The Withdrawal of NATO Forces from Afghanistan: Consequences for Tajikistan
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Afghanistan Regional Forum No. 6, March 2013 The Afghanistan Regional Forum series discusses the place of Afghanistan in the wider region and both the local and international preparations for the post-2014 situation. It gives the floor to experts from all over the world, especially from Afghanistan’s neighboring countries, Central Asia, China, Pakistan, India, Iran, Russia, and Turkey. The Withdrawal of NATO Forces from Afghanistan: Consequences for Tajikistan Muzaffar Olimov and Saodat Olimova* Many people in Tajikistan are concerned about Afghanistan’s future trajectory existing alongside how the situation will develop in Afghanistan well-founded fears of what may happen. The after the contingent of NATO troops withdraws in main apprehensions concern issues pertaining to 2014 and what impact this will have on Tajiki- security and the political settlement in Afghani- stan. Afghanistan is a neighbor of Tajikistan, con- stan, economic cooperation, and the transit of nected with it by unbreakable bonds that include drugs. A key factor of concern is the weakness of language, the ethnic kinship of a considerable the state and political fragmentation in the coun- part of the population, religion, culture, and his- try. It is well known that power in Afghanistan is tory. Accordingly, developments in Afghanistan extremely decentralized and that real control is affect Tajikistan, which give rise to certain wor- exercised by a multitude of local field command- ries. This report is based on material from inter- ers without any real political affiliation. The Tali- views with experts and with members of central ban movement long ago lost the influence that it and local elites in Tajikistan and on data from a once possessed. Whereas local leaders may iden- public opinion poll (OOMT-2012).1 tify themselves with the Taliban for various rea- sons, in reality their political sympathies and ori- Tajikistan’s Anxieties Regarding Afghanistan entations depend not so much upon a system of religious views as upon the local situation. All the In Tajikistan the year 2014 looms as a pivotal experts interviewed agree that the fragmentation juncture with there being much speculation on of political forces and their struggle for power in AFGHANISTAN REGIONAL FORUM No. 6, March 2013 the context of an extremely weak state and a defi- has witnessed a growing tension among elite cit of governance at all levels will exacerbate cha- groups of various ethnic origins, combined with os, with the result that after 2014 Afghanistan their continuing strong self-identification as Af- will become even more fertile ground for the ghans. global drugs trade, terrorism, and organized crime. Starting with the bloody events associated with the so-called Saur Revolution of April 27, 1978, It is also feared that the elite group represented and proceeding to the Soviet invasion of 1979– by President Hamid Karzai will be unable to hold 1989, the tragic fate of President Najibullah, the on to supreme power. The struggle for leadership accession to power of the Rabbani government in may exacerbate the traditional competition be- 1994, the seizure of power by the Taliban in tween Pushtun and Dari/Tajik-speaking elite 1996, and the U.S.-led war on terror and the for- groups, leading to growing tension among vari- mation of the Karzai government—in all these ous ethnic communities in Afghanistan. Current dramas we can discern an open or concealed eth- topics of discussion in Tajikistan are the future nic component, which finds expression above all ethno-political composition of state power in in the rivalry and fighting between Pushtun and Afghanistan and, in particular, the possible intro- Tajik political elites. Afghanistan’s other ethnic duction of a federal or confederal structure. groups also play their political cards within the framework of this struggle. The antagonism in- Why is this issue so important for Tajikistan? The tensified after the Soviet occupation and especial- answer has to do with a cultural-historical and ly after the seizure of power by the Taliban. In linguistic legacy that compels Tajikistan formally recent years, however, ethnic competition has and/or informally to take an active part in Afghan grown so fierce that it has begun to threaten the affairs. country’s territorial integrity. The idea of intro- ducing a confederal structure in the event of the Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group in Af- return of the Taliban to power is now widely dis- ghanistan, accounting for 27 percent of the coun- cussed in northern Afghanistan. try’s population.2 In addition, a considerable pro- portion of the Tajiks and Uzbeks of northern Af- This places Tajikistan in a difficult position. On ghanistan come from areas that now form part of the one hand, it is undesirable to support federal Tajikistan, having fled from the advance of the projects because any plan to give autonomy to Red Army which saw over a quarter of the popu- the Dari/Tajik-speaking population of Afghani- lation of Eastern Bukhara (present-day Tajikistan stan may encourage ideas of uniting northern and southern Uzbekistan) migrate to Afghanistan Afghanistan with Tajikistan, and this would rep- in the 1920s. Added to this is the problem of di- resent a threat to the security of Tajikistan. On vided historical provinces such as Darvaz.3 the other hand, Tajikistan has no interest in per- mitting the Pushtuns to achieve complete control Dari, which is spoken by the Afghan Tajiks as well over the country. This may happen either in the as by a number of other ethnic groups, is one of event of the return of the Taliban to power or as a Afghanistan’s two official languages. From 1747 result of NATO actions. Tajikistan would there- up until 1936, Dari was the sole state language. In fore like to preserve the status quo, under which 1936 Pashto acquired equal status. Despite the the Pushtuns share power with the non-Pushtun policy of Pushtunization conducted by the rulers peoples. But such a balance can be established of Afghanistan over the last two centuries, Dari only with the participation of authoritative lead- has preserved its position as a language of poli- ers who represent northern Afghanistan. Howev- tics, culture, literature, and interethnic communi- er, the elimination of such northern leaders as cation. Professor Rabbani has deepened distrust of the Taliban both among the Dari/Tajik-speaking Political rivalry between Tajiks and Pushtuns has population of northern Afghanistan and in Tajiki- been a constant in the rich and complex history of stan. Afghanistan over the last century. The contempo- rary history of Afghanistan over the last 30 years 2 AFGHANISTAN REGIONAL FORUM No. 6, March 2013 This has narrowed Tajikistan’s scope for maneu- Dari/Tajik-speaking population of Afghanistan. ver and complicated the task of working out a As for the Taliban in the event of its return to foreign policy toward Afghanistan after the with- power, it is understood that Tajikistan will be drawal of part of the NATO forces in 2012. It must compelled to deal with the question of how to also be borne in mind that since 2001 marked interact with the Taliban, at what level and within changes have occurred in Tajik-Afghan relations. what limits. In the decade since the start of the antiterrorist campaign, two processes have taken place con- Officials in Tajik government agencies are also currently: 1) a rapid growth in social, political, discussing how to fortify border defenses and military, and trade contacts between the two prepare to receive a possible flow of refugees countries; and 2) the loss of channels through from the Afghan side of the border. Equipping which Tajikistan can influence northern Afghani- long sections of the border, setting up refugee stan, a growth in distrust and decline in mutual reception points, temporary maintenance cen- understanding between the elites of Tajikistan ters, a border medical service—all this will re- and northern Afghanistan, and a deterioration in quire large financial outlays, which cannot be their ability to take mutual interests into account made at the necessary level by the government of and coordinate their actions. Tajikistan.4 Besides fortifying its borders and preparing to receive refugees, Tajikistan must These processes are already generating hidden strengthen its domestic security services in order contradictions within elite groups in Tajikistan to withstand the threats of terrorism, organized concerning mutual relations with a future Af- crime, and trafficking in arms, people, and drugs. ghanistan. Unlike the central government, the There also exists another real danger—an at- regional elites of central and southern Tajikistan tempt by Uzbekistan to take advantage of the have a political agenda in Afghanistan. They seek situation to try and increase pressure on Tajiki- to give all possible support to the Tajiks of north- stan in the expectation that with its security ern Afghanistan within the framework of an au- gravely undermined on its southern border, Ta- tonomous region and deny the very possibility of jikistan will be more tractable.5 While at present, negotiations with the Taliban, while the country’s in spite of the exacerbation of tensions in Tajik- leadership takes a less categorical approach to Uzbek relations, there is little cause for worry, a this problem. Public opinion also shows a broad change in leadership in either of the two states spread of positions on this issue. In total 67 per- may see the situation change for the worse. cent of respondents in the OOMT-2012 poll ex- pressed the opinion that Tajikistan should render The Impact of Afghanistan on Tajikistan’s De- assistance and take active part in the reconstruc- velopment tion of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of NATO forces, while 30 percent of respondents took the Apart from threats of various kinds, it should not opposite view.