Issue Brief Number 9 August 2014
Fire and Forget The Proliferation of Man-portable Air Defence Systems in Syria
Introduction statements by government officials. and Soviet-designed systems or These accounts document the foreign variants. Since the start of Syria’s civil war in acquisition and use of increasingly There is no publicly available 2011, the country has become a advanced MANPADS by Syrian evidence to support claims by the hotbed of arms trafficking and armed groups, including systems not Russian government that armed proliferation of conventional previously seen outside of govern groups in Syria have acquired weapons. Images and accounts of the ment control. US FIM-92 Stinger-series conflict reveal that armed groups MANPADS or foreign Stinger- Major findings from this Issue Brief pattern systems. have acquired a variety of small arms include the following: and light weapons, some of which International transfers of are recent-generation systems that Armed groups in Syria have acqu MANPADS to armed groups in are rarely encountered outside of ired at least eight models of Syria appear to violate resolutions, government control elsewhere. MANPADS, including three guidelines, and agreements Among the most sensitive of these models not previously seen adopted by several multilateral weapons are the numerous man- outside of government control in organizations. portable air defence systems other countries. These MANPADS Video footage of armed groups and (MANPADS) that armed groups have include recent-generation systems. their arsenals is useful for identi looted from Syrian government The vast majority of MANPADS fying the types of MANPADS in depots and acquired from other acquired by Syrian armed groups Syria but provides little insight into sources. Many of these missiles are appear to be Chinese-, Russian-, their origins or suppliers. newer and more technologically sophisticated than illicit MANPADS in other countries. Given the porosity of Syria’s borders, the presence of groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and other violent extremists, and the inherent limitations of controlling small arms and light weapons in conflict zones, the danger that violent groups in other countries will acquire these missiles is real.
This Issue Brief assesses the acquisition and use of MANPADS by armed groups in Syria. The analysis is based on a review of video footage and photographs posted online by journalists, researchers, and armed An armed group firing a MANPADS in Syria, 2013. © faroq syria/YouTube groups; media reports; and
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 1 This Issue Brief begins with an over missile in a launch tube, a gripstock those posted online. When referring view of the models, capabilities, age, (launcher), and a battery. Most generally to the model and foreign and condition of MANPADS circula MANPADS are ‘fire and forget’ variants, the term ‘pattern’ is used, as ting in Syria. It continues with an weapons, meaning that the missiles in ‘Igla-1-pattern MANPADS’. assessment of the sources of these guide themselves to their targets. Similarly, the term ‘Strela-2- or Strela- systems, as well as of allegations of The disposable launch tubes 2M-pattern’ is used to refer generally trafficking from Sudan. The conclu containing the missiles are to the sub-category of MANPADS ding section evaluates the impli approximately 1.5–1.8 m in length consisting of the Strela-2 (SA-7a) and cations of MANPADS proliferation in and the entire system typically Strela-2M (SA-7b) and foreign Syria, including in the context of weighs between 15 and 19 kg. Since variants, or to individual MANPADS global counter-MANPADS efforts. the first MANPADS were fielded in that fall within this sub-category the late 1960s, manufacturers in at when the precise model is not This Issue Brief makes use of the least two dozen countries have known. Armed groups in Syria often definition of MANPADS in the produced more than one million refer to Strela 2- and Strela-2M- Wassenaar Arrangement’s Elements missiles (Schroeder, 2013, pp. 3, 5). As pattern missiles as ‘Cobras’. Table 1 for Export Controls of MANPADS: of 2011, the US government had lists the MANPADS identified in this identified 40 civilian aircraft that had Issue Brief. surface-to-air missile systems been struck by MANPADS, resulting designed to be man-portable in 28 crashes with more than 800 and carried and fired by a deaths (USDOS, 2011). Overview of MANPADS single individual; and other surface-to-air missile systems acquired by armed groups When referring to specific models of designed to be operated and MANPADS, this Issue Brief uses the in Syria fired by more than one indi transliterated model designations vidual acting as a crew and assigned by the country of origin. portable by several individuals Models and capabilities Other common designations are (WA, 2007, art. 1.1). included in parentheses next to the first reference to the model. Variants An analysis of video footage and photographs from Syria reveals that While this definition captures a wide of several of these systems have been armed groups have acquired at least range of man- and crew-portable produced by multiple countries. eight different models of MANPADS, systems, the vast majority of Many of the variants are similar in three of which had not been seen MANPADS—in Syria and globally— appearance to the original model; outside of government control prior are shoulder-fired. These systems are telling them apart often requires to sightings in Syria. These systems comprised of three key components: a images of higher resolution than
Table 1 MANPADS exported to Syria (1970–2012) or acquired by Syrian armed groups (2012–14)
System US Department of Country of origin Year fielded Selected foreign vari- Acquired by Syrian Defense/NATO ants (by country) armed groups designation 9K32 Strela-2 SA-7a/Grail Soviet Union 1968 Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Confirmed 9K32M Strela-2M SA-7b/Grail Mod 1 Soviet Union 1970 North Korea, Poland Romania, Serbia Belarus, Bulgaria, 9K34 Strela-3 SA-14/Gremlin Soviet Union 1974 No reports North Korea 9K310 Igla-1 SA-16/Gimlet Soviet Union 1981 Bulgaria, North Korea Confirmed 9K310-1 Igla-1M SA-16/Gimlet Soviet Union Unknown/unclear Unknown/unclear Confirmed 9K38 Igla† SA-18/Grouse Soviet Union 1983 Unknown/unclear Unclear No known foreign 9K338 Igla-S SA-24/Grinch Russian Federation 2003 Confirmed producers No known foreign FN-61 FN-6 China Unknown/unclear Confirmed producers
Notes: Imports and acquisitions are ‘confirmed’ via video or photograph. † To the author’s knowledge, the only 9K38 Igla identified in Syria is a training unit seen in video footage posted on YouTube in 2012 (Hammoriaforever, n.d; Image 1). Sources: Brown Moses (n.d.); Chivers and Schmitt (2013); Fiszer and Gruszczynski (2004); O’Halloran and Foss (2011); Spleeters (2013)
2 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 9 August 2014 Image 1 Launch tube for Igla trainer system in Syria, 2012
© Hammoriaforever/YouTube
range from the comparatively the arsenals of non-state actors. The footage featuring stockpiles of primitive Strela-2, a first-generation FN-6 has a range of 6,000 m and can multiple launch tubes reveals that Soviet-designed system initially reportedly engage targets flying as anti-government forces have acquired fielded more than 40 years ago, to high as 3,500 m (O’Halloran and Foss, at least dozens of MANPADS, but third-generation Igla-S (SA-24) 2011, p. 7). In contrast, the Strela-2 has existing data sources do not permit MANPADS. Other systems spotted in a maximum effective range of just extrapolation beyond this rough Syria are the Soviet-designed Strela- 3,400 m and an effective altitude of minimum estimate. 2M and Igla-1 (SA-16) or foreign only 1,500 m (p. 37).4 The FN-6, which variants, and the Chinese FN-6. A has a more sophisticated guidance The Russian Federation and the yellow-coloured training version of system, is also faster than Strela-2 Stinger missile myth the Igla (SA-18) MANPADS is also missiles (pp. 6–7, 37). The Igla-S visible in a video posted online in indicates that it too is superior to the November 2012 (Hammoriaforever, Strela-2 MANPADS in range, Contrary to repeated claims by the n.d.; see Image 1). To date, no engagement altitude, engagement media and the Russian government, standard Igla (9P39) launch tubes velocity, guidance, and resistance to there is no evidence that armed have been spotted in Syria.2 countermeasures (O’Halloran and groups in Syria have acquired US- Foss, 2011, pp. 36–37; Rosoboron designed FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS. Strela-2 (or -2M) and Igla-1-pattern export, n.d.). While the Igla-S is more The reports appeared regularly in MANPADS are widely proliferated3 capable than the Igla-1 in range and media articles in 2012, culminating in and have been acquired by numerous accuracy, the differences in perfor claims by a high-ranking Russian armed groups worldwide, including mance are less stark (O’Halloran and official that Syrian armed groups had in neighbouring Iraq (Schroeder, 2007; Foss, 2011, p. 34). acquired several dozen Stinger mis Schroeder and King, 2012, pp. 326– siles (AFP, 2012; RIA Novosti, 2012a; 5 29). FN-6 and Igla-S MANPADS were Estimating the quantity of MANPADS MFA, 2012). US officials denied the fielded more recently and their global acquired by Syrian armed groups is allegations, challenging Russian gov distribution is significantly more much more difficult than identifying ernment officials to provide evidence limited; there are no substantiated the models in circulation. The groups to support their claims, which were reports of acquisition of either system have not released detailed infor also denied by a spokesman for the by armed groups outside of Syria. mation about their holdings, and Syrian National Council (SNS, 2012; Both systems are notably more other sources of information are too Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 2012). An official capable than the first-generation vague and incomplete to conduct from the Russian Foreign Ministry systems commonly encountered in even a cursory inventory. Video subsequently conceded that ‘the US
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 3 Image 2 FN-6 launch tube spray-painted to conceal markings, 2013
© C.J. Chivers/The New York Times
does not supply MANPADS to source reporting on the global March 2013 (see Image 3). The missile militants in Syria’ (RIA Novosti, inventory of illicit MANPADS, which was attached to a gripstock but no 2012b). Two weeks later, however, includes few if any illicit Stinger battery is apparent. Markings on the Russian foreign minister Sergey missiles and launchers. launch tube indicate that it was manu Lavrov claimed to have ‘confirmed factured in 1970, which coincides with information’ that anti-government Age and condition of MANPADS data on early imports of Strela-2 forces had acquired 50 Stinger in Syria missiles by the Syrian regime missiles for use against regime fighter (Spleeters, 2013; SIPRI, n.d.). Assu jets. Lavrov also hinted at the ming the markings are accurate, the possibility of attacks on civilian Information on the manufacture date missile was more than four decades aircraft. ‘You know, what “Stingers” of the MANPADS acquired by Syrian old when it was photographed. are intended for. Free Syrian Army armed groups is sparse. Video footage leaders have repeatedly said that civil and other images of MANPADS in Two months later, C.J. Chivers of The aircraft will be a legitimate aim, if Syria are often of low resolution and New York Times took photographs of they use the Syrian airports,’ he taken from a distance, making it the markings on an Igla-1M in the remarked (MFA, 2012).6 impossible to read the markings on Idlib Governate (Chivers, 2013a). the launch tubes—a significant source The markings indicate that the missile An analysis of videos and photo of data on illicit missiles. Exacerbating was made in 1990, meaning that it graphs from Syria yielded no this problem is the deliberate obfus was half the age of the SA-7a evidence of acquisition or use of cation of the markings on the FN-6 encountered near Azaz (see Image 4). Stinger MANPADS by armed groups. launch tubes, many of which were There is little additional, substan The Russian government has not painted over at some point in the tiated information on the age of the 8 released photographs or other hard supply chain (see Image 2). MANPADS in Syria, data that would evidence to support their claims, and be helpful for identifying the sources the only photo accompanying media Journalists working in Syria or with of these weapons and the likelihood reports of ‘Stingers’ in Syria is of Syrian contacts have published photos that they are still operational.9 another type of missile misidentified of the markings on two launch tubes: as a Stinger (Hughes, 2012).7 The a Strela-2 and an Igla-1M. The Strela-2 Data limitations also preclude a apparent absence of US-produced was photographed by journalist systematic assessment of the missiles is consistent with open- Damien Spleeters near Azaz, Syria, in condition of the MANPADS in
4 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 9 August 2014 question. Armed groups in Syria have base. But they also had four 2013a). It is unlikely that advanced posted several videos of what appear SA-16s, he said, that failed to age explains these problems; FN-6 to be successful MANPADS attacks fire before the fifth one MANPADS were not fielded until the on Syrian government aircraft. These launched and struck an aircraft 1990s and are still in production. videos confirm that at least some of (Chivers, 2013a). Regardless, the malfunctioning the systems acquired by the armed missiles have potentially significant groups are operational, although the implications, the most obvious of Given the advanced age of Syria’s extent to which they are represen which concerns the threat posed by Strela-2- and Strela-2M-pattern tative of all MANPADS in Syria is cross-border proliferation of the missiles, high failure rates would not unknown since the groups are pre missiles. Each unserviceable missile be surprising. Data on arms transfers sumably less likely to post videos of not only reduces the pool of to Syria indicate that, by 2012, many unsuccessful engagements. Media MANPADS vulnerable to diversion of its Strela missiles were at least 30 to reports from Syria suggest that many but also sows doubt about the 40 years old—well past the estimated of the MANPADS acquired by Syrian reliability of MANPADS from Syria shelf life (Schroeder, 2013, p. 64). Less armed groups have not performed as more generally, potentially reducing is known about the Syrian gov well as those featured in the videos. international demand for them. ernment’s Igla-1 MANPADS, which Rebel commanders interviewed by were manufactured more recently The New York Times reportedly At the same time, high failure rates than the Strela-2 and Strela-2M complained that many of the may lead to increased trafficking of missiles but may also be nearing (or MANPADS looted from government MANPADS to Syria. The apparent be past) the end of their shelf lives. depots were inoperable. As unreliability of existing stocks may Other possible explanations for the summarized by New York Times help to explain the persistent and high failure rates include improper correspondent C.J. Chivers: often emphatic calls by anti- storage, inadequate maintenance, or government forces for more and rough handling. [A] field commander in the better anti-aircraft weapons. The Idlib and Hama countrysides resulting pressure on state sponsors of Media reports also raise questions for Ahfad al-Rasul said his these groups may lead (or may have about the reliability of the later- fighters had captured as many already led) to additional MANPADS generation FN-6 MANPADS acquired as 50 SA-7s at Base 46, a transfers, which would further by Syrian armed groups. ‘Most of the government stronghold near undermine international norms and FN-6s that we got didn’t work,’ noted Aleppo that rebels seized in increase the risk of illicit proliferation, one commander, who claimed that late 2012, but almost none of both within Syria and abroad. Thus, some of the malfunctioning missiles them have worked. They have the impact of the age and condition of had exploded during use, killing or had better success, he said, MANPADS in Syria is multi-faceted wounding six of his men (Chivers and with captured SA-16s, with and may influence events on the Schmitt, 2013). Rebels from other which they have shot down at ground in ways that are unpredictable units also reported problems with least one MiG and a helicopter or counter-intuitive. their FN-6 MANPADS (Chivers, near the Abu ad Duhur air
Image 3 Strela-2 launch tube near Azaz, Syria, 2013 Image 4 Igla-1M launch tube in Syria
© Damien Spleeters © C.J. Chivers/The New York Times
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 5 Sources and trafficking Table 2 Publicly available data on MANPADS acquired by the Syrian government prior to 2011, routes by source
Data source While data limitations preclude a Model IHS Jane’s (inventory) IISS (inventory) SIPRI (transfers) conclusive analysis of the sources of Strela-2 or -2M† MANPADS in Syria, publicly Strela-3 available accounts of the Syrian military’s missile inventories, video Igla-1 No data No data footage and photographs taken in Igla No data* Syria, and media reports allow for a Notes: partial accounting. This section † The sources studied do not always indicate whether the MANPADS listed as ‘SA-7s’ are Strela-2 or Strela-2M systems. * IHS Jane’s indicates that Igla missiles imported in 2006 were for vehicle-mounted systems. summarizes and analyses the various Sources: IHS Jane’s (2014c); IISS (2010); SIPRI (n.d.) claims regarding the sources of the MANPADS acquired by Syrian armed groups and the methods and routes among the largest importers of Countryman estimating that Syria through which they are obtained. MANPADS, and video footage from had ‘tens of thousands’ of missiles for Syria clearly shows the capture of MANPADS (Birch, 2012).10 It is not There is little doubt that some of the MANPADS missiles from the Syrian clear whether he was referring to MANPADS acquired by armed government. In February 2012, the Syria’s current inventory or the sum groups in Syria came from domestic Associated Press quoted US Assistant total of imported missiles, many of sources. The Syrian government ranks Secretary of State Thomas which may no longer be in the Syrian
Image 5 Vehicle-mounted missile system captured by Libyan armed groups in 2011
© Anonymous (n.d.)
6 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 9 August 2014 military’s arsenals. Other publicly Image 6 Inert Igla-S MANPADS reportedly taken from the Bala air defence base in available estimates suggest that November 2012 Countryman was referring to all missiles for MANPADS transferred to Syria since 1970. Data on transfers compiled by the Stockholm Inter national Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) lists nearly 17,000 missiles, most of which are Strela-2- or Strela-2M-pattern missiles imported from 1970 to 1983. More recent transfers identified by SIPRI were much smaller and include 1,500 Strela-3 missiles imported from the Soviet Union in 1987–89 and 300 Igla missiles retransferred from Belarus in 2003. © Hammoriaforever (n.d.) Data compiled by SIPRI is largely consistent with estimates of the Syrian government’s inventory of Image 7 Anti-government forces transporting an Igla-S MANPADS launch tube with an earlier MANPADS published by IHS Jane’s Igla-series launcher and the International Institute of Security Studies (IISS). There is consensus that MANPADS imported by the Syrian government consist exclusively of Soviet-designed systems, including Strela-2-, Strela-2M-, and Strela-3-pattern MANPADS. There is less agreement regarding the importation of Igla-1- pattern MANPADS. Only IHS Jane’s lists Igla-1s among the MANPADS acquired by the Syrian government, reportedly in 2003—the same year as a Belarusian transfer of Igla MANPADS reported by Jane’s and SIPRI (IHS Jane’s, 2014c; SIPRI, n.d.). Since Jane’s does not identify the quantity or source of the imported Igla-1 missiles, it is not clear whether © Harakat Hazm 9th Unit (n.d.) the listing is a reference to the MANPADS from Belarus identified by SIPRI as Iglas, or a separate transfer of Igla-1s that also occurred including Libya and Burkina Faso indicate that the Russian government in 2003. Table 2 lists the models of (IHS Jane’s, 2014a, Pyadushkin, 2011; denied Syria’s requests for Igla 11 MANPADS identified by IHS Jane’s, see Image 5). SIPRI estimates that MANPADS in the early 2000s, selling IISS, and SIPRI. the Russian Federation exported them vehicle-mounted Strelets roughly 200 Igla and 200 Igla-S systems instead (IHS Jane’s, 2002; The Syrian government has also missiles to Syria for use with its 2005). In 2007, a representative of imported vehicle-mounted Strelets air Strelets launchers in 2006 and 2008– Russia’s Rosoboronexport company defence systems that employ missiles 10, respectively (SIPRI, n.d.). reportedly told RIA Novosti that the with the same model designation as Syrian government ‘want[s] the Igla missiles used with Igla and Igla-S There are no substantiated, publicly portable air defense system, but we MANPADS. In recent years, the available reports of deliveries of have refused to supply it’ (RIA Russian government has sold similar Igla-S MANPADS to the Syrian Novosti, 2007). Rumours of an launchers to several other countries, government. US and Russian sources impending Russian MANPADS sale
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 7 A Syrian rebel holding a MANPADS, 2013. © atareb ctiy/YouTube
surfaced in 2008, but there is no or -2Ms and more Igla-1s, imports of 2012c; Higgins, 2012; see Image 6). publicly available evidence that the which are documented by SIPRI and Inert missiles and launchers are sale was completed. IHS Jane’s. Similarly, images of the typically used for training purposes training rounds for Igla MANPADS and it is unclear why a government Video footage of Syrian armed groups captured by armed groups in would stockpile them if it had not corroborates some accounts of the November 2012 lend credence to also imported live MANPADS. Their Syrian military’s imports of SIPRI’s data regarding the transfer of presence raises the possibility that MANPADS while also raising doubts these systems. Igla-S MANPADS were indeed about the comprehensiveness of these transferred to Syria, although more accounts. In November 2012, anti- At the same time, videos and photos information is needed to draw any government forces overran the 46th from Syria indicate that some definitive conclusions.12 Regiment base near Aleppo, cap transfers to the Syrian government turing large quantities of weapons may have eluded non-governmental Images of a conventional (non- and ammunition. Video footage taken research organizations. A video of trainer) Igla-S MANPADS raise shortly after rebels took control shows weapons reportedly taken from the additional questions. A video posted them inspecting crates containing Bala air defence base in November on YouTube in February 2013 shows Igla-1-pattern missiles (Atareb 2012 includes several Igla-S launch what appears to be an Igla-S missile Syriafree, n.d.). Armed groups in tubes and gripstocks. Many of the connected to a MANPADS grip Syria have posted several additional tubes—and all of the gripstocks—are stock—the first such sighting outside videos and photographs of painted silver, and the gripstocks are of government control, not only in MANPADS purportedly seized from marked with the word ‘MAKET’, the Syria, but worldwide (Harakat Hazm government forces, including Strela-2 Russian word for ‘model’ (Binnie, 9th Unit, 2013). Notably, the gripstock
8 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 9 August 2014 featured in the video is not the stan government, and investigations by insufficient to support the air defence dard Igla-S (9P522) launching journalists point to foreign sup- needs of the growing insurgency in mechanism; it is a launcher for an pliers.13 Government officials and Syria. Regardless, definitively linking earlier version of the Igla-series rebels interviewed by The New York the FN-6 MANPADS acquired by MANPADS (see Image 7). The Times identified Sudan as the source Syrian armed groups to Sudanese markings on the launch tube are not of the missiles, which were reportedly arsenals would require significantly visible and therefore it is difficult to purchased by Qatar and shipped more information than is currently in tell whether it was sourced domes through Turkey. A spokesman for the public domain. Such a link could tically or from abroad. If the missile the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) only be established through the sys was looted from Syrian government denied the accusations, saying they tematic comparison of lot numbers stockpiles and the gripstock is capable were aimed at ‘harm[ing] our and manufacture dates on the of launching the missile, the video relations with countries Sudan has missiles in Syria with those of the calls into question repeated claims good relations with’ (Chivers and FN-6 MANPADS imported by that the Igla-S missiles sold to Syria Schmitt, 2013). SAF. Given efforts to conceal the for the Strelets systems are incom origins of the FN-6 MANPADS patible with MANPADS gripstocks SAF is a plausible source given that it provided to the Syrian armed groups (Pyadushkin, 2012; Binnie, 2012b). is one of only a handful of known (through the spray-painting of launch importers of FN-6 MANPADS, and in tubes)—and the Sudanese gov In some cases, MANPADS acquired view of the widespread proliferation ernment's non-cooperation with 16 by armed groups were smuggled into of Sudanese weapons and ammu previous arms tracing requests — Syria. These systems include Chinese- nition among armed groups.14 Yet the acquiring this information would be made FN-6 MANPADS, which first number of FN-6s delivered to Sudan extremely difficult. appeared in videos in February 2013. were reportedly small—ten systems The FN-6s almost certainly came from according to IHS Jane’s (2014b).15 The government of Qatar has also abroad; there are no known reports of Assuming this estimate is correct, been implicated in transfers of exports of these systems to the Syrian even Sudan’s entire stock would be MANPADS to armed groups in Syria.
Syrian rebels displaying four different models of MANPADS, 2013. © Alasala Watanmya/YouTube
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 9 In June 2013, The New York Times Without more and better data on the assertions of these individuals. There published an article detailing the Strela-2 and Strela-2M MANPADS in is also little information about the Qatari government’s alleged role in at Syria—and the alleged shipments of smuggled MANPADS, making it least two shipments of MANPADS, these missiles from abroad—any link difficult to assess claims about the including FN-6s. Citing four between Libya and the MANPADS types, manufacturers, and sources of unidentified ‘American and Middle acquired by armed groups in Syria these weapons. Without better data, Eastern officials with knowledge of will remain unverifiable. there is no way to determine what intelligence reports on the weapons’, role, if any, the Saudi government and the article claims that the two ship Claims regarding Saudi Arabia’s many of the other governments ments were relatively small— alleged role in MANPADS transfers to implicated in these articles may have ‘amounting to no more than a few Syria are even more difficult to assess. played in the proliferation of dozen missiles’—and that they Iterations of this claim have appeared MANPADS in Syria. consisted of unidentified ‘Eastern in numerous media articles, including Bloc’ missiles, along with the FN-6s. in a widely referenced June 2013 story These gaps highlight the limitations The Eastern Bloc missiles reportedly from Reuters.21 Citing an unidentified of available data sources. While came from Libya (Mazzetti, Chivers, ‘Gulf source’, the article indicates that useful for identifying the types of and Schmitt, 2013), where hundreds Saudi Arabia ‘began supplying anti- illicit MANPADS, video footage of MANPADS were looted from aircraft missiles to rebels “on a small posted online reveals little about the government arsenals during the scale” about two months ago’ and quantity, condition, sources, or uprising that toppled dictator that the intended recipient was Gen. suppliers of MANPADS to armed Muammar Qaddafi in 2011. Salim Idris, then the leader of the Free groups, or the trafficking methods Syrian Army. According to Reuters, and routes used to deliver them. This The vast majority of the looted ‘suppliers in France and Belgium’ information is still best acquired Libyan missiles were indeed Eastern provided the missiles, the transport of through conventional sources, namely Bloc Strela-2M-pattern MANPADS, which was reportedly funded by on-the-ground reporting by several of which were subsequently France (Bakr, 2013). journalists, private researchers, and seized from armed groups and UN investigators. The continued smugglers in Lebanon, Mali, and Nine months later, the media again value of—and need for—such Tunisia, according to UN inves implicated the Saudi government in reporting is illustrated by the case of tigators (UNSC, 2013, p. 32; 2014, pp. the provision—or planned Libya. As noted above, hundreds of 92).17 The Strela-2M MANPADS provision—of MANPADS to armed MANPADS were looted from Libyan seized in Lebanon18 were reportedly groups in Syria. In February 2014, the arms depots during the 2011 uprising. bound for Syria (UNSC, 2013, pp. 35– Wall Street Journal published an article Numerous amateur videos featuring 38; 2014, pp. 49, 89), although asserting that the Saudi government the missiles were posted online but evidence supporting this claim had offered to supply unspecified the information of greatest value was appears to be circumstantial.19 Even if ‘Chinese man-portable air defense obtained by veteran journalists and the missiles were destined for Syria, systems’ to Syrian groups aligned researchers deployed to Libya.22 By it does not necessarily follow that the with the Free Syrian Army. The scouring looted depots, these Strela-2Ms acquired by Syrian armed MANPADS and other weapons were individuals found MANPADS groups came from Libya. Deter to be delivered to southern Syria components, documentation, and mining whether arms traffickers have through Jordan and to groups in the storage crates that contained critically succeeded in delivering Libyan north via Turkey, according to important bits of information (see MANPADS to Syria is difficult given: unidentified ‘Western and Arab Image 8). Combined, this information diplomats and opposition figures’. revealed the types, models, countries the lack of specific information The weapons were reportedly already of origin, and manufacture dates for about the Strela-2M missiles ‘waiting in warehouses in Jordan and many of the MANPADS in Libya, acquired by anti-government Turkey’ as of mid-February (Abi- along with a rough minimum number forces—such as the make, Habib, 2014). of missiles imported by the Qaddafi manufacture date, and lot number; regime (Chivers, 2011). the presence of similar (Strela-2- or Assessing the veracity of these claims Strela-2M-pattern) missiles in is extremely difficult. The articles rely Since then, UN investigators have Syrian government arsenals; and heavily on anonymous sources, tracked the regional proliferation of the widespread availability of whose credibility and expertise are Libyan MANPADS through on-site Strela missiles on black markets unknown, and journalists have inspections of seized weapons and the worldwide.20 provided little or no corroborating submission of trace requests to documentation to support the various governments (UNSC, 2014,
10 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 9 August 2014 pp. 29, 31, 92). Through a comparison and wide-ranging implications. This security measures and stockpile of manufacture dates and lot section identifies and assesses their management procedures that can be numbers, the UN has managed to potential impact on the global implemented by groups operating in trace Strela-2M MANPADS seized in terrorist threat from MANPADS and war zones.23 These limitations are Lebanon, Mali, and Tunisia to Libya. on international efforts to combat illustrated by the US government’s The resulting account of MANPADS this threat. efforts to monitor and retrieve Stinger proliferation within and outside of MANPADS distributed to armed Libya—while far from complete—is The most obvious implication—and groups in Afghanistan in the 1980s. much more nuanced and compre the one that has received the most As part of a covert aid programme for hensive than the current (public) media attention—is the potential anti-Soviet fighters, the US Central understanding of the MANPADS in threat posed by the diversion and Intelligence Agency (CIA) supplied Syria, despite daily postings of video misuse of MANPADS in Syria. several hundred FIM-92 Stinger footage of armed groups and their Weapons acquired by armed groups MANPADS, which were distributed weapons. As researchers in Libya are generally more vulnerable to theft, by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelli proved, a single scanned shipping loss, and diversion than weapons held gence agency. The CIA attempted to document or a photo of the markings by governments, and the use of limit the risk of diversion, partly by on a storage crate often conveys more diverted MANPADS against com keeping detailed records of each information than dozens of low- mercial airliners could have catastro missile, expanding its network of resolution videos posted on social phic consequences. It is unclear what, Afghan informants to better track the networking sites. Without access to if any, control measures have been weapons, and requiring a one-for-one comparable documentation on implemented by the armed groups exchange of expended launch tubes MANPADS in Syria, public know and their state sponsors. Stockpile for new missiles (Coll, 2004, pp. 11, ledge of the sources and suppliers of security and end-use monitoring 151; Schroeder, Stohl, and Smith, these weapons will remain limited. could help to reduce the risk of 2007, p. 83). Despite these efforts, diversion—but only marginally. dozens of the missiles were acquired by unauthorized end users, including Implications of MANPADS the Soviet military, the Iranian The ability of governments to track government, and various armed proliferation in Syria the movement and to control the use groups in Afghanistan and elsewhere of MANPADS provided to armed (Schroeder, Stohl, and Smith, 2007, The acquisition of MANPADS by groups is inherently limited, as are pp. 88–89). Attempts to buy back the armed groups in Syria has significant the type and rigour of physical
Image 8 Markings on eight MANPADS crates
© C.J. Chivers/The New York Times
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 11 wayward Stingers in the early 1990s safeguards would be implemented this difference matters is debatable. In proved only partially successful without a robust on-the-ground the hands of trained terrorists with despite a multi-million dollar budget presence in Syria, or clarify how global reach, even a few missiles pose and extensive international support;24 agencies tasked with implementing a potentially catastrophic threat to an estimated 600 Stinger missiles these safeguards would overcome the commercial aviation, and it is clear remained outside of government obstacles that have hindered previous that dozens of MANPADS are control as of 1996 (Coll, 2004, p. 337). covert aid programmes.25 Concrete vulnerable to cross-border diversion, and specific answers to these including to terrorist organizations. Other examples of third-party questions are essential to the assess acquisition of government-supplied ment of proliferation risks posed by Concerns about proliferation extend MANPADS include the retransfer of the provision of additional MAN beyond the hardware. The same Libyan Strela missiles by the Irish PADS and other sensitive weapons to social media sites used by researchers Republican Army (IRA) to the armed groups in Syria. to track the spread of MANPADS in Spanish separatist group ETA in 2000, Syria also host videos that provide and the sale of 41 Eritrean-supplied Assessing the net impact of the detailed instructions on how to MANPADS to the US government by MANPADS already in Syria is assemble and operate these weapons, Somali militant leader Hussein extremely difficult. Little is known and how to construct improvised Aideed in 2003. ETA reportedly used about the quantity of missiles and key components.27 Such videos are the missiles—which the Libyan components outside of government accessible to anyone with an Internet government provided to the IRA in control, the serviceability of these connection, including violent non- the 1980s—in three failed attempts to items, or the usage rates by armed state actors. When combined with assassinate the Spanish prime groups—key variables in determining MANPADS user manuals and other minister in 2001 (Belfast Telegraph, the quantity of functional systems instructional materials available 2010; Goodman, 2010). The missiles potentially available to terrorists. online, the videos form an increas supplied to Aideed in 1998 were Publicly available data on arms trans ingly voluminous ad hoc online intended for use against Ethiopian fers indicates that the Syrian govern training library for terrorists aircraft but instead ended up in the ment had imported thousands, pos worldwide. hands of US agents, who reportedly sibly tens of thousands, of missiles for paid Aideed USD 500,000 for the MANPADS, but these estimates do Some of these sites prohibit the missiles (UNSC, 2003; Economist, not necessarily reflect current national posting of content that is intended to 2004). holdings of complete, operational incite violence or that encourages systems. Most governments procure illegal activities that are dangerous, The limitations of stockpile security more missiles than launchers and such as instructional videos on bomb- and end-use monitoring as they apply thus the number of complete systems making or terrorist acts. Presumably to armed groups is germane not only imported by the Syrian government is this restriction extends to videos with to the MANPADS currently in Syria, some fraction of the total number of instructions on how to operate or but also to those that could be imported missiles.26 make improvised components for provided should advocates of greater MANPADS. Yet despite these US and European support for anti- Furthermore, attrition through age, restrictions, such videos are readily government forces in Syria prevail. training exercises, and possibly available on prominent file-sharing Since 2011, there has been intense through retransfer has undoubtedly websites. The videos highlight the debate in the United States and reduced the Syrian government’s ease and rapidity with which Europe over whether to supply inventory of functional missiles, potentially dangerous information is MANPADS and other sensitive perhaps significantly. Use by anti- disseminated in the Internet age, and weapons to moderate factions of the government forces has further the challenges of limiting the spread Syrian opposition. For some advo reduced these stocks, and complaints of such material without unduly cates of increased aid, the debate boils by rebels of malfunctioning MAN infringing on free speech and down to the pressing need to neutra PADS indicate that at least some of academic inquiry. lize Syrian air power, which out the remaining missiles are inoperable. weighs the potential harm associated The transfer of sophisticated MAN with diversion or misuse of MAN Assuming that the malfunctioning PADS to Syrian armed groups also PADS provided to armed groups. missiles described by the rebels are signifies a serious erosion of inter Other advocates call for the impo not anomalous, the quantity of national norms prohibiting the sition of ‘reasonable safeguards’ on complete, operational MANPADS in distribution of MANPADS to non- shipments of surface-to-air missiles to Syria is unlikely to exceed several state actors. These norms are clearly Syria but do not identify specific hundred—far fewer than commonly articulated in guidelines adopted by safeguards, explain how these assumed. Whether and to what extent the 100+ members of the Asia–Pacific
12 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 9 August 2014 Economic Cooperation Forum the proper security clearance’; Endnotes (APEC), the Organization for Security assure themselves that the recipient and Co-operation in Europe government will not re-export 1 FN-6 is the export designation. The units used by the Chinese military are (OSCE), the Organization of MANPADS except with the prior referred to as the HY-6 (Hong Ying-6) American States (OAS), and the consent of the exporting (O’Halloran and Foss, 2011, p. 6). Wassenaar Arrangement. government; and 2 Video footage purportedly taken in satisfy themselves of the recipient Syria also features a model of The prohibition on transfers of government’s ‘willingness and MANPADS that the Small Arms MANPADS to armed groups is ability to implement effective Survey was unable to identify. The unambiguous. The Wassenaar measures for secure storage, missile features an aerodynamic spike, Arrangement’s Elements for Export handling, transportation, [and] which is a distinguishing characteristic Controls for MANPADS, which the use’ of MANPADS, including of the Russian Igla (9M39) and Igla-S (9M342) missiles. However, the launch OSCE subsequently applied, almost inventories by serial number of tube and position of the missile in the initial shipments and monthly verbatim, to the OSCE region, tube appear to differ from those of the restricts exports of MANPADS ‘to physical inventories thereafter Igla and Igla-S. See Revolutionary foreign governments or to agents (WA, 2007, paras. 3.1, 3.8, 3.9, Shields Commission (n.d.). specifically authorised to act on emphasis added). 3 The US Department of State describes behalf of a government’ (WA, 2007, the Strela-2M as the model of para. 3.1). APEC and the OAS adop MANPADS ‘most commonly held by These and other provisions require ted agreements that include nearly terrorist groups’ (USDOS, 2011). While specific actions on the part of the identical provisions (APEC, 2004; not as widely proliferated as Strela- government of the destination 2Ms, Igla-1 MANPADS have been OAS, 2005). Members of the Group of country, the implementation of which acquired by armed groups in several Eight (G8) agreed to ban the transfer is not possible when MANPADS are countries (Hunter, 2001; Schroeder, of MANPADS to non-state actors (G8, transferred to non-state entities 2007; 2013). 2003). Resolutions passed by other without the knowledge or consent of 4 Some manufacturers have produced organizations, such as the 191-member the destination country’s government. improved variants of Strela-2M- International Civil Aviation Organi pattern missiles that feature improved Transfers of MANPADS to Syrian zation, indirectly promote this norm seekers and larger and more effective armed groups thus violate key by urging members to adopt the warheads (O’Halloran and Foss, 2011, provisions in landmark agreements provisions in the Wassenaar Arrange p. 42). It is not clear whether and to and the norms they underpin. These ment's Elements.28 what extent these systems have violations erode the influence of these proliferated. agreements and threaten the progress 5 See also Al-Akhbar English (2012); Al Transfers of MANPADS to armed made through international counter- Arabiya (2012); Binnie (2012a); ITAR- groups in Syria indirectly undermine MANPADS efforts, including the TASS (2012). other key provisions of international increased international restraint in 6 The States News Service quotes agreements on MANPADS control. MANPADS exports demonstrated Lavrov’s statement as follows: ‘There The Elements and other guidelines (albeit imperfectly) in recent years. is confirmed information that there are adopted by members of APEC, the about 50 complexes “Stinger” in the OAS, the OSCE, and the Wassenaar hands of opposition groups in Syria’ Arrangement contain numerous List of abbreviations (MFA, 2012). See also AFP (2012). controls on the import, transit, and 7 The term ‘Stinger’ is often incorrectly APEC Asia–Pacific Economic export of MANPADS, many of which used as a synonym for ‘MANPADS’. Cooperation require specific actions by the reci 8 See, for example, Chivers (2013b), Al CIA Central Intelligence Agency pient government.29 For example, the Turkey (n.d.), and Deir al-Zour Media G8 Group of Eight Wassenaar Arrangement’s Elements Authority (n.d.). for Export Controls for MANPADS IISS International Institute of 9 The manufacture date alone does not Security Studies requires exporting governments to: reveal the operational status of MAN IRA Irish Republican Army PADS. Some first-generation systems export MANPADS only ‘after MANPADS Man-portable air defence are still functional years or decades presentation of an official [end-use system beyond their estimated shelf lives while newer systems may not function certificate] certified by the OAS Organization of American due to poor storage conditions, rough Government of the receiving country’; States handling, or faulty components. limit access to hardware, training, OSCE Organization for Security 10 It is not clear from the source whether and technical and technological and Co-operation in Europe Countryman was referring to missiles documentation for MANPADS to SAF Sudan Armed Forces or complete systems, but it is unlikely ‘military and civilian personnel of SIPRI Stockholm International that Syria would have imported tens the receiving government who have Peace Research Institute of thousands of complete systems.
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 13 11 See also IHS Jane’s (2014a). 25 See, for example, Ford (2014). www.youtube.com/watch?feature 12 An alternative explanation put 26 See UNROCA (n.d.). =player_embedded&v=spiD0PASzzI> forward by IHS Jane’s is that the inert 27 In the interest of limiting the spread of Bakr, Amena. 2013. ‘Saudi Supplying systems were delivered as part of a potentially harmful online content, Missiles to Syria Rebels: Gulf Source.’ planned sale that was cancelled by the bibliographic information for the Reuters. 17 June. Russian government as a result of videos referenced in this section has Belfast Telegraph. 2010. ‘ETA “Tried to Kill diplomatic pressure (Binnie, 2012c). been withheld. Spanish PM with Missile from IRA.”’ 13 According to IHS Jane’s, a member of 28 International Civil Aviation 14 January. the Free Syrian Army claimed that an Organization Resolution A36-19 Binnie, Jeremy. 2012a. ‘Russian General FN-6 MANPADS used in an attack on ‘[u]rges all Contracting States to apply Claims Syrian Rebels Have Stinger a Syrian helicopter had been looted the principles defined in the Elements MANPADS.’ 24 October. from a Syrian military installation (IHS for Export Controls of MANPADS of —. 2012b. ‘Syrian Rebels Obtain Igla-S Jane’s, 2013). There is little evidence to the Wassenaar Arrangement’ (ICAO, MANPADS.’ Jane’s Defence Weekly. support this claim, however. 2007, para. 5). 14 November. 14 See, for example, Conflict Armament 29 See G8 (2003), OAS (2005), and OSCE —. 2012c. ‘Video Shows Captured Syrian Research (2012); Small Arms Survey (2008). Igla-S MANPADS Are Models.’ Jane’s (2013, p. 6); UNSC (2014, p. 22). Defence Weekly. 5 December. 15 SIPRI estimates that 50 missiles were Birch, Douglas. 2012. ‘US Closely delivered, which is not necessarily References Watching Syrian Chemical Weapons.’ inconsistent with IHS Jane’s estimate, if Associated Press. 15 February. the latter is for launchers (SIPRI, n.d.). Abi-Habib, Maria. 2014. ‘Saudis Agree to Bouckaert, Peter. 2011. ‘Qaddafi’s Great 16 See, for example, UNSC (2014, p. 77). Provide Syrian Rebels with Mobile Antiaircraft Missiles; US also Giving Arms Bazaar.’ Foreign Policy. 8 April. 17 Researcher Nic Jenzen-Jones has also Fighters Millions of Dollars for 14 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 9 August 2014 Conflict Armament Research. 2012. The news/cia-spies-smuggle-14- a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/5601 Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in stinger-1266487> 51bd42336e0e44257ab000224f8d! Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Hunter, Thomas. 2001. ‘The Proliferation OpenDocument> Investigation. London: Conflict of MANPADS.’ Jane’s Intelligence OAS (Organization of American States). Armament Research. December. Review. September. 2005. Recommended Guidelines for http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 15 www.smallarmssurvey.org/ Spleeters, Damien. 2013. The Trigger. (2011) Concerning Libya. S/2014/106 of fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2012/ 17 March. About the Small Arms Survey Author: Matt Schroeder The Small Arms Survey serves as the principal interna- tional source of public information on all aspects of small Copy-editor: arms and armed violence, and as a resource centre for Tania Inowlocki governments, policy-makers, researchers, and activists. Research and fact-checking: In addition to Issue Briefs, the Survey distributes its Mark Janssen and Richard Rice findings through Research Notes, Working Papers, Proofreader: Occasional Papers, Special Reports, Handbooks, a Book Stephanie Huitson Series, and its annual flagship publication, the Small Arms Survey. Design and layout: The project has an international staff with expertise in HotHouse South Africa security studies, political science, international public Small Arms Survey policy, law, economics, development studies, conflict 47 Avenue Blanc resolution, sociology, and criminology, and works closely 1202 Geneva with a worldwide network of researchers and partners. Switzerland The Small Arms Survey is a project of the Graduate t +41 22 908 5777 Institute of International and Development Studies, f +41 22 732 2738 Geneva. For more information, please visit e [email protected] www.smallarmssurvey.org. 16 SmallSudan ArmsIssue BriefSurvey NumberIssue Brief 6 April Number 2007 9 August 2014