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Secretary General, this magazine is © Reuters intended to contribute to a constructive FOCUS ON NATO discussion of Atlantic issues. Articles, 4 therefore, do not necessarily represent Alliance news in brief official opinion or policy of member governments or NATO.

EDITOR: Christopher Bennett COMBATING NEW SECURITY ASSISTANT EDITOR: Vicki Nielsen THREATS PRODUCTION ASSISTANT: Felicity Breeze 6 LAYOUT: NATO Graphics Studio Aiding America Publisher:Director of Information and Press Christopher Bennett examines how NATO, 1110 Brussels, Belgium NATO has assisted the United Printed in Belgium by Editions Européennes © NATO States since 11 September. [email protected] [email protected] ON THE COVER Articles may be reproduced, after permission has been obtained from the editor, provided mention Manhattan on 12 September. is made of NATO Review and signed articles are reproduced with the author’s name. NATO Review is published periodically in English, as well as in Czech, Danish (NATO Nyt), Dutch (NAVO Kroniek), French (Revue de l’OTAN), German (NATO Brief), Greek (Deltio NATO), 16 Hungarian (NATO Tükor), Italian (Rivista della Countering cyber war NATO), Norwegian (NATO Nytt), Polish (Przeglad Timothy Shimeall, Phil Williams NATO), Portuguese (Noticias da OTAN), Spanish (Revista de la OTAN) and Turkish (NATO Dergisi). and Casey Dunlevy argue for One issue a year is published in Icelandic (NATO incorporation of the virtual world Fréttir) and issues are also published in Russian in defence planning. and Ukrainian on an occasional basis. 8 Rethinking security NATO Review is also published on the NATO web site at: www.nato.int/docu/review.htm Robert Hall and Carl Fox argue for new strategies to meet 21st century Hard copy editions of the magazine may be security challenges. obtained free of charge by readers in the follow- ing countries from the addresses given below:

UNITED KINGDOM: 12 Communication Planning Unit Ministry of Defence Fighting terrorism Room 0370 Main Building Frank J. Cilluffo and Daniel Rankin London SW1A 2HB urge a flexible, comprehensive and UNITED STATES: coordinated approach. NATO Review - US Mission to NATO SPECIAL PSC 81 Box 200 - APO AE 09724 19 Towards a new strategic Requests from other countries or for other NATO publications should be sent to: partnership Willem Matser examines NATO Office of Information and Press NATO-Russia relations 1110 Brussels, Belgium Fax: (32-2) 707 1252 in the wake of 11 September. E-MAIL: [email protected] Every mention in this publication of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is marked by an INTERVIEW asterisk (*) referring to the following footnote: 22 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with Ted Whiteside: its constitutional name. Head of NATO’s WMD Centre

2 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 Volume 49 Winter 2001/2002 The magnitude of the events of 11 September, when terrorists flew hijacked airliners into the Pentagon and World Trade Center, is such that the date has already been ingrained on humanity’s collective consciousness. Few people alive today will ever be able to forget where they were or what they were doing when they heard the news. FEATURE In response, this issue of NATO Review focuses on new 24 security threats and ways of combating them. In the first of On the front line four articles on this theme, I look at how the Alliance has Osman Yavuzalp examines NATO’s assisted the United States in the wake of the 11 September relations with its Central Asian attacks. Subsequently, Robert Hall and Carl Fox argue Partners. that new, comprehensive and transnational strategies are

Aral Sea required to deal with the security challenges of the 21st KAZAKHSTAN century. Frank J. Cilluffo and Daniel Rankin of the Center for Strategic and International Studies urge a flexible,

UZBEKISTAN

KYRGHYZ editorial comprehensive and coordinated strategy to fight terror- REPUBLIC ism. Timothy Shimeall, Phil Williams and Casey Dunlevy TURKMENISTAN CHINA TAJIKISTAN of the CERT Analysis Center of Carnegie Mellon Caspian Sea University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, argue that defence PAKISTAN IRAN AFGHANISTAN planning has to incorporate the virtual world to limit physical damage in the real. Elsewhere, Willem Matser of the Office of NATO’s Special Adviser for Central and DEBATE Eastern Europe examines the evolution in NATO- 26 Russian relations since 11 September and Osman In the wake of 11 September, Yavazalp of NATO’s Political Affairs Division considers where does missile defence fit the Alliance’s relations with its Central Asian Partners. In in security spending priorities? the interview, Ted Whiteside of NATO’s WMD Centre KEITH B. PAYNE describes the work of his centre. In the debate, Keith vs JOSEPH CIRINCIONE Payne of the National Institute for Public Policy and What are the greatest security Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for threats? What resources should be International Peace discuss how missile defence fits into devoted to missile defence? security spending priorities in the wake of 11 September. In the review, Petr Lunak, outreach editor in NATO’s Office of Information and Press, considers how docu- REVIEW 31 ments discovered in Warsaw Pact archives are influencing Reassessing the Cold War and challenging conventional interpretations of the Cold alliances War alliances. Statistics illustrating international terrorism Petr Lunak considers new thinking and a map indicating the nationalities of the dead from on NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 11 September round out the issue. Christopher Bennett

Vacancies at NATO

Nationals of NATO countries may apply for all posts on NATO’s international staff. Details of vacancies, procedures and application forms are available on the NATO web site at: STATISTICS 34 http://www.nato.int/structur/recruit/index.htm International terrorism

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 3 FOCUS ON NATO

Robertson in Russia ber, where he discussed the country’s Bosnian Serb military headquarters Shanghai, China, concerning the progress in meeting membership cri- during the Bosnian war. 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. teria with President Milan Kucan, Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek and At a meeting in Tbilisi, Georgia, on 29 On 24 October, US Admiral Gregory Defence Minister Anton Grizold, as October, NATO’s Science Committee G. Johnson took over from US well as members of parliament. gave the go-ahead for the Virtual Silk Admiral James Ellis as Commander Highway project to provide internet of Allied Forces Southern Europe, the Balkans trip access via a satellite network for the regional command based in Naples, Following the resumption of civil scientific and academic communities Italy, responsible for NATO-led peace- unrest in the former Yugoslav of eight countries of Central Asia and support operations in the Balkans. Republic of Macedonia,* Lord the Southern Caucasus. Robertson met government leaders in the capital Skopje, on 7 November, Nine NATO and 11 Partner countries to push for progress on implement- took part in Cooperative ing promised internal reforms. He Determination 2001 in Baku, travelled to Pristina, Kosovo, the next Azerbaijan, between 5 and 16 During a trip to Russia from 21 to 23 day for meetings with UN Special November. This command post/com- November, NATO Secretary General Representative Hans Haekkerup and puter assisted exercise, organised by Lord Robertson met in Moscow with the KFOR Commander, General Allied Forces Southern Europe, was Russian President Vladimir Putin, Marcel Valentin, to discuss prepara- aimed at improving military interop- Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Defence tions for the elections for a new erability for crisis response opera- Minister Sergey Ivanov and National assembly planned for 17 November. tions. Security Council President Vladimir Rushailo. Discussions focused on a Meeting at NATO on 5 and 6 Parliamentarians from NATO and package of proposals for more sub- November, the Conference of Partner countries gathered in stantive cooperation, particularly to National Armaments Directors dis- Bucharest, Romania, for a seminar combat terrorism. cussed the reinforcement of NATO’s on The role of NATO in the security of Lord Robertson visited Lisbon, defence capabilities, further opportu- the Black Sea region, organised by Portugal, on 24 and 25 October, On 20 and 21 November, the annual nities for defence cooperation with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly where he met Portuguese President meeting of NATO’s Chiefs of Defence Partner countries, and the develop- in cooperation with the Romanian Jorge Sampaio, Prime Minister Staff (CHODs) took place at NATO. ment of NATO’s theatre missile Chamber of Deputies from 25 to 27 Antonio Guterres, Foreign Minister Following this meeting, the CHODs defence programme and Alliance October. Jaime Gama and Defence Minister met separately with their counter- Ground Surveillance. For the first Rui Pena, and addressed a confer- parts from Euro-Atlantic Partnership time, Partner countries were invited An international conference, entitled ence on the future of transatlantic Council countries, Russia and to attend certain sessions. Ten Years of Partnership and relations. Ukraine. Cooperation, took place at NATO on Tour of capitals 26 October to mark the tenth anniver- The eighth meeting of the North General Harald Kujat of the German Lord Robertson, started his tour of sary of the establishment of the North Atlantic Council and the European Air Force was designated to take over the nine Partner countries aspiring to Atlantic Cooperation Council. Union’s Political and Security from Admiral Guido Venturoni as NATO membership with a visit to Committee, which took place at NATO Chairman of the Military Committee Bratislava, Slovakia, on 5 November. on 23 October 2001, focused on con- in June 2002 for a three-year term. He met President Rudolf Schuster, tributions to the international coalition Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda, against terrorism, the peace process Towards normality Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Lord Robertson welcomed the peace- Defence Minister Jozef Stank and Macedonia* and progress made in ful conduct of elections for a provi- Slovak parliamentarians. establishing arrangements for EU- sional assembly in Kosovo on 17 NATO cooperation. November as “a remarkable step for- Some 2,500 personnel from 14 NATO ward towards normality” which and 13 Partner countries took part in The prime minister and former king would give all communities “the Allied Effort 2001 in Wroclaw, of Bulgaria, Simeon Saxe-Coburg chance to build a truly democratic, Poland, from 5 to 20 November. The Gotha, met Lord Robertson at NATO multi-ethnic and prosperous society”. aim of the exercise, which was organ- on 22 October. ised by Allied Forces North, was to Lord Robertson commended the par- train the headquarters and compo- liament of the former Yugoslav nent commands of a Combined Joint Republic of Macedonia* for passing Task Force in the planning and con- 15 constitutional amendments on 16 duct of a peace-support operation. Missile defence update November to provide for more equi- NATO ambassadors were updated on table treatment of minorities. Two illegal arms caches were dis- US plans for a missile-defence shield covered by SFOR troops on 29 and on 25 October by senior US diplo- As part of his tour of aspiring NATO 30 October in Han Pijesak, a Serb- mats, who reported on the previous members, Lord Robertson visited controlled village in Bosnia and weekend’s discussions between the Ljubljana, Slovenia, on 12 Novem- Herzegovina, which served as a Russian and US presidents in

4 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 FOCUS ON NATO

Cooperative Support 2001 took place contributions to Operation Enduring The New NATO — Trends, Challenges, Defense College in Rome, Italy, to between 17 and 23 October in Freedom. Hopes and Opportunities were dis- celebrate its 50th anniversary. Borovets, Bulgaria, to train NATO and cussed at the Atlantic Treaty Partner forces in logistical aspects of Article 5 measures Association’s annual assembly, host- Prospects for the Federal Republic peace-support operations, including The NATO Allies agreed on 4 October, ed by the Atlantic Council of Slovenia, of Yugoslavia joining the Partnership maritime, land, air, amphibious and at the request of the United States, to in Bled, Slovenia, between 3 and 6 for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic secu- medical components. take eight measures, individually and October. rity community were discussed at the collectively, to expand the options first, NATO-sponsored seminar to be The Standing Naval Force Atlantic available in the campaign against ter- Article 5 confirmed held in the capital, Belgrade, on 28 left Zeebrugge naval base in Belgium rorism. These included deployment On 2 October, Lord Robertson con- and 29 September. on 22 October to join the Standing of ships from the Alliance’s standing firmed the invocation of Article 5 Naval Force Mediterranean in the naval forces to the Eastern after US envoys informed NATO Defence ministers meet Eastern Mediterranean in support of Mediterranean and AWACS aircraft to ambassadors on the results of inves- NATO defence ministers met infor- Article 5 operations against terrorism. the United States. tigations into the 11 September ter- mally at NATO, on 26 September, in rorist attacks. The US envoys con- the wake of the 11 September terror- On 18 October 2001, Lord Robertson Lord Robertson met the heads of firmed that the attacks had been ist attacks, and reiterated their soli- and Supreme Allied Commander state of the Vilnius Group countries directed from abroad by the al-Qaida darity with the United States and their Europe General Joseph Ralston — Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, terrorist network, headed by Osama commitment to the principle of joined a high-level delegation of rep- Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, bin Laden. Article 5. US Deputy Secretary of resentatives from the European Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Defense Paul Wolfowitz briefed min- Union and the Organisation for Republic of Macedonia* — at a meet- Polish President Aleksander isters on the wide-ranging, long-term Security and Cooperation in Europe ing in Sofia, Bulgaria, on 4 and 5 Kwasniewski met Lord Robertson at approach being developed to combat (OSCE) in urging government and October, where discussions focused NATO on 2 October. He expressed his terrorism. The impact of the terrorist opposition leaders in the former on new threats to global security fol- country’s readiness to contribute to attacks on NATO’s future structure Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* to lowing the terrorist attacks against the fight against terrorism and to and tasks, and the need for more flex- resume the internal reform process. the United States. increase its peacekeeping presence in ible forces and intelligence sharing the Balkans. Discussions also were discussed, as were NATO’s NATO assets deployed Putin meeting focused on defence reform and the commitments in the Balkans. For the first time in NATO’s history, Russian President Vladimir Putin six-year plan, launched in 1999, to Alliance assets were deployed in sup- reiterated his country’s desire to con- modernise the Polish armed forces. On 25 September, the day before port of Article 5 operations on 9 tribute to the global campaign against completion of Essential Harvest, the October. Five airborne warning and terrorism, when he met Lord On 1 October, Lord Robertson met 30-day mission to disarm ethnic control systems (AWACS) aircraft Robertson in Brussels, Belgium, on 3 Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping, were sent to the United States to free October. They also discussed the sit- Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer uation in Chechnya, missile defence, and the chairman of the opposition prospects for NATO-Russia relations CDU party, Angela Merkel, in Berlin, and how present cooperation could Germany. They discussed German be extended into new areas. support for the campaign against ter- rorism, as well as the country’s lead General Marcel Valentin of France role within Task Force Amber Fox in succeeded Norwegian General the former Yugoslav Republic of Thorstein Skiaker as Commander of Macedonia,* which is providing KFOR on 3 October. He will hold this security for EU and OSCE monitors.

Some 2,000 troops from 14 NATO countries took part in Exchange Adventure 2001, in north-west up US planes for operations over Turkey from 1 to 25 October, an exer- Afghanistan. The Standing Naval cise to train high-readiness forces in Force Mediterranean was reas- Article 5 operations. signed to assure a NATO presence in the Eastern Mediterranean cutting Lord Robertson attended a ceremony Albanian rebels in the former short an annual maritime, air and on 28 September at the NATO Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,* amphibious exercise, Destined Glory Lord Robertson visited Skopje, 2001, which had been scheduled to where he met government leaders to run from 5 to 23 October. discuss arrangements for a follow-on mission to provide additional security Lord Robertson met Canadian Prime for international monitors. Minister Jean Chrétien, US President George Bush and other key figures post for one year, the previous six- during a trip to North America from 8 month rotational system having been For more information, to 10 October. Discussions focused extended as part of KFOR’s reorgani- see NATO Update at: www. on counter-terrorism activities and sation. nato.int/docu/update/index.htm

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 5 Aiding America Christopher Bennett examines how the Alliance has assisted the United States since 11 September and its contribution to the campaign against terrorism.

n the months since terrorists crashed hijacked airliners United States and, in a statement following the meeting, into the Pentagon and World Trade Center, NATO Ukraine announced that it stood ready to contribute fully to IAllies and Partners have lined up behind the United ensuring that those responsible for the attacks were brought States in an unprecedented display of support and solidari- to justice. ty. From invoking Article 5 in the immediate aftermath of the attacks to lending the United States the Alliance’s air- Having invoked Article 5, the Allies agreed on 4 October borne warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft and — at the request of the United States — to take eight meas- preparing for a possible role in humanitarian operations in ures to implement it and expand the options available in the Afghanistan, actions have demonstrated louder than words campaign against terrorism. Specifically, they agreed to the unity of Europe and America in the face of what are enhance intelligence sharing and cooperation, both bilater- common security challenges. ally and in the appropriate NATO bodies, related to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken The decision on 12 September to invoke Article 5 of the against it; to provide individually or collectively, as appro- Washington Treaty, the core clause of NATO’s founding priate and according to their capabilities, assistance to charter which states that an armed attack against one Ally Allies and other states which are or may be subject to in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the against them all, remains the most profound expression of campaign against terrorism; and to take necessary meas- Alliance solidarity. Initially invoked provisionally, pending ures to provide increased security for facilities of the determination that the attacks on the United States were United States and other Allies on their territory. directed from abroad, the decision was confirmed by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson on 2 October The Allies also agreed to “backfill” selected Allied after US envoys briefed the North Atlantic Council (NAC) assets required to support operations against terrorism; to on the results of investigations into the attacks. provide blanket overflight clearances for US and other Allied aircraft for military flights related to operations Few of the Alliance’s founding fathers could have imag- against terrorism; and to provide access for the United ined that the first invocation of Article 5 would come in the States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory wake of an attack on the United States and not on a of NATO nations for operations against terrorism. In addi- European Ally. However, all would surely have been tion, the NAC agreed that the Alliance was ready to deploy impressed by the speed of response and the degree of unity part of its standing naval forces to the Eastern it represented. Moreover, the NAC’s historic decision was Mediterranean and five AWACS planes to the United but one of many demonstrations of support for the United States to support operations against terrorism. States and condemnations of the attacks made at NATO headquarters in the days following 11 September. On 8 October, five NATO AWACS aircraft, together with their crews — including personnel from Belgium, Canada, Also on 12 September, the 46 members of the Euro- Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Atlantic Partnership Council — 19 Allies and 27 Partners Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and — unconditionally condemned the attacks as brutal and the United States — flew to the United States to assist with senseless atrocities and an attack on their common values. counter-terrorism operations. The deployment is for an ini- Moreover, they agreed that they would not allow these val- tial six months with a first rotation after six weeks. During ues to be compromised by those who follow the path of this time, French AWACS aircraft have taken over respon- violence and pledged to undertake all efforts to combat the sibility for those tasks, which would normally have been scourge of terrorism. On 13 September, the NATO-Russia performed by the NATO planes, in particular over Bosnia Permanent Joint Council condemned the attacks and and Herzegovina. agreed on the need for NATO-Russia cooperation in com- bating international terrorism. And on 14 September, the NATO’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, which NATO-Ukraine Commission condemned the attacks on the consists of eight frigates and one logistic-support ship from eight countries, set off for the Eastern Mediterranean on Christopher Bennett is editor of NATO Review. 9 October. These forces, which are under UK command, have not been involved in combat operations, but have

6 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 COMBATING NEW SECURITY THREATS demonstrated Alliance resolve and participation in the cam- rorism more extensively and more frequently. And the paign against terrorism. Moreover, they are available for WMD Centre (see interview with WMD Centre Head other missions, including participation in diplomatic initia- Ted Whiteside on pages 22 and 23) is contributing to tives, such as under the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue, improved coordination of all WMD-related activities at NATO’s forum for discussion and cooperation with coun- NATO Headquarters. tries in the wider Mediterranean region. These ships were later joined by the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. On 25 and 26 October, heads of Alliance and Partner countries’ civil-emergency planning organisations met at The United States and the United Kingdom began mili- NATO to discuss the implications of the 11 September tary operations against the al-Qaida terrorist network and attacks. They agreed to prepare an inventory of national the Taliban regime, which has been harbouring it in capabilities, including transport, medical and scientific Afghanistan, on 7 October. Although this ongoing action is assets, which could be made available in the event of a bio- not a NATO operation, it is supported by all Alliance mem- logical, chemical or radiological attack to be better able to bers, many of whom have also pledged ground troops and protect civilian populations. If required, the Euro-Atlantic other military assets to support the campaign and to assist Disaster Response Coordination Centre, which is based at with humanitarian NATO and staffed by relief for the Afghan experts from several people. NATO forces NATO and Partner in the Balkans have © Reuters countries, could act as also contributed to the a clearing house for fight against terrorism. international assis- They have arrested tance — in the same several suspected ter- manner as it has done rorists with links to the in response to several al-Qaida network and natural disasters in are continuing to inves- recent years. tigate the activities of foreign nationals who Since 11 September, came to the region as NATO has been devel- volunteer soldiers dur- oping increasingly ing the fighting and close relations with the have remained. European Union to help address the terror- In response to a ist threat. At a 24 potentially grave September meeting humanitarian situation, between the NAC and the NAC tasked NATO’s the European Union’s military authorities Political and Security Take-off: Five NATO AWACS aircraft have been deployed in the United States to help on 13 November with with counter-terrorism operations Committee, ambassa- preparing contingency dors agreed the impor- plans for possible humanitarian operations in and around tance of close consultations and cooperation between the Afghanistan. The Alliance has both expertise and experience two organisations. On 12 October, Lord Robertson briefed in this field, as well as significant logistical capabilities, EU defence ministers on steps NATO had taken in response as demonstrated during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. A possible to US requests or recommendations by NATO military contribution by NATO in the context of the current crisis authorities. And the campaign against terrorism was high would be at the request of the United Nations, and in close on the agenda of the joint meeting of EU and NATO for- coordination with UN agencies and other humanitarian organ- eign ministers held in Brussels on 6 December. isations. The unique cooperation among NATO’s armed forces that underpinned the success of both the coalition campaign The events of 11 September have also given new against Iraq a decade ago and the ongoing peace-support oper- momentum to the NATO-Russia relationship (see article ations in the Balkans could prove extremely beneficial in on pages 19, 20 and 21). Responses to the terrorist attacks difficult conditions. have become a regular theme of meetings of the NATO- Russia Permanent Joint Council. Moreover, Lord In the wake of 11 September, the Alliance has consider- Robertson met Russian President Vladimir Putin both in ably increased its efforts against the dangers of terrorism Brussels on 3 October and in Moscow on 22 November to by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in all fields, discuss ways that NATO and Russia can work together to including political, military and medical ones. The Allies fight terrorism and develop a closer relationship that are exchanging information on issues related to WMD ter- reflects cooperation in this and other areas.

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 7 Rethinking security Robert Hall and Carl Fox argue that new, comprehensive and transnational strategies are required to deal with the security challenges of the 21st century.

n the day that terrorists struck the heart of the importantly, they seem constitutionally incapable of rising United States, an exhibition of modern military to the changing nature of the security challenges. As that Oequipment was opening in the United Kingdom. inability becomes more apparent, disenchantment with the The timing of the two events was coincidental. Yet, taken old system grows. And the cycle perpetuates itself to bitter together, they are symbolic of fundamental shifts in the effect. world of international security. The first of these is that today’s threats are of an entirely different nature and scale To date, the remedy that has generally been prescribed in than hitherto. The second is that current responses to them the face of these challenges is based on yet better intelli- appear increasingly inadequate. Weapons of war designed gence-led activities by specific and official organisations, to counter dangers at the end of the last millennium will not coupled with more cooperation and partnership between be sufficient for the problems of the next. Yet beyond spe- interested sectors. Recent events have given this approach cific technologies, fresh thinking is required to cope with added impetus. However, although there have been positive the new environment. moves in these areas, they have not gone far enough or fast enough to meet the growing challenges. For instance, the A new approach is critical because terrorism is just one law-enforcement agencies are at least a decade behind in of many, non-traditional security challenges. Examples acquiring and deploying the leading technologies available include ethnic and religious conflict, drug trafficking, mass to new-age criminals, while intelligence-led policing migration, environmental instability, corruption, money seems to be capable of apprehending no more than ten per laundering, militant activism and information theft. Such cent of the illegal drugs or illegal migrants coming into a threats — where conflict and crime often merge — respect country. As a result of such deficiencies, real power is now no boundaries. All too often, there are no leaders or legions moving beyond the confines of the nation state and institu- against which to focus attention or target a response. tions like the G8 (the group of seven most industrialised Moreover, the scale of these activities, both in terms of the countries and Russia) and the Organisation for Economic multitudes caught up in them and the money diverted, is so Cooperation and Development. The scale of the issues is great that it dwarfs the national economies of many coun- making those organisations feel increasingly swamped, if tries. The threats can undermine national and international not impotent. institutions, as well as bring ruin to employers and employ- ees alike. A strategic approach While local issues are likely to remain the bedrock of At the same time, legitimate organisations that operate political actions and business success will always rest on without borders are also growing in power and influence being able to respond quickly to market changes, the and are therefore technically able to respond to the new importance of the bigger, strategic picture is often missed. environment. The currency speculators, the commodity This must change for two principal reasons. First, the per- traders, the multinational corporations and the internet vasive and pernicious nature of the new security challenges service providers now have a profound effect on daily lives. is universal in effect. Transnational assaults have transna- Globalisation, coupled with the revolution in information tional victims. Second, many of the issues are interconnect- technology, has given these private institutions the upper ed. It is no longer possible to separate terrorism from hand. Control is now directed more by way of financial money laundering or organised crime from drug traffick- markets than any precise geopolitical structures, and dis- ing. Similarly, it is impossible to “wage a war” against one ruption is created by the same route. It is perhaps not sur- to the exclusion of the other. prising, therefore, that traditional state mechanisms based on ideas of frontiers and order — monarchies, police, Migration is another example of the interrelationship of establishments of power — appear under threat. More issues. Refugees and asylum seekers not only pose internal security concerns but may encourage xenophobia and con- Robert Hall is project director of the LE&NS Global Forum flict, as traditional work opportunities appear threatened. and former head of analysis at the National Criminal At the same time, mass movement may bring with it the Intelligence Service (NCIS). Carl Fox was a senior analyst possibility of infectious diseases affecting both people and with NCIS. livestock. Migration is also exacerbated by environmental instability arising from climate change. A one-metre rise in

8 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 COMBATING NEW SECURITY THREATS sea levels — and nearly one-third of a metre has occurred of giving the resources, the structures and above all the in the past century — will displace 300 million people authority to that global institution to get to grips with the worldwide and put half the cultivated land of countries like problem effectively. Bangladesh under salt water. Paradoxically, many countries spend many times more on physical immigration barriers Whatever the ultimate level of authority granted or than on funds to help eradicate the migratory causes or to degree of cooperation agreed, any strategic approach counter the environmental pollution in the first place. Yet, demands a more top-down emphasis, with a large degree of our responses will go on being reactive and behind the acceptance and subordination by those lower down in the curve — not preventive and ahead of the game — as long pursuit of the greater good. It requires a grand vision and a as we perpetuate parochial thinking, practise barrier tech- single plan, designed to meet a common objective with niques and pull out band-aid solutions. finite resources. Detailed implementation of such a plan may be tailored to circumstances and institutions but only The strategic thinking necessary to prevail in the face of within a common rubric. That plan must have authority and these interrelated security challenges needs to be similarly the people overseeing it the teeth with which to bite. interrelated and much more pluralistic. This begins with ever-closer coopera- A top-down approach tion between law- does not mean to say enforcement and that input from the

national-security agen- © Reuters ground is irrelevant. cies. It also requires On the contrary, infor- full cooperation from a mation from the grass range of other govern- roots is vital to prevent mental departments, planning in a vacuum. including the military, Yet those on the acting in concert with ground cannot hope to business. The attacks see the bigger picture in the United States because of the context reinforce the call for an in which they operate integrated approach and may be unaware of involving diplomatic, more influential fac- military and economic tors that are coming elements. This holistic into play. Strategy approach mirrors the should be a guide to nature and complexity what takes place — of the problem, and and, more importantly, other international to what is likely to take security issues are not place. Moreover, as a dissimilar. While coop- result of limited eration between organ- resources, part of that isations will pay divi- guide should be a clear dends in specific indication of the priori- instances, that alone The faces of terrorism: It is no longer possible to separate terrorism from money ties that everyone must can only achieve so laundering or organised crime from drug trafficking follow. Sadly, what much. This is because often appears in strate- of the scale and bureaucracy of the various agencies and gic plans are straight lines of broad intent, extrapolating institutions involved, their traditions and vested interests. current developments with targets of 10, 20 or 30 per cent over the next 5, 10 or 15 years. Those targets are replicated In attempting to create an effective strategic framework, by individuals at lower levels without real understanding of the question of greater global governance must be the grand vision. addressed. This is not a popular subject in many quarters. Yet the longer politicians fail to address this question, the One of the greatest challenges to implementing an effec- more powerless they will likely become, the more instabil- tive strategy is to shift focus from short-term crises and ity will result and the more painful the eventual transition annual performance criteria towards longer-term thinking will be. While there is naturally great suspicion of any on a higher plane and with a more rounded perspective. supranational body, especially one that is non-elected, it is Short-term deficits may well have to be accepted in order hard to avoid the conclusion that a global strategy ultimately to gain long-term benefits. While this is hard for share- needs some form of global supervision. This is not the holders to accept, it is not impossible for governments — same as global government. In practical terms, it is a case even with five-year mandates — to implement. As with

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 9 COMBATING NEW SECURITY THREATS

good driving, the key is to keep the eye on the road and not dilemma of intelligence versus evidence will appear at watch the pedals. It is also a case of anticipating wisely but awkward moments. Certain types of threat seem to exploit being able to manoeuvre quickly in the face of surprises. the natural antipathy between law enforcement and nation- Anticipation in politics relies on strategic awareness and al security. While the former is concerned with evidence planning, and this depends on better long-range intelli- collection and preservation, the latter is concerned with gence. intelligence collection and analysis. As a result, law- enforcement agencies tend to be more open and mindful of Intelligent structures civil liberties than their national-security counterparts. Success also depends on having the right intelligence structures in place. To date, there has been a tendency to All these jurisdictional niceties and divisions hinder the perpetuate intelligence entities that were created and devel- response to certain attacks, particularly where the perpetra- oped to cope with traditional enemies. Formal boundaries tor is unknown. To the policeman, a criminal inserting a between long-established empires remain solidly in force. computer virus is someone to be apprehended and data Customs, the police, the intelligence agencies themselves, retrieved is evidence to be used in a court of law. But to the key government departments and the military, all have their counter-terrorism expert, stopping the attack or mitigating own intelligence or analytical divisions and rely heavily on its effects is the first concern with arrest a useful second. service-level or bilateral agreements to pass certain infor- Unfortunately, in the cyber world, for example, one does mation as well as numerous meetings and committees to not know which is the case until after the investigation has demonstrate coordination and consensus. This may work begun. Yet the speed of response could be critical in head- for most of the time, but it is not an adequate response to ing off disaster. These two, sometimes mutually exclusive, today’s security environment. priorities can be resolved in only two ways. One is to create an organisation with the authority of a law-enforcement A solution can best be achieved by going beyond coordi- agency but the capabilities of both law-enforcement and nation and consensus-building and imposing a controlling, national-security agencies combined. The other is a clear centralising body on the decision-making process. In other revision of authorities allowing functional barriers to be words, it may be necessary to give executive power to a removed. joint authority that could take the collective intelligence, determine the collective response and then direct the vari- The intelligence failings which allowed the terrorist ous departments to act in a specific and coordinated fash- attacks on the United States to occur will no doubt lead to ion. The way that subordinate departments responded a significant shake up of both the law-enforcement and would be individually determined as part of an agreed national-security departments in that country. With annual strategic approach. Various models have been proposed to intelligence budgets of $30 billion and the economic price help this process, but they have not been sufficiently broad- of failure on 11 September alone many times greater, the based to receive universal acclaim or market-driven to incentive for doing better in the future is enormous. The ensure relevance. need for better human intelligence will surely be a key fea- ture of any review. However, there is also a wealth of intel- The idea of centralism is not one that traditionally man- ligence to be tapped in the open literature and from the pri- aged, fiercely independent institutions like working with. vate sector. Journalists and businessmen alike operate in Fears of centralism have already killed a proposal present- many of the problem areas and have a wealth of back- ed to the previous US Administration to amalgamate the ground information to contribute, as they deal with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement security issues on a daily basis. In tackling a global prob- Administration and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and lem, burden sharing in the intelligence game is as valid as Firearms into one body to tackle the serious crime issues of in other legitimate activities. the day. The idea of an EU intelligence agency, proposed by France and Germany in 1999, was also quickly rejected by The private sector others. At the same time, it is recognised that both Europol It is clear that governments, in fighting the growing and Interpol do make valuable contributions in the fight threats to security, realise that the involvement of the pri- against crime — hence recent efforts to strengthen Europol vate sector is a vital ingredient. At the simplest level, this to fight terrorism. However, Europol is currently hindered can be seen at ports where transport companies are pre- by the extent and value of national contributions, broad sented with fines if adequate checks are not made on the legal parameters and limited resources. In spite of all the movement of unauthorised personnel. Moves to insist that attempts in many areas, progress to centralise information internet service providers collect historic data as an eviden- gathering and operations has been either slow or non- tial aid are another. existent. These steps towards partnership are understandable, but Intelligence vs evidence the impetus has so far been on expectations from govern- As the nature of the threats becomes more diverse and ment on business as part of good corporate governance. To universal, requiring an all-agency response, the central date, there seems to have been little understanding of the

10 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 COMBATING NEW SECURITY THREATS needs of business. This is, however, beginning to change with the rapid development of electronic commerce, the need for information security and, since 11 September, the LE&NS Global Forum realisation that the impact of failure falls heavily on many economies.

Major businesses can offer a great deal as they operate beyond national boundaries, are relatively good at protect- ing their intellectual property and usually incorporate the latest technologies. They also have resources. Yet they need to be a proper part of a two-way flow of information and the strategic planning process. Automatic demands for information, some of which may be business sensitive, will not encourage participation. A distrust of sharing informa- tion with a law-enforcement community, which believes in the right to prosecute in all circumstances, will again fail to open doors where it matters.

When big business and government come together to discuss matters affecting national security and law and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson was order, there can be a misappreciation of intent, particularly the keynote speaker at the inaugural, annual Global among activist groups. It is therefore important to reveal Forum for Law Enforcement and National Security the full purpose of this relationship and to demonstrate the (LE&NS), which took place in Edinburgh, relevance between the fruits of the strategic exchange for Scotland, in June 2001. In a pre-recorded video local communities. Ultimately, action against the drug address, Lord Robertson spoke of the increasingly crops in Colombia or the people smugglers in Albania can blurred lines between military security and policing have a greater effect than more policemen on the streets of and urged both the adoption of innovative approach- provincial towns. It is surely the politicians’ role to argue es to modern security challenges and increased gov- the case. ernment spending to be able to pay for them.

In order to meet the growing number of security chal- The LE&NS Global Forum was formed with lenges in the new millennium, a continuation of past poli- three aims. These were: to be a vehicle for discus- cies and old practices will not suffice. The problems are sion and analysis of key issues affecting security simply too politically intractable, too thematically interre- during the next two decades; to act as a bridge lated and too economically costly. Good intentions built between law-enforcement and national-security around closer cooperation and sharing — particularly in agencies from around the world in the pursuit of the face of a major tragedy — will not be sufficient or sus- common goals against increasingly transnational tainable over the long term. What is needed is an unre- threats; and to offer an opportunity for the public stricted, comprehensive and transnational strategy that and private sectors to share ideas and propose joint focuses attention beyond the immediate and towards the solutions for addressing security challenges. horizon. Forecasting the future will always be fraught with pitfalls but that is not cause for ignoring discernible trends The inaugural LE&NS Global Forum made four and developments in a rapidly changing world, any more key recommendations. These were: to raise aware- than trying to adopt isolated policies in the hope that events ness of modern threats; to highlight relevance of the will pass by. strategic case; to invest in global institutions; and to develop cooperation, particularly in intelligence It is a double tragedy that it has taken the events of 11 sharing, between the public and private sectors. The September to galvanise world efforts in tackling a problem second LE&NS Global Forum takes place in that is not new but is symptomatic of the dangers of non- London in June 2002 on the theme Security state actors on the modern stage and the impotence of Governance to meet New Challenges — Creating nation states to defend themselves adequately. The neces- Partnerships, Finding Solutions. sary shift in emphasis towards surveillance and stealth and away from tanks and trumpets will have significant impli- For further details, see www.lensforum.com cations, and not just for the traditional arms sector. International security has entered a new era.

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 11 Fighting terrorism Frank J. Cilluffo and Daniel Rankin urge adoption of a flexible, comprehensive and coordinated strategy to fight terrorism. © Reuters

Anthrax alert: The events of 11 September and the subsequent anthrax attacks have shown that greater attention must be paid to the terrorist threat

he events of 11 September have transformed and harder to see and counter. Because these new threats America, American attitudes, and the world in are by their nature dynamic, amorphous and moving tar- Twhich we live. The United States can no longer rely gets, efforts to combat them must be flexible, comprehen- on the protection of the two oceans that have historically sive and coordinated. shielded its country and people. The terrorist attacks brought home the fact that, since the end of the Cold War, Terrorism does not emanate from one country, one reli- threats have become more complex and far-reaching. gion, or even one group, but from networks that span the Instead of facing a single, predominantly military threat globe from East to West and North to South, irrespective of capable of wiping out the entire nation (and the world), we national boundaries. It is a transnational threat that requires are faced with a myriad of threats, smaller in magnitude a transnational response. The attacks against the Pentagon and the World Trade Center may have been carried out on US soil but the shockwave continues to echo around the Frank J. Cilluffo recently chaired two committees on home- world. How now are we to respond? How should the United land defence and counter-terrorism at the Center for Strategic States act to protect itself, its interests and its allies? What & International Studies (CSIS). Since writing this article, should our goals be in the short term? And what should he has become special assistant to President Bush for home- they be in the long term? land security. Daniel Rankin is a defence and national secu- rity analyst at CSIS. The response must be holistic. Organisation, coopera- tion and coordination are the keys to successfully dealing

12 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 COMBATING NEW SECURITY THREATS with this problem. Initially, we must look at how we wish to Terrorists have also shown an increased interest in formulate our responses and then focus efforts on mar- obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, shalling the world’s resources to mount a cohesive global Bin Laden has publicly pronounced that he considers it his response. Indeed, many of our efforts must involve other religious duty to obtain them. The use of chemical weapons nations and organisations in order to be effective. would be devastating but does have limits. The effects of a Engagement with these nations is critical for anti-terrorism chemical agent are immediate, but it is possible to turn vic- and counter-terrorism endeavours, where cooperation and tims into patients by rapidly administering antidotes. The understanding provide the keys to success. Critically, such use of radiological or nuclear weapons by terrorists is less cooperation works. The Jordanian authorities, for example, likely. The process of research, development and deploy- helped save countless American lives during the millenni- ment of these weapons by non-state actors is extremely um celebrations by preventing planned attacks on complex. The infrastructure required is difficult to hide or American and other tourists in the Middle East. move — particularly for a non-state actor — and there are numerous ways to detect their development using existing Despite current emphasis on non-state actors, it is methods and technologies. The danger here is that terrorists important to continue to pay attention to state actors or could either be given materials or weapons by a sympathetic state-sponsored actors. This is because they still pose a state, could steal them from a poorly guarded facility, or threat and they can share information, technologies and could even buy them from a disgruntled or poorly paid capabilities with non-state actors. Indeed, a recent report guard or scientist. on biological weapons by the National Intelligence Council stated that more than a dozen states are known to possess or Biological weapons give greatest cause for concern. are actively pursuing offensive biological capabilities. There is a significant difference between biological and Perhaps not surprisingly, most of the so-called “rogue” other threats because with a biological attack it may not be states feature on this list. possible to work out when, where, or how it was launched for some time after the event. The added complexity of the It is difficult to generalise about state intentions, devel- biological threat lies in the highly infectious nature of opment or possible use or delivery of weapons of mass many of its agents — such as diseases like smallpox or the destruction (WMD) because they differ from state to state. plague — which multiplies the initial effect exponentially While it is true that greater resources to develop these if allowed to spread through a population. These “silent weapons are available to state actors than non-state actors, killers” cannot be seen, do not announce themselves until usage by states remains constrained to an extent by the pos- symptoms arise, and the onset of those symptoms is often sibility of retribution and retaliation. The same does not delayed until long after the initial exposure. This uncertain- tend to apply to non-state actors. ty, in contrast to the visible, finite explosion of a bomb, can cause considerable panic and paranoia, in addition to fatal- Traditionally, terrorism has been a political tactic, used ities. These infectious agents best demonstrate the impor- by its practitioners to bully their way to the negotiating tance of building a system that not only provides options table. It has been a low-cost, high-leverage method that has for a single threat but also tools to handle a variety of pos- enabled small nations, sub-national groups and even indi- sibilities. As the threat is multifaceted, so too must be the viduals to circumvent the conventional projections of defence. national power. However, some of today’s groups, motivat- ed by radical religious or nationalist beliefs, no longer seek The nightmare scenario is that of a terrorist organisation a seat at the table, but would prefer to blow it up and build using a combination of attacks, or that of a state actor and something else in its place. The best example of this is non-state actor working in unison. This could be the release Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaida organisation. In effect, of a toxin in a shopping mall, coupled with the blowing up Bin Laden is the chief executive and chief financial officer of a power plant to deprive an area of energy and hacking of a loosely affiliated group of radical terrorists, who share into the phone system to stymie communications. A low- resources, assets and expertise, and who can come together tech, high-tech combination is a dangerous possibility, for for an operation and then disperse. Al-Qaida is simply the while Bin Laden may have his finger on the trigger of an most visible head of a hydra. AK-47, his nephew may have his finger on a computer mouse. This simple, but horrific example demonstrates the Over the years, terrorists have become expert at using need for an integrated, comprehensive approach rather than conventional weapons, such as explosives and firearms, to one trying simply to isolate and counter a single threat. maximum effect. These have been and will continue to be their preferred weapons. They are cheap, easy to obtain and The events of 11 September and the subsequent anthrax use, do not require extensive scientific capabilities to pro- attacks have shown that, in addition to maintaining vigi- duce or employ, are “low profile” and hard to defend lance on traditional fronts, greater attention and resources against. Moreover, terrorists are increasingly innovative in must be paid to the terrorist threat. Prior to 11 September, their methods of employing these weapons, and those there was no consensus on what constituted the primary methods have become more lethal. threat to the United States. Some thought it was terrorist

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 13 COMBATING NEW SECURITY THREATS

attacks against US military installations abroad, others of those agencies that have traditionally been tasked with it. believed it was the rise of China, another faction a North New players must be introduced, including health and Korean attack on South Korea and another, a rogue state human services, state and local authorities, and the private firing a missile at the United States. Even now, while there sector. All assets must be integrated and brought to bear. At is consensus on terrorism being the overriding threat, there present, however, many agencies are acting independently. is some dissent on what form it might take. The public is This produces overlap and confusion about authority, overwhelmingly concerned with biological attacks, specif- duplication of capabilities, incompatible systems and wasted ically anthrax. As a result of these concerns and the fact expenditure, and needlessly raises the risk. Many state and that its own employees were targets of anthrax attacks, local governments and federal agencies have made Congress has focused on biological agents. The Pentagon, progress in their preparations for dealing with terrorist by contrast, is primarily concerned with protecting its per- attacks. What they lack is cohesion. We need to build on sonnel abroad and with a possible inter-continental ballis- those centres of excellence that do exist and weave them tic missile attack. Despite these differing perceptions, it is into a cohesive and comprehensive national strategy. In this important not to focus solely on one aspect of the problem respect, President George Bush’s call, prior to the events to the detriment of capabilities in others and consequently of 11 September, for Vice President Dick Cheney to estab- invite attacks in those areas where we are the least pre- lish a national plan and create an Office of National pared. Preparedness was exemplary. Moreover, this momentum has been maintained with the creation of the Office of In moving forward, it is important to find answers to a Homeland Security under former Pennsylvania Governor series of difficult questions. Are our existing structures, Tom Ridge. policies and institutions sufficient? And what has been done right and what needs improvement? The time has All capabilities have to be included in this effort. The come for a cold-eyed assessment and medical, public-health and human- evaluation of current approaches that services communities are especially considers and appreciates what has While Bin Laden may critical to bioterrorism preparedness worked, what has not worked and what and response. It can take days, or even has not been adequately addressed. have his finger on the weeks, for the symptoms of biological Only then is it possible to go on to the trigger of an AK-47, agents to manifest themselves. In this next step of crafting an effective counter- case, the first responder, the very tip of terrorism strategy. his nephew may have the spear, is likely to be a primary-care his finger on a physician, healthcare provider, veteri- While WMD terrorism is a cross- narian, agricultural inspector, patholo- cutting phenomenon, government is computer mouse gist or even perhaps an entomologist. organised vertically. Clearly, govern- Here again, the need for effective ment must adapt to be able to cope and organisation is in marked contrast to the manage the myriad of multi-dimensional issues that WMD current state of affairs. That said, the response to the ongo- terrorism poses. “Stove-piping” will not work. Effective ing anthrax attacks has been admirable. It has demonstrated organisation is the concept that not only lies at the heart of the need to bring new players to the table and provided a comprehensive national counter-terrorism strategy but timely lessons on how to improve responses. also underpins it from start (meaning pre-event preventive, pre-emptive and preparedness measures) to finish (mean- Perhaps the most important tool in counter-terrorism is ing post-event crisis and consequence management and intelligence. Accurate and timely information, coupled response). Currently, an artificial line is drawn between cri- with proper analysis is the lifeblood of the campaign sis management and consequence management. This dis- against terrorism. Every aspect of the campaign from tinction has proved unworkable in practice. Crisis manage- diplomatic, military, financial and political operations to ment (immediate response and apprehension of the provision of warnings about future attacks relies largely perpetrators) and consequence management (treating mass on our intelligence. More specifically, the breadth, depth casualties and restoring essential services) occur simulta- and uncertainty of the terrorist threat demands significant neously and must be dealt with simultaneously. investment, coordination and re-tooling of the intelligence process across the board for the pre-attack (warning), Our concept of national-security planning needs to be trans-attack (pre-emption) and post-attack (“whodunit”) broadened to encompass WMD counter-terrorism as well phases. Multi-disciplinary intelligence collection is crucial as critical infrastructure protection, such as telecommuni- to provide indications and warning of a possible attack — cations, electric-power systems, oil and gas, banking and including insights into the cultures and mindsets of terrorist finance, transportation, water-supply systems, government organisations — and to illuminate key vulnerabilities that services and emergency services. We need to recognise that can be exploited and leveraged to prevent, pre-empt and no single federal agency owns this strategic mission, that disrupt terrorist activities. To date, signals intelligence has national security is no longer the exclusive responsibility provided decision-makers with most operational counter-

14 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 COMBATING NEW SECURITY THREATS terrorism intelligence. While a robust technical intelli- Within the federal government, we must develop for gence capability is important, enhancing our human intelli- counter-terrorist purposes smooth channels of inter-agency gence capability is even more so. Here, the United States and intra-agency coordination and cooperation. Many needs to strengthen its partnerships with foreign intelli- agencies have had little experience working together, such gence services. as the intelligence community and the defence, justice, health and human services, agriculture, and energy depart- While it is impossible to negotiate directly with extrem- ments, as well as the Federal Emergency Management ists like Bin Laden, diplomacy does play a major role in Agency and the National Institute of Health. Certainly, we combating terrorism. The shift away from political and need to envisage a better partnership between the Federal towards ideologically based terrorism means that many Emergency Management Agency and the Health and more countries have become direct targets of escalating Human Services, one capable of galvanising the public- acts. As a result, many countries now have a vested interest health and medical sector in response to bioterrorism. in studying terrorism. Indeed, many already possess a Further, and with specific regard to the private sector, the breadth of knowledge and experience on the subject that expertise of the commercial pharmaceutical and biotech- the United States should draw on. Cooperative pursuit of nology sectors has yet to be genuinely leveraged. common interests is a hallmark of good diplomacy and often leads to further cooperation on other issues. The United States needs to develop integrated surge capabilities for the entire health-care system. We must first A comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy should identify all existing assets and how they could be mobilised. incorporate a full spectrum of activities, from prevention Next, we need working strategies to be able to balloon and deterrence to retribution and prosecution to domestic- care-giving efforts, at both the regional and national levels. response preparedness. All too often, these elements of Additionally, we need to reach out to the international strategy are treated in isolation. Such a strategy must incor- health-care community to coordinate efforts and provide a porate both the marshalling of domestic resources and the global epidemiological surveillance and monitoring capa- engagement of international allies and assets. And it bility with the resources to respond immediately to a crisis. requires monitoring and measuring the effectiveness Monitoring global infectious diseases helps build expertise (“benchmarking”) of the many programmes that imple- and research and can provide advance warning for a bioter- ment this strategy, so as to lead to common standards, prac- rorist event. Here, too, is an example of where immediate tices and procedures. strengthening of resources for national and international security purposes would have immediate secondary and A complete WMD counter-terrorism strategy involves tertiary benefits. both preventing an attack from occurring — including deterrence, non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and Biological agents also demonstrate more clearly why pre-emption — and preparing federal, state, local, private- statecraft is of paramount importance. Many biological and sector and non-governmental capabilities to respond to an chemical agents can be developed clandestinely, making actual attack. In short, our counter-terrorism capabilities the detection of programmes and/or acquisition of biologi- and organisations must be strengthened, streamlined and cal/chemical capabilities so vexing, as seen in Iraq. then synergised, so that effective prevention will enhance Furthermore, given that most biotechnology research and domestic-response preparedness and vice versa. development is dual-use in nature, it is possible to wrap efforts to acquire offensive biological agents in a cloak of In conducting this assessment and evaluation and in con- legitimate research. The danger of theft from Russia or of structing a national strategy, all possibilities have to be countries sharing information, technologies or materials considered. We cannot protect against everything, every- with terrorists is considerable. where, all the time from every adversary and every modal- ity of attack. We must prioritise with the understanding that The task is enormous and requires efforts on many vulnerable areas will remain. And we must accept these fronts: law enforcement, military, intelligence, finance, vulnerable areas, minimise them and not allow them to hin- diplomacy, homeland defence, and health care. This effort der our efforts. What we will find, though, is that this of statecraft must bring together the greatest possible inter- investment will have beneficial secondary and tertiary national coalition and marshal all available resources to effects. Most of the institutional changes we make to face this challenge. We cannot shy from it because of its improve organisation, cooperation and coordination will be magnitude. We can, and must overcome it. beneficial across the board, not just for WMD incidents. Strengthening the ability to deal with extraordinary, and especially catastrophic, events provides tools and capabili- ties that are equally valuable in dealing with “ordinary” sit- CSIS analysis of the terrorist threat and responses, uations, such as natural outbreaks. Preventive measures, including details of an exercise simulating the effects designed to address nightmare scenarios, also have utilitar- of a bioterrorist attack on the United States, can be found ian, day-to-day, functions and benefits. at: www.csis.org

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 15 Countering cyber war Timothy Shimeall, Phil Williams and Casey Dunlevy argue that defence planning has to incorporate the virtual world to limit physical damage in the real. © Reuters

Viral attack: Disruption of information infrastructures is an attractive option for countries that lack the capacity to compete on the traditional battlefield

or many, the term cyber war conjures up images of ners have come to see it as both a target and a weapon, deadly, malicious programmes causing computer exactly like other components and forces. Like other ele- Fsystems to freeze, weapon systems to fail, thwarting ments of the modern military, cyber forces are most likely vaunted technological prowess for a bloodless conquest. to be integrated into an overall battle strategy as part of a This picture, in which cyber war is isolated from broader combined arms campaign. Computer technology differs conflict, operates in an altogether different realm from tra- from other military assets, however, in that it is an integral ditional warfare and offers a bloodless alternative to the component of all other assets in modern armies. From this dangers and costs of modern warfare, is attractive but unre- perspective, it is the one critical component upon which alistic. Such a scenario is not beyond the realm of possi- many modern militaries depend, a dependence that is not bility, but it is unlikely. Cyber warfare will almost certain- lost on potential enemies. ly have very real physical consequences. Countries around the world are developing and imple- As computer technology has become increasingly inte- menting cyber strategies designed to impact an enemy’s grated into modern military organisations, military plan- command and control structure, logistics, transportation, early warning and other critical, military functions. In Timothy Shimeall is a senior analyst with the CERT addition, nations are increasingly aware that the use of Analysis Center of Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, cyber strategies can be a major force multiplier and Pennsylvania, with specific interests in cyber war and cyber equaliser. Smaller countries that could never compete in a terrorism. Phil Williams, a former NATO fellow, is a profes- conventional military sense with their larger neighbours sor at the University of Pittsburgh and a visiting scientist at can develop a capability that gives them a strategic advan- the CERT Analysis Center. Casey Dunlevy is a former tage, if properly utilised. As a RAND Corporation study intelligence analyst, and leads the CERT Analysis Center. pointed out in the mid-1990s, the entry costs for conduct- ing cyber war are extremely modest. Not surprisingly,

16 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 COMBATING NEW SECURITY THREATS therefore, countries that are not as dependent on high tech- network connections. Alternatively, an inside agent might nology within their military establishment consider such place malicious software directly on the enemy’s networks. dependence a potential “Achilles heel” for their enemies. As the target of attack, the infrastructure forms a means Advanced, post-industrial societies and economies are by which the effectiveness of the enemy is reduced. critically dependent on linked computer information and Networks facilitate organisational missions. Degrading communication systems. Sophistication has itself become network capacity inhibits or prevents operations that a form of vulnerability for enemies to exploit. Disruption depend on the network. Degrading the level of service on of civilian infrastructures is an attractive option for coun- the network could force the enemy to resort to backup tries and non-state actors that want to engage in asymmet- means for some operations, which might expose additional ric warfare and lack the capacity to compete on the tradi- vulnerabilities. Degrading the quality of the data on a net- tional battlefield. Indeed, so important are information work might even force the enemy to question the quality of infrastructures that more and more nations consider an the information available to make decisions. As the weapon attack against them the equivalent of a strategic strike. of attack, the infrastructure could be perverted to attack itself — either via the implantation of multiple pieces of Traditional lines between war and peace are becoming malicious software, or via deliberate actions that exploit blurred. This development was presaged by the Cold War, weaknesses. Limited cyber war of this kind could be but is even more obvious in the war against terrorism in the designed to slow an adversary’s preparations for military wake of the 11 September attacks on the World Trade intervention, as part of an economic warfare campaign, or Center and the Pentagon. It suggests that the computerised as part of the manoeuvring that typically accompanies a information systems of NATO member states are likely to crisis or confrontation between states. be the continuing target of attacks by a non-traditional enemy, whose main goal is physical destruction and dis- More serious, and perhaps more likely, than limited ruption and who is likely to exploit vulnerabilities wherev- cyber war is what can be termed unrestricted cyber war, a er they are to be found. form of warfare that has three major characteristics. First, it is comprehensive in scope and target coverage with no dis- In this connection, it is worth emphasising that cyber tinctions between military and civilian targets or between war is not the defacement of web sites owned by a rival the home front and the fighting front. Second, unrestricted nation, organisation or political movement. Even when cyber war has physical consequences and casualties, some they accompany other tensions or hostilities — as they did of which would result from attacks deliberately intended to during NATO’s Kosovo air campaign in 1999 — such create mayhem and destruction, and some of which would attacks on web sites are best understood as a form of result from the erosion of what might be termed civilian harassment or graffiti and not as cyber war per se. There command and control capabilities in areas such as air-traf- are, nevertheless, several levels of cyber war, of which fic control, emergency-service management, water- three stand out: cyber war as an adjunct to military opera- resource management and power generation. Third, the tions; limited cyber war; and unrestricted cyber war. economic and social impact — in addition to the loss of life — could be profound. When modern military establishments are involved in military hostilities, a key objective is to achieve informa- An unrestricted cyber campaign would almost certainly tion superiority or information dominance in the battle be directed primarily against the target country’s critical space. This requires suppressing enemy air defences, national infrastructure: energy, transportation, finance, blocking and/or destroying radar, and the like. The aim, in water, communications, emergency services and the infor- Clausewitzian terms, is to increase the “fog of war” for the mation infrastructure itself. It would likely cross bound- enemy and to reduce it for one’s own forces. This can be aries between government and private sectors, and, if achieved through direct military strikes designed to sophisticated and coordinated, would have both immediate degrade the enemy’s information-processing and commu- impact and delayed consequences. Ultimately, an unre- nications systems or by attacking the systems internally to stricted cyber attack would likely result in significant loss achieve, not denial of service, but a denial of capability. In of life, as well as economic and social degradation. effect, this form of cyber warfare focuses almost exclusive- ly on military cyber targets. Denial-of-service attacks would take on new meaning where the services do not simply provide access to the In a limited cyber war, the information infrastructure is internet but are systems supporting critical, national infra- the medium, target and weapon of attack, with little or no structures; systems that are not designed for prolonged out- real-world action accompanying the attack. As the medium ages. A chronic loss of power generation and transmission of attack, the information infrastructure forms the vector by capabilities, for example, would have a major impact on which the attack is delivered to the target — often through medical and other emergency services, communications interconnections between the enemy and its allies, using capabilities and the capacity to manage. A failure of emer- links for sharing resources or data, or through wide-area gency services in major cities would not only result in the

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 17 COMBATING NEW SECURITY THREATS

deaths of those requiring such services but also in a loss of attack is underway, the defender must correlate multiple confidence in the government’s ability to provide basic pieces of information (each of doubtful quality) to gain a services and protection. As it became apparent that the better understanding of the actions involved in the attack, attack was impacting other infrastructure such as commu- before deciding how best to respond. The degradation of nications, transportation and water, the levels of fear and network service, data quality or capacity makes this diffi- loss of confidence would begin to impact the basic social cult, especially if the data on the network cannot be trusted. fabric. Attacks against the financial infrastructure would erode the capacity of business to function normally and Preventive or deterrent measures are difficult in the raise questions among the public about the security of their cyber world, partly because of the ability of attackers to personal finances, including retirement accounts, invest- remain anonymous. An unrestricted cyber-war offensive, ments and personal savings. Military networks, all of however, would almost certainly provide some clues as to which utilise commercial communications pathways, their identity. One of the issues for decision-makers in would also be hampered, undermining command and con- NATO countries for the future will therefore be whether trol, logistics and both preparedness and operations. In such attacks lead simply to cyber retaliation or to retaliato- unrestricted cyber warfare, virtual attacks can have conse- ry actions in the physical world, or both. Notions of link- quences that are real, profound and far-reaching. age, escalation and deterrence that were familiar during the Cold War have to be re-examined in relation to new kinds The irony is that those nations, like the United States and of contingencies. Indeed, it might be that strategies of its NATO Allies, that have the capacity to excel in cyber war deterrence could have an impact in cyber space — at least as an adjunct to military operations — and can achieve against unrestricted offensives. information dominance over the battlefield — are also those most vulnerable to unrestricted cyber war. There are, Defences can also be developed with some expectation however, measures that can be taken to reduce these vulner- of success. In the near term, modern network attack almost abilities. always favours the aggressor. In the long term, this advan- tage may shift to the defenders, as they identify the means Cyber warfare is not fundamentally different from con- of attack and block them by patching vulnerabilities and ventional, physical warfare. When conducted by a nation insulating network connections. Moreover, information state, it is integrated into a defined strategy and doctrine, networks can be made more robust. Essential network serv- becomes part of military planning and is implemented with- ices can be isolated in order to maintain mission capability. in specific parameters. Consequently, it is subject to analysis Physical security and personnel training can minimise the and warning in much the same way as other military opera- threat of malicious insider activity. And firewalls and intru- tions. Indeed, there are several ways of reducing vulnerabil- sion detection systems can be configured in such a way as ity to cyber war. These include anticipation and assessment, to provide warning and response systems for both public preventive or deterrent measures, defensive measures and and private infrastructures. measures for damage mitigation and reconstitution. Finally, it is necessary to develop a capacity for damage The Clausewitzian notion that war is an extension of pol- mitigation and reconstitution. Network design should inte- itics by other means provides the basis for the development grate notions of robustness and survivability (based in part and implementation of a reliable warning system for cyber on the availability of other means to perform critical mis- threat. Prior to an attack, whether cyber or conventional, sions), while contingency plans for the continued imple- there is usually an element of political confrontation. mentation of critical roles and missions with far less cyber Awareness of an escalating political conflict, recognition connectivity are essential. Insulated intranets that can oper- and analysis of developing cyber-warfare capabilities, and ate efficiently and safely without wider connections offer detection and assessment of attack precursors all provide considerable promise in this respect. warnings of impending cyber attacks. While still being developed, methodologies to provide warning can be com- All this is, of course, easier said than done. The obstacles bined with coordinated and sophisticated survivability to enhanced network survivability are many and varied. strategies to increase the likelihood of recognition, Security is often an afterthought rather than an integral part response and recovery from a concerted cyber attack. of network design. Government and business have different approaches to security and its provision. Dependence on Warning methodologies are all the more important computer networks often goes unquestioned. And the lines because of the difficulties inherent in identifying and of responsibility in government are often blurred and con- assessing a sophisticated cyber attack. Differentiating a fused by overlapping and competing jurisdictions. Yet all network attack from accidental factors (such as a surge in these difficulties can be overcome with a mixture of politi- demand for certain information on the network) or imple- cal will, organisational commitment, careful planning and mentation mistakes (such as errors in the portion of a serv- systematic implementation. Defence planning needs to er’s operating system that processes network traffic) is nei- incorporate the virtual world, if there is to be any chance of ther quick nor easy. Moreover, even when it is clear that an limiting physical damage in the real world.

18 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 Towards a new strategic partnership

Willem Matser examines NATO-Russia relations in the wake of 11 September and the prospects for improved cooperation. © NATO

Moscow meeting: The rapprochement of recent months has made it possible to bring far-reaching proposals to the table

ew events bring people together more effectively signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual than a tragedy and few tragedies have been greater or Relations, Cooperation and Security, the heads of state and Ftheir consequences more wide-reaching than that of government of NATO and Russia committed themselves to 11 September. In addition to the several thousand “the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confronta- Americans who lost their lives, close to 800 citizens of tion and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and other NATO countries and nearly 100 Russians died as the cooperation, thus marking the beginning of a fundamen- twin towers of the World Trade Center collapsed, watched tally new relationship between NATO and Russia and live on television by millions around the world. In the wake intending to develop a strong, stable and enduring partner- of this shared disaster, the unity of purpose of Allies and ship”. Moreover, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Russia in the face of a common threat has been a key fea- Council (PJC) was created to provide “a mechanism for ture of the international coalition’s war on terrorism. consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent Moreover, the shuttle diplomacy, summits and flurry of possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint new proposals of recent months have clearly opened up action”. great opportunities for closer cooperation and a deeper relationship between NATO and Russia. Since then, NATO-Russia relations have seen many highs and lows. In the course of this journey, the many It is not, of course, the first time that expectations for personalities involved have played their part, as have NATO-Russia relations have been so great. In 1997, by shifting political paradigms and pressing security challenges, including the Balkan conflicts, the first Willem Matser works in NATO’s Office of the Special Chechen War, NATO’s Kosovo campaign, the second Adviser for Central and Eastern Europe. Chechen War and now the international coalition’s war on terrorism.

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 19 SPECIAL

In attempting to place the NATO-Russia relationship on ing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. From the moment a sound footing, therefore, it is important to examine Primakov took charge of the foreign ministry, Russia’s for- where, when and how it has turned sour in the past and eign and security policy became more cohesive and to determine whether certain lessons can be learned for assertive. Indeed, one objective underlying the NATO- the future. Such an analysis should perhaps have been Russia Founding Act was that of ensuring that Russia had a made earlier. But until very recently, it was precluded by voice in the key Euro-Atlantic security institutions and the political baggage weighing on the NATO-Russia rela- influence on their decision-making processes. Since the tionship in general and the functioning of the PJC in par- PJC was supposed to include mechanisms for both joint ticular. decision-making and joint action, Russia viewed it as an opportunity to exert such influence. To appreciate fully the current situation and to assess the nature of the difficulties that have to be overcome, Despite early optimism, however, it rapidly became the NATO-Russia relationship has to be viewed in its his- clear that the PJC was not functioning as intended. Some torical context. It is, after all, only a little over a decade of the PJC’s shortcomings could be attributed to cultural since the end of the Cold War and attitudes from that differences. NATO functions on the basis of consensus period have continued to influence thinking. Although and has therefore always had a bottom-up approach to some individuals at the very top of Russian society were collaboration. This presupposes an ongoing process of eager to pursue a pro-Western agenda in the early 1990s, informal consultations among the Allies’ Permanent many senior officials found it difficult to come to terms Representations at NATO headquarters in order to smooth with the demise of both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet the way towards agreement, including, in some instances, Union and the loss of super-power sta- agreement to avoid particular areas of tus that this entailed. Indeed, in many discord. Despite promoting the PJC, cases, they found it humiliating to however, Primakov decided not to have to continue to deal with NATO, The terrorist attacks establish a permanent presence at the “victorious Cold War adversary”, against the United NATO headquarters. This decision, as they saw it. Many in Russia viewed when viewed in conjunction with NATO’s very continued existence as a States have given Moscow’s top-down approach betrayal. If the Soviet Union and the NATO-Russia to collaboration, was critical, as it Warsaw Pact – the “threats” NATO severely limited potential Russian par- was formed to counter – had ceased relations added ticipation in this consensus-building to exist, they wondered, why was impetus, but the roots process. a Western military alliance still neces- sary? of a better relationship An even greater obstacle, however, pre-date 11 September was the reluctance on both sides to As Russia struggled to integrate overcome Cold War stereotypes. itself into Western institutions and eco- Russia, driven by Primakov’s aspiration nomic hardship dashed the dreams of to restore his country’s great-power sta- capitalist prosperity for ordinary Russians, disillusionment tus in a “multi-polar” world, remained focused on obstruct- set in. At the same time, NATO failed to find the right tone ing Alliance solidarity. Allies responded by requiring that for developing its relationship with Russia and was there- no discussion with Russia could proceed without a formal- fore unable to convince the Russian bureaucracy of its pos- ly agreed NATO position. For the Russians, denied the itive intentions. Russian foreign and defence ministry offi- opportunity to influence Alliance policies before decisions cials were disappointed to find themselves treated no had been taken, the “nineteen-plus-one” format became differently than their counterparts from former Warsaw “nineteen-versus-one”, and NATO-Russia exchanges often Pact countries and other former Soviet constituent amounted to no more than repetitions of well-known posi- republics in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the tions. The PJC ceased meeting early in 1999, when Russia predecessor of today’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council walked out in protest over NATO’s decision to wage an air (EAPC). The decision by Allied leaders, at the 1994 campaign to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. This freezing Brussels Summit, to reaffirm that NATO’s door was open of NATO-Russia relations was, however, above all confir- to new members, followed by the commissioning of a mation of pre-existing difficulties in the relationship and Study on Enlargement in 1995, contributed further distrust diverging approaches to the PJC. to the relationship. In Russian eyes, not only had NATO outlived the threats that had given birth to it, but it was also Although the terrorist attacks against the United States expanding its military and political influence ever closer to and the process of building an international coalition the Russian border. against terrorism have certainly given the NATO-Russia relationship added impetus and injected a sense of urgency The appointment of Primakov as foreign minister in into discussions, the roots of a better relationship pre-date 1996 was a turning point and led within a year to the sign- 11 September. Already at the beginning of 2000, the

20 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 SPECIAL appointment of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia Many Western analysts believe that President Putin is paved the way for a new and more constructive relation- currently far ahead of other players in the Russian ship and in May of that year the PJC resumed its activities. defence and security community. Some even think that Since then, despite Western unease with Russia’s opera- he is overextending himself and thereby making himself tions in Chechnya, NATO and Russia have been able vulnerable. Whatever the precise nature of his situation, steadily to increase the range and number of joint activi- the pressure for success is high – both for President Putin ties. and for NATO – and the need to deliver concrete achievements will become increasingly important as the By spring 2001, the PJC’s work agenda had expanded to Prague Summit approaches and the issue of NATO cover a wide range of issues of mutual interest, including enlargement begins to loom larger. A carefully consid- ongoing cooperation in and consultation on peacekeeping ered and coordinated package of visible steps forward in the Balkans, discussions of strategy and doctrine, and could help President Putin bridge the gap with the more cooperation in arms control, proliferation, military infra- conservative elements in his security elite. Moreover, a structure, nuclear issues and theatre missile defences, as prudent public information policy is also required, since well as the retraining of discharged military personnel and media expectations and/or speculation risk generating a search and rescue at sea. Indeed, the programme was dangerous level of pressure on what will inevitably be a almost as broad as the one that existed at the end of 1998. complex political process. In February 2001, after a year of negotiations, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson was able to inaugurate a The fundamental attitudes of many institutional actors NATO Information Office in Moscow. It was in this, more in the NATO-Russia relationship have not changed. As a congenial atmosphere, therefore, that Lord Robertson and result, “breakthroughs” at the highest political level and/or Russian President Putin had two constructive meetings constructive approaches in informal talks will not auto- during the latter part of 2001. matically be translated into practical achievements. Concrete proposals and programmes will still have to be The Putin-Robertson meetings in Brussels in October implemented through the same bureaucratic channels and, and Moscow in November, and several meetings between in some instances, in spite of them. Although the environ- Presidents Bush and Putin during this same timeframe ment for cooperation appears conducive to progress, suc- have clearly put both NATO-Russia and Russia-US rela- cess is not assured and high-profile initiatives may not tions on a new footing. Indeed, in a joint statement fol- come to fruition soon, or at all. A more realistic approach lowing their meeting in Crawford, Texas, in November, might therefore be the time-consuming process of pushing the two Presidents pledged that Russia and the United forward smaller, formal and informal, but still substantive States would “work, together with NATO and other issues. NATO members, to improve, strengthen, and enhance the relationship between NATO and Russia, with a view to Russia’s principal objective has not changed. It still developing new, effective mechanisms for consultation, wants, above all, to be treated as a mature, influential cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint partner and to have a voice in the key Euro-Atlantic secu- action”. Moreover, at the December foreign ministers’ rity institutions and in defence and security decision- PJC meeting at NATO headquarters, NATO and Russia making. If the Allies are unwilling or unable to give sub- committed themselves to “forge a new relationship” and stance to this objective, the backlash could be serious and tasked ambassadors to explore “effective mechanisms for long-lasting. Although symbolic steps forward can be of consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinat- value, the process will also need substance. New cooper- ed/joint action”. ative mechanisms can help to overcome the mistrust of the past and to streamline our ability to take joint action The rapprochement of recent months has made it possi- when appropriate. New mechanisms alone, however, can- ble to bring far-reaching proposals to the table, including not form the basis of a strong, durable NATO-Russia part- the institutionalisation of NATO-Russia cooperation “at nership. There must be new attitudes, particularly on the 20”. It has also generated great expectations, on both Russian side. sides, not all of which are realistic. Establishing mecha- nisms for meeting with Russia “at 20”, without pre-coor- As policy makers and political leaders attempt to dinated Alliance positions, does not mean that Russia will seize an historic opportunity, they should understand secure a veto over Alliance decision-making. The what is at stake. False moves could seriously undermine Alliance will continue to function “at 19”, and to main- the good will that has been built up in recent months and tain its freedom of decision-making and action on any actually set back the relationship. If, however, despite issue consistent with its responsibilities under the the complexity and sensitivity surrounding this issue, Washington Treaty. However, where common ground can NATO and Russia can come together and forge a new be found and NATO and Russia are able to work together, strategic partnership, this will have considerable it is important to build the necessary mechanisms to make benefits stretching well beyond the common interests of this possible. the two partners.

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 21 Ted Whiteside: Head of NATO’s WMD Centre Ted Whiteside has headed NATO’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre since its creation in autumn 2000. He joined NATO’s Political Affairs Division in September 1999 as deputy head of the Disarmament, Arms Control and Cooperative Security Section, having served in the Canadian Delegation to NATO and the Canadian Embassy in Bonn.

NATO Review: What is the WMD Centre Senior Defence Group on Proliferation. In and why was it set up? addition, the WMD Centre actively sup- Ted Whiteside: The WMD Centre is an © NATO ports the Senior Political Committee in its interdisciplinary team in the Political work dealing with theatre missile defence, Affairs Division of NATO. It was estab- cooperation with Russia and issues related lished in order to support the work of com- to the Alliance’s response to terrorism fol- mittees and working groups dealing with lowing the 11 September 2001 attacks proliferation issues. The WMD Centre against the United States. draws its mandate directly from the Alliance’s 1999 Washington Summit and NR: How has the WMD Centre’s agenda the WMD Initiative. There are basically changed since 11 September? six broad objectives. These are: to ensure a TW: In the wake of 11 September, there is more vigorous debate at NATO leading to clearly an increased awareness of the strengthened common understanding potential use of weapons of mass destruc- among Allies on WMD issues and how to tion by non-state actors. As a result of this respond to them; to improve the quality and quantity of increased awareness, the Centre has adapted its work pro- intelligence and information sharing among Allies on pro- gramme to the evolving demands of the Committees we liferation issues; to support the development of a public- support. That said, there is a great deal of continuity in the information strategy by Allies to increase awareness of pro- work of a committee such as the Senior Defence Group on liferation issues and Allies’ efforts to support Proliferation — in terms of what it has been doing over non-proliferation efforts; to enhance military readiness to recent years to enhance military readiness to operate in a operate in a WMD environment and to counter WMD WMD environment. Many of the practical steps that have threats; to exchange information concerning national pro- been taken by Allies with respect to force protection, detec- grammes for bilateral WMD destruction and assistance — tion, identification and medical counter-measures can be specifically how to help Russia destroy its stockpiles of adapted to the risks associated with the potential use of chemical weapons; and to enhance the possibilities for weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors. We are Allies to assist one another in the protection of their civil therefore seeking to build upon existing work and initia- populations against WMD risks. As you see from these tives. Although our agenda has not changed markedly, objectives, the Alliance has a very active programme of there is clearly a different emphasis on the risks associated work regarding WMD risks and threats, and the Centre is with biological agents. Indeed, we will have to get to know the focal point for support to these efforts. more about the potential use of biological, chemical and radiological devices by non-state actors and to build this in NR: How does the WMD Centre function? How many as an important part of our thinking. In addition, we need to NATO staff and how many national experts work there? review how best to work together to protect civilian popu- TW: There are three international staff and seven national lations against these risks. experts. The seven national experts bring with them a very wide experience. We have expertise in chemical weapons, NR: Media appear obsessed about bioterrorism as a result biological agents, ballistic missiles, knowledge and experi- of the spate of anthrax letters in the United States. How ence in force protection, intelligence, and political aspects serious a threat is this form of warfare? of arms control and non-proliferation regimes. We support TW: The potential use of biological agents by non-state a number of NATO committees. The two principal ones are actors is a significant problem. Non-state actors have the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation and the shown the potential to create and use some of these

22 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 INTERVIEW weapons. One of the principal characteristics of biological the capability to address appropriately and effectively the agents that may make their use attractive to non-state actors threats that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc- is their toxicity. Potential use of such agents by terrorist or tion and their means of delivery can pose. It is critical to criminal elements would be extremely disruptive. These maintain the flexibility and effectiveness of Alliance forces agents are insidious, difficult to trace and extremely despite the presence, the threat or the use of nuclear, bio- resource-intensive to counter, both in terms of medical logical and chemical weapons. In this context, the Alliance counter measures and law enforcement. Dual-use technol- draws upon a mix of means to address the challenges of ogy and the widespread expertise associated with modern proliferation, including deterrence and offensive and biological industries exacerbate the difficulties associated defensive means, and enhancing the effectiveness of arms with countering this type of proliferation. Although the use control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as and possession of biological weapons have been prohibited diplomatic and counter-proliferation measures. since the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Biological NR: Russia has displayed interest in cooperation with and Toxin Weapons, it remains extremely difficult to NATO on tactical missile defence. What direction could implement suitable verification measures. Unlike conven- this take? tional arms-control regimes where it is possible to count TW: There have been a number of close and intensive con- specific objects, such as tanks and artillery pieces, and sultations with Russia on missile defence. These consulta- establish verification benchmarks, this option is not readi- tions will continue in the future and are likely to head in ly available in the case of biological agents. It remains two or three generic areas. Firstly, we can discuss the nature important to pursue efforts to ensure that the 1972 of ballistic-missile development in the world, our under- Convention is an effective instrument to counter the grow- standing of the problem, its scope and the range of efforts ing threat of biological weapons. to counter it. Secondly, we can discuss concepts, such as a common understanding of the meaning of missile defence, NR: What other threats appear most dangerous to you at how it can be integrated into the overall concept of present? Extended Air Defence, how it works in terms of communi- TW: There are risks related to biological and chemical cations and command and control, and what it presupposes agents, toxic industrial chemicals, as well as radiological in terms of training. And we can also explore potential devices. Beyond that, ballistic-missile proliferation remains industrial cooperation that could eventually take place an issue of serious concern to the Alliance. In this area, the between NATO and Russia on systems that are currently Alliance remains strongly committed to the Missile being developed. Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group and the Zangger and Nuclear Suppliers Groups as important ele- NR: Are there any plans to expand WMD Centre activities ments in our efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons to include Partner countries? of mass destruction and the means for their delivery. TW: Partners have already had some consultations with the Alliance on proliferation. There have been specific, in- NR: Is there an emerging Alliance view on proliferation? depth bilateral talks with Russia and Ukraine. There have On missile defence? been general discussions within the Euro-Atlantic TW: The Alliance has recognised since the early 1990s that Partnership Council and, as in the past, disarmament it is important to strengthen efforts against proliferation. experts’ meetings will continue to take place with Partners. The principal goal remains that of preventing proliferation We hope to see this expanded within committee work, so from taking place, or, should it take place, to reverse it that we can increasingly address the challenges associated through diplomatic means. Hand in hand with such an with proliferation with all Partners. Contacts and consulta- approach goes the important role of ensuring an appropri- tions have also begun with Mediterranean Dialogue coun- ate defence posture against the possible use of weapons of tries. More work is ongoing to strengthen and deepen all of mass destruction. The Alliance’s defence posture must have these consultations.

HE NATO SCIENCE PROGRAMM T“Bringing scientists together for progress and peace”E The NATO Science Programme supports collaborative projects between scientists from Allied and Partner countries. The programme – which is not defence-related – aims to stimulate cooperation between scientists from different backgrounds, to create enduring links between researchers, and to help sustain scientific communities in Partner countries.

Full details can be found on the NATO web site: http://www.nato.int/science

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 23 On the front line As NATO’s Central Asian Partners take up frontline positions in the international coalition against terrorism, Osman Yavuzalp examines the Alliance’s relations with these countries.

hen it became clear that the 11 September ter- In the immediate aftermath of 11 September, the coun- rorist attacks on the United States had been mas- tries of Central Asia joined fellow members of the Euro- Wterminded by Osama Bin Laden’s Afghanistan- Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in unconditionally based al-Qaida network, their ferocity and audacity came condemning the attacks and pledging to undertake all as little surprise to the countries of Central Asia. The inter- efforts to combat the scourge of terrorism. Since then, they national community had, of course, been aware of the dete- have made good their pledge by making territory and assets riorating situation in Afghanistan and expressed concern available to the international coalition. Kazakhstan about human rights’ violations, the wanton destruction of announced its readiness to support the US-led coalition Buddhist statues and the arrests of international aid work- with all the means at its disposal on 24 September. ers for allegedly preaching Christianity. But the Kyrghyz Similarly, the Kyrghyz Republic, Tajikistan and Republic, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and, to a lesser extent, Turkmenistan have made their support for the fight against Kazakhstan had experienced first-hand the dangers posed terrorism clear. And Uzbekistan has become a vital ele- by Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, having long suffered con- ment in the campaign against the Taliban, announcing on 5 sequences of the drugs trade and been victim, since 1998, October that it would open its air space to US planes and of several incursions by terrorists linked to al-Qaida. grant landing rights on Uzbek territory for search-and-res- cue and humanitarian missions. Given that all these coun- Indeed, the countries of Central Asia had been among tries have predominantly Muslim populations, their sup- the first to draw the world’s attention to the deteriorating port demonstrates that, contrary to Bin Laden’s claims, the situation in Afghanistan and the potential risks to interna- international campaign against terror is neither a crusade tional security. As early as 8 September 2000 — a year against Islam nor a clash of civilisations. before the attacks on the United States — Uzbek President Islam Karimov warned the UN General Assembly that: The 11 September attacks have demonstrated the indi- “Afghanistan has turned into a training ground and a visibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic area. All coun- hotbed of international terrorism” and that: “The continu- tries now face the same threats, whether they be in North ing war in Afghanistan stands as a threat to the security of America, Europe or Central Asia. Moreover, the attacks not only the states of the Central Asian region, but to the and the ensuing campaign against terrorism have also whole world.” brought into focus the importance of Central Asia to Euro- Atlantic security and the need for closer cooperation Mindful of the need to restore law and order and to end between NATO and its Central Asian Partners — not just the suffering of the Afghan people, Tajikistan, within the context of the current crisis, but beyond. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have, since 1997, tried to work for a peaceful solution to the Afghan crisis through Central Asia and Europe have a long history of close the so-called “six plus two group” of countries which interaction. During the 19th century, the region attracted includes China, Iran and Pakistan, and is supported by both the attention of both British and Russian empires because Russia and the United States. More recently, this group met the Great Silk Road, the major trade route linking Europe Ambassador Lakdar Brahimi, UN special envoy to the to the Far East, passed through it. Today, Central Asia’s region, in New York on 12 November, on the fringes of the energy reserves hold out the possibility of great wealth for UN General Assembly, for talks about a post-Taliban the development of the region. However, NATO’s interest Afghanistan at which the representatives of the six neigh- in the region during the past decade is neither the result of bouring countries expressed support for the formation of a Central Asia’s history nor its economic potential. Instead, broad-based, multi-ethnic and freely chosen post-Taliban the Alliance has wished to foster security in Central Asia as government. part of its strategy of building partnerships with emerging democracies, meeting new security challenges and promot- Osman Yavuzalp works on NATO enlargement and rela- ing stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. Efforts to tions with the Alliance’s Central Asian Partners in NATO’s pursue closer partnership and cooperation through both the Political Affairs Division. Partnership for Peace programme and the EAPC have been of benefit to all.

24 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 FEATURE

The Partnership for Peace offers an extensive menu of series of regional, security-cooperation seminars address- security-related activities covering areas, such as civil- ing Central Asian security issues have also been organised emergency planning, crisis management, language train- under EAPC auspices. These have been held in the region ing, scientific cooperation and the interoperability of itself to help NATO Allies and other Partners get a better armed forces. From this menu, each Partner can pick and understanding of conditions on the ground. The first took choose on the basis of individual requirements and priori- place in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in October 1999. The suc- ties. Moreover, under the terms of the Partnership, NATO cess of this initiative led to a second seminar in Bishkek, Allies will consult with any Partner, at its request, if that the Kyrghyz Republic, in November 2000, and a third in Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, Almaty, Kazakhstan, in September 2001 — only a few days political independence or security. after the terrorist attacks against the United States.

Two key principles underpin the Partnership for Peace. Civil-emergency planning is another key area of cooper- First, it is not directed against the interests of a third party. ation. Central Asian countries are prone to natural disas- Neutral countries, such as Austria, Ireland, Moldova and ters, such as earthquakes and floods, and are therefore keen Switzerland, are also able to benefit from the wide range of to explore ways of protecting cities and populations locat- activities offered. Second, it does not seek to substitute or ed in high-risk zones. Planning for such civil emergencies duplicate other cooperative initiatives but rather to comple- and preparing the way for civil-military cooperation in ment them, as NATO has always respected the specific disaster-response operations is being facilitated by partici- interests and regional considerations of its Partners. In pation in workshops and activities organised within the Southeastern Europe, for example, countries participate in framework of the Partnership for Peace. To this end, tai- lored courses have taken place in the Kyrghyz Republic in 1996, in Uzbekistan in 1999 and in Kazakhstan in 2001. Aral Sea KAZAKHSTAN NATO and its Central Asian Partners are also benefiting from the opportunity to work together in the field of scientific and technological research. Some 120 NATO UZBEKISTAN Caspian KYRGHYZ science and technology grants have been Sea REPUBLIC awarded to the five Central Asian countries in the eight years since NATO’s Science TURKMENISTAN CHINA TAJIKISTAN Programme was opened to Partner-country participation. In October this year, the Science Programme launched a major project, the “Virtual Silk Highway”, to IRAN AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN provide internet access via a satellite net- work to the scientific and academic com- munities of eight countries in Central Asia a number of parallel, multinational initiatives and have spe- and the Southern Caucasus. Other NATO-sponsored sci- cial bilateral relations among themselves, in addition to ence projects in Central Asia include a pilot study on envi- cooperating with NATO. In the same way, the Alliance is ronmental decision-making for sustainable development, eager to support the various cooperative activities in which launched in February 2001, involving Kazakhstan, the some Central Asian Partners participate, such as the Kyrghyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; projects Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or the Conference on addressing radioactivity problems at the former nuclear test Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, site at Semipalatinsk in the Sarzhal region of Kazakhstan; and it respects the relations that have been built up with and initiatives to tackle pollution in the Aral Sea. Russia for historical, geopolitical and socio-economic rea- sons. Once the scene of “the Great Game”, Central Asia remains a region of crucial, strategic importance at the On the basis of such understanding, NATO and its beginning of the 21st century. However, the zero-sum Central Asian Partners have been able to embark on coop- games of the past have now been consigned to history. erative activities in various areas. Structured dialogue takes Recent events have again demonstrated the wisdom of pro- place between Alliance members and 27 Partner countries moting cooperation, stability and security throughout the on virtually all issues of common concern within the Euro-Atlantic area. While the Alliance does not claim to framework of the EAPC. Through this multilateral forum, have solutions to all the problems there, or elsewhere, it is Central Asian Partners have been able to keep Allies and increasingly clear that long-term investment in building other Partners informed of developments in their region, relationships, improving understanding and enhancing since the emergence of Taliban-sponsored terrorism. A cooperation strengthens security for all.

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 25 Debate In the wake of 11 September, where does missile defence fit in security spending priorities?

High: Low: Keith B. Payne is president of the Joseph Cirincione National Institute for Public is Director of the Policy, chairman of the Non-Proliferation Deterrence Concepts Advisory Project at the Group of the Office of the Carnegie Secretary of Defense and adjunct Endowment for professor at Georgetown International University. Peace.

Dear Joseph, immediate, serious and growing Even if the broader missile threat threat to US forces, interests and is between five and 15 years away, we A bipartisan consensus in allies, and has significantly altered the are unlikely to have a mature defence Washington supports the proposition strategic balances in the Middle East when that threat is clear and immedi- that missile defence should be a US and Asia”. The fact that some of those ate, unless we have a robust pro- defence spending priority, and the countries pursuing missile pro- gramme now. To await the blatant American public strongly favours grammes are also building nuclear, emergence of a North Korean, missile-defence deployment, as it has biological and chemical (NBC) Iranian and/or Iraqi NBC-armed for many years. Indeed, approximate- weapons and sponsor/harbour terror- ICBM before making missile ly two-thirds of the American people ists brings this emerging threat into defence a high priority would be to believe they already are protected by perspective. risk an extended period of unprece- missile defence. When the truth is dented vulnerability. revealed, most are not amused. The current proliferation threat generally involves missiles of less- In addition, Secretary of Defense The most basic reason for making than-ICBM range. This does not sug- Donald Rumsfeld has now stated missile defence a priority is the gest, however, that defence against publicly that a “rogue” state has test emerging multifaceted ballistic mis- long-range missiles should be a low fired a ballistic missile at less than sile threat. The September 1999 pub- priority. To the contrary, the bipartisan intercontinental range from a ship at lic report from the National Rumsfeld Commission concluded in sea. Consequently, it is a mistake to Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile August 1998 that emerging ballistic- suggest that the missile threat to the Developments and the Ballistic missile powers could acquire an United States is limited to ICBMs. Missile Threat to the United States ICBM capability within about five Through 2015, projected that: years of a decision to do so and, for The fact that rogue missiles may “During the next 15 years the United several of those years, we could be be relatively unsophisticated is of no States most likely will face ICBM unaware that such a decision had been comfort. Accuracy is not required to [intercontinental ballistic missile] made. We have been duly warned of threaten or to attack cities. Nor can threats from Russia, China and North the potential for the rapid emergence any credibility be ascribed to the fre- Korea, probably from Iran, and possi- of additional ICBM threats. In some quent, confident assertion that the bly Iraq.” The report also noted that cases, such as North Korea, the clock chances of a rogue NBC missile the proliferation of medium-range already appears to be ticking and a attack are low. No one knows the ballistic missiles “has created an leisurely response would be unwise. probability of such an event. What

26 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 KEITH B. PAYNE versus JOSEPH CIRINCIONE we do know is that a missile strike will last beyond the current crisis. the Republican-controlled House are could kill hundreds of thousands, But principled disagreements on key split over costs. even millions of American and allied issues remain, particularly on missile citizens in a single stroke. The proba- defence. There is no bipartisan con- One example of this divide — and bility of such a missile attack is sensus. of the serious technological problems unknown, but the consequences plaguing the programme — is the would be catastrophic. Addressing Representative John Spratt, a key November decision by the House this emerging threat in a timely way moderate Democratic leader in the Appropriations Committee to cancel must be a high priority. US House of Representatives, told us the satellite system that is vital to at the Carnegie Endowment that the long-range missile-defence systems. Missile defence is, of course, not Democrats receded on missile- The Space-Based Infrared System- the complete answer to this threat. defence issues after 11 September Low is years behind schedule and But it is an essential ingredient in any “because we did not want to be in a programme-cost estimates have answer. The terrorist attacks of position of hammering at the admin- grown to $23 billion from $10 billion 11 September illustrate the folly of istration at this critical time”. in just the past year, the Committee comfortable and convenient asser- Chairman of the Senate Committee said. Pentagon officials say that tions that opponents “won’t dare” on Armed Services Carl Levin missile defence can’t work without extraordinarily high-risk acts. History writes: “Those of us who have argued the satellites. The Committee’s is littered with deterrence failures that unilaterally deploying a missile- Republican leaders say the pro- because leaderships occasionally are defence system could make the gramme is plagued with technical willing to dare. Even during the Cold United States less, not more, secure and design problems and has simply War, the United States and Soviet find fresh evidence for our position grown too expensive. Union survived because “we lucked in the administration’s admirable out”, according to Secretary of multilateral response to the recent This is just one of the dozens of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The terrorist attacks.” technical problems that committed conditions necessary for deterrence to missile-defence advocates brush operate reliably are even less likely to There is still a deep divide over the aside with bromides about America’s pertain in the post-Cold War environ- threat, technical feasibility, schedule, technical abilities. But it will take ment. This is not because “rogue” cost and strategic consequences of years before we know if any system leaders should be viewed as irrational, deploying missile defence. As you will work. As Secretary of Defense but because many of the underlying know, there is considerable agree- Rumsfeld said this July: “We don’t conditions necessary for the pre- ment on the need to press forward have a system. We don’t have an dictable functioning of deterrence that with the deployment of short-range architecture. We don’t have a pro- were assumed in the Cold War can no or theatre missile defences. Here, posed architecture. All we have is a longer be taken for granted. there is a demonstrable threat and a couple of handfuls of very interesting greater chance of eventually getting a research and development and testing The missile and weapons-of-mass- system with at least some capability programmes.” destruction (WMD) threat is real and against Scuds, missiles with a range growing. Deterrence is inadequate and, of about 180 km, and their slightly While 11 September has not appar- if missile defence is to be available in longer-range cousins. The Patriot did ently changed the views of either pro- the foreseeable future, it must be a not work in the Gulf War — despite ponents or opponents — and you and priority. Fortunately, the President, initial false perceptions and more I, Keith are two excellent examples — Congress and public have made it so. persistent false claims — but an it has changed the diplomatic, politi- improved version will finally be cal and financial environment pro- Yours, fielded in 2002 and should fare better foundly. In this New World, missile- Keith against simple, short-range threats. defence programmes are likely to The divide over long-range defence, suffer. “Never again will supporters Dear Keith, however, continues and not just along of national missile defence be able to party lines. Many officials in the claim, as President Bush did in May, The fierce partisan political war- departments of state and defence that ballistic missiles in the hands of fare that has characterised hold sharply different views on the rogue regimes constitute ‘today’s Washington policy issues since the programme and the utility of remain- most urgent threat,’” says Senator mid-1990s has now thankfully sub- ing in the ABM Treaty. Meanwhile, Levin. “Ballistic missiles are not the sided. We all hope that the new spirit defence hawks and fiscal hawks in tools of terrorists.... nor are terrorists

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 27 KEITH B. PAYNE versus JOSEPH CIRINCIONE

Emerging ballistic missile Dear Joseph, Committee report, issued just before 11 September, stated: “The commit- powers could acquire an You dispute my contention that tee endorses the President’s approach ICBM capability within there exists a political consensus to ballistic missile defence, and is about five years of a for priority spending on missile encouraged that the proposed mis- decision to do so defence, citing statements from sile-defence programme includes KEITH B. PAYNE Representative John Spratt and plans for a layered defence system Senator Carl Levin. Selective quota- and realistic testing, and explores a likely to obtain ballistic missiles for tion usually presents a limited pic- full range of technologies. As such, future attacks. When the missile- ture. But if that is the evidence you the committee endorses the defence debate resumes, there must appreciate, I should cite the follow- Administration’s missile-defence be a renewed appreciation that every ing comments from the same programme, with modest adjust- dollar we spend on the least likely Congressional leaders. ments, and recommends $8.2 billion, threat of ballistic missiles is a dollar $2.9 billion more than the fiscal year not spent on the most likely threat: In contrast to your suggestion that 2001 level, for the continued devel- terrorism.” there is no “demonstrable” long- opment of ballistic missile defences.” range missile threat, Representative On 25 September 2001 the full The bills for the new war on terror- Spratt has stated: “I think there is a House of Representatives ultimately ism are mounting. The postal service threat of an accidental, unauthorised, passed, by the overwhelming vote of needs billions just to decontaminate or rogue missile attack, existing and 398 to 17, the National Defense its mail facilities; bioterrorism emerging, and I think it would be Authorization Act of 2002. It would defence will cost tens of billions; air- wise to have a missile-defence sys- provide $7.9 billion for missile port security billions more; and the tem to meet that threat.” And, despite defence, over $2.5 billion more than military campaign alone will already your contention that there is general the 2001 level, and almost $1 billion receive half of the $40 billion emer- support only for short-range more than the 2002 budget request. gency appropriations Congress defences, Representative Spratt The ultimate budget figures for mis- approved in September. Missile speaks in favour of missile defence: sile defence will obviously depend defence will now have to compete “I have long thought that a ground- on the outcome of the ongoing with new defence demands, most of based defence, deployed at two sites, Senate-House conference, and the which the American people see as is our best first step.” Senate has proposed lower funding addressing more urgent threats. levels. At this point, however, it is These are not hypothetical “what ifs” Senator Levin has similarly stated: clear that the level of spending to be but real, already-happened-and- “I share the goal of providing the made available for missile defence could-happen-again threats. American people with effective pro- will be increased significantly over tection against the emerging long- 2001. Homeland defence means increas- range missile threat from rogue ing security for critical infrastructure states.” And, to add weight to my The consensus I described has including dams, nuclear reactors, point, note that Senator Joseph held, and for good reason. 11 chemical plants, bridges, tunnels and Lieberman, the recent Democratic September did not fracture the public stadiums. It means not just stockpil- candidate for vice president, has stat- or political consensus behind mis- ing vaccines, as the president wants, ed: “We need the national missile sile-defence spending. Instead, it but pouring money into emergency defence. We face a real and growing demonstrated just how arrogant and rooms and clinics for more staff, threat that cannot be countered by foolish is the “they-wouldn’t-dare- training and detection equipment, as our conventional forces and which strike-us” attitude and, therefore, the Congress wants. It has already will not be deterred by the threat of how serious is the emerging ballistic- meant that the United States is fight- retaliation.” missile threat. The United States ing a two-front war — in Afghanistan need not abandon missile defence to and in the airports and mailrooms of Further, you claim that the 11 fund other programmes. This is not America. Missile defence is irrele- September terrorist attacks moved the either/or choice you would like to vant to both wars. This is a whole the political climate away from sup- pose. As the emerging missile- new game. port for missile defence. The most defence budget and recent $40 bil- recent and definitive proof to the lion emergency anti-terrorism appro- Yours, contrary is the actual legislative priation show, the United States will Joseph record. The House Armed Services fund defensive capabilities against a

28 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 KEITH B. PAYNE versus JOSEPH CIRINCIONE wide spectrum of threats, including If Osama bin Laden had a nuclear Dear Joseph, missile attack. weapon, few doubt he would use it. But where would he get one? Most I appreciate your endorsement of Yours, likely from the vast, poorly secured missile defence and your agreement Keith stockpiles of materials, weapons and with my initial point that there is an expertise remaining in Russia and American political consensus for pri- Dear Keith, other former Soviet states — some ority spending on missile defence. within 800 km of Afghanistan. This No evidence suggests that this politi- I, you, the US Congress, NATO is why it is so important to secure and cal consensus is fracturing. Recent and Russia all support missile eliminate the 20,000 Russian nuclear polling data from the Pew Research defences. But there are wide chasms weapons and 1,100 tons of fissile Center, for example, reveals that within that apparent consensus. It all material, and find jobs for the thou- since 11 September the already depends on your definition of “mis- sands of unemployed nuclear scien- strong public support for defence sile defence”. Most support research, tists and biowarfare specialists. We spending and missile defence has short-range defences and exploration should triple the $700 million per increased. of national-defence options. There is year the US government spends on broad opposition, however, to abro- cooperative threat-reduction pro- I agree with you that missile gating the ABM Treaty and pursuing grammes with Russia (and help con- defence is only one of a variety of US a crash programme to deploy ineffec- vince the European Union to start and allied security requirements. tive interceptors. spending some serious money as But, missile defence is essential and well). If we did, we could secure and there is no necessary choice between The budget for missile defence has eliminate most of the threat within it and other security needs, financial- indeed ballooned this year, but this eight years. ly or operationally. Congress rightly may be its high-water mark. Political and obviously will fund missile and editorial opinion across the This is the tragedy of the Bush- defence and other requirements. The United States and Europe is over- Putin meeting in Crawford. All the recent $40 billion emergency anti- whelmingly in favour of preserving good humour and good food still left terrorism appropriation, for example, the treaty regime that has helped the new strategic framework an will build on existing civilian and keep our nations secure for over 50 empty shell. The chance to lock-in military counter-measures. years and for responsible budgets. binding weapons reductions and to For example, the most widely distrib- secure Russian arsenals against ter- We also concur on the need for uted paper in the country, USA rorist thefts was missed because of balance. The existing “imbalance”, Today, argued in an editorial on 22 the positions you and others have however, is in the complete absence October that: “The missile-defence championed. Disagreements over a of missile defence, the complete vul- programme stands as an embarrass- missile-defence system that exists nerability of the United States and ing admission that the United States only on paper prevented progress in allies to missile attack. No other vul- during the past decade has spent con- reducing genuine nuclear threats. nerability has been accepted with siderable time and money attempting such equanimity. We will seek to rec- to counter the least likely of threats: a Even after the international coali- tify this imbalance, so that a future rogue nation willing to commit tion smashes al-Qaida and uproots biological or nuclear-armed missile national suicide by launching a its American and European cells, does not find America as unprepared nuclear-tipped missile. Neglected other terrorist threats will remain. as it was for 11 September. To was the more urgent threat of low- There will always be a terrorist eschew missile defence now, in the budget terrorists with rich imagina- demand for weapons of mass tions.” destruction. Our best defence is to Missile defence will now shrink the supply. This, in the end, is have to compete with For fiscal year 2002, the federal where you and I differ. Missile government has budgeted $1.7 bil- defence has a role to play in a com- new defence demands, lion to combat WMD terrorism, as prehensive defence. For you, it is the most of which the part of a $9.7 billion budget for anti- leading role. For me it is a bit player American people see as terrorism efforts overall. Yet we will in a larger and more urgent drama. addressing more urgent spend, as you note, $7.9 billion on threats missile defence. We must restore Yours, some balance. Joseph JOSEPH CIRINCIONE

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 29 KEITH B. PAYNE versus JOSEPH CIRINCIONE

Missile defence is from doing what President Bush just With the ABM-treaty dispute did. Republicans blocked efforts by behind us, missile defence becomes essential and there is no President Clinton and President just another programme competing necessary choice between Boris Yeltsin to reduce each side to for funds and surviving on its own it and other security 2,000-2,500 warheads. The United merits. We will preserve the interna- needs States and Russia agreed, they just tional coalition and the national unity couldn’t get Congress to go along. of purpose we now enjoy. It will KEITH B. PAYNE allow us to work together on reduc- President Bush essentially ing the threats we both agree are the face of an obviously emerging mis- embraced the 1997 Clinton-Yeltsin most urgent international priority. sile threat, would be as negligent as goal, minus the verification that a not pursuing those non-proliferation treaty provides. His figure of 1,700- Yours, and counter-terror measures you 2,200 is lower only because he will no Joseph rightly endorse. longer count warheads on submarines and bombers in overhaul as Synopsis: Both debaters agreed Your description of the Crawford “deployed”. With one to two subs in that the events of 11 September had Summit is curious. In a fully congen- overhaul at any time, each with 192 highlighted the vulnerability of the ial atmosphere, old animosities obvi- warheads, this magically lowers the United States and its allies to a wide ously were demolished. While pre- numbers without changing the force. range of security threats demanding serving all START limits and There is less to this “breakthrough” urgent attention and increased expen- verification measures in effect, than meets the eye. diture. They also welcomed the President Bush announced unprece- Congress’s approval of $40 billion dented reductions in US nuclear Just like missile defence. You insist emergency appropriations in forces, and Russian President on trying to wrap this programme in September and the bipartisan Vladimir Putin followed suit. This some grand consensus, some over- approach to addressing the current breakthrough could take place only whelming public desire. But neither crisis. They disagreed, however, over by transcending archaic Cold War- exists. Let us move beyond this whether the $7.9 billion earmarked style negotiations. Some bemoaned decades-old debate. Here is where for missile defence for 2002 was the the passing of the Cold War you and I and the rest of the Alliance best use of these resources. For Keith approach, but it had become an can agree. Let us pursue an aggres- B. Payne, it was critical to invest obstacle to more amicable political sive test programme for missile today to plug a massive security gap, relations and corresponding nuclear defence, that will go beyond simplis- namely the ICBM threat, which had reductions. In addition, at Crawford tic demonstration shots to true com- been identified by 1998 Rumsfeld and before, President Bush clearly bat conditions against multiple tar- Commission. Moreover, there was no sought a cooperative resolution of gets with realistic decoys and realistic conflict between spending on missile the ABM Treaty question, and re-entry speeds. If such defences defence and on other priority areas. President Putin exhibited consider- work, we can work out cooperative For Joseph Cirincione, the cost, tech- able flexibility. This cooperative res- deployment plans that increase US nical feasibility, threat and strategic olution appears to be in the making security, not decrease it by starting consequences of missile defence to the chagrin of some missile- new conflicts. were such that it was a lower priority defence critics. Crawford reflected a than areas such as bioterrorism new day in US relations with Russia, All we need are slight modifica- defence, airport security, cooperative and that is for the good. tions to the ABM treaty. The Russians threat reduction programmes are prepared to agree to permit a new and deterrence, which had to be Yours, Alaska test range and the testing of addressed immediately. Keith radars aboard Aegis ships — the two areas where current tests “bump” the Dear Keith, treaty. As Secretary of State Colin Powell just told The New York Times Missile defence is a It wasn’t the “archaic” arms-con- magazine: “We can’t do this on the trol process that blocked nuclear basis of personal relations. It has to bit player in a larger reductions; it was the Republican be on the basis of our national interest drama Congress. Republicans passed legis- over time.’’ Which means, Powell lation prohibiting President Clinton said, “You codify it somehow.” JOSEPH CIRINCIONE

30 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 Reassessing the Cold War alliances Petr Lunak considers how documents discovered in Warsaw Pact archives are influencing and challenging conventional interpretations of the Cold War alliances.

he period since the War and Soviet Insecurity: end of the Cold War The Stalin Years Thas been especially (Cambridge University stimulating for historians of Press, 1996) that Stalin that era. Whereas, under feared imminent Western normal circumstances, attack in Europe, which he researchers are obliged to believed would come in the wait several decades before wake of a series of Western classified documents are defeats in Korea. As a made public, the demise of result, Mastny argued that the Eastern bloc has been what others viewed as a call followed by the opening of to prepare for attack against Cold War warriors: The Parallel History of NATO and the Warsaw Pact project some former Warsaw Pact has brought together scholars from both East and West the West should, in fact, be countries’ archives, which interpreted as a call to pre- have, in turn, provided hitherto unimagined possibilities pare for defence of the East. for study. In 1999, an international project entitled Parallel History of NATO and the Warsaw Pact was established New evidence, uncovered in the archives of the former bringing together scholars from both East and West to Eastern bloc, appears to add weight to Mastny’s arguments. assess the record of the two alliances during the Cold War. In particular, the transcript of the January 1951 Moscow In the process, key controversies – such as the nature of the meeting, drafted by Romanian Armed Forces Minister threat from the Warsaw Pact, the relative importance of Emil Bodnaras and recently uncovered in Bucharest, nuclear deterrence and the reasons for the collapse of the seems to confirm the defensive character of Stalin’s inten- Eastern bloc – are being re-examined, with new evidence tions, an interpretation that is further supported by the fact challenging the conventional wisdom. that no preparation for an invasion of Western Europe was made at the time. Indeed, well into the 1950s, all Europe’s Traditionally, the danger of the Cold War turning hot was Communist armies concentrated on territorial defence. considered to have been greatest in the early 1950s in the From the Czechoslovak archives, for example, we know aftermath of North Korea’s invasion of South Korea. As that although military exercises did occasionally include Konrad Adenauer put it in his memoirs: “Stalin was planning offensive operations, they almost never took place outside the same procedure for West Germany as had been used in Czechoslovakia. In the few cases when forays into foreign Korea.” Indeed, the notion of an imminent Soviet march into territory were envisioned, it was only in the framework of a Western Europe in the 1950s was advanced by many histori- successful counter-attack. ans, including the then Czech émigré Karel Kaplan in Dans les Archives du Comité Central: Trente ans de secrets du If evidence from the Czechoslovak archives is circum- Bloc Sovietique (Michel, 1978). Basing his thesis on an stantial, documents recently found in Poland offer more interview with former Czechoslovak Defence Minister conclusive proof of the defensive thinking of the Eastern Alexej Cepicka, Kaplan claimed that Stalin called upon bloc at the time. Drafted when Poland’s defence minister Eastern Europe’s Communist leaders to prepare an invasion was the Soviet Marshall Konstantin Rokossovskij, the of Western Europe at a meeting in Moscow in January 1951. Polish Army’s 1951 war plan was clearly based on the assumption that Western military invasion was inevitable This interpretation of events has since been challenged and therefore focuses on defensive actions to be taken on by many researchers. Convinced that the Soviet Union was Polish territory. Haunted by the memory of Nazi never such a formidable enemy, Czech-born American his- Germany’s surprise invasion in 1941, Eastern military torian Vojtech Mastny, for example, concluded in The Cold strategists could not envisage the next war in any terms other than one beginning with a Western attack. Petr Lunak is outreach editor in NATO’s Office of Information Paradoxically, therefore, at a time when Western decision- and Press and a Czech scholar participating in the “Parallel makers were obsessed with the Soviet threat, Eastern mili- History of NATO and the Warsaw Pact” project. tary planners sought nothing more than to contain what they saw as imminent Western invasion.

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 31 REVIEW

If Soviet intentions in the early 1950s now seem less conflict and its potential consequences in East and West. ambitious than once believed, does this vindicate those According to Soviet military planners of the time, nuclear who questioned the need for Western efforts through weapons would determine the speed of war, but not its NATO to prevent what was thought to be an imminent entire character. Since nuclear arms considerably short- Soviet attack? To make such a judgement, it is important to ened the stages of war, Soviet strategists argued, it would be take several additional factors into consideration. Firstly, necessary to try to gain the initiative with a powerful, pre- what we know today is not what Western leaders knew at emptive nuclear and conventional strike. Whereas Western the time. Secondly, although we now know that Stalin did planners never envisaged actions beyond the initial, mas- not wish to repeat the Korean experience in Europe, it is sive nuclear clash — as can be seen in Gregory Pedlow’s not clear whether his attitude would have been the same edited NATO Strategy Documents: 1949-1969 (NATO, had NATO not existed. In fact, his decision to give the go- 1997) — Soviet strategists assumed that their massive ahead for the attack on South Korea in the summer of 1950 strike would prepare the way for a ground offensive. was probably based on a misreading of the likely US reac- Persuaded of the possibility of winning a nuclear war, tion, after then US Secretary of State Dean Acheson had Eastern-bloc operational plans viewed such a conflict as a publicly excluded the Korean realistic scenario, thereby peninsula from the US securi- downgrading any Western ty sphere. When the United deterrent and making war per- States intervened in Korea, ilously more realistic as a Stalin could be almost sure prospect. that it would also honour its obligations under the This crude military think- Washington Treaty in Europe. ing can also be seen in a plan If, therefore, NATO’s exis- which I uncovered in the mili- tence failed to deter a commu- tary archives in Prague, nist attack on Korea, it was, whose details can be found on nevertheless, indispensable as the Parallel History of NATO an insurance policy for the and the Warsaw Pact web site West in its aftermath. and will be analysed in a forthcoming issue of The shift from defensive to International Cold War offensive thinking in the History Bulletin. According to Warsaw Pact seems, ironically, this document, which dates to have taken place in the peri- from 1964, the then od that has traditionally been Czechoslovak and Soviet mil- viewed as a time of improving itary planners anticipated East-West relations after advancing into France within of Stalin’s death. This trans- a few days of the outbreak of a formation was closely con- war, capturing Lyon on the nected with a reassessment of ninth day and turning Western the role of nuclear arms. Europe into a nuclear inferno. Although Stalin was eager to acquire nuclear weapons, he The 1964 Czechoslovak war plan The 1964 Czechoslovak did not consider them a criti- war plan ignored the possibili- cal, strategic factor because of, among other reasons, their ty of a non-nuclear war in Europe and assumed that the war small number. In the wake of Stalin’s death, Soviet strate- would start with a massive nuclear strike by the West. gists began to discuss the implications of nuclear war, at a Drawn up in the period of détente after the conclusion of the time when nuclear weapons already formed the corner- first arms-control agreement, the 1963 Test-Ban Treaty, it stone of NATO’s doctrine of massive retaliation. In this shows that the Soviet leaders at this time remained wedded way, nuclear weapons were belatedly included in the strate- to Leninist notions of an aggressive Western bloc, views gic plans of Eastern European armies in the mid-1950s. that were harboured by Soviet leaders and their Eastern This discussion and its results are brilliantly described by European allies well into the 1980s. The plan is something Herbert Dinerstein in War and the Soviet Union: Nuclear of a revelation, since it appears that NATO’s doctrine of Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and flexible response, which sought to enhance the credibility of Political Thinking (Praeger, 1959) and Raymond Garthoff deterrence by limiting conflict to a supposedly manageable in Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (Praeger, 1958). level, failed to discourage the Soviets from harbouring notions of winning a nuclear war. Moreover, it indicates that As these and other authors have pointed out, there were the Soviets had no illusions about the possibility of fighting fundamental differences in the understanding of nuclear either a conventional or a limited nuclear war.

32 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 REVIEW

Although US nuclear superiority failed to discourage alliances, Khrushchev believed that he could get rid of Soviet leaders from indulging in nuclear brinkmanship dur- NATO, while maintaining a system of bilateral defence ing the two major crises of the Cold war – over Berlin in agreements with Eastern European nations. 1961 and Cuba in 1962 – the deterrent effect of Western nuclear weapons has generally been taken for granted. Nevertheless, once the Warsaw Pact came into existence, However, as John Mueller suggests in Retreat from Soviet leaders found it increasingly difficult to resist Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Basic Books, attempts by Eastern European allies to turn it into a gen- 1989), Western reliance on nuclear deterrence seems to uine alliance, not unlike NATO. When initial reform efforts have been neither the only conceivable, nor even the most failed to generate any tangible results, the inability of the reliable way of preventing the outbreak of a Third World Soviets to accord their allies a more equal status under- War. Indeed, according to documents uncovered through mined enthusiasm among some Eastern European allies for the Parallel History project, it even seems that, in the last the newly created alliance. Increasingly, the Soviet Union’s decade of the Cold War, the Soviets were less concerned Eastern European allies found themselves in a situation in about the precise numbers of nuclear weapons on both which they were obliged to share the risks involved in sides and increasingly worried that they were falling Soviet ventures without having a say in managing them. In behind in conventional weaponry – especially in the field this way, in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, of high-tech, high-precision weapons – where they had we now know that Bucharest secretly let it be known to once held an undisputed advantage. Washington that Romania intended to remain Although the debate on the effect of Western neutral in the event of a nuclear conflict. deterrence on the Soviets remains inconclu- sive, the West’s conventional weapons While reluctant to and a clear willing- give the Eastern ness to use them European allies appear to have been more say than at least as effective a necessary, Mastny deterrent as the writes, the Soviets threat of nuclear realised the necessi- Armageddon. ty of giving the allies a sense of Is it fair to say that belonging in the the Eastern bloc col- wake of growing lapsed under the weight Romanian dissent and of its own failures and the 1968 invasion of that the West only played Czechoslovakia. The a marginal role in its results of this ongoing demise? Or was the West, Revealing reading reform were, however, and more specifically mixed. While trying to NATO, critical to this event? The answer may be rather sub- satisfy the allies’ desire for a more equal alliance, it rapidly tle. As Mastny argues in his superbly researched Learning became apparent that the Soviets would not be able to give from the Enemy: NATO as a Model for the Warsaw Pact them what they really wanted, namely similar consultation (Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und to that which the Western European nations secured Konfliktforschung, Nr. 58, 2001), NATO was not only an through NATO. On the other hand, the Soviets did succeed adversary but, in many ways, a model of how to address the in educating a Moscow-loyal officer corps by forging a perennial crisis of the Warsaw Pact. However, as Mastny more equal relationship with military establishments in illustrates, the various attempts to emulate NATO in the various Eastern European countries. This saved them, for end deepened that crisis. example, from having to invade Poland in the early 1980s, where the immediate crisis was temporarily resolved by the The difference between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was military coup of General Wojciech Jaruzelski. When, how- as obvious as it was crucial. NATO was created at the ever, the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, tried to request of Western European governments and, in spite of breathe new life into the Eastern bloc, his hope of marrying the undisputed leadership of the United States, it was a a Western-style alliance of equals with a revamped Soviet community of equals. By contrast, the Warsaw Pact was a system only exacerbated the crisis of the Warsaw Pact and creation of the Soviet Union in which the other members hastened its demise. initially had minimal influence. Indeed, when Nikita Khrushchev created the Warsaw Pact in 1955, allegedly in Details of the Parallel History of NATO and the response to the entry of the Federal Republic of Germany Warsaw Pact project, all key documents and results into NATO, the decision to do so was above all a tactical of historical research are available on the internet at: ploy. By proposing the simultaneous disbanding of both www.isn.ethz.ch/php

Winter 2001/2002 NATO review 33 STATISTICS International terrorism

Countries suffering casualties on 11 September 2001

Areas in blue suffered casualties

International casualties by region, 1995-2000 International attacks by region, 1995-2000 5639 272 5379 193 1995 1996 1997 1507 1998

1097 1999 2000 898 128 690 121 121 98 111 635 503 480 92 445 85 84 405 72 344 287 55 52 52 49 48 45 45 42 195 37 185 35 31 31 30 25 24 21 21 102 103 16 16 60 14 13 69 68 11 11 11 10 46 31 27 29 5 28 20 20 17 16 18 2 12 11 9 7 6 8 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Africa Asia Eurasia Latin Middle North Western Africa Asia Eurasia Latin Middle North Western America East America Europe America East America Europe

The above map and statistics come from the web site of the US Department of State: www.state.gov

34 NATO review Winter 2001/2002 Partnership in Action Brochure looking back on the birth and development of the Partnership idea and examining how Partnership works in practice

NATO in the 21st century Introductory brochure on the Alliance, giving an overview of its history, policies and activities

The NATO Handbook A comprehensive guide to NATO’s aims and activities, its current policies and structures, including a chronology of Alliance history

NATO and Russia: Partners in Peacekeeping Information sheet describing practical cooperation on the ground between Russian and NATO peacekeepers in the Balkans

NATO 2000 CD-Rom charting the evolution of the Alliance and describing the adaptation it has undergone to address the security challenges of the 21st century

The Reader’s Guide to the Washington Summit Compilation of all official texts and declarations issued at NATO’s summit in Washington in April 1999, including background information on Alliance programmes and activities

NATO Topics Visual presentation of the Alliance outlining milestones in NATO’s development and key issues on its current agenda (electronic edition only: www.nato.int/docu/topics/2000/home.htm)

NATO Update Weekly web-based newsletter which covers NATO activities and events in brief, giving a broad overview of Alliance initiatives (electronic edition only: www.nato.int/docu/update/index.htm)

ALL PUBLICATIONS ARE AVAILABLE IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH, SOME ARE AVAILABLE IN OTHER LANGUAGES

All enquiries and orders for print copies should be Electronic versions of these publications are available on addressed to: NATO’s web site at www.nato.int Office of Information and Press - Distribution Unit The web site also publishes official statements, press Bld Leopold III - 1110 BRUSSELS releases and speeches, and other information on Alliance Tel: (32-2) 707 5009 structures, policies and activities, as well as offering several Fax: (32-2) 707 1252 on-line services. E-mail: [email protected]