UNITED Distr. ', .;, ., GENERAL .:1' s/10132 : '! 'ia 26 February 1971 ,! ORIGINAL: ENGLISH '. 1 : , ji I .' I LElX'l3R DATED 24 FEXBUARY 1771 FROM THE EXEXUTIVE SECRE'IIRRY OF TB3 ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UlKKCYAT THE ADXRESSED / ;/, TO THE: PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY C0u'NCI.L ,' !

In conformity with Article 5b of the Charter of the United Nations, 1 have the honour to transmit to YOW Excellency -4-0~ the information of the Security 'Council text of the memorandum on the prepared by the Organization of African Unity.

(Signed) Mamadon Moctar' WIAM -- Axnbassador Executive Secretary of the Organization of African Unity at the United Nations

71-03397 s/10132 English Page 2

MEMORANDUMON THE SIMONSTOWNAGREEMENT

The Government has claimed that it has an obligation under the so-called Simonstown Agreement to supply more warships and other naval equipment to the racist South African re'gime. It has persisted in this claim despite the appeals by the Organization of African Unity and the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as massive opposition in Great Britain and the Commonwealth to the sale of arms to the rbgime. A study of the so-called Simonstown Agreement shows clearly that the United Kingdom has no obligation to sell any more military equipment to . Moreover, the Agreement itself, concluded fifteen years ago, before the achievement of independence by most African States and the establishment of the Organization of African Unity, is anachronistic and can have little validity at the present time. Any revitalization of that Agreement, accompanied by the breach of the arms embargo against South Africa and attempts to link South Africa by the backdoor with NATO, cannot but be regarded by the independent African States as an unfriendly and hostile act.

The term -M.--m--"Simonstown Agreement'm-2 _I--a misnomer The so-called Simonstown Agreement consists of exchanges of four letters between the British Minister of Defence, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, and the South African Minister of Defence, Mr. F.C.&asmus, in London on 30 June 1955. They were published under the title: "Exchanges of Letters on Defence Matters between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Vnion of South Africa, June 1955" '( Comd. 9520). They were entitled: (a) Memorandum on the need for international discussions with regard to regional defence; (b) Agreement on defence of the sea routes round Southern Africa; (c) Transfer of the Simonstown Naval Base and arrangements for its future use; and (d) Details of the ancillary administrative and financial arrangements for the purpose of implementing the agreement on the transfer of the Simonstown Naval Base. / . . . S/10132 English Page 3

Only (c) and (d) concern the Simon&own Naval Base and only (c) can properly be called the Simonstown Agreement, The first three exchanges of letters were registered more than a year later, in August 1956, with the United Nations and were published in the ---United Nations Beaty Series, No. 3495. They are reproduced in full in the a:;ndx 50 this memorandum, Moreover) in registering the letters with the United Nations, the United Kingdom Government indicated that (a) "does not contain any substantive obligations but is registered in order to facilitate understanding of the other two agreements".

-k?reement contains------no obligation --- to continue-- supply of arms The only provision concernLng supply of arms by the United Kingdom to South Africa is not in the exchange of letters on the transfer of the SimOnStOWn Naval Base, but in the "Agreement on the defence of the sea routes round Southern Africa". Paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Agreement read:

"2 l The Union Government have approved a programme for the expansion Of the South African . The programme will be spread over a period of eight years from 1955 to 1963, and will involve the purchase of the following vessels 1 which will be added to the existing fleet: - 6 Anti-submarine ; - 10 Coastal ; - 4 Seaward Defence Boats.

3. Tn.e Union Government will. place firm orders in the United Kingdom for the purchase of these vessels, costing some 818 million. The Britis: Admiralty agree to act as agents for the Union Government in this matter . Thus, the only obligation of the United Kingdom was to facilitate purchase of some equipment before 1963, As these purchases were completed (except for tW0 Vessels for which South Africa cancelled the orders, no further legal obligation remains. If there had been such an obligation, South Africa could have denounced the Agreement when the Labour Government announced an arms embargo in 1964. The conclusion is not disputed even by South Africans. Mr. C.J.R. DUgard, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Witwatersrand, wrote in the South African---- Law Journal of May 1968: s/10132 English Page 4-

"There is no other provision dealing with the supply of coastal defence vessels (and none at all dealing with the supply of aircraft). It therefore seems clear that Britain's legal obligations in this respect came to an end before the British Government's decision to discontinue the supply of arms to South Africa in November, 1364."

Mr. G.G. Lawrie, Senior Lecturer in Political Studies at the University of Witwatersrand, wrote in the same journal: II . . . The text of the Correspondence gives no support to the charge that the failure of Britain to supply arms to South Africa is a breach of her treaty obligations". Leaders of the British Conservative Party and the South African regime have had to resort to arguments on the "spirit" of the Agreement or a "moral" obligation under the Agreement to defend the supply to South Africa of arms and ammunition. On this point, the comment of Mr. C.J.R. Dugard is very pertinent, He wrote:

"As Britain's sole obligation to supply defence equipment to South Africa in terms of the Simonstown Agreement was restricted to a specified number of naval vessels to be furnished between 1955 and 1963, it cannot seriously be contended that her decision to impose an embargo on the sale of arms and ammunition to South Africa constitutes a breach of the Agreement. Furthermore, if Britain did have a 'moral* obligation to continue the supply of defence equipment to South Africa after 1963, this must clearly have given way to her legal obligation to carry out the recommendations of the Security Council m-such supplies of arms be discontinued. This does not mean that the resolutions were mandatory but simply that they imposed an obligation upon Britain to consider them in good faith, with a view to putting them into effect. However weak and uncertain such an obligation may be, it is at least a legal obligation which takes precedence over a purely 'moral' obligation". If the United Kingdom resumes the supply of military equipment to South Africa, * in violation of resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, it will not be because of any legal obligations under the 1955 Agreement, but because of other motives.

__----The importance.---I-- of the Simonstown---- Naval Base The Labour Party Government in Britain recognized that the Simonstown Naval Base had ceased to be of vital importance because of the developments in Asia and in naval strategy. At the end of 1966, it decided, for economic reasons, to withdraw her one warship stationed at Simonstown. It also decided to withdraw the -in-Chief, / . . . S/l0132 English Page 5

,., ‘~ South Atlantic, from Simonstown. In negotiations between Britain and South Africa : ',' ,,: in January 1967,.it was agreed that Britain would withdraw all its militarY : personnel from SimonstOwn and retain only a naval officer and a Small Staff to maintain liaison. Despite the British arms embargo and the virtual withdrawal of British military PYese%ce ii South Africa, the South African regime did not repudiate the Simonstown Agreement, One of the reasons for this attitude was explained by the JohannesburgI. -_-- Star on 6 January 1,968 as follows: : I1 .*s ',Ihile the Simonstown Agreement lasts Britain is by implication pmmitted L to help us defend, for example2 against any comers . :!., ;' It will be seen from paragraph 7 of the "Agreement on defence of the sea ,'/. .: ', rOUb?s round Southern ;'Jfrica" that the Agreement covers the coast of , a .' I' territory for which the United Nations has assumed direct responsibility and which , : .I is under illegal occupation by the Pretoria regime. Ji,' the Pretoria re'gime is the possibility 8. An even more important consideration for 8' of linking itself with NATO or other military alliances through the military agreement with Britain. The bacQ;round of the 1955 Agreements is worth recalling in this connexion. I : !

I_-_The background ..-,..w-of the 19% Agreements--- The date of the Agreements - 30 June 1955 w is very significant. This was '. SOOn after the Asian-African Conference at Bandung. The South. African r&gime and

the Central African Federation were deliberately not invited to that historic I,' .,:'5' Conference, while African leaders from colonial territories were welcomed. The 2 Conference adopted important decisions on the elimination of colonialism and - in Africa. This was also soon after the British decision to grant independence to Gold Coast, later Ghana, the first of the British colonial territories to achieve independence. The South .kfrican rkgime opposed the granting of independence to African territories, but its views had been ignored. Already in January 19534 the South African Prime Minister, Dr. Malan, had : proposed that an "African Charter " should be drawn up by Britain, France, Belgium, PcX?tugal and South Africa to ensure tllat Africa would develop as part of "Western

. Christian Civilization", He had declared .

/ e.. S/10132 English Page 6

"Personally, I would rather be a member of NATO. I would rather be a member of NATO than a member of the United Nations. It is a better safeguard for world peace". g In August 1954, he proposed a NATO guarantee for South Africa and Western Indian Ocean area. Mr. Strijdom, the Minister of Lands, who was to succeed Dr. Malan as Prime Minister, declared that his Government aimed at winning over the four colonial powers in Africa to a policy of maintaining white supremacy. He said: "It is our task to win their support for our standpoint that white rule must be maintained and that otherwise they, as well as we, are doomed to disappear. The white man who does not view with fear conditions throughout Asia and Africa is an irresponsible fool.", g The South African Defence Minister went to London after proposing a five-power Western control of the Simonstown Naval Base and the creation of a Western Indian Ocean Treaty, allegedly to deter Soviet and Indian ambitions in Africa. g The British Government paid little attention to these proposals and drove a hard bargain. All that South Africa obtained was the transfer of the administration and cpntrol of the Naval Base at Simonstown. (Under the Smuts-C~~urchi.11 Agreement of 1921, Britain had "the right of perpetual user" in this Base,) While the transfer might have given some emotional satisfaction to Afrikaner nationalists, the South African rggime had to agree: (a) 15 pay the sum of Z2,25O,OOO to Britain; (b) To maintain the facilities in a state of efficiency; (c) To make the facilities available to in time of peace, and to make them available to the Royal Navy and of allies of the United Kingdom when United Kingdom is involved in war, even if South Africa is not involved; (d) ?s place the command and control of the wireless telegraphy installations in the hands of the Royal Navy Commander-in-Chief when the United Kingdom is involved in war; and

--- I/ The New York Times, 18 January 1963. Ej The New York Times, 18 August 1954. g J.B. Spence, The Strategic Significance of Southern-- Africa, London, 1970, p. 12. , / . . . S/l0132 English Page 7

(e) Tp purchase naval vessels from the United Kingdom at a cost of JX8 million. It inight be presumed that the main reason that the South African rkgime accepted this'Xgreement was the promise of a role in wider defence arrangements bY the colonial powers in Africa.

----The abortive .---.-_-plans for "Regional-_- Defence" -4s indicated earlier, the first exchange of letters was on a "memorandum on the need for international discussions with regard to regional defence", which,, Britain later claimed, did not contain any substantive obligations but was included only to facilitate understanding of the other Agreements. This memorandum makes strange reading today, For instance, paragraph 3 reads:

"The defence of Southern Africa against external aggression lies not only in Africa but also in the gateways to Africa, namely in the Middle East. It is therefore the declared policy:

(a) Of the United Kingdom to contribute forces for the defence Of Africa, including Southern Africa, and the Middle East; (b) Of the Union Government to contribute forces in order to keep the potential enemy as far as possible from the borders of South Africa, in other words, for the defence of Southern Africa, Africa and the Middle East gateways to Africa. mile the Union's contribution Will depend upon satisfactory arrangements being arrived at between_._ the countries mainly concerned as to the nature and extent or‘ the contribution which each will make, the Union Government is in the meantime building up a task force for use outside South Africa against external aggression". It was agreed in the memorandum that the United Kingdom and South Africa would jointly sponsor a Conference to develop the planning begun at a Conference in Nairobi on the logistic facilities and communications within Southern Africa, I and particularly along the lines of communications to the Middle East. 1-t was also !' agreed that they would jointly endeavour at that Conference to secure the'setting UP of "suitable machinery to pursue the aims of the Conference on a continuing basis". ., The African Defence Facilities Conference had been held in Nairobi in August 1951 with the participation of the United Kingdom, South Africa, Belgium, Italy, France, Portugal and Southern . (The United States attended as an observer.) It made a number of recommendations "to ensure the rapid movement of S/10132 English Page 8 troops and military supplies through the eastern and central parts of Africa".- 1/ However , discussions to establish a Regional Defence Treaty for South and Central Africa broke down: Britain argued that African troops were essential for guarding airfields,and supply bases, but South Africa opposed allowing African units to bear arms. El Soon after, on 12 November 1951, the South African Government announced that "in accordance with its declared policy of assisting in the defence of the Middle East and of the African continent against communist aggression, the Government has undertaken in time of war to send ground and air forces to the Middle East *,a In pursuance of this undertaking, the Union has accepted membership of the Middle East Command. ,,3/- What was envisaged in the memorandum was, therefore, another Conference of colonial power's in Africa to negotiate a "cold war" military pact, despite the opposition of Egypt and other Non-Aligned States. But, already by 1955, the Middle East Command had proved abortive, the Egyptian revolution had taken place and Britain had been obliged to agree to evacuate the Suez Canal Zone. The forthcoming independence of the Gold Coast, as Ghana, had presaged the beginning of the end of the era of colonial domination in Africa. Needless to say that independent African States would never enter into a military Agreement with the racist regime in South Africa. The only real conclusion which Britain should draw today from the situation in Africa is a pure and simple denunciation of the Simonstown Agreement which has become not only outdated and anachronistic in letter and spirit, but in fact, ridiculous in its imperialist implications. Africa is against it and will spare no effort to show its opposition.

1/ Commomrealth Survey, 1951, Part 1 (b), p. 7. 1/ J.E, Spence, The Strategic Significance of Southern Africa, London 19700 z/ Commonwealth Survey, 1951, Part 1 (b), p. 9.

/ . . . I,: ,,:, :“i ,’ S/l0132 ;.!' ,:: E Er.glish <',I iz Annex I .' Page 1 )>(i,E .I -.A- 8. ,I ,: MIZMORAIJDUMON THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSIONS WITH REGARD 1 TO REGIOHAL DEFENCE i; ,;. I / 1. : .' Southern Africa and the sea routes round Southern Africa must be secured ; (' against aggression from ,without, ‘,;'.: fi 2. The internal security of the countries of Southern Africa must, however, remain pi;I; I r ': a matter for each individual country concerned. ,,, 3. The defence of Southern Africa against external aggression lies not only in- j,, ,., ‘,I Africa but also in the gateways to Africa, namely in the Middle East. It iS .: j. ;, therefore the declared policy: I<,m (a) Of the United Kingdom to contribute forces for the defence of Africa, i:':;2 including Southern Africa, and the Middle East; ,' 1 (b) Of the Union Government to contribute forces in order to keep the ';: ,:, II, Potential enemy as far as possible from the borders of South Africa, in Other words i ,': I' for the defence of Southern Africa, Africa and the Middle East gateways to Africa. ,' While the Union's contribution will depend upon satisfactory arrangements being /,! arrived at between the countries mainly concerned as to the nature and extent of j :. the contribution which each will make, the Union Government is in the meantime 0:~ ;~ building up a task force for use outside South Africa against external aggression. ,! 4. In order to implement the above policies, the lines of communication and logistic support in and around Southern Africa must be adequate and securely defended. 5. In this connexion the arrangements set out in a separate agreement for the ii 1 defence of the sea routes round Southern Africa are of primary importance. 1 6. The adequacy and security of logistic facilities and communications within Southern Africa, and particularly along the lines of communication to the Middle East are matters which should be further considered. 7. To this end, it is agreed that the United Kingdom and South Africa Will jointly Sponsor a conference to integrate forward and develop the planning already begun at the PJairobi Conference. 8. This would cover the technical adequacy of routes, railwaYs, inland waterways, : i airfield and seaplane bases, radar facilities for SCreenkng, sea transport facilities, telecommunications and mails facilities and arrangements for their i defence in the event of external aggression, / . . . S/l0132 English Annex I Page 2

P* It would also cover base facilities, e.g. storage and stockpiling arrangements, repair facilities, etc., on the lines of communication through and around Southern Africa. ' 10. It is agreed that the United Kingdom and the Union will jointly endeavour, at : this Conference, to secure the setting up of suitable machinery to pursue the t; [, aims of the Conference on a continuing basis. ,;I' >I1s 1i+ s/10132 English Annex II Page 1

AGREEMENTON DEFENCE OF THE SEA ROUTES ROUND SOUTHERNAFRICA

1 1. Recognizing the importance of sea communications to the well-being of their .' respec"cive countries in peace and to their common security in the event of 1N :- aggression, the Governments of the and of the United Kingdom ':, enter into the following Agreement to ensure the safety by the joint operations of ;I ; their respective maritime forces, of the sea routes round Southern Africa. 2. The Union Government have approved a programme fox the expansion of the South 'i:, African Navy. The programme will be spread over a period of eight years from 1955 .Irn to ~$3, and will involve the purchase of the following vessels, which will be , , ,d added to the existing fleet: - 6 Anti-submarine Frigates; : - 10 Coastal Minesweepers; ! - 4 Seaward Defence Boats. i 3 3. The Union Government, will place firm orders in the United Kingdom for the 8. purchase of these vessels, costing some 218M. The British Admiralty agreed to act : ! as agents for the Union Government in this matter. i. 4. After the control and administration of the Simonstown Naval Base are handed Over to the Union Government in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement relating to that subject, the Royal Naval Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, Will continue to fly the flag to which he is entitled by Royal Naval regulations in ! * the Cape area outside Simonstown and to exercise command over any Royal Naval units , in the Union.

7* The strategic zone will include an area to be known as the "South African Area", which will be bounded by the coast of South Africa and a line drawn from the northern boundary of South-West Africa through positions: Latitude Longitude (a) 20'S 0" (b) 50's 0" (d 50°S 55'E (d) 30"s 55'E to Cap Sainte Marie (Madagascar), and thence to the boundary between Union territory and Portuguese East Africa. These boundaries will be subject to modification by agreement in the light of changing strategic considerations. The Union Government will appoint the Flag Officer commanding the South African area. a. As agreed between the two Governments, forces will be earmarked in peace time for assignment to the Commander-in-Chief and assigned to him in time of war as defined in the Annex or emergency likely to lead to such a war. 9. In peace time, the Commander-in-Chief will be directly responsible only to the United Kingdom Government and will have no executive authority over South African forces, establishments, or service. He will, however, have as one of his primary functions the guiding of maritime war planning in the stragetic zone, and will be free to confer on these matters, in consultation with the South African Naval Chief of Staff, with the Union Minister of Defence. The position and method of working of the Commander-in-Chief as the designated supreme naval commander in war will be as described in the Annex, which is based on North Atlantic Treaty Organization practice. 10. A joint maritime war planning committee will be set up, containing representatives of the Royal Navy and the , one of whose functions will be to co-ordinate the use of'all maritime facilities in British and South African territories in the strategic zone, 11. In a wa.r in which both the United Kingdom and the Union are involved the Commander-in-Chief will be granted operational command as defined in the Annex of all forces assigned to his strategic zone. #12. Since on the transfer of the control of the Simonstown Naval Base in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement relating to that subject, Admiralty / . . . ./ ,;I;;,I s/10132 ,::' English ..s,'- Annex II : J,, i I, Page 3

i :~- I ,, Rouse and the adjacent offices and residences will be transferred to the Union i Government, the Union Government will in agreement with the United Kingdom I ';: ,: Government provide headquarters in the Cape area, but outside Simonstown, with (' ,' requisite communications and operational facilities, for use by the Commander-ln- i. Chief in peace and war. These headquarters will be at Youngsfield, or at Wingfield, :<' rAB or any other suitable place in the Cape area at which the Union Government may ,, - decide to establish their maritime headquarters. _,m4 l-3. The command and control of the wireless telegraphy installation known as 'b ' ,' Slangkop, Klaver, and Cape East will be regulated in accordance with the ProViSiOnS ,': of the Agreement relating to the transfer of the control and administration of the b", :: Simonstown Naval Base. :!ol? ;,i nd 14. It is agreed in principle that exchanges of officers and ratings between the tW0 navies would be of advantage to both navies and should take place whenever ,('/ practicable. Such exchanges will be effected by mutual agreement between the two Governments, .' !32 15 . It is agreed that the south African Navy will introduce a definite programme for the recruitment, as well as the subsequent training in the United Kingdom, Of Engineering and Electrical Officers in accordance with existing practice. 16. The arrangement outlined in this Agreement will not preclude the aSSOciati.on of other Governments with the defence of the strategic zone, should all the I .' Governments concerned so agree. In that event the Union Government would support I I the United Kingdom Government in the designation of the Royal Naval Commander-in- :; Chief, South Atlantic, as Commander-in-Chief of the zone. 17 * This Agreement will remain in force until such time as the two Governments decide otherwise by mutual agreement. .',

,1 I.: , 1

/... : S/10132 English Annex II I Page 4 I’ , 1 I NAVAL COMMANDSTRUCTURE a8 9 $ Responsibilities and Powers of the Naval Commander-in-Chief '! Designate of the Strategic Zone # .!~ ,:1 1. It is agreed between the two Governments that the Commander-in-Chief of the $1I.( Z) strategic zone will in accordance with North Atlantic Treaty Organization practice 12r' ;:;'$ be accorded the following powers and responsibilities, which he will exercise in !'I j. consultation with the South African Naval Chief of Staff in so far as Union forces Ii *j, or resources are concerned: Bni ;j " --In War 'fj* g (i.e. war in which the Union and the United Kingdom are co-belligerents) ij I 4&,j g (a) The Commander-in-Chiefwillbe responsible for the over-all direction ;ID "" and conduct of maritime operations within the strategic zone, and will have $4 operational command of all forces assigned to the zone by the United Kingdom $ $ Government and the Union Government respectively: that is, he will have authority $1. 1\ in relation to those forces to assign missions or tasks to subordinate , "b,3 ,:-$1 to deploy units, both within and between subordinate commands, and to retain or ,$" ya assign operational and/or tactical control as he may deem necessary. It does not, if.1 of itself, include administrative command or logistic responsbility, which remains ,$ f a national responsibility;' B![i (b) He will be responsible for the co-ordination of plans and operations with 'i[p i adjacent allied naval authorities, I;;',j I'1 LJlk( ,!;iJi In Peace ,i";!Pg :t '1: 2. The Commander-in-Chief will be responsible for: 11f& >J' (a) The development of plans and the necessary preparations for the execution '21"1 1s$l,, of his wartime tasks; ~'4,: /$ (b) The organization for and conduct of combined training of such national qc‘d _,i I$ units as are assigned or earmarked for assignment to his command in war - ,and which je' :L.G, can be made available 4 i - so as to ensure that they can operate as an effective and $ integrated force. j,# ::iJ bli*$, . . . $t$>q:'<1 / f'.q,,')y ._ ,, s/10132 English Annex II Page 5

I' which will be the nucleus (c) The establishment of an official organization i!, for expansion in war for the control of the strategic zone. 3. To fulfil his peace-time functions the Commander -in-Chief will be authorized: (a) To co-ordinate combined training of national maritime forces of the the zone in wax; United Kingdom and of the Union earmarked for aseignment to (b) To call for reports based on inspections, carried out by national . . authorities, concerned with the State of readinese and effzLClenCY of forces earmarked for his command, but not under his control in peace time. ;, Assignment and earmarking for assignment of forcee !:_;0 to the Commander- n 4. Forces will be assigned, or earmarked for assignment in war, in-Chief as agreed between Governments* in coastal waters will 5. In general, forces designed solely for local operations ',' assignment to the Commander-in-Chief. BY not be aesigned or earmarked for ,u agreement, however, Lsuch forces may also be re -deployed within the limits of the zone if operational developments so require.

! X/l0132 English Annex III Page 1

AGREEMENTRELATING TO THE 'I'RAJYSFEROF THE SIMONSTO~ NAVAL BASE

1. Consequent upon the intention of the Union Government to expand the South African Navy as described in the Agreement on defence of the sea routes round Southern Africa, and in order that the Union Government may be able to provide adequate logistic support for their expanded Navy, the United Kingdom Government agree to hand over to the Union Government the administration and control of the Naval Base at Simonstown in accordance with the provisions which follow and will also transfer the title to certain property to be agreed. 2. It is agreed that the Ro,yal Navy will continue to require the use of facilities at the base in peace and in war. The Union Government agree that the facilities of the base will be available for use by the Royal Navy in peace and by the Royal N--y and ships serving with the Royal Navy and by navies of allies of the United Kingdom in any war in which the United Kingdom is involved.

3. a In a war in which the Union is a co-belligerent, priority in the allocation of space and facilities in the base between the two navies will be settled by mutual Consultation between the Commander-in-Chief of the strategic zone referred to in the Agreement on the defence of sea routes round Southern Africa and the South

African Naval Chief of Staff, as strategic and operational needs may require.

4. The expansion of the South African Navy will necessitate the provision for

Use in war of naval facilities beyond the capacity of Simonstown, SO as to ensure that the facilities of the base will in fact be available, to the extent required, f'or use by the Royal Davy and its allies in any war in which the United Kingdom, but not the Union, is involved. To this end the Union Government Will take, if necessary in peace, any measures required to ensure the availability of additional facilities elsewhere in the Union for use by the South African Navy in a War in which the United Kingdom, but not the Union, is involved. 5. The Union Government will maintain the facilities of the base at Simonstown in a state of efficienc,y not inferior to that existing at the time of transfer. 6. The Union Government agree to expand the facilities of the base to the extent necessary to ensure the fulfilment of this Agreement, taking into account the expansion of the South African Navy referred to in the Agreement on defence of the

Sea routes round Southern Africa. / . . . SflOl32 English Annex III Page 2

7. It is agreed that the Royal Naval Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, will retain his present responsibilities for, and authority over, the wireless telegraphy installations known as Slagkop, Klaver, and'Cape East until a date to be decided by mutual agreement, when the South African Navy can provide the officers and senior ratings together with the majority of the remaining communications personnel. After the transfer of the wireless telegraphy installations, the Union Government will continue to fulfil the requirements of the world-wide wireless organization of the Royal Navy and will provide the Commander-in-Chief with the necessary facilities for that purpose; they will also continue to employ Royal Navy personnel for the maintenance of equipment at the two-transmitting stations until, by mutual agreement, the South African Navy are able to provide all the officers and men required for this purpose, The Union Government will, in the event of a war in which the United Kingdom is involved 3 place the command and control of the wirel@ss telegraphy installations in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. 8. It is agreed that the necessary detailed preparations for the transfer of the base will be put in hand immediately upon the signing of this Agreement and will be completed as soon as possible. It is further agreed that transfer of administration and control will take place as soon as all the necessary preparations have been made, but not later than 3lst March, 1957. Nevertheless, should it become apparent that all the necessary preparations cannot be completed by that date, the two Governments will consult together on the measures to be taken. 9* This Agreement will remain in force until such time as the two Governments decide otherwise by mutual agreement.

P .,----