Joint Force Quarterly a PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

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. . . for those who served 1941–1945

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CONTENTS

A Word from the Chairman 4 by John M. Shalikashvili The Case for Forward Deployment 7 by Hans Binnendijk Q National Power and the Interagency Process 8 by George T. Raach and Ilana Kass

F Restore Hope: Coordinating Relief Operations 14 by Jonathan T. Dworken J Joint Special Operations in Peace 22 and War by Wayne A. Downing

PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC 28 by Jeffrey B. Jones and Michael P. Mathews

JFQ FORUM Commemorating World War II: 34 A Final Reprise Jointness and the Impact of the War 36 by David A. Armstrong PHOTO CREDITS The cover features a reproduction of a painting entitled Air Transport in the South Pacific— Fighting with Allies: The Debate Fifty Years On 1943 by Sidney Simon (U.S. Air Force Art Collection); the four cover insets (clockwise, 38 by Russell F. Weigley from top left) capture American and Thai special forces descending from a helicopter during Cobra Gold ’94 (Joint Combat Camera A War That Was Not Left to the Generals Center); M1A1 tank during Bright Star ’94 (U.S. Army/Jeffrey T. Brady); F–16D on patrol 46 by Eliot A. Cohen during Roving Sands ’94 (Combat Camera Imagery/Steve Thurow); and USNS Comfort in transit through the Panama Canal (U.S. Air The Meaning of World War II Force/H. Cintron). by Williamson Murray The background work of art replicated for 50 the table of contents is B–17 Base in England by Peter Hurd (U.S. Air Force Art Collection); insets on these pages (from top left) include The Generation of 1945 shoulder tabs and patch of a CARICOM force 58 by Ronald H. Spector member (DOD/Greg Scott); a reproduction of a painting of a carrier launch during World War II entitled Plane Director by Paul Sample (The The Battle for Anzio Life Collection of World War II Art/U.S. Army Center of Military History); operating room 62 by William Woodruff preparations during the Persian Gulf War (U.S. Navy/Joe Gawlowicz); and an American soldier taking an Iraqi prisoner of war during Soldier Art of World War II Desert Storm (DOD). The back cover depicts a change of 68 by Peter Harrington command at Tactical Assembly Area Liberty, Kuwait (55th Signal Company/Casey T. Smith). The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence 70 by David S. Yost

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SUMMER 95 / NUMBER 8

Presence—Do We Stay or Do We Go? 83 by James A. Lasswell Joint Force Quarterly A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

Problems in Defense Organization Hans Binnendijk 86 and Management Editor-in-Chief Patrick M. Cronin by Michael B. Donley Executive Editor Robert A. Silano War Termination and Joint Planning Editor 95 by Robert R. Soucy II, Kevin A. Shwedo, and John S. Haven II Martin J. Peters, Jr. Production Coordinator Calvin B. Kelley Joint Medical Support: Are Senior Copy Editor 102 We Asleep at the Switch? by Arthur M. Smith The Typography and Design Division of the U.S. Government Printing Office is responsible for layout and art direction.

Joint Force Quarterly is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN the Institute for National Strategic Stud- ies, National Defense University, to pro- 110 Carl Andrew Spaatz mote understanding of the integrated employment of land, sea, air, space, and FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET special operations forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, 111 Letters to the Editor contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the unified com- IN BRIEF mands, and joint force development. The editors invite articles and other 114 The Joint Staff: Completing the Metamorphosis contributions on joint warfighting, inter- by Mark C. Nesselrode service issues that support jointness, and topics of common interest to the Armed 118 Which Way Joint Doctrine? Forces (see page 136 for details). Please by Edward C. Ferriter direct editorial communications to: Editor 120 Atlantic Command’s Joint Training Program Joint Force Quarterly by Clarence Todd Morgan ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 124 Coalition Rules of Engagement by Drew A. Bennett and Anne F. Macdonald Telephone: (202) 475–1013 / DSN: 335–1013 FAX: (202) 475–1012 / DSN 335–1012 THE JOINT WORLD Internet: [email protected] 126 Doctrine, Lessons Learned, and Education The opinions, conclusions, and recom- 128 Quarterly Survey of Periodical Literature mendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not OFF THE SHELF necessarily reflect the views of the De- partment of Defense or any other agency 129 Desert Storm Warnings: A Book Review of the Federal Government. Copyrighted by Grant T. Hammond portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without permis- 131 Squaring the Pentagon: A Book Review sion of copyright proprietors. An ac- by William H. Gregory knowledgment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever material is quoted from or based on its contents. 134 Cumulative Index (1994–95): Issues 5–8 This publication has been approved by POSTSCRIPT the Secretary of Defense. 136 A Note to Readers and Contributors June 1995

ISSN 1070–0692

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Joint Force Quarterly A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL

Publisher GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman of the Advisory Committee Lt Gen Ervin J. Rokke, USAF National Defense University Members of the Advisory Committee BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) Office of the Chairman Brig Gen David E. Baker, USAF The Joint Staff Brig Gen Roger E. Carleton, USAF Armed Forces Staff College MG Richard A. Chilcoat, USA U.S. Army War College A. Denis Clift Joint Military Intelligence College AWord Col Paul V. Kelly, USMC Marine Corps War College Lt Gen Walter Kross, USAF The Joint Staff RADM Michael A. McDevitt, USN National War College Col Andrew Pratt, USMC Marine Corps Command and Staff College from the BG Randall L. Rigby, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Maj Gen Peter D. Robinson, USAF Air War College RADM Jerome F. Smith, Jr., USN Industrial College of the Armed Forces RADM Joseph C. Strasser, USN Chairman Naval War College Col John A. Warden III, USAF Air Command and Staff College Chairman of the Editorial Board orld War I was the last time Hans Binnendijk any nation equated war with Institute for National Strategic Studies Members of the Editorial Board glory. The causes of that war Richard K. Betts remain debatable today be- Columbia University causeW the quarrels that ignited it were ques- COL William D. Bristow, Jr., USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College tionable and shallow even at the time. But Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University once the spark was lit and Europe’s armies COL Robert A. Doughty, USA were on the march, there was a mood of eu- U.S. Military Academy LtCol Robert C. Figlock, USMC phoria across the continent in anticipation Marine Corps War College of romance and adventure. When the fight- Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University ing finally ground to a halt, when fighters Alan L. Gropman were drowning in mud, stupefied by the un- Industrial College of the Armed Forces COL Peter F. Herrly, USA ending slaughter, when the staggering losses National War College on the Marne and Somme and at Ypres, Ver- Col Douglas N. Hime, USAF Naval War College dun, Mons, and Gallipoli were tallied, the William T. Hodson world was stunned. The efficiency of the in- Information Resources Management College COL Richard L. Irby, Jr., USA dustrial age had reached the battlefield. Any U.S. Army War College vestige of glory that had existed in 1914 had Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College long since been extinguished by the murder- William H.J. Manthorpe, Jr. ous fires of machine guns, mangling fury of Joint Military Intelligence College Thomas L. McNaugher modern artillery, suffocating barbarism of The RAND Corporation poison gas, and the strategy of attrition—the Col Charles H. Mead, USAF Armed Forces Staff College incomprehensible response of the generals John J. Mearsheimer University of Chicago to the new tools of war. When it was over, Col Philip S. Meilinger, USAF the only way to rationalize the carnage was Air Command and Staff College LTG William E. Odom, USA (Ret.) to declare it the war to end all wars. Hudson Institute World War II was in so many respects James H. Toner Air War College even worse. Many more perished. But funda- LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) mentally it was different; it was not sense- Harvard University LTG C.A.H. Waller, USA (Ret.) less. Its causes were genuine, compelling, RKK, Limited terrifying. For countless millions it was a

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a special place in our hearts for its veterans it is because we know that their cause was right. But in many ways we would never be the same World War II erased again. Just as World War I all doubt about the stripped away all innocence motives of aggressors about the horrors of battle, World War II erased all doubt about man’s potential for bar- barity, the motives of aggressors, consequences of naivety, and cost of appeasement. Nobody emerged from this war talking foolishly about it as the war to end all wars. We learned a lot about others. We wit- nessed the astonishing resolve of the British who for two years refused to succumb when even staunch admirers conceded that their cause was hopeless. We developed an infatu- ation with Winston Churchill that still en- dures. Quintessentially English, he was wise, principled, urbane, dogged, and brave. We watched Britain stoically bear night after night of terror bombing, devastating losses on land and at sea, and one setback after another, never giving in to the slightest doubt or hesitation. We fought beside their soldiers, so different from our own with a non- Collection of World War II Art, U.S. Army Center Military History chalant valor and dry acceptance of success Life

The and failure alike. Soldier Carrying France was humbled more terribly than Wounded Child ever before in its history, swiftly defeated by (Leyte, October 1944) struggle for survival, a desperate clash be- a kind of war it had tragically failed to antic- by Paul Sample. tween good and evil. Its causes were forged ipate. Yet waiting in exile was a stubborn, in the angry, base mind of a murderous ma- irascible colonel, one of the few who had niac, and in response it brought out the best seen what was coming and tried valiantly to in our people. Unlike World War I when this get his countrymen to listen, who then led conflict ended, when the death camps were his men in their last battle of 1940 with opened for all to see and the remains of great courage and skill. Charles DeGaulle thousands of innocents were discovered in was the epitome of his nation’s character; the killing fields of Nanking, any lingering noble, proud, unyielding, a patriot whose doubt about why we fought was washed all-consuming faith in France was untainted away. Eisenhower had been right. It was a by defeat or the shame of Vichy collabora- crusade, a very righteous crusade at that. tion. As he argued vehemently and often If there is a lingering sense of fondness during his exile, defeat was only a temporary about the war that is why. If it spawned le- setback. French patriots would resist with all gions of heroes, that is because their courage their might; and once free, he said passion- and prowess went to a noble cause. If there is ately, France would rebound with its pride and power more intact than in the past.

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FROM THE CHAIRMAN

The Soviets began the war in league We also learned a lot about ourselves. with the Nazis, cutting political bargains for We had our own quintessential leader, FDR, their own gain. Then Hitler betrayed them, whose magnificent grin, characteristic and they paid a terrible price for having aplomb, and unforgettable rhetoric com- foolishly made a deal with that particular bined to capture our hearts and minds. He devil. But once that episode passed, we came had a vision for both the Nation and the to admire the mystical devotion of a tough world. Born a Brahman, he loved the com- people who took the worst punishment the mon man and democracy with all his spirit; Nazis offered, accepting millions, then tens and these two objects of his passions were of millions of casualties, until we the cornerstone of his vision. That is where wondered if there were any Sovi- he differed from European leaders, who were It was an outsized ets left to fight back. But fight schooled to think about the world with their war fought by back they did. They swallowed intellects, not their emotions. That is pre- outsized personalities one Nazi division after another, cisely why our alliance was such a great mar- destroying each with whatever riage, combining old and new, practicality means was at hand, with the and idealism, common sense and brilliant harshness of winter, tides of poorly armed reasoning. That is what it took to win, and yet courageous men and women, and soon to prevail so successfully after the war. enough with battle toughened, well led This is the second time in as many years units equipped with thousands of tanks and that World War II has been the theme of a cannons. And several months after the fight- forum in JFQ. In truth, part of every issue ing in Europe was over, the same skillful So- could be devoted to some aspect of the war viet forces attacked Manchuria, hurtling the and it would still be impossible to do credit Japanese back in a lightning attack. Sadly, as to all that has been learned and experienced soon as the war ended, the Soviets returned from that conflict. It was an outsized war to those same designs that had taken them fought by outsized personalities. At one into the war. point or another, either during or after the Then, of course, there were Germany, war, it really did bring out the best in all of Italy, and Japan, our enemies in those terri- us. We need to remember the remarkable ble years. As we fought them we convinced character of the nations we today call our al- ourselves that they were inhuman. But when lies. They are magnificent in adversity. And we became their occupiers and watched we need also to renew our faith in ourselves. them struggling to survive the miseries of Neither we nor our allies have changed a defeat, living in cities and towns pounded whit. Were another war like it to erupt into rubble, trying to care for refugees and today, we would be just as persevering, families torn apart by the war, while endur- valiant, and noble. That is our strength. ing severe impoverishment and scarcities with courage and sacrifice, we were re- JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI minded that they were people with a great Chairman capacity for good, indeed that it had been of the Joint Chiefs of Staff human failings that had carried them to such a terrible fate. Soon new leaders and new faiths took root that brought out the best in them as well. In fact, as they recov- ered, we gained valuable insights into their very formidable qualities. Soon all three became close allies, nations that we have since proudly served beside.

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tioned in East Asia stabilize the balance, reassure our The Case for Forward friends, and prevent unnecessary regional military buildups. Most Asians recognize this more readily Deployment than Americans, which is why they wish us to stay and why Japan is willing to contribute a high level of th he 50 anniversary of World War II is an apt host nation support. Reassurance also remains impor- moment to consider the linkage between U.S. tant in Europe where most want Germany to retain its engagement overseas and a stable international non-nuclear status and defensive posture. system. Three times between 1914 and 1950, In a world of multilateral diplomacy and combined Tneutrality or disengagement led America to major con- military operations, close cooperation with foreign flict. Then we engaged globally, ultimately winning the forces is indispensable. Habits learned in NATO facili- Cold War. Now we are entering a new international envi- tated the establishment of the coalition for Desert ronment and are wisely following the lessons of history Shield/Desert Storm around which the Arab states gath- with a national strategy of engagement. ered. This cooperation is not only critical for the suc- The most critical military aspect of the engage- cess of combined forces on the battlefield, but it also ment strategy is forward deployment. Post-Cold War yields diplomatic capital. Bosnia has illustrated the cor- reductions are nearly complete, and we now have relation between force presence and influence in the about 285,000 personnel (or 17 percent of the active contact group. Cooperation can benefit civil-military force) stationed overseas. That’s down from 510,000 relations in transitional societies as the Partnership for (23 percent) just five years ago. Peace has demonstrated. And cooperation yields intelli- But we are reminded by two articles in this issue gence assets, such as early warning of terrorist threats that the debate over forward deployment continues. against the Panama Canal. Forward deployment is cru- David Yost (in “The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence”) cial to forging patterns of cooperation without which cites an opinion survey that shows about half of Amer- American influence would rapidly decline. ica’s elite favors maintaining current troop levels in Eu- Forward deployed forces are fundamental to Amer- rope while the general public is far more isolationist. ica’s ability to react to crises around the world which af- He points out that the Frank amendment of last year fect vital interests or humanitarian concerns. In Desert would have cut our force levels drastically if Europe de- Storm about 95 percent of the airlift came via Europe. A clined to greatly increase host nation support pay- review of 27 operations mounted between March 1991 ments. In commentary by James Lasswell (“Presence— and October 1994 reveals that more than half were Do We Stay or Do We Go?”)—a response to the new staged from Europe. Some, like Able Sentry, contribute Air Force white paper, Global Presence, which appeared to preventive diplomacy. Without forward staging in JFQ, no. 7 (Spring 1995)—there is a strong case areas, America would be severely constrained. made for a continued naval presence overseas. Each service struggles with a portion of forward de- This is a debate that, given the history of this cen- ployment. Many in the Army would prefer to bring tury, cannot be allowed to drift. We need a national home the two heavy divisions in Europe while only re- consensus in favor of continued overseas deployment. taining a “reception center” infrastructure. There may But to achieve that consensus we need a clearer under- be a case for replacing armor with more mobile light standing of the role of forward deployed forces in the units. The Navy finds it increasingly difficult to retain a post-Cold War era. significant presence in the Caribbean, Mediterranean, During the Cold War the Armed Forces were de- Atlantic, Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf with a ployed overseas as part of containment to deter attack fleet two-thirds the size of a decade ago. As Marine Am- by a known enemy. We relied heavily on rapid rein- phibious Units increasingly provide a mobile presence forcement to defend. Today we still maintain a presence for crisis management, there do not seem to be enough in South Korea and the Persian Gulf for the same pur- to go around. Some within the Air Force advocate vir- pose. It is better to deter two major regional conflicts tual as opposed to physical presence as a major contri- than to fight them. Such deployments are easy to justify. bution to our military capabilities. The complex strategic environment for this era, As we assess the significance of deterring regional however, requires a better explanation of the overseas conflicts, reassuring allies, cooperating in multilateral deployment of 285,000 Americans in uniform. It is actions, and responding to crises, the case for forward this more complex case that must be made to the pub- deployment becomes clear. We are deployed overseas lic. It rests on the concepts of reassurance, cooperation, to promote U.S. national interests first and those of and crisis response. our allies second. This should not be a difficult notion Often even a token presence can serve like a cool- to get across to the American people. ing rod in a nuclear power plant. This is particularly true in Asia where a power balance among China, HANS BINNENDIJK Japan, and the members of ASEAN has yet to be Editor-in-Chief struck. Our roughly 100,000 military personnel sta-

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National Power and the Interagency Process By GEORGE T. RAACH and ILANA KASS

Summary merican strategic culture holds Inhibitions about using force can distance the military from that military force is a last resort. participation in interagency decisionmaking. As a result As a people, we are not entirely other instruments of national power may be exhausted be- comfortable with using force untilA the other instruments of national fore serious attention is given to the unique capabilities of the Armed Forces, and then only with a deep sense of having power—economic, diplomatic, political, and failed in employing other means. The interagency process, informational—have been wielded. Given especially when military planners are involved throughout, our history, values, and ideals such reluc- can represent a significant force multiplier, but it suffers tance is understandable. In this context, cau- from deficiencies in methods, actors, and structure. Military tious use of force with its potential for vast officers, accustomed to a settled and demanding system of destruction and loss of life reflects wise staff work, may be frustrated by governmental mechanisms statesmanship. which are known for elasticity and ambivalence. But the This cultural bias, however, often isolates military should remain engaged in the interagency process the military from the other instruments of both to make it more effective and to ensure that the mili- power. In fact, some policymakers consider tary voice is heard at the table. Officers can educate the the use of force as an admission of foreign interagency community about military capabilities and, policy failure. As a result, force is regarded as more importantly, about the limitations of force. a separate instrument that is somehow in-

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Raach and Kass

compatible with other means. This percep- crises of the new order which have been in- tion of military power undermines efforts to tricate and difficult to understand. By con- achieve a more synergistic application of na- trast the standoff against the Soviet Union tional power today with increasing frequency was not only comprehensible but, given before as well as during crisis. each side’s capability to destroy the other, This article does not argue that force included a premium on avoiding extremes. ought to be either a primary or an ordinary Today such constraints rarely apply. instrument of policy. While one can envi- Coupled with the increased complexity sion scenarios in which the Nation might of problems is a relative decrease in conven- strike preemptively, or prior to exhausting tional military power. Reduction in the size other means, they are exceptions to the rule. of forces and the slowing of some high tech- Employing combat power should virtually nology programs mean that there will be less always be a final recourse. Nor is this article decisive force, qualitatively and quantita- concerned with generating additional power. tively. This relative decline in capability is It does not suggest that future dangers will more apparent when one contemplates force require new weapons systems or that diplo- improvements underway in many other matic and economic techniques should be states and the proliferation of weapons of reshuffled and reprioritized. Rather, it is mass destruction. about enhancing power through the inte- A low level of military superiority does grated and synergistic use of the various in- not necessarily mean that power cannot be struments of power. It begins with the used decisively. However, when it is applied premise that there must be a close, interde- it may well be with greater risks and nar- ) d

ar pendent relationship among economic, rowed options. To compensate for a decline diplomatic, and military instruments, and in U.S. strength and increase in that of po- R.D. W ( especially in crises. If the United States is to tential adversaries requires innovative ways DOD enjoy a measure of order and stability in the of bolstering the effectiveness of national National Military Command Center. conduct of world affairs, this synergism power—both to deter and to win on the bat- must be routine, must occur across the spec- tlefield. Greater effectiveness calls for im- trum of relations, and must be applied with proved productivity in applying instruments vision and conviction. of power and, in turn, requires better interagency dynamics in dealing with crises. The New Order of Crisis Future crises are likely to differ signifi- Power and Process cantly from those of the Cold War. When Force and combat multipliers often de- the focus was the Soviet Union, and the scribe measures that improve effectiveness or overarching doctrine of productivity at reasonable cost. To exercise events indicate a worrisome containment guided our command and control more competently, actions, coordinated use improve the lethality or accuracy of fires, loss of effectiveness in apply- of national power was and develop new doctrines for employing ing power synergistically usually effective. How- forces are examples. In effect, multipliers ever, coordinated efforts allow commanders to do more without pro- since the Persian Gulf portionate increases in force size or cost. War have been uneven. Events of the last The term multiplier is particularly used to year or so indicate a worrisome loss of effec- describe tactical or operational enhance- tiveness in applying power synergistically. ments. To cope with future problems, a com- A new world order, regardless of its parable multiplier is required at the strategic form, brings with it a new order of crisis. So- level. What might be called power multipliers malia, Haiti, Bosnia, and even Korea are all are needed, and improving the interagency process to optimize instruments of national power is one way of bringing them to bear. When working properly, the interagency Colonel George T. Raach, USA (Ret.), is a member process determines the national interests at of the professional staff of the Commission on stake, defines immediate- and long-term ob- Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces; Ilana Kass jectives, and considers the best ways of is director of Russian studies and professor of achieving ends with minimal risk. In an- military strategy at the National War College.

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INTERAGENCY PROCESS

other light, this process is the mechanism dinates issues, sifts through information, which drafts, coordinates, and assesses na- and passes analysis, together with policy op- tional strategy and oversees its implementa- tions and recommendations, to the Deputies tion. Ideally, it is a forum for creative and vi- Committee.3 sionary use of national power, where The committee includes relatively senior participants look for opportunities to com- officials from various departments and agen- plement and enhance the capabilities that cies.4 It can usually make some decisions and others bring to the table. members can agree to proposals affecting Yet based on most daily press accounts, their departments or agencies. For the most the process is in disrepair. Within the gov- part, the members are not experts on the ernment the degree of dysfunction depends problem at hand, but if their representatives on the agency’s point of view. Still, in the to the IWG prepare them well, they usually course of numerous interviews with players have a sound grasp of the issues, risks, and from various agencies, there was no satisfac- likely outcomes. Initial responses to crises tion expressed in the health of the inter- often result from the deliberations by the agency process.1 What is supposed to hap- deputies, but for critical decisions the dep- pen, why it doesn’t, and what professionals uties defer to the principals. can do about it are issues worth exploring. The principals include departmental secretaries, senior officials, agency directors, Structures and Fractures and the National Security Advisor.5 Their On the face of it, the interagency meetings may directly involve the President process is designed to ensure that informa- and Vice President, or the results of meetings tion and options are developed and passed may be presented to them for approval.6 De- up the line and that decisions and guidance cisions resulting from these meetings and are passed back down to approved by the President ought to lay for military officers used the staffs which must write down markers and commit all governmental the orders and oversee to a defined framework the offices to an agreed course. their execution. A Presi- interagency arena can be While this description is somewhat sim- dential Review Directive, plified, it highlights the guidelines pre- especially frustrating initiated by the National scribed by the Clinton administration. In Security Advisor, defines the main, it appears to be a sound approach the scope of the process, identifies interested to a complex business and to include those agencies, and appoints an executive agent or who control various instruments of power. lead agency.2 This may be a cabinet agency Yet there are significant problems that affect like the Department of State or Defense or the quality of decisions, the effectiveness of an organization like the Agency for Interna- actions, and the ability to synchronize tional Development, which establishes the power.7 Fractures are evident on several lev- coordination process, sets the agenda, drafts els involving process, personalities, and policy recommendations, and conducts structure. For military officers used to a de- meetings. This lead agency also implements fined framework and clear-cut decisionmak- decisions unless that responsibility is passed ing the interagency arena can be especially to another organization. frustrating. The interagency hierarchy is designed to Unlike the structured coordination of provide information and refine options military staffs, membership in the inter- while also allowing participants to voice agency process is not fixed and varies from opinions, offer recommendations, and for crisis to crisis.8 On the one hand, this offers better or worse advance bureaucratic agen- flexibility and facilitates tailoring a team to das. In theory, the action officers who oper- include those who are critical and exclude ate informally or as members of task forces those who are not. On the other hand, it and special councils provide information to often means that those who participate in mid-level officials who comprise an inter- the process have little experience in crisis agency working group (IWG). Meeting at the management and must operate in an un- direction of the lead agency, the IWG coor- structured environment which provides little compensating support. In the military

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system position is important, while in the able distances, under tight time constraints. interagency process personalities are key. Problems of implementation are also exacer- Personalities can dominate interagency bated when implementing instructions are deliberations—especially if process manage- couched in vague language open to different ment is ineffective—and personal or organi- interpretations. zational agendas may take precedent over Can It Be Fixed? larger crisis-related issues.9 The result is often Rather than focusing diplomatic, eco- chaotic and disruptive. For example, policy nomic, and military power in complemen- papers are often presented for coordination tary fashion, power is being diffused. Embar- on short notice, often late on Fridays, in goes may be imposed, negotiations may take what appear to be deliberate attempts to place, and there may be some vague idea forestall detailed study and reasoned com- that the military can be called on to accom- ment; or initiatives of limited value are ad- plish an ill-defined purpose unrelated to the vanced in ways that detract, often bypassing real problem except in a very general way. existing chains; or the time and energy of This is hardly synergistic action. It seems to action officers, who ought to be providing fall more into the category of muddling. pertinent information, are diverted to stud- On the surface, military players in the ies of dubious merit. interagency process appear to be poorly posi- Structural and personality-dependent tioned to improve it despite the fact that impediments work against the synergistic they stand to lose the most if the muddle be- application of power. If lead agencies lack comes something worse. Some aspects of the experience in setting goals and objectives or process are unlikely to change much, and it guiding interagency groups through the co- is important to realize that at the outset. For ordination process to specific policy recom- example, to expect the civilian-dominated mendations, it may result in time-consum- interagency process to remodel itself in the ing meetings without agenda or purpose in image of a military staff system is anticipat- which information is not refined and oping too much. Despite the fact that the mili- tions are not developed. In some recent tary staff process works well, there is cultural cases, the process has been so chaotic that resistance to surrendering flexibility and am- the Deputies Committee has met before the biguity that many see as necessary. Addition- IWG has focused the discussion or prepared ally, few are eager to subject their offices to the agenda. Failures of this sort produce an unfamiliar architecture which appears to tardy or poor decisions, which further com- threaten prerogatives of turf. plicates matters. Nevertheless, if one accepts the un- The feedback from decisionmakers to changeable and works within certain para- those who must develop implementing meters, several initiatives could begin to re- plans is often sparse or obtuse, indicating store interagency relationships and weaknesses in process and personalities. transform the process into a power multi- There have been occasions when action offi- plier. First, although many military officers cers (and sometimes principals) who should see the process as frustrating, burdensome, have known about decisions reached up the and counterproductive, withdrawal is ex- chain were not informed in a timely man- actly the wrong approach. The faults in the ner. This inevitably results in wasting energy system are readily apparent and foregoing it and falling behind in the time-sensitive mat- is tempting. The interagency process will ter of crisis management. The system never continue whether the military plays or not, fully recovers and continues to lurch however, and ultimately the Armed Forces through the crisis. The initiative is thus in- must deal with the flawed results. Instead, variably lost and reaction becomes the officers should focus on making the system modus operandi. more effective. To do that, military staffs at Finally, lead agencies, responsible for all levels must be willing participants who making policy and decisions in the planning understand the system and can work to im- phase, may not have the resources and ex- prove it.10 pertise to oversee implementation. This is especially true where operations involve large numbers of players working over consider-

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INTERAGENCY PROCESS

Understanding the system goes beyond often operate more efficiently in crisis situa- a mere description of the mechanism. It in- tions. This attribute should be used to includes knowing the personalities of players form, persuade, and assist other members in and their agendas and the rationale behind applying national power. them. It means looking for points of agree- Third, while standing interagency work- ment rather than bones of contention. An ing groups may be less commonly used effective interagency process depends largely today than they were four years ago, they on trust among the participants, and devel- should not be.12 Working in isolation until oping trust depends on understanding and a the proverbial balloon goes up does not im- willingness to help move the prove the process. Though few formal, military officers in the process along. What may be sur- standing IWGs have been constituted, this prising to many in the military does not mean opportunities for informal interagency process can is that they usually know more coordination or forward-looking exchanges contribute by asking about other agencies than those should go begging. Officers at all levels who the right questions agencies know about DOD or are likely to be part of the interagency about each other. The key is to process should look for chances to form or build a robust base of knowl- participate in such groups. When that is not edge and apply it in ways that enhance the feasible, they should at least regularly seek process without attempting to control it. out potential counterparts. Even if this re- Second, officers working in the process sults in nothing more than a handshake and as members of OSD, joint, or service staffs exchange of telephone numbers, the system must be willing to educate nonmilitary play- will be stronger for the effort. Having the ers about the capabilities and, especially im- measure of one’s colleagues has great value. portant, the limits of military power, and Finally, military officers involved in the also to market ideas and positions effec- interagency process can contribute a good tively. As the former Commander in Chief of deal by asking the right questions. They must U.S. Atlantic Command pointed out, “The ensure at the outset that terms are properly necessary first step in shaping effective inter- defined and that every assumption makes agency groups is making known what skills sense. Dialect, if not language, differs from and resources one brings to the table.” 11 agency to agency, and it is important to over- Education involves more than a list of come varying cultures at the beginning. what force can and cannot achieve. It must Other points for investigation include touch on relevant theory about how force is the process itself, the role of the military in applied, how the military assists other de- the crisis at hand, and the degree of risk poli- partments and agencies in accomplishing cymakers are willing to accept. Simply asking common goals, how actions by other depart- whether another agency has been consulted ments can pave the way for effective and ef- might be illuminating. For example, if there ficient use of force, and how other agencies is concern over the use of economic power, must decide where the role of the Armed inquiring if the Department of the Treasury Forces leaves off in order to translate battle- and the National Economic Council (which field results into politically relevant out- is coequal to the National Security Council) comes. Officers should not hesitate to help have provided input may elicit a more potent others understand what is feasible, what is concept. Similarly, inquiring into the details not, and where cooperative use of power can of the end state and specific military role in be most effective. This requires not only achieving it can open new vistas—as can knowledge but vision. queries about alternative courses of action in Both education and marketing must be case of failure of the proposed approach. approached in ways that gain the willing When a decision appears to be forthcoming, support of other members of the interagency questioning whether or not the risks in- process without undermining mutual trust. volved are fully understood will do much to This is crucial. It is important to remember assure proper force size and structure. that by virtue of training and discipline mili- When decisions are made, questions tary officers are accustomed to crisis and can must be asked to ensure that policies and concepts are stated in language that makes sense across the cultural lines of the agencies

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which will implement them. No member NOTES should assume that something will happen 1 perforce. That is not the history of crisis man- This article is based on research undertaken to define the quality of relationships among agencies and agement or the interagency process. Collegial departments. Interviews were conducted with more questioning serves to ensure that national than twenty officials from action officers to members of power is focused and that the ends, ways, and Deputies Committees. means of strategy, as well as the risks of both 2 Presidential Decision Directives numbers 1 and 2 action and inaction, are all fully considered. spell out the interagency process in the Clinton administration. As indicated at the outset, present 3 Membership on IWGs varies from action officers predilections against the use of force may to assistant secretaries, depending on the importance of seem to banish military power to a distant, the issue. In some cases, a group is comprised of action unwelcome, and misunderstood role. Yet officers who report to an IWG executive committee global conditions suggest that this is the made up of assistant secretaries which, in turn, feeds into a Deputies Committee. wrong solution. In fact, the synergistic use of 4 An NSC briefing listed the members of the all instruments of power, including force, can Deputies Committee as the Deputy National Security serve as a strategic power multiplier, and the Advisor, Deputy Assistant for Economic Policy, Under interagency process is one way to achieve Secretary of State for Political Affairs, National Security that end. But the interagency process is Advisor to the Vice President, Under Secretary of De- fense for Policy, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of clearly broken. Staff, and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Will the course suggested above resolve 5 According to NSC sources, the usual principals in- the myriad problems which plague the inter- clude the National Security Advisor to the President, agency process? Not entirely. However, sim- Secretaries of Defense and State, Ambassador to the ply allowing the process to drive itself United Nations, Director of Central Intelligence, Eco- nomic Policy Adviser, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs deeper into chaos is not in the best interest of Staff. of national security and sooner or later will 6 Sometimes this is done in a formal NSC setting, lead to greater disasters. What is proposed is but often the venue is less formal. a beginning, albeit modest, to set the process 7 While the leadership styles of some senior officials on the way to improved effectiveness. had an influence, several individuals interviewed indicated that the uneven quality of national security deci- The amount of military power that can sions over the past year were as much the result of a be brought to bear in the future will be rela- failed interagency process as of personalities. tively less as force levels are drawn down 8 Some argue that the process is not process at all, and threats become more sophisticated and but merely the trappings of process. However, this does intricate. At the same time, the risks and not square with actual workings, which suggests the problem is more a case of dysfunctional process than consequences of failure will be great. Unless the absence of process. instruments of national power are wielded 9 Bureaucracies are inherently adversarial. But normal effectively, efficiently, and in concert, the bureaucratic gamesmanship can be disruptive during ability of the Nation to take unilateral action crises when time for reasoned decisions is at a premium. 10 and to lead a coalition will be diminished. Relationships at action officer-level appear to be healthier than those at mid- or upper-level. Bureaucratic Unlike the Cold War, there is no over- friction, though present, does not have the same hold arching policy to guide us. In these circum- that it does at upper echelons. Yet there is a downside as stances, the organized application of limited well. Officers who are detailed to civilian agencies must resources to achieve crucial objectives be- not allow themselves to be captured by the host agency, comes more difficult and more important. but rather should use their organizational skills to help focus that agency’s effort. Thus the interagency process, for better or 11 Paul David Miller, The Interagency Process, National worse, is a necessary mechanism. The mili- Security paper 11 (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Pol- tary cannot revitalize the process itself, nor icy Analysis, 1993), p. 12. should it. However, the steps outlined 12 During the previous administration, there were a above, though frustrating or unwelcome, number of standing interagency groups and several interagency coordinating bodies which met periodically, can both reduce organizational stress and even when there were no crises on the horizon. This improve effectiveness to a level where all proved to be valuable and created the sorts of positive participants are engaged and revitalization dynamics that facilitate responsive crisis management. becomes possible. Ultimately, such a renewal While some standing working groups remain, their may be in the interest of the Armed Forces meetings are often infrequent, poorly attended, and un- productive. most of all, so it is up to them to begin. JFQ

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RESTORE HOPE Coordinating Relief Operations By JONATHAN T. DWORKEN

Summary Joint force commanders and their staffs can expect to be called on to coordinate with humanitarian relief organizations (HROs). Restore Hope in Somalia exposed problems between the military and relief agencies in everything from operational planning to organizational culture. Such difficulties in the future could endan- ger the mission if relations between JTF officers and relief workers are not more firmly established. The military operated under a U.N. mandate to create a secure environment in which humanitarian assistance could be delivered. In turn, some officers saw HROs as supporting the military in distributing food and perceived relief workers as disorganized do-gooders. HROs, on the other hand, saw their role as delivering supplies to the Somali people with military support. They found the military rigid and bureaucratic, unable to tackle the complexities of relief work, and consumed by a fear of “mission creep.” Both sides sparred over policies on security, convoys, and weapons confiscation because of deep institutional differences.

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Dworken

ow well do joint force comman- of subsequent relief operations as well as the ders coordinate humanitarian as- course of military-HRO relations. sistance operations with relief or- The United Nations sent a force to So- ganizations? In every relief malia that was too small and limited by its Hmission from Provide Comfort in northern mandate to end the violence. As the situa- Iraq to Sea Angel in Bangladesh such coordi- tion deteriorated, the Security Council au- nation has been both necessary and exten- thorized a U.S.-led military intervention. sive. It also has been difficult. Dealing with The Commander in Chief, Central Com- humanitarian relief organizations (HROs), mand, established JTF Somalia in December an umbrella term which embraces various 1992 to mount Operation Restore Hope.2 Its types of relief groups, can be rewarding as purpose, according to one HRO official, was well as frustrating. to stop images of bloated babies and walking Operation Restore Hope in Somalia was skeletons from appearing on American tele- no exception. Although military-HRO coop- vision. To do so, the JTF had to ensure that eration was sufficient to enable the military relief agencies could get supplies to those to accomplish its mission of improving secu- who needed them most. rity, and for HROs to provide relief, relations From a JTF viewpoint there was a clear were strained. Each saw the other as uncoop- division of labor between the military and erative. This review of the relationship be- HROs. The former would create a secure en- tween the military and HROs in Somalia vironment in which to deliver supplies by identifies ways in which JTF commanders protecting the HRO distribution system, can better coordinate with relief agencies. from the ports and airfields where the sup- Since there are likely to be more military hu- plies entered the country, to the road net- manitarian assistance operations in the fu- works over which the supplies moved to dis- ture, joint commanders can facilitate them tribution points. The latter would get the by fostering cooperative relations with supplies in country, transport them over- HROs. The question remains how. land, and distribute them. Thus, the mission statement was drafted carefully to reflect The Military and HROs that ideal division of labor. With the fall of the Somali government y Mitchell) r When directed by the National Command Au-

er in 1991, the country split into more than a dozen factions. Fighting among them and thorities, CINCCENT will conduct joint/combined banditry created widespread starvation. To military operations in Somalia to secure major air and U.S. Navy (T sea ports, to provide open and free passage of relief alleviate suffering HROs tried to deliver re- Medical civic action in supplies, to provide security for relief convoys and re- 1 Mogadishu. lief supplies but faced serious difficulties. It lief organization operations, and to assist the United was hard to get supplies to major ports in Nations/non-governmental organizations in providing light of widespread fighting and general humanitarian relief under U.N. auspices.3 lawlessness. Some organizations delivered The JTF commander—who was the com- food to coastal towns by ship but then manding general of the First Marine Expedi- could not reach the interior where starva- tionary Force (I MEF)—set up headquarters tion was the worst. Airlifts could only haul a in Mogadishu and assumed control over all small amount of supplies, were extremely Marine and Army forces, various Air Force costly, and could only be made to secure and Navy assets, and coalition troops from areas. Cross-border HRO convoys from almost twenty countries. The JTF divided Kenya brought food to the towns of south- southern Somalia into eight areas, surround- west Somalia, but not farther north. Prob- ing each major town that would serve as a lems in delivering food increased the rate of distribution point, and later carving out a starvation (some 350,000 died prior to mili- ninth area. The military called these areas tary intervention) and shaped the conduct “humanitarian relief sectors” rather than military sectors to emphasize the nature of the operation. Overall the division of labor worked. The Jonathan T. Dworken is a member of the Center military secured the ports and airfields, en- for Naval Analyses assigned to III Marine Expedi- tionary Force; he was a CNA field representative sured that HRO convoys were not attacked or with JTF Somalia during Restore Hope. looted by factions and bandits, repaired the

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road network, and guarded distribution With few exceptions, however, members points. Also, as the operation improved secu- of HOCs did not answer to each other; in- rity in general, it was easier to provide relief stead they coordinated among themselves. and the HRO presence al- HOC directors reported to the United Na- as the operation improved most doubled between De- tions, civilian deputies to the U.S. Liaison cember 1992 and March Office (the State Department presence in So- security in general, the HRO 1993.4 The relief agencies malia) and to OFDA in Washington, military presence almost doubled included both nongovern- deputies to the JTF, and the HROs to their mental and private volun- national headquarters. The resulting com- tary organizations like CARE, international mand relationship could be best depicted by groups like the Red Cross, and U.N. agencies overlapping circles rather than by a like the World Food Program. They distrib- schematic diagram. uted food, ran clinics, and worked on long- The Mogadishu HOC was both the na- term projects such as infrastructure, educational HOC and the HOC for the city’s hu- tion, and agriculture which greatly lowered manitarian relief sector. It was collocated the death rate. with U.N. headquarters, not with JTF headquarters, because there was a reluctance to Humanitarian Operations Centers give HRO workers access to the JTF com- When operational planning started, the pound and because the United Nations, and JTF staff knew they would need to cooperate not the U.S.-led JTF, had the overall task of with HROs. To ensure close coordination organizing relief efforts in Somalia. they established humanitarian operations Each HOC had a civil-military operations centers (HOCs) in Mogadishu and smaller cell (CMOC) manned by JTF officers and ones in other sectors. Their general mission headed by the center’s military deputy. was to plan, support, and monitor the deliv- CMOCs coordinated military support to relief ery of relief supplies.5 Each HOC had three groups by validating HRO requests for assis- supporting functions: to develop and imple- tance and asking the JTF to task subordinate ment relief strategy, coordinate logistic sup- commands to fulfill requests. CMOC officers port for HROs, and arrange military support worked with DART officials, drawing on their for relief agencies. The key to HOC success expertise in managing humanitarian assis- was the daily meeting among HROs and rep- tance and dealing with relief organizations. resentatives of the military, United Nations, and a disaster assistance response team Military-HRO Coordination (DART)—specialists from the Office of For- The military and relief agencies had to eign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), U.S. Agency coordinate policy on various issues, of which for International Development, to coordi- three stand out: convoy escort, security for nate American relief efforts. HROs, and weapons confiscation. One JTF The official HOC organizational struc- staff member referred to these three issues as ture included a director, both a civilian and a “the good, the bad, and the ugly.” It was an military deputy, and associated groups. The apt characterization. director was a U.N. official on loan from the Convoy Escorts. On average the military relief agency CARE. The civilian deputy was escorted 70 convoys carrying 9,000 metric the DART leader and the military deputy was tons of supplies from Mogadishu inland from the JTF. Core groups coordinated the ef- each month. This ensured that relief reached forts of HROs in areas such as agriculture and those who needed it and was not looted. sanitation. A Standing Liaison Committee The effort also greatly decreased the cost of was, at least in theory, a policymaking forum transport for HROs who had previously air- for humanitarian relief affairs. The HOC di- lifted supplies or relied on highly paid, rector chaired the committee, and its mem- armed Somalis and expensive truck rentals. bers included representatives of the United Convoys worked well, but communications Nations, JTF, DART, and HROs. problems arose because CMOCs were not located with the force headquarters that notified the appropriate commands to furnish escorts.

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workers needed security, they contacted the local CMOC which notified JTF headquar- the JTF was trying to disarm ters which in turn tasked U.S. or coalition warlords, bandits, and large forces to assist. Providing security was not easy, especially in Mogadishu. Communica- segments of the population tion problems were compounded by the fact that the city’s CMOC, where incoming requests were received, was not collocated with JTF headquarters which directed support to HROs. Relief agencies were also widely dispersed. In Mogadishu alone they had 585 offices, residences, warehouses, feeding centers, and clinics that could require security.6 Weapons Policy. The most contentious issue was weapons confiscation.7 Most vehicles rented locally to deliver supplies came with armed drivers to protect them from bandits. To pick up supplies, HROs took vehicles into areas like ports and airfields which were controlled by the JTF. To deliver supplies, they had to cross humanitarian relief sector boundaries and pass checkpoints. At the same time, however, the JTF was trying to disarm warlords, bandits, and large y Mitchell) r

er segments of the population. Some soldiers had difficulty in distinguishing bandits from

U.S. Navy (T local HRO drivers and impounded any weapon they saw, including those be- Unloading equipment longing to HROs. Others, thinking that in Mogadishu. most drivers took the weapons home at night and became bandits, confiscated their weapons purposely. The first solution to this problem was for the JTF to issue pink identifica- tion cards to HRO drivers in Mogadishu. But this proved to be ineffective since the cards lacked pictures, the military did not fully disseminate the rules, and Drilling for water, Somalia. the confiscation policy varied by sector. Marines continued to expropriate DOD weapons. Without their weapons drivers would not operate the vehicles them- Security. HROs requested that the mili- selves nor allow relief workers to drive them tary provide security for their facilities unescorted. Several HROs were thus paying against two different threats: continuing spo- large sums for vehicles (upwards of $2,500 a radic banditry and HRO guards themselves. month) which remained idle as relief sup- The latter threat was due to the widespread plies went undelivered. banditry prior to military intervention when The JTF thus decided to issue blue iden- relief agencies hired guards for personal and tity cards—with photos to prevent fraud. compound security which, in many in- HROs vouched for their Somali drivers who stances, was not voluntary—guards de- received these cards from CMOCs. Once is- manded to be hired or would attack com- sued, the drivers could enter ports and air- pounds. For the same reason, HROs found fields, cross sector boundaries, pass daylight they could not fire the guards. When relief

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roadblocks, and have limited numbers of DART—was in the lead with the other in a weapons. The JTF disseminated the rules supporting role. But in Restore Hope neither widely, but then the Marines initiated a new one clearly had the lead. Military officers ac- disarmament policy in Mogadishu which customed to command and control mecha- called for confiscating any visible weapon.8 nisms and wiring diagrams were frustrated. When HRO vehicles passed checkpoints, They found operating with HROs under an marines would look inside, see weapons, and assumption that a chain of command ex- seize them. (The HRO drivers carried weapons isted was like trying to put a square peg in a in their laps for access; keeping them on cab round hole. Instead, what was needed was floors or in car trunks would not have al- constant negotiation with everyone in- lowed them to defend their vehicles.) volved at every step in the operation. Even with blue identity cards, marines Second, JTF officers had differing views confiscated many HRO weapons. During one on the mission and the role of supporting week in Mogadishu, for example, 84 HROs. The mission statement identified four weapons were seized, 54 from HROs because objectives. The first two centered on improv- they were visible. Relief agencies were upset ing security in general, the third on provid- since even if weapons were wrongly seized it ing security for HRO convoys and activities, took four days for them to be returned. The and the fourth on assisting agencies in deliv- JTF eventually redefined the term visible to ering humanitarian relief. Some officers, es- allow drivers to carry weapons in their laps pecially those on the Marine and JTF staffs, and distributed new policy cards widely in held that the military was to assist HROs in- early April. This clarified the policy on HRO directly through overall security, thus allow- weapons by indicating in which positions ing HROs to provide relief. Those with this guards and drivers could carry them. Al- view focused on the security aspect of the though putting such information on easy- mission statement as a whole. Others, espe- to-read cards for the benefit of the military cially JTF officers on CMOC staffs, believed and relief workers appeared to resolve most that the military was there to help HROs, di- problems, the cards were not circulated until rectly and indirectly. They cited the final immediately before the U.S.-led JTF trans- line of the statement (“to assist the United ferred control of the operation to the newly Nations/non-governmental organizations in formed U.N.-led military force. providing humanitarian relief”) and stated that helping HROs was the basic reason for Why the Problem? being in Somalia. Who was right? The intent There were more differences between was for the military to provide security, but the military and HROs in Mogadishu than in the concluding phrase of the mission state- outlying areas because there were more mili- ment was added to give the JTF commander tary personnel and relief workers in the capi- authority to do more if required, and it was tal and the security situation was worse meant to be permissive, not directive. Few there than in other sectors. So marines in JTF staff officers, however, were aware of this Mogadishu, not as familiar with individual fact. The problem was not in gearing the HRO workers, focused on confiscating mission toward the HROs, but rather dis- weapons more actively than elsewhere. But agreement over how much to assist them. the weapons confiscation issue and other Relief workers, used to military officers who differences between the military and HROs cooperated with them, were frustrated by reflected a deeper tension between the two the attitude of JTF officers who believed in a communities which was attributed to a se- more restrictive mission and viewed their ries of factors. agencies as intransigent. First, there was no clear military-HRO Third, the Marines in Mogadishu were command relationship. No single organiza- not as accountable to HROs as were forces tion had control over relief issues. While located in outlying areas. There was no Mo- neither the military nor HROs could control gadishu humanitarian relief sector because the other’s actions, this had been less of a the local HOC was also the national HOC problem previously where either the military for all of Somalia. Thus JTF officers from or the relief agencies—under a U.N. organ or I MEF manned the Mogadishu CMOC—the military side of HOC—and not officers from

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the unit controlling the Mogadishu relief And relief workers viewed their plans and sector (1st Marine Division). In other sectors, operations as humanitarian and regarded in contrast, officers from local headquarters the JTF as having a supplemental role. Nei- manned CMOCs. So if local ther side went out of their way to bring the many HROs held unrealisti- forces confiscated weapons, other into their planning process until it was their officers had to deal almost complete. cally high expectations of with HRO complaints and Organizational Culture military support thus worked to avoid un- Many problems noted above could have necessary seizures. In Mo- been successfully overcome. They were not, gadishu, however, Marine officers were to a in large part due to organizational culture. certain extent insulated from HRO com- The way a group is organized and operated is plaints. a reflection of its culture—those values and Fourth, many HROs held unrealistically methods of operation which characterize an high expectations of military support, per- institution. Militaries have characteristics haps due to the significant help which was that arise from a specific culture. They have being provided in northern Iraq at that time. rigid rules, hierarchical structures, planning The relief agencies in Somalia expected the systems, and processes for selecting experi- military to rid the southern part of the coun- enced officers for positions of command in try of bandits and warlords so that they the field. HROs, in contrast, are flexible, in- could provide humanitarian assistance. At dependent, unstructured, and adaptive orga- least they thought the JTF should provide nizations that tend to employ young work- blanket security and allow them to keep ers in the field. their armed guards. But many of these agen- There are good reasons why both types cies did not—or could not—take steps to of organization have developed different help the military improve security, such as cultures. The military needs certain qualities consolidating facilities in Mogadishu, firing to function in combat. HROs face changing Somali guards hired before intervention, and circumstances, rely on uncertain local sup- ensuring that their local drivers followed port, work in difficult environments, and rules on carrying weapons. have small numbers of indigenous employ- Fifth, competition and hard working ees. They do not need military values and in conditions led to high turnover rates among fact could not operate with them. The mili- HROs. Many arrived after the military inter- tary and HROs attract disparate people. vention and knew little about what had gone Why do differences in organizational cul- on beforehand and thus exaggerated the sig- ture matter? For one thing, they make work- nificance of differences. Also, since HROs ing together a challenge. Varied practices must appear to be effective to raise funds, and dissimilar personalities can lead to mis- they sometimes compete rather than collabo- understanding. The military penchant for rate. This can make cooperation difficult. detailed planning, for example, made HROs Sixth, there was insufficient planning. believe that the JTF wanted to take over In several instances the military and relief every aspect of the operation. agencies failed to involve each other in deci- Perhaps more importantly differences in sions that required cooperative military-HRO organizational culture create negative stereo- operations. During cease fire and disarma- types. The military was frustrated by what ment planning, for example, military offi- they viewed as disorganization and waste cers committed agencies to provide relief at growing out of a tendency not to conduct certain sites before coordinating the loca- detailed planning. Individually, they saw re- tions and the requirements with HROs. Simi- lief workers as young, liberal, anti-military, larly, agencies did not inform the military of academic, self-righteous, incompetent, expa- their decision to establish soup kitchens in triate cowboys who came to an area for a Mogadishu, even though the military may short time to “do good” without fully consid- have been called upon to provide security. ering the consequences. Officers simply did Why didn’t they include one another in not see women in their late-twenties with planning? The JTF officers took their plans Berkenstock sandals and “Save the Whales” and operations to be primarily military and saw HROs as occupying a supporting role.

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T-shirts as experts worthy of consultation. At ▼ Ensure clarity of mission. The mission the same time, many relief workers saw mili- statement, commander’s intent, policy guidance, tary officers as inflexible, conservative, and et al. should make clear the role of humanitarian bureaucratic. They found them insensitive to assistance, what priority the commander places Somali suffering and viewed their concern on assisting HROs, and how the military relates to HROs. over “mission creep” as obsessive, an excuse ▼ Ensure that the military and HROs both to do the minimum and go home. understand how the other operates. Soliciting in- Finally, with the JTF and HROs seeing formation from relief workers and briefing them one another as hostile, the job of CMOC of- on doctrine, standard operating procedures, and ficers became extremely difficult. To their capabilities could help form a basis of knowledge peers they were suspect for for cooperation. most differences can only working with HROs. Phrases ▼ Involve relief organizations in military like “going native” and decisionmaking. Getting HRO input would help a be handled indirectly by “Stockholm syndrome” were JTF commander make better decisions and make increased military-HRO often used to describe CMOC HRO acceptance of military plans more likely. ▼ officers who also fared no Ensure that JTF officers see relief agencies interaction as partners. Stressing relations could help con- better with HROs at the time. vince officers to take HROs seriously and not re- Representing JTF positions, gard them as nuisances. such as following weapons rules, resulted in ▼ Use the DART. Involving DART members CMOC officers being regarded like the other in planning and operations would allow JTF offi- officers who did not understand HROs. cers to draw on their expertise and use them as intermediaries in dealing with HROs. Improving Relations Though some problems can be ad- Tension between the military and HROs dressed directly, most (especially overcoming during Restore Hope had little operational differences in organizational culture) can impact. But in future missions, when more only be handled indirectly by increased mili- direct support to relief agencies may be tary-HRO interaction. To do so, a JTF com- needed or more serious threats may arise, co- mander facing a humanitarian assistance op- ordination and cooperation must be closer. eration can take the following steps: Military officers can improve this relation- ▼ Establish HOCs and CMOCs. Having the ship. But relief workers have to meet them military and HROs in one place makes the job of halfway. The efforts by a JTF commander to coordination easier than moving liaison officers improve coordination with HROs is likely to among various headquarters. yield greater cooperation. JFQ ▼ Collocate HOCs and CMOCs with JTF headquarters to increase interaction, help the NOTES military and HROs learn more about their respec- 1 Frederick C. Cuny, “How the U.S. Military Could tive operations, and facilitate planning. Assist Relief Operations in Somalia,” Intertect, August 1, ▼ Staff CMOCs with officers experienced in 1992. humanitarian assistance. Assigning such officers 2 For different views, see “JFQ Forum: Mission to So- would allow JTF commanders to draw on their malia,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 2 (Autumn 1993), pp. expertise. 37–70. 3 ▼ Involve officers from local military forces Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Somalia OPLAN,” p. 5. in CMOCs. Placing such officers there could 4 UNITAF briefing, “Civil-Military Operations Cell,” make them responsive to HRO needs and ensure March 1993. that they are not insulated from HRO complaints. 5 Except where indicated information on HOCs and ▼ Increase the stature of CMOCs and the CMOCs is from a UNITAF briefing entitled “Humanitar- visibility of HRO coordination. Giving CMOC di- ian Operations Center,” January 1993. rectors the status and access accorded special staff 6 UNITAF, “Civil-Military Operations Cell.” section chiefs reporting to JTF commanders 7 UNITAF, “Differences between the Humanitarian would demonstrate the importance of relations Community and UTF and How to Resolve Them,” Janu- with HROs. ary 27, 1993; F. Lorenz, “Weapons Confiscation Policy during Operation Restore Hope,” unpublished paper, August 1993. 8 CJTF Somalia, 081200Z January 1993, “UTF Soma- lia—Commander’s Policy Guidance, no. 3 (Weapons Confiscation and Disposition).”

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ANNOUNCEMENT

Joint Force Quarterly ESSAY CONTEST ON THE Revolution Contest Rules 1. Entrants may be military personnel or civilians (from the public or the private sector) and of any nationality. Essays in Military written by individual authors or groups of authors are eligible. 2. Entries must be original and not previously published (nor under consideration for publication elsewhere). Essays Affairs that originate from work carried out at intermediate and senior colleges (staff and war colleges), service schools, civilian uni- o encourage innovative thinking on how the Armed versities, and other educational institu- Forces can remain at the forefront in the conduct of tions are eligible. war, JFQ is pleased to announce the first annual “Essay 3. Entries must not exceed 5,000 words T in length and must be submitted typewrit- Contest on the Revolution in Military Affairs” sponsored by ten, double-spaced, and in triplicate. They should include a wordcount at the end. the National Defense University Foundation, Inc. Documentation may follow any standard The contest solicits innovative concepts for operational academic form of citation, but endnotes rather than footnotes are preferred. doctrine and organizations by which the Armed Forces can 4. Entries must be submitted with (1) a exploit existing and emerging technologies. Entries that letter clearly indicating that the essay is a contest entry together with the author’s most rigorously address one or more of the following name, social security account number (or questions will be considered for a cash award: passport number in the case of non-U.S. entrants), mailing address, telephone num- ▼ The essence of an RMA is found in the magnitude of change ber, and FAX number (if available); (2) a compared with preexisting warfighting capabilities. How might cover sheet containing the contestant’s full name and essay title; (3) a summary of the emerging technologies—and the integration of such technologies— essay which is no more than 200 words; result in a revolution in conducting warfare in the coming decades? and (4) a brief biographical sketch of the What will be the key measures of that change? author. ▼ Exploiting new and emerging technologies is dependent on the 5. Entries must be mailed to the following address (facsimile copies will not be ac- development of innovative operational concepts and organizational cepted): RMA Essay Contest, Joint Force structures. What specific doctrinal concepts and organizations will be Quarterly, ATTN: NDU-NSS-JFQ, Washing- required to fully realize the revolutionary potential of critical military ton, D.C. 20319-6000 technologies? 6. Entries must be postmarked no later than August 31, 1995 to be considered ▼ How might an adversary use emerging technologies in innova- in the 1994-95 contest. tive ways to gain significant military leverage against U.S. systems 7. JFQ will hold first rights to the publi- and doctrine? cation of all entries. The prize-winning as well as other essays entered in the Contest Prizes contest may be published in JFQ. Winners will be awarded prizes of $2,000, $1,000, and $500 for the 8. Winners’ names will appear in JFQ and the prizes will be presented by the three best essays. In addition, a special prize of $500 will be awarded for President of the National Defense the best essay submitted by either an officer candidate or a commis- University at an appropriate ceremony sioned officer in the rank of major/lieutenant commander or below (or in Washington, D.C. equivalent grades). A selection of academic and scholarly books dealing with various aspects of military affairs and innovation will also be presented to each winner. JFQ

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Joint Special Operations

Patrol coastal class ship USS Cyclone with Dominican craft. in Peace and War

U.S. Air Force (Eugene L. LaDoucer) By WAYNE A. DOWNING

Summary The experience of U.S. Special Operations Command over its eight-year history has surfaced five factors integral to the success of special operations: regional orientation; readiness; programming and budget; research, development, and acquisition; and command and control. In adjusting to the new security environment and changing threats, the special operations community is building on lessons from Panama, the Persian Gulf, and Haiti. For example, theater special operations commands provide regional CINCs with headquarters for planning. Mission criteria originally developed for Desert Storm are being institutionalized in doctrine to validate proposed operations: Is it appropriate? Does it support the campaign plan? Is it feasible? Are resources available? Will the outcome justify the risk? Such initiatives will ensure that special operations personnel effectively meet the challenge posed by two kinds of threats: nation-states with conventional forces and groups without a viable military or a clear national center of gravity.

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ince it was founded in April 1987, The SOCOM Experience the U.S. Special Operations Com- After eight years of carrying out our mis- mand (SOCOM) has provided the sion, we have derived a series of lessons, Nation with special operations forces namely, regional orientation, readiness, pro- S(SOF) that are arguably the most capable in gramming and budget, RD&A, and com- the world. SOCOM trains, equips, and pro- mand and control. vides joint special operations capabilities to Regional Orientation. A post-Cold War se- each regional CINC, American ambassadors curity strategy that focuses on regional af- and country teams, and governmental agen- fairs, in war and OOTW, requires a force that cies. SOCOM ensures the combat readiness of operates effectively in a variety of environ- forces assigned and monitors the ments. SOF has enhanced regional orienta- post-Cold War strategy preparedness of SOF assigned to tion and language proficiency in many units and reinforced the capability of others. Spe- requires a force that other commands. Unique among the unified commands, SOCOM cial Forces (SF) have always been language- operates in a variety manages its own program and qualified as well as regionally focused, and of environments budget and also conducts re- the regional orientation of PSYOP and CA search, development, and acquisi- units has been expanded. Selected members tion (RD&A) of SOF-peculiar items. Lastly, the of the Navy’s Sea, Air, Land teams (SEALs) re- command maintains a proficient Reserve ceive language training for foreign internal component which is fully integrated into the defense (FID) missions, and Air Force Special total SOF concept. Operations Command (AFSOC) has formed a The command sets SOF priorities to special operations squadron with appropriate meet the requirements of regional CINCs. It language and regional training for FID mis- ensures that those priorities are supported by sions. Because of the ability of SOF to work joint doctrine, planning, and training and overseas, employment rates have steadily in- that interoperability across the SOF commu- creased. In FY94 alone SOF operated in 139 nity and compatibility with the equipment nations, providing ambassadors and geo- of all the services are maintained. To some, graphic CINCs with regionally-oriented sup- it may appear that SOCOM looks and acts port for country and regional development like a fifth service. But it is not, and could plans. In an average week some two to three not be, since its mission can only be accom- thousand SOF operators are deployed on 150 plished with solid service support. Among missions in 60 to 70 countries. other things, the services provide quality Readiness. Another lesson is the impor- personnel, common equipment, base operat- tance of maintaining a consistent and high ing support, a good deal of the logistical sus- state of readiness. This is a function of containment, and critical core service skills centrating on core missions, quality people, training. This support allows SOCOM to and a continuous, regionally-oriented, joint focus on SOF-specific training and equip- training program. It is a focused program ment as well as joint integration. that allows Army, Navy, and Air Force special SOF provide an unprecedented range of operators to be ready to work together as a capabilities including regionally oriented as- joint team, performing those tasks that they sets for operations other than war (OOTW), know and understand, as soon as they arrive specially tailored JTFs for unique missions in in an objective area in peace, conflict, or war. peace and war, short-notice strategic strike Programming and Budgeting. It is essential forces for global deployment, and psycho- in fielding a preeminent force to have au- logical operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs thority over programming and budget for- (CA) capabilities for the entire range of mili- mulation and execution. The congressional tary operations. mandate to manage a separate major force program (MFP 11) ensures visibility for SOF program requirements in DOD as well as Congress. Because of the growing utility of SOF in a world characterized by multiple re- General Wayne A. Downing, USA, is Commander gional challenges, SOF funding (about 1.2 in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, and formerly headed U.S. Army Special Operations percent of the defense budget) has remained Command.

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JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

relatively stable which has allowed us to re- which hardware will be procured and uti- tain adequate forces. In fact, we have added lized to support the C4I system. In sum, we two SF battalions oriented on the Caribbean have revamped modernization based on a and Africa to the active force since the end hard look at available funding and future of the Cold War while, at the same time, needs which resulted in canceling 42 pro- eliminating two Reserve groups focused on jects and reducing 24 others in scope. The Central Europe. approximately 200 programs that remain are Research, Development, and Acquisition. affordable and will provide equipment es- The fourth lesson is that RD&A authorities sential to succeed in a dynamic, unpre- are essential to having the best equipped dictable environment. Just as important as force in the world. MFP 11 facilitates the major systems acquisitions is quick reaction fielding of major systems that will take SOF procurement which gives us the ability to into the 21st century with the most capable equip the force with commercially available, equipment available. Every C–130 platform nondevelopmental items in a matter of has gotten an SOF-improved capability— weeks or days. that is, enhanced navigation, self defense, Command and Control. SOCOM has and communications. We are fielding the made notable advancements in command MC–130H Combat Talon II for long-range and control since 1987 that have focused on penetration which has increased cargo ca- improving the integration of SOF and con- pacity and enhanced avionics. AC–130U ventional forces. The history of special oper- Spectre gunships will offer SOF and conven- ations has repeatedly shown that SOF make tional commanders a capability that can be their greatest contribution when they are strategically deployed to immediately attack fully integrated into the overall theater cam- more targets under more severe conditions paign plan, working in close cooperation than its predecessor. SF aviation is fielding with other joint forces. The most important the MH–60K and MH–47E, air-refuelable improvement is the increased capabilities of transport helicopters that provide superb theater Special Operations Commands short- and medium-range insertion capabili- (SOCs). These sub-unified commands pro- ties under all weather conditions. vide regional CINCs with the headquarters The Naval Special Warfare Command to plan and control the employment of joint (NAVSPECWARCOM) is replacing its Viet- SOF in war and OOTW. Theater SOCs have nam-era fleet of special boats. Moderniza- formed joint special operations task forces tion programs include a 10-meter rigid-hull several times, including for Promote Liberty inflatable boat and the Mark V special opera- in Panama, Desert Shield/Desert Storm in tions craft, a high-speed boat which can Southwest Asia, Provide Comfort in North- carry a platoon of (16) SEALs with an opera- ern Iraq, the humanitarian relief efforts in tional range of 500 nautical miles and a top Rwanda, and, lately, multinational force speed in excess of 50 knots. Transportable in training for Haiti. To support this growing C–5 aircraft, the boats will dramatically en- role, SOCOM has manned theater SOCs at hance SEAL support. NAVSPECWARCOM 100 percent of peacetime authorization and has taken delivery of nine of thirteen provided interim quick reaction communi- planned naval ships that are particularly ef- cations. In addition, all theater SOC com- fective for coastal patrol and interdiction manders are now flag officers. missions and transporting SEALS. The last A major step in integrating SOF effec- major program under development is an ad- tively is the increased use of special opera- vanced SEAL delivery system—a dry, sub- tions coordination elements, special mersible (or mini-) submarine—that will sig- operations command and control elements nificantly increase the speed and range of within Army corps and conventional head- clandestine insertion and extraction in hos- quarters, special operations liaison elements tile or denied waters. with joint force air component commander Finally, SOCOM is implementing a com- headquarters, and naval special warfare task mand, control, communications, computers, units with amphibious ready groups and, and intelligence (C4I) master plan for restructuring architecture and the way in

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New World Order Probably the most profound challenge that we confront is dealing with two competing and different kinds of threat. One is a AC–130U Spectre well-equipped nation-state, like gunship. Gunners feeding Iraq, which requires high-tech ca- Bofors cannon pabilities that can quickly and precisely attack high-value targets and integrate coalition forces of

U.S. Air Force (Charles U.S. Air Force Gohl) diverse backgrounds, tasks which SOF accomplish extremely well. But we also face threats which have no viable conventional military or clear ic Owens) V

ce ( national centers of gravity, as illustrated by r Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti. Here threats are subnational groups, disintegrating social U.S. Air Fo structures, disease, and environmental degradation. Some classify them as fourth genera- more recently, carrier battle groups. All of tion warfare. The forces that are needed to these organizations have been used by con- fight a nation-state are usually not appropri- ventional commands in several recent con- ate to address these latter threats. tingency operations to fully integrate SOF The task is to field sufficiently flexible, into operations. adaptable forces that can operate effectively Another step in integrating SOF into against both kinds of threat. This is a sub- conventional operations is developing mis- stantial task and requires regionally ori- sion criteria. During the Gulf War, to pro- ented, culturally attuned, and highly ready vide guidance on planning and executing forces with extensive experience. SOF pro- operations, Special Operations Command, vides outstanding capabilities to assist con- Central (SOCCENT), developed mission cri- ventional commanders in meeting a chal- teria for proposed operations: lenge from another state or fourth ▼ Is this an appropriate SOF mission? generation warfare. ▼ Does it support the CINC’s campaign SOF can provide direct action, special replan? connaissance, unconventional warfare, ▼ Is it operationally feasible? PSYOP, and CA capabilities against other ▼ Are required resources available to exe- states to support a joint conventional cam- cute? paign plan. Effectively integrated into that ▼ Does the expected outcome justify the plan, special operations can act as a force risk? multiplier for conventional forces by syn- These criteria were invaluable in mission chronizing coalition operations or providing planning and execution for the remainder of coalition support teams to allied contin- the war and are being incorporated into doc- gents. SOF language capabilities help com- trine for SOF and conventional planners. In municate with other contingents, and their addition, they provide a test organic communications systems make SOF SOF provides outstanding for determining the feasibil- ideal links between multinational partici- ity of operations, ensure SOF pants and coalition headquarters. SOF can capabilities in a challenge are properly employed in also be used in an economy-of-force role by from another state or theater or JTF campaign helping nations on the theater periphery to fourth generation warfare plans in peace and war, help bolster their defenses, thus freeing U.S. con- to objectively evaluate mis- ventional forces for the main effort. sions, improve Joint Target Coordination Board actions, and educate others to ensure realistic perceptions of SOF capabilities.

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JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS

The Tools plan as well as the languages and cultures of SOF is particularly useful in OOTW. FID, each audience. Joint operations can be PSYOP, and CA can be critical components greatly enhanced when supported by care- of a regional or country plan (crafted by the fully planned and executed PSYOP cam- geographic CINC or ambassador for a spe- paigns, a potential of the information age cific country) designed to alleviate the prob- that is only beginning to be appreciated. lems that cause instability. Working with PSYOP is a vital national asset that will only foreign governments, foreign militaries, and reach maturity when we channel its efforts various civilian organizations, SOF can assist through a national-level, interagency body to the host nation in creating programs that coordinate disparate elements of information will prevent conflict. And if conflict does warfare. A coherent theater information arise, SOF’s knowledge of the area, its peo- strategy and coordination mechanisms are ple, and its institutions, gained through fre- needed as well. quent deployments to the locale, can pro- Civil Affairs. Another facet of SOF that is vide valuable information to the geographic gaining prominence is CA. A commander CINC as he devises his campaign plan. has a moral and legal obligation to protect Psychological Operations. New and dra- civilians caught in a conflict. Often a root matic challenges highlight the importance cause of conflict, especially in OOTW, is a of one of our least known and least under- failure of civil infrastructure to meet the stood yet powerful assets—PSYOP. While it needs of the population. In war, CA units has been an element of military operations can look after displaced persons and help to since World War II, PSYOP played a key role get the local infrastructure functioning as a combat multiplier during Just Cause, again. In OOTW, they can help create a ca- and also gained prominence during Desert pable infrastructure or assist in times of nat- Storm. In the Gulf, PSYOP contributed to ural disaster where the infrastructure has theater strategy by communicating the been overwhelmed. Some 97 percent of CA power of the U.S.-led coalition, strengthen- capabilities reside in the Reserve compo- ing economic and diplomatic sanctions, em- nents. The skills needed to manage a coun- phasizing Iraq’s isolation, and conveying the try’s infrastructure—sanitation, public trans- destructive consequences of Saddam’s refusal port, legal systems, and other public to comply with U.N. Security Council reso- services—can only be maintained by people lutions. Some 29 million with similar civilian backgrounds. Highly the utility of SOF was leaflets, radio broadcasts skilled personnel from the Reserves have evident in Haiti even before over 40 days, and 66 loud- performed such jobs in Panama, the Persian speaker teams reinforced Gulf, and Haiti. forces were committed the effects of coalition Restore Democracy combat power and helped The utility of SOF was evident in Haiti to encourage 70–80 thousand enemy sol- where they were integral to restoring democ- diers to desert, defect, and surrender, thereby racy even before forces were committed. Four saving countless lives on both sides. months earlier, extremely versatile new SOF PSYOP has continued to be an important patrol craft joined the fleet to enforce trade part of all major deployments. It paved the sanctions, capitalizing on their capabilities to way for humanitarian assistance food drops operate near-shore and embark SEALs and in Bosnia and was a key contributor to the rigid hull inflatable boat detachments. In five success of U.S.-led multinational efforts in months of continuous operations the craft Somalia. Leaflets and loudspeaker messages conducted 153 interdictions, 24 boardings, introduced U.S. forces to the country. Com- and multiple Dominican Republic patrols. plemented by newspapers and radio these For two weeks before the introduction tools provided needed information and in- of troops, Air National Guard EC–130E Com- struction, allayed fears, and underscored the mando Solo PSYOP aircraft broadcast four- humanitarian intent of the operation. But hour programs daily to reduce the volume of PSYOP staffs must be included in initial plan- refugees leaving the country and create sup- ning to tailor products to the goals of the port for the return of President Aristide. joint commander and the target audience. PSYOP personnel must know the campaign

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many AC–130 crews and planes were from the Air Force Reserve. SOF had a significant quick reaction and show-of-force capability with ground-deployed Rangers, Air Force special operations aircraft, and a command and control headquarters. From the outset, SOF have been an integral part of our effort to restore democracy in Haiti, providing capabilities available nowhere else in the military. As SOCOM moves into the 21st century, we will keep apace of the security environment. But in every phase of that evolution DOD SOF long-range the focus will be on people. The most impor- reconnaissance patrol tant ingredients of success are the personnel inside Iraq. Some 900 hours of broadcasts were contin- who we commit to diverse missions. We ued until ground broadcasts started. In the continually seek innovative ways to select weeks prior to intervention, AFSOC aircraft the right people, train them, and develop delivered 8.4 million leaflets paving the way them throughout their professional careers. for the multinational forces and the return The best piece of equipment will not accom- of Aristide. plish the mission without the right person The U.S. Atlantic Command SOC set up operating it, and the right person will find a a training camp in Puerto Rico and coordi- way to succeed using almost anything at nated support of international police moni- hand. All our programs assume that we will tors and multinational force contingents. have the right people in the right place with Moreover, SOF had the lead in invasion the right training. planning. A number of units were involved, The range of capabilities, size, and operating from the United States, a forward strategic reach of SOF today are unmatched staging base, an aircraft carrier, and other fa- anywhere in the world and offer the Nation cilities. They would have conducted forced unparalleled capabilities to influence the in- entry operations to facilitate the follow-on ternational security environment. SOCOM is introduction of conventional forces. evolving in this environment. Instead of Once the island’s occupation began, SF sticking to comfortable defense paradigms of teams—fluent in French/Creole—were dis- the past, we are vigorously pursuing innova- patched to restore civilian rule. Small teams tive ways to promote national security. We operated in over 500 towns and villages, are developing equipment that will enable helping people set up police forces, courts, our most important asset, the operator, to and government services to provide law and perform in difficult exigencies. SOCOM has order and bolster democratic rule. Moreover, moved beyond the Cold War into a new en- they resolved disputes, repaired utilities, pre- vironment in which we may not have all the vented violence, offered medical aid, and answers but in which we possess unique and conducted information campaigns. Other SF valuable capabilities. JFQ teams provided coalition support teams to foreign contingents in the multinational force and international police monitor force. In addition, SOF personnel were instru- mental in rebuilding the civil infrastructure. As was the case in the Persian Gulf, Reservists were called to active duty to offer expertise that exists only in Reserve CA units. To back up these lightly armed forces, other SOF assets, including AC–130 Spectre gunships, provided a rapid reaction force to persuade Haitian thugs not to run afoul of the peace- keepers. In total, nearly 400 mission hours were flown to support multinational forces;

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PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC

By JEFFREY B. JONES and Printing newspaper for Cubans at MICHAEL P. MATHEWS Guantanamo. U.S. Navy (Wendy Hamme) U.S. Navy (Wendy

Summary Psychological operations (PSYOP) is a multifaceted instrument of national power and influence that can deter or dissuade potential adversaries and reach a variety of audiences abroad in support of U.S. objectives. PSYOP can erode an enemy’s will before the commitment of combat forces as well as facilitate humanitarian relief missions and the reconstitution of societies following conflicts. Economical yet very effective, it is extraordi- narily adaptable in various regions and across diverse cultural and ethnic groups. To be efficacious in conflicts, PSYOP must be included in planning at the highest level from the outset; in peacetime, it merges with diplomacy, public affairs, and other tools of statecraft. Each service has organic capabilities to develop and furnish PSYOP products in support of joint force commanders. Much more than simply leaflets and loudspeakers, PSYOP in the final analysis can provide the warfighting CINC with an extremely imaginative and versatile force multiplier. U.S. Navy (Wendy Hamme) U.S. Navy (Wendy

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Jones and Mathews

or Panamanian soldiers during Just (OOTW). Low-cost and high-impact, it is an Cause, U.S. psychological operations instrument that can directly reach adver- (PSYOP) was the voice of reason. In saries as well as other foreign audiences. In the Gulf War, PSYOP was millions of addition, PSYOP plays an indirect role by fo- Fleaflets delivered by conventional means (ar- cusing the efforts of the U.S. Government— tillery and aircraft) as well as more unusual as well as allies, friends, and international ones (facsimile machines and bottles washed organizations—on defusing crises, contain- up on beaches). It meant 18 hours of daily ing conflicts, or if deterrence fails, defeating Arabic broadcasts and 66 loudspeaker teams an enemy in the shortest time with the least deployed at brigade level with coalition loss of life. forces. For the Kurds in Provide Comfort, Capabilities PSYOP was multifaceted media support of Before describing support to joint com- humanitarian relief. In Restore Hope, PSYOP manders, four kinds of PSYOP—namely, was radio and press—known as Rajo strategic, operational, tactical, and consolida- (Hope)—that offered credible information to tion—must be defined. Strategic PSYOP in- some 100,000 Somalis; and it was seven mil- cludes international information activities to lion leaflets that disseminated guidance on influence foreign attitudes which support lessening anarchy and receiving aid. It was U.S. objectives. It is carried out largely by communication via tactical loudspeaker civilian agencies but may utilize or be sup- teams accompanying Army and Marine ported by military PSYOP assets. Operational units as well as coalition forces. To U.S. PSYOP occurs prior to war, during war or diplomats in Central and South America and OOTW, and at the end of operations in de- the Caribbean, PSYOP is an effective tool in fined regions; it promotes campaign effec- drug interdiction and eradication, medical tiveness. Tactical PSYOP is mounted in areas and engineer support, public information, assigned to commanders in war or OOTW disaster relief, the formation of professional and supports tactical missions against oppos- armies, and promoting democracy. In former ing forces. Consolidation PSYOP is executed in war-torn nations, it is an educational vehicle foreign areas inhabited by enemy or hostile to publicize landmine awareness in schools populations and occupied by U.S. forces, or and villages. in areas where U.S. forces are based. PSYOP therefore represents different The Armed Forces have capabilities to things to disparate audiences, circumscribed support national objectives with organic as- only by the ingenuity of a commander. Im- sets that can produce and disseminate plemented on the strategic, operational, and PSYOP products. The Army has both active tactical levels, it is more and Reserve component units to support than leaflets and loud- at a time of growing demands training, conduct planning, and furnish ad- speakers. It can be writ- vice. They are equipped and trained to exe- on U.S. engagement, PSYOP ten, aural, and audiovi- cute strategic, operational, and tactical level is more important than ever sual, and take the form PSYOP; support special operations; and carry of action, advice, sua- out consolidation missions. Specifically sion, common sense, and notably, truth. At trained units also support enemy prisoner of a time of decreasing deployments, declining war missions. These units are assigned to the force structures, intermittent presence over- U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological seas, reduced security assistance, and grow- Operations Command (USACAPOC), a ing demands on U.S. engagement, PSYOP is major subordinate command of U.S. Army more important than ever. It is an asset in Special Operations Command. peace, war, and operations other than war Navy capabilities to produce audiovisual products are made available by Fleet Audiovi- sual Command, Pacific; Fleet Imagery Com- mand, Atlantic; Fleet Combat Camera Colonel Jeffrey B. Jones, USA, and Lieutenant Groups; various film libraries; and Naval Colonel Michael P. Mathews, USA, serve as Imaging Command. A Naval Reserve audiovi- the commander and the deputy commander, sual unit supports Atlantic Fleet. Fleet Tacti- respectively, of the 4th Psychological Operations cal Readiness Group provides equipment and Group (Airborne).

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PSYOP

technical mainte- al. provide political and other forms of sup- nance support to con- port for joint commanders. duct civil radio broad- Allocating Forces . Conway) casts, jam the AM Joint planning documents call for 4th frequency band, and PSYOP Group (Airborne), which is assigned respond to real-world to USACAPOC, to provide contingency sup- missions and natural port worldwide, normally through a PSYOP disasters. Navy assets Task Force (POTF) under a joint commander. have the ability to Based on the size of an operation, POTF create documents, headquarters are formed either from 4th posters, articles, and Group headquarters for large operations or a

Joint Combat Camera Center (Raymond T other products. Capa- regional PSYOP battalion headquarters for UH–60 dropping bilities ashore and smaller ones. POTFs consist of regional, tac- leaflets during Cobra afloat also can pro- tical, and dissemination assets, as well as Gold ’94. duce printed material. The Marines have the enemy prisoner of war and Air Force and capability to execute observable actions in Navy capabilities as required. With the addi- support of psychological objectives through tion of assets from other services, such task shore-based loudspeaker broadcasting, aerial forces are designated JPOTFs. Commanders leaflet dissemination, combat camera docu- of POTFs direct, coordinate, and deconflict mentation, and use of motion picture projec- theater or JTF PSYOP plans. Regional assets tion and viewing equipment. are retained at theater or JTF level while tac- The Air Force has aircraft capable of sup- tical assets may be attached to supported porting PSYOP across the operational contin- maneuver units as appropriate. uum including several types specifically mod- In peacetime, Reserve PSYOP units par- ified for this role. Air Force Special Operations ticipate with active forces in integrated plan- Command is equipped with various aircraft ning and training to prepare for regional for broadcasting and dropping leaflets. Four conflicts or contingencies. In wartime, the EC–130 Commando Solo air- Reserve component will mobilize and deploy craft of the Pennsylvania Air forward detachments with the necessary forces to augment the active National Guard have PSYOP unified commands provide POTF and continue peacetime PSYOP pro- as a primary mission and can grams in the absence of active forces. The J-3s with PSYOP expertise broadcast radio and televi- Reserve will also task organize, mobilize, and sion signals worldwide. An and capabilities deploy a POTF should a second regional con- MC–130 Combat Talon tingency arise. force—based in the conti- With recent changes in force structure nental United States, Europe, and the Pa- and mission realignment, Reserve PSYOP cific—is equipped for leaflet operations. In ad- groups are no longer aligned with or respon- dition to specialized assets, most aircraft can sible for supporting specific theaters. Instead, conduct PSYOP missions. For example, con- 4 th Group—the only active component ventional airlift C–130s or rescue HC–130s group—is responsible for coordinating both can be configured to drop leaflets, and strike active and Reserve support to CINCs with aircraft can dispense leaflets with M–129 planning in peacetime, contingency opera- leaflet bombs. Moreover, strike aircraft can tions, and war. To facilitate this effort there conduct specific attack missions designed to are forward detachments with three unified dramatically reinforce messages presented by commands and Combined Forces Command broadcasts, leaflets, etc. (CFC) in Korea which provide J-3s with ac- PSYOP-related interagency support to cess to PSYOP expertise and capabilities. commanders is normally accessed through CINC-approved strategic PSYOP or external Command and Control information plans which are reviewed by Joint and service doctrine incorporates unified command or JTF staffs. Through major PSYOP lessons from Panama and the these documents the representatives of the Persian Gulf War and has been validated dur- National Command Authorities, Depart- ing recent contingency operations. The key ments of State and Defense, U.S. Informa- tion Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, et

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principle is that all planning must be central- In peacetime and OOTW, PSYOP cam- ized at the highest levels because of the paigns that support CINCs take the form of strategic and operational role of PSYOP to an overt peacetime PSYOP program (P3). CINCs. POTFs work for CINCs and JTFs are CINCs plan and conduct P3 to support objec- formed for joint commanders through J-3s. tives, interests, and theater plans in coordi- POTFs are usually separate JTF components, nation with chiefs of mission. Programs are like service and special operations, and do proposed by CINCs through CJCS who, in not come under the command and control turn, refers them to the Assistant Secretary of special operations forces (SOF) component of Defense for Special Operations and Low- commanders (unless the Joint Special Opera- Intensity Conflict for review and approval. tions Task Force commander is senior). During contingencies, a PSYOP concept PSYOP is critical in command and con- plan which is broad in scope is forwarded trol warfare which is the integrated use of from the CINC to the Joint Staff for approval operations security, military deception, of overarching themes, objectives, and guid- PSYOP, electronic warfare, and physical de- ance, but not products. While the time re- struction, supported by intelligence, to influ- quired to get approval during Desert Shield ence, degrade, destroy, or deny information was literally months, recent operations such to adversary command and control capabili- as Restore Hope saw approval time reduced ties and to protect friendly command and to a few days. Once the concept plan is ap- control against such actions. The employ- proved, a more detailed theater campaign ment of these separate disciplines is de- plan is developed along with supporting ap- signed to cause an enemy to react in a man- pendices. This plan and the resulting pro- ner deemed advantageous to achieve U.S. grams and products are approved by the objectives. Integrating PSYOP with C2W joint commander and apply throughout the planning from the outset will facilitate coor- area of operations. dination with other components and ensure From Peace to War effectiveness by eliminating inconsistencies To assist in day-to-day peacetime plan- among the various elements. PSYOP is also ning, each unified command (save for the bridge to public diplomacy. EUCOM) has permanently assigned PSYOP Taken together, direct PSYOP support to staff officers. As previously mentioned, warfighting CINCs and JTF commanders and 4th PSYOP Group also has forward support its integral relation to C2W may warrant seri- detachments at EUCOM, SOUTHCOM, ous consideration for inclusion as part of C2 PACOM, and CFC Korea headquarters. In co- Battlefield Operating Systems rather than a ordination with regionally-oriented tactical subset of fire support. Its increased impor- battalions that routinely deploy to the the- tance along with other conduits may also jus- ater, these 4th Group personnel are responsi- tify the creation of new information systems. ble for ensuring the currency of OPLANs and Campaign Planning CONPLANS, facilitating the conduct of Driven by national and theater objec- peacetime PSYOP programs, and coordinat- tives as well as imperatives from a thorough ing exercise and crisis response support. Tak- mission analysis, a PSYOP campaign in- ing advantage of the Army’s Redtrain pro- volves conducting programs, integrated with gram as well as other live environment a CINC’s operational plan, to achieve psy- training opportunities, those soldiers have chological objectives in support of the also served with U.S. country teams in more CINC’s campaign objectives. In sum, it is se- than thirty countries in recent years. They quencing and executing myriad activities de- have made unique contributions to achiev- signed to get measurable responses from spe- ing theater objectives under the guidance cific target audiences. The desired result of and direction of ambassadors, defense at- the campaign’s many thousands of distinct tachés, and officials. Finally, through a DIA- responses is the creation of conditions that sponsored and CINCSOC-managed PSYOP will facilitate mission accomplishment for a studies program, CINCs and interagency supported commander. users can access PSYOP expertise for peacetime and contingency-related analyses of situations in selected countries or regions.

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While P3s are conducted with varying PSYOP officers assigned to the Joint Staff levels of support, there is a lack of a multifac- bridge interagency public diplomacy efforts eted, coordinated theater information strat- as well as special efforts by other govern- egy for unified commands to effectively mental agencies. PSYOP civilian and military leverage all available information assets. The- planners can offer expertise and ensure coor- ater strategies can be de- dination and synergy. As previously men- PSYOP can assist in dissuading veloped together with tioned, through theater-approved strategic a potential adversary from the CINC’s political ad- PSYOP or external information plans, CINCs visor, U.S. Information can provide input that is region-specific to taking actions inimical to the Service representative, the national level. PSYOP Assessment Teams national interest and strategy and plans, (POATs) can also deploy to unified com- intelligence, public af- mands to help develop such plans. fairs, staff judge advocate, and PSYOP offi- During an initial projection of combat cers. Information strategy must concentrate power—by land, sea, or air—PSYOP is an im- on proactive versus reactive efforts to: reduce portant tool. Driven by national level guid- sources of conflict; assist nations in the tran- ance, integrated early in the planning sition to democracy; increase international process, augmented by the basis of a request dialogue and understanding; build political, from a CINC or JTF commander to JCS or SOCOM, and integrated with C2W, especially in support of deception planning and conditioning, PSYOP can magnify existing combat power, overcome potential vulnera- bilities, and convey U.S. intentions. Recent operations reveal that the most effective way to ensure the availability and adequate preparation of PSYOP assets occurs when joint commanders request activation of POTFs under their OPCON. This allows for rapid deployment and, if necessary, incremental augmentation of a POAT that is in theater. Beginning PSYOP and information preparation of the battlefield early is essen- y Mitchell) r tial. Considerable work is required before ad- er ditional combat power arrives. Preposition- ing assets—up front in the time-phased force U.S. Navy (T and deployment data—is critical to conduct- Mobile loudspeakers ing PSYOP immediately on receipt of an exe- in Somali market. economic, military, medical, commercial, so- cute order. The Commando Solo aircraft of cial, and educational bridges; limit the moti- the Air Force 193d Special Operations Group vation and perceived legitimacy of those who are vital to joint commanders, enabling possess weapons of mass destruction; empha- them to broadcast TV as well as AM, FM, size the role of the military in a democracy; and SW radio messages. Ground-based and highlight the constructive domestic uses broadcast assets can augment these efforts of the military. The goals for theaters include on arrival. When authorized, a variety of information strategies, continuous coordinat- leaflets is used, with themes from dissuasion ing mechanisms, and information crisis ac- and deadlines to safe conduct passes, coalition teams to help defuse, contain, mitigate, tion superiority, and surrender appeals. Tai- or resolve unanticipated crises. lored leaflets also significantly enhance the Planned and broadly implemented at vulnerability of enemy concentrations. As the strategic level, PSYOP can assist in deter- the size of the commitment increases, addi- ring or dissuading a potential adversary from tional tactical forces (including Reserve taking actions inimical to national interests. units) must be added to a POTF. In every instance, PSYOP-trained or supporting coalition expertise and forces are essential to maximize the overall impact.

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Combat Operations presence is not needed and that there are During combat operations, PSYOP is a coalition partners available to help bear the proven force multiplier, synchronized with burden. Promote Liberty in Panama, Task land, sea, air, and special operations. Con- Force Freedom in Kuwait, the first year of trolled through command channels and in- Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq, and JTF- tegrated by J-3, it magnifies U.S. and coali- Southwest Asia all provide innovative illus- tion combat power, especially in support of trations of PSYOP in support of post-combat C2W, and degrades enemy combat power by endeavors. persuading air defense units not to engage, air forces not to fly, and ground forces not to Based on experience over the last few use their weapons—but instead to desert, de- years, what lessons can joint commanders fect, or surrender. In addition, PSYOP en- draw? First, while the number of PSYOP per- courages civilians to escape advancing coali- sonnel permanently deployed in various the- tion forces (thereby clogging major supply aters is low, they provide access to a range of routes). In conjunction with military police capabilities and expertise in peacetime, cri- and interrogators, PSYOP specialists exploit sis, and war. They must be actively lever- prisoners of war, using volunteers to record aged. Second, DOD-mandated peacetime radio and loudspeaker appeals to their com- PSYOP programs, which offer imaginative patriots. ways to further theater and national objec- As the tactical situation changes, PSYOP tives, must be robust. Third, strategic assets at corps and division level may need to PSYOP—engaged in concert with statecraft, be relocated. Such decisions public diplomacy, public affairs, and other early integration of PSYOP are handled via command, activities—can defuse, deter, and contain in the planning process not PSYOP channels. Corps- conflict, encourage allied contributions, and size echelons have PSYOP influence target audiences both inside and and early deployment support elements to conduct outside a given area of conflict. The coordi- are critical planning and monitor sub- nation of informational strategy results in ordinate tactical units. synergy of the highest order. Next, early in- PSYOP guidance and specified tasks pass tegration of PSYOP in the planning process through G3/S3 channels as part of the plans and early deployment are critical. Prior to and orders process. Divisions have PSYOP the arrival of combat forces, PSYOP assets support elements that coordinate with POTFs can direct influential information at audi- to meet the requirements of commanders. ences in a zone of conflict. If the forces ar- Since commanders normally will not have rive late, they are of little value to a com- product approval authority, requests for mander on the ground. Fifth, PSYOP is a products must be submitted to POTFs for ap- force multiplier that yields a high return for proval by CINCs or JTF commanders. a small investment. Always joint, combined, Brigades have PSYOP support elements con- and multiagency, PSYOP supports conven- sisting of three- to four-man headquarters tional, unconventional, and coalition forces. and three to five tactical loudspeaker teams Last, PSYOP forms an integral part of mili- with three personnel each. tary operations and, as such, is the inherent Coalition success, significant enemy loss responsibility of every commander. In sum, or miscue, and indications of allied determi- PSYOP is a proven combat multiplier and nation can be stressed by local, regional, and peacetime contributor to U.S. national secu- international PSYOP, public diplomacy, and rity strategy. JFQ public affairs. This can accelerate the collapse of an enemy with minimum collateral damage and loss of life. During combat operations, PSYOP planners must prepare for what happens after hostilities end. Long-term U.S. interests are not well served if we do not think through the requirements and are ill-prepared to restore stability. A good plan developed beforehand can ensure that a long-term military

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The insets (clockwise, from top) are reproductions of Field Hospital in Normandy by Milton Marx (U.S. Air Force Art Collection); The Fighting Hornet by Tom Lea (The Life Collection of World War II Art/U.S. Army Center of Military History); Barrage Balloon by Alexander Brook (U.S. Army Center of Military History); and We Move Again (Anzio, 1944) by Edward A. Reep (U.S. Army Center of Military History).

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COMMEMORATING WORLD WAR II A Final Reprise

The insets (clockwise, from top left) are Clear the Deck by Tom Lea (The Life Collection of World War II Art/U.S. Army Center of Military History); P–38 Diving on an Me 109 by C. Ross Greening (U.S. Air Force Art Collection); A Red Cross Leave Center in Australia by Robert H. Laessig (U.S. Air Force Art Collection); and Barbershop, Guadalcanal (1944) by Aaron Bohrod (The Life Collection of World War II Art/U.S. Army Center of Military History). The background crossover reproduction is entitled Objective of the 88th Division (Italy, 1944) by Frank D. Duncan (U.S. Army Center of Military History).

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Jointness

The Battle for Fox Green Beach by Dwight C. Shepler. U.S. Navy and the Impact of the War By DAVID A. ARMSTRONG

s General Colin L. Powell noted Dwight D. Eisenhower was, however, to two years ago in introducing the maintain U.S. forces as “a separate and dis- inaugural issue of JFQ, the experi- tinct component of the combined forces.” ence of World War II provided a With a task that called for Army leadership, foundationA for jointness. Operations during the prospect of American participation in the war clearly and repeatedly demonstrated coalition operations led to early agreement the advantages of jointness and the penalties by the War and Navy Departments to estab- for failing to achieve it. At war’s end, the Joint lish a joint command in Europe.2 Chiefs of Staff supported jointness in princi- Jointness was strongest in face of the ple.1 The progress of jointness was slow, how- enemy or when necessitated by coalition op- ever. A review of JCS action in creating a post- erations. But even in war, it fell prey to interwar system of unified commands suggests service rivalries and other concerns. In the that the wartime experience left an ambigu- Pacific, the lack of strong allied forces dimin- ous legacy for the development of jointness. ished coalition pressures to achieve unified Unified command of U.S. forces in Eu- command. Coupled with the special prob- rope began with the establishment in June lems posed by the presence of General Dou- 1942 of the European Theater of Operations, glas MacArthur, Army and Navy reluctance U.S. Army (ETOUSA), a joint command in to trust their forces to the command of offi- which an Army officer exercised planning cers of another service led to separate theater and operational control of assigned naval commands. The Army promoted unity of forces. Directed to cooperate with the British, ETOUSA commander Major General

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command by forces or functions while the Approved by the President on December Navy advocated achieving it geographically. 14, 1946, the “Outline Command Plan” was While joint operations were routine in the the first unified command plan, a basic doc- Pacific, command of the entire theater had ument of the joint system. Publication of not been unified at the war’s end.3 the plan did not, however, resolve the issue Dissatisfied by the separate command of of the organization of unified commands. Army and Navy forces in the Pacific, the The debate over organizing by geographic Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral area versus forces and functions was to sur- Chester W. Nimitz, called in 1946 for creat- face repeatedly in the joint arena during the ing a single command for the entire decades of the Cold War.5 Pacific less Japan, China, Korea, As the Chairman observes in this issue, and the coastal areas of Central the lessons of World War II are boundless. In and South America. Based on the medley of original contributions that Oahu and supported by a joint make up this JFQ Forum, various aspects of staff, the commander would that conflict are presented as tribute to the sol- “exercise unity of command” diers, sailors, marines, and airmen who fought of all U.S. forces in the theater. as a team to lay the foundations of joint and The Army and Army Air Forces combined warfare. JFQ countered the Nimitz initiative with a proposal to organize com- NOTES mand based on the assignment of 1 See, for example, statements by Ernest J. King and forces. The heart of the problem lay in estab- Henry H. Arnold on the inside back cover of Joint Pub lishing an organization that centralized con- 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991). trol of forces without impinging on what the 2 Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Plan- services considered basic prerogatives in the ning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942, United States Army command of their respective forces.4 in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Mili- With joint planners split along service tary History, U.S. Army, 1953), pp. 196–97. Subsequent lines, JCS deferred action for almost six developments are covered in Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944, United States months. Finally, the Army Chief of Staff, Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of General of the Army Eisenhower, revived the Military History, U.S. Army, 1959), pp. 102–05, 270–74. issue with a paper outlining command 3 Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two arrangements worldwide. That proposal was Years, United States Army in World War II (Washington: greeted by one from the Navy, and subse- Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1962), pp. 361–63; Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the quent staff deliberations were complicated Sun (New York: Vintage Books, 1985), pp. xiii–xv, when the question of control over strategic 540–43; Matloff, Strategic Planning, 1943–1944, pp. air forces was raised by General Carl A. 525–26, 536; Grace Person Hayes, The History of the Joint Spaatz, the Commander of Army Air Forces. Chiefs of Staff in World War II, The War Against Japan In December, having seen nine staff papers (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982), pp. 93–96, 476–79, 563–66, 586–95. on unified command in less than three 4 James F. Schnabel et al., The Joint Chiefs of Staff and months, General Eisenhower sought a com- National Policy, 1945–1947 (Washington: Historical Divi- promise. Admiral Nimitz was similarly in- sion, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1979), pp. 171–77. clined. Including provisions that dealt with 5 Ibid., pp. 177–86. The original commands were the problems posed by the requirements of Far Far East, Pacific, Alaskan, Northeast, Atlantic Fleet, Caribbean, and European. JCS also recognized the East Command under General of the Army Strategic Air Command (SAC), an Army Air Forces com- MacArthur and of strategic air forces, the mand made up of units normally based in the United plan that emerged established a worldwide States and under a commander responsible to JCS. SAC system for the unified command of U.S. was the first example of what later were known as speci- forces under JCS control. fied commands. Control of the Bonin and the Marianas Islands was split with MacArthur controlling forces and local facilities, but having no responsibility for military or civil government or naval administration and logistics. The Cold War debate over unified and specified commands will be treated in The History of the Unified Brigadier General David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.), Command Plan, 1946–1993 (Washington: Office of the is Director for Joint History in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Of- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a member fice, February 1995). of the JFQ Advisory Committee.

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London Underground by Floyd Davis. ar II Art, U.S. Army Center of Military History W orld W Collection of

Fighting with Allies Life The The Debate Fifty Years On By RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY

ow epoch-making an event was After all, from Chester Wilmot’s forma- World War II? In particular, fifty tive analysis of inter-allied controversy in his years after the close of that con- 1952 The Struggle for Europe onward,1 percep- flict—and several years after the tions of the relative wisdom or unwisdom of Hend of the Cold War—can we still compre- American versus British strategic and opera- hend the great wartime strategic and operational designs hinged upon the question of tional debates between the principal West- which took better into account the post-war ern Allies, the United States and Great Soviet threat to the security of democratic Britain, and the ponderous import imputed interests in Europe, and which was better to them, both at the time and in controver- calculated to counter that threat. Yet now sies among historians in the intervening the peril from the East has largely evapo- decades? rated, and the rapid collapse of the Soviet

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Union in 1991 suggests that the substance of the peril was never so great as the Kremlin’s Sanctuary, Luxembourg by Aaron Bohrod. bristling facade led us to fear. how much did it matter So how much did it matter whether it was the whether it was the Americans or the British who during the Americans or the British hot war of 1939–45 more accu- who more accurately rately foresaw the Cold War? foresaw the Cold War Wilmot set the terms for historical analysis of the Anglo- y American strategic and opera- y Histor tional debates. According to his version of the war in Europe, the United States had to provide most of the muscle for the defeat of Germany, but the British provided most of my Center of Militar the experienced judgment in international t, U.S. Ar affairs that realized the desirability of tailoring the conduct of the war not to military ar II Ar expediency alone but to considerations of orld W the post-war balance of power. Unfortu- nately for the interests of the West, the Collection of W

diplomatically and strategically sophisti- Life

cated British—especially Prime Minister The Winston Churchill—proved unable to overcome the naive insistence of the Ameri- against Germany was not merely an expres- cans—in particular, President Franklin Roo- sion of an American military tradition based sevelt—on military strategy and operations on large-scale wealth and power and there- which aimed at head-on assault of the fore favoring head-on confrontation as the enemy’s Fortress Europe. The dual unhappy most expeditious way to swift victory. The consequences of this situation were that the rebuttal indicated also that U.S. strategists, absence of Allied military subtlety probably including military leaders, were not politi- prolonged the war, and that the inflexible cally naive, but rather were thoroughly focus on northwest Europe led to the sacri- aware of the political implications of mili- fice of opportunities to thwart Soviet expan- tary actions. For that reason the Americans sionism elsewhere on the continent. There- regarded a prompt Allied return to northern fore, the Iron Curtain clanked down deep in Europe as the best way of curbing Soviet ex- central Europe. pansion in the most valuable area of Europe, An American rebuttal soon took shape, the industrial, urban northwest. In contrast, especially in two volumes published in the the British preference for peripheral nibbling official United States Army in World War II se- at the German empire, especially in the ries, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, Mediterranean, would have taken Anglo- 1941–1942 by Maurice Matloff and Edwin American forces into military and political M. Snell, and Strategic Planning for Coalition dead ends. Warfare, 1943–1944 by Maurice Matloff.2 Pri- The lines of historical controversy over marily devoted to strategy as their titles indi- American direct versus British peripheral cate, but with consideration of operational strategy and operations having become set decisions as well, both volumes argued that early in the post-war years, the terms of the the American insistence on a direct strategy controversy became altered subsequently of the earliest possible cross-Channel assault only in detail. Another official historian, James M. Leighton, argued that the wartime divisions between the Western Allies were Russell F. Weigley is professor of history emeritus not so wide as the historians made them at Temple University. His works include The seem and that greater emphasis should be American Way of War: A History of United States placed on the essential and remarkable unity Military Strategy and Policy.

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P–51 Fighter Strip Control Tower (Normandy, 1944) by Ogden Pleissner. y y Histor my Center of Militar t, U.S. Ar ar II Ar orld W Collection of W Life The

of the Anglo-American alliance;3 but that head-on assault approach to warmaking per- view did not deter a continuing focus on sisted after the Overlord invasion at the in- wartime disputes rather than agreements, sistence of the American Supreme Comman- partly no doubt because disputes are more der, Allied Expeditionary Force, General interesting, but mainly be- Dwight Eisenhower on a broad-front offen- cause the depths of the strate- sive from France into the Low Countries and the commemorations gic and operational disagree- Germany. The British alternative, a narrow of D-Day last year found ments were profound in spite thrust into Germany proposed by General the lines of historical of all that bound the Allies to- Sir Bernard Montgomery, would allegedly gether. The controversy did not only have ended the war earlier, but by controversy remarkably not always follow national doing so would have limited the westward unchanged alignments. A British histo- extension of Soviet power and thereby rian, Michael Howard, was strengthened the post-war geopolitical posi- one of the first to argue that tion of the West. Thus Chester Wilmot ar- the strategies of both allies had to be forced gued on behalf of superior British opera- by wartime pressures into pursuit of what tional wisdom in his early post-war book, was expedient and possible, an argument and again he set the terms of an enduring that undermined the idea of a consistent controversy.6 (Of course there is an internal Churchillian world view as the foundation contradiction in the British arguments. If it of British strategy.4 Such vicissitudes aside, was so vital to conduct the European cam- however, the commemorations of D-Day last paign after the cross-Channel invasion with year found the lines of historical controversy the utmost dispatch, why was it not simi- remarkably unchanged.5 larly important to launch the invasion with A corollary to the disputes over the dispatch in the first place?) strategy of the cross-Channel invasion has Once again the American rebuttal has boiled up over the operational issues of the taken the form of arguments that, in spite of campaign in northwest Europe following British experience, it was British soldiers at June 6, 1944. Here the British contention has been that the Americans’ unsubtle,

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Queen Elizabeth Arriving (The Clyde, Scotland, 1944) by Byron Thomas. y y Histor my Center of Militar t, U.S. Ar ar II Ar orld W Collection of W Life The

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Tossing the Cans– understand a sound opera- Atlantic Patrol (1941) tional plan bespoke an ex- by Tom Lea. treme of ingratitude that was unhappily all too characteristic of the British commander. To permit

y Montgomery to attempt Operation Market Garden, y Histor the airborne-plus-overland drive to the Rhine bridges at Arnhem in the Nether-

my Center of Militar lands launched on Sep- tember 17, Eisenhower’s t, U.S. Ar Supreme Headquarters Al-

ar II Ar lied Expeditionary Force

orld W allotted to Montgomery’s 21 Army Group the lion’s share of Allied logistical Collection of W support and the theater’s Life

The only reserve force, the First Allied Airborne Army. The only support that the time and British historians later who Eisenhower did not proffer was a complete have been unrealistic in both military and curtailment of fuel to the armies on the Allies’ policy assessments. Montgomery’s proposals southern flank, the Third U.S. and, as Sixth for a narrow-thrust invasion of Germany in Army Group arrived from southern France, the the autumn of 1944 have been subjected to Seventh U.S. and First French. Montgomery logistical analysis and found impractical in proposed that to fully support a narrow-thrust terms of Allied capabilities to support them.7 offensive, the southern armies should be The narrow thrust, moreover, would not grounded, at least as far as support other than have been all that narrow, or it would have from southern French ports was concerned. To had no chance of wielding enough force to have done so would have virtually paralyzed win. Montgomery had contemplated an of- the Third Army under Lieutenant General fensive by some forty divisions, employing George Patton just as the enemy was about to the U.S. First and Ninth Armies as well as the launch a new concentration of Panzer forces to British Second and the Canadian First.8 With precipitate the largest-scale tank battles in the the great Belgian port of Antwerp not open West thus far, the counterattacks in Lorraine to Allied shipping until on September 19–29. The Germans initiated it is hard to imagine how a November 28—because of these counterstrokes because they believed more rapid push could have Montgomery’s neglect in that the aggressive Patton, not Montgomery, clearing passage to it from posed the most severe threat. If Patton had substantially altered the the North Sea after troops been unable to maneuver in riposte, the level post-war balance of British 30 Corps had en- of the ensuing disaster would have been incal- tered it on September 4— culable. Eisenhower had provided the single- supplies still had to reach the front largely thrust design all the support it was safe to give. from Normandy, and the ability to sustain a To have followed Montgomery’s complete pre- forty-division punch into Germany much scription would have been folly.10 beyond the Rhine was simply nonexistent In any event it is hard to imagine how a until Antwerp had been in full utility at least more rapid Western push into Germany in the for several weeks.9 autumn of 1944 could have substantially al- More than that, Eisenhower offered tered the post-war balance between East and Montgomery every reasonable opportunity to West. The boundaries of the occupation zones execute his narrow-thrust design, and Mont- in Germany had been drawn in early 1944, gomery’s carping that Eisenhower did not and that the Supreme Commander failed to

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when the Western armies had yet to land in worth the risk of high casualties if it could northern Europe. The zonal boundaries had not be permanently retained. He thought it therefore anticipated that the Red Army was worth more to placate the evident mis- would march deep into central Europe before conceptions and distrust of the Soviets and the war ended. Even with the lateness of the thus to do his part to head off a cold war fol- cross-Channel invasion, and in spite of the lowing the hot war. The futility of such a failure to defeat Germany in autumn 1944 hope as demonstrated by subsequent devel- with a narrow thrust or by other means, the opments does not make his decision a bad American forces eventually penetrated far into one under the circumstances.12 the prospective Soviet occupation zone. U.S. Altogether, then, there is no good rea- troops withdrew from much of Saxony and son to believe that the conduct of the cam- Thuringle after the war (two-fifths of what was paign from Normandy to the Elbe made any to be the Soviet zone) to the zonal boundaries. significant difference in the post-war balance A yet deeper penetration of the Soviet zone of power between the Soviet Union and the would have led to the same result. West. No variants on Eisenhower’s strategy The zonal boundaries drawn in February and operations could have made the post- 1944 had placed Berlin inside the Soviet zone, war Western position appreciably stronger or although the German capital was to be occu- the Soviet position much weaker. In any pied by the Allied powers, each with its minia- event, Eisenhower gave the British and par- ture zone corresponding to a larger zone ticularly Montgomery every reasonable op- within the country. Roosevelt drew up his portunity to test their prescriptions for a own occupation plan in 1943, proposing a more rapid Western advance. large American zone in the northwest, the But did the end of the Cold War not im- most strategically and economically impor- pose on all these grand old controversies tant part of Germany, rather than in the about American versus British strategic and southwest, to which the Americans were even- operational designs the stale flavor of anti- tually relegated largely because their forces en- quarianism, of irrelevance to the world of tered Germany on the right flank, south of the 1990s? What did it matter how much of the British. But in Roosevelt’s plan, the Ameri- Europe the Soviet Union came to dominate can sector of Germany would have met the by 1945 when the Soviet system of Eastern Soviet sector at Berlin, reaching the city di- European satellites was to collapse in 1989 rectly. The final zonal boundaries were drawn and the Soviet Union itself was to perish two principally by the British and the Soviets with years later? American acquiescence when Roosevelt had It mattered a great deal for almost half a grown sick and distracted. After these bound- century, and it created a dangerous world in aries placed Berlin inside the Soviet zone, even which the outcome now so gratifying to the the prospect of a Western capture of Berlin be- West was not assured. Whatever circum- came relatively unimportant.11 stances aggravated bad feeling between the The British would have liked to have en- communist bloc and the West from 1945 to tered the German capital first as a final stim- 1991 enhanced the possibility of nuclear ulus to their waning prestige, although they war. That such a war did not occur by no had had much to do with placing the city means signifies that the peril was never real. outside the Western zonal boundaries. The The delay of two-and-a-half years between Ninth U.S. Army would have enjoyed the the U.S. entry into World War II in Decem- distinction of taking Berlin since it nearly ber 1941 and the ultimate execution of the came within its grasp. But such visions as- central design of American strategy, the sumed that the Germans would go on fight- cross-Channel invasion, as late as June 1944 ing the Red Army much more seriously than did more than any other aspect of the war to they resisted the Western Allies in the last exacerbate Soviet suspicions of the West and days of the war even with their capital as the thus assured there would be a cold war with prize, which was not necessarily so. Eisen- its corollary danger of nuclear conflict. If a hower decided instead that Berlin was not more prompt cross-Channel invasion could merely have mitigated Soviet distrust of the West, rather than allaying it altogether, such

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diluting the arrogance with which the Sovi- ets came to regard themselves as the main actors in the defeat of Germany. That result should have also diluted the Soviet denigra- tion of Western military prowess that consistently tempted Moscow toward adventurism during the Cold War years. Our understanding of the truth about the respective merits of American and British policy, strategy, and military operations during the war matters because the architects of the British version of history persuaded many American soldiers and policymakers to accept their interpretation which injured the self-confidence of U.S. leaders during the Cold War and later. Americans struggled during the Cold War under the burden of be- lieving that lack of wisdom in their hot war strategy and operations had much to do with creating Cold War predicaments. Of course they carried their Cold War campaigns to a successful conclusion. But a surer confidence that American decisions had rested on a foundation of sound and wise policy, strategy, and operational art during the war might have generated an assertiveness and optimism that could have made U.S. post-war policies even more successful y and conceivably have brought the Cold War

y Histor to an earlier end. The truth about policy, strategy, and operations in World War II is that U.S. military Four Allied Soldiers and political leaders conducted the war with by Savo Radulovic. my Center of Militar a soundness and maturity of judgment that

U.S. Ar were enviable, admirable, and in light of the genuine limitations of American experience, extraordinary. Rarely in history have a na- a more likely scenario would still have re- tion’s military chiefs who began a war been duced peril in the post-1945 world in pro- so numerous in remaining in charge until portion to the degree to which suspicion was the conclusion, with so few setbacks and so mitigated. consistent a pattern of success along the And if nothing at all the West could way. Rarely have a nation’s policymakers have done during the war could have sub- kept their eyes so firmly fixed on the appro- stantially affected post-war priate objects of warfare and so ably adjusted understanding the merits of Soviet attitudes because military strategy to serve all policy objec- American and British policy, paranoia was too deeply tives: the correct intention to defeat the Axis engrained in both Russian powers so completely and leave them so ut- strategy, and operations and Soviet history, then it terly malleable in Allied hands that there during the war matters yet remains true that an could be a virtual guarantee that neither earlier cross-Channel inva- Germany nor Japan could threaten the secu- sion should have carried the Western armies rity of the world again; the persistent pursuit deeper into Europe by V-E Day. They most of partnerships and agreements that would likely would have reached Berlin, thus lead to a post-war era conducive to U.S. and strengthening the West in the post-war political balance and, perhaps most important,

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global economic prosperity and to reason- 6 See note 1. On the impact of operational decisions able safety for political democracy; the rejec- on the post-war world, many of the same arguments ad- tion whenever America’s allies permitted of vanced by Wilmot are put forth by Hubert Essame in The Battle for Germany (New York: Charles Scribner’s military strategies of mere short-run expedi- Sons, 1969). ence that would not contribute to the Na- 7 The best succinct analysis is found in Martin van tion’s long-term interest. Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Pat- Fifty years on it is long past time for us to ton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. recognize the wisdom of American policy- 216–30. See also Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Sup- port of the Armies. vol. 2, Logistical Limitations as the Ar- making, strategic planning, and operational biter of Tactical Planning. United States Army in World War direction during World War II, and to draw II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, from that acknowledgment a self-confident 1953–59), pp. 3–21. assertiveness to fit U.S. leadership responsibil- 8 Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field- ities in the post-Cold War world. JFQ Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamwin, K.G. (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958), pp. 239–42; Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, pp. 489–90, 528–31, NOTES 533–36; Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Cam- 1 Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: paign. The European Theater of Operations. United States Harper and Brothers, 1952). His influence is critiqued in Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief Maurice Matloff, “Wilmot Revisited: Myth and Reality of Military History, 1963), pp. 8–10. in Anglo-American Strategy for the Second Front,” in 9 For the entry into Antwerp by the 11th Armoured Theodore A. Wilson, editor, D-Day 1944 (Lawrence: Division, see Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, p. 474; the date University Press of Kansas, 1994), pp. 3–23, 340–41. is confirmed by Ruppenthal in Logistical Support, vol. 2, Also bringing the historiography up to date in the same p. 48, and MacDonald in Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 207. volume are Alex Danchev, “Biffing: The Saga of the Sec- For the opening of the port, see ibid., p. 229; Rup- ond Front,” pp. 24–41, 341–45, and Gerhard L. Wein- penthal, Logistical Support, vol. 2, p. 110. For its impor- berg, “D-Day: Analysis of Costs and Benefits,” pp. tance, ibid., pp. 13–14, 109–16. 317–18, 389–90. 10 For Eisenhower’s support to Montgomery and 2 Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Plan- Market Garden, see Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, vol. ning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942. United States in 2, pp. 8–15, and MacDonald, Siegfried Line Campaign, World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Mili- pp. 8–10, 119–23, 127–29. For the battles in Lorraine, tary History, 1953); and Maurice Matloff, Strategic Plan- see Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign. The European ning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944, United States Army Theater of Operations. United States Army in World War II in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Mili- (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the tary History, 1959). Army, 1950), “The German Counterattack in the XII 3 This view is offered by Kent Roberts Greenfield in Corps Sector (19 September–1 October),” pp. 209–55. American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration (Bal- 11 On occupation zones see Gerhard L. Weinberg, A timore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), es- World at War: A Global History of World War II (New pecially “Elements of Coalition Strategy,” pp. 3–23, York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 793–95, 122–24; and “American and British Strategy: How Much 804, 829–30; Cornelius Ryan, The Last Battle (New York: Did They Differ?” pp. 24–48, 124–26. Also James M. Simon and Schuster, 1966), pp. 141–61; and on Roo- Leighton, “Overlord Revisited: An Interpretation of sevelt’s plan, Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 794, American Strategy in the European War, 1942–1944,” 829–30; Ryan, Last Battle, pp. 141, 145–50, 154–61. For The American Historical Review, vol. 67, no. 4 (July 1963), the withdrawal from the Soviet zone, see Weinberg, A pp. 919–37. Leighton also helps inform Richard M. World at Arms, p. 830. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and 12 On Montgomery’s hopes and plans to take Berlin, Strategy, 1940–1943, United States in World War II (Wash- see Ryan, Last Battle, pp. 135–36, 139–40, 165, 199–202, ington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955), 206–07; Charles B. MacDonald, The Last Offensive. The and Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global European Theater of Operations. United States Army in Logistics and Strategy, 1943–1945, United States Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Mili- World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Mili- tary History, 1973), pp. 341–42, 480; on Eisenhower’s tary History, 1968). attitude toward Berlin, ibid., pp. 339–42, 379, 384, 387, 4 Michael Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the 395, 399, 405–06, 480, and Weinberg, A World at Arms, Second World War (New York, Washington: Frederick A. pp. 813–14. Praeger, 1968). 5 In addition to the works cited in note 2, see the overviews of the historiography of the war’s strategy (though not written specifically for the 50th anniversary observances) in David Reynolds et al., editors, Allies at War: The Soviet, American, and British Experience, 1939–1945 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), particularly Alex Danchev, “Great Britain: The Indirect Strat- egy,” pp. 1–26, and Mark A. Stoler, “The United States: The Global Strategy,” pp. 55–78.

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and Admiral Ernest J. King. Both favored an assault on occupied France in 1943, not a diversion to a secondary AWarThat theater in 1942. Both sus- pected machinations by the British and were contemptu- ous of the President’s argu- Was Not Left ment that action somewhere in the European theater of operations—even North Africa—was essential to the to the Generals politics supporting the strat- By ELIOT A. COHEN egy of Germany First. Yet Roosevelt was right. Indeed, he was even more correct than he knew, since it appears unlikely in retrospect There were two men at the top who really fought that an invasion in 1943 would have succeeded against a Wehrmacht not yet bled out and finally agreed on the major moves that white by the Red Army or a Luftwaffe not yet led to victory. They were Franklin Roosevelt and shattered by the Army Air Forces and the Royal Air Force. Winston Churchill. They really ran the war . . . Churchill, who actually never overruled we were just artisans building definite patterns his generals in such a dramatic and irrevoca- ble fashion, once remarked to one of the of strategy from the rough blueprints handed to most valuable members of his wartime team, us by our respective Commanders in Chief. General Hastings Ismay, that the extent to which the generals had been discredited in —William D. Leahy World War I meant that in World War II their successors could not pretend to be professionally infallible. In practice, this view did not translate t was more than a pious deference to into arbitrary reversals of the generals’ or- senior politicians that led Admiral ders by Churchill, or grand and impractica- Leahy to give the credit for war leader- ble designs of the kind in which Adolf Hitler ship to Franklin D. Roosevelt and his indulged. But it did mean that Churchill Igreat colleague, Winston Churchill. Rather, would subject his generals and admirals to a the sober truth was that Roosevelt, and to an merciless cross-questioning about military even greater measure Churchill, minutiae. Churchill would subject exercised a directive, forceful One illuminating example is that of Op- his generals to a merci- control of a kind that most eration Victor, an anti-invasion exercise held members of the defense estab- in January 1941, which suggested that the less cross-questioning lishment today would find un- British army would have a difficult time about military minutiae usual—and perhaps improper. holding off a German onslaught. In March, They prodded subordinates, after reading exercise reports, Churchill in- questioned their orders, and on occasion terrogated the Chiefs of Staff: drove them into paroxysms of either anger 1. In the invasion exercise Victor two armoured, or despair. Yet the end result was better strat- one motorised, and two infantry divisions were as- egy, not merely better democracy. sumed to be landed by the enemy on the Norfolk coast The most notable example of assertive in the teeth of heavy opposition. They fought their control in the United States was FDR’s insis- way ashore and were all assumed to be in action at tence on invading North Africa in 1942, a the end of 48 hours. move vehemently opposed by his main military advisors, General George C. Marshall

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Cohen y y Histor my Center of Militar t, U.S. Ar ar II Ar orld W Collection of W Life The Taking Cover from Strafing Fire on Arawe Beach by David 2. I presume the details of this remarkable feat Churchill observed sardonically, “I Fredenthal. have been worked out by the staff concerned. Let me should be very glad if the same officers see them. For instance, how many ships and trans- would work out a scheme for our landing an ports carried these five divisions? How many ar- exactly similar force on the French coast at moured vehicles did they comprise? How many motor the same extreme range of our fighter pro- lorries, how many guns, how much ammunition, how tection and assuming that the Germans have many men, how many tons of stores, how far did they naval superiority in the Channel.” advance in the first 48 hours, how many men and vehicles were assumed to have landed in the first 12 A spate of memoranda back and forth hours, what percentage of loss were they debited with? ensued, with the commander of British What happened to the transports and store-ships home forces, General Alan Brooke, stoutly while the first 48 hours of fighting was going on? Had defending the exercise and Churchill rebut- they completed emptying their cargoes or were they ting his arguments one by one. Two points still lying in shore off the beaches? What naval escort stand out. First, in part based on his assess- did they have? Was the landing at this point protected ment of the difficulty of invasion Churchill by superior enemy daylight fighter formations? How was willing to risk diverting scarce armor to many fighter airplanes did the enemy have to employ, North Africa, where it could make all the dif- if so, to cover the landing places? ference in the spring and summer of 1941; second, he ultimately appointed the dour Eliot A. Cohen is professor of strategic studies at Brooke as the Chief of the Imperial General the School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University. His books include Staff and later as the Chairman of the Chiefs Citizens and Soldiers, Military Misfortunes, and of Staff Committee. Gulf War Air Power Survey.

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The examples of Roosevelt’s and Church- are historically inaccurate, but what counts ill’s assertive civilian control could be multi- here is the legend more than the reality. A plied. The American decision to aid Britain in Roosevelt or Churchill would not have given 1940; the timing, weight, and direction of the a Westmoreland a free hand to pursue a Combined Bomber Offensive; the allocation wasteful, destructive, and politically unsus- of resources for combating the U-boat men- tainable strategy of search and destroy, nor ace in the North Atlantic—all bore the im- would he have allowed a Schwarzkopf to ne- print of assertive civilian leadership. gotiate an armistice without guidance on the A great deal of friction resulted, and more peace terms to be exacted at the end. than one senior military figure contemplated In part, the situation of World War II resignation in despair and outrage. Nor were leaders was simply very different: the margin the civilians always in the right: indeed, it is a between success and failure was much nar- mark of their good sense that they yielded, rower. American strategists of that war, un- on almost all occasions, to military argument like those of late, had to allocate military re- that met the test of massive and ruthless com- sources that were scarce and difficult to mon sense. But the war was run by politicians replace. The Army, after all, ended up deploy- who knew that the ultimate responsibility for ing almost every available division overseas, victory or defeat rested with them, and who leaving no strategic reserve in the United acted accordingly. States. Here were real strategic choices. The current models of civil-military rela- Civil-military relations in the Axis states tions are very different. We think of either were either corrupted by one-man rule as in civilian micro-management, á la Vietnam, or Italy and Germany or nonexistent as in a supposedly hands-off and out-of-the-way Japan, a military dictatorship throughout handing over of strategic responsibilities to the military in the Persian Gulf. Both views y y Histor my Center of Militar t, U.S. Ar ar II Ar orld W

Fighter in the Sky (Solomon Islands, 1943) by Tom Lea. Collection of W Life The

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Landing Operations by David Fredenthal. y y Histor my Center of Militar t, U.S. Ar ar II Ar orld W Collection of W Life The

the war. Only among the Anglo-Saxon pow- more exercise critical judgment about a cam- ers—and oddly, to a lesser extent, in Stalinist paign plan than about the procedure to fol- Russia—did civilians engage military subor- low for open heart surgery. dinates in prolonged and orderly argument, The upshot was civil-military relations a dialogue of unequals but a dialogue fraught with conflict. Today commentators nonetheless. In the course of that dialogue view conflict as something dysfunctional civilians learned when to ac- and dangerous, forgetting that it character- Roosevelt knew that cept professional opinions izes many successful governments at war. generals could make dis- proffered by their military Who recalls, for example, that General subordinates and when to William Tecumseh Sherman refused to shake astrous military mistakes, question or discard them. In- the hand of Secretary of War Edwin M. Stan- not merely political ones deed, their very understand- ton at the Review of the Armies held at the ing of professional judgment conclusion of the Civil War? No doubt the differed from that of today. unequal, tension-ridden dialogue between Roosevelt and Churchill knew full well civilian and military leaders took a heavy that generals could, in the nature of things, psychological, even physical, toll on the par- make disastrous military mistakes, not ticipants. But in the end it was an essential merely political ones. They discriminated ingredient for victory—and in all likelihood clearly between those generals whom they will be so again in the future. JFQ regarded as operationally talented and operationally incompetent and had no hesitation about sacking the latter. Both would have rejected the view, currently prevalent in some circles, that a politician can no

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WBy WILLIAMSON MURRAYarII

ne cannot look across the long, there were similar American or British crimes seemingly endless rows of crosses (a Hamburg, Berlin, or Dresden), the refusal and Stars of David that dot the to bomb the rail lines to Auschwitz, the star- cemeteries at Omaha Beach, St. vation of German POWs at the war’s end, or OJames, and elsewhere in Europe and the Pa- Hiroshima—undoubtedly this summer we cific without a sense of the terrible cost of will hear ceaseless comments about drop- victory in World War II. The cold stone ping the atomic bomb on Japan as a “crime memorials underscore the ages of those against humanity.” whose lives war cut short at eighteen, twenty, These purveyors of moral equivalence twenty-four, thirty years—men who never are wrong. It is well that we realize, in con- again saw their families and homes. And as sidering its human cost, why the war was each year passes fewer and fewer visitors fought and why there is a moral dimension come to these lonely corners of America. to the Allied victory. Perhaps nothing delin- As the past recedes from memory to eates the character of World War II better words printed on a page, historians will start than the ambitions and actions of our oppo- to depict victory in that terrible conflict in nents. Adolf Hitler aimed, in the words of soft, ill-measured words. They will suggest one historian, at nothing short of “a biologi- that our efforts were nothing more than the cal world revolution”—the conquest of Eu- reverse side of a coin—that in fact there was rope and beyond, the enslavement of Slavs, little moral worth to the Allied cause, that for every German or Japanese war crime

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Pacific theaters that made the war phenomenal even in the long, vio- lent history of the human race. Ger- man attacks on Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, and Belgrade were out-and- out attempts to intimidate opponents into surrendering through the whole- sale murder of civilians by airpower; and the Luftwaffe was highly successful, killing 17,000 Serbs in a single day.2 In the late 1930s the Japanese lacked the capabilities for strategic bombing, but the “Rape of Nanking” illustrates Tokyo’s contempt for international law and the treatment of civilians at the outset of what eventually turned into its war against every ethnic group in Asia. Moreover, from the outset Ger- man forces displayed a callousness toward both civilians and prisoners

y of war that represented a sharp break with the practices of World War I. y Histor The killing of over a hundred British POWs at Le Paradis in May 1940 was the first in a series of incidents in-

my Center of Militar volving the Waffen SS.3 The execu-

U.S. Ar tion of Canadians by the murderous Intersection in Tokyo juvenile delinquents of the 12th SS (Japan, 1946) by Hans Panzer Division, Hitler Jugend,4 the Mangelsdorf. the elimination of all differently abled, the slaughter of French civilians at Oradour-sur- extermination of European and possibly Glan by troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Division, world Jewry, and the creation of a great Das Reich,5 and the slaying of Americans at Aryan empire that would rule from Gibraltar Malmedy by Peiper’s SS troops in late 1944 6 to the Urals and last “a typified behavior among Hitler’s ideological behind the murderous thousand years.” 1 Japanese legions in the west. The east was another execution of operational objectives were perhaps matter. As Waffen SS soldiers told the inter- less coherent, but propa- viewer Max Hastings, Oradour-sur-Glan was campaigns came ideological ganda about a “Greater small potatoes compared to what had hap- and racial baggage East Asian Co-prosperity pened in the east. Sphere” suggests a dra- But the largest military crime—one that matic plan to restructure Asia—including makes other incidents pale into insignifi- the enslavement of much of China, an effort cance—was the treatment of Soviet POWs by that if not equal to the viciousness of Hitler’s the Wehrmacht, not the SS. By the end of the “New Order” certainly did result in extraor- 1941 campaign, the Germans claimed to dinary crimes against humanity. have captured over 3.6 million Soviets in the Thus, behind the murderous execution great encirclement battles of Operation Bar- of operational campaigns came ideological barossa.7 What ensued was a calculated pol- and racial baggage in both the European and icy of starvation and murder, of which the infamous commissar order represented only the tip of the iceberg.8 Field Marshal Keitel received a memo Williamson Murray is professor of history in March 1942 indicating that of the ap- emeritus at The Ohio State University. He is the author of The Change in the European Balance of proximately 3.6 million POWs captured in Power, 1938–1939, and Luftwaffe. operations against the Soviet Union barely

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a hundred thousand were fit to work. The plagues in China if it had developed the ca- vast majority had already perished from pabilities.12 What Japan did inflict more gen- starvation, exposure, or disease.9 By 1945 erally on occupied Korea and China has yet only a hundred thousand of the Soviets to be fully examined by historians. captured in 1941 had survived the maltreat- Thus, there was a moral as well as a ment inflicted on them in work camps. strategic dimension to the war that the Allies Throughout the war, particularly in the waged in Europe and Asia. Unfortunately, 1941 campaign, the German army was de- only Churchill among the leaders of Western lighted to undertake “special action” (Son- democracies had recognized in the 1930s derbehandlungen) against East European that Nazi Germany represented a strategic as Jews.10 Beyond the villainy of the military well as a moral threat to the survival of delay the ferocious crimes of the Nazi regime mocratic values and regimes. But conven- that resulted in the extermination of 6 mil- tional wisdom had considered his views old lion Jews solely on the basis of their race, fashioned and no longer relevant in a world the murder of 3 million Poles, and the where intelligent people recognized that war death of more than 25 million Soviet citi- was no longer an instrument of statecraft. zens—a record unequalled even by Stalin Even Churchill’s stirring words after the ru- and Mao. inous Munich agreement could not shake Japanese crimes in the Pacific never the government or citizens out of the com- reached the levels of German atrocities, placent belief that surrendering Czechoslo- though not for lack of trying. The “Rape of vakia “had achieved peace in our time.” The Nanking” set the standard for the Imperial British continued a policy of appeasement Army’s conduct in China. Throughout the for six months and refused to mobilize for war the Japanese carried out extensive exper- the coming struggle. Because Europe was so iments in biological warfare, including live far away American policymakers were even vivisections and dropping bubonic agents on less willing to recognize the threat and sup- Chinese villages.11 One suspects, given the port measures needed to prepare the Nation. lack of control which Tokyo exercised, that the military would have unleashed terrible

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Navy Day (New York The Life Collection of World War II Art, U.S. Army Center of Military History Harbor, 1945) by Julien Binford. Fortunately, geography and the enemy’s Ironically, the ferocity and ruthlessness with stupidity permitted the Anglo-American which the Nazis waged ideological war drove powers to escape the full consequences of the Soviet peoples to support Stalin’s crimi- their folly. When France fell in 1940, nal regime which many of them would have Britain’s position seemed hopeless. It was been delighted to overthrow. not. Churchill galvanized the will of a na- In the end Barbarossa also foundered on tion outraged by aggression.13 Fighter Com- intelligence misestimates and logistic mis- mand, under Air Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, takes that still take one’s breath away. An provided that measure of effectiveness to August 1941 quotation from the diary of keep Britain in the war and allow the United General Franz Halder, chief of the general States more than a year to repair its consid- staff, suggests the extent of the Nazi intelli- erable military deficiencies. gence failure: In 1941 the Germans turned a favorable The whole situation makes it increasingly plain situation against themselves. First they that we have underestimated the Russian colossus, launched a great racial crusade against the who consistently prepared for war with that utterly Soviet Union, one that aimed not only at ruthless determination so characteristic of totalitarian the extermination of Jews but the enslave- states....At the outset of the war, we reckoned with ment of Slavic peoples on Soviet territory.

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about 200 enemy divisions. Now we have counted The evidence suggests that the Japanese 360. These divisions are not armed and equipped ac- surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, followed cording to our standards, and their tactical leadership shortly by Hitler’s declaration of war on the is often poor. But there they are, and if we smash a United States, sealed the fate of the Axis. dozen of them, the Russians simply put up another Certainly that was how Churchill saw the dozen. The time factor favors them, as they are near strategic situation in December 1941 before their resources, while we are moving farther and farther from ours. And so our troops...are subject to the meeting with Roosevelt in Washington. But incessant attacks of the enemy.14 whatever economic and military advantages America, Britain, and the Soviet Union had The logistic mistakes accumulated from over Germany, Japan, and Italy, victory the first step into Russia to wreck what little could only come after great land, sea, and chance the Germans might air campaigns with terrible casualties. Given the defeat of the Axis have had to overthrow the nature of the opposition, there was no Stalin’s regime in 1941. required the use of force other road. Quite simply, even as win- Moreover, the defeat of the Axis re- that more squeamish times ter approached in Novem- quired the use of force in a fashion that have found repugnant ber 1941 and every step in more squeamish times—when the funda- the advance on Moscow mental survival of the West was less directly prevented the Germans threatened—have found repugnant. The from building up supply dumps to meet the combined bomber offensive against Ger- trials of a Russian winter or even from mov- many is perhaps the prime example; critics ing winter clothes to the front, Halder could of that great Anglo-American effort have only idly hope that perhaps it would not seized on its supposed immorality in killing 15 snow until January. and maiming hundreds of thousands of “in- PBY Halt to Rest nocent” Germans as well as its supposed lack (Norfolk, 1942) by Paul Sample. y y Histor my Center of Militar t, U.S. Ar ar II Ar orld W Collection of W Life The

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All Aboard for Home by Joseph Hirsch. y y Histor my Center of Militar U.S. Ar

of effect. In fact, that effort was not pretty; it the Nazis from making a last stand among did lead to the death of civilians. And it did the ruins of the Thousand Year Reich.18 Con- not reach the over-optimistic goals which its sequently, it is clear that the strategic bomb- advocates had intended. ing of Germany was as vital to victory as the But the bomber offensive was essential battles on the Eastern Front, or the struggle to winning the war in Europe: it broke the to control the sea lanes of the North At- back of the Luftwaffe, and without that lantic, or Allied ground operations in West- achievement it is doubtful whether Allied ern Europe after June 6. There was nothing forces would have made a lodgement on the pretty or redeeming about the effort itself; French coast.16 It wrecked the transport sys- but there was no other choice. tem, a key element in the success of the Nor- Similarly, when it comes to dropping mandy landings. It diverted more than the atomic bomb on Japan, one must look 10,000 high velocity anti-aircraft guns and beyond the horror of that event to examine half a million soldiers to the defense of the what other courses of action were available. Reich—assets that would definitely have The argument that the enemy was ready to played a more useful role on the battlefield. surrender at that point in the war, to put it It had a direct impact on the morale of Ger- bluntly, is virtually unsupported by the evi- man civilians, although how that impact ac- dence except in unrealistic proposals that tually translated into an Allied advantage is the Japanese foreign ministry sent to difficult to calculate. It wrecked the German Moscow but which it was careful not to in- oil industry and from summer 1944 on had form its military masters about because of a significant impact on the mobility of Ger- the consequences. man ground forces.17 Finally, the destruction By August 1945 the American military that it wreaked on the transportation net- had determined on an invasion of the Home work in fall and winter of 1944 prevented Islands that would begin with Kyushu. The estimates provided by MacArthur’s command appear to have been unrealistic in

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light of Okinawa and Iwo Jima, especially number of civilian casualties. Finally, one when intelligence already indicated that the might also note that prolonged combat on Japanese were concentrating most of their Kyushu would undoubtedly have resulted in forces on Kyushu along southern beaches Soviet operations against Hokaido and per- where landings would occur.19 But even haps the main island itself with a resulting MacArthur’s estimates, however low they ap- Soviet zone of occupation in the north that pear in retrospect (approximately 40,000 would have had a devastating impact on killed and 200,000 total casualties), were post-war Japan. equivalent to the casualty level suffered by The terrible war on which the survival of the Army from Normandy to the Bulge.20 As democracy depended did not halt the endless one historian pointed out, any President struggles that Thucydides foretold in The who allowed U.S. forces to suffer such casu- Peloponnesian War; but democratic values sur- alties without first using the atomic bomb vived and, under the leadership of the would have faced immediate impeachment United States, those values were maintained given the political realities of 1945.21 throughout another great contest that lasted But the most terrible results of a refusal almost to the end of this century. But the by America to use the bomb would have im- great victories of 1945 and 1989 were attrib- pacted on the Japanese themselves. Fighting utable to the will of America to defend its on Kyushu would have visited a terrible fate values and traditions with the lives of its on that island’s peasant population, and not young men and women. The long white only would the fighting have killed tens of rows of markers in Arlington and cemeteries thousands, but starvation in the Home Is- across Europe and the Pacific bear mute testi- lands as well as mass suicides aided and mony to that courage and dedication. JFQ abetted by the Japanese military (as happened on Okinawa) would have swollen the Awaiting Take-off, Aleutians by Ogden Pleissner. y y Histor my Center of Militar t, U.S. Ar ar II Ar orld W Collection of W Life The

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13 No one at the time foresaw how extraordinary NOTES German actions would be in the war. One historian ar- 1 See MacGregor Knox, “Conquest, Foreign and Do- gues that London could have reached an acceptable ac- mestic, in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany,” Journal of commodation with Berlin in 1940 to save the empire. Modern History, vol. 56, no. 1 (March 1984), pp. 1–57. But Churchill dragged Britain down a road of slavish 2 In the case of Belgrade, Operation Gericht (Punish- surrender to American interests—one that inevitably ment) killed some 17,000 Serbs. On German attitudes spelled destruction of the empire. What such an argu- toward strategic bombing at the beginning of the war, ment misses, of course, is the nature of Hitler’s regime see Williamson Murray, German Military Effectiveness and that any accommodation, as Vichy France illus- (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1992), pp. trates, would have led to a surrender of the British soul. 39–52. For an exposition of this position, which reveals how 3 At Le Paradis soldiers of the SS Totenkopf Division far historians can be removed from reality, see John killed no fewer than 110 members of the Royal Norfolk Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory: A Political Biogra- Regiment, but the authorities never investigated the in- phy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1993). cident. George H. Stein, The Waffen SS, Hitler’s Elite 14 Franz Halder, The Halder War Diaries, 1939–1942, Guard at War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, Charles Burdick and Hans Adolf Jacobsen, editors (No- 1966), pp. 76–78. vato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988), entry for August 11, 4 Guides to Normandy indicate that 18 Canadian 1944, p. 506. bodies were found at Abbe d’Ardennes, headquarters of 15 Klaus Reinhardt, Die Wende vor Moskau, Das Scheit- the 12th SS Panzer Division outside Caen. A recent visit ern der Strategie Hitlers im Winter 1941/1942 (Stuttgart: to the site revealed that 27 bodies now have been dis- Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1972), p. 140. covered, and according to a local construction foreman 16 For a detailed exposition of the combined bomber the number goes up each year. offensive, see Williamson Murray, “Reflections on the 5 See Max Hastings, Das Reich, The March of the 2nd Combined Bomber Offensive,” Militärgeschichtliche Mit- SS Panzer Division through France (London: Papermac, teilungen, vol. 51 (1992), Heft 1. 1993) for a further discussion of the murderous activi- 17 For example, when the Soviets hit Silesia in Janu- ties of the division as it moved north from Toulouse to ary 1945 the Germans had 1,800 tanks to defend the Normandy. province, but no fuel. As a result most of Silesia fell into 6 Peiper and fellow criminals were condemned to Soviet hands in less than a week. Sir Charles Webster death by an American military court, but the sentence and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against was commuted to life imprisonment through the efforts Germany, vol. 3 (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1962), of Senator Joseph McCarthy and they were then almost p. 239. immediately released by the post-war West German 18 See in particular Alfred C. Mierzejewski, The Col- government. lapse of the German War Economy, 1944–1945; Allied Air 7 The Soviets, not surprisingly, contested that num- Power and the German National Railway (Chapel Hill: ber, but even their figures suggest that millions of their University of North Carolina Press, 1988). soldiers fell into German hands during the course of the 19 It is more likely that the level of ferocity and losses campaign. would have replicated Okinawa. But instead of 200,000 8 For details on the savage treatment of Soviet casualties, America would probably have suffered as POWs by the German army during the war, see Kristian much as twice that among its ground and naval forces. Streit, Keine Kameraden, Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetis- 20 Americans in the Pacific had fewer illusions about chen Kriegsgefangenen (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags- the level of casualties in an invasion of the Home Is- Anstalt, 1979). lands than MacArthur’s staff or historians born years 9 Ibid., p. 9. later. See Paul Fussell, “Thank God for the Atomic 10 On the German army’s enthusiastic support for Bomb: Hiroshima, A Soldier’s View,” The New Republic the final solution see Horst Boog et al., Das Deutsche (August 22–29, 1981), pp. 26–30. Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, vol. 4, Der Angriff auf die 21 Peter Mazlowski, “Truman, the Bomb, and the Sowjetunion (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983), Numbers Game,” Military History Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 3 pp. 413–51; Jürgen Förster, “Hitler’s War Aims Against (Spring 1995), pp. 103–07. the Soviet Union and the German Military Leaders,” Militärhistorik Tidshrift (1979), pp. 83–93; Christian Streit, “The German Army and the Policies of Geno- cide,” in The Policies of Genocide: Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany, Gerhard Hirschfeld, editor (London: German Historical Institute, 1986). JFQ is grateful to the U.S. Army Center of 11 See Peter Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731: Japan’s Secret Biological Warfare in World War II (New Military History for the loan of most of the York: Free Press, 1989). World War II art reproduced in this issue and, 12 One of the most disgraceful post-war decisions was especially, to Marylou Gjernes, Chief of the not to bring those Japanese involved in bacteriological warfare to trial. Instead the authorities decided to enlist Army Art Activity, and Verne E. Schwartz, their help in the American program. This undoubtedly Visual Reference Specialist, for their support in raised the suspicion of the Chinese and explains why they accused the United States of using such weapons obtaining items from the Life collection of during the Korean War. World War II art.

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When I went to war I thought that soldiers were old men. It was not until long after . . . that it came over me that the Army was made up of what I should now call very young men. —Oliver Wendell Holmes

The Generation of 1945 By RONALD H. SPECTOR

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Camouflage Face by y Tom Lea. y Histor my Center of Militar t, U.S. Ar ar II Ar orld W Collection of W Life The

n the same way that it was hard for Just as it is difficult to see the heroes the college students in Holmes’ audi- honored at Normandy and other com- ence at Harvard University thirty memorations as real people, it is even years after Appomattox to imagine harder to recall the mood of the country Ihim and his comrades “upon whose heads in 1941. Many older Americans, the par- the white shadows have begun to fall” as ents and grandparents of the GIs who the youthful soldiers many of them had were about to be committed to battle, been, it is difficult for us to think of the shared an uneasy belief that they had veterans of World War II as real people, as somehow botched it, that their generation “very young men,” some still in their had lost the chance to build a world teens, not a few from families still strug- where peace and freedom gling with the effects of the Great Depres- would prevail, and that sion, and for whom the military was their their children would first real job. Today they are all ten feet now have to pay the tall and have become not so much indi- price. Anthropologist viduals as icons of patriotism. Margaret Mead worried that perhaps “the moral debauches of the last

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twenty years left congenital scars on the Soldiers in the Vietnam era, most of children’s souls which no medicine can cure them children of World War II veterans, nor scalpel remove....We must be able to were seldom unaware of the implicit com- look them in the eye and say, ‘We failed you parison between their own exasperating, because we lied to you, forcing ourselves and seemingly intractable war and the glorious you to believe that we had no part in the achievements of their fathers. way in which the world was getting steadily Tim O’Brien served in Vietnam with the worse.’” 23d Infantry Division. In World War II that Along with the guilt was a nagging anxi- division had relieved the Marines on ety that the new generation might not be up Guadalcanal, fought under MacArthur in to the task. “Many observers considered us a Bougainville, and played a major role in lost generation and feared we might collapse General Robert Eichelberger’s campaigns in if summoned to some crucial battlefield,” re- the southern Philippines. In Vietnam, called James Michener. Many veterans of O’Brien writes, the men of the Americal divi- World War I looked at the new cohort of sion “did not know the feeling of taking a American soldiers and feared they had been place and keeping it. No sense of order and softened by the antiwar ideas of their momentum. No front, no rear, no trenches overindulgent mothers dur- laid out in neat rows, no Patton rushing for by the end of the war the ing the 1930s. “Our men the Rhine, no beachheads to storm and win GI had become a universal who had to do the fighting and hold for the duration. They did not didn’t want to fight,” con- have targets, they did not have a cause. On a American symbol of cluded one veteran war cor- given day they did not know where they courage and prowess respondent. “They had been were...or how being there might influence told in the all-important larger outcomes.” During the Vietnam War first ten years and in their teens that it was the Americal soldier was best known not for not necessary to fight. Our men just wanted Guadalcanal or Bougainville but for My Lai. to go home.” Everybody knew, or at least said, that Viet- The campaigns of 1942 and 1943 quickly nam was a different kind of war. Yet it may erased these doubts. Indeed by the end of the have been a half-conscious desire to repeat war the GI had become a universal American the great deeds of World War II that some- symbol of courage and prowess. Later writers how contributed to that quixotic undertak- might point out that the Russians had fought ing and increased the frustration level when and defeated a larger number of German events never followed the old script. troops than Americans were ever to face in Whether the World War II generation western Europe and that it was Australians, was really the most successful in American not Americans, who first turned back the tide history as soldiers, they were undoubtedly of Japanese land offensives in the southwest the most successful as veterans. In every Pacific. Analysts might use graphs, charts, field, from classics to corporate law, from and statistics to illustrate that the Germans play-writing to plasma physics, they quickly were actually more effective fighters. To most assumed positions of leadership, often trans- Americans that was all unimportant and un- forming entire industries, research fields, interesting detail. For them the U.S. conduct and professions—or creating new ones. This of the war soon became and was long re- transformation of society by veterans began membered as the norm of how wars ought to almost immediately after the end of the war. be fought. The GI of World War II also be- The GI Bill of Rights, one of the most no- came the model of what was expected of a table pieces of welfare legislation in U.S. his- fighting man. tory, provided job training and homes for millions of veterans and allowed millions more to attend college. Before the advent of the veteran, colleges and universities were places where a handful of young men and Ronald H. Spector teaches history and interna- women went because of wealth and family tional relations at The George Washington tradition. The influx of veterans who often University. He is the author of Eagle Against the Sun and After Tet: The Bloodiest Year of the Vietnam War.

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Platoon Commander Chester, who commanded a destroyer escort and Sherman Tank in both theaters and later headed a thriving by Albert Gold. shipping conglomerate, wrote disparagingly in his memoirs of “the wheeling and dealing of the greedy 1980s.” He recalled a time when “decency prevailed and greed was not the driving force. I had the good fortune to have experienced a time when I shared the company of individuals who subordinated their own interests to those of their comrades in arms.” This commitment to public service, it might be argued, was passed on to the children of the World War II generation. Baby- boomers certainly did not feel the same obligation as their fathers to serve in the military. Quite the opposite. Yet many of the crusades of baby-boomers, with all their self- righteous nuttiness, resulted in solid achievements and advancement in areas such as civil rights, the environment, and women’s status, thus continuing to express y commitment to bettering the Nation in ways

y Histor different from their parents. The children of World War II veterans themselves are now entering middle age, and may be the last generation to believe that making money is

my Center of Militar not necessarily life’s highest goal. The younger generation—born in the U.S. Ar 1960s and 1970s—are less likely than their parents or grandparents to be deceived by went on to positions of leadership in acad- spurious causes, but they are unlikely to eme changed higher education from a lim- make any sacrifices either. Rather than join- ited enterprise for the well-to-do into the ing the military or protesting against mili- meritocracy it still claims to be today. tary service they are content to hire others What if anything did this generation to take care of that distasteful necessity. In have in common? Most of them were far too contrast to the impassioned protests of the busy to be introspective, but those who con- 1960s, most student demonstrations in re- sidered the question usually had the same cent years have focused on a lack of parking answer, a dedication to ser- for their late model cars. this commitment to vice, to something greater James Michener, writing about veterans than making a living. “Time of the Pacific theater soon after the war, ac- public service was passed magazine had an editorial curately foresaw the situation which has on to the children of the about the men and women of now come to pass. our age. They called us the World War II generation They will live a long time, these men of the ‘Take Charge Generation,’” South Pacific. They had an American quality. They, wrote Harry Crosby, a former like their victories, will be remembered as long as our command navigator with the 100th Bomb generation lives. After that, like the men of the Con- Group, and later a highly successful teacher federacy they will become strangers. Longer and of writing at Iowa and Harvard. “I don’t longer shadows will obscure them until their Guadal- know about that. If I were asked to list any canal sounds distant on the ear like Shiloh and Valley one quality which characterized my associ- Forge. JFQ ates from the 100th it would be their continued dedication to public service.” Alvin

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I remember the battle for Anzio as the most brutal in which I fought during World War II. I also remember it as the most futile; for fifty years its futility has haunted me.

The Battle for Anzio By WILLIAM WOODRUFF

he story begins in the summer of Italy across the Straits of Messina. Regardless 1943 when Allied victories in of intentions, once started the Italian cam- North Africa and Sicily made it paign took on a life of its own. By the fall of necessary to redefine strategy in 1943 Allied armies had reached the German Tthe Mediterranean. Because Great Britain Gustav Line anchored on Cassino. Beyond looked upon the Mediterranean differently that was the Liri valley leading to the prize— than the United States—it was after all a life- Rome. In spite of desperate Allied attacks to line of empire—its influence gradually pre- break through to Rome, the German line dominated. America was more concerned held. Stalemate ensued. with invading Western Europe and sought to To break the deadlock, a plan was limit its adventures in the Mediterranean. hatched in early December 1943 at Mar- Before long-term Allied strategy could be rakech to make an amphibious landing agreed to, the British Eighth Army invaded (code named Shingle) at the port of Anzio- Nettuno, 80 miles north of the Gustav Line and 35 miles south of Rome. The task force

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was expected to secure a beachhead and K. Truscott 2 on the right, the task force push twenty miles inland to the Alban Hills. landed at Anzio-Nettuno against minimal Once in possession of the hills, it could out- opposition.3 By nightfall Lucas had managed flank the German Tenth Army, disrupt the to establish a lightly-held semi-circular line road and rail links joining the southern Ger- around the port. With most of his forces man front and Rome, capture Rome, and ashore, he prepared for the counterattack he thus shorten the war. was sure would come. It did not, which was The British—including General Sir just as well, for the bulk of Shingle’s armor— Harold R.I.G. Alexander, deputy Allied com- the 1st Armored Division—had been delayed mander in chief, Mediterranean Theater, and by a shortage of landing craft and rough General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imper- seas. On the second day of the landing, ial General Staff—favored the plan while the knowing that the Allied attempt to break Americans—including Lieutenant General through the Gustav Line two days earlier Mark W. Clark, commander of Fifth Army, had failed, Lucas cautiously began to move and Major General John P. Lucas, whom his troops inland.

y Clark named the task force commander Almost at once VI Corps ran into trouble. shortly before the battle—were lukewarm. On January 23 units of the 3d Infantry Divi- y Histor Clark and other Americans felt that Fifth sion headed for Cisterna clashed with Ger- Army was already exhausted from the casu- man units on the Allied right flank. The 1st alties suffered on the southern front and Infantry Division met with resistance in the

my Center of Militar that adequate transport and forces for such a center and on the left. Two days after the hazardous operation could only be obtained landing more than 40,000 German troops t, U.S. Ar by weakening Overlord. Arguments against faced the Allies. By January 31, by which time

ar II Ar Shingle prevailed and the plan was shelved. the invading forces had reached their farthest

orld W But unconvinced of the wisdom of this penetration, the number had doubled. action, Prime Minister Winston Churchill By the end of January the stage was set promptly revived the plan, devoting himself for what proved to be one of the bloodiest Collection of W to it with Herculean energy. Eisenhower battles on the western front. In the battles for Life

The thought him “almost exclusively responsi- Aprilia (the factory), Cisterna, and Cam- Itri, Italy by Tom Craig. ble” for the Anzio invasion.1 With the coop- poleone, heavy losses were suffered on both eration of President Roosevelt and a reluctant sides. To take and hold Aprilia, some Guards General George C. Marshall, a Churchill- units were decimated. The attack by the 3d Di- directed conference in Tunis on December vision on the night of January 30 resulted in 25, 1943 decided that the invasion would the massacre of the 1st and 3d Ranger battal- take place after all. Responsibility for Shingle ions. The battle for Campoleone ended disas- was assigned to the 36,000-strong U.S. VI trously as the enemy cut off the Allied salient. Corps, chiefly comprised of the British 1st By February 4–5, under hammer blows and American 3d Infantry Divisions under from the German Fourteenth Army led by Fifth Army. The U.S. 1st Armored Division General Eberhard von Mackensen, VI Corps would follow immediately after a beachhead had been forced into retreat. By mid-Febru- was established. Several days prior to the in- ary a quarter of a million men were locked vasion, a new offensive would be launched in deadly combat on the Anzio plain. On against the Gustav Line. The two fronts were one occasion, the battle had to be halted to to be linked within seven days. Frantic prepa- bury the dead. Extraordinary courage and rations for the landing followed. heroism were displayed by friend and foe; In the early hours of January 22, 1944, neither would yield. Several times the Ger- with the 1st Infantry Division under Major mans almost broke through to the sea. With- General W.R.C. Penney on the left and 3d In- out Allied artillery on land and at sea, as fantry Division under Major General Lucian well as the crushing blows delivered by Al- lied planes, they might have succeeded. Yet overwhelming Allied superiority in the air did not prove decisive. William Woodruff is graduate research professor The Anzio nightmare continued day of economic history at the University of Florida. As a captain in the British army he landed at after day, night after night, until the troops Anzio and fought with the 24th Guards Brigade. could no longer stand. They could neither

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go forward nor back. Yet to stay where they base, my brigade moved five to six miles in- were was to invite death from the hills. land to the area of the overpass (eventually Nowhere was there safety. Nothing was still; our last line of resistance) which straddled terror was everywhere. By the the Anzio-Albano road. Before us a formida- by the end of February end of February (by which time ble dark-gray mass of hills covered the hori- neither side had the the beachhead had shrunk to zon. The next day we advanced three miles four miles wide and five miles to Carroceto where we were forced to with- strength to deliver a deep) neither side had the draw. I emerged unscathed from that en- knock-out blow strength or the reinforcements to gagement, though a shell blast tore every deliver a knock-out blow. button off my battledress. Others were less By early March the battle had been fortunate. For my brigade the agony of fought to a standstill; it became as static and Anzio had begun. deadly as the trenches of World War I. It was There was no talk in those first three at this point that Clark relieved Lucas and re- days of “dashing for the hills” or “racing placed him with Truscott. Not until the end across the plain.” Such phrases were only of May did the renewed of- used by armchair warriors fensives in the south and at with no knowledge of the Anzio force the enemy to re- battlefield. To have dashed y treat from both fronts to po- for the hills would have sitions north of Rome. The y Histor been suicidal. On D+2 I sat pathetic (perhaps unneces- in a ditch with a captured sary) struggle for supremacy German tank officer who

in Italy went on for eighteen my Center of Militar told me that the invasion more months. Anzio was had come as no surprise and

forgotten. After the war t, U.S. Ar that we would shortly be

Churchill never had diffi- ar II Ar wiped out. There were peo-

culty in ascribing the deba- orld W ple who thought that Lucas cle to American ineptitude. might have been more dar- It is usual, especially ing on the first and second

among British historians, to Collection of W day, but I know of no one at place the responsibility for Life the time who suggested a The the failure of the Anzio cam- headlong race to the hills, W.O. John W. Kramer (Italy, February paign at General Lucas’ 1944) by Tom Craig. especially since we knew door. It is argued that Lucas that the Allied offensive in failed to take advantage of the surprise he the south against the Gustav Line—on had achieved. Instead of racing for the Alban which everything turned—had stalled. Hills, he frittered away precious time in his Regardless of whether Lucas was over- bunker by the sea. The unprecedented toll of cautious or not, I believe that the Anzio cam- lives (75,000 killed, wounded, and missing) paign was doomed from the outset. The task was the price paid for his initial timidity. allotted to him exceeded realistic expecta- Far from frittering away precious time, tions. He was not given the necessary in- my experience was that the task force was fantry and armor to accomplish what Shingle committed from the moment it landed, not intended. His opinion on what was needed least in trying to disentangle itself from the was never sought. Had Patton led us, the out- confusion that such a landing entails. For come would have been the same except that me the whole of the first day was taken up the killing ground would have been closer to in disembarking, consolidating our position the hills. Had we had ships to land five divi- around the port, and (having learned en sions instead of two (including an armor di- route from Naples that considerable German vision on D-Day) the story might have had a forces awaited us in the vicinity of the different ending. More than anything else, beachhead) feverishly preparing to with- the lesson of Anzio was too little, too late. stand the expected German counterattack. Shingle began with a flawed battle plan: On D+3, with Lucas having protected his it took too little account of the enemy’s options or responses; it assumed—one might say gambled 4—that the Germans would be

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German Tank and Crew, St. Lo–1944 by Ogden Pleissner. y y Histor my Center of Militar t, U.S. Ar ar II Ar orld W Collection of W Life The

thrown off balance. Everything we knew and pouring rain. With only a sparse net- about the German commander Kesselring work of narrow roads, it proved to be the disproved such an assumption. He neither worst possible place for armor. On one occa- panicked on word of the invasion nor hesi- sion the 1st Armored Division lost 24 tanks tated to implement a contingency plan in trying to pull each other out of the mud. known as Case Richard. The German rein- The more I study Shingle the more I am forcement was unusually swift. Everything convinced that it failed not due to a lack of we had learned about the Germans—espe- courage on the part of any GI or Tommy, who cially at Salerno—told us that this was how were beyond praise, but because of weakness they would react. at the top of the command structure. The in- Even if Lucas had been given adequate structions regarding Shingle that Alexander forces to reach the hills and had accurately gave to Clark were very different from the in- assessed Kesselring’s reactions, the structions Clark gave Lucas. Alexander had re- Shingle failed because plain before the Alban Hills was quired Clark to secure the Alban Hills and to of weakness at the definitely the wrong place to fight be ready to advance on Rome. Clark required such a battle, especially in winter. neither of Lucas, probably realizing that top of the command In the planning stages too little Alexander was expecting more than he and structure attention was given to the terrain. Lucas could deliver. The differences were not Yet I know from bitter experience argued out: they were ignored. that it was terrain that repeatedly defeated Clark’s tendency to go his own way, re- both sides. With flooded deep ditches, gul- gardless of what his British chief ordered, relies, canals, tank traps, bottomless mud, and flected the unfortunate divisiveness between bogs, it is hardly possible to imagine worse terrain in which to fight, especially in mist

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Alexander was not. Except for Al- Polish Officer’s Tent (Cassino, Italy, 1944) lied superiority in the air, by Frank Duncan. Churchill’s predictions proved to be wrong on every count. Alexan- der should have joined others who alerted Churchill to the hazardous nature of the operation, including Brigadier Kenneth Strong, G-2, Al- lied Forces Headquarters; 6 Admiral Sir John D. Cunningham, Allied naval commander in chief, Mediterranean; 7 and Rear Admiral Frank J. Lowry, Allied naval commander of Shingle. Anzio was not a failure because senior commanders did not know better, but because commanders like Alexander y did not speak up or their advice

y Histor was rejected. I believe that Lucas has been much maligned. General Marshall

my Center of Militar thought so too. Lucas did what he was supposed to: conquer, consol- U.S. Ar idate, and advance. Warned by Clark not to stick out his neck, he American and British commanders in the- fought the Germans to a standstill. His so- ater (but not among the men). Clark was un- called caution may well have saved the Al- doubtedly an Anglophobe, while Penney lies from annihilation. The task given him was critical of Lucas. Truscott and Major was as impossible as the one given us. General Ernest N. Harmon of 1st Armored While I think there is much to be said in Division had little time for Penney. At the Lucas’ favor, I also think that he was the top, Shingle was the work of a divided, inef- wrong man for the job. I was young then, fective command. Clark’s description of but I’d seen enough battle to realize that he Alexander as a “peanut” and a “feather- was not the man to lead a wildcat mission. duster” 5 was well known but wide off the He didn’t put fire into anybody’s belly. I mark. Alexander may have failed to ensure spoke to him once when we were preparing that his orders were carried out, but his for the invasion and twice on the beach- courage as a soldier was never in doubt. On head, but I never saw him at the front. The one occasion, his head covered only by a British troops called him “Father Christ- cloth cap, he left our forward trench which mas.” Critics have argued that he did not was under fire, walked slowly across the ex- know what he was doing. The vital weakness posed rubble-strewn ground, surveyed the that I observed was not that he did not enemy, and sauntered back. We were im- know what he was doing, but that he did pressed. If he’d done that every day, we’d not believe in what he was doing. have won the battle. Anzio was Valley Forge without Wash- More damaging than Alexander’s inabil- ington. We had no single commander with ity to control his team was the encourage- whom to identify, no mystique for which to ment he gave Churchill when he should fight. The absence of an inspiring leader, cou- have been restraining him. There was no pled with the lack of a definite plan, could basis for Churchill to be optimistic. Of the only have one outcome—demoralization. To risks of Shingle he was largely ignorant. fight and to achieve nothing was deadening. Alexander and Clark were no better than Lucas in providing leadership. They were chateau generals, appearing rarely and always dressed as if on parade. To my knowledge,

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neither of them slept at the front one night. An old General going back, not bitter, sad, They arrived, made a quick tour, and were Convinced that he’d been sent on a damn-fool off. I think it embarrassed them to witness a mission, tragedy of their own making. Ill-prepared, frantically launched, too many cooks wherever blame is placed, I once visited their headquar- brewing a broth of overwhelming disaster. Divided counsel, risks uncalculated, advice ters at Casserta Palace and Anzio was a tragedy rejected. was dumbfounded by the from beginning to end Hellespont, dice in a can. luxury. There were not only In the German, not terror roused, panic caused, beds, movies, and messes, but But anger, heroism, and resistance. sheets. If I lived in a palace, I too would have Bluff called, the long chance lost. taken a very different view of sleeping in a freezing, water-filled foxhole. On the beach- An old General going back, head we didn’t need Churchill to tell us we To strike his flag, were a “stranded whale.” And watch clever men refight his battle Wherever blame is placed, the battle for With their slippers on, writing under the warm Anzio was a tragedy from beginning to end. glow of a desk lamp, Their bottoms warm, roasted by the fire, At the last, in spite of Alexander’s intentions Detached, removed, cozy. set out at a conference at Headquarters AAI They would tell him on April 2, 1944 that Fifth Army would And he would weep, for man.9 “break out of the Anzio beachhead and advance on Valmontone,” when the breakout I believed that then; I still do. JFQ came Clark took the fastest route to Rome. He achieved what he had always wanted, to NOTES be the first one there. The price was the sur- 1 vival of the German Tenth Army and pro- See Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisen- hower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), p. 494. longing the war in Italy. He earned the 2 See Lucian K. Truscott, Command Missions (New wrath of every senior commander (American York: Dutton, 1954). and British) of VI Corps. 3 Unknown to Lucas, while embarkation was taking I have pondered the battle for Anzio for place in Naples, Generalfeldmarshall Albert Kesselring, German commander in Italy, had shifted the 29th and half a century. It should never have been th 8 90 Panzer Grenadier Divisions from the Rome area to fought. Relative to what it achieved, its cost Cassino to bolster the southern front. He had been en- was atrocious. Like Gallipoli, Anzio was couraged to do so by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the tinged with a fatal futility. Because of this it head of German intelligence, who assured him that will find a lasting place in the annals of war. there was “not the slightest sign” of an invasion within In Vessel of Sadness I tried to recapture the next four to six weeks. 4 See Martin Blumenson, Anzio: The Gamble that the essence of Anzio’s tragic moment of Failed (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963). time; of General Lucas I wrote: 5 Quoted by Carlo D’Este, Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome (New York, HarperCollins, 1991), An old General going back p. 62. The original source was Clark’s diary. God knows he’d tried, 6 According to Brigadier Strong, Shingle “could not A German lance broken, achieve a decisive success in the face of the opposition Massacre averted, the line held. that could be expected.” He indicated that its success relied on a breakthrough at Cassino which he thought But not victory. would not be obtained. See Sir Kenneth Strong, Intelli- Guns on the Alban hills gence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer Looking down on men in the mud. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), p. 125. The thrower thrown. 7 Admiral Sir John D. Cunningham, Allied Naval Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, stated, “You know, An old General going back, Prime Minister [Churchill], this operation is fraught with To hear them say: great risks.” Quoted by Carlo D’Este, Fatal Decision, p. 98, Why didn’t you get on the hills? from oral history interview of Lord Harding (Department They’d show him with colored pencils and flags of Sound Records, Imperial War Museum). 8 What he should have done. The most recent assessments of the battle for Anzio are Carlo D’Este, Fatal Decision, and Dominic J. But it wasn’t like that. Caraccilo, “Assault on Anzio,” VFW, vol. 72, no. 5 (Jan- A band of steel, constant crisis, ditches full of uary 1994), pp. 14 and following. corpses, first tanks burned to a cinder. 9 William Woodruff, Vessel of Sadness, with a foreword by Martin Blumenson (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois Uni- versity Press, 1978; Washington: Brassey’s, forthcoming).

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to scenes connected with the artist’s experiences while on active duty with the Armed Forces.” This Soldier Art was the first time that a national magazine had taken an active part in promoting soldier art. In fact, of World War II Life had commissioned artists in 1941 to represent how America was By PETER HARRINGTON preparing for war. The artists involved were Tom Lea, Floyd Davis, Fletcher Martin, Byron Thomas, and Paul Sample. The subjects of Lea’s works, for instance, ranged from soldiers in training to scenes of North Atlantic naval patrols. full range of combat opera- Military pictures by other artists tions on land, at sea, and in such as Griffith Baily Coale of the the air. Navy and Barse Miller were also re- After the Japanese attack produced in Life. on Pearl Harbor thousands The first service art program of men enlisted in the was established by the Navy in Armed Forces, including September 1942 when Coale, many artists. Assigned to along with Dwight C. Shepler, camps and bases across the William F. Draper, Albert K. Nation they applied their tal- Murray, and Mitchell Jamieson, ents to painting murals were commissioned to “record dra- which transformed drab bar- matic incidents in combat areas.” racks, day rooms, mess halls, Within months the Army began to and service clubs. This sol- plan a similar program. In Novem- The Life Collection of World War II Art, U.S. Army Center of Military History War The Life Collection of World dier art was fostered by the ber the Corps of Engineers started Arawe, New Britain (December 1943) by David Fredenthal. Office of War Information’s to compile the names of those Bureau of Publications and Graph- artists deemed suitable to work in ics which issued a pamphlet enti- theater. This program, organized tled Interior Design and Soldier Art on under the auspices of the War De- how “to surround military person- partment Art Advisory Committee orld War II will go nel with a cheerful and attractive (WDAAC) to supervise war art into history more environment, reflecting the tradi- units, was “taken over” by leading “W vividly documented tions, accomplishments, and high artists and museum administrators than any other conflict.” So wrote standards of Army life.” Among its in 1943. The committee included Captain Edwin Taggert in 1946 in larger projects were those carried artists George Biddle and Henry describing the War Department’s out at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and Varnum Poor and the writer John “huge and still growing collection Keesler Field, Mississippi. Steinbeck, who suggested that of drawings, water-colors, and Interest in war-related art also writers accompany artists in the paintings depicting almost every took root outside the Armed field to describe events. Some 23 facet of the war.” On balance, the Forces. By February 1942 the Office soldier-artists and 19 civilian art collected by the various ser- of Emergency Management had or- artists were selected, and by early vices provides a detailed record of ganized an exhibit at the National May the first units were in the Pa- all theaters of the war as well as a Gallery in Washington in which cific and Alaska. Greeted with en- 2,582 works on the theme of war thusiasm by theater commanders, and defense were submitted by including Generals Eisenhower over a thousand artists. Soldier art and MacArthur, they started to Peter Harrington is curator of the Anne competitions were held around the document fighting as well as other S.K. Brown Military Collection at the Brown country and in April 1942 Life University Library and author of British Artists and War: The Face of Battle in magazine announced a competi- Paintings and Prints: 1700–1914. tion whose entries were to “relate

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aspects of military life, while on war while serving in units. One bonds. The competition closed in the home front WDAAC geared up joined Collier’s while others like August and its fruits were exhib- for exhibits and publications to Henry Varnum Poor just went ited in 24 cities beginning that au- showcase their work. Unfortu- home. Jack Levine spent 20 tumn. Life was not the only pri- nately, this enthusiasm was not months on Ascension Island with vate employer of wartime artists. shared by members of Congress Special Services as a sergeant re- Abbott Laboratories of Chicago, in who cut off funds for the program sponsible for movies and books. collaboration with the Office of effective August 31, 1943. None- Edward Reep no sooner arrived in the Surgeon General, commis- theless, the six-month program re- Algiers than he got orders from sioned 12 artists, including Robert sulted in 2,000 pieces of art repre- Eisenhower giving him command Benney, Howard Baer, and Joseph senting wartime activities around of five artists attached to Fifth Hirsch, to cover efforts of the the world. Army in North Africa and Italy. Army Medical Staff. Previously Ab- News of the cancellation of the Similarly, after the Southwest Pa- bott had contracted for several Army program was a devastating cific unit had been told of the end artists to depict naval aviation. blow to artists, many of whom did of the Army program, MacArthur On Pearl Harbor Day in 1960 not learn about it until late July, decided to keep the artists. Based Henry R. Luce gave the Life war art and triggered disparaging editorials in Manila, the unit was comprised collection to the Nation. Consist- in art journals. In “Congress Fum- of Frede Vidar, Sidney Simon, and ing of 1,058 paintings done by 27 bles the Ball” (The Art Digest, Barse Miller, who traversed the artists, it was valued at more than a August 1943), Peyton Boswell ad- Philippines, China, Japan, and million dollars. The collection was mitted that while no enemy soldier Korea. Other veterans of the 1943 added to paintings from other pro- had been killed by an artist’s brush, program, including Manuel grams and works commissioned by “it is also true that the country was Bromberg, Olin Dows, and Albert Abbott Labs. There are around in line to receive a lot of good art Gold, made up the nucleus of an 6,000 original pieces of art depict- reporting for its comparatively Army combat art program under ing World War II in the Army Art small outlay—paintings that would the Historical Branch, Assistant Collection today which is held by have constituted an irreplaceable Chief of Staff for Intelligence, au- the U.S. Army Center of Military pictorial history of the war.” thorized by Congress in 1944 after History, and the Navy Department In North Africa artists discov- the worth of soldier art had been has some 8,000 works. Although ered that George Biddle had de- revisited. They covered D-Day the Marine Corps did not have an camped for Sicily where he was en- preparations and the Normandy official art program, several artists joying a new role as a Life artist. invasion as well as the drive into were commissioned to paint com- The executive editor of Life, Daniel Germany and other operations. bat scenes. While some of this Longwell, had visited Assistant The program was terminated by work belongs to the Marine Corps Secretary of War John McCloy on the Military Appropriations Act Historical Center, a number of hearing of Congress’s decision and of 1945. artists retained their pictures. The offered to employ some artists. While some programs were Air Force art collection has the Seventeen civilian artists, includ- ended due to the liquidation of smallest graphic representation of ing David Fredenthal and Aaron the Section of Fine Arts in the the war since many paintings done Bohrod who had been in the Graphic Division of OWI, Con- by members of the Army Air Corps Pacific, were recruited on relatively gress could not stifle artistic cre- became part of the Army collec- cheap contracts by the magazine ativity, and war-inspired art ex- tion, though a number were later while the military provided their hibits continued to draw large transferred to the Air Force. transportation and billeting. Life’s crowds. In July 1943, 125 eye-wit- Overall these works provide action in effect saved the program ness war paintings done for Life vivid impressions of the millions and for two years these artists went on show at the Metropolitan of soldiers, sailors, marines, and produced an extensive assortment Museum of Art in New York prior airmen who we remember during of paintings and drawings at the to a national tour. Earlier a war- this 50th anniversary of the end of front. Only one artist, Lucien time organization of art groups, World War II. JFQ Labaudt, was lost when his plane Artists for Victory, Inc., announced crashed en route to China in a contest entitled “America in the late 1944. War” in which artists could com- For artists not hired by Life pete for prizes of $800 in war there were alternatives, and several Convoy by Ben Oda. continued to create images of the U.S. Army Center of Military History

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France, 1917.

The Future of U.S. U.S. Army Military History Institute Overseas Presence By DAVID S. YOST

he future of U.S. overseas military presence cannot be properly assessed without going back to first principles. It is essential to examine the historical pattern and purposes of presence; domestic economic and political factors likely to affect overseas com- Tmitments; the future security environment, including possible requirements for U.S. action; the changing nature of warfare; and the basic choices that we will face as our policies stop coasting on the residual inertia of the immediate post-Cold War era. These choices will ultimately concern how to conduct sensible policies and strategies within a broad approach of overseas engagement. This article argues that disengagement could not satisfy U.S. national security objectives. If the United States is to be guided by a prudent assessment of its strategic position, it must accept responsibilities for continuing engagement in the management of international security affairs. Moreover, it is urgent to place the debate on overseas presence in a broad, long-term context. Some recent discussions of presence have been based on a short-term perspective—no more than a few years—and influenced by intra-alliance burden-sharing disputes or interservice competition for resources. Deci- sions on presence must be reached in light of larger choices about security commitments, economic interests, national purposes, and grand strategy.

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Historical Overview Britain and Germany. As a byproduct of the Prior to 1898, the Nation deployed al- war with Spain, Cuba in 1903 leased Guan- most no land forces in peacetime outside the tanamo Bay indefinitely. Also in 1903, territory that became the continental United Washington recognized the independence of States, except for token forces in Alaska after Panama and gained control of the Canal its purchase from Russia in 1867.1 For most Zone in perpetuity.4 of the 19th century, U.S. forces did not have The Spanish-American War was also sig- to go overseas to engage external presence nificant because it (and the Venezuelan challenges. Central preoccupations were eco- boundary crisis, 1895–96) inaugurated an era nomic progress, national cohesion, and con- of U.S. interventionism in Latin America. tinental expansion. The adversaries in ensur- President Theodore Roosevelt declared a ing freedom of navigation or realizing the “corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904 “manifest destiny” of the that asserted a national right to assume “an the main historic thrust of Nation included Britain, international police power” in “flagrant U.S. isolationism was to France, Spain, Mexico, and cases of...wrong-doing or impotence” in American Indian tribes. the Western Hemisphere. The United States keep clear of war in Europe Overseas military opera- intervened repeatedly in Cuba, Haiti, Mex- tions consisted primarily of ico, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. brief expeditionary actions in North Africa Some interventions were prolonged (for ex- and the Mediterranean, the Caribbean and ample, Haiti, 1915–34, and Nicaragua, Central America, and Asia. Some operations 1912–33, almost continuously). Franklin D. were small in scale but relatively prolonged Roosevelt’s noninterventionist “Good (for instance, the First Barbary War against Neighbor” policy in 1933 marked the end of Tripoli, 1801–05), while others had signifi- this phase. cant consequences (such as opening Japan The main historic thrust of U.S. isola- to international trade in 1853–54).2 tionism was to keep clear of war in Europe, a These operations were facilitated by policy that was sustained until World War I. naval detachments that cruised far from American forces were sent to Europe in North America almost continuously, such as 1917–18 for combat and post-war occupa- the Mediterranean (1801–07; 1815–61), Euro- tion duties (in Germany until 1923), and to pean (1865–1905), East India (1835–61), and Siberia and northern Russia for intervention Asiatic (1866–1902) squadrons. With a few (1918–20) in the Russian civil war. After exceptions (such as Yokohama, Nagasaki, these events associated with World War I, Hong Kong, Macao, Gibraltar, Port Mahon, however, overseas deployments of ground Spezia, and Villefranche), the Nation was re- forces were mainly limited to areas acquired luctant to establish depots or shore facilities or leased at the turn of the century. In 1939 abroad, and foreign ports were used on a about a quarter of the Army was assigned minimal basis. Navy policy called for em- outside the continental United States ploying floating storeships anchored at ren- (20,000 in Hawaii, 17,000 in the Panama dezvous points.3 Canal Zone, 4,000 in the Philippines, 900 in The turning point came in 1898, partly Puerto Rico, and 400 in Alaska) while the because of the annexation of Hawaii—the Navy was based at Guantanamo Bay, Samoa, treaty of 1887 had granted America the right Guam, Hawaii, the Canal Zone, the Virgin to establish a base at Pearl Harbor—and Islands, and the Philippines. The Navy regu- partly because of the Spanish-American War, larly cruised the international waters of the through which Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Caribbean and elsewhere, however, and the Philippines were acquired. Moreover, Amer- United States based troops and ships in ica obtained part of Samoa in 1899 from China (including gunboats on the Yangtze) continuously from 1912 to 1941. After Hitler’s Blitzkrieg victories in 1940 the United States reached agreements with David S. Yost teaches at the Naval Postgraduate Britain and other nations on bases overseas, School. He has been a fellow at the Woodrow Wil- including Newfoundland, Iceland, Green- son International Center for Scholars and visiting land, and Bermuda. Then, after entering professor at the École Militaire in Paris. World War II with the Japanese attack on

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Pearl Harbor in 1941, Washington acquired The overall force levels overseas nonetheless an array of overseas bases and facilities in remained remarkably consistent through the Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, 1980s, with a brief surge during the 1990–91 and Asia. Despite rapid post-war demobiliza- Persian Gulf War. tion, occupation kept U.S. forces in Europe The end of the Cold War in 1989–91 led and East Asia (especially in Austria, Ger- to substantial cutbacks in U.S. force structure many, Japan, and Korea) during the onset of and overseas deployments. The drawdown the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Crises has been most dramatic in Europe, where in Berlin, Greece, Iran, and Czechoslovakia, two-thirds of all the bases have been closed and the Korean War led to many U.S. com- and forces have been pared from 341,000 in mitments, which required retaining and up- 1989 to 109,000 in 1995. The reduced threat grading much of the World War II base and the sense of diminished need for over- structure. seas deployments seem to have encouraged By the eve of the Korean War in 1950, and justified withdrawals hastened by other the 12 million Americans who had been factors (for example, the departure from the under arms during World War II had been Philippines in 1991–92 after the unfavorable reduced to 953,000, with 328,000 overseas. votes in the Manila Senate and the eruption The latter included 122,000 in Europe, of Mount Pinatubo). 150,000 in Japan, and only 500 in South Historical Purposes Korea. (American and Soviet occupation The United States has deployed forces forces had been withdrawn from Korea by overseas for many purposes short of war. Prior mid-1949.) The Korean War resulted in a to World War II these included protecting huge expansion of the Armed Forces. The commerce and trade routes, deterring and highest level of U.S. military strength (and punishing piracy, enhancing prestige, culti- overseas deployments) during the war came vating relations with foreign governments, in 1953, when the combat stopped. As restoring order, guaranteeing the collection of shown in the accompanying chart, overseas debts, and defending American citizens and deployments remained relatively high in the interests during regional upheavals. 1950s and 1960s, with a quarter to a third of The primary justification for FDR’s first all active forces serving in some 35 coun- base accords in 1940 was U.S. forward de- tries, mainly in Europe and East Asia. fense. Overseas deployments can provide The decline in overseas bases and force early warning of aggressive actions and fur- levels began in the late 1960s. The causes in- nish opportunities for prompt response and cluded technical factors—for instance, im- defense in depth. Moreover, they facilitate provements in command, control, commu- the organization of coalitions for collective nications, and intelligence; the shift from defense against aggression and multilateral medium-range B–47s to long-range B–52s; enforcement of international law. Another and increased numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs purpose has thus been post-war occupation for strategic nuclear deterrence—as well as to enforce peace settlements, including dis- political events in France, Okinawa, Libya, armament and political reeducation (as in and Vietnam. As the chart shows, substan- Austria, Germany, Japan, and Korea follow- tially fewer personnel served at home or ing World War II). The restrictions on Iraq abroad after the Vietnam War. Various fac- since the Gulf War—including those en- tors explain this decline, including the em- forced under Provide Comfort and Southern phasis of the Nixon Doctrine on more bal- Watch—offer a contemporary example of ef- anced burden-sharing in alliance relations, forts to uphold a peace settlement. reduced defense spending, and the move to Owing in part to its interest in deter- the all-volunteer force (which created a ring—and, if necessary, fighting—adversaries smaller, costlier personnel system). The far from North America, the United States 1970s saw further reductions, with partial has made numerous security commitments. disengagement (Spain, Thailand, and the Its forces have thus helped protect host Philippines) or total withdrawal (Morocco). countries against coercion or aggression, as well as allies without a continuing military presence such as Norway, Denmark, and

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Active Duty Military Strength, 1953–94 (in thousands)

4000

3500 Total Strength 3000

2500 U.S.–Based 2000

1500 Total Deployed Overseas 1000

500 Europe East Asia 0 1960 1970 1980 1990

Source: Department of Defense, Worldwide Manpower Distribution By Geographical Area (1953–94; various reports).

France. The United States has given credibil- joint and multinational training in specific ity to security commitments by placing climate or terrain conditions and combat these forces (and, in many cases, accompa- zones; and facilities for maintaining and nying dependents) at risk overseas. protecting air and sea lines of communica- In backing its commitments with forces tion and for ensuring orderly air and mar- abroad, the United States has reassured na- itime traffic control and freedom of naviga- tions that might otherwise seek nuclear tion in international waters and straits. weapons or other exceptional capabilities. Since the late 1980s overseas presence Overseas presence has thus supported non- has also become a major element in opera- proliferation. Besides, it has—by making po- tions other than war—peace operations, em- litical will manifest—contributed to broad bargoes, no-fly-zone enforcement, nation- goals of deterrence, war-prevention, political building, arms control, democratization, and economic stabilization, and influence in civil-military education, et al. Special opera- regional balance of power configurations tions forces, moreover, participate in unobtru- across Europe, East Asia, and the greater sive foreign internal defense programs that Middle East. These purposes support larger protect societies from anarchy, subversion, goals, such as supplying an enduring frame- and insurgency, and that promote human work of confidence for trade and (at least in rights and civilian control of the military. some regions) democratization efforts. U.S. forces were deployed at their high- Moreover, bases in Europe and East Asia est levels after World War II in three con- have provided essential logistical support for flicts—the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf Wars. forces operating far beyond the host coun- In situations short of actual combat during tries, as in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. the Cold War, the largest concentrations Overseas presence has also offered: means to were in Europe, particularly Germany. This cultivate relationships with foreign govern- was understandable, given that the bulk of ments to improve prospects for U.S. access Soviet military power was in Europe, includ- to key facilities during crises; resources for ing Russia west of the Urals, with the best- exercises and other bi- and multinational ac- equipped forces massed in Germany. In view tivities (including foreign military sales) that maintain interoperability; opportunities for

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of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Frank amendment was noteworthy. It called withdrawal of former Soviet forces from for reducing authorized end strength for Central and Eastern Europe, the continuing NATO Europe unless host nations paid 75 shift in U.S. overseas commerce from a percent of nonpersonnel costs (on the model transatlantic to a transpacific emphasis, the of the agreement with Tokyo). Without the increase in military and economic potential compliance of our allies, the amendment in Asia (notably in Japan, would have cut strength to 25,000 personnel China, and India), and the in Europe and reduced end strength world- economic and demographic dangerous situation in wide. The Frank amendment was approved trends will constrain the Korea, the continued con- in the House by a vote of 268 to 144, and ar- capacity to maintain centration of U.S. forces in guments in its favor were essentially eco- Asia might appear more nomic—equity in burden-sharing, deficit re- forces abroad likely than the retention of duction, and economic competitiveness.6 significant force levels in Economic arguments and domestic pre- Europe. But the Gulf War and subsequent occupations take on greater political signifi- events have shown a continuing interest in cance at times when no serious threat is on Middle East oil. The political obstacles to the horizon. The sense of a challenge to vital prepositioning equipment and basing forces U.S. interests that justified an extensive in large numbers in this region constitute overseas presence during the Cold War one of the many arguments for sustaining seems to be in decline. The lack of a galva- the U.S. military presence in Europe. nizing ideological as well as military threat to NATO or world security has raised doubts Domestic Factors in the minds of many Americans about the Economic and demographic trends will need for much of the remaining overseas constrain U.S. defense spending and the ca- presence. pacity to maintain a large defense establish- A recent survey of American elites found ment, including forces abroad. It will proba- that “almost half of the Influentials would bly be hard to arrest the continuing decline keep U.S. troop strength in Europe at the in defense spending underway since 1985 100,000-man level....More than one- for several reasons: pressures to reduce the third...would cut significantly below the deficit; possible tax cuts (or at least a reluc- 100,000-man level, however, and more than tance in Congress and the White House to one in ten favor bringing the U.S. force home raise taxes); and growth in entitlements (So- entirely.” In contrast, the survey reported “a cial Security, Medicare, et al.) and interest strong two-thirds majority ...favored keep- payments on the deficit. These payments ing U.S. troop strength in South Korea...at will be about $257 billion in FY96 (16 per- 39,000 men.” 7 cent of the Federal budget), and almost The same survey found noteworthy dif- equal to defense spending ($262 billion). ferences between U.S. elites and the general Medicare and Medicaid will total $271 bil- public in foreign policy priorities and with lion while Social Security will amount to regard to the possible use of force: $351 billion. Some project that spending on Medicare and Medicaid will grow at a 7 per- The Influentials were clearly prepared to send Ameri- cent annual rate in real terms in 1995–2000, can fighting men to honor long-standing U.S. commit- in part because of increased demand due to ments and protect vital interests. By margins of about two-thirds or more, they would support the use of the continued growth of the elderly popula- American forces to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraq, tion. During 1983–93, defense spending fell South Korea against North Korea, and Israel against from 6.3 percent to 4.7 percent of GNP, and Arab invaders....Compared to the Influentials, the it is expected to decline further.5 public appeared willing to go to war for almost no- In this budgetary context (absent a body. The exception was to fight Iraq (53 percent ap- major international crisis), decisionmakers prove, 40 against)....The public was strongly may perceive financial incentives to further against fighting on behalf of South Korea (63 percent reduce deployments overseas or to demand versus 31 percent), and marginally against fighting more host nation support from foreign gov- for Israel (48 percent versus 45 percent).8 ernments. In this regard the debate in the House of Representatives in 1994 on the

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At both the elite and popular levels, the deter- Osan Air Base, Korea. mination to exercise greater caution and selectivity in accepting security commitments ) overseas—even of a limited and humanitarian e nature—appears to have grown, especially Jim Steel 9 ( after the 1992–94 Somalia intervention. ce Americans looking for rationales to cut

overseas commitments have found inspira- U.S. Air For tion in the long history of U.S. isolationism. Macedonia. Some cite John Quincy Adams: “America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.” 10 Indeed, George F. Kennan, the author of the famous “X” article on containment which appeared in 1947, has argued that the principles outlined by Adams are relevant today. Kennan now advocates a “principle of nonintervention” and Combat Camera Imagery (Efrain Gonzalez) suggests that “The best way for a larger country to help smaller ones abroad may make it more costly and difficult is surely by the power of example.” 11 Others for the United States to maintain bases, facil- propose disengaging from Cold War security ities, and burden-sharing and host-nation commitments and exercising greater restraint support arrangements in specific countries in intervening or assuming obligations over- and regions. In a number of nations there seas,12 adding to the plurality of viewpoints seems to be a growing sentiment that for- on U.S. international security policy. eign bases amount to a derogation of sovereignty, and sometimes anti-Western or anti- The Future Security Environment American feelings are concentrated against The increasing caution about overseas such installations. There is no longer a con- commitments has also stemmed from a vincing Soviet threat to persuade host gov- resurgence of ethnic conflicts in Europe, ernments to put up with a politically sensi- Africa, the former Soviet Union, and else- tive U.S. military presence. where—complex, intractable, age-old an- Moreover, it became apparent in the tipathies that seem impossible for outsiders 1970s and 1980s—particularly in Spain, to resolve at a reasonable cost and that do Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Japan—that not appear to involve vital American inter- greater consensus, coordination, and com- ests. The potential security environment, in- bined action would be needed for the United cluding possible requirements for U.S. mili- States to be able to use the facilities. The tary action, is nonetheless far more complex obligation to get permission from a foreign than this general impression. country before taking military action has To begin with, overseas bases may not seemed irksome to some American officials be as readily available as they were during the Cold War. Political and social trends

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and members of Congress and has reinforced decline of the nation-state and underesti- interest in disengagement, unilateralism, mating the prospect for large-scale power and autonomous military capabilities less competitions and conflicts in coming dependent on foreign facilities. Specific cases decades.13 differ, however. The desirability of U.S. pres- A recent book by Max Singer and Aaron ence for general regional stability or imme- Wildavsky contains a useful point of depar- diate security needs may be rapidly re- ture for thinking about the international sit- assessed, depending on circumstances. Base uation at hand. They contend that the in- access may be directly related to the degree dustrial democracies of North America, of perceived threat and consequent need for Western Europe, East Asia, and the South Pa- help. For example, Iraq’s action in August cific constitute “zones of peace,” with politi- 1990 led to a prompt revision of Saudi poli- cal systems favoring compromise, tolerance, cies on foreign military presence. Since the consensus-building, and power-sharing. The Gulf War some U.S. equipment has been rest of the world consists mostly of “zones of prepositioned in Kuwait, complementing fa- turmoil,” burdened by poverty and either ac- cilities in Oman, Bahrain, and elsewhere. tual or latent ethno-national struggles. Al- In surveying probable sources and types though the industrial democracies are eco- of conflict—challenges for overseas presence nomic competitors and often differ over and power-projection capabilities—it is use- how to deal with conflicts in the “zones of ful to consider a range of scenarios and criti- turmoil,” and although some assert national cally evaluate forecasts about the future se- autonomy on a Gaullist model, there is no curity environment. For example, Robert prospect of armed conflict among them in Kaplan’s provocative article, “The Coming the foreseeable future.14 Anarchy,” draws on Martin van Creveld’s This study may nonetheless understate The Transformation of War, and both are sub- the importance of continuing U.S. engage- ject to the same criticisms: overstating the

Major Active Air Unit Locations (as of June 30, 1994)

Source: Armed Forces Information Service, Defense 94 Almanac.

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ment for political stabilization in Europe Some speculation has focused on the and East Asia and the vast differences be- possibility of facing new military peer com- tween the regions. East Asia lacks institu- petitors. Owing to its rapid economic tions comparable to NATO, the European growth—according to some, its GNP could Union, and Organization for Security and exceed our own in 25 years—China is seen Cooperation in Europe. as a potential military peer competitor of the the potential for large-scale Democratic institutions United States if it can avoid civil war and conflict in Europe should not are, for the most part, less maintain its cohesion. Speculative long-term firmly established. The analyses have also mentioned Russia under be underestimated economic dynamism of dictatorship, Japan after events such as Ko- specific rising powers is rean unification and U.S. disengagement, such that—given the unresolved territorial and even India if it could gain greater politi- disputes and historical grievances—the re- cal and social cohesion. Even if they did not gion seems much more “ripe for rivalry” become peer competitors, some observers than Europe. According to Aaron Friedberg, suggest, such countries might become “While civil wars and ethnic strife will con- “niche competitors” with substantial capa- tinue for some time to smolder along Eu- bilities in certain areas—for instance, land- rope’s peripheries, in the long run it is Asia based sea control—or, at least, sea denial (to that seems far more likely to be the cockpit counter foreign naval forces in littoral areas). of great power conflict.” 15 The Changing Nature of Warfare The potential for large-scale conflict in New methods of combat could well alter Europe should not be underestimated, how- overseas presence requirements, especially if ever. Though clashes in the former Yu- a revolution in military affairs (RMA) is un- goslavia and the Caucasus have been con- derway or imminent. Although various defi- tained so far, both could lead to wider wars nitions of the concept are in circulation, it is with greater involvement by external powers, generally agreed that an RMA requires the including Islamic countries. Russia could pre- combination of advanced weapons and asso- sent greater uncertainties, owing in part to ciated systems based on new technologies, the risk that democratization efforts could innovative operational concepts, and astute fail and the Russian federation could break organizational adaptations. The result of apart. Anarchy and civil war, or confronta- such a revolution is a basic change in the tions with states such as Ukraine, could draw character and conduct of operations, with in other powers and result in major conflicts. substantially increased combat effectiveness. Long-term assessments of the interna- Specialists do not agree on the identifi- tional scene should take other risks into ac- cation of previous RMAs but offer examples count. For example, a depression could lead such as the standardization of parts for large- to a sharper decline in U.S. defense spending scale arms production, plus mass conscrip- as well as overseas presence and engage- tion (1789–1815); the railroad, telegraph, ment, in conjunction with a rise in protec- and rifled weaponry (1850–71); and the in- tionism and the formation of antagonistic ternal combustion engine, aircraft, radio, trading blocs, even within supposed “zones radar, carrier air, and strategic bombing of peace.” Anti-Western as well as anti-U.S. (World Wars I and II). During the interwar ideologies vehemently articulated in some period Germany was the most farsighted and Islamic and East Asian circles could give new adept in preparing for land warfare, includ- purposes to those bent on the acquisition of ing coordinating airpower for ground sup- weapons of mass destruction—leaders who port, while Japan and the United States both seem to be motivated mainly by regional exploited carrier aviation and developed ambitions and insecurities. Relatively fragile concepts and organizations for long-distance communications and energy infrastructures operations and amphibious attacks. in America as well as other advanced soci- If a new RMA is at hand, it may be based on eties in zones of peace could become targets advances in at least three areas of technology: for adversaries from zones of turmoil, risks that could be incentives for closer coopera- ▼ information systems to gather, process, tion—and continued U.S. engagement and and disseminate data about targets and plans as overseas presence.

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well as to deny data to an enemy and thus create armed with long-range precision-guided mis- an “information gap” or “information dominance” siles and other strike systems that would ▼ extended-range, highly accurate conven- imply a drastically reduced need for a huge tional munitions logistical infrastructure ashore, with reloads, ▼ simulations techniques to train forces and personnel support facilities, and so forth. develop new capabilities and operational con- Mobility, dispersion, deception, stealth, cepts. It is generally agreed that such a revolution might have greater effects on mid- to high-inten- electronic warfare, and active defenses might sity conventional warfare than on low-intensity be better sources of protection—and wiser conflicts or “operations other than war,” and that investments—than costly permanent instal- mastering the new capabilities (with the requisite lations. It might be desirable to increase in- new organizations and operational concepts) vestment in maritime prepositioning and to could take twenty to fifty years.16 investigate the potential merits of dispersed, Changes foreseen by current assessments “transitory,” low-cost facilities as well as the of a new RMA remain to be demonstrated, sustainability of defenses for a smaller num- and some observers have reservations about ber of permanent bases. Overall, changes in these assessments.17 If such a revolution was high-intensity conflict may imply reduced realized, it would put a high premium on needs for forward bases and prepositioning jointness—that is, a closer integration of ca- ashore but call for maintaining access to for- pabilities to exploit infor- eign-operated facilities. Low-intensity con- changes in high-intensity mation and long-range pre- flict, crisis management, and overseas presence activities comparable to those in recent conflict may imply reduced cision-strike systems in virtually simultaneous and years might, however, be conducted with as- need for forward bases multidimensional land, sea, sets little different from those today. Re- air, and space operations. quirements for temporary but prolonged Operational and organizational innovations overseas basing in support of specific opera- could include improved forces dedicated to tions might also emerge. strategic mobility, information dominance, Even with a new RMA, some continuing space control, forcible entry, long-range pre- purposes of overseas presence will require cision attacks, air superiority, and strategic forces abroad, on land or at sea—for in- and theater defense. stance, to maintain relations with foreign Some implications for overseas presence governments and militaries, partly to im- would flow from the probability that an prove prospects for access to facilities; enemy might also obtain new capabilities. In demonstrate security commitments; and that event, perhaps in 2015–20, preposi- support broader missions such as political tioned equipment, ports, airfields, ammuni- stabilization, deterrence, and war-prevention stockpiles, and infrastructure could be- tion. But presence will probably continue to come large fixed targets, highly vulnerable decline from Cold War levels for political, to long-range precision-strike attacks. Some economic, and military-technical reasons, speculate that an enemy with extensive sur- perhaps without clear-cut strategic decisions veillance and target-acquisition capabilities in the near term. might monitor the oceans far offshore and Grand Strategy Choices make U.S. carriers vulnerable to precision- Although deliberate decisions about guided missiles in some situations.18 overseas deployments and security commit- In other words, future planners may find ments may be evaded or postponed, the incentives to cut forces overseas, including United States will eventually face fundamen- naval forces in littoral areas, to lessen the risk tal choices. It will not be possible to coast in- of losses in preemptive attacks. Alternatively, definitely on the inertia of the immediate to operate in range of enemy strike systems, post-Cold War era, cutting forces and spend- U.S. forces might need improved mobility, ing on a percentage basis while trying to re- stealth, deception, and active defenses—and tain all the essential elements of past policies. enhanced means of preemptively neutraliz- It was pointed out in 1986 that World ing surveillance, command and control, and War II and subsequent Cold War commit- strike systems. Some envisage arsenal ships ments put the United States “in an unprecedented position of geopolitical extension,”

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continuing engagement.” Three approaches have been available: ▼ an “explicitly imperial” rationale—glory, economic gain, even a “civilizing mission” ▼ power politics—preserving a favorable balance of power and securing national interests ▼ ideology—America’s duty “to oppose an inimical political creed or to promulgate its own beliefs.” Except for the era of the Spanish-Ameri- can War, Friedberg observed, Americans have been reluctant to see their nation as an imperial power. A combination of power politics and ideology has usually provided the rationale for involvement in war and . Call) overseas commitments in this century.22 The argument can be made that U.S. security commitments and military presence in Europe and East Asia help to prevent local U.S. Navy (Franklin P USS Shreveport, arms races and power competitions and thus Norway. diminish the risks of war. The political stabi- with virtually global deployments. This posi- lization function may, however, become less tion is difficult to maintain on logistical and less credible in domestic politics. In ef- grounds, given the need to protect sea and fect, the argument is that U.S. involvement air lines of communication, overseas bases, helps to prevent or postpone arms competi- and related assets; costly to sustain because tions and conflicts between major powers in of the expense of overseas basing, reinforce- Eurasia. Ultimately, such wars may take ment capabilities, extended deterrence, C3I, place—perhaps in fifty or a hundred years. and support facilities; and dangerous to re- American politicians and commentators tain, in that overseas commitments imply may ask whether lessening the possibility of the risk of being drawn into foreign wars, in- such major-power regional wars is worth the cluding nuclear conflicts.19 expense and security risks involved. It was also pointed out in 1986 that Such questions draw attention to the “Virtually the only way in which this coun- crossroads America faces. As Friedberg asked try is ever likely to become involved in a nu- in 1986: clear conflict would be in support of one of How could the case for continuing U.S. engagement the overseas commitments which we took best be made?...Presumably the truest, and one on forty years ago. If avoiding nuclear war hopes therefore the most persuasive, argument will in- were the sole objective of our foreign policy, volve again a blending of ideology (both positive and the critical first step would undoubtedly be negative) and power politics. Perhaps it will also have to withdraw from these responsibilities and to include an appeal from necessity, which has a to bring our forces home.” 20 Exactly this sort somewhat unfamiliar ring to American ears. However of argument for disengagement is now made difficult the course on which we embarked forty years in some circles, justified not only by the end ago and however distant its end, the alternatives to it 23 of the Cold War but also by increased risks are all likely to be far worse. of nuclear proliferation.21 Engagement versus Disengagement Aaron Friedberg suggested that Amer- In broad terms the Nation faces a choice ica’s unprecedented overseas engagements between continuing engagement and disen- would be “hard to justify over time to a gagement. As the figure suggests, continuing democratic polity,” given its isolationist tra- engagement would imply an enduring and ditions. As a result, U.S. policymakers have central U.S. role in meeting challenges to in- had to provide justifications for the “effort, ternational security. The United States would expense, and danger of intervention and

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Engagement versus Disengagement

Continuing Engagement Disengagement

Basic U.S. Role Remain at center of international security Concentrate on immediate security needs management efforts

U.S. Posture Overseas Provide extended deterrence and other types of Withdraw from extended deterrence and cut protection and support (including intelligence) other security commitments and partnership to allies and key security partners activities (including intelligence-sharing)

Near-Term Costs The more difficult course to pursue politically, Perhaps the course of least resistance in owing to domestic priorities and the short-term domestic politics—less costly in the near analysis tendency in U.S. politics term, with fewer immediate risks

Long-Term Implications Lower probability of regional conflicts among Higher probability of major-power regional major powers, but continued immediate risks conflicts owing to renationalization and greater multipolarity, and more nuclear proliferation, with the risk of the United States being drawn into war on unfavorable terms

thus maintain extended deterrence and other If I look at Germany or ...Japan, I see two nations protection and support to key allies and secu- that I hope will continue to be close allies of the rity partners, and corresponding capabilities United States....I would think [that] if the United including global surveillance and power-pro- States cuts back so much that all we can do and all jection assets. This would represent a more we can talk about is defending the continental United States, we’ll create an incentive for other nations that difficult course in U.S. domestic politics, be- do not now feel the need to develop their own nuclear cause it would involve a higher level of im- arsenals to do so.24 mediate costs and risks. But it might substantially reduce prospects for major-power Similarly, shortly before joining the regional confrontations and thus markedly Clinton administration, Walter Slocombe, lessen long-term costs and risks. The alterna- who currently serves as the Under Secretary tive of disengagement would be less costly in of Defense for Policy, wrote: the near term, after the United States ab- A unified Germany would not readily rely indefinitely sorbed the initial cost of withdrawing and on a British or French deterrent. The practical issue, disbanding forces, transporting and storing therefore, is whether there will be U.S. nuclear weapons equipment, and closing bases. But disengage- in Europe—or German ones. So long as there is a reluc- ment could radically increase long-term risks. tance to see German nuclear weapons, there will be a strong case for an American nuclear guarantee made Long-standing alliances could break down, manifest by the presence of nuclear weapons nearby.25 perhaps in a surprisingly rapid “renationalization” of defense policies; regional power In February 1995, Joseph Nye, Assistant vacuums and arms competitions could Secretary of Defense for International Secu- emerge; nuclear proliferation could acceler- rity Affairs, indicated that one of the pur- ate; and power configurations unfavorable to poses of forward presence in the Asia-Pacific U.S. security interests could arise. region is to “discourage the emergence of a Some prominent Americans have under- regional hegemon,” adding that “[the] scored the U.S. role as a guarantor and stabi- United States has the capability, credibility, lizer to prevent unwanted outcomes. For ex- and even-handedness to play the ‘honest ample, in August 1991, after the attempted broker’ among nervous neighbors, historical coup in Moscow, Secretary of Defense Dick enemies, and potential antagonists.” 26 Cheney warned that disengaging from our alliance commitments could cause destabi- lization by encouraging nuclear proliferation:

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One must distinguish between different partners; arms competitions, wars, and other models of disengagement and various out- struggles among regional powers do not en- comes of reduced involvement in Eurasian gage vital national interests; peace is “divisi- power configurations. What might the U.S. ble,” contrary to the rhetoric of those who military posture look like under a disengage- would entangle the United States in the ment approach that was nonetheless oriented Eurasian balance of power; and America can to defending immediate and longer-range se- best serve democracy by minding its own curity interests? The defensive perimeter business, addressing its domestic problems, would naturally include Alaska, Hawaii, and and serving as a good example. U.S. territories in the Pacific and the Such arguments may gain political po- Caribbean and might extend to the mid-At- tency and should not be dismissed as short- lantic and the northern part of South Amer- sighted or as half-truths without due analy- ica, to protect access to Venezuelan oil. In- sis. The military posture and national vestments in intelligence, space, ballistic security strategy postulated under either a missile and air defenses, and nuclear forces partial or comprehensive disengagement ap- would have to continue and perhaps be in- pear, however, to pose greater long-term creased to compensate for greater instabilities risks than being immediately engaged and and risks in key regions. well-positioned to shape the international the damaging consequences America would still need security scene. The damaging consequences of disengagement might take airlift, sealift, maritime of disengagement might take years to de- prepositioning, power velop, but there can be little doubt about years to develop projection, and interven- their nature. Crisis response actions and tionary capabilities that, overseas commitments and deployments are in turn, might need to be improved to com- scrutinized abroad for signals of the risks pensate for a lack of forces, equipment, and that America is prepared to accept and the installations prepositioned forward ashore. It behavior that it is likely to oppose. U.S. dis- is not clear whether the financial savings engagement could be destabilizing because would be significant in relation to the in- some nations might seek to acquire new ca- creased risks to national interests, such as pabilities (including nuclear arms) and es- overseas allies, economic and security part- tablish new coalitions to substitute for partners, and key resources—to say nothing of nership with the United States. the greater potential for major-power regional Fundamental choices are involved: To rivalries and wars, absent the U.S. engage- what extent can the United States sustain ment as a stabilizer and balancer. over the long term the task of serving as a While disengagement options would re- central leader in world security management, quire extensive analysis, one might also pos- one of the strongest guardians of interna- tulate a comprehensive disengagement rather tional order in the U.N. Security Council, than a partial disengagement as outlined and a key stabilizer and balancer inhibiting above. This would imply a far smaller mili- new major-power regional rivalries and con- tary establishment; a defensive perimeter flicts? The limits to America’s resources and limited to territorial possessions; continued the nature of its interests argue for interna- or increased investments in intelligence, tional engagement, renewing the key al- space, ballistic missile defense, air defense, liances, and pursuing skillful, long-term ef- and nuclear forces; and greatly reduced air- forts to maintain alliance cohesion and lift, sealift, power-projection, and interven- military interoperability and effectiveness. tionary capabilities. In this hypothesis, a For its own security, the Nation must pro- withdrawal from the greater Middle East mote an international security environment might be justified by the emergence of hy- which is pervaded by confidence in its mili- drogen fuels or other substitutes for oil, new tary credibility and in America’s political oil deposits, and greater conservation mea- sagacity and staying power. sures. More generally, the advocates of a U.S. withdrawal from Europe, East Asia, and the The United States should be resolute in Middle East might appeal to arguments such upholding its commitments to key security as the following: commerce will continue in partners. Backed by overseas presence and the economic self-interest of the trading

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other capabilities, these commitments con- amendment goal to have our European allies pay at least tribute to a structure of stability and order 37.5 percent of the stationing costs by that date was (albeit imperfect). This structure will be nec- adopted by the conference committee. 7 Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, essary, for the foreseeable future, to promote America’s Place in the World: An Investigation of the Atti- vitality in the world economy, sustain demo- tudes of American Opinion Leaders and the American Public cratic reform, organize collective action about International Affairs (Washington: Times Mirror against aggression and other threats (such as Company, November 1993), pp. 37–38. 8 the proliferation of weapons of mass de- Ibid., pp. 24, 26. 9 See, among other sources, Andrew Kohut and struction), and ensure America’s own secu- Robert C. Toth, “Arms and the People,” Foreign Affairs, rity and prosperity. Uncertainty about our vol. 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994), pp. 47–61. political will and priorities over the long 10 John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, ad- term can only be addressed through persua- dress on July 4, 1823, cited in George F. Kennan, “On sive and steadfast leadership. Doubts about American Principles,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995), p. 118. the wisdom of continuing our overseas en- 11 Kennan, ibid., pp. 123, 125. gagement would, of course, be compounded 12 See, for example, Ronald Steel, Temptations of a Su- by political and strategic blunders. Hence, perpower (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). perhaps even more than in the past, U.S. 13 Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic leaders will have incentives to cultivate dis- Monthly, vol. 273, no. 2 (February 1994), pp. 44–76; Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New cernment and to exercise selectivity in the York: The Free Press, 1991). face of specific military challenges. JFQ 14 Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil (Chatham, N.J.: NOTES Chatham House Publishers, 1993). 15 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for 1 Special thanks are owed to members of the over- Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International Security, vol. seas presence working group sponsored by the Institute 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/1994), p. 7. for Joint Warfare Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate 16 For background, see James R. FitzSimonds and Jan School. The historical section benefitted greatly from M. van Tol, “Revolutions in Military Affairs,” Joint Force the advice of Frank Schubert, Joint History Office, Of- Quarterly, no. 4 (Spring 1994); Andrew F. Krepinevich, fice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Among “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolu- the best sources on overseas presence are George Stam- tions,” The National Interest, no. 37 (Fall 1994), pp. buk, American Military Forces Abroad (Columbus: The 30–42; and testimony presented by Andrew F. Kre- Ohio State University Press, 1963) and Robert E. pinevich and Andrew W. Marshall before the Subcom- Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The mittee on Acquisition and Technology, Senate Armed Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Services Committee, May 5, 1995. Press, 1982). 17 A.J. Bacevich, “Preserving the Well-Bred Horse,” 2 For background, see Ellen C. Collier, ed., Instances The National Interest, no. 37 (Fall 1994), pp. 43–49; and of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798–1989 Carl H. Builder, “Looking in All the Wrong Places?” (Washington: Congressional Research Service, Library of Armed Forces Journal International (May 1995). Congress, December 4, 1989). 18 Barbara Opall, “China Sinks U.S. in Simulated 3 Paolo E. Coletta, ed., United States Navy and Marine War,” Defense News (January 30, 1995), pp. 1, 26. Corps Bases, Overseas (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 19 Aaron L. Friedberg, “America’s Strategic Position,” Press, 1985), pp. 115–21, 202–06. Parameters, vol. 16, no. 4 (Winter 1986), pp. 30–36. 4 This arrangement was modified by treaty in 1978. 20 Ibid., p. 36. The United States agreed to withdraw all its forces by 21 See, for example, Ted Galen Carpenter, “Closing the end of the century, but with (1) a permanent right the Nuclear Umbrella,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 2 to return to defend the canal against any external threat (March/April 1994), pp. 8–13. to its neutral service to the ships of all nations and (2) a 22 Friedberg, “America’s Strategic Position,” pp. 36–38. guarantee that U.S. warships would have a right to ex- 23 Ibid., p. 38. peditious passage in emergencies. 24 Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, address 5 The data in the last sentence of this paragraph to the American Political Science Association, August may be found in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 29, 1991, p. 8–1 of text furnished by the Department Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, of Defense. 1993–1994 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 25 Walter B. Slocombe, “The Future of U.S. Nuclear February 1995), p. 87. The Office of Management and Weapons in a Restructured World,” in Patrick J. Garrity Budget furnished the rest of the data in this paragraph. and Steven A. Maarenen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in the 6 Congressional Record (May 19, 1994), pp. H3736–46. Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia, and North No comparable amendment was passed in the Senate. In America (New York: Plenum Press, 1992), p. 63. August 1994 the House-Senate conference committee 26 U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security approved a defense authorization bill for FY95 that sub- Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (Washington: Of- stantially qualified the Frank amendment. The level of fice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna- roughly 100,000 as the authorized end strength for Eu- tional Security Affairs, February 1995), p. 23. rope was retained for the end of FY96; but the Frank

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merica maintained an unprece- 340,000 in 1989 to under 100,000 today. On the other hand, naval

dented level of its military commentary strength overseas for over forty presence remains about the same as years—from a quarter to a third it was during the Cold War, just ofA the Armed Forces. The primary purpose under 100,000. Why? While the cer- was to contain the Soviet Union. This ration- tain threat went away, the uncertain ones ale is now gone leaving defense intellectuals did not. to debate how to protect our interests in a Now an intense competition for renew era. The naval camp contends it can be sources among the services prompts the achieved by forward presence—keeping some question: does the systematic naval presence combat forces abroad. The continental camp stay or does it go? The new Air Force white argues that it can be accomplished with vir- paper Global Presence (published in the last tual presence—forces based in the United issue of JFQ) proposes replacing “the cop on States but capable of rapidly responding to the beat” with virtual presence, satellite cov- overseas crises. This is the difference between erage of key areas backed by CONUS-based being engaged on the world scene and a re- bombers and troop transports responding on turn to Fortress America. warning. Still others maintain that defense attachés, mobile training teams, and ground What Now? units deployed for allied exercises are an ef- Form follows function in overseas pres- fective overseas presence. In essence, these ence as elsewhere. That presence was struc- alternatives are all CONUS-based strategies tured to oppose a specific land power in the indicative of isolationism. Cold War, the Soviet Bloc. U.S. presence The more important question is what abroad during that period—excluding the does the Nation seek to achieve on the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars—averaged world scene? If we choose a strategy that is about half a million. Of those, almost not supportive of that, the costs could be 400,000 were Army and Air Force personnel higher than realized. who directly countered threats in Europe What was a by-product of the Cold War and Korea. Naval forces made up the bal- now becomes the primary reason for main- ance, supporting Europe and Korea on the taining forces overseas—a liberal world econ- maritime flanks. And they handled uncer- omy. It developed behind the walls of contain threats—some 80 percent of the crises tainment, with the oceans—under the aegis to which the Nation responded from 1945 of a forward Navy—as the unifying medium. to the end of the Cold War. As the Soviet North America, Western Europe, and East threat receded, so did land-based presence in Asia account for three-quarters of the gross Europe. Force levels there dropped from world product. Accordingly, the National Se- curity Strategy seeks enlargement, incorpo- Colonel James A. Lasswell, USMC, is Deputy Direc- rating Cold War outsiders in this economy, tor of the Plans Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations, on the premise that prosperity will bring re- at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. gional stability.

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The world economy that came out of when presence failed to deter Iraq, U.S. carri- the Cold War is vulnerable to post-Cold War ers covered the initial airlift to Saudi Arabia. disorder. Absent a threat, the international American presence is a critical thread community is becoming increasingly suscep- holding together an otherwise fragmenting tible to fragmentation. The symptoms are all world. Its interactions engage allies and too apparent: the proliferation of weapons friends in cooperative security efforts. When of mass destruction, rogue states, the rise of sustained over time, it builds interoperabil- national rivalries, deteriorating states, ethnic ity among forces. It sets the stage in crises unrest, and mass refugee migrations. The for successful coalitions which are ad hoc in world economic system is susceptible to dis- nature. Operation Desert Storm succeeded order as demonstrated by the 1987 Gulf largely because of four decades of allied Tanker War, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, work in NATO. Moreover, a credible Ameri- and the recent collapse of the Mexican peso. can combat presence provides a nucleus around which the forces from other nations Why Forward? can coalesce. U.S. military presence remains central to the regional stability on which the expan- Why Naval? sion and enlargement of the world economy Clearly, presence is critical to the security depends. A 1992 survey of American em- environment. But while many nations want bassies around the Mediterranean indicated the United States to remain in their region, unanimous agreement on the deterrent most do not want foreign troops on their soil value of our presence. East Asian nations even in times of crisis, as has been often want our presence for the same reason. seen. American presence will withdraw in- American presence deters since it represents creasingly from Eurasian shores to the decks the might of the only superpower. As Admi- of vessels operating in the Mediterranean, In- ral William A. Owens, USN—the Vice Chair- dian Ocean, and western Pacific. Naval man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—recently forces, which accounted for a fifth of our wrote, “Any potential opponent must as- overseas presence in the Cold War, are ex- sume that it cannot win a military con- pected to reach half after 2000. Future naval frontation with the United States.”1 presence will involve more than just crisis re- Overseas presence is sponse, which is how most people view it American presence is a critical real, as opposed to hy- today. As Owens notes, “Naval forces will in- thread holding together an pothetical, use of creasingly be seen as representative of the en- CONUS-based forces. tire range of U.S. military power.”2 otherwise fragmenting world “Any potential oppo- While naval presence may be out of nent of the United sight and mind for most Americans, its visi- States contemplating a fait accompli strat- bility to others means it plays a greater role egy,” Owens continues, “is likely to see in deterrence. As always, deterrence depends greater risk if U.S. forces are visibly present on an opponent receiving, understanding, than if they are not.” The initiative rests and heeding an intended signal. “We per- more with on-the-scene forces. They can ceived the U.S. Navy as more psychologi- readily influence events in contrast to the re- cally impressive,” a former Soviet admiral active nature of CONUS-based forces. And if stated, “since the U.S. Air Force maneuvers this forward presence fails to deter, it be- were not so obvious.”3 Conversely, the comes the “tip of the spear,” the enabler for British relied on overflights to demonstrate follow-on forces. their interest in the Falklands prior to the The efficacy of presence is readily appar- 1982 Argentine invasion. ent. Many nations in Asia want America to With the diffusion of nuclear power, for- remain the countervailing power in the face ward-deployed naval forces will be a more of an ascendant China. In the Mediter- credible deterrent. The threat posed by U.S. ranean, U.S. presence keeps rogue states such strategic weapons may be seen by lesser nu- as Libya in check. In addition, the rescue of clear states as too disproportionate to be noncombatants from Liberia in 1990 and, in credible. Accordingly, deterrence will shift particular, from Somalia in 1991 largely relied on the proximity of naval forces. And

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toward conventional weapons with greater This appears to have influenced y accuracy and lethality, launched by forward- Japan’s rejection of the Malaysian postured carrier air and Tomahawk land-at- proposal for a strictly Asian politi- r tack missiles.4 Deterrence may also depend cal-economic forum that excluded on ship-based theater missile defenses. the United States. But American mil- Engaging and enlarging cooperative se- itary withdrawal means removing a curity efforts will be done increasingly key incentive to discouraging the through naval presence. Their success in cri- formation of trading barriers and

sis depends on building confidence in mili- blocs. Consider the disintegration of enta tary capabilities, as well as interoperability, the world economy into trading beforehand. But many nations do not have blocs where competition might turn the domestic political capital to allow U.S. adversarial. m forces on their turf for exercises, not to men- Also consider a world without tion for operations. In the words of the Chief U.S. presence, one in which security of Naval Operations, “Naval overseas pres- concerns drive nations to acquire nu- m

ence may be the best way to establish mili- clear weapons. Asia is a prime exam- o tary-to-military relationships with many of ple. Faced with a nuclear-armed these new nations . . . they welcome the con- China, Japan would likely seek a nu- c tact with the United States but do not want clear arsenal if our presence was re- to be smothered by it.”5 Largely because of tracted. If Japan went nuclear, so this, the Navy participated in 163 combined could most of East Asia. Maintaining or aban- exercises involving 58 nations in 1994. doning overseas presence may mean the dif- The most unappreciated reason for ference between nuclear proliferation being naval presence is freedom of the seas. The constrained or unconstrained. Those who be- seas remain unrestricted to global trade and lieve presence can be provided with less than strategic mobility largely because of the credible combat power—such as mobile train- Navy. This is more than a nod to Mahan. ing teams or defense attachés—may find that Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of they have offered up hostages to hostile na- the Sea (LOS) regional waters are more mili- tions and groups. tarized and some 82 countries have claimed Overseas presence is the price a super- excessive territorial seas. Unless contested, power pays for doing business in a relatively these claims might be regarded as valid safe and secure world. There is no short-cut. through acquiescence. Since the advent of Presence means either being there or not. It LOS in 1982, such claims have been opera- is the difference between engagement and tionally challenged more than 200 times, isolation. If we choose the latter option, it is primarily by the Navy, and as a result 12 na- likely to lead to a more dangerous world that tions have formally rolled back their claims.6 is far more costly than maintaining overseas presence today. JFQ What If We Don’t? Those who advocate CONUS-based NOTES strategies may not be considering the conse- 1 William A. Owens, High Seas: The Naval Passage to quences of an increasingly fragmented an Uncharted World (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute world. After the continuous presence of Press, 1995), p. 12. American forces in a region, many nations 2 Ibid., p. 38. would likely regard reduction or withdrawal 3 Stanley B. Weeks, “U.S. Naval Forward Presence in as a diminishing of U.S. interest. Their anxi- the Cold War: Perceptions of Former Soviet Elites” (Sci- ence Applications International Corporation, November eties are likely to be manifested in forms of 1994). protectionism not realized before. 4 Joint Strategic Planning Staff, “The Role of Nuclear The link between a reassuring presence Weapons in the New World Order,” Report of the Sci- and liberal trade must not be ignored. It is ence Advisory Group, October 1991, p. 26. unlikely that a nation would raise trade bar- 5 Presentation by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed riers without concern over the withdrawal of Forces, September 20, 1994. U.S. forces by an angry American public. 6 CJCS Instruction 2420.01, August 16, 1993, enclo- sure B, “Illegal Maritime Claims”; DOD Representative for Ocean Policy Affairs memorandum, subject: “Exces- sive Maritime Claims,” March 23, 1995.

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Problems of Defense Organization and Management By MICHAEL B. DONLEY

n February 1993 the Chairman of the for the creation of the Commission on Roles Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) completed a and Missions of the Armed Forces to review triennial report required by law on the allocations of roles, missions, and functions, roles, missions, and functions of the evaluate alternatives, and recommend IArmed Forces which contained 29 specific change. This article looks at current issues of recommendations. But Congress defense organization as well as relevant trends in defense management. Congress is asking if expressed dissatisfaction with the report, finding that the “allo- Agreeing on appropriate terms of refer- strategy, management, cation of roles and missions ence is an important starting point for a dis- and organizational among the Armed Forces may no cussion of defense organization and management. , , and may be trends are on track longer be appropriate for the Roles missions functions post-Cold War era,” and that re- considered terms of art in that they have alignments may be essential for special significance in this context. They are efficiency and effectiveness in light of lower defense budgets. The FY94 Defense Autho- rization Act therefore included a provision

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not necessarily well defined or consistently In addition to reviewing terms of refer- applied in the defense community, however, ence and the charter, historical and political and their meaning can at times overlap. A contexts are also important. In the evolution degree of discrimination can nonetheless be of defense organization since 1947 the com- achieved by synthesizing the usage found in mission is perhaps the most significant con- CJCS reports, JCS Pub 1-02 (Department of gressional initiative since the Goldwater- Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Nichols DOD Reorganization Act to advance Terms), and Title 10 of the U.S. Code. fundamental questions about who does what For the purpose of this review: and why. And, in a strategic environment ▼ Roles are the broad, enduring purposes which is vastly different from that of the for which organizations are established in law. mid-1980s, with a budgetary squeeze, the ▼ Missions are broad tasks, combined with congressional charge for a new look at roles, a description of purpose, indicating action to be missions, and functions could serve many taken; considered generally as integrating many purposes. In a general sense Congress is ask- activities around a common theme or purpose. ing if strategy, management, and organiza- (Missions are tasks assigned by the President or tional trends are on track and what must be Secretary of Defense to combatant commanders.) done to get greater combat effectiveness and ▼ Functions are powers, duties, and responsi- peacetime efficiency out of a smaller defense bilities; considered generally as intended activities. establishment. Such issues demand well-de- Usually such definitions are helpful; but veloped perspectives on DOD organizational they are likely to fall short in distinguishing structure and its components. Therefore, this all the activities and relationships at issue article is concerned primarily with roles and among DOD components. The subjects and functions. multiple levels of detail in the CJCS report show the difficulty in separating “roles, mis- Organization and Management sions, and functions” from general chal- DOD is a large, highly complex organi- lenges to defense organization and manage- zation that is not easy to compare to other ment. Previous debates on roles, missions, executive departments or private enterprises. and functions have also been heavily laden It is a product of history (our own and that with issues of strategy, plans, doctrine, and of other countries), technology, legislation, resource allocation. Just after World War II, et al. The effectiveness of its components is for example, Secretary of Defense James For- often seemingly intertwined with the suc- restal observed that “until the Joint Chiefs cess or failure of individuals who lead them have completed their joint strategic plans, and vice versa. Nevertheless, the purpose there is no solid foundation on which to and intent behind defense organization can base a meaningful assignment of roles and be discerned in law and regulation, and its missions.” development traced over the course of the The commission’s charter has rein- last five decades. forced this view. Among other things, it was Congressional Intent. The purposes for tasked to: creating a new military establishment are outlined in a “Declaration of Policy” in the ▼ “review the types of military operations National Security Act of 1947, as amended that may be required in the post-Cold War era,” (50 U.S.C. 401): taking into account “official strategic planning” ▼ “define broad mission areas and key sup- In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of port requirements for the U.S. military establish- Congress to provide...a Department of Defense, in- ment as a whole” cluding the three military departments of the Army, ▼ “develop a conceptual framework for or- the Navy (including naval aviation and the United ganizational allocations” among the military de- States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the di- partments and combatant commands. rection, authority, and control of the Secretary of De- fense; to provide that each military department shall be separately organized under its own secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and con- Michael B. Donley is a senior fellow at the trol of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their Institute of Defense Analyses; he has served as unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary an assistant secretary of the Air Force and as a of Defense but not to merge these departments or ser- consultant to the Commission on Roles and vices; to provide for the establishment of unified or Mission of the Armed Forces.

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Newport Conference, August 1948. U.S. Navy

specified combatant commands and a clear and direct thority. Overall, however, the rambling na- line of command to such commands; to eliminate un- ture of this declaration needs support by orga- necessary duplication in the Department of Defense, nizational structures and relationships estab- and particularly in the field of research and engineer- lished in law and regulation to clarify ing by vesting its overall direction and control in the congressional intent. Secretary of Defense; to provide more effective, effi- Making Sense of Various Elements. Title 10 cient, and economical administration in the Depart- ment of Defense; to provide for the unified strategic [chapter 2, 111(b)] organizes DOD into ten direction of the combatant forces, for their operation basic components: under unified command, and for their integration into ▼ Office of the Secretary of Defense an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but ▼ Joint Chiefs of Staff not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the Armed ▼ Joint Staff Forces nor an overall Armed Forces general staff. ▼ defense agencies The “Declaration of Policy” does not re- ▼ DOD field activities ▼ Department of the Army flect everything that has been done to shape ▼ Department of the Navy organization, though changes such as the ▼ Department of the Air Force Goldwater-Nichols Act were presented as ▼ unified and specified combatant com- “consistent with” and adding emphasis to its mands basic purpose. The declaration contains broad ▼ such other offices, agencies, activities, objectives for the establishment of DOD such and commands as may be established or desig- as “unified direction” and “effective, efficient, nated by law or by the President. and economical administration”; words and Yet a careful reading of the law and phrases found later throughout the statute DOD Directive 5100.1 shows that these (such as “under the authority, direction, and components are divided into three major el- control of the Secretary of Defense”); and at ements: least three prohibitions—not to merge the 1. unified services and not to create a single “chief of The roles and functions related to the authority, direction, and control of the Department staff” or “general staff.” It also reveals bureaucratic tensions that existed in 1947 and also later between central and decentralized au-

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of Defense are vested in the Secretary of Defense, as- tional direction of forces which are under sisted by his staff (the Office of the Secretary of De- CINCs. Subject to the authority, direction, fense) and the defense agencies and field activities and control of the Secretary of Defense, the which report to them. common functions of these departments fall Law and regulation are particularly clear into four groups. Organizing includes recruit- in the ultimate authority and responsibility ing, mobilization, and demobilization. Train- of the Secretary of Defense. He is charged ing includes doctrine, procedures, tactics and with providing DOD components with guid- techniques, and support for joint training. ance on national security Equipping includes research and develop- the Chairman may be objectives and policies for ment, supply, maintenance, and “construc- described as the day-to-day preparing programs and tion, outfitting, and repair of equipment.” budgets, as well as policy The fourth function is the general administra- manager of the CINCs guidance for the Chairman tion of these activities including servicing concerning contingency forces; developing policies, programs, and planning. The Secretary is in the chain of budgets; carrying out construction, mainte- command and is responsible for the effec- nance, and repair of buildings; and manag- tive, efficient, and economical administra- ing real property. Overall, through these tion (including the assignment of defense functions, the role of each department is to agencies and field activities to his staff or prepare and maintain ready, mutually sup- CJCS); and all components—including mili- porting forces (including Reserves) for assign- tary departments—are subject to his author- ment to combatant commands. ity, direction, and control. In sum, the purposes of defense organi- 2. The roles and functions of joint military ad- zation as outlined in law and regulation, as vice, strategic planning, and the integration and well as the roles and functions of many direction of combatant forces are vested in the DOD components, are best understood Joint Chiefs of Staff (headed by the Chairman), the under three major elements: Joint Staff, and the unified and specified combatant ▼ unified direction, authority, and control commands. ▼ joint military advice and planning as well CJCS responsibility for joint military as integrated employment components is very clear. He presides over ▼ organization, training, and equipping ad- JCS, controls the Joint Staff, and is assigned ministered generally on the basis of land, sea, and no less than 52 principal functions under air forces. DOD Directive 5100.1 which are indepen- While a good deal of congressional in- dent of the corporate responsibility of the terest has focused on duplication among the Joint Chiefs to provide military advice. At services, higher level issues among three pri- the direction of the Secretary (as authorized mary elements—the Office of the Secretary in law), CJCS functions within the chain of of Defense, joint military components, and command, serves as spokesman for CINCs, military departments—are also important. and is responsible for their oversight. While Most DOD components and activities have he has no command authority, the Chair- roots in them, and basic issues of defense or- man may aptly be described as the day-to- ganization and management involve appro- day manager of the CINCs as well as the Sec- priately balancing them and the way that retary’s “first phone call” on issues involving roles and functions intersect or overlap. combatant commands. Moreover, organizational and bureaucratic 3. The roles and functions of organizing, train- history can best be understood in the con- ing, and equipping forces are the responsibility of text of how these elements developed. the military departments (that is, the Departments of Organizational History the Army, Navy, and Air Force). The period from 1947 to 1960 was for- The military departments are separately mative as the legitimacy of centralized con- organized and administered under their re- trol slowly increased. The management and spective secretaries, who are in the chain of oversight responsibilities of the Secretary de- command for purposes other than the opera- veloped in functional organizations beginning with the comptroller and expanding to

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the general counsel, R&D, supply and logis- Forces shares similarities with earlier debates. tics, personnel, health affairs, et al. The Interservice issues seem much the same, for strengthening of joint military perspectives example: how to separate Air Force and Army went beyond coordination among the Joint responsibilities for theater aerospace defense Chiefs in post-war theaters of occupation to and ground support; how to distinguish be- a new system of unified and specified com- tween Army and Marine Corps contingency batant commands. And statutory responsi- or expeditionary responsibilities; and how to bilities for operational control of forces properly allocate airpower responsibilities shifted from military departments and ser- across the services. Each issue involves the as- vice secretaries to JCS, combatant comman- signment of responsibilities and forces ders, and the Secretary. This period can be among the military departments. As in 1948, characterized as a struggle between central this review occurs in a period of strategic re- authorities and long-standing (previously assessment and reductions in spending. But autonomous) military departments. the context of these and other issues has The authority that the Secretary ac- been greatly changed by history and opera- quired in this formative period was asserted tional experience, technology, and organiza- throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. Man- tional developments. A quick comparison agement processes (in particular, the plan- will illustrate the magnitude of this change. ning, programming, and budgeting system When Secretary Forrestal took the Joint and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Chiefs to Key West in March 1948 (seven Council) shifted broad resource allocation months after passage of the National Security responsibilities to OSD, and growth of de- Act) the military departments were still the fense agencies and field activities was initi- dominant players in what was then the Na- ated to promote efficiency in areas of com- tional Military Establishment. The Secretary mon supply and support. Both of these had little institutional stature, almost no trends further eroded the influence of the staff, and only a rudimentary organizational military departments. As a result of these plan for his office. The Joint Chiefs were seen trends and the Vietnam War, familiar inter- as representatives of service interests; and the service rivalries were less prominent than Joint Staff was weak and beholden to individ- friction with OSD over the importance and ual JCS members. A new outline command quality of joint advice as well as the role of plan was less than 15 months old and JCS civilians in operational planning. Overall, did not as yet have a chairman. this was an era of civil-military competition. In contrast to Forrestal’s situation in The 1970s and 1980s produced a pro- 1948, incremental changes have profoundly gressive rebuilding of bridges between OSD altered the balance of power (that is, the and JCS in matters of strategy, policy, and re- roles and functions) among DOD compo- source allocation. It also saw growing joint nents. Today the Secretary has all the au- influence in DOD management processes. thority and standing that law can provide, a The authority of the Secretary over DOD ac- large staff, and 45 years of operational and tivities was reinforced, as was OSD staff con- management precedents that have weakened trol over defense agencies. The role of CJCS the independence of the military depart- was strengthened by the assignment of nu- ments and strengthened joint military com- merous duties and responsibilities indepen- ponents and perspectives. JCS is headed by a dent of the corporate JCS, and CINCs gained powerful Chairman recognized under law as further control over their component forces. the principal military advisor who controls The influence of the military departments the Joint Staff, oversees a vital system of uni- continued to decline in comparison to OSD fied commands, and exercises increasing in- and joint military components, but the re- fluence over the allocation of resources. sponsibilities of civilian appointees in ser- The extent to which the 1948–49 roles vice headquarters were broadened. In sum, and missions debate was really a continua- those organizations at the highest levels— tion of the 1946–47 debate over organiza- OSD, CJCS, and CINCs—were substantially tion and post-war strategy, as Forrestal strengthened during this period. noted, deserves elaboration. The roles and The review conducted by the Commis- sion on Roles and Missions of the Armed

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missions debate of the late 1940s, played out post-Cold War experience reveals the broad in bureaucratic struggles over the first DOD range of political-military circumstances and organizational directives, had much to do geographic locations to which the Nation with contrasting perspectives of how the ser- may commit its forces in a variety of combi- vices would fight the Soviet Union. Each ser- nations. The strategic environment calls for vice jockeyed for position as the Nation’s flexibility, and doctrine for force employ- “primary force in being” by arguing the wis- ment emphasizes jointness. As underscored dom and feasibility of strategic bombing and in Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed carrier air, and by wrestling for control (and Forces: debating impacts) of new technologies. The nature of modern warfare demands that we Eventually, these volatile arguments came fight as a team. This does not mean that all forces down to a programmatic competition and to will be equally represented in each operation. Joint a false choice between weapon systems—the force commanders choose the capabilities they need Air Force B–36 bomber and the proposed from the air, land, sea, space, and special operations Navy “super carrier.” forces at their disposal. The resulting team provides Strategy is an issue today. The collapse of joint force commanders the ability to apply over- the Soviet Union has caused a rethinking of whelming force from different dimensions and direc- defense requirements across the board, and tions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. Effec- tively integrated joint forces expose no weak points or despite the Base Force and the Bottom-Up Re- seams to enemy action, while they rapidly and effi- view the resulting adjustments may not yet ciently find and attack enemy weak points. Joint war- be complete. But the process for deciding fare is essential to victory. strategy is more joint than ever and is no Changes in structure, process, and doc- longer dominated by the military depart- trine may explain why the definition of a ments. Likewise, the development of major mission as outlined in recent CJCS reports is new technologies and weapon systems is in- a “task assigned to a CINC.” This is a depar- creasingly influenced by ture from 1948 when missions were assigned the strategic environment joint requirements and to military departments which had responsi- an acquisition process calls for flexibility, and bility for operations, and given a weak joint managed by OSD. Joint doctrine for force employment system, competed for dominance in making processes are emerging strategy. Such changes underscore the major emphasizes jointness to develop strategic importance of roles and functions—the bal- plans, define mission ance among OSD, joint military compo- areas, identify essential tasks, and validate re- nents, and the military departments—and quirements. Thus, while there may be dis- the need for careful attention in current de- agreement over the direction of a new mili- bates. In fact, many contemporary issues can tary strategy, changes in structure and be accurately framed within the context of processes since 1948 leave little doubt that this three-way relationship. the Secretary and Chairman are responsible for deciding its content. Aligning Roles and Functions Moreover, if in 1948 the chain of logic Where should the line be drawn between (from strategy to roles and missions and pro- OSD and service responsibilities? Many long- grams) was strategic bombing to long-range standing problems are embedded in manag- nuclear delivery and the B–36, there as yet ing support functions common to all three appears to be no compelling analogy in departments, like medical, personnel, finan- 1995. Congress invited the commission to es- cial management, C4, base engineering, com- tablish such linkages if and where they seem missary, et al. In these areas a basic tension warranted, but it is not clear that any simple exists between the responsibility of the Secre- alternatives have emerged to form the basis tary for “effective, efficient, and economical for radically new directions in strategy. And administration” of DOD and the intentional it is wholly unlikely in today’s environment structure of “three military departments... that such alternatives would gain support if separately organized.” On issues of support developed around limited, one-dimensional, or administration, OSD sees the military de- single-service capabilities. Cold War and partments potentially doing business three different ways and thus seeks a better solution. As outlined in the conference report to

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The Secretary accepting the report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces on May 23, 1995. ) d ar R.D. W ( DOD

the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the law intends execution split between newly created de- generally for the Secretary to have “sole and fense agencies and further diminished mili- ultimate power within the Department of tary departments. As a result, the principle of Defense on any matter on which the Secre- maintaining authority and responsibility to- tary chooses to act,” giving him broad au- gether within clear chains of command has thority to reorganize DOD activities without been progressively and broadly compromised changing statutory arrangements. Yet the (a problem also common in defense acquisi- practical problems of balancing the assign- tion). Moreover, the result could be the con- ment of responsibilities among the DOD solidation of support functions to the extent components must be addressed, involving that combat and support forces would be careful distinctions among concepts such as separately administered in peacetime, and policy review and oversight, management, OSD-run agencies would be primary resource allocation, administration, and pro- providers of support in war. There is little evi- gram execution. These have been key prob- dence that the implications of such an action lems in the reduction and streamlining of de- have been thoughtfully considered. fense infrastructure. It is also notable that the appropriate During the early 1990s, as common sup- alignment of responsibilities for support port functions were consolidated, in part functions is not limited to debate between through the Defense Management Review, the military services and OSD, as illustrated the roles of OSD and military departments by the 1990–91 case of depot maintenance. became subject to confusion in areas such as In this instance, OSD determined that closer contract management, financial manage- interservice coordination of the reduced ment, medical programs, and personnel depot workload would not yield sufficient management. This oversight grew into savings and efficiency. The resulting pro- hands-on program and resource manage- posal for a depot maintenance agency ment, with more authority migrating to OSD (under the then Assistant Secretary of De- officials, and responsibilities for day-to-day fense, Production and Logistics) so concerned the services that it was greeted by a counterproposal for a Unified Depot Mainte-

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nance Command under CJCS. This classic man is evidence that major issues are at stake roles and functions debate begs the question concerning the balance of responsibilities be- of whether depot maintenance is to be re- tween the military departments and JCS in garded, in relative terms, as a business/man- developing requirements, programs, and agement activity or a function of combat budgets. And it raises questions on the re- support. It is, of course, a combination of spective roles of civilian and military staffs in both; but the issue of reducing depot main- providing advice on priorities to the Secre- tenance capacity and apportioning manage- tary, in particular on the role and function of ment and operational responsibilities among JROC versus that of the Assistant Secretary OSD, joint military components, the mili- for Strategy, Requirements, and Resources tary departments, and the private sector is and the Director of Program Analysis and unresolved. Evaluation. It also addresses the relationship How should responsibilities be divided between the council and the Defense Re- between joint military components and the sources Board. While there is no doubt that military departments? Two current issues the Secretary is responsible for strategy, pol- offer examples. First is the division of re- icy, and unified direction of DOD, the struc- sponsibilities between these elements in the ture and process for making decisions about areas of operational planning and doctrine. resource allocation—although a matter best While the joint military structure (in partic- left to the Secretary’s discretion—also deserve ular CJCS and CINCs) is responsible for careful consideration from a roles and func- preparing contingency plans, much of the tions perspective. competence and doctrinal expertise concern- In addition to the above issues, which ad- ing employment of land, sea, and aerospace dress the juncture of responsibilities among forces (generally, but not exclusively, from OSD, joint military components, and the mil- single-service perspectives) is found in the itary departments, there are unresolved issues three military departments. The role of within each. With respect to OSD and JCS, in Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, in developing particular, it can be argued that issues of in- the CENTCOM air campaign plan in the ternal functions and responsibilities should Gulf War is a case in point. As joint agencies be handled at the discretion of their respec- such as the Joint Warfighting Center are tive leaders. This is more difficult in the mili- strengthened the question of appropriate di- tary departments, however, since Title 10 provisions of labor with the departments will be vides for both military and civilian staffs more prominent. Like- within the same departmental headquarters. there are questions about wise, the strengthened The Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed some of “exceptional cases”—the role of CJCS in resource those issues in 1986, but current (and con- allocation raises the issue trasting) models for managing acquisition as Reserve components and of how much of the pro- well as financial and manpower affairs in the Special Operations Forces gramming and budgeting departments reveal that there is unfinished assets in the military de- business and that a further rationalization of partments and OSD should be duplicated by civilian and military responsibilities would the Joint Staff or combatant commands. It is lead to greater efficiencies. not clear how the CJCS prerogative to de- Finally, beyond addressing roles and velop alternative program and budget pro- functions among and within the essential ele- posals (under section 153a, 4c) will be exer- ments of DOD, there are questions about the cised. status of “exceptional cases”—areas of law How should roles and functions be di- where Congress created unique relationships. vided between OSD and JCS? Since both law Two examples worthy of special note are the and DOD directives intend that JCS function Reserve components and special operations as the “military staff” of the Secretary of De- forces (SOF). fense, he must apportion responsibilities be- The Reserve components—which in- tween his staff and JCS. The recent debate clude the Army and Air National Guard— surrounding the Joint Requirements Over- have a long heritage combining the tradi- sight Council (JROC) under the Vice Chair- tion of state militias and citizen-soldiers with important national plans and assumptions about mobilization. A thorough review

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of roles, missions, and functions should ask Among the broad paths available for re- what the Nation needs from the Reserve view, issues related to general roles and func- components—basic questions that are long tions deserve special emphasis. Such points overdue. What should be their role in a post- raise fundamental questions about the core Cold War strategy, within both the DOD responsibilities of OSD, joint military compo- management structure and the Federal-state nents, and the military departments; how relationship with regard to the Guard? Is management and command relationships be- current Total Force policy sufficient to define tween combatant forces and supporting infra- this role? Is there a way to depoliticize the structure can be approached, balancing com- Reserve components and to develop a mod- bat effectiveness and peacetime efficiency; ern management approach that could more and the state of civil-military relations. The efficiently meet Federal requirements for House National Security Affairs Committee mobilization and state needs for augmented and the Senate Armed Services Committee as public safety and disaster relief? If we were well as the Secretary and Chairman are re- starting with a clean slate in the late 20th sponsible for shaping defense organization. If century, would we establish Federal Reserves the DOD leadership does not attend to higher as well as multiple National Guards? order issues, current trends may lead to a fur- SOF administrative responsibilities are ther blurring of roles and functions among addressed differently under law than those of the essential elements of DOD. Without a other combatant commands. Congress gave thoughtful assessment of the primary roles head of agency responsibilities to a CINC (for and functions outlined in Title 10 we may example, for programming, budgeting, and lose perspective on who is responsible for equipping), dividing authorities generally as- what, a true duplication and diffusion of ef- signed elsewhere to the military departments. fort may result, and the fundamental pur- One must ask whether such an alignment poses of those organizations established in and concentration of authority and resource law may be easily forgotten. JFQ allocation responsibility in a combatant commander is an exception to the general practice, should be adjusted, or could be used as a model for defense reorganization. The evolution of defense organization combined with both a new strategic environment and resource constraints provide a rich menu of defense management issues. Thinking about DOD in terms of its three essential elements can provide a useful framework for discussion. A key issue is whether the underlying organizational structure remains clear or is being clouded by “exceptional cases” and a long series of piecemeal adjustments lacking coherence or vision. The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces can make a significant contribution by presenting its findings in ways that provide management principles that can be used by the Secretary and Con- gress to make recommendations or subsequently resolve roles, missions, and functions issues; clear a path for the DOD leadership to settle issues internally before Congress inter- venes; and offer the Secretary and Chairman an agenda for the methodical review of defense organization and management.

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War Termination and Joint Planning By ROBERT R. SOUCY II,

KEVIN A. SHWEDO, and

JOHN S. HAVEN II

Surrender ceremonies in Tokyo Bay, September 2, 1945. U.S. Army

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hile attending the Armed but asserted that the primary characteristic Forces Staff College, the au- of war was its nature as a political tool and thors took part in an exercise not chance itself. He wrote: called Certain Challenge If we keep in mind that war springs from some whichW exposed them to strategic and opera- political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of tional concerns at the Joint Staff level. One its existence will remain the supreme consideration in lesson of the exercise was the importance of conducting it....The first, the supreme, the most far- guidance from the National Command Au- reaching act of judgment...is to establish by that thorities (NCA) on how to end a war. That test the kind of war on which they are embarking....3 guidance was lacking throughout the plan- That test involves two factors: that war ning process during the exercise and had a is a deliberate instrument of policy and that ripple effect of uncertainty since, absent an it varies with given situations. War, in end-state with specific criteria, the crisis pro- essence, reflects the motives of policymak- cedures were left without a unifying theme. ers.4 This is important because it reveals that What is more, volume one of Joint Pub 5- although war is in the realm of chance, it is 03, Joint Operation Planning and Execution more fundamentally a province of policy- System (Planning Policies and Procedures), did makers who must inform manipulators of vi- not provide us with guidance on how to in- olence—that, is military commanders—what tegrate and analyze criteria for the termina- they want from war and how to end it. Sur- tion of a conflict. prisingly ending war receives scant atten- Even step-by-step crisis action checklists tion: “The fact is that of the three categories which are part of the joint operation plan- of the spectrum of conflict,” writes Harry ning and execution system (JOPES) lack clar- Summers, “war termination has been virtu- ity on the subject of war termi- ally ignored. In our fascination nation. One is not reminded to with the means of strategy, we consider termination criteria. why does the United have neglected the study of its It is reasonable to assume that States fail to prepare ends—those objects which will 5 timely development and con- for the end of war? lead directly to peace.” tinuous revision of criteria Why does the United should be integrated into all States fail to prepare for the phases of JOPES, yet there is a void in guid- end of war? Finding a definitive answer to ance. The issue which confronted us was that question may prove elusive. Russell Wei- whether this gap is real or the result of our gley has suggested that the American way of unfamiliarity with joint doctrine. war follows a strategy of annihilation.6 If so, The lack of clear guidance on war termi- this approach could predispose us to destroy nation criteria is confirmed by recent opera- an enemy force while blinding us to other tions in the Persian Gulf and Somalia as well means of achieving objectives. Furthermore, as through an examination of joint doctrine. inflexibility can lead an adversary to fight Concern over this issue—from Clausewitz to harder and prolong conflict. As Sun Tzu a range of other prominent theorists of mused, a desperate foe should not be pressed war—speaks to its historical as well as con- too hard, especially if he is returning home, temporary relevance.1 While no one can pre- because he will probably fight to the death.7 dict how a conflict will end, Clausewitz A bloody battle of little strategic or political knew the effect that chance has on conflict,2 import is a double tragedy. The amount of bloodshed and violence in a conflict has a bearing both on the war and the peace that follows: The modern desperation in war produces a bitter legacy....All sides harbor bitter feelings because of Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Soucy II, USAF, is widespread death and destruction. The losing side ag- chief Air Force special operations instructor at the onizes over how much it gave and how much it lost. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; The winner resents the suffering endured in relation to Major Kevin A. Shwedo, USA, is director of per- the objectives achieved....Winning a better state of sonnel at JTF-6; and Major John S. Haven II, USAF, peace after a modern war may be the most difficult of is an action officer in the Contingency Support all tasks.8 Division (J-6), Joint Staff.

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On August 5, 1990, three days after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Presi- dent Bush articulated the following objectives to Congress: “immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government; security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.”11 As diplomatic, economic, and limited military means failed to achieve those objectives, he ordered that the objectives be accomplished through offensive

ony Joseph) military action. According to one analyst, the coalition leaders tried

U.S. Navy (T to think the conflict through from UNISOM troops leaving start to finish: “Bush and the other for home under United allied leaders were careful to em- Shield. As difficult as winning that state may be, phasize that the winning of the war had to be it must be approached with an understanding followed by winning the peace.”12 of the consequences of considering war and The initial combat phase of Desert peace in isolation. They are linked; actions in Storm was fought from the sky. Coalition one affect the other. Based on the literature it aircraft struck targets in the theater for a appears that there is one key connection be- month to prepare for the ground phase. tween them, namely, the termination phase, Once started, the ground effort moved that is grasped by the Nation. But recent con- quickly. In 72 hours “the coalition was about flicts demonstrate that, while we may under- to accomplish...two key objectives—Iraqi stand the concept of war termination, we army out of Kuwait and reestablishment of have difficulty applying it. the legitimate government.”13 General Pow- ell found the reports of carnage disturbing Historical Perspective and told General Schwarzkopf that a cease- After identifying a potential flaw in the fire could not be far away. He also relayed joint crisis planning process, we tested our his concerns to the President. Lawrence insights against those of military planners in Freedman wrote, “Politically the President the Gulf War and Somalia. We had to estab- had to judge whether the extra advantage to lish definitions for two key concepts, end- be gained by finishing off the remaining state and war termination, before drawing Iraqi units was worth the political costs of conclusions. We chose to use John Fishel’s the continuing carnage. [NSC staff member] definition of end-state. He said it is “what Richard Haass later observed, using an Amer- the leadership desires the battlefield and the ican football analogy, ‘We didn’t want to be surrounding political landscape to look like accused of piling on once the whistle had when the war is over....Moreover, end- been blown.’ If the war ended on a sour states suggest descriptions, in fairly great de- note, this could complicate post-war politics. tail, of the goals of national policy.”9 For these reasons the President was now in- Termination objectives “define the in- clined to conclude the war.”14 tended manner of conflict termination and Some analysts discovered that the desire the required military and diplomatic achieve- to end the war raised a problem for the ments to obtain it.”10 War termination criteria coalition: “Once the basic objective of the thus seem not only to establish the conditions for a cease-fire, but also help commanders and planners prepare for what follows combat operations.

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war—evicting Iraq from Kuwait—was accom- on termination criteria will not find it in plished, there was no clear post-war path for Pub 5-0. Joint Pub 3-0 stands out by compar- the coalition to follow.”15 One observer also ison.20 War termination was much on the found confusion on the post-war path that minds of its authors and is covered in con- the Nation should take: “The U.S. Govern- siderable detail. Planners are reminded to ment...suggested another blend termination criteria into initial plan- mutual understanding political objective for Kuwait ning and strategy formulation prior to oper- between policymakers that was not at all reflected in ational activity, to wit: the end-state derived by the and commanders requires Properly conceived conflict termination criteria are military planners. This objec- key to ensuring that victories achieved with military constant attention tive was to move the Kuwaiti force endure...it is fundamentally important to un- government to a more demo- derstand that conflict termination is an essential link cratic mode.”16 And there was more confu- between national security strategy, national military sion in the air. Fishel went on to note that strategy, and posthostility aims—the desired outcome.21 public rhetoric by President Bush caused Further, there is guidance on when to some concern about whether the removal of consider criteria: Saddam Hussein had become one of the cri- Before forces are committed, [a JFC] must know 17 teria for war termination. how NCA intend to terminate the operation and en- Somalia illustrated the troubled relation- sure its outcomes endure, and then determine how to ship between political leaders and field com- implement that strategic design at the operational manders in crises. The commander of the level [emphasis added].22 th 10 Mountain Division, for instance, had Pub 3-0 offers clear guidance on the rel- difficulty in obtaining specific guidance evance of war termination criteria in joint from NCA about ending the operation. In an planning. Since anyone who finds Pub 5-0 article describing the lessons of that experi- lacking has another source, why worry about ence, he observed that he and his staff deficiencies in the JOPES manual? Is the an- drafted proposed end-states to forward up swer to simply to look up the guidance in the chain for approval and also fashioned another publication? The short response is criteria to determine if the desired end-state no. A better answer requires understanding 18 Mutual understanding could be achieved. the JOPES role in national planning. between policymakers and commanders re- JOPES is much more than a manual. It is quires constant attention. an elaborate system run by many people Doctrine who use procedures, publications, and auto- Before analyzing joint doctrine, and matic data processing to integrate NCA pol- specifically JOPES, one must briefly consider icy decisions with military planning and ex- the joint doctrine system. It is relatively new ecution at national, theater, and supporting and still incomplete with many publications organizational levels. JOPES supports this in- in development. It uses keystone volumes as tegration by facilitating actions during delib- foundation guidance for major areas of doc- erate planning or crisis action planning. De- trine. Most joint planning guidance is con- liberate planning “is a cyclic process carried tained in Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning out in peacetime to develop and refine plans Joint Operations, and Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine to be used in wartime.” It is a detailed, intri- for Joint Operations. JOPES is a subset of mul- cate five-phase process which can take 18 to tiple volumes in the 5-0 series. A look at 24 months.23 Yet nowhere in the chapters on Joint Pub 5-0 and Joint Pub 3-0 with regard deliberate planning is the critical nature of to termination criteria is revealing. war termination criteria discussed. This is First, Joint Pub 5-0 does not discuss ter- not a serious problem because of the long mination criteria or how they are related to timeframe involved; planners have plenty of the end-state and planning military opera- opportunity to refer to Joint Pub 3-0 and all tions. It focuses on basic principles and con- the pertinent information in other doctrinal cepts of joint planning and describes the organization and structure for conducting deliberate and crisis action planning.19 Any- one using JOPES and in need of clarification

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publications while developing their deliber- so are conflict termination issues. Prompting ate plans. to begin a dialogue between NCA and the A crisis, on the other hand, requires a Joint Staff is not found in this part of JOPES. different process, because there is a threat Guidance also is not on the supported against U.S. interests that develops rapidly commander’s checklist. The JOPES checklist and may call for a military response.24 Crisis does not lead supported commanders to action planning, according to Pub 5-03.1, query the Joint Staff, CJCS, or NCA about in- “provides for the rapid and effective ex- terwoven courses of action that they develop change of information and analysis, the with certain termination criteria. They are timely preparation of military [action] for told to take the same types of actions as the consideration by crisis procedures, and the Joint Staff.29 Even guidance given by NCA prompt transmission of NCA decisions to through CJCS at the end of the crisis assess- supported military commanders.”25 Com- ment phase does not foster dialogue on ter- manders use options previously developed mination issues. The Chairman’s warning by deliberate planning if possible to solve order, according to the JOPES format, con- crises quickly, but such plans have major tains general guidance on assumptions, a shortcomings. JOPES points out that deliber- generic remark about political constraints, ate planning is done for hypothetical crises and the requirement for a concise mission and relies “heavily on assumptions regarding statement. Other guidance is given on the political and military circumstances courses of action, operational security and [which] make it improbable that any contin- deception, psychological operations, intelli- gency plan will be usable without modifica- gence and counterintelligence, civil affairs, tion.”26 In a crisis, military staffs are faced et al., but nothing specific about termina- with a serious, rapidly developing situation tion criteria.30 for which they must produce a plan that The subject is never explicitly men- takes into account the realities of a particu- tioned in phase two. Nor is it raised in lar problem, not a hypothetical incident. phases three, four, or five. Only with phase Moreover, they may not have a lot of time six (execution) and publication of the exe- to consult the keystone doctrinal manuals. cute order does the concept appear. JOPES JOPES helps alleviate the tremendous guidance states that CJCS “takes actions pressure in a crisis by building a six-phase needed to effect a quick and successful ter- process with a checklist of actions for antici- mination of the crisis.”31 This information, pated problems. Are clear instructions given however, is in the basic chapter on crisis on formulating war termination criteria and planning and not the checklist. In the latter, a coherent strategy around them? Are crite- CJCS is advised to assess the accomplishment ria articulated and passed on to operational of objectives and the supported commander commanders? Unfortunately the answer to to replan or terminate the operation.32 This is both questions is no; much guidance is the first explicit mention of crisis termina- given, but little concerns conflict termination and comes after all previous phases— tion. For example, phase two of crisis action situation development, crisis assessment, planning is crisis assessment. This phase COA development and selection, and execu- “[begins] with a report from a supported tion planning—are finished. Despite being commander and ends with a decision by the urged to integrate termination criteria early, NCA or the Chairman...to develop possible the guidance given to commanders and military COAs.”27 Joint planners are not ad- planners in a pressure-filled crisis situation vised at this critical time to ask NCA about consists of only two references in the final their concept for terminating a war or crisis. execution phase. They are instead advised to review plans, co- The advice of James Reed, special assis- ordinate noncombatant evacuation with the tant to the Secretary of the Army, is appropri- Department of State, review legal obliga- ate: “War termination has been a neglected tions, evaluate rules of engagement, update topic for doctrinal development...current strategic lift, and redirect intelligence gather- operational doctrines display a serious blind ing, et al.28 Such actions are important but spot with regard to the issue of conflict termination.”33 His proposal includes seven guidelines for ending the doctrinal silence on war

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W AR TERMINATION ejo) r guidelines for ending the doctrinal silence on war termination:

backward-planning and conditions planners should work toward my (Jose D. T U.S. Ar Discussing cease fire terms, March 3, 1991. termination, two directly related to this dis- formulation and issuance of specific guidance to cussion: backward-planning and clearly defin- the military commanders. ing the conditions military planners should ▼ Such criteria, once developed, must be work toward. He trusts this would “prompt constantly reassessed by all parties involved as increased communication between the civil- the situation evolves. ian and military leadership...to ensure con- Responses to conflict must be planned gruence between operational objectives and and conducted to enhance prospects for the larger policy aims of a campaign.”34 long-term peace and stability. One dimen- A review of the theory, literature, issues, sion is knowing when, where, and how to and doctrine leads to the following conclu- stop hostilities. There is a gap in the current sions: JCS planning guidance, however, that may ▼ Winning the peace is as important as result in planners overlooking the impor- winning the war and calls for judicious applica- tance of this factor during a fast moving cri- tion of force and knowing when to stop fighting. sis. Therefore, new guidance needs to be ▼ Current joint doctrine used for deliberate added to each phase of the JOPES crisis ac- planning (especially Joint Pub 3-0) adequately tion planning system sections of the manual sensitizes planners to the concept of war termina- as follows: tion criteria. ▼ phase one (situation development)—guid- ▼ The practical application of the concept ance that the theater commander’s assessment in crises—as seen in the Persian Gulf War and So- should incorporate thoughts on how to resolve malia—seems haphazard. the situation ▼ The absence of initial or updated political ▼ phase two (crisis assessment)—guidance guidance about termination criteria in a crisis can that CJCS should query NCA about termination be critical. Such gaps may require commanders to criteria and to include NCA termination guidance alter the tempo of operations at critical times to in the warning order to facilitate the supported allow for guidance to be developed or to impro- commander’s backwards planning vise their own. Such unilateral military actions ▼ phase three (COA development)—first, guid- may be counterproductive because they reverse ance that theater commander must use the termi- the critical flow between political guidance and nation criteria from warning order to develop the application of military force. possible COAs; second, CJCS will evaluate the ▼ The current system for crisis action plan- CINC’s estimate and recommended COA using ning in JOPES does not highlight the need for the termination criteria before submission for the Joint Staff to facilitate the dialogue between NCA approval NCA and operational military commanders on war termination criteria, nor does it mandate the

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▼ phase four (COA selection)—guidance that 14 Ibid., p. 404. CJCS should reconfirm the termination criteria 15 James Blackwell, Michael J. Mazarr, and Don M. with NCA; CJCS should also review the criteria in Snider, Center on Strategic and International Studies either the planning order or the alert order to the Study Group on Lessons Learned from the Gulf War, theater commander The Gulf War—Military Lessons Learned (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 47. ▼ phase five (execution planning)—guidance 16 John T. Fishel, “Liberation, Occupation, and Res- that the theater commander reevaluate the COA cue,” p. 61. selected by NCA in terms of the reconfirmed ter- 17 Ibid., p. 60. mination criteria; CINCs should, situation per- 18 S.L. Arnold, “Somalia: An Operation Other than mitting, bring any shortfalls or limitations to the War,” Military Review (December 1993), p. 34. attention of CJCS and NCA before entering the 19 Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations next phase (Washington: Government Printing Office, May 1993). ▼ phase six (execution)—guidance that CJCS It is important to note that this is still in the proposed monitor the situation for potential changes in the stage of doctrine development and subject to change; as applicability of current termination criteria and currently structured it provides only very generic guidance. communicate them to all concerned parties. 20 Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Wash- The above recommendations will ensure ington: Government Printing Office, September 9, that termination criteria are considered 1993). Chapter 2 fails to mention war termination criteria or post-conflict concerns, but there are numerous throughout the crisis planning process. Until references elsewhere beginning with a three-page dis- then, we will enter every crisis with a built- cussion on p. III-30. in handicap. The time to change JOPES to 21 Joint Pub 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Exe- address this void is now. JFQ cution System, Volume 1, Planning Policies and Procedures (Washington: Government Printing Office, August 4, NOTES 1993), p. I-1. Five volumes and supplements address various aspects of JOPES. Only volume 1 covers the 1 A search revealed 37 books and articles from the minimum content for crisis action planning procedures mid-1980s with an accelerating interest in the 1990s. which should address the areas where war termination 2 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and trans- criteria would fall if it had been properly covered. See lated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: pp. I-2 and I-4. Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 101 and following. 22 Ibid., p. III-2. 3 Ibid., pp. 87–88. 23 Class notes from AFSC Pub 1, p. 6–4. 4 Ibid., p. 88. 24 This paraphrases the definition of crisis found in 5 Harry G. Summers, Jr., “War: Deter, Fight, Termi- Joint Pub 5-03.1, volume 1, p. V-1. nate; The Purpose of War is a Better Peace,” Naval War 25 Ibid., p. V-1. College Review, vol. 39, no. 1 (January–February 1986), 26 Ibid., p. V-1. p. 19. 27 Ibid., p. A-2-1. 6 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A His- 28 Ibid., pp. A-2-1 to A-2-2. tory of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloom- 29 Ibid., pp. A-2-2 to A-2-3. ington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. xxii. 30 Ibid., all of Annex C. 7 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford Univer- 31 Ibid., p.V-15. sity Press, 1963), pp. 109–10. 32 Ibid., pp. A-6-1 to A-6-2. 8 Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, The Eagle’s 33 James W. Reed, “Should Deterrence Fail: War Ter- Talons: The American Experience at War (Maxwell Air mination in Campaign Planning,” Parameters, vol. 23, Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1988), p. 34. no. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 41–42. 9 John T. Fishel, “Liberation, Occupation, and Res- 34 Ibid., pp. 49–50. cue: War Termination and Desert Storm” (Carlisle Bar- racks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 31, 1992), p. 59. 10 Armed Forces Staff College, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 1993, AFSC Pub 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. I-I-41. 11 U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington: Govern- ment Printing Office, April 1992), p. 19. 12 Ronald Dannreuther, “The Gulf Conflict: A Politi- cal and Strategic Analysis,” Adelphi Papers no. 264 (Lon- don: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), p. 57. 13 Lawrence Freedman, The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 403.

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Joint Medical

Support: Medical transport aircraft at Ramstein. (Chris U. Putman) U.S. Air Force Are We Asleep at the Switch? By ARTHUR M. SMITH

he terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks at Beirut airport in 1983 prompted a detailed evaluation of the medical structure available to support similar incidents as well as a conflict in Eu- rope. Some of the medical capabilities probed were command Tand control, casualty evacuation, regulating procedures, facilities capabilities, the transition from routine peacetime to contingency operations, and efficacy of readiness planning. While no life was lost that could have been saved, if the ratio of killed to wounded had been reversed, with more than 200 in need of treatment rather than only half that number, the system might have Captain Arthur M. Smith, USNR, is clinical failed. Has the intervening period enabled us to professor of military and emergency medicine at the Uniformed Services University of the Health assess such shortcomings, adapt to a new security Sciences; he is also professor of surgery at the environment, and offer prompt, consistent care? Medical College of Georgia.

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Analyses of the Beirut bombing revealed medical needs in support of a continuous deficiencies in readiness caused by shortages flow of sick call patients put a heavy demand in personnel, evacuation assets, and materiel, on medical services. Females, for example, as well as lack of joint planning for their comprised 6 percent of deployed naval per- wartime use.1 Such deficiencies were attribut- sonnel, yet only one gynecologist was as- able to the low priority that medical readi- signed to the deployed hospitals, and no ness is given in planning, programming, and space or examination table was allocated in budgeting. Recommendations included the fleet hospitals for gynecologic examina- greater investments in basic readiness re- tion. Similarly, there were insufficient Air sources and refinement of mechanisms for Force gynecologists. Also lacking during the effecting command and control over wartime buildup phase were sufficient orthopedic spe- support and operating those assets. A world- cialists, since members of all services in- wide reassessment of contingency medical curred bone, joint, ligament, and tendon in- capabilities ensued, and a template of princi- juries which required specialized care. While ples for implementing joint support of com- medical units had some sick call supplies and bat operations evolved.2 Then Operation equipment, their inventories could not ac- Desert Storm provided an opportunity to re- commodate the demand. Thus some patients assess progress in meeting readiness goals in were evacuated to distant facilities, often for contrast to the medical support provided in long periods. response to the Beirut tragedy. Prior to ground operations, hospital ships and fleet hospitals were told to expect Deployment that up to 15 percent of casualties would be After Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on Au- contaminated. No service had units designed gust 2, 1990, Saudi Arabia requested assis- or staffed to handle large numbers of such tance and U.S. Central Command (CENT- casualties. Fleet hospitals did not even have COM) tasked the services to decontamination stations. many medical personnel provide specific medical sup- had limited training in port. By most accounts, units Training that were deployed provided To support combat operations medical their military specialties adequate care. In the eyes of training is focused on teaching individual analysts from Capitol Hill, skills and preparing units to perform however, if the war had started earlier or wartime tasks. Individuals must manifest not lasted longer, or if the number of casualties only medical expertise but basic combat had matched the predictions, the care would skills. Likewise, medical units must train to have been grossly inadequate.3 perform fundamental military activities as While the Navy sent the units re- units rather than as individuals with varied quested, casualty predictions were double skills. Units must also perform “militarily what they were intended to handle. For in- unique” medical roles in combat. In an ech- stance, hospital ships designed to receive up eloned medical support structure, for exam- to 100 casualties per day for a sustained pe- ple, surgical care of wounds must be done riod were told to anticipate between 200 and incrementally, at differing facility levels, in- 300; and combat zone fleet hospitals capable stead of total care at one hospital. This of receiving 80 casualties per day were actu- would mean having extensive personnel and ally expecting 200. Under those projections, logistic resources in forward combat areas there would have been shortages in Navy which is not feasible. and Air Force units, although they were Realistic field training with wartime staffed to their authorized levels. Critical equipment is critical for preparing medical shortages would have occurred among gen- personnel to fulfill their mission in a no- eral and orthopedic surgeons, anesthesiolo- warning situation. Yet the DOD inspector gists, nurse anesthetists, operating room general believes the services have failed to nurses, and non-medical support personnel. provide it.4 Following the Gulf War, GAO re- Within Navy fleet hospitals and Air vealed that many medical personnel had Force air transportable hospitals, noncombat limited training in their military specialties or coping with a new environment. Individ- uals in deploying units were often unaware

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of their wartime assignments, particularly ju- were Field Medical Service School (FMSS) nior officers and enlisted personnel. Poor trained. In addition, some corpsmen certified oversight of compliance with mandatory as field medical technicians had never served basic training requirements for officers with FMF. Thus their familiarity with Marine caused deployment delays until those re- operations was limited. A Navy physician quirements were met. with a Marine tank battalion stated that his Many naval medical personnel lacked battalion aid station (BAS) personnel had basic military skills in the Gulf and were ad- limited experience in the transport, assem- judged as ill-prepared to serve in the fleet hos- bly, and disassembly of the station in the pitals, hospital ships, and Fleet Marine Force field. “The most valuable lesson that I hospital facilities. Those stationed on Mercy learned,” he indicated, “is that we must be and Comfort, for example, cited training defi- willing to train during times of peace as we ciencies in shipboard skills such as firefight- will operate during times of conflict.”7 ing, damage control, mass casualty evacua- Many Army medical personnel were also tion, abandon ship procedures, and chemical, adjudged unfamiliar with equipment and fa- biological, and radiological defense. Prior to cilities used by field hospitals and units. Due deployment, fewer than half were trained in to inaccessibility of field equipment, they had those areas, and three quarters had no prior not trained on deployable medical systems shipboard experience. Furthermore, less than which they would use in contingencies. Fol- a fifth of the active duty personnel with the lowing Desert Storm, the CENTCOM surgeon First Fleet Hospital were trained to construct remarked, “The . . . overwhelming emphasis and operate a fleet hospital, much less prac- on peacetime health care conflicted with the tice medicine under field conditions. training and readiness of Army clinical per- Unlike hospital ships with state-of-the- sonnel to provide the best medical care to art equipment, fleet hospitals had technol- large numbers of casualties in the combat ogy from the 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, zone.”8 Moreover, air transportable hospitals most of their personnel had not trained with in the Gulf were supplied with older genera- the aged equipment before arriving in-the- tions of equipment. Consequently, extensive ater, contributing to a pervasive belief that training on the hospital gear was conducted care would be inadequate. Moreover, many for Air Force personnel in-theater. personnel had never, or not recently, treated Mobility trauma patients, and a majority had not During the 1970s and early 1980s vari- completed training in combat casualty care.5 ous studies and joint exercises confirmed the In addition, few fleet hospital and hospital need for standardized deployable facilities. As ship personnel were trained in patient de- developed, the deployable medical systems contamination and treating chemically con- (DEPMEDS) consist of standardized unit taminated casualties. The Navy estimated modules (operating rooms, laboratories, radi- that less than 10 percent of its physicians ology suites, etc.) that can be transported and being deployed could treat such casualties, configured into field hospitals. Although but luckily the buildup allowed them to DEPMEDS modules now comprise a large complete an acceptable level of medical and portion of DOD war reserve equipment, operational training. there remain problems with their mobility, In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the support equipment, and policy guidance. DOD inspector general noted that: “The First While DEPMEDS strategic mobility is Marine Expeditionary Force surgeon ex- paramount to all services, each has differing pressed concern over the training of Navy tactical requirements. The Army needs a medical forces that were deployed to the considerable amount of tactical mobility Fleet Marine Force (FMF). The surgeon said since its field hospitals support advancing that Navy corpsmen, doctors, and nurses combat forces. To move a 60-bed mobile who augmented FMF did not have the opera- army surgical hospital (MASH), for example, tional training to be immediately effective. requires organic transport to haul 63 con- As he stated, ‘Thank goodness we had five to tainers configured in fifty 40-foot truckloads. six weeks to get everyone trained prior to the war’s beginning.’”6 Indeed, not all corpsmen, physicians, and nurses who augmented FMF

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Many hospitals lacked trucks and handling such as Proud Eagle, Reforger, and Team equipment for such a move, which meant Spirit. Although DOD has tried to field inter- that only part of the bed capacity and surgi- operative and reliable equipment for combat cal capability of a MASH could go forward as units, no comparable effort was made for the ground war began. As a result—due to medical units. In 1986 the Secretary of De- the speed of the battle—more than 40 per- fense issued a policy for fully equipping the cent of bed capacity was left behind in order first to fight (deploy) regardless of compo- to allow MASH units to be positioned to pro- nent. While both XVIII and VII Corps met vide surgical support early. Furthermore, the criteria, those medical units were not some units were not fully mobile even when equipped with adequate communication there were adequate trucks because the fifty equipment. 40-foot vehicles could not keep up with the When Desert Shield began in August combat forces and had to wait until the en- 1990 the communication equipment was in- gineers built roads.9 adequate. The services had not identified or subsequently resourced their requirements. Communication For example, tables of organization and Shortfalls in communication during the equipment for Army contingency hospitals Gulf War degraded the casualty receiving cited a need for AM and FM radios. While mission, compromised personnel and patient FM radios were listed, hospitals had a lower safety, and hampered contact between treat- priority than combat units and rarely re- ment facilities and control elements. These ceived them. Moreover, the services have ac- problems were primarily related to divergent quired communication equipment that is capabilities and limitations not interoperable. These problems will con- at the inter- and intra-ser- patient regulating systems tinue until the commitment is made to a vice levels. Medical units did not provide effective joint, interoperable communication system could not communicate that includes medical units.10 oversight of casualties with control elements, one another, supported combat Evacuation units, or supporting logistics units. While Prompt and well-planned casualty evac- moving into Iraq, some field hospitals had uation requires matching patient needs and no method of communicating with combat treatment facilities. It assures that hospitals and evacuation units for several days. are not over- or underutilized, which is es- Dialogue between medical units and be- sential when numerous facilities are avail- tween the different levels of care (for exam- able. In the Persian Gulf War patient regulat- ple, from aeromedical evacuation units to ing systems did not provide effective field hospitals) was difficult due to the mix oversight of casualties. Communications of radio equipment and the use of commer- problems were the greatest limitation. cial and tactical telephone systems. Without Troops could not talk to ambulances. Radios communication capability, Army field hospi- used by medical regulators had operating tals and some Air Force facilities frequently ranges of 15 miles in a corps area 250 miles had no forewarning of the number or type deep and 100 miles wide. Therefore ambu- of casualties. The only warning some hospi- lance crews, using similar equipment, could tals had was when aeromedical evacuation not communicate with most evacuation reg- helicopters landed with patients. Helicopters ulators or hospitals and took patients to fa- and hospitals could not communicate with cilities whose locations they knew, not to each other; the former had FM radios with a those best suited to the needs of patients. range of only 20 miles and the latter had AM One air ambulance crew reported flying radios with only line-of-sight capability that directly to a hospital over enemy tanks and when used near a battlefield could be traced infantry after picking up casualties. If it had by the enemy. been a shooting war the aircraft and its crew Similar communication problems were might have been lost for want of direc- identified during Urgent Fury and Just tions.11 To overcome communication prob- Cause, and in subsequent joint exercises lems, both VII and XVIII Corps had air ambulances making repeated round trips between a designated forward collection

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point and a drop-off area in the rear near range helicopters in the Gulf. This shortfall hospitals. As a medical officer with a Marine was partly due to the fact that Navy tank battalion noted, “The locations of aeromedical needs were never previously higher echelon field medical facilities were levied on the Army and Marine Corps, so not even available at the battalion or divi- the services did not program for them. As sion level!”12 noted by the Navy, “Lack of dedicated tacti- In the Gulf War, the Air Force—as lead cal aeromedical evacuation capability in service for joint theater medical regulating— naval services would have created difficul- was to provide the communications system ties had the theater matured as ex- to regulate the movement of patients to ap- pected....”14 propriate facilities. A report by the Air Mobil- Patients brought to underway hospital ity Command stated that communications ships must be transported by helicopter. Due problems resulted in 43 percent of patients to ship design, access by sea is not consid- landing at the wrong airport which required ered reliable. In rough seas, ship-to-ship pa- their rerouting.13 In sum, the inability of reg- tient transfers can be unsafe. Helicopter ulators to manage evacuation could have led transport to hospital ships was problematic to underusing some hospitals and over- in the Persian Gulf because each ship had whelming others, a tragedy if the casualties only one landing pad, helicopter capacities had met projections. Even automated sys- were limited, and the ships had to stay out tems were not standard, interoperable, or of harm’s way. As a result the distance and available in all theaters and could not track travel time would have increased. Hospital individual patients. Each service had its own ships might not have been fully used to treat system, and the incompatibility of systems mass casualties, therefore, even if combat severely limited interservice communication. had continued. Moving patients under medical supervi- Further shortfalls in Air Force aeromed- sion to or between treatment facilities by ical evacuation assets could have affected pa- military or military chartered transport is tient care as well. One after-action report known as medical evacuation. While all the stated that because of insufficient aircraft, services maintain tactical and strategic air- the predicted flow of casualties would have craft for combat and combat support, the overwhelmed the system. Furthermore, even Army and Marines provide most tactical if aircraft were identified, shortfalls existed ground and helicopter lift for medical evacu- in crews and in-flight equipment. As the Air ation. The primary Air Force medical mission Force surgeon general noted, “We were for- is in-theater fixed wing aeromedical intra- tunate that the medical evacuation system and intertheater evacuation. Problems arose was not taxed in Desert Shield/Desert in Desert Storm with ground ambulances and Storm.” Substantial shortages in strategic helicopters in tactical evacuation of patients. and tactical aeromedical evacuation would Ground ambulances often could not be used have materialized.15 because of rugged terrain, lack of naviga- Shortfalls in aeromedical evacuation as- tional equipment, and distances between sets were not new. They were identified in hospitals and front lines. Even for air evacua- Reforger ’87 and Wintex ’88 and ’89. During tion units long distances required refueling. Wintex in Europe, lack of dedicated Air ambulances landed near ground vehicles aeromedical evacuation paralyzed the entire to request fuel or directions to fuel supplies. combat zone until 3,000 casualties could be Lacking organic aeromedical evacuation moved.16 Furthermore, while the Air Force assets, the Navy depends on returning (ret- was responsible for evacuating casualties, rograde) aircraft that are primarily assigned most hospitals lacked sufficient personnel combat support missions other than med- and equipment for patient care during ical as transportation of opportunity for flights. Under an Air Force requirement, a moving casualties to hospital ships and fleet hospital unit sending a patient needing con- hospitals. But such aircraft may be scarce, stant attention had to provide an in-flight and the ability of ships to receive and treat medical attendant and specialized equipment casualties can be limited by transport difficulties. Indeed, Army and Marine medical officials noted the inadequacy of short

106 JFQ / Summer 1995 Smith Pgs 8/26/97 12:52 PM Page 107 y (James Bowman)

MASH surgery during Provide Promise. Combat Camera Imager

existing medical mobilization plans lacked a substantial

joint perspective U.S. Marine Corps

Caring for injured Marine in Beirut.

USNS Comfort U.S. Navy (Joe Gawlowicz) during Desert Storm. such as ventilators or cardiac monitors. The Navy control of medical equipment and Air Force required service medical units to supplies prior to and during Desert have equipment and supplies to last five days Storm/Desert Shield was also inadequate and for each patient evacuated, as well as moni- medical units had incompatible supplies. For toring personnel. In addition, two fleet hos- example, cartridges did not fit surgical guns pitals were to care for patients at evacuation and film did not match x-ray machines. staging sites. These requirements were not Equipment and supplies in fleet hospitals anticipated by Navy units; consequently, were often not packed according to the they were never included in the fleet hospital manifest, making field assembly time-con- and hospital ship authorization levels. Fi- suming. Materiel from different functional nally, had the casualty rates approached pre- areas was packed together, and in one case dicted levels, the inventory of ventilators, in- materiel that belonged in one or two con- travenous fluids, medications, blankets, tainers was dispersed among thirty. Short litters, and other items would have been shelf-life items such as intravenous fluids rapidly exhausted. and sterile and pharmaceutical supplies were either expired or in limited supply. Logistics Air Force hospitals found that lab chem- One opinion held in the Gulf was that icals in some prepositioned packs could not prepositioned medical packs were not appro- be used with available equipment. Some priately managed and updated. An air trans- dated back to the 1950s, others were miss- portable hospital, for example, ordered to re- ing. A critical shortage of aeromedical evacu- locate after being established, set up a ation kits would have hindered patient second time using a different prepositioned movement had casualties been heavy. Fur- package. While the first package had been in thermore, some critical items had not been place only two years, equipment was miss- properly maintained and were not based on ing, batteries had exceeded their storage life, current equipment lists. A report described critical chemicals for lab areas were missing, the program at one location as “a major and medicines and other supplies were out- medical disaster.”17 dated. The second package, although newer, The inspector general reported that con- lacked ventilators, cardiac monitors, and mi- tingency medical logistics support was ham- croscopes. Another hospital spent $1.5 mil- pered by trouble with the single integrated lion on local purchases to replace articles in medical logistics manager (SIMLM) system. its prepositioned package.

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Under this concept, one service is responsi- sharing in peacetime, coordinating service ble for primary medical logistics support to operations in wartime, nor resolving incon- all DOD customers in a specified geographic sistencies among the components’ plans. area. In the Gulf, Army medical supply and The DOD inspector general reported in ophthalmic maintenance (MEDSOM) mid-1993 that existing medical mobilization units—the basic logistics structure for the plans did not generally reflect changes in SIMLM mission—did not possess adequate planning scenarios, force structure, or med- personnel or material handling equipment ical support policies. It further alleged that and mobility for the support requirements.18 the plans were dated, lacked a substantial Army MEDSOM units, for example, did joint perspective, and went largely untested not carry sufficient supplies of service- and unvalidated. Medical personnel require- unique items including various non-stan- ments likewise did not reflect changes aris- dard, state-of-the-art items used by hospital ing from Desert Storm (for example, newer ships. Fleet hospitals and even a Marine operational doctrine and the continuation tank unit BAS also experienced shortages. of the peacetime health care mission in con- Authorized medical resupply cans routinely tingencies). The report predicted problems if arrived partly filled or empty.19 Inadequate the Joint Staff and unified commands do not communications and incompatibility be- ensure that all components can realistically tween the Navy and Army supply systems fulfill medical support requirements. Insuffi- further rendered Army SIMLM supply sup- cient oversight has led to inaccurate data, in- port insufficient for naval needs which re- complete readiness information, and unreal- sulted in increased order and shipping times. istic plans (many pre-dating changes in the Consequently, the Navy got only half of its threat). But the report acknowledged that supplies through SIMLM. such deficiencies did not lead to degradation The reasons for the SIMLM failure in- of medical support in Desert Storm, no cluded poor planning, misunderstood re- doubt because of the substantial time be- quirements, and an inadequate support tween mobilization and the start of offensive structure. A CENTCOM report noted that operations.21 “Without a clearly defined task organization The report further noted that opera- that is concurred with by all components, tional planning had not promoted efficient and a concept of standard operational doc- use or sharing of medical assets. CENTCOM, trine, the MEDSOM (used as the quasi- EUCOM, and PACOM did not plan for inte- SIMLM) will remain a haphazard organiza- grated medical support but instead tasked tion requiring coordination and compromise service components to care for their own with the components each and every time personnel. CENTCOM and EUCOM plans deployed. In a rapidly developing theater, even tasked the services to provide their own the valuable time and effort to do this can- patient evacuation. These inconsistencies not be afforded.”20 have persisted largely because of poor testing of medical systems during joint exercises Policy and Planning and inadequate service oversight of mobi- A general lack of joint medical planning lization plans for contingency hospitals and can hamper resource sharing and create medical treatment facilities. confusion over responsibilities. In 1984, for Joint exercises generally provide realistic example, the Zimble report noted that no combat training and evaluation of fighting joint comprehensive plan for service assets forces. According to the inspector general existed. The service plans were described as these exercises tend to include only token “stovepipe documents” which bore little re- medical participation and cannot validate lation to each other. This resulted from a readiness. Although medical units have peri- tendency of each component’s medical ser- odic in-house training, large-scale interservice vice to support personnel of its own line exercises do not exist. Limited participation units in a vacuum, as well as a lack of joint leaves commanders without independent val- command medical staffing to arbitrate. idation of medical unit capabilities, readiness, There was no mechanism for cross-service or risks. Unless the medical community is more active in joint exercises, planners will remain unable to assess readiness and train-

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ing requirements. They will also have little Forces to Provide Medical Care and Evacuation in the foundation for making tradeoffs when an op- European Theater,” DOD IG audit report 87-048, No- vember 17, 1986. erational demand arises.22 3 U.S. General Accounting Office, “Operation Desert Joint planning and contingency utiliza- Storm: Full Army Capability Not Achieved,” GAO/T- tion of triservice medical assets takes practice. NSIAD-92-8, GAO/NSIAD-92-175; “Operation Desert In the final analysis the Armed Forces must Storm: Improvements Required in the Navy’s Wartime ensure more realistic medical unit participa- Medical Care Program,” GAO/NSIAD-93-189; “Opera- tion in exercises. This should include interser- tion Desert Storm: Problems with Air Force Medical Readiness,” GAO/NSIAD-94-58; “Medical Readiness vice medical participation, interaction with Training: Limited Participation by Army Medical Per- combat and support units, communication sonnel,” GAO/NSIAD-93-205. with control of supported and supporting 4 U.S. Department of Defense, “Medical Mobilization units, and enough patients to validate patient Planning and Execution,” DOD IG report 93-Ins-13. 5 care and movement concepts. Erwin F. Hirsch, “Were Naval Medical Forces Pre- pared?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 118, no. 7 Professional medical personnel must (July 1992), pp. 93–95; Donald Trunkey, “Lessons also meet basic and field training require- Learned,” Archives of Surgery, vol. 128 (March 1993), pp. ments, which is usually left to medical treat- 261–64. ment facility commanders. Being responsible 6 DOD IG report 93-Ins-13, p. 71. 7 for in-house patient care and staff readi- R.J. Burke, “Medical Support for U.S. Marine Corps Armored Battalion: Problems Encountered During Oper- ness—including field training—these com- ation Desert Shield/Storm/Cease Fire and Some of Their manders may not always comply with opera- Solutions,” paper presented at the Seventh Conference tional training requirements. Since hospitals on Military Medicine, “The Spectrum of Medical Support receive resources based on their annual out- to Operation Desert Shield/Storm,” April 13–15, 1992. 8 put (commonly known as medical care D.G. Tsoulos, “Preparing the Theater Army Med- ical System for War,” paper presented at the Seventh credit units), commanders have a substantial Conference on Military Medicine. incentive to keep credit units high and the 9 GAO/NSIAD 92-175, p. 40. cost of Champus low by retaining their med- 10 DOD IG report 93-Ins-13, pp. 119–26; GAO/NSIAD ical staffs in-house. 92-175, pp. 46–47. 11 How have we done since the Beirut disas- GAO/NSIAD 92-175, p. 47. 12 Burke, “Medical Support.” ter? History will ultimately adjudge whether 13 GAO/NSIAD 94-58, p. 10. we have been asleep at the switch, but the 14 DOD IG report 93-Ins-13, p. 150. cost of medical readiness remains an unpopu- 15 Ibid., p. 151. lar issue among those who seek peacetime 16 Ibid., p. 148. 17 budget cuts. Medical preparation and training GAO/NSIAD 94-58, p. 6. 18 U.S. General Accounting Office, “Operation Desert for combat, however, are akin to an insurance Storm: Army Medical Supply Issues,” GAO/NSIAD-93- policy. When not needed, it seems to be a for- 206; “Desert Shield/Storm Logistics: Observations by midable expense; but if needed, one wonders U.S. Military Personnel,” GAO/NSIAD-92-26; GAO/ why the coverage was not greater. The Armed NSIAD 92-175; DOD IG report 93-Ins-13, p. 127. 19 Forces expect and deserve adequate medical Burke, “Medical Support.” 20 DOD IG report 93-Ins-13, p. 130. care, especially in combat. The certainty of it 21 DOD IG report 93-Ins-13. has motivated troops to victory; its lack has 22 Ibid.; U.S. General Accounting Office, “Joint Mili- reduced their will to fight and created the po- tary Operations: DOD’s Renewed Emphasis on Interop- tential for disaster on the battlefield. JFQ erability Is Important but not Adequate,” GAO/NSIAD- 94-47; “Operation Desert Storm: War Offers Important NOTES Insights into Army and Marine Corps Training Needs,” GAO/NSIAD-92-240; “Operation Desert Storm: Army 1 U.S. Department of Defense Medical Readiness Re- Had Difficulty Providing Adequate Active and Reserve view Group,“Medical Readiness Planning in the U.S. Eu- Support Forces,” GAO/NSIAD-92-67. ropean Command” [Zimble report] (Washington: Gov- ernment Printing Office, April 18, 1984). For an examination of the bombing of the Marine barracks, see U.S. Department of Defense, “Report of the DOD Com- mission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act” (Washington: Government Printing Office, December 20, 1983). 2 U.S. Department of Defense, Medical Readiness Re- view Group, “Medical Readiness Status in the United States Pacific Command” (Washington: Government Printing Office, June 1, 1984); “Capabilities of U.S.

Summer 1995 / JFQ 109 C&C Letters Pgs 8/26/97 1:03 PM Page 110

OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN

General Carl Andrew Spaatz (1891–1974) Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

VITA

orn in Boyertown, Pennsylvania; graduated from Military Academy (1914); commissioned in the infantry; Schofield Barracks (1914–15); aviation school, San Diego B(1915–16); 1st aero squadron (punitive expedition, Mexico) and 3d aero squadron, San Antonio (1916– 17); 31st aero squadron, American aviation school, and 2d pursuit group, France (1917–18); assistant air service officer, Western Department, California and Texas (1919–20); Kelly Air Field (1920–21); air officer, 8th Corps Area (1920); 1st pursuit group, Ellington and Selfridge Fields (1921–24); Air Corps Tactical School, Langley Field (1924–25); office of the chief of the Air Corps (1925–29); commanded refueling flight near Los Angeles for With reference to the unification compro- 150 hours, 40 minutes, and 15 mise, I suppose there will always be a seconds (1929); Rockwell and

controversy over who got what out of the U.S. Air Force Art Collection March Fields (1929–33); chief agreement. The fact that each interested Portrait by of training and operations party feels that the other got the best Thomas E. Stephens. (1933–35); Command and General Staff College, Fort break is probably the strongest argument Leavenworth (1935); Langley Field (1936–39); assistant in favor of the soundness of the agreed executive to chief of the Air Corps (1939); special mili- scheme. So far as the Air Force is con- tary observer, England (1940); chief, plans division, and cerned, we will...achieve the position of chief, air staff, Army Air Forces (1940–42); Army Air independence and parity with the other Force Combat Command (1940); 8th Air Force; Army services. I feel that the aircraft, air facili- Air Forces, European Theater; 12th Air Force; Northwest ties, and air functions not under the Air African Air Force; Mediterranean Allied Air Forces; U.S. Force are at least under a top authority Strategic Air Forces, Europe (1942–44); Air Force Head- who can insure that they are not misap- quarters; U.S. Strategic Air Forces, Pacific; attended sur- plied or used to establish a basis of en- renders at Rheims, Berlin, and Tokyo (1945); Comman- croachment on the proper activities of the der of Army Air Forces (1946–47), and subsequently the Air Force. We believe that the agree- first Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (1947–48); died at ment...will be a forward step for the Air Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Force and will represent marked progress in the operating efficiency and economy of our Armed Forces.

—Letter from “Tooey” Spaatz to “Hap” Arnold cited in Master of Airpower: General Carl A. Spaatz by David R. Metz

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FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

Corps Business Contrary to Hooker’s assertion, the Army, To the Editor— I am writing with regard to by either law or custom, does not exist “to win Richard Hooker’s article, “America’s Two the Nation’s wars.” Historically, the Army has Letters... Armies,” which appeared in JFQ (Autumn/Winter failed to meet the initial test of combat. By law, 1994–95). My dissatisfaction with this funda- the Army conducts prompt, sustained land com- mentally distorted article starts with the thesis bat, generally as part of a joint or combined that: “We have two services which see their core force. By custom, all services contribute to joint An Army Message... operations in successfully prosecuting war. By From the Sea business as sustained land operations.” The Marine Corps has a legislated mission and force custom and law, one service is expected to be at To the Editor— As the only Army officer de- structure that is distinct from the Army’s. Built a very high state of readiness to prevent or con- ployed with an amphibious ready group (ARG), I into its legislatively-mandated role is the require- tain such conflicts. participated in the first “workups” by the Navy for ment for a combined arms force composed of —Frank G. Hoffman deployment (on the west coast) of an ARG and a both air and ground components to engage in, Committee on Roles and carrier battle group (CVBG). One of my duties seize, and defend advanced naval bases inci- Missions of the Armed Forces was preparing the daily air tasking order (ATO) as dent to prosecuting a naval campaign. The ca- the helicopter coordinator for an embarked tacti- pabilities needed to execute these tasks, such To the Editor— I compliment the authors cal air control squadron (TACRON) detachment. as artillery or tanks, might lead the uninformed of two articles which were published in the Au- To put it mildly, it was interesting to write a Navy- to think there is a deliberate attempt to build re- tumn/Winter 1994–95 issue of your journal, Marine air schedule. The highlight was a six- dundant forces. These capabilities and systems Richard Hooker for “America’s Two Armies” and month deployment aboard USS Peleliu for opera- are consistent with the mandated role and func- Thomas Linn and C.P. Neimeyer for “Once and tions that included Continue Hope and Quickdraw tion of the Marines and are not intended to com- Future Marines.” Yet while their arguments are off Somalia as well as Distant Runner, a noncom- pete with the Army. It is difficult to envision that well put, both articles contain a number of flaws batant evacuation operation in Burundi. the Corps with only 271 tanks poses a threat to and, thus, cannot be considered as definitive. As a team the CVBG and ARG have an the Army’s 7,000 tanks and 20,000 armored For instance, while Hooker presents a rea- awesome amount of firepower. They can provide vehicles. In short, the Marine Corps is not in the soned case on why the Marines should revert to a quick-reaction, one-two punch in remote trou- business of sustained land operations nor does being the Nation’s amphibious force, he fails to ble spots around the world. CVBGs and ARGs it see itself as such. consider whether the modernized tanks and did not typically work together in the past be- The business of the Marines as defined by MLRS requested by the Corps will be required cause the former focused on fighting the Rus- Congress in the aftermath of the Korean conflict for amphibious assaults in the 21st century. In sians in open-ocean nuclear war and the latter arose from the need for a force-in-readiness addition, he does not acknowledge that the law conducted training and deployments separately. that is highly mobile, constantly ready, and ap- stipulates that the Marine Corps should perform As with any new doctrine or concept, there are plicable across a broad spectrum of possible other tasks as directed by the President. While challenges to overcome. It was interesting to ob- contingencies “to prevent potential conflagra- that may mean that the Marines should take on serve the Navy leadership wrestling with com- tions and to hold full-scale aggression at bay sustained land combat or expeditionary mis- mand and control issues. Who is the supported while the American Nation mobilizes.” In creat- sions, it casts doubt on the extent to which the and who is the supporting commander? How is ing a force to suppress international distur- law allows them to perform what some regard the composite warfare command structure mod- bances, it was determined that a balanced, as “Army missions.” ified and will it change once command and con- combined arms team in a high state of readi- Linn and Neimeyer see the Marines as the trol of the operation is phased ashore? Many of ness was required. Nation’s expeditionary force, but their argument the same issues and struggles are encountered From this strategic assessment and de- is supported by many undocumented quotes in integrating service capabilities through a joint sign, Hooker finds a “propensity of the Marine which suggests the quotes may be taken out of task force (JTF). Corps to wage sustained land combat.” It is true context. The more subtle assertion that the Corps Interoperability between the carrier Navy that the Corps provided forces for World War I represents the American way of war while the and the amphibious Navy is an evolving process. and II as well as Korea and Vietnam. Much of Army has forgotten its roots is inaccurate, unfair, By the end of our workups we had a superior this combat was fought on land, and for sus- and irrelevant—particularly when roles and func- fighting force and follow-on CVBG/ARG teams tained periods. But the reason such forces were tions are the real issue. The argument is weakest are getting better. As a member of a TACRON, I ordered into action and operated for extended in claiming that the Marines always have been learned the synergy of bringing a carrier air wing periods is more a function of their initial use in intended to be an expeditionary force and basing to the amphibious fight. With submarine and air crisis response and the lack of preparedness. that claim almost exclusively on statements by threats, an ARG simply cannot go into battle If there is a propensity it is an expectation former Commandants, Secretaries of the Navy, et alone. The CVBG/ARG team is a lethal package by the National Command Authorities for prompt al. That the Marines should be the Nation’s expe- that can rapidly project combat power ashore and exacting mission execution. This perfor- ditionary force—since they historically define and defeat the enemy below the surface, on the mance, whether in crises requiring a delicate themselves as such—eludes all logic. surface, and in the air. balance of political actions and military force or Regardless, both articles inform debate on —Major Paul R. Disney, USA in full expeditionary warfare with ground and air the complementary nature of service capabilities. TACRON 11 forces, has been a standard of excellence which —LTC Robert E. Johnson, USA Naval Air Base, Coronado our national leaders expect as a byproduct of the Springfield, Virginia particular role and function of the Marine Corps.

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FROM THE FIELD AND FLEET

Tales Out of School To the Editor— Robert Kupiszewski’s Presence Is in the To the Editor— I can’t imagine a more article covers a range of PME issues and offers Beholder’s Eye some far-reaching, even revolutionary proposals. sure-fire way of ruining Professional Military Ed- To the Editor— As an Air Force officer as- Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act ucation (PME) than by adopting the main pro- signed to CENTCOM, I read “Global Presence” the Armed Forces have made steady progress in posal offered by Robert Kupiszewski in “Joint (see JFQ, Spring 1995), the new Air Force white integrating jointness into education, training, Education for the 21st Century” (see Out of Joint, paper, with interest. It is incomplete and appears and operations. JFQ itself symbolizes the emer- JFQ, Spring 1995). “I propose,” the author to be an extension of the strategic bomber ver- gence of joint culture. states, “forming a joint command to oversee sus carrier battle group debate. My views on The Chairman is responsible for coordinat- every aspect of education....” If one’s aim is presence have been shaped by the unique situa- ing education by law. Cooperation between the to fertilize arrogance, nurture dogma, and instill tion faced by CENTCOM. The command is lo- joint community and services has significantly perfect knowledge, then no surer path to its ac- cated 7,000 nautical miles from its AOR, with improved the quality and scope of joint educa- complishment could be envisioned. relatively few permanently assigned or forward tion and, since 1991, service war and staff col- Congress was well aware of that danger in based forces, in a volatile region where the leges have been accredited by CJCS to provide crafting the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It did not, as United States has vital national interests. joint education. the article contends, “[place] responsibility for As “Global Presence” notes, presence is Beside improving current education, atten- PME under the Chairman” as a “major step to- situational, and there is consequently no single, tion has been given to the year 2000 and be- ward unity of command....” What the law did universally correct type of presence forces re- yond. In October 1994, CJCS named a panel of do was assign CJCS “coordinating authority” for quired. That said, the white paper does not dis- cross-functional, flag-level representatives to reeducation policy. All of us who have been in the cuss key aspects of military presence. The utility view the PME system and its ability to prepare joint community for any length of time know the of presence, like beauty, is in the eye of the be- joint warfighters in the future. The panel con- precise difference between that authority and holder. What’s missing? Certainly visibility, cluded that the commitment to joint matters has other forms of command. The law states that lethality, and nonmilitary dimensions of presence continued to evolve since Goldwater-Nichols was the Chairman shall be responsible for “formulat- warrant more consideration. Presence serves at enacted into law. ing policies for coordinating the military educa- least two objectives which are critical to regional Joint acculturation is occurring among tion and training of members of the Armed stability: as a deterrent to would-be aggressors members of the Armed Forces earlier in their ca- Forces [emphasis added].” CJCS can write poli- (and early defensive force if deterrence fails) and reers because of increased emphasis on joint cies to ensure that the services properly coordi- as a means of access—a foot in the door to training and exercises. As a result officers arrive nate the training and education of their soldiers, support various national interests beyond mili- at staff colleges with a greater appreciation of sailors, airmen, and marines. And, by the bye, tary crisis response. other services which enhances the joint environ- the Secretary of Defense had better sign these For a force to be a deterrent it must be ment that is so vital to learning. The panel also coordinating policies if they are to be followed seen as a credible threat to hostile acts by a po- recommended that the PME framework be ex- since, as the law states, the Chairman is not in tential enemy. The perceptions of credibility to a panded to include every level—viz., precommis- the chain of command. target audience (friend or foe) is at the heart of sioning, primary, intermediate, and senior—and More importantly, competition, diversity of forward presence. To a sophisticated foe, vulner- that certified resident intermediate and senior opinion, multiple approaches, and broad fields of able to long-range strategic attack, it may be education be designed to fulfill educational re- investigation—all of which sound very Ameri- sufficient to periodically move forces into its quirements for Joint Specialty Officers to prepare can, very market-oriented, and very characteris- radar/sensor coverage. It becomes evident that them for joint assignments immediately upon tic of the unique strengths of our Nation—con- the United States is there, concerned and capa- graduation from a joint or service PME institution. stitute the essence of good education, inside or ble. To other audiences, over-the-horizon/low vis- Jointness is not a panacea. Efforts to incul- outside the military. Imagine putting the presi- ibility or occasional presence may be less threat- cate jointness into training, education, and oper- dent of Harvard in charge of all the engineering ening to foes and less reassuring to friends. ations should not lose sight of the primary impor- schools in the country and then expecting in ten In addition to visibility, lethality of forward tance of proficiency in the roles and missions of years to find a single competent engineer in the presence forces is key to deterrence as well as one’s own service. The balance between joint United States. Picture that scenario and you essential during initial defense. This is particu- and service education is paramount to organizing have the major defect in the article’s formula for larly true when attempting to delay/disrupt an educational oversight bodies. Efficiencies can be future education in the Armed Forces. Consoli- attack, buy time to deploy, and bring to bear ad- gained by consolidating and collocating colleges dation does not produce “the same level of ex- equate force capability for decisive defeat of an and headquarters, but at what cost? Further- cellence”; rather it will guarantee the same level aggressor. Again, this is threat/target depen- more, creating greater capacity at colleges would of mediocrity. And the saints preserve us if train- dent. A flyover of B–2s in Somalia would not not necessarily result in more officers being edu- ing is to be placed under the same czar which have been nearly as effective as a deterrent/re- cated, because only a finite number of officers Kupiszewski seems to be suggesting. Education sponse capability as an amphibious ready group can attend college and satisfy other mission re- and training are like Mozart and cordite: nor- steaming over the horizon with the appearance quirements. mally they are not mixed since their purposes of AC–130s and helicopter gunships. are antithetical. —Brig Gen David E. Baker, USAF Credible forward presence, as a symbol of —COL Lawrence B. Wilkerson, USA Deputy Director, Joint Staff, commitment to allies and friends, is at the heart Deputy Director for Military Education of access and future international cooperative Marine Corps War College efforts whether they be economic or collective crisis response. In an era of declining forces, there is a high probability that operations in the

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future will be multinational. Seeds of collective Engineering Blinders flexibility. That is the key to understanding the security are planted by forward presence forces To the Editor— I thank Chris Golden for his future of war. If we get the basic thinking about that nurture military-to-military relationships. Bi- comments (see “From the Field and Fleet,”JFQ, the possibilities of 1990s warfare clear as Gude- lateral and multilateral relations, in turn, are built Spring 1995) on my article, “Software Warfare: rian did in the 1930s, it is but a few doctrinal on a history of cooperation in exercises, security The Militarization of Logic,” which appeared in steps to having control over the real motor of the assistance, etc., which depend on forward de- the Summer 1994 issue of JFQ. Nobody is sug- RMA. ployed forces. gesting modifying code on the fly in the battle- —Sqn Ldr Peter C. Emmett, RAF Air Force strategic forces have significant field. Software adaptability—logical mobility— Defence Research Agency presence value, but not universally and not to comes in many ways, of which the user-screen Ministry of Defence the exclusion of other force packages. These interface, artificial intelligence, and code modifi- force packages should be handcrafted—de- cations are just some of the options. Software Wargaming and signed for the appropriate level of visibility and complexity is indeed inevitable, however you de- lethality—to send the intended message of de- Stimulation fine it, which is why we need overarching doc- To the Editor— I was gratified to see that terrence/reassurance that best supports the the- trine to guide us through the maze. But my arti- ater strategy. Let’s be joint. my article on the “Future Directions for Wargam- cle was about the big picture, not engineering ing” generated the three thoughtful letters in —Col Ronald E. Dietz, USAF detail—an attempt to trigger a realization that your last issue (see “The Fog of Wargaming,” Chief, Policy and Strategy software is the powerhouse of the Revolution in JFQ, Spring 1995, pp. 102–03). Such interest- CENTCOM Military Affairs. It is to this wider horizon that I ing comments deserve a response. would encourage my engineering colleagues to First, an apology to CDR M.K. Murray. Augmenting the JFACC lift their gaze. More than ever it is necessary for Painting with a broad brush frequently spatters To the Editor—Maj Gen Hurley is right on software engineers to recognize the power of the innocent. I have a deep and abiding respect target in “JFACC—Taking the Next Step” (JFQ, what they create at the keyboard and to become for Naval War College’s long history of resisting Spring 1995) when he identifies the need for a fully engaged in current operational debates. the siren song of sexy new technology. Its effort trained cadre on the CINC’s air component staff. They must realize that they are participants in a to remain true to that tradition while aggressively In this regard I suggest we are overlooking a po- grand process of change every bit as important attacking the problems of the future is an object tential source of trained cadres or augmentation as that triggered by mechanization and electron- lesson for every DOD wargaming activity. staffs—the Reserves. ics. That is the real meaning of software war- William Cooper points out inherent ten- Dedicated Reserve staffs could be trained fare—it delineates the new era of warfare. Soft- sions in using gaming to train operators on sys- and prepared to mobilize or deploy in keeping ware engineers will be needed in future war and tems and procedures. If indeed the intent of with current continued readiness. They could the wider their perception of what is going on BFTT precludes controllers from allowing the fog augment exercise JFACC staffs during annual operationally, the greater will be the demand for of war to “fall too thickly” because “the result training and drill with their component air com- their talents. But they must be prepared to think would be incorrect and invalid operational train- mand and control agencies. Moreover they could sideways and for major changes in the business ing,” then some other means of educating play- drill with agencies of other services to further of software production. ers about real world effects of mistakes and un- enhance their knowledge and skills. The costs of software production on over- certainties must be found. But I am puzzled over Such staffs need not be service specific. stretched budgets are already staggering and how a realistic fog of war could ever be incorrect Consideration should be given to forming joint the engineering-oriented approach to solving the and invalid. Reserve individual mobilization augmentee de- crisis has got us nowhere. Look at the ever- Finally, Edward Marks maintains that PKO tachments at the headquarters of every warfight- growing list of project failures in which software games “teach the wrong lessons.” Games do ing CINC. The Reserve forces have proven that is cited as the principal cause (further spectacu- not teach, they help players learn. Improperly they can perform professionally and efficiently in lar failures are on the way). The West is busy designed games, managed and controlled pri- responding to crises. A JFACC augmentation procuring fighter aircraft so technologically “ad- marily to play the game (“in a rush to deploy the staff mission seems almost made to order. vanced” that can hardly be flown. The time is ‘big battalions’”) almost always lead down the —Col Steven C. Morgan, USMCR long overdue to ask—what’s it doing for us and garden path to a proverbial dung heap of false Commanding Officer how about getting some economy of effort out of lessons. If you buy the scenario, you buy the Reserve Support Unit software? Remove the engineering blinders that farm. But the fault is not with gaming. It is not MCABWEST El Toro condemn software to the domain of “experts.” the case that “wargaming is inappropriate to There’s no such thing in this game. Bring princi- multinational operations.” The Dutch have been ples of war to bear on the problem. At present using gaming since 1992 to explore political- the focus is on information. But information has military issues. No, the problem lies not in JFQ always been critical—as much to the Romans wargames but in how gamers apply them. If you welcomes your letters and as to us. Information does not underpin the must distort reality to either meet an arbitrary comments. RMA; what has really changed is the ability to “training imperative” or fall “into step with ap- process information—using software—and to proved doctrine,” then it is time to reexamine Write or FAX your communications apply it at the sharp end with weaponry that is your training and doctrine. to (202) 475–1012/DSN 335–1012 also under software control. Increasingly battle- —Peter P. Perla or send them via Internet to field information and weapons can be linked di- Center for Naval Analyses [email protected] rectly in an automated loop. The trick is how to do this with maximum speed, effectiveness, and

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IN BRIEF The Joint Staff: Completing the Metamorphosis By MARK C. NESSELRODE

rior to 1870 the German gen- and policy exist to guide technologi- supporting commands, operations eral staff developed organiza- cal improvements, there are obsta- centers, and intelligence agencies Ptional principles and studied cles to joint operations of global pro- should share data. Decision briefings logistics, wargames, and planning. portions. One is the inability of joint require video, graphic, and digital The staff was comprised of the best and service operations centers to data that should be compatible for and brightest officers in the Prussian communicate in an integrated mul- transfer from terminal to terminal. army. After a rigorous education, timedia mode with theater com- Incorporating service-wide con- they served on the general staff, mands. The worldwide military nectivity for all communications then returned to enhance opera- command and control system media may appear simple, but it is tional units.1 Under Helmuth von (WWMCCS) has been our chief com- not. The services have moved to Moltke, the general staff forged the munications system. Though better make ADP systems interoperable. army into a premier force through than having no system at all, it is Only noncompliance with CJCS superior technology, training, and cumbersome and cannot exchange policies prevents such connectivity. strategic planning.2 Similar at- data that is not in a rigid format. Yet Even in the Pentagon it is not possi- tributes are found in our service with the exception of secure tele- ble to exchange the full range of staffs, theater commands, and Joint phones and radio communications, data among operations centers. Soft- Staff today. The mission statement WWMCCS was the only common ware, protocols, and architectures of the Joint Staff even incorporates a capability during Desert Storm. used by the services and Joint Staff number of principles espoused by A growing number of communi- are often incompatible, especially in the German general staff.3 cations satellites, fiber optic technol- sharing data with theater or opera- ogy, and high data rate transmission tional commanders. 4 C I for the Warrior are harbingers of real-time commu- Security is the common argu- The information explosion pre- nications for voice, video, and data. ment used to limit access to such in- sents opportunities unequaled since The joint worldwide intelligence formation. But automatic data pro- the industrial revolution. A nation communications system (JWICS) im- cessing network management that visualizes and pursues the po- proves teleconferencing between together with existing security badge tential of information systems and theater command centers and the technology can prevent unautho- communications will ultimately Pentagon. Action officers in com- rized access to highly classified data. dominate the economic and military mand centers worldwide rely on Security is the least serious obstacle environments. The battlefield use of video, graphic, and digital data in to implementing joint connectivity railroads along with the advanced order to manage crises. This data and data exchange. arms deployed by the German army aids in accurately and rapidly deter- The Joint Staff, in concert with th in the late 19 century pale in com- mining force, logistics, and lift re- the Defense Information Systems parison to military capabilities for quirements. Presentations using Agency (DISA), has the technical ex- integrated data systems and instant state-of-the-art displays enable se- pertise as well as the authority to 4 worldwide communications today. nior leaders to review, select, or re- bring both the services and theater Doctrine exists to define new ject options. commanders into compliance. The technologies and integrate them Action officers can stop tran- renovation of the Pentagon offers an into combat, logistics, and intelli- scribing mountains of data into excellent chance to install a state-of- gence. CJCS memoranda (such as charts and carrying them from one the-art data network. JCS has ap- MOP 58) and design documents office to another. Technology exists proved collocating the National Mil- (such as the Command Center Design to link offices, command centers, or itary Command Center (NMCC) and Handbook) provide guidelines on in- units from terminal to terminal. service operations centers. This is an teroperability, automatic data pro- Only parochialism precludes such opportunity to establish layered se- cessing (ADP) architecture, and com- instant communication.6 While each curity zones for personnel and infor- 5 mand center design. While doctrine service utilizes connectivity and in- mation exchanges. A number of cor- ternal data exchange (for instance, porate headquarters have built ships, aircraft, and submarines use extremely flexible data processing the Naval Tactical Data Link), there networks which permit access to is a reluctance to share data. U.S. multiple security levels. Commander Mark C. Nesselrode, USN, is Transportation Command must the prospective commanding officer of USS know material requirements for Oldendorf and has served in the Operations forces deploying overseas. Similarly, Directorate (J-3), Joint Staff.

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If the services were to imple- Theater commanders submit inte- Service-unique capabilities—such as ment the architecture and protocols grated priority lists to the Joint Staff deep strike aircraft for the Air Force,9 necessary to permit access from one that can serve as the basis for service high speed, heavy lift amphibians center to another and from terminal priorities. Theater-unique require- for the Marine Corps, and surface to terminal, two immediate benefits ments that differ from service- combatants, submarines, sealift, and could be realized: data of practically unique requirements must be re- aircraft carriers for the Navy—pre- any bandwidth could be exchanged, solved. Through joint oversight, the sent other considerations. In addi- greatly enhancing operations by the Logistics Directorate (J-4) and the tion, the Army must be able to con- services and Joint Staff; and the no- Force Structure, Resources, and Ac- duct land warfare with heavy forces tion that separate ADP systems en- quisition Directorate (J-8) are ideally and sustain them inland. The spe- hance service identities and rele- suited to coordinate service input for cialized industrial base needed to vance would be overcome. Once all programs. In fact, J-4 may have underpin such systems may not be communication in the Pentagon is the greatest potential to lead the amenable to consolidation. conducted in this way, resistance by military into the 21st century. Acqui- theater operations centers and ser- sition, procurement, repair, and Common Training: A Hard Choice vice commands would be inexcus- transport are all areas that require re- Many training problems need able given the budgets required to form and integration. The Logistics resolution. For example, an initiative support the necessary software or ar- Directorate must be aware of main- to train all rotary wing pilots at one 10 chitectural changes. Such a transfor- tenance and support requirements site is being pursued. The syllabus mation can be achieved because for new systems. would separate pilots to teach spe- commercially available technology Dwindling R&D funding, rising cialized skills such as shipboard meets standards for interoperability manufacturing costs, and restricted landing qualifications. The benefit and compatibility. budgets are compelling reasons to of pilots from all services training to- The Joint Staff can direct DISA abandon service programs for joint gether early in their careers is ines- to address interoperability and com- ones, including fighter/attack air- timable. But it is not enough. patibility and to propose cost-effec- craft, gun systems, and helicopters. tive, near-term solutions. Approval of a solution would affirm the need for all services to move quickly and in unison in resolving one of the most vexing issues facing the Armed Forces. Information Technology Advanced aids or smartware will extend tabletop gaming to policymakers.7 Commanders could select and review scenario options without engaging combat forces. The ability to predict conflict outcomes using a tabletop method is limited but is immediately available and merits prompt implementation. The cost of engaging multiple combat commanders, the Joint Staff, and services in worldwide wargaming is becoming prohibitive. The development of games at the U.S. Army War College and its projected connectivity to major Army commands is a precur- sor to the needed connectivity among service, theater, and Joint Staff command centers. Consolidating capabilities enhances efficiency. The ownership of systems and programs requires that the Joint Staff arbitrate disputes.8 U.S. Air Force (Jim Steele)

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The service academies have employment of available forces. In Joint Staff, the JROC process is the unique missions which provide the addition to personnel, this system foundation for planning, budgeting, education that their gradustes will depended on conformity to a com- requirements review, interoperability, require well into the next century. mon fighting doctrine and opera- force integration, and prioritization. The need to imbue service traditions tional procedure.12 This is what is re- But to achieve force integration and and culture as well as specialized quired today for the Armed Forces. interoperability under JROC requires skills is not in question.11 The point The era when a single service organizational changes. An alterna- is whether there is any essential dif- could prepare for war by exclusively tive is to subordinate service chiefs to ference in engineering and history featuring its strengths and platforms CJCS while allowing combatant com- degrees awarded at West Point, An- is gone. Officers must be able to un- manders to retain their current sta- napolis, Colorado Springs, or Gro- derstand cultural biases, operational tus. (A similar change would be war- ton. Consider the officer accession capabilities, and weaknesses of the ranted for service secretaries vis-à-vis process used by the Maritime Self- other services with which they will the Secretary of Defense.) Defense Force (MSDF) in Japan. The train and fight as a team. If service chiefs were subordi- MSDF academy offers a common un- The Joint Staff and theater com- nate to CJCS, various elements of dergraduate program for all mand staffs are substantially differ- each staff could coordinate with branches. Upon graduation, candi- ent today than they were a decade other services through the Joint dates proceed to service-specific ago. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Staff. Programs requiring interoper- training at facilities such as the Reorganization Act of 1986 required ability would be identified and eval- naval officers school at Eta Jima. In that officers get a joint education to uated accordingly. Electronic con- the case of the U.S. military, existing be competitive for command and nectivity would reduce the time to institutions could provide four-year, promotion, and that those pro- process actions. The top-heavy struc- baccalaureate programs for a specific moted to flag rank after January ture of Pentagon staffs would be re- number of candidates. Summer 1994 must have had a joint duty as- duced. The overall effect of the sub- training could enable candidates to signment. This has positively af- ordination of service staffs would sample various services or choose fected the quality of the personnel reduce the size and the seniority of specific training. Then follow-on, and planning of the Joint Staff. Its all staffs. The time devoted to service-specific training would be roster now represents the best of preparing and reviewing actions conducted at the appropriate institu- each service. would be cut down. tion. As the military decreases in The joint oversight process size, it is logical that all prospective The Way Ahead would be enhanced because of the officers, regardless of accession Marginal interoperability suc- necessity for each service to coordi- source (that is, from service cess in Grenada confirmed what had nate budget and program require- academies, Reserve Officer Training been evident since 1947. The ser- ments early. The joint action process Corps, and officer candidate pro- vices were fragmented, independent would be a forum for the services grams) also receive advanced train- organizations that had neither kept and theater commanders to ensure ing such as the surface warfare offi- abreast of national priorities nor interoperability. Adherence to the 13 cers’ basic course at these learned the necessary lessons. joint oversight process would permit institutions. Goldwater-Nichols provided an im- consideration of programs that were The senior service colleges need petus for change. It is a superb foun- service-unique and require justifica- a more radical approach. Do curric- dation for implementing substantive tion in terms of the value added to 14 ula substantially vary from one to changes in the Joint Staff. The the Armed Forces. Likewise, candi- another? If the intent of the colleges Chairman has a stronger role and date programs for consolidation is to develop strategic and opera- the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of would be scrutinized by the services tional thought with a joint founda- Staff (VCJCS), provides him with a and Joint Staff prior to presentation tion, the colleges should be consoli- legitimate deputy. Both the Opera- and approval. dated under the aegis of the tional Planning and Interoperability Few issues raised here are either National Defense University. The Directorate (J-7) and J-8 address new or startling. Unfortunately, the number of officers requiring joint readiness and budget issues of con- services have resisted fundamental education is greater than any one cern to all services. Finally, officers change to such an extent that it is campus can accommodate. The ex- assigned to the Joint Staff must meet unlikely Congress will be content isting colleges would have a single strict rules on tour-length and quali- with marginal adjustments in the focus and provide a similar educa- fications, measures that have already present structure. To paraphrase a tion for all officers regardless of ser- born fruit operationally. cry often heard at the Naval vice. The Prussian war academy in- Of particular interest is the role Academy, “Time, tide, and forma- stitutionalized combat efficiency by of VCJCS as chairman of the Joint tion wait for no man!” Time is run- ensuring that in a given situation Requirements Oversight Council ning out for efforts to streamline the 15 different staff officers, educated to a (JROC) process. Supported by the services into an effective joint force. common fighting doctrine, would It is therefore recommended that: arrive at approximately the same

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▼ Office, September 9, 1993), p. III-40, con- Service chiefs and service staffs NOTES should be subordinate to CJCS. All re- siders rehearsals on the operational level ductions in the Joint Staff should be 1 Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of An with computer-aided simulations. Joint Pub stopped and manning requirements Army: A Popular Account of the German Gen- 3-02.8, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Opera- adjusted for it to carry out the plan- eral Staff (Westminster: Archibald Consta- tions (Washington: Government Printing ble, 1895), pp. 43–60. Office, October 1992), p. XII-4, references ning, doctrinal, logistical, and other 2 Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and the expanding use of computer simulations functions needed to implement the Prussian War Planning (New York: St. Mar- to enhance amphibious operations and en- concepts discussed above. tin’s Press, 1991), p. 57. sure operational security. Research is being ▼ A concerted effort must be 3 Walter Goerlitz, History of the German done that would permit evolutions such as made to comply with industry stan- General Staff (New York: Praeger, 1953), predicting enemy force locations. dards consistent with the complex, re- pp. 15–49. 8 Builder, Roles and Missions. dundant, and unique requirements for 4 Goerlitz, History, p. 58. 9 CJCS, Report on the Roles, Missions, and global command and control as man- 5 The Command, Control, Communica- Functions of the Armed Forces of the United dated by the Joint Staff. ADP, commu- tions, Computers, and Intelligence Direc- States (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4 nications, and information systems torate (J-6) is working to standardize C I, in- February 1993), pp. III-13 through III-15. cluding command center design. The 10 CJCS, Roles, Missions, and Functions, p. must be compatible with all service Operations Directorate (J-3) is working on xvi. operations centers, theater command standardizing command centers as lead 11 Builder, Roles and Missions. centers, service staffs, and NMCC at a agency for Pentagon renovation as it applies 12 Bucholz, Moltke, p. 53. minimum. to both NMCC and service operations cen- 13 Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompe- ▼ The acquisition objectives ters. MOP 58, JCS Instruction 6212.1, and tence: Why the American Military Doesn’t Win found in the report to the President, Command Center Design Handbook (DISA) (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), p. 199. “A Quest for Excellence,” must be im- support standardization as do initiatives for 14 The Goldwater-Nichols Department of plemented to preserve service-unique information management being led by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public th capabilities.16 If the industry standard Office of the Secretary of Defense. Law 99–433, 99 U.S. Congress, October 1, 6 or minimal modifications make prod- Interview with Carl H. Builder, U.S. 1986, pp. 25–31. Army War College, April 7, 1994. He 15 See CJCS, JROCM–052–92: Adminis- ucts acceptable to all the services, then stressed that the parochialism of the Navy trative Instruction, July 6, 1992, for a de- their interests must be subordinated to and the changes that were evident in the scription of the mission and the members the need for interoperability, main- policies of that service when certain com- of JROC. tainability, and affordability. munities (for example, submarine, surface 16 President’s Blue Ribbon Commission ▼ JROC, the budget process, and warfare, or aviation) were dominant on the on Defense Management, A Quest for Excel- national military strategy must be in- service staff. lence, (Washington: Government Printing terlocking pieces of a single supporting 7 Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Opera- Office, June 1986), pp. xxi–xxx. effort. Data exchange, connectivity, tions (Washington: Government Printing maintenance, acquisition, and depot repair must be subjected to JROC. There is no other means to ensure that systems or families of systems will have a fair hearing and compete against all For 100 years, the other warfighting requirements. New York Public Library has been a The United States lost many of haven for readers. its first battles in past wars. The Na- It is also a research tion is unlikely, and would be im- center and a refuge prudent, to remove itself from the for writers. international scene. There will in- —The New York Times evitably be another first battle. The (May 19, 1995) military has proven that it need not is only celebrating its second lose that engagement. The vision, anniversary with the publica- intelligence, and ability to effect tion of issue 8 (Summer 1995), changes beyond the scope of those already legislated rest with the but you’ll find the journal in the JFQ periodical reading room at the Armed Forces. Their unique capabilities deserve enhancement to guaran- New York Public Library. Does your agency or tee combat effectiveness. The Joint institution subscribe to America’s joint profes- Staff must complete the metamorphosis initiated by Goldwater- sional military journal? Why not tell your librarian Nichols and capitalize on the tech- about JFQ so that your colleagues don’t miss nological revolution underway to what you’ve come to expect each quarter. lead us into the 21st century. JFQ

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IN BRIEF Which Way Joint Doctrine? By EDWARD C. FERRITER

hile the Armed Forces must munitions must be developed. The particularly at the JTF level. But ad- be prepared for a range of issue is not whether we will fight vanced simulation technology needs Woperations, they will jointly, but whether we have doc- to address the tactical level as well. henceforth have less time to prepare trine to make joint warfare success- JWFC or another agency must em- for individual missions. During the ful. Does joint doctrine support the phasize this lower level of doctrine 1980s a large number of forces were synergism of capabilities that makes and JTTP. forward deployed. As we downsize, for success in combat? The present The Joint Training Analysis and more and more forces will return to joint doctrine system needs help to Simulation Center established at stateside bases. In the future the mil- make this a reality. U.S. Atlantic Command is another itary will rely on critical mobility as- Joint doctrine does not currently positive step. Designed to integrate sets for regional conflicts. But unfor- get enough attention. Development the training, modeling, and wargam- tunately, as forward presence draws takes too long, is too cumbersome, ing systems of the individual ser- down, combatant commanders and is parochial. Joint tactics, tech- vices, this center will impact on doc- (CINCs) have less time to organize niques, and procedures (JTTP) are trine development through concept these “responsive” forces for com- rarely joint. They are usually less tac- evaluation. For example, compli- bat. It is doctrine, particularly joint tical in nature and more of a broad mentary forces combined under var- doctrine, that provides the vehicle restatement of policy and guidance ious battle scenarios can be tested with which to shape forces into a or lists of individual platform capa- before going to the field. Joint doc- single fighting team. bilities. Service and even multi-ser- trine can be evaluated in joint com- The individual services view vice TTP, on the other hand, nor- puter guided exercises, but again the doctrine from various perspectives. mally do achieve tactical relevance. JTTP level must not be left out. The term doctrine may be considered Significant steps are being taken There are several key tangible new to some, but the concept is not. to improve this situation, however, steps that can improve the joint ap- The Navy has always projected with each service now focusing on proach to warfighting. seapower with a solid foundation of doctrinal issues. The Navy and Ma- First, there must be continued principles, traditions, and practice, rine Corps stood up the Naval Doc- initiatives in the area of joint doc- although it has not previously for- trine Command in Norfolk in 1993. trine. Joint doctrine is not easy or malized much of this thought in The Air Force Doctrine Center was fun. Military professionals may pre- written doctrine. The Navy is now formed at Langley Air Force Base fer to drive tanks, ships, and planes, developing overarching doctrine near Norfolk in 1994. Both collabo- but joint doctrine provides the basis which can best be characterized as rate closely with the U.S. Army Train- for the teamwork needed to win “a common body of operational ing and Doctrine Command, also lo- with those tanks, ships, and planes. thought.” Doctrine gives comman- cated in Norfolk, and the Marine Quality people with career potential ders standards for a common, effec- Corps Combat Development Center will be needed to take on tough doc- tive approach to warfare. at Quantico. Each of these activities trinal problems. It is likely that the military of has a section devoted to joint mat- Second, efforts to streamline the future will be a joint warfighting ters, and their proximity constitutes doctrine development must be re- team. Both manpower and resource what is known as the “Tidewater newed. A responsive system would constraints, coupled with limited connection.” Moreover, the Joint instill confidence and strengthen re- types and numbers of weapons, not Warfighting Center (JWFC) was es- solve to make it work. The process is to mention congressional direction, tablished in Norfolk and combines agonizingly slow and an average of have made a joint approach manda- the efforts of the Joint Doctrine Cen- three years to develop a joint publi- tory. We cannot afford duplication of ter and the Joint Warfare Center. cation is unacceptable. With concen- effort, nor can we afford not to have JWFC has tremendous promise trated effort a joint pub can be com- enough capability to accomplish but also faces potential pitfalls. The pleted in 12 months. But when a the mission. This means that compli- center must support the operational joint document cannot reach final mentary systems, weapons, and needs of warfighters. If JWFC gets approval within 18 months, it re- mired in the bureaucracy that has flects fundamental flaws in the pro- characterized joint doctrine in the posed concept and should be re- past it will fail. The center will focus vamped or canceled. Captain Edward C. Ferriter, USN, is assigned on sophisticated modeling and sim- Third, the issue of parochialism to the Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) ulation to support joint training, must be addressed. Service perspec- Center. A maritime patrol aviator, he has tives are essential, but parochialism commanded a fleet composite squadron.

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IN BRIEF

cannot be allowed. Joint doctrine in this way. Written from a joint per- level. The services form, fund, and must quickly identify common spective, the draft identifies com- operate forces at unit level. A test ground that is found in service doc- mon ground and provides a basis for program under a joint command at trine. Then that commonality must agreement on joint doctrine. unit level, however, may provide a underpin JTTP which are derived Fifth, combat forces must be vehicle to test new and sometimes from doctrine. provided with JTTP that link joint unpredictable approaches to joint- Fourth, joint pubs should be capabilities. Some of the work done ness. This concept will make many written by joint organizations. The by the Army in the combat arms ap- uncomfortable. Loss of control by biggest shortcoming in the current proach to battlefield warfare could the services, budget difficulties, and development of joint doctrine is the serve as a model for team synergy. the perception that the unit would “lead agent” concept. When a publi- The Army fights using a combined become a loose cannon highlight cation is proposed, one service is as- arms team in the simultaneous appli- problems with the concept. But for a signed as lead agent and then pro- cation of forces—combat, combat relatively small cost, the payoffs duces the first draft of the doctrine. support, and combat service sup- could be high. Even with the best of intentions, the port. JWFC should be the focal point The goal of joint doctrine is to first draft invariably favors the lead of JTTP integration and concentrate combine the strengths of all the ser- agent’s perspective. A better idea is exclusively on combat issues for vices to achieve success in combat. to have a joint command, such as both JTFs and the tactical level. The world has changed. The Armed JWFC or ACOM, bring together sub- Finally, obstacles to new ways of Forces operate in a very different ject matter experts from the individ- looking at joint issues must be re- geopolitical and operational environ- ual services and other doctrine cen- moved. It may be time, for example, ment than they did five years ago ters to develop an initial draft. to form a joint command at unit and changes will continue to occur. Several activities produce service, (battalion, ship, squadron) level. The foundation of a more effective multi-service, and joint documents Jointness normally occurs at com- joint doctrine system will allow the mand and control (headquarters) military to be ready for whatever missions the future holds. JFQ

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IN BRIEF Atlantic Command’s Joint Training Program By CLARENCE TODD MORGAN

Our new strategy demands forces that five-year defense program (FYDP) Table 1. ACOM Long-Range are highly skilled, rapidly deliverable, planning for 1995–99 provides de- Joint Training Program and fully capable of operating effec- tailed training guidance to CINCs, tively as a joint team... especially CINCUSACOM. It puts —GEN Colin L. Powell, USA1 greater emphasis on joint and combined exercises and training to stress hanges to the unified com- interoperability and joint warfight- Tier 3 (Joint Operational) mand plan in 1993 directed ing doctrine and prepare joint force COMMANDER AND STAFF TRAINING Cthat the Commander in commanders (JFCs) and staffs for cri- Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command sis and contingency operations. To- Academic JTF OPORD CAX/CPX (CINCUSACOM), integrate and con- gether with the other CINCs, Joint Training Development CINC, JFC duct joint training of all forces based Staff, and services, ACOM trains and Seminars Exercise Components in the continental United States conducts exercises in peacekeeping, (CONUS). U.S. Atlantic Command peace enforcement, counterdrug, Tier 2 (Joint Operational/Tactical) (ACOM) was assigned combatant disaster relief, and humanitarian as- JOINT FIELD TRAINING command authority over Forces sistance operations. Current guid- Component Staffs/Forces Command (FORSCOM), Atlantic ance stresses using technology (in- Fleet (LANTFLT), Marine Forces At- cluding simulations) to improve Tier 1 (Service Operational/Tactical) lantic (MARFORLANT), and Air training at a reduced cost. Such SERVICE COMPONENT TRAINING Combat Command (ACC) as service training is designed to achieve effi- Forces components, forces which comprise ciency and full effectiveness through fully three-quarters of the Armed distance learning, distributed simu- Forces. As a result, ACOM imple- lation, and leveraging existing ser-

mented a joint training program vice component and other joint Source: Adapted from ACOM J-7A briefing, “ACOM Joint (JTP) to significantly enhance the ca- training and exercise programs. Training Program,” March 15, 1994.

pability of U.S. forces to deploy and U.S. Army Combat Camera (Daniel Hart) Three Tiers of Training operate immediately on arrival over- Rangers jumping seas. This article describes these joint ACOM JTP enriches joint and during Agile Provider. training responsibilities, the scope of service component training and ex- ACOM joint training, and the vari- ercise programs, where appropriate, ous tiers of training and their imple- with scheduling coordination and Square) as well as other initiatives. mentation. It also addresses ACOM sponsorship for increased joint par- Tier 2 activities are usually executed reorganization to meet new require- ticipation. It also includes specific by a sponsoring service component. ments, the training facility necessary joint task force (JTF) training tai- Utilizing tier 1 exercises to generate to accomplish the program, and the lored for CONUS-based joint forces tier 2 opportunities for resource effi- transition to new exercises and that emulates portions of the Army’s ciency is a primary goal. The tier 2 training. battle command training program objectives are derived from tactical CINCs have full authority and (BCTP) and CINCEUR JTF training. joint mission essential tasks (JMETs) responsibility to train assigned ACOM JTP consists of three tiers as and service-specific operational and forces. As the largest joint force outlined in table 1. tactical mission essential tasks. provider to regional CINCs, ACOM ACOM service components con- ACOM sets tactical JMETs to be at- trains CONUS-based forces in joint duct tier 1 training to meet unit- and tained by components and the com- doctrine and joint tactics, tech- force-specific training requirements ponents nominate specific tier 1 ex- niques, and procedures (JTTPs) for at service standards. ACOM will ercises to accomplish them.2 deployment anywhere in the world. monitor schedules for these events to ACOM conducts tier 3 training In addition, ACOM continues to preserve their integrity and ensure with a focus on JFCs and staffs and conduct distinct theater exercises fo- deconfliction and/or coordination objectives derived from operational- cused on these unique missions. The with joint training. level JMETs. Potential JFCs come Tier 2 includes diverse activities from XVIII Airborne Corps, III Corps, such as LANTFLT/MARFORLANT Eighth Air Force, II Marine Expedi- Lieutenant Commander Clarence Morgan, fleet exercises, ACC exercises (Quick tionary Force (MEF), and Second USN, serves in the Analysis and Simulation Force, Sand Eagle), and FORSCOM Division (J-73), Joint Training Directorate, exercises (Roving Sands, Market U.S. Atlantic Command.

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Fleet. These commanders will serve Phase 3 uses a computer-assisted scheme. The worldwide conference as JFCs in the tier 3 program approxi- command post exercise (CAX/CPX) will produce the CJCS joint training mately once every two years. The JTF to execute the JTF staff OPORD pre- master schedule, which includes all components will be drawn from viously developed in phase 2. This CINC joint training plans. among eight Army divisions; six phase lasts between seven and ten Joint training execution en- Navy carrier battle groups; 2d Marine days and normally includes partici- compasses a range of academic and Division, Air Wing, and Force Service pation by a CINC, joint intelligence exercise activities which include tra- Support Group; three Marine Expedi- center, JFACC, JFC, JSOTF, and JTF ditional field exercises, hybrid exer- tionary Units; and eight Air Force components. The JTF staff conducts cises with live play in the field and fighter wings and five bomber wings. phase 3 at its home station or JTASC, constructive or virtual simulation, Both a joint force air component and components participate from CPXs in synthetic environments, commander (JFACC) and a joint spe- home stations or other facilities. Pri- academic seminars, briefings, and cial operations task force (JSOTF) will mary emphasis is on planning pro- computer-aided instruction. Field also normally be assigned. cedures, decisionmaking, and the training exercises (FTXs), advanced The new JTP training initiative application of joint doctrine and distributed simulation, academic breaks with previous CONUS-based JTTPs. ACOM continues to provide training, and seminar wargames will training and resides in tier 3 activi- joint training support as in phases 1 all play a role in the ACOM JTP. In ties under three phases. Phase 1 uses and 2. The CAX/CPX will generally order to train as we will fight, JTTPs academic instruction structured as use a confederation of service mod- will guide JTP execution.5 Joint com- seminars, briefings, or interactive els to challenge the JTF in exercising mand, control, communication, computer learning to train JTF staffs. virtually any aspect of joint warfare. computer, and intelligence (C4I) Topics include responsibilities and It also uses a real-world scenario equipment and procedures will be functions of a joint staff, joint plan- with real terrain and threat data used and logistics support will be ning, joint doctrine, and JTTPs. The bases. A professional opposing force modeled. JFC guides the academic design and (OPFOR) with an observer/controller JTP evaluation is critical to over- sets training objectives. ACOM pro- group supports the training.3 all effectiveness. The assessment vides a team of subject matter ex- must ask if the training objective— perts, appropriate training materials, JTP Implementation meeting specific JMETs—is being and a retired flag officer to mentor An accurate definition of joint successfully achieved. Joint readiness the academic training. The instruc- training requirements is needed to assessment will use reports by re- tion will be structured toward three design an effective JTP. To identify gional CINCs, the joint after action distinct audiences: executive level requirements each regional CINC reporting system (JAARS), and the for senior officers, action officer will rely on JMETs derived from as- status of resources and training sys- level for staff officers, and noncom- signed theater missions and plans, tem (SORTS) as measuring devices. missioned officer level for staff sup- which will be compiled into a mas- Objective evaluation can provide the port personnel. Phase 1 is one week ter list called the joint mission es- impetus for program improvement in duration and is conducted at ei- sential task list (JMETL). This will be- and increase overall joint readiness. ther the JFC’s home station or an- come the design basis for a regional ACOM has reorganized to suc- other location of his choosing. CINC’s joint training program. In cessfully execute its expanded joint Phase 2 has the JFC and his order for ACOM to train its CONUS- training responsibilities. A joint components develop a crisis action based forces for deployment to the training directorate was created to operation order (OPORD) concen- forward-based CINCs their JMETs ensure forces are highly skilled, trating on JTF planning, joint doc- must be a driving factor in the JTP’s rapidly deliverable, and fully capable trine, and JTTPs. A joint training structure. When two or more CINCs of operating as a joint team on ar- team and senior mentor assist with identify the same JMET as a require- rival. A Director for Joint Training is the training objectives. The JTF staff, ment it becomes a common joint responsible for joint force exercise with component liaisons, assembles task. ACOM will use common joint and training development, resource at its home station or the ACOM tasks as a baseline JMETL for train- allocation, management, and assess- 4 Joint Training, Analysis, and Simula- ing in tiers 2 and 3. ment. He also supervises the review, tion Center (JTASC) for one week to ACOM will plan its JTP by host- coordination, development, promul- develop a plan. JTF components de- ing quarterly exercise and training gation, and application of joint doc- velop supporting plans at locations scheduling conferences to provide trine, joint universal lessons learned, selected by the ACOM component deconfliction and coordination for and JTTPs ensuring that maximum commanders in conjunction with the three tiers and ultimately pro- value is attained from joint force their training programs. All plan- duce the ACOM joint training master integration.6 ning uses a crisis situation based on plan. The Joint Staff’s annual world- ACOM J-7 is organized into ex- a real-world scenario. wide joint exercise scheduling con- ercise (J-71), training and doctrine ference will furnish the mechanism (J-72), and analysis and simulation to ensure that the ACOM JTP fits the (J-73) divisions. J-71 coordinates JTP CJCS overall training and exercise

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IN BRIEF

communication AP ’94 force deployment, employ- and computer ca- ment, and sustainment issues and pacity for ad- produced a CINC-level draft OPORD vanced distributed for later JTF-level campaign plan- simulation, dis- ning at CAPEX. This experience pro- tance learning, vided outstanding staff warfighting and teleconferenc- training, enhanced coordination, ing with compo- and exercised staff crisis action pro- nents or on-site cedures. The JTF CAPEX was held in computer exercises January 1994 at Camp Lejeune with and training. This the commanding general, II MEF, as will provide JFCs JFC. Much like planned tier 3, phase and their staffs 2 training, the JFC staff met in one with assets to con- location and developed an OPORD duct all phases of based on a given scenario. Staff and Agile Provider ’94. tier 3 training in component liaison teams greatly

U.S. Navy Combat Camera (Robert N. Scoggin) one location using benefitted from being able to meet actual C4I facilities and work together, solidifying the in exercise spaces. staff prior to the FTX. scheduling, monitors CJCS-directed By FY97, JTASC will routinely host Both the wargame and CAPEX NATO and bilateral exercises, and three JTF tier 3 training cycles each exposed divergent experience levels documents and reports or corrects year, have the capability to conduct among staff members in joint opera- deficiencies in exercises and opera- JTF mission rehearsals to support cri- tions and the staff planning process. tions. It also maintains a schedule of sis action preparations, and provide These experiences illustrated the tier 2 component activities to iden- simulation support for tier 2 FTXs.7 need for tier 3, phase 1 academic tify and enhance mutual training training to reach a common level of opportunities and lower costs. Exercise and Training Transition knowledge and understanding. J-72 has overall responsibility JTP implementation is changing CAPEX, unlike tier 3, phase 2 train- for tier 3 training. Its joint training previous training methodologies. ing, was constrained by actual unit teams develop, execute, and main- Ocean Venture has been canceled training in May 1994, planned by tain tier 3 phase 1 academic training and Agile Provider (AP) ’94 is proba- each service for AP ’94. Linking the as well as design and direct phases 2 bly the last exercise of its kind. staff exercise and live ground FTX and 3. The teams provide observer/ Funding previously used for ACOM- limited the possible courses of action controllers and arrange for a profes- sponsored major field exercises will (COAs) available to staff planners be- sional OPFOR to support phase 2 be divided between tier 2 activities cause of unit availability as well as and 3 exercises. J-72 also manages for added participation and tier 3 fiscal, geographic, and environmen- doctrinal issues, develops and pro- training. This will allow greater op- tal constraints. This limitation drove mulgates ACOM JTTPs, coordinates portunities for service component the development of a fictitious sce- the application of JAARS, and assists participation in tier 2. Additional fi- nario that melded widely separated in the design and evaluation of nancial assets shifted to tier 3 will training areas at Camp Lejeune and CONUS joint exercises and training. enable more people to participate in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort J-73 is a focal point for joint joint staff training. Rather than a Chaffee, Arkansas. At the Camp Le- modeling and simulation. It has the single staff gaining experience in an jeune CAPEX debrief, the JTF chief of expertise, analytical tools, and facili- expensive annual FTX, three staffs staff recommended that future sce- ties necessary to conduct analysis, will undergo tier 3 training each narios be devised to fully maximize 8 modeling, and computer simulation. year at less cost. JTF staff training with portions of J-73 supplies the analysis and simu- AP ’94 served as a partial transi- those scenarios designed for suitable lation support for tier 2 and 3 train- tion from previous CINC-sponsored unit field training. ing. Also, it evaluates operational annual FTXs toward the future JTP. The AP ’94 seminar wargame and concept plans in support of J-5, In addition to traditional planning and CAPEX offered the first opportu- maintains theater-wide analysis and conferences, AP ’94 included an nity to conduct limited joint train- simulation capability, and coordi- ACOM seminar wargame and crisis ing. J-71 provided the control group nates analytical studies with J-3 on action planning exercise (CAPEX). and acted as higher headquarters adaptive force package deployment, The ACOM staff held a seminar staff. In this role, J-71 coordinated employment, and force mixes. wargame in the autumn of 1993 and facilitated the required intelli- In support of the new J-7 direc- with component, JFC, and JTF staff gence and scenario support for the torate, a state-of-the-art JTASC will participation. The wargame explored CAPEX from ACOM. J-72 acted as be created with an initial reduced primary observer for the exercise and training capability slated for opera- documented JTF staff interaction and tion in January 1996. It will have a functions. Data were collected to

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IN BRIEF

support AP ’94 after action reviews Table 2. Phase III CAX/CPX Participants and lessons learned. J-73 provided analytical and computer simulation Command Training Role Training Location support at Camp Lejeune for the JTF staff. During OPORD development, U.S. Atlantic Command CINC Norfolk, Virginia various COA options were discussed III Corps JFC Fort Hood, Texas and J-73 did a comparative analysis CCDG 12 NAVFOR Portsmouth, Virginia of options using a joint conflict II Marine Expeditionary Force MARFOR Camp Lejeune, North Carolina model. This model acted as a high III Corps (-) ARFOR Fort Hood, Texas resolution joint combat simulation Eighth Air Force AFFOR Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana under controlled conditions and pro- 1st Brigade, 87th Division OPFOR Birmingham, Alabama duced quantitative results allowing the JTF staff to compare the impact of various COA options. The J-7 participants in this exercise all gained valuable experience and a glimpse of the future JTP. Roving Sands. After AP ’94, the next step in Combat Camera Imagery (Kimberly A. Yearyean-Siers) JTP implementation was Unified En- deavor (UE) ’95. This was the first Table 3. Phase III CAX/CPX Service Models developmental tier 3 CAX/CAPEX. The phases were as follows: phase I, Agile Provider ’94. academic training (January 1995); phase II, OPORD development (February 1995); and phase III, plan execution (April 1995). The 1994 ag- gregate level simulation protocol (ALSP) confederation of models acted as exercise driver for the phase III CAX/CPX via distributed simula- Model Warfare Area tion architecture transmitted to the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS) ground JFC and component commanders Air Warfare Simulation (AWSIM) air at their home stations (see table 2 Research, Evaluation, and Systems Analysis (RESA) naval air, surface, and subsurface for participants). Tactical Simulation Model (TACSIM) intelligence The confederation linked ser- Joint Electronic Combat-Electronic Warfare Simulation (JECEWSI) electronic warfare vice models listed in table 3. The exercise scenario was set in Southwest U.S. Marine Corps Combat Camera (Ronald Pixler) Asia and included a JTF with two reinforced heavy divisions, a reinforced composite wing, MEF forward, carrier joint training which is less costly and NOTES battle and amphibious ready groups, better than the available alternatives. The program is designed to accom- 1 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Report and special operations forces. The on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the opposing forces fielded seven divi- modate current technology and incorporate new capabilities as they are Armed Forces of the United States (Washing- sions and supporting combined arms. ton: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1993), UE ’95 was a training and technical developed. Existing service compo- p. III–4. success as well as a proof of principle nent exercises will continue to pro- 2 Briefing by James C. Sherlock, ACOM, for the JTF tier 3 initiative. vide opportunities to train jointly. J-7A, “USACOM Joint Training Program,” Numerous lessons from UE ’95 The JTP tier 3 initiative will train ad- January 24, 1994. 3 are being used in the planning for ditional staffs in extremely impor- CINCUSACOM Message, “USACOM UE ’96–1 which is well underway tant skills that heighten the ability to Joint Task Force Training Program,” DTG fight as a team. Joint warfare is criti- 050423 JAN 1994, p. 3. and scheduled for September, Octo- 4 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Universal Joint ber, and November 1995. cal in realizing the greatest return from limited resources. We must Task List, October 25, 1993, p. i. The ACOM joint training pro- 5 train as we intend to fight, and the U.S. Atlantic Command, Implementa- gram will enhance operational capa- tion Plan, October 1, 1993, bilities, increase service interoperabil- ACOM JTP provides the means to p. D–1–1. ity, and provide a higher state of reach that goal. JFQ 6 Ibid. joint readiness. It will be an effective, 7 Briefing by Walter Brentano, MITRE efficient, and flexible way to conduct Corporation, January 24, 1994, pp. 7–9. 8 Sherlock, “USACOM Joint Training Program.”

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IN BRIEF Coalition Rules of Engagement By DREW A. BENNETT and ANNE F. MACDONALD

oalitions must overcome After the Persian Gulf War and operations under its constitution.7 many obstacles.1 Developing with the downsizing of U.S. forces, National security policy spells out C rules of engagement (ROE) is coalition warfare has received greater how forces may provide security, for one. ROE are tools that coordinate attention. While the world is no example, by declaring “no first use” the use of force, orchestrate a cam- longer bipolar, it is increasingly in- of nuclear weapons. Operational paign, synergize an effort, ensure terdependent. Unilateral action is concerns become a factor when a compatibility among dissimilar part- not the preferred or likely way of commander attempts to control ners, control escalation, and under- war. The desire for international le- damage to friendly forces or neutral pin political objectives. The coordi- gitimacy, basing rights, additional aircraft and ships. Finally, rules nated use of force on land, at sea, forces, increased diplomatic power, should ensure that international law and in the air can be the difference and greater economic leverage is a is not violated. They are affected by between winning and losing.2 A strong incentive to operate alongside the law of armed conflict as con- commander must establish ROE that other countries with shared interests. tained in the Hague and Geneva are neither restrictive nor permissive, Rules of engagement are “direc- Conventions and the right to self de- that do not leave their forces either tives issued by competent military fense under the U.N. Charter.8 vulnerable to attack or inhibit judg- authority which delineate the cir- ROE also can be seen as a means ment, and that do not inadvertently cumstances and limitations under of controlling a nation’s shift along harm political or operational objec- which United States forces will initi- a conflict continuum. On one end is tives. The intricacy of this issue is ev- ate and/or continue combat engage- peace, followed by crisis, then lim- ident as one considers coalition ment with other forces encoun- ited war, and finally total war. In members of varying capabilities, per- tered.”3 They facilitate guidance on this model, the rules have three gen- spectives, agendas, forces, ideologies, the use of force. Generally, they ad- eral purposes: political, military, and and cultures. dress when, where, against whom, legal.9 The political purpose prevents How should rules be developed and how force can be used.4 Rules military operations from expanding and by whom? Should a single com- may be permissive as illustrated by beyond political objectives, as af- mander or country draft them? the following cases: a unit may use firmed by Clausewitz’s dictum that Should each nation establish its own? whatever force it deems necessary to war is an extension of politics by Should an existing international or- defend itself against a hostile act or other means. Nations will use ROE ganization such as the United Na- hostile intent (how and when); mili- to deter war, isolate conflict, and tions determine them? What are the tary aircraft of country X operating prevent escalation to total war. This guiding principles of ROE? in a specified area will be considered is why states abide by them in Coalitions can be divided into hostile (when and against whom); and peacetime. Such rules may halt the two categories: standing and ad hoc. shoot first and ask questions later pursuit of enemy forces into a third A standing coalition is grounded in (when). Or rules may be restrictive: nation to contain a conflict. Those an existing agreement (such as the do not fire unless fired upon (when); which control weapons of mass de- North Atlantic Alliance), wherein a unattended munitions, mines, and struction serve a political purpose. majority of the forces involved have booby traps are forbidden (how); do The military purpose of ROE is mis- planned and trained together for not fire until you see the whites of sion accomplishment. A commander combined operations. An ad hoc their eyes (when and against whom). applies the rules to guide his subor- coalition is one in which the forces ROE balance the objectives and con- dinates on using force to seize objec- have not worked together, regardless cerns of those who establish them tives. He must balance aggressive ac- of whether it is sanctioned under a with the judgment and capabilities tion and the right to self-defense U.N. mandate, hasty treaty, or other of those who must execute them.5 against losing public support, pro- arrangement. The sources of ROE are domestic voking a more powerful enemy, or law, national security policy, opera- fighting at an unfavorable time or tional concerns, and international place. ROE are intended to prevent law.6 Domestic law affects how mili- violations of domestic and interna- taries are organized and equipped, tional laws and must consider, for Lieutenant Colonel Drew A. Bennett, USMC, where they may operate, and even example, the concept of proportion- is a member of the Naval Forces Branch, how they are employed. Japan, for ality and the selection of criteria for Operations Division, at Combined Forces example, with the world’s third targeting. Command, Korea; Major Anne F. Macdonald, largest defense budget, cannot per- USA, is personnel plans officer assigned to mit its forces to conduct offensive U.S. Forces, Korea.

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IN BRIEF

Various factors affect ROE devel- Developing coalition ROE re- Hope, when forces are called upon opment, including humanitarian is- quires negotiation and consensus, to make split-second decisions. For a sues, actions by higher authorities, not dictation. All members must be set of rules to be understood by concern for risks, and technological represented. A commander must cre- troops who speak different lan- capabilities.10 ROE may be influ- ate an atmosphere in which coalition guages and come from different cul- enced by issues such as limiting col- members will set aside sovereignty tures, they must be simple. lateral damage or casualties. This issues and make concessions to bene- The principles outlined above may demand pin-point accuracy and fit the final ROE. can help coalitions develop work- surgical strikes. Actions by higher The goal in coalition ROE devel- able ROE. While following them will authority will influence the develop- opment is commonality. Ideally, a not guarantee victory, ignoring ment of rules. Interaction between single set of rules that applies to all them will invite failure. With these senior government officials and mil- coalition members in the theater of principles, a coalition commander itary leaders is complex. The degree operations is better understood, eas- may find it easier to develop rules of confidence, skill, and expertise in- ier to implement, and increases in- given the membership, mission, and volved in these relations will deter- teroperability. A commander may circumstances of a coalition, thereby mine whether ROE development is find significant advantage in ROE dramatically increasing the chance micro- or macro-managed. More- that accommodate the lowest com- of success. JFQ over, restrictive rules may be devel- mon denominator. But he must also oped to minimize risks of personnel realize commonality is not always NOTES becoming POWs or hostages. Tech- achievable but may only serve as a 1 The authors are indebted to Colonel nology may influence ROE in vari- starting point for ROE development. Abdulaziz N. Abaykan, Saudi Air Force, a ous ways. A small air force and poor If commonality cannot be classmate at the Armed Forces Staff College, communications require different achieved, flexibility is key. Accom- for his insights on coalition warfare. rules than a large air force and ad- modation and work-arounds may be 2 Michael A. Burton, “Rules of Engage- vanced communications. In addi- needed because of irreconcilable dif- ment: What is the Relationship Between tion, technology determines how far ferences in national equipment, doc- Rules of Engagement and the Design of Op- off a target can be detected and en- trine, capabilities, or political objec- erations?” (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. gaged, and thus how much time the tives. Separating forces or tasks Army Command and General Staff College, on-scene commander has to decide. geographically or functionally, as in School of Advanced Military Studies, May Before specifying the exact rules the case of Desert Storm, may re- 4, 1987), p. 27. 3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, of engagement for a coalition, it is solve such issues. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military helpful to consider the principles ROE change with the situation. and Associated Terms (Washington: Govern- that influence their development: Coalitions must transition from ment Printing Office, March 23, 1994), p. unity of purpose, negotiation, com- peacetime rules designed to deter 329. monality, flexibility, adaptability, hostilities to wartime rules designed 4 Scott D. Sagen, “Rules of Engage- and simplicity. to win. A commander must have a ment,” Security Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (Au- The glue that holds coalitions means to constantly evaluate ROE tumn 1991), p. 80. together is unity of effort, not neces- and promulgate necessary changes 5 W. Hayes Parks, “Righting the Rules of sarily unity of command. Unity of quickly. In contrast to Provide Com- Engagement,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed- effort implies that political and mili- fort, which successfully adapted ROE ings, vol. 115, no. 5 (May 1989), p. 84; Sagen, “Rules of Engagement,” p. 79. tary objectives are harmonized and from those used in Desert Storm, the 6 Parks, “Righting the Rules,” p. 86; that a coalition is devoted to mis- coalition participating in Restore Ashley J. Roach, “Rules of Engagement,” sion accomplishment. If coalition Hope was plagued by a lack of adapt- Naval War College Review, vol. 36, no. 1 partners agree to a combined com- ability. (January/February 1983), p. 48. mander, such as in NATO, so much Coalition ROE must be judged 7 Catherine S. Mangold, “The Military the better. As the Gulf War demon- against the overriding principle of Question,” Newsweek, vol. 118, no. 22 strated, however, a single comman- simplicity. One summary of this (November 25, 1991), p. 45. der does not always lead a coalition. principle provides the following ad- 8 John G. Humphries, “Operations Law Moreover, a coalition may be vice: and the Rules of Engagement,” Airpower quickly formed, given its mission, Journal, vol. 6, no. 3 (Fall 1992), p. 27; ▼ make them clear and brief Roach, “Rules of Engagement,” p. 47. and forced to develop ROE with ▼ avoid excessively qualified lan- 9 Guy R. Phillips, “Rules of Engage- only limited planning. Cooperation guage ment: A Primer,” Army Lawyer (July 1993), overcame this obstacle in Provide ▼ tailor the language to the audi- pp. 7-8; Roach, “Rules of Engagement,” pp. Comfort. Under these circum- ence 47-48. stances, a commander may find that ▼ separate them by job descrip- 10 Parks, “Righting the Rules,” pp. 88-93. emphasizing and nurturing the tion 11 Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. ▼ d coalition’s commitment to the ob- assure they are easily under- Army Operational Law Handbook, Draft, 2 stood, remembered, and applied.11 jective is especially critical. edition, 1991, p. H-87. Simplicity is even more important in coalitions, such as Restore

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JDWP gave unanimous approval have resulted: Joint Task Force Com- Doctrine to a proposal by the Naval Special mander’s Handbook for Peace Opera- Warfare Command to staff a pro- tions, a peace operations database, JOINT DOCTRINE gram directive on Joint Pub 3-06, and a compilation of peace opera- WORKING PARTY Doctrine for Joint Riverine Operations, tions tasks for inclusion in the uni- to clarify its scope and purpose. versal joint task list. U.S. Space Command hosted ACOM recommended changing The Commander’s Handbook was th the 15 Joint Doctrine Working the title and focus of Joint Pub developed in concert with both U.S. Party (JDWP) meeting at the U.S. Air 3-01.6, Joint Air Defense Operations/ and allied military organizations as Force Academy on April 4–5, 1995. Joint Engagement Zone (JADO/JEZ), to well as governmental and non- Projects underway in the Opera- fully cover fighter engagement zone governmental organizations. The tional Plans and Interoperability Di- or missile engagement zone (FEZ/ draft of this work, which was circu- rectorate (J-7), Joint Staff, were MEZ) procedures. JDWP agreed lated among flag officers and the briefed to include work on a revised unanimously to change the title to joint doctrine community for review, hierarchy of publications; a profes- Joint Air Operations and thoroughly has drawn positive reactions. The sional desk library; and consolidat- incorporate these procedures into handbook will be distributed this year ing, revising, and reformatting cur- the publication. and also be made available through rent joint doctrine pubs. The Operations Directorate the Joint Electronic Library (JEL). The Operations Directorate (J-3), Joint Staff, proposed consoli- A JEL peace operations database (J-3), Joint Staff, briefed a proposal dating the 3-50 series of pubs on has been created which contains to combine joint command and search and rescue. This calls for policy, doctrine, articles, lessons control warfare and information preparing an edition of Joint learned, etc., from joint, service, and warfare (IW) in Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Pub 3-50 that covers overarching multinational sources. It contains Doctrine for Command and Control doctrine on personnel recovery; re- over 14,000 pages of text which can Warfare. This initiative was origi- structuring Joint Pubs 3-50 and be accessed on-line (dial-up). A sig- nally raised at a JDWP meeting last 3-50.1 (National SAR Manual) as nificant byproduct of the database is autumn, and J-33 subsequently re- Joint Pub 3-50.1, volumes 1 and 2; a special CD–ROM version for distri- ported on it to the group. There was combining Joint Pubs 3-50.2 and bution to selected agencies. The a consensus that development of a 3-50.21 as Joint Pub 3-50.2; and re- database will eventually include re- joint pub on command and control taining Joint Pub 3-50.3 unchanged. sults from other peace operations warfare should proceed and that IW The Air Force is lead agent for Joint and related initiatives such as JTF doctrine should be addressed in the Pub 3-50; the Joint Services SERE mission training plans developed by future. There was emphasis on the Agency and the Air Force Doctrine ACOM. Publications, articles, and need for a chapter in Joint Pub 3-13 Center are primary review authori- lessons learned are still being ac- to establish the linkage between ties. cepted and all suggestions are wel- command and control warfare and In addition, information brief- come. A classified database is being IW architecture. Because it is a rela- ings were presented on the Joint Tar- created for access via the classified tively new concept, development of geting Control Board, Joint Doctrine JEL which is under development. It doctrinal pubs on IW was deferred Futures Project, Joint Special Opera- also will be available in a limited dis- pending further guidance. Another tions Forces Institute, defense trans- tribution CD–ROM. information brief will be provided at portation system 2010, and inclu- The last product was a review of the next JDWP meeting to track de- sion of combat camera capabilities universal joint tasks. Research and velopment. in joint doctrine. The next JDWP analysis resulted in a list of joint The Joint Warfighting Center meeting is scheduled for October tasks, with definitions, for use by proposed that Joint Pub 3-02, Am- 1995 with the Joint Warfighting joint forces in the preparation and phibious Operations, and Joint Center serving as the host. JFQ conduct of future peace operations. Pub 3-02.1, Landing Force Operations, JWFC efforts addressed specific voids be combined by placing doctrine in and provided proposed changes and Joint Pub 3-02 and retaining Joint additions for use in the Universal Pub 3-02.1 for tactics, techniques, PEACE Joint Tasks List, JSM 3500.14. and procedures. In addition, infor- OPERATIONS The overall result of this effort is mation found in Naval Warfare Pub- a comprehensive and accessible set lications 22-2 and 22-3 would be INITIATIVES of tools for planning and conducting deleted and redundancies between Over the last year, the Joint peace operations. For further details the pubs would be eliminated. On a Warfighting Center (JWFC) has initi- contact the Joint Warfighting Cen- related note, a recommendation was ated an effort to assist joint forces in ter, Ingalls Road (Bldg. 100), Fort made to seriously examine the con- planning, training, and preparing Monroe, Virginia 23651–5000. JFQ tinuing need for Joint Pub 3-18, for peace operations. Three products Forcible Entry Operations.

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Individual lessons include de- staffs do not have the requisite ex- Lessons Learned tailed discussions of logistics, pertise in joint doctrine as well as in TRANSCOM operations, SHF ability joint tactics, techniques, and proce- UNOSOM II afloat, ammunition supply, convoy dures that is required by a JTF nu- The CENTCOM joint after ac- communications, policy on utilizing cleus formed and deployed in crisis tion report (JAAR) on U.N. Opera- Reserve volunteers for operations action conditions. It also indicates tions in Somalia (UNOSOM) II is other than war, and joint integration that JTF personnel were not assigned being incorporated in the master of medical evacuation. Classified early enough to participate in the joint universal lessons learned sys- JULLs cover force protection, com- planning process nor pre-trained as tem (JULLS) database. The interim munications, QRF, and airspace con- a functional staff to effectively exe- and final CENTCOM JAARs are the trol in littoral areas. Specific infor- cute the communications plan. 4 official joint reports on UNOSOM II. mation on C I is found in some Early efforts at component level The final JAAR contains 53 individ- JULLs. Concerns associated with were hampered by unfamiliarity ual JULLs covering a wide range of U.N. transportation requests, fund- with JOPES crisis action planning topics, some of which are briefly ing arrangements, and food procure- which suggested a need for more de- highlighted below. It also contains ment are also documented. tailed doctrine. Another observation the TRANSCOM interim report and Of particular interest to joint cites the lack of a joint staff mission the MARFORSOM summary report staffs are lessons on developing a JTF statement and planning guidance for JTF Somalia. headquarters nucleus; JTF staff desig- early in the decisionmaking process In May 1993 operations in So- nation and assignment; require- which resulted in unclear command mali were transferred from U.S. con- ments for mission statement and relationships and responsibilities of trol under the Unified Task Force planning guidance; and early plan- supporting commands. There is a (UNITAF) to the United Nations ning efforts. While many issues recommendation to establish liaison under UNOSOM II. The mandate identified during operations in So- early in the planning cycle at higher had been expanded by Security malia have been rectified, others are headquarters to monitor decision- Council resolution 814 to include all common to most contingency JTF making and ensure clear guidance of Somalia, disarming factions, and staffs and planning efforts. Regard- on the mission, troops/time avail- nation building. In support of UNO- ing JTF headquarters, it is found that able, specific command relation- SOM II, COMUSFORSOM was tasked staffs should be formed from head- ships, and allocation of critical re- to provide the deputy commander quarters trained and experienced in sources. of UNOSOM II with selected head- joint operations and not formed Another source on this subject quarters personnel, limited combat from division staffs. The report is being developed by the Peacekeep- support, and a quick reaction force states that corps headquarters are ing Institute at the U.S. Army War (QRF). Following the ambush of a much better suited for functioning College and will be named for the UNOSOM II weapons site inspection at the operational level. Division Deputy Commander UNOSOM II in June 1993, the Security Council and Commander, U.S. Forces Soma- established a new mission with pas- lia. The “LTG Montgomery After Ac- sage of resolution 837 which di- ...new from the tion Report on Somalia” will be rected that appropriate action be INSTITUTE FOR available in both classified and un- taken to hold those responsible ac- NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES classified versions. While this report countable and also authorized that will not be an official document, it all necessary measures be taken Somalia Operations: promises to be an important compi- against them. After the adoption of lation of lessons presented from a this resolution, U.S. forces moved to Lessons Learned JFC’s perspective. In addition, the the operational forefront with the by Kenneth Allard Institute for National Strategic Stud- deployment of Task Force Ranger to ies at the National Defense Univer- Somalia in August 1993. The CENT- sity has published a monograph en- COM JAAR (Secret) summary JULL titled Somalia Operations: Lessons briefly discusses the events leading Learned under the auspices of the to the engagement in October 1993 Operational Plans and Interoperabil- in which 18 Americans were killed ity Directorate (J-7), Joint Staff. The and 75 wounded. The withdrawal of work is focused primarily on the op- U.S. forces was carried out by the erational level of joint warfare. Writ- end of March 1994. (United Shield, ten by COL Kenneth Allard, USA, it the pull out of U.N. forces from draws on a multitude of sources, including the master JULLS database. Somalia which was concluded on Washington: National Defense University —Contributed by March 3, 1995, will be covered by a Press, 1995. [ISBN 0–16–045577–4] separate CENTCOM JAAR.) For sale by CAPT Rosemary B. Mariner, USN the Superintendent of Documents Exercise and Analysis Division (J-7) Joint Staff JFQ

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James R. FitzSimonds, “The Coming Robert D. Warrington, “The Helmets JFQuarterly Survey Military Revolution: Opportunities May Be Blue, but the Blood’s and Risks,” Parameters, vol. 25, Still Red: The Dilemma of U.S. of Periodical no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 30–36 Participation in U.N. Peace Literature Lukas Haynes and Timothy W. Operations,” Comparative Strategy, Stanley, “To Create a United vol. 14, no. 1 (January–March Nations Fire Brigade,” Comparative 1995), pp. 23–34. Strategy, vol. 14, no. 1 (January– Gary Waters and Chris Mills, “Com- Hans Binnendijk and Patrick March 1995), pp. 7–21. mand of Australian Joint Force Clawson, “New Strategic Operations,” Australian Defence Priorities,” The Washington Jonathan T. Howe, “The United Force Journal, no. 111 (March/April Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 2 (Spring States and United Nations in 1995), pp. 43–47. 1995), pp. 109–26. Somalia: The Limits of Involve- ment,” The Washington Quarterly, Bill G. Welch and William O. Welsh Mark Clodfelter and John M. vol. 18, no. 3 (Summer 1995), III, “The Joint Warfighting Center Fawcett, Jr., “The RMA and Air pp. 49–62. Focuses on the Brave New World,” Force Roles, Missions, and U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. Doctrine,” Parameters, vol. 25, John W. Jandora, “Threat Parameters 121, no. 5 (May 1995), pp. 109–11. no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 22–29. for Operations Other Than War,” Parameters, vol. 25, no. 1 (Spring Lawrence B. Wilkerson, “Learning Eliot A. Cohen, “The Meaning 1995), pp. 55–67. Jointness,” U.S. Naval Institute and Future of Air Power,” Orbis, Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 5 (May vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring 1995), Steven Lambakis, “Space Control in 1995), pp. 107–08. pp. 189–200. Desert Storm and Beyond,” Orbis, vol. 39, no. 3 (Summer 1995), Dov S. Zakheim, “A Top-Down Plan John H. Cushman, “In Joint pp. 417–33. for the Pentagon, Orbis, vol. 39, Doctrine: What Are Exceptional no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 173–87. Circumstances?” U.S. Naval Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., “Beyond Institute Proceedings, vol. 121, Luddites and Magicians: Examin- Also noted . . . no. 4 (April 1995), pp. 46–50. ing the MTR,” Parameters, vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 15–21. ———, “Make It Joint Force XXI,” Oliver Morton, “A Survey of Defense Military Review, vol. 25, no. 2 K.A. Nason, “Joint Operations in the Technology,” The Economist, (March/April 1995), pp. 4–9. Canadian Forces: A Meaningful vol. 335, no. 7918 (June 10, 1995), and Timely Start,” Canadian 20 pp. Lawrence T. DiRita, “The Color Defence Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 2 Purple,” U.S. Naval Institute Roger H. Palin, “Multinational (December 1994), pp. 6–9. Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 5 (May Military Forces: Problems and 1995), pp. 104–06. Nick Olmstead, “Humanitarian Prospects,” Adelphi Papers, no. 294 Intervention?” U.S. Naval Institute (London: International Institute Bradford Dismukes, “The U.S. Mili- Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 5 (May for Strategic Studies, April 1995), tary Presence Abroad,” Strategic 1995), pp. 96–102. 84 pp. [ISBN 0–19–828025–4] Review, vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring JFQ 1995), pp. 49–60. William A. Owens, “The Emerging System of Systems,” U.S. Naval In- George B. Eaton, “General Walter stitute Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 5 Krueger and Joint War Planning, (May 1995), pp. 35–39. 1922–1938,” Naval War College Review, 48, no. 2 (Spring 1995), Antonio L. Pala, “The Increased Role pp. 91–113. of Latin American Armed Forces in U.N. Peacekeeping: Opportunities David A. Fastabend, “Checking the and Challenges,” Airpower Journal, Doctrinal Map: Can We Get There vol. 99, special edition (1995), from Here with FM 100-5?” Param- pp. 17–28. eters, vol. 25, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 37–46. Ralph Peters, “After the Revolution,” Parameters, vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer Scott A. Fedorchak, “Roles and 1995), pp. 7–14. Missing Missions: The Army’s Role in Am- an Issue? phibious Warfare,” Marine Corps William A. Stofft and Garry L. Gazette, vol. 79, no. 3 (March Guertner, “Ethnic Conflict: The Copies of back numbers of JFQ are 1995), pp. 76–83. Perils of Military Intervention,” available in limited quantities to Parameters, vol. 25, no. 1 (Spring members of the Armed Forces and 1995), pp. 30–42. institutions. Please send your request to the Editor at the address JFQ lists recent selected titles of interest or FAX number listed on the to its readers. Publishers are asked to masthead. JFQ forward new works to the Editor.

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ship of the Army got what it DESERT STORM wanted, but less than it de- served. The book was not WARNINGS published by the U.S. Army A Book Review by Center of Military History, GRANT T. HAMMOND but under the auspices of the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. In the first Certain Victory: The U.S. Army chapter and conclusions, the in the Gulf War text wallows in effusive by Robert H. Scales, Jr., et al. prose and shameless self- Washington: Government Printing promotion of Army doctrine Office, 1993. and prowess. Elsewhere, it 435 pp. $115.00 combines aspects of a Victors. Festschrift in honor of Gener- U.S. Air Force (Dean W. Wagner) The Generals’ War: als Vuono and Sullivan with The Inside Story of the Conflict vignettes by Bradley drivers, The general tone of Certain Vic- in the Gulf tank gunners, and infantrymen. tory is more like cheerleading than by Michael R. Gordon and Certain Victory purports to de- careful analysis. Sadly, demonstrat- Bernard E. Trainor Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. scribe how revised doctrine as prac- ing success by the destruction of 551 pp. $27.95 ticed in the Gulf War and the suc- weapons (a variation on the body [ISBN 0–316–32172–9] cess that training and reequipping count as a measure of merit) cannot after Vietnam brought about. We are camouflage the fact that we won a treated to reviews of AirLand Battle, battle, not a war. Iraq was expelled the expanded role of realistic train- and the government of Kuwait re- hese two books on the Persian ing, the “big five” systems (namely, stored. But neither the Republican Gulf War are radically different. T the Abrams, Bradley, Apache, Black- Guard nor Saddam’s WMD capabil- One is the official Army history hawk, and Patriot). The Army was ity was destroyed. Despite the while the second is a journalistic radically transformed in the wake of changes showcased by the Gulf War post-mortem written in the same Vietnam. But it would never have in Certain Victory, one is struck by genre as Commanders by Bob Wood- undergone that change under the the verities of continuity. Time, ter- ward. Although both promise ground inspiration of books like this. rain, and weather were greater obsta- truth, we are left with very different A host of questions are raised by cles than the Iraqis. impressions of what happened and this book. Some are mentioned, but The complete destruction of the why. They reinforce the maxim that others are not. Few are assessed in Republican Guard was identified by in war, truth is the first casualty. detail. Among those cited are com- General Schwarzkopf as the “main One ignores many questions and munications problems with older operational objective.” One gets the failures raised in a host of other model short-range radios and depen- impression that if destruction of the works; the other is a more engaging dence on satellite communications, Republican Guard is repeated often account, the more informative as difficulties in resupply on the move, enough, the reader will ignore the well as the more useful and impor- and a disinvestment in UAVs. Other reality that it was not destroyed. De- tant of the two books. issues—such as how we might have spite Schwarzkopf’s assurance to the Certain Victory is an odd work. supplied the requisite water and POL media in the briefing at the end of The effort to produce it began if had not been in theater already, the war that “the gate is closed” and shortly after the Gulf War and at sustained a longer ground campaign, the Republican Guard could not es- least one version, far more critical, and dealt with a 28 percent friendly cape, that was not true and at least was abandoned. General Scales and fire rate, or why VI Corps stopped its half of it did. VII Corps did not oc- his team of officers put together a advance at night if time was critical cupy Safwan, the site selected for work that is basically operational in and the inability to adapt rapidly to cease fire negotiations, much to the focus with far more tactical detail changing battlefield conditions—are embarrassment of all concerned. The than strategic perspective. Massaged not. The chapter describing the at- somewhat disingenuous epigraph to for one year by the U.S. Army Train- tack on the Iraqis is entitled “The Certain Victory is a quote from Sun ing and Doctrine Command, it was Great Wheel.” Both the name and Tzu’s Art of War: “In war, then, let pasted together in distinct pieces for the reality strongly question doctri- our great object be victory, not various purposes. The senior leader- nal commitment to agility and ini- lengthy campaigns.” We had a short tiative. Phase lines and synchroniza- campaign, but we did not get a us- Grant T. Hammond holds the Air War Col- tion rule all along with lousy able victory—no better peace but lege chair of national security strategy and weather, an enormous appetite for rather a status quo ante bellum. is the author of Plowshares Into Swords: fuel and ammunition, and poor Arms Races in International Politics. communications.

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The Generals’ War is written by logic. It certainly was not, as they As Schwarzkopf presented his the military correspondent for The entitle the chapter, “The Mother of famous “Mother of All Briefings” as- New York Times and a retired Marine All Battles.” suring the press and the world that three-star general. It pulls few The threatened Marine am- “the gate is closed,” it was apparent punches and draws sweeping con- phibious attack on Kuwait is rightly to field commanders that the bulk of clusions worthy of further assess- characterized as “deception by de- the Republican Guard was being al- ment. The authors tell us that joint- fault.” But the change in plans for lowed to escape. Instead of peace, we ness is largely a myth—that each an attack from the south—which re- gained a truce of indeterminate du- service planned and fought its own quired reconstituting a huge logistics ration. Although General Waller, war in its own way. While the ser- base in a new position, planning of a deputy CINC, told Schwarzkopf vices developed their own plans, a new axis of advance, etc.—showed “You have got to be bullshitting me” lack of careful monitoring, accord- skill and ingenuity. The attack, once when informed of the decision, no ing to Gordon and Trainor, caused launched, proceeded faster and more one seriously questioned, let alone problems later in the war. During effectively than anticipated. The suc- challenged it. Deployments on the the planning process, we overesti- cess of the Marines was one of the ground were unknown, the site se- mated our enemy, likely casualties, reasons for the discontinuity and lected for negotiations was not in needs, and effectiveness right to the mistiming of the left hook. What coalition hands, and no serious dis- end of the war. Perhaps this is a failed in a basic sense was the very cussion of war termination criteria legacy of the Cold War—the infla- concept of synchronization so cher- had occurred. We just stopped and tion of threats, budgets, and capabil- ished by the Army. The coordination declared victory. ities is a hard habit of mind to break. of the ground war and the difficul- What Gordon and Trainor show A good deal of the book is based ties encountered fall at the feet of is that many flag officers are hide- on interviews and privileged, even Schwarzkopf who was dual hatted as bound, risk averse, and unable to classified information. The authors CINC and the ground component give or accept constructive criticism. give vivid insights into the personal- commander—and who was posi- They command by virtue of rank ities of Powell, Schwarzkopf, Horner, tioned 300 miles to the rear of the and temperament. Schwarzkopf’s Glosson, Waller, Franks, McCaffrey, initial FEBA. tirades were so well known that Yeosock, and others, and also vi- The plan developed to trap and most felt lucky to survive briefings gnettes on debates, temper destroy the Republican Guard, the in his presence unscathed, rather tantrums, disputes, and briefings major military objective, was flawed than saying what perhaps should that occurred during Operations from the outset. The distances, fuel have been said. Work-arounds were Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Powell and ammunition consumption rates, devised for personalities as well as seems more the politician and even and such were known well in ad- problems and each deferred to those pacifist than one might expect. They vance. The pace of the advance to of higher rank without a full brief also document that as good as the various phase lines was carefully cal- for opposing opinions. Everyone air campaign was, it had many flaws. culated. Gordon and Trainor go fur- burnished his own record. In that Discriminate warfare through air- ther. The Army plan to destroy the sense, the book is perfectly titled for power worked better in theory than Republican Guard was designed to it shows much of the infighting, at- in practice. take seven to ten days but got less titudes, tirades, and problems of a On the significance of the Battle than five. Even then the pace could generals’ war. of Khafji, a key element of the book, have been faster. VII Corps synchro- The book takes the services to the authors stretch the evidence to nized the advance to its slowest unit task for not candidly assessing their make their point. They claim that and stopped at night. Still worse, respective performances and for pub- the two-day series of border engage- General Franks, the major ground licly ignoring many problems which ments at the end of January was the force combat commander in contact, they encountered. All sought to take “defining moment in the Persian spoke directly with Schwarzkopf advantage of the war to showcase Gulf War.” They argue that this was only once during the ground war. their prowess and get favorable pub- both tactical and strategic and de- Though the hundred hour war was licity. They also ducked major prob- signed to cause American casualties in many ways a public relations lems in their self-assessments. Such in large numbers, that Schwarzkopf gambit (shorter than Israel’s Six Day criticisms is needed in order to avoid failed to grasp what it signified War, Schwarzkopf quipped), the gen- a “Gulf War Syndrome” of unde- about Iraqi capabilities, and that in eral retreat of Iraqi forces began only served praise and success that could failing to revise his plans, Khafji set 39 hours after the main attack. be every bit as destructive as the the stage for the escape of the Re- Phase line “Victory” was 27 miles “Vietnam Syndrome” of defeat and publican Guard one month later. from Basra and the main highway demoralization. This has appeal but to infer that an north, but it was to be the limit of Unfounded, at times un- accurate assessment of the Iraqi advance. VII Corps turned east too bounded, puffery and self-promo- army and its fighting skills could quickly and then stopped too soon. tion bespeak a tendency that is a have been drawn at the time seems tragic flaw in much of the American to rely more on hindsight than military. That flaw is the general re-

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luctance to accept criticism and, military leadership, more versatile, more importantly, the inability to SQUARING THE imaginative, and rigorous in train- make objective self-assessments. ing, and more dependent on re- This is highlighted by a comment PENTAGON search, development, and new Schwarzkopf made to a meeting of A Book Review by weapons because it lacked old ones. the Marine high command after the WILLIAM H. GREGORY The bloated French military struc- war. ture collapsed in mere months in Watch out what you say. Why do I 1940 under the onslaught of a leaner Reinventing the Pentagon: say that? Because we have people inter- and better trained German force. viewing everyone they can get their hands How the New Is there a parallel between on. They are out writing their books. Just Public Management Can Bring France and Germany after World think of the reputation of the United Institutional Renewal War I and the United States at the States military, what it is today, compared by Fred Thompson and L.R. Jones end of the Cold War? The authors to what it was six months ago. I think we San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994. say there is and have a point. Acqui- ought to be very proud of what we did sition, a perennial source of horror here, and don’t allow those bastards to 298 pp. $29.95 [ISBN 1–55542–710–3] stories, is dissected once more in rob us of that. their answer. Such an attitude does a disser- The systems command of every vice to the Nation. So too does a pre- he title Reinventing the Pentagon service is huge. And, according to sumption that patriots come only in Tseizes on a current all-purpose Thompson and Jones, their person- uniforms. buzz word epitomized by Vice Presi- nel are chronically underemployed. Writing military history is not a dent Gore’s report on reengineering Micromanaged by Congress, organi- stale academic enterprise, nor the Federal bureaucracy and a move- zational bloat leads them to more should it be a public relations ploy. ment sweeping local and state gov- controls and paperwork for indus- Accounts of what happened—both ernment to improve efficiency. Yet try—at greater cost. Myriad factions how and why—depend on the con- the authors, both academics, do not in these organizations are able to text of the times, the perspectives attempt to reinvent the Pentagon in participate at each point in the gov- taken, the evidence available, and the synoptic sense, starting with force ernment where a project can be the skill of the authors. No one work structure or roles and missions. vetoed. To keep everyone on board a contains the truth, the whole truth, Rather their summons to restructure, given project, all potential partici- and nothing but the truth. But the not simply deregulate, focuses on pants are given a piece of the action. effort to distill as much as possible narrower, specific areas: the reinven- Requirements proliferate, driven by from an examination of the past is tion of defense budgeting, the rela- diverse doctrines and interests. The vitally important to our present un- tionship between DOD and Congress, net result is the spinning out of ex- derstanding and future capabilities. the acquisition process, and defense travagant operational requirements, As General Sir William Butler re- accounting. Nonetheless, their ap- gold-plated designs, and unneces- minded us, “The nation that will in- proach is valuable. They raise prickly sary elaboration of subsystems by sist on drawing a broad line of de- issues about the effectiveness of DOD the functions responsible for them. marcation between the fighting man administration. Is the defense estab- Acquisition is only one splinter and the thinking man is liable to lishment overstaffed now that the in a larger plank. Going back to the find its fighting done by fools and Cold War is over? They think that it origin of the problem, the authors its thinking done by cowards.” We is—and was long before the demise of charge that DOD has never clarified can ill afford either. JFQ the Soviet Union. administrative boundaries and has A proxy for the book’s thesis not resolved the issue of centraliza- comes in its story of Germany and tion versus decentralization. Instead, INTERNET users who want to France after World War I. Under of respond to this review should for- the Pentagon alternated between del- the Treaty of Versailles, Germany egating authority to the military de- ward their comments to: was forced to cut military spending, [email protected] partments and centralizing it in the reduce its officer corps to one-fif- hands of the Secretary of Defense. teenth of its pre-war size, and scrap Unlike the success of the Strate- its weapons and equipment. Al- gic Air Command which had a though France outspent Germany sharply defined mission and re- on defense in the next two decades, sources, DOD got off on the wrong Germany was more selective in its foot. Unification initially was ill-defined and management policy swung back and forth like a pendu- William H. Gregory is the former editor-in- lum. Then Robert S. McNamara chief of Aviation Week and Space Technology super-centralized the military. While and the author of The Defense Procurement Mess and The Price of Peace.

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the authors credit him with consid- A second, more radical step ment and its failings reaching back erable accomplishment, as in tough would throw out the President’s bud- to World War I. There is a wonderful decisions on force structure, his five- get, which the authors say Congress Navy memo complaining about con- year planning, programming, and now treats as little more than a pol- gressional overprescription of detail budgeting system (PPBS) degener- icy statement. Instead, projects which sounds contemporary but is ated into the triumph of process should be approved once and recon- dated 1915. For anyone seeking solu- over purpose. The DOD structure sidered only as events dictate. Obli- tions to what the authors identify as bloated and lost its way. gational authority should be granted longstanding problems, past analyses Centralizing authority in McNa- throughout the life of a project, a and proposed solutions are there. It mara’s hands left commanders with- giant step toward funding and indus- also raises in forthright terms the un- out authority to carry out their mis- trial stability but also a strong dose pleasant realities that the military sions. Inevitable administrative for a Congress grown accustomed to must face in the stand-down from a failures spawned more detailed pro- annual detailed approvals. virtual wartime structure to a much cedures to avoid their recurrence. A third equally drastic change less pervasive threat environment. The latter applied especially to would adopt mission budgeting. The questions are simple but admit- weapons acquisition. More regula- “Congressional budgeting should tedly difficult to deal with. tions led to extended development focus on significant changes in oper- Private companies have been cycles. As the authors argue, over- ations, activities, and equipment,” cutting their work forces and clean- staffing and make-work drove costs the authors contend. “It makes no ing up outdated systems. Their em- inexorably higher for equipment sense for Congress to look at every ployees have suffered and cynicism that often faced obsolescence when purchase contemplated by the entire has eclipsed the company man. it was fielded. That Congress, which Federal Government every year.” In Thompson and Jones argue that the had deferred to the executive branch defense mission budgeting, combat- government must face the same on defense policy from 1930 to 1960, ant commands and some defense painful process, and in today’s cli- should go deeper and deeper into agencies might operate under per- mate excuses about the difficulty of micromanagement was understand- manent authority. Force structure or the job will not be accepted. The able as mutual trust vanished in an combat supplies would need con- November 1994 election, which ever thickening gumbo. Legislation gressional authority, as would major took place after this book was pub- proliferated, eventually measured by hardware investments. Obligational lished, reflected the distress over the the foot rather than the page and authority would be permissive, not inability of government to down- further constraining discretion and mandatory, implicitly favoring man- size. initiative. Management grew layer agement decentralization and McNamara brought the kind of upon layer and the system clogged up. greater discretion at the operating top-down strategy found in policy Congress and budgets bulk large level. books to the Pentagon, the quest for in Reinventing the Pentagon. Granting Radical as these ideas sound, an Olympian view, a master plan, that restructuring the budgeting pro- they are not new. “Congressional one final convincing solution. His cess collides with the trend in budgeting has traditionally been elegant ideas had to march into the Congress over the last two decades permissive, continuous, and selec- real world and be carried out by real toward more detailed line-item con- tive rather than comprehensive and people. Olympian fiats are chroni- trol over defense spending, the au- repetitive,” the authors say. “In cally misunderstood or overtly op- thors urge that Capitol Hill opt for essence, these changes would re- posed by those who must do the more permissive budgeting. The store the congressional budget pro- work. As the authors of Reinventing Pentagon should emulate private- cess that existed prior to the Budget the Pentagon point out, fiat did not sector capital budgeting. Act in 1921, which established a work for McNamara any more than This would upset settled con- comprehensive annual executive legislative edicts were able to fix ac- gressional practices such as dabbling budget for the entire Federal Gov- quisition. Thus the best insight of in cash-flow scheduling by empha- ernment, created what has become Reinventing the Pentagon is into over- sizing outlays rather than broad pro- the Office of Management and Bud- centralization and overcontrol in re- gram approval through new obliga- get, and at the same time reduced moving discretion from, and not de- tional authority. Theoretically this congressional power.” manding good judgment by, the idea has strong points, because it There are excellent insights as working level. The book cites Gore’s makes Congress a board of directors well as historical perspectives in Rein- report with approval which has a instead of line managers. Yet outlays venting the Pentagon, particularly in message. Enfranchise workers who are the basis for calculating the acquisition and the plethora of fi- can deal with a solution one brick at deficit, now accepted as a fact of life; nancial management systems the a time. If the top-down approach and they reflect checks for local con- DOD controller is currently attempt- has failed, try the bottom-up. tractors. Congress would not deem- ing to consolidate and improve. The phasize outlays casually. book’s greatest values are twofold. One is the comprehensive survey of the literature on defense manage-

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Comprehensive research can be tion as a reason to distance itself militarily competent monarch re- a drawback when it diffuses one’s ex- from responsibility for unpleasant laxed his suspicion of the House of perience to consensus by citation. Pentagon force structure and equip- Commons and renewed permissive- Frederick Thompson teaches public ment decisions. ness in lawmaking. While the au- management in the Atkinson Gradu- To counter those who say the thors reached back into history for a ate School of Management at gulf between Congress and the exec- parallel, they end on an optimistic Willamette University and L.R. Jones utive branch is too deep to span, note: what happened before can teaches financial management at the Thompson and Jones cite the fifty- happen again. Difficult as the chal- Naval Postgraduate School. They year period of military microman- lenge may be, this reader hopes that draw some tales from the trenches al- agement by the British Parliament in history does repeat itself. JFQ though they have moved beyond the 17th century. It ended when a academe and authorities. One is their story of a small firm building low- technology trailers for the Army. Smallness notwithstanding, the company had separate production lines 1995 CJCS ESSAY COMPETITION for its military and commercial busi- The 14th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Strategy Essay ness because it was the easiest way to Competition was conducted on May 24–25, 1995 at the National deal with Federal accounting stan- Defense University. This competition challenges students from both dards and reporting. Commercial intermediate and senior colleges to write on an aspect of international manufacturing time, drawing down security, defense policy, or military affairs, with special emphasis on bare-bones just-in-time inventory, joint matters. was less than 36 hours with immediate delivery. Military inventories were WINNING ESSAY 25 times higher at one point, which pushed up overhead costs. Army in- Commander Frank C. Borik, USN (Air War College) “Sub Tzu and the Art of Submarine Warfare” spection at each stage of manufacture and insistence on delivery in batches DISTINGUISHED ESSAYS lengthened cycle time and added to overhead. Direct labor costs were Commander Lawrence G. Downs, Jr., USN (Air War College) “Digital Data Warfare: Using Malicious Computer Codes as a Weapon” about the same for military and commercial work, but military overhead Hon K. Lee, Department of State (National War College) costs were double. The story had a “China in the 21st Century: America’s Greatest Strategic Challenge” happy ending. With the help of an Army contracting officer, the firm James F. Lindner, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (Naval War College) was designated an exemplary facility, “Pax Americana Part II: Theoretical and Practical Considerations exempt from direct oversight under for a Future American Grand Strategy” DOD policy. The company was able to adapt many of its commercial Timothy M. Savage, Department of State (Industrial College practices to military work, a concrete of the Armed Forces) “One Hand Clapping: Systemic Change and U.S. Policy case of the kind of crossfeed that Sec- Toward Europe After the Cold War” retary of Defense William J. Perry is trying to introduce to acquisition on Lieutenant Colonel Jon Moilanen, USA (Army War College) a grander scale. “Engagement and Disarmament: A U.S. National Security Not that the authors expect a Strategy for Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction” totally happy ending to restructuring the Pentagon. Progress in acqui- Lieutenant Colonel James C. Pearson, USAF (Air War College) sition? They quote a senior Navy of- “Mid-Course Corrections for the National Security Adviser” ficial: “Everybody is still falling over everybody else. I just don’t see any Lieutenant Colonel Jeannette K. Edmunds, USA (Army War College) “Organizing Logistics for Peace and War: The Essentiality of real changes.” Even more abstruse is a Trained Joint Logistics Support Command Headquarters” the relationship between Congress and DOD. In a hopeful sign, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph H. Daves, USA (Army War College) Congress has been more receptive to “American Global Logistics and Peace Operations” the Gore report, at least before the 1994 election, than it was to those Lieutenant Colonel James W. Dowis, USAF (Air War College) of either the Grace or the Packard “Maintaining U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure in Commissions. In the coming era of the 21st Century: A Different Challenge” retrenchment, furthermore, Congress has political self-preserva-

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Flores, Susan J. JTFs: Some Practical Implications, Cumulative Index (1994–1995) no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 111–13 ISSUES 5–8: CONTRIBUTORS Fogleman, Ronald R. Global Presence, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 94–99 Freedman, Lawrence Adolph, Robert B., Jr. Choi, Kang Britain, NATO, and Europe, no. 5 Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn’t Go South Korea’s Defense Posture, (Summer 94), pp. 8–17 Far Enough, no. 7 (Spring 95), no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 26–31 pp. 48–53 Genschel, Dietrich Clawson, Patrick Russia and a Changing Europe, Armstrong, David A. Assessing U.S. Strategic Priorities, no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 24–35 Jointness and the Impact of the no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), War, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 36–37 pp. 10–17 Goodale, Richard W., Jr. Planning for War: A System, no. 5 Bacevich, A.J. Cohen, Eliot A. (Summer 94), pp. 106–10 Civilian Control: A Useful A War That Was Not Left to Fiction?, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter the Generals, no. 8 (Summer 95), Gray, Colin S. 94–95), pp. 76–79 pp. 46–49 The Limits of Seapower: Joint Warfare and Unity of Conflict, Ballard, John R. Cole, Bernard D. no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), Joint Task Forces: A Bibliography, Struggle for the Marianas, no. 7 pp. 52–61 no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), (Spring 95), pp. 86–93 pp. 121–26 Gregory, William H. Cossa, Ralph A. Squaring the Pentagon: A Book Barry, Charles L. Asian Multilateralism: Dialogue Review, no. 8 (Summer 95), NATO’s Bold New Concept—CJTF, on Two Tracks, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 131–33 no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 46–54 pp. 32–36 Hammond, Grant T. Bennett, Drew A. Cronin, Patrick M. Desert Storm Warnings: A Book Coalition Rules of Engagement, Asia-Pacific Challenges, no. 7 Review, no. 8 (Summer 95), no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 124–25 (Spring 95), pp. 6–7 pp. 129–31 Benson, Sumner Japan’s Emergent Security Policy, Harrington, Peter Shaping Arms Export Policy, no. 6 no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 20–22 Soldier Art of World War II, no. 8 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 84–91 Dallaire, R.A. (Summer 95), pp. 68–69 Binnendijk, Hans UNAMIR: Mission to Rwanda, Haven, John S., II Asia-Pacific Challenges, no. 7 no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 66–71 War Termination and Joint (Spring 95), pp. 6–7 Donley, Michael B. Planning, no. 8 (Summer 95), Assessing U.S. Strategic Priorities, Building a New Defense pp. 95–101 no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), Consensus, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter Hines, Scott M. pp. 10–17 94–95), pp. 18–27 Standing Down a Joint Task Force, Forward Deployment, no. 8 Problems in Defense Organization no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), (Summer 95), p. 7 and Management, no. 8 pp. 111–13 (Summer 95), pp. 86–94 Rethinking European Security, Hitchen, Ralph M. no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 6–7 Downing, Wayne A. Cutting Defense: Method Instead Joint Special Operations in Peace of Madness, no. 5 (Summer 94), Budura, Vic and War, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 91–94 Joint Space Doctrine: Catapulting pp. 22–27 into the Future, no. 5 (Summer 94), Hitt, Franklin D., Jr. pp. 71–76 Dworken, Jonathan T. Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn’t Go Restore Hope: Coordinating Relief Far Enough, no. 7 (Spring 95), Canby, Steven L. Operations, no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 48–53 Roles, Missions, and JTFs: pp. 14–20 Unintended Consequences, no. 6 Hooker, Richard D., Jr. (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 68–75 Edmondson, Charles M. America’s Two Armies, no. 6 Writing Joint Doctrine, no. 7 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 38–46 Cerjan, Paul G. (Spring 95), pp. 109–10 Service Identities and Joint Hurley, Marcus Culture, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter Emmett, Peter C. JFACC—Taking the Next Step, 94–95), pp. 36–37 Software Warfare: The no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 60–65 Militarization of Logic, no. 5 Cha, Young-Koo Johnson, W. Spencer (Summer 94), pp. 84–90 South Korea’s Defense Posture, Under Four Ensigns: A Book no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 26–31 Ferriter, Edward C. Review, no. 5 (Summer 94), Which Way Joint Doctrine?, no. 8 pp. 125–27 (Summer 95), pp. 118–19

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Johnson-Freese, Joan Metz, Steven Owens, William A. Joint Space Doctrine: Catapulting Learning from Rwanda, no. 7 JROC: Harnessing the Revolution into the Future, no. 5 (Summer 94), (Spring 95), pp. 105–08 in Military Affairs, no. 5 pp. 71–76 (Summer 94), pp. 55–57 Miller, Charles E. Jones, Jeffrey B. Roles, Missions, and Functions: Pendley, William T. PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC, Terms of Debate, no. 5 America and the Asia-Pacific no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 28–33 (Summer 94), pp. 103–05 Region, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 37–42 Kass, Ilana Millett, Allan R. Perla, Peter P. National Power and the The Korean War: A Review Essay, Future Directions for Wargaming, Interagency Process, no. 8 no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 119–26 no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 77–83 (Summer 95), pp. 8–13 Montaperto, Ronald N. Poulin, B. Katz, Douglas J. The PLA: In Search of a Strategic UNAMIR: Mission to Rwanda, Unity of Control: Joint Air Focus, no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 16–17 no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 66–71 Operations in the Gulf—Part Two, Moore, George M. Raach, George T. no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 59–63 Joint Space Doctrine: Catapulting National Power and the Kievit, James into the Future, no. 5 (Summer 94), Interagency Process, no. 8 Learning from Rwanda, no. 7 pp. 71–76 (Summer 95), pp. 8–13 (Spring 95), pp. 105–08 Morgan, Clarence Todd Ryan, Donald E., Jr. Krause, Michael D. Atlantic Command’s Joint Implications of Information- Getting to Know Jomini: A Book Training Program, no. 8 (Summer Based Warfare, no. 6 (Autumn/ Review, no. 7 (Spring 95), 95), pp. 120–23 Winter 94–95), pp. 114–16 pp. 126–28 Murdock, Clark A. Scheina, Robert L. Kuehl, Daniel T. Mission-Pull and Long-Range Argentine Jointness and the Roles, Missions, and Functions: Planning, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter Malvinas, no. 5 (Summer 94), Terms of Debate, no. 5 94–95), pp. 28–35 pp. 95–101 (Summer 94), pp. 103–05 Murray, Williamson Shalikashvili, John M. Kupiszewski, Robert B. The Meaning of World War II, no. A Word From the Chairman, Joint Education in the 21st 8 (Summer 95), pp. 50–57 no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 4–5; no. 6 Century, no. 7 (Spring 95), (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 4–8; Neimeyer, C.P. pp. 72–76 no. 7 (Spring 95), pp. 4–5; no. 8 Marines as an Endangered Species: (Summer 95), pp. 4–6 Lasswell, James A. A Book Review, no. 5 (Summer 94), Presence—Do We Stay or Do pp. 121–22 Shwedo, Kevin H. We Go?, no. 8 (Summer 95), War Termination and Joint Once and Future Marines, no. 6 pp. 83–85 Planning, no. 8 (Summer 95), (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 47–51 pp. 95–101 Lawrence, K. Scott Nelson, Michael A. Joint C2 Through Unity of Simon, Jeffrey Unity of Control: Joint Air Command, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter Partnership for Peace: Stabilizing Operations in the Gulf—Part Two, 94–95), pp. 107–10 the East, no. 5 (Summer 94), no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 59–63 pp. 36–45 Leurs, Michael Nesselrode, Mark C. Joint Doctrine: New Pubs, Old Smith, Arthur M. The Joint Staff: Completing the Controversies, no. 5 (Summer 94), Joint Medical Support: Are We Metamorphosis, no. 8 (Summer pp. 111–13 Asleep at the Switch?, no. 8 95), pp. 114–17 (Summer 95), pp. 102–09 Linn, Thomas C. Nicula, Gail Once and Future Marines, no. 6 Soucy, Robert R., II Joint Task Forces: A Bibliography, (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 47–51 War Termination and Joint no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), Planning, no. 8 (Summer 95), Macdonald, Anne F. pp. 121–26 pp. 95–101 Coalition Rules of Engagement, Okonogi, Masao no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 124–25 Spector, Ronald H. Assessing the U.S.-North Korea The Generation of 1945, no. 8 Macke, Richard C. Agreement, no. 7 (Spring 95), (Summer 95), pp. 58–61 A Commander in Chief Looks pp. 23–25 at East Asia, no. 7 (Spring 95), Stiles, Charles W. Owens, Mackubin Thomas pp. 8–15 Why Goldwater-Nichols Didn’t Go Civilian Control: A National Far Enough, no. 7 (Spring 95), Mallard, Philippe H. Crisis?, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter pp. 48–53 France’s European Priority, no. 5 94–95), pp. 80–83 (Summer 94), pp. 18–23 Stucky, Scott W. Joint Operations in the Civil War, Mathews, Michael P. no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 94–95), PSYOP and the Warfighting CINC, pp. 92–105 no. 8 (Summer 95), pp. 28–33

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POSTSCRIPT

Sullivan, Brian R. CONTRIBUTIONS: JFQ welcomes Joint in Spite of Themselves: A NOTE TO submissions from members of the A Book Review, no. 7 (Spring 95), Armed Forces as well as from de- pp. 129–31 READERS AND fense analysts and academic special- Mediterranean Warfare in 3D: CONTRIBUTORS ists from both this country and A Book Review, no. 5 (Summer 94), abroad, including foreign military pp. 122–25 DISTRIBUTION: JFQ is distributed officers. There is no required length Szafranski, Richard to the field and fleet through service for articles, but contributions of When Waves Collide: Future channels. Corrections in shipping 3,000 to 5,000 words are appropri- Conflict, no. 7 (Spring 95), instructions should be directed to ate. Other submissions, however, to pp. 77–84 the appropriate activity listed below. include letters, items of commen- Tertrais, Bruno tary, and brief essays are invited. Re- ▼ ARMY—Contact the installation France’s European Priority, productions of supporting material Publications Control Officer or write no. 5 (Summer 94), pp. 18–23 (such as maps and photos) should to the U.S. Army Publications Distribu- be submitted with manuscripts; do Todd, David F. tion Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Cutting Defense: Method Instead not send originals. Baltimore, Maryland 21220–2896 (ref- Manuscripts are reviewed by the of Madness, no. 5 (Summer 94), erence Misc. Publication 71–1). pp. 91–94 Editorial Board, a process which ▼ NAVY—Contact the Aviation takes two to three months. To facili- Viccellio, Henry, Jr. Supply Office, Navy Publications tate review, provide three copies of The Joint Challenge to and Forms Directorate (Code 10363), the manuscript together with a 150- Interservice Training, no. 7 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, (Spring 95), pp. 43–47 word summary. Place personal or bi- Pennsylvania 19120–5000; FAX: ographical data on a separate sheet Weigley, Russell F. (215) 697–2601/DSN 442–2601. of paper and do not identify the au- Fighting with Allies: The Debate ▼ MARINE CORPS—Contact the thor (or authors) in the body of the Fifty Years On, no. 8 (Summer 95), Marine Corps Logistics Base Atlantic, pp. 38–45 text. Follow any accepted style guide Warehouse 1221, Section 5, Albany, in preparing the manuscript, but Westenhoff, Charles M. Georgia 31704. endnotes rather than footnotes Why We Need an Air Force, no. 6 ▼ AIR FORCE—Contact the base should be used. Both the manuscript (Autumn/Winter 94–95), pp. 62–67 Publishing Distribution Office to and endnotes should be typed in Whitlow, J.L. establish requirement at the Air double-space with one-inch margins. JFACC: Who’s in Charge?, no. 5 Force Distribution Center, 2800 East- JFQ reserves the right to edit (Summer 94), pp. 64–70 ern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland contributions to meet space limita- 21220–2896. Widnall, Sheila E. tions and conform to the journal’s ▼ Global Presence, no. 7 (Spring 95), COAST GUARD—Contact U.S. style and format. Proofs of articles pp. 94–99 Coast Guard Headquarters, ATTN: accepted for publication are not nor- Defense Operations Division, 2100 mally sent to authors for review. Willmott, H.P. 2d Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. Operation Downfall: A Book If possible submit the manu- Review, no. 6 (Autumn/Winter 20593–0001. script on a disk together with the 94–95), p. 127 In addition, bulk distribution is typescript version. While 3.5- and 5.25-inch disks in various formats Wilson, Thomas R. made to defense agencies, the Joint Joint Intelligence and Uphold Staff, unified commands, service col- can be processed, WordPerfect is Democracy, no. 7 (Spring 95), leges, and other activities. Changes of preferred (disks will be returned if pp. 54–59 address for these shipments should requested). Further information on be communicated to the Editor. the submission of contributions is Woodruff, William The Battle for Anzio, no. 8 available by calling (202) 475–1013 / (Summer 95), pp. 62–67 SUBSCRIPTIONS: JFQ is available DSN 335–1013, FAX (202) 475–1012 / by subscription from the Govern- DSN 335–1012, or writing: Yost, David S. ment Printing Office (see the order The Future of U.S. Overseas Editor Presence, no. 8 (Summer 95), blank in this issue). To order for one Joint Force Quarterly pp. 70–82 year, cite: Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ JFQ on the order and mail with a check Washington, D.C. 20319–6000 JFQ for $21.00 ($26.25 foreign) or provide a VISA or MasterCard account number with expiration date to the Superintendent of Documents, Articles published in JFQ are listed in the Air University Index to Military Periodicals. P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, Penn- In addition, brief abstracts of selected sylvania 15220–7954, or FAX the contributions appear in Current World Affairs, order to: (202) 512–2233. A Quarterly Bibliography.

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In Memoriam U.S. Casualties in World War II Army 1 Navy Marine Corps Total 2 Number Serving 11,260,000 4,183,466 669,100 16,122,566 Battle Deaths 234,874 36,950 19,733 291,557 Other Deaths 83,400 25,664 4,778 113,842 Wounds Not Mortal 565,861 37,778 68,207 671,846

1 Includes Army Air Forces. 2 Period from December 7, 1941 to December 31, 1946.

Brig. Gen. Roosevelt’s Grave (Normandy, 1944) by Fletcher Martin.

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JOI JFQ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Restore Hope coming next... U.S. Central Command and the greater Middle East plus revamping the doctrine development process, strategy for theater missile defense, deep strike operations and more in the Autumn 95 issue of JFQ Special Ops

Commemor World War I

JFQ 8 1995 / NUMBER SUMMER JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Published by the Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Medical Supp Washington, D.C.

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