UNITED Distr. ', .;, ., GENERAL .:1' s/10132 : '! 'ia 26 February 1971 ,! ORIGINAL: ENGLISH '. 1 : , ji I .' I LElX'l3R DATED 24 FEXBUARY 1771 FROM THE EXEXUTIVE SECRE'IIRRY OF TB3 ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UlKKCY AT THE UNITED NATIONS ADXRESSED / ;/, TO THE: PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY C0u'NCI.L ,' ! In conformity with Article 5b of the Charter of the United Nations, 1 have the honour to transmit to YOW Excellency -4-0~ the information of the Security 'Council text of the memorandum on the Simonstown Agreement prepared by the Organization of African Unity. (Signed) Mamadon Moctar' WIAM -- Axnbassador Executive Secretary of the Organization of African Unity at the United Nations 71-03397 s/10132 English Page 2 MEMORANDUMON THE SIMONSTOWNAGREEMENT The United Kingdom Government has claimed that it has an obligation under the so-called Simonstown Agreement to supply more warships and other naval equipment to the racist South African re'gime. It has persisted in this claim despite the appeals by the Organization of African Unity and the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly, as well as massive opposition in Great Britain and the Commonwealth to the sale of arms to the Pretoria rbgime. A study of the so-called Simonstown Agreement shows clearly that the United Kingdom has no obligation to sell any more military equipment to South Africa. Moreover, the Agreement itself, concluded fifteen years ago, before the achievement of independence by most African States and the establishment of the Organization of African Unity, is anachronistic and can have little validity at the present time. Any revitalization of that Agreement, accompanied by the breach of the arms embargo against South Africa and attempts to link South Africa by the backdoor with NATO, cannot but be regarded by the independent African States as an unfriendly and hostile act. The term -M.--m--"Simonstown Agreement'm-2 _I--a misnomer The so-called Simonstown Agreement consists of exchanges of four letters between the British Minister of Defence, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, and the South African Minister of Defence, Mr. F.C.&asmus, in London on 30 June 1955. They were published under the title: "Exchanges of Letters on Defence Matters between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Vnion of South Africa, June 1955" '( Comd. 9520). They were entitled: (a) Memorandum on the need for international discussions with regard to regional defence; (b) Agreement on defence of the sea routes round Southern Africa; (c) Transfer of the Simonstown Naval Base and arrangements for its future use; and (d) Details of the ancillary administrative and financial arrangements for the purpose of implementing the agreement on the transfer of the Simonstown Naval Base. / . S/10132 English Page 3 Only (c) and (d) concern the Simon&own Naval Base and only (c) can properly be called the Simonstown Agreement, The first three exchanges of letters were registered more than a year later, in August 1956, with the United Nations and were published in the ---United Nations Beaty Series, No. 3495. They are reproduced in full in the a:;ndx 50 this memorandum, Moreover) in registering the letters with the United Nations, the United Kingdom Government indicated that (a) "does not contain any substantive obligations but is registered in order to facilitate understanding of the other two agreements". -k?reement contains------ no obligation --- to continue-- supply of arms The only provision concernLng supply of arms by the United Kingdom to South Africa is not in the exchange of letters on the transfer of the SimOnStOWn Naval Base, but in the "Agreement on the defence of the sea routes round Southern Africa". Paragraphs 2 and 3 of that Agreement read: "2 l The Union Government have approved a programme for the expansion Of the South African Navy. The programme will be spread over a period of eight years from 1955 to 1963, and will involve the purchase of the following vessels 1 which will be added to the existing fleet: - 6 Anti-submarine Frigates; - 10 Coastal Minesweepers; - 4 Seaward Defence Boats. 3. Tn.e Union Government will. place firm orders in the United Kingdom for the purchase of these vessels, costing some 818 million. The Britis: Admiralty agree to act as agents for the Union Government in this matter . Thus, the only obligation of the United Kingdom was to facilitate purchase of some equipment before 1963, As these purchases were completed (except for tW0 Vessels for which South Africa cancelled the orders, no further legal obligation remains. If there had been such an obligation, South Africa could have denounced the Agreement when the Labour Government announced an arms embargo in 1964. The conclusion is not disputed even by South Africans. Mr. C.J.R. DUgard, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Witwatersrand, wrote in the South African---- Law Journal of May 1968: s/10132 English Page 4- "There is no other provision dealing with the supply of coastal defence vessels (and none at all dealing with the supply of aircraft). It therefore seems clear that Britain's legal obligations in this respect came to an end before the British Government's decision to discontinue the supply of arms to South Africa in November, 1364." Mr. G.G. Lawrie, Senior Lecturer in Political Studies at the University of Witwatersrand, wrote in the same journal: II . The text of the Correspondence gives no support to the charge that the failure of Britain to supply arms to South Africa is a breach of her treaty obligations". Leaders of the British Conservative Party and the South African regime have had to resort to arguments on the "spirit" of the Agreement or a "moral" obligation under the Agreement to defend the supply to South Africa of arms and ammunition. On this point, the comment of Mr. C.J.R. Dugard is very pertinent, He wrote: "As Britain's sole obligation to supply defence equipment to South Africa in terms of the Simonstown Agreement was restricted to a specified number of naval vessels to be furnished between 1955 and 1963, it cannot seriously be contended that her decision to impose an embargo on the sale of arms and ammunition to South Africa constitutes a breach of the Agreement. Furthermore, if Britain did have a 'moral* obligation to continue the supply of defence equipment to South Africa after 1963, this must clearly have given way to her legal obligation to carry out the recommendations of the Security Council m-such supplies of arms be discontinued. This does not mean that the resolutions were mandatory but simply that they imposed an obligation upon Britain to consider them in good faith, with a view to putting them into effect. However weak and uncertain such an obligation may be, it is at least a legal obligation which takes precedence over a purely 'moral' obligation". If the United Kingdom resumes the supply of military equipment to South Africa, * in violation of resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, it will not be because of any legal obligations under the 1955 Agreement, but because of other motives. __----The importance.---I-- of the Simonstown---- Naval Base The Labour Party Government in Britain recognized that the Simonstown Naval Base had ceased to be of vital importance because of the developments in Asia and in naval strategy. At the end of 1966, it decided, for economic reasons, to withdraw her one warship stationed at Simonstown. It also decided to withdraw the Commander-in-Chief, / . S/l0132 English Page 5 ,., ‘~ South Atlantic, from Simonstown. In negotiations between Britain and South Africa : ',' ,,: in January 1967,.it was agreed that Britain would withdraw all its militarY : personnel from SimonstOwn and retain only a naval officer and a Small Staff to maintain liaison. Despite the British arms embargo and the virtual withdrawal of British military PYese%ce ii South Africa, the South African regime did not repudiate the Simonstown Agreement, One of the reasons for this attitude was explained by the JohannesburgI. -_-- Star on 6 January 1,968 as follows: : I1 .*s ',Ihile the Simonstown Agreement lasts Britain is by implication pmmitted L to help us defend, for example2 South West Africa against any comers . :!., ;' It will be seen from paragraph 7 of the "Agreement on defence of the sea ,'/. .: ', rOUb?s round Southern ;'Jfrica" that the Agreement covers the coast of Namibia, a .' I' territory for which the United Nations has assumed direct responsibility and which , : .I is under illegal occupation by the Pretoria regime. Ji,' the Pretoria re'gime is the possibility 8. An even more important consideration for 8' of linking itself with NATO or other military alliances through the military agreement with Britain. The bacQ;round of the 1955 Agreements is worth recalling in this connexion. I : ! I_-_The background ..-,..w-of the 19% Agreements--- The date of the Agreements - 30 June 1955 w is very significant. This was '. SOOn after the Asian-African Conference at Bandung. The South. African r&gime and the Central African Federation were deliberately not invited to that historic I,' .,:'5' Conference, while African leaders from colonial territories were welcomed. The 2 Conference adopted important decisions on the elimination of colonialism and -apartheid in Africa. This was also soon after the British decision to grant independence to Gold Coast, later Ghana, the first of the British colonial territories to achieve independence. The South .kfrican rkgime opposed the granting of independence to African territories, but its views had been ignored. Already in January 19534 the South African Prime Minister, Dr. Malan, had : proposed that an "African Charter " should be drawn up by Britain, France, Belgium, PcX?tugal and South Africa to ensure tllat Africa would develop as part of "Western .