REPORT 2D Session SENATE 104–33 "!

104TH CONGRESS EXEC. REPORT 2d Session SENATE 104±33 "! THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION SEPTEMBER 11, 1996.ÐOrdered to be printed Mr. HELMS, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following REPORT together with MAJORITY and MINORITY VIEWS [To accompany Treaty Doc. 103±21] The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stock- piling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature and signed by the United States at Paris on January 13, 1993, including the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Annex on Chemicals; the Annex on Imple- mentation and Verification; and the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information, having considered the same, reports fa- vorably thereon and recommends that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification thereof subject to 7 conditions and 11 declarations as set forth in this report and the accompanying resolution of ratification. CONTENTS Page I. Purpose ........................................................................................................... 2 II. Treaty Terms .................................................................................................. 2 III. Treaty Obligations ......................................................................................... 7 IV. Background .................................................................................................... 12 V. Committee Action .......................................................................................... 17 VI. Resolution of Ratification .............................................................................. 19 VII. Article-by-Article Analysis ............................................................................ 32 VIII. Majority Views ............................................................................................... 162 IX. Minority Views ............................................................................................... 241 27±027 2 I. PURPOSE The purpose of the Convention on the Prohibition of Develop- ment, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (The Chemical Weapons Convention or ``CWC'') is to create a global ban on the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, or transfer of chemical weapons. The Convention seeks to reinforce the international norm against the use of chemical weapons by reaffirming and building upon the prin- ciples, objectives, and obligations assumed under two other international agreements: (1) the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare; and (2) the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their De- struction, or the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The United States has been engaged in negotiations for the elimination of weapons for chemical and biological warfare for more than 70 years. The Geneva Protocol and the BWC are the two basic treaties now in force. Most countries, including the United States, are parties to both. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use in war by a Party against another Party of chemical and biological weapons, but places no restriction on production or possession of such weapons. In addition, reservations attached to the Protocol by many countries, including the United States, preserve the right to use chemical weapons in retaliation. The Biological Weapons Con- vention, on the other hand, outlaws the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of biological and toxin weapons and provides for their destruction. (Toxins are considered both chemical and biological weapons in that they are biologically de- rived but act in a chemical manner. Thus, toxins are also covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention.) However, the BWC does not contain verification provisions. The administration is currently working with other nations to expand the BWC drawing upon the verification regime contained in the CWC. As noted, the CWC goes beyond both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the BWC by prohibiting any use of chemical weapons in warÐ including retaliatory useÐas well as military preparations for the use of chemical weapons, and by establishing a verification regime to monitor compliance with the Convention. The CWC requires member states to declare all of their existing chemical weapons and chemical weapons storage and production facilities, requires their indigenous commercial chemical industries to declare their production activities and to allow an international inspectorate to exam- ine those declarations and to have access to both military and commercial facilities, and to completely eliminate all of their chemical weapons within 10 years of the Convention's entry into force. The goals of the CWC are to eliminate the possession of chemical weapons, to reverse chemical weapons proliferation, and to preclude any future use of these weapons. II. TREATY TERMS The Chemical Weapons Convention consists of the main Treaty text and three annexes, together with two documents, formally 3 transmitted to the Senate by the President on November 23, 1993, for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification. The CWC is a treaty with a preamble and 24 Articles with an unlimited duration, and three annexes as follows: the Annex on Chemicals; the Annex on Implementation and Verification (the ``Verifica- tion Annex''); and the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information (the ``Confidentiality Annex''). The President also transmitted documents associated with, but not integral parts of, the Annexes or the Chemical Weapons Con- vention. These documents embody legally binding commitments regarding the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and on privileges, immunities, practical arrangements, and commitments undertaken with respect to the hosting of the Preparatory Commis- sion. These documents are relevant to the consideration of the CWC by the Senate. No new U.S. security assurances or guaran- tees are associated with any of these documents. A. THE TREATY TEXT Article I contains the principal obligations undertaken by countries that become parties to the Convention. Parties are prohibited from: (a) Developing, producing, otherwise acquiring, stockpiling or retaining chemical weapons or transferring them, directly or indirectly, to anyone; (b) Using chemical weapons under any circumstances, including retaliatory use; (c) Engaging in any military preparations to use chemical weapons or assisting, encouraging, or inducing anyone to en- gage in any activity prohibited by the CWC; and (d) Using riot control agents as a ``method of warfare.'' Article II provides the definitions used in the Articles and An- nexes and the criteria used to determine what is included within the scope of the Convention's controls. The definition of ``chemical weapons'' is specifically broad to encompass all known, unknown and future toxic chemicals, so that novel, as well as traditional chemical agents, will be prohibited in types and quantities that cannot be justified for permitted purposes. Article II also defines what is meant by the phrase ``purposes not prohibited under this Convention.'' (Additional definitions are found in paragraph 1 of Article X, Part I of the Verification Annex, and paragraph 12 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex.) Article III requires all States Parties to declare whether or not they possess chemical weapons, including old and/or abandoned chemical weapons, chemical weapons production facilities and facilities or establishments that have been designed, constructed or used primarily for chemical weapons since January 1, 1946. States Parties are also required to report any chemical weapons on its territory that are owned and possessed by another State and located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of another State. Arti- cle III also requires States to declare any shipments, direct or indi- 4 rect, of any chemical weapons, or chemical weapons production equipment, to or from its territory since January 1, 1946. Article IV describes the obligations of States Parties regarding destruction of chemical weapons, including the scope of the obligation, verification procedures, destruction, reporting of destruction activities, safety and environmental standards for destruction, bilateral and multilateral verification arrangements and costs of verification and destruction. Article IV also specifies that duplication of bilateral verification activities should be avoided, provided that the bilateral efforts are consistent with the Convention's provisions and that the States Parties involved keep the Organization fully in- formed of their verification activities. This provision was added to limit the duplicative cost of verification in instances in which States are already planning bilateral destruction and verification activities, namely between the United States and the Russian Fed- eration. Article V describes the obligation by States Parties to destroy chemical weapons production facilities. This article specifies that each State Party immediately cease all production of chemical weapons and that all chemical weapon production facilities must be closed within 90 days of the Convention's

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