DOCSLIB.ORG

Iran and the Changing Military Balance in the Gulf

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Iran and the Changing Military Balance in the Gulf 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Working draft, Washington, DC 20036 Please send comments Anthony H. Cordesman and suggested additions Phone: 1.202.775.3270 to Email: [email protected] [email protected] Iran and the Changing Web version: www.csis.org/burke/reports Military Balance in the Gulf Net Assessment Indicators Anthony H. Cordesman With the assistance of Grace Hwang March 26, 2019 Burke Chair Photo: -/ Getty Images In Strategy 1 Table of Contents The Third Key Shift in the Military Balance: The Impact of Iran’s Missile Forces …………………………………………………………….……….…… 162 The Changing Impact of Iran’s Missile Forces ……………………………………………………….……..………………………….…………………..163 The Air and Air Defense Side of the Air-Missile Balance ………………………………………………………………..……….………………………. 165 Comparing the Missile Forces on Each Side ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 184 The Changing Character of Iran’s Missile Forces …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 203 Beyond the Chronology, Examples of Iran’s Recent Use of Missile Forces ……………………………………………………..…………….…………. 204 Gulf Vulnerability and the Regional Nature of “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD) ……………………………………………………..…………. 217 The Need for Missile Defense? ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 243 The Iranian Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Risk ……………………………………………………………………………….……………..………. 251 The Uncertain Future Evolution of Missile Forces ………………………………………………………………………………….………………….…. 257 Probable Patterns of Deterrence, War Fighting, and Escalation ……………………………………………………………………………………………261 15 Appendix of Charts, Maps, Tables, and Graphics Chart of Total Oil Flows through the Strait of Hormuz ..………………………………………….…………………………………….………..…………………147 Map of The Strategic Importance of the Bab el-Mandeb ..……………………………………………….…………………………….………….……..………….148 Chart of The Strategic Importance of the SUMED Pipeline and Suez Canal (I) ..…………..………………………………………….…………….….………….149 Chart of The Strategic Importance of the SUMED Pipeline and Suez Canal (II) ..…………………………………………………….……………….…..……….150 Map of The Iran-Iraq Border Area ..…………………………………………………………………………………….……………………………….…..………154 Map of The Kuwaiti “hinge ” in Land Combat in the Gulf ..…………………………………………………………………………….………………………….155 Chart of Comparative Active Armed Forces, Estimated Reserves, and Active Paramilitary Personnel: 2019 ..………………………………..………..…………156 Chart of Comparative Active Army, National Guard, Royal/Presidential Guard, IRGC Military Personnel (Thousands) 2019 ..……….………………………...157 Chart of Comparative Total Land Force Major Weapons Holdings in 2019 ..………………….……………………………………….…………………..………158 Chart of Comparative Main Battle Tank Strength, 2019 ..……………………………………………………………………………………..…………………….159 Chart of Comparative Other Armored Vehicle Strength by Major Category, 2019 ..……………………………………..…………….……………..……………160 Chart of Comparative Artillery Strength by Major Category, 2019 ..…………………………………..……………………………….……………………..…….161 Map of Gulf Air Power and Air and Missile Bases ..……………………………………………………………………………………..………………………….167 Chart of Comparative Total Fixed-Wing Combat Aircraft Strength, 2020 ..…………………………………………………………….…………………….…….168 Chart of Comparative Modern Dual Capable and Strike Combat Aircraft Strength, 2020 ..……………………………..…………….………………………..….169 Chart of Comparative Fighter and Strike-Attack Combat Aircraft Strength by Type ..………………………………………………….………………………….170 Map of Iranian Combat Airbases and Major Combat Aircraft ..…………………………………………………………………………….……………………….173 Map of Iran’s Strategic Depth ..………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…….175 Map of Range of Iran’s Air Power ..…………………………………………………………………………………………..………….………………………….176 Map of Iranian (Pars) View of Gulf Air Threat ..……………………………………………………………………………………….………………………..…..177 19 Appendix of Charts, Maps, Tables, and Graphics Chart of Major Iranian UAVs ..………………………………………………………………………………………………….……….……………….………….178 Map of Gulf SAM Defenses (Pre S-300) ..…………………………………………………………………………….………………….…………………………179 Map of Iranian Major Bases and SAM Defenses ..…………………………………………………………….……………………….…………………..…….….180 Map of DIA Assessment of Iranian Long-Range Land-Based Air Defense Systems and Surface to Air Missiles …………………………………………………182 Map of Key Deployment Factors ..…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..183 Chart of DIA Estimate of Iranian Missile Profiles ..………………………………………….………………………………………….………………….……….192 Chart of Iran’s Major Missiles ..…………………………………………………………………………………..…………………….……………………………193 Map of Iran's Current Surface-to-Surface Missile Ranges ..……………………………………..……………………………………….………………………….194 Map of DIA Estimate of Iranian Missile Ranges ..…………………………………………………………….…………………………………………………….195 Map of Shabab 3M Coverage ..…………………………………………………………………………………………..……………….………………………….196 Map of The Missile War in Yemen ..………………………………………………………………………………..…………………….…………………………205 Chart of Houthi Attacks versus Saudi Intercepts ..………………………………………………………..…………………………….……………………..….….206 Chart of Houthi Missile, UAV, and Other Attacks on Saudi Infrastructure: (Jul 2016-Jul 2019) ..…………………………………………………………………207 Map of Iranian Missile Attacks: 2017-2020 ..……………………………………………….………………………………………….……………………..….….208 Photo of Iranian Precision Strikes on Abqaiq in September 2019 ..……………………………………….…………………………….……………………….….209 Satellite Photo of Attacks on Ain al-Asad Air Base ..…………………………………………………………………………………….………………………….212 Photo of Damaged and destroyed structures at Ain al-Asad Air Base ..……………………….………………………………………….…………………………213 Photo of Sample Damage to Ain al-Asad Air Base ..…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…….214 Map of Sample PMF Rocket Damage to PMF Bases in Iraq on March 13, 2020 ..………………………………..…………………….…………………………..215 Map of Major Gulf-Wide Petroleum Targets ..…………………………………………………………………………….……………………..………………….223 20 Appendix of Charts, Maps, and Tables Map of Broader Gulf Energy Infrastructure ..………………………………………………………………………………………….……………..……………...224 Map of Petroleum Targets Near Strait of Hormuz ..……………………………………………………………………..……………….………………………….225 Map of Major Iranian Petroleum Targets ..…………………………………………………………………………………………….….…………………………226 Photo of Iran’s Kharg Island ..………………………………………………………………………….…………………………………….……………..………. 228 Map of Nationwide Saudi Petroleum Targets ..…………………………………………………………………………..…………….……………………..……..229 Photo of Saudi Ras Taura Main Facility ..……………………………………………………………………………………………….…………………………..230 Photo of Oil Tank Farm at Ras Tanura ..………………………………………………………………………………………..……….…………………………..231 Map of Nationwide UAE Petroleum Targets ..………………………………………………………………………………..………….………………………….232 Map of Major Gulf Urban Areas, Seaports and Tanker Terminals ..………………………………….………………………………….………………………….233 Chart of Hostage Cities: Gulf Urbanization and Area Targets (2020) ..………………………………………………………………….………………….………234 Map of Gulf Desalination Facilities –2009 ..………………………………………………………………………….………………………….……………….....235 Map of Gulf Desalination Facilities – 2013 ..…………………………………………………………………………….……………………………………….…236 Map of Saudi Desalination Plant ..…………………………………………………………………………….……………………………………………………..237 Map of Major Air Facilities Near the Gulf Coasts ..……………………………………………………………………………..……….………………………….238 Satellite Photo of Dubai City ..…………………………………………………………………………………….………………………..………………………. 239 Map of Qatari Energy Facilities ..…………………………………………………………………………………….…………………..………………………….240 Photo of Qatari NGL Gas Train ..………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…………………….…….241 Map of Regional Nuclear Capabilities ..………………………………………………………………………………………….……….…………………………242 Chart of ThAAD vs. Patriot ..……………………………………………………………………………………………………….….………………………..…,248 Map of Iran with S400 ..……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..….……………….………..….250 21 Appendix of Charts, Maps, and Tables Chart of Iran Reinvigorated Push for Atomic Fuel ..……………………………………………………………………..…………….…………………..………..254 Map of Remaining Iranian Nuclear Facilities ..………………………………………………………………………………….…….…………………………….255 Photo of Hard Targets: Iran’s Fordow Facility ..………………………………………………………………………………..……….………………….………..256 22 The Third Key Shift in the Military Balance: The Impact of Iran’s Missile Forces 162 The Changing Impact of Iran’s Missile Forces The third key shift in the balance is the rising capabilities of Iran’s missile forces and their growing conventional precision strike capability – evolving capabilities whose end state is still far from clear and interacts with both unclear changes in airpower of each nation shaping the Gulf balance and changes in their land-based air and missile defenses. The charts and data that follow address both known changes in this aspect of the balance and the uncertainties involved. They do not attempt to forecast the impact of the Coronavirus. The assessment is divided into the following sections to illustrate both the importance of known shifts in the balance and the key uncertainties that still exist regarding the character and effectiveness of these changes: • The Air and Air Defense Side of the Air-Missile Balance shows that the United States and the Arab Gulf states steadily built-up a decisive lead in air power during the time from the fall of the Shah to the present. It further illustrates the impact of sanctions and of the arm embargoes that placed severe limits on Iran’s imports of advanced combat aircraft, precision guided munitions, and advanced surface- to-air missiles (SAMs) and missile defenses. • Comparing the Missile Forces on Each Side provides a rough comparison of Iranian and Arab missile forces that highlights
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Iran's Evolving Military Forces
    CSIS_______________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 To download further data: CSIS.ORG To contact author: [email protected] Iran's Evolving Military Forces Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy July 2004 Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved. Cordesman: Iran's Military forces 7/15/2004 Page ii Table of Contents I. IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE: THE “FOUR CORNERED” BALANCING ACT..........1 The Dynamics of the Gulf Military Balance ..........................................................................................................1 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTH GULF ........................................................................................................................2 II. IRAN’S ERRATIC MILITARY MODERNIZATION.......................................................................................9 THE IRANIAN ARMY ...................................................................................................................................................9 THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS (PASDARAN).................................................................................14 THE QUDS (QODS) FORCES ......................................................................................................................................15 THE BASIJ AND OTHER PARAMILITARY FORCES ......................................................................................................15 THE IRANIAN
    [Show full text]
  • Global Military Helicopters 2015-16 Market Report Contents
    GLOBAL MILITARY HELICOPTERS 2015-16 MARKET REPORT CONTENTS MARKET OVERVIEW 2 MILITARY HELICOPTER KEY REQUIREMENTS 4 EUROPE 5 NORTH AMERICA 10 LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN 12 AFRICA 15 ASIA-PACIFIC 16 MIDDLE EAST 21 WORLD MILITARY HELICOPTER HOLDINGS 23 EUROPE 24 NORTH AMERICA 34 LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN 36 AFRICA 43 ASIA-PACIFIC 49 MIDDLE EAST 59 EVENT INFORMATION 65 Please note that all information herein is subject to change. Defence IQ endeavours to ensure accuracy wherever possible, but errors are often unavoidable. We encourage readers to contact us if they note any need for amendments or updates. We accept no responsibility for the use or application of this information. We suggest that readers contact the specific government and military programme offices if seeking to confirm the reliability of any data. 1 MARKET OVERVIEW Broadly speaking, the global helicopter market is currently facing a two- pronged assault. The military helicopter segment has been impacted significantly by continued defense budgetary pressures across most traditional markets, and a recent slide in global crude oil prices has impacted the demand for new civil helicopters as well as the level of activity for existing fleets engaged in the offshore oil & gas exploration sector. This situation has impacted industry OEMs significantly, many of which had been working towards strengthening the civil helicopter segment to partially offset the impact of budgetary cuts on the military segment. However, the medium- to long-term view of the market is promising given the presence of strong fundamentals and persistent, sustainable growth drivers. The market for military helicopters in particular is set to cross a technological threshold in the form of next-generation compound helicopters and tilt rotorcraft.
    [Show full text]
  • Flaming Cliffs 3] Dcs
    [FLAMING CLIFFS 3] DCS DCS: Flaming Cliffs 3 Eagle Dynamics i Flight Manual DCS [FLAMING CLIFFS 3] DCS: Flaming Cliffs 3 is the next evolution of the Flaming Cliffs series. Flaming Cliffs 3 updates both Lock On and Flaming Cliffs to include new features in modular structure DCS World. Flaming Cliffs 3 was designed to continue the Flaming Cliffs series as what we term a "mid-fidelity" flight simulation. General discussion forum: http://forums.eagle.ru ii [FLAMING CLIFFS 3] DCS Table of Contents AIRCRAFT INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 2 SU-27 FLANKER B ............................................................................................................... 2 SU-33 FLANKER D ............................................................................................................... 3 MIG-29A FULCRUM A & МIG-29S FULCRUM C ...................................................................... 4 F-15C ............................................................................................................................... 5 SU-25 FROGFOOT ............................................................................................................... 6 SU-25Т FROGFOOT ............................................................................................................. 7 A-10A .............................................................................................................................. 8 GAME AVIONICS MODE .............................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Gulf Military Balance in 2019: a Graphic Analysis
    Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy The Gulf Military Balance in 2019: A Graphic Analysis Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan With the Assistance of Max Molot Working Paper: Please send comments to [email protected] REVISED December 9, 2019 Photo: ARASH KHAMOUSHI/AFP/ Getty Images Introduction 2 The military balance in the Gulf region has become steadily more complex with time. Conventional forces have been been reshaped by massive arms transfers, and changes in major weapons, technology, and virtually every aspect of joint warfare, command and control, sensors, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Missile warfare is changing radically as diverse mixes of ballistic and cruise missiles, UAVs and UCAVs, and missiles are deployed. Precision-guided, conventionally armed missiles are becoming a key aspect of regional forces, and so are missile defenses. The threat of nuclear pro0liferation remains, and at least one state – Iran - is a declared chemical weapons power while the Assad regime in Syria has made repeated use of chemical weapons At the same time, asymmetric forces, “proxy” forces, and various forms of military advisory and support missions are playing a growing role in local conflicts and gray area operations. So are local militia and security forces – often divided within a given Gulf state by sect and ethnicity. Terrorist and extremist forces continue pose serious threats, as do political tensions and upheavals, and the weaknesses and failures of some regional governments to meet the needs of their people. The most serious sources of Gulf conflicts are now the tensions between Iran and the Arab Gulf states, and the role played by terrorists and extremists, but civil war and insurgencies remain an additional threat - as does the links between Iran, Syria, and the Hezbollah.
    [Show full text]
  • ISSUE 5 AADH05 OFC+Spine.Indd 1 the Mortar Company
    ARTILLERY AND AIR DEFENCE ARTILLERY ISSUE 5 HANDBOOK HANDBOOK – ISSUE 5 PUBLISHED MARCH 2018 THE CONCISE GLOBAL INDUSTRY GUIDE ARTILLERY AND AIR DEFENCE AADH05_OFC+spine.indd 1 3/16/2018 10:18:59 AM The Mortar Company. CONFRAG® CONTROLS – THE NEW HIGH EXPLOSIVE STANDARD HDS has developed CONFRAG® technology to increase the lethal performance of the stan- dard High Explosive granade for 60 mm CDO, 60 mm, 81 mm and 120 mm dramatically. The HE lethality is increased by controlling fragmentation mass and quantity, fragment velocity and fragment distribution, all controlled by CONFRAG® technology. hds.hirtenberger.com AADH05_IFC_Hirtenberger.indd 2 3/16/2018 9:58:03 AM CONTENTS Editor 3 Introduction Tony Skinner. [email protected] Grant Turnbull, Editor of Land Warfare International magazine, welcomes readers to Reference Editors Issue 5 of Shephard Media’s Artillery and Air Defence Handbook. Ben Brook. [email protected] 4 Self-propelled howitzers Karima Thibou. [email protected] A guide to self-propelled artillery systems that are under development, in production or being substantially modernised. Commercial Manager Peter Rawlins [email protected] 29 Towed howitzers Details of towed artillery systems that are under development, in production or Production and Circulation Manager David Hurst. being substantially modernised. [email protected] 42 Self-propelled mortars Production Elaine Effard, Georgina Kerridge Specifications for self-propelled mortar systems that are under development, in Georgina Smith, Adam Wakeling. production or being substantially modernised. Chairman Nick Prest 53 Towed mortars Descriptions of towed heavy mortar systems that are under development, in CEO Darren Lake production or being substantially modernised.
    [Show full text]
  • Hezbollah's Missiles and Rockets
    JULY 2017 CSIS BRIEFS CSIS Hezbollah’s Missiles and Rockets An Overview By Shaan Shaikh and Ian Williams JULY 2018 THE ISSUE Hezbollah is the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor, with a large and diverse stockpile of unguided artillery rockets, as well as ballistic, antiair, antitank, and antiship missiles. Hezbollah views its rocket and missile arsenal as its primary deterrent against Israeli military action, while also useful for quick retaliatory strikes and longer military engagements. Hezbollah’s unguided rocket arsenal has increased significantly since the 2006 Lebanon War, and the party’s increased role in the Syrian conflict raises concerns about its acquisition of more sophisticated standoff and precision-guided missiles, whether from Syria, Iran, or Russia. This brief provides a summary of the acquisition history, capabilities, and use of these forces. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & middle east INTERNATIONAL STUDIES program CSIS BRIEFS | WWW.CSIS.ORG | 1 ezbollah is a Lebanese political party public source information and does not cover certain topics and militant group with close ties to such as rocket strategies, evolution, or storage locations. Iran and Syria’s Assad regime. It is the This brief instead focuses on the acquisition history, world’s most heavily armed non-state capabilities, and use of these forces. actor—aptly described as “a militia trained like an army and equipped LAND ATTACK MISSILES AND ROCKETS like a state.”1 This is especially true Hwith regard to its missile and rocket forces, which Hezbollah 107 AND 122 MM KATYUSHA ROCKETS has arrayed against Israel in vast quantities. The party’s arsenal is comprised primarily of small, man- portable, unguided artillery rockets.
    [Show full text]
  • NSIAD-98-176 China B-279891
    United States General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, Joint Economic GAO Committee, U.S. Senate June 1998 CHINA Military Imports From the United States and the European Union Since the 1989 Embargoes GAO/NSIAD-98-176 United States General Accounting Office GAO Washington, D.C. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division B-279891 June 16, 1998 The Honorable James Saxton Chairman, Joint Economic Committee United States Senate Dear Mr. Chairman: In June 1989, the United States and the members of the European Union 1 embargoed the sale of military items to China to protest China’s massacre of demonstrators in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. You have expressed concern regarding continued Chinese access to foreign technology over the past decade, despite these embargoes. As requested, we identified (1) the terms of the EU embargo and the extent of EU military sales to China since 1989, (2) the terms of the U.S. embargo and the extent of U.S. military sales to China since 1989, and (3) the potential role that such EU and U.S. sales could play in addressing China’s defense needs. In conducting this review, we focused on military items—items that would be included on the U.S. Munitions List. This list includes both lethal items (such as missiles) and nonlethal items (such as military radars) that cannot be exported without a license.2 Because the data in this report was developed from unclassified sources, its completeness and accuracy may be subject to some uncertainty. The context for China’s foreign military imports during the 1990s lies in Background China’s recent military modernization efforts.3 Until the mid-1980s, China’s military doctrine focused on defeating technologically superior invading forces by trading territory for time and employing China’s vast reserves of manpower.
    [Show full text]
  • The Washington Institute for Near East Policy August
    THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY n AUGUST 2020 n PN84 PHOTO CREDIT: REUTERS © 2020 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. FARZIN NADIMI n April 22, 2020, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (IRGC-ASF) Olaunched its first-ever satellite, the Nour-1, into orbit. The launch, conducted from a desert platform near Shahrud, about 210 miles northeast of Tehran, employed Iran’s new Qased (“messenger”) space- launch vehicle (SLV). In broad terms, the launch showed the risks of lifting arms restrictions on Iran, a pursuit in which the Islamic Republic enjoys support from potential arms-trade partners Russia and China. Practically, lifting the embargo could facilitate Iran’s unhindered access to dual-use materials and other components used to produce small satellites with military or even terrorist applications. Beyond this, the IRGC’s emerging military space program proves its ambition to field larger solid-propellant missiles. Britain, France, and Germany—the EU-3 signatories of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal is known—support upholding the arms embargo until 2023. The United States, which has withdrawn from the deal, started a process on August 20, 2020, that could lead to a snapback of all UN sanctions enacted since 2006.1 The IRGC’s Qased space-launch vehicle, shown at the Shahrud site The Qased-1, for its part, succeeded over its three in April. stages in placing the very small Nour-1 satellite in a near circular low earth orbit (LEO) of about 425 km. The first stage involved an off-the-shelf Shahab-3/ Ghadr liquid-fuel missile, although without the warhead section, produced by the Iranian Ministry of Defense.2 According to ASF commander Gen.
    [Show full text]
  • The Iranian Missile Challenge
    The Iranian Missile Challenge By Anthony H. Cordesman Working Draft: June 4, 2019 Please provide comments to [email protected] SHAIGAN/AFP/Getty Images The Iranian Missile Challenge Anthony H. Cordesman There is no doubt that Iran and North Korea present serious security challenges to the U.S. and its strategic partners, and that their missile forces already present a major threat within their respective regions. It is, however, important to put this challenge in context. Both nations have reason to see the U.S. and America's strategic partners as threats, and reasons that go far beyond any strategic ambitions. Iran is only half this story, but its missile developments show all too clearly why both countries lack the ability to modernize their air forces, which has made them extremely dependent on missiles for both deterrence and war fighting. They also show that the missile threat goes far beyond the delivery of nuclear weapons, and is already becoming far more lethal and effective at a regional level. This analysis examines Iran's view of the threat, the problems in military modernization that have led to its focus on missile forces, the limits to its air capabilities, the developments in its missile forces, and the war fighting capabilities provided by its current missile forces, its ability to develop conventionally armed precision-strike forces, and its options for deploying nuclear-armed missiles. IRAN'S PERCEPTIONS OF THE THREAT ...................................................................................................... 2 IRAN'S INFERIORITY IN ARMS IMPORTS ................................................................................................... 3 THE AIR BALANCE OVERWHELMINGLY FAVORS THE OTHER SIDES ........................................................... 4 IRAN (AND NORTH KOREA'S) DEPENDENCE ON MISSILES ........................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Is Their New Flight Simulator Package Set for Release in 2020 for Both PC and Xbox
    New M Announced by Microsoft at Electronic Entertainment Expo 2019 (E3 2019) is their new flight simulator package set for release in 2020 for both PC and Xbox. We weren't expecting this announcement - given the history of Microsoft's attempts to revise its historic Microsoft Flight Simulator package (aka Microsoft Flight). This is a developing story so be sure to bookmark this page - it will be updated regularly with more information as and when it becomes available. The announcement was made via a YouTube video previewing the new sim. At first, we thought it was a hoax (like our 2014 April fools joke) however the video was verified and had been released on Microsoft's official Xbox YouTube channel. You can jump to the individual sections of this article using the links below: Official Release o Release Date o Official Pre-Order Launch Trailer Video o Editions, Pricing & Airports/Aircraft Included COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Delays X019 Update FSX Beta Global Preview Event Analysis FAQ SDK The Announcement Our Analysis What About Those Add-ons? The Next Generation Of Flight Simulation, “For You, With You!” August 8th Update: Development & Control of Flight Simulator X Insider Launch Videos o Discovery Series . World . Weather . Aerodynamics . Cockpits . Soundscape . Airports . Multiplayer Screenshots What do You Think? Release of Microsoft Flight Simulator NEW Posted 14th July 2020 Finally, after all the waiting, Microsoft Flight Simulator is set to be released on the 18th August 2020 courtesy of Xbox Game Studios and Asobo Studio. The release will be available for PC as well as Xbox Game Pass for PC (Beta).
    [Show full text]
  • INDO-PACIFIC China’S New Road-Mobile ICBM DF-41 Officially Unveiled
    INDO-PACIFIC China’s New Road-Mobile ICBM DF-41 Officially Unveiled OE Watch Commentary: On 1 October, China held a large military parade in commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic. The Chinese military used the occasion to show off a number of pieces of new equipment, including a new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the DF-41. According to the accompanying article, the DF- 41 is a “mainstay of China’s…nuclear deterrent.” While China maintains a small number of silo-based DF-5 ICBMs, it has historically pursued mobile launch systems for its ballistic missiles to improve their survivability in a conflict. Adoption of an off- road-capable transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) gives the missile a much greater range of launch and concealment positions. Separate Chinese media reporting on the DF-41 noted that the missile has a range of 14,000 and can carry up to ten independently targetable nuclear warheads. However, there is a compromise between distance and “throw weight”—the number of warheads and penetration aids (decoys) that a missile Chinese Mobile ICBMs. can carry—and the missile likely carries considerably Image by Peter Wood fewer when fired to maximum range. Researchers using commercial imagery previously identified what appears to be a nuclear silo for the DF-41, likely used as part of testing the missile. Reporting in China Daily in 2017 claimed that it could be launched from trains and silos as well as the road-mobile configuration. The DF-41 was accompanied by 16 DF-31AG missiles, an improved version of the DF-31 mobile ICBM.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran and the Gulf Military Balance - I
    IRAN AND THE GULF MILITARY BALANCE - I The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions FIFTH WORKING DRAFT By Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner Revised July 11, 2012 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected] Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 2 Acknowledgements This analysis was made possible by a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation. It draws on the work of Dr. Abdullah Toukan and a series of reports on Iran by Adam Seitz, a Senior Research Associate and Instructor, Middle East Studies, Marine Corps University. 2 Cordesman/Wilner: Iran & The Gulf Military Balance, Rev 5 7/11/12 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................................... 6 Figure III.1: Summary Chronology of US-Iranian Military Competition: 2000-2011 ............................... 8 CURRENT PATTERNS IN THE STRUCTURE OF US AND IRANIAN MILITARY COMPETITION ........................................... 13 DIFFERING NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 17 US Perceptions .................................................................................................................................... 17 Iranian Perceptions............................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]