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JOURNAL FALL 19 87 , Vol. 1, No. 2 AFRP 50-2

From the Editor 2

The Decade of Opportunity: Air Power in the 1990s AVM R. A. Mason. RAF 4

Doctrine, Technology, and Air Warfare: A Late Twentieth-Century Perspective Dr Richard P. Hallion 16 Coalition Air Defense in the Persian Gulf Lt Col Ronald C. Smith, USAF 28

Editorial—End of an Era Maj Michael A. Kirtland. USAF 40 Tactical Airlift Brig Gen Billy M. Knowles, USAF, Retired 41 Shortchanging Our Young Officers: Military Traditions Denied Lt Col Stephen C. Hall, USAF 48 US Air Force Special Operations: Charting a Course for the Future Maj Kenneth M. Page, USAF 58 Ira Eaker and the Ear of Dionysius Col Timothy E. Kline, USAF 70 Ricochets 3 Letters Net Assessment 74 Reviews of Current Literature Notams 83 Notices of Interest Contributors 87 military orientation in every professional EDITORIAL endeavor. We must regard our jobs as part of an overall combat mission. Regardless of Air Force Speciality Code, we must under- Building a Broad stand the overall purposes of military air power and then see how our individual du- Professional Base ties support those purposes. To fully develop this professional knowl­ edge base and orientation, supervisors and However much you may tvish for peace, never commanders must be involved. We need to forget military skill if you do not wish to suffer recognize and support the value of profes­ the same fate as the Byzantine Monarchy. sional courses and participation in Project Warrior discussion groups. Above all, we Peter the Great need to set an example in getting our people to study, think about, and discuss air power S THE second issue of the Airpower and those elements in all our jobs that con- A Journal was being prepared for publi- tribute to the effective application of com­ cation, the Air Force celebrated a milestone bat power. The days when the majority of event, the 40th anniversary of its creation as our people had combat experience have a separate Service. As we consider those 40 passed. Very few of our company grade of- years. the immense changes that have taken ficers or junior enlisted members have any place dominate our thoughts. In that time combat or related experience. Our combat- we have gone from the B-29 to the B-l and seasoned leaders at every levei need to from the P-51 to the F-16. We see change make a positive effort to transfer their war- everywhere we look. time experience and combat-related peace- Change is a necessary part of a vital mili- time experience to our middle ranking and tarv force. At the same time. some basic con- junior people. cepts have remained constant over the 40 The consequence of not developing a years and longer. Among them is the notion broad professional base can be disastrous in that to be a truly prepared Air Force we warfare. But a lack of professional knowl­ must develop a wide base of professional edge has extremely adverse results in peace- knowledge. Professional knowledge is time as well, for it is in peacetime that we something that is cultivated through years develop the orientations we will use in of experience and studv. Its development is, fighting the next war. We must be prepared in fact. one of the constant responsibilities to give the best possible professional advice in a military career. Far too often, we as­ to our leaders and our subordinates. This is sume that all the professional knowledge true whether we are talking about large- necessary will be given to us through the scale operations in a dangerous area of the various professional military education world or the day-to-day operation of a se- courses we take in our career. either in res- curity police squadron here in the United idence. by seminar, or by correspondence. States. While these courses are an important con- As leaders we need to encourage the de­ tribution to that professional base, they can- velopment of professional knowledge in not provide it all. The Air Force has other our people. As subordinates we need to structured programs such as Project Warrior glean as much as we can from our leaders’ that are important, and well-chosen civilian experiences. As Douglas MacArthur re- education plays a part as well. But there is minded us, ‘‘In no other profession are the still more. The professionals should under- penalties for employing untrained person- take programs of self-education and devel­ nel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the opment and should strive to develop a military.” KWG

2 ricochete

TAKING AIM AT THE AIR WAR relatively less criticai during that time? The planning process is not likely to be able to re- spond to the changed circumstances. And the Kudos to Captain Morra and Major Lange for problem is even more acute with regard to mo­ their letters and comments. We want to print bile targets. more, but we can only do that if more of our This unhappy situation again poses the ques­ readers pick up the gauntlet and write to us. The tion, should planning be more decentralized? “Ricochets” department is your chance to ex- And should wing commanders be given greater press yourselves, both pro and con, on the arti- responsibility for operational planning? Should cles we publish. The editors believe an exchange wing commanders be elevated from what Colo­ of ideas filling these pages is a healthy sign that nel Krieger terms the "bottom fringe of the op­ Air Force people are thinking about their erational levei of war”? profession. Integral to the overall operational planning process at the fighter wing are mission planning and mission integration, as well as wing-level in- telligence inputs. Colonel Krieger emphasizes I have a few thoughts on Col Clifford R. Krie- the human element in his discussion of mission ger's fine article in the inaugural issue of the Air- planning and wing intelligence. Clearly, out- power Journal. Overall, the piece provides a rare standing individuais are necessary to the success insight into the concerns of a perceptive, con- of the frag shop and wing intelligence operations temporary fighter wing commander. (more on personnel follows below). Neverthe- My specific focus, however, is on Colonel less, automating the process of integrating Krieger’s discussion of the ‘‘War in the Air.” His timely, locally received intelligence inputs di- explication of the planning cycle is particularly rectly into an automated mission planning Sys­ valuable for its clarity, and at the same time tem will speed up the planning cycle and enable rather embarassing for what it says about our in- the wing to operate much more effectively if ability to plan in a dynamic, timely fashion. With Communications are lost with higher command our current (and one would hope future) empha- and intelligence echelons. sis on the operational levei of war and the US Ar- With respect to wing-level intelligence per­ my’s orientation toward maneuver warfare. our sonnel; one must agree that with notable excep- inability to plan air operations at a tempo con- tions their levei of performance does not match sistent with the pace of modem battle is glaring improvements in intelligence products. In addi- indeed. That shortcoming raises the old question tion, the centralization of intelligence capability of centralized versus decentralized planning. at the major force levei exacerbates the problem Whether Communications from the wing to the of poor quality intelligence at the wing levei. For ATOC (and by extension, through the ATOC to example, while it is true that we have much to the ATAF) remain intact during conflict, or the learn about enemy capabilities and tactics, it is wing commander is forced to rely on runners, also true that Air Force intelligence already does staff cars, and aero club aircraft to communicate know a good deal about those areas. Efforts such in the event more timely links are lost, the frag as USAFE's Warrior Preparation Center notwith- cycle is too slow. As Colonel Krieger States, “Ti- standing, the problem is that such information is meliness is the key to successfully executing the not integrated into comprehensive aircrew prep­ air plan.” Unfortunately, our present ATO/ATM aration at the wings. Colonel Krieger’s descrip- process is not timely. It is well and good that tion of intelligence as a "weak link at wing levei, ATMs now contain DMPI and TOT information particularly at fighter wings” is true, although as for fixed targets that were identified for strike at an intelligence officer I find it difficult to admit. the ATAF levei 12—48 hours previously, but what if those fixed targets become irrelevant or Continued on page 69

3 The Decade of Opportunity

Air Power in the Í990s

Air Vice-Marshal R. A. Mason, Royal Air Force

Promises, Promises... T HAS frequently been the fate of air- gregate they offer to airmen a decade of op­ men to be criticised for failing to meet portunity in which the most apparent their promises rather than to be congrat- dilemma is that of choosing where best to ulated on the reality of their actual invest resources and manpower to ensure Iachievements. The vision, determination, that air power sustains its pervasive influ- and dedication of the early air power pi- ence on warfare well into the twenty-first oneers vvere essential for the military ex- century. If that dilemma should be resolved ploitation of the skies, but it has taken only by reference to technological promise. longer for the dream of these visionaries to then the visions of the early pioneers may be realised because of the realities of the not be so much vindicated as betrayed. world, especially technological limitations. With a shameless and selective applica- As the microcomputer revolution impinges tion of hindsight, one may argue that air more and more on air power, it is tempting power could have made a greater, and ear- to look forward to a golden age of instant lier, impact on twentieth-century warfare Communications, perfect navigation, un- had airmen placed more emphasis on con- ambiguous target identification, infallible tinuity in warfare and less on the unique weapon accuracy, and inevitable target characteristics of air power, had they rec- destruction, all flowing from a multirole, in- ognized that the traditional pendulum of finitely manoeuverable, and probably invis- offence and defence could swing in the ibleaircraft platform. third dimension as much as it had always There is little doubt that many recent done on land and sea; and had they not el- technological advances have brought the evated a specific role or roles into a dog- dreams of the visionaries closer to reality in matic raison d’être'^§KPí' power itself. But the last decade than in the previous six. that is not only shameless and selective Their impact on airframe, engine, avionics, hindsight. it is also unfair. If one is faced by weapons. Communications, and associated army generais who cannot lift their eyes , systems has been well documented. In ag- above the next trench, or over the latest

A

6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1987

tank, to appreciate that whiie occupying • Real-time command, control, commu- ground is frequently essential in combat, it nication, and intelligence (C3I) Systems. may not be essential to achieving victory in Secure, real-time, data-linked Communica­ warfare; and if one is vying for resources tions between airborne command posts, re- with admirais who fuily understand the im- connaissance platforms—manned and plications of command of the sea, asserting unmanned—and units requiring the data to that 75 percent of the earth’s surface is cov- pursue their operational objectives will be- ered by it but overlooking the fact that since come increasingly prevalent. 1941 command of the sea has depended on • Computerised exploitation of the elec- command of the air above it, which, inci- tromagnetic spectrum. “Electronic war­ dentally, covers 100 percent of the earth’s fare, ” a term loosely used originally to surface; and if an infant Service has to fíght describe the avionic activities of special for its existence against jealousy, bigotry, units in World War II seeking to enhance narrow-mindedness, and a simple failure to friendly air activity and to degrade that of appreciate that airmen not only work in a an enemy, has expanded to encompass most different dimension but must think in one air operations. In the next decade, manipu- also— then, under all these circumstances, lation of all frequencies in the electromag- it is very natural that airmen the world over netic spectrum will make the lessons drawn have tended to emphasise the unique char- from the Bekaa campaign of 1982 seem rel- acteristics of air power and to minimise evant only to elementary operations. both its shortcomings and the principies it • Stealth technology. The application of has inherited from warfare on land and sea. all aspects of stealth technology to aircraft To move from the easy confidence engen- and weapons (physical dimensions and dered by generalities bred of selective hind- shape, absorbent materiais, self-screening sight to the identification of opportunities, transmissions) is likely to become an inte­ challenges, and difficulties in the last de- gral consideration in design. cade of this century is to offer several hos- • Static target location. The location of tages to fortune. But on the principie that static targets will become possible well be- men who do not court fortune are unlikely yond previous visual or electronic ranges as to receive many favours from her, the likely a result of satellite and other airborne recon- major developments in air warfare and their implications for airmen must be assayed. naissance systems. • Weapons capability. Air-launched weapons will possess longer target-detec- Probable Developments tion ranges, more refined target discrimina- tion, greater terminal accuracy, and higher Ten quite separate developments in air kill probabilities. warfare in the next decade can be confi- • Twenty-four-hour operations. With dently forecast. What is not so clear is their the widespread application of all-weather, likely impact and their relationship one day-and-night navigational, target-acquisi- with another. This list is therefore in order tion, and blind-landing systems, continu- of association rather than necessarily in or­ ous air operations will be technologically der of signifícance. sustainable. • Airborne early warning and control. • Equalisation of technological applica- The example of E-3A and E-2C aircraft is tion. The superpowers, and hopefully the being followed worldwide. The Soviet 11-76 United States in particular, will retain a de- Mainstay is the most notable competitor at cisive edge over third world countries in the present, but many of the world’s air forces broad application and employment of ad- will likely seek an airborne warning and vanced aerospace weapon systems. But al- control system (AWACS) capability. though the gap may remain, these systems DEC ADE OF OPPORTUNITY 7

vvill move inexorablv up the scale of tech- the next decade. However, the impact of any nological sophistication. The briefest sur- aircraft on warfare is not measured solely by vey of specialist journals demonstrates the its agility, endurance. or flexibility but by eagerness of Western aerospace systems what it actually does with those attributes manufacturers to peddle their advanced in the circumstances of its operational en- wares worldwide. quite apart from the in- vironment. If aircraft development and op- clination of an increasing number of “sec- eration take these 10 developments into ond-rank” povvers to acquire their ovvn account, then the decade will indeed be one indigenous expertise. of opportunity grasped. If not. then the manned aircraft will pass into military his- • Constraints on manpower availability. torv books to become a source of affection- Much has been written on the increased ate study alongside the knight in shining unit costs of many modern aircraft and as- armour. the castles of Marshal Sebastien de sociated systems. However, there are clear Vauban, the Thin Red Line, and the tradi- signs that manufacturers, chastened bv rig- tional battleship. orous contract application. inspired bv tight government budgeting, and stimulated by international competition, are beginning to recognize that escalating costs cannot indef- The Implications initelv be passed on to naively appreciative customers. But as the third industrial revo- It is very reassuring to be aware of the in- lution spreads worldwide. there is increas­ cessant discussions in professional air staffs ing competition with civilian industrv and and to read the eqüally vociferous opinions commerce for the highly trained manpower expressed in informed and not-so-well-in- needed to operate and maintain the hard­ formed aviation journals about all the likely ware. The problem can be solved by direc- developments and their implications. It is tion, as in totalitarian States, or by market also very easy to be criticai of decisionmak- forces, or by ensuring that status and polit- ers. One yearns for the halcyon interwar ical influence remain the prerogative of the years when in Britain the “10-Year Rule” armed Services, as in many third w’orld postulated that armed forces were likely to countries. The problem will subside in due have 10 years warning of any major conflict course. but in the next decade most air at a time when industrv could produce a forces will need to look hard at their man­ new front-line combat aircraft in little more power requirements and how to meet them. than a year. Today, should deterrence fail. a major conflict could erupt in seven days, • Increasing capability of surface-to- while the gestation period of a new aircraft surface weapons. Surface-to-surface weap- or weapon system can take seven years. ons will become very much more accurate, Today, however. it is unlikely that an air and their ability to deliver submunitions force could equip for an offensive role with- designed to attack a wide range of targets out taking into account defensive research will markedly increase. being carried out elsewhere in the system. The absence of one particular develop- which. if employed by an enemy, could ment from the list will probably prompt in- have severelv adverse consequences for its stant controversy. Contemporary advances own offensive operations. It is readily ap- in aircraft technologv—aeroelastic air- parent that the 10 developments noted frames, aerodynamic instability, quantum above will have very contradictory impli­ enhancement of propulsion efficiency and cations for future air operations. For exam- avionics— are dramatic and will undoubt- ple, airborne early warning, even at a edly improve the operational effectiveness relatively primitive stage, already enhances of the air superiority fighter, the strategic air defence considerably. It extends warn­ bomber. and the tactical transport alike in ing time and provides the defender an op- 8 AIRPOWEfí IOURNAL FALL 1987

portunity to concentrate defences in time level, air-to-air combat. If, on the other and space. Because such warning reduces hand, short-range, surface-to-air defences opportunities for surprise attack, a prospec- are prepared for an enemy’s approach at a tive attacker must in theory reassess the specific height, speed, and direction, the ratios required to achieve his own concen- criticai advantages hitherto possessed by tration of force at the decisive point of the the low-flying intruder are minimised. engagement. However, that advantageous Moreover, while the defenders may be in defensive position is unlikely to be any some doubt until the later stages of an attack more permanent than Vauban’s mutually about which target is under threat, there covering parapets guaranteed perpetuai in- will be little uncertaintv about the destina- vulnerabilitv to his fortresses. When the at­ tion of the intruders as they turn for home. tacker is similarly equipped, he will It is sometimes forgotten that Royal Air become aware of the position of intercept- Force and US Army Air Forces aircraft in ing aircraft and, assuming that his attackers the bomber offensives of World War II usu- have the necessary range redundancy and ally incurred heavier losses returning from that he has secure communication with their targets than while fighting their them, he can minimise the impact of the de­ way towards them. In any future European fensive concentration of force by unitary or scenario, relative combat attrition will mass rerouting. Or he may decide that the be a signifícant factor in the air war, importance of the opposing AWACS plat- and the employment of an unimpaired form is so great that he will be prepared to AWACS could have a signifícant impact on allocate an apparently disproportionate the sustainability of deeper-penetrating amount of effort to its destruction or electro- operations. magnetic neutralisation. That consideration can be extended a stage further. The possession of an AWACS bv an opponent poses complicated ques- AWACS: A Pivotal System tions for the projection of friendly offensive air power. It is, for example, still possible to It is therefore highly probable that an exploit the earth’s curvature and terrain fea- AWACS will assume pivotal importance for tures to minimise aircraft vulnerability by both defensive and offensive air operations. high-speed. low-level penetration of hostile As a result, its preservation or destruction, air space. However, an AWACS not only depending on whose system it is, will be­ provides early warning, it will increasingly come a prime consideration on all sides. It enhance look-down detection also. While follows, therefore, that investment in re- range redundancy will permit variable rout- sources to protect one’s system and to de- ing and multidirectional approaches to tar- stroy or neutralise that of the opponent gets, it will become increasingly difficult to should be given very high priority. do so without an opponent having an op- In assessing the signifícance of AWACS, portunity to prepare and direct his defen­ an important assumption has been mad.e sive assets for interception. Improvements that the data it acquires can be securely and in fighter look-down target acquisition are speedilv made available to the units that complementary, but the problems of de- need to use it. The problem is not new to stroving low-flving targets from above may war in the third dimension. Timely warning prove less tractable. of an enemys disposition, direction, and Radar-guided and heat-seeking missiles strength has been of value throughout his- continue to be susceptible to the natural torv, but only if the commander had the “noise” of ground clutter, and few fighter opportunity and the resources to take ad- pilots relish the additional stimulus of vantage of it. Ambush is ambush, whether going down “among the weeds” for low- achieved by the US Cavalry, by F-14 Tom- DECAÜE OF OPPORTUN1TY 9

cats. or by SA-12s. The difference lies in the optical reconnaissance and visual attack. speed and three-dimensional mobility of Electronic countermeasures and counter- the air forces. In this context. the capabili- countermeasures are their modern expres- ties of AVVACS resemble those of systems sions, while “stealthy” technology speaks such as the TR-1 or SR-71, vvhich can relay for itself. Stealth is a military attribute not data on surface movements as well as those only designed to take an enemy by surprise of aircraft. The better the C‘l svstem, the but. by minimising risks of detection, to also more accurately can the location of even a increase one’s own survivability. highly mobile opponent be identified, mon- itored, and reported. The efficacy of mobil­ ity. especially on land or at sea, as a Weapon Lethality traditional defensive option is proportion- The lethality of many current air-to-air, atelv reduced. Thus. a strategy that relies on air-to-ground, and ground-to-air weapons is reinforcement to sustain offensive impetus such that to afford an opponent an oppor- could become more vulnerable to increas- tunity to attack is to risk destruction or se- inglv effective interdiction. On the other vere degradation. The radius of lethality is hand, so could an alliance strategy that re­ continuing to increase as detection and ac­ lies on reinforcement to strengthen thinly quisition ranges are extended and warhead stretched. forward-deploved, defensive efficiency is enhanced. All-aspect, highly forces. Therefore, there are strong incen­ agile air-to-air missiles are, when launched tives to develop weapon systems that can within the parameters of the overall weapon take advantage of the commander’s real- system. likelv to be far more manoeuverably time avvareness of what is going on much reactive than their manned aircraft targets. farther “over the hill” than ever before. The Weapon lethality depends increasingly less inherent characteristics of air povver— on the judgment of the pilot and more on speed. reach. and flexibility—are well the artificial intelligence of the missile’s suited to the task as long as they are applied guidance system. The need to neutralise or in a manner appropriate to the likelv oper- impede such a system has led to demands ational environment. on electromagnetic exploitation far in excess of that required for traditional distortion of navigational aids or Commu­ The Electronic Fog of War nications. Therefore, a future combat air­ craft will still need to be highly agile and to Even in the least-developed areas of the have an extremely responsive aircrew, but third world, that operational environment unless it carries systems that can detect and will be increasingly influenced by elec- engage threats beyond visual range, its con- tronic warfare (EW). If it should involve tribution to the essential struggle for air su- confrontation between the superpowers or prem acy is likelv to be severely their immediate surrogates, then EW will be constrained. That leads to the further reflec- pervasive. Advanced technology for mili- tion that in the not-too-distant future, air tary exploitation of the electromagnetic force strength comparisons may need to spectrum is well documented and is in­ concentrate more on the relative perform­ creasingly enhanced by the impact of the ance of missiles than on the derivatives of Computer. The acceleration of detection Eagle and Flanker. and target acquisition time has already prompted countervailing investment in the various components of stealth technology. Again. it is the technology that is novel, not Offensive Objectives the underlying principies. Camouflage and The implications of improved air-to- decoy targets are traditional responses to ground missile performance are no less sig- 10 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALLÍ9H7 nificant. The possible impact of well-coor- did not use the same expression, they pur- dinated AWACS, SAMs, and interceptors sued the same idea in the belief that the en- has been explained. Therefore, the farther emy’s morale, or his industrial capacity to avvay from the target the manned aircraft wage war, should be the legitimate target of can release its weapons, the greater the re- offensive air power. Indeed, such beliefs are duction in its vulnerability. At this point, still inherent in the concept of deterrence by however, there is a danger of allowing prior- mutually assured nuclear destruction. ities to be obscured. Clausewitz suggested that the enemy’s In societies that place high premiums on centre of gravity would tend to be his ar- human life, attrition rates rightly have an mies, or as we would translate it, his armed important subjective value. But in combat forces. However, that concept in the context their importance lies primarily in relation of offensive air operations in the 1990s to the overall means required to achieve an should be refined, with pertinent implica- overall objective. Modern combat aircraft tions for the consideration of attrition. For are indeed expensive, but apprehension example, if a potential opponent has mani- about attrition rates and exchange values festlv adopted an offensive military strategy should follow, not precede, the basic ques- based on surprise and on the impetus of sus- tion: vvhat exactly is the contribution of the tained and closelv coordinated combined attacking aircraft to the overall combat arms, at least three criticai hinges are read- objectives? ilv apparent: first is his ability to achieve Certain characteristics of air power, not surprise, second is his ability to sustain the shared to the same degree bv land or naval necessarv momentum of his offensive, and forces, have always been emphasised by its third is his ability to coordinate his activi- proponents, and with good reason. These ties. These hinges become more sharply de- characteristics include not just long reach fined if one focuses on a European scenario and high speed. alreadv mentioned, but the in which the longer the conflict the greater ability to deliver very heavy firepower con- the opportunity for Western superior mili­ centrated in space and time against a wide tary and economic strength to be brought to varietv of target arrays. But the application bear, the greater the risks to the aggressor of of force has traditionallv been concerned nuclear escalation, and the greater the pos- with more than massive destruction. If war sibility of dwindling enthusiasm among his remains a rational instrument of national acolytes for his venture. policy—and it at least continues to be when The advent of AWACS and other technol- waged with conventional weapons— then ogy for “over-tlie-hill” reconnaissance has destruction of the enemy’s assets is still reduced the opportunities for even the lim- only one way of imposing one’s will on an ited covert transition to war preparations opponent. needed to launch a surprise attack by in-po- A modern military theorist can quote sition forces. The other two hinges. impetus Clausewitz with the same selective aban- and coordination, depend on the oppo- don displayed by a religious bigot dipping nent's ability to control the timing of events, into Ezekiel, and with equally inappro- and both are vulnerable to accurately di- priate conclusions. But the central tenet of rected offensive air power. Complete de­ Clausewitz’s philosophy does remain valid: struction of an opponenfs military strength every armed force has a centre of gravity, an remains an ideal solution to a defensive element upon which all else depends. It problem, and on many occasions it may be may be in an engagement, or in a theatre of feasible. But if not, neutralisation will operations, or in the larger conflict itself, achieve the same objective, which is to deny but it will be there. Success will ultimately an opponent the use of his military instru­ depend on its identification and neutralisa- ment to achieve his political goal. Military tion. Although the early air power theorists victory is not an end in itself. DECADE ÜF OPPORTUNITY 11

One or two examples will illustrate the question must be posed. is it the only solu­ practical implications of the principie. tion? Will not delay, disruption. and dislo- First, in offensive air-to-ground operations cation in foreseeable scenarios be equally the relative merits of close air support, bat- effective? And will not the reach, capacity, tlefield air interdiction. and deeper inter- and flexibility of air power be eminently diction continue to be hotly debated. An suited to attack and disrupt highly mobile obvious factor in the discussion is the abil- targets well beyond artillery and helicopter ity of the air forces to have an effective range? All Western assessments of Warsaw choice between the three. But assuming that Pact forces acknowledge their numerical such a choice does exist, perhaps the deci- superiority and their ability to increase sion should depend not on the absolute de- them by reinforcement. A battle of attrition, struction that each mode could achieve but either in the air or on the ground, does not on their relative impact. In the European seem an ideal Western option. Time, on the scenario already described, for example, the other hand, íavours the deíence and with it impetus of an offensive mav be more dele- the implications for the offensive of dislo- teriously affected bv the delayed appear- cated impetus. ance of a complete armoured regiment than by the timely arrival of one-half of it. Or put another vvav, delay, disruption, and dislo- Offensive cation of a greater number mav have more impact on the "hinge” than destruction of Counterair Operations onlv a proportion. Again, of course, destruc­ tion of the whole is the ideal, and if practi- Direct contribution to the air-land battle cally attainable, all well and good. But is one significant offensive role of tactical whereas destruction of the current genera- air power; the other is offensive counterair tion of heavily armoured vehicles calls for (OCA). It should not be necessarv to stress the large-scale use of accurate and penetra- the continued criticai importance of secur- tive firepower, tank formations disrupted ing a favourable air situation, but sister Ser­ by minefields lose impetus and cohesion, vices still occasionally seem to regard OCA and tanks unsupported by infantry become as a uniquely air force interest. In fact, as themselves vulnerable to infantry-borne an- every airman knows. OCA makes two criti­ titank weapons. Even in an age of increased cai contributions to the air-land battle. First, self-containment, armoured divisions re- by denying the opponent sanctuary to rearm quire extensive logistic support for sus- and return aircraft to the air superiority con- taining their momentum. Such support, test, it reduces the task of friendly air supe­ vvhich does not have the same heavy armour riority fighters. One has only to reflect on protection. is already vulnerable to contem- the impact on recent air wars in the Middle porary air-launched missiles with submu- East if Israeli aircraft turnaround times had nition warheads and is likely to remain so. been extended, or worse, if Israeli aircraft Several air-launched antiarmour weap­ had been unable to intervene in the 1973 ons are under development in the West for and 1982 conflicts. employment in the next decade. All are In possible European scenarios, the tra- faced with the same problems. Assuming ditional objective will remain, but the War­ the current location of the enemy armour is saw Pacts emphasis on combined arms known. how can submunitions be launched operations introduces another objective, by missiles from the stand-off range with one relating to the third hinge—coordina- sufficient dissemination to hit different tar- tion. The concentration of tactical air gets and with sufficient lethality to destroy power, either to coincide with a ground them.,> That ideal solution, however expen- force surge or to produce a saturating air at­ sive. obviously needs to be pursued, but the tack on a particular target arrav well behind 12 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1987 the ground battle area, requires well-coor- sley’s studies of intelligence in World War dinated timing. An armoured regiment can II. hold for several hours if necessary to await reinforcing units, but tactical aircraft can- not. Even third-generation Warsaw Pact air­ Surface-to-Surface OCA? craft have finite limits to their unrefueled endurance. If OCA can delay takeoffs by as If, however, the need for selective OCA little as 30 minutes, massive disruption can throughout the next decade is beyond dis­ ensue, leaving either piecemeal forces to be pute, the methods to be employed will be- dealt with by air defences or numbers of air­ come debatable. Criticai installations— craft in holding patterns that are visible to aircraft shelters, fuel and weapon storage, AWACS and that have had their subsequent and operations and air traffic control flexibility of routing seriously degraded. centres—can all be hardened against all but A principie similar to that in offensive air the heaviest direct conventional weapon at- support or interdiction therefore applies to tack. Short and vertical takeoff and landing OCA. While ideally OCA will destroy en- capabilitv, rocket-assisted takeoff, aircraft emy aircraft on their bases, the mere delay carrier-type arrester gear, dispersai, and of operations could in many circumstances runway and taxiway redundancy can make have equally important results. That as- dislocation of operations by OCA a complex sumption affects considerations of resource operation. But in the last resort, airfield lo- allocation to OCA in the next decade. cations are known, as hopefully are the air­ To close airfields for several hours or even craft tvpes being flown from them. They davs is at present very costly. Even with the may be heavily defended and protected but imminent generation of airfield-attack they cannot evade an air attack. The ques- weapons such as the JP233 and the Duran- tion must therefore be asked, are they in the dal, it requires comparatively large num­ longer term appropriate targets for attack by bers of aircraft per target. The advent of highlv flexible manned aircraft or by sur- standoff OCA weapons will reduce the vul- face-to-surface missiles (SSMs)? At present. nerabilitv of attacking aircraft but not the surface-to-surface missile accuracy is ade- amount of effort required to achieve a given quate to hit an airfield—and indeed, the closure capabilitv. Here again, “over-the- threat from Warsaw Pact chemically armed hill" reconnaissance must be synchronized SSMs is already being studied by NATO wdth OCA, which hits specific airfields at commanders. But conventional warhead criticai times to achieve the objective of payload is considered inadequate, and ter­ neutralising the contribution of enemy air minal accuracy insufficient. to allocate the power to both the air superiority and com- OCA role comprehensivelv to SSMs. If, bined arms battles. however, one pursues the previous logic An aside to the main themes of this arti- that neutralisation of enemy air effort does cle, but not to the effectiveness of OCA, not necessarily imply its destruction, then a is the need for comprehensive and readily combination of SSMs with conventional available signals intelligence (SIGINT) submunition warheads becomes a more at- to track the employment, recovery, and tractive proposition. Indeed, assuming ac- possible dispersai of enemy formations. Oc- curate and timelv intelligence on enemy casionally in the past, airmen have concen- operations, swift ballistic missile attack trated on the need to procure the best could be very effective. possible combat aircraft to the extent that Clearly, many other factors impinge upon resource allocation to. and support of, the the resource-commitment equation. Air­ more esoteric intelligence Systems has been craft can be allocated either to OCA or to grudging and shortsighted. Unbelievers many other roles; OCA missiles, on the should be dispatched to study F. E. Hin- other hand, would be far less flexible. Attri- DECADE ÜF OPPORTUN1TY 13

tion rates permitting. aircraft could make re- munition warheads sufficiently accurate to peated attacks at the cost of replacement “buckshoot” the area, then all the many vveapons; missiles could be used once only. qualities of air power will count for nothing. What should be avoided, however, is the be- There is one approach to reducing de­ lief that to replace the aircraft in the OCA pendence on main base facilities that has role is somehow to erode the importance of very respectable roots in military history air power. As vvas stated at the outset, air but that for several good reasons has tended povver is far too comprehensive to be tied to be neglected by air forces until very re- indefinitely to one specific role. Indeed, it centlv. The traditional concept is simply could be argued that its reach. flexibility, dispersai, or as Napoleon would have said, and concentration of firepower would in division. Concentration of force at the de- any event be more appropriately directed cisive point does not require concentration against more flexible, unpredictable. and of force either at the point of origin or at mobile target arrays. points en route unless there is a need for mass saturation of intermediate defences. But permanent dispersai of aircraft is ex- pensive. It demands duplicated support, The Reduction of Airfield maintenance facilities, weapon and fuel Dependence stocks, transport, and, above all, manpower. Not surprisingly, it takes more than just VVhatever its role. the manned aircraft has the perception of an uncertain threat to got to be able to leave the ground and sooner overcome Western habits engendered by or later return to it. This is not the most orig­ decades of operations mounted from rela- inal of observations but it is one whose im- tively secure bases either in peacetime or in plications are giving rise to numerous third world conflicts. But one may reilect on studies by Western air staffs and, presum- the Falklands campaign and consider the ably, by those farther east also. A great deal implications for the British task force if the has alreadv been done to make the targeting Argentinian air force had had three air­ of main bases more problematical, includ- fields, instead of just Port Stanley, from ing hardened shelters, duplicated operating which to operate both heavy transports and surfaces, and soft-field, short-field, and off- fast jet aircraft. The inestimable advantage main-base operations. For the foreseeable of air power, because of its abilitv to con- future, however, aircraft will be at highest centrate heavy firepower or indirect sup­ risk in two out of three locations— in hostile port over long ranges from many different airspace and on the ground. The third loca- directions, is that there is no military need tion is friendly airspace. The theory is there- for the individual components of anv mis­ fore simple: minimise the time spent in two sions to launch from, or return to, a small and maximise the third. number of locations. Therefore, the imper- In practice, in-flight refueling, integral atives would seem to be the maximum stan- range redundancy, and combat air patrols dardisation of support facilities, reliable can all facilitate airborne loitering as well as multistrand Communications, and wide- enhance reaction speed in time-sensitive spread use of both civilian and military air­ missions. However, if specific aircraft al- fields. In periods of tension and transition to ways have to return to specific airfields for war, lateral as well as forward dispersai to refueling, rearming, servicing, and crew as many locations as possible is desirable. handover, they will remain vulnerable to There should be an adequate prestocking of the hostile OCA described in the previous special-to-type weapons, but dispersed paragraphs. If the opposition does come to forces should draw upon common fuels and possess real-time surveillance of the airfield locally recruited reserve manpower, vehi- and surface-to-surface missiles with sub- cles, and basic logistic support. 14 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL FALL 1987

If it is accepted that air power is and will and they will seldom see the successful con- increasingly become the dominant factor in clusion of their efforts in wartime. Indeed, most conflict scenarios, the opponent must in Europe at least some may suffer the fate of be given the credit for also recognising that those British, French, and Russian ground­ fact and placing its neutralisation at the top crew in the early years of World War II of his priorities. There is ample evidence to whose airfields were devastated by the Luft- suggest that along with the destruction of waffe with little opportunity on the ground Western nuclear capability. Soviet military to fíght back. Quite clearly, an air force that doctrine has for some time reached that con- does not procure adequate aircraft and clusion. If, ideally, every mission had alter- weapons will stumble to a rapid defeat nate launch and recovery bases, then the against a better-equipped opponent. How- task of their neutralisation by airheld attack ever, if resource allocation has also failed to would demand an almost prohibitive allo- provide for adequate numbers and quality cation of resources. of groundcrew, even the most sophisticated aircraft are unlikely to get airborne at all. “Quality of life" is a clichê that slips easily Manpower into a sentence. It means many things to many servicemen and women but because it There are tvvo inherent characteristics of cannot be neatlv quantified in a cost-effec- air forces that can lead to an almost subcon- tiveness equation, it is sometimes diffícult scious underestimation of the importance to include in arguments about resource al­ of people in vvarfare. First is the preoccu- location. And vet, the one asset possessed pation with technology— with aircraft and by an air force that actually appreciates supporting systems. Second is the fact that rather than depreciates over a period of time the actual fíghting or other air operations are and operations is its people. carried out bv only a verv small proportion of all the people in uniform. From that small proportion is drawn the executive and higher command of the entire force. In the Forward with the Past Royal Air Force, for example. only some It is natural that air force planners. re­ 7,000 out of 93,000 are aircrew. In dispersed source allocators, forward thinkers, and all operations, the same number of aircrew who are concerned with the continued ef- mav be required as for missions launched fective application of air power into the from main bases, but the overall manpower twenty-first century will focus sharply on bill will be considerably larger. Moreover, the 10 developments—or a similar collec- the increasing introduction of aircraft and tion— listed earlier in these reflections. But weapons with 24-hour, all-weather capabil­ the application of air power is not just about ity demands not only more aircrew. but pro- the military exploitation of the third dimen- portionate increases in ground personnel sion above the surface of the earth. It must also. This comes at a time when manpower also take into that dimension the traditional costs for training and quality retention are, characteristics of warfare itself. Perhaps one in the Western wrnrld at least, rapidly in­ could add to the 10 possible developments creasing and when high-technology skills in air warfare 10 thoughts of a more tradi­ are in even greater demand in the commer- tional nature: cial and industrial marketplace. Finally, the unwelcome impact of early casualties on • Every offensive weapon or tactic will groundcrew and aircrew personnel alike is in time stimulate an effective defensive easy to underestimate. response. Groundcrew do not enjoy the exhilara- • Identification of the enemv’s centre of tion and satisfaction of flying in peacetime, gravity is a prerequisite for offensive action. DEC A DE ÜF OPPOfíTUNITY 15

• Neutralisation of an opponenfs mili- ture. but command, control, and communi- tary strength does not necessarily call for its cation remain susceptible to fog. destruction. • Accurate and timely intelligence of an enemv’s intentions, direction, and deploy- • A secure base is a prerequisite for anv ment is the greatest ‘‘force multiplier.” militarv operation. • A good defence will avoid defeat, but • Active defence is not the only route to only offensive action will wrest the initia- security. tive from an opponent. • Preliminary division of strength is not • Any armed service is only as good as incompatible vvith concentration of force at the people who are in it. the decisive point. And then we must make sure we get the • “VVar is the province of uncertainty.” best available next-generation The fog of war may change its scientific na- fighter. ... DOCTRINE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AI R WARFARE A LateTwentieth- Century Perspective

Dr Richard P. Hallion

HE AIR FORCE is virtually unique in the skv as a laboratorv. To give a pedestrian its dependence upon high technol- example, in the 1920s the advantages of tur- ogy, specifically the technology of bosupercharging were demonstrated suc- tlight. both air and space. We have cessfully at McCook and Wright fíelds, and Tgone through manv revolutions in aeronau- the results of this work were applied to tur- tics such as revolutions in structures, pro- bocharged engines of the late 1930s incor- pulsion, Controls, and aerodynamics. and porated in such World War II-era combat over the vears the Air Force has had to prove aircraft as the B-17, B-24, P-38, and P-47. its mastery over these disciplines. Gener- Now, this schema of development is not ally speaking, the Service has relied on lab- unique to the Air Force; to a degree, the oratory demonstration to validate concepts other military Services operate in the same before applving them to operational Sys­ way. But because the Air Force as a Service tems. We can carrv this a step further and is wedded (and rightlv so) to technology, consider the various technology demonstra- there is always the danger that technology tors and so-called X-series aircraft as labo- will rnake one’s doctrine obsolete, will re- ratory experiments or tools that have used place doctrine as the determinant of the íu- ir ture course of the Air Force, and will quirements of the Service. If technology lags become merely a convenient shibboleth en- behind doctrine, planners and decision- dowed by advocates with greater signifi- makers will likewise discover that their ac- cance than it in reality possesses. tual capabilities cannot meet their needs We must recognize that both technology and expectations. An area of particular con- and doctrine are dyncimic processes, always cern is the combination of an advancing but advancing or receding, and are necessarily immature technology coupled with doc­ adaptive to change lest they stagnate and trine that is also changing. lose relevance. Neither is independent of Finally, we must recognize that both doc­ the other; rather, each generates a synergis- trine and technology are complex systems tic impulse that encourages and strengthens embedded within other complex systems, the other. The lagging of one is necessarily and thus responsive—one might even say injurious to the other. For example, if doc­ vulnerable—to externai influences and trine lags behind technology, projects that pressures. An example is the contemporary are wildly fanciful may result, projects that decisionmaking environment afflicting de- are unrelated to the realistic needs and re- fense systems acquisition, an environment

17 18 AÍRPOIVER IOURNAL FALL 1987

that is influenced as much by social, eco- the introduction of the all-metal ship nomic, and political pressures as it is by mounting centerline gun turrets. The First purelv technological ones, or ones dealing World War offers numerous examples with national defense doctrine. where military technology outstripped ex­ The operational use of aircraft and aero- isting doctrine. Unimaginative brute-force space systems, the development of technol- frontal assaults crumbled under artillery ogy, and the derivation and application of and machine-gun fire. doctrine take place through the actions of But mere technological superiority could individuais; it is the overall interactions of not, on its own, drastically reshape military these often disparate communities—opera- events. Rather, such superiority had to be tors, engineers, scientists, and planners— coupled with appropriate doctrine in order that spell the difference betvveen the suc- to generate a kind of catalyst to change. For cessful or unsuccessful application of doc­ example, the initial use of tanks by the Brit- trine and technology. Each community has ish at Cambrai in late 1917 offered the its own viewpoint. Operators, typified by promise of converting the existing war of aircrew, tend to believe that they alone are stalemate into a war of movement, perhaps the best determinants of needs and require- resulting in a decisive breakthrough of Al- ments for combat aircraft and that they are lied forces. Instead, the tank offensive best suited to evaluate the application of halted when coordinated infantry and artil- technology to meet those needs and require- ments. Engineers and scientists, familiar with and accustomed to operating on the The Form B Supercharger írightj vvas a technological "cutting edge” of Science and technology, development in the I920s that enabled the develop- feel that only they have the insight to deter­ ment of World War II combat aircraft such as the B-l 7 and P-38. It is a good example of technology supporl- mine vvhat combinations of new and old ing doctrine. technology will work in particular system programs. Planners and students of air war- The tivo-seat Bristol Fighter (below) vvas considered a fare oftentimes voice skepticism at the abil- “sitting duck" untii its aircreivs changed their em- ployment doctrine to enable them to effectively em- ities of these other two camps to determine p loy the advantages of the aircrafts forvvard-firing future courses of action, feeling instead that guns combined ivith a de/ensive gunner. more can be gained by placing the study of air war and the development of appropriate doctrine within a larger framework than that of the cockpit and the laboratory. In fact, as warfare itself is an integrated and ‘‘combined arms” exercise—as is aircraft design itself—so too should be the devel­ opment of'doctrine and the integration of that development into the ongoing national expansion of the existing technology and Science base. Historical examples abound where tech­ nology and doctrine have vvorked together poorly at best or unsatisfactorily at worst. It took several decades for navies to rid them- selves of the notion of fighting parallel- course. broadside engagements, even after

The German fixation on advanced technology weap- ons. such as this V-2 ballistic missile (bottom rightj. contributed to Germany's defeat in World War II. ! 20 AIRPOWEfí IOUHNAL FALL 1987

lery support was not provided to the tank- nored completely the offensive potential of ers. The introduction of a technologically underwater craft—an illusion shattered superior weapon—the tank— had been frus- early on when a single U-boat sank the trated by total lack of appreciation of how to cruisers Aboukir, Hogue. and Cressy. By the use and support such a weapon. (France, in- middle of the war, of course, U-boats were cidentally, repeated this experience in already conducting operations off the North 1940, even though its own tanks were, one American coastline. for one. arguably superior to their German It is interesting to consider the interplay counterparts.) of technology and doctrine between the two When the First two-seat Bristol Fighters world wars, highlighted by the develop- appeared in 1917, air commanders consid- ment of fighter and bornber aircraft and the ered them no different in principie from the rationale for the use of both. World War I existing two-seat reconnaissance aircraft of had already given dramatic evidence that the day and directed that pilots should fly long-range bombers could strike military straight courses when engaging other air­ and civilian targets over significant dis- craft, allowing their gunners to shoot down tances, as witnessed by the experiences of attacking German fighters. This essentially German. British, and Russian air Services in defensive notion of fighter employment im- the war. particularly the German bombing mediately doomed them to defeat. Not until campaign against Great Britain. But it had at frustrated pilots began using these robust the same time also demonstrated—even at and maneuverable aircraft as they would a this early stage in air warfare—the extreme single-seat fighter— maneuvering them into vulnerability of unescorted bombers to firing position for their forward-firing guns fighter attack. After the war, the impact of and letting the rear gunner protect their those bornber operations remained while “six”—did the two-seat fighter come into its own as perhaps being the finest general class of fighter to appear during the Great Advanced German aircraft designs, incJuding the VVar. world's first variabie-wíng aircraft, the Me P-1101 (be- In the war at sea, the prewar conviction of low). and the Me 262 jet aircraft frightj were either ili- conceived or operationally ivasted. Planners need to Great Britain’s Admiraltv that the subma- remember the German technology/doctrine split in fu- rine was suitable only for Coastal defense ig- ture vveapons and doctrine planning. DOCTR1NE. TECHNOLOGY. ANU A1H WARFARE 21

the specific lessons became muddied. Though Spain did demonstrate that Schools of thought arose—encouraged by fighter-versus-fighter combat was still via- the more extreme interpretations of Tren- ble in the era of the monoplane fighter (in­ chard. Douhet, and M itchell— that the troduced before the end of the war), it did bomber would alvvavs be able to get through nothing to change the existing notion that to its target, vvhich it would totally pulver­ bombers could get through to their targets. ize. This idea assumed axiom atic This pernicious doctrine remained in effect proportions. and had to be revised at bitter cost by the At the same time, vvith the bomber assum- British. German, and American air forces ing centerpiece importance in air power during the Second World War. Britain thought. the role of the fighter was shifted learned it in 1939 over the German coast; from maneuvering air combat to intercep- Germany learned it in the Battle of Britain tion, with a resulting emphasis upon rigid in 1940; and we learned it at Ploesti, tactics and mass formation attacks. The Schweinfurt, and Regensburg in 1943. Spanish Civil VVar, while demonstrating the The experience of Nazi Germany during value of nevv high-performance monoplane the Second World War demonstrates the technology, did not significantlv change failure of a nation to match its technology this thought, in part because the war’s ex- with appropriate doctrine. That Germany periences were so limited that it was more found itself involved in a general multifront of a campaign than a genuine European- war is an indictment of the strategic plan- stvle war. (As an aside, it should be noted ning process within the Nazi regime, partic- that military analvsts should always be ularly as that war enlarged to involve careful drawing lessons from small wars American and Soviet interests. German pre- and campaigns such as the Spanish war or war planning had so emphasized a short, the Falklands and Bekaa Vallev experi- tactically oriented war that almost from the ences.) In Spain high-performance mono­ outset Germany proved incapable of main- plane bombers, introduced when most of taining the research and development and the fighters in Service in Spain were still bi- acquisition flexibility required to meet the planes, generallv were able to outrun their ever-changing needs of the long war that it opposition, thus contributing a “factual” actuallv found itself fighting. Germany. case to the mvth. with a strong aeronautical technology base, proved incapable of developing the kind of long-range, high-payload bombers and transports that might have made a differ- ence. It never developed a bomber in the class of the B-17 or B-24, much less the B- 29. or a transport equivalent to the C-47 and C-54. Further, due to the politicalization of its scientific process and the pollution of that process with ideology, Germany robbed itself of the verv scientific base that might have helped it produce an atomic weapon. Because technology tended to outstrip doctrine. the German research and development process was critically frag- mented and isolated from the operational and planning world, and thus researchers tended to show an alarming trait of doing their own thing. This led to technologically fanciful projects more related to World War 22 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALLÍ987

III than World War II— projects such as bal- listic missiles (a wasteful drain on the Ger- man research and development and war economy effort), supersonic research, and even a scheme for an orbital hypersonic bomber. What good technology did exist— such as the first operational jet fíghter, the Me 262—was often badly managed and op- erationally wasted. The experience of Nazi Germany should be ever uppermost in the minds of defense planners, as there are les- sons aplenty here in operations. doctrine, strategy, research and development, and acquisition. Col Dennis Drew of the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (AUCADRE) refers to an “air power vvilderness" afflicting Air Force doc­ trine over the last two decades (Air Univer- sity Revieiv. September-October 1986). He perceptively points out that our doctrine since the days of the Air Corps Tactical Schooi at Maxwell (a school that, ironically, seems to have spent most of its time dealing with strategic questions) has emphasized two assumptions: wars are fought to destrov the enemy’s abilitv and will to win via in- direction that sent unfortunate signals to tensive attacks on the enemy’s homeland; the enemy, as well as problems in often hav- and the enemies of the United States will be ing to take aircraft optimized for one role modern industrial nations. Yet, since 1945 and hastilv adapting them to meet the needs we have found ourselves fighting much dif- of vastly different operational require- ferent kinds of contlicts— limited wars in ments, have led to high loss rates for mar­ the third world. Although we assumed after ginal gain. 1945 that future air power applications Thus, interdiction failed in Korea and would involve nuclear warfare against an failed in Vietnam. More precisely, though enemy’s heartland—specificallv the Soviet interdiction sorties took a high toll of enemy Union and its allies—our wars have been logistics and severely disrupted Communi­ conventional ones with nations that are not cations and transportation. the nature of the vulnerable to the kinds of pressures that can wars— marked by bitter but largely static devastate an industrial nation such as Nazi fighting involving no great short-term ex- Germany. penditure of stockpiles—frustrated interd- Instead of conducting global operations ictors since the small amount of supplies delivering strategic and tactical nuclear that did get through were often more than weapons, we have found ourselves of neces- sufficient to enable the enemy to maintain sity fighting limited wars for prolonged pe- combat operations at the same or an even riods of tim e— wars demanding the greater levei of intensity. As Colonel Drew application of conventional air power. Un- has pointed out, the tendency after Korea realistic expeclations about what could be and Vietnam has been to consider these achieved by conventional air campaigns, wars as aberrations— never-to-be-repeated aggravated by often-contradictory political experiences. On the other hand, I would Long-range bombers, such as these B-l 7s of the 390th Bomb Group (left). shoived that development of doctrine without technoJogicaJ ca- pabilitv to support it could prove deadly. The i\'avy’s "flying bomb" (abovej. deveíoped frow 1916 to 1918, was not capable of supporliug doctrine. It ivas not until 35 years Jater that a practical cruise missiJe, the V-l buzz bomb, was deveíoped. After World War II, technologicaJ problems buried cruise missi/e emplovment for another 35 years.

venture that these are preciselv the kinds of space. Will this require a special space conflicts that are the new norm: prolonged, doctrine? draining, and frustrating wars of greater or It is well to consider brieflv the doctrine lesser scope. constrained by a variety of fac- and technology relationship within the Air tors, not the least of which are the political Force since 1945. Generally speaking, the climates and popular attitudes within the technology tail has wagged the Air Force United States and its citizenry. dog. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but In the face of this situation, vve must ask it does require some clarification. Since ourselves, what is the necessary interplay technology and doctrine are inherently dv- betvveen technology and doctrine todav? namic, the rapid expansion of technology Obviously, we must be concerned with the should trigger an anticipatory, proactive possibility of strategic nuclear vvarfare and impulse within the doctrine community so with the nature of a general VVarsaw Pact- that doctrine can be established to guide the NATO war. But, in addition. vve must not application of high technology for suitable neglect the kinds of conflicts that are more Air Force missions. Too often this has not likely: necessary operations such as Gren- taken place. Tying technology too closely to ada and the strike against Libya, scenarios existing doctrine and philosophy immedi- involving Air Force operations in Central ately after World War II led to the creation of America, the question of limited war and classes of straight-wing aircraft, ironically low-intensity conflict, and—an important blending advanced turbojet propulsion issue I think—the role of special operations with late-1930s aerodynamics. These were forces in all of the above, including coun- awkward vehicles rendered quickly obso- terterrorist operations. Finally. there is an­ lete by the swept-wing transonic designs of other challenge: the role of the Air Force in the late 1940s. On the other hand. when

23 technology was freed from such doctrinal The AC-13Ü gunship is an example of technology de- constraints but while doctrine itself did not veloped in the Wfíüs with little attempt to consider keep pace vvith technological development, next-generafion doctrinal needs. the result tended to be wildlv fanciful ideas perhaps best typified bv the atomic airplane commercial nuclear power-generated prograin of the 195üs or the aerospace plane plants, and the supersonic transport.) program of the 1960s. Ironically, it was the failure of the Air We have found repeatedly since 1945 that Force to ensure that it maintained a fleet of the aircraít vve have designed for a certain combat aircraft appropriate to the service’s mission have had to be modified at great needs in the 1960s that led to the adaptation cost and with a relative loss of efficiency for of three types from the Navy: the F-4 Phan- other missions. For example, vvith the ex- tom II, the A-7 Corsair, and the A-l Skv- ception of-the F-102 and F-106 interceptors, raider, the latter being acquired primarilv as none of the original century-series aircraft a counterinsurgency aircraft. The Korean served—particularly in combat—in the role War had a profound impact upon the Navy, for which they had been originally in- and that Service responded very quicklv to tended. In some cases, our fascination with its Korean experience by modifyingthe doc­ technology over doctrine has led to ques- trine concerning employment of carriers. tionable programs actually placed in pro- Whereas previously the carrier had briefly duction, such as the F-104 and B-58, or to sallied forth as a destroyer of fleets, it now expensive prototype efforts that led no- became a mobile airfíeld intended to oper- where, such as the XB-70A. (The civilian ate, if necessary, for extended periods of world is not immune to such problems, of time in proximitv to hostile shores—as it course, as evidenced by the attempt to de- did off Korea and would do again on Yankee velop atomic-powered merchant ships. Station off North Vietnam. In Korea, the DOCTRINE. TECHNOLOGY. AND AIR WARFARE 25

Navy had lived in fear of air assault from the since there are many, many projected com­ mainland. As a result. after the vvar the bat environments where such vehicles Navy emphasized development of air de- would not be survivable or effective. The fense aircraft capable of undertaking sub- era of the shoulder-mounted and portable stantial air-to-ground missions as vvell. The surface-to-air missile and the plethora of best example of this “swing-fighter” con- cheap and relatively effective air-to-air cept vvas the F-4. which, vvhen it flew in weapon svstems today pose threats that call 1958, vvas more than a generation ahead of into question our abilitv to undertake spe­ anv equivalent aircraft existing at that time. cial operations missions. We need a doc­ The F-100. F-101. F-104, and even the F-105 trine that integrates all the combat elements simply could not meet the Air Force’s re- of the Air Force into the SOF arena, as ap­ quirements in the way that the F-4 and A-7 propriate. Such a doctrine could in itself could: hence, we adapted them in the help influence the range of technology 1960s. choices available to the Air Force for SOF Today the Air Force faces many chal- vehicles and capabilities of tomorrow. lenges to the development of doctrine ap- The field of spaceflight is another doc- plicable into the 1990s. I vvould like to trinal challenge. 1 like to think that the State emphasize tvvo: first, the challenge of doc­ of technology and doctrine appropriate to trine appropriate to the limited war and spaceflight operations todav is akin to that low-intensity vvar environment that vvill, I of submarines in the vears prior to World predict, prove commonplace vvithin the War I. At that time, the submarine was con- next decade; and second, the challenge of sidered merely a surface ship capable of spaceflight. brief excursions under vvater and opera­ During the 196üs. there vvas a blossoming tions close to shore. Over time, the depth, of Creative activity in applying appropriate endurance, and range of submarines in- technology to defeat the insurgencies and creased to the point where the American low-intensity threats of the time. However, and German navies conducted global oper­ todav special operations forces (SOF) tend ations during World War II, and to the point to mean little more than AC-130 gunships, where today’s American and Soviet nu- MC-130 Combat Talon transports, HH-53 clear-povvered “boomers” are vital plavers helicopters, and UH-lN Hueys for special in strategic warfare scenarios. Today we en- missions. This situation should not exist vision operating advanced hvpersonic ve­ hicles on suborbital and orbital defense- This XF-88 aircraft served as a technological festbed. related missions in proximity to the earth. The majoríty of century-series aircraft required signif- In traditional research and development ica/il modification to perform their eventual opera- tional missions. fashion, we are proceeding with a planned technology demonstrator, the X-30, to fur- nish us with the requisite technology base to embark upon the development of mature systems—true aerospace planes. Yet again we see a case where the technology is lead- ing our doctrine, for our doctrine with re- gard to space is imperfect. It is tom between those who see space as a unique environ­ ment requiring its own Mitchells or Dou- hets (hopefully, as someone has noted, without attendant Schweinfurts) and those who see it merely as an extension of the at- mosphere. What needs to be addressed in space doctrine, given the State of flux with 26 Aí R POWER JOURNAL FALL 1987

A Peacekeeper missile is engine tested (right). lt ivas designed as a mobile ICBM bat is now locked in fixed silos—lhe penaltv for not considering lhe political and econnmic climate when developing doctrine. In developing our next generation of aircraft, such as lhe advanced Iactical fighter(far right), ive need to consider hovv to inlegrale our nevv technoiogies inlo a coherent combat force.

Shovvn beJoiv is a scale model of lhe B-lB undergoing ivind-tunne) tesling. Does th is aircraft have lhe tech- nology to match our doctrine?

flect the complete climate in which it is framed. a climate including existing politi­ cal and economic realities. And this brings up the state of conditions today, the climate in which we are shaping our doctrine. Frankly, I think we must recognize that the approximately one. decade of strong support for the national defense effort is rapidly drawing to a close, and. as a result, the shape of defense acquisition—and. for our national space effort, is its tacit recog- that matter, civilian high-tech programs as nition that we alreadv rely heavily upon well— is open to question in the post-1988 space for weather, Communications, navi- time frame. If the Air Force is to support gation, and intelligence assistance. Beyond modernization of strategic forces via the ad- this, we must develop a realistic apprecia- vanced technologv bomber (ATB), devel- tion of what near-term space Systems may opment of the advanced tactical fighter offer for these and other missions. (ATF), development of the C-17, improve- The key word here, I think, is realistic. ments to tactical aircraft such as the F-15 Doctrine must function in the present. be and F-16, possible development of new at- appropriate for the near-future. possess tack aircraft. modernization of special op- flexibility and aclaptability to meet chang- erations forces, support of the Strategic ing conditions, and be rooted in the past, in Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO). de­ military history and experience. It must re- velopment of new heavy launch vehicles, development of new small ICBMs. and sup- search, and for support for a broad range of port of the National Aerospace Plane and a space science and exploration research. Ob- wide range of technology demonstrators viously some—and possiblv manv—of and flight research programs, vve clearlv those simplv are not going to flv. have to have a cohesive doctrine that ad- In this environment, doctrine is more dresses where these elements—strategic than a theoretical luxury of value only in warfare. airlift, tactical aviation, SOF, the classroom. It must instead be the binder, SDIO, and space— all fit together. Some of the adhesive, justifying our future techno- these, such as the ATB and improvements logical research and development. ration- to the F-15 and F-16, appear safe from future alizing our planned acquisition strategy, legislative cuts. The rest—and it is a fright- and governing our present employment of ening thought—are still up for grabs. forces. The challenge faced is a complex one Again, this is not something that afflicts that involves convincing the operational merely the Air Force. The civilian world has and the research, development, test. and this difficulty as well. I would not want to evaluation worlds of thè value of doctrine to be a NASA planner in the post-1988 time them as they undertake their mission today period going up on the Hill to try to justify and their planning for the future. But it is a expenditures and improvements to the ex- challenge that must be faced, for at no time isting space shuttle, for development of a in the previous 40 years of Air Force history second-generation shuttle. for development has the Service faced such a range and com- of an orbiting space station. for develop­ plexitv of possible futures. ment of a National Aerospace Plane, for Editorial Note: The lext of thisarlii le is lukrn írorn lhe keviiole speech delivered by Dr R. P Hallion to the Air Force Doctrinal support for a broad range of aeronautics re­ Coníerence. Hurlburl Fiehl, Florida. 5 Marcli 1987.

27 COALITION AIR DEFENSE IN THE PERSIAN GULF Lt Col Ronald C. Smith, USAF

HE SIX NATIONS on the West side of the Persian Gulf that are members of the loose alliance called the Gulf Co- operation Council (GCC) together Tpossess approximately 40 percent of the world’s crude oil reserves, with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia possessing the overwhelming majority of them. The Iran-Iraq war has shown that refíneries, processing facilities, and Gulf lines of communication are very vulnerable to air attack. In addition to tank- ers in the Gulf, oil facilities at Ras Tanura and Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia and a vast com- plex of key petrochemical. desalinization, and power facilities between Kuwait City and Mina 'al Ahmadi in Kuwait are attrac- tive targets of immense value. Although individual members of the GCC tance goals, capabilities, and shortfalls have spent billions of dollars on defense identified; and the need for cooperative ef- and are beginning to work together on some fort emphasized. matters, they are not yet able to defend themselves against the major regional pow- ers—Iran and Iraq—nor, understandably, against Soviet might. If recent experience is The GCC any indicator, GCC air defenses are likely to be challenged periodically and the United The concept of a Gulf security arrange- States is likely to be involved in air defense ment has existed since the early 1970s. assistance to the GCC. Several air defense Prompted by a number of events including scenarios could be considered. the Iran-Iraq war, internai security prob- Scenario one: Iran is unable to gain the lems, and possibly the Soviet invasion of upper hand in the stalemated Iran-Iraq war. Afghanistan, the six nations of Bahrain, Ku­ Angry at Kuwait and Saudi Arabia over wait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the their continuing support for Iraq, Iran United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed the launches several air attacks against them. GCC charter on 25 May 1981. The charter To anyone who has followed the Iran-Iraq generally States that GCC objectives are co- war and its spillovers, this is not an unreal- ordination, integration, and interconnec- istic scenario. Iran bombed Kuwait in 1981 tion between member States in all fields.1 and had an air skirmish with Saudi Arabia in June 1984. In addition, both Iran and Iraq The Need for Mutual Security have made air attacks on Arab-owned tank- The GCC has social, economic, and political ers carrying oil from ports in Kuwait and aims, as well as internai and externai secu­ Saudi Arabia. rity concerns. Because security was high on Scenario two (which is being acted out as the list. a GCC military committee was es- this is written): The United States, with tablished later in 1981 to begin work on some involvement of European allies, pro- joint exercises, a joint military command, vides naval escort for tankers in the Gulf. and cooperation in air defense. GCC wealth Cooperative air defense by the US Navy, US has purchased a wide range of weapons, Air Force, and some GCC countries is espe- many of them state-of-the-art. However, cially important in view of the mistaken many of these expenditures appear to be in Iraqi attack on the USS Stark and the threat response to local rather than regional con­ of Iranian air attack in the “tanker war.” cerns. This is not surprising since each Scenario three: The Soviet Union invades country has its own internai and externai Iran. In this scenario, US Central Command defense problems requiring a variety of (USCENTCOM) forces are given basing forces that frequently must counterbalance rights in Gulf States. The United States con- each other in addition to countering exter­ ducts conventional air attacks on Soviet nai threats. All of the Gulf States are rela- forces in Iran and provides logistics support tively new nations with political and to US troops attempting to slow the Soviet military power distributed along tribal advance. Bases in Saudi Arabia. Bahrain, lines, which can hinder internai and inter- and other Gulf States would be high-priority national cooperation. The result is ineffec- targets for Soviet air attacks. tive use of resources and redundant military The focus of this paper is GCC air defense effort that may not support regional defense capability, with emphasis on the somewhat goals. neglected command, control, and commu- GCC countries do not have a wealth of nication (C3) elements. GCC capabilities people. The aggregate GCC population is in and limitations will be characterized; US the range of 12-15 million, and only about direct military assistance and security assis­ 50 percent of the population is literate.2

29 30 AIHPOIVER JOURNAL FALL 1987

This is not a very large base for supporting rally have their own national sovereignty national development efforts and simulta- concerns, pride, and goals to consider. neously providing qualified personnel to Some are leery of linkage with the United operate increasingly large arsenais of so- States because of its close ties with their phisticated military equipment. avowed enemy, Israel, and because of its re- Tvvo other factors exacerbate the popula- cord of inconsistent policy and action in the tion problem: the distrust between mem- Middle East. Close GCC association with bers of different Moslem sects and the the United States could draw the ire of more protective attitude of Moslems toward fe- radical Arab states and Iran. The GCC as a males. Approximately 6 percent of the GCC defense alliance is in a precarious posi- population is Shi’a Moslem. (In Bahrain, tion— its members not entirely trusting each Shi’ites constitute a numerical majority.) In other and yet needing to be drawn together nations ruled by Sunni Moslems, Shi’ites for mutual support. They are unable to de- are usually not trusted with military posi- fend against the large regional powers and tions or, at best, are given only subordinate therefore want to have US assistance in a roles. The female portion of the GCC popu­ pinch, but they do not want a close relation- lation is not utilized in the military or in ship in the meantime because that could in most of the civilian sector due to the pre- itself cause a crisis. vailing Moslem protective attitude toward Whether the other GCC nations wish to women. With such a small population to admit it or not, the Saudis are the mainstay dravv on and with the GCC’s relatively re- of anv GCC air defense effort by virtue of cent entrance into the world of modern wealth, political ties, population, military technology, the quantity of highly skilled equipment, and geography. The GCC, in military personnel is low. turn, has little alternative than to look to the Total GCC military forces number ap­ United States for air defense assistance if proximately 137,000 compared to Iran’s the situation gets beyond the alliance’s lim- 555,000 and Iraqs 642,000.3 It is difficult to ited capability. give an exact numerical breakdown of air defense forces that could be the first line of GCC Capabilities for Air Defense defense for the GCC. Some GCC air defense units serve in land forces and some in air In October 1981, Iranian aircraft bombed forces, and in Saudi Arabia there is also a Kuwait. In early 1984, Iran and Iraq began separate military Service for air defense mis- attacking ships in the Persian Gulf, some of sile forces. A generous estimate (which in- which carried oil loaded in Saudi Arabia cludes all GCC air force personnel) is 28,000 and Kuwait. Also in 1984, the Saudis suc- men. These forces are generally in an uphill cessfullv defended against an Iranian F-4 at­ struggle to operate and maintain the equip­ tacking Saudi Arabia. In November 1986, ment they have now. The hill becomes Iranian F-4s reportedlv attacked a French- steeper as the military buildup continues. operated oil platform 30 miles from the The need for air defense cooperation among UAE. the relatively weak GCC States seems self- In three of these four situations. the GCC evident. countries involved were unable to defend Cooperation in the GCC cannot be taken against attack. A number of factors contrib- for granted, although several heads of indi­ uted to air defense impotence, including the vidual states are related. Saudi Arabia, un- lack of long-range early warning, limited re­ der its first king, Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud, once sponse time, limited communication, and ruled most of the GCC States. It is no secret lack of coordination between member coun­ that the Saudis aspire to leadership of the tries. In the fourth situation. a small attack GCC; however, the other GCC members tend was thwarted by the Royal Saudi Air Force to be skeptical of Saudi motives and natu- (RSAF), but not without key help from the AIR DEFENSE IN THE PERSIAN GULF 31

Table 1, GCC Air Defense Forces

Missiles Fighters Command and Control Bahrain RBS-70 F-5 —limited manual system Kuwait Hawk Mirage F1 —integrated air defense system being built Oman Rapier Jaguar —manual integrated radar system Qatar Rapier Mirage F1 —very limited Saudia Hawk F-15 —AWACS Arabia Shahine F-5 —Air Defense Force missile Stinger command and control Redeye system nearly complete —Peace Shield (RSAF) C3 being built UAE Hawk Mirage F5 —Electronic warfare early Rapier Mirage 2000 warning system under RBS-70 construction

Sources: The Military Balance, 1985-1986 (London: Interna- tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985); and DMS Market Intelligence Reports—Middle Easl/Afnca, 1985 (Greenwich. Conn.: Defense Marketing Ser- vices, 1985)

US E-3 airborne warning and control system being best equipped. Surface-to-air missiles (AWACS) and US ground C3 equipment de- provide responsive close-in protection at ployed to Saudi Arabia in 1980 at Saudi re- lower operational cost than fighter-inter- quest. Although the Saudis made their own ceptors but do not have the latter’s range or air defense decisions and flew the intercep- flexibility. The longest-range missile in the tors that shot dovvn an Iranian F-4, the US- GCC inventory is the Hawk (an estimated 22 operated C3 equipment probably made the batteries, which is complemented by nu- difference between being the shooter and merous medium-range Rapier, Shahine, being shot. Crotale, and SA-8) and short-range (RBS-70, The GCC has recognized its need for Stinger, and SA-7) missiles. effective air defense. Since 1984, Saudi Fighter-interceptors provide long-range Arabia alone has made deals vvorth approx- defense and are normally very responsive if imately $12 billion to buy AWACS. air de­ kept at high States of alert or on an airborne fense missiles, and two ground command patrol. GCC nations have approximately and control systems.4 Majorsuppliersof air 240 fighters, of which one-third are front- defense equipment to GCC countries in- line F-15 and Mirage 2000 interceptors.5 But clude the United States, the United King- other aircraft—the F-5, Mirage Fl, and Jag­ dom. France, and the USSR (to Kuwait). The uar—are significantly less capable in an air diversity of sellers and equipment is in it- defense role. Together, GCC missiles and self a barrier to interoperability and efficient aircraft are moderately capable of air de­ joint use. Table 1 shows the variety of air de­ fense in depth if they can be put to timely fense equipment in use or planned. use and coordinated by effective C3. Individual air defense capabilities vary C3 capability in the GCC has generally between Gulf States with Saudi Arabia lagged behind other air defense equipment. 32 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1987

In recent years Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait have begun to narrow the gap by making large expenditures on new C* Sys­ tems. All six GCC countries have taken ac- tions to improve their radar detection capability vvith both surface-based systems and, in some cases, are considering airborne systems such as aerostats (balloon-borne ra­ dar systems) or fixed-wing platforms. For example, Saudi Arabia, in a joint venture The E-3A Sentry AWACS is o mobile, flexible, and i vvith a US company, has developed and vivable early ivarning command and control centerl tested an aerostat radar platform called the lhe identification, surveillance. and tracking of a| borne enemy forces. The Royal Saudi A ir Force low-altitude surveillance system. Initia- five such aircraft. tives to obtain better radar detection and in- tegrated command and control equipment vvill play a criticai role in GCC air defense capabilities. Air defense forces without ef- fective C' are like a football team without a coach; individual talents notwithstanding, there vvill be no one to coordinate the team effort. Two potential star players on the GCC C3 team are the Saudi AWACS (Peace Sentinel) and the Peace Shield programs. The five Saudi AWACS delivered between June 1986 and March 1987 give, in principie, the same air surveillance umbrella that the US AWACS has provided for seven years. In fact, AWACS is so complex to operate and maintain that Saudi Arabia will most likely be dependent on US contractor support for the life oí AWACS.6 Clearly, AWACS capability is needed by the Saudis and the GCC. With it, a potential hostile attacker can be detected and tracked over 200 miles. The Persian Gulf is not much of a barrier to air attack. Simple cal- culations show that a bomb-laden F-4 could travei at low levei from Bushehr, Iran, to Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, in about 17 minutes. With AWACS, th is raid can be detected al- most immediately, giving defenders time to launch fighters and to activate missile de- fenses. Without an airborne radar capabil­ ity, warning time is cut to about five minutes at best. The Peace Shield program complements the Saudi AWACS program. Peace Shield, an RSAF C3 system, will be a network of command centers, ground radars, and com- AIH DEFENSE IN THE PERSIAN GULF

\

«O j» '' al' ajJj ü ' *m V $N ft\ NVR 34 A/RPOVVEfl JOURNAL FALL 1987

munication sites strategically placed addition to four flight-crew positions, there throughout Saudi Arabia. The system will are 13 mission-crew positions that all re- take inputs from any ground radar site, and quire moderate to high-technical sophisti- AWACS, displaying them in each regional cation. Limited manpower, aggravated by air defense facility as vvell as the command demands of the private sector, and other operations center for Saudi air defense de- competing military systems (such as the cisionmaking and management. Tornado and ground command and control Conceived in the early 1980s, the Peace systems) are likely to plague the Saudi Shield program was not begun until 1985 AWACS for its lifetime. Other GCC States and will not be completed until the early are no better off than Saudi Arabia and will 1990s. The guiding force behind Peace have similar problems with new systems. Shield has been Prince Fahad bin Abdullah, former RSAF director of air operations and now deputy minister of defense and presi- The First Two Cs: Command and Control dent of civil aviation. Prince Fahad is a vi- Another problem area for GCC air defense is sionary who saw Peace Shield as a means to old manual command and control systems three ends: fírst, to link RSAF forces to- that use 1950s technology, that are gener- gether in one system; second, to integrate ally not computerized, and that depend on the air defenses of other Saudi armed forces manpower-intensive devices such as into one national system; and third, to serve grease-pencil plotting boards to display in­ as the underlying structure for a regional air formation. No GCC member has a system defense network. Whether the other Saudi that automatically integrates all the air de­ forces will cooperate and whether the GCC fense information available within a coun- nations will agree to link with Peace Shield try. Some systems use a mixture of manual remains to be seen. Obtaining cooperation and digital information; some are com- is a difficult but not impossible task. pletely manual. Manual methods are not in- herently bad, just too slow for modern air defense. As indicated above, at least three GCC C3 Problems GCC countries have embarked on new com­ mand and control programs, but in some A list of GCC O problems should include cases they will not be complete for years. at a minimum those associated with man- One other aspect of this problem is that ning, segregated command and control, bar- individual command and control systems riers to sharing information, identifícation, cannot quickly pass information back and and proliferation of incom patible forth between countries. This is an absolute equipment. necessity for a truly integrated and respon- sive defense effort on the part of the GCC. Manning AWACS and Other C3 Facilities Pooling information will become more im- The criticai AWACS support issue is prob- portant as the amount of data and the capa- ably crewmembers. US contractors can bility of sensors increase. This ability to maintain AWACS in peacetime, but US share information is called interoperability. contractor personnel are prohibited by US The interoperability concept has been slow law from flying on combat missions. In ad- to develop in the GCC. There are recent in- dition. a US congressional prohibition on dications that the idea is taking root. For ex- members from other nations operating ample, the LJAE reportedly refused deliverv Saudi AWACS prevents the Saudis from ob­ of the fírst French Mirage 2000 fighters be- taining outside help from the third-country cause they did not meet UAE specifications sources.7 for interoperable communication with The 17-position AWACS crew is difficult other GCC fighters and did not have the ca- for tec.hnically developed nations to fill. In pability to fíre US missiles.8 AIH DEFENSE IN THE PERSIAN GULF 35

The Third C: Communication of mining friend from foe. With six difíerent Information types of GCC interceptor aircraft. numerous missile systems, and often more than one Saudi AYVACS information could be of use agency with an air defense role in each to other GCC countries. An AWACS flying country, it is difficult to keep from shooting to protect the northeastern portion of Saudi down as many allied aircraft as the enemy Arabia could also provide valuable infor­ does. Ideally, common GCC identification mation to Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar. How- equipment would solve this problem. US ever. the US Congress placed limits on the experience in other alliances indicates that use and transfer of Saudi AYVACS informa­ obtaining agreement and common equip­ tion as one of the conditions of the AYVACS ment is easier said than done. Alternatively, sale. The terms state that the information if each GCC country can keep track of its from Saudi AYVACS will not be shared with own aircraft and has the capability to rap- anv other country except by mutual US- idly exchange this information with other Saudi agreement.9 GCC members through interoperable C3 Sys­ It seems possible that mutual agreement tems, fratricide can be reduced. could be reached on sharing Saudi AWACS information with GCC countries. An air de- fense information link was reportedly es- Proliferation and Incompatibility tablished in 1984 between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for the transfer of US AWACS The diversity of air defense suppliers and data.10 This sort of arrangement could serve equipment obtained without an air defense as the prototvpe for sharing on a limited ba- master plan has resulted in an interopera- sis. Since Saudi AWACS cannot cover the bility nightmare. Nine different surface-to- entire GCC defense area simultaneously, its air missiles, six air defense aircraft, and C* information would not be of use or interest systems from at least three different coun­ to all members. tries greatly complicate attempts to work The sharing of air defense information, together—although such diversity compli- whether by data or voice, must be done rap- cates the problem for attackers. The reason- idly and by secure means. Integration of air able goals of obtaining lower prices through defenses depends on integration of com­ competition and avoiding dependence on munication and secure devices. A popular one supplier may not seem as important misconception about modern secure de­ when the time comes to defend together. vices is that if a device falis into unfriendly The situation is not hopeless. On the hands, the entire system is compromised. In positive side, an overall GCC air defense fact, today's secure devices are about as use- planning effort has started. GCC defense ful as bookends without the material or de­ sectors have been laid out, basic procedures vice that puts the encrypting code in them. discussed, and modest joint air defense ex- Thus. a loan of one country’s secure de­ ercises conducted. Principies of common- vices, or better yet, a GCC common device, ality, interoperability, and joint operations could be used on GCC business with a GCC are at least in the military lexicon of most key. Under this concept, each country could GCC countries. Advisers associated with also have its own unique set of keys that the GCC have indicated that the GCC has so- would permit national secure Communica­ licited a contractor study of air defense fa- tions unmonitored by anyone else. cilities. This study or others like it could be the basis of a GCC air defense master plan. With this broad overview of the equip­ Identification— Who is the Enemy? ment and some of the limitations of individ­ A well-integrated command and control ual (and by extension, GCC) assets, let us network helps to solve a notoriously diffi- turn to the second part of the potential coa- cult problem for any alliance— that of deter- lition air defense force— the United States. 36 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL FALL 1987

US National Interests likely that the United States would be called on to deploy the entire USCENTCOM force. Although massive troop deployments are less probable, the consequence of failure to The 1980 Carter Doctrine States that the operate effectively is much greater. Persian Gulf was an area vital to US inter­ Given these political realities, it is appro- ests and that the United States would mili- priate to briefly discuss the air defense tarily intervene there if necessary. A US forces that might provide direct assistance Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) was formed to the region, then turn to the indirect ef- as a means to implement the doctrine. forts through the security assistance Largely a paper force at first and initially program. without plans or means to get to the region, the RDF was a target of much criticism. The Direct Assistance RDF became the basis for the US Central Command, which now has responsibility As a subset of the overall USCENTCOM mil­ for the Persian Gulf area and is severely itary package, air defense forces share the hampered by not having any in-place same problems that plague the entire over- forces.11 the-horizon effort—distance, time, fire- power, and sustainability. For ease of dis- cussion, USCENTCOM air defense forces Some Political Realities can be placed in two categories: quick-re- Although the United States continues to action forces for contingencies and forces seek bases on the Arabian Península, it is for major confrontation with the Soviet unlikely to achieve success even in rela- Union. (Supporting and sustaining forces, tively closely aligned nations like Oman.12 although very important, will not be It appears that there is little chance that a discussed.) sizable US force would ever be based in a Quick-reaction forces are generally air GCC State in peacetime. The GCC nations forces such as a small number of F-15 fight- simply do not want large standing US forces ers and AWACS. Personnel could also be in the area. Even after requesting US escorts deployed to act as liaison with host-nation for tankers, Kuwait and other GCC countries forces and might be used to augment some are limiting military cooperation to areas air defense units. Similar forces have been specifícally related to that mission.13 The used in past contingencies. The 1980 United States should accommodate to that AWACS deployment to Saudi Arabia is an fact. This is not to say that the United States example of this kind of package without would never be asked to send direct-assis- fighters. The advantages of this type of force tance forces to the region, in which case bas- are that it is easy to send, can respond and ing rights would then be granted.14 An over- deploy within hours, and provides a quick the-horizon US presence appears to suit the show of US resolve. On the negative side, GCC. although this places the United States these forces are relatively light in terms of at a severe disadvantage in coming to the equipment and are not self-sustaining for GCC’s aid in a timely manner. long periods. Quick-reaction forces can fill The United States has demonstrated its gaps in existing radar coverage, increase air willingness to come to the aid of the Gulf interceptor effectiveness, and thus improve nations should they need and request it. It air defense capability. has sent fighter and radar air defense forces The air defense portion of the “major con­ to the Gulf a number of times in the past and frontation” package includes greater num- quite likely will have to deploy them in the bers of the quick-reaction forces, a full- future. For example, US AWACS have been blown air defense system complete with in Saudi Arabia for seven years. It is less tactical command and control equipment, AIR DEFENSE IN THE FEfíSlAN GULF 37

plus the full range oí US air defense missiles GCC air defense capability so important be­ and guns (such as Havvk. Chaparral, and cause GCC forces and equipment will al- Stinger). An obvious US goal should be that ready be in place on day one of any conflict. of combining its air defense capability with One avenue through which the United that of the GCC to protect vital Gulf areas States can support the GCC and its own in- and US forces from attack. US equipment terests indirectly is the security assistance and personnel could fill gaps in GCC capa- program. bility, strengthen defenses, and at some Security Assistance points tie the US and GCC air defense Sys­ tem together. In his 1985 State of the Union Message, US '‘confrontation” forces provide much President Reagan said, “Dollar for dollar, greater capability for air defense, but they our security assistance contributes as much require a great deal of transportation and to global security as our own defense bud- time to arrive in theater. The distance from get.”17 It has long been the goal of the US se­ the United States to Saudi Arabia is roughly curity assistance program to build an 7.000 miles by air (16 hours) and 9,000- indigenous capability for defense that could 12.000 miles by sea (20-30 days). reduce or obviate the need for direct US in- The following example will demonstrate volvement. More recent policy pronounce- the magnitude of USCENTCOM’s transpor­ ments State that specific US goals in the tation problem. Hawk is a key part of the US region include strengthening Saudi and missile defenses. Air deployment of one moderate nations’ forces with equipment Hawk battalion requires about 215 C-141 that is interoperable with US equipment.1U equivalents.15 The total airlift on any given There are many barriers to US security as­ dav is 400 C-141 equivalents.1" However, it sistance efforts. Among these barriers are is unlikely that the total US airlift capacity arms restrictions, emphasis on management vvould be available to USCENTCOM due to rather than capability, special interest other high-priority commitments, staging, groups, and the country receiving the and geographic factors. A lesser number, in assistance. the range of 250-300, may be more realistic. There are numerous restrictions on the From USCENTCOM’s point of view, air type of equipment and technology we can defense should have a high priority for de­ sell to another country, and the process of ployment so that operating bases can be pro- approval and release is too complex to deal tected, but a single Hawk battalion uses a with here. Some restrictions protect the US day’s worth of airlift. The need to support ‘‘technological edge,” but sometimes they air forces and to get ground troops into Iran get in the way of common sense. For exam­ quicklv could preempt deployment of air ple, the point-to-point data links used in defense weapons. Equipment that does not Hawk command and control equipment shoot (like the US Air Force’s tactical com- (the TSQ-73) were not deemed releasable. mand and control system) and that is airlift Thus, TSQ-73s in the GCC inventorv cannot intensive (roughly 49 C-141 equivalents for “talk” with equipment that USCENTCOM one control and reporting post) could miss may deploy into the area. In addition, TSQ- the war because it will arrive by ship weeks 73 link capability differs between GCC later. States. In summation, massive US defensive fíre- In the interagency review process— usu- power will not arrive in the region quickly. ally involving the Department of Defense, Command and control equipment, other the State Department, the Office of Manage­ than airborne systems like AWACS, will lag ment and Budget, the National Security behind direct-combat systems due to move- Council, and others— the emphasis seems ment priority. This transportation bottle- to be on getting the sale through Congress, neck is what makes US support for organic arranging funding, documenting arrange- 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1987

ments, and setting up management plans. needlessly duplicated. Given Service rival- Those are important, but they detract from ries, it is unlikely that the command centers efforts that should be devoted to ensuring exchange much information with each that the equipment is vvhat the buyer wants other. and can use and that it is compatible with US equipment. Nowhere in the US security The Record assistance system does there appear to be an Given the above and other barriers to secu­ advocate for operationaLeffectiveness. It is rity assistance, how well has the United possible that US management of security as­ States achieved its stated security assis­ sistance programs suífers from many of the tance goals? The Hawk situation has already same ills that plague the DOD procurement been mentioned. Technical workarounds to system. the Hawk problem are possible, but if not Special interest groups can adversely af- developed, tested, and procured, they will fect security assistance. This is especially not be available for the next contingency. true in Middle Eastern matters. Lobbying US AWACS shares a fair degree of equip­ against a sale often slovvs down or blocks ment commonalitv with Saudi AWACS. A the approval process, thus absorbing much more important feature is that US and Saudi of the time and effort of US agencies and AWACS can communicate, with proper co- complicating our foreign policy. A classic ordination, on the same data link.20 This case is the Saudi AVVACS sale proposed to also means that Saudi AWACS can work Congress in 1981. Between the time of the with appropriately equipped US Navy formal Saudi request for an AWACS/F-15 ships. US forces will also be able to ex­ air defense package on 26 March 1981 and change information with the Saudi Peace its approval on 28 October 1981, inter- Shield C' system in the future. agency groups met 42 times to resolve prob- The Peace Shield system. a foreign mili­ lems and coordinate efforts and strategy.10 tary sales acquisition, could provide the After a rather bloody fíght, the sale was ap- backbone of a GCC C3 network. The US Air proved in the Senate by a narrow 52-48 mar- Force manages the program for the RSAF. gin. The threat of another such battle over The Peace Shield program has the potential the delivery of AVVACS in 1986 caused to integrate the entire Saudi air defense sys­ much concern and generated an inordinate tem and to facilitate exchange of informa­ amount of work to avoid a repeat of 1981. tion between GCC nations. The receiving nation itself is at times a barrier to successful security assistance ef­ A Note on the Role of Our European Allies forts. Frequently nations want the most ad- vanced equipment whether or not they can Earlv air defense assistance to Saudi Arabia afford it or can absorb it into their military was done in cooperation with the British. forces. GCC countries are no exception. Cost For around $400 million, the British pro- is usually not the major consideration. but vided fighters and radars while the United getting the most sophisticated US weapons States provided Hawk missiles and Com­ is. Weapons sales become barometers of the munications equipment. The system was political climate. established in 1965.21 Since that time there A related barrier is competition within is no evidence of overt security assistance the receiving nation’s military structure. cooperation between the United States and For example, there are four command and Britain or any other ally. This is very unfor- control centers in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, tunate and shortsighted because the United one for each military Service. Each of these States and Europe have convergent interests command centers is linked with elements of in preserving the tlow of oil from the area. its particular Service. Especially in the area US and European forces separately escort- of air defense are some information lines ing ships in the Gulf may serve to reem- AIR DEFENSE IN THE PEfíSIAN GULF 39

phasize to the Europeans the need for time factors, US assistance may not be quite interoperabilitv and cooperation. as rapid as all concerned would wish. lt is therefore critically important for the GCC to integrate its air defenses to increase their ef- Conclusion fectiveness. Concurrently, it is incumbent The GCC has a fairly good inventory of air on the United States and its European allies defense vveapons, but CJ has fallen behind to help the GCC by overcoming security as­ other modernization efforts. Also, the pro- sistance barriers. liferation of equipment has had a negative Problems of a political nature, as well as effect on interoperabilitv because procure- technical barriers, stand in the way of a ment actions and upgrades have been made GCC-wide integrated systein. Political prob­ pieceraeal. C! upgrades, along vvith planned lems will require internai Solutions. The air defense force modernization, will ulti- technical problems may be solved by a mas- mately improve GCC capabilitv for self-de- ter air defense plan, driven by interopera- fense against small attacks and give these bility goals. and vvith provisions for US nations some capabilitv to hold out until as- military forces to tie in, when necessary, for sistance arrives. Because of distance and coalition air defense.

Notes I Foranexcellent discussion of GCC origins. structure. and Force in August 1987, according to Loren Jenkins. "Gulf Har- reiated issues. see Nadav Safran, Saudí Arabia. The Ceaseless bors Doubts about Naval Build-up," Washington Post, 16 Au­ Quest for Security (Cambridge. Mass.: Belknap Press of the gust 1987. A23. Harvard University Press. 1985). chap. 14. ). E. Peterson. De- 12. Thesultan of Oman hasstated that his country will stick fending Arábio (New York: St. Martín's Press. 1986). 185-224: by the 1980 agreement allovving US acxess to military instal- and R. Hrair Oekmajian. "Conflict and Cooperation ín the lations and authority to store military equipment in Oman. but Gulf.' Middle East AnnuaJ (Boston: G. K. Hall and Co.. 1984), he has declared that US bases in Oman would never be agreed 83-106. upon. Statement in the Boston Globe. "Oman holds moderate, 2. James A. Bill. "Resurgent Islam in the Persian Gulf." For- independent course in sultaiTs hands." 10 lanuary 1987, 3. eign Affairs 63. no. 1 (Fali 1984): 120; and Defense and Foreign 13. David B. Ottaway. "Arab Cooperation wíth US Grows,” Affairs Handbook 1986, lOth ed . (Washington. D.C.: Perth Washington Post. 21 |ulv 1987, Al. Corporation, 19861. 51.418. 561.608. 636. 766. 14. The GCC views denial of US basing rights as a means of 3 The Mililary Balance. 1984-1985 (London: International reducing the likelihood of superpower involvement in the re­ Institute for Strategic Studies. 19851, 59-72. The GCC's esti- gion. For the GCC to make open admission of intent to request mate is higher—160.000 men—as cited in the Los .Angeles US intervention in the Gulf could make things difficult for Times. 30 November 1984. A-4. them with the less-moderate islamic States. More likelv are re- 4 DMS Morket Intelligence Reports—Middle East/África marks of the type made by the Kuwaiti ambassador lhat leaders (Greenwich. Conn.: Defense Marketing Services. 1985), 4. 5. of the GCC "hope to see the region free from military opera- 26. tions and big povvers rivalry." Quote in Foreign Broadcast In- 5. The Military Balance. 1984-1985. 59. 65. 68. 69, 72. form ation Service (Middle East and África|, 31 October 1986; 6. Testimonv of the under secretary of defense for policy. in FBIS-MEA-86-211. vol. 5, C3. Individual GCC nations such as House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Proposed Sale of Air- Oman might independentlv request US intervention. but a borne Wornirigand Control System and F-15 Enhancemenls Io GCC consensus, except in extremis, seems highlv unlikely. Soudi Arabia Report 97-268. 97th Cong . lst sess.. 1981. 15. Discussion with Third Army air defense personnel on 7. lames K. Cordon. "Debate Expected Over Plan to Sell 12 November 1986. Missiles to Saudi Arabia.” Aviation Week and Space Technol- 16. Developing Cooperulive Forces in lhe Third World. 14- ogy. 3 March 1986, 26. and Bemard Gwertzman. "Accords 15 March 1985 conference. Rand Report N-2325-USDF (Santa Pave Way for Saudi Control of AWACS Planes,” Neiv York Monica. Calif.: Rand Corp.). 250. Note: 400 C-141 equivalents Times. 15 (une 1986.1 include the C-5 aircraft. also available for airlift. 8. Giovanni de Briganli. "Emirates Refuse Mirage Deliver- 17. US Foreign Policy: The Rengan fm prinl (Washington, les. Defense News 2. no. 1 (5 Januarv 1987): 21 There may D.C.: Congressional Quarterlv. lnc.. 1986), 6. have been other factors lhat conlributed to the refusal such as 18. Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Near East manpower and training problems. and Southwestern Affairs Richard W. Murphy. in Department 9. Cordon. 28. of State Bulletin 86, no. 2111 (June 1986): 70-73. 10 DMS Morket Intelligence Reports—Middle East/Africa, 19. Peace Sentinel (Saudi AWACS) program working paper, Kuwait II. 7. undated. II Although frequently used for effect. this statement is not 20. Many people in the DOD fought hard to get the US data entirely correct. USCENTCOM has forces in the region; fouror link (called TADIL-A) released for use in Saudi AWACS. Their five US Navy ships of the Middle East Force operating from ultimate success was a major step toward interoperability and Bahrain, and the four AWACS and ground CJ support in Ri- coalition air defense. yadh. Saudi Arabia There were nine ships in the Middle East 21. Safran, 97, 109. scores; but after all, they did not fly, and this EDITORIAL made their value a little suspect. It also made for a difficult morale situation, since the only reward for a successful alert was a End Of An Era chance to do it all over again another day. It is one of the ironies of nuclear strategy that Maj Michael A. Kirtland the more successíully you deter your en- emy, the less you actually have to do. The E NOTE witli nostalgia the announce- Air University Library is full of Air Com- ment of the deactivation of the last Ti- mand and Staff College and Air War College Wtan II ICBM complex at Little Rock AFB, papers on how to solve this dilemma. But Arkansas. The cleparture of the last of the since it is a dilemma that is inherent in the liquid-fueled ICBMs closes a chapter in work, the missileers had to make their own American rnilitary history dating back a morale. Each of the Titan II wings won the Blan- quarter of a century. Fifty-four Titan lis chard Trophy, symbolic of the best missile vvere based at Little Rock, McConnell, and wing in SAC, at least once. They trace their Davis-Monthan AFBs beginning in 1962. heritage to B-17 units in World War II, units Since then a great deal of rnilitary history with impressive records like those in the has transpired. Through it all, the Titan lis Schweinfurt raid in 1943 and those that set quietlv maintained their nuclear alert. records for downing enemy aircraft. Now, The tremendous deterrent effect of the Ti- people will ask what the Titan IIs accom- tan's multimegaton warhead, the largest in plished. They have no air victories. no tat- the inventorv, proved too valuable to deac- tered battle streamers stained with the tivate, and so its life was repeatedly ex- blood of combat. The Titan II’s dead died in tended. Congressional pressure after the the line of duty, underground, surrounded 1980 accident at Little Rock, the cost of by concrete. and away from the public eye. maintaining support equipment for this liq­ They died in peacetime accidents. not com­ uid-fueled missile and finally ICBM force bat, but they gave their lives keeping the modernization prograins caught up vvith peace just the same. Most of the time the this valuable missile. In addition to the Air public never even realized they were there. Force tnissiles on alert, Titan IIs provided Occasionally a crew would get a call from the launch vehicle for the Gemini astronaut their own gate phone from someoneAsking program for NASA. Now thev vvill be held what the place was. When told, the callers in reserve at Norton AFB. Califórnia, as ex- usually hung up quickly and departed. not pendable space-launch vehicles for DOD really believing what they had been told. satellites. Other syslems carne and vvent. At Davis- But the Titan II crews rolled up the best score of all— 54 missiles on alert dav-in and Monthan, for example, the F-4s carne and went. So did the A-7s and the U-2s. The O- dav-out for 25 vears without having to con- 2s carne and vvent, as did the drone groups, duct an operational launch. The mission of nuclear deterrence continues because peace while the 18 missiles sat silentlv waiting. Various world crises erupted and ended, is a never-ending quest. Other missiles and but the Titan IIs continued to maintain their other missileers continue the tradition, waiting patiently in their underground quiet watch over the nation. People in other homes and hoping they will never have to weapon svstems often poked fun at the giant roll back their giant doors. But as the last of missiles. pointing to their own air victories these tired old giants end their alert, we in Vietnam and asking what the Titan IIs might at least stop long enough to think had done. Titan II vvings gained their share about the quarter century of nuclear peace of trophies. unit citations, and successful that thev presided over. . . and sav thanks. operational readiness inspection (ORI) 40 A little neglect may breed mischief. Henjumin Franklin, 1757

NE VVOULU lliink tliat bv now there woulcl be a consensus as to the application of the US Air Brig Gen Bilty M. Knowles, USAF, Retired Force tactical airlift discipline in

41 42 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1987 support of the AirLand Battle doctrine and of career-long preoccupation with doctrine. maneuver warfare, particularly if one con- Most lament that doctrine all too often has siders vvhat AirLand Battle and maneuver been developed during the course of hostil- warfare imply or that the tenets of that doc­ ities, not the best of times to decide such is- trine are not in serious question. If a consen- sues. Fortunately, in the early 1980s, the sus exists, it is not readily apparent in Army formalized its concept for warfíght- budget perturbations, program documents, ing. Called “AirLand Battle doctrine,” it the Five Year Defense Plan, connectivity be- represents the fundamental statement for tvveen joint and Service doctrine, or joint warfare and is outlined in Field Manual training and exercising. Certainly, there re­ 100-5, Operations. This manual, which has sides a sense of illusoriness, and thus frus- since been revised to better describe the in- tration, in the minds of the tactical airlift tegration of sister Services into the overall community. Col Paul L. Wilkes prize essay, “Tactical Àirlift Tactics and Doctrine: More Carts, More Horses,” in the May-June 1986 issue of Air University Review, is an excel- The YC-15 (rightj is novv in mothballs at Dcwis-Mon- lent introduction and serves to focus on an tlian AFB. The YC-14 and 15 were the last attempts to obvious and worrisome link in the doctrinal consider a follow-on aircraft for the C-130 over a de- cade ago. Beiow is an artisfs concept of the C-17. Al- chain. though this aircraft w ill have intratheater capability. Memoirs of our greatest tvventieth cen- it will still be the tactical airlifters that deiiver troops tury vvarriors are replete with recollections and supplies into battle.

Depicted above is a model of the Boeing CX aircraft from 1981. The follow-on aircraft for strategic airlift has been well considered. Unfortunately, no such thorough consideration has been given to tactical air- lift forces. TACTICAL AIRL1FT 43 battle, also incorporates NATO recommen- dations for improved execution in both joint and combined operations. The Army’s success on the battlefield will depend on its ability to fight in accordance with its four basic tenets: initiative, depth, agility, and svnchronization. As Colonel Wilke points out, Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doc- trine of the United States Air Force, and AFM 2—4, Tactical Air Furce Operations— Tactical Airlift, clearly define what the Air Force responsibility is to be in support of the Army. Acknowledging a lack of defini- tion as it would relate to a current threat as- sessment of the envisioned battlefield, 1 submit that this results from a continuing erosion in tangible advocacy for tactical air­ lift as an AirLand Battle-contributing disci­ pline. Insufficiency of advocacy is, in my mind, the underlying reason why the tacti­ cal airlift community remains in a quandary and seems to be adrift for lack of specificity with regards to current and future weapon system capability and operational tactics. Long before single management of all air­ lift, tactical airlift occupied the last rear seat on the bus. It certainly did not compete well with modernization priorities, which at the time were so imperative to the fighter forces. During that period, it also suffered major setbacks when Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, intent on overselling the vir- tues of the C-5, launched conflicting signals by redefining intertheater and intratheater requirements. It can be readily understood under such circumstances whv, as the Air Force moved from acquiring first Curtiss, then Fairchild, and now Lockheed tactical airlift aircraft, that not one weapon system was designed to actually perform the fu 11 spectrum of its missions. And before any- one takes issue with that statement, let us just glance at the C-130—a truly great work- horse. As fine a machine as it is, there was never a thought for radar warning receivers or electronic countermeasure (ECM) pods or fiare/chaff dispensers. It has a wet wing, and there is no internai system to ensure predictable “time of exit" for airdrop, still An RAF C-130K undergoes stretch modiflcation. A dicate 16 years of relative inattention and similar modification to US Air Force C-130s could pro- clear inaction. vide an ínterim solution until a follow-on tactical air- Later, under single management. tactical lift aircraft is ready. airlift has not fared much better due to sim­ ilar competing priorities. For a while it was largelv due to the strategic-tactical dichot- the only uncontrolled variable in the com- omv, or the “Big MAC— Little MAC” svn- puted air-release point (CARP) system. drome. As had previously been its (Opening delay, forward travei balíistics. experience in competing vvith fighter prior­ and driít plot are indeed controllable.) ities. tactical airlift subsequentlv found it- Furthermore, much is made over future self unable to compete with strategic inventories that include a stealth bomber, airlifts 66-million-ton/mile-per-day man- an advanced tactical figbter, strategic air- date. shrinking budgets, or increasing em- lift’s C-17, and a high-performance rotary- phasis on special operations—each a wingspecial operations vveapon system. No compelling issue in its ovvn right. advanced intratheater tactical airlift system Notvvithstanding tactical airliffs near-or- is keeping pace, even though both the Na­ phan status. Armv, Air Force, and joint doc- tional Military Airlift Subcommittee of the trines fullv expect the Air Force to provide House Armed Services Committee in 1970 the tactical airlift response necessarv for and the Heritage Foundation in its January maintaining the initiative. depth. agilitv, 1986 “Backgrounder” paper urged devel- and synchronization on ivhich AirLand opment efforts for timely C-130 replace- Battle success depends. I can ivell imagine ment. Of course, there have been a number that if and when a major land vvar erupts, of similar studies and recommendations the joint force commander (JFC) vvill spread Irom varying sources before and during this established joint and Service doctrine on his period. but these two are referenced to in- desk right alongside his execution plan. I

44 TACTICAL A1HL1I-T 45

can further visualize his land component changed. Others, as pointed out by Colonel commander (LCC) levying tactical airlift Wilke, are devoting inordinate time to tac- support requirements on the air component tics and training designed to increase sur­ commander (ACC) to satisfy the fluidity and vivability but without due regard to the dvnamics of a developing land war. It doctrinal commitment. Either position would be helpful to remember at this junc- should be disquieting to the principal ben- ture that the ACC is not Headquarters Mili- eficiary, the Army. Yet the Army probably tary Airlift Command (HQ MAC) or the has contributed as much to this dilemma as theater commander of airlift forces (COM- has the absence of devoted Air Force ALF). Nor vvill there be much argument or advocacy. time for scholastic dissertations. Even if the Within the Army there is a whole gener- ACC demonstrates reluctance, perhaps ation of line officers who have little regard prompted bv COMALF concerns stemming for or knowledge of proper use of tactical from preconflict survivability questions, the air, whether fighters or tactical airlift. Joint JFC is the adjudicating authority. His game exercises are already fraught with enough plan calls for Air Force support, and I sus- artificialities such as vertical and horizontal pect he vvill get it. War is still hell. Those airspace restrictions, time compressibility, who still remember a land war in Europe environmental constraints, decreasing re- can recail boring in on hundreds of strategic servation space, and exercise scenarios pri­ or tactical objectives, absorbing remarkable mar i 1 y d e p e n d e n t o n c o r e - u n i t (A rm y ) losses, but pressing in all the same. The two training objectives. To make matters worse, situations are not as dissimilar as one might the Army prepositions all that it can, relies wish. In all major conflicts, losses are seri- on surface movement, and has not shown ously measured against requirements and the inclination to learn the intricacies of co- objectives. Under current doctrine, the LCC ordinating, requesting, competing for, and has every right to expect the Air Force to deconflicting fínite tactical air assets. Even provide sufficient tactical airlift assets at the accepting that major exercise artificialities place and time of need and with the precise are a fact of life and either cannot or will not integrity and interval across or into an ob- materially change, the primary user of tac­ jective area that supports the intended tical air is not only denying optimum real- ground tactical circumstances. ism of training for both the Army and Air In his provocative and imaginative book Force participants but is institutionalizinga Red Storm fíising. Tom Clancy, knowingly growing belief that ground forces can go it or not, incorporated all four tenets in his ex- alone and is unintentionally withholding citing dramatization of the AirLand Battle its strong advocacy for tactical airlift in this and maneuver warfare. Initiative passed be- case. Perhaps they remember their last tween adversaries at times. Depth was alter- strong support for the Air Force’s advanced nately achieved and denied, as was agility médium STOL (short take-off and landing) (maneuver). Synchronization often was transport (AMST) and “CX” strategic airlift blown as much bv the winds of war as by de- initiatives. Maybe Army confidence in liberate planning. But the author left to the jointness is not as high as it should be. lron- reader’s thought processes the logistic ically, its own AirLand Battle doctrine, struggles in the deep and immediate rear which says otherwise, will suffer the area of the flowing lines of battle. It is fairly consequences. certain that sustainment was, and would be, It is not the purpose of this paper to dart as dependent on responsive air as on down interconnected corridors in search of ground lines of communication (GLOC). weight, cube, or volume. But it is appropri- There are those who argue that since the ate to remind ourselves that jointness is actual capability of tactical airlift is more truly nonnegotiable for two reasons. The than just in question, doctrine should be first is one of law. Under its constitutional 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL1987 autliority, the Congress has made it reason- quickly with off-the-shelf, existing radar ably clear that a condition for preserving warning receivers, ECM pods and chaff, and separate Services vice a uniservice is the ex- tlare dispensers. Without reasonable pros- pectation for an intelligent, cost-effective pects for a near-term replacement for the C- economy of joint effort (and all that that en- 130, we must go with what we have and up­ tails). It has been parochial Service intran- grade its capabilities. There is nothing par- sigence that has brought ‘‘military reform” ticularly new in such a concept. We do it all once again to national attention. The second the time; so do the Soviets. reason for the nonnegotiability of jointness Next, we must keep the C-130H produc- is to avoid the wartime tragedy that results tion line open and replace the older models from precontlict interservice rivalries and as quickly as fiscally prudent. All the while, competition for missions, roles, and funds we must rethink current intentions to draw at the expense of and detriment to deliber- down tactical airlift. Any further diminu- ate planning. tion only serves to exacerbate the situation. So, vve all have contributed to the plight There is every reason to believe a serious in vvhich tactical airlifters find themselves. shortfall has existed a long time. Holding Hovvever, tactical airlifters will not solve the line where we are and upgrading and the problem hy suggesting the doctrinal modernizing the fleet will not satisfy pres- statement of responsibility go away nor, ent shortfall, but it is a wise and cost-effec- through frustration, by developing tactics tive expedient. that ignore doctrine. Instead. the essential All of the above should begin to tip the first step must be a renewed commitment by scales in the right direction. but there are both the Air Force and Army as strong ad- two more matters that must not be over- vocates of this discipline. Please note that I looked or the issue will stall out and create am careful not to insert the C-17 into the new frustrations. The same doctrine that equation. VVhether the C-17 becomes a real- commits the Air Force to bore into a hostile ity or not, the rather “untidy”— the original objective area, as previously described. "cigarette-and-puke-for-breakfast”— intra- makes abundantly clear that such opera- theater tactical airlift job in and around the tions will— repeat. will—require a high de- forward line of own troops (FLOT) will re- gree of control of the air and massive main one for the C-130s and allied equiva- tactical air support. both battlefíeld air in- lents. A very fluid, elongated FLOT of terdiction (BAI) and close air support hundreds of miles requires daily short-no- (CAS). Colonel Wilke made this abundantly tice reaction when shoring up corabat forces clear in his essay. Up to now we have out- tlowing vvith the tide of battle, answering lined things the “big" Air Force and Army the dictates of either offensive or defensive must do. Now enter stage left. the tactical air maneuver. The aforementioned basic tenets forces (TAF)—that is, committed F-15, F- remain inifiative, depth, agility, and syn- 16. F-4, A-7, A-10, EF-111, and WEASELre- chronization. Onlv infrequently will “bri- sources. It is a fair assumption that TAF gade airdrop" or insertion by C-141s or does not spend much time thinking. plan­ C-17s be a player and then will be unlikely ning. and, more importantly, training those if in the rather awesome and lethal elec- people to provide en route and objective- tronic combat environment of a high-threat area protection. specifically in support of battlefíeld. intratheater airlift. Joint exercises. as previ­ Once serious Air Force and Army advo- ously stated, do not purposefullv incorpo- cacy for tactical airlift has been reestab- rate such operations in their scenarios. Air lished, the rapid acceleration of follow-on Force Red/Maple Flag and composite force initiatives is fundamental to any meaning- training (CFT) exercises do not formalize ful mending of the tactical airlift discipline. such requirements. True. many units gin-up All C-130 models must be retrofitted such opportunities in CFTs because thev re­ TACTICAL AlfíUFT 47 alize the need; but even then, en route es- wargame the proposition in a Blue Flag ex- cort and objective-area protection lack ercise dedicated to determining attrition institutionai development and guidance. factors with and without “a high degree of And, of course. several more lavers of arti- control of the air and massive tactical air ficialities overlay the operations. Ironically. support.” I should think the Army would be the mechanism already exists that would al- vitally interested in such an evaluation. lowthe ArmysTrainingand DoctrineCom- Though not near term in value, the last in- mand (TRADOC) to pull the players gredient towards permanency would be def- together. inite development efforts by the Air Force As a matter of fact, MAC’s Airlift Con- for a timely replacement for the C-130—a cepts and Requirement Agency (MAC/ dedicated follow-on intratheater airlift ACRA), a joint agency of TRADOC, must be weapon system. Such an aircraft must not given appropriate credit for publishing a be gold-plated but should be specifically de- MAC-TRADOC “Qualitative Intratheater signed for the envisioned battlefield. The Airlift Requirement Study” as recently as weapon system will mean as much to the 30 November 1985. That study accurately Army as to the Air Force. Given their vested reaffirms joint and service doctrine, pro- interest in theater airlift, it is logical to ex- vides a basis for the requirement for tactical pect strong Army support for such an airlift, and defines both prerequisites and aircraft. inhibitions for successful response. Ob- viously, then, neither Colonel Wilke nor In conclusion, all-party advocacy is the this author is reinventing wheels or disturb- cornerstone for recovery. Off-the-shelf elec- ing graveyards of the ancient past. The tronic countermeasures/ electronic warfare MAC-TRADOC study indeed addresses tac­ upgrade of the current C-130 fleet, concur- tical airlift in terms of the AirLand Battle. rent with continued “H-model” inoderniza- There is not, however, a discernible road- tion, and discontinuance of tactical airlift map tovvards fruition. Instead, there is a drawdown are all essential and doable, sense that the corporate community knows even in a Gramm-Rudman era. providing what should and would be done if only tactical airlift is not conveniently perceived there were not so many other priorities. VVe to be an impediment to other programs. The have all learned that studies do not alwavs TAF must accept and vigorously pursue find their way down the “ yellow brick their role in support of this doctrinal re­ road.” Maybe there is no Oz, but we sorely quirement. And finally, a follow-on intra­ need an institutionai wizard. theater airlifter is an imperative. Both the Tactical Air Command (TAC) In the absence of real Solutions, the Army and MAC's Airlift Concepts and Require- can rightfully remain suspicious of Air ments Agency are legitimate (institutionai) Force intent, the Air Force can question the participating partners of TRADOC. If we in- doctrine, and the tactical airlift community, troduce the TAF's responsibilities and ca- in its frustration, will go on jinking and juk- pabilities into the formal training ing, content with "everv man for himself." environments. that part of the doctrine will Then one day it will be SURPRISE! SUR- come alive. At the very least, we should PRISE! Bore in, gentlemen. I— s-•r i Shortchanging Our Young Officers Military Traditions Denied

Lt Col Stephen C. Hall

OOKING OUT over the 80-plus Someone Should Have Taught You Along shiny, squeaky-clean, company the Wav But Probably Didn’t!” and it had grade offícers gathered in front of me been a dav to remember. Since beginning at the Johnson Manned Space Flight this free-lance program over two years ear- CenterL in Houston, Texas, 1 could not help lier, I had traveled all over the country but think that if this group of young men speaking to young officers and had never and vvomen did not make a person feel met a more enthusiastic group. We had great, then feeling great vvas simply not in talked about evervthing from military jus­ the cards. We were halfwav through a day- tice and how to put a bad actor in confine- long seminar I bill as the “Company Grade ment to social etiquette and how not to feel Officer Training Program, or Lots of Things like a fool in a receiving line. Their response

48 SHORTCHANGING OUfí YOUNG OFFICFHS 49 had been exhilarating; the voung officers group of company grade officers the very were eager. bright. and hungry for tradi- military values for which they raised their tional military values. Their response was right hands. We fail to train them in long-es­ all the more exciting when I reflected upon tablished military customs, courtesies, and hovv far removed from the mainstream of traditions; we fail to demand proper and en- Air Force lives these engineers and Com­ thusiastic execution of duties along tradi­ puter experts were; the Space Flight Center tional military lines; and then we wringour did not even have a BX! Nevertheless. these collective hands and with bowed, shaking young officers shovved the same desire for heads bemoan an officer corps that “just traditional military values I had witnessed isn’t what it used to be.” The problem is big in vvell over 1,500 of their contemporaries and getting bigger as year after year we fail all over the country. to give our young officers the basic under- I introduced the first hour of the afternoon pinnings of military virtues that will carry session by stating the topic of discussion: them through their careers. military customs and courtesies and the senior/subordinate relationship. For 30 minutes I extolled the accepted formalities and courtesies exchanged between officers of different rank and especiallv between What Are Our Young Officers commanders or supervisors and their Saying to Us? subordinates. “There is a long-established tradition of How does one truly discover the issues courtesies and customs.” said 1, “all de- posing the biggest problems for our lieuten- signed to show proper respect for persons of ants and captains? How do we realiy find higher rank and authority and to clearly de­ out what they need to develop into the best fine and to make more workable the sênior/ officers they can be? For two years, from subordinate relationship.” I then spent sev- 1984 to 1986, 1 had a rare opportunity to ex­ eral minutes discussing why it is wrong to plore these questions with over 1.500 young use a seniors first name. From the back of officers. the room a second lieutenant raised his As a four-time aircraft maintenance hand. squadron commander. 1 had discovered that “Sir. 1 have a problem with that,” he said. my own officers were very uncomfortable in On the one hand, I was not surprised at certain situations and. not surprisingly, did his comment, since a certain aversion to not perform well at certain criticai times. special treatment for higher rank is not un- My officers were terribly uncomfortable common among officers of this voung man's with officer/enlisted relationships, not an generation. On the other hand, this partic­ uncommon or unexpected malady for a 24- ular group had been so receptive to my strict year-old second lieutenant faced with lead- military line that I was taken aback just a bit ing 100 enlisted members. Similarly, my by the lieutenanfs objections. young officers viewed military justice and “What’s your problem?” I asked. discipline as a hot potato to be tossed either The lieutenant stood up, looked me to the first available NCO or to the com­ straight in the eye and replied, “Sir, I'm an mander. And last, but far from least, my of­ engineer and I work for a major who keeps ficers almost totallv lacked those basic telling me to ca 11 him ‘Jim.' Sir, if I‘d wanted social skills that are a proud part of our mil­ to call my engineering boss ‘Jim,’ I’d have itary heritage. gone to work for Hewlett-Packard!” To attack these weaknesses. my young of­ And in 35 words, that young second lieu­ ficers and I developed the Company Grade tenant said it all. We as an institution, as a Officer Training Program, a slightly uncon- profession, are denying to a fine. eager ventional series of weeklv training sessions 50 AIfíPOWER JOURNAL FALL1987 using lectures (by both me and my officers), administrators but into good officers. In far, role-playing, and field trips to expose the far too many instances, these expectations young officers to topics that were essential have been frustrated. to their professional development. The The list of examples is almost endless. A course was so successful that we subse- first lieutenant graduate of the Reserve Of­ quently presented it to officers throughout ficer Training Corps (ROTC) seriously asked the base and eventually took the show on if he was required to salute all ranking offi­ the road. Through nothing more than word- cers and chief master sergeants. (Probably of-mouth advertising, invitations began not a bad idea, but one not supported by reg- rolling in from all over the country. Even­ ulations!) A second lieutenant nurse related tually the program was presented to that she had been reprimanded by her hundreds of lieutenants and captains from nurse-in-charge for not encouraging her en­ coast to coast. At every stop, the company listed men and women to use her first name. grade officers were literally bursting with A captain who graduated from the Air Force questions, problems. and issues that they Academy asked why he was expected to were understandably uncomfortable limit his social contacts with enlisted men broaching with their superiors but that they and women when his supervisor, a lieuten­ readily revealed to a relatively safe source of ant colonel, was openly dating a staff ser- information like me. geant. Literally hundreds of young officers Throughout all the seminars, no matter uniformly stated, ‘‘My boss always finds the locale or the professional specialty or time to talk to me after I’ve messed up.. . . I source of commission of the audience, an just wish I’d received some help a little bit amazing unanimity of concern immediately sooner.” And the list goes on and on and on. became apparent: our young officers are far more militarily conservative than one would ever have expected, and they want far more military in their lives, not less. From Los Angeles to Boston, from Florida to Utah, the refrain rang true time and time again. Traditional Military Values— Todav’s lieutenants and captains entered Why So Important? the Air Force for many reasons, and high on the list were traditional military values. To­ This question seems so basic, and the an- day^ young officers were not teenagers dur- swer so obvious. that we need not tarry ing the 1960s when nearly all traditional overly long with it. Military customs, cour- values. both civilian and military, were sus- tesies, and traditions are vitally important pect. Today’s young officers were teenagers to our Air Force because shared traditions in the post-Vietnam years. They saw the re- are one of the few things remaining that can newed stature of the armed Services in the bind officers of widelv differing skills and 1970s, and the general return to basic values specialties into one professional corps. throughout our country. These officers One hardly needs to perform a detailed carne into the Air Force expecting to find document search to discover a perceived well-established (and well-enforced) codes rise in careerism and the accompanving de­ of conduct and deportment; well-defined cline in cohesion and professionalism. A and proudly executed relationships be- Squadron Officer School (SOS) survey of tween members of different ranks in both 613 officers showed that 76 percent of op- the officer and enlisted corps; and probably erations officers and 63 percent of support most important, they expected to find a officers associated themselves more readily cadre of field graders prepared to turn them and strongly with their career colleagues not merely into good engineers, pilots, or than with the Air Force as a whole.' While S HORTCHANCING OUR YOUNG OFF1CERS 51

one mav be displeased with this fact, the Traditions Denied Specifically fairly parochial allegiance shovvn by young My experiences with hundreds and officers should come as no surprise. By its hundreds of officers all over the country re- very nature, the Air Force is a compart- vealed that the officership skills they mentalized Service, the greatest and most need—and which we fail to provide— are obvious distinction being between those very similar to those problem areas articu- vvho flv and those vvho do not. But while lated bv my own squadron officers and al- "rated nonrated” is the most obvious dis­ luded to earlier. tinction, it is not the only one that tends to promote compartmentalization within the Officer/Enlisted Relationships Air Force. It is hardly surprising that the contracting officer who has never adminis- The special relationship between officers tered the many Air Force personnel pro- and enlisted members can be one of the grams has little in common with a most rewarding facets of military Service, or personnel officer who. in turn, has never su- one of the most confusing and frustrating. pervised 100 enlisted men and women For the officer properly schooled and around the clock as has the maintenance of­ trained in the complementarv roles of the ficer who, in turn. has never had to make the enlisted and officer corps, the relationship highlv technical decisions of the Computer is nothing short of wonderful. What a thrill or engineering officer who deals with civil- it is when an officer. junior or sênior, can ian contractors. help guide a young airman through the Is compartmentalization bad? The ques- earlv, trving years of service. What a thrill it tion is moot since career specialties are here is when a young airman matures both per- to stay. as well they should be. National de- sonally and professionally as a result of a fense in general and the Air Force in partic­ concerned, involved officer in charge. The ular are far too complex to be administered same thrill is equallv intense when roles are bv anyone not possessing specialized skills. reversed, when the master sergeant takes a There is no other choice. But specialization young officer in tow and helps turn that of­ has its price, and lack of cohesiveness is a ficer into a fine leader. The memories of big part of the bill. hours spent working with and learning from Given the existence of some 217 career fine NCOs will remain in an officer's heart specialties based on 60 academic disci­ long after the roar of the engines grows plines, the bonding effect of a solid body of quiet. traditional military values can hardly be ov- For the properly schooled and trained of­ erstated.J The navigator, administrative of­ ficer. the opportunity to work closely with ficer, civil engineer, and doctor may have the fine members of the enlisted corps is little in common in terms of job description, reason enough, in and of itselí. to join the but they mav nevertheless be bound to- Air Force. But tor the unschooled, un- gether by the shared customs, courtesies, trained officer, relationships with the en­ and traditions embodied in officer/enlisted listed corps can be a source of constant relationships, military discipline, and uncertainty and consternation. All too professional social protocol. These topics, many of our young officers find themselves and manv more. are no less important to one in this latter category, and they suifer terri- officer than to another. regardless of career bly. For most of our young officers, the re­ specialty. At the risk of waxing excessively lationship with a corps of enlisted men and eloquent, I submit that there exists over all women is a totally new phenomenon, one Air Force careers a patina of military values without corollary in the civilian world. Our and officership skills that offers to all mem- lieutenants and captains are too young in bers a common bond of professionalism. both age and Service to have learned how to But the veneer grows thinner by the day. properly and effectively work with enlisted 52 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL FALL 1987

members, yet they are expected to do so discharge their duties. At best we glibly toss írom day one. The questions they raise at them trite phrases and little more. shovv the immediacy of the problem and “Enforce standards!” their concern. ”Don’t permit shoddy performance!” ‘‘Can I date an airman who does not work ”We’ve gotta have discipline!” directly for me but who is in my squadron? Though noble assertions, these phrases And if I legallv can, shoulcl I?” do little to tell three-year lieutenants how to •‘I don’t think the chief likes young offi- execute their disciplinary responsibilities. cers. What should I do?” From the minor—but significant—offense "VVhen vve're TDY, some of my NCOs call of avoiding a salute, to theft of government me by my fírst name. Is this OK?” property, to the thousands of events in be- "My NCOIC is 10 years older than me and tween, the young officer is ill-prepared to has a personal problem. How is a young per- take the proper action. Most ROTC instruc- son like me supposed to help?” tion is by officers who have yet to hold com- These questions and hundreds more like mand and who have never, in most cases, them carne forth in seminars all across the imposed administrative or judicial disci­ country as our young officers highlighted a pline on any military member.'* Subsequent glaring omission in their professional up- formal training dedicates very little time to bringing. For the most part, schooling in of- the topic. Of 268 hours at SÓS, only 3 1/2 ficer enlisted relationships receives short hours deal with military discipline.5 Fur- shrift. Formal training invariably consists of ther, most superiors spend little or no time seminars in which a cadre of enlisted mem­ discussing discipline with their officer sub- bers attempts, in two or three hours, to im- ordinates. Ask the next five captains you part some feeling of NCO expectations and meet the difference between a letter of coun- responsibilities to our young officers.3 The seling and a letter of reprimand; ask them to effort is noble but only marginally produc- describe an unfavorable information file; tive. And if 1,500 young officers are to be be- ask them to identify the key elements of any lieved, counsel from their own officer offense in the Uniform Code. Unless you are superiors is woefully lacking. The young extremely fortunate, you will not receive lieutenants and captains apparently are ex­ learned responses. pected to learn by osmosis the intricacies of This is not to say that one should expect a one of the mos* important, meaningful, and young lieutenant or captain to be the equiv- sensitive relationships in military Service. alent of a squadron commander or a military That our young officers experience so many trial counsel. Because the disciplinary task difficulties in this arena should be no source is so difficult and because the effects of dis­ of surprise to those of us whose duty it is to ciplinary action are so significant, we pur- properly train them. It should also be no posefully reserve this task for field grade source of pride. commanders or at least for officers with many years in Service. But this does not Discipline and Military Justice mean that the young lieutenant or captain Young officers almost totally lack the skills has no role in the disciplinary system. The necessarv to do their part in maintaining a young officer must be able to distinguish ac- fair and effective system of military disci­ ceptable conduct from unacceptable. must pline. Their shortcomings in this criticai know when to act, and must know how to area of military life result from the lack of act. The vast majority of the young officers experiences that accompany their short with whom I spoke did not possess the req­ time in Service and from a near-total failure uisite skills for this criticai duty. And they ot their superiors to explain to them both are not to blame. How can we blame them how they fit into the military discipline/jus- for what we never taught them? As a result, tice system and how they can effectively they either avoid their disciplinary respon-

54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL1987 sibilities altogether or make well-inten- tle fingers properly extended, nibble tioned but fatal errors in administering watercress sandwiches while making cock- discipline. In either case. both they and the tail party conversation? Hardly! But the ob­ Air Force suffer. jective should be to make our officers comfortable in a broad range of social situ- Social Protocol ations, to be able to effect proper manners and protocol both at home and abroad, to Inherent in all of the military Services is a complement their strong technical and proud history of professional social contact, leadership skills with equally strong social a history of protocol and social etiquette skills, and to represent the Air Force as pol- that helps distinguish our profession of mil­ ished officers, ladies, and gentlemen. itary Service frorn its civilian occupational Amazingly enough, our young officers are counterparts. From a New Year’s Day visit eager to learn. Thev have felt uncomfortable to the commander’s home, to the formal on far too many social occasions, and they military bali, to the daily customs and cour- do not like the feeling. They want to do the tesies exchanged between military mem- proper, courteous. gracious thing but sim- bers, professional social etiquette has been a ply do not know what to do. They see the continuing thread throughout military his­ value of the professional social contact but tory. Yet our young officers know almost are often deterred from participation by nothing about their social obligations and their lack of social proficiency. hovv to gracefullv execute their social du- ties. One hears “an officer and a geiitleman” or “an officer and a lady” far more often The Verdict than one sees proper execution of all that is In the final analysis, the sincere, honest as- denoted in those phrases. sertions of hundreds and hundreds of our VVhat do our young officers not know finest lieutenants and captains can lead to about the social aspect of their profession? onlv one conclusion: no matter hovv well we Plenty! VVith verv few exceptions, the offi­ think we are training our young officers in cers with whom I spoke do not fully appre- traditional officership skills, we are simplv ciate their responsibilitv to activelv support not hitting the mark. Our best intentions the officers’ club and its attendant associa- and efforts notwithstanding, we are not giv- tions, do not know hovv to extern! thanks to ing them what they want, what thev need. the hostess for a club or home party, do not what they deserve. know basic rules of engagement for receiv- ing lines, do not know when and for whom to stand (either sociallv or at work), and manv do not even know proper etiquette for the natioiVal flag! Again, we should not be surprised at the absence of social skills Military Traditions shown by these fine voung officers. In most Revived cases, their civilian rearing offered little op- portunity to acquire even rudimentary so­ What can be done to return military tra­ cial skills. and, for the most part, Air Force ditions to their rightful place in Air Force efforts do not get the job done. ROTC in- life? What can be done to make our time- struction relies heavily on a yearlv dining tested military values part and parcel of the out as the primary teaching tool; current professional development of each of our SOS curriculum offers only 90 minutes of fine young officers? There is much that can instruction on the subject, 30 minutes of be done, both institutionally and person- which is preparatorv reading.h ally; and if we are truly sincere in our ef­ Should it be our objective to turn our of­ forts, the necessary actions are not all that ficers into simpering dandies who, with lit­ difficult. SHORTCHANG1NG OUR YOUNG OFFICERS 55

Beginning at the Beginning: from them! Are these topics any less impor­ Fixing “the System’' tant to an officer commissioned via ROTC or OTS? Obviously not. This material should The institutional remedy requires only that be the basis of instruction in all commis- we codify our important traditions in regu- sioning programs. The Other Hulf, a booklet lations, pamphlets, or curricula, and then created by a student at Air Command and use these as tools to instruct our young of- Staff College and available at ROTC units to­ ficers. We should by no means vvait until an day, is an excellent primer on social sur- officer attends SOS to begin such instruc- vival skills. However, the degree to which tion. From the earliest days at the Air Force this booklet is used is left to the discretion Academy, in university and college ROTC of individual ROTC detachments. Finally, programs, and at Officer Training School the Air Force Officer Guide, now in its 27th (OTS). our young officers should be in- edition, is a fine book for teaching militarv structed in detail on the three topics dis- customs, courtesies, and traditions but cussed here and on many topics of similar often spends more time on bookstore value. shelves than in the hands of a young officer. The first step in this process is to clearly The Guide and the other texts mentioned articulate in a regulation or similar docu- here could form a solid nucleus for ex- ment those militarv traditions we vvish to panded professional education in our com- foster. AFR 30-1, Air Force Standards, is missioning programs, at SOS, and in the generally accepted as the prime document Lieutenanfs Professional Development that articulates basic values and is certainly Program. the most vvidely read and best known. But AFR 30-1, in its current form, falis some- The instruction should be meaningful. what short of the mark in both content and Militarv discipline should be taught by specificity. While the regulation speaks to squadron commanders who have had to customs and courtesies, professional rela- make those tough decisions that changed tionships, militarv ethics, dress and appear- people's lives. I doubt there is a squadron ance, and the like, it does so in rather commander (or ex-commander) who would general terms. Our young officers need spe- not gladly visit an ROTC detachment, OTS, cifics to guide them through the specific or SOS and share real-life experiences with problems of their daily lives. When the reg­ a group of prospective or commissioned of­ ulation says it is “inappropriate” for a sub- ficers. If one truly wants to teach officer/en- ordinate to address a sênior by first name, listed relationships, let first sergeants visit what it really means is that subordinate vvill our officer schools and offer their perspec­ not address seniors in so informal a manner. tives. A fine first sergeant possesses a wealth If this is what it means, why not say so? The of experiences beyond compare. Let us use regulation is a fine document but can be those experiences to better teach our com- even better. pany grade officers. To impart to our young Amazingly enough, superb material al- officers the necessary social survival skills, ready exists for teaching many of the sub- who would be better suited than protocol jects identified in AFR 30-1, but we do not officers or aide-de-camps, many of whom make the best of what we ha ve. Lcnv for are company grade officers themselves? Commcinders and the Decorum/Protocol Their experiences would be invaluable to Handbook used today at the Air Force all company grade officers; and especially Academy are exactly what the doctor or- because of age and rank similarities, their dered. The academy training outline on of- experiences would be credible. We would ficer/enlisted relationships is an equally never dream of permitting aviation skills to fine document. These texts deal with real is- be taught by a nonfiier, or medicai skills to sues in a thorough, detailed fashion. But be taught by anyone other than a medicai one must be an academy cadet to benefit professional. Yet we all too often allow im- 56 A1RPOWER fOURNAL FALL 1987 portant oíficership skills to be taught by their superiors to making them the best of­ people vvho, through no fault of their own, ficers they can be. All the formal training in simply do not possess the body of experi- the world will be for naught unless there is ences absoluteíy essential to meaningful complementary personal training and mod- instruction. eling by superiors. We cannot expect formal The instruction must be sufficiently de- training to do in a few hours that which we tailed to be of real value. Three hours de- ranking officers should be doing every day. voted to militarv discipline would not Every ranking officer should view as a to­ achieve the desired goal even if the instruc- tal honor the fact that the Air Force has en- tor were Oliver VVendell Holmes; and Amy trusted into their care the professional Vanderbilt herself would be hard-pressed to upbringing of subordinate company grade teach social eticjuette in 90 minutes! The ex- officers. With that honor also comes total re- pected objection to an expanded curricu- sponsibility for that upbringing. Discharg- lum is that there is too little time to permit ing that responsibility is far from difficult, such a detailed examination of these spe- and little things do mean a lot. Two hours cialized subjects. A valid rejoinder to this weekly spent with young officers simply objection would be to restructure the cur- discussing pertinent topics can do wonders. rent curricula in our commissioning pro- Monthlv breakfasts, retreat ceremonies, cel- grams and in company grade officer ebration of special national and military education. At the risk of speaking words of holidays, and attendance at leadership blasphemy, I submit that to the prospective school graduations are but a few easy ways or novice officer. basic oíficership skills are to foster professionalism. Failure to teach at least as important as national grand strat- one’s subordinate officers everything egv. svstem acquisition, or—dare I say it?— needed for a productive Air Force life the Program Objective Memorandum should be viewed as nothing short of derel- (POM) process. But should it prove impos­ iction of duty on the part of the superior. Of­ sible to change existing curricula at ROTC, ficers who do not do everything possible to OTS, or SOS, the oíficership skills I have improve the professional qualities of sub­ discussed and manv more can be covered ordinate officers have no right to expect via correspondence school. A well-de- high marks for their own professionalism at signed correspondence course, specificallv evaluation time. designed to address traditional militarv How much contact, training, and interac- subjects and mandatory for all company tion are required of the superior officer? The grade officers, could work wonders. test is simple. One needs only to answer this question: "If the subordinate lieutenants “Phvsician, Heal Thyself" and captains working for me were my sons or daughters, what would I be teaching While the institutional remedy is absoluteíy them in order to make them the most profes­ essential to improve the oíficership skills of sional officers they can be?” Both the anal- our voung officers, the institution cannot ogy and the question posed bv it seem solve the problem by itself. It is all too easy totalIv appropriate, since in no small sense to point the accusing finger at a regulation, is an officer of superior rank the military at a commissioning program. or at military parent of the subordinates placed in his or academia. Indeed. the lengthy discussion in her charge. Whatever we would do for our this very paper of institutional remedies own sons and daughters we should do with could lead one to view them as the answer equal enthusiasm for all our voung officers. to the problem and to ignore that which ac- tually is both the source of the problem and the key to its resolution. The real kev to in- creased professionalism among company Back to Houston grade officers is the total commitment of The simple question posed by a fine voung lieutenant at the johnson Manned Space SHORTCH ANGING OUR YOUNG OFFICERS 57

Flight Center and recounted at the begin- shortcomings, "The fault, dear Brutus, lies ning of this article shows in the clearest not in the stars, but in ourselves.” The fault terms exactly what our young officers want, lies in ourselves as we institutionally and need. and deserve. They want more military personally deny to our company grade offi­ in their lives, not less. They want to learn cers the basic military skills so essential for and lead—today! Yet they are being denied their professional development. But what the very officership skills they seek. Where we have done, we can undo. We can take lies the fault for this predicament? Is the steps to once again instill traditional mili­ problem insoluble? Has the decline in mil­ tary values into the lives of all our fine itary traditions simply become an irreversi- young officers. We owe it to ourselves to do ble fact of Air Force life? Hardly. As Cassius just that. We owe it to our company grade said to Brutus when discussing their own officers. We owe it to the Air Force.

Notes 1. Capt James H. Slagle. “The Junior Officer of the 1980s," 4. Headquarters Air Training Command, Special Duty As- Air University Revievv. November-December 1981.90-95. signment Branch, telephone interview with author, 24 Febru- 2. LtCol Donald R. Baucom. "The Air Force Officer Corps in ary 1987. the 1980s." Air University Revievv. September-October 1983, 5. SOS CurricuJum Catalog. 51. 50. 6. Headquarters Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps. 3. SOS CurricuJum Catalog (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Squadron Curriculum Branch. telephone interview with author. 24 Feb- Officer School. Air University. August 1986). 40-41 ruarv 1987. OR MORE than two decades, conflicts short of conventional war have threatened US in- terests around the world. This type of war- fare, called low-intensity conflict, has spread so rapidly it now represents the most probable arena for the application of US military force in the foreseeable future. Even so, the US Air Force remains poorly postured institutionally, materially, and psychologically to effectively operate in low-intensity conflict.1 F Although there are numerous reasons for this lack of capability, the overriding factor has been the Air Force’s inability to fullv comprehend the threat or to develop a clear set of priorities so it can respond to the threat with confidence.2 Since much has been written recently on the threat associ- ated with low-intensity conflict, this article will propose a clear set of priorities for or- ganizing, training, and equipping Air Force special operations forces (SOF) to effec­ tively operate in low-intensity conflict. Al­ though this article focuses on SOF as the appropriate vehicle to meet the challenges of low-intensity conflict, thev are not the only answer, or necessarily the best answer in every scenario. Virtually all conventional weapon systems could be called on to pros- ecute the mission, depending on the situa- tion. However, SOF do form the criticai nucleus for low-intensity operations to which other aerospace forces are added or withdrawn as required bv the mission. Like- wise, the employment of SOF is not re- stricted to low-intensity conflict. SOF have a very important mission in mid- to high- intensity theater warfare as well.

Organizing One of the fírst priorities should be a re- structuring of the current Air Force SOF or- ganization to enhance its contribution to the overall effectiveness of the US Special Op­ erations Command as well as the theater SOF commands. These changes should be focused in two areas: basic organizational structure and peacetime capabilities.

58 IS AIR FORCE |/ ICIAL OPERAnONS ting a Course for the Furure

59 The C-7 Caribuu light transport aircraft was in US requirements of the other Services can be Army Service prior to its transfer to the US Air Force in supported.3 The best way to do that is to or­ 1966'. IVitli the C-7 novv out nf the inventory, a follow- on aircraft. capable of takeoff and landing on shorl, ganize Air Force SOF into no fewer than unimproved runways, needs to be developed to sup- four vvings. Three of these vvings should be part SOF missions. assigned to specific geographic areas of re- sponsibility, including vvings in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The criticai need Organizational Structure for rapid deployment and employment of SOF dictates these forces be maintained Numerous studies have pointed to short- within the theater if at all possible.-1 Due to falls in Air Force SOF capabilities vvith ac- Latin America’s proximitv to the United companying recommendations to increase States, that particular wing could be located the force structure so the programmed SOF in the United States. Personnel assigned to

60 AIR FORCE SPEC1AL OPERATIONS 61 these wings should be completely familiar extremely restricted role to allow the Air vvith the geography, weather, customs, and Force to take a greater part in providing crit­ language of their areas. The fourth wing icai noncombal assistance to friendly third should be a combat crew training wing lo- world countries. While the Army has tradi- cated in the United States. An organiza- tionally done much in the areas of foreign tional structure such as this would bring internai defense (F1D) and civic action, the the Air Force in line with the Army and Air Force has done little, with the possible Navy organizational structures, thereby exception of the air commandos in Vietnam complementing them vvithin the US Special during the early days of that conflict. Sev- Operations Command and theater SOF eral recent studies have concluded that commands. there is little or no capability in these areas Each wing should be composed of three due to a lack of clear guidance that has cre- operational squadrons, three maintenance ated confusion over Air Force-wide respon- squadrons. and two specialized detach- sibilities for conducting FID and civic ments. The operational squadrons would action. include two fixed-wing squadrons com­ By joining with the Army in a cooperative posed of MC-130S and AC-130s, or their re- approach in these areas, everyone benefits. placements, and a rotary-wing squadron The host country gains valuable expertise in composed of either MH-53 Pave Low IIIs or the form of instructors and advisers. That MH-60G Pave Hawks. There are currently expertise pays off as host-country air forces too few AC-130s to form more than the one are trained in basic combat tactics and ad- squadron now located at the lst Special Op­ vised in the employment of air power in erations Wing (SOW), Hurlburt Field, Flor­ low-intensity conflict operations. Add a ida. However, when the next generation of vigorous foreign military sales program— gunships is acquired, the quantities need to which, depending on a countrv’s specific be large enough to fill squadrons in each of needs, could include helicopters, light the other wings. The helicopters will be tactical transports, gunships, reconnais- augmented by the CV-22 Osprey. the “tilt- sance platíorms, and close-air-support rotor" aircraft, when it comes on-line in the aircraft— and the United States can do early 1990s. The three maintenance squad­ much to assist the host government in win- rons would be organized for rapid deploy- ning the conflict. Additionallv, Air Force ment and consist of an aircraft generation medies and civil engineering personnel can squadron, an equipment maintenance work beside their Army counterparts in squadron, and a component repair squad­ civic actions designed to improve the qual- ron. Whenever any of the operational ity of life in the host country and to win the squadrons deploy, an aircraft maintenance support of the people. In wars fought for the unit—comprised of technicians from each hearts and minds of the people, that support of the three maintenance squadrons— may go a long way in deíeating an would deploy with it to provide essential insurgency. on-site maintenance. Two specialized de- The Air Force benefits by advising the tachments, a speciai operations combat host government in low-intensity conflict control team and a special operations operations, thereby providing Air Force weather team, would provide the remaining personnel with valuable experience in ap- essential support of each wing. While this plying doctrine to real-world situations. Ac- wing organization is not new, it has proved tual experience in what works and does not very effective to date in the lst SOW. work in that environment would provide Peacetime Capabilities the crucial feedback needed to revise and update US operational doctrine. More im- Next, Air Force SOF need to expand their portant, the Air Force builds a corps of per­ peacetime capabilities beyond the present, sonnel who have observed low-intensity 62 AIfíPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1987

conflict firsthand and could apply that ex- The MC-130E Combat Talon (top right) is specially de- perience in combat should the need ever signeci for long-range infilfration. This aircraft. or its arise. follow-on, would work well aiongside shorter-range Army rotary-wing aircraft as a coordinated, joint-ser- Air Force SOF personnel, following ap- vice. special operations capability. The AC-130H gun- propriate training, could begin this vital ship (bottom right) needs a follow-on replacement in work in minimal time and at very little cost. enough numbers to support a multiwing special oper­ One proposal would involve designating a ations capability. position in all appropriate military assis- tance advisory groups (MAAGs) for SOF takes two or three times longer to initially personnel. This use of an already existing qualify aircrew members than it should.6 organization would result in only small This deficiency could easily be rectifíed by costs and in the necessary infrastructure removing mission qualification training being put in place. A second proposal from the operational units and placing it would be to attach SOF personnel to mili­ under the combat crew training wing dis- tary training teams (MTTs), which provide cussed above. training to other nations under the interna- The other, and more significant, problem tional military education and training area relates to the limited amount of joint program/1 training that can be accomplished due to the These proposals for restructuring Air small numbers of SOF aircraft and their cur­ Force SOF would do much to improve their rent locations. As such, SOF components capabilities and to enhance their contribu- from the sister Services may not be as com- tion to the effectiveness of the US Special fortable working with the Air Force as they Operations Command as well as the theater should be. Likewise, the Air Force may not SOF commands. An organization that com- be as comfortable working with SOF com­ plements the sister Services promotes ponents from the other Services. However, integration and coordination. Expanded the very nature of special operations re- peacetime capabilities also provide tangible quires that units who fight together train and intangible benefíts to host countries, together. The success of the mission de- the Air Force, and the United States. Once pends on it.7 Two examples support this these organizational issues are resolved, contention. one needs to look at training. During preparations for the raid on the Son Tav prisoner of war camp near Hanoi in 1970, absolutelv nothing was left to chance. The plan called for nearly four weeks of Training training prior to employment. During this period, the aircrews flew a total of 1,017 SOF training priorities need to change hours in 368 sorties to hone their skills. The with the organizational restructuring and three elements of the ground assault force focus on both operational and functional practiced their attack no less than 175 times training. Operational training has tradition- before the raid. Each element had an alter- ally been very good; however, problems native plan of action and was cross-trained have arisen recently in two key areas. The in the missions of the other two elements. first involves initial mission qualification. Even the pilot who had to crash-land his Under the current program, most of this helicopter in the center of the prison com- qualification training takes place in opera­ pound practiced his mission at least 31 tional units. Since these units are heavily times.H The team members knew each other involved with operational and exercise mis- and trained well together, and when the sions, students must compete for equip- time carne, the mission was executed flaw- ment and for instructors. This has resulted lessly. (Poor intelligence rather than poor in a training program, for example, which planning, training, or execution led to the

The Air Force’s MH-53H Pare Low helicopter fabovej has been cauglil up in an interservice rivalry over hel- icopter support for speriai operalions. CurrenI plans suggest the same problem mav liamper Air Force and Army V-22 Osprey tilt-rotoraircraft (rigbfj as well. The photo depicts a US Marine Corps M V-22 A.

failure to recover any prisoners.) Contrast own commander and its own Service officers, the Son Tav raid preparation, particularlv so that. in the end. none of the components the training, with the debacle of the Iran was ever evaluated bv officers from the other rescue attempt. Services/' The Iran rescue attempt has been the sub- There was not even one final exercise that ject of intense review and criticism. Many brought all the separate components to­ would agree the mission was doomed from gether. Although some of the components the beginning for a number of reasons, one did train together. the first time the entire of which was inadequate training. Richard rescue force worked together was during ac- A. Gabriel, author of Military Incompet- tual mission execution. Unfortunatelv. thev ence, writes: discovered too late that each component The rescue force did not train together as a had its own way of doing things— its own complete unit. Instead. each component standard operating procedures. Addition- trained separately, at dispersed training cen- ally, many of the problems that hampered ters. some at their home bases. Moreover, each the mission probablv would have surfaced component trained under the direction of its during combined training exercises and

64 could have been addressed long before em- consideration in operational training. ployment. Failing to train together defi- Establishing a sound functional training nitely contributed to the failure of the Iran program is more difficult but. for noncom- rescue attempt. bat operations. just as important. This train­ Although these two examples relate to ing can be subdivided into regional training missions that allowed at least some time in and foreign assistance training. Regional advance to train. the United States may not training simply orients personnel assigned enjov that luxury in the future. To avoid the to overseas units to lhe region of the world problems associated with inadequate train- in which they will be operating, and it in- ing. it is essential for Service components cludes geopolitical. customs, and language who vvill fight together to train together. Re- instruction.1" Initial training should be pro- structuring Air Force SOF as outlined above vided in the United States prior to transfer will permit Air Force units to train with sis- overseas with continuation training pro- ter service units who share geographic areas vided bv the unit. An individual assigned to of responsibility. Training together in order the wing responsible for Latin America, for to fight well together must be the paramount example, would be trained in the geog-

65 66 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1987

raphy, politics, and customs of the various preparation for assuming the SOF rotary- Latin American countries and would learn wing mission as outlined in the joint SOF to speak either Spanish or Portuguese. initiative. Unless this issue is resolved one Foreign assistance training prepares in­ way or the other, valuable resources could dividuais for service as members of MTTs or be wasted in unnecessary modifications MAAGs. Training would build on the base and duplication of effort. established during regional training and Add to this already confused situation the would include more specific information Air Force’s acquisition of the CV-22 “tilt- on the host country's political situation, rotor" aircraft with SOF-unique equipment military capabilities, and the nature of the such as extended-range fuel tanks, elec- threat. Regional and foreign assistance tronic countermeasure equipment, and training prepares SOF personnel for these multimode radar. The Air Force plans to use challenging assignments, enabling them to these aircraft for long-range exfiltration of be more effective in the politico-military en- special operations forces and to augment vironment in which they are expected to the MC-130 in the SOF infiltration and re- work. supply missions. While the Air Force is buving 55 “SOF-configured” CV-22 aircraft, the Army intends to buy 231 “basic” UV-22 models." Will history repeat itself? Will the Equipping same SOF roles and missions argument for the V-22 surface as was the case with the ro­ Perhaps the most neglected aspect of Air tary-wing SOF mission? The issue has come Force SOF is equipment. To solve this full circle without an adequate answer. pressing problem, SOF priorities should fo- Weapon system development and acquisi­ cus on tw-o areas: roles and missions, and tion is another criticai area in need of atten- weapon system design and acquisition. The tion. Traditionally, the SOF community has area of roles and missions has long been a taken a backseat in this important arena. problem between the Services, and special Under both the Tactical Air Command and operations is no exception. Historically, the the Military Airlift Command, SOF en- Air Force has provided both fixed-wing and hancement has been neglected. not because rotary-wingsupport to the SOF community. of any lack of interest on the part of the com- Today this support is provided bv the AC- mands but because of money. As each com­ 130. MC-130, and MH-53. Although the Air mand competes for dollars in the budgetary Force is the obvious service to provide process. it never gets enough to meet all its fixed-wing support, responsibility for requirements, forcing the command to or- the rotary-wing mission is not so easily der its programs by priority. Naturally, pro- established: grams such as the advanced tactical fighter Five years ago, the Air Force and Army and the C-l 7 are considered more important chiefs of staff agreed to transfer the special because they represent the “bread and but- operations rotary-wing mission to the ter” of each command. As a result, SOF Army. Despite this initiative, no such trans­ have been equipped with “borrowed” air- fer has taken place. Rather, the Congress has frames modified to meet the requirements of directed the Air Force to enhance its SOF the SOF mission. Today, SOF operate a helicopter capability by modifying all of handful of converted cargo airplanes and its H-53s to Pave Low III configuration (pre- “rescue” helicopters rather than weapon cision navigation, radar, and enhanced systems designed specifically to operate in Communications equipment). While the Air low-intensity conflict. Force has been complying with the congres- Given these issues, what can the US Spe­ sional directive, the Army has begun modi­ cial Operations Command do to correct the fying (JH-60 and CH-47 helicopters in deficiencies and enhance SOF air assets in AIR FORCE SPEC1AL OPERATIONS 67 the future? First, regarding the roles and forces in Latin America. These require­ missions issue. the Air Force should con­ ments include: tinue to keep the long-range infiltration, ex- • Capability to take off and land within fíltration, and resupply missions. This 1,500 feet on unimproved runways. includes the long-range. rotarv-wing mis- • Minimum cruise airspeed of 200 knots. sion. The Air Force already has the aircrew and maintenance expertise to accomplish • An operating radius of 300 nautical the mission vvith the sophisticated SOF- miles with a payload of 10.000 pounds. unique equipment on its MH-53 Pave Low • A 1.000 nautical-mile ferry range. III helicopters. With the acquisition of 33 • High flotation, rugged landing gear more MH-53s in the short term and 55 CV- with low-pressure tires. 22s in the early 1990s. it will also have the • A self-start capability.14 necessary resources.'2 For the Armv to develop an aircrew and These specifications translate roughly into a maintenance capability to perform the long- follow-on to the C-7 Caribou. a light twin- range mission while discarding the Air engine transport. Since the C-7 left the in- Force assets and personnel experience ventory, the C-130 has been used to fili the vvould be foolish. The Army should assume gap; however, the size, airspeed. and heavy responsibility for the short-range infiltra­ footprint of the C-130 prevent it from oper­ tion. exfiltration, and resupply missions. It ating in the same environment as the C-7 has the assets to meet virtually anv require- even though the need still exists. ment of this nature due to its large number Jerome W. Klingaman, in an article titled of helicopters with diverse configurations. “ Light Aircraft Technology for Small The same principie would hold true for the Wars,” proposes "using modem design new CV-22 Ospreys. The Air Force should formulas and industrial manufacturing employ its CV-22s for the long-range mis­ techniques to produce a light-armed sur- sions, where the SOF-unique equipment veillance aircraft (LASA) for conflicts below greatly improves the probabilitv of success. the levei of general war.”15 Klingaman sug- The Army would use its basic utility ver- gests that this aircraft be designed with per­ sion for the short-range missions where the formance parameters similar to the 0-1D SOF-unique equipment would not be as im- and that it be armed with two forward-firing portant to mission success. The key is to in- guns as well as 2.75-inch, high-velocity tegrate both Army and Air Force assets rockets. In addition to armed surveillance, under an air component commander if ne­ he advocates the LASA be employed in mis­ cessary to accomplish the mission. sions such as reconnaissance, forward air Second, w'hile the CV-22 will be a versa- control, convoy escort, and perimeter tile and exciting replacement for helicop­ defense.16 ters in the mid-1990s. a replacement for the Another source outlining requirements aging C-130 needs to be developed. Since for SOF aircraft is the foint Loiv-Intensity the US Special Operations Command has Conflict Projecl Report, issued by the US Ar- been given budgetarv and research, devel- my’s Training and Doctrine Command, opment, and acquisition authority,13 the which includes the findings of an exhaus- SOF community may be able to acquire a tive review of this country’s SOF capabili- follow-on aircraft designed specifically to ties across the board. The report identifies meet the needs of low-intensity conflict. fixed-wing aircraft requirements in four Three recent studies proposed various air­ areas. First, the report calls for a light tacti- craft for that purpose. cal transport similar to the type proposed The commander in chief of the US South­ by US Southern Command. This aircraft ern Command has identified requirements should be simple, rugged, reliable. and able for a light transport aircraft to support US to support fiare drop and psychological op- 68 A1RPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1987 erations in addition to the transport role.17 where it could be used in conjunction with Second. the report identifies the need for export versions of the light tactical trans­ a light armed surveillance aircraft similar port and gunship in counterinsurgency op­ to the tvpe proposed by Klingaman, but erations. Troop infiltration and exfiltration slightly more sophisticated. This aircraft missions could continue to be performed by should includean imagery intelligence (IM- helicopter. Together, these aircraft could INT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) ca- provide friendly countries with a formida- pability, be capable of short-field ble set of tools for counterinsurgency operations, and be indistinguishable from operations. other similar aircraft.1" Third, the report suggests the need to de- velop and produce a follovv-on, side-firing gunship to replace the AC-130. The gunship Conclusion provides an appropriate levei of firepower Much has been done lately to improve for counterinsurgency operations and limits this country’s SOF capability, but much collateral damage because of its high degree more remains to be done. The military must of accuracy. Like the light tactical transport. overcome the institutional myopia that the gunship should be simple, rugged. and causes it to focus almost exclusively on the reliable. high-risk/low-probability leveis of mid- to Finally. the report supports the need for a high-intensity conflict to the exclusion of forvvard air control platform. It proposes us- the low-risk/high-probability levei of low- ing modified single-engine, propeller-dri- intensity conflict. This nation must be pre- ven trainers for the mission of locating pared to fight across the spectrum of conflict guerrilla forces and directing air strikes or where and when US interests are chal- air-mobile assaults on the target.20 lenged. Equally important is the need to en- Each of these proposals is good as far as it hance US capability to advise and train goes. but it vvould be unrealistic to suggest third world countries in counterinsurgency that the US Special Operations Command operations while providing the necessary design and acquire a separate aircraft for military equipment for them to win the each of these missions. Rather, the com­ fight. mand should pursue a two-pronged ap- The SOF community in this country has proach to this issue. The command should the opportunity to meet these challenges seek a single airframe. which fulfills the head-on—to do more to enhance US prepar- light tactical transport requirements, to re­ edness and security at the low end of the place the C-130 in the US SOF inventory. conflict spectrum than ever before. The time Then. a portion of these airframes should be for action is at hand. Failure to address the modified to accomplish the reconnaissance crucial issues in organizing, training, and and surveillance missions, including IM- equipping Air Force SOF can bear grave INT and SIGINT capabilities. while remain- consequences. Secretary of State George ing externally indistinguishable. Another Shultz says that to shrink from this task portion of these same airframes could be means “the world’s future will be deter- modified to support the side-firing gunship mined by others—most likely bv those who mission. So, one airframe designed to are the most brutal, the most unscrupulous, meet the demanding requirements of low- and the most hostile to evervthing we be- intensity conflict could support intratheater lieve in.”21 What will the final outcome airlift. surveillance/reconnaissance, and be? gunship missions. Next, the command should pursue Kling- Notes aman s proposal for developing the LASA 1. Department of the Armv. loint Loiv-lntensity Conflict for export to friendly third world countries, Prnject Report, vol. 1, Analylical fíevietvof Loiv-lntensitv Con- AIR FORO' SPECIAL OPERATIONS 69

flicl. Fort Monroe. Va : US Army Training and Doctrine Com- 11. |effrey P Rhodes. ''The Ainazing Osprey." Air Force mand, 1986. 1-9. Magazine, january 1987. 83. 2. Ibid.. 1-11 12. Department of the Air Force, The Air Force Issues Book. 3 Department of the Air Force. L'SAF Speciai Operations Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986, 6- 13. Forces Master Pian (U). Washington. D.C.: n p.. 1983. 5-1 (SE- 13. Senate and House. Gompromise on Speciai Operations CRET—Information extracted is undassified.) Forces. S.K. 2453 and H.R. 5109, 99lh Cong.. 2d sess.. 1986. 3. 4. Ibid.. B-l-5. 14 Department of the Army, foint Low-Intensity Conflicl 5. Robert L. Brenci. USAF Speciai Operations. The Forgot- Project Heport. vol. 2. Low-Intensity ConflU I Issues anil Rec- ten Force (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air University Press. 1983|. om/nendotions (U), Ft. Monroe, Va.: US Army Training and 49-50. Doctrine Cominand, 1986. Bl 1-4. Hereafter cited asLIC issues 6. Department of the Air Force. Report of lhe Panei on (SECRET/NOFORN—Information extracted is undassified.) Enhancement of Speciai Operations Forces (ü). Washington. 15. |erome W. Klingaman, “Light Aircraft Technology for D.C: USAF Scientific Advisory Board. 1985. 153. (SECRET— Small Wars," Low-Intensity Conflicl und Modem Technology, Information extracted is undassified.) ed. David ). Dean (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press. 7. Master Plan, 4—8. 1986). 123. 8. Richard A. Gabriel. MiJitary íncompetence (New York: 16. Ibid., 130-32. Hill and Wang. 1985). 47. 49-50. 17. LIC Issues. B9-5. B9-6. 9. Ibid.. 107. 18. Ibid.. B9-6. B9-7. 10. Harold K. lohnslon and Michael G. Slattery. Policy, 19. Ibid.. B9-7. Strategy and Speciai Operations (Washington. D.C.: National 20. Ibid., B9-7. B9—8. Defense University Press. 1983). 39. (SECRET—Information 21. George Shultz. "Low-Intensity Warfare: The Ghallenge extracted is undassified.) of Ambiguity," Proreedings of the Low-Intensity Warfare Con- ference (Washington. D.C.: n.p.. 1986|, 12.

Rícochets Confinued from page 3 tem’’, in the summer issue of the Journal is a It is evident that centralization of planning, well-presented analysis of a problem that has decisionmaking. and intelligence capability plagued the TACS for at least the 17 years I have is the crux of the matter. Raising the wing been part of the 17XX AFSC. Although much of commander from the nether regions of the oper- the training Major Buchanan suggests is in fact ational levei of war implies a tilt toward decen- being provided, much of it is on an ad hoc, catch- tralization, vvith all that may mean in terms of as-catch-can basis at the local unit levei. Imple- resource allocation and orientation of roles. It mentation of a Battle Management Course would will require delegating responsibility to lower be a signihcant step in the right direction. Time leveis and tailoring the concept of mission-type constraints. however, would in all probability orders to Air Force needs and objectives. The key severely limit the number of Air Guard person- question is will such decentralization enhance our ability to apply air power in a more timely nel who could directly benefit from such a fashion, with better intelligence preparation course. against a maneuvering, dynamic opponent? It is If a Battle Management Course is in fact imple- an issue worthy of further discussion in these mented, thought should be given to taking it to pages and around the Air Force. the field so that we "weekend warriors” who are such a large proportion of the TACS can benefit Capl Brian J. Morra, USAF from the program as well. This could be done Headquarters L/mted Slales Air Forces either through sending instructors to the units on Washington. D.C. drill weekends or through the development of a training syllabus for individual or group studv. In both cases, the training could be meshed with the Systems Training Exercise program already THE BATTLE MANAGEMENT COURSE AND available to the units. THE “WEEKEND WARRIOR" Maj Stuarl B. Lange, Geórgia ANG Maj Thomas Buchanan's article. “The Need for 1 18 Tactical Control Flíglil (TCF) Battle Managers in the Tactical Air Control Sys- Kennesaw, Geórgia IRA EAKERAND THE EAR OF DIONYSIUS Col Timothy E. Kline

LD DIUNYSIUS often emploved should not require overmuch support. The an artful device to keep tabs on “ear” and the Eakers are what we are after. his kingdom. By listening above Gen Ira Eaker was remarkable for many an ancient quarry in Sicily, at a reasons. He became a legend by dint of he- convenientO orifice vvhere the chasm tapered roic leadership and longevity. Having been to a virtual ear trumpet. he could monitor honored in recent time with a fourth star expressions of divergent viewpoints. The that recognized the patriarchal role he had informed monarch would then act to defuse fulfilled sincethecloseof theSecond World criticism or to redirect policy. Of course, he War. Ira Eaker was a role model for the offí- vvas not an enlightened bureaucrat. A few cer corps. Even in retirement his labors in people vvere killed. He was just beginning to the realm of Communications were legion. vvield the informational instrument that Especially in the defense of Air Force roles, Stalin perfected centuries later with his dia- missions. and people was the pen of Ira bolical policy against “state wreckers." Eaker often the sole focal point for express- Nonetheless. the ancient tyrant was onto ing the very vital informal feedback that something of benefit to more benign me- provides leaders with countervailing view­ gaorganizations like the United States Air points and permits a clear assessment of Force. It is never too late to provide safe whatever potentialities exist within the channels for the upward fiow of informal scope of those challenging views. Percolat- feedback in an enterprise with lots of peo­ ing up from the ranks were hosts of ideas. ple. even if you do not intend to crush those General Eaker amplified those worth label- thinkers who will surface from time to time. ing as concepts. He frequentlv passed them Their usefulness to the life of a military Ser­ along in the open press. His was an ear like vice is a basic premise of this article that Dionysius’s. During the halcyon davs of Billy Mitch- ell's fiery ascendancy, Capt Ira Eaker had functioned as an ear for the chief of the Air Service—Maj Gen Mason Patrick—and for Assistant Chief Mitchell himself while the famous court-martial was in progress. Sit- ting between the offices of the chief and the embattled assistant chief, both Eaker and Maj Carl "Tooey" Spaatz were fully tuned in to distracting waves of opinion wafting up from the far-flung officers’ clubs and thinlv manned airfields and warehouses across the continent. The Service was small enough in the twenties and early thirties for a handful of opinion samplers like Spaatz and Eaker to track almost all disparate opinions. And shvness was no hallmark of the aviators who comprised the interwar air arm. Eaker and Spaatz could capture inputs from a Hor- ace Hickam. a Frank Andrews, or a “Hap” Arnold, and the word would quickly get to the highest echelon ungarbled. But not evervone who is positioned to lis- ten to contending opinion will faithfully re- transmit what is gleaned. If a large, modem military organization relies solely on verbal feedback from the troops, it will face the hazard of inevitable distortion manufac- tured by purvevors of comment who fear self-incrimination. Such is the natural hu- man response once the scale of an organi­ zation gets so large that full trust cannot be automatically assured in interpersonal re- lationships. An impersonal vehicle for car- rying viewpoints is needed. And as long as the growing yet fledgling air arm lacked such a vehicle, it paid the bloody price that is the product of bad doctrine. The lesson is that bad doctrine means bad guidance. There is a direct impact on warfíghting potential. Maj Gen I. B. Holley, Jr.. USAFR. Retired, tells us that immediately after Wortd War I the Army Air Service courted just one fash- ionable viewpoint despite the expression of several diverging opinions. The combat ex- perience of qualified fliers was not assidu- ously sought. Instead, the Air Service afflicted itself with a flawed doctrine: “For

71 72 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1987 want of an objective and authoritative sombre fruit of that flawed doctrine re- method of formulating doctrine on air quired major and wrenching repairs in the power, the manifestly inadequate doctrine white hot combat of the Combined Bomber . . . reached publication and consequent cir- Offensive. That tale of bombers and fighters culation while opposing points of view did is the one legend Air Force partisans do not not.”1 Without an aggressive policy of can- need to rehash. In the end, a proud combi- vassing and evaluating the variety of nation of missions made victory in the air thought in the vast marketplace of ideas rep- possible. That lesson is inculcated in var- resented by its own constituency, any Ser­ ious teachings of air power. It is enshrined vice can be caught wearing the blinders of as well in US Air Force doctrinal publica- the Army Air Service. Ignoring the combat tions. Perhaps, on reflection, the corporate experiences of the only war in which air- Air Corps had once upon a time located its craft had flung mankind’s military combat- ears too far from the geography of its brain. ants through the firmament, the spokesmen All the interwar fumbling for coherence of the earliest airmen managed to invent a in terms of doctrine amounted to another particularly egregious way to start their doc- fashionable thought train that excluded any trinal process—administering poison at its competing views. Clearly, there is a danger birth. What it meant for our forebears was “a involved in stifling too completely any op­ doctrine which utilized far less than the posing thought. How does the US Air Force maximum potential of aviation.”- preclude the hazard of a single-frequency From that awful doctrinal beginning in receiver today? 1919, when the observation role was foisted Happily, the free society wherein the Air on an inarticulate Air Service, until 1931, Force is rooted provides plenty of externai when another equallv dangerous doctrinal criticism. Air Force leaders can pick and variant was perfected, the air arm had mis- choose from whatever wends its way across carried in every attempt to give birth to a their desks. And military leaders are sensi- coherent doctrine. In 1975 Col Fred Shiner tive to myriad views expounded in the open asked General Eaker for his appreciation of press. But how does our modern air arm the doctrinal difficulties facing airmen of provide an “ear of Dionysius" to collect vi­ that decade-plus period. Eaker’s estimate in tal internai opinions reverberating around recalling the struggles to tie down ideas of the interior of its own collective expertise? warfighting is captured by his terse com- Does any such device exist? ment that Air Corps doctrine “remained For 40 years the device was the Air Uni- fluid.”3 versity fíeview. Sometimes maligned. some- Meanwhile, the almost mythical Air times exalted, this professional journal of Corps Tactical School (started at Langley the Air Force was the focal point for mani- Field in 1920) had removed in 1931 from fold rays of wisdom within blue-suit ranks. Langley to Maxwell with the aim of becom- It had no challengers within or without the ing the primary locus for doctrine develop- Service. Editorial awards rained praises on ment. Until 1928 it had boasted no victories its authors, artists, and staff. Unlike the on the mental front. That year, however, Navy with both Proceedings and the Naval saw a surprising turnaround. Maj Gen James War College Review (not counting the E. Fechet, chief of the Air Corps, reversing a Marine Corps Gazette, which enjoys a dv- potent engine of ideas, boosted the school namic reputation within a separate constit­ into the too familiar fatal groove from which uency in the same department), and the it was never rescued. When Fechefs staff re- Army with Parameters and Military fíe- minded the Air Corps Tactical School of the view, the Air Force has no internai compe- “independent decisiveness of airpower,”4 a tition among journals vving for thoughtful headlong drive toward the obsessive idea of reflections or insightful advocacies. The bomber invincibi 1 ity began in earnest. The single vehicle for carrying first-class think- IRA EAKER 73 ing across the global Air Force was the Air now aftlict the American Services in these University Revieiv. late 1980s, Lord Rutherford offered a Having had a solid reputation for years, sombre yet comforting thought: ‘‘We’ve got the Air University Revieiv once enjoyed no money, so we’ve got to think.”5 One real- wide readership. Retirees, civilian scholars, ity of budget-cutting is a perceived threat to flag officers. and active-dutv types of all luxury. But one would hope the last thing ranks competed for the limited space avail- slated for slicing is the arterial conduit able in the bimonthlv journal. Despite through which surges spontaneous thinking severe budget cuts and concomitant circu- to enliven the realm of thoughtful airmen. lation restrictions, a series of great editors An Air Force that fails to consider every labored in recent years to cull the submis- competent challenge might as well confine sions for gems while rejecting other offer- itself to two-dimensional warfare. There is ings of excellence. Yes. the Air Force had an simply little hope for a blindered military "ear of Dionvsius." but curious brambles force. All the dancing on “laughter-silvered have obscured that only opening available wings" will not recoup bad doctrine. And to commentators and readers. A new title bad doctrine always costs lives in combat. (Airpoiver Journal), tighter quarters, and In the end, it can catastrophically break the even tighter thematic approaches threaten back of the American effort in battle. the larger voice of Service critique. What does all this have to do with Air Force doctrine? Well. for years Air Force doctrine briefers from Headquarters USAF/ XOXFP (formerly XOXID) have affirmed to Notes audiences the threefold sources of Air Force 1. 1. B. Hollev, |r.. Ideas and Weupons (Washington, D. C.: doctrine: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 169. 2. Ibid. 1. Historical experience 3. Footnoted in John F. Shiner. Foufois und the U.S. Army 2. Technology Air Corps, 1931-1935 (Washington. D. C.: Office of Air Force 3. Professional insight History. 19831.43. 4. Ibid.. 45. Of these three sources. tvvo vvere solidly the 5. E. N. da C. Andrade. Hulherfurd and lhe Nature of the subject matter of the Air University Revieiv. Atom (Garden City. N Y.: Doubleday and Co.. Inc.. 1964), 188. And the technology categorv, if not so boldly proclaimed, was regularly reflected in discussions arraved upon the journaPs pages. Editor's PostScript What other source so admirably com- bined the available wisdom in a single for- AS INTENDED, the author makes a case for the use- mat? The Air University Revieiv was fulness of internai discussion and dissent in any mil- famous as a vehicle for ideas. It owned a itary Service, pointing out that the Air Force's only knovvn constituency. The journal was at- written, open forum for this activity has been the Air University Revieiv. tractive. The arena for debate by thoughtful To these points and others per- taining to the importance of doctrine and its origins, contributors was unmatched within the Air the Airpoiver /ournal can only nod in wholehearted Force family. Therefore, any diminution of agreement. The author’s desires for an open Air Force the carrying capacitv of the journal should forum are exactly coincident with those of the Journal be resisted. Can anvone promise the recent and are incorporated into uur editorial and operating philosophy. The Airpoiver JournaVs purpose is to downvvard spiral will be stopped? provide the forum and to act as an educational tool, In the 1920s, when the United Kingdom the end result being solid air doctrine that will stand faced the prospect of budget cuts such as us in good stead. KWG net assessment

The Keorganization of the Juinl Chieis of Staff: A Owen s recommendations for improvement of Criticai Anaiysis by Allan R. Millet et ai. the National Security Council will probablyhave (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey, 1986). xi, 81 to compete with results of the Iran-Contra hear- pages. ings for attention and support. Hecomplains that "the main problem in Congress is the inability of The moderate reforms of the Defense Reorgan- that bodv to consider national security issues in ization Act of 1986 were resisted by DOD. but the the contexl of the big picture." (p. 39) Perhaps handwriting was on the wall In January 1986 the some current senatorial initiatives will interact Institute for Foreign Policy Anaiysis convened a with the DOD commission on integrated long- conference to discuss defense reorgani/.ation; term strategy to improve the situation. this booldet is the result and it contains revised The next three chapters are of particular inter- versions of papers by stellar numes, including est to students of strategy. Lt Gen Bernard Trai­ Proíessors A. R. Millet and Robert Murray and nor. USMC. Retired, describes and assesses Generais E. C. Meyer and Bernard Trainor. (favorablv) the JCS and Joint Staff planning pro- Professor Millet. most recently noted as a his- cess. The CINCs and operational planning are torian of the Marine Corps in terms of “open Sys­ also discussed. Thanks to an initiative by Gen tems" theory. demonstrates the sharpshooter‘s lohn W. Vessey, “war plans left the realm of de- instinct. His opening chapter bluntly denies any ployment and entered the operational world." relationship between the structure of military or­ (p. 48) General Meyer. the former Army Chief of ganization and combat performance. He traces Staff. argues that double-hatting. pressures of the record from the interwar period to Vietnam. time. and other conflicting demands degrade the of which he vvrites that quality of military advice below what is neces- organization problems in Washington and sary to the civilian leadership. (p. 55) Southeast Asia no doubt made an unhappy. Will the reform measures being proposed do frustrating vvar all the more miserable, but the job? Professor Murray of the Harvard Na­ they did not rank with American political ir- tional Security Program devotes six pages to this resolution and the fragility and incompetence crucial question. His answer strikes a somber of the South Vietnamese government as note: "In general, there is more hope than prom- causes for defeat. (Of course, the Communist ise in the proposed reforms." (p. 64) Vietnamese and their allies also had some- thing to do with the war’s outcome.) (p. 15) The major deficiencies of the unified system . . . lie mainly outside the organization So Millefs conclusion emerges: “Unthinking chart. . . . The danger in many reform propos- support of the organizational status quo mav be als is that they enmesh the joint system in the no virtue. bul it is less a vice than the illusion programming and budgeting business, or in that tinkering with Title 10. U.S. Code. will the managerial responsibilities of the military somehow improve military effectiveness. That departments, to the great detriment of the war task lies bevond the range of organizational re- planning and preparation tasks. The latter form of the armed forces alone." (p. 17) should be the principal occupation of the Next Mr Mackubin T. Owens, a special assist- Chairman and unified commanders. (pp. 66- ant in the Department of Energy, examines 67) executive and legislative influence in policy- making about national security. Rightly he How is one to assess this booklet? It would be stresses the constitutional foundation and effect. a failure of nerve to note that the implementation Interagencv coordination. he finds, is the chief of the Defense Reorganization Act is in its earli- problem vvithin the executive branch. (Here he est stages and to conclude that no evaluation of might have mentioned increasing tension be­ this work is now possible. In fact. one can assign tween the Air Force and NASA. but the aero- a very clear and significant place to the proceed- space dimension is not the focus of the book.) ings of the 1986 conference here reported. The

74 NET ASSESSMENT 75 conference and the book come 40 years after the with a mismatch of its own means and airns. The fundamental National Security Act of the post- Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu noted vvar period and the accompanying work by Maj some 2,500 years ago that the object of military Gen Otto L. Nelson. |r., National Security and policy should be to defeat the enemy’s plan. lf the General Staff (1946). With amazing presci- this is so, and if it is true that the Soviets pursue ence. General Nelson specified the very func- a warfighting-damage-limiting strategy, then the tional and organizational defects that ensured US concept of mutually assured destruction the passage of last year’s legislation. The act of could be rapidly becoming dangerous in the 1986 is illuminated in a general way by this sam- extreme. pling of informed opinion. As noted. there are, of course, alternative John Tashjean views of Soviet intentions. Raymond Garthoffs Washington, D.C. classic defense of a Soviet acceptance of mutual deterrence is an example of this. Lee and Staar’s work will certainly not stop this debate; the Soviet Military Policy Since World War II by question of which Soviet sources are to be William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar. Stanford. trusted is almost epistemological in its scope. Califórnia: Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 262 But the mass of data and the apparent conclu- pages, S21.95. sions cannot be ignored. In fact, the authors make their case well for the The title of this book is somewhat misleading warfighting-damage-limitation theory by match- in that it implies a treatment of the breadth of So­ ing declaratory policy with the observable ele- viet military policy. vvhereas in realitv the focus ment of operational policy, that of weapon is on strategic nuclear doctrine. To be sure, since deplovmeiits. Obviouslv the scope of the book 1960 the Strategic Rocket Forces have dominated must be limited, but one might expect to see a Soviet military thought. But as the authors do treatment of the issue that would include alter­ mention. theater "strategic-operational” con- native hypotheses. Thus, there arguably could be cerns vveigh heavilv on Soviet doctrine because an alternative fit between weapon acquisition the Soviets see contiguous theaters of military policy and strategic doctrine. This may be seen, operations (TVD) as strategic. Another anomalv for instance, if one stresses Malenkov’s 1950s or to be recognized in this book is that the authors Brezhnev‘s 1970s view of the horrors of nuclear participated in this volume in different ways. war. In this perspective, the procurement of William Lee wrote the '‘basis" for the book and counterforce weapons could be viewed through Richard Staar vvas responsible for "updating and the lens of a technology-driven model perhaps consolidation." linked with a bureaucratic decisionmaking anal- But aside from these distractions, the book is a ysis. This argument may not withstand the rigors competent and straightforward treatment of its of serious analysis, although it may be strength- topic—one that is of the utmost importance due ened by Gorbachev's recent public-policy pro- to the ongoing public debate over the Strategic nouncements and budget decisions, but one Defense Initiative and its doctrinal implications. might expect the authors to at least demonstrate The authors’ main theme, stated clearly and the value of their hypothesis over alternative often (the reader is relieved to see serious schol- explanations. ars take a firm position on an important issue). is The authors demonstrate their point graphi- that Soviet military “ doctrine and strategy cally by using the SALT process as a vehicle to clearly State both the reasons for and objectives illustrate the continuity of Soviet doctrine (a of the USSR military buildup,” and more impor­ much broader and higher levei political-military tant. that the “final objectives" are “to be pre- concept than we are accustomed to in the West). pared to fight and win wars at all leveis, Theysuggest that the Soviet acceptance of a limit including a nuclear war.” The unstated assump- on strategic defense is a change in national strat- tion is that vve should not make the mistake of egy comparable to Stalin's pact with Hitler. They "mirror-imaging’’ the USSR in our defense identify the basis of this as a realization that the policy. correlation of forces was about to make a historie The importance of this conclusion cannot be turn in the 1970s toward the United States. This overstated. lf one accepts the authors' viewpoint was due to a lagging Soviet technological-indus- (and there is indeed room for differing interpre- trial base and the development of an American tation of the data), then the United States is faced antiballistic missile (ABM) system. The shift 76 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1987

would have historie consequences in Soviet eyes benefit from General Smith’s multitude of "how- since it would criticaiIy threaten the very basis to” approaches to different situations, handy of Soviet strategy—the warfighting-damage- checklists, rules of thumb, and detailed case limiting doctrine that has existed since the studies and analyses. 195Us. Using weapons data and open-source Leaders can and should make a difference in publications, the authors make the case that the the organizations they head, Smith points out, by military suggested and supported the political setting standards and goals and then establishing imposition of a limit on US strategic defense un- priorities. With each chapter of this book, an­ til the time vvhen the USSR could compete tech- other gem of wisdom and common sense nologicallv. Having accomplished this with emerges for the advancement of both the individ­ SALT I and the ABM Treaty, the Soviets are now ual subordinate’s performance and unit effec- in a position to begin again to implement their tiveness. The first chapter details 20 vvarfighting-damage-limiting strategy. This does fundamentais to remember for basic leadership not imply a Soviet ABM capability today, but it philosophy. Subsequent chapters consider does suggest that a “creep-out" of the treaty changing command in an organization; steps could coincide with next-generation ICBMs that through the hiring. counseling, and firing of could meet Soviet hard and soft target-kill re- those who work for you; highlights of situations quirements with a lower levei of launchers. The all leaders deal with in daily routine operations generally unpublicized Soviet progress in devel- on the job; development of ideas for nurturing oping and deploying strategic defensive systems communication networks; and a focus on the would tend to support this view. need for strategic Vision and the role of planning. In sum, the authors' case is tightly argued and Top this off with checklists for busy leaders that well documented. but as always in studying the include, among others, integrity, hang-ups, and USSR, it is based on assumptions that are diffi- thank-yous. The checklists are followed by a cult to define precisely. The contribution of Lee section of case studies and their analysis. In ad- and Staar is that now a coherent examination of dition, you will find a selected bibliography on weapons acquisition policy. deployed forces, literature about leadership challenges and op- doctrine. and operational concepts has been portunities. The following paragraphs highlight blended with a case study of Soviet political-mil- some of the book’s clever insights into the role of itary policy. To argue with these conclusions a leader. will now take more than a basic disagreement on How much time do you spend visiting on the "Soviet altitudes.” The future of US security pol­ shop floor, conducting meetings, or socializing icy rests on how w'e treat the Soviet reaction to with your people? Taking Charge recommends President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative. the four-hour rule, which prescribes that a leader Lee and Staar suggest that we study what hap- should spend no more than four hours a day in pened 15 years ago before we take further action. the office and the rest of the time meeting other Maj Douglas L. Erwin, USAF people, visiting subsidiary organizations, partic- US Air Force Academy, Colorado ipating in or watching sports activities with sub- ordinates, conducting ceremonies, or giving motivational speeches. Are you an innovator? Do you hang on to the Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders status quo or get caught in policy rigidities that by Maj Gen Perry M. Smith, USAF, Retired. do not allow much flexibi 1 ity? General Smith Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univer- points out the importance of nourishing the mav- sitv Press. 1986, 234 pages. $7.00. ericks in the organization: of being open to sug- gestions. ideas, new thoughts, direction. and "Don t buy a book until you have read at least concepts; and of striking a balance between con- two book reviews to ensure that reading the book tinuity and creativity. is worth your valuable time." Such is some sage How can you repeal the Paul Principie? What advice given by Maj Gen Perry M. Smith in his is the Paul Principie anyway? It refers to the recent book Taking Charge: Á Practical Guide gradual obsolescence of leaders as they lose for Leaders. And with that advice, I recommend touch with the unit they lead, become too con- you quickly find another book review on this servative, resist innovation and change, and fail masterpiece of leadership wisdom, then obtain a to take advantage of technological break- copy of the book so you can start to share and throughs. And what can they do about it.,> They NET ASSESSMHNT 77

can develop a systematic reading program, par- tory." In that chapter he defends Gen Douglas ticipate in management training symposiums MacArthur against a criticai historian, and urges and workshops, have regular interaction with us to read enough history to form our own judg- long-range planners, and brainstorm with the ments. Certain chapters appear to apply only to staff. the Army, such as chapter 43, "The Ties That And what about wordsmithing? A leader Bind the Airborne.” However, that chapter crosses an important milestone when signing the makes the point that a team works more success- first imperfect. but totally adequate, staff paper fully as a unit, which applies to all organizations. without editing or changing it personally. Gen­ Although General Newman uses examples eral Smith States. “The perfect can be the enemy from his Army career to make his points, a little of the good." thought on the reader’s part will often reveal a All this adds up to a textbook on valuable lead- corresponding Air Force situation. Many times ership actions and philosophies for all leaders at while reading the book, I was reminded of lead- any levei. Taking Charge is handy for reference ership principies I had already studied and prac- purposes and is as readable as it is beneficiai. tices I already used, but these universal themes Capt Sue Slavec, USAF never bored me because of the author’s vivid ex­ Maxwell AFB. Alabama amples. Also the book provided "refresher train­ ing" to reduce my poor habits and strengthen the good ones. Don’t read this book expecting a What Are Generais Made Of by Aubrey New- checklist on how to obtain general officer rank raan. Novato, Califórnia: Presidio Press. 1987, (although page 243 contains a short list of needed qualities). Instead use the book to focus 344 pages. $18.95. your ideas on how to improve as an officer. How many of us would like to have an infor­ Some weak points must be mentioned. Since mal chat with a major general? Well. the book this book is a compilation of articles written at What Are Generais Made Of. by Maj Gen Aubrey various times, certain examples do repeat from Red" Newman. is probablv as close as most of one chapter to another. I also found that the gen­ us will ever get to the experience. In this book, eral sometimes hints at events he never relates. General Newman provides clear insights into the In some cases he expects the reader to know the lessons he learned throughout his career. Al- incident. and my lack of Army background left though we are not allowed the luxury of a two- me guessing. In other cases the author seemed way conversation, Newman's openness and in­ purposely vague about the incident, and I won- formal writing style convey the feeling that he is dered why he mentioned it at all. talking to you. General Newman’s viewpoints and tales from Throughout his career General Newman wrote his career are enlightening. I recommend the articles for Army magazine, and most of the book as easy, enjoyable. and worthwhile reading. books 66 chapters are taken from these articles. Capt Cathyrn Plum, USAF Each is a focused discussion of a particular con- Maxwell AFB, Alabama cept. General Newman organized these short chapters into three main areas—company grade officers, field grade officers, and general officers. However, even the author admits, “It is not pos- The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World War by Malcolm sible to arrange the chapters here in any precise manner, since each theme is developed to stand Cooper. Winchester, Massachusetts: Allen and Unwin, 1986, 169 pages, $27.95. alone in its own right." 1 found the book most useful when I could read an individual chapter When something important happens and we and mull it over for awhile before going to the want to know why, we look for simple answers. next. This was due to both the loose organization Those of us who are not historians—and here I between chapters and the quality of the infor- nail my own colors to the mast—love to find one mation packed in each short chapter. clear cause for each major event of the past. Mal­ The topics covered in the book are quite di- colm Cooper, in his brief study of the develop- verse. Most chapters contain practical guide- ments that led to the formation of the Royal Air lines, such as chapter 12, “To Lead Well Takes Force (RAF) on 1 April 1918, does not permit his Heart and Head." Others are editorial in nature, readers that luxury. With an almost infuriating such as chapter 46, "Evaluate: Not Just Read His- willingness to see the opposite point of view, 78 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL1987

Cooper provides a meticulously researched anal- formed an independent bombing force within ysis of the period from the conception of military the new RAF that should have been the weapon aviation itself to the birth of the world's first in- to take the war to the German homeland. lt is dif- dependent air force. He leads us skillfully ficult to argue with Malcolm Cooper's researched through the many factors that “caused" the for- opinion that the RAF was little different from the mation of the RAF. RFC it replaced. lt continued to concentrate on Cooper’s comments on the pre-1914 British dose air support and reconnaissance, neglecting governmenfs half-hearted support of aviation offensive counterair and interdiction operations research show his refusal to depend on hind- and especially strategic bombing. The RAF’s sight. While recognizing the disadvantage this later espousal of strategic bombardment, to the gave Britain at the outbreak of war, he simulta- exciusion of other valid aspects of air power, was neously admits to the justification of the attitude a result of its struggle for survival in the interwar on the grounds of the uncertain potentia! of avia­ years and was based more on untried theory than tion and of unwillingness to provoke an aerial on its experiences in 1918. arms race that vvould dissipate Britain’s advan- In many ways this is a sorry story. Cooper de- tages as an island nation. scribes with brutal directness the inadequate He shovvs us how the lack of any coherent gov- analysis of intelligence and capabilities and the ernment air policy led to the fragmented devel- personal disputes and the political infighting opment of British military aviation. Scores of that took Britain along the uneven path to an in­ different aircraft types vvere ordered by the gov- dependent air arm. He shows how the lack of ernment from various sources; duplication of ef- strategic direction and the late stage of its for­ fort and waste of resources were the inevitable mation left the RAF’ to fight a battle in the 1920s results. More damaging in the long term was the for its continued existence. Yet his even-handed grovving divergence between the army and the approach prevents him from pillorying individ­ navy in the ideas of doctrine and resource allo- ual “culprits.” He is always fair. cation and in the perceptions of each other's mis- This book is not written to entertain. It is a de- sion. This. if anything, might be called the tailed and carefully researched description of primary “cause" of the formation of the RAF. how independent air power carne into existence. The backdrop to Coopers analysis is a gradual Its scope is deliberatelv limited, but it is a rele- shift in dominance. from the enthusiastic naval vant study both to those interested in the historv airmen vvho were later brought under control by of air power and to those who like to find out their masters in the Admiralty to the military pil- how political decisions are taken. The author’s ots of the Roval Flving Corps (RFC) gaining con- professional approach to his research has re- fidence in their ability to give effective support to sulted in a detailed, well-indexed work with the army in France. But personalities play their comprehensive footnotes and bibliography, part: a voung and visionary Winston Churchill which is brought to life by 31 well-chosen con- vvho used the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) to temporary photographs. I recommend The Birth attack vvithin their bases the Zeppelins that of Independent A ir Power. It casts light on the threatened London. and a reluctant Hugh Tren- problems of making major organizational chard vvho was far more interested in supporting changes in wartime and, as a cautionary tale, has the ground troops than in developing the inde- much to sav to us today about preparedness, the pendent air force whose “father” he later balanced employment of air power, and the in- became. lluence of personalities on policy. The trigger for the formation of that force was Squadron Leader Peter Dixon, RAF a series of raids by Gotha bombers on London US A ir Force Academy. Colorado starting in May of 1917. As Cooper shows in de- tail, there had been attempts to mediate in the squabbles for resources between the RNAS and Managing Nuclear Operations edited by Ashton the (now preeminent) RFC. There were a few vi- B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner. and Charles A. sionaries vvho felt that a new médium of warfare Zraket. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institu- needed a new Service. But it was the Gotha raids tion, 1987, 751 pages, $39.95 in hardback, and the public outcrv for retaliation that led the $18.95 in paperback. cabinet to combine the RFC and the RNAS into This volume is composed of 21 essavs that ad- one organization. On the basis of a forecast—and dress the various dimensions of managing nu­ nonexistent—surplus of aircraft, they also clear forces in peacetime and wartime, with NET ASSESSMENT 79 special emphasis on the all-important transi- place where they can be destroyed by follow-on tions from one state to the other. They are counterforce attacks. What really highlights this grouped in three parts: "Nuclear Operations," faulty logic is the essay by Albert Wohlstetter "The Command System." and "Policy Perspec­ and Richard Brody in which they postulate mis- tives.” There are a total of 22 contributors. each siles armed with very low-yield. highly accurate, vvith excellent credentials. burrowing warheads that could act as prompt The first part of the book contains five essays hard-target killers while causing almost zero col- that address peacetime operations. alerting lateral damage. They claim the necessary tech- forces in crises and the outbreak of conventional nology has already been developed for the war. preplanned operations. maintaining control Pershing II. If this is true. we can expect future during wartime, and terminating the war. The forces to evolve to such precisely usable weap- second part of the book discusses command Sys­ ons. Attacks could be large enough to destroy tems vvith essays on Communications systems command systems but far smaller than would and vulnerabilities, strategic and tactical vvarn- justify a single major response option. This tells ing. targeting. delegating authority. NATO oper­ me that the command system's vulnerability to ations, the role of wargaming. the psychology of an attack involving a large number of warheads command. command centers, and Soviet opera­ will not likely remain an irrelevant problem tions. Part III treats a variety of policy areas in- even to those who argue that it is now. Such an cluding strategic defense, arms control. attack could wipe out our command system and antisatellite issues. sources of error and uncer- be the precursor of an across-the-board counter­ tainty. acquisition of command systems, com­ force attack that likewise would cause extremely mand system vulnerability, and the choices and limited collateral damage. It could lead to a sit­ trade-offs involved. uation in which the command system is knocked This is a book for the serious student of nuclear out, forces are largely destroyed. but society is doctrine and strategy. It presents no magic Solu­ for the most part undamaged and therefore hos- tions to the dilemmas inherent in managing nu­ tage to further attack. Obviously, such logic does clear forces. Its purpose is simply to call not lead to strategic stability. attention to this largelv overlooked subject. This is not the best book for the average reader The authors feel that the "neglect of nuclear of the Airpoiver Journal to find out what he or operations is a major flavv in the prevailing un- she should know about the command and con­ derstanding of security." I agree. With this lim- trol of nuclear forces. I vvould recommend first ited purpose in mind, the book fulfills its reading Strategic Command and Control: Rede- objective. Hovvever, the authors not only gained fining the Nuclear Threat, by Bruce Blair. and my attention. they convinced me that many of The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces. the leading thinkers on this subject—people who by Paul Bracken. (Both authors were contribu­ have influenced and are novv at least influencing tors to this book.) These books will provide a if not determining policy in this area—are using good foundation for reading and understanding questionable logic. this book. Several of the authors offer as accepted vvis- For those readers who are well versed in this dom that the command system for nuclear forces subject area or who serve in any capacity in the does not need to be any more survivable than the area of nuclear operations, I heartily recommend forces it serves. They point out that any attack Managing Nuclear Operations. The authors are large enough to knock out the command system right when they say we have not given the area vvould be so large as to justify a single large re­ enough thought. In my opinion. their essays sponse. And a single large response does not re- combine to prove their premise. quire a command system that has to survive any Lt Col Fred J. Reule, USAF, Retired longer than to order that response. By this logic. Longivood, Florida they conclude that the idea that the command system is vulnerable to a large attack is irrele- vant. It seems to me that this logic is faulty. In a Conflict of Myths by Larry E. Cable. New York: crisis or a wartime situation. a vulnerability to a New York University Press, 1986, 285 pages, large attack is an invitation for just such an at­ $30.00. tack. for a rapid escalation to knock out com­ mand systems before launch orders can be In Vietnam, “ignorance, not malice, as was disseminated. thus freezing offensive forces in later charged by opponents of the war, was at the 80 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL FALL1987

root both of American escalation and the ulti- also considerable insight and a marvelous writ- mate American failure." (p. 279) So begins the ing style. It is most encouraging to find a scholar concluding chapter of this brilliant new book in- concerned with national security affairs who is vestigating America’s trauma in Southeast Asia. willing to do solid research on a difficult subject. The ignorance referred to was the American fail­ All too many scholars in that field content them- ure to understand the fundamental differences selves with ruminations about things nuclear (a between the two basic types of guerrilla warfare: field in which there is little evidence and even partisan and insurgent. In the American view, all less real research) or endless studies concerning such wars were waged by partisans, sponsored the NATO-Warsaw Pact face-off (a field that has by an externai power, and often presaged con- been and continues to be overworked by mun- ventional aggression by the sponsoring power. dane bean counters and fantasizing scenarists). The result was American military doctrine (the- Cable has tackled a difficult, emotion-laden sub­ ory of victory) skewed toward conventional war­ ject crucial to the most likely future conflicts that fare, particularly the destruction of supply and may draw American involvement. This book is Communications links between the guerrillas must reading! and their presumed sponsors. Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF Cable's thesis offers a plausible explanation Maxwell AFB, Alabama for American military strategy in Vietnam, par­ ticularly the bombing efforts along the Ho Chi No More Heroes: Madness and Psychiatry in Minh Trail and in the Rolling Thunder campaign War by Richard A. Gabriel. New York: Hill and in North Vietnam, and explains why we trained, Wang, 1987, 174 pages, $17.95. structured, and equipped the South Vietnamese Army in the American image. Such a Clause- Catch-22 in Joseph Heller’s novel of the same witzian viewpoint also helps explain the big unit name stated that if you wanted to fight in a war, ground operations throughout South Vietnam. you were crazy and had to be medically disqual- To support his thesis, Cable illuminates the “les- ified from fighting, but if you did not want to sons" learned and ignored by the American mil­ fight, you were sane and had to. This book by itary from other guerrilla wars, offering short but Richard Gabriel examines a way out of Catch-22: amazingly insightful chapters on the Greek Civil give a soldier Chemicals that remove his anxiety, War, the “Banana Wars,” and the wars in Korea, declare him sane, and let him fight till he the Philippines, and Malaya. His recitation of the dies. Mr Gabriel sets up this straw man, and conversion of these “lessons” into doctrine is then spends 174 pages being aghast at his own very convincing. creation. All of this adds up to a convincing case, one The book’s premises are as follows: almost that is important in understanding the American evervone who fights long enough will become a failure in Vietnam. It is particularly important combat fatigue (CF) casualtv. CF losses, he in- and convincing for the early years—what the fers, are permanent. As the nature of warfare has American military refers to as the advisory pe- become more intense, and as night-fighting ca- riod. It is important to our understanding of the pability has removed nocturnal rest periods, we early years of direct American combat involve- may expect CF to sap quicklv anv military force's ment. The argument lost its punch, however, as fighting power. In order to maintain this power, the war continued and the North Vietnamese be- military psychiatrists are developing drugs to came more heavily involved. numb human anxiety so that men will become Cable’s scholarship is impressive and well emotionless fighting robots, undeterred by the documented in extensive chapter endnotes and fear that would otherwise drive them from the an impressive bibliography. Much of his re- hopelessly lethal modern battlefield. In conse- search was done in various archives (Truman, quence, all soldiers will fight till thev die since Kennedy, and Johnson libraries, National Ar­ neither side will turn and run when things are chives, and military Service historical centers) perceived as hopeless, which they will be. With- and relies on original source documentation. out fear, the human virtues—heroism. camara- One curious omission was his failure to use the derie, self-sacrifice—that have historically Air Force Historical Research Center located at ennobled war will not exist, and war will be­ Air University. come meaningless. Soldiers will either take the Cable’s contribution is most welcome and pills and become virtual automatons or they will helpful. He offers not only solid research, but not take the pills and be quicklv rendered hope- NET ASSESSMENT 8 i

lessly mad by the intense and never-ending war. way just because someone tells them to. And the The only way to avoid this Armageddon is (1) proper term is now “antisocial personality dis- not to have vvars or (2) to mutually agree to give order,” not “sociopath." up some or all of modern weaponry, thus low- For all this, the book is provocative. Some- ering the levei of lethalitv. A brave new world, times reading such a book and arguing with it in indeed. your head, which I obviously did, leads to useful Unfortunately, all is not well in this book. Yes, new insights. Richard GabriePs view of the na- combat fatigue occurs. Some 25—50 percent of all ture of modern warfare is that it is insane, and if casualties (not of the total force) mav be due to not driven mad by it, modern men must become, CF. However, about 60-80 percent can be re- or be chemically made to be, so emotionally tumed to dutv in three days or so, and the relapse numbed as to be unthinking killing machines. rate is relatively low at 10-15 percent. Mr Ga­ Therefore, we must change the way we think and briel revels in descriptions of the ailment and en- feel about war, or change the nature of war, or tirely neglects the fact that treatment. using little face Armageddon. What is your view? if any medication, has been quite effective in sev- Col (Dr) David R. )ones, USAF eral wars. If combat is so stressful on the lethal San Antonio, Texas modem battlefield. CF will affect both sides and the levei of lethalitv will drop as both sides lose George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-1959 by their manpower. We alreadv have fairly effective Forrest C. Pogue. New York: Viking-Penguin, antianxiety drugs. If their effect is to make men less cautious (as was anecdotally observed in 1987, 528 pages. $29.95. Vietnam). some of these men will, as Mr Gabriel Seldom is a biographer better qualified to write predicts, likely become casualties. Experienced on his subject than is Forrest C. Pogue, whose and trained troops foolishly and fruitlessly ex- earlier volumes on Marshall are already con- posing themselves to enemy fire would not be sidered classics. His work is highlighted by tolerated by any leader who wanted to win. Fear- personal insight sharpened by his years as a De­ less, incautious, dead soldiers benefit no one. partment of the Army historian. Later he served Even George Patton was quoted as saying that the as both executive director of the George C. Mar­ purpose of it all was to get the other guv to die for shall Research Foundation and director of the his countrv. Mindlessly aggressive soldiers, Marshall Library in Lexington, Virgínia. Once given drugs to allay fear and to inflame anger, again, he has tied his firsthand knowledge of the would not win, and the military, even taken at its era to an intimate understanding of Marshall worst (as Mr Gabriel generally does) is at least gained over the years. Thus, George C. Marshall: pragmatic. Ethics aside. the idea will not work. Statesman. 1945-1959 is more than just a factual This book has flawed scholarship as well as account of the final years of an American hero. It flawed logic. Of the 12 psychiatric sources cited, is an in-depth study of Marshall the general, the five are pre-1960 and one is undated. Farley diplomat, and the man. Mowat's name is mispelled, as is the Ganser syn- More than any other leader, Marshall had drome, which is no longer defined as it was in shaped the Allied victory in World War II. But the 1942 source from which the author cites it it was not in his character to serve on as the out of context. victorious commander once the job was finished. Elavil is an antidepressant medication and After 43 years of distinguished Service, he sought will not "prevent or control anxiety.” (p. 143) only to retire to the peace of Leesburg, Virgínia. "The author’s contention that “the basis of all On 19 November 1945, General Marshall sub- human emotions is anxiety" is stated without mitted his letter of resignation to President Tru- authority and is flat wrong, as is his unsupported man. A week later at his retirement ceremony, assertion that to rid oneself of anxiety would de- General Marshall received his only American stroy all emotions and, with them. the soul. (p. military decoration of the war, an Oak Leaf Clus- 148) Sociopaths are indeed out for "their own ter to the Distinguished Service Medal. He had benefit" at the expense of others, but "their own steadfastly refused any higher decoration. benefit" certainly does not include fearlessly let- When he returned home to Virgínia, the phone ting themselves get killed, since they also lack was ringing as he walked through the door. A 30- loyalty, dedication, respect for authority—ever second conversation with the president ended had one in your outfit?—or a sense of right and his retirement—he had been appointed as a spe- wrong. Such men are not likely to go in harm’s cial ambassador to China. It is this transition 82 AIRPOWER IOURNAL FALL 1987 from soldier to statesman that marks the begin- for US foreign policy. During that time, he served ning of Pogue’s fourth and final volume on as ambassador to China, secretary of State, pres­ George C. Marshall. ident of the American Red Cross, and finally as This biography gives one the opportunity to secretary of defense. The challenges Marshall vievv the postvvar period from the broad perspec­ faced in each of these positions are clearly pre- tive of the most respected and influential man of sented as Pogue carefully explores MarshalTs this time. Marshall dealt face-to-face with foreign policy. Chiang Kai-shek and Chou En-lai as he struggled Although popular history seems to have ne- to find the impossible compromise for the Na- glected Marshall in favor of the more colorful fig­ tionalists and Communists. In desperation, the ures of the time, few men can match the tenure or European heads of State turned to him to formu- quality of his Service. For over 50 years he served late the European Recovery Program, vvhich is his country with an ingrained quality of selfless- novv remembered as the Marshall Plan. His care- ness that gave him the freedom to foster great- fully measured policies were the key to the back- ness in men like Arnold, Eisenhower, Dulles, drop for the Truman Doctrine. As secretary of and Acheson. Forrest Pogue’s detailed. informa- defense, he sought the expanded UN participa- tive, yet enjoyable. treatment of Marshall pro- tion in Korea, prepared the US forces for the con- vides an opportuniiv for the reader to appreciate flict, and provided the president needed support those contributions and to recognize MarshalTs during the MacArthur affair. personal greatness. Fortunatelv for the reader, the author uses a Lt Col Thomas M. Kearney, USAF topical approach to this complex period of US Headquarters United States Air Force history. Most of the book is devoted to the years Washington. D.C. 1945-1952. when Marshall vvas a key spokesman notams

Notices of upcoming conferences, seminars, and Executive Director. Thirteenth Military History other professional notices of a noncommercial Symposium, HQ USAFA/DFH, Colorado nature should be sent to: Editor. Airpovver /our- Springs. CO 80840-5701. nal. Walker Hall. Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit material for length USAFA DOD Psychology Symposium and editorial content. The Air Force Academy’s Department of Behav- ioral Sciences and Leadership will hold its Elev- Airpower Research Institute, Sênior Research enth Biennial Psychology in the Department of Fellow Positions Defense Symposium at the Air Force Academy The Airpovver Research Institute (ARI) has two 13-15 April 1988. Possible topics for the sympos­ sênior research fellow positions available. ARI's ium include leadership and productivity, air- research is concentrated in three areas: nuclear crew performance issues, opera ti ona I and space strategy; development of doctrine, environments, women in the military, the mili­ strategv. and force structure for low-intensity tary familv. human factors engineering, organi- conflict: and theater-level military strategy and zational psychology. educational innovations, doctrine. and expert systems. The deadline for submission of papers is 4 january 1988. For further infor­ The two positions will be filled beginning in mation on submitting papers or attending the 1988, preferablv early in the year. Both positions symposium, contact Lt Col Robert Ginnett or Maj are for one vear with possible extensions. To be David Porter, Department of Behavioral Sciences eligible. an applicant must be serving on the fac- and Leadership, United States Air Force Acad­ ulty of an accredited academic institution of emy. CO. 80840. or call (303) 472-3860/3861 higher learning. Applicants should possess a (AÜTOVON 259-3860/3861). PhD in a discipline such as political Science or history. Fellows will be expected to produce a Air War College Aerospace Power Symposium book-length manuscript based on their research as well as to advise active duty military research- The Air War College will hold its 12th annual ers. Some instruction at Air University's Air War Aerospace Power Symposium at Maxwell AFB, College and Air Command and Staff College may Alabama. from 2-4 March 1988. The topic of the also be involved. All applicants should submit symposium will be “lntegrating Strategic and an updated vita and a two-page research pro- Tactical Air Power in Conventional Warfare." posal to CADRE/RI, Attn: Lt Col Price T. The symposium is sponsored by the Air Force Bingham. Walker Hall. Building 1400, Maxwell Chief of Staff, Gen Larrv D. Welch, and provides AFB, AL 36112-5532. For further information, a forum for exchange of ideas among key air contact Lieutenant Colonel Bingham at (205) power theorists. students. and practitioners. Key 293-6214. issues will include doctrinal concerns, training implications, applicability to airland/maritime USAF Academy Military History Symposium operations. organizational impacts. and logistics considerations. For further information, contact The Department of History at the United States Lt Col Marcy Powers, AWC/XP, Anderson Hall, Air Force Academy has announced that its Thir- Maxwell AFB. AL 36112-5522. orcall (205) 293- teenth Military History Symposium will be held 2335 or AUTOVON 875-2335. 12-14 October 1988. The topic will focus on the role of intelligence in military operations. The department has sponsored a symposium series USMA History Symposium since 1967. and all but the first symposium pro- The United States Military Academy, with the ceedings have been published through the Office generous support of the National Endowment for of Air Force History by the Government Printing the Humanities. will sponsor a history sympos­ Office. For further information, please write to: ium entitled “The Theory and Practice of Amer-

83 84 AIRPOWEfí JOURNAL FALL 1987

ican National Security, 1960-1968,” at West Intelligence and War Program Point, New York, 13-15 April 1988. Historians and political scientists will present papers on The Air Force recently announced the formation political, strategic, economic, and other aspects of a program to broaden the knowledge base of its of American national security policy during the intelligence personnel. The program, called the Intelligence and War Program. uses a reading Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administra- list, a speakers program, and a resource center lo- tions. For further information, contact Lt Col cated at Goodfellow AFB, Texas. There are ten Charles F. Brower, Department of History, books on the program’s core reading list. The USMA, West Point, NY 10996. books should be available at most base libraries. The resource center contains both classified and USNA Naval History Symposium Proceedings unclassified oral histories, intelligence studies, The proceedings from the Sixth Symposium of books, films, and static display material. The the US Naval Academy are now available. Top- speakers program provides guest speakers at din- ics covered include: Navies in the Early Age of ings-in and other events. Speakers are current Sail, New Perspectives on British Sea Power, Na­ and former intelligence officers. val Technology, Diplomacy and Intelligence, World War II Naval and Amphibious Operations, and Biographical Naval Studies and Material History. Copies are $40.00 each and may be or- dered from Scholarly Resources Inc., 104 Green- Decoy Aircraft hill Ave, Wilmington, DE 19805-1897. Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) of the Air Force Systems Command has awarded two con- Air Staff Doctrine Office Change tracts to develop decoy aircraft designed to look As part of the DOD reorganization. the Air Force like F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft. Requirements has moved the office that is primarily concerned of the contract include easy assembly and trans- with Air Force doctrine. This office, formerly port and a requirement to strongly resemble the XOX1D, has become a part of the Force Planning actual aircraft. This is ASD’s first decoy devel- Division (XOXFP). opment program. I Can Write Better Than That! OK, then do it! Airpcnver Journal is always looking for good ar­ ticles written by our readers. If you’ve got something to say, send it to us. We’ll be happy to consider it for publication. The Airpower Journal focuses on the operational levei of war, that broad area between grand strategy and tactics. We are in- terested in articles that will stimulate thought on how warfare is conducted. This includes not only the actual conduct of war at the operational levei, but also the impact of leadership. training, and support functions on operations. We need two typed, double-spaced draft copies of your work. We encourage you to supply graphics and photos to support your article, but don’t let the lack of those keep you from writ- ing! We are looking for articles from 2,500 to 5,000 words in length—about 15 to 25 pages. As the professional journal of the Air Force, we strive to ex- pand the horizons and professional knowledge of Air Force per- sonnel. To do this, we seek and encourage challenging articles. We look forward to your submissions. Send them to the Editor, Airpower Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5532.

Writing for the Airpower /ournal

Over the years and throughout the var- even if that means writing that the US Air ious units to which the editors of Airpower Force could be doing it better. We can’t Journal have been assigned, we have known guarantee you that someone won’t oppose many people who debated whether or not to your views, but it is not Air Force policy to write an article for the Air Force’s profes­ penalize its people for writing in a publica­ sional journal. Most decided not to do so for tion. So go ahead, share your thoughts with a variety of reasons. your fellow airmen. 111 get hammered! This was the most often-heard reason. People perceived that “They” don’t publish “regular people” speaking out was something Air Force like me. Just try us! With the Journal focus- members shouldn't do and that those who ing on the operational levei of war, we hope did suffered for it. They felt that if they to see more and more articles coming from wrote, even for an approved Air Force pub­ the people who know what theyTe talking lication, their commanders, their major about—people like YOU. The officer corps, command, or the Air Force as a whole enlisted personnel, and the Air Force civil- would take actions to show disapproval. As ians are the hands-on experts. You are the you may have read in our premier issue people who deal with war and the prepara- (Summer 1987), Gen Larry D. Welch, Air tion for war. You are the people who have Force Chief of Staff, addressed this issue in the ideas we need to hear. We can’t guaran­ a most positive light. The Air Force recog- tee we’ll print what you write, but we’ll nizes the need for its members to speak up help you in every way we can to achieve and write about the profession of warfare. that goal.

85 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL FALL 1987

They only want to hear about ops. Not so. using multisyllable words where they’re We interpret the term “operational levei of not needed, but don’t shy away from send- war" very broadly. It is how we fíght. And ing your readers to the dictionary when nec- that depends on how we train, how we op- essary. Remember that your readers are erate our logistics Systems, how we manage probably not as expert on the subject of your and lead our people— in short, all the day- article as you. Write to your audience. Or­ to-dav functions that create a capability to ganize your thoughts in a logical way and effectively applv combat power. stick to the subject. Cite sources and data Convinced? We hope so. If you are, the where appropriate (endnotes are in addi- next step is to write an article that has a tion to the 15 to 25 pages). Papers contain- good chance of being published. First, write ing unsupported assertions are not the type on a topic: you are familiar with, either be- that get published. cause you have worked in that area or be- Finally, if possible, send photos, maps, cause you have a special interest in the area. and other appropriate illustrations that sup- Don't try to guess what topic the Airpower port your article. If you don’t have them, Journal "needs” an article on. We don't don't let that deter you from writing. You work that vvay. Likewise. don’t stop just be- may have supporting illustrations that are cause you saw an article on your subject in more appropriate than those available to the a recent issue. We review each article on its editors, but if not, press ahead. own merit, and yours may offer a new Once you’ve written your article, send it perspective. to the Editor, Airpower Journal, Walker Second, don't try to solve the problems of Hall. Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5532. We’ll the world in one article. We look for articles assess it for publication. If we like it but of between 2,500 to 5,000 words (approxi- think it needs some rewriting, we’ll work matelv 15 to 25 typewritten double-spaced with you to make a stronger article. If we de­ pages). So concentrate on a specific area. A cide not to publish it, we'll let you know topic such as ‘‘Defending Against the Sovi- why rather than simplv sending you a short ets” is too broad. “Effective Use of Air Base “thanks-but-no-thanks” letter. We will as- Ground Defense Teams” is more sist you as best we can to make for the best appropriate. professional journal possible. That’s what Next. be straightforward in your writing, we’re here for, but it’s your journal. Now get Don’t try to make it look more impressive by out there and write. contributors

was professor of history and instructor in versity of Southein Califórnia), is director of aerospace engineering at the Universily of operational plans. Headquarters Aii Force Maryland Dr Hallion is the author of ten Reserve, Robins AFB. Geórgia He served 18 books on aerospace history years wilh perlinent assigriments that in- duded chief of flight operutions. 7U5th Combat Crew Training School, Ellington AFB. Texas, director of operations at Sel- friilge AFB. Michigan. and Robins AFB. Geórgia; vice cornmander at Kir.kenbacker AFB. Ohio. and commander at Westover AFB. Massachusetts. and Dobbins AFB. Geórgia General Knowles was a command pilol. instructor. and an operations officer.

Air Vice-Marsbal R. A. Mason, C.B.E. |MA. Kings College, London; MA. Universily of St Andresvs, Scotland). is air secretary of the Rovat Air Forte. His previous asstgn- menls in lhe Royal Air Force mtlude direc- Lt Col (Col seletiee) Ronald C. Smilh IAB, tor of DefenceStudies. director of Personnel Princeton Universily; MS. Universily of Management. Policv. and Plans; and ex- Southern Califórnia) is chief. NATO Com- change offiter on the faculty of the US Air mand and Control Branch. Europe/NÀTO Force Academv He has been a visiting lec- Plans and Policy. Headquarters USAF. He turer to Air War College. National War Col­ has served in operational air defense units lege. and other universities and military in the United States. Vietnarn. and West Ger- colleges worldwide. Air Marshal Mason is many and has advised the Royal Saudi mil- the author of several books and was a fre- itarv in Saudi Arabia. Colonel Smith quent contribulor to Air Universily Hevievv. participated in test and evaluation of the air- He is a graduale of Air War College bome warning and control system. was a program element monitor and contingency planner in the Pentagon. served as chief of Air Defense Plans for US Central Command Air Forces, and recently was a sênior fellow in national security at Harvard‘s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Armed Forces Staff College

Lt Col (Col selectee) Stephen C. Hall IBS, Geórgia Institute of Technology; MS. Troy State Universily) is deputy director for Lo- gistics, US Atlantic Command (J4|. Norfolk. Richard P Hallion (PhD. Universily of Virgínia. His previous assigninents include Maryland). the director. Special Staff Office. alrnost four years comtnanding aircraft Aeronautícal Systems Division. Wright-Pat- maintenance squadrons, five years on lhe terson AFB. Ohio. was selected lhe Harold US Air Forces in Europe staff. and two years Keith johnson V’isiting Professor of Military at an air logistics center in the Air Force Lo- History for 1987-88 at the US Army Military gistics Command. Colonel Hall is a graduate History Institute He has been chief histo- of Squadron Officer School and the Indus­ rian. Air Force Flight Test Center. Edwards trial College of the Armed Forces, a Distin- AFB, Califórnia; served £s curator of Science guished Graduate of Air Command and Staff and techology of the National Air and Space Brig Gen Billy M. Knowles. Sr.. USAF. Re- College. and a previous contribulor to the Museum of the Smilhsonian Institution. and tired (BS. Universily of Houston; MS. Unl- former Air Universily Review.

87 Maj Kenneth M. Page (USAFA; MS, Rens- selaer Polvlechnic Inslilute) is lhe aide-de- camp lo thecommander in chief. US Special Operations Command. MacDilI AFB. Flor­ ida A sênior pilol with more lhan 1.500 living hours. he has held numerous living Col Timolhy E. Kline IUSAFA; MA. Louisi- and staff positions at Detachment 18. 40th ana State University) is a memberof lhe staff Aerospace Resi ne and Recovery Sqnadron. of lhe National War College. His previousas- and lhe 155Üth Combat Crew Training Wing, signmenls include chief. Long-Range Plan- including chief of standardization and eval- ning and Doctrine Division. Headquarters ualion. wing execulive officer, mainlenance USAF; chief. Operalions Division. Air supervisor, and officer in charge of job con- Cround Operalions School: chief. Fighter trol. Major Page has also served an Air Staff Training Branch. 18th Tactical Fighler Training IPrograml tour as a congressional Wing. kadena AB. fapan: assislant opera­ affairs and resource planner and an air op­ lions officer. 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron eralions staff officer in Plans and Opera­ al Kadena; and chief. Doctrine and Concepts lions. Depuly Chief of Staff. He is a graduate Division. Headquarters USAF. Colonel of Squadron Officer School and Air Com­ Kline is a graduate of National War College mand and Staff College. and a Distinguished Graduate of Air Com­ mand and Staff College.

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BOARD OF ADVISERS

Col Kenneth J. Alnwick, IJSAF, Retired EA ST, Incorporoted 1,1 C o l D o n a l d R. B a u c o m . I J S A F Office of Air Force History Dr Donald I). Chipman Educational Adviscr, Squadron Officer School Col James L. Cole, Jr., IJSAF Deputy Assistant for Joint Matters, OO/S Col Raymond A. Hamilton, Jr., IJSAF AFROTC, University of Alabam a Maj Cen I. B. Holley, Jr.. IISAFR, Retired Duke University Dr Richard H. Kohn Chief. Office of Air Force History COMING... in our winter edition

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