The Neutron Bomb
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The Neutron Bomb - by - Michael A. Aquino, Ph.D. © 1980, 1982 Michael A. Aquino Post Office Box 470307 San Francisco, CA 94147 - 2 - “Do you find the neutron bomb more humane?” -Horst Haitzinger, Nordwest Zeitung - 3 - Table of Contents Introduction 4 1. The 1977-1978 Neutron Bomb Episode 6 2. The Political Setting - The United States 12 3. The Neutron Bomb Defined 19 4. NATO - The Strategic Context 24 5. The American Political Decision 36 Appendix: Arms Control Impact Analysis 58 6. NATO - The Political Sequence 60 7. Germany and the Neutron Bomb 72 Appendix: FRG Government Declaration 87 8. The Soviet Union’s Reaction 89 9. Neutrons for the 1980s? 102 10. Conclusions 106 Bibliography 112 - 4 - Introduction The Neutron Bomb was originally my dissertation for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara. It consisted of the present Chapters #1-8 and an earlier (#9) version of the present Chapter #10. The dissertation version was completed in February 1980 and my Ph.D. conferred the following month. While subsequently considering whether to publish the work commercially, I updated it through 1982 with the current Chapter #9 and appropriate annotations to (original #9) Chapter #10. Later that year I decided that it was too “research-intensive” to be viable commercially, so devoted no further time to it. Over the next twenty years I was occasionally asked by friends and colleagues about The Neutron Bomb, and for whatever reason there has recently been an upsurge in such queries. So I’ve decided to make it easily available as a .pdf “ebook” on the Internet. I have resisted the temptation to do any further factual updating, or even to tinker with my 1980-82 opinions and conclusions to enhance their “wisdom” with 2002 hindsight. Part of the present value of The Neutron Bomb, I think, is precisely its “snapshot” of its topic from a research-vantage-point just past the events in question. Thus it serves to illustrate just how much information could be discovered, correlated, and analyzed that quickly. In today’s “Internet age” it is not unusual to be inundated by data about a given topic before it has had time to cool even a little. In 1980-82 a scholar determined to get to the bottom of a research topic still needed to wear out both shoe- leather and library cards! As an incidental curiosity, The Neutron Bomb was, as far as I know, the first dissertation at U.C.S.B. to be prepared and printed on a computer - a PolyMorphic #8813 named “Glinda” - long before IBM and Apple entered the personal-computer market. I still remember the astonishment in my doctoral committee’s eyes when I presented them with a pristinely-retyped revision of the text only a day or two after receiving marginal annotations on the previous draft from them! As for The Neutron Bomb today, I think it still stands the test of time as a close-look into how an international issue, not quite of “crisis” proportions, came to be addressed and [sort of] resolved in the late 1970s. It is part history, part James Bond adventure, and part soap opera - and I daresay the latter two elements help to make it entertaining as well as informative. I hope you enjoy it, and perhaps learn a bit more about the mysteries of politics as well. Finally I must recall with appreciation the many individuals and offices without whose gracious time and helpfulness this study never could have been written. Among these I owe particular gratitude to: President Jimmy Carter and Mr. Landon Kite, Staff Assistant to the President. Senator Mark 0. Hatfield of Oregon and Mr. Jack Robertson, Foreign Policy Advisor. Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts. Major General Bjorn Egge, Norwegian Army, Deputy Commandant of the NATO Defense College, Rome. Professor Dr. Helga Haftendorn, Institut für Internationale Politik und Regionalstudien, Fachbereich Politische Wissenschaft, Freie Universität Berlin. Dr. Erwin von den Steinen and Dr. Peter Schöttle of the Office of Central European Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. Mr. Mark Parris, Office of Soviet Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. - 5 - Dr. Hans von Plötz, Counselor, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Washington, D.C. Colonel A. J. B. Stagg, Assistant Military Attaché, British Embassy, Washington, D.C. Wang Qiming, Assistant Military Attaché, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in U.S.A. Igor S. Neverov, Research Assistant, Embassy of the U.S.S.R., Washington, D.C. Inge Godenschweger of the German Information Center, New York City. The Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C. Commandant of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Commandant of the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Commander of the U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, Charlottesville, Virginia. Mr. John M. Fisher, President of the American Security Council, Boston, Virginia. The Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia. The Defense Intelligence Agency, Arlington Hall Station, Washington, D.C. The staff at the Consulate of the Federal Republic of Germany, San Francisco. The staff of the Goethe-Institute, San Francisco. The staff of the World Affairs Council of Northern California. The Academic Senate of the University of California, Santa Barbara. The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. An especial remembrance to Professor Michael Gordon, Chairman of my Doctoral Committee, and to Professors Peter Merkl and Stanley Anderson, Members of the Committee, for the inspiration they were to me in my undergraduate and graduate studies. And with love to my wife Lilith, and to my parents Michael Aquino Sr. & Betty Ford, for their encouragement, suggestions, and tolerance throughout the years of this project. And finally with fondness to my Irish setter Brandy, who was always there to keep me company in my study during those long evenings of work. Michael A. Aquino San Francisco, 2002 - 6 - Chapter One: The 1977-1978 Neutron Bomb Episode On June 6, 1977 the Washington Post printed a story with the provocative title “Neutron Killer Warhead Buried in ERDA Budget”.1 Thus began a year-long controversy on the subject of what are technically called enhanced-radiation weapons, but what the press, the public, and the diplomatic community came to know simply as the neutron bomb. The issue - whether or not the United States should produce and deploy the bomb in NATO and particularly in West Germany - became a subject of prime concern for President Jimmy Carter, who saw it become a test of his administration’s humanitarianism on one band and an issue of defense preparedness on the other. In Congress Senator Mark Hatfield led a, fight against introduction of the bomb, which for a time became one of the most highly-debated subjects in both legislative houses, and in Germany Chancellor Helmut Schmidt tried to walk a tightrope between offending factions in the Bundestag by making an unpopular decision, damaging his rapport with Carter by refusing the bomb outright, and crippling Germany’s promising Ostpolitik successes with the Soviet Union and eastern Europe by accepting it. From Moscow Leonid Brezhnev issued letters to virtually all NATO heads of state warning against the introduction of the bomb, whipping up an international propaganda barrage that pictured the new weapon as barbaric and inhumane beyond the acceptable limits for modern warfare. And the Soviet Union’s concern was of all the more interest to Germany because of an important state visit of Brezhnev’s to that country, scheduled for early May 1978.2 Aside from the purely political considerations, there was the question of the bomb’s tactical effectiveness both as a deterrent and as an actual battlefield device for combat. Would it solve the growing problem faced by NATO - that of confronting an increasingly well-armed Warsaw Pact with seemingly inferior resources? As a “usable” nuclear weapon - a device whose collateral damage would be substantially less than that of existing tactical nuclear weapons - would its deterrence be greater, thereby discouraging the Warsaw Pact even more from attempting a westward attack? Or would its impact on deterrence be insignificant, in which case its presence might serve primarily to encourage NATO to cross the nuclear threshold that much earlier in any conflict? [That, of course, could be interpreted as a deterrent factor from the Soviet point of view.] But the issue went deeper than simply the introduction of a new and more efficient weapon into the NATO arsenal. For the first time the United States was asking states that had renounced both the production and the use of nuclear weapons (most conspicuously Germany) to participate in a decision regarding the production and deployment of a new and potentially significant nuclear device. In Germany feelings ran high on the subject of nuclear warfare and nuclear weapons, and expecting the Bonn government to commit itself even prior to a U.S. decision was expecting a great deal. And there was time pressure, since Congressional approval of funds for production and deployment was sought by the Carter Administration in 1977 for use during fiscal 1978. Yet when the funds were finally approved after tortuous Congressional debate, President Carter delayed making a production decision, waiting for endorsement from other NATO governments. Not until April of 19178 did Carter announce a, decision, and then it was neither a firm commitment to the neutron bomb nor a firm rejection of it. Production and 1 Washington Post, June 6, 1977 and June 24, 1977.