Porkkala - Hanks - Aaland
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© Scandia 2008 www.scandia.hist.lu.se GORAN RYSTAD Porkkala - Hanks - Aaland A coaatributisns to the history of the Fimish-Ra~ssiancease-fire amegotiationss, September 1944 011 12 January I 945> the Stockholm evening paper, Afiontid- ningen, printed a relegram from Helsinki which said that the people of Aaland planned to boycott the Finnish parliamentary elections which were due to take place in March. The back- ground was said to be that the people of Aaland hade got the impression that, at the cease-fire negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union in September the previous year, the Fin- nish government had been willing to exchange Aaland for the Porkkala area claimed by the Russians.' The next day the news- paper, Morgontidningen, gave the news a prominent place under the heading, "AaBand does not wish to be exchanged for Porkkala".' A more detailed account then followed, which the newspaper claimed to have got from sources on Aaland. "Even before the Finnish-Russian cease-fire negotiations, there was lively discussion in certain Finnish circles of the suitability of offer- ing Moscow Aaland in exchange for Hanko, on which the Soviet Union was then expected to renew its claims. The Finns thereby argued that it would not be such a sacrifice to hand over Aaland to the Soviet Union as it would be to lease out Hanko or any other part of the Finnish mainland. Nor did certain Finnish circles miss the © Scandia 2008 www.scandia.hist.lu.se 2 Goran Rystad opportunity for malicious insinuations that 'it would serve the Swedes right to get the Russians as next-door neighbours, since they are so anxious for us to make peace with them'." The article then went on to say that, from a Finnish point of view, it was naturally more advantageous to relinquish Aaland rather than Hanko or Porkkala. According to Morgontidningen, the people of Aaland claimed that the matter was discussed within the Finnish government, but the article pointed out that the suggestion did not appear to have been put forward at the negotiations in Moscow, since the Russians were not willing to discuss any alternatives. Morgontidningen's information was said, as mentioned above, to emanate from Aaland. On 14 January, Hufvudstadsbladet in Helsinki wrote that it was 'a persistent rumour' which had cir- culated in Stockholm for some time before it was brought into the open in M~rgontidningen.~The very same day that Mor- gontidningen printed the sensational news, Aftonbladet was able to publish an interview with the Finnish foreign minister, Carl Enckell. The interview contained a categorical denial of the startling report in Morgontidningen. "Aaland rumours pure fantasy. Categorical denial by Finnish foreign minister" was the heading of the interview. Enckell had personally led the cease- fire negotiations in Moscow and could now give full assurance that Aaland had not even been mentioned in this connection. The Finnish government had never had any plans to exchange AaBand. Enckell also gave an explanation of the origin of the rumour. Just before the delegation left for the negotiations in Moscow, "a small Finnish group suggested to the government then in office that a proposition be made in Moscow that the Russians accept some of the groups of islands around Aaland instead of bases on the Finnish mainland". This suggestion was naturally never taken up by the government, emphasised Hufv~dstadsbladet1411 1945. © Scandia 2008 www.scandia.hist.lu.se Porlckala - Hanko - Aaland 3 ~nckell."Enckell's statement was also given wide publicity in Finland, where the Finland-Swedes were naturally extremely anxious to put an end to these rumours and prevent an election- strike on Aaland, since this would result in a loss of seats for the Swedes in parliament5 Enckell's denial reassured Swedish public opinion, but the people of Aaland were not satisfied.' Not until the minister for home affairs, Ernst von Born, chair- man of Svenska folkpartiet, the Swedish party, had visited haland and had discussions with representatives for Aaland's 'landstinget' [council for local government], did Aaland's voters agree to participate in the election.' These rumours were natur- ally extremely damaging, not least through the effect they had on public opinion in Aaland and Sweden, but was there any substance to them? Peace probes had been made as early as autumn ICJ~I'and the efforts to pull Finland out of the war started to play a more significant part in Finnish politics, at least after the beginning of 1943.The coming of the new Linkomies government in Feb- ruary should be seen partly against this background. The first chance of sounding the possibility of a separate peace treaty came in July through the mediation of the Belgian minister in Stockholm, but this came to nothing.2 More important, tho~~gh also without result, were the contacts made in November the same year. Erik Boheman, cabinet secretary in the Swedish foreign department, played an important role as mediator in Vftonbladet 1311 1945. "Cf. the leader in Nya Pressen 1611 and Hufvudstadsbladet r7/r 1945. G Dagens Nyheter 2311, Morgontidningen and Svenska Dagbladet 2411, Stock- holms-Tidningen 2511 och 2011 1945. Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet 512 1945. See page 12 below. HJ. J. PROCOPE,Fallande dom som friar. Doku~nentur Finlands krigsansvarig- hetsprocess (19461, p. 74 ff. Wnthis see e.g. G. A. GRIFENBERG,London-Vatikanen-Stockholm. En beskick- ningschefs minnen I1 (1g6o), p. 153 ff. © Scandia 2008 www.scandia.hist.lu.se 4 G~ranRystad these and subsequent Finnish-Russian contacts h Stockh~lm.~ It soon became obvious that Moscow took the boundaries of the Moscow Peacy Treaty as the starting-point for all negotiations. The Finnish response to the first Russian lead was considered unsatisfactory by the Russians. When contact was renewed at the beginning of 19414) the Finns' military situation had deteriorated. During a conversa- tion between Ryti and Mani~erheimat the beginning of Feb- ruary, the commander-in-chief strongly recommended peace, even on the terms of the Moscow Peace Treaty. Ryti folPowed the same lineO4On 12 February, Paasikivi went to Stockholm on behalf of the government to make contact with the Russian en- voy, Madame ~ollonta~.~The conditions he took back to Fin- land included a demand for the boundaries of 1940. Further- more, prisoners of war and internees in concentration camps were to be released and all connections with Germany were to be severed. No German troops were to be allowed on Finnish territory, but were to be interned, with Russian help if neces- sary. Questions such as the future of the Petsamo area and an indemnity wouad be dealt with at the negotiations in Moscow. According to Boheman, Madame Kollontay stated that if Fin- land accepted these terms in principle, "the question of Hanko could be taken into ~onsideration".~ The majority of the government and Mannerheim regarded the Russian conditions as unacceptable, especially the demand that the German troops should be interned. In his statement to a f~lPlsitting of parliament on zg February, Prime Minister Ein- " GRIPCNBERGp. 176ff., ERIK BOHEMAN,Pi vakt. Kabinettssekreterare under andra varidskriget (19643, p. 248 ff. G. MANNERHEIM,Minnen I1 (Stockholm 1952, in EngIish, The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, London 1953, in German, Marshal Mannerheim, Erinne- rungen, Ziirich 1952)~p. 374. The negotiations in Stockholm are described by GRIPCNBERG>p. 186ff. and BOHEMAN,p. 252 ff. BOIITMAN,p. 254. Cf. GRIPFNBCRGP). 193 ff. © Scandia 2008 www.scandia.hist.lu.se komies declared anotlaer of the poiiits to be unacceptable also: "wit11 regard to Hanko, it is impossible for us volu~atarilyto surrender this area to foreign ~ccu~ation".~ Linkomies wanted the negotiations to continue, however, and the government was given powers for this. On 4 March, die Finnish ambassador in Stockholm, Gripenberg, gave the Fin- nish reply to Guntlier, who was to forward it to Madame Kol- Bontay. The reply was expressed in such negative terms, how- ever, that Giinther and Boheman advised against its being hand- ed over and managed to get the wordiilg changed8But even this version was found completely unacceptable by the Russians. After the Finns had asked for an interpretation of the Russian demands, it was agreed that this should take place in Moscow. Paasikivi and Carl Enckell flew to Moscow on 25 March. The terms they returned with were decidedly harsh compared to the preliminary conditions, above all in the demand for an in- demnity of 600 inillion dollars, which was to be paid within five years. The Germaii troops were to be put to flight or in- terned before the end of April. The Fi~~nisharmy was to return to the 1940 boundaries and gradually be put on a peace footing. Furthermore, the Petsamo region was to be surrer~deredto the Soviet Union, who would, however, if Finland accepted the other conditions, abstain from '"ts right to lease Ha~~ko".~The government decided to reject these conditions, a decision which was accepted by the Finnish parliament on 12 April. In June, however, the military situation was such that a se- parate Finnish peace treaty wit11 the Soviet Union was obviously necessary. Ramsay, the minister for foreign affairs, sent a mes- sage to Boheman that Finland was now prepared to withdraw from the war and sever its connections with This Cf. V. TANNER,Vagen till fred 1943-1944 (Helsinki 1952) p. 130 f. BOHEMANp. 255, GRIPENBERGp. 200 ff. "OHEMAN p. 256 ff. TANNERp. 158 f. GRIPENBLRGp. 215. 'O GRKPENBERGp. 237 ff. © Scandia 2008 www.scandia.hist.lu.se 6 Goran Rystad brought no result, however. It was made impossible by the rather strange interlude of the Ryti-Ribbentrop Pact.