disruption. chiefs acting as its agents within defined In 1966, the Bechuanaland Protecto Commercial competition among these tribal territories. rate became the independent Republic "squatter Bushmen" has replaced the The colonial administration made no of Botswana. The new government con custom of open-handed sharing. and special provision for the Bushmen. who tinued to recognize tribal chiefs. tribal alcoholism, promiscuity and prostitu were assigned neither land nor a role in courts, tribal law and tribal land. The tion are rife. government. A measure of protection Bushmen. however. remained a land The plight of the Ghanzi Bushmen was offered to their laws. however, less class with no institutions of their raises the question of the acculturation albeit on paper rather than in practice. own, although they are recognized in of Bushman society in Ghanzi and in Section 4 of the Bechuanaland Protec terms of the Independence Constitution Botswana as a whole. torate General Administration Order in and its enforceable Bill of Rights as full ) It is indeed striking that all over Bot Council of 9 May 1891 is relevant in this and equal citizens. 0 swana,1 even among the most sedentary regard. It enjoined the High Commis A remarkable illustration of the Bush 0 Bushmen.2 the organizational model of sioner to "respect any native laws and men's full and equal citizenship is pro Bushmand society has remained close to customs by which the civil relations of vided by the Boake case - criminal trial e t thata of the traditional, mobile band any native chiefs, tribes or populations 32 of 1978 (23 November 1978) in the d society.( Until now, alien cultures have under Her Majesty's protection are now High Court of Botswana. The accused. a hadr but a marginal effect on traditional regulated. except so far as the same may 23-year-old Bushman herdsman. had e h been charged with the murder of a tribal Bushmans culture. Although contact be incompatible with the due exercise of i withl alien cultures resulted in the Her Majesty's power and jurisdiction" policeman in the Kalahari. Counsel for b majorityu of Bushmen leading a sen (my emphasis) when issuing proclama the defence endeavoured to introduce P dentary life around boreholes, tribal tions for the protectorate. the customary ideas and practices of the e h villagest and ranches, and sometimes Acknowledging the existence of a area in order to show that the accused's eveny in the disappearance of the band "Bushman problem", the colonial behaviour was perfectly reasonable b structure, band values have survived. administration declined to make a deci within his frame of reference. Chief Jus d e Somet areas have acquired hereditary sion in favour of either integration or tice Hayfron-Benjamin. who heard the headmen.n but their status is not the same segregation. In fact, its concern for the case. was unconvinced. "Underdeve a r Bushmen never extended beyond offer lopment". he said, "is a misfortune. and asg that of the African tribal chief. Alien beliefse - Bantu as well as European - ing protection against ill-treatment by no useful purpose would be served by c haven also had an impact on Bushman others, and even this limited form of treating it as a privilege. The standard of e c concern was rather ambiguous. conduct required by law of all persons is culturei by bringing a new content to the l traditionalr trance dance and giving rise Informed by concerned European that of a reasonable man." Having said e missionaries of the ill-treatment of this, he proceeded to analyse the evi tod a group of professional traditional healers.n Bushmen by Tswana tribesmen, the dence and concluded that the accused u had been the victim of an unlawful arrest y So far, the acculturation process has colonial administration initially denied beena slow and gradual. but post the missionaries' allegations that Bush and wrongful imprisonment by the de w independencee educational and other men were held in slavery, choosing to ceased policeman. with prospects of t developmenta programmes have brought describe the position of those Bushmen subsequent improper prosecution. As a G who were permanently attached to matter of law he had been entitled to use aboutt a different pattern. Young Bush e Tswana tribesmen. as a form of "heredi reasonable force to extricate himself menn are losing interest in their traditions i andb culture. This should come as little tary service". from the position in which he had been a surpriseS in view of the disregard of other In 1926, however. under pressure placed. The question was whether the sectorsy of the population for Bushman from the League of Nations which had prosecution had established that the b d e c u d Africa Insight, vo119, no 3, 1989 180o r p e R ------Deve0pment force used by the accused had in the cir Programme", which began as an Republic of Botswana, Bushmen natu cumstances been unreasonable. In the American private initiative. In 1975, rally have the right to vote, access to the opinion of the Chief Justice the answer however, this special programme was general law courts, and -- if they have to this question lay, at least partially, in incorporated in a new "Remote Area the necessary capital -- the chance of the country's Constitution: "The right to Development Programme" (RADP), acquiring freehold land in the freehold liberty is enshrined in the Constitution, applicable to "all those living outside areas. In practice, however, the Bush and to subject its enjoyment to con organized village settlements". Remote men are a marginal people. Now they ditions of humiliation would be demand Area Development Officers are now are being told by the central government ing and unreasonable. To fight to be free attached to the District Councils, but to integrate with the rest of the popula cannot be regarded as unreasonable may run their own projects using central tion. The fact that the Bushmen have the conduct." After scrutinizing the circum government funds. International aid least say in how this integration should stances which had led the accused to donors make available additional funds take place is a fatal flaw in the govern attack the deceased with a knife, the for specific projects, and local welfare ment's policy. Chief Justice acquitted him, as the use of organizations, churches and concerned the knife in the circumstances could not individuals also give assistance. be said to have been so excessive as to The RADP is in line with the Bot have been unreasonable. swana government's reluctance to run The position of the Bushmen in Whereas the court's interpretation of separate development schemes for the the right to freedom must have caused benefit of ethnic groups. It is also an international law unease in executive quarters, the court's attempt to divert international attention The last few years have witnessed in remark that no useful purpose is served away from the plight of the much creased international attention on the by treating underdevelopment as a privi publicized Bushmen and towards the rights of indigenous or aboriginal lege was undoubtedly welcomed by government's national social welfare peoples, as special minority groups. In government. Any scheme which is "for programme. The truth is that the RADP 1971, the United Nations' Commission Bushmen only" is felt by the govern faces some very serious problems with on Human Rights' Sub-Commission on ment to compromise its ideology of regard to the Bushmen. the Prevention of Discrimination and nationalism. Central government encourages Protection of Minorities initiated a study The government of Botswana has Bushmen to congregate in villages, but of the problem of discrimination against stated as its policy the integration of all individual Bushman bands often prefer indigenous popUlations. This was com the) country's 30 000 Bushmen with the to have their own development scheme pleted in 1983 and now serves as a guide 0 rest1 of the country's popUlation, which or to be left alone. On the other hand, line for the Working Group on Indige 0 now2 stands at approximately one mil what hope is there of having Bushmen nous Populations, appointed by the Sub lion.d The following quotation from the who are long-term residents in the tribal Commission in 1982 to prepare a "Draft e Botswanat Daily News of 8 February 1988 areas admitted to tribal membership, Declaration on Indigenous Rights" for a d is ( indicative of the government's deter should they want it? As a matter of in approval by the UN General Assembly. mination:r terest, the country's statute law contains The first problem the Working Group e h no definition of "tribesmen". The was called upon to resolve, concerned s For many years, the government has i l been persuading Basarwa [Bushmen 1 Customary Law Act of 1969 distin the definition of the term "indigenous". b u who live in the Central Kgalagadi Game guishes between two categories of Whereas most UN mem ber states agree P Reserve that outside the reserve lies a "tribesmen". The first category consists that indigenous or aboriginal minority e better life. The reasons the government h of members of a "particular tribe", but groups deserve special state protection t puts before them are that the game re y the Act is silent about the criteria of such and that their position is a matter of legi b serve should be secured for animals as it membership. The second category is timate concern to the UN, some mem d is in the interest of the nation. The e composed of members of a "tribal com ber states prefer the view that problems t government has reserved a placc for n munity" which is defined in the Act as a concerning indigenous populations arise a them outside the game reserve where r community living outside a tribal terri only where there are imported popula g they will be provided with social facilities e such as clinics, schools and water, where tory, but organized in a tribal manner. tions of Europeans, as in the Americas c n they can settle and build permanent Most likely, it was the intention to in and Australasia. In recent years this e c homes. clude the Bushman bands in this cate attempt to associate indigenousness i l This quotation is from a report on an gory. In terms of the Tribal Land Act of with historic European colonialism has r addresse by the Ghanzi District Commis 1968, Bushmen -- provided they can begun to break down. d sionern explaining to Bushmen living in prove established tribal residence - The next item on the agenda of the u the game reserve why they have been ought to qualify as "tribesmen" so that Working Group was to define the con y askeda to leave the reserve. The govern tribal land may be allocated to them. tent of indigenous or aboriginal rights. w ment'se development policy for the Bush With regard to the tribal courts, the In this respect one may observe increas t mena clearly concentrates on the provi Customary Courts Act of 1961 enables ing support among UN member states G sion of major social services, the three "non-tribesmen", upon their consent in for a "bottom-up" policy which allows t primarye areas being health, education writing, to be defendants in a civil trial or an indigenous population to determine n i andb domestic water supply. the accused in a criminal trial, before a its own place in the national society, a For about five years the govern rather than for a "top-down" policy of S tribal court. menty had a "Bushman Development As full and equal citizens of the integration and assimilation. There is a b d e c u Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3,1989 181 o r p e R Oeve/oprnent------ growing recognition of the need for will it be possible to ascertain and pro neighbours, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard affirmative action - action which ex vide for the Bushmen's particular needs University Press, 1976. tends beyond mere non-discrimination. within the broader framework of the Marshall, L, "Kung Bushman bands", Africa, The focus is on cultural rights, land nation state. Such an approach would be vol 30, 1960. Marshall, L, The Kung of Nyae Nyae, Cam rights and collective political rights, all in line with the Botswana government's bridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, within the framework of the national declared policy of "therisanyo", which 1976. state. UN member states are agreed that means "consultation". Roberts. S, Order and dispute: An introduction the right to secede should not form part to legal anthropology. Harmondsworth: of the aboriginal rights presently being Penguin, 1979. formulated. However, this does not Russell, M, "Slaves or workers? Relations be tween Bushmen, Tswana, and Boers in the deny an aboriginal people the right to Kalahari", Journal of Southern African what may be described as "internal" - Bibliography Studies, vol 2, 1976. as distinct from "external" - self Barnard, A, "Basarwa settlement patterns in Silberbauer, G B, Hunter and habitat in the determination. the Ghanzi ranching area", Botswana Notes central Kalahari Desert, Cambridge: Cam and Record5, vol 12. 1980. bridge University Press, 1981. Barsh, R L, "Indigenous peoples: an emerging Silberbauer, G B, and A J Kuper, "Kgalagadi object of international law". American masters and Bushman serfs: Some obser Journal of International Law, vol 80. 1986. vations", African Studies, vol 25, 1966. Conclusion Ebert, J L "Comparability between hunter Stephen, D, The San of the Kalahari, London: gatherer groups in the past and present: Minority Rights Group, Report no 56,1982. Growing international recogmtton of modernization versus explanation", Bot Steyn, H P, Die Kalahari-Boesmans, Pretoria, aboriginal rights ought to help the Bot swana Notes and Records. vol 10, 1978. HAUM (2nd ed). 1983. swana government to overcome its un Elphick. R, Khoi-Khoi and the founding of Tanaka, J. The San hunter-gatherers of the ease towards a special development pro white South Africa, Johannesburg: Ravan Kalahari, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. 1980. gramme for its Bushman population, as Press. 1985. Cadibolae. M N. "Serfdom (bolata) in the Tlou, T. and A Campbell, History of Botswana. well as to overcome its qualms that to Natal area 1926-1960". Botswana Notes and Gaborone: Macmillan, 1984. allocate certain areas to the Bushmen Records. vol 17, 1985. Tobias, P V, (ed), The Bushmen: San hunter.1 for their exclusive use would be to set up Gelburt, D J, "Indicators of culture change and gatherers of Southern Africa, Cape South African-type "homelands". In among the Dobe !Kung San", Botswana Town: Human and Rousseau, 1978. fact, it is hard to see how national princi Notes and Records, vol 10, 1978. Van der Post, L. and J Taylor, Testament to the Guenther, M G, "Kalahari Bushmen in transi Bushmen, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985. ) ples could be compromised by a deve Werbner, R P, (ed). Land reform in the mak 0 tion", Rotunda. vol 4, 1971. 1 lopment scheme for Bushmen providing Guenther, M G, "The trance dancer as an ing: Tradition. public policy and ideology in 0 2 for Bushman land, in a country which, in agent of social change among the farm Botswana, London: Rex Collings, 1982. d its very core, is structurally plural and Bushmen of the Ghanzi District", Botswana (Previously published in the Journal of e t acknowledges the institution of tribal Notes and Records, vol 7. 1975. African Law, Special Number. Spring a 1980.) d land. Guenther, M G. "San acculturation and incor ( poration in the ranching areas of the Ghanzi Wily, L, Official policy towards San (Bushmen) r People need a land base if they are to e District: Some urgent anthropological hunter-gatherers in modern Botswana: h develop in their own right. In view of the s issues". Botswana Noles and Records. vol 7, 1966- i l individualistic nature of Bushman 1975. 1978, Gaborone: National Institute of b Development and Cultural Research, u bands, various territories will have to be Guenther. M G, "Bushman hunters as farm P Gaborone. Botswana, Working Paper no set aside for them. Nevertheless, Bush labourers", Canadian Journal of African e 23, 1979. h man band structure perhaps provides Studies, vol 11, 1977. t more of a solution to economic prob Hermans, J, "Official policy towards the Bush Woodhouse, B, The Bushman art of Southern y Africa, Cape Town: Purnell, 1979. b men of Botswana: A review, Part I", Bot lems than to socio-political ones, and Yellen. Y E, "The process of Basarwa assimila d swana Notes and Records, vol 9. 1977. e may well be dispensable where the tion in Botswana", Botswana Notes and t Lee, R B, and I Devore (eds) , Man the hunter, n Bushmen's economy is no longer based Chicago: Aldine, 1968. Records. vol 17. 1985. a r primarily on subsistence hunting and Lee, R B, and I Devore (eds), Kalahari hunter g gathering. Only through consultation gatherers: Studies of the !Kung San and their e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u 182d Africa Insight. vol 19. no 3. 1989 o r p e R ------Bookshelf The military and politics in Nkrumah's Ghana by Simon This book focuses especially on the character of the post Baynham. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1988, 294 colonial state in Africa, the nature of and reasons for state pp. ISBN 0 8133 7063 9. deterioration, and the mechanisms and policies for coping Since the 1966 coup d'etat against Nkrumah, Ghana has had with state malfunction. Scholars from Africa, the United four more military interventions and has experienced less States, Europe and the Middle East combine a broad under than five years of civilian rule. In order to identify the standing of African political processes with expertise on reasons that first led the armed forces to intervene in politics, specific regions. Their analytical and comparative perspec Dr Baynham assesses the impact of British colonial with tive provides a comprehensive and timely treatment of this drawal and officer Africanization on Ghana's pattern of civil vital and hitherto neglected theme in African politics. military relations. The book is based on documents from the Ghanaian Ministry of Defence and on interviews with 96 Ghanaian and British army officers, civil servants and politicians. Satisfying Africa's food needs: Food production and commercialisation in African agriculture edited by Ronald Cohen. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988,243 pp. Women and the state in Africa edited by Jane L Parpart ISBN 1 55587116 X. ) and0 Kathleen A Staudt. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989, 229 Outside Africa, especially in the Western capitalist nations, 1 pp.0 ISBN 1 55587082 1. . the dramatic news L0verage of starving and disabled peoples 2 has stimulated increased aid from both public and private Ind this book the authors assert the particularity of women's e t sources. The problem of developing food self-sufficiency is relationa to the state in Africa and, accordingly, the need to d still the truly pressing issue. Christopher Delgado points out study( gender-state relations in order to understand both the that, despite the good rains of the mid-1980s, long-term vul naturer of the state and women's place in it. Exploring e nerability remains. He discusses the setting of priorities for women'sh degree of access to the apparatus of the state, the s i promotine,'African food production. In his chapter on break consequencesl of their under-representation, and the mecha b ing the spell of mono-culture, Goran Hyden concludes that nismsu they have evolved to cope with their slender hold on P Africa's crisis is less a matter of the inability of the peasant the levers of power, the book includes discussions of general e producers to feed the continent than an institutional and theoreticalh debates followed by case studies from Nigeria, t policy problem that has to be resolved through a redirection Zaire,y Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. An analytical con b clusion places the material in a global context. not only of African governments but also of the official donor d agencies, whether bilateral or multilateral. The Nigerian e t n case is discussed in much detail, with contributions from a Ther precarious balance: State and society in Africa edi Akin L Mabogunje and Ronald Cohen. g tede by Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan. Boulder: c Westview,n 1988, 157 pp. ISBN 086531 738 O. e c Thomas Sankara speaks: The Burkina Faso revolution i Sincel independence, the political institutions of many 1983-87 translated by Samantha Anderson. New York: r Africane states have undergone a process of consolidation Pathfinder, 1988.206 pp. ISBN 0 87348 5262 paper. andd subsequent deterioration. Constrained by external n economicu dependency and an acute scarcity of economic and The collection of speeches and interviews of Thomas technicaly resources, state officials have demonstrated a dimi Sankara spans the period from March 1983 to October 1987, a nishedw capacity to regulate their societies. Public policies are just before he was assasinated. The book's purpose is to e agreedt upon but ineffectively implemented by the weak make Sankara's political legacy available in English for the a institutionsG of the state. Although scholars have analysed the first time. Sankara practised internationalism, an inter t variouse facets of state-building in detail, little systematic nationalism completely intertwined with his commitment to n attentioni has been given to the issues of the decline of the defend the interests of the Burkinabe workers. He fought for b statea and mechanisms to cope with state ineffectiveness in various causes in the world, from South Africa to Nicaragua S Africa. to Cuba to Third World debt. y b d e c u Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 183 o r p e R Booksheff------ The long struggle of Eritrea edited by Lionel Cliffe and The fuelwood trap: A study of the SADCC region by Basil Davidson. Nottingham: Spokesman, 1988, 215 pp. Barry Munslow with Yemi Katerere, Adriaan Ferf and Phil ISBN 085124463 7 Pbk. O'Keefe. London: Earthscan in association with ETC Foun dation. 1988. 181 pp. ISBN 185383007 O. The area known as the "Horn of Africa" is facing the very real prospect of major political change. In Africa's longest The more than 60 million people in the SADCC countries war of national liberation we are seeing what may well be a will increase to over 1oo million by the year 20oo. Both the significant shift in the military balance in favour of the city-dwellers and the farmers rely on wood for domestic use Eritrean resistance movement. This could herald the final and supplies are diminishing as consumption grows. These defeat of Ethiopia's claim to Eritrea, especially if the ruling phenomena flow from a complex network of causes each Dergue loses Soviet support. This book provides back contributing in its way to growing poverty and want, which ground to the struggle, Lionel Cliffe puts the liberation has, as one obvious symptom, the shortage of fuel for life's struggle in comparative perspective, Mary Dines and Roy basic purposes. Pateman look at the effects of the war, and Basil Davidson The authors, by means of case studies, examine those concludes with conditions for peace in Eritrea and Ethiopia, causes throughout the nine SADCC countries and consider and the role of the outside world. the policies that can be developed there which will not only help to alleviate the symptom but will help to prevent the imminent catastrophe which it represents. The Hom of Africa: A strategic survey International Secu rity Council. Washington, D.C. 1989.68 pp. Elections in Nigeria: A grassroots experience by William Public awareness of this region, and of its many problems, Miles. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 1988. 168 pp. has tended to be fitful and superficial. Most recently, hor ISBN 1 55587054 6. rendous drought and famine in Ethiopia and Somalia have captured the interest of the West and evoked some response, This book presents a case study of what the electoral process but even so, yesterday's headlines are soon forgotten. In this in Nigeria has meant, both on a "micro" level and in cultural study that was undertaken by Lij Imru Zelleke at the request ly specific terms. The scale of perspective is that of a single of the International Security Council, Ambassador Zelleke rural village and its outlying district. Based on formal inter looks at the historical background, economic conditions and views and informal discussions with local party candidates military role and status in the strategic context of Ethiopia, and leaders, attendance at local political rallies, observation Somalia and Djibouti. of actual voting and tabulation, and general participation in ) 0 Recently the region of the Hom has taken on new geo the daily lives of rural villagers before, during and after the 1 political0 and strategic dimensions, in view of its importance campaign itself, the book provides an anthropological per 2 to African politics generally; its position towards the spective to the political scientist's domain. d e t Arabian peninsula and the Gulf. where more than a third of a d the world's energy sources is situated and lastly the outreach ( r of the Soviet Union into South Yemen and Ethiopia itself. e h s i l b u P e h t y b d e t n a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u 184d Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 o r p e R ------Africa monitor African Monitor April to June 1989 Jenny Macgregor NORTH AFRICA recent rapprochement between Chad and Libya Libya and Habn::'s policy of bringing former The defection of a Libyan helicopter pilot exiled opponents into the government are headed for Sudan, to Egypt on 27 April, has thought to have been the plotters' major brought to the fore the constant aid which grievanees (AC 14/4,2&'4; AA 14/4; ION 15/4; Algeria Libya is supplying to the Sudanese govern AED 24/4, 5/6; SWB 211/4; WA 24/4). ment. Observers have suggested that Libya is Borrowing for the first time from the IMF, Relations with Libya and Sudan have be putting pressure on Pres Museveni of Uganda Algeria has been granted a $592 mn loan. The come increasingly tense due to an apparent to allow Libyan military aid intended for the package includes a $376 mn compensatory build-up of Libyan and pro-Libyan Arab beseiged government garrisons in South financing facility to help pay for cereal im nationalist forces in Sudan's western province Sudan to cross Ugandan territory (SWB 211/4, ports, which almost doubled last year to $6lXl of Darfur. Chad has accused Libya of pre par 3/5; ION 6/5). mn.) This year about 70 per cent of foreign ing to attack the country, despite the 1987 0 (Opening of the border - see Egypt; Rising exchange1 earnings arc supposed to be spent agreement to cease hostilities (AA 14/4; tensions - see Chad; Bourri oil field - see on0 servicing the country's estimated $23 bn AED 19/6). 2 Tunisia; Libyan nationals expelled - see foreignd debt (AED 5/6). Burundi.) e t Opposition groups are organizing publicly a Egypt on an unprecedented scale following the d ( government's adoption of a law authorizing Pres Mubarak has dismissed the man pre r Morocco thee formation of new political parties, a move viously regarded as his most likely successor, h thats will lead to a multi-party system in a defence and military production minister, The peace process begun with Polisario in i countryl which has been ruled solely by the Field Marshal Mohamed Abdel-Halim Abu January this year has lost momentum with the b Nationalu Liberation Front (FLN) since 1962. Ghazala, a move thought to be aimed at sepa failure of a second meeting to take place. The P Announcing the new developments, Pres rating him from his power base in the armed government's denial that a date had been e Chadlih told the FLN that it must fight for forces (DT 17/4; E 22/4; AED 24/4). fixed and its apparent refusal to arrange one, t popular acceptance of its socialist ideology as The opening of the Egyptian-Libyan bor has resulted in Polisario's withdrawal of its y b this can no longer be guaranteed by the con der, closed since 1977, was announced after '"goodwill gesture" of a promise to release stitutiond or by law (A ED 10/4; ACon 26/5; the Arab League's emergency summit in 200 of the 2 500 prisoners of war it holds. At e AAt 26/5; S 417). Morocco which readmitted Egypt to the present, however, there is little if any fighting n a A conclusive ruling has finally been League. (Egypt's membership of the League (ARB 15/6; DT 16/6; AA 23/6; AED 26/6). r reachedg on the 1972 agreement which defin was suspended in 1979 after it signed a sepa Morocco's economic performance has re e rate peace treaty with Israel.) The decision cently shown a sharp improvement: GOP in edc the Algerian-Moroccan border, marking ann important step towards the establishment followed a meeting at the summit between creased in 1988 by an estimated 8,2 per cent in e c Egyptian Pres Mubarak and Libyan leader, current prices; the current account. which ofi a stable Maghreb (ARB 15/6). l Col Gaddafi. Daily flights between the two moved into surplus in 1987 after reschedul r e countries have been resumed and a Libyan ing, remained in surplus last year; inflation Chadd n passenger ship has docked in Cairo for the has dropped to 2,5 per cent. the lowest figure u An unsuccessful attempt on 1 April to over first time in over a decade (C 22/5; DT 19/5, in more than a decade; and the budget deficit y throwa Pres Habn~ involved three of his closest 1/6, 5/6, 7/6, 22/6; AA 9/6). has been trimmed to 4,5 per eent of gross confidantsw - commander-in-chief Hassan Limited bilateral air links between South domestic product. Strong support from the e Djamous,t former army chief Idriss Deby, Africa and Egypt have been revived, after a IMF and the World Bank, which has commit anda interior minister Mahamat Ibrahim Itno, lapse of 25 years. The service, resumed in ted $3 bn to the country since 1980, as well as G Itnot was arrested the following day, but the June, is for the sole use of South African moves to lure foreign investors with new e othern two fled with a band of supporters to Muslim pilgrims, who then take connections economic liberalization policies designed to i Sudan,b where they applied for political from Cairo to Mecca (BD 15/6; S 16/6). boost exports, are seen as making a major a (Political asylum for Libyan pilot - see contribution to these achievements. In 1988 asylum,S a move which created tension be tweeny the two countries. Resentment at the Libya.) the trade deficit was reduced by 20 per cent to b d e c u Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3,1989 185 o r p e R Africa monitor ------ $1 bn, a dramatic improvement which offi elections for which there was an 82 per cent Burkina Faso cials attributed to an overall 25,6 per cent in turnout. In the parliamentary elections the Head of State, Capt Blaise Compaore has crease in exports in 1988 (TS 1714; ARB 31/5). ruling Democratic Constitutional Union carried out a major cabinet reshuffle primarily (Moroccan-Algerian border - see Algeria.) (RCD) gained 80 per cent of the votes and all intended to strengthen the position of parties 141 seats in the House of Representatives. supporting the ruling party (SWB 27/4; Sudan Opposition groups, the left-of-centre Move AED 1/5). On 3 April the parliament overwhelmingly ment of Socialist Democrats and the Islamic Movement, accused the government of irre approved Sadiq el-Mahdi's general policy Ghana statement on ways to speed the adoption of gularities (DN 4/4; SWB 5/4; AC 14/4). The the peace plan agreed in November 1988 be composition of the new government appoin A feasibility study at Bogosu has revealed a tween representatives of the rebel Sudanese ted by Pres Ben Ali remains largely un 54 per cent increase in the country's reserves People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and changed; however two non-members of the of gold-bearing ore to 10,2 mn tonnes of Sudan's Democratic Unionist Party ruling RCD were appointed to the cabinet (A ED 3/4; ARB 30/4). (DUP). A Sudanese government delegation (SWB 13/4; AED 17/4,24/4). The World Bank is to provide a credit of held talks with the SPLM in Addis Ababa Agreement was reached in April between $120 mn in support of the second phase of the from 8-10 April, but little of any substance Libya and Tunisia on exploration of the structural adjustment programme, which was discussed, though it was agreed that Bourri oil and gas field in the Gulf of Gabes, aims to maintain average economic growth of channels of communication would be main setting the seal on growing bilateral coopera 5 per cent a year. supported by increased in tained. tion and opening the way for a rapid expan vestment and domestic savings (WBN 20/4; On 10 April parliament voted 154-53 to sion of joint projects. Because of its AED 24/4; ARB 31/5). postpone the debate on the controversial proximity to the maritime border, the Inter Shari'a law issue until the convening of a con national Court of Justice in The Hague issued Liberia stitutional conference. This development a ruling in 1982 on the division of the shelf. Several million dollars have been raised fol occurred against a background of violent Tunisia, whose oil prospects are deteriorating lowing Pres Doe's official launch in April of a demonstrations by Islamic fundamentalists in rapidly, is the major beneficiary of the nationwide fund-raising drive to help repay Khartoum, the further deterioration of the accords (AED 24/4; ARB 31/5). the country's debts. The US Agency for economy and the capture by SPLA forces of A group of Tunisians have set up a Libyan International Development (USAID) has major garrison towns in the south of the style revolutionary committee movement threatened to suspend its programmes and country. and applied to the government for recogni cut off aid unless the USA receives payment The continued heavy fighting in the south tion as a political party (DT 28/6). of$7 mn arrears on interest owed. Liberia has seriously impeded the passage of relief sup a mounting US debt of $183 mn; it is also in plies provided by international donors ) debt tothe IMF for $650 mn and tothe World anxious to ease the plight of more than two 0 Bank for $180 mn. The West German 1 million civilians threatened with starvation. 0 government has recently suspended financial At2 the end of April the SPLA declared a uni aid worth $10,7 mn because of the non laterald month-long ceasefire, which was sub e repayment of loans (AED 3/4, 24/4; WA 1714; sequentlyt extended. The move was wel a ARB 31/5). comedd by Sadiq, but although some relief aid ( WEST AFRICA wasr facilitated, there still appeared to be little e urgency on either side to secure a lasting Mali h Benin s i peace. A cabinet reshuffle on 8 June brought the dis l The international fmancial rescue package b Meanwhile serious clashes occurred in missal of several long-serving ministers and Darfuru province in May, involving Fur tribes for Benin, which is presently going through the appointment of a number of close asso P its worst economic crisis since independence mene and the Arab nomads. As many as a ciates of Pres Traore. Minister of foreign h in 1960, has been completed with IMF ap t thousand people were reported dead, and affairs and international cooperation for the proval of a $27 mn structural adjustment faci therey were allegations of the involvement of past three years, Modibo Keita, has been re b iity. The comprehensive adjustment pro Libyans and Chadian refugees. placed by N'Golo Traore. The post of secre d gramme adopted by the government aims to e On 18 June Khartoum announced the frus tary-general to the presidency, held by t produce annual average real growth of 3 per trationn of a coup attempt by supporters of Django Cissoko, is now given cabinet status exileda ex-President Nimieri. A number of cent. This will be achieved mainly by reduc r (A ED 19/6). g ing the state's role in the economy and arrests followed. On 30 June Sadiq's govern Mali's plans for substantial investment in e encouraging greater reliance on market mentc was overthrown by a group of officers extending the electricity distribution network n mechanisms. Approval of the IMF credit e led by Brig Omar Hassan Ahmed el-Beshir. have received a boost with World Bank c gives the green light to external creditors to Ai "National Salvation Revolution Com approval of an International Development l proceed with renegotiation of the country's mandr Council" under el-Beshir's leadership Association loan of $33 mn. At present only 4 e outstanding debt. The government however, wasd set up to run the country (E 1/4; SWB 4/4, per cent of the population is supplied with n 12/4, 14/4, 19/4,8/5, 13/5,26/5,20/6; ION 8/4, remains vulnerable to any new outbreak of electricity (A ED 1/5, 8/5). u 27/5; AED 10/4, 8/5; TWR 26/4; AA 26/5; popular discontent (AED 26/6). y Mali is to exploit alluvial gold deposits in ARBa 15n). In a bid to ease growing civil service ten the southern part of the country. Production w sion, particularly in the teaching field which (Relationse with Chad - see Chad; Assistance at the mine is scheduled to start next year with t has been paralysed by strikes since January, froma Libya - see Libya; CAR breaks off a 2,2-tonnes output, rising to 3,7 tonnes a the banks were ordered on 5 May to pay diplomaticG relations - see CAR.) year by 1998 (AA 28/4; ARB 30/4; AB 5/89). t salaries for April 1989 to the country's 60 000 e n civil servants and soldiers, though salaries for Tunisiai Mauritania b the first quarter remain unpaid (AC 6/4, 21/4; Presa Ben Ali was returned to power with AED 24/4; WA 27/3, 8/5, 15/5; SWB 5/4, In April a clash between nomadic Maurita S y 99,27 per cent of the votes in the 2 April 19/4, 8/5). nian herders and black Senegalese farmers b d e c u d 186 Africa Insight, vol19, no 3,1989 o r p e R ------Africa monitor over grazing rights along the border between Assembly irreparably. The five-year ban on following payment of interest arrears. Higher the two West African states sparked ethnic party political activity was lifted on 3 May. than expected oil prices in the past few riots in both countries. The incident escalated Sometime in the third quarter of this year the months enabled the government to clear the because of the long-standing economic and government will select two parties to contest interest arrears. Thc agreement calls for the ethnic tensions between the two countries. parliamentary and presidential elections repayment of around $2 900 mn of medium An estimated 200 people were killed in (WA 1714, ISIS, 22/S; AC 2114; SWB SIS; and long-term debt, to begin in 1992; repay Mauritania, where between 3(X) (XX) and C 116; ARB IS/6). ment is in 17 years at 7/, per cent. Nigeria's SOO 000 Senegalese live, while in SenegaL Student-led protests against the govern total debt is put at around $30 bn (AED 19/6, where more than 30 000 Mauritanians live, ment erupted in Lagos on 31 May. bringing 26/6). between SO and 60 deaths were reported. the unrest which had spread across the Although strong trading links exist between country over the previous week to the heart the two countries, growing economic prob of the capital. Over 13 academic institutions Senegal lems have revealed many areas of conflict and were closed by the authorities after a week of Pres Diouf made a renewed bid to defuse the it is feared that the loss of life will make it rioting which resulted in an estimated 22 political crisis in his country by announcing a difficult to restore bilateral relations and to deaths. the temporary arrest of over 1 SOO series of constitutional reforms on 3 April. stave off adverse economic consequences. people and the loss of property worth about While pledging that bills would be tabled to The violence in Mauritania unleashed ill NHXl mn. Political activity in Lagos State was reform the electoral code and provide better feeling against French-speaking black Mauri banned. The protests have been fuelled by access to the official media for opposition tanians, who resent the political and econo rapidly falling living standards which the parties, he warned against public disorder, mic dominance of the Arabic-speaking students blame on the structural adjustment and ruled illegal a mass rally called by opposi Moors. Refugees and aid workers in Senegal policies in effect since 1986. The inflation rate tion leader Abdoulaye Wade, who has rejec have estimated that 20000 people. mostly exceeds SO per cent and per capita incomes ted all Dioufs reform proposals. The mea blacks. have been expelled from Mauritania have fallen from $670 in 1979 to $300 in 1988. sures are likely to be put into effect during the in the last month. not all of them illegally A wave of repression against critics of rural and municipal elections, originally resident Senegalese Africans as Mauritanian government policy, reports of numerous scheduled for November 1989, but now post officials claim. Deportees are said to be grow arrests and the harassment of "radicals" poned for a year. Opposition parties will also ing increasingly militant over their loss of pro around the country were reported as the be given greater access to the state-controlled perty and cattle left behind in Mauritania government attempted to re-establish media (SWB 7/4; AED 10/4; WA 1714). (SWB 27/4, liS, 9/S, ISIS, 29/5; AED 8/5; control. (Mauritania deporting Senegalese - see WA IS/S;JA3I1S. 7/6;E6/S, 10/6; ARB 311S, Accusations have been made that powerful Mauritania. ) IS/6; DT 16/6). opponents of the government, angered at being banned from politics. exploited the Sierra Leone ) public's widely-felt hostility towards the SAP Niger0 and coordinated the riots with the aim of On 3 April Sierra Leone adjusted its currency 1 On0 17 May at the ruling party's congress. Gen bringing down Pres Babangida. Leaflets by 49 per cent to $1 = Le6S, a move expected 2 Saibou was elected president of the country's carrying allegations about the president's to bring the country closer into line with IMF d newe supreme ruling body, the Conseil Supe "secret wealth" were apparently distributed recommendations and to break the deadlock t rieurea d'Orientation National (CSON) , the on campuses throughout the country, spark in negotiations with the Fund. Borrowing d guiding( body of the Mouvement National ing the riots. In June the government an from the Fund has been suspended until pourr la Societe du Developpement (MNSD) nounced a massive relief package designed to arrears of around $91.4 mn have been cleared e andh the future single party. The CSON will create 72 jobs, a programme to boost (AED 1714; AA 26/S; ARB 3I1S). s om i replacel the Supreme Military Council set up food production and the offer of assistance The government has taken control of b imports of hydrocarbons and decided to byu Pres Kountche and composed exclusively for the importation of vehicles for public P of higher ranking army officers. The congress transport. in an effort to ease the hardships nationalize the local refining company fol ise the first step towards a return to a normal caused by structural adjustment. It will pro lowing a serious shortage of petrol which h t constitutional life after 15 years of military vide N460 mn to implement the complete paralysed the country for three weeks at the y ruleb (SWB 23/S; ARB IS/6). package (AC 26/S; SWB 29/S, 216. 3/6, 14/6. end of April. Negligence by officials of the d In a wide-ranging cabinet reshuffle of 19 IS/6; C 216, 3/6; BD 2/6; E 3/6; AA 9/6, 23/6; parastatal company was given as the reason e May,t Pres Saibou dropped four soldiers, sig ARB 15/6; DT 15/6; WBN 15/6). for the move (AE&M 18/S; AA 916). nificantlyn reducing the number of soldiers Nigeria's first ever population policy has a r been launched by the federal government in holdingg ministerial portfolios to five, includ inge himself. There were II new appointments an attempt to check the annual growth rate, c ton the 24-member cabinet. The reshuffle - estimated at 3-4 per cent. The main thrust of e whichc also marked the return to the cabinet of the programme is to encourage four-children i l CENTRAL AFRICA Sani Bako and Almoustapha Soumaila. two families, as against the current average of six. r closee colleagues of the late Pres Kountche - The current population is estimated at be followedd Saibou's unanimous election as tween 106 mn and 110 mn; if the growth rate Cameroon n headu of the CSON (SWB 22/S; AED 29/S; remains unchecked Nigeria's population Aid donors have agreed to finance nearly SO JAy 3I1S). could rise to 160 mn by the year 2000, leaving per cent of the $144 mn tropical wood action a the country with a food deficit equal to 11 mil plan which, in collaboration with the United w e t lion tonnes of grain (WAilS; DT 7/6). Nations Development Programme and the Nigeriaa As from 1992, education up to junior UN Food and Agriculture Organization, G The draft constitution was submitted to the secondary level will be free and compulsory aims to rationalize and relaunch timber ex t Armede Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) for for every Nigerian child (ARB IS/6). ploitation. It has been estimated that 200 000 n finali approval on S April. The controversial An agreement with the London Club of ha of the country's 17 ,S mn ha of forest are b issuea of Shari'a law caused an eight-week delay commercial creditors for the rescheduling of destroyed each year because of population S and threatened to divide the Constituent $S.4 bn of debt came into effect on 14 June, pressure (AED 8/S; ARB 3014, 31/S). y b d e c u Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3, 19a9 187 o r p e R Africamonitor------ Cameroon is moving ahead with a struc plots have been rife in recent weeks in the C 12/6; AED 29/5, 19/6,26/6; TS 21/6). tural adjustment programme that is expected run-up to the ruling party's congress at the According to the UN Economic Commis to revitalize its once vibrant economy. Sup end of July at which major changes have been sion for Africa (ECA), Zambia and Zaire ported by a World Bank loan of$150 mn, the predicted (AC 717). failed to take full advantage of the un programme aims to improve the govern precedented increases in copper prices on the menfs financial management through world market during 1988 because of supply changes in the country's banking, public Gabon problems. Despite the fact that copper prices enterprise and agricultural sectors, in an A senior figure in Gabon's leading opposition ended the year 46 per cent higher than in effort to revive overall economic growth and movement, Father Paul M'8a Abessolo, re 1987, overall export commodity prices fell in end the recession caused by the 1986 oil price turned to Gabon in May after an exile lasting 1988 by an average of 12,9 per cent, with collapse (WBN 22/6; AED 26/6). Shortly more than 12 years. President of the National many key export commodities recording after negotiations with the bank were com Revival Movement (Morena) which emerged large declines (EASA 19/5). pleted, a Paris Club meeting of official credi in the 1970s as the main opposition force to Pres Mobutu hosted the summit of 18 tors agreed to reschedule around $550 mn of Gabon's one-party system, he met with the African heads of state at Gbadolite on 22 outstanding disbursed public external debt Pres Bongo to renew requests for a multi June to discuss ways of ending the 14-year-old which was put at $2785 mn at the end of 1987 party system (DN 15/5; SWB 16/5,23/5,21/6; civil war in Angola. After the meeting, atten (AED 5/6). JA 31/5). ded by Angolan government officials and Pres Biya has carried out a limited cabinet Unita rebels, a ceasefire was announced reshuffle of which the main feature is the (S 19/6, 20/6; BD 26/6; SWB 26/6). appointment of former justice minister Ben Sao Tome and Principe (Relations with Congo - see Congo.) jamin hoe to head the newly created Ministry At a meeting of aid donors organized by the of Tourism. Tourism is one of the sectors the UN Development Programme it was agreed government is seeking to expand in its search that Sao Tome's debt of $91 mn should be for additional revenue sources, to offset the renegotiated by the end of the year and that decline in oil receipts. Paul Tessa, the de facto half of it should be at lower levels than those EAST AFRICA prime minister, has been removed from the currently on the market. Concern was ex influential portfolio of secretary-general at pressed that without assurances of debt relief Burundi the Presidency and replaced by Akame and fresh funding the government may An estimated I 000 of the original 63 000 Mfoumou Edouard (SWB 1514; AED 24/4; abandon the economic liberalization pro refugees who fled to Rwanda following the WA 115). gramme (ARB 3(14). ethnic massacres last year, have refused to re turn to their country or, having returned, have gone back to Rwanda. The 31 May was Central African Republic Zaire ) the last day for voluntary repatriation under 0 Diplomatic relations with Sudan were broken Pres Mobutu announced a minor cabinet re the auspices of the UNHCR (SWB 3/6; ARB 1 0 off on 29 May - and the border closed - shuffle on 12 May - the third since October. 15/6). 2 following an incident the previous day in Among other changes, Mobutu has resumed About 70 Libyan diplomats and expa d e which an aircraft carrying Pres Kolingba to responsibility for defence, a portfolio he re t triates were expelled from Burundi on 5 April a Israel was turned back over Sudan "in accor linquished only in December. after 20 years. following what the government called con d ( dance with the Arab boycott of Israel". An The fonner minister. Nsinga Boyenge tinued "acts of destabilization" (SWB 7/4, r e agreement for political, economic and cul Mosambay, retains responsibility for ter 8/4, 1014; AED 1714). h s tural cooperation was signed by the foreign ritorial security and war veterans (SWB 15/5; i l ministers of Israel and the CAR at the subse AED 22/5; ARB 15/6). b Comoros u quent meeting (C 29/5; SWB 116; AED 5/6; The funding expected from the IMF in sup P ARB 15/6). port of the 1989-90 economic and financial Comoran exports increased by 84 per cent in e h programme came through on 9 June, when it 1988 over the previous year, while imports re t approved credits totalling $253 mn. The mained stable with a mere I per cent rise. The y Congo b agreement followed repayment to the IMF of improvement in exports is largely attributed d The government has launched a campaign for $128.1 mn arrears. Of the total. $144 mn is to the selling off of vanilla stocks accumulated e t debt ratios to be taken into account in deter being provided under a 12-month standby over the previous two years. Vanilla repre n a mining "poorest nation" status. Congo, with arrangement; the remainder comprises a sented three-quarters of total 1988 exports r g a population of less than 2 mn, owes its second-year credit under the three-year (ION 8/4; ARB 30/4). e foreign creditors some $5 bn, which gives it structural adjustment facility signed in mid- A bill revising the constitution was passed c n one of the highest per capita debt ratios in the 1987. The government has committed itself unanimously on 2 June. It contained motions e c world. The country however, is classified as a to reducing inflation and creating conditions to remove the limit on the number of presi i l "middle-income" country largely because its for real economic growth through "strong dential mandates, provided for the resuscita r e oil earnings have kept its per capita GNP stabilization policies" -liberalization of the tion of the post of prime minister, and for the d n above the $580 bench-mark level (AA 14/4, exchange rate, higher domestic interest rates, election of governors for each island. A refe u 9/6). price increases and a cut in government sub rendum on the bill will be held by October y Strained relations between Zaire and sidies. IMF approval opened the way for a (ION 17/6,24/6). w Congo caused by cross-border smuggling and World Bank disbursement of the second $82 A "provisional national committee" has e t opposing views on Angola, have deteriorated mn tranche of the $149 mn structural adjust been formed by Abdu Bakari Boina, the a following the expulsion from the Congo of ment loan approved in mid-1987. Overall ex former ex-party secretary of the liberation G t 140 Zaireans, mainly market traders, and the ternal debt is estimated at above $8500 mn; movement, Molinaco, and Ahamed Mlindas e n reciprocal expulsion from Zaire of 40 Con as of the end of 1987, total disbursed external se, who was a member of parliament. The i b golese (AED 1/5; WA 8/5, 15/5). debt was $7334 mn, of which $5 101 mn was committee is considered to be the embryo of a a On 19 May Pres Sassou-Nguesso escaped owed to bilateral and $1 355 mn to multi new political opposition party working within S y an assassination attempt. Rumours of coup lateral official creditors (SWB 25/5; AA 9/6; the country and which supports Mohammed b d e c u 188d Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 o r p e R ------~-~-~-~-~~~~~~~-~-~---~------Africamonitor Taki, who is one of the main contenders for Ethiopian parliament on 5 June unanimously investors generally appear to have been with Pres Abdallah's post (ION 117). backed unconditional peace talks with rebels drawing from the continent (ION 29/4). Pres Abdallah made his first official visit to in Eritrea, to try to end the 28-year-old civil Kenya has bowed to international pressure Tanzania from 19-22 June. Tanzania has re war. Pres Mengistu, however, ruled out on human rights by suddenly setting free poli cently expressed concern about the increased negotiation on the issue of secession for the tical prisoners held without trial. The surprise South African presence in Moroni (ION 24/6). northern province of Eritrea. In response to release of Kenya's seven remaining political the peace initiative, the Eritrean People's detainees was the result of a long, low-key Liberation Front (EPLF) reiterated its posi campaign by western nations (DT 8/6; ION Djibouti tion that the "fundamental issue of the illegal 10/6; SWB 12/6). The move was followed Eight people died and 150000 people's unity deceitfully imposed on the people" be a shortly after by an amnesty offer by Pres Moi homes were destroyed by torrential rains principle of negotiations (S 6/6, 15/6; DT 7/6, to his political opponents residing abroad which fell on Djibouti for three days from 5 to 15/6; SWB 8/6, 9/6, 1016; ION 10/6). (ION 17/6). 8 April. Officials estimated that 70 per cent of the capital had been damaged. France gave financial and logistical aid after appeals for Kenya Madagascar international assistance (ION 15/4; SWB 10/4). Former vice-president Josephat Karanja has Five people were killed and at least 60 injured About ten people were killed during vio been forced to resign after a no-confidence in three days of rioting that followed protests lent outbreaks of street fighting in Djibouti vote in parliament. Aceused of reeeiving rallies sparked by allegations of fraud in the on 19 April between Issas and Gadaboursis, money from Uganda to overthrow the 12 March presidential elections. Timed to the latter a non-native community represent government, he was removed after an un coincide with Pres Ratsiraka's inauguration ing about 15 per cent of the capital's popula precedented display of parliamentary unani for his third seven-year term, the rallies were tion. The events were preceded by friction mity. His resignation prompted a major held by two of the defeated contenders, over emergency supplies following the floods. cabinet shake-up on I May, which brought in Manandafy Rakotonirina and Jerome Raza Activist Afar groups unhappy about food dis the minister of finance, Georgc Saitoti as nabahiny of the newly formed Alliance tribution and about general economic eon vice-president. For the first time since inde Democratique, who called for the president's ditions, besieged the Tadjourah administra pendence, the Kikuyu, the principal ethnic overthrow. The election results held few sur tive centre in the north of the country. The group, hold neither the presidency nor the prises: Pres Ratsiraka was returned with 62 government has reacted to the volatile situa vice-presidency. The reshuffle resulted in per cent of the votes; second place went to the tion with repression (ION 22/4, 29/4, 27/5). In three new appointments, the creation a new MFM-MFT leader who has recently conver an effort to diversify external relations and ministry, the abolition of the year old ted to liberalism, Manandafy Rakotonirina financial sources, and to attract investors at a national guidance and political affairs minis with nearly 20 per cent of the votes, followed time when the domestic scene is fraught with try, and reshuffling of 10 portfolios (C 29/4; by Jerome Razanabihiny, a resurgent social unprecedented) tensions, partly because of SWB 2/5, 3/5; AED 8/5, 22/5; NA 5/89, 6/89; democrat who confirmed the presence of his 0 regional1 problems, but also the lack of eco ION 6/5; ARB 15/6). Vonjy party with 15 per cent of the votes; 0 nomic2 development, Pres Hassan Gouled has On 15 May the IMF approved a three-year Monja Jaona was eliminated with 3 per cent undertakend official visits to Turkey, Kuwait, enhaneed structural adjustment facility of the votes. On 21 April the president reap e Bahraint and France (ION 29/4, 17/6, 24/6). worth $310,8 mn on the basis of the govern pointed his entire Cabinet, but dismissed five a d ment's latest policy paper and the progress members of the Council of the Revolution ( made under the previous programme. The a presidential advisory body - because they Ethiopiar e 1989-91 programme aims to build on the pre were now openly opposed to the govern h Thes government foiled a coup attempt car vious IMF-backed programme by further re ment. Three of the five were candidates who i l riedb out by senior army officers on 16 May ducing inflation, and achieving average GDP challenged Ratsiraka for the presidency. whileu Pres Mengistu was on a four-day visit to growth of around 5 per cent a year. It also Pres Ratsiraka announeed a new election P East Germany. The attempt was attributed to seeks to reduce the current account deficit, law on 12 May, after the opposition Alliance e widespreadh discontent within the armed and to provide employment for the rapidly ex Democratique threatened to boycott the 28 t forcesy over the government's handling of the panding labour force (ION 20/5; AED 17/4, May legislative elections. All parties took b war in the provinces of Eritrea and Tigray. 22/5). part in the general elections, which saw the d Twenty-eighte generals and senior officers im The minister of finanee, George Saitoti. presidential party Arema win 120 of the 137 plicatedt in the attempted coup were killed presented a cautious budget mid-June for parliamentary seats, increasing its majority; n duringa the fighting or have subsequently been 1989/90, stressing the govcrnment's commit the opposition parties took the remaining r executed,g among them the chief of staff of the ment to structural adjustment and the twin seats. In spite of its success, the Arema party armede forces, Maj-Gen Merid Negusie, and c goals of boosting the private sector and pro only won two seats in the capital, while in the airn force chief. Maj-Gen Amha Desta. Pres moting exports. Predicting an economic major cities more than 40 per cent of voters e c Mengistui subsequently carried out a com growth rate of 5,1 per cent this year, the abstained. The opposition parties, MFM and l plete reshuffle within the military hierarchy budget forecasts a 21 per cent increase in re Vonjy, have persisted in their demand for the r - e several loyal colonels were rewarded with current expenditure. This will mean that the formation of a provisional government (ION d promotionsn to the rank of brigadier-general government will be hard pressed to meet its 8/4, 15/4, 22/4, 13/5, 3/6, 10/6; ARB 15/4; u and at least three brigadiers became major budget deficit, which is equivalent to 42 per C 18/4, 22/4; AC 28/4; AED 1/5,29/5, 19/6; y generals.a Vice prime minister. Addis Tedla, cent of GDP (ION 24/6; AED 26/6, 317; SWB 18/5, 14/6, 30/6). replacedw Merid Begussie, one of the principal EASA 30/6). The IMF has approved a three-year enhan e coupt leaders, as chief of staff; General French prime minister Michel Rocard be ced structural adjustment loan worth over Seyouma Mekonen was appointed his deputy came the first French government leader to $99 mn for Madagascar. The ESAF replaees G (St 17/5, 18/5, 19/5, 7/6; AED 22/5, 29/5, 5/6; make an official trip to Kenya, when he visi the IO-month standby arrangement approved e TWRn 24/5, 7/6; AC 26/5; AA 26/5; SWB 26/5; ted the country on 27-28 April. Economic ex last September and the structural adjustment i IONb 27/5, 3/6; JA 31/5). change between the two countries has in signed in August 1987. The cash will support a In a dramatic policy change, all 750 depu creased more than four-fold over the last a programme for 1989-91 that aims to reduce S tiesy attending an extraordinary session of the seven years, despite the fact that French inflation, increase investment and real per b d e c u Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3,1989 189 o r p e R Africarnonftor------ capita income, and make progress towards Ogadenis, the group to which he belongs ing illegal meetings. and two opposition pub financial stability. The agreement confirms (ION 15/4). lications have been banned (AA 12/5, 26/5, the IMFs satisfaction that adjustment mea After being quiet for months, the opposi 9/6; SWB 16/5; ION 20/5; DT 29/5, 13/6). sures introduced since 1980 have moved the tion Somali National Movement (SNM) A South African man has been sentenced country towards a more open, market made a series of sudden and successful attacks to 15 years in jail for endangering and injuring oriented economy (ION 20/5; AED 29/5; on the north-eastern port of Zeila, the town passengers aboard a Soviet jet which was EASA 30/6). of Loyada on the Djibouti border, and seve carrying ANC members from bases in An ral other small villages. Since last year's gola to Dar es Salaam. Using explosives as a government counter-attacks, when Hargeisa threat, Bradley Richard Stacey (alias George Mauritius and Burao were badly damaged by artillery Hodges) attempted to hijack the plane to Opposition MP Ivan Collendavelloo has re and air bombardment, SNM operations have Johannesburg (S 1/6, 2/6; C 2/6). signed from parliament over his links with been small-scale and scattered. The latest A section of the task force sent to South African businessman Sol Kerzner, fighting is not so much part of the SNM Mozambique to help the armed forces pro whose application for a Mauritian passport he struggle against the government as an tect certain strategic areas against Renamo, had supported. The disclosure has been a attempt to prevent control of the lucrative and repatriated in September 1988, mutinied source of embarrassment to the opposition trade between northern Somali towns and in Tabora, a south-west Tanzanian town, be whose members have in turn been accused of Djibouti passing out of the hands of the Issaq cause of the government's refusal to give corruption by Prime Minister Jugnauth. Op (who provide the SNM's main support) and them back pay owing from their stay in position to fraud, corruption and South into those of another clan, the Gadabursi Mozambique. The party chairman, Julius African connections have formed part of the (AC 26/5; ION 27/5). Nyerere, and not the president, personally MMM's political platform since 1983; they Pres Barre was given an ultimatum on 26 visited the mutineers to placate them with will now have to answer to the inquiry which May by members of his own Marehan clan promises of payment in a move which is seen the government has set up to investigate the urging a return to democracy. He was presen as undermining Pres Mwinyi's position dealings of a South African company, Jalc, in ted with a plan of action and given twenty (ION 3/6. 17/6). Mauritius (ION 15/4; S 2214, 16/5; AA 28/4; days in which to satisfy the first demand - Defence minister, Salim Ahmed Salim, has AC 28/4; AED 1/5). that he broadcast a statement in which he been appointed secretary-general of the In 1988 France remained Mauritius' princi recognized "the failure of his policy" which Organization of African Unity (DT 8/5). pal supplier and its number two customer has led to a civil war and "which the President Tanzania's currency was devalued by 4,8 after Great Britain. Imports rose by 20 per is incapable of ending". The ultimatum also per cent to $1 = Tsh17 in an effort to boost cent, although exports fell for the first time in called for a multi-party system and an early exports (EASA 30/6). many years, by 3 per cent, the results of a general election. As a direct consequence of Pres Mwinyi has launched a five-year deve reduction in sugar imports by France (ION the demands, the central committee of the lopment plan which endorses the principles of 15/4).) ruling Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party socialism, but also promotes the private sec 0 1 (SRSP) met on 18-20 June to discuss the end tor and foreign investment while focussing on 0 2 of the one-party system; however, this was the priority sectors of agriculture and trans d not followed by an immediate extraordinary portation to provide a platform for economic Rwandae t session of the parliament as the president had revival and growth. The dilapidated road and Morea than one million people in western and promised (ION 10/6, 24/6; SWB 22/6). rail network is given top priority. with a 24 per d ( southern Rwanda -- about one-fifth of the The World Bank has granted a $70 mn loan cent share of the total $1 ,3 bn projected in r country'se population -- are facing food shor to Somalia for the economic reform pro vestment. Agriculture, whose strong perfor h tagess after unusually heavy rain since gramme which continues Somalia's agricultu mance has resulted essentially from economic i l Februaryb damaged crops. More than 1,1 mn ral-sector adjustment efforts. The pro reforms since 1985, will receive 18,5 per cent, peopleu live in the affected area (DN 11/5). gramme is expected to boost economic resources and industry 10 per cent. Foreign P (Refugees to return to Burundi - see growth, food production, exports, and the aid is expected to finance almost half of ex e Burundi.)h wages of people in rural areas (WBN 8/6; penditure. Running from 1989 to 1993, the t ION 10/6; AED 26/6). plan aims to increase real GDP growth on the y b mainland to 6 per cent a year by the end of this Somaliad period. The launching of Tanzania's fourth e Thet need for improved relations with the Tanzania five-year development plan after a two-year n IMFa was a factor behind the 11 April govern The former Chief Minister of Zanzibar, Seif postponement is seen as reflecting Mwinyi's r mentg reshuffie, when the president's brother, Shariff Hamad, and several of his political consolidation of power and his commitment Abdurhmane Jama Barre, was moved from associates -- Suleiman Seif Hamad, Juma c to the IMF-backed Economic Recovery then finance ministry back to foreign affairs Ng'wali and Masoud Omar -- were arrested Programme (ION 29/4; AED 1/5, 29/5; e andc Mohamed Sheikh Osman, former on 10 May on charges of having organized an EASA 19/5). i l finance minister, was returned to his old job. illegal meeting on the island of Pemba. Seif A preliminary report on the census carried r Foure ministers were sacked and several Hamad was dismissed in January following out in 1988, puts the country's population at d ministersn exchanged portfolios (SWB 13/4; accusations that he was opposed to the union 23 174 336, reflecting an annual growth rate u AED 17/4; AC 26/5; ION 15/4). with mainland Tanzania and favoured the re of 2,8 per cent growth over the past 10 years; y a The government appears to have lost con suscitation of the sultanate. With increasing 640 578 people live on the islands (ARB 30/4). trolw of a large part of the south of the country demands on the islands for a referendum to (Tanzanian concern about South Africa and e as t rebellions among officers have spread from decide on the issue of the union with main Comoros - see Comoros.) thea Kisimayo Military Academy where there land Tanzania, Hamad's detention is seen as G wast a mutiny in March. At the root of the an outcome of party chairman Julius e Uganda militaryn mutinies is the exclusion from Nyerere's public demand that dissidents be i governmentb of the former minister of detained. In a continuing crackdown of poli In a long awaited cabinet reshuffie, Pres a defence,S Gen Gabiyu, who was demoted in tical dissidents, about 50 people have been Museveni has dropped eight ministers who January.y The army is largely manned by subsequently arrested on charges of attend- failed to win seats in the country's new b d e c u 190d Africa Insight, vo119, no3, 1989 o r p e R ------Africamonitor parliament, and placed two generals in top agreement remained vague, but some dele proportion of Angola's diamond production defence posts. Maj-Gen Tumwine, the army gates claimed that it made provision for the through De Beers' Central Selling Organiza commander-in-chief. has been appointed integration of Unita members into Angolan tion (CSO) as early as 1990; thereafter, in minister of state for defence and his second state institutions and the temporary with principle the CSO will handle all Angola's in-command, Maj-Gen Gwigyema. deputy drawal from politics of Unita leader Dr production through an exclusive marketing of defence, although Pres Museveni retains Savimbi while a transitional government is agreement. The agreement is expected to overall control of the defence portfolio. formed, leading to elections in which he lead to the establishment of a joint venture to Although there are 10 new faces in the 48- would compete. Pres Mobutu of Zaire, a develop the kimberlite mines which could member cabinet, there are no changes among staunch ally of U nita leader Dr Savimbi, was make Angola one ofthe world's top four dia the key portfolios (SWB 12/4; ACon 21/4). the principle architect of the talks. As a sign mond producers with earnings of $1 bn. Pro Pres Museveni later named his 32-year-old of good faith, Pres dos Santos released 7(X) duction of diamonds - 90 per cent of which brother, Maj-Gen Salim Saleh Akandan Unita prisoners and commuted the death sen are of gemstone quality - has increased to an waho, as army commander, and Brig Ikecho tences of 50 others, prior to the meeting. The annual rate of 1,6 mn carats, worth $250 mn, as chief of staff (ON 9/5; ION 13/5). talks were preceded on 16 May by the first five times the level in 1986 (AA 26/5; BD 1/6; Three opposition movements, the Uganda ever concerted regional effort to halt the con C 2/6; AC 9/6). Democratic Alliance, the Uganda People's flict when an eight-nation summit of African Front and the Uganda National Liberation countries met to endorse a proposed peace Front, have agreed to form an alliance to pro plan drawn up by Pres dos Santos (S 10/5, 19/6. Lesotho vide more effective opposition to Pres Muse 20/6,23/6; C 15/5,30/5,22/6,23/6; WM 23/6; A leading politician and economics lecturer veni's government. Each organization will AA 9/6, 23/6; DT 15/6.29/6,30/6; SWB 5/6. at the University of Lesotho, Joel Moitse, retain its name and ideology. but military and 27/6. 30/6; AED 22/5). was detained in June under the Internal Secu political campaigns will be coordinated Angola's request to become a member of rity Act (S 1/6). (ION 10/6). the IMF has been accepted, making it the The IMF has granted a structural adjust Government forces claim that they killed 152nd member of the financial institution. ment facility worth $5,6 mn. The credit is about 370 rebels in an intensified military Angola's contribution to the IMF budget will intended to support the economic reform offensive in northern Uganda during May. be very low - 0.007 per cent (S 15/6). programme and promote "reasonable" eco The army said it had fought against more than By mid-June over 10 000 Cuban soldiers nomic growth (AED 19/6; IMF S 26/6). I 500 rebels, who for the first time were made had left Angola since the signing of the An epidemic of cutworm has drastically re up of two former rival forces - the Holy December peace accord (S 17/5; C 14/6). duced output of the country's chief grain Spirit Movement and the Uganda Peoples An estimated I 500 Angolans fled across crops - maize and sorghum - by 45 and 72 Army. About 300 rebels subsequently sur the border into Namibia during mid-June to per cent respectively. For the country as a rendered (ARB 15/6; SWB 19/6; ION 24/6). escape renewed fighting between Unita whole, the level of staple food self-sufficiency Over one million people in the West Nile rebels and government forces. Not accorded is projected to fall from 65 per cent to ) region0 of north-western Uganda are facing refugee status, they are being assisted by the between 38 and 21 per cent (AA 26/5; AED 1 starvation0 brought about the loss of crops as a International Committee for the Red Cross 29/5; C 30/5; ARB 31/5). 2 result of heavy rains and swarms of grasshop (ICRC) because the UN High Commission d perse late last year. The problem has been for Refugees does not have a mandate to t Malawi aggravateda by rebel activity in the region, assist them (S 11/6, 12/6; C 12/6). d which( has impeded the distribution of relief Angola has returned to the international The government has announced substantial suppliesr (DT 6/6). financial markets with the 10 May signing in increases in the minimum daily wage (almost e h Uganda has secured a $238 mn Enhanced Luanda of a $220 mn commercial pre-finan double in the main centres) to help com s i Structurall Adjustment Facility (ESAF) from cing loan, based on a crude oil sales contract pensate for cost-of-living increases over the theb IMF to finance three years of economic with the UK's BP Oil International. The loan past three years. The last wage rises were in u P will enable the government to honour some reforms, which it is hoped will help to boost January 1986; since then there have been reale economic growth by 5 per cent a year and of its outstanding short-term debts. as well as three devaluations and the rate of inflation h t cut annual inflation to 7,5 per cent from 55 to purchase imports to support the economic has risen from around 15 per cent to almost 32 y recovery programme (AED 5/6). perb cent by 1992 (AED 24/4; IMF S 26/4; per cent (AED 8/5). EASAd 28/4; ARB 31/5). The Defence and Security Council Econo Wide-ranging tax reforms to ease the e t mic Commission has approved a basic pro burden of taxation on essential commodities n gramme for the reconstruction of southern was the main thrust of the recently announ a r Angola aimed at promoting greater regional ced 1989/90 budget which has been described g e autonomy to overcome existing economic as the best in years. It follows improved eco SOUTHERNc AFRICA and social bottlenecks. Valued at $240 mn, nomic performance last year, and the pro n e the investment plan does not include the mise of increased aid receipts as the country c Angolai l transport sector's rehabilitation of the port of carries out an IMF/World Bank-approved r Southe Africa, Angola and Cuba signed the Namibe and the Namibe Railway, valued at adjustment programme. However, the Mountd Etjo Declaration on 9 April which $272 mn. Backed by the UN and many visible trade deficit in 1988 - MK 274,7 mn n establishedu a complex set of procedures to re western countries, Luanda will host a donor against MK 38,7 mn in 1987 as the rise in ex storey peace in the region, notably the with nations' conference in September in the hope ports failed to match the near-60 per cent drawala of Swapo insurgents to bases north of of implementing the plan nex1 January (S 23/5; boom in imports - points to continued w e ARB 30/6). economic pressures caused by transport thet 16th parallel in Angola. The USA and USSRa attended as observers (C 10/4; SWB A prospecting, marketing and mining bottlenecks (ARB 30/4; AB 5/89). G 11/4) . agreement, worth $180 mn annually, has t e A ceasetire agreement was apparently been signed by the Angolan government and n Mozambique reachedi between the Angolan government De Beers. In terms of the agreement b anda the rebel Unita movement at the Gbado Endiama, the government-owned diamond Pledges amounting to over $350 mn in sup S lite summit held on 22 June. Details of the firm, expects to start marketing a significant port of Mozambique'S emergency programme y b d e c u Africad Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 191 o r p e R Africamonitor------ 1989--1990 were made by the international Pres Chissano had talks with South chairman of the extra-parliamentary opposi community at the UN-sponsored donors con Africa's foreign minister, "Pik" Botha in tion group. the Five Freedoms Forum, and a ference in April. The programme calls for the Maputo on 23 March to discuss ways of bring member of the Detainees Parents Support supply of around 916 000 tonnes of food aid, ing peace to Southern Africa, notably Committee, was killed by an unknown gun costing more than $237 mn, plus almost $70 Mozambique. The discussions also dealt with man outside his home on 1 May. An estima mn in logistical support. It aims to meet the economic and joint development issues. ted 10 000 people attended his funeral (SAB needs of the 7,7 mn people -almost half the While in Europe the previous month, Pres 19/5; ARB 15/6; WM 12/5). population, who are now dependent on food Chissano confirmed that Mozambique was Helene Pastoors, the Belgian national sen donations as a result of the war and drought. open to all peace initiatives for Mozambique tenced to ten years imprisonment in 1986 for Of nearly three million people seriously (MF 4/89; AED 3/4). treason. was released from prison on 10 May affected by the war, more than half have been In a major political shift Pres Chissano an following an agreement between the South displaced and are homeless; a further million nounced in April the government's willing African and Belgian authorities. Before her people are refugees in neighbouring coun ness to talk to representatives of Renamo, release Pastoors was required to sign an tries. The cost to the country of "Renamo's but stressed the talks would be aimed at dis undertaking that she would not return to banditry" was estimated by the prime cussing only the reintegration of Renamo Southern Africa or participate in violent ac minister to equal more than $6 bn - double members back into society and not power tivities directed against South Africa; on her the country's current external debt and 60 sharing between the ruling Frelimo party and arrival in Belgium she tore up the promise (C times the value of its 1987 exports. Italy the rebels. While continuing to rule out nego 11/5; S 12/5; B 11/5). headed the list of donors, reinforcing its tiations about power, Pres Chissano's shift in The three-year long State of Emergency increasingly dynamic aid and cooperation attitude has been attributed to efforts by reli was renewed on 9 June. An estimated 32 programme in Africa, with a contribution of gious organizations which are playing an im organizations and 500 individuals had new $78 mn, followed by the USA ($65 mn), the portant role as unofficial "mediators" in restriction orders imposed on them (C 8/6; World Food Programme ($62 mn), European drawing up a peace plan. (Chissano first gave SAB 16/6). Community ($44 mn) and Sweden ($30 mn). his approval in August 1988 to representa National Party leader, F W de K1erk visited The outstanding success of the meeting is tives of the Roman Catholic Church and the Britain, West Germany, Portugal and Italy at seen as a clear indication of the broad inter 17-church Christian Council of Mozambique the end of June. The meeting with South national support the Frelimo government meeting with Renamo leaders.) On 23 June Africa's main trading partners was under now enjoys in its efforts to put the country on the government put forward a tentative plan taken in an apparent effort to inform them the road to economic and social recovery to end the war against Renamo. Setting out about his plans for reform after the elections (AED 1714, 2414; ION 2214; ARB 31/5; conditions for a possible dialogue with the when he is expected to assume the presidency AB 6/89). rebels for the first time, it demands that "all (SS 25/6; SAB 30/6). The World Bank is to provide a third acts of terrorism and banditry" be stopped as ) credit, worth $87,2 mn, to support the third the first condition for dialogue. Chissano also 0 TBVC States 1 phase of the economic rehabilitation pro indicated that he was ready to modify the 0 gramme for 1987-90 which is focussing on the existing political order to accommodate the Bophuthatswana - All eight members of the 2 liberalization of trade and production (AED rebels (S 2414, 2fJI6; ION 17/6; AC 23/6; C 24/6). banned Peoples Progressive Party charged d e t 29/5; ION 3/6). with treason were found guilty on 15 June. a Mozambique has formally joined the Pre Most of the eight are members of the PPP d South Africa ( ferential Trade Area (PTA), the economic national executive. An application by the r e grouping of Southern and East African After a unanimous decision to dissolve itself, defence council for the 143 accused that evi h s states. Because of the ongoing war against the Progressive Federal Party merged with dence be heard from Rockey Malebane i l Renamo, Mozambique has been excused the Independent Party and the National Metsing, the exiled leader of the coup b u payment of dues to the PTA for three years Democratic Party on 7 April to form the attempt who is living in London, was granted. P (ARB 31/5). Democratic Party. Wynand Malan, Dennis In defence of those accused, Malebane e h Donor funding for the second-phase re Worrall and Zach de Beer are the co-leaders Metsing gave evidence that the eight accused t habilitation programme for the 533 km of the party (S 7/4, 8/4). Known world-wide of treason were merely acting as his mes y b Limpopo railway has now reached about for her championing of human rights, veteran sengers (S 10/5, 15/5,2/6,6/6,9/6, 15/6; C 16/6). d $104 mn - covering the key elements of the MP Helen Suzman who has represented her The estimated budget for the Department e t $150 mn core programme which is due for constituency for 36 years, announced her re of the President for 1989--90 is R53 mn - an n a completion in 1991 (AED 26/6). tirement from parliament on 16 May (S 17/5, increase of 106 per cent over the previous r g During British prime minister Thatcher's 19/5,27/6; ST 21/5). year (C 24/5). e visit to Zimbabwe on 29 March where she met Pres Botha dissolved parliament at the end Transkei - An attempted coup to overthrow c n Pres Chissano and Pres Mugabe at the of May in preparation for the nation-wide Maj-Gen Bantu Holomisa was reported on e c Nyanga military training camp, she announ elections of all three houses of parliament to 30 April. Several prominent people in the i l ced an increase in the number of British in be held on 6 September, despite the acknow homeland were arrested, including Lt-Col r e structors to train Mozambican army officers. ledged need for a new delimitation of seats. Craig Duli. a member of the Military Coun d n and reaffirmed her determination to prevent He indicated that he would not stand again in cil. The attempt was apparently linked to Gen u Renamo from ousting the Mozambican the presidential elections (SAB 19/5; SWB 8/4; Holomisa's involvement in a divorce case (S y government (MF 4/89; ION 1/4). ARB 15/6). A spate of ministerial resig 2814; SS 3014; ST 30/4; SWB 2/5). a w Renamo rebels promised to lay down their nations followed the announcement of the Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo, a 26-year-old e t arms from 1 to 30 April to allow aid to reach September elections, bringing to six the Zambian-educated student, has become a starving people. Officials have reported that number of ministers who have resigned since paramount chief of the Tembu, one of the G t as many as 130 people are dying every day in the beginning of the year. Notable among major black tribes in the country. The selec e n two isolated districts of Zambezia province. them was the resignation of the minister of tion of Dalindyebo by the tribal council in i b Prime minister Muchungo rejected the cease consitutional development and planning, May ended a two-year power struggle for the a fire as a "stunt" after a rebel attack on 6 April Chris Heunis (S 10/5, 13/5; C 12/5, 30/5). chieftancy and toppled paramount chief S y (C 11/4, 13/4). Dr David Webster, the former vice- Mtirara, the only pro-South African b d e c u d 192 Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 o r p e R ------Africamonitor government chief to contend the post. There repatriate 47 (XX) Namibian exiles was well incomes. The principal prime aim of the in are four paramount chiefs in Transkei and all under way, with 5 381 now back in the terri vestment guidelines is to attract investment to hold powerful positions in the administration tory. Their return was preceded by a general create jobs. With universal primary educa of the homeland as well as over their own amnesty for Namibian guerrillas and for the tion and a massive expansion of the secon tribes. The Tembu royal house has been repeal of apartheid legislation signed by dary sector, Zimbabwe now has a highly edu divided by conflicts between the new chiefs South African Pres Botha on 6 June (S 3/5, cated workforce which is severely frustrated father, paramount chief Sabata, who was op 7/6,1116,13/6; BD 16/5, 19/6; ARB 15/6; C by problems of growing unemployment. posed to independence, and Chief Kaizer 6/6, 13/6, 20/6). Economists have estimated that the number Matanzima, his cousin, causing Chief Sabata of unemployed at present is around 900 000, to flee to Zambia in the early 1980s where he while only 6 800 new jobs are being gene Swaziland became an "elder"' of the ANC. He died in rated annually. There has been little invest 1986 (C 29/5; S 17/6). Over 40 ()()() people attended the 21st birth ment in the country for decades, growth hav Ciskei - More than R650 mn was paid to day celebrations of King Mswati III on 19 ing to depend heavily on foreign borrowing. Ciskei by South Africa in the form of direct April when he assumed full executive Private capital inflow during the 1980/86 assistance and transfers in terms of bilateral powers. In a major policy speech, the King period has been put at no more than $50 mn, agreements during the 1988/89 financial year reaffirmed his country's policy of good neigh while in the past two years there has been a (C 29/3). bourliness and non-alignment. Regarding net out-flow of about $100 mn, mainly re domestic policy he defended the non-party flecting disinvestment by SA firms. As a re system of government and elections, esta sult Zimbabwe has a debt service ratio of South West Africa/Namibia blished by his late father, but said it should be around 30 per cent of export earnings, On the I ApriL the day which marked the adjusted where necessary. He also vowed to around ten times higher than before 1980 start of the transitional period to indepen take steps to eradicate corruption and reaf (DT 20/4, 18/5; WM 27/4; S 12/5; AED 22/5; dence and consequent withdrawal of South firmed the country's policy of free enterprise AC 23/6; ARB 3115, 30/6; AB 6/89; BD 8/6, African troops to bases in Namibia, hundreds and a free market economy (ARB 15/4; C 1914; 2116; AA 9/6). of Swapo guerrillas crossed into Namibia S 20/4; TS 2(14). Zimbabwe's economy grew by 5,3 per cent from Angola in violation of regional peace in 1988 - the highest growth rate since 1985, agreements. In some of the bloodiest fighting when output expanded 7,3 per cent. Agri to take place in Namibia since the bush war Zambia culture was the main source of growth, ac began 23 years ago, an estimated 278 insur Expectations that Zambia's copper output counting for almost three percentage points gents and 27 security force members died. At had stabilized at around 470 (XlO tonnes a of output expansion, while manufacturing the Mount Etjo meeting held on 9 ApriL year have been not been met as copper pro was responsible for only one percentage South Africa, Angola and Cuba reached duction for the year ending 31 March has point. Real GOP has been growing at 3 per agreement on the withdrawal of Swapo forces been estimated at 425 000 - down about 14 cent a year, fractionally above the rate of ) from0 Namibia. In terms of the agreement, per cent on the previous year. Declining pro population growth (ARB 30/6). 1 Swapo0 was given until 21 April to withdraw duction has meant that Zambia has not been Several more senior ministers resigned 2 all its forces from Namibia; the forces were to able to capitalize on steeply rising world from their posts in April in the wake of dis d congregatee at 18 UN assembly points in the prices for copper. Operational problems and closures made by the San dura Commission in t territorya to be escorted north of the 16th unavailability of equipment were named as the "Willowgate" car scandal; Maurice d parallel( in Angola. Swapo blamed the subse the reasons. The government has forecast Nyagumbo, number four in the government quentr impasse over their withdrawal on the that production will be back to its previous and administrative head of the ruling party, e proximityh of South West Africa Territory three-year level in 1989, and will rise to who resigned in March, subsequently com s i Forcel and counter-insurgency police bases to 553000 tonnes in 1993 (AED 3/4; EASA 19/5; mitted suicide (C 1314; S 10/4; SWB 14/4, theb assembly points. Following the confine AA 23/6). 17/4; ARB 1514; AED 1714; ST 23/4). u mentP to bases of the South African-comman Pres Kaunda has accused white bureau The launch of Edgar Tekere's new party, dede forces on 26 April, the withdrawal of the crats in neighbouring Zimbabwe of unleash The Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) on h t remaining Swapo guerrillas was completed (S ing a smear campaign against himself which 30 April, was dismissed by Pres Mugabe as y 1/4-914,b 10/5; SWB 1/4-6/4, 1814; ST 2/4; FM alleges that he is guilty of corruption and of the "joke of the year". Former secretary 7/4;d AED \7/4,24/4, 1/5; WA 17/4; BD 18/4; poaching wild animals in Zimbabwe (C 14/6, general of Zanu, Tekere was fired from the e C t 2714, 29/4; ACon 21/4; ARB 15/6). 15/6; S 15/6). ruling party last year after repeated ac n Outlining Swapo's economic plans for an Following a meeting of the prime ministers cusations of corruption against the govern a independentr Namibia, leader Sam Nujoma of Zambia and Zaire, agreement has been ment. ZUM's three attempts at holding a g saide at a Business International conference reached on a delineation of the border, on political rally have been stopped by the heldc in London on 21 April that he envisaged measures to restore security along the fron government (C 3/5,22/5; FM 5/5; AED 8/5; n a mixede economy in which there would be "A tier, and the regulation of cross-border trade Ff 5/89; S 12/6, 13/6; DT 13/5; ARB 15/6). c i l continued and significant role for the private (AED 17/4). Five detainees being held without trial in a r sector".e No wholesale nationalization was maximum security prison in Harare began a planned.d Criticizing what he called "wide hunger strike in Harare on 3 May. Prominent n Zimbabwe spreadu irregularities and abuses in the mining among them is a Britain, Jack Lewis-Walker industry",y he foresaw a renegotiation of the The Promotion of Investment: Policy and who was arrested in September 1987 on sus agreementsa governing this sector to increase Regulations which replaces the 1982 invest picion of being a South African spy; two of w statee leverage if Swapo formed the new the others were arrested on the same charge t ment code unveiled on 8 May by Minister of government,a as is widely predicted. Land Finance, Bernard Chidzero, has been (S 9/5; C 13/5). G reforms involving a state takeover of aban cautiously welcomed by both local and Pres Mugabe announced on 27 June that t donede or underutilized farmland and of farms foreign investors as a modest step in the right the Senate is to be abolished; the 40 Senate n ownedi by absentee owners were outlined direction. The "overall economic reform pro seats are expected to be added to the 100 seats b (EASAa 2814; Ff 5/89; AB 5/89; ARB 31/5). gramme" includes changes in dividend remit in the House of Assembly (SWB 29/6). S By the end of June, the UN programme to tance policies, labour relations, prices and The alleged leader of a South African y b d e c Africau Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 d 193 o r p e R Africamonitor ------ commando, Dennis Charles Beahan who Economic Digest; AE&M - Africa Energy & -Mozambique Information Office; MNR tried to free six detained men from a maxi Mining; AIB - Africa Institute Bulletin; AN Mozambique News Review; NA - New mum security prison in Harare, was jailed for .,-- Africa Newsfile; BD - Business Day; African; SAB - SA Barometer; SAE - life by the High Court on 30 June (C 29/6,1/7; BDN -Botswana Daily News; C- Citizen; Southern African Economist; SAD - South S 29/6). Cr - Crescent; D - Drum; DN - Daily African Digest; SAT - Southern Africa News; E - Economist; Ff - Frontfile; FM - Today; So-South; SN -Swazi News; ST Financial Mail; F&T - Finansies & Tegniek; Sunday Times; SWB - Summary of World Sources H - The Herald; IMF S -IMF Survey; LT Broadcasts; TS - Times of Swaziland; TWR A - Afrika; AA - Africa Analysis; AB - - Lesotho Today; I - The Independent; - Third World Reports; WA- West Africa; African Business; AC -Africa Confidential; ION - Indian Ocean Newsletter; JA - WM - Weekly Mail; ZN - Zimbabwe ACon - Africa Concord; AED - Africa Jeune Afrique; MF - Mozambiquefile; MIO News; NN - New Nation; S - Star. ) 0 1 0 2 d e t a d ( r e h s i l b u P e h t y b d e t n a r g e c n e c i l r e d n u y a w e t a G t e n i b a S y b d e c u d 194 Africa Insight, vol 19, no 3, 1989 o r p e R Membership of the Africa Institute Membership fees: Rand monetary area: R40,oo p a (which includes Africa Insight and Africa Institute Bulletin) elsewhere US $40,00 or equivalent (which includes Africa Insight and Joumal of Contemporary African Studies). 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