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B6.3.05 SPACE STATION MMOD SHIELDING Eric L. Christiansen

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B6.3.05 SPACE STATION MMOD SHIELDING Eric L. Christiansen IAC-06- B6.3.05 SPACE STATION MMOD SHIELDING Eric L. Christiansen NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX 77058, USA [email protected] Kornel Nagy NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX 77058, USA [email protected] Dana M. Lear ESCG-KX NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX 77058, USA [email protected] Thomas G. Prior ESCG-KX NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX 77058, USA [email protected] ABSTRACT This paper describes International Space Station (ISS) micro-meteoroid orbital debris (MMOD) impact shielding including requirements for protection as well as technical approaches to meeting requirements. Current activities in providing MMOD protection for ISS are described, including efforts to augment MMOD protection by adding shields on-orbit. Another activity is to observe MMOD impact damage on ISS elements and returned hardware, and to compare the observed damage with predicted damage using Bumper code risk assessment software. A conclusion of this paper is that ISS will be protected adequately from MMOD impact after completing augmentation of ISS shielding for Service Module, and after improving MMOD protection for Soyuz and Progress vehicles. Another conclusion is that impact damage observed to the ISS mini-pressurized logistics module matches the distribution of impacts predicted by Bumper code. NASA and international partners in Europe, Introduction Russia, Japan, and Canada. Top-level ISS MMOD requirements are allocated to Providing adequate micro-meteoroid orbital individual elements. The element providers debris (MMOD) protection for the are responsible for meeting allocated MMOD International Space Station (ISS) is essential protection requirements, while NASA is to ensure crew safety, vehicle survivability responsible for determining compliance to the and functionality. A number of papers and top-level requirement. NASA reports provide a detailed description of the ISS MMOD protection strategy, This paper summarizes current status of ISS requirements for protection and means to MMOD protection. The methodology used in meet requirements1-6. ISS consists of a assessing MMOD risk and typical shielding number of individual elements provided by techniques implemented to meet 1 requirements are described. On-orbit PNP is assessed using the Bumper code. augmentation of Service Module MMOD Pressure shell leaks of any size from MMOD shielding is underway. Methods to improve impact would be a serious operational issue. MMOD protection for Soyuz and Progress ISS crews are trained to locate, isolate and have been evaluated and will substantially patch leaks in the pressure shell7. However, reduce MMOD risks for these vehicles. certain types of penetrations are potentially These changes/modifications are necessary catastrophic, i.e., a penetration could be of to meet ISS MMOD protection requirements. the size or in a location that results in death of one or more crew members. Determining risk of catastrophic impact from MMOD ISS MMOD Requirements involves calculation of the “R” factor for each ISS module and external critical element, MMOD protection exists to ensure crew which is the ratio of catastrophic loss to shield safety and mission success. MMOD penetrating impacts. PNCF for each module requirements for ISS have the following and external shielded element is determined objectives: from PNP and R as follows: R • Protect the crew from meteoroid/debris PNCF = PNP impact. R-factor includes assessment of crew loss • Protect ISS critical hardware from due to a number of scenarios including meteoroid/debris impact. catastrophic rupture of the crew module pressure shell, hypoxia of crew from fast • Minimize damage to all station elements depressurization, loss of crew from internal fragments and other effects of a MMOD from meteoroid/debris. 1,8 penetration, as well other factors . Specific requirements for ISS MMOD protection include: MMOD Shielding Development (1) Comply with overall ISS shielding penetration probability requirement of less Development of MMOD shielding for ISS is than 24% over 10 years; i.e., based on risk assessments using Bumper meet/exceed 0.76 Probability of No code supported by hypervelocity impact tests Penetration (PNP). and numerical simulations as illustrated in Figure 1. (2) Comply with ISS catastrophic penetration probability requirement of less than 5%; Spacecraft Geometry Failure Criteria i.e., meet/exceed 0.95 Probability of No HVI Test & Catastrophic Failure (PNCF). Analysis BUMPER M/D Probability Analysis Code By definition, a hole or through-crack in the S/C pressure shell of an ISS module is a Operating Environment Models Probability of Ballistic Limit - Debris & Meteoroid No Failure “penetration” of MMOD shielding covered by Parameters Equations P the first requirement; i.e., there should be less No Protection Meet Requirements? Iterate than a 24% chance that a shield penetration Requirement R P < R P > R Yes or depressurization event occurs from MMOD Qualify impact to ISS over 10years. A PNP requirement is allocated to each ISS module and external “MMOD critical” element (such Fig. 1: MMOD risk assessment process showing as pressure vessels or control moment gyros) that failure criteria is defined for each part of based on the surface area (in m2) and the vehicle, hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests exposed duration (years) of the and analysis are performed to develop module/element using the following formula: ballistic limit equations (BLE), the BLEs and MMOD environment models are used in PNP = 0.99999Surface Area * Duration Bumper code to assess MMOD risk. 2 An objective of the assessments is to identify 3.0% risk drivers (i.e., areas of the vehicle that 2.5% contribute a majority of the overall MMOD 2.0% risk), and determine relative effectiveness of 1.5% changes in vehicle design, shielding or 1.0% operations to reduce MMOD risk. Bumper 0.5% code results provide the basis for showing 0.0% compliance of the hardware to MMOD b protection requirements. Additional details of z ft B s a 1 t) 2 1 3 U dir yu L rd) s A C a o ule t1FG a C P 1,9 n S n CMG o (por M the Bumper code can be found elsewhere . s e Node b S PMA P PMA s m r TC gre art (sta ro Progress a p S P Service Modom MMOD penetration risk for 1year (2006) TC After vehicle shielding has been developed g C Airlock & HPG in ock and verified, the risk assessment process is D not over. Actual MMOD damage to the vehicle is identified during mission Fig. 2: MMOD penetration risk breakdown for ISS operations, to assess how well actual in current configuration (basis: 1 year, 2006). damage compares to Bumper predictions, to trend damage, evaluate design margins, and most importantly to determine if changes should be considered to vehicle design and operations to decrease MMOD damage and vehicle survivability. As an example, based on actual MMOD damage identified in post- flight inspections, changes were made to vehicle design and operations (i.e., via selection of low-risk flight attitudes and on- Fig. 3: Current ISS configuration showing 2 orbit inspections) to reduce MMOD risks to Progress vehicles and 1 Soyuz docked to ISS Shuttle radiator and wing leading-edge 10 (excluding solar arrays, radiators and truss). systems . MMOD Risk & Shielding Overall Status ISS Elements Metrics Results of MMOD risk assessments indicate Combined for 12 of 16 ISS MMOD risks are driven by Service current elements (FGB, 1. 85% of total ISS by area Node 1, PMA 1, PMA 2, 2. Penetration Risk 14% of Module (SM), Soyuz and Progress as PMA 3, CMG, PCU, US total illustrated by Figure 2 showing penetration Lab, Airlock & HPGC, 3. Catastrophic Risk 49% of risk breakdown for each element on ISS TCS-S, TCS-P, MPLM) total assuming 2-Progress operations. The reason and 10 future elements 4. Shielding mass 22,700kg (Node 2, Columbus, 5. Shielding mass/area for this result is simply that low-weight and ATV, JEM PM, JEM 10kg/m2 relatively low-performance shields protect ELM-PS, HTV, Node 3, 6. “Average” shielding areas of these elements. As shown in Table MLM/FGB-2, Research capability=1cm 1, the average shield mass per unit area for Module, Cupola) elements of ISS that are risk drivers (SM, Soyuz, Progress) are a factor of 5 lower than 1. 15% of total ISS by area 2. Penetration Risk 86% of the MMOD shielding mass for the rest of ISS. total Combined for 4 The lightly shielded elements on ISS 3. Catastrophic Risk 51% of elements: total constitute only 15% of the total exposed area, Service Module, Soyuz, 4. Shielding mass 700kg but contribute a disproportionate amount of Progress & Docking 5. Shielding mass/area MMOD risk to ISS. The most effective way to Compartment 2 <2kg/m reduce MMOD risk to the elements that are 6. “Average” shielding risk drivers is to add supplemental MMOD capability=0.3cm shielding in locations where risks are highest. The effort to improve MMOD shielding on Table 1: MMOD risk and shielding mass/area for these elements is underway. current and future ISS elements. 3 ISS MMOD Shields Ballistic Limit Equations (BLEs) Many hundreds of MMOD shields protect ISS Ballistic limit equations for all ISS shields are elements, differing by location and in essential for MMOD risk assessments. BLEs materials of construction, mass, thickness define the MMOD particle size that “fails” a and volume. Figure 4 illustrates typical shield as a function of impact velocity, angle, MMOD shield types used on ISS, which density of MMOD particle and shape. Failure include Whipple and “Stuffed” Whipple (SW) is defined for ISS shields as a complete shields. Whipple shields consist of an outer penetration, through-hole or through-crack in bumper (typically aluminum), multi-layer the rearwall or pressure shell of the shield. insulation (MLI) thermal blanket, and an inner Detached spall (without a through-hole) in the rearwall or pressure shell (also aluminum rearwall is also a failure mode, but does not typically).
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