SOUTH AFRICA, THE COLONIAL POWERS AND 'AFRICAN DEFENCE' By the same author

ECONOMIC POWER IN ANGLO-SOUTH AFRICAN DIPLOMACY DIPLOMACY AT THE UN (edited with Anthony Jennings) INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: States, Power and Conflict since 1945 THE POLITICS OF THE RUN: European Shipping and Pretoria RETURN TO THE UN: UN Diplomacy in Regional Conflicts South Africa, the Colonial Powers and'African Defence'

The Rise and Fall of the White Entente, 1948-60

G. R. Berridge Readerill Politics University ofLeicester © G. R. Berridge 1992 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1 st edition 1992

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or * transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, london W1T 4lP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

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Published by PAlGRAVE Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PAlGRAVE is the new global academic imprint of St. Martin's Press llC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave Publishers ltd (formerly Macmillan Press ltd). ISBN 978-1-349-39060-1 ISBN 978-0-230-37636-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9780230376366 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources.

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Transferred to digital printing 2002 For my wife, Sheila Contents

Acknowledgements IX List ofAbbreviations X Introduction XI

1 Dreaming of a White Alliance, 1948-9 1 'Leadership in Africa' 5 'Educating' Dr Malan 10 The 'organic approach': te Watcr's tour of British Africa and Wcstern Europe, April-July 1949 15 The 'inorganic approach': enter Eric Louw 23

2 Reluctantly to the Middle East, 1949-51 24 Secret commitment to the Middle East, September 1950 29 Gordon-Walker and South Africa 39 General Robertson's visit to the Union) May 1951 43 The Commonwealth Defence Ministers' Conference) June 1951 44- Still stalling on Simonstown 50

3 The Cloak of Multllateralism, 1949-54 55 France, Africa and South Africa 56 Anglo-French staff talks, 1949-52 60 The African Defence Facilities Conference) Nairobi, August 1951 65 Preparing for , 1951-4 72 The Dakar Conference, March 1954 84 The issue of 'follow-up' machinery 87

4 The Churchlll Factor, 1951-4 91 Churchill kills the Simonstown negotiat,ions, March 1952 93 Squaring up over Simons town, 1952-4 96

VII viii Contents

Erasmus makes a concession, August-September 1954- 101 Reviving the African Pact, September 1954- 106

5 The SiJnonstoWD Agreements, 1955 no British tactics, December 1954--April 1955 III Finessing the African Pact 113 The final negotiations, June 1955 122

6 Louw versus Erasmus, 1955-6 133 The Pan-African Conference - confronting the zombie, July-November 1955 133 The Erasmus track, July-September 1955 137 Settling for South African goodwill, October 1955 14-3 Erasmus, radar, and the 'Southern Tier', November 1955-May 1956 14-7 Opposition to the Cape Town Sea Routes Conference, December 1955-December 1956 14-9 The Pan-African Conference: Britain bemused, 1956 154-

7 The Hollowing of the Entente, 1957~O 157 A 'Sea Routes Conference' ofsorts - Paris, May 1957 158 Britain re-thinks African defence, March-September 1957 162 Erasmus-Mancroft talks, September 1957 165 Sea routes reach dead-end, June 1958-1960 170 The Nairobi-Dakar system: condemned to sleep, January 1956-December 1959 175 Little more than the shell: the entente in 1960 180

8 Conclusion 183 Appendix A: The Fourth (Secret) Simonstown Agreement. on Anglo-South African Staff Talks with Regard to the Defence ofthe Middle East. 30 June 1955 189 Appendix B: The Agreed Communique Released Following the Erasmus-Mancroft Talks. London. 18 September /957 190 Notes and References 192 Index 224- Acknowledgements

This book is based principally on British official papers which, at the time I finished writing, were available until the end of 1960; on such South African official papers as were available (chiefly on the late 1940s and early 1950s); and on French and Belgian official papers, which were selectively available up to the mid­ 1950s. (I was unable to draw on Portuguese official papers.) In addition, I used private papers in Britain, especially at the Churchill College Archives Centre and at Birmingham Univer­ sity Library; and also in South Africa, particularly at the Killie Campbell Afrikana Library in Durban, Library, the Government Archives Depot in Pretoria, and the Cape Archives Depot. To all of the librarians and archivists who helped me I express my warmest thanks. For financial support to the research on which this book is based, 1 wish to acknowledge the generosity of the Nuffield Foundation, the British Academy, Leicester University Research Board, and the Economic & Social Research Council (award reference number: R000221073). I also wish to express my gratitude to Hilda Botha for assistance with documents in (as well as to her Cape Town friends, Pierre and Johanna du Preez, who dug out for me Malan's letters to Geyer, which I had overlooked); to Pixie and George Young for such warm hospitality on more than one research trip to Cape Town; and to Mrs Jones in Bloemfontein, for enabling me to see that the Verwoerd papers at the Institute of Contemporary History contain nothing of value to this research. Finally, I am grateful to the Editor of International Relations, Leicester University Press, and Macmillan, for permission to draw on previously published work.

Leicester G. R. BERRIDGE

ix List of Abbreviations

ADO African Defence Organisation ['African Pact'] AE Affaires Etrangeres [French] BCK Chemins de Fer du Bas Congo au Katanga CCEM Comite des Chefs d'Etat-Major [French] CCTA Commission de Cooperation Technique en Afrique au Sud du Sahara CDN Comite de Defense Nationale [French] CFL Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Congo Superieur aux Grands Lacs Africains COS Chiefs of Staff [British] CRO Commonwealth Relations Office DEA Department of External Affairs [South African] ECA Economic Cooperation Administration GAP Government Archives, Pretoria JIB Joint Intelligence Bureau [British] JMPC Joint Maritime Planning Committee JPS Joint Planning Staff [British] MAE Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (Bclge) [Archives] MEDO Middle East Defence Organization OTRACO Office d'Exploitation des Transports Coloniaux PRO Public Record Office [British] Qd'O Quai d'Orsay [French Foreign Ministry, Archives] SADF South African Defence Force SANF South African Naval Forces SGPDN Secretariat General Permanent de la Defense Nationale [French] SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization SHAT Service Historique de l'Arrnee de Terre [Chateau de Vincennes, Paris] UDF Union Defence Force WEU Western European Union

x Introduction

In 1976 Robert A. Kann, the well-known authority on Habsburg history, sought to rescue an important distinction which was in danger of extinction: the distinction between an alliance and an entente. J An alliance is a formal commitment entered into by two or more states to engage in cooperative military action in specified circumstances. The formality of the commitment, however, is less important than its precision, or its explicitness, though it is the combination ofthese two characteristics which make alliance-style commitments 'firm' ones. By contrast, an entente is a military relationship between states in which the commitment to co­ belligerency - though it may be formalised in some manner - is at most implicit rather than explicit, deriving either from an agreement to consult in the event of a crisis, or from practical military collaboration rooted in shared political and strategic assumptions, or from both. Characteristically, the kinds of practical military collaboration in which ententes are embodied are staff talks, arms sales, officer training programmes, arrange­ ments for the use of military bases, manoeuvres, and so on. Ententes, in other words, suggest that the parties are sympathetic to each other to the point that they will stand shoulder to shoulder in war - but they contain no clear promises of co-belligerency. Kann, however, was not concerned only with conceptual explication. His view was that ententes possess the advantages of alliances without the disadvantages. While having the same operational significance as alliances, he argued, their lower visibility and general fuzziness enables them to be emphasised or played down as the sensitivities of different constituencies require; this includes hostile states, in regard to which ententes are less provocative. These characteristics also allow them to be dissolved when the circumstances which encouraged their growth change without the 'credibility' of the participants being called into question; by contrast, the floodlit preciseness of alliances creates 'strait-jackets' which lock states to commitments long after they have ceased to be useful out of fear that withdrawal will undermine their prestige. In short, since ententes are less 'entangling' than alliances, they are less likely to impede that

xi xii Introduction fluidity of alignment and realignment which is the essence of balance of power diplomacy. On the face of it, however, ententes would also seem to have their drawbacks. For example, imprecise commitments might be expected to be less compelling in a crisis, especially when govcrnments are internally divided on the most prudent course to follow. Partly for this reason and partly because entente commitments may be less likely than alliances to generate pressure for force build-ups and joint military planning, ententes may be generally less efficient in the deterrence role. The vagucness and open-ended character of ententes (consultation agreements excepted) may also encourage policy drift and be more likely to lead to friction between the partners over questions of responsibility. It is with general questions of this kind in mind that this study of the military relations between the and the four major African colonial powcrs is approached. For in the period from 1948, when the National Party carne to power in the Union, until 1960, when the British and French colonies in Africa, together with the Belgian Congo, had either been or were shortly to be surrendered (and only Portugal was deter­ mined to resist the trend), the military relations between these powers had all the trappings of a classic entente. Moreover, since until near the end of the period the South Africans (with some encouragement from France) repeatedly pressed the case for the transformation of this entente into an alliance, the distin ction was very much a live one in this instance, and the arguments for and against the two modes ofassociation were continuously rehearsed. Throughout this period Britain remained the paramount external power in southern Africa and, indeed, in Africa as a whole. The corollary of this, against an international background which placed a premium on inter-colonial solidarity, was that the other colonial powers were reluctant to gct too far out ofstcp with British policy in their own relations with the Union. For this reason, and despite South Africa's attempts to interest the other powers (and the United States) in its military ambitions, it was forced to look principally to London. It is thus appropriate to note at the outset that in 1948 the whole of thc Bri tish Commonwealth, of which the Union remained a member, was, ofcourse, a vast and still relatively intimate entente - even if of a rather special kind. Introduction xiii

'Co-operation in Commonwealth Defence', had said the British White Paper, Central Organisation for Defence, in 1946, 'has ... always taken the practical form of promoting uniformity of organisation, training, and equipment of military forces, main­ taining the closest possible touch between Staffs, and inter­ changing officers in order to promote a common doctrine and outlook in military affairs'.2 Indeed, it was on this basis - no longer as an empire and certainly not as an alliance - that the Commonwalth had entered the Second World War. It is true that after publication of the 1946 White Paper it was recognised that the future security of the Commonwealth would best be guaran­ teed by membership ofregional alliances, preferably including the United States.3 Nevertheless, there had been tremendous Com­ monwealth solidarity during the Second World War, and in the years immediately following great importance continued to be attached to regular 'military cooperation' between its members. This was designed not only to foster alliances in the most insecure regions but also to serve in their stead until such time as they should emerge and then to supplement them where they were actually created. For this reason, Service Liaison Staffs were exchanged between Commonwealth members in 1946 and the months following, similar organisations for the study of 'defence science' were put on the Commonwealth agenda, 'the interchange of military personnel for training and consultation became more intense and organised than ever before', annual conferences of Commonwealth Commanders-in-Chief and Chiefs of Staff (pre­ sided over by the Chief of the General Staff in Britain) were introduced for the first time, and joint (especially naval) exercises were instituted." In South Africa, however, the newly ascendant National Party did not entirely share the 'kindred ideals' and 'community of outlook' in which the Commonwealth entente was rooted. On the contrary, its followers hated the English, had opposed the Union's entry into the Second World War on Britain's side, and were determined to take South Africa out of the Commonwealth at the first opportune moment. But an entente with Britain was one thing; an entente with all of the colonial powers in Africa was something else - and an alliance with them all was something else again. Were such an alliance to be directed against Soviet and African-supported black nationalists, it would be the stuff of which National Party dreams were made.