Issue Brief Number 9 August 2014 Fire and Forget The Proliferation of Man-portable Air Defence Systems in Syria Introduction statements by government officials. and Soviet-designed systems or These account s document the foreign variants. Since the start of Syria’s civil war in acquisition and use of increasingly There is no publicly available 2011, the country has become a advanced MANPADS by Syrian evidenc e to support claims by the hotbe d of arms trafficking and armed groups, includin g systems not Russian government that armed proliferati on of conventional previously seen outside of govern- groups in Syria have acquired weapons. Imag es and accounts of the ment control. US FIM-92 Stinger-series conflict reveal that armed groups MANPADS or foreign Stinger- Major findings from this Issue Brief pattern systems. have acquired a variety of small arms include the following: and light weapon s, some of which International transfers of are rece nt-generation systems that Armed groups in Syria have acqu- MANPADS to armed groups in are rarely encount ered outside of ired at least eight models of Syria appear to violate resolutions, government control elsewhere. MANPA DS, including three guide lines, and agreements Among the most sensitive of these models not previously seen adopted by several multilateral weapons are the numerous man- outsid e of government control in organizations. portable air defence systems other countries. These MANPADS Video footage of armed groups and (MANPADS) that armed groups have include recent-generation systems. their arsenals is useful for identi- looted from Syria n government The vast majority of MANPADS fying the types of MANPADS in depots and acquir ed from other acquired by Syrian armed groups Syria but provides little insight into sources. Many of these missiles are appear to be Chinese-, Russian-, their origins or suppliers. newer and more technologically sophisticated than illic it MANPADS in other countries. Given the porosity of Syria’s borders, the presence of groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and other violent extremists, and the inherent limitations of controlling small arms and light weapons in conflict zones, the danger that viole nt groups in other countries will acquire these missiles is real. This Issue Brief assesses the acquisition and use of MANPADS by armed groups in Syria. The analysis is based on a review of video footage and photographs posted online by journalists, researchers, and armed An armed group firing a MANPADS in Syria, 2013. © faroq syria/YouTube groups; media reports; and http://www.smallarmssurvey.org 1 This Issue Brief begins with an over- missile in a launch tube, a gripstock those posted online. When referring view of the models, capabilities, age, (launcher), and a battery. Most generally to the model and foreign and condition of MANPADS circu la- MANPAD S are ‘fire and forget’ variants, the term ‘pattern’ is used, as tin­­g in Syria. It continues with an weapons, meaning that the missiles in ‘Igla-1-pattern MANPADS’. assessment of the sources of these guide themselves to their targets. Similarly, the term ‘Strela-2- or Strela- systems, as well as of allegations of The disposable launch tubes 2M-pattern’ is used to refer generally trafficking from Sudan. The conclu- containing the missiles are to the sub-category of MANPADS ding section evaluates the impli- approximately 1.5–1.8 m in length consisting of the Strela-2 (SA-7a) and cations of MANPADS proli feration in and the entire system typically Strela-2M (SA-7b) and foreign Syria, including in the context of weighs between 15 and 19 kg. Since variants, or to individual MANPADS global counter-MANPADS efforts. the first MAN PAD S were fielded in that fall within this sub-category the late 1960s, manufacturers in at when the precise model is not This Issue Brief makes use of the least two dozen countries have known. Armed groups in Syria often definition of MANPADS in the produced more than one million refer to Strela 2- and Strela-2M- Wassenaar Arrangement’s Elements missiles (Schroeder, 2013, pp. 3, 5). As pattern missiles as ‘Cobras’. Table 1 for Export Controls of MANPADS: of 2011, the US govern ment had lists the MANPADS identified in this identified 40 civilian aircraft that had Issue Brief. surface-to-air missile systems been struck by MANPADS, resulting designed to be man-portable in 28 crashes with more than 800 and carried and fired by a deaths (USDOS, 2011). Overview of MANPADS si ng l e individual; and other surface-to-air missile systems acquired by armed groups When referring to specific models of design ed to be operated and MANPADS, this Issue Brief uses the in Syria fired by more than one indi- transliterated model designations vidual acting as a crew and assigned by the country of origin. portable by several individuals Models and capabilities Other common designations are (WA, 2007, art. 1.1). included in parentheses next to the first reference to the model. Variants An analysis of video footage and photographs from Syria reveals that While this definition captures a wide of several of these systems have been armed groups have acquired at least range of man- and crew-portable produced by multiple countries. eight different models of MANPADS, system s, the vast majority of Many of the variants are similar in three of which had not been seen MANPAD S—in Syria and globally— appearance to the original model; outside of government control prior are shoulder-fired. These systems are telling them apart often requires to sightings in Syria. These systems comprised of three key components: a images of higher resolution than Table 1 MANPADS exported to Syria (1970–2012) or acquired by Syrian armed groups (2012–14) System US Department of Country of origin Year fielded Selected foreign vari- Acquired by Syrian Defense/NATO ants (by country) armed groups designation 9K32 Strela-2 SA-7a/Grail Soviet Union 1968 Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Confirmed 9K32M Strela-2M SA-7b/Grail Mod 1 Soviet Union 1970 North Korea, Poland Romania, Serbia Belarus, Bulgaria, 9K34 Strela-3 SA-14/Gremlin Soviet Union 1974 No reports North Korea 9K310 Igla-1 SA-16/Gimlet Soviet Union 1981 Bulgaria, North Korea Confirmed 9K310-1 Igla-1M SA-16/Gimlet Soviet Union Unknown/unclear Unknown/unclear Confirmed 9K38 Igla† SA-18/Grouse Soviet Union 1983 Unknown/unclear Unclear No known foreign 9K338 Igla-S SA-24/Grinch Russian Federation 2003 Confirmed producers No known foreign FN-61 FN-6 China Unknown/unclear Confirmed producers Notes: Imports and acquisitions are ‘confirmed’ via video or photograph. † To the author’s knowledge, the only 9K38 Igla identified in Syria is a training unit seen in video footage posted on YouTube in 2012 (Hammoriaforever, n.d; Image 1). Sources: Brown Moses (n.d.); Chivers and Schmitt (2013); Fiszer and Gruszczynski (2004); O’Halloran and Foss (2011); Spleeters (2013) 2 Small Arms Survey Issue Brief Number 9 August 2014 Image 1 Launch tube for Igla trainer system in Syria, 2012 © Hammoriaforever/YouTube range from the comparatively the arsenals of non-state actors. The footage featuring stockpiles of primitive Strela-2, a first-generation FN-6 has a range of 6,000 m and can multiple launch tubes reveals that Soviet-designed system initially reportedly engage targets flying as anti-government forces have acquired fielded more than 40 years ago, to high as 3,500 m (O’Halloran and Foss, at least dozens of MANPADS, but third-generation Igla-S (SA-24) 2011, p. 7). In contrast, the Strela-2 has existing data sources do not permit MANPADS. Other systems spotted in a maximum effective range of just extrapolation beyond this rough Syria are the Soviet-designed Strela- 3,400 m and an effective altitude of minimum estimate. 2M and Igla-1 (SA-16) or foreign only 1,500 m (p. 37).4 The FN-6, which variants, and the Chinese FN-6. A has a more sophisticated guidance The Russian Federation and the yellow-coloured training version of system, is also faster than Strela-2 Stinger missile myth the Igla (SA-18) MANPADS is also missiles (pp. 6–7, 37). The Igla-S visible in a video posted online in indicates that it too is superior to the November 2012 (Hammoriaforever, Strela-2 MANPADS in range, Contrary to repeated claims by the n.d.; see Image 1). To date, no engagement altitude, engagement media and the Russian government, standard Igla (9P39) launch tubes velocity, guidance, and resistance to there is no evidence that armed have been spotted in Syria.2 countermeasures (O’Halloran and groups in Syria have acquired US- Foss, 2011, pp. 36–37; Rosoboron designed FIM-92 Stinger MAN PADS. Strela-2 (or -2M) and Igla-1-pattern export, n.d.). While the Igla-S is more The reports appeared regularly in MANPADS are widely proliferated3 capable than the Igla-1 in range and media articles in 2012, culminating in and have been acquired by numerous accuracy, the differences in perfor- claims by a high-ranking Russian armed groups worldwide, including mance are less stark (O’Halloran and official that Syrian armed groups had in neighbouring Iraq (Schroeder, 2007; Foss, 2011, p. 34). acquired several dozen Stinger mis- Schroeder and King, 2012, pp. 326– siles (AFP, 2012; RIA Novosti, 2012a; 5 29). FN-6 and Igla-S MANPADS were Estimating the quantity of MANPADS MFA, 2012). US officials denied the fielded more recently and their global acquired by Syrian armed groups is allegations, challenging Russian gov- distribution is significantly more much more difficult than identifying ern ment officials to provide evidence limited; there are no substantiated the models in circulation.