The Unfinished Quatfor Unity THE UMFIMISHED QUEST FORUMITY Africa and the OAU Zdenel< Cervenl<a JrFRIEDMANN Julian Friedmann Publishers Ltd 4 Perrins Lane, London NW3 1QY in association with The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, Sweden. THE UNFINISHED QUEST FOR UNITY first published in 1977 Text © Zdenek Cervenka 1977 Typeset by T & R Filmsetters Ltd Printed in Great Britain by ISBN O 904014 28 2 Conditions of sale This book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form or binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition inc1uding this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. CONTENTS Preface vii Introduction by Raph Uwechue ix Author's Note xiv Map xx CHAPTER l:The Establishment of the Organization of African Unity 1 1. Africa before the OAU 1 2. The Addis Ababa Summit Conference 4 CHAPTER II: The OAU Charter 12 1. The purposes .12 2. The principles .13 3. Membership .16 CHAPTER III: The Principal Organs of the OAU. .. 20 1. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government .20 2. The Council of Ministers .24 3. The General Secretariat .27 4. The Specialized Commissions .36 5. The Defence Commission .38 CHAPTER lY: The OAU Liberation Committee . .45 1. Relations with the liberation movements .46 2. Organization and structure .50 3. Membership ..... .52 4. Reform limiting its powers .55 5. The Accra Declaration on the new liberation strategy .58 6. Financial difficulties .... .59 7. Confrontation in southern Africa .61 CHAPTER Y:How the OAU Settles Dispute Amongst its Members .64 1. The African framework .... .. .65 2. Employmem of supreme authority .67 3. Guiding principles applied in various types of conflict .68 CHAPTER Yl:The Congo Crisis (1964-1965) . .84 1. OAU intervention in the Congo Crisis .86 2. The 'Stanleyville drop' .89 3. Lessons fram the Congo Crisis .94 4. New 'Katanga' conflict .95 CHAPTER VII: The Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) .97 1. The motives for GAV intervention .97 2. Summit at Kinshasa .... .98 3. The Kampala Peace Talks .99 4. New initiative - talks at Niamey 101 5. The Addis Ababa peace negotiations 102 6. Summit at Algiers 103 7. The Monrovia Mission on Nigeria 105 8. Summit at Addis Ababa 105 9. End of peace efforts and the collapse of Biafra 106 10. Conc1usions ............ 108 CHAPTER VIII: GAV Policy and Strategy on Southern Africa. 110 1. South Africa 110 2. Rhodesia 122 3. The politics of detente 127 4. Portugal 134 5. Namibia 148 CHAPTER IX: The GAVandAfro-Arab Relations 156 1. The GAV Peace Initiative on the Middle East Crisis in 1971 158 2. Afro-Arab unityat the 1973 GAV Summit 162 3. The crumbling of the Afro-Arab alliance 166 4. Afra-Arab alliance at the 1975 Kampala Summit 169 5. Afra-Arab ca-operation in 1976 170 6. The 1977 Afra-Arab Summit at Caira 172 7. What future for Afra-Arab ca-operation? 174 CHAPTER X: The GAV and Economic Co-operation in Africa 176 1. The GAV and the Economic Commission for Africa . 177 2. The GAV and the 'new international economic order' 182 3. The new GAV initiative on economic problems 186 4. GAV support for ECGWAS 188 5. The undoing of illusions 189 Notes .... 191 Appendix 1: The Members of the GAV in 1977 226 Appendix 2: The GAV Charter 228 Index .... 236 PREFACE The purpose of this book is to help fill one of the widest gaps in understanding African affairs: although the Organization of African Unity is one of the largest international organizations in the world, less is known about it than almost any other. Writing books on Africa has always been a hazardous enterprise. This is not only because of the rapid changes on the continent, which can outdate a manuscript overnight; more intimidating is the growing mistrust in Africa of books written by non-Africans. Given that Africa has for decades been the object of European and American research and experiments, based often on false premises and foregone conclusions, this hostility is understandable. The findings of the various research projects, which have been lavish and arrogant in dispensing advice to Africa on how to cure its il1s, have seriously weakened confidence in the value and integrity of such investigations - particularly when the governments and trans-national foundations financing the research have often been largely responsible for those ills in the first place. On the other hand, some outsiders have gone out of their way to push 'the African point of view', ending up more pro-African than the Africans themselves - which pleases neither side. What is needed is a new approach. The author firmly believes that the future of Africa lies in co-operation with Europe and the outside world; indeed that such co-operation is going to be vital for both sides. The efforts to create a new relationship in the economic field are known as the search for a 'New International Economic Order'; but its equivalent in the political, social and cuituraI spheres has yet to be defined. Much of the present conflict between Africa and the outside world arises from the lack of international understanding of the African scene. There has been great reluctance to face the facts for fear they might be different from the assumptions upon which policies have been based. This has been particularly true of the OAV, which to this day has not been credited as it deserves for its important role in shaping the destiny of the continent. This book refleets the experiences and opinions of a wide circ1e of people, both African and European. I am greatly indebted to my friends at Africa magazine, in particular Raph Uwechue, Peter Enahoro and Godwin Matatu, who have given me an invaluable insight into African thought on international relations and African affairs in general. I am also grateful to eolin Legum for his co-operation in writing jointly the annual survey of OAU activities for his Africa Contemporary vii Record, and for his guidance in understanding Western policies towards Africa. I would also like to thank Diether Habicht-Benthin and his colleagues at 3 Welt Magazm in Bonn, for their assistance and material towards the chapter on Afro-Arab co-operation; Peter Onu, for his help in supplying me with OAU documents and reading parts of my manuscript; George Magombe and Mohamed Sidky, for their help with the chapter on the OAU Liberation Committee; the Swedish diplomatic corps in Africa and at the Swedish Foreign Ministry, for their help both in Sweden and during my visits in Africa; Stanley Moody, who helped me edit the manuscript and encouraged me when it needed sweeping revision; and Christopher Hurst, Liz Clemens and myeditor, for their editorial suggestions. Finally, I owe a great deal to the Dag Hammarskjöld Library for help with UN documents, and to the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies for the great support I have enjoyed throughout the long process of producing this book. Uppsala, 1977 Zdenek Cervenka viii INTRODUCTION The OAV - Time for a change The Organization of African Unity was founded at a time when African leaders were experiencing their first taste of independence and were anxious to consolidate their leadership. Across the continent they saw the danger posed by the divisions of language, culture and religion, by the economic inequalities, by the controversies over boundaries arbitrarily drawn by the colonial powers. It quickly became clear that a high degree of co-operation was necessary among the fledging African States, if the continent was to survive as a viable economic and political entity. It was to achieve this co-operationthat the OAUwas established. Understandably, there were considerable differences of opinion as to how African unity could best be attained. The signing of the Charter establishing the OAU was quite an achievement at a time when Africa was sharply split into three rival blocs - the Casablanca group, the Monrovia group and the Brazzaville Twelve. Indeed, it is not sufficiently realized that, because of these deep divisions the OAU represents a largely negative agreement - not to move too much to the left nor too far to the right. As a result ofthis stagnating consensus, the OAU has in the past fourteen years moved hardly at all. Kwame Nkrumah's call for continental unity was brushed aside, and the African leaders settled for a superficial unity which brought together African Heads of States but not African peoples. This in no way affected the sovereignty of each independent State, and they were left free to pursue policies in which continental priorities were sacrificed to narrow national interests. This arrangement suited the so-called 'moderate' conservative governments in countries such as Ethiopa (as it was then under Emperor Haile Selassie), Nigeria under Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, Liberia under President Tubman, and Libya under King Idris; they had commanded a majority in the Organization, and made sure that none of the OAU decisions would conflict with their interests. The willingness, on the other hand, of the 'radicals' - such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ben Bella of Algeria, Modibo Keita of Mali, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Milton Obote of Uganda - to join the OAU was based on a hope that they would gradually would be able to convince the others to come their way and shift the ix Organization to a unity of greater depth and eloser co-operation than that offered by the loose provisions of its Charter.