. Aionrm*JCD, SPECIAL FOURTH CLASS MAIL '/uiin/rrui CALCULATED POSTAGE JOURNAL PERMITG-1 USAF-ECI MAXWELL AFB. AL 36112 GUNTER AFB, AL 36118 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300 RETURN POSTAGE GUARANTEED Secretary of the Air Force Edvvard C. Aldridge, Jr. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch Commander, Air University Lt Gen Truman Spangrud Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Gol Sidney ). Wise Professional Staff Editor Col Keith VV. Geiger Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland Contributing Personnel Hugh Richardson, Associate Editor |ohn A. Westcott. Art Director and Production Manager Steven C. Garst. Illustrator Address manuscripls to Editor. Airpower /ournal, VValker Hall. Maxwell AFB. Alabama 36112-5532. Jour- nal telephone listings are AUTOVON 875-5322 and commercial 205-293-5322. Manuscripls should be typed, double-spaced, and submitted in duplicate. Au- thors should enclose a short biographical sketch indi- cating current and previous assignments. academic and professional military education. and other particulars. Printed by Government Printing Office. Subscription re- nuests and change of address notifications should be sent to: Superinlendent of Documents. US Government Print- ing Office. Washington. D.C. 20402, Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2. ISSN: 0002-2594. JOURNAL FALL 19 87 , Vol. 1, No. 2 AFRP 50-2 From the Editor 2 The Decade of Opportunity: Air Power in the 1990s AVM R. A. Mason. RAF 4 Doctrine, Technology, and Air Warfare: A Late Twentieth-Century Perspective Dr Richard P. Hallion 16 Coalition Air Defense in the Persian Gulf Lt Col Ronald C. Smith, USAF 28 Editorial—End of an Era Maj Michael A. Kirtland. USAF 40 Tactical Airlift Brig Gen Billy M. Knowles, USAF, Retired 41 Shortchanging Our Young Officers: Military Traditions Denied Lt Col Stephen C. Hall, USAF 48 US Air Force Special Operations: Charting a Course for the Future Maj Kenneth M. Page, USAF 58 Ira Eaker and the Ear of Dionysius Col Timothy E. Kline, USAF 70 Ricochets 3 Letters Net Assessment 74 Reviews of Current Literature Notams 83 Notices of Interest Contributors 87 military orientation in every professional EDITORIAL endeavor. We must regard our jobs as part of an overall combat mission. Regardless of Air Force Speciality Code, we must under- Building a Broad stand the overall purposes of military air power and then see how our individual du- Professional Base ties support those purposes. To fully develop this professional knowl­ edge base and orientation, supervisors and However much you may tvish for peace, never commanders must be involved. We need to forget military skill if you do not wish to suffer recognize and support the value of profes­ the same fate as the Byzantine Monarchy. sional courses and participation in Project Warrior discussion groups. Above all, we Peter the Great need to set an example in getting our people to study, think about, and discuss air power S THE second issue of the Airpower and those elements in all our jobs that con- A Journal was being prepared for publi- tribute to the effective application of com­ cation, the Air Force celebrated a milestone bat power. The days when the majority of event, the 40th anniversary of its creation as our people had combat experience have a separate Service. As we consider those 40 passed. Very few of our company grade of- years. the immense changes that have taken ficers or junior enlisted members have any place dominate our thoughts. In that time combat or related experience. Our combat- we have gone from the B-29 to the B-l and seasoned leaders at every levei need to from the P-51 to the F-16. We see change make a positive effort to transfer their war- everywhere we look. time experience and combat-related peace- Change is a necessary part of a vital mili- time experience to our middle ranking and tarv force. At the same time. some basic con- junior people. cepts have remained constant over the 40 The consequence of not developing a years and longer. Among them is the notion broad professional base can be disastrous in that to be a truly prepared Air Force we warfare. But a lack of professional knowl­ must develop a wide base of professional edge has extremely adverse results in peace- knowledge. Professional knowledge is time as well, for it is in peacetime that we something that is cultivated through years develop the orientations we will use in of experience and studv. Its development is, fighting the next war. We must be prepared in fact. one of the constant responsibilities to give the best possible professional advice in a military career. Far too often, we as­ to our leaders and our subordinates. This is sume that all the professional knowledge true whether we are talking about large- necessary will be given to us through the scale operations in a dangerous area of the various professional military education world or the day-to-day operation of a se- courses we take in our career. either in res- curity police squadron here in the United idence. by seminar, or by correspondence. States. While these courses are an important con- As leaders we need to encourage the de­ tribution to that professional base, they can- velopment of professional knowledge in not provide it all. The Air Force has other our people. As subordinates we need to structured programs such as Project Warrior glean as much as we can from our leaders’ that are important, and well-chosen civilian experiences. As Douglas MacArthur re- education plays a part as well. But there is minded us, ‘‘In no other profession are the still more. The professionals should under- penalties for employing untrained person- take programs of self-education and devel­ nel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the opment and should strive to develop a military.” KWG 2 ricochete TAKING AIM AT THE AIR WAR relatively less criticai during that time? The planning process is not likely to be able to re- spond to the changed circumstances. And the Kudos to Captain Morra and Major Lange for problem is even more acute with regard to mo­ their letters and comments. We want to print bile targets. more, but we can only do that if more of our This unhappy situation again poses the ques­ readers pick up the gauntlet and write to us. The tion, should planning be more decentralized? “Ricochets” department is your chance to ex- And should wing commanders be given greater press yourselves, both pro and con, on the arti- responsibility for operational planning? Should cles we publish. The editors believe an exchange wing commanders be elevated from what Colo­ of ideas filling these pages is a healthy sign that nel Krieger terms the "bottom fringe of the op­ Air Force people are thinking about their erational levei of war”? profession. Integral to the overall operational planning process at the fighter wing are mission planning and mission integration, as well as wing-level in- telligence inputs. Colonel Krieger emphasizes I have a few thoughts on Col Clifford R. Krie- the human element in his discussion of mission ger's fine article in the inaugural issue of the Air- planning and wing intelligence. Clearly, out- power Journal. Overall, the piece provides a rare standing individuais are necessary to the success insight into the concerns of a perceptive, con- of the frag shop and wing intelligence operations temporary fighter wing commander. (more on personnel follows below). Neverthe- My specific focus, however, is on Colonel less, automating the process of integrating Krieger’s discussion of the ‘‘War in the Air.” His timely, locally received intelligence inputs di- explication of the planning cycle is particularly rectly into an automated mission planning Sys­ valuable for its clarity, and at the same time tem will speed up the planning cycle and enable rather embarassing for what it says about our in- the wing to operate much more effectively if ability to plan in a dynamic, timely fashion. With Communications are lost with higher command our current (and one would hope future) empha- and intelligence echelons. sis on the operational levei of war and the US Ar- With respect to wing-level intelligence per­ my’s orientation toward maneuver warfare. our sonnel; one must agree that with notable excep- inability to plan air operations at a tempo con- tions their levei of performance does not match sistent with the pace of modem battle is glaring improvements in intelligence products. In addi- indeed. That shortcoming raises the old question tion, the centralization of intelligence capability of centralized versus decentralized planning. at the major force levei exacerbates the problem Whether Communications from the wing to the of poor quality intelligence at the wing levei. For ATOC (and by extension, through the ATOC to example, while it is true that we have much to the ATAF) remain intact during conflict, or the learn about enemy capabilities and tactics, it is wing commander is forced to rely on runners, also true that Air Force intelligence already does staff cars, and aero club aircraft to communicate know a good deal about those areas. Efforts such in the event more timely links are lost, the frag as USAFE's Warrior Preparation Center notwith- cycle is too slow. As Colonel Krieger States, “Ti- standing, the problem is that such information is meliness is the key to successfully executing the not integrated into comprehensive aircrew prep­ air plan.” Unfortunately, our present ATO/ATM aration at the wings. Colonel Krieger’s descrip- process is not timely. It is well and good that tion of intelligence as a "weak link at wing levei, ATMs now contain DMPI and TOT information particularly at fighter wings” is true, although as for fixed targets that were identified for strike at an intelligence officer I find it difficult to admit.