FINLAND'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, 1940-1952 by HANS PETER KROSBY B.A., University of British Columbia, 1955 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES We accept this Thesis as conforming to the required standard: UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April, 1958 ABSTRACT In March 194-0, Finland had just completed another life and death struggle with the Soviet Union, the second such struggle since Bolshevik autocracy- replaced Tsarist autocracy in Russia in 1917. During the following fifteen months, Soviet diplomacy endeavoured to complete the job which the Red Army had "begun. By a unilateral and extremely liberal interpretation of the Peace Treaty of March 12, 1940, the Soviet Union tried to isolate Finland from her other neighbours and to establish a favourable basis for a complete annexation of Finland in the manner of the three Baltic States. Surrounded by Soviet and German military might, and noticing the increasing friction in the Nazi-Soviet alliance, Finland, in order to save herself from an imminent Soviet invasion, grasped the only straw which seemed to offer some hope: a transit agreement for German troops from Finland's Bothnian coast to Kirkenes in oc• cupied Norway. The resulting presence of German troops in the country did save Finland from becoming the seventeenth Soviet Socialist Republic in 1940 or 194-1* but it also involved her deeply in the Nazi-Soviet conflict which followed. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 194-1, Finland tried in vain to have her neutrality respected, and she was attacked by Soviet forces three days after the German aggression. During the so-called Continuation War, Finland refused to take part in the general German offensive plan, restricting herself to attaining her own strategic goals only, all of them dictated by the requirements for the defence of Finnish territory. Nevertheless, when Finland was finally able to pull out of the war in 1944, she was treated by the Allied Powers as an ally of Germany and subjected to an exceedingly heavy indemnity, payable in goods to the Soviet Union. She also lost more than ten per cent of her territory and had to give the Soviet Union a fifty-years lease on Porkkala, ten miles from the capital. The retreating Germans destroyed ninety per cent of all facilities and resources in North Finland. Although Finland was not occupied, her government worked under the supervision of an Allied Control Commission installed by the Soviet Union. The government was forced to prosecute hundreds of 'war criminals', including eight of Finland's war-time leaders. However, as long as Finland fulfilled the conditions of the Armistice Agreement, she was allowed to handle her internal affairs in relative liberty. The Finnish Communists were unable to out- ma neuvre the government and were removed from all positions of control after the Peace Treaty had been signed in 194-7. Finland was also able to meet the obligations of the war indemnity, although the total cost to Finland was approx• imately $900,000,000. The general election of 1948 marked a turning point in that it inaugurated a period during which Finnish democracy managed to reconquer all territory lost to the Communists during the era of the Control Commission. In spite of that, Finnish-Soviet relations grew increasingly better after it had become clear to the Soviet Union that Finland intended to stay aloof from Great Power conflicts in all circumstances. By 1952, it could safely be said that Finland's relations with the Soviet Union were the best since 1917. But Finnish independence was conditional on her own policy of absolute neutrality and the future developments in the East-West conflict. In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representative. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed, without my written permission. Department of HISTORY The University of British Columbia, Vancouver 5, Canada. Date April 16. 1958 CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE Foreword i I From Independence to the Winter War 1 II Ordeal by Peace, March 1940-June 1941 59 III The Continuation War, June 1941-September 1944 .. 102 IV The Price of Peace 156 V The War Indemnity, its Impact and Liquidation, 1944-1952 176 VI The Struggle for Survival, 1944-1947 204 VII Democratic Reconstruction, 1948-1952 241 Epilogue 297 MAPS i Proposed border adjustments, October-November 1939, and Finnish-Soviet border of March 12, 1940 55 ii Maximum advance by Finnish Army into Soviet territory during World War II 116 iii Finnish-Soviet border of September 19, 194-4, and February 10, 1947 171 BIBLIOGRAPHY 313 FOREVTORD When this thesis was first begun, its title was "Finland's Relations With the Soviet Union Since the Armistice". However, as the research progressed, it was found that it is impossible to explain satisfactorily Finland's postwar relations with her eastern neighbour without going rather extensively into the preceding war years. Soon it also became inevitable that an introductory survey of Finnish-Soviet relations between the Bolshevik revolution and 194-0 must be included, since it is difficult to understand one period in this unique relationship without a general knowledge of the others. The present thesis, therefore, is perhaps at• tempting too much in that it endeavours to do justice to two chapters of Finnish-Soviet relations which, strictly speaking, may be two distinct periods, but in reality complement each other. The experiences of 1940-44 were the prerequisites which decisively influenced the conditions governing the Soviet Union's approach to Finland during ii 1944-52. And the qualities which sustained the Finnish people during the Winter War of 1939-40, during the ordeal of peace after the Moscow Peace, and during the years of the Continuation War from 1941 to 1944, were the same qualities which enabled them to carry the burden of the heaviest war indemnity obligations successfully discharged by any nation at any time, the same qualities which allowed Finland, as the only country among those which fell under Soviet domination at the end of World War II, to emerge with her principles, her liberty and her democratic institutions intact. One other major reason why the period of 1940-44 was included in the present thesis was a desire on the part of the author to attempt to dispel some of the popular misconceptions still prevailing about the events which led to Finnish co-belligerency with Germany from 1941 to 1944. As a logical consequence of Great Britain's most reluctant decision to accede to Soviet demands that she declare war upon Finland to bolster the Anglo-Soviet alliance against Germany, the Soviet version of Finnish-Soviet relations gradually seeped into the war propaganda of the Allied Powers. This was made easier by the undeniable presence of German troops on Finnish territory since the fall of 1940, a fact which was magnified beyond all reasonable proportions in Allied propaganda. Since the origin of the transit agree• ment, which made the presence of German forces in Finland possible, was - and still is - the object of considerable iii dispute, postwar writers on the topic have been able to take their choice of which side of the argument they prefer to accept, which has tended to continue the suspicion of Finnish integrity and democracy sown during the war. The most recent example of such writings appeared only last year. It is hoped that the thesis has managed to cast some new light on the origin of the Continuation War, because it is only when that chapter of Finnish history is understood that one can fully understand the injustice suffered by Finland after World Vfer II for having accidentally been pushed into one belligerent camp rather than the other. Her position differs little in this respect from that of Norway. Norway would undoubtedly have resisted the planned British invasion as she resisted the Germans, but since Germany reached Norway first - Norway accidentally found herself on the winning side in the war. It is true that there are major differences between the cases of Norway and Finland, but a generalized comparison such as the one above is not entirely unjustified. No reader of the present thesis can fail to notice that it is written by one who has a profound admiration for the Finnish people. As one who hails from Scandinavia, the author has come by that respect honestly and it has not been lessened by the rather extensive research which went into the preparation of this thesis. On the contrary, the evidence of history can only serve to increase one's admiration for the four million Finns and for what they have iv accomplished in the face of supreme hardships. In spite of the presence of this admiration, the author believes that objectivity of treatment has not been sacrificed. All evidence of which he has knowledge has been taken into consideration, and to the best of his knowledge no fact has been 'conveniently forgotten' because it might tend to contradict opinions expressed in this thesis. The author is deeply indebted to Dean F. H. Soward, whose expert advice has always been given freely, and whose thorough examination of the manuscript has removed at least the worst discrepancies in language and fact.