Russian History: a Brief Chronology (998-2000)
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Utopian Visions of Family Life in the Stalin-Era Soviet Union
Central European History 44 (2011), 63–91. © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association, 2011 doi:10.1017/S0008938910001184 Utopian Visions of Family Life in the Stalin-Era Soviet Union Lauren Kaminsky OVIET socialism shared with its utopian socialist predecessors a critique of the conventional family and its household economy.1 Marx and Engels asserted Sthat women’s emancipation would follow the abolition of private property, allowing the family to be a union of individuals within which relations between the sexes would be “a purely private affair.”2 Building on this legacy, Lenin imag- ined a future when unpaid housework and child care would be replaced by com- munal dining rooms, nurseries, kindergartens, and other industries. The issue was so central to the revolutionary program that the Bolsheviks published decrees establishing civil marriage and divorce soon after the October Revolution, in December 1917. These first steps were intended to replace Russia’s family laws with a new legal framework that would encourage more egalitarian sexual and social relations. A complete Code on Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship was ratified by the Central Executive Committee a year later, in October 1918.3 The code established a radical new doctrine based on individual rights and gender equality, but it also preserved marriage registration, alimony, child support, and other transitional provisions thought to be unnecessary after the triumph of socialism. Soviet debates about the relative merits of unfettered sexu- ality and the protection of women and children thus resonated with long-standing tensions in the history of socialism. I would like to thank Atina Grossmann, Carola Sachse, and Mary Nolan, as well as the anonymous reader for Central European History, for their comments and suggestions. -
Reassessing the Standard of Living in the Soviet Union: an Analysis Using Archival and Anthropometric Data
IZA DP No. 1958 Reassessing the Standard of Living in the Soviet Union: An Analysis Using Archival and Anthropometric Data Elizabeth Brainerd DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES DISCUSSION PAPER January 2006 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor Reassessing the Standard of Living in the Soviet Union: An Analysis Using Archival and Anthropometric Data Elizabeth Brainerd Williams College, CEPR, WDI and IZA Bonn Discussion Paper No. 1958 January 2006 IZA P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany Phone: +49-228-3894-0 Fax: +49-228-3894-180 Email: [email protected] Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit company supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. IZA Discussion Paper No. -
1. the Chronological Structure of the Modern "History Textbook"
Part III. THE CHRONOLOGY AND GENERAL CONCEPTION OF ROMAN AND BYZANTINE HISTORY Fig. 15.2. Scaligerian dating of the events described by the fa- mous mediaeval English chroniclers – Galfridus Monemuten- sis and Nennius. See [577] and [155]. chapter 19 The problem of reconstructing the veracious version of Roman history The amended chronology of Rome and Byzantium nologists of the XVI-XVII century, J. Scaliger and was presented in the works of A. T. Fomenko (see D. Petavius. Most professional historians of our epoch Chron1 and Chron2). It is based on extensive com- do not dispute this version, although its veracity was puter calculations made in the course of analysing put to doubt by a number of scientists. the entire volume of historical and chronological data 2) The historical and chronological version of Sca- available today from the natural scientific point of liger and Petavius contains a number of phantom view. The new chronology of Rome and Byzantium duplicates, or repeated rendition of the same histor- implies that the consensual Scaligerian version of Ro- ical events that are presented as different ones and man and Byzantine chronology is blatantly erroneous. dated to different historical epochs, which are often We call for a revision of the surviving historical separated by centuries and even millennia. sources, which attain a totally new meaning when 3) All the events dated to the epochs that precede analysed from the position of the New Chronology. 1000 a.d. in the version of Scaliger and Petavius are Since Roman history is closely related to the his- phantoms that reflect more recent events in reality. -
Edinburgh Research Explorer
Edinburgh Research Explorer 'Dating the Death of Jesus' Citation for published version: Bond, H 2013, ''Dating the Death of Jesus': Memory and the Religious Imagination', New Testament Studies, vol. 59, no. 04, pp. 461-475. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0028688513000131 Digital Object Identifier (DOI): 10.1017/S0028688513000131 Link: Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer Document Version: Peer reviewed version Published In: New Testament Studies Publisher Rights Statement: © Helen Bond, 2013. Bond, H. (2013). 'Dating the Death of Jesus': Memory and the Religious Imagination. New Testament Studies, 59(04), 461-475doi: 10.1017/S0028688513000131 General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 01. Oct. 2021 Dating the Death of Jesus: Memory and the Religious Imagination Helen K. Bond School of Divinity, University of Edinburgh, Mound Place, Edinburgh, EH1 2LX [email protected] After discussing the scholarly preference for dating Jesus’ crucifixion to 7th April 30 CE, this article argues that the precise date can no longer be recovered. All we can claim with any degree of historical certainty is that Jesus died some time around Passover (perhaps a week or so before the feast) between 29 and 34 CE. -
The Russian Revolutions: the Impact and Limitations of Western Influence
Dickinson College Dickinson Scholar Faculty and Staff Publications By Year Faculty and Staff Publications 2003 The Russian Revolutions: The Impact and Limitations of Western Influence Karl D. Qualls Dickinson College Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.dickinson.edu/faculty_publications Part of the European History Commons Recommended Citation Qualls, Karl D., "The Russian Revolutions: The Impact and Limitations of Western Influence" (2003). Dickinson College Faculty Publications. Paper 8. https://scholar.dickinson.edu/faculty_publications/8 This article is brought to you for free and open access by Dickinson Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Karl D. Qualls The Russian Revolutions: The Impact and Limitations of Western Influence After the collapse of the Soviet Union, historians have again turned their attention to the birth of the first Communist state in hopes of understanding the place of the Soviet period in the longer sweep of Russian history. Was the USSR an aberration from or a consequence of Russian culture? Did the Soviet Union represent a retreat from westernizing trends in Russian history, or was the Bolshevik revolution a product of westernization? These are vexing questions that generate a great deal of debate. Some have argued that in the late nineteenth century Russia was developing a middle class, representative institutions, and an industrial economy that, while although not as advanced as those in Western Europe, were indications of potential movement in the direction of more open government, rule of law, free market capitalism. Only the Bolsheviks, influenced by an ideology imported, paradoxically, from the West, interrupted this path of Russian political and economic westernization. -
Peter the Great and His Changing Identity Emily Frances Pagrabs Wofford College
Wofford College Digital Commons @ Wofford Student Scholarship 5-2016 Peter the Great and His Changing Identity Emily Frances Pagrabs Wofford College Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wofford.edu/studentpubs Part of the European History Commons, and the Slavic Languages and Societies Commons Recommended Citation Pagrabs, Emily Frances, "Peter the Great and His Changing Identity" (2016). Student Scholarship. Paper 17. http://digitalcommons.wofford.edu/studentpubs/17 This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Wofford. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Wofford. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Peter the Great and His Changing Identity Senior History Honors Thesis May 11, 2016 Emiley Pagrabs Pagrabs 1 Introduction Well aware of the perception that foreigners held of him, Peter the Great would never apologize for his nationality or his country. A product of his upbringing, Peter did have some qualities that many foreigners criticized as barbaric and harsh. Said Peter: They say that I am cruel; that is what foreigners think of me, but who are they to judge? They do not know what the situation was at the beginning of my reign, and how many were opposed to my plans, and brought about the failure of projects which would have been of great benefit to my country obliging me to arm myself with great severity; but I have never been cruel…I have always asked for the cooperation of those of my subjects in whom I have perceived intelligence and patriotism, and who, agreeing with my views, were ready to support them.1 Essentially, Peter I was simply a Russian. -
Arctic and North
Arctic and North. 2012. № 6 1 ISSN 2221-2698 Arctic and North Arkhangelsk: Northern (Arctic) Federal University Named after М. V. Lomonosov 2011. № 4 (November) Arctic and North. 2012. № 6 2 ISSN 2221-2698 Arctic and North. 2011. № 4 (November) Electronic periodical edition © Northern (Arctic ) Federal University named after M. V. Lomonosov, 2011 © Editorial Board of the journal «Arctic and North», 2011 Published 4 times a year The journal is registered like electronic periodical edition on Russian and English languages. The testimony of the Federal service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technologies and communications (№ FC77-42809 from the 26 of November 2010.) The journal is registered in the system of the Russian Index of the scientific quotations (RINZ), where should be placed all the regular issues of the journal. A license agreement is № 96- 04/2011R on April 12, 2011.12. The journal is registered in the Depository in the electronic editions FSUE STC «Informreg- istr» (registration certificate № 543 от 13 October 2011) and it was also given a number of state registrations 0421200166. Founder: The federal state autonomous institution of higher education «The Northern (Arc- tic) Federal University» named after M.V. Lomonosov. The chef editor − Lukin Urii Fedorovich, Doctor of History, Professor. Editorial council Editorial board Vostryakov Lev Evgenievich Vertishin Aleksey Nikolaevich Glazichev Vyacheslav Leonidovich Dregalo Aleksandr Alekseevich Dergachev Vladimir Aleksandrovich Zalivskii Nikolai Pavlovich Kefeli -
History As a Means of Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the North Caucasus/Chechnya by Cecile Druey
History as a Means of Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the North Caucasus/Chechnya by Cecile Druey Starting from the example of the post-Soviet space, this article is interested in how conflicts are caused by – or result in – tensions between groups promot- ing different types and versions of historical memory. In the neo-authoritari- an, (post-) conflict setting of Chechnya, Jan Assman’s concept of cultural and communicative memory offers an interesting entry point to analyse the differ- ent types and levels of conflict, between the Chechens and Moscow, and within society in Chechnya proper. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the nationalisation of historiography in the 1990s, the new elites of Chechnya formulated local alternatives to the dominant Russian (and Soviet) narrative of the past. During the second war in Chechnya in the early 2000s, and with the strengthening of authoritarianism under the Kadyrov regime, the formerly open conflict with Moscow was again pushed underground. Ramzan Kadyrov’s instrumentalisation of history as a means to legitimise his cult of the Kadyrov family and the political choice for Moscow, that is, for Vladimir Putin, plays an important role in fuelling these grievances. Civil society, and expecially young people are an important actor in this conflict between official (or cultural) and popular (or communicative) forms of historical memory – a new conflict that is smouldering within the Chechen society, only waiting to eventually break out. Keywords: Communicative Memory, Cult of Personality. Post-Soviet Space, Memory Conflicts, Chechnya, Cultural Memory, Introduction The newly-gained independence or aspirations for autonomy and self-determi- - nation borne out of the collapse of the Soviet Union have put in motion the redefi nition of national and ethnic identities, which has often resulted in armed conflicts createbetween an minority ongoing riskgroups of re-escalation. -
Organized Crime and the Russian State Challenges to U.S.-Russian Cooperation
Organized Crime and the Russian State Challenges to U.S.-Russian Cooperation J. MICHAEL WALLER "They write I'm the mafia's godfather. It was Vladimir Ilich Lenin who was the real organizer of the mafia and who set up the criminal state." -Otari Kvantrishvili, Moscow organized crime leader.l "Criminals Nave already conquered the heights of the state-with the chief of the KGB as head of a mafia group." -Former KGB Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin.2 Introduction As the United States and Russia launch a Great Crusade against organized crime, questions emerge not only about the nature of joint cooperation, but about the nature of organized crime itself. In addition to narcotics trafficking, financial fraud and racketecring, Russian organized crime poses an even greater danger: the theft and t:rafficking of weapons of mass destruction. To date, most of the discussion of organized crime based in Russia and other former Soviet republics has emphasized the need to combat conven- tional-style gangsters and high-tech terrorists. These forms of criminals are a pressing danger in and of themselves, but the problem is far more profound. Organized crime-and the rarnpant corruption that helps it flourish-presents a threat not only to the security of reforms in Russia, but to the United States as well. The need for cooperation is real. The question is, Who is there in Russia that the United States can find as an effective partner? "Superpower of Crime" One of the greatest mistakes the West can make in working with former Soviet republics to fight organized crime is to fall into the trap of mirror- imaging. -
The Historical Legacy for Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy
CHAPTER 1 The Historical Legacy for Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy o other country in the world is a global power simply by virtue of geogra- N phy.1 The growth of Russia from an isolated, backward East Slavic principal- ity into a continental Eurasian empire meant that Russian foreign policy had to engage with many of the world’s principal centers of power. A Russian official trying to chart the country’s foreign policy in the 18th century, for instance, would have to be concerned simultaneously about the position and actions of the Manchu Empire in China, the Persian and Ottoman Empires (and their respec- tive vassals and subordinate allies), as well as all of the Great Powers in Europe, including Austria, Prussia, France, Britain, Holland, and Sweden. This geographic reality laid the basis for a Russian tradition of a “multivector” foreign policy, with leaders, at different points, emphasizing the importance of rela- tions with different parts of the world. For instance, during the 17th century, fully half of the departments of the Posolskii Prikaz—the Ambassadors’ Office—of the Muscovite state dealt with Russia’s neighbors to the south and east; in the next cen- tury, three out of the four departments of the College of International Affairs (the successor agency in the imperial government) covered different regions of Europe.2 Russian history thus bequeaths to the current government a variety of options in terms of how to frame the country’s international orientation. To some extent, the choices open to Russia today are rooted in the legacies of past decisions. -
Communist) Academy
4 I SCIENCE, ORTH ODOXY, AND THE QUEST FOR HEGEMONY AT THE SOCIALIST (COMMUNIST) ACADEMY Bolshevik intellectuals presented their cause as a class strug gle with bourgeois academia. Their primary field of battle in higher learning, however, was first and foremost institutional. When Evgenii B. Preobrazhenskii insisted in the Socialist Academy's newly founded jour nal in 1922 that the academy "represents the highest scientific research institute of Marxist thought," the academy leader was linking the Bol shevik declaration of war in organized intellectual life to his own insti tutional base. It has rarely been considered, but such assertions of pri macy implied as many internal ramifications for the Bolsheviks as outward effects for the nonparty intellectual world. The Socialist Academy - Preobrazhenskii elaborated on his claim to authority - "does not recognize social science not operating on the basis of Marxism. The Academy must turn itself into its own kind of Gosplan in the realm of ideology."l In this formulation, the assertion of orthodoxy, and the vision of a new kind of planned science, or nauka, is intertwined with the claim to hegemony - not simply of a doctrine, a party, or a class, but of an institution.2 1. E. Preobrazhenskü, "Blizhaishie zadachi Sotsialisticheskoi Akademii," Vestnik Sotsia listicheskoi Akademii (henceforth cited as VSA), no. 1 (November 1922): 7, 9. 2. "Hegemony" is employed not in tbe Gramscian sense, but in the blunter meaning most frequently implicit in tbe Bolshevik use of tbe word gegemoniia, denoting wide-ranging dornina tion, political subordination, and eon�ol over activities and resources. THE SOCIALlST (COMMUNIST) ACADEMY 1 193 No matter that Gosplan, the central state planning agency, was of negligible importance at the time Preobrazhenskii wrote; no matter, indeed, that the Socialist (after 1924, Cornmunist) Academy never achieved the hegemony in the Soviet scholarly world that its leaders coveted. -
Laws in Conflict: Legacies of War and Legal Pluralism in Chechnya
Laws in Conflict: Legacies of War and Legal Pluralism in Chechnya Egor Lazarev Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2018 © 2018 Egor Lazarev All rights reserved ABSTRACT Laws in Conflict: Legacies of War and Legal Pluralism in Chechnya Egor Lazarev This dissertation explores how the social and political consequences of armed conflict affect legal pluralism; specifically, the coexistence of Russian state law, Sharia, and customary law in Chechnya. The study draws on qualitative and quantitative data gathered during seven months of fieldwork in Chechnya. The data include over one hundred semistructured interviews with legal authorities and religious and traditional leaders; an original survey of the population; and a novel dataset of all civil and criminal cases heard in state courts. First, the dissertation argues that armed conflict disrupted traditional social hierarchies in Chechnya, which paved the way for state penetration into Chechen society. The conflict particularly disrupted gender hierarchies. As a result of the highly gendered nature of the conflict, women in Chechnya became breadwinners in their families and gained experience in serving important social roles, most notably as interlocutors between communities and different armed groups. This change in women’s bargaining power within households and increase in their social status came into conflict with the patriarchal social order, which was based on men’s rigid interpretations of religious and customary norms. In response, women started utilizing the state legal system, a system that at least formally acknowledges gender equality, in contrast to customary law and Sharia.