Quarter 2020 st Issue 96, 1 96, Issue
Century st
Megacities and the Joint Force Joint the and Megacities DOD Labs for the 21 the for Labs DOD Edge and Future War Future and Edge The Intellectual
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE NINETY-SIX, 1ST QUARTER 2020 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 96, 1st Quarter 2020 http://ndupress.ndu.edu
GEN Mark A. Milley, USA, Publisher VADM Frederick J. Roegge, USN, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Copyeditor Andrea L. Connell
Associate Editor Jack Godwin, Ph.D.
Book Review Editor Brett Swaney
Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Publishing Office
Advisory Committee Ambassador Erica Barks-Ruggles/College of International Security Affairs; RDML Shoshana S. Chatfield, USN/U.S. Naval War College; Col Thomas J. Gordon, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; MG Lewis G. Irwin, USAR/Joint Forces Staff College; MG John S. Kem, USA/U.S. Army War College; Cassandra C. Lewis, Ph.D./College of Information and Cyberspace; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; LtGen Daniel J. O’Donohue, USMC/The Joint Staff; Brig Gen Evan L. Pettus, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; RDML Cedric E. Pringle, USN/National War College; Brig Gen Kyle W. Robinson, USAF/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Brig Gen Jeremy T. Sloane, USAF/Air War College; Col Blair J. Sokol, USMC/Marine Corps War College; Lt Gen Glen D. VanHerck, USAF/The Joint Staff
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; Richard L. DiNardo/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/Joint Forces Staff College; COL James E. Hayes, USA/National War College; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Bert B. Tussing/U.S. Army War College
Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Aviation structural mechanic 2nd class, assigned to Navy Flight Demonstration Squadron “Blue Angels,” communicates with other crew chiefs during morning turn operations, El Centro, California, January 6, 2020 (U.S. Navy/ Timothy Schumaker); Young officer and his wife sit at dock in San Diego, California, staring quietly at waiting aircraft carrier before he leaves for Korea, ca. 1950 (Courtesy Black Star/U.S. Information Agency/National Archives and Records Administration); Administrative clerk with Installation Personnel Administration Center, Marine Forces Reserve, performs ammo can lifts during combat fitness test, Marine Corps Support Facility New Orleans, December 14, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Tessa D. Watts) About the Cover In This Issue U.S. Marine Corps Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Dialogue Nuclear Defense specialist 2 Letter to the Editor Private First Class James Fish, with Headquarters Company, Forum Headquarters Regiment, 1st Marine Logistics Group, conducts training 4 Executive Summary in Level A vapor protection suit 6 The Intellectual Edge: A during Dismount Recon Sets Competitive Advantage Kit and Outfits course on Camp Pendleton, California, June 13, 2017 for Future War and (U.S. Marine Corps/Evan Ahlin) Strategic Competition By Mick Ryan 12 Reconceiving Modern Warfare: A Unified Model By KC Reid 74 Adapting to Disruption: Aerial 129 The Future of Interagency Combat over North Vietnam Doctrine 22 Adapting for Victory: DOD By Robert G. Angevine By George E. Katsos Laboratories for the 21st Century By William T. Cooley, David J. 84 The Revival of Al Qaeda 132 Joint Doctrine Update Hahn, and John A. George By Jami T. Forbes 29 Beyond Auftragstaktik: 90 Frustrated Cargo: The U.S. Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National The Case Against Hyper- Army’s Limitations in Projecting Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Decentralized Command Force from Ship to Shore in Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to By Trent J. Lythgoe an A2/AD Environment inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and By Brian Molloy other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat JPME Today terrorism; homeland security; and developments in training and joint professional military education to 37 Asking Strategic Questions: Recall transform America’s military and security apparatus A Primer for National 96 Attaining Maritime Superiority to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today. All published articles have been vetted Security Professionals in an A2/AD Era: Lessons from through a peer-review process and cleared by the By Andrew Hill and Stephen J. Gerras the Battle of the Bismarck Sea Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. By Ben Ho NDU Press is the National Defense University’s 42 Clausewitz’s Wondrous cross-component, professional military and academic publishing house. Yet Paradoxical Trinity: Book Reviews The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations The Nature of War as a expressed or implied within are those of the Complex Adaptive System 105 Small Arms contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views Reviewed by Kira I. McFadden of the Department of Defense or any other agency of By Brian Cole the Federal Government. Copyright Notice 106 Japan Rearmed This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition Commentary Reviewed by Nathaniel L. Moir of Joint Force Quarterly. Any copyrighted portions 50 A Blue-Collar Approach to of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without permission of the copyright proprietors. JFQ Operational Analysis: A Special 107 White House Warriors should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted Operations Case Study Reviewed by Edward G. Salo from or based on its content. By Steven J. Hendrickson Submissions and Communications JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent and Riley Post Joint Doctrine research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, 58 The Bering Strait: An Arena 109 Failed Megacities and academic specialists, and civilians from the United the Joint Force States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration for Great Power Competition to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. By Ryan Tice By Matthew N. Metzel, Todd J. manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress, or write to: McCubbin, Heidi B. Fouty, Ken Editor, Joint Force Quarterly G. Morris, John J. Gutierrez, NDU Press Features and John Lorenzen 300 Fifth Avenue (Building 62, Suite 212) Fort Lesley J. McNair 64 Peacemakers: Chaplains as 115 Harnessing Artificial Washington, DC 20319 Vital Links in the Peace Chain Intelligence and Autonomous Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 By David R. Leonard Email: [email protected] Systems Across the JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu/jfq Seven Joint Functions 1st Quarter, January 2020 By Brian David Ray, Jeanne F. ISSN 1070-0692 Forgey, and Benjamin N. Mathias Marines with Combat Logistics Battalion 31, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, move simulated casualty to triage care during casualty evacuation exercise aboard amphibious assault ship USS Wasp, underway in Philippine Sea, June 12, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Isaac Cantrell)
environment presents unique constraints for those traditional partnerships. As the article mentions, the Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs) have been identified as a viable solution for movement and treat- ment of patients, and design concepts are under way. Forward Resuscitative Care. A great deal of analysis has been done that demon- strates the necessity of damage control surgery and forward resuscitative care as close to the point of injury as possible to increase survivability rates. Allowing greater distribution of Role II afloat both through the diffusion of Role II light ma- neuver in the fleet—as well as integration Letter of surgical capabilities on the EPFs to in- crease surgical capacity, while also holding and moving the patient—is key. Afloat Theater Hospitalization. The To the Editor: The article “Joint Inte- of the “golden hour” is no longer ability to maneuver and distribute over grative Solutions for Combat Casualty achievable in the future fight. The veloc- the significant distances of the Pacific Care in a Pacific War at Sea” by Dion ity-based capabilities that multidomain while providing accessable capacity and Moten, Bryan Teff, Michael Pyle, supremacy allows will not be granted in capability challenge the current construct Gerald Delk, and Randel Clark (JFQ a Great Power competition. Instead, a of USNS Mercy and Comfort hospital 94, 3rd Quarter 2019) is an insightful capacity-driven network challenging the ships. The evaluation found a need to piece that brings to light many issues traditional continuum of care must be have smaller, more agile vessels that that the Department of the Navy has developed. The evaluation demonstrated are able to be dynamically employed been diligently pursuing over the past 2 many opportunities to develop capabili- throughout the theater to support a years. In May 2018, the Chief of Naval ties to enable the warfighter. Some of the wider range of warfighting missions. The Operations directed a comprehensive key findings that the Navy is currently de- Navy is currently reviewing alternatives to review of Navy Medicine’s ability to veloping are first responder care, patient support the current and future demands. support the concepts of Distributed movement, forward resuscitative care, As the demands and complexity of Maritime Operations and Expeditionary and afloat theater hospitalization. war continue to evolve, it is imperative Advanced Basing Operations with the First Responder. The first responder that the Military Health System leverages underlying concept of Fleet Design. is vital to survivability within a distributed its strengths and partnerships to truly This review was not conducted solely environment. The Navy and Marine enable the warfighter. An ongoing con- under the auspices of medical oper- Corps recognize this and are currently in- versation and exchange of ideas is key to ational requirements in a distributed stituting tactical combat casualty care for ensuring optimization of our resources maritime environment. Rather, it was all Servicemembers and developing what across warfighting domains. JFQ developed by leveraging capabilities prolonged maritime care will look like, across surface platforms and the combat both in equipment packages and training. Rear Admiral Bruce Gillingham logistics force in order to enable a com- Patient Movement. A consistent U.S. Navy Surgeon General prehensive approach for medical capa- gap in the Navy is the ability to treat bilities across warfighting domains. and move patients via dedicated medical and The requirements evaluation iden- evacuation. Traditionally, the Navy and Lieutenant Commander tified a necessary paradigm shift for the Marine Corps have leveraged Army and Kathleen Dagher delivery of medical care within an austere Air Force capabilities to treat and move U.S. Pacific Fleet Medical Planner and distributed maritime environment. patients around and out of the battle- As the article mentions, the standard field. A contested distributed maritime
2 Dialogue / To the Editor JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 call for entries for the 2020 Secretary of Defense and 2020 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions
Are you a professional military education (PME) student? Imagine your winning essay published in a future issue of Joint Force Quarterly, catching the eye of the Secretary and Chairman as well as contributing to the debate on an important national security issue. These rewards, along with a monetary prize, await the winners.
Who’s Eligible? Students, including international students, at U.S. PME colleges, schools, and other programs, and Service research fellows.
What’s Required? Research and write an original, unclassified essay on some aspect of U.S. national, defense, or military strategy. The essay may be written in conjunction with a course writing requirement. Important: Please note that entries must be selected by and submitted through your college.
When? Anytime during the 2019–2020 academic year. Students are encouraged to begin early and avoid the spring rush. Final judging and selection of winners take place May 2020, at NDU Press, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
For further information, see your college’s essay coordinator or go to: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/About/Essay-Competitions/ Albert Einstein, Washington, DC, ca. 1921–1923 (Library of Congress/Harris & Ewing)
Executive Summary
ne of the great efforts under- to comprehend a little of this mystery paper writing, presentations, travel to taken every year is the mission every day.” It seems that a key to genius familiar and new places, and interacting O of joint professional military is in constantly seeking out answers with senior leaders all work together to education (JPME) faculty members even to questions that we may already slowly and irreversibly place each even- to advance the critical and creative know the answers to. tual graduate on a different and perhaps thinking skills of their students. Why In my JPME teaching experience, I higher intellectual plane. and how do they do this? For the why, believe many students matriculate think- What happens in the classrooms is I turn to one of the greatest minds we ing they are already successful thinkers. often quite remarkable and difficult to have known, Albert Einstein, who in But what happens over that year tends explain to an outsider, but essentially 1955 stated to Life, “The important to surprise them and, to the satisfaction the faculty asks students to question thing is not to stop questioning. Curi- of their faculty, is the real secret to everything in order to better understand osity has its own reason for existing. joint force sustainment. Students are the world they live in. Some might ask, One cannot help but be in awe when he challenged at every turn by the readings “Aren’t military personnel just supposed contemplates the mysteries of eternity, as well as their faculty and classmates, to accept the orders of their superiors and of life, of the marvelous structure of whether they openly admit so or not. The do as they are told?” The answer to such reality. It is enough if one tries merely seminar discussions, problem-solving, a question—“It depends”—is exactly why
4 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 we need such educational experiences. In JPME Today, we offer two articles to approach logistics in the antiaccess/ American history is replete with examples that are both classic parts of the JPME area-denial problem set in the Pacific. of leaders deciding to go against their experience, strategic thinking and the As is always the case with our Recall training and mission brief when cir- nature of war, but suggest cutting-edge articles, the past has informative expe- cumstances demand a less-than-obvious ideas on how we approach the work. riences for the present-day warrior to approach to solving a problem. U.S. Army War College professors know and understand. Ben Ho takes Such is the fundamental separation Andrew Hill and Stephen Gerras offer us to the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in between what has happened that can be their approach on how strategic leaders the South West Pacific Area to discuss documented and what may happen that should ask questions. As long as there how gaining maritime superiority was has not. Successful fighting forces in the have been staff and war colleges, Carl von a game of antiaccess/area-denial long past have learned to adapt and overcome, Clausewitz’s writings have been a part of before it became a modern catch phrase. and PME classrooms are one of the key the mix of military and political science In addition, we have recently shifted places where that ability is developed theory, which of late has added systems our book review editor responsibilities for those who are headed to our highest and systems theory as a focus of research to one of National Defense University’s positions of responsibility in uniform. and planning approaches. From the brightest rising research associates, Brett The best are expert thinkers who can also Marine Corps War College, Brian Cole Swaney, who has selected three reviews of express their thoughts in such a way as takes us once again to the Baron’s Trinity important books. Along with our Joint to convince others to follow as needed, to understand war as a complex adaptive Doctrine Update, we bring three articles adapt when necessary, but always value system. on how the joint force, joint functions, the process of learning to become a bet- Our Commentary authors address and doctrine will be adapted to deal with ter thinker. It starts when one questions two different subjects, both with im- megacities, artificial intelligence, and everything with the end of learning how portant strategic implications. Steven interagency operations. Looking at a to fight the next war better than the last. Hendrickson and Riley Post have de- hole in our joint doctrine in dealing with This issue of Joint Force Quarterly, the veloped a simple answer on how best to failed megacities, Matthew Metzel, Todd first of 2020, will certainly require you to apply operations analysis to special oper- McCubbin, Heidi Fouty, Ken Morris, ask questions as the authors try to pro- ations. Ryan Tice tells us that we should John Gutierrez, and John Lorenzen sug- vide insights to the future in the decade get serious about the growing likelihood gest changes to Joint Publication 3-29, ahead. of Great Power competition in the Bering Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, as well Leading the Forum, one of the Strait, as he lays out the case for a perma- as other areas for future joint doctrine Australian Army’s leading thinkers, nent joint task force in the area. focus. Brian Ray, Jeanne Forgey, and Mick Ryan, discusses efforts to advance Features contains a diverse set of Benjamin Mathias help us work out the intellectual development within the discussions about the role of chaplains range of likely impacts of artificial intel- ranks to meet what he describes as a new on the modern battlefield, the Vietnam ligence on joint warfighting. And one of industrial revolution. The problem of air war, the revival of al Qaeda, and land our most prolific joint doctrine authors, modeling warfare in all its forms has been force projection across the shore. Seeing George Katsos, returns with an interest- an equally challenging problem, so when chaplains as valuable in a range of tasks ing view on interagency operations. an author such as KC Reid offers a way beyond the individual spiritual needs of As you can now see, critical and to develop a unified model of warfare, we the military, David Leonard describes creative thinking leads to writing and take notice. While reports of decreased how commanders can place them where discussions on a wide range of issues con- funding for research and development regular troops lack the skill set to succeed fronting the joint force and its partners. have made news lately, the directors of particularly in interagency humanitarian Remember to pose questions as Einstein the U.S. military’s laboratories, William operations. At the other end of the con- suggested. Then write down what you Cooley, David Hahn, and John George, flict spectrum, Robert Angevine takes us think will make the joint journey more provide a valuable update on what ad- to the skies over Vietnam 50 years ago interesting and ultimately successful. vances we can expect from their work and to offer a lesson in adaptation during When you do, we will be here for your what they recommend other national re- war. As today’s conflicts have evolved best questions. JFQ search efforts can do to keep the United since 9/11, Jami Forbes writes that al States out front technologically. As Qaeda is regaining areas of influence in William T. Eliason advancements in technology arrive in the places we have already fought them and Editor in Chief battlespace, arguing against going too far gaining ground in new places we have down the mission command road, Trent not, at least not yet. As I have often said Lythgoe suggests that fighting forces to my students over the years, war is a need to become less hyper-decentralized physics problem when it comes to force in terms of command relationships. projection. Brian Molloy agrees, and he discusses how the U.S. Army needs
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Eliason 5 Ensign observes Israeli INS Lahav, left, INS Sufa, center, and USNS Leroy Grumman from USS Carney during exercise Reliant Mermaid 2018, Mediterranean Sea, August 7, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Ryan U. Kledzik)
The Intellectual Edge A Competitive Advantage for Future War and Strategic Competition
By Mick Ryan
In the early twenty-first century, the train of progress is again pulling out of the station—and this will probably be the last train ever to leave the station called Homo Sapiens. Those who miss this train will never get a second chance. In order to get a seat on it you need to understand twenty-first century technology, and in particular the powers of biotechnology and computer algorithms. . . . [T]hose left behind will face extinction.
—Yuval Noah Harari
uval Harari’s warning about the development of future military leaders.1 array of predictions, they pose useful future of human development Harari and others such as Heidi and questions to inform future intellec- Y in Homo Deus provides a clarion Alvin Toffler, Nick Bostrum, Andrew tual development within military call for those who lead the intellectual Krepinevich, T.X. Hammes, and Ian institutions. Morris have speculated about the The world is potentially now at the potential future impacts of technology start of a new industrial revolution. This 2 Major General Mick Ryan, AM, is Commander of on humans and war. While these revolution is underpinned by connec- the Australian Defence College. visions of the future contain a wide tivity, biotechnology, and silicon-based
6 Forum / The Intellectual Edge JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 technologies that include various forms largely be a technologically level playing applied to the challenges of force design, of narrow artificial intelligence. Described field. Recent publications, such as those operational concepts, logistics, network as the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” by the Commission on the National security, the integration of kinetic and by World Economic Forum founder Defense Strategy for the United States,8 nonkinetic activities, as well as personnel Klaus Schwab, it is disrupting business, have described how the technological development and talent management. entertainment, communication, trans- edge that has been the preserve of This intellectual edge must be con- portation, and national economies.3 Like Western military institutions for several structed around the development of an previous industrial revolutions, it is almost centuries has declined.9 ultra-professional intellectual military cul- certain that this one will also change how As General Joseph Dunford described, ture—from deployed forces to education society and its constituent communities the pace of strategic and technological and training institutions to strategic plan- develop and interact. Scientific advances, change is increasing.10 Where military ning organizations. People in this system commercialization, and the diffusion of forces do generate capability advantages, must be able to contextualize, plan, innovation are social processes that unfold they are likely to be more short-lived decide, act, and adapt faster and more as people develop and exchange ideas, than has been the case in previous eras.11 successfully relative to adversaries.15 The values, interests, and social norms.4 Western military institutions must best within this evolved culture—the elite The transformations that sweep therefore evolve additional sources of military thinkers—must be celebrated through society will inevitably result in advantage. Lacking an enduring techno- and nurtured in the same way as we cur- changes to how governments evaluate logical edge, and often without recourse rently celebrate and value elite athletes. national security. As Kenneth Payne to the massed forces of previous eras,12 the Institutional incentives to encourage this recently noted, “For encultured hu- only other option is an intellectual edge.13 elite thinking must be reinforced and, po- mans, technology, warfare, and society This intellectual edge manifests in two tentially, promotion pathways and talent are dynamically linked.”5 This means different, but interconnected ways. The management systems adapted. that change will also cascade into how first is individual professional mastery. Excellence in attaining military and military organizations conduct military The intellectual edge for an individual is broader national security outcomes in operations for the new era. the capacity for that person to creatively the 21st century will be achieved by those The impact of the new technologies of outthink and outplan potential adversaries. institutions that are able to develop their this revolution on military institutions has It is founded on the broadest array of personnel in a way that supports them been explored by a range of authors, in- training, education, and experience that in the intellectual edge while applying cluding Amir Husain, Williamson Murray, can be provided by institutions, as well this in a unified way to institutional Paul Scharre, Sean McFate, and Hammes.6 as a personal dedication to continuous problems. The ultimate expression of However, as McFate has recently written, self-learning over a long period of time. institutional intellectual edge will be the “Warfare evolves before fighters do.”7 Increasingly, this intellectual edge for capacity to either win without fighting Therefore, if military institutions are to an individual will be underpinned by in a strategic competition or be able to optimize the employment of these new cognitive support through human–arti- apply its strengths to win any fight that it technologies, investments in new military ficial intelligence teaming. Increasingly, must engage in. To build this intellectual concepts and organizational approaches synthetic biology and artificial intelligence edge, military institutions will also need will have to be made. These evolved ideas must be used in concert with human intel- to appreciate two additional contextual and organizations must be underpinned lectual power to general advantage. Frank elements that will influence the develop- by an evolved approach to the intellectual Hoffman has described this as “System ment of this evolved edge. preparation of future military leaders. 3” thinking, where the nascent field in the The first element is continuity in the collaborative application of biological and wider security environment. Regardless of The Military and Education: machine intelligence will increasingly be the disruption caused by various elements An Evolved Intellectual Edge central to the development of the intellec- of the future environment, there are also Over the next two decades, most tual edge in military personnel.14 likely to be some enduring characteristics. Western militaries will be smaller than The second manifestation of the One is the likelihood that humans will their adversaries, with a declining tech- intellectual edge is institutional. While still wage war on each other. Another is nological advantage. Compounding having the intellectual edge in leadership that the nature of work undertaken by this challenge, they will fight in a new and planning is vitally important, so too humans, and the structures of military hyper-technical, transregional, and is a collective, institution-wide intellectual organizations, will continue to evolve as increasingly disaggregated physical-cy- edge. This will allow groups at different they have over millennia. It is important ber operating environment. Increasingly levels to effectively harness the disparate to understand this continuity because it dominated by more lethal weapons and diverse intellects of its individuals to provides the context that future military systems and the manifestations of a con- solve complex institutional problems in leaders must prepare for. vergence of information and biotech- the short, medium, and long term. This A second element is the overwhelm- nologies, the future conflict space will institutional intellectual edge must be ing impact that the convergence of
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ryan 7 information and biological technologies This should form part of a more expan- need for change, make informed decisions will have. For thousands of years, military sive view of future military capability about change, and enact those changes in leaders have applied their intellect and and national security policy. In the U.S. a timely and efficient way. the tools of war to achieve their desired context, the description of professional Continuous Career-Long Learning. objectives. But regardless of the era, these military education (PME) as “stagnant” Future military institutions require a military leaders have used machines and in the recent National Defense Strategy continuum with functional descriptions other tools as one part of their overall provides a starting point and driving force of what future military leaders must approach to win battles, campaigns, and for strategic reform.17 be capable of at various stages of their wars. The world is now at the precipice of Strategic Engagement. Engagement professional journeys. An institutional an era where humans and machines will among like-minded military institutions, curriculum must underpin this. It should work in an entirely symbiotic way. The different Services, and like-minded not, however, be an industrial-age rapidly evolving capabilities of artificial in- nations must continue to evolve and production line. It should form a “back- telligence hold the promise of supporting embrace an enhanced sharing of ideas. An bone” around which individually tailored better decisionmaking by military and po- array of concepts and designs in military intellectual development might be con- litical leaders. For the first time in history, education is being shared online, but this structed. Williamson Murray and Allen humans and machines may be truly equal is not always replicated among institu- Millet, in their examination of interwar partners in many of the cognitive aspects tions. Enhanced sharing of best-practice military innovation, found that military of war and strategic competition. Evolving curricula, outstanding academic per- leaders were better able to lead and invest this new intellectual edge requires a range sonnel, new learning approaches, and in innovative ideas and technologies of institutional adaptations in the develop- new military theories must be one of the when they had undertaken continuous ment of military personnel. cornerstones of the future approach to learning throughout their careers.18 Western military alliances. Continuous learning has other important A Design for Future Strategic engagement must, however, outcomes as well. Intellectual Development extend beyond the sharing and exchange First, a more holistic approach to con- Building an evolved intellectual edge activities of like-minded institutions. tinuous learning should have the added will demand a range of new and evolved Engagement with civilian universities is benefit of assisting in talent and career approaches. But it is, at its heart, about critical. In these civilian institutions reside management systems of military institu- people. Military personnel must be able centuries of learning across the human- tions. Second, it permits a series of “small to expand their skills and focus on the ities and sciences. Civilian universities bets” with more course corrections on intellectual capacity to apply themselves represent a resource that can provide the types of learning outcomes needed to a wide array of activities that they intellectual rigor to further hone skills for by military personnel. This contrasts with may not have been prepared for. This military personnel at the undergraduate current approaches where reliance on a requires a whole-of-enterprise approach and postgraduate levels. They could also limited number of learning interventions to applying the right level of resourcing provide viewpoints on national security many years apart means institutions make and focuses on training servicemembers that might differ from officially sanc- “larger bets” on preparing their people who are ready for contemporary and tioned policy, forcing military students to for future challenges.19 A mixture of short future challenges, applying the military more carefully analyze the shibboleths of and long residential learning opportuni- art and science within a broader national contemporary national security policy. ties, blended with formal online learning security establishment. The design for Futures, Education, and Adaptation. and curated hubs for self-learning, is the how this system operates within a larger The curriculum of military institutions optimal approach for future continuous military enterprise, however, must be must be informed by an institutional view learning. driven by strategy. This strategy should about the future environments that its Guided Self-Development in a Global draw its desired goals from the capability people will operate in. Military education PME Ecosystem. Formal education in mil- objectives of military organizations for must form closer and more substantial itary institutions cannot hope to cover all the next two decades and will rely on a linkages with organizations—in the mili- the needs in the intellectual development range of institutional, educational, and tary and beyond—that undertake futures of contemporary or future joint officers. technological elements. work. There should be a transparent and Therefore, formal education must be A Strategic Vision. The development logical pathway from informed views of supplemented through self-study.20 This of military personnel, through education, the future and type of intellectual develop- self-study might be most effective if it is training, experience, talent management, ment received by the future joint officer. complementary to formal educational and other mechanisms, provides the To retain relevance and remain at the fore- experiences. The implication is that mili- essential “software” of a military insti- front of best practices, the PME system tary organizations should provide curated tution.16 Therefore, an institutionally must also complement its future work with resources that future joint officers might endorsed view of future military person- mechanisms for adaptation. The system “pull down” from their institution—using nel—especially their leaders—is required. requires formal mechanisms to identify the Internet or other sources—to supplement
8 Forum / The Intellectual Edge JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Marine rolls die during game of war-themed strategy board game Memoir ’44 on Camp Schwab, Okinawa, Japan, December 10, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/ Timothy Hernandez)
their professional development. These circumstances change. Current military with advanced skills.23 Over the coming curated hubs of professional development organizations may have to re-educate years, at almost every rank level, military material can complement informal re- entire generations of military leaders in the personnel will require basic literacy in a sources, be widely available across alliance next 5 to 10 years because of the profound spectrum of new and disruptive technol- partners, and be changed quickly to adapt impact of these new technologies and ogies.24 This must include knowledge of to changes in the strategic environment because of the historically unprecedented its application, how to provide a level of or in technological developments. They acceleration in technological change.22 assurance and quality control, and how to might therefore comprise a resource that Enhanced Technological Literacy. A optimally combine it with new concepts has a shorter adaptation cycle than military range of advanced technologies, such as and human organizations at every level.25 schools and academies. hypersonics, space-based capability, infor- Accessibility. Much of contemporary Skill, Re-Skill, Repeat. The future mation technologies, and biotechnology, joint education and individual training is environment is one where the construc- is starting to rapidly spread through delivered in a residential setting. While tion and destruction of occupations and military organizations. But if institutions this provides for good learning outcomes, industries will occur more quickly than in are to effectively use these systems, they it results in only a small percentage of previous industrial revolutions. As Harari will need informed users. Military orga- military personnel gaining access to joint has recently predicted, “Just as in the 20th nizations will therefore need more than learning opportunities. Military insti- century governments established massive just deep technical experts in the devel- tutions must break down geographic, education systems for young people, in opment of algorithms and the design of technical, and cultural barriers to create a the 21st century they will need to establish artificial intelligence for military systems. truly connected force where education is massive re-education systems for adults.”21 As a recent United Kingdom govern- continuous and self-sustaining. The system Therefore, future military institutions ment report describes, skilled workforces to develop future military leaders should will need to possess a system that is built using new technologies should be a mix be accessible to military members and around skilling and rapidly re-skilling their of those with a basic understanding, defense civilians, regardless of role, rank, personnel as technology and strategic more informed users, and specialists or location. There is much that military
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ryan 9 Technology will not bring clarity or brev- ity.”32 The global security environment continues to evolve. Warfare is becoming more technologically complex while retaining its human essence. Military or- ganizations must have the capacity to deal with future threats that the application of technology and mass will not solve. Only through thinking better and building the intellectual edge in servicemembers and institutions will they evolve an improved capacity for securing future national se- curity objectives. While many of the skills required may change, and the human composition of these forces continues to evolve, the intellectual preparation of the military for the demands of future con- flict is an enduring requirement.
Students of Officer Candidate School class 01-20 are first to test new Conning Officer Virtual Military organizations across the Environment cart system at Officer Training Command in Newport, Rhode Island, September 18, globe now find themselves with a range 2019 (U.S. Navy/Darwin Lam) of new circumstances affecting how their institutions can learn in this area from impact of these technologies on learning operations are conceptualized and exe- the civilian education sector, while also and developing future military leaders cuted and how their people are recruited, leveraging efforts such as the Advanced might be an area of collaborative innova- trained, and educated. In developing an Distributed Learning Initiative.26 tion among Western military institutions. intellectual edge in their future leaders in Innovation in Delivery and Learner But not all evolutions of learning these new circumstances, military forces Engagement. The pace of change in approaches need to be based on advanced must think and act anew.33 JFQ technology is also disrupting longstanding technologies. Wargaming is an effective approaches to training and education. method of applied learning that has Technology has enabled a more “con- a long history in military institutions. Notes nected” approach to learning. This is The use of wargaming to allow future 1 resulting in a gap between older (or heri- leaders to visualize the preparation for, Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief 27 History of Tomorrow (New York: HarperCollins, tage ) institutional education models and and conduct of, military operations is a 2017), 319. the newer digitally enabled approaches. necessary component of preparing future 2 Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler,War New learning approaches are now available joint officers. These wargames need not and Anti-War: Making Sense of Today’s Global for students who may have been excluded be sophisticated computer games. Simple Chaos (New York: Warner Books, 1995); Nick from existing models in the past. desktop games are often effective at en- Bostrum, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Recent digital-age technologies will gaging students and providing additional 2014); Andrew Krepinevich, 7 Deadly Scenarios: underpin this more advanced approach outcomes such as collaboration and A Military Futurist Examines War in the Twen- to learning. The bio-info technology influence skills.30 While the requirement ty-First Century (New York: Bantam Books, revolution offers the military profession to include integrated influence operations 2010); and T.X. Hammes, “The Future of multiple pathways to enhancing the and space capabilities might be new, war- Conflict,” inCharting a Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration, ed. R.D. Hooker, intellectual capacity of individuals and gaming methodologies can be evolved Jr. (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2016), institutions. Artificial intelligence may to retain relevance for future learning available at
10 Forum / The Intellectual Edge JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 5 Kenneth Payne, Strategy, Evolution 16 On the need for the “software” in a mili- 27 Cathy Downes, “Rapidly Evolving, and War: From Apes to Artificial Intelligence tary institution, see Dima Adamsky, The Culture Digitally-Enabled Learning Environments: (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, of Military Innovation (Stanford, CA: Stanford Implications for Institutional Leaders, Educators 2018), 13. University Press, 2010), 142. and Students,” in Innovative Learning: A Key to 6 Amir Husain, Hyperwar: Conflict and 17 Summary of the 2018 National Defense National Security, ed. Ralph Doughty, Lin Wells Competition in the AI Century (Austin, TX: Strategy of the United States of America: Sharp- II, and Theodore C. Hailes (Fort Leavenworth, Spark Cognition Press, 2018); Williamson ening the American Military’s Competitive Edge KS: Army University Press, 2015), 101. Murray, America and the Future of War: The Past (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 28 This is explored in Ryan, “Intellec- as Prologue (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution 2018), 8. tual Preparation for Future War”; Michael Press, 2017); Paul Scharre, Army of None: 18 Williamson Murray and Allen R. Millet, Horowitz and Casey Mahoney, “Artificial Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period Intelligence and the Military: Technology (New York: Norton, 2018); Sean McFate, The (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Is Only Half the Battle,” War on the Rocks, New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable 327. December 25, 2018, available at
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ryan 11 Marine with Marine Rotational Force–Europe 19.2, Marine Forces Europe and Africa, fires M240B machine gun during exercise Sea Breeze 2019, in Chabanka, Ukraine, July 11, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Williams Quinteros)
Reconceiving Modern Warfare A Unified Model
By KC Reid
he U.S. military has numerous tions and paradigms are useful in disag- across the many disparate capabilities, ways it describes, conceives of, and gregating the challenge or technology technologies, and applications of the T organizes for war. Added capabil- to understand it better, but they work in tools, concepts, and personnel used today ities and new technologies continually opposition to a comprehensive under- and in the future, while simultaneously spur new terms and efforts, even new standing of 21st-century warfare, even enabling tactical planning, operational warfare types, to describe operations in while attempting to further it. design, strategic discussion, and exe- a way that is helpful for organization, Joint warfighting requires a new cution. This article proposes a unified planning, and execution. These defini- model that enables integrated thinking model of warfare, tailored for modern technologies and emerging concepts as well as strategic thought, which bring together several existing paradigms in KC Reid is a Booz Allen Hamilton Lead Associate with Special Operations Command–Europe. She previously served at I Marine Expeditionary Force and as the Devil’s Advocate at the Defense use today. Unifying these models enables Intelligence Agency, where she ran its alternative analysis program. broader consideration, integration, and
12 Forum / Reconceiving Modern Warfare JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 innovation in warfare, but most import- to enable mission-focused planning and Third, the domain structure anchors ant, allows discussion of, planning for, operations. These models are domains, thinking in where the fight occurs, rather and prosecution of modern warfare to be Marine Corps forces, joint functions, than what needs to be accomplished. It is simple and mission-focused. the continental or general staff system, useful for understanding what capabilities What is war in the 21st century? and information-related capabilities. The can accomplish in each domain, but it Often, this phrase expresses a warfare existing models are not necessarily un- more often inspires a mine-theirs mental- that is more complex, multifaceted, fast- sound, but each frames warfare such that ity relating to capabilities based on where er-paced, and more human-centric and/ new models must be generated as modes they have effects. It also gives fighting or more dependent on technology than of war develop and change. The result is locality primacy over the capability in warfare in earlier centuries. As used here, many models, all of limited utility, and a terms of importance and thinking. When 21st-century warfare is simply warfare as resulting inability to discuss modern war- discussion focuses on “What domain prosecuted in the 21st century. It includes fare in clear, concise language that can be are we fighting in?” rather than “What every weapon or tool from the most basic shared among strategic, operational, and capabilities do we have to prosecute the to the most advanced; state and nonstate tactical levels. mission?” the domain focus impedes not actors as adversaries, third parties, and Domains. Domains for warfighting— only integration but also innovative capa- partners; and military, paramilitary, and land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace bility combinations. ad hoc forces. It is not relegated to two in joint doctrine—pose three problems Forces Model. The forces model used irreconcilable wills; there can be many. when considering 21st-century warfare.3 in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication First, discussions of new domains needed 1 (MCDP-1), Warfighting, is broad and Existing Models to keep the model relevant are nearly encompasses many warfare aspects, such Most existing paradigms rise from a continuous. Pundits in 2017 discussed as moral and mental capacities, which Clausewitzian championing of conven- the domain of the mind or the individual, are not present in most other models. In tional force-on-force warfare. Carl von while the special operations community MCDP-1: Clausewitz declares that “[physical] discusses the human domain.4 Military The physical characteristics of war force . . . is thus the means of war; to doctrinaires debate whether the electro- •• are generally easily seen, understood, impose our will on the enemy is its magnetic spectrum should be a domain. and measured—for example, equip- object.”1 Problematically, many newly In 1998, generals discussed information ment, capabilities, supplies, physical emphasized warfighting technologies as a domain, as some still do today. objectives seized, force ratios, losses and capabilities either are not physical Second, attempts to integrate the of materiel or life, terrain lost or in nature or have a debatable physical domains succeed mostly in subordinating gained, and prisoners or materiel nature—is a cyber capability part of to one domain all the others. A white captured. physical warfare if the result is merely paper jointly developed by the Marine Moral forces are difficult to grasp different data? What if the result is Corps and Army, though signed only by •• and impossible to quantify, includ- temporarily incapacitating a computing the Army, defines multidomain battle ing national and military resolve, capability? (MDB) as “an approach for ground national or individual conscience, Interpreting the means of war as combat operations,” clearly emphasizing emotion, fear, courage, morale, lead- physical force restricts thinking to the the land domain over others.5 Although ership, and esprit. physical realm, when the focus should be, it does discuss capability integration and Mental forces provide the ability to as Clausewitz points out, “To secure that acknowledges the need for superiority •• grasp complex battlefield situations; object we must render the enemy pow- in other domains, the MDB neverthe- to make effective estimates, calcula- erless; and that, in theory, is the true aim less focuses on how other domains can tions, and decisions; to devise tactics of warfare.”2 To this end, the frame used support the land domain. Vice Admiral and strategies; and to develop plans.7 to think about, plan and prepare for, and Charles Richard, USN, former deputy prosecute war should focus on accom- commander of U.S. Strategic Command, A key drawback, however, is that it plishing the mission rather than another put forward the concept of multidomain pushes the user to focus on the physical, aspect of the fight, such as where it is integration, noting, “Whether you’re given that it openly states an entire aspect prosecuted or what capabilities are used. guiding ships, jets, drones [or] missiles, of war cannot be understood or mea- Instead of restricting thinking about how space is the domain that enables all the sured. In a superficial cost-benefit analysis to fight, the model should free thinking others.”6 One domain’s dominance is of exploring or thinking about moral to enable integration and innovation. not an issue in itself, but when the model forces that are “difficult to grasp and This model overlays several predomi- focuses on how other domains support impossible to quantify,” the effort hardly nant warfare models, each with a different one, it skews thinking toward that pre- seems worth it. focus area and original intent, to identify defined relationship—in support of land Given the vernacular definition a unified paradigm that is comprehensive or space, for instance—rather than true of physical meaning “tangible” rather yet simple to understand and work within integration. than “governed by physics,” the line
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Reid 13 between what is physical and what is not a checklist, over time checklists shape and function. In fact, regarding “support in 21st-century warfare becomes blurry, usually limit thinking to only those things for human decisionmaking,” every staff in particular with cyberspace, cyber on the checklist. In practice, therefore, its section could be said to have a role in security, and electromagnetic spectrum categories also limit thinking about capa- executing the information joint func- operations. bilities. As an example, logistics usually tion, greatly complicating the actual Joint Functions. Defined in Joint includes health services, but the personnel inclusion of this in a planning process. Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the accountability aspect for which personnel In garrison, as well as in opera- Armed Forces of the United States, and JP staff would be responsible is rarely part tions, the general staff system is used 3-0, Joint Operations, the joint functions of the discussion. Personnel functions to organize forces, yet in exercises and are “related capabilities and activities are required for actual warfighting, and sometimes operational planning, not all grouped together to help Joint Force participation in exercises enhances skills, the staff sections participate. Personnel, Components integrate, synchronize, and knowledge, and experience for seasoned training, and finance staffs rarely partici- direct joint operations.” They are often staff and is especially important for less pate in JPP applications while remaining used in planning processes to form the experienced staff. critical in preparing for and prosecuting planning cells and develop courses of General Staff System. While the joint war. If included in operational planning, action. They include: functions are used to plan for military those sections may be better able to iden- operations and exercises, day-to-day func- tify creative, innovative ways to enable command and control: exercising •• tions in garrison are compartmentalized operations. authority and direction over assigned differently despite the fact that those Left out of the joint functions al- or attached forces in the accomplish- same joint functions are executed in and together, though addressed nominally ment of a mission by these same staff organizations in gar- by the “Green Cell” that is tasked with maneuver: employing forces in the •• rison and combat. The JPs and doctrine playing transnational groups, human operational area through movement follow this organization in their number- factors are so important that some are in combination with fires to achieve ing and categorization: considering an entire domain dedicated a position of advantage in respect to to civil affairs. Civil affairs can serve the enemy in order to accomplish the J1, Personnel •• an important role in preconflict, post- mission J2, Intelligence •• conflict, and fighting stages of both fires: using weapons systems to create J3, Operations •• •• counterinsurgency and major contin- a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on J4, Logistics •• gency operations by demonstrating U.S. a target J5, Plans •• intent to nearby populations, engender- intelligence: providing the com- J6, Communications. •• •• ing good will, undermining adversary mander with an understanding of Many staffs use additional sections to efforts, engaging with groups in the the adversary and the operational cover the range of activities that they en- vicinity of friendly forces, and liaising environment and identifying the gage in. While application varies widely, with international and other nongovern- adversary’s centers of gravity and often the military activities included are mental organizations. critical vulnerabilities training, finance, and civil affairs. The or- Information-Related Capabilities. logistics: all activities required in •• ganization varies over time as a function Information-related capabilities (IRCs) moving and sustaining military forces of personality, activity, leadership require- are a key part of information operations force protection: the measures taken •• ments, and functional emphasis. (IO) doctrine, which includes the phys- in preserving the force’s potential so The staff sections coincide partially ical attack and physical protection IRCs. that it can be applied at the appropri- with joint functions. J1 (Personnel) This acknowledges that a missile on ate time and place8 is not included as a joint function, target sends a message simultaneously information: managing and applying •• whereas J2 (Intelligence) and J4 with the target’s physical destruction. information and its deliberate inte- (Logistics) are explicitly and directly It also brings conventional physical fires gration with other joint functions to such. J3 (Operations) is divided into into the IO tent as an IRC. Physical influence relevant actor perceptions, joint functions of maneuver, fires, force ways of communicating are included in behavior, action or inaction, and protection, and (often) information. IO doctrine and, if applied accurately, support for human and automated J5 (Plans) typically orchestrates the are integrated with it. Doctrinally, IRCs decisionmaking.9 longer term planning efforts for all the are tools, techniques, or activities that The joint functions are helpful in functions and staff sections both in affect any of the three information forcing planners and operational planning garrison and deployed environments. environment dimensions (physical, team (OPT) members to consider various J6 (Communications) only roughly informational, and cognitive). JP 3-13, capabilities and requirements of warfare correlates with command and control. Information Operations, includes fires, during the joint planning process (JPP). The J2, J3, J5, and J6 sections all have a targeting, physical security, legal, and Even if intended as a paradigm to serve as role with the newly added information counterintelligence along with J4, J5,
14 Forum / Reconceiving Modern Warfare JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 J6, and J7 in the notional information Figure 1. Unified Model of 21st-Century Warfare operations cell, but specifies 14 IRCs: Mental and Moral Forces •• strategic communication •• joint interagency coordination group Integrated Planning and Operations public affairs •• Analyzing & Deciding Attacking & Protecting Communicating Enabling/Supporting •• civil-military operations •• cyberspace operations information assurance •• in place of all the paradigms examined skills, monitoring behavioral health, and space operations •• above. In short, it simplifies warfare so forth. Mental and moral forces—in- military information support •• enough to understand it easily, while cluding force resilience—underpin not operations enabling much more detailed discussion only the entire mission but also the entire intelligence •• and integration of capabilities and tech- battlespace including adversaries and military deception •• nologies not yet conceived. third-party actors. operations security •• There are two element types in this Foundation Element: Integrated special technical operations •• paradigm: foundation and application. Planning and Operations. This incor- joint electromagnetic spectrum •• Foundation elements are those that under- porates the J5 and J3 roles. J5 conducts, operations lay military actions, specifically moral and and is responsible for, integrated planning key leader engagement. •• mental forces and integrated planning to achieve the four categories of action in If taken as a modern warfare and operations. Application elements are support of the mission. J3 is responsible model—which is possible when aspects those that focus on specific actions to be for the execution of those categories to like physical protection and joint fires taken, namely analyzing and deciding, achieve the mission. from the doctrinal, notional IO cell attacking and protecting, communicat- Application Element: Attacking are included—this not only expands ing, and enabling/supporting. They are and Protecting. Lacking a joint defi- consideration of capabilities focused on not arranged in any particular order, but nition, attack is, as defined in Marine undermining the enemy’s will but also are equal in their importance and contri- Corps Reference Publication 1-10.2, runs the danger of overemphasizing IO’s bution. Each element is defined below Marine Corps Supplement to the DOD communication aspects at the expense of to enable an in-depth understanding of [Department of Defense] Dictionary of the more tangible physical aspects. them. In most cases, doctrinal definitions Military and Associated Terms, an offen- are used because they are good, known, sive action characterized by movement A Unifying Paradigm and relevant. Where definitions deviate supported by fire with the objective Aligning the models reveals four key from doctrine, they are defined and of defeating or destroying the enemy. elements of any military operation, justified. Protection is defined in the 2019 DOD while providing enough flexibility Foundation Element: Moral and Dictionary of Military and Associated within each to enable analysis of new Mental Forces. These are almost the same Terms as active and passive defensive and emerging concepts and technol- as in MCDP-1. Moral forces are national measures to ensure preservation of the ogies without having to create a new and military resolve, national or individ- effectiveness and survivability of mis- warfare type or model with each tech- ual conscience, emotion, fear, courage, sion-related military and nonmilitary nological development or change in morale, leadership, or esprit. Mental forces personnel, equipment, facilities, infor- era. This model can be used for tactical are the ability to grasp complex battlefield mation, and infrastructure deployed or planning, operational design, strategic situations; to make effective estimates, located within or outside the boundaries discussion, and execution. World War calculations, and decisions; to devise of a given operational area. This includes II, Cold War, and post–Cold War eras tactics and strategies; and to develop overcoming an adversary’s attempts to fit as easily into this model as the post- plans.10 As used in MCDP-1, these forces negate them and to minimize damage if 9/11 era. It addresses actions to be exist and can be affected, but most focus negation is attempted. taken, audiences to address, capabilities is placed on undermining the adversary’s Application Element: Analyzing to apply, approaches and perspectives mental and moral forces. Usage here and Deciding. The term analysis to maintain, and even processes to differs in that it emphasizes that these included in the DOD dictionary re- incorporate. mental and moral forces can be under- lates only to intelligence. Therefore, This alignment of models is domain- mined as well as enhanced for enemy, this model leans on facilitation and and Service-agnostic, freeing thought friendly, and third-party personnel. instruction theory to define analyzing about military operations from limita- Included here are activities that may not as drawing connections among ideas tions, such as where it is prosecuted or by reside in the general staff system, such as through various means, including but whom, and enabling focus on missions enhancing individual resilience, teaching not limited to differentiating, orga- and capabilities. It can be used, perhaps, critical thinking and decisionmaking nizing, comparing and contrasting,
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Reid 15 Combat medic assigned to 2nd Combined Arms Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, mentally prepares to engage in M249 squad automatic weapon and M240B general-purpose machine gun qualifications for Best Warrior Competition, May 3, 2018, at Fort Stewart, Georgia (U.S. Army/Arjenis Nunez) distinguishing, and examining available to another. In this model, it includes sustains another force in accordance with information. Deciding is making a de- communication internal to, and external a directive requiring such action. This cision; a decision is defined in the DOD communication from, the operating definition replaces “the action of a force dictionary as, in an estimate of the situa- forces to any audience including the ad- that aids” with “providing a force or tion, a clear and concise statement of the versary, third-party actors, internal forces, element of a command that aids” in order line of action intended to be followed by and other commands. not only to address the different verb the commander as the one most favor- Application Element: Enabling/ form but also to expand the concept to able to the successful accomplishment of Supporting. The DOD dictionary does incorporate the idea of giving resources the assigned mission. In this paradigm, not include a definition of enabling. to another force or element. analysis is done specifically in informed This model modifies the legal definition With the model elements defined, this decisionmaking. of enabling as conferring new powers, overlay can assist thinking about this new Application Element: capacities, means, abilities, competences, model by showing how the older models Communicating. Communicate was capabilities, or authorities on an element fit within its construct. Each model is removed from the DOD dictionary in its of the force to enhance mission accom- indicated by different text type or color. 2019 revision, but the definition included plishment. Supporting modifies the For instance, portions of the forces model in earlier versions is retained here: to use dictionary’s definition of support as pro- are red text. Note the information joint any means or method to convey informa- viding a force or element of a command function must be divided among the tion of any kind from one person or place that aids, protects, complements, or application elements; this speaks to the
16 Forum / Reconceiving Modern Warfare JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 premise of this article, that the existing Figure 2. Unified Model of 21st-Century Warfare models fall short and therefore inhibit with Other Model Overlay the ability to discuss warfare in a holistic, Mental and Moral Forces broadly applicable yet flexible and nu- anced manner. Integrated Planning and Operations This paradigm will be applied to different areas of planning, organization, Analyzing Deciding Attacking Protecting Communicating Enabling/Supporting and execution in the next sections to J2 Physical Force Civil Affairs Section J1 Command and Control J6 Information (partial) J4 illustrate the ways in which it alters think- Intelligence Land MILDEC Training Section ing and enables, encourages, or enhances Information (partial) Maritime MISO Finance Section coordination, integration, and innovation Intelligence Cyber Strategic Communication Air Space Joint IA Coord Group Logistics in warfare. These applications are neither Fires Public Affairs Maneuver comprehensive nor conclusive; there may Force Protection Civil-Military Operations be many other ways this paradigm can be Information (partial) Information Assurance Cyberspace Operations Key Leader Engagement applied to enhance warfighting. The in- Key: Space Operations tent is both to spur and to challenge ways USMC Forces Operations Security the U.S. military describes, conceives of, General Staff Special Technical Ops Domains JEMSO organizes for, and prepares for war. Joint Functions Joint Fires IRCs Physical Protection An Enduring Model Military thinkers propose new warfare types and models when discussing capabilities available. Constantly invent- Design. This involves understanding changes in prosecuting war under ing new types of warfare—or new labels the current and desired future states certain circumstances, even when the for application of new and old technolo- and the problem set, producing an op- change is simply different combinations gies and capabilities—distracts from the erational approach, and reframing. It is of existing technologies and capabilities. mission and from innovation. This model really part of the first phase of the JPP Russia’s heavy use of information oper- can be used to talk about warfare during but is continuous and always subject to ations and social media, combined with the Cold War and also in an era of preci- revision. Using this unified model of war- guerrilla tactics and heavy artillery to sion-guided munitions, drones, offensive fare provides a more comprehensive and annex Crimea while managing to avoid cyberspace operations, and anti-satellite integrated framework within which to a military response from Ukrainian weaponry. It is technology independent, deconstruct (and reconstruct) the current allies, is labeled “hybrid warfare” or while still enabling discussion of any kind and desired future states. In addition to “operations in the gray zone,” some- of technology within its elements. standard brainstorming for current and where between peace and war. These desired conditions, the application ele- efforts merely categorize a specific com- Impact on Planning ments are good testers to ensure that key bination of capabilities but do little to and Operations areas are considered and included. For enhance the ability to integrate, coordi- Overlaying this model with the JPP instance, they inspire questions such as, nate, and innovate in warfare. highlights some key differences in “How are we and the enemy analyzing Drones, robots, cyberspace opera- thinking as it is now and as it would and deciding?” or “In what ways are we tions, and artificial intelligence create be using this model. The model does and the enemy communicating to dif- different effects on the battlefield and not alter the key steps in JPP—mission ferent audiences—friendly, enemy, third should change thinking about force analysis, course of action (COA) devel- party, and so forth,” and “Where might protection, signature management, and opment, COA analysis and wargaming, we use deception, and where might it be electronic countermeasures. Appreciating COA comparison and approval, and used against us?” the changes that new technologies plan or order development. This model Mission Analysis. This model brings bring is critically important to shaping does alter the way in which these steps to the forefront the moral and mental expectations, planning for operations are executed by adjusting the frame forces at play in the scenario. Applied and acquisition, countering effects, ap- used to engage with JPP and design. to friendly forces, what is the moral and plication, and exploring the ways friendly Moreover, it can be applied to friendly mental status of friendly troops? How and adversary forces may use them. Yet forces as well as enemies, adversaries, do they view the conflict in general, and introducing a new lexicon every time this and third parties, making it useful as a what are external influences conveying occurs obscures the key elements of war- check for Intelligence Preparation of the about the conflict that might affect fare as well as the mission. Battlespace (IPB), as well as monitoring friendly force morale at the individual, At the core, warfare is accomplish- friendly forces’ readiness, which typi- unit, and commander levels? Do friendly ing a mission with the resources and cally falls outside the JPP. forces have the resilience needed to take
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Reid 17 or another similar tool, PMESII-PT could be used within each element. This would mean that enemy moral and men- tal forces are examined with PMESII-PT, but so would their planning and opera- tions, how they attack and protect, their surveillance and decisionmaking pro- cesses, all aspects of their communication, and enabling/supporting their forces. Using the application element of at- tacking and defending in mission analysis enables thinking about friendly or enemy capabilities as a whole, rather than offen- sive and defensive. This can help prevent assumptions about how a capability could be applied, which assumptions limit military planners’ ability to conceptualize how the enemy might act or react in a given circumstance, resulting in unpleas- ant surprises. Similar results could come from using the other application elements in other areas of problem-framing, such as identifying implied tasks, assumptions, centers of gravity analysis, and more. COA Development. Development can th Airman with 38 Air Defense Artillery Brigade assembles omnidirectional line-of-sight antenna benefit from this paradigm by ensuring to enable communication with aviation assets during unilateral joint training exercise on Sagami that all aspects of warfare and ways to General Depot, Sagamihara, Japan, September 17, 2019 (U.S. Army/Raquel Villalona) target the enemy’s will are addressed on a clever, insightful adversary who Questions (and answers) related to the within the commander’s intent and mis- adjusts to changing situations rapidly cultural perspectives of varying groups, sion statement. Typically, when moving and does not follow laws of war? Have levels of commitment or determination, into COA development, OPTs will break friendly forces been adequately educated and morale are often left unanswered, if into working groups along the lines of to problem-solve, innovate, and fulfill they are even asked, because they are dif- the joint functions to dig deeper into the their functions at the time and place ficult to measure and evaluate. They are capabilities each joint function can bring required? also not solely the purview of intelligence; to the mission. Rather than aligning to For all actors—enemy, third party, rather, some of these questions are an- joint functions, OPTs can divide into host nation, partner nation, other U.S. swered through other resources entirely, groups that are aligned with the appli- Government organizations in the situ- such as culture-focused organizations, cation elements of this paradigm, which ation—what is their resolve? How does civil affairs, or even other departments or force greater cohesion and integration their culture view this conflict and armed agencies. They are rarely included as part across military capabilities than the joint conflict in general? What kinds of actions of exercises because doing so requires functions. are seen as honorable or unacceptable deep expertise on adversaries or other Analyzing and deciding brings in warfare, both overtly and covertly? parties at many levels, and they are even together intelligence and the ability How determined or committed to the more difficult to measure, quantify, and to control operations and forces from cause is the enemy as a whole, and how apply with any rigor in a fictive scenario the initial planning stages, enabling determined or committed is it at a given than a real one. better streamlining and integration of unit level? What are the strengths and Each of the elements (foundation and intelligence and friendly knowledge man- weaknesses of key leaders on all sides? application) can be used to frame IPB agement for the commander’s advantage. These and other similar questions would and enable deeper analysis and better In attacking and protecting, fires and provide insight into the moral and mental understanding of adversaries and the en- force protection assets can work together, status of adversaries and third-party actors vironment as systems, rather than discrete perhaps identifying areas in which one as well as regional or international group- parts. Rather than focusing on examining capability can fill two functions. Fires, ings relevant to the scenario. an adversary with PMESII-PT (political, cyberspace operations, space, special While some of these questions are military, economic, social, infrastructure, technical operations, and network ex- often answered through IPB, not all are. information, physical environment, time) ploitation and protection are all present,
18 Forum / Reconceiving Modern Warfare JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 commander-established criteria or in truly integrating lethal and nonlethal Notes (and/or kinetic and nonkinetic) capabil- framing those criteria. For instance, ities to the commander’s best advantage commander-provided criteria might in- 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and in the battlespace. Operations security clude speed of operation, level of risk to trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Prince- and force protection are together, able to forces (or mission, or both), and likeli- ton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 75. 2 leverage mutual gains from the outset of hood of residual resistance after the core Ibid. 3 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations planning, rather than as a result of decon- mission is accomplished. The staff using (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January fliction later in the process. the foundation and application elements 17, 2017), xiv, available at
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Reid 19 U.S. Marine Corps recruits with November Company, 4th Recruit Training Battalion, complete obstacles during Crucible at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, February 21, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Bobby J. Yarbrough)
X-51A Waverider, powered by Pratt Whitney Rocketdyne SJY61 scramjet engine, prepares for hypersonic flight by riding its own shockwave, accelerating to nearly Mach 6 (U.S. Air Force graphic)
Adapting for Victory DOD Laboratories for the 21st Century
By William T. Cooley, David J. Hahn, and John A. George
The United States must regain the element of surprise and field new technologies at the pace of modern industry. Government agencies must shift from an archaic R&D process to an approach that rewards rapid fielding and risk-taking.
—National Security Strategy of the United States of America
n an era of renewed Great Power ation, are now approaching parity in Major General William T. Cooley, USAF, is former competition, the technological many areas. Their stated intent is to Commander of the Air Force Research Laboratory advantage of the U.S. military— reach full parity, and then achieve at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Rear I Admiral David J. Hahn, USN, is Chief of Naval long the cornerstone of our military technological dominance themselves, Research and Director of Innovation Technology assurance and hence world security—is in an accelerated timeframe. The Requirements and Test and Evaluation. Major threatened. Strategic competitors, consequences of that to the United General John A. George, USA, is Commanding General of the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities chief among them the People’s Repub- States and the rest of the world are Development Command. lic of China and the Russian Feder- unacceptable.
22 Forum / DOD Laboratories for the 21st Century JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 The U.S. military excels from under- Figure Global R D Expenditures, by Region: 2015 sea to cyber to space, but as the National Billions of U.S. PPP dollars Defense Strategy reminds us, “America’s
military has no preordained right to Central Asia 1 39 (2.0 ) victory on the battlefield.” In this chal- Europe 415 (21.6 ) lenging moment, the process by which North America 535 (27.9 ) Middle East 56 (2.9 ) South Asia the Department of Defense (DOD) and 53 (2.8 ) military Services conduct research and East and Southeast Asia develop new capabilities for our warf- Central America 721 (37.6 ) and Caribbean ighters must be reviewed, renewed, and 2 (0.1 ) Africa reimagined. We must maintain our edge 20 (1.0 ) and also achieve advantage in emerging World total 1,918 fields such as directed energy, artificial South America Australia and Oceania intelligence, hypersonics, autonomy, 50 (2.6 ) 20 (1.0 ) quantum capability, synthetic biology, and technologies of the future that have Note(s) Foreign currencies are converted to dollars through PPPs. Some country data are estimated. Countries are grouped according to the regions described in he or a t ook, not yet been imagined. We, as com- available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/index.html . manders of the science and technology PPP purchasing power parity. (S&T) laboratories of the Army, Navy, Sour e National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2018. and Air Force, are working together to ensure the continued U.S. advantage Driven by consumer demands and 1947 Scientific Research Board reported in the race for military technological competition, many companies develop to President Harry Truman, the “security superiority. and implement new technologies at im- of the United States depends today, as Call to Action for a New Era pressive speeds that are far faster than our never before, upon the rapid extension existing government acquisition processes. of scientific knowledge. So important, Our established processes for basic and Companies know they would have to slow in fact, has this extension become to our applied research worked well during down and fight through cumbersome country that it may reasonably be said to the post–World War II era. DOD lab- Federal acquisition regulations to do busi- be a major factor in national survival.”3 oratories, in partnership with the U.S. ness with the military. In a 2016 report, Our current lab structure came about in defense industrial base, met operator the Center for a New American Security part due to that realization and helped requirements via S&T and research and noted that the “decreased demand, lower provide decades of technological advan- development (R&D) programs. U.S. profitability, and high barriers to entry tage. We answered the call before, and we academia, backed by generous Defense have made the defense market less attrac- are answering it again. funding, helped identify approaches to tive than at any time in modern history.”2 solve new problems. To maintain superiority and meet The Agenda for Change However, this domestic- and gov- the guidance of the National Defense Within the Labs ernment-centric approach to basic and Strategy, there is urgent need for dramatic applied research, developed and refined change and acceleration in how DOD It is of the utmost importance to our during the Cold War, cannot remain in does the hard business of S&T and R&D. national security that the Navy prosecute stasis in today’s strategic environment. To be successful in today’s flat tech-access a vigorous and well-rounded program of The global technology landscape has world, DOD must adapt its R&D model research and development. To fail to do so changed. The world is more technologi- for greater speed and agility and a greater in time of peace will surely result in this cally “flat” than it once was. As shown in capacity to leverage expertise from tech country entering another war with obsolete the figure, the United States accounts for sectors unaccustomed to collaborating weapons and machines of warfare. And the only a fraction of today’s global R&D ex- with the U.S. Government. This call to tempo of modern war has reached the point penditures. The U.S. Government invests action has been evident in recent strate- where this nation will probably never again less in R&D than the private sector, and gic products and actions including the have an opportunity to arm itself success- the leading edge of many emerging fields National Defense Strategy, the Naval fully after the start of hostilities. is being advanced by privately funded Research and Development Framework, large technology companies and nimble —James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, the Air Force Science and Technology startups that have little or no connection 1944–1947 Strategy, and the establishment of Army to defense R&D. With modern informa- Futures Command. tion systems, knowledge and technology As commanders of DOD laboratories, This is not the first time the Nation are easier and cheaper for adversaries to we know that business as usual will not has faced an urgent call to adapt. As the obtain and quickly weaponize. sustain U.S. technological advantage. In
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Cooley, Hahn, and George 23 Army Research Laboratory’s electronics program seeks to generate knowledge of electromagnetic, photonic, and acoustic devices, systems, and phenomena to provide technological superiority to Army’s future force (Army Research Laboratory) fact, business as usual will lose the fight. using Federal sponsorship and funding one will. DOD labs then guide the results We must change how we operate in order of research through DOD labs. It is a of basic research into more advanced to maintain our technological lead. We unique partnership that has served free- R&D that applies the basic science in new must retool how we do the hard business dom well. DOD labs are part of a larger devices, components, and even full-scale of discovering, developing, and fielding ecosystem of discovery, innovation, and prototypes—ideally transitioning into new capabilities, at sufficient scale, for collaboration—one in which investment future acquisition programs. our warfighters. And we must do all of is focused on warfighter needs without These basic functions are enduring, this quickly. The bottom line is that we regard to the short- and long-term profits but we have identified many specific areas must radically adapt our laboratories to prioritized by private industry. where major changes are needed in order today’s S&T environment, embracing DOD labs, and the extramural re- to carry them out effectively in the tech- risk and eschewing the status quo. This search programs they oversee, execute nology environment of the 21st century. is America’s national challenge at this the basic scientific research that helps Some of the most critical areas are con- unique moment in history, as urgent as us understand fundamental aspects of tracting and partnering, financial agility, any we have faced before. military-relevant scientific phenomena and workforce development. While these We seek to adapt in the ways that and gain the insights necessary to develop are not always recognized as vital for suc- need to change, while retaining and re- future warfighting applications. As just cess on the battlefield, they play crucial freshing the unique and valuable aspects one example, today’s laser weapons roles in the military’s ultimate success or of the DOD lab system that have helped systems would not have been possible failure in developing technology for our our defense S&T excel. The United without sustained, military lab–supported warfighters. States has been able to defeat some of basic research by Charles H. Townes For too long, DOD labs have strug- the most aggressive regimes in the world and others into microwave amplification gled to get contracts issued in a timely in large part due to technologies made by stimulated emission of radiation, or manner, due to decades of steadily in- possible by a vibrant relationship between masers, starting in the 1950s. In short, if creasing red tape. The result is research academia, industry, and the military, the labs do not perform this function, no that is often old where it was once new.
24 Forum / DOD Laboratories for the 21st Century JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 And even worse, brilliant, patriotic time will be optimized. Recent initiatives data-driven management decisions and researchers can decide that the sluggish to reduce online training requirements execute integrated business functions. pace of getting contracts decided and are one way to help solve this issue. While For example, an intelligent Business funds delivered—coupled with a constant increasing the efficiency and lowering the Process Management platform and need to fill out forms—is not worth it burden of processes may not seem critical shared development environment are and begin looking elsewhere for a more at first, innovations in these areas are being implemented, enabling a team to efficient workplace. important to developing the talent and develop multiple integrated applications. As one example, a 2018 faculty work- technologies we need to prevail in future These changes will allow real-time infor- load survey conducted by the Federal conflicts. mation on contracts, finances, and other Demonstration Partnership revealed that topics—collected automatically through principal investigators—that is, scientists New Cooperation and the conduct of daily work, eliminating and engineers looking for breakthroughs New Reforms burdensome taskings to collect informa- that will help us achieve mission suc- tion. They will also provide up-to-date, cess—estimate they spend 44 percent We should remember that it was the tech- information-rich pictures for decision- of their research time during Federally nical superiority of our forces that provided makers, allowing business decisions to funded projects meeting administrative the basis for our strategic advantage in the be made more quickly and effectively. requirements, instead of doing actual years following World War II. For that rea- Lessons learned from testing at the Air research.4 This is a sobering figure and son, we strongly advocate the continuation Force Research Laboratory will be shared a disservice to our Servicemembers who of an intensive technical effort to [e]nsure to benefit the other Services. are depending on unimpeded delivery that we preserve the qualitative edge in R&D Management Data Analytics. of cutting-edge tech to do their job and weapon systems. Early in the history of quarterly joint defend the Nation. meetings, the DOD lab commanders —General Curtis LeMay, Chief of Staff of The underlying reason for DOD labs’ established a data analytics working the Air Force, 1961–1965 success is our greatest asset: our people. group, with the objective of establishing However, worries and hurdles regarding cross-Service sharing of S&T and R&D Faced with the self-evident need to workforce development have grown data to improve collaboration. One of adapt, and encouraged to drive change rather than diminished. As the demand the chief challenges identified by the from the highest levels of leadership, for science, technology, engineering, and working group was the variation of data DOD lab commanders have been meet- math college graduates increases faster collected and modeled in the Services’ ing quarterly since November 2017 with than the supply, recruiting top-notch financial systems. To address this, the the goal of synchronizing efforts, gaining researchers dedicated to national defense group focused on defining a data catalog efficiencies, and enhancing collaboration becomes more challenging. This is par- of the minimum viable product (MVP), across Service labs. We have focused on ticularly worrisome as we see significant containing metadata for all grants, defense technology priorities and have numbers of our researchers and program contracts, and funding documents to begun to align business practices that will officers beginning to retire. To retain a external institutions. This MVP data increase information transparency. cutting-edge workforce, we must con- catalog supports analytics to help identify These proactive efforts have yielded tinue to build more flexible and modern common research interests and institu- early results that are making a difference. employment models, find innovative ways tions, performer networks, and funding Three examples highlight the ways DOD to compete with private industry salaries, levels. When combined with external data labs are working together to develop joint and ensure workforce diversity in all its sets, the MVP helps identify emerging solutions, share best practices, and accel- dimensions. technology areas, rising stars, and core erate our shared progress. These include Behind all these ideas is the reality research institutes. The working group our work in establishing new and efficient that researchers can face daily frustrations is currently deploying this capability to a enterprise business systems, our initiatives and disincentives when working for DOD government cloud environment, allowing in R&D management data analytics, and labs. Poorly functioning information for collaborative data-driven decision- our design and implementation of Open technology (IT) systems, excessive train- making across the three Services. Campus initiatives for partnering and ing requirements, and other bureaucratic Open Campus Initiatives. These workforce development. hurdles often limit the time scientists and efforts were spearheaded by the Army Enterprise Business Systems. A engineers can dedicate to actual research Research Laboratory several years ago tri-Service collaboration team, led by each day. Exit interviews with DOD to pilot new approaches to building the Air Force Research Laboratory, is researchers leaving military laboratories a broader science and technology putting IT tools, people, and processes indicate many of these researchers are not ecosystem—thus enabling DOD labo- in place to enable the labs to operate leaving DOD in search of higher salaries ratory scientists and engineers to work as highly efficient, transparent organi- or more meaningful purpose—rather, collaboratively and side by side with zations—fueled by the ability to make they are seeking positions where their visiting scientists and other partners in
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Cooley, Hahn, and George 25 lab facilities and likewise allowing DOD sharing their benefits and results with our Second, the Naval Research researchers to work at collaborators’ peer labs in the other Services. Enterprise (NRE) has significantly institutions. These also involve creation First, the Army’s modernization reorganized to streamline and acceler- of flexible career path options that allow strategy is focused on one goal: to make ate the way it discovers, develops, and easier transitions between government, Soldiers and units far more lethal and delivers new capabilities for Marines and academia, and industry. As a result of effective than any adversary. The estab- Sailors—including using new congres- collaboration between the Services, lishment of the Army Futures Command sional authority to eliminate the need to lessons learned are being shared that (AFC) is the largest organizational recompete contracts for development of are helping other DOD labs implement change the Service has undertaken in initial prototypes within already existing, the most successful practices that have more than 40 years. AFC is charged with approved research. This is only common emerged from the Army’s experiences leading a continuous transformation in sense because it is difficult to imagine and develop new ideas to expand the order to provide future warfighters with why any organization would have to concepts even further. the concepts, capabilities, and organiza- recompete to do a prototype within the These are only the start. Many other tional structures they need to win on the timespan of its own already approved activities are under way across our labs battlefield. The elements of the Army’s research program. After these and other that are breaking new ground. For in- Future Force modernization enterprise changes, the Chief of Naval Research stance, DOD and the individual Services have moved from separate commands announced in 2018 dramatically short- are rapidly establishing innovation centers into AFC to achieve the unity of com- ened timelines for critical Future Naval across the Nation—physical locations mand and effort that leaders believe Capabilities (FNCs)—high-priority, fast- meant to bring together leading minds are essential to meeting these global tracked research—to reach programs of to facilitate collaboration and accelerate challenges. record: It is now 3 years or less, vice the products. From the Defense Innovation Under AFC, the Combat Capabilities previous standard of 5 years, from “we Unit to the Air Force’s AFWERX to the Development Command (CCDC), need this” to “here you go.” expansion of the Army’s Open Campus formerly the U.S. Army Research, Other naval efforts bearing fruit to the Navy’s new NavalX Agility Office Development, and Engineering include naming an outside-the-box- featuring regional technology hubs Command, is in the second year of an thinker senior executive as the new “naval called Tech Bridges, we are paving new internal campaign of reform, realign- accelerator”—a senior leader with deep roads (sometimes literally) to connect ment, and process improvement. As part familiarity of successful private industry the warfighter with innovators. These of AFC, CCDC has positioned itself to practices—charged with finding new ways centers tap into commercial technology integrate more effectively with the oper- to utilize private industry practices within and innovation, following best-practice ational Army and to mature relationships the Service. The NRE is optimizing business models that reduce bureaucracy. with AFC cross-functional teams, which business operations and personnel man- They have storefronts in many major have been given the mandate to improve agement practices, facilitating “bridge cities to make connections with industry. delivery of the Army’s six modernization award” authority to ensure projects They can also facilitate partnerships, focus priorities: long-range precision fires, near the end of a term can be brought projects on warfighter needs, and ensure next-generation combat vehicles, air and to completion, and even trying to solve technology transitions. missile defense, Soldier lethality, network, something as mundane as increasing the Congress has also given DOD labs and future vertical lift. limits on purchase cards—long a sore special authorities to increase speed and The Army also analyzed the process to spot for performers whose work comes to agility for contracting and partnership pinpoint bottlenecks and identify work- a screeching halt due to an inability to le- agreements and the associated financ- arounds. In an article released in 2018, the gally purchase a small piece of equipment ing. The labs have been granted special Service noted that “successful transitions without significant delay and paperwork. authorities to recruit and hire the best begin early during science and technology (This one change alone has facilitated the scientists and engineers available, using development with the establishment of execution of hundreds of transactions at hiring processes outside the regular strong working relationships between the Naval Research Laboratory, allowing government hiring pace. Each Service technologists within the research labora- expedited purchase of critical scientific brings its own experiences implementing tories and program executive officers and and engineering materials and saving an these authorities that other labs can program managers.”5 Additionally, there estimated 1,000 days of processing time.) leverage, enabling the joint team to is an opportunity for the DOD R&D These and other steps have enabled progress together. community to enable the development of the NRE to move at speed to deliver All these changes have begun to smarter requirements by increasing the use lethal, sustainable capability. In fiscal year enable faster delivery of more lethal capa- of prototyping and experimentation ven- 2018, the NRE accelerated 30 FNCs to bilities across the Service labs. Additional ues and incorporating warfighter feedback, the fleet, while realistically deciding 21 initiatives are being pursued within while also leveraging innovative research others were not ready and taking them individual Services, with an eye toward from our industry and academic partners. out of the accelerated pipeline. In fiscal
26 Forum / DOD Laboratories for the 21st Century JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Dr. Courtney Webster makes adjustments to Warrior Web physical augmentation suit from Harvard’s Wyss Institute in Boston, Massachusetts (Army Research Laboratory/David McNally) year 2019, just a few of the new FNC deepen and expand the scientific and technology development programs, capabilities reaching our Marines and technical enterprise. To affect these including Vanguards, fulfill warfighter Sailors included rocket imaging seekers, changes, and ultimately drive competition requirements. AFRL is embedding highly avionic trainers, logistics support tools, to address interdisciplinary joint force qualified scientist and engineer liaisons and detection and classification algo- challenges, AFRL is launching multiple on major command staffs to synchronize rithms. And in fiscal year 2020, 19 new lines of effort. with operational requirements and en- FNCs include new capabilities in sonar The new AFRL Transformational sure support for successful technology systems, electromagnetic warfare, fleet Capability Office (TCO) will provide transition. training technologies, diver safety, un- enterprise management of advanced Additionally, AFRL is using Modeling manned systems, and more. technology development programs, Simulation and Analysis (MS&A) tools Third, the Air Force recently com- ensuring integration of required com- to predict the relative impact of potential pleted an 18-month study with higher petencies from the AFRL Technology technical capabilities on future Air Force education and industry that resulted Directorates. The TCO will also manage operations. MS&A offers insights into in the Science and Technology 2030 the Air Force’s Vanguard programs, technical concepts before making large Strategy. The Air Force Research another core element of the S&T 2030 investments. Coupled with wargaming Laboratory (AFRL), Air Force Strategy. Vanguards are short duration, exercises, these approaches bring the Warfighting Integration Capability highly focused programs that drive for- operational community into the research (AFWIC), and the Office of the Assistant ward innovative capabilities to advance process, allowing them to influence the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, emerging weapons systems and warfight- design and employment concepts to Technology, and Logistics (SAF/AQ) are ing concepts through demonstration, increase mission compatibility of the using the strategy to develop and deliver experimentation, and prototyping. AFRL products sooner. We expect these ap- on the five transformational strategic is working closely with AFWIC, SAF/ proaches to reduce timelines and costs. capabilities outlined in 2030, reform AQ, and major commands through re- AFRL recognizes the importance of the way S&T are led and managed, and curring summits and workshops to ensure leveraging the research investments of
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Cooley, Hahn, and George 27 external organizations. Consequently, we of becoming integrated . . . not just inter- The Nation’s military labs are but are emphasizing strong partnerships with dependent, not just joint, but integrated one player in the overall DOD system other government agencies, international in our operations.” Because if we could of delivering capability to ensure victory. partners, academia, and the commercial do that—if we can “gather information However, we realize the serious respon- sector with close attention to nontradi- faster, decide faster, and act faster on sibility we have: Future military power tional players in the DOD ecosystem. that information”—then we are going starts here. The United States, and the This includes tech startups, venture “to prevail in 21st-century conflict.”6 We DOD labs, have an advantage: We are part capitalist firms, and small businesses. are on the cusp of being able to think of multiple thriving partnerships of the To that end, AFRL will reinforce the and move in that direction. The DOD best minds in the world. We can support lead, leverage, watch (LLW) model for lab commanders continue to expand research that is determined not by the managing technology development. With collaboration and alignment between the stock market but by the marketplace of LLW, AFRL will identify those areas with Services. This partnership brings the joint ideas. DOD labs are the only place this can specific Air Force applications where mil- force closer to the necessary integrated occur. It is a responsibility, a challenge, and itary lab leadership is appropriate (lead) operations DOD needs going forward. an opportunity of the highest order. vice those being pursued by academia, All this collaboration is for naught We call upon key partners within industry, and other agencies that have a unless we can get technology into the our own Services—as well as the Office primarily commercial purpose but with hands of our warfighters. The growing of the Secretary of Defense, elected potential for Air Force applications (lever- sophistication of our potential adversaries officials, other governmental agencies, age). For promising technologies with against the backdrop of information-age large industry and small business, aca- unclear military utility, AFRL will closely warfare requires seamless integration and demia, Federally Funded Research and monitor their progress (watch). execution. In order to remain the world’s Development Centers, and more—to join Finally, AFRL is adapting recruiting most lethal and capable fighting force, us in this critical mission. JFQ and management practices to get in lock we must be able to innovate and operate step with the demands of a 21st-century faster and more effectively than our workforce. New recruiting strategies and adversaries. We must continue to work Notes agile workplace practices will help the lab toward the big technology breakthroughs 1 acquire and retain top talent from across that not only keep future fights unfair and Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the the Nation. This is especially important provide overmatch but also change the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Wash- in high-demand technology sectors, such equation altogether. ington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), as artificial intelligence and data analytics, Part of dominance is being so strong 1, available at
28 Forum / DOD Laboratories for the 21st Century JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Air Force A-10C Thunderbolt II from Indiana Air National Guard’s 122nd Fighter Wing sits on flightline at sunrise during Northern Strike 19 at Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center, Michigan, July 26, 2019 (U.S. Air National Guard/Matt Hecht)
Beyond Auftragstaktik The Case Against Hyper-Decentralized Command
By Trent J. Lythgoe
he U.S. Army’s mission command fails to live up to its intel- This article sets out to show that the command doctrine has sparked lectual predecessor, Auftragstaktik,1 a argument for hyper-decentralized com- T considerable discussion and Prusso-German command philosophy mand is flawed and that the concept itself criticism among Service professionals. that emphasizes decentralization, is dangerous. The case for hyper-decen- Most agree that mission command is commander’s intent, and low-level ini- tralization relies on a misinterpretation of the right approach for commanding tiative.2 These critics maintain that the Auftragstaktik, which underappreciates and controlling Army formations. Army must decentralize command as the role of planning and coordinating in However, some argue that the Army’s much as possible in order to realize the Prusso-German warfighting. Moreover, de facto implementation of mission Auftragstaktik ideal. decentralizing as much as possible is no guarantee of command effectiveness and is often harmful. This is not to say, however, that the current approach is Lieutenant Colonel Trent J. Lythgoe, USA, is an Aviation Officer currently serving as an Instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Science at the effective. Army doctrine advises com- University of Kansas. manders to “balance” centralization and
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Lythgoe 29 Israeli gun boat passes through Straits of Tiran near Sharm el-Sheikh during Six-Day War, June 8, 1967 (Israel Government Press Office/Yaacov Agor) decentralization. This static approach cycle of four activities—synchronization, The Wehrmacht penetrated, exploited, fails to account for the dynamic nature dissemination, initiative, and report- encircled, and collapsed its hapless of operational context. It also frequently ing—Army commanders would be able opponents with ruthless efficiency. results in overly centralized control be- to continuously adjust to the demands The U.S. Army explicitly modeled cause many Army commanders lack trust of the operational contexts within which its mission command doctrine on in subordinates, are uncomfortable with their formations must fight. Auftragstaktik for good reason.3 An un- uncertainty, and are risk-averse. fortunate side effect of this linkage is that Ultimately, mission command must Auftragstaktik and many Service leaders evaluate mission enable forces to win by bridging the gap Moltke’s Dialectic command vis-à-vis Auftragstaktik rather between doctrine and operational con- Born in the aftermath of the Napole- than on its own terms. They argue that text. It must resolve the inherent tension onic Wars and rooted in the theories mission command falls short because between centralization and decentraliza- of Carl von Clausewitz, the philosophy it fails to live up to the Prusso-German tion. Mission command must allow forces of Auftragstaktik was an exceptionally ideal. These criticisms follow a predict- to mass combat power on decisive points effective tactical innovation. One factor able script. They begin by claiming the while remaining adaptable to emergent that made Auftragstaktik successful Army’s adoption of mission command opportunities and threats. Perhaps most was its emphasis on lowering decision is deficient. Next is a brief history of important, it must enable the commander thresholds. By allowing company- and the Prusso-German way of warfighting to operate in diverse, dynamic, and vio- field-grade leaders to act without first that characterizes Auftragstaktik as a lently entropic operational contexts. An seeking permission, the Prussians/ completely decentralized command iterative approach to mission command Germans increased their tactical deci- philosophy. Critics then contrast the is necessary to satisfy these requirements. sion cycle speeds. In World War II, the ostensibly decentralized, improvisational An iterative approach would allow the German Wehrmacht gave a spectacular character of Auftragstaktik with the commander to move continually between demonstration of Auftragstaktik’s tac- Army’s centralized, methodical approach. centralization and decentralization based tical potency. The Germans combined Finally, the proposed fix is hyper-decen- on the demands of the operational con- Auftragstaktik with well-trained soldiers, tralization—lowering decision thresholds text. By iterating continuously through a aggression, and mechanized formations. as much as possible—to bring mission
30 Forum / Beyond Auftragstaktik JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 command in line with what critics imag- and 10th Panzer divisions and led by the ridge near the town of Bulson, and the ine Auftragstaktik to be. The problem legendary Heinz Guderian—spearheaded high ground proved decisive terrain from with this argument is that it relies on the advance through the Ardennes. which the Germans were able to repel the a flawed interpretation that equates Knowing they would have to cross the French counterattack.10 Auftragstaktik with decentralization. River Meuse at Sedan, Guderian’s corps Guderian’s victory at Sedan was as While decentralization was an important had planned and rehearsed crossing op- much a result of planning, preparation, part of the Prusso-German way of war- erations extensively before the campaign. and coordination as it was of improvi- fighting, it was not the sole factor that Upon arriving at the Meuse on May 12, sation and initiative. Detailed planning made Auftragstaktik effective. Guderian’s chief of staff wrote and issued and rehearsals set the conditions for the Helmuth von Moltke the Elder is a detailed operations order to synchro- river crossing. However, uneven success widely credited with institutionalizing nize crossing operations. The Panzer during the initial crossings resulted in Auftragstaktik in the Prussian/German divisions did the same. The 1st Panzer a substantially different situation than army. His famous dictum that “no plan Division order, for example, included a Guderian’s initial plan had envisioned. of operations extends with any certainty fires synchronization matrix, a centralized Still, Guderian and his staff were able to beyond the first contact with the main coordination tool that critics would view rapidly adapt to the changed situation hostile force” is a favorite among mission as anathema to Auftragstaktik.7 and coordinate the necessary changes to command critics.4 However, Moltke’s Despite being well planned, the deal with it effectively. Those who advo- views on command were more nuanced crossing was only partially successful. cate for hyper-decentralized command than his famous quotation suggests. For Guderian’s three Panzer divisions began too often ignore the centralized aspects example, he observed that “it is always a crossing at three bridgeheads during that made the German approach work serious matter to abandon, without the the afternoon of May 13. At the center at Sedan and elsewhere. They herald the most pressing necessity, a once settled bridgehead, 1st Panzer had good success aggression and initiative demonstrated and well-devised plan for a new and un- and penetrated several kilometers into the by Kirchner but minimize or ignore prepared scheme.”5 Moltke resolves the French rear. On the flanks, however, the the planning and rehearsals that made apparent conflict between this notion and defending French 55th Infantry Division the crossing possible in the first place. his more famous dictum by acknowledg- checked the 2nd and 10th Panzer attacks. Ignored too is the hasty coordination to ing the dialectical interaction between That night, 1st Panzer commander get armor support forward, which saved planning and reality: Friedrich Kirchner pressed his attack even Kirchner’s aggressive penetration from further. Though he had no orders to do being a crippling defeat. [S]trategy affords the tactics the means for so, Kirchner’s aggressive actions were fighting and the probability of winning entirely within Guderian’s intent that The Dangers of by the direction of armies to their meet- “once armoured formations are out on Hyper-Decentralization ing place of combat. On the other hand, the loose they must be given the green The idea that Auftragstaktik is a strategy appropriates the success of every light to the very end of the road.”8 But hyper-decentralized command philoso- engagement and builds upon it. The de- Kirchner’s thrust had placed 1st Panzer phy persists despite contrary evidence.11 mands of strategy grow silent in the face of in a vulnerable position. Lack of progress Many Army officers have come to a tactical victory and adapt themselves to on the flanks left 1st Panzer occupying a believe that decentralization is the most the newly created situation.6 narrow salient with little more than an important tenet of mission command. infantry brigade and no armor.9 For example, one Army major writes For Moltke, higher level planning sets The French, meanwhile, had spent that mission command is “the practice the conditions for lower level actions by the night reorganizing from their initial of decentralizing decision-making and creating favorable conditions for those setback. By the morning of May 14, authority down to the lowest possi- actions. Upon execution, however, the they were ready to counterattack with a ble echelon.”12 This obsession with results of lower level actions drive sub- combined tank and infantry task force. decentralization is not only ahistorical sequent higher level planning. Though Guderian himself had crossed the river but also potentially dangerous. There Moltke was writing about the interaction and was forward with 1st Panzer when are axiomatic reasons to be wary of between the levels of war, the dialectic German reconnaissance reported the hyper-decentralization. can also be seen in German tactical and massing French tanks. While Kirchner First, decentralization is not inher- operational warfare. Planning drives prepared to meet the French assault, ently advantageous. It is true that in action, the results of action drive subse- Guderian raced back to the bridgehead many cases, lower decision thresholds quent planning, and the cycle continues. and directed his staff to rapidly move 2nd are necessary for operational effec- The Battle of Sedan is a characteristic Panzer Regiment’s tanks across the river tiveness.13 At the extreme, however, a example of Moltke’s dialectic at the tacti- to support 1st Panzer. Guderian’s speedy completely decentralized force is little cal level. In May 1940, the German XIX reorganization succeeded; the German more than an unruly mob. Beyond a Panzer Corps—consisting of the 1st, 2nd, tanks narrowly beat the French to a key certain point, more decentralization
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Lythgoe 31 Formation of F-35 Lightning IIs from 388th and 419th Fighter Wings stationed at Hill Air Force Base performs aerial maneuvers during combat power exercise over Utah Test and Training Range, November 19, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Cory D. Payne) impedes operational effectiveness rather with little more than mission orders and instance, Brigadier General Israel Tal’s di- than enables it. Second, the operational commander’s intent. The results, how- vision conducted an armored penetration context—the mission, the enemy, and the ever, were middling. While some brigades and exploitation along the Mediterranean environment within which formations were successful, others were not. Brigades coast toward El Arish. Faulty intelligence fight—is a critical factor in determining did not mutually support each other, and and unexpected events made Tal’s fight how a commander should organize com- fratricide was rampant. Although the IDF a series of improvisations that in the end mand. Decentralized command is not prevailed, Israeli soldiers paid in blood for only vaguely resembled his original plan. desirable or effective in every operational the lack of coordination.16 Major-General Ariel Sharon’s division, on context.14 After the war, IDF commanders the other hand, conducted a tightly con- The Israeli experiences in 1956 and decided that brigades had been given trolled set-piece attack on the Egyptian 1967 illustrate the limits of decentral- too much independence. The Israelis strongpoint at Umm-Qatef. Both com- ization. In the 1950s, the Israel Defense subsequently revamped their command manders were successful because they Forces (IDF) adopted German tactical philosophy by increasing centralization adapted the IDF command philosophy to doctrine with the aim of fighting a to coordinate operations more effec- suit their unique operational contexts.18 maneuver war against potential aggres- tively. The IDF implemented this new The IDF experience demonstrates sors.15 A rapid and decisive blitzkrieg approach in the 1967 Six-Day War. This both the limits of decentralization and campaign was an ideal solution to Israel’s time, division-level commanders ensured the importance of considering the opera- dual problems of being surrounded by brigades were mutually supported, and tional context. The principal shortcoming enemies and lacking the depth necessary corps-level commanders synchronized of hyper-decentralized command is that for a strategic defense. The Israelis decen- actions among divisions. The results it drives commanders to decentralize tralized command even more than the were nothing short of spectacular.17 IDF as much as possible in all contexts. Yet Germans, and this hyper-decentralized commanders demonstrated the value not all operational contexts demand philosophy was tested in the 1956 Suez of being able to dynamically centralize decentralization. This argument is elab- Crisis. IDF maneuver brigades operated or decentralize command based on the orated below, but it bears mentioning nearly independently from one another operational context. In the Sinai, for the German case at Kursk (1943), where
32 Forum / Beyond Auftragstaktik JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 decentralization and individual initiative to push better situational awareness up The problem with implicit control is mattered little in the teeth of a well- the chain of command. The idea is that that it degrades over time. Commanders planned and prepared Soviet defense. technologically enabled higher level formulate their intent and build a com- Commanders must consider the opera- commanders can make decisions with the mon understanding with subordinates tional demands of a given situation when big picture in mind but at the speed of based on a shared visualization of the determining where to place decision adaptability. These efforts, however, have future situation. This estimate, however, thresholds. largely proved fruitless and even coun- is no more likely to be accurate than the terproductive.20 Technology has in some one that underpins Jominian controls. Army Doctrine: A Tale ways inhibited rather than enabled com- Combat is violently entropic; it relent- of Two Traditions mand by creating enormous information lessly moves toward disorder and chaos. Command is a means to an end, which appetites that lower level commanders The commander’s intent and shared is to win. The character of command must continually feed.21 understanding may initially synchronize is therefore strongly influenced by The second approach is the action. But as disorder increases, reality the methods by which winning is Clausewitzian tradition. Clausewitzians diverges from the shared visualization. achieved—that is, a force’s fighting are skeptical of coordination because The implicit synchronization of otherwise doctrine. A command philosophy combat is inherently uncertain, and real- disconnected actions erodes and even- must bridge the gap between how a ity is unlikely to unfold according to any tually ceases. Unless commanders and commander wants to fight (doctrine) plan.22 For Clausewitzians, improvisation subordinates periodically refresh their and how the force must fight given is necessary to cope with unanticipated shared understanding, they will eventu- the operational context. The Army’s conditions, and therefore adaptability ally cease to be on the same conceptual fighting doctrine presents a unique should be command’s central concern.23 page. Implicit controls have the same challenge because it is an amalgama- Since lower level commanders will be limitation as the explicit controls favored tion of two traditions—the Jominian the first to recognize the need to adapt, by the Jominians; they have a short half- and the Clausewitzian. Each tradition higher level commanders enable adapt- life in combat. In other words, the only views winning through a different con- ability by allowing their subordinates thing that will make formations perform ceptual lens. This dichotomy leads to to act independently. The risk is that “as if they were centrally coordinated” is different command philosophies and an lower level commanders may fracture to centrally coordinate them. inherent tension in how Army doctrine the higher commander’s unity of effort. approaches mission command. Each lower level commander may act Doctrinal and De Facto The Jominian tradition subscribes correctly according to his or her under- Shortcomings to the “one great principle” of war—to standing of local problems but without The Army’s competing concepts of throw the mass of one’s force on the appreciating how this might affect the command create a paradox: neither decisive point. The Jominian imperative higher level situation. Divergent actions centralization nor decentralization is to “arrange these masses . . . at the proper may render disparate units unable to independently sufficient, yet both are time and with energy” requires synchro- provide mutual support and make necessary. The Army’s command philos- nization, centralized control, and unity them vulnerable to defeat in detail. The ophy must provide enough control to of effort.19 For Jominians, command Clausewitzian approach, therefore, has synchronize combat power at decisive primarily coordinates the application of the opposite problem of the Jominian points, but at the same time be decen- combat power. The centralized control approach: how to adapt to the uncertainty tralized enough to deal with the uncer- required to do so, however, risks sac- of combat while retaining the ability to co- tainty and chaos of battle. rificing adaptability. Moltke’s dictum ordinate the application of combat power Unfortunately, Army doctrine fails underscores the idea that the chaos of at decisive points. to resolve this tension in both theory battle will eventually render preplanned The Clausewitzian tradition’s answer and practice. It advises commanders to controls obsolete, at which point they to its coordination problem is implicit “use the guiding principles of mission merely limit freedom of action. Lower control enabled by shared understanding command to balance the art of command level commanders are unable to adapt to and commander’s intent. The idea is with the science of control.”25 This “bal- changed conditions without permission, that higher and lower level commanders ancing” approach imagines a continuum and enemies can exploit this inaction. come to a shared understanding of what of command with decentralization at one Thus, the principal problem for Jominian needs to be done based on the higher extreme and centralization at the other. command is how to coordinate the appli- commander’s intent, then use this un- The commander adjusts the level of con- cation of combat power at decisive points derstanding as a conceptual handrail trol up or down based on the situation.26 without sacrificing adaptability. when circumstances change. This is said In theory, the balancing approach is a The Jominian tradition’s answer to to enable “decentralized and distributed modest (if still flawed) improvement over the adaptability problem has historically formations to perform as if they were hyper-decentralization. It at least directs been a technologically centered effort centrally coordinated.”24 the commander to consider operational
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Lythgoe 33 B-17 leaves trails over Brunswick, Germany, during World War II (U.S. Army Signal Corps/Library of Congress) context to determine the degree of con- we accept that war is inherently chaotic If such a scenario is likely to happen trol necessary. Its weakness, however, is and uncertain, then we must also accept (probability) and could result in that that it is missing the entire latter half of that some decentralization is required to unit’s destruction (consequences), then Moltke’s dialectic. It describes how con- win. Therefore, trust is required to win. a control (such as a limit of advance) is trol limits adaptability but fails to describe Commanders who do not trust subor- prudent. how adaptability must also shape control. dinates enough to decentralize are at a Nevertheless, the urge to overcontrol In practice, the balancing approach fre- severe disadvantage. Lack of trust cannot is strong. One reason is risk aversion.27 quently results in excessive control. Army be mitigated with additional controls. Research suggests Army leaders are par- commanders tend to overcontrol because While tightening control based ticularly risk-averse. Officers selected to they either lack trust in subordinates, are on risk is a sound practice, too often attend the Army War College score lower risk-averse, or both. commanders impose excessive controls than the general population on open- Adjusting the level of control based because they are either risk-averse or ness to experience using the Five Factor on trust (or lack thereof) is the same because they mistake risk for uncertainty. Model personality test, and those selected inward orientation error seen in hy- Risk is a function of the probability for brigade command score even lower.28 per-decentralization. That is, it structures that an event will happen and the con- Research on personality and risk-taking command based on internal concerns sequences if it does. For example, a shows that openness to experience cor- rather than operational demands. commander may judge that a subordinate relates with less risk-taking behavior.29 Moreover, it makes little sense. The unit that advances beyond a certain point Commanders also overcontrol purpose of decentralization is to increase may be vulnerable to counterattack and because they are uncomfortable with adaptability in response to uncertainty. If beyond the range of mutual support. uncertainty. Risk is not necessarily higher
34 Forum / Beyond Auftragstaktik JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 under conditions of uncertainty, but repeating cycle of four activities: synchro- iterative cycle begins again. Each cycle commanders often perceive it to be be- nization, dissemination, initiative, and is an opportunity for the commander to cause they lack the information necessary reporting. adjust the level of control. As the opera- to estimate risk. Many commanders Synchronization is the process of tional context changes, the commander instinctively tighten controls, but this is implementing the minimum necessary can continually adjust his or her com- precisely the opposite of what they should control to mass combat power at decisive mand approach to compensate. do. Uncertainty increases the possibility points and maintain mutual support Iterative command is in some of unforeseen threats and opportunities. while preserving as much freedom as ways already “out there” in the force. Lower decision thresholds enable lower possible for subordinates. Importantly, Commanders already synchronize, dis- level leaders to respond quickly to these minimum necessary control is not the seminate, take initiative, and report. The emergent demands, while more central- same as minimal control. The operational real change is the mental shift required ized control limits their ability to do so. context drives how much control is mini- from both junior and senior leaders to mally necessary. In some cases—such as a make iterative command work. Junior Operational Context and combined arms breach or an air assault— leaders often believe mission command Iterative Command the minimum controls will be necessarily means no higher level control and The idea that the Army’s command phi- stringent. In all cases, however, the com- perceive reporting requirements as mi- losophy must bridge the gap between mander must avoid overcontrolling and cromanagement. These misconceptions fighting doctrine and operational should decentralize as quickly as the need must be dispelled. Mission command is context creates two challenges. First, to control diminishes. not equivalent to minimal control; some the philosophy must resolve the tension The second activity, dissemination, situations require more control and some between the Jominian and Clausewit- involves the higher commander com- less. Likewise, reporting requirements zian imperatives. Second, it must do so municating his or her intent and mission are not micromanagement. Reporting is in whatever operational context Army orders to subordinates. Commander’s necessary for the higher commander to forces must fight. Adapting to the oper- intent and mission orders should be create an accurate visualization, resyn- ational context is the more formidable short, easily understood, and contain the chronize the force, and maintain unity of task. While Army fighting doctrine is minimum necessary control measures to effort. relatively stable, operational context enable synchronization. When dissemi- Senior commanders must also change is nearly the opposite. Operational nating orders, commanders should not how they think about mission command. context is diverse, dynamic, and violently rely exclusively on voice and data com- They must accept that mission command entropic. Each operational situation is munications. The best commanders move is both top-down and bottom-up. It is unique, constantly evolving, and contin- around the battlefield and communicate top-down in that higher commanders ually moving toward disorder. their intent to subordinates face-to-face. synchronize the activities of subordinate Neither hyper-decentralization nor The third activity is initiative. units. However, it is bottom-up in that the balancing approach has the means Commanders empower subordinates to subordinate initiative drives resynchro- to address these challenges. Hyper- take the initiative to respond to emergent nization. The higher commander must decentralization is explicitly biased conditions. Subordinates seize fleeting be responsive to and support lower level toward the Clausewitzian imperative, and opportunities and mitigate emergent initiative. In this way, lower level initiative as a result it fails to account for synchro- threats immediately and effectively when “pulls” higher level synchronization nization and mass. It is inwardly oriented they do not have to seek permission or rather than the opposite and more con- on maximum decentralization rather than await directions from their higher com- ventional “push” from higher to lower. outwardly oriented on the demands of mand. Initiative allows units to adapt to This arrangement may feel alien to many the operational context. The balancing uncertainty and change. senior commanders who prefer the more approach is likewise inadequate. It does Finally, reporting means subordinates conventional “higher says, lower does” not account for the dialectic between communicate information rapidly and hierarchical approach. However, allowing adaptability and control and in practice accurately to the higher commander. initiative to drive synchronization is re- frequently results in overly central- Reporting mitigates the risk of units quired for mission command to succeed. ized control, which is no better than acting on their own initiative. By com- hyper-decentralization. municating and reporting, subordinates Conclusion The solution to these problems is an allow the commander to update his Calls for the Army to adopt hyper-de- iterative approach to mission command. or her visualization of the battle and centralized command are misplaced. This approach enables the commander determine what additional decisions are The case for hyper-decentralized to move continually between central- required to maintain mutual support and command rests on a misinterpretation ization and decentralization based on unity of effort across the formation. The of Auftragstaktik, which underestimates the demands of the operational context. commander relies on this updated visual- the importance of planning and control The iterative approach is a continuously ization to resynchronize the force, and the in the Prusso-German approach while
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Lythgoe 35 19 overestimating the importance of Eitan Shamir, “The Long and Winding Road: Baron Antoine-Henri De Jomini, The Art The U.S. Army Managerial Approach to Com- of War, trans. G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill improvisation and low-level initiative. mand and the Adoption of Mission Command (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1862), Moreover, hyper-decentralization pro- (Auftragstaktik),” Journal of Strategic Studies 70. vides no means to coordinate mutual 33, no. 5 (October 2010), 645–672, available 20 Van Creveld, Command in War, support among units or mass combat at
36 Forum / Beyond Auftragstaktik JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Aircrew member of C-130J Super Hercules assigned to 774th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron prepares to depart for various bases throughout Afghanistan, August 2, 2019, at Bagram Airfield (U.S. Air Force/Keifer Bowes)
Asking Strategic Questions A Primer for National Security Professionals
By Andrew Hill and Stephen J. Gerras
If one wants to solve a problem, one must generally know what the problem is. A large part of the solution lies in knowing what it is one is trying to do.
—Fred Kerlinger and Howard B. Lee, Foundations of Behavioral Research
our teachers lied to you: some problems are even more pronounced in questions really are stupid. At the military, where a powerful culture Y best, a bad question wastes time of obedience responds to a leader’s curi- and energy by distracting from what osity with a frenzy of activity that may Andrew Hill is the Chair of Strategic Leadership is important. At worst, it sets one up or may not be useful. at the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Stephen J. for failure, either by asking the wrong Because leaders have so much power Gerras is Professor of Behavioral Sciences in the Department of Command, Leadership, and question or presuming the wrong over which questions organizations ask, Management at the U.S. Army War College. answer to the right question. These it is essential that leaders understand the
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Hill and Gerras 37 Figure. Detail of Memorandum by Theodore Sorensen, ational readiness levels of Air Force October 18, 1962 aircraft changed in the past 5 years? Causation questions ask why a thing is happening or what it may lead to in the future. These questions include: •• Explanation: Why is it happen- ing? What are the causes? Example: Why are African American officers underrepresented in the combat arms branches of the Army? •• Prediction: What is likely to happen because of this situation or event? Example: What kind of senior leaders is the current Army personnel system likely to produce? Intervention questions involve propos- als for solving or mitigating a problem (or Source: Image courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. exacerbating a problem for an adversary). Intervention questions extend causal analysis to examine one or more pro- basic characteristics of good strategic is happening? What does it mean? What posed actions (such as a policy change or questions. We use the term strategic to will happen if we do nothing? What can a new program). Intervention questions differentiate the questions that shape we do? What will happen if we do X? fall into one of three areas:1 and inform strategy—the focus of this Finally, what could go wrong? In that article—from the wide variety of ques- situation, the short answer was “a lot,” •• Effectiveness: Does it work? tions that organizations may explore. including a nuclear war with the Soviet Example: What is the likely effect of For example, what are the essential Union. The prospect of Armageddon new sanctions on Iran? characteristics of 21st-century military gave the other questions a great deal of •• Efficiency: What is the relationship leaders? Are we selecting for and devel- urgency. President Kennedy avoided the between the benefits and the costs? oping these characteristics? What are worst-case scenario for the Cuban Missile Example: What are the readiness U.S. military options in dealing with Crisis, in no small part because of the way improvements resulting from more [nation X]? How will [nation X] respond he guided his leadership team through a frequent Army unit rotations at the to different military actions? What are grueling process of strategic inquiry. He National Training Center? How do the most significant current capability asked excellent strategic questions. those improvements compare to the needs of the U.S. Army? How should costs of those rotations? we prioritize those needs? These are all Three Categories of •• Robustness: Is the proposed inter- strategic questions—difficult to answer, Strategic Questions vention still sufficiently efficient or but useful to ask and explore. In this Definition questions ask what is happen- effective if we relax key assumptions? article, we propose guidelines for asking ing. These include: Example: How effective is our cam- questions designed to improve an orga- paign plan if we lose access to bases in Defining nature: What is the thing nization’s performance amid competitive •• [country X]? we are analyzing? How is it inter- uncertainty. acting with the world around it? Asking good strategic questions is Example: What is China’s current Five Characteristics of a not just a useful leadership habit; in the policy toward Taiwan? Good Strategic Question national security profession, it can save Defining extent: How big is the While definition, causation, and inter- lives or alter the course of history. On •• problem? What are the likely costs of vention questions require different October 16, 1962, President John F. inaction? Example: How many sexual research approaches, all three question Kennedy was briefed on the photographic assaults occurred among Active-duty types should have five characteristics in findings of U-2 flights over Cuba. The Servicemembers last year? common.2 President was shown photos that ap- Defining urgency: How is the A Good Question Is Grounded in the peared to reveal Soviet medium-range •• problem unfolding in time? Is Competitive Context. A good research ballistic missile sites. Over the next 13 it getting better or worse? How question reflects a preliminary under- days, President Kennedy and his advisors quickly? Example: How have the oper- standing of the context of the problem would ask hundreds of questions. What
38 JPME Today / Asking Strategic Questions JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 or issue. That is, the question is grounded it tends to approach them as if no prior not yield specific research implications is in a basic understanding of the situation. work had ever occurred. A key part of a poor one. The purpose of asking these questions grounding questions is developing famil- A Good Question Implies the is not to become an expert on a topic— iarity with the good work that has already Possibilities of an Observable Answer. A that is what the subsequent research is been done. This saves time and energy good question will convey some informa- supposed to do. Nor does grounding and is more likely to produce original tion about how the relationship between necessarily sacrifice creativity. Grounding and important insight. Instead of redoing the two (or more) variables is going to is akin to conducting a reconnaissance the good work of our predecessors, we be tested. It tells us something about the of a problem or issue. Research scholar should build on it. key variables and about how we are likely Andrew Van de Ven writes, “The purpose A Good Question Has Two or More to model the relationship between them. of these activities is to become sufficiently Variables. A good strategic question Above all, a good question suggests the familiar with a problem domain to be has at least one “explanatory” or “inde- possibility of a positive or a negative able to answer the journalist’s basic ques- pendent” variable and one “response” result, and a willingness to accept either tions of who, what, where, when, why, and or “dependent” variable. In the Cuban one. how.”3 Depending on the topic, this may Missile Crisis, the independent variable The question “How does the type involve a review of prior work on the was the action chosen by the United of patrol (foot patrols vs. car patrols) af- subject, some direct interaction with the States, and the dependent variable was fect the prevalence of violence in similar problem area, review of relevant data, and the result of that action. In experimental neighborhoods with otherwise similar discussions with people familiar with the terms, the explanatory variable is the military presences?” contains a lot of problem. “treatment” condition, and the response information about the statistical model There is tension between knowing variable is the “outcome” measure. a researcher is likely to use. It tells us enough to ground analysis and knowing A Good Question Is Stated Clearly something about the explanatory variable so much that one becomes a slave to the and Unambiguously in Question Form. (percentage of patrol time spent on foot, tyranny of expertise. Much can be said This seems like an easy rule to follow, but controlling for overall patrol time) and for bringing in the novel perspective of it is not. For example, we ask, “How does the dependent variable (violence rate). a nonexpert. Grounding is intended to a U.S. military presence in Afghanistan It also suggests other measures (called give leaders enough of an understand- affect violence in the country?” Is this a “control variables”) that will be included ing to judge whether a question has the good research question? On the face of to try to isolate the effect of policing: potential to generate useful insight and it, it seems to be. Two variables? Check. total police presence, geographic size of to avoid replicating others’ work or fall- Clear and unambiguous? Maybe not. the area, demographics, income levels, ing into a trap that prior researchers have It is, in fact, a vague research ques- and so forth. All of that can be quantified encountered. tion. Which two variables are we going to and modeled. It would be incorrect to say that explore? We have lots of choices. How are A Good Question Acknowledges the grounding is the most important part we going to measure “military presence”? Uncertainty Inherent in Competition. of asking strategic questions, but hastily Are we interested in all U.S. military ac- “The enemy gets a vote” is a wise military passing over the grounding questions tivity, or do we focus only on U.S. troops adage. Most significant strategic ques- may set one up for big problems. The in regular contact with noncombatants? tions inevitably involve some matters failure of U.S. policymakers and military What about measuring violence? Are we that are partially (if not entirely) outside planners to anticipate the effects of the interested in violence in general or only in of our control. When posing strategic 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein and political or military violence? questions, it is useful to have in mind the the ruling Ba’athist party in Iraq was Maybe we want to know about how limits of what we can know at any time. rooted (among other things) in a failure different forms of military activity influ- The answers to most important strategic to ask basic contextual questions before ence violent behavior, so we want to questions are inherently provisional. the invasion that would have led to an en- examine how foot patrols compare to Good strategic questions invite us to tirely different set of questions about the mounted patrols in affecting violence in consider how to improve our competitive strategic plan for a post-Saddam Iraq. different areas. Or perhaps we are testing position or manage a problem better. Grounding also underscores a com- the “broken windows” theory of civil They do not ask us how to “win” where mon problem in large organizations: their order, exploring the connection between winning is not possible or “solve” where frustrating tendency not to know what the intensity of policing low-level offenses no permanent solution exists. For ex- they know. What characteristics and be- and the occurrence of violence.4 ample, “How do we solve the improvised haviors are necessary for effective military When formulating or evaluating a explosive device (IED) problem?” is not a leadership? How do we select for the research question, consider whether a good question. It is better to ask, “How right characteristics? How do we develop question clearly identifies the phenom- can we improve the protection of our the right behaviors? The U.S. military is enon of interest. A question that does forces against IED attacks?” “How can constantly examining these questions, yet we reduce the number of IEDs being
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Hill and Gerras 39 Afghan National Army 10th Special Operation Kandak commandos conduct small arms barrier firing drills during series of weapons proficiency ranges at Camp Pamir, Kunduz Province, Afghanistan, January 13, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Sean Carnes) placed?” “How can we identify emplaced effectively with the current problems. discussion about which variables are the IEDs prior to detonation?” Note that the Badly grounded questions often begin, right ones for analysis, then it probably answers to each of these questions will “Why don’t we just . . . ?” For example, needs to be rephrased. change over time. “Why don’t we just control our own A Bad Question Presupposes the Thus far, we have explored five char- budget?” “Why don’t we just push legal Answer, Includes the Answer, or Signals acteristics of good questions. What about approvals down to the lowest level?” That Only Certain Answers Are bad ones? “Why don’t we just impose a common Acceptable.5 “Why is counterinsurgency standard?” not working in Afghanistan?” presup- Five Signs of a Bad Question A Bad Question Is Vague Regarding poses an answer to two other questions: Formulating a good strategic question Key Variables. “Why is counterinsur- first that the U.S.-led coalition and takes time and effort. Asking a bad gency not working in Afghanistan?” is a Afghan national forces are executing a question is easy. Bad strategic ques- bad analytical question. What does “not large-scale counterinsurgency, and second tions often have one of the following working” mean? The question does not that the counterinsurgency is not effec- characteristics. suggest any specific measure of perfor- tive. The author of such a study (and A Bad Question Displays Little mance, and we have numerous options: many others) may see both assumptions Grounding in the Context of the violent noncombatant deaths, Afghan as settled issues. However, avoid embed- Problem or Issue. Just as it is arrogant military casualties, coalition casualties, ding assumptions in any question that are to assert that nothing new can be said number of cities and villages under (1) not beyond doubt and (2) not central about an issue, it is equally hubristic to Taliban control, total population under to the question. assume that no prior work is relevant Taliban control, and so forth. Without It may sometimes be necessary to to a problem now. Do the homework. knowing more about the basic question break a strategic question into multiple Ask the journalist’s questions. Assume motivating the analysis, the question of parts. This is fine, if follow-on questions that predecessors’ experiences dealing variable specification has no right answer. logically reflect the answers to opening with their problems may help deal more If the analytical question opens an endless questions. For example, “How well does
40 JPME Today / Asking Strategic Questions JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 the current U.S.-Afghan operation match Thus, “How does incarceration affect Leaders who ask good strategic ques- the canonical principles of counterinsur- the probability of a first-time offender’s tions prompt productive inquiry and set gency?” is a decent definitional opening future imprisonment?” may have a corol- a positive example when they reveal their question regarding what is happening lary hypothesis: “Incarceration increases justifiable ignorance. Leaders cannot be in Afghanistan. Thus, if we find that the the probability of a first-time offender’s expected to be experts in all things, but U.S.-Afghan effort is not a counterin- future imprisonment.” That is a testable guiding or assessing a strategic question surgency, focusing more on killing the claim, and it does not carry any unneces- is one area in which they must be active enemy and less on protecting popula- sary or unfounded assertions about why it and involved. A lack of research expertise tions, then we may ask questions about may (or may not) be true. is no barrier. Leaders are responsible for the effectiveness of this approach. In discussing the hypothesis, a leader shaping good questions to prompt an Another research foul is a question may acknowledge many reasons for an intelligence report or a research study and that clearly indicates the unacceptability expected relationship. In this example, for reviewing the questions that guided of certain answers, such as, “What makes such discussion may include the “prison completed work. Strategic questions drive the aircraft carrier essential to American is college for criminals” concept. This is organizational attention, energy, and power?” This question (a bad one) fine. But we must always bear in mind resources and can make the difference be- strongly implies that it is unacceptable to what is and is not being tested in any tween competitive success and failure. JFQ conclude that the aircraft carrier is not es- analysis. For example, finding that in- sential to American power. carceration increases the probability of In policy and program analysis, as in future imprisonment will corroborate Notes all research, the potential value of the (but not prove) the hypothesis, but it 1 work is proportional to its potential to will not justify a specific causal claim for Adapted from Eugene Bardach, A Practi- cal Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path find a surprising result. Again, Van de Ven that relationship. That would require a to More Effective Problem Solving (New York: advises, “Permit and entertain at least second research question and a second Chatham House, 2000), 20–25. two plausible answers to the question. hypothesis. 2 Characteristic one adapted from Andrew Alternative answers increase independent A Bad Question Includes Moral or H. Van de Ven, Engaged Scholarship: A Guide thought trials.”6 Ethical Claims or Value Statements That for Organizational and Social Research (Ox- ford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 77–79. A Bad Question Includes Causal Complicate Quantification. Many of us Characteristics two through five are adapted 7 Claims or Solutions. “Given that pris- have an understandable aversion to the from Fred Kerlinger and Howard B. Lee, Foun- ons are the higher education system of modern tendency to count everything. dations of Behavioral Research, 4th ed. (New crime, how does incarceration affect “Not everything that counts can be York: Wadsworth Publishing, 1999), 16. 3 the probability of a first-time offender’s counted,” someone wise once stated. The Van de Ven, Engaged Scholarship, 78. 4 George L. Kelling and James Q. Wilson, future imprisonment?” This question is analytical rejoinder is, “If it cannot be “Broken Windows: The Police and Neigh- interesting but flawed. It both answers counted, it will not count.” Intangibles borhood Safety,” The Atlantic, March 1982, the question (imprisonment increases are often the last refuge of obsolete ideas. 29–38, available at
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Hill and Gerras 41 Marine with 2nd Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion Counter–Unmanned Aerial Systems Detachment, attached to Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response–Central Command, conducts functions check on Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, Southwest Asia, February 17, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Jack C. Howell)
n On War, Carl von Clausewitz intro- duces readers to widely recognized Clausewitz’s I axioms such as how the simplest things become hard in war and how the fog and friction of war transform Wondrous Yet minor difficulties into major, nearly insurmountable obstacles. Within many of these axioms, Clausewitz describes Paradoxical Trinity the nonlinear nature of war. It is, however, the last five paragraphs of his first chapter that holistically describe The Nature of War as a the nature of war as a nonlinear system. His description and understanding of Complex Adaptive System the social dynamics of war give complex meaning to the interaction of various social elements in war, characterizing it By Brian Cole as a complex adaptive system. Political and military leaders and policymakers should be mindful of the nonlinear But in war more than in any other subject we must begin by nature of the social interactions in war. In doing so, they will be more prepared looking at the nature of the whole; for here more than elsewhere and adaptable to unpredicted yet mate- the part and whole must always be thought of together. rial developments throughout a conflict.
—Carl von Clausewitz
Brian Cole is the Director of the Joint Warfare Department at the Marine Corps War College.
42 JPME Today / Clausewitz’s Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Clausewitz describes war in holistic nonlinear nature of war, explains how his to understand the nature of war, and terms as a paradoxical trinity comprised trinity is a complex adaptive system, and the wondrous trinity can be used as a of the tendencies of the people, the illustrates how complexity theory can be methodological starting point to study- commander and his army, and the gov- applied as a framework to examine his ing post–19th-century war.9 Ultimately, ernment. In war, the most violent of observations of the interactions among war is characterized by a combination social interactions—the three elements of chance, politics, and passion in unity. of the three tendencies of the trinity the Clausewitz’s trinity—interact within with varying influences dependent on and among the other elements to create Clausewitz’s Trinity conditions such as the state of weapons a pattern of behavior that is understand- Clausewitz argues that war is a phe- technology and the historical relation- able yet difficult to predict. Clausewitz nomenon consisting of three central ships between opponents.10 warns that while it is hard enough to un- elements or dominant tendencies. War is an act of violence, of that there derstand the nature of each of the three This triad, or trinity, is a paradoxical is no question, but it is first an extension elements of war’s paradoxical trinity, a relationship “composed of primordial of policy, a rational and purposeful act of “theory that ignores any one of them or violence, hatred, and enmity . . . chance violent means used to forcefully compel seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship be- and probability . . . and of its element one’s opponent to its will. The primacy of tween them would conflict with reality to of subordination, as an instrument of politics may start as the most influential such an extent that for this reason alone policy.”4 It is paradoxical because while tendency of war, but the nature of the it would be totally useless.”1 John Miller war is an extension of policy—a ratio- conflict will be determined by the initial and Scott Page echo Clausewitz’s senti- nal tendency—it is propelled at times conditions and the subsequent interac- ments by exclaiming that to understand a by primordial violence and hatred— tion of the trinity’s three elements.11 The complex adaptive system, we must know irrational tendencies—or by chance. combatants’ subordination of rational both the nature of each element and the Primordial violence is the blind natural policy may be usurped by chance and meaning of their interactions.2 force, whereas the subordinated nature luck, or by the primordial tendencies of Clausewitz uses still-contemporary of war as a political tool is what makes hatred and enmity. ideas and terms in his manuscript, but it subject to pure reason, and chance is his descriptions of the trinity, its at- always a factor under extremely violent Three Levels of the Trinity tributes, and its emergent behavior are and dangerous conditions.5 Each of Thomas Waldman establishes a typol- what complexity theory describes as a the three elements are “manifested in ogy for the trinity’s elements. The complex adaptive system. Complexity a corresponding subject within society: typology is defined as the objective, theory was originally developed for the respectively, the people, the commander subjective, and contextual levels of the natural sciences, but social scientists find and his army, and the government.”6 trinity. Passion, chance, and politics it useful to understand social systems. Clausewitz’s trinity is a compressed constitute the primary or objective Complexity theory provides a framework concept of a number of central ideas trinity. The primary trinity is manifested to help us understand the root causes that are integrated by a logic of inter- into the societal elements of the people, of phenomena—not replace traditional acting contrasts.7 The trinity is a social the commander and his army, and the theories—and to help us understand the system that exhibits complex interac- government, respectively. The societal nature of war. tions and adaptive, emergent behavior. elements, Waldman explains, make Modern military strategists, com- The system is sensitive to initial condi- up the secondary or subjective trinity, manders, and staff officers must be tions, and chance and luck can always whereas context constitutes a third level. familiar with the abstract conception of alter the system’s behavior in unpredict- Context is not a trinity, but it is the war and be willing to release the con- able ways. conditions under which the other two crete, tangible tactics for the operators. levels of the trinity exist and interact. War must be considered as a whole or, The Nature of War Is Constant The trinity as a system is highly sensi- as Michael Handel writes, a gestalt, to Clausewitz wrote On War in a time tive to its conditions, and thus context appreciate the complexity and nonlin- when wars were interstate conflicts is vital to explaining changes that occur ear nature of war. Handel argues that fought by clearly defined armies. War at the secondary level and provides an “because of its infinite complexity and was confined to battlefields and uni- understanding of the inherent flexibility non-linear nature, war can only be under- formed combatants. The characteristics of the trinity.12 stood as an organic whole, not as a mere of war have changed since the 19th The third level, context, influences compendium of various elements.”3 century, but its nature has not. It is con- the system the most. Context provides This article provides an overview of structive to challenge the relevance of the setting in which “the three primary Clausewitz’s wondrous yet paradoxical Clausewitz to modern war, and doing tendencies—passion, chance, and poli- trinity, complexity theory, and complex so forces one to revisit his nonlinear tics—are manifested in reality through adaptive systems. In the end, it revisits theories of war.8 The first book in On secondary level subjects.”13 Clausewitz Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity and the War is a conceptual framework created explains context by showing that
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Cole 43 historically, societies tend to conduct wars to the economic theory of increasing Aggregation of Agents. A complex in their own particular ways, using differ- returns, making it difficult to predict adaptive system is an aggregation of ent methods and pursuing different aims its behavior. The theory of increasing agents within a given environment. The than their opponents.14 He describes con- returns relies on a principle of inde- modeler decides what to focus on and text in the opening sentence of his section terminacy and accounting for random what to avoid. Aggregation is a build- on the trinity, writing, “War is more than events affecting markets. The properties ing block approach in which aggregates a true chameleon that slightly adapts of complex systems also make them act like agents at a higher level, or as its characteristics to the given case.”15 capable of self-organizing and adapting meta-agents. Modeling is an art form, Waldman argues that Clausewitz uses without a central authority. and what is aggregated is dependent the chameleon to demonstrate how war Complex Adaptive Systems. Complex on what a modeler wishes to examine. is connected to its surroundings.16 Justin systems are found in many places. In the Aggregation is also about the actions of a Kelly and Mike Brennan write that war natural world, such systems include the complex adaptive system. In aggregation, must be viewed as a complex system that brain, immune systems, ecologies, cells, a modeler can identify and understand a emerges from “infinitely small changes developing embryos, and ant colonies. In system’s emergent behavior as a whole, in its environment, truly ‘more than a the human world, they include cultural, which is commonly different than the chameleon.’”17 Initial conditions are too economic, and social systems such as behavior of the individual agent. varied to apply a single methodology on political parties or scientific communities. Tags. Boundaries can be defined for which to approach a conflict. The context Complex systems are everywhere in all specific aggregations of agents or popula- constructs the initial relationships, acting sorts of contexts, but complex systems tions. When one defines the boundaries as a catalytic force of emerging, largely that adapt share central properties.20 of an aggregation, it is referred to as unpredictable behaviors among and be- A complex adaptive system consists of tagging. For example, a flag or guidon is tween elements of the trinity. The hope, a network of agents acting in parallel. used to unite in effort an army or group as Kelly and Brennan remind us, is not to Agents, depending on the context, can of people under a political system. Billiard achieve absolute control but to influence be nerve cells, individuals, firms, or even balls on a table are a population of billiard tendencies toward desirable outcomes whole nations. In a complex adaptive balls, but adding stripes to half the balls and away from undesirable ones.18 system, “Each agent finds itself in an manipulates the symmetry and tags the environment produced by its interac- aggregations into stripes and solids. In A Review of the Inherent tions with other agents in the system. An the field of complexity theory, tags are Properties of Complex Systems agent is constantly acting and reacting used to manipulate symmetries in order What makes a system complex and not to what the other agents are doing.”21 to study certain details while ignoring complicated? Complicated systems may As a result, nothing in a complex adap- others. Tagging manipulates symmetry by seem complex, but they are not unless tive system is fixed, and control is highly creating boundaries and thus defining the they possess certain inherent properties decentralized.22 system or a particular aggregation that we of a complex system. Complex systems In Harnessing Complexity, Robert seek to observe that might otherwise be come in a wide variety of forms, and Axelrod and Michael Cohen describe hidden.24 Clausewitz tags the elements of at times they can be difficult to recog- a complex adaptive system as the inter- the second level of the trinity by delineat- nize or distinguish from complicated locking sets of processes that generate ing the objective level of passion, chance, systems. A complex system is an open productive actions in a world that can- and politics to designated aggregates. system that interacts with its environ- not be fully understood. The three key Those aggregates are the population, the ment, whereas complicated systems are processes that constitute a complex military, and the government. The divi- usually closed systems. A complicated adaptive system are variation, interac- sion is not an arbitrary device; rather, it system is reducible; its parts can be dis- tion, and selection. The framework by is meant to isolate and study the interac- aggregated, and by understanding the which Axelrod and Cohen study complex tions both within a particular system and nature of its parts, one can determine systems is made up of three elements between the systems. the nature of the system in the aggre- called agents, strategy, and population. An Flows. The concept of flows is impor- gate. A complex system is irreducible. agent interacts with its environment and tant to understanding complex adaptive One cannot determine the nature of the with other agents. It can respond to what systems. For example, flow can refer to system in the aggregate by understand- happens around it and can act, to some the movement of goods into or out of an ing its disaggregated parts because the extent, purposefully. A strategy is the way economy, or flow could refer to informa- elements of a complex system interact in an agent responds to its surroundings tion or transportation with networks and developing ways that give rise to emer- and pursues its goals. Populations are part connectors. Tags can be used to define gent behavior.19 Unlike a complicated of an agent’s environment.23 The agent- the system and the networks that con- system, a complex system often exhibits strategy-population framework is known nect and direct flows. Two properties can nonlinear characteristics that can lead to as the population approach to complex affect flows. The first is the multiplying positive feedbacks and instability, similar adaptive systems. or multiplier effect, which is common in
44 JPME Today / Clausewitz’s Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Commander Task Force 51 Marine Major General Carl E. Mundy III addresses Sailors and Marines during all-hands call on flight deck of USS Essex, Pacific Ocean, February 26, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Jason M. Graham)
economics when discussing circular flows; points out, it is easiest to understand complex adaptive system must work to the second is the recycling effect. by using an example. A steel producer increase or decrease the variety of agents The multiplier effect is the overall sells some fraction of his steel to a car in a population, but not simply by ac- increase in returns for every unit of manufacturer. The cars are built, then commodating variety. A population with currency spent. For example, as John driven and sold repeatedly to the point varying types of agents creates a system Holland explains, if you were to contract that they are no longer useful and finally that gives rise to events that unfold in someone to build a house, you would pay given up for scrap metal in a junkyard. often unpredictable ways. the contractor, who in turns pays varying The junkyard then recycles a portion of Interaction. Interaction is essential subcontractors. Those subcontractors use the steel used to make the cars and sells it to Axelrod and Cohen’s framework part of that money to buy food and other for some other use. In the end, each cycle because the events of interest within a things, and so on. By taking a fraction of traps resources to be recycled again and system come from the interactions of the original contract and using that same again, creating a multiplying effect on the agents with other agents and artifacts. fraction at each subsequent phase, we original resource sold to the car manu- For example, trade occurs when a buyer can determine the multiplying effect. For facturer.26 This cycle can occur several meets a seller, strategies of bidding and instance, if the fraction to be applied to times over, depending on the system and offering take place, and eventually goods each step in the spending process is r = 80 resource. change hands. Most complex adaptive percent, we can calculate 1 + r + r2 + r3 + Variation. Variation of a population systems have distinctive interaction pat- r4 + . . . or using the equation 1/(1 – r), is an essential attribute of a complex terns, which are “neither random or we get a multiplying effect on the overall adaptive system. Variation, Axelrod and completely structured.”29 Axelrod and system of 1/(1 – 0.8) = 5.25 The result Cohen write, “provides the raw material Cohen provide two examples: asymmetric in this example is that for every $1 spent, for adaptation.”27 There are, however, interaction and uniform interaction. the effect to the overall economy is $5. limits to the extent variation in a popula- Asymmetric interaction occurs, for ex- The other property of flows is the tion will facilitate adaptation.28 Those ample, when a leader is able to broadcast recycling effect. Once again, as Holland who want to shape the behavior of a messages simultaneously to many who
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Cole 45 Marine Corps Communication-Electronics School student racks billiard balls before match during Single Marine Program’s weekly pool tournament held at 5th Street Zone, Twentynine Palms, California, July 16, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Levi Schultz) likely do not have the same capabil- complexity of global life as interaction and amplification or some change of fre- ity to broadcast information back to a complexity, or the condition in which the quencies of type.31 Natural selection relies leader. This type of highly asymmetric effect of a factor on a social system is de- on the selection of the agent, but a more interaction is different from symmetric pendent on the state of other factors.30 direct method of adaptation is the selec- interactions, in which all agents can Selection/Adaptation. The properties tion of the strategy. Instead of waiting for interact equally with all others. Uniform described so far are necessary for a system agents to reproduce, a good strategy can interaction is established when, for ex- to be complex, but for such a system to achieve successful results much faster. ample, there is a neighborhood in which become adaptive, it must have a mecha- In either the agent or strategy level of there are stores, schools, and churches. In nism for selection. Axelrod and Cohen selection, to retain effective adaptation all these places, people are able to meet use evolutionary biology’s concept of reproduction needs to occur. Natural and develop a network with a strong natural selection to understand the na- selection occurs in the absence of central- local bias. People know many others near ture of complex adaptive systems. While ized control and authority. The absence where they live and very few people, in not identical to the process of natural of central authority is what allows a com- comparison, who live elsewhere around selection, complex adaptive systems do plex system to adapt. However, defining the globe. Interactions, the authors write, operate in a similar way. Natural selection criteria for success is essential to harness- are what make complex adaptive systems requires a means to retain agents’ essen- ing complexity, as the title of Axelrod and come alive. David Earnest describes the tial characteristics, a source of variation, Cohen’s book implies. The framework
46 JPME Today / Clausewitz’s Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 they present offers a way to “analyze system has a dampening property so making war most like a game of cards in institutions and how they shape—and that the system maintains its essential which chance is as dominant a force as are shaped by—the actions of individu- properties. When the actions of others calculation.36 Acting courageously in war als.”32 Complex systems are constantly in a given population influence others, is one aspect of unpredictable human shaped by the interaction of agents. One as in the Standing Ovation Problem (de- nature; another is the level of indiscrimi- agent acts as a result of another’s action. scribed later), a tipping point may occur nate violence that people have shown to In other words, actions are informed by that could lead to a cascading effect and be capable of committing. other actions, and so on. undermine system stability. When agents A complicated system, as mentioned, Axelrod and Cohen write that a do as other agents do, they can become is one whose individual parts (when system is complex when there are strong locked into path-dependent behavior. broken down) can be studied and under- interactions among its elements, such that Path dependency can lead to a nonlinear, stood. By understanding all the parts, it “current events” heavily influence the magnifying effect amounting to a social is possible to understand and thus predict probabilities of later events. A change in tipping point. the behavior of the system in its aggre- strategy results from a system’s selection The model of a steel ball suspended gate. This is possible because the parts process, which leads to an improvement above three equally spaced magnets pro- are actually independent from each other, according to some measure of success. vides a good visualization of the trinity. even when they are in the aggregate. Axelrod and Cohen call this process When the ball is pushed in one direction, A piston rod, when connected to the adaptation. A complex adaptive system the magnets all act on the steel ball and camshaft, does not change the nature of then, is a system that contains agents, or the ball reacts to the magnets. The path the camshaft itself or the piston attached populations, that seek to adapt. the ball takes is highly dependent on, to the other end. These parts behave as Nonlinearity. The nonlinear char- and sensitive to, its initial conditions, would be predicted given the context in acteristic of the relationship among the but the path is difficult if not altogether which they function. The tendencies of three tendencies in Clausewitz’s trinity impossible to predict in real life. There Clausewitz’s trinity cannot be isolated is potentially the most significant and are many variables involved in the initial because the boundaries among them dangerous attribute. The nonlinear conditions, such as wind, temperature, are indistinct—all three elements help interaction is analogous to when “a symmetry of the ball, and strength of the define the others.37 In complex social magnet is released over three equidistant magnets. Once the ball is set in motion, systems like Clausewitz’s trinity, the parts and equally powerful magnets, it moves it is unlikely to gain momentum while or tendencies are interconnected and irresolutely to and fro as it darts among it gyrates wildly. In this model, friction interdependent. the competing points of attraction.”33 is one of the moderating forces that acts Clausewitz writes that war is a human Predicting the trajectory of such a magnet to stabilize the ball and prevent it from social activity. According to him, the fun- is essentially impossible, even though one reaching a tipping point. In war, an damental understanding of war is based could anticipate its pattern. Any infinitely unmoderated trinity could manifest in on the human element. He observes that small variation in initial conditions can irrational acts of large-scale violence. The war is “an activity in which each aspect cause significant subsequent variations. violence may continue until it expands influences and is influenced by others, Waldman explains that this can occur in into new boundaries where there are and this interrelationship extend[s] to the war because it is an open system that is moderating forces that will dampen and social and political matrix of war.”38 In sensitive to differences in initial condi- end the violence. It can be difficult to war, like life, all parts are interconnected tion and external influences. The magnet predict under what conditions violence and constitute a whole. Waldman argues model analogy captures the complexity of will extend beyond the rational tendency. that the trinity is not “simply a combina- war. As Waldman notes, such complexity tion of these elements placed side by side. makes it difficult to make “neat” analyses The Trinity as a Complex It is much more than this and is intended of war. Clausewitz conceived of the trin- Adaptive System to reflect the incredible complexity of war ity with complexity in mind, “a fact that Because of the overarching inherent in reality.”39 One cannot reduce the ten- belies its seeming simplicity.”34 No single element of danger in war, no other dencies to individual elements and seek tendency can be understood in isolation human endeavor is more turbulent, to understand them—the trinity is a unity because, as Waldman points out, in war ambiguous, or reliant on luck than and must be comprehended as such. all three tendencies simultaneously inter- war.35 Human behavior in the face of Isolating each tendency is not only act, creating a nonlinear, unpredictable danger is largely an unpredictable vari- an insufficient way to attempt to under- complex system. able across a given population. The stand the trinity as a whole, but it is also A moderating tendency can cre- subjective nature of courage plays dif- paradoxically impossible to understand ate a stable system. This means that a ferently among everyone. No matter the each element in isolation of the others. moderating tendency can prevent minor extent of mathematical calculations in The scientific approach of reduction- disturbances from amplifying into major planning, the roles of luck and chance ism begins to fail “as we move from the disturbances. In other words, a stable interject probabilities into the equations, realm of complication to complexity, and
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Cole 47 reductionism no longer gives us insight no adaptive property that emerges as a be stronger than the other. Intuitively, into construction.”40 The tendencies do result of their proximity. Clearly, when the greater the distance between op- not exist independently; they are in con- the two parts are attached as designed, ponents and their respective use of force, tinual tension and interaction with each they physically act and react in accor- the more likely rationality will predomi- other. Their interaction is dynamic and dance to Newton’s laws of motion. But nate. When in personal contact with the continually varying over time. Clausewitz at the macro level, the actions of the parts enemy, the hatred and enmity for each creates an image of two wrestlers to illus- interact linearly (this example is only con- opponent can lead to excessive aggression trate the interaction of the tendencies. He sidered at the macro level because at the and carry the violence to levels beyond explains how the actions of one wrestler quantum level the interacting elements what are necessary, or legal, to achieve are dependent on the interaction with the may, in fact, exhibit complex adaptive rational political objectives. other. Not only would the actions of a characteristics). The Standing Ovation Proximity can also lead to group- wrestler seem odd if not in the context of Problem is based on the premise that fol- think or mob behavior. If the elements a match with another; the actions would lowing a performance, an audience will of hatred and enmity lie carefully below be impossible, for they rely on the inter- respond with applause that may lead to a the surface, bringing them to the surface active participation of the other. Much standing ovation. Each audience member would not take much effort. If one per- like in any complex system, the actions of can choose whether to applaud standing son or small group is more likely than agents are dependent on, and a result of, or remain seated. The social dynamics can another to act out primordial violence the interaction of the other agents. lead an audience member to feel pres- on another group, it may be enough They are not always in competition sured to stand and join her immediate to encourage another group to act the with each other; sometimes they are even neighbors even if she despised the perfor- same way though they are at first re- mutually supportive. The boundaries of mance, whereas if an audience member luctant. One act of primordial violence each tendency are defined by the others. was farther away from those standing, the may unleash the hatred and enmity of a For instance, policy is thought to be the pressure to stand would be diminished as population against its opponents. The rational and goal-oriented attribute in a function of distance.43 The model can irrational aspect of base human violence war. Yet policy cannot define war in isola- provide interesting insights into how the toward another may inspire a neighbor, a tion because war as a whole is “pervaded irrational tendency of primordial violence friend, or a family member to act in a like by great chance, uncertainty and fric- can predominate actions and reactions in manner. The violent actions may spread, tion, while inescapable emotions impact war. the deviation of laws and norms will soon behaviour.”41 The authors cite Robert Putnam’s become normalized, and what was once War, Clausewitz writes, is never an 1939 writings on social capital as a public an unthinkable act will become common- isolated act. Opponents are aware of each good, where social capital is measured by place within the context of the tagged other. Individuals may be strangers, but the proximity and activation of agents. system. Once the violence subsides, and they are not abstract entities. Clausewitz Putnam believed that social capital is the conflict ends, a society may look back points out that war does not spontane- largely a byproduct of social interaction on its actions in disgust and disbelief. ously break out unexpectedly. Each side that creates ties, norms, and trust within Under normal circumstances, they would has an awareness of the others’ motives, a particular network. Interaction within not have acted like they did, but the but an element of uncertainty always a social network can be measured in interaction and proximity to the violence exists. This uncertainty, Clausewitz em- terms of proximity and activation factors. created perceived social pressures to act phasizes, creates a moderating tendency Proximity factors determine how agents in a similar way. This is a hypothetical and on each side that can prevent a tipping are likely to interact, and activation fac- theoretical example, yet there are many point.42 tors determine the sequencing of their examples that demonstrate how probable, Space and distance affect the interac- activity. In addition to physical proximity, under the right conditions, such actions tion between opponents and shape the many other types of relational networks can occur. interaction of the tendencies of the trin- establish proximity. Activation groups ity. The Standing Ovation Problem that many processes together that affect the Conclusion John Miller and Scott Page created is a timing of agent activity or the temporal The question that should arise while general model that can be used to study structure of events.44 Social capital, then, reading Clausewitz’s description the effect that proximity has on many is a result of the interaction of the features of the three tendencies regards the social issues, such as drug use, schooling of social organization, such as networks, extent to which the trinity shapes the choices, whether to recycle or not, and norms, and trust, that facilitate coordina- outcome of war. Of course, the most a variety of other issues. In the example tion and cooperation occurring in both obvious answer is, “It depends.” While of the piston rod and camshaft, no mat- time and space. this answer is true, it is not helpful. ter how close the two parts are moved Much like the Standing Ovation However, if we understand what together, there will be no effect on how Problem, proximity of opponents in war Clausewitz defines as the trinity and they behave toward each other; there is can influence which tendency will likely the tendencies that make it a complex
48 JPME Today / Clausewitz’s Wondrous Yet Paradoxical Trinity JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 adaptive system, then by using com- rational and irrational forces from which at the Edge of Chaos: Reflections on Complexity and Global Life, ed. Emilian Kavalski (Albany: plexity theory as a framework, we can unpredictable behavior emerges. In other SUNY Press, 2015), 53–77. understand how initial conditions affect words, both Clausewitz and Rosenau are 20 M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The the interactions. Efforts to identify the stating that to study international rela- Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and conditions under which events occur is tions and war, one must be willing to live Chaos (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), often a frustrating endeavor. The Arab in and with change to come to terms with 145. 21 Ibid. Spring took many by surprise because the “turbulence of global life.”49 In the 22 Ibid. they did not recognize the conditions end, the trinity is only an abstract model 23 Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, that led to the events. Many other con- of the complex social structure of society, Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Impli- flicts have destabilized entire regions designed to help political and military cations of a Scientific Frontier (New York: The unexpectedly. In 1914, a series of seem- leaders understand and appreciate the Free Press, 2000), 3–5. 24 John H. Holland, Hidden Order: How ingly unrelated events inadvertently decidedly unpredictable, emergent nature Adpatation Builds Complexity (New York: Basic sent European powers spiraling to war. of war. JFQ Books, 1996), 13. David Earnest writes: 25 Ibid., 25. 26 Ibid., 27. The spiral theory of inadvertent war Notes 27 Axelrod and Cohen, Harnessing Complex- ity, 32. provides one of the most compelling argu- 28 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and Ibid. ments about emergent phenomena in world 29 trans. Michael E. Howard and Peter Paret Ibid, 63. 30 politics: micro-decisions produced macro- (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), David C. Earnest, “The Gardner and behaviors that none of the political actors 89. the Craftsman,” in World Politics at the Edge of desired. One cannot simply reduce the war 2 John H. Miller and Scott Page, Complex Chaos, 31–51. 31 Axelrod and Cohen, Harnessing Complex- to preferences of the tsar, Kaiser, emperor, Adaptive Systems: An Introduction to Com- ity, 117. 45 putational Models of Social Life (Princeton: or king. Thirty-seven million people died. 32 Princeton University Press, 2007). Ibid., 159. 33 3 Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, Alien: Waldman, War, Clausewitz, and the World War I resulted from nonlinear How Operational Art Devoured Strategy (Car- Trinity, 70, 176. Waldman references Alan and recursive relationships between lisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security causes and effects. Nonlinear effects are September 2009), 6, available at
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Cole 49 SEALs participate in ground mobility training with Mine Resistant Ambush Protected armored vehicles, Forward Training Area, March 28, 2012 (U.S. Navy/Meranda Keller)
A Blue-Collar Approach to Operational Analysis A Special Operations Case Study
By Steven J. Hendrickson and Riley Post
or many military commanders, This condition typically results from Central (SOCCENT), we have, at the word assessment induces bouts years of exposure to well-intentioned times, been those briefers, struggling F of eye-rolling, daytime drowsi- analysts briefing either overly compli- to provide value to the command. ness, and, in some cases, mild nausea. cated analysis that is unintelligible to However, through trial and error over all but the presenter or, on the other 4 years and with three different com- end of the spectrum, overly simplified manders, we narrowed in on an analytic Steven J. Hendrickson is a Lead Associate with stoplight charts and thermographs process that both informed decisions Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., and Task Lead for the aggregated into trivial and often decep- and catalyzed organizational change at U.S. Special Operation Command J52 Strategic tive “trends.” As analysts responsible SOCCENT. Our goal in this article is Analysis Cell. Lieutenant Colonel Riley Post, USA, is the Program Manager for Army Talent Based for organizing the commander’s assess- to distill those years of experience into Branching at West Point. ments at Special Operations Command a set of simple principles that are useful
50 Commentary / A Blue-Collar Approach to Operational Analysis JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 to any commander and applicable across I need to learn?” we were asking, •• identified gaps relative to desired a wide variety of requirements. “What can I learn from the data?” outcomes in the AOR This article stands on two assump- •• We isolated ourselves from the rest of •• recommended measures to address tions about value-added operational the staff and made no effort to build those gaps with future investments analysis: the analysis has to be right, and relationships with forward elements. or divestments across the AOR. commanders must use it.1 Since com- This relegated us to being graders of Despite its flaws and room for manders, not operations research and the commander’s homework rather improvement, the SOCCENT com- systems analysts, make assessments, analy- than an integrated evaluation and mander deemed our new process effective sis results are only valuable if they are feedback mechanism for plans. because it produced digestible and analyt- trusted and allow the commander to pro- We compounded these mistakes •• ically sound outcomes that commanders duce faster or more informed decisions. by quantifying and aggregating and staffs across the enterprise used for Commanders are, above everything else, everything through a complicated making resource allocation decisions, decisionmakers, and good analysis will system of questionable mathematical communicating outside the organiza- lead to better or quicker decisions. We models. tion, and building future plans. These hope this article helps both command- We did not ask, “At what cost?” and •• outcomes manifested at multiple levels ers and their staffs avoid some of our so we could not help the commander of the enterprise, from civil affairs teams mistakes along the path to more accurate understand the amount of resources adjusting their areas of focus to the CG and useful analysis, allowing for improved applied to create the outcomes we redirecting Marine Special Operations decisionmaking across an organization. observed. Teams (MSOTs) across the battlefield. Context Not surprisingly, for the first few years In the course of building our new way neither the SOCCENT commanding ahead, we identified seven keys to success Our earliest attempts at operational general (CG) nor any other senior leader or guiding principles: analysis in SOCCENT were neither within the organization found our work overtly right nor useful to the com- Answer the question of interest to to be particularly useful. As keepers of the •• mander. Relying on a traditional doc- the command. data, we would get the occasional request trine-guided approach, we attempted Tie all analysis to clearly defined and for information, but rarely did anyone •• to answer “how are we doing?” by agreed-upon requirements. use our analysis to make meaningful deci- translating task accomplishment to Be proactive about data collection. sions. Moreover, despite our best efforts •• objective achievement through mea- Be value-added at multiple levels. to convince people otherwise, none of •• sures of effectiveness (MOEs) and Build collaborative networks to our forecasts (read: guesses) of future •• measures of performance (MOPs). This execute, verify, and validate analysis. outcomes gained traction. In short, we method focused extensively on activity, Resist the tyranny of averages and were a marginalized team, spending our •• such as number of engagements and aggregation wherever possible. days nurturing a complicated model that partner-nation units trained, rather than Understand that products matter, nobody seemed to care about. Something •• understanding effects the unit created in but not as much as the process. needed to change. the operational environment. Then we The remainder of this article focuses attempted to translate that activity to an A Better Way on presenting these seven guiding prin- estimate of progress toward achieving In late 2015, we scrapped our existing ciples and illustrating how to replicate objectives. methods and charted a new path. We our process in almost any command. As we forced doctrine to fit our stopped adhering to common practices, problem, we began to recognize five un- including the strict mechanical process 1: Answer the Question of Interest to derlying behaviors that undermined the rooted in MOEs and MOPs. Instead, the Command value of our work: we developed what we view as a “blue- At SOCCENT, we found answering a •• We did not seek to answer—or even collar business case” analysis focused on single question, the one most promi- understand—the most pressing ques- measuring and articulating SOCCENT nent in the CG’s mind, provided a tion for the commander. Although return on investment (RoI)2 to coherent logic for motivating both staff our process reflected the campaign resources in areas of operation (AOR).3 and subordinate commanders to actively plan goals, we wasted energy answer- In doing so, this process: participate in the analytic process. In ing questions of little consequence to essence, if the boss cares about a topic described SOCCENT’s allocation of the commander. •• and is constantly asking about it, the resources across the AOR We passively used the data we had individuals in the unit want to be part •• articulated current progress toward rather than actively collecting the •• of the answer. Fortunately, we enjoyed objectives according to the com- data we needed. When we should an environment of shared information mander’s stated priorities have been asking, “What data do and openness to inquiry. This allowed
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Hendrickson and Post 51 Servicemembers assigned to Naval Special Warfare Group 2 conduct military dive operations off East Coast of United States, Atlantic Ocean, May 29, 2019 (U.S. Navy/Jayme Pastoric) our team to attend strategy sessions to which requires a clear understanding tion environment to degrade support for with the CG, his team of directors, of resources available, CG priorities, the violent extremist organizations. and subordinate commanders. It also expected returns to any given invest- To standardize RoI measures, we gave us the space to iterate with the ment of SOF, and an evaluation of what defined returns and currency in an op- CG to identify what analysis he found actually materializes in the operational erational context. Returns were either useful. Through this combination of environment. In theory, there existed desired or actual: passive and active elicitation, we identi- some optimal allocation of SOF that Desired returns: Objectives in fied the following question of interest maximized SOCCENT’s effect in the •• regional plans, or the state of the to the CG: “Given a finite number of AOR. We built our analysis to move the operational environment that special operations forces [SOF] and a command toward that allocation. SOCCENT expected to materialize nearly infinite demand for their capa- by applying SOF resources to them. bilities, how does SOCCENT allocate 2: Tie All Analysis to Clearly Defined Actual returns: The observable its SOF to maximize achievement of and Agreed-Upon Requirements •• impact SOF resources—through the planned objectives in the U.S. Central Every organization faces requirements. execution of operations, actions, and Command [USCENTCOM] AOR?” In the financial world, the requirement is activities (OAAs)—had on objectives. The scarcity of SOF relative to de- clear: apply human and physical capital to mand prevents SOCCENT from applying generate a profit, and measuring returns Using these definitions, we were able high-end human capital to every problem is a simple accounting drill. In organiza- to standardize and defensibly articulate set in the AOR. For every application tions not driven by profit, such as the comparisons of outcomes to the com- of SOF against one problem, there is an military or other public-sector entities, mander’s expected outcome.4 inherent opportunity cost of not investing measuring and articulating RoI is more Next, we defined a standardized mea- somewhere else. The question, then, is challenging. For example, no com- sure to make comparisons of investments not simply, “How is SOCCENT doing monly agreed-upon method exists for across units. We settled on man-days of relative to its stated objectives?” but measuring and comparing investments SOF as the unit of measure for resources rather it is a more expansive inquiry that and returns between training a partner applied to an OAA. For example, a considers the opportunity cost of ac- SOF unit, conducting a key leader 12-man Special Forces Operational complishing those objectives. In simplest engagement with partner special force Detachment–Alpha (ODA) conduct- terms, this is an RoI question, the answer commander, or exploiting the informa- ing a 10-day training engagement in
52 Commentary / A Blue-Collar Approach to Operational Analysis JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Lebanon would count as a 120-man-day practice, this often required traveling higher headquarters analysis. In part, (12 men x 10 days) investment applied across the AOR to conduct in-person this approach originated from an un- in Lebanon.5 Although this approach did interviews with forward commanders and anticipated stroke of good fortune. In not capture every SOF investment in the operational units executing SOCCENT October 2015, a U.S. SOF commander region, it did encompass the majority of orders. In other cases, the only travel in Lebanon asked our team to review the activities and, more important, focused required was foot movement to another progress of his command and provide on the operational units that could be staff section, such as the J2 or J4. In all recommendations for resource alloca- shifted from one mission set to another. instances, though, we built data collec- tion as well as future campaign activities. Furthermore, it was a way of measuring tion platforms tailored to the type and This commander also happened to be SOF investment across all types of OAAs, source of data we needed and followed one of the more vocal leaders in the campaigns, and phases of war. up in person. SOCCENT enterprise. When our analysis Critically, the process of measur- Regardless of data type, we supple- and products exceeded his expectations, ing investments and returns relative to mented all primary source data by he became our best advocate, using our desired outcomes pinned the analysis data mining open-source and classified products to articulate his progress and to clear requirements, lending validity reporting before and after in-person intent to his peers, the CG, and lead- and, ultimately, utility to decisionmakers. visits. Doing so allowed us to capture ers of outside organizations, including The direct reliance on the SOCCENT data already provided through situation the Ambassador and Embassy staff. His plans to drive analytic requirements reports, intelligence information reports, advocacy opened doors throughout the also allowed us to provide constructive and other data provided by the operator, command, allowing our team to visit feedback to the planners at the end of the allowing us to focus personal interactions SOCCENT subordinate units in every analysis cycle. on data gaps rather than burdening the corner of the AOR. operator with questions already answered With our foot in the door, we estab- 3: Be Proactive about Data Collection in reporting. Lastly, because our inter- lished relationships with other forward Once we determined the critical ques- view sample size was small, we found the commanders—the primary consumers tion and defined requirements, we supplementing data useful for a broader and advocates of our product—to apply identified the data we needed and the perspective and clarification. concentrated analytic capability to their person or unit most likely to have that This multisource data collection ap- most pressing concerns. When meeting data. In person, proactive data col- proach reaped several benefits to include with the commander, “How can we help lection fundamentally changed our increased detail and veracity of data, you answer your mail?” was always one process. We argue that it is the differen- insight for subordinate commanders, the of the first questions we posed. Most of tiator that enabled a useful analysis and development of a collaborative analytic our subordinate commands lacked the elevated our team to an integral element network, and increased buy-in to the staff manning to dig deeply into anything of the command. process across the command. The active other than immediate mission require- In April or May of any given year, approach to data collection also gave the ments. As an analytic team, we viewed staffers around the Department of analytic team unique insights into a wide ourselves as a temporary staff element Defense receive the dreaded annual analy- spectrum of issues across the command, for the forward commander and took on sis data call tasker from “higher.” Almost affording it the opportunity to contribute whatever analytic challenge he faced at without fail, it comes in the form of a to teams and projects outside of its nor- the time. lengthy, confusing email with an equally mal analytic requirements. We reaped significant benefits from confusing Excel spreadsheet attached, or focusing on the analytic needs of the an equally unhelpful Task Management 4: Be Value-Added at Multiple Levels forward command. Because the concerns Tool message. In turn, these staffers push In SOCCENT, forward operational of the forward command overlapped similar requests throughout their organi- units held the keys to the best data significantly with those of SOCCENT, zations and subordinate units until some available. However, these operational the data we collected fed analysis for poor captain or major is stuck with the elements are mostly ODAs, MSOTs, both the forward node and SOCCENT task. Not surprisingly, the returning data and SEAL platoons—tightly knit groups commander. Additionally, because the vary greatly in quality and are wholly de- wary of “outsiders.” These teams typi- work we did directly supported the for- pendent on the knowledge, competence, cally operate at a tempo and in an envi- ward commander, he and his team were and motivation of the respondent. The ronment that is not conducive to site engaged in verifying and validating the result is a mixed bag of high-quality, de- visits from data collectors. products we produced post-visit. Without tailed data and check-the-box drivel—the To solve this access problem, we exception, we received clarifying or cor- combination of which precludes useful flipped the traditional analysis approach recting comments from the commanders analysis. on its head, focusing on providing an that ensured our analysis was current and To overcome this plight, we physi- analytic service to the forward node accurate before release to the CG. cally went to the source of the data. In rather than simply seeking data for the
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Hendrickson and Post 53 Figure 1. Analysis Framework granular data as possible but communi- cate useful findings at operational and Terms of Reference OBJ strategic levels. Unfortunately, averag- Ob ective: Goals the ing and aggregating results destroy the commander wants to achieve. fidelity and value of otherwise valid analyses. Some analysts refer to this as Intermediate Military IMO IMO Ob ective: color math where, by bending the laws Decomposition of the objective into distinct, of math, a series of red, amber, or green manageable, and indicators are “averaged” to produce measurable elements. Effect Effect Effect Effect a single color indicator for a strategic Effect: Conditions that issue.6 The reality is that the strategic must materialize to achieve the IMO. issue, represented by a single color, CriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterionCriterion Criteria: Metrics, is actually a collection of small issues, measures, and study each possibly on a different part of the questions that define what it means for an spectrum. In this case, establishing clear Data effect to materialize. requirements, collecting high-quality data, and building a networked team of commanders and analysts are all for As forward commanders used our Base. At SOCCENT, the J5 director naught because the process of aggrega- products to brief the SOCCENT CG on rightly mandated collaboration between tion has diluted or obfuscated findings, their progress and concerns, the boss be- planners and analysts. That collabora- making them inaccurate and dangerous. came acquainted with the results prior to tion was critical for building measurable To fight the tyranny of aggregation our engagements with him. Rather than a requirements, garnering buy-in from the and preserve the fidelity of findings, we formal brief, discussions among our team, planners, gathering data, and validating used a combination of nuanced narra- the CG, and the forward nodes became results. We also built similar relationships tive and supporting visualizations. We environments of shared consciousness within and across the SOCCENT J2 and intentionally did not use averaged num- and the dialogue centered on future ac- J3 directorates, with USCENTCOM bers, thermographs, or other techniques tion rather than a review of the past. and U.S. Special Operations Command common to DOD analyses; they are (USSOCOM) staffs, and with subordi- misleading, arguably inaccurate, and are 5: Build Collaborative Networks to nate units. for good reason viewed with significant Execute, Verify, and Validate Analysis In many cases, though, we relied suspicion by most SOF commanders. The process of active data collection on analysts from across DOD, the Instead, we relied on a logical framework also builds a network of collaborators interagency community, and private that guided our translation of raw data useful for executing, verifying, and vali- sector to provide external analyses of to influence objectives through criteria, dating analysis. The network is unde- the operational environment relative to effects, and intermediate military objec- fined in advance of the analysis, but, in SOCCENT objectives. Using external tives (IMOs). Figure 1 shows a simplified our case, it included forward command- analysts and companies mitigated confir- version of this framework. ers and their units; staff officers and mation bias and provided multiple lenses The framework decomposed plan analysts within the SOCCENT staff; through which we viewed the problem objectives into IMOs and their related and subject matter experts from across set. We also employed two specialized pri- effects.7 We developed criteria for each DOD, the interagency community, vate research firms to help us understand effect that answered the question, “What and private sector. The combination of the human element of the operational does it mean for this effect to material- internal and external collaborators pro- environment. Combined with our own ize?” For example, if plans called for a vided what we believe was an optimal internal analysis, the networked approach partner force to conduct counterterror- mix of first-hand knowledge and out- provided multiple perspectives on com- ism, criteria may have been the unit’s sider perspective. It also allowed our plex problems, increasing our confidence ability to execute lethal and nonlethal team of two to three people to conduct in common findings and driving further find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and dis- in-depth analysis for a command spread research in areas of divergence. seminate functions. After we collected, across the U.S. military’s most active validated, and adjudicated the data, we region of the world. 6: Resist the Tyranny of Averages and did not aggregate the results. We kept As important as our data collection Aggregation Wherever Possible our sleeves rolled up and wrote nuanced, approach was, it would not have been The challenge for analysts at compo- qualitative descriptions of progress and possible without support and buy-in nent or higher headquarters, such as a gaps at the effect and IMO levels. While from both the forward commanders and Theater Special Operations Command we would further distill these narratives key staff members at MacDill Air Force or combatant commands, is to use as for specific reports, detailed, qualitative
54 Commentary / A Blue-Collar Approach to Operational Analysis JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Soldiers with Special Operations Command South prepare to board Army helicopter assigned to Joint Task Force–Bravo’s 1st Battalion, 228th Aviation regiment, during joint airborne operations exercise at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras, February 22, 2018 (U.S. Army/Maria Pinel)
evaluation at the objective level and We also avoided aggregation by com- Once briefed to the CG, we circulated below gave commanders the detail they municating results of analysis often, at the findings with other USCENTCOM needed for reallocation of resources. multiple levels, and in varied forms. While components, USSOCOM resource man- Instead of stating we were yellow on we socialized initial drafts of the analysis agers, and anyone else that would benefit a scale of red to green, we found that a with SOCCENT staff action officers, from understanding how SOCCENT was narrative focused on successes and gaps we never considered analysis complete using SOF resources. The analytic cycle in the context of each objective was the and ready to brief to the CG until the culminated with an AOR-level summary most effective form of articulating RoI. forward commander had reviewed and presentation at the SOCCENT In addition to presenting findings in approved it. In every case, forward com- Commander's Conference (SCC). For the context of cost, this method yielded manders welcomed the “good” with the that brief, we distilled findings at the palatable and pragmatic recommenda- “bad” news in the reports, likely because objective level for each forward node into tions for commanders to make the most they viewed them as accurate reflec- five pages efficient use of their limited resources, tions of reality. These reports were rich of analysis for the CG that focused on whether at the country, regional, or in detail and light on summaries. With each of his strategic objectives. Because AOR level. concurrence and participation from the almost every commander in the room had Our approach also heavily leveraged forward nodes, we engaged the CG with seen earlier, more detailed variants of the information graphics to augment results. executive-level briefs that focused on the analysis, the presentation facilitated a Using visualizations that preserved most important returns on the invest- productive discussion about reallocation important differences within broader ment to a given problem set. Because of SOF resources across the command. themes allowed the consumers, often the forward commanders typically commanders within the SOCCENT en- video-teleconferenced in, these briefings 7: Understand that Products Matter, terprise, to determine what mattered and became an opportunity for the CG, staff, But Not as Much as the Process Rather what did not within any larger strategic and forward node to agree on a common than producing a single product briefed issue. However, we always emphasized understanding of the ground truth and to the commander at the end of the the importance of the narrative over the to craft courses of action for increasing cycle, we developed and executed visualization. returns moving forward. a qualitative, evidence-based analysis process. The process supported planning
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Hendrickson and Post 55 Figure 2 Analysis Timeline and Process Example for Conclusion Phase 0 Operations A commander’s job is to give guidance APR MA JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NO DEC JAN FEB MAR APR and make decisions, and operations evelo Plans Develop research and systems analysts should Plans evelo rders ec te Planned erations ctions and ctivities make those jobs easier by providing Develop Plans data that inform those decisions. We Step 1 Understand CDR’s objectives (desired returns) are confident that adhering to the seven Step 2 Develop and validate IMOs and effects with planners principles described here will put any Step 3 Develop criteria to evaluate effects commander and his staff on the right Step Partition criteria by effect domain path to conducting useful analysis that Collect Data leads to better and/or more timely deci- Step 5 Determine invested resources Step 6 Determine data and sions. Like most valuable innovations, re uirements the process that we settled on was the Step 7 Develop and execute data collection plan accumulation of failures, tinkering, and Step 8 Compile, arbitrate, and validate data refining. And while there is certainly Conduct Analysis more space for improvement, the advan- Step 9 Conduct analysis by effect domain (partner capability, threat, tages of the current approach are clear. population and PE) Step 10 Evaluate effects, IMOs, and objectives First, the analysis is more useful. Step 11 Conduct gap analysis Instead of answering a vague “How are Step 12 Identify actions to address gaps Step 13 alidate analysis we doing?”-type question, we provided
Develop Analysis the commander an ability to understand Step 1 Produce and refine country and regional products real-world outcomes, the opportunity Step 15 Produce AOR-level products cost associated with those outcomes, and Region A SCC Region B information about how, if at all, he might USSOCOM Region C produce better results with a realloca- AOR tion of resources. The process is useful Analysis Updates Legend because it ties outcomes to requirements Analysis Timeline Analysis Muscle J3/5 Functions Decision Brief CCMD Inputs and Process Movements that matter to the commander. The process produces more accurate and timely analysis built on better and and informed resource allocation deci- fall and were able to brief the country more current data. Where passive data sions throughout the year and at mul- and regional findings along the way collection produces stale, incomplete tiple echelons of the SOCCENT enter- to both the CG and subordinate com- data, in-person interviews allow the data prise. Championed and advocated for by manders. By the time we briefed the final collector to ask questions of primary data J5 leadership at its onset, the collabora- AOR-level analysis to the commander sources that he ties to the commander’s tive process unified planners, executers, before the SCC, he knew it reflected real- requirement. Building a networked team and analysts into a coherent cycle. ity on the ground. of supporting analysts also increases Because of budgetary and manning During the conference, commanders diversity of observations, reducing the cycles, we believe the ordering of this used the information generated by our chances that one perspective creates a process matters. Figure 2 captures what process as a basis to have an informed biased depiction of reality. we found to be a rigorous and repeatable discussion about what resources they Finally, relying on rich narrative and way to execute the analytic process while needed to achieve their objectives, while supporting visualizations drives analysis remaining integrated with planning and planners used it to calibrate objectives for away from the color math and death- resourcing. Of course, any unit applying the upcoming year’s plans. Outside of by-aggregation that dooms traditional this process will need to modify it to its SOCCENT, the commander also used analyses. In most cases, granular, contex- specific requirements and, importantly, to the results to justify his resource require- tual data are the only means of conveying the commander himself. ments to USSOCOM post-conference. the nuance of a situation. Since the In our case, the resourcing cycle Much of this was possible because we process is iterative and not a once-a-year turned on the SOCCENT SCC. During were included as members of the opera- event, commanders at all levels can take the conference and after briefings by all tional planning teams from the beginning in the details necessary to understand subordinate commanders, the CG would of each plan that SOCCENT produced summarized documents later in the establish priorities and provide guidance in the spring. Integration with those process. for the coming year. Therefore, as shown teams also gave us the legitimacy to make We should like to finish by mak- in figure 2, we completed analysis for recommended changes at the end of the ing a few suggestions about the people subordinate commanders the preceding analysis cycle. and skills needed to conduct analysis
56 Commentary / A Blue-Collar Approach to Operational Analysis JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Navy seaman guides Egyptian Naval Force S-70B Sea Hawk helicopter onto flight deck of USS Carney during exercise Bright Star 2018, in Mediterranean Sea, September 10, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Ryan U. Kledzik) like this. Over the course of the 4 years analysis team will do that for the com- the authors view national security as a business. that we tried, failed, innovated, and mander in almost any environment. JFQ That said, some commonly understood busi- ness terms can be useful for conceptualizing a improved, our team took on multiple security problem. configurations. We have had military and 4 Our process did not claim to identify contractors as properly trained operations Notes causal relationships between operations, ac- research and systems analysts, social scien- tions, and activities (OAAs) and the state of 1 tists, mathematicians, and lawyers on the Although we understand there are infi- the operational environment. We also did not nitely many types of analysis conducted across weight actual returns or attempt to articulate team. Regardless of the titles, the team the Department of Defense (DOD), this article that one OAA had more of an impact on an needs members with two primary skills: focuses on operational analysis. We define this objective than another. Because the importance interpersonal skills for building teams as analysis conducted to inform the com- of any objective could change at any time, we and networks, and logical/analytic skills mander’s decision cycle at the operational and preferred to clearly state the actual returns for building frameworks and conducting strategic levels of war. rather than weight their importance to the 2 Return on investment (RoI) is a quan- objective, and allow the decisionmaker, typically analysis. Neither skill set is sufficient by titative metric used to describe efficiency of the commanding general, to determine the itself, and both are necessary for the team an investment. Although further research is relative importance of any given outcome. to work properly. warranted to fully define the military applica- 5 We understand there are other investments, Ultimately, providing useful analysis tion of RoI, the principles still apply in this such as equipment, training, and so forth, but that allows commanders to make better context. We are comparing what was invested, for analysis scoping reasons, we decided to focus what was returned, and what was expected to on the scarcest and most important resource: decisions does not require a Ph.D. or be returned. Like RoI in a financial context, special operations forces operators. a mastery of rocket science. It requires this yields an understanding of force efficiency 6 As one enlightened staff officer at SOC- answering questions that matter with but in the context of campaign plan objectives. CENT stated, “Averaging colors is about as quality data in a manner that articulates Furthermore, our application of RoI is based useful as comparing apples to dump trucks.” 7 rather than averages the truth. Adhering on economic costs vs. accounting costs and We understand that the terms objective, therefore does not lend itself to a quantitative intermediate military objectives, and effect have to the seven principles in this article and comparison as does RoI in a financial context. meaning in joint doctrine. However, we found applying them through a disciplined pro- 3 Neither the Special Operations Command it necessary to create specific definitions based cess with an enthusiastic and hard-nosed Central (SOCCENT) commanding general nor on the logic of our analysis framework.
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Hendrickson and Post 57 USS Connecticut and USS Hartford break through ice in support of Ice Exercise 2018, Ice Camp Skate, March 9, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Michael H. Lee)
corridor that is becoming increasingly vital to the economic and national The Bering Strait security interests of the United States and its allies. Once a region of coopera- An Arena for Great tion between the Soviet Union and the United States, rapidly changing envi- ronmental conditions and the resulting Power Competition increase in human activity have made the Arctic an arena for potential Great By Ryan Tice Power competition between Russia, China, and the United States. The Navy foretold the Bering Strait’s sig- nificance in 2013 when it published its aritime corridors such as the United States and the global commu- U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap: 2014–2030, Straits of Hormuz and the nity. Now due to Russia’s and China’s asserting that M Bab al-Mandeb have long been interests and activities in the Arctic, the vitally important to the interests of the Bering Strait is an emerging maritime this 51-mile-wide strait between Russia and the United States . . . will become a more important security planning con- Major Ryan Tice, USMC, is a graduate student in Regional Security Studies in the Department of sideration as maritime activity continues National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. to increase. . . . As the Pacific gateway for
58 Commentary / The Bering Strait JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Russia’s Northern Sea Route, the Bering with Arctic interests; and ensure that U.S. countries that it seeks to assert itself as the Strait will become increasingly important for adversaries do not exploit gaps created at dominant Arctic power. seaborne trade between Europe and Asia.1 the far boundaries of the GCC areas of But Russia is not the only power with responsibility (AORs). its eyes on the Arctic. Potential economic Any threat, perceived or real, to the and ambiguous international regula- freedom of access to these maritime cor- External Challenges: tions, as well as a lack of institutional ridors usually elicits a strong and swift Russian and Chinese governance, are already enticing China to response by the United States and its Interests in the Arctic position itself as a powerful stakeholder allies. Although the importance of the To fully appreciate the exigency of in Arctic affairs. China is looking north to Bering Strait is increasingly being rec- establishing a CJTF in Alaska, it is use the Arctic sea lines of communication ognized throughout the Department of necessary to understand Russian and as a third belt in its massive infrastructure Defense (DOD), the United States still Chinese interests and activities in the network dubbed the Belt and Road faces several obstacles to achieving the Arctic. Russia’s military assertiveness Initiative.9 All Chinese maritime traffic strategic objectives outlined in the Navy’s in the region is a strong indicator of utilizing Russia’s Northern Sea route roadmap, namely to “ensure United its ambitions. In December 2015, will have to transit the Bering Strait in States Arctic sovereignty and provide President Vladimir Putin stated in his order to travel between the Chinese homeland defense,” “provide ready naval National Security Strategy that port at Dalian to the port in Rotterdam, forces to respond to crises and contingen- Netherlands. To further its economic cies,” “preserve freedom of the seas,” and leadership in exploiting the resources of the interests in the region, China is wielding “promote partnerships within the United world’s oceans and the Arctic is acquiring its soft-power weapons to gain leverage. States Government and with interna- particular significance. . . . An entire spec- It has invested in nuclear-powered ice- tional allies and partners.”2 trum of political, financial-economic, and breakers and increased its foreign direct In particular, because the Bering Strait informational instruments have been set in investment in such countries as Finland lies at the boundary of three geographic motion in the struggle for influence in the and Norway, with ambitions to establish combatant commands (GCCs), increased international arena.4 a Chinese-Arctic corridor that connects adversary activity around the strait cre- China with European markets.10 In only a ates challenges for unity of effort among To achieve its geostrategic objectives few years, such trans-Arctic shipping will those combatant commands. Moreover, in the Arctic, Russia has established become an economically viable alternative since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic to the Suez Canal and cut travel time be- United States has invested little in Arctic Command, embarked on large-scale tween Shanghai and northwestern Europe capabilities, and since 2014, the United investment in Arctic airfields and ports,5 by approximately 18 to 27 percent.11 States and its allies have focused personnel and initiated the development of dis- Thus, it was unsurprising that, after visit- and resources on deterring Russian aggres- crete Arctic military capabilities such ing with President Donald Trump in sion around northern Europe.3 as the Northern Fleet’s Arctic Motor- April 2017, Chinese President Xi Jingping As a result, the United States finds it- ized Rifle Brigade6 and “Arctic-proof” stopped in Alaska to meet with Governor self in a position of weakness in the region. drones that can withstand the region’s Bill Walker, attempting to find opportuni- If steps are not taken to correct these vul- severe climatic conditions.7 This Arctic ties for Chinese investment in Alaska.12 nerabilities, the Bering Strait will almost investment was on full display during China’s interests in the Arctic may certainly become a region like the South Russia’s strategic exercise Vostok-18, not be purely economic, however, but China Sea or the Baltic region, where when units of the Arctic Motorized might also involve national security. competition, harassment, and intimidation Rifle Brigade conducted an amphibious China views the Aleutian Islands as the threaten its status as a place of peaceful insert on the Chukotka Peninsula and northernmost extent of the first island cooperation and exploration. To meet the executed a tactical foot movement from chain, a series of islands extending from challenges posed by the rapidly changing its insertion point to an undisclosed the Aleutians in the northeast down security environment in the Arctic and the location along the Pacific coastline while through the Philippine archipelago in the Bering Strait in particular, U.S. Northern the Northern Fleet conducted multiple southwest.13 The Chinese, a historically Command (USNORTHCOM) should amphibious landings and search-and-res- seafaring nation, see these islands as barri- establish Combined Joint Task Force cue missions throughout the exercise.8 ers used by the United States and its allies (CJTF) in Alaska. A CJTF in Alaska, In addition to developing Arctic to limit their power projection capabilities like CJTFs in other parts of the world, capabilities, Russia is investing in Arctic by restricting their maneuverability.14 would enable the necessary conditions infrastructure to enable operations and Seen from this perspective, freedom of to integrate the full effects of the joint has developed a system of military facili- maneuver through the Aleutian Islands force across land, sea, air, space, and cy- ties—radar stations, air bases, and ports. and Bering Strait in order to access the berspace warfare domains; create a venue Its militarization of the Arctic sends Arctic’s natural resources and trade routes for military cooperation among partners clear signals to the other Arctic littoral is of great strategic importance for China.
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Tice 59 Crew of U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Maple follows Canadian Coast Guard Icebreaker Terry Fox through icy waters of Franklin Strait, in Nunavut Canada, August 11, 2017 (U.S. Coast Guard/Nate Littlejohn)
Both China and Russia are taking Sea.16 This infrastructure, including a domains.18 With Russia’s increased invest- the long view in their Arctic strategies, military airfield, is believed to consist of ment in infrastructure in the Arctic, it has setting the necessary conditions to assert hardened facilities for the deployment the ability to create such an integrated themselves in the region. As noted in the of radars, antiship and antiair missile network of sensors and shooters in and British publication The Observer, “A great launchers, and combat aircraft. China around the Bering Strait. The Sopka-2 chess game is being played with countries uses these activities to secure its claims radar system on Wrangel Island is a three- staking claims to the Arctic to make sure to natural resources and extend its dimensional dual-use S-band air-route they are not left out. . . . Some countries, influence over that strategic maritime radar with a range of 350 kilometers.19 like China, are looking 50 years ahead.”15 corridor in an attempt to reduce U.S. Though not a significant threat in isola- sway over what China considers to be its tion, this radar—potentially employed as External Challenges rightful area of influence.17 a part of an integrated network of Russian In other regions where they have Similar to Chinese actions in the land-based antiship cruise missiles, elec- interests, both China and Russia secure South China Sea, Russia’s deployments of tronic warfare systems, and ground-based those interests through increased A2/AD capabilities in the Black Sea and mobile air defense systems in the Bering militarization, employing antiaccess/ Kaliningrad offer operational planners Strait—would pose a formidable obstacle area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities from insight into what a Russian land-based to the United States and its allies’ ability sovereign territory to control strategic A2/AD “bubble” in the vicinity of the to access the Arctic. maritime corridors, and they could take Bering Strait might look like: a nearly im- That said, given the concentration of the same approach around the Bering. penetrable, three-dimensional area where Russian A2/AD assets being employed In late 2017, China constructed military the United States and its allies would be elsewhere, it is unlikely that Russia will infrastructure on Subi, Mischief, and under the threat of attack across surface, employ them around the Bering Strait in Fiery Cross reefs in the South China sub-surface, air, and electromagnetic the near term. Instead, Russia will likely
60 Commentary / The Bering Strait JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 adopt the role of Arctic intimidator, For example, a Russian navy surface Europe.24 In 2018, the U.S. Navy rees- using a complement of electromagnetic combatant traveling from the North- tablished Second Fleet with the stated sensors and electronic warfare capabilities ern Fleet port at Murmansk along the mission to develop and dynamically to collect information about and probe Northern Sea route toward Vladivostok employ maritime forces ready to fight and harass countries it deems competi- to link up with the Russian Pacific Fleet across multiple domains in the Atlantic tors in the region. There is evidence that would have to pass through the Bering and Arctic in order to ensure access; deter this is already happening. During the Strait and the maritime waters of three aggression; and defend U.S., allied, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization GCCs. An individual GCC has the partner interests.25 This surge of person- (NATO) multinational large-scale ex- authority to plan operations and operate nel and resources toward Europe has left ercise Trident Juncture-18, Russia was its forces whenever and wherever little capacity to devote forces to address accused of employing global positioning they are required to accomplish their emerging threats in and around the system jamming measures from the Kola mission. However, any cross-AOR oper- Bering Strait. With little to no Navy or Peninsula, a border region with Norway ations or activities require coordination Marine Corps forces stationed in Alaska, and Finland, on NATO aircraft flying with the affected GCC.22 Russia and the United States finds itself unbalanced in support of the exercise.20 The former China know well the Unified Command across the Pacific and Atlantic sides of the head of NATO’s Emerging Threats Plan and will look to exploit the gaps at Arctic. Division characterized Russia’s behavior the AOR boundaries. The current U.S. The United States will have to de- as follows: “We’ve seen transmitters institutional conception of geographic velop an Arctic strategy that views the going down mysteriously in Sweden, responsibility will thus challenge the Bering Strait as a strategic maritime hacking of soldiers’ personal devices unity of effort required to respond to corridor serving as the bridge between in the Baltics, disruptions to mobile security issues in the Bering Strait. the growing threats in Asia and Europe. phone networks in Lithuania during Another challenge to U.S. efforts The critical task will be to balance forces maritime exercises and so on.”21 Without in the Arctic is that the Euro-centric across the Arctic region to ensure that a complement of responses from the focus on the Russian threat has diverted China and Russia do not exploit the United States and its allies, the sum ef- personnel and resources away from the physical gaps and organizational seams fect of these more aggressive tactics in growing threats that Russia and China created by the current imbalances be- the Bering Strait is a normalization of pose in and around the Bering Strait. The tween forces assigned to the European bad behavior that threatens access to eight littoral Arctic countries (Canada, and Asian regions of the Arctic and the the region, potentially creating a situa- Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, combatant command boundaries. tion in which the United States and its Russia, Sweden, and the United States) allies would only be able to access this are either NATO or European powers Combined Joint Task maritime corridor under the threat of and, as a result, have drawn U.S. atten- Force–Alaska: Leveraging nonkinetic or even kinetic attack. tion and resources toward the European Partnerships to Win Early Arctic to meet their collective defense Ensuring access to the Arctic by con- Internal Challenges: Command needs. trolling the Bering Strait is a global and Control and Balanced Forces Since the annexation of Crimea issue, one that requires participation In addition to the challenges China and and invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the from U.S. Asian and European allies, Russia pose in the Arctic, the United Pentagon has responded by initiating including NATO, Japan, and South States faces a number of internal chal- Operation Atlantic Resolve, which has Korea, which have commercial and lenges. One is that the Bering Strait established enduring rotational units security interests in the Arctic. There- exposes a potential seam at the edges and commands to reassure the Alliance fore, we need a CJTF; it has a track of three GCC AOR boundaries: U.S. and deter further Russian aggression in record of success in addressing the Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. European Europe. Recognizing Norway’s strategic very institutional issues and foreseeable Command, and USNORTHCOM. As position and unique security challenges, threats emerging in the Bering Strait. human activity increases and China and the U.S. Marine Corps has prioritized Alaska is an ideal location to establish Russia seek to further assert themselves support to contingency operations in a CJTF to demonstrate to China and in the Arctic, the task of effectively NATO’s northern flank by eliminating Russia that the United States takes identifying and tracking potential rotational forces to the Black Sea region access to the Arctic seriously. threats across multiple warfare domains and reallocating forces to Norway as One reason a CJTF would be effective will challenge the coordination and Marine Rotational Force–Europe.23 The is that it would necessitate establishing a unity of effort of these commands. U.S. Army has committed a regionally combined joint operation area (CJOA) The 2011 update of the U.S. Unified aligned division headquarters in Poland with sufficient land, sea, and air space—a Command Plan boundaries illumi- with armored and aviation brigade com- critical first step toward ensuring unity nates the command and control (C2) bat teams with support from logistics task of effort when conducting operations at challenges the Bering Strait presents. forces on 9-month rotations in Northern the geographic boundaries of contiguous
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Tice 61 areas of operation. As defined in Joint their military interoperability, specifically Accredited a Joint National Training Publication 3-0, Operations, “A CJOA is by planning and executing joint training Capability, JPARC is a resource that en- an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined exercises.29 Increasing this allied presence sures training is conducted under realistic by a geographic combatant commander in Alaska would balance the force posture conditions across warfare domains.31 The or subordinate unified commander, in on both sides of the Arctic and bring port of Alaska in Anchorage is another which a joint force commander . . . con- much needed Arctic capabilities to bear. ready-to-use capability that the state has ducts military operations to accomplish CJTF-Alaska is not merely an effec- to offer. During the height of combat a specific mission.”26 In the case of the tive but hypothetical solution; it is an operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bering Strait, this CJOA would create an altogether logistically achievable one, as port supported more than 20 military area owned by one commander, thereby it could capitalize on the existing facilities deployments and the onward movement streamlining decisionmaking by routing it and personnel force structure of Alaska of 18,000 pieces of military equipment.32 through only one GCC. Command (ALCOM), a sub-unified joint It has direct access via secure rail lines Another virtue of the CJTF as a command of USNORTHCOM head- to major military installations and year- solution to the Bering Strait problem quartered in Anchorage and commanded round accessibility, allowing the United is that it would create an institutional by an Air Force three-star general. States and its allies to deploy rotational platform for cooperation among allied ALCOM could readily serve as the foun- forces and equipment with ease. and partner nations, thereby providing dation of a CJTF headquarters. The rest Redesignating ALCOM as a standing the necessary balance of forces across the of the personnel needed could be globally CJTF headquarters and inviting countries Arctic region. Japan and South Korea, sourced by USNORTHCOM through to participate in a coalition come with both seafaring nations and close allies the Request for Forces process. Both the little opportunity cost in the near term; of the United States, look to the Arctic Air Force and the Army have significant serve to demonstrate U.S. resolve to for access to hydrocarbons, minerals, capabilities in Alaska and would not deter malign activity in the Bering Strait; and fisheries.27 Their participation in require additional forces above discrete set a strategic anchor on the Pacific side CJTF–Alaska would serve to enhance capabilities needed to compete across of the Arctic sea lines of communication; their ability to protect their economic warfare domains. With little Navy and and complement the military planning and security interests in the North Pacific Marine Corps presence, the CJTF might and security cooperation that has hereto- and the Arctic, while the CJTF could be better served employing rotational fore been focused on the threats on the leverage their icebreakers and ice-class Navy and Marine Corps forces. As noted European side of the Arctic. ships to bolster the coalition’s presence in by Walker Mills, shorter “deployment for the Arctic. Both Japan and South Korea training periods of one or two months The CJTF headquarters is a proven could increase rotational training oppor- to Alaska would still offer much better model that fosters cooperation and collab- tunities for their air forces and armies at training opportunities while limiting the oration. Establishing a CJTF headquarters the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex impact to our global force model and in Alaska would signal to U.S. partners and further develop their amphibious current deployment commitments.”30 across the globe that Washington is taking capabilities in partnership with the U.S. This concept of rotational forces would the necessary steps to address the growing Marines at Adak Island in the Aleutian also apply to U.S. multinational partners security challenges in the Arctic. The CJTF Island chain.28 and would go a long way toward enhanc- is not a novel idea but rather a time-tested As with Asian allies, a CJTF in Alaska ing multinational interoperability. model that fosters integration and unity would likely draw interest from NATO Alaska also serves as an ideal loca- of effort and clearly signals U.S. resolve and our European allies, serving as a tion for a standing CJTF headquarters to adversaries. Controlling the Bering welcome opportunity for Europe’s non- because it has the established military Strait, in concert with sea control efforts NATO members to contribute to global infrastructure, including 32 military in the European Arctic, would provide the security and cooperation outside the facilities and 12 major bases and stations, essential security necessary to deter aggres- auspices of NATO. Finland and Sweden, to meet the military demands of the sion so the Arctic remains a place where non-NATO Arctic countries, would rapidly increasing human activity in the peaceful nations can coexist without fear of benefit greatly from cooperating with the Arctic region. With well-established and interference or intimidation. JFQ Alliance in a non-NATO military struc- ready-to-use resources, Alaska would ture. Likewise, inviting both countries to facilitate security cooperation training participate in CJTF-Alaska would bring across all warfare domains with coalition Notes valuable Arctic military experience to the partners. Alaska’s Joint Pacific Alaska 1 team. Recognizing the growing threats to Range Complex (JPARC) has 65,000 U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap: 2014–2030 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department their security, the United States, Sweden, square miles of airspace, 2,560 square of Navy, February 2014), available at
62 Commentary / The Bering Strait JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Enhanced Deterrence Initiative Fact Sheet,” Race,” The National Interest, March 5, 2017, 2019, available at
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Tice 63 U.S. Agency for International Development worker waits for flight on C-130J Hercules assigned to 75th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, in Maputo, Mozambique, March 29, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/Chris Hibben)
Peacemakers Chaplains as Vital Links in the Peace Chain
By David R. Leonard
ommanders should consider tion of military chaplains. It frames organizations (IGOs), agencies, NGOs, using Department of Defense the chaplain’s advantage in working and international foreign humanitar- C (DOD) chaplains to significantly with nongovernmental organizations ian assistance mechanisms. The “fog of enhance the pursuit of national objec- (NGOs), interagency and international peace” created by numerous organiza- tives by providing humanitarian liaison actors as prescribed by joint doctrine, tions in the battlespace requires military officer (LNO) capabilities at each level and humanitarian organizational leaders to develop and utilize tools for of military operations. This article guidance. Finally, it provides recom- maximizing coordinated humanitarian as- reviews current scholarship, missions, mendations for implementation at the sistance (HA).1 The U.S. military, under and limitations regarding the utiliza- strategic, operational, and tactical levels Title 10 authority, conducts humanitar- of employment. ian action in support of U.S. security In conflict regions where the U.S. interests through personnel possessing Government operates, military com- “specific operational readiness skills.”2 Chaplain (Major) David R. Leonard, USAF, is an Instructor in the Department of Research at the manders are challenged with a complex However, humanitarian assistance and Air Command and Staff College. architecture of intergovernmental disaster response aid must not duplicate
64 Features / Chaplains as Vital Links in the Peace Chain JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 other U.S. humanitarian efforts or by military actions. Local populations the Red Cross and NGOs demonstrated support groups engaged in military often resist military humanitarian ac- their openness to improved relations activity and consequently requires ap- tion because of its temporary nature. between the two communities.15 Effective proval by the Department of State.3 The For instance, the military might build a HA therefore requires a bridge that spans United Nations (UN) Civil-Military school, only to have it destroyed 2 weeks both functional cultures for maximizing Coordination guidance gives the HA later because insurgents are hiding there. effectiveness in delivering aid. designation to all “assistance, protec- Since people often perceive the military The chaplain is an often underutilized tion, and advocacy action in response to as the group bringing violence to the soft-power resource in the commander’s human needs resulting from complex region, the military might lack credibility toolbox. Contemporary analysis on the emergencies and natural disasters.”4 with humanitarian actors.10 At times, HA subject lays a solid framework for the Its purpose is to save lives and alleviate brought by agents typically associated discussion of chaplains as liaison officers suffering, and it broadly encompasses with violence compromises the neutral- in HA operations. Joint doctrine directs the entirety of the humanitarian action ity of other humanitarian actors. This is chaplains to be used as liaisons to the in the operational environment.5 The particularly true when violence has been interagency community, IGOs, NGOs, International Federation of Red Cross disguised as HA. A representative from multinational forces, and local religious and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has InterAction, a clearinghouse of 195 leaders “[to advise regarding] religious established seven guiding principles for NGOs, cited a case wherein the Central and humanitarian dynamics in the op- humanitarian actors in conducting HA: Intelligence Agency sponsored a polio erational area.”16 This doctrinal mandate humanity, impartiality, neutrality, inde- vaccination program, intending to use it contrasts with a failure to develop chap- pendence, voluntary service, unity, and as a ruse to capture Osama bin Laden. lains for use in this capacity. The chaplain universality.6 The U.S. military, directed Ten years later, this deception resulted has superior expertise, experience, and by different priorities, often finds itself in in legitimate polio vaccination workers credibility to work effectively with hu- tension with other humanitarian actors being killed by insurgents.11 manitarian actors when compared to while attempting to provide similar aid in Todd Greentree concludes that the other military members. pursuit of unaligned objectives. military also lacks confidence in hu- Military commanders coordinate manitarian groups. In 2001, the U.S. Missions and Limitations movement and economy of effort with Agency for International Development Chaplains bring a robust set of qualifi- the various agencies, who often fear (USAID) diverted cash for work funds cations and capabilities, unparalleled by that meeting with military forces will and other unspecified priorities. These any other DOD personnel. Chaplains compromise their image of neutrality.7 work projects were a critical tool for must complete 72 hours of postgradu- In a hostile or uncertain environment, keeping fighting-age males from joining ate work in subjects including coun- the military typically prioritizes security, the Taliban. The change in policy worked seling, social work, world religions, while NGOs often focus on humanitar- against the military effort in the area. theology, and ethics. Additionally, they ian needs and resist association with the Some commanders began referring to must be endorsed by a recognized military.8 However, the military desires USAID as “the source of instability.”12 religious body.17 The religious endorse- to leverage the NGOs as force multipliers Humanitarian actors often lack trust in ment places the chaplain under two in the battlespace as part of counterin- the military while the military desires HA sets of authorities: the military, which surgency operations. Essentially, military to work in concert with its own lines of gives them their commission, and the and humanitarian actors exist in the same effort. religious body, which ordains them for “humanitarian space,” needing one an- Building mutual trust between com- religious work within the military. No other yet operating as reluctant partners.9 munities with different priorities and other career field requires training in Many commanders see non-DOD values within the same humanitarian such broad subjects with ready applica- humanitarian work as an extension of space is essential to HA. It requires a tion to humanitarian settings. Addition- U.S. policy on counterinsurgency, while multitiered approach to coordinate agen- ally, they spend 2 years of develop- neutral humanitarian groups want no cies, NGOs, host-nation personnel, and mental training in churches that are by such perception. Often the NGOs and local leaders. Commanders seeking to nature nonprofit, charitable humanitar- international organizations have more ac- work effectively with humanitarian actors ian organizations. As the only career cess to local populations but lack security, need a representative who understands field required to work in a nonprofit logistics, or situational awareness of the the culture, mission, and values of the humanitarian organization prior to battlefield. The International Committee diverse groups participating in the hu- serving in the Armed Forces, chaplains of the Red Cross (ICRC) explains that manitarian operation.13 When asked what possess a unique set of skills as highly regardless of how well intentioned the relationship most NGOs would like to qualified subject matter experts for military is, servicemembers will not be have with the military, one representative work as liaisons to humanitarian actors. accepted by some in the humanitar- responded, “We don’t and we won’t.”14 The table compares the qualifications of ian space who are negatively affected Yet in interviews, numerous members of military career fields. I have modified it
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Leonard 65 Table. Qualification of Humanitarian/Religious LNO Compared to Other Career Fields Can Refrain from Collecting Training Skills Credentials Accessibility Noncombatant Intelligence Overall Ranking Civil Affairs Limited Yes Yes No No No 4 Chaplain Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 1 Intelligence Limited No No Yes No No 5 Personnel Limited Yes Limited Yes No No 3 JAG No Yes Yes Yes No No 2
Source: Adapted from William Sean Lee, Christopher J. Burke, and Zonna M. Crayne, Military Chaplains as Peace Builders: Embracing Indigenous Religious in Stability Operations (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, February 2005), 13. for this analysis with ranking based on humanitarian requirements. Additionally, Historically, chaplains have provided qualifications relative to chaplains for they possess the requisite skills to bridge religious services, warrior care, and utilization in humanitarian work. the communication gap with diverse ac- leadership advisement.25 The leadership As outlined by Title 10, chaplains tors in the humanitarian space. advisement typically given to command- provide both religious services and Commanders who desire to achieve ers involves religious requirements and advising, enabling the expression of synergy in civil-military operations should sensitivities as they relate to the assigned faith or religious practice for all assigned therefore use the chaplain’s capabilities unit. Rarely do chaplain duties involve personnel.18 Chaplains provide for the to cultivate “holistic, cumulative, and strategic or operational applications be- religious and spiritual support of mili- integrative” partnerships.22 While com- yond the religious care of U.S. forces.26 tary members, authorized civilians, and manders have traditionally avoided using Chaplains are appointed by their their families. In counseling, chaplains chaplains in these types of roles, this endorsing bodies to provide religious ser- have privileged communication, which change of paradigm represents smart risk. vices, yet HA also serves to save lives and protects the adherent’s confidentiality By selecting the most qualified specialist ameliorate suffering, roles consistent with in all matters dealing with religion and for this mission set, commanders gain the their identity as “visible reminders of the conscience. As a special staff officer, the greatest likelihood of achieving desired holy.”27 To be relevant to the emerging chaplain also advises the commander and outcomes. In addition to their qualifica- needs of national and military strategic staff on “issues surrounding moral and tions, limitations unique to the chaplain’s objectives, the DOD chaplain corps must ethical decision making, [and] morale role in the military serve to further sup- consider moving beyond its traditional as affected by religion and personnel port their utilization as humanitarian roles to additional applications consis- issues.”19 Religious advisement informs LNOs in the operational environment. tent with their identity as peacemakers. leadership concerning the impact of reli- Chaplains have protections and limi- Chaplains have failed to realize their gion on joint operations.20 tations not afforded to other career fields. potential as vital links in the peace chain. As the commander’s primary religious International law and U.S. code limit the They could potentially save lives through representatives, chaplains may draw roles and responsibilities of chaplains in participation in peace operations and by from this expertise to provide liaison to ways that enhance their ability to serve fostering partnerships in conflict areas. religious leaders, NGOs, and local civil- in a liaison function to humanitarian ian and military agencies “to the extent actors. The law restricts chaplains from Humanitarian Actors that those contacts relate to the religious intelligence-gathering and combatant Humanitarian actor describes the or humanitarian purposes approved activities. The Geneva Conventions complex web of U.S. interagency, by the commander.”21 However, com- identify chaplains as “protected person- private, national, and international manders use chaplains as liaisons rarely, nel” in their function and capacity as humanitarian relief organizations active and typically only at the tactical level. ministers of religion, and U.S. law further in the humanitarian space. During Furthermore, training and application as restricts chaplains from bearing arms as foreign humanitarian crises, HA is typi- a tactical liaison differ between military noncombatants.23 Only chaplains and cally coordinated by the USAID Office branches. Commanders and chaplains medical personnel are permitted to wear of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), alike have yet to realize the latent capa- the protected symbol of the Red Cross/ the UN Office for the Coordination bilities of these robust resources already Crescent.24 This distinction ameliorates of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), present within their own organizations. many of the concerns presented by or some combination of the ICRC As an embedded subject matter expert, humanitarian actors in the operational and IFRC. The lead organization will chaplains are acutely aware of military ob- environment. coordinate unity of effort between the jectives, religious cultural sensitivities, and various agencies present. Despite some
66 Features / Chaplains as Vital Links in the Peace Chain JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Chaplain with 2nd Battalion, 114th Strike Field Artillery Regiment, Mississippi National Guard, reads passage from Bible during visit with Ugandan security guards in security tower at Forward Operating Base, Marez, Mosul, Iraq, September 24, 2009 (U.S. Navy/Carmichael Yepez)
outliers, most organizations will work and operations of humanitarian actors. relationships between military forces and to some degree with these organizing Humanitarian actors seek to preserve indigenous populations and institutions partners. Besides the interaction of the their neutral status in a conflict, but . . . by directly supporting the attainment various elements of DOD, coordination neutrality is not always in DOD’s inter- of objectives relating to the reestablish- also takes place between U.S. Gov- est. Humanitarian actors seek a dialogue ment or maintenance of stability within a ernment agencies, foreign militaries, with the military without blurring the region or host nation.”33 The geographic international organizations, NGOs, and lines of neutrality.32 InterAction explains combatant commanders (GCCs) “pro- the private sector.28 Many private self- that the association of military uniforms vide regional coordination and direction governing humanitarian NGOs work to with NGOs in the humanitarian space to their subordinate commanders for the alleviate suffering; promote health care calls into question the NGO’s neutral- integration and coordination of civil- and economic and educational advance- ity, placing its personnel in danger. It military operations into military plans ment; and advocate for human rights will take time, patience, and someone and operations.”34 Civil-military opera- and conflict resolution.29 Most legiti- who speaks the cultural language of tions elements are located at the Joint mate NGOs are coordinated through these organizations to build bridges Staff J9, Joint Civil-Military Operations the Red Cross or OCHA, but some into their community. This can only Task Forces (JCMOTF), Civil-Military work independently, such as Doctors happen through ongoing dialogue and Operations Centers (CMOCs), and Without Borders.30 Between 6,000 and relationship-building. Currently, the U.S. civil-military teams (such as provincial 30,000 NGOs annually provide more military typically conducts HA through reconstruction teams).35 The J9 pro- than $8 billion in aid to help more than the civil affairs teams aligned under the vides, communicates, and coordinates 250 million people.31 These various civil affairs command. support requests and activities while organizations coalesce around the cause DOD civil affairs teams serve as the also providing analysis in support of the of HA, but with different limitations commander’s lead military agent in civil- commander’s assessment. A civil-military and agendas. military HA. According to U.S. joint team utilizes diplomatic, informational, The commander requires an LNO doctrine, civil-military operations “es- military, and economic factors to sta- with expertise in the concerns, legitimacy, tablish, maintain, influence, or exploit bilize the operational environment in a
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Leonard 67 Figure. Notional Composition of a CMOC with the USAID administrator designated as the U.S. HA coordinator for emer- gency response.41 By adding chaplains Military as permanent subject matter experts in Forces these centers, commanders will signifi- cantly increase communication, trust, and understanding between military and hu- manitarian agencies. OCHA has developed a guide for Intergovernmental Nongovernmental militaries that outlines engagement, Organizations Organizations coordination, and limits of civil-military coordination. The UN recognizes that the military may provide helpful assis- tance in HA, yet some military interests Civil-Military Operations Center (to gain acceptance, provide security, or gather intelligence) are not connected to HA. The United Nations and NGOs fear that military HA operations blur the lines between the military and the International work of humanitarian actors. This blur- Other and Regional Government Organizations ring of roles endangers neutrality and Agencies shows partiality.42 The skewed perception produced hinders the work of the civil- ian HA teams. To mitigate this, the UN Private recommends that HA should primarily be Sector conducted by designated humanitarian and local partners through the coordina- tion of local authorities and community Source: Field Manual 3-07, Stability (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, June 2014), A-14. leaders.43 Humanitarian actors seek to develop a humanitarian space where they can operate unhindered. OCHA oper- province, district, state, or locality. These and programs through planning and ates at the global strategic, operational, teams conduct military engagement, regional engagement while providing civil and tactical levels and presents a vital interorganizational coordination, and component analysis at the strategic and conduit for developing LNO capacity. HA while also assessing the impact on theater level.” LNOs are placed alongside At the strategic level, most coordina- military operations.36 Civil affairs teams NGOs, U.S. Government, and host- tion is developed at an interagency are comprised of “special forces, military nation agencies, serving as a bridge to standing committee comprised of 18 information support, legal support, pub- facilitate unity of effort and understanding major humanitarian organizations.44 At lic affairs, engineer, transportation, health for U.S. military forces.38 At the opera- the operational level, the UN resident support personnel, military police, secu- tional level, LNOs may function as part of coordinator provides the vital link to the rity forces, and maneuver units”—none a JCMOTF or as part of a coordination global level as lead representative of the of which specializes in religious or hu- element such as a CMOC, Humanitarian UN Secretary-General. When required, manitarian operations.37 These functional Assistance Coordination Center, or a humanitarian country team brings representatives lack expertise in conduct- Humanitarian Operations Center. The together all major UN and non-UN or- ing religious and humanitarian-focused CMOC is the primary operational ganizations in the humanitarian space in diplomacy. While the civil affairs teams do DOD tool for coordination among the a process called “cluster coordination.”45 provide humanitarian capabilities, they do key participants, Service and functional A cluster is a group of humanitarian not represent the best option available for components, USAID, Embassy country agencies active in the operational environ- commanders to use as LNOs to humani- teams, and interagency liaisons.39 While ment. Humanitarian actors prefer military tarian actors. augmented with other specialists such as engagement on their terms and will not The U.S. Army Civil Affairs and medical and engineering personnel, chap- advocate for the U.S. commander’s re- Psychological Operations Command lains do not currently serve as functional quirements. Increased LNO capacity will supports commanders at the GCC level representatives.40 At other times, USAID facilitate better communication and civil- through the Joint Staff in five GCCs. In coordinates unity of effort for humanitar- military understanding. As David Levine this capacity, they “develop plans, policy, ian actors when providing foreign HA rightly observes, “Direct coordination
68 Features / Chaplains as Vital Links in the Peace Chain JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Marines currently under 4th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division, and members of Indian military wade to shore during exercise Tiger Triumph, on Kakinada Beach, India, November 19, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Christian Ayers)
[requires] personal relationships between humanitarian law. A sister organization, humanitarian actors, they seek to pre- the U.S. military and coalition military the IFRC, brings together national serve their neutrality when seen meeting organizations, IGOs, and NGOs.”46 The arms of the organization, which aim to with military representatives. Permitting military would be well served by having a coordinate the effort of 189 national military noncombatants to wear the representative humanitarian LNO special- Red Cross/Red Crescent organizations. Red Cross emblem on their uniform as ist at each level of OCHA planning and Red Cross/Red Crescent comprises the liaisons could potentially mitigate these coordination. largest volunteer-based humanitarian concerns. The symbol visibly communi- The Red Cross/Red Crescent organization in the world. The national cates the neutrality of the noncombatant Movement is the international authority organizations provide assistance without to all who witness the interaction. on humanitarian relief in conflict regions. discrimination to the wounded on the As various agencies strive to coordi- As explained by the UN guidance for battlefield, prevent human suffering, nate the work of participating NGOs in civil-military relations, “The components and protect life and health for all.49 In the specific humanitarian operation, com- of the International Red Cross and Red a conflict region, the ICRC will usually peting ideologies may interfere with unity Crescent Movement—ICRC, IFRC, and take the lead, along with the Federation, of effort. Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, the national societies are neither NGOs to coordinate humanitarian effort when Civil-Military Operations, states that nor IGOs. They have a special legal OCHA is not present.50 The various ele- “some NGOs may have policies that are status, role, and relation to the military ments of the Red Cross/Red Crescent purposely antithetical to both the U.S. based on the Geneva Conventions, the Movement can operate as a trusted, military forces and U.S. Government movement’s statutes and national law.”47 neutral agent—a prolific and persistent departments and agencies, but they may The Geneva Conventions of 1949 af- humanitarian force at the local level have resources and capabilities that could firm that it is a “neutral and independent throughout the world. They do not wish promote the accomplishment of military humanitarian organization.”48 The to meet regularly with military members objectives.”52 Not all NGOs are the same, ICRC provides assistance, protection, and request servicemembers to be in and many must be fully vetted for legiti- and education governing international uniform when doing so.51 Like many macy and performance. Some NGOs will
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Leonard 69 other U.S. Government lead agencies and international humanitarian actors. Current civil-military efforts provide co- ordination but lack capability for military expertise in achieving commanders’ ob- jectives as shaped by civilian religious and humanitarian actors. Civil affairs teams provide excel- lent military coordination and expertise in logistics but lack specific training, qualifications, and experience for engag- ing humanitarian actors. Religion can be a contributing factor in many conflicts due to the manipulation of ideologies. Military forces must recognize religious and cultural sensitivities and ideologies, so as not to hinder military operations. JP 3-57 recognizes that chaplains, in their distinctive role as noncombatants, “will participate as appropriate in plan- ning for the impact of religion on current and future operations.”55 They may also “conduct liaison with key civilian religious leaders and faith-based organizations, with the goal of fostering understanding and reconciliation.”56 Current doctrine already empowers chaplains to conduct liaison activities, but commanders do not typi- cally assign them as permanent members of civil affairs teams in the same manner as lawyers and engineers. Additionally, LNOs are not routinely collocated with the humanitarian actors. By permanently assigning chaplains to function as LNOs in the same manner as other subject mat- ter experts, the commander can achieve economy of effort while also utilizing the best resources available. This particularly applies to humanitarian coordination ele- ments in which the U.S. military does not have the operational lead. Each of these humanitarian actors and government agencies brings distinctive Air Force Technical Sergeant Sophia Hayner, 82nd Reconnaissance Squadron, shared her story of capabilities and limitations in providing resilience to provide raw perspective on how suicide affects more than victims, Kadena Air Base, humanitarian action. The military can Japan, December 3, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/Daniel E. Fernandez) best utilize these soft power elements by accept money but not follow through resources, communication, media, law not confusing its mission with theirs, by on promised HA. Ongoing relationships enforcement, religion, and cultural/ not compromising their neutrality, and with known organizations will help to historic property.54 Chaplains have been by developing enduring LNO relation- determine legitimacy.53 In achieving unity trained to understand culture and religion ships at each level of military operations. of effort, military commanders require in the operational environment and can Chaplains provide the best resource for an LNO who can accurately evaluate the therefore add a distinct value alongside this mission because, as noncombatants, actors in the humanitarian space. This the other staff officers in this capacity. they are restricted from intelligence- requires military experts who under- These skills could be further developed gathering yet possess superior training, stand issues relating to heritage, cultural through an increased partnership with skills, and education.
70 Features / Chaplains as Vital Links in the Peace Chain JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Not every chaplain will be a good fit for chaplains could prepare them tactical level. This could also be a for this specialization, however. Chaplains to bridge U.S. strategic policy with “rapid mobility” billet in support of at the rank of major should be vetted HA operations. Additionally, the joint civil-military operations task for aptitude, temperament, endorser curriculum should include courses force or CMOC operational deploy- restriction, and interest in working with on religion and humanitarian action. ments. In these assignments, the humanitarian actors. Specific areas should Developmental utilization tours for assigned chaplain should determine then be developed accordingly. Key areas chaplains would be preferred at the with the hosting agency whether for development include accessibility, spe- OCHA, World Council of Churches, to wear civilian or military attire, cific civil-military training, and focused ICRC, GCC (J9 Staff), NGO head- as appropriate. When in uniform, employment of chaplains as humanitarian quarters, Chaplain Corps Colleges, the chaplain should display the LNO specialists. or JCMOTF, as required. A devel- Red Cross/Crescent emblem as What follows are some recommenda- opmental IDE track for chaplains noncombatant identification at all tions for employment: would require the procurement of times. Implementation will require suitable post-IDE assignments. clear communication with endorsers, Develop a position for religious/ •• Employ chaplain LNOs at key an expanded understanding of the humanitarian LNO specialists. This •• strategic points. OCHA, ICRC, Title 10 employment of chaplains, requires civil-military training, strate- or the World Council of Churches and administrative tracking of the gic and operational employment, and could serve as executive-level assign- selected chaplain’s utilization. specific utilization capability. Other ments for chaplain colonels, giving Dialogue with religious endors- countries have effectively developed •• them the ability to advocate for ers, clarify Title 10 requirements, their chaplains to serve in similar DOD interests with a high-level and develop requisite administra- roles. South Africa has utilized its sight picture of global HA initia- tive systems: “Title 10 gives the chaplains as religious, mediation, and tives.61 Chaplain lieutenant colonels Secretary of Defense ‘authority, negotiation experts and as NGO/ could be positioned in joint billets direction, and control’ over DOD, religious leader engagement special- at the GCCs, working alongside including all subordinate agencies ists in peace operations. Norway the J9. They would enable civil- and commands.”64 First, Title 10 has developed doctrine defining military forces to ensure persistent authorization will need to be clarified the operational role of chaplains in coordination with humanitarian for chaplains to define their role in stability operations.57 Training can be actors within the area of responsibil- providing religious and humanitar- accomplished through focused study ity. These assignments could also ian liaison.65 Second, the Service during intermediate developmental align with those GCCs with civil chiefs of chaplains should consult education (IDE) with follow-on affairs command elements currently endorsers as to this new mode of training at USAID, OCHA, ICRC, assigned.62 Chaplain majors could employment.66 In some instances, or an NGO’s global headquarters.58 serve operational interests through this development could serve both Develop a fellowship for chaplains •• assignment at USAID or in fellow- the military and the endorsing agent, similar to the existing Political-Mili- ships with ICRC, IFRC, or NGO such as developmental assignments tary Affairs Strategist (PAS) program, clearinghouses such as InterAction. with national church humanitar- which offers a well-established While opportunities to work with ian agencies. This noncombatant developmental track that is currently non-U.S. agencies do not currently role will serve to further the care not available to chaplains. It refines exist, there has been some precedent and amelioration of suffering while selectees at the O4 or O5 level with established.63 Agencies such as Inter- also promoting peace. This will an “international political-military Action, Catholic Relief Services, or certainly align with the values of affairs assignment on their first or World Vision would make excellent religious groups currently repre- second post-IDE assignment.”59 training partners. These fellowships sented in DOD. Third, leaders at Like the PAS program, a fellow- would build enduring relationships, the headquarters level must develop ship for chaplains could develop providing coordination and com- and secure LNO assignments at the a cadre of religious officers with munication with humanitarian actors global, national, and military strate- cultural and civil-military expertise. in the operational environment. gic levels for employment. The PAS development opportunity Another key area for employment Finally, selection for a humanitarian specifically provides future senior •• could be at the respective Service LNO specialist must be administra- military leaders with valuable chaplain corps colleges. Chaplain tively connected with existing pro- political-military education and majors could be utilized to teach grams. Fellowship programs for field experience through a single, well- chaplain corps personnel about grade officers need to be expanded managed developmental assignment NGO, IGO, and religious leader to include military chaplains with opportunity.60 A similar program engagement requirements at the an emphasis on civil military affairs,
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Leonard 71 Deputy wing chaplain for Joint Base Langley, Virginia, helps carry religious items from church, October 22, 2018, on Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, after Hurricane Michael caused catastrophic damage (U.S. Air Force/Sean Carnes)
world religions, and NGO studies. agencies in pursuit of national objec- opportunities for other specialties to de- Selected chaplain LNOs should be tives. Military chaplains have not been velop as experts in HA. By making these tracked with a special experience frequently used outside of their histori- positions joint, the manpower cost will identifier (SEI) to enable identifica- cal role in providing religious accom- be shared by all Services, yet there will be tion and vectoring. This working modation. While this new utilization fewer chaplains to fill traditional billets. model will provide commanders a stretches the traditional boundaries of To meet these requirements, current vital connection between the stra- the chaplain’s role, it does not exceed programs will need reevaluation and tegic national objectives and the noncombatant limitations. prioritization. Training and fellowship humanitarian actors in the opera- On a tactical level, civil affairs teams programs will remove chaplains from op- tional environment. have been functioning in this space, erational utilization for extended periods yet strong evidence suggests that the of time, potentially placing the most qual- Conclusion military would be better served by add- ified officers into a permanent “HLNO Military chaplains provide commanders ing religious specialists to increase this track.” To fill training, fellowship, and with a powerful resource, significantly capability. Some humanitarian actors utilization manning requirements will enabling peace operations as LNOs to may avoid embracing a chaplain within require eight chaplains per Service humanitarian actors at the strategic, their organizations. Time and proximity branch. In utilizing resources already operational, and tactical levels. This will build relationships based on shared vetted, trained, and equipped for this position should come with the creation interests between chaplains and humani- type of mission, however, commanders of a new SEI—the humanitarian liaison tarian actors that will enable civil-military can expect a significant return on invest- officer (HLNO), who will illuminate coordination. The opportunity costs of ment. Chaplains will develop strategic the commander’s understanding of the implementing this program will include relationships that will exponentially en- operational picture and help him or less funding and utilization for other able military HA efforts. Further research her to coordinate with humanitarian personnel. This program will entail fewer should look at ways to develop, employ,
72 Features / Chaplains as Vital Links in the Peace Chain JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 17 51 and combine religious leader liaison, DOD Instruction 1304.28, Guidance for Ibid. the Appointment of Chaplains for the Military 52 Ibid. diplomacy, and reconciliation capabilities Departments (Washington, DC: DOD, June 53 See ICRC Web site. under the HLNO specialist. JFQ 11, 2004), available at
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Leonard 73 Catapult officer signals launch as A-4 Skyhawk starts down flight deck of USS Coral Sea during operations in South China Sea, March 24, 1965 (U.S. Navy/James F. Falk)
Adapting to Disruption Aerial Combat over North Vietnam
By Robert G. Angevine
ilitary organizations devote tactics are not as successful as desired, consists of several elements. The first is substantial effort to antici- weapons do not perform as planned, cognitive adaptation. In order to adapt to M pating and preparing for and organizations and policies are a disruption, a military organization must future conflicts, yet they rarely get not as effective as expected. Success- first recognize that the problem exists. things exactly right. Inevitably, the ful adaptation to such disruptions Once the disruption is acknowledged, the enemy does not operate as predicted, is thus a key component of military organization may adapt its tactics, tech- effectiveness.1 nology, institutions, and policies to deal The 2018 National Defense Strategy more effectively with the challenge. 2 Robert G. Angevine is a Research Staff Member at calls for a “rapidly adapting Joint Force.” During the first four years (1965– the Institute for Defense Analyses. Successful military adaptation typically 1968) of the U.S. military’s participation
74 Features / Adapting to Disruption JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 in aerial combat over North Vietnam, likely routes of U.S. strike forces. The The Navy also recognized early on both the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air MiG-21s, guided by ground control- that its fighters were not performing Force experienced unexpectedly high lers, approached U.S. attack formations as well as had been expected. In early losses. The Air Force kill ratio in Korea at low altitudes to avoid radar. They 1966, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) was 4.7 to 1 from 1950 to 1952 and 13.9 gained positions behind the forma- Admiral David L. McDonald directed to 1 from 1952 to 1953. Between 1965 tions, then climbed rapidly and made a the creation of Project Plan to review and 1968, however, U.S. aircraft downed single high-speed pass, often catching the effectiveness of Navy missiles and 118 North Vietnamese MiGs and suf- U.S. pilots unaware. From July 1967 to air-to-air tactics. As air-to-air performance fered 55 losses, a kill ratio of just 2.1 to March 1968, the United States lost 26 deteriorated in the spring of 1968, the 1. From August 1967 to February 1968, aircraft while downing only 24 MiGs. new CNO, Admiral Thomas Moorer, U.S. fighters suffered an adverse kill ratio The kill ratio remained in favor of initiated a comprehensive investigation. against the most advanced Vietnamese North Vietnam until the bombing was He ordered Captain Frank Ault to exam- fighter, the MiG-21, losing 18 aircraft halted on October 31, 1968.4 ine all aspects of the situation, from the and downing only 5.3 The cessation of Both the Navy and the Air Force manufacturing of the planes, their radars, bombing in 1968 gave the Navy and the struggled to counter the MiG chal- and their armament to the preparation of Air Force a chance to respond to the dis- lenge. During the final 13 months of the pilots. Ault was ordered to figure out appointing performance of their fighter Operation Rolling Thunder (October why the Navy pilots were downing so few planes. The resumption of the bombing 1967–October 1968), Navy pilots shot MiGs and then to come up with fixes that campaign in 1972 provides an opportu- down only nine MiGs against six losses. would improve air-to-air performance by nity to evaluate how well the two Services Meanwhile, the Air Force registered just a factor of three.7 adapted to disruption. A comparison 27 kills and lost 24 aircraft from October The Ault Report concluded that there of Navy and Air Force efforts to adapt 1967 through March 1968.5 was no single explanation for the poor their approaches to aerial combat also il- air-to-air performance of Navy fighters. luminates who typically drives adaptation, Cognitive Adaptation Moreover, incremental improvements of how long it takes, what contributes to The Air Force and the Navy recog- existing practices would be insufficient success, and what the joint force can do nized relatively quickly that U.S. air- to solve the problems. Instead, the to avoid or minimize future disruptions to-air combat performance was not as report concluded, “The need for new and to adapt to the ones that inevitably good as expected based on U.S. per- approaches and innovations appeared occur. formance in the Korean War, and they self-evident.” It discussed extensively how took action. However, the two Services to improve missiles, but a small section Background came to different conclusions regard- also focused on air-to-air training. The In early April 1965, U.S. aerial forces ing the sources of disruption and thus report argued that many of the missile clashed with Soviet-built Vietnamese pursued different adaptation strategies. problems and overall air-to-air problems MiG fighters for the first time. During The Air Force quickly decided that the in the Navy were because F-4 crews were these early encounters, U.S. pilots problems were largely technical and poorly trained in air-to-air combat, and it found that engaging in close-in, turning therefore sought to adapt its technol- recommended immediately establishing a dogfights with the old but highly ogy. The Navy, in contrast, initiated a training program.8 maneuverable gun-armed MiG-17 was comprehensive investigation of air-to- dangerous. By the end of July 1966, the air performance and adopted a broader Tactical Adaptation Navy had downed 9 MiG-17s and lost 3 adaptation strategy. Tests conducted soon after aerial aircraft while the Air Force had downed The Air Force drew on an analysis of combat began over Vietnam indicated 10 aircraft and lost 6. The more air-to-air engagements conducted by the that standard Air Force fighter tactics advanced MiG-21, which was evalu- Institute for Defense Analyses in response were not effective. The primary Air ated as equal or superior to the most to a request in 1966 from the Deputy Force fighter formation at the begin- advanced U.S. fighters and carried two Director, Tactical Warfare Programs, ning of the Vietnam War, the Fluid Atoll infrared missiles, first appeared in Office of the Director of Defense Four, was the same one used in World the skies over Vietnam in early 1966. Research and Engineering. The study, War II and Korea. The Fluid Four The MiG-21s had little impact until called “Red Baron,” found that many of formation called for four airplanes, October 1966, when they shot down an the Air Force losses came when MiG-21s divided into a lead element and a Air Force F-4C and a Navy F-4B with attacked almost unseen from the rear, second element of two planes each, Atolls. In 1967, however, the MiGs catching Air Force pilots by surprise. The to operate together. The two pairs adopted new tactics. The MiG-17s Air Force concluded that the problems supported each other, but the flight tried to lure the F-4s into slow-speed, were largely technical and pursued a leader usually made all the deci- turning fights by employing circling number of measures to increase its pilots’ sions for all four planes and was the formations at low altitudes over the situational awareness.6 primary shooter. The wingmen were
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Angevine 75 tasked with protecting the flight and engines were not engaged. Visibility from maintained, and stored. Any test failure second element leaders and were the front and rear cockpits was poor, and was dismissed as the result of poor not expected to fire their weapons. the layout of switches and controls in maintenance or an improperly executed Because the wingmen were typically the cockpit, especially the missile firing test instead of the product of a flawed less experienced than the leaders, controls, was a “nightmare” according design.15 they often found it difficult to remain to one F-4 pilot. The F-4 also had a The ineffectiveness of U.S. air-to-air in formation when the flight and tendency to go out of control when ma- missiles provoked a number of efforts second element leaders maneuvered neuvered at high angles of attack—that is, to improve their performance. The aggressively.9 at low speed.11 Navy and Air Force teamed up to try In contrast, Navy air-to-air tactics In the short term, both Services to improve Sparrow performance with called for a two-ship formation. This sought to adapt the F-4 by addressing the introduction of the AIM-7E in mid- formation made better use of the planes’ some of the weaknesses exposed during 1966, but the new version made only potential firepower and enabled them to the early air battles in Vietnam. In 1966, minor improvements over the previous provide greater mutual support than the the Navy introduced the F-4J, which model and had little impact. Another four-ship formation. Widespread recogni- emphasized improved air-to-air combat effort to improve the Sparrow was the tion of the Fluid Four formation’s tactical capability. Also in 1966, the Air Force AIM-7E2, introduced in August 1968. deficiencies prompted Air Force units to announced its plans to acquire the F-4E, Called the “Dogfight Sparrow,” the increase the separation between aircraft which solved many of the technical defi- AIM-7E2 had a significantly shorter and adopt different configurations, but the ciencies of earlier Air Force F-4 models. minimum range and was more capable Air Force continued to use the four-ship It had a new wing with hydraulically against maneuvering targets, but it saw formation until the end of the war. Tactical operated slats on its leading edge that only limited use before the end of Rolling Air Command (TAC) and the Fighter improved the maneuverability and limited Thunder in 1968. It proved only a mar- Weapons School (FWS) at Nellis Air Force the danger of spins.12 ginal improvement. During the entire Base in Nevada were vehemently opposed Armament: Missiles. Among the rea- course of the war (1965–1973), 281 to changing tactics. Many Air Force of- sons for the disappointing performance AIM-7E2s were fired and achieved only ficers believed the reason for the Service’s of U.S. fighter aircraft during the first 34 kills—a 12 percent success rate.16 continued adherence to the four-ship 4 years of the war in Vietnam was the Meanwhile, the Services followed formation was that the primary alternative, ineffectiveness of the missiles the aircraft different paths to improve their heat- the two-ship formation, was so closely as- carried. Navy and Air Force F-4s carried seeking missiles. The Navy decided to sociated with the Navy.10 both the AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided improve the AIM-9B by adding a cooled missile and the AIM-9 Sidewinder seeker. To ensure that there was sufficient Technological Adaptation infrared-guided missile. During Rolling coolant for long engagements, the Navy Both the Navy and the Air Force also Thunder, about 330 AIM-7s were fired mounted the liquid coolant bottle in the tried to adapt their technology to for about 27 kills, a success rate of less missile launch rail. The Navy introduced improve air-to-air performance. They than 9 percent. The AIM-9B Sidewinder the AIM-9D in June 1966.17 sought to improve the planes, their was slightly more effective: about 15 per- The Air Force, in contrast, aban- armament, and the situational awareness cent of its shots were kills.13 doned the AIM-9B and revived its of the pilots. Both Services made strides The Services and the Department AIM-4 Falcon infrared-guided mis- in all three areas. of Defense were shocked by the poor sile, which had been beaten out by Planes. The primary fighter plane missile performance—pre-war missile the Navy-developed AIM-9 in 1957. for both Services during the Vietnam testing programs had predicted much Like the AIM-9D, the AIM-4D had a War was the F-4 Phantom. Originally higher levels of effectiveness. Initial larger engagement envelope than the designed as a two-seat fleet air defense research and development tests for the AIM-9B and a cooled seeker. Unlike the interceptor, the F-4A was delivered to AIM-7 produced 80 to 90 percent kill AIM-9D, however, the AIM-4D stored the Navy in 1960. The Air Force soon rates. Operational tests predicted that the its coolant in the missile body, which adopted the F-4 and, after making minor AIM-7 would hit 71 percent of time; the meant the supply of coolant was small modifications, introduced it to service AIM-9 was expected to hit 65 percent of and the missile had to be fired within 2 as the F-4C in 1963. The F-4 was fast the time.14 minutes of being armed or it would not (Mach 2.2), could operate over a long The missile testing program, however, work. The Air Force also chose to wire range, and had a powerful radar and did not reflect how the missiles would its newest F-4 model, the F-4D, to carry heavy armament, but it was not designed be used. Almost all the tests were against only the Falcon; it was not wired to for aerial dogfighting. The F-4 did not non-maneuvering drone targets at high carry the Sidewinder.18 maneuver as well as the MiGs it faced, it altitudes, many of them with artificially The AIM-4D performed poorly lacked a gun, and it produced a smoky strengthened radar returns. The mis- in combat and forced the Air Force to trail when the afterburners for its twin siles for the tests were carefully handled, scramble for a replacement. Less than
76 Features / Adapting to Disruption JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 3 months after the Falcon’s introduc- tion into theater, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces decided to replace all the AIM-4Ds on its F-4Ds with AIM-9B Sidewinders. The F-4Ds all had to be re- wired to carry the old missile. Upgrading to the Navy’s AIM-9D would have required modifying all the Air Force F-4 missile rails. Navy and Air Force AIM-9 rails were incompatible until the late 1970s.19 Armament: Guns. The prevailing sentiment within the Pentagon in the early 1960s was that future air combat would consist of long-range radar detection and missile exchanges; thus, fighters would not need guns. By the spring of 1967, however, a number of Air Force reports had concluded that the lack of a gun on the F-4 was one of the reasons for the low kill rate in encounters with MiGs. The advocates of guns on fighters were able to cite the analysis of aerial combat over Vietnam to justify repurposing a podded gun system being developed to enhance the F-4’s air-to-ground capabilities and use it for air-to-air combat. The first gun pods for the F-4 began arriving in Southeast Asia in April 1967 and were in use a month later. The pod scored four kills the first eight times it was fired.20 Meanwhile, the F-4E—the Air Force’s newly announced version of the F-4—was equipped with an internal gun in addition to its other improve- ments. Reflecting the Air Force’s faith in technological solutions, some Air Force During Vietnam War, Airman fires 20mm cannon at point-blank range from F-105 while passing 15 pilots believed that the F-4E would solve to 20 feet below MiG, hitting left wing near fuselage as it bursts into flames (U.S. Air Force/National Archives and Records Administration) their aerial combat problems. As Major William Kirk noted, “Eventually we’re board a carrier. The Navy also eschewed to detect MiGs and transmit their loca- going to have the E-model airplane with an internal gun on later models of the tions to U.S. fighters, such as the group the internal gun. That’s the answer. F-4, such as the F-4J, in part because of EC-121D airborne radar surveillance That’s obviously the answer.” The first it already had a gun-armed fighter, the aircraft flying orbits over the Gulf of F-4Es did not deploy to Southeast Asia F-8, and because the Navy devoted more Tonkin, were insufficient due to technical until November 1968, however, and effort to training its pilots on how to em- limitations, harsh environmental condi- problems with the aircraft slowed deploy- ploy the F-4’s missiles effectively.22 tions, and resource constraints. U.S. pilots ment. By mid-1971 there were only 72 Situational Awareness. The Air Force were being shot down because they were F-4Es in theater.21 also pursued a technological solution caught unaware. The key requirement The Navy never did adopt a gun to increase its pilots’ situational aware- was for more timely position information pod for the F-4 because it would have ness. The Red Baron study cited earlier on enemy aircraft. The Air Force assumed prevented its planes from carrying an concluded that achieving a position of that if pilots knew where the MiGs were external fuel tank on the plane’s center- advantage first was the most important and could enter engagements from at line, and employing wing tanks was very determinant of success in air-to-air com- least a neutral position, they stood a good difficult given the cramped flight deck on bat over North Vietnam. Existing efforts chance of scoring a victory.23
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Angevine 77 In August 1972, the Air Force training interval included more than 100 the existence of a community that was began to field a technical solution to air-to-ground missions and only 6 air-to- already advocating for change. Navy the warning problem, an all-source fu- air missions.27 squadrons were divided into fighter and sion center—called Teaball—located at The quality of Air Force air-to-air attack squadrons, so fighter squadrons Nakhon Phanom Air Base in Thailand. training was also poor. Pilots who went focused on air-to-air training. F-8 pilots, Teaball fused signals intelligence, includ- through it complained that it was confus- who still had cannons on their airplanes, ing voice communications between ing and relied on outdated formations developed a training program before the Vietnamese MiG pilots and their ground and tactics, such as the Fluid Four. There war that emphasized dogfighting. Some controllers, with ground- and air-based was little true verbal instruction by flying of those pilots had been sent to “help” radar information. It then relayed the lo- instructors, who seemed to believe that Ault with his report. It is thus unsurpris- cation of both U.S. Air Force and enemy they had learned the hard way, so their ing that Ault’s report recommended aircraft to U.S. pilots over a complicated students should too.28 establishing an advanced FWS “as early as set of radio nets. Pilots received compass Lastly, Air Force air-to-air train- possible.”32 heading, speed, and vector information.24 ing was unrealistic, largely because of Another part of the changes the Navy The Navy had been using the radars the heavy emphasis on safety. The Air implemented was an effort to ensure and signals intelligence capabilities on its Force lost 824 aircraft in 1951 and 472 that Navy GCI controllers had extensive ships in the Gulf of Tonkin to improve in 1959. Increased emphasis on safety training in controlling fighters in air-to- the situational awareness of its pilots and reduced the loss rate to 262 in 1965, and air combat. The Navy’s ship-based Red provide ground-control intercept (GCI) no one wanted the rate to go back up. Crown controllers worked closely with along the coast of Vietnam, a capabil- Consequently, TAC imposed strict limits the Top Gun–trained Navy pilots and ity it called Red Crown. The SPS-30 on aircraft maneuvering and conducted knew how and when to feed them the radar on the ships proved unreliable, so all air-to-air training against similar information they needed to be effective.33 in early 1967 the Navy upgraded the aircraft.29 ships with the more reliable and capable The Air Force examined proposals Policy Adaptation SPS-48 radar. After the upgrade, the to change the training system during the Air Force personnel policies also Red Crown ships were able to improve war, but they were not considered fea- adversely affected pilot performance. substantially the situational awareness sible. The pressure to get pilots through When the air war over Vietnam began of pilots in their coverage areas for the the pipeline and into combat operations in 1965, the average Air Force fighter remainder of the war.25 was too great. The Air Force had no pilot had more than 500 hours of flying spare assets to begin new programs.30 experience in his aircraft type. However, Institutional Adaptation In the Navy, the Ault Report also Air Force Chief of Staff Joseph P. Analysis of the engagements during found that F-4 crews lacked the train- McConnell implemented a policy the first 4 years of aerial combat over ing and tactics to cope with the smaller, stating that no pilot would be required Vietnam suggested that U.S. pilots, more agile North Vietnamese MiGs. to do two tours of duty in Southeast especially F-4 crews, were not ade- The Navy acted quickly to correct the Asia until every pilot had done one. quately trained for the air-to-air mission. deficiencies in its air-to-air training. The Aircrews returned home after one year Debriefings of F-4 and F-105 pilots Navy established the FWS, more com- or 100 missions; less experienced crews found that most of them felt poorly monly known as “Top Gun,” at Marine replaced them. By June 1968, Air Force trained for air-to-air combat. Both the Corps Naval Air Station Miramar near fighter pilots facing MiGs over North Air Force and the Navy recognized that San Diego, California, in late 1968. The Vietnam had spent just 240 hours in the air-to-air training for their pilots first class graduated in April 1969. By their aircraft type.34 was insufficient, yet only the Navy took mid-1972, more than 200 naval aviators According to several Air Force pilots steps to change the training quickly had been through Top Gun and returned who served in Vietnam, the Service’s enough to affect aircrews’ performance to the fleet. The syllabus emphasized pilot rotation policy affected the qual- before the end of the war.26 training against dissimilar aircraft whose ity of training. Air Force training bases Pre-war training in the Air Force did size and performance resembled North sought to produce pilots as fast as pos- little to prepare pilots for aerial combat. Vietnamese MiGs. Because the Navy had sible to accommodate the policy goals The problem was not, however, the total not adopted a cannon in the F-4, Top of no pilot doing two tours until every amount of training, but its focus, quality, Gun training also emphasized employing pilot did one. Standards were lowered as and realism. From 1954 to 1962, the missiles more effectively, primarily by quantity became more important than Air Force training curriculum for fighter using the AIM-9 rather than the less reli- quality. Most who attended the training pilots sought to qualify them for both able AIM-7.31 regarded it as a poor learning experience ground attack and air-to-air missions. Among the reasons for the Navy’s that did not adequately prepare them for Training time was divided between the more rapid implementation of improve- combat. Some pilots never qualified in two missions, but the standard 6-month ments to air-to-air combat training was some of the events in the training syllabus
78 Features / Adapting to Disruption JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 North American Rockwell OV-10A “Bronco” Light Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft of U.S. Navy Light Attack Squadron Four (VAL-4) fires Zuni 5-inch Folding-Fin Aircraft Rocket at target somewhere in Mekong Delta, Republic of Vietnam, June 1969 (U.S. Navy/National Archives and Records Administration/A.R. Hill)
but graduated and were sent into combat opportunity to assess how well the Air Force developed after the AIM-4D failed, because the Air Force needed bodies to Force and the Navy adapted to the the AIM-9E, actually had fewer kills per fill cockpits.35 disruption they had experienced from missile fired than its predecessor, the In contrast, Navy aircrews flew 60–70 1965 to 1968. When aerial combat AIM-9B. In July 1972, the Air Force missions each cruise; a tour of duty in recommenced, the Navy’s kill ratio rushed another new Sidewinder model, a carrier air wing typically involved sev- increased dramatically. During the the AIM-9J, into service. Tests indicated eral cruises. Experienced pilots rotated final 13 months of major U.S. combat it was more maneuverable and had a continuously through the combat zone. operations (January 1972 to January larger launch envelope than the AIM-9E, Moreover, the Navy could not lower 1973), Navy F-4 squadrons shot down but the tests were conducted under pilot standards too far because pilots still 24 MiGs and lost only 2 of their own highly controlled conditions. The missile had to land on a carrier. A relatively small aircraft for a kill ratio of 12 to 1. Mean- performed poorly in actual service. Of cadre of Navy pilots thus flew the bulk while, the Air Force kill ratio declined. the 31 attempted AIM-9J launches from of the missions over North Vietnam and The Air Force shot down 48 MiGs and September until the end of December took most of the losses. Although the loss lost 24 aircraft to MiGs for a kill ratio of 1972, 23 were misses, 4 were kills, and 4 rate remained steady rather than increas- 2 to 1.37 failed to launch.38 ing, the losses were distributed among There were differences in perfor- Meanwhile, the Navy’s replacement a smaller group of pilots, which caused mance between Air Force and Navy for its AIM-9D, the AIM-9G, was even morale problems.36 aircrews in 1972–1973, one being a dif- better than its already successful prede- ference in missile performance and usage. cessor. The Navy AIM-9G was fired 50 Evaluation The Air Force continued to have missile times and had 23 kills for a success rate The resumption of the air war over problems when the air war resumed in of 46 percent. The Air Force asked if the North Vietnam in 1972 provided an 1972. The Sidewinder variant the Air AIM-9G could be made available, but it
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Angevine 79 was found to be incompatible with Air Nellis Air Force Base in October 1972. Without the support of senior leader- Force launchers and electronics.39 The aggressors initially flew T-38s, which ship, adaptation in the Air Force often The AIM-7 Sparrow continued to resembled MiG-21s in size and perfor- depended on initiative from field grade be a disappointment for both Services. mance, to provide dissimilar training to officers and took much longer. There Two-thirds of the AIM-7s fired by both Air Force fighter units. The initiative for were advocates for guns on fighters Services malfunctioned. The Air Force creating the aggressors came from FWS within the Air Force, for example, but never recognized the ineffectiveness of instructors at Nellis.43 they were typically lone colonels in the the AIM-7. An Air Force general who In 1975, officers in the Air Force’s distinct minority and had no platform directed Pacific Air Forces operations electronic combat directorate—who or organization around which to con- noted in 1972 that Air Force aircrews felt were aware of research indicating that centrate. Similarly, the key figures in the the AIM-7 was a better missile than the the majority of combat losses occurred creation of the aggressors and Red Flag AIM-9. The Air Force used the AIM-7 in a pilot’s first ten missions—pushed were field grade officers. Criticism within for 30 of its 48 kills. The Navy, on the to expand test instrumentation at Nellis the Air Force of training and tactics dur- other hand, realized by 1968 that the and used the test range and aggressor ing the war was relatively muted after the AIM-7 was unreliable. Top Gun instruc- squadrons in a series of rotational train- war because many of the generals who tors urged their students to avoid it in ing exercises, called Red Flag, for fighter had been responsible were still in high favor of the AIM-9. The Navy used the squadrons. The goal was to provide positions within the Air Force. It was AIM-9 for 23 of its 24 kills.40 pilots with the experience of their first not until the late 1970s, when many of The Air Force credits Teaball with ten dogfights, thus increasing their odds the field grade officers from the Vietnam substantially reducing its air-to-air losses. of surviving and performing well in an era began to reach higher ranks, that the From the time Teaball became opera- actual conflict.44 corporate Air Force felt free to criticize its tional on July 29, 1972, until the end of training during the war.45 the war, the U.S. Air Force kill ratio im- Conclusion Once the problem was understood proved to almost 4 to 1. But Teaball did A review of Navy and Air Force efforts and adaptations were proposed, imple- not always work. The biggest problem to adapt to unexpectedly poor air-to- mentation was relatively quick in both was the ultra-high-frequency relay that air performance in Vietnam provides Services. The Ault Report was finished Teaball used to send updates and guid- several insights for the current and within months of starting in 1968. Top ance to U.S. aircraft, which tended to future joint force regarding who Gun was created late that year, and the stop working unexpectedly. When Teaball typically drives adaptation, how long it first graduates reached the fleet by spring did not work, the Air Force struggled. takes, what contributes to success, and 1969. The first Red Flag took place just 6 The Air Force lost six aircraft to MiGs what can be done to avoid or minimize months after it was approved by the TAC after Teaball was activated; at least three future disruptions. The first insight commander. and possibly four of the aircraft were lost is that the time needed to adapt to The importance of senior leadership when it was not working.41 disruption depended most significantly to successful adaptation suggests that The key difference, however, appears on senior leadership. Even with senior leadership development will continue to to have been training. Post-war inter- leadership’s backing, however, adapta- be a crucial element in creating a more views with Air Force F-4 crews showed tion took several years. Recognition that adaptive joint force. The inclusion of they thought the first and most impor- there was some sort of problem came case studies of successful and unsuc- tant reason for the Navy’s higher kill ratio fairly quickly. Within a few months of cessful adaptation in joint professional was its aggressive training program. Naval the start of aerial combat, both the military education could better prepare aviators returning from their second Navy and the Air Force recognized that commanders for the cognitive and orga- combat tour reported that their MiG en- their air-to-air performance was not nizational challenges of adapting under counters were “like Top Gun, only these living up to expectations. fire.46 guys weren’t half as good.”42 Gaining the requisite understanding The second insight is that a broad The experience of U.S. aerial forces of the problem took longer and required approach to the problem and changes in in Vietnam eventually contributed to initiative from higher level leadership. In more than one area produced more suc- a training revolution. The Navy was so 1966, the Director of Defense Research cessful adaptation. The Air Force quickly convinced that the dissimilar air combat and Engineering initiated the Red Baron concluded that the problems were training at Top Gun was so valuable studies that collected and analyzed the largely technical and therefore sought that it expanded the technique to at- data on aerial engagements over North to adapt its technology. The technologi- tack squadrons after the war ended. Vietnam. The CNO started Project Plan cal changes, including the addition of Although it was too late to affect fighter the same year. Initiating a comprehensive a gun and other modifications to the performance in Vietnam, the Air Force study of the problem, the Ault Report, F-4 and the development of the Teaball established its first aggressor squadron, took 2 more years and required the inter- fusion center, improved performance the 64th Fighter Weapons Squadron, at vention of a newly appointed CNO. moderately but could not counteract the
80 Features / Adapting to Disruption JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Three fighter squadron 161 Phantom II fighter aircraft from USS Midway and three Corsair II attack aircraft from USS America drop Loran bombs during strike mission in Vietnam, March 1973 (U.S. Navy/National Archives and Records Administration/Fred P. Leonard) negative effects of Air Force inaction in example, because the AIM-9 Sidewinder knowledge to the students and helped other areas, including tactics, training, was originally a Navy missile. The Air them learn how to teach the members of and personnel policy. By contrast, the Force also chose to forgo cooperating their squadrons when they returned to Navy changed its tactics by relying less with the Navy on a new Sidewinder. the fleet. The Navy’s success highlights on AIM-7 Sparrow missiles and more When neither the Falcon nor the Air the potential value of joint lessons learned on AIM-9 Sidewinders, its technol- Force version of the Sidewinder proved efforts that seek to transmit the knowl- ogy by improving the naval version of effective, the Air Force’s options were edge won on the battlefield to the rest of the Sidewinder and, most important, limited because its planes were not wired the force. its training by creating Top Gun. The to carry other missiles. The joint force Navy and Air Force experience with result was a significant improvement in must take advantage of all opportunities aerial combat during the Vietnam War performance. to learn and improve its ability to adapt also suggests some steps that might help The third insight is that disregard- to disruption, no matter which Service avoid or minimize disruption in the ing alternatives because they were “not originated those ideas. future. One step is to consider a broad invented here” significantly slowed The fourth insight is that harnessing spectrum of scenarios for future conflict adaptation. The Air Force adhered to the expertise coming off the battlefield instead of just fixating on one. Even as outdated fighter tactics throughout the contributed to successful adaptation. Top today’s joint force focuses on potential war, in part because the alternative was Gun worked because the Navy used expe- conflicts with peer competitors, it would seen as too closely associated with the rienced combat pilots to teach students. do well to keep other contests and com- Navy. It revived the AIM-4 Falcon, for The Top Gun instructors conveyed that petitors in mind. Many Air Force and
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Angevine 81 Two F-4B Phantoms of VMPA-542, U.S. Marine Aircraft Group 11, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Da Nang RVN, on way to targets in support of Marines working in Northern “I” Corps, Vietnam, January 1969 (U.S. Marine Corps/National Archives and Records Administration/Carl Erikson)
Navy deficiencies in aerial combat during Finally, realistic testing and training environments. The U.S. Navy regularly Vietnam occurred because the Services that employ challenging situations and trains to operate in an electronically focused almost exclusively on a potential capable adversaries may enable military denied environment where command large-scale conventional and nuclear forces to avoid or more quickly adapt to and control has been heavily impacted, conflict against the Soviet Union during future disruptions. Both the Navy and and the U.S. Air Force has explored the the late 1950s and early 1960s. Fighters the Air Force were consistently surprised implications of a day without space, but did not need to maneuver or carry guns when their missiles performed poorly, the joint force needs to begin developing if they were shooting at slow-moving in part because missile testing was often new tactics, techniques, procedures, and Soviet bombers with limited maneuver- conducted against unchallenging targets capabilities to ensure coordinated efforts ability. Unfortunately, the war in which under highly controlled conditions. In in such scenarios. JFQ the Navy and Air Force found themselves contrast, the implementation of more was not the one for which they prepared. realistic, albeit more risky, dissimilar air Lieutenant General William Wallace’s ob- combat training at Top Gun and, eventu- Notes servation in 2003 that the irregular Iraqi ally, at Red Flag, significantly improved 1 enemy that U.S. forces were fighting “is the ability of U.S. pilots to respond to Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change (New York: Cam- different from the one we’d war-gamed the unexpected. Current and future joint bridge University Press, 2011), 1. against” suggests that the challenges of training must incorporate challenging 2 Summary of the National Defense Strategy anticipating future opponents and sce- scenarios, such as operations in degraded of the United States of America: Sharpening the narios persist.47 information or contested aerospace American Military’s Competitive Edge (Wash-
82 Features / Adapting to Disruption JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 ington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 1. 11 Lambeth, Transformation of American 34 Lambeth, Transformation of American 3 Paul F. Gorman, “The Military Value Air Power, 42; Nordeen, Air Warfare in the Air Power, 46; Anderegg, Sierra Hotel, 14; of Training,” Institute for Defense Analyses, Missile Age, 6–7; Boyne, Red Flag, 47; An- Boyne, “Teaball Tactic,” 69. Alexandria, VA, December 1990, 4, available at deregg, Sierra Hotel, 11–12. 35 Anderegg, Sierra Hotel, 17, 24; Michel,
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Angevine 83 Chadian special forces soldier receives basic rifle marksmanship training at live-fire range in Massaguet, Chad, as part of exercise Flintlock 17, March 6, 2017 (U.S. Army/Derek Hamilton)
The Revival of Al Qaeda
By Jami T. Forbes
Today’s terrorist threats have changed, and terrorist groups are now more geographically dispersed and their tactics more diversified.
—National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America, October 2018
Time and territory allow jihadist terrorists to plot, so we will act against sanctuaries, and prevent their reemergence before they can threaten the U.S. homeland.
—National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017
n March 2, 2018, militants end of the day, 16 people were dead conducted near-simultaneous and more than 80 injured.1 The attack O assaults on the French embassy on the military headquarters was likely and the military headquarters of aimed at targeting a gathering of senior Jami T. Forbes is a Senior Intelligence Analyst for Special Operations Command Africa in Burkina Faso in Ouagadougou, the officers, and Burkinabe officials stated Stuttgart, Germany. West African nation’s capital. By the the attack could have “decapitated”
84 Features / The Revival of Al Qaeda JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 their military had the meeting not been as al Qaeda continue to present the most country and is reportedly garnering moved to a different location at the dangerous terrorist threat to the United revenue from the extortion of state- last minute.2 Al Qaeda’s West Africa States, and they draw from networks owned firms and oil companies.9 In affiliate Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al- around the globe to “radicalize isolated Africa, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Muslimin (JNIM) claimed credit for individuals, exploit vulnerable popula- (AQIM) oversees an arc of instabil- the attack, stating it was a message to tions, and inspire and direct plots.”3 As ity that flows from the Maghreb into France and its partners in the Sahel such, it is imperative that we challenge the Sahel. In February 2017, AQIM that the group was advancing “with the narrative that al Qaeda has all but oversaw the merger of several armed a resolve unhindered by wounds and been defeated, seek to gain a better un- groups in Mali, creating JNIM, which pains” inflicted by French-led counter- derstanding of how al Qaeda is rebuilding now controls a large portion of north- terrorism (CT) pressure in the region. its movement, and utilize diverse inter- ern Mali and is expanding attacks into The events served as an ominous agency resources to degrade the ability Burkina Faso and western Niger (an reminder of an ascendant al Qaeda that for a potential resurgence of the group. area roughly equivalent to the geo- targeted the U.S. Embassies in Kenya graphic size of Mexico).10 and Tanzania more than 20 years ago. Global Resurgence On occasion, these affiliates are will- Since its emergence in 2013, the Despite the broad focus on IS, al ing and able to conduct high-profile so-called Islamic State (IS) has been Qaeda and its affiliated networks likely operations, including external attacks. at the forefront of the U.S. CT effort. hold the largest swaths of territory This suggests that al Qaeda’s slow and The brash and often shocking tactics under jihadist control, including areas patient strategy does not equate to a of IS largely overshadowed al Qaeda, of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. lack of operational activity. For example, which was weakened due to internal fis- Over the past few years, the group has in addition to the embassy attack in sures, robust CT pressure, the death of enhanced its footprint by cultivating Ouagadougou, AQAP was responsible Osama bin Laden, and battlefield losses local support and by forging alliances for the January 7, 2015, assault on the in Afghanistan and the Middle East. with local armed groups. In 2014, offices of the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Al Qaeda ceded its prominence in the al Qaeda announced the creation of France, which resulted in the death of 12 Salafist jihadist world to a faster, flashier, a new affiliate called al Qaeda in the people and the injury of at least 11.11 In and more aggressive movement and be- Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), its first addition, in October 2017, al-Shabaab came a seemingly peripheral actor in the official network in Asia.4 AQIS operates detonated an explosives-laden vehicle global war on terror. in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also in Mogadishu, causing 500 casualties— However, while IS was promoting its has ambitions for India, Burma, and Somalia’s largest terror attack to date.12 use of terror as a means to become a state, Bangladesh. The group is responsible al Qaeda was quietly laying the founda- for several small attacks in Pakistan and Adaptive Yet Consistent tion for its resurrection. This article reportedly attempted to hijack a Paki- Leadership argues that al Qaeda is resurgent due in stani vessel off the port of Karachi in One key factor that has likely enabled part to its ability to exercise strategic pa- 2014.5 In Afghanistan, al Qaeda senior al Qaeda to withstand CT pressure tience. While the high-profile tactics of IS leaders appear to continue to benefit and usher in a potential resurgence is made it easy to understand IS strategy and from Taliban-provided haven and are its leadership cadre, which appears to intent, al Qaeda pursued a more discreet reportedly facing a “resurgence” in have embraced traditional leadership path, making it more difficult to judge its areas of Afghanistan stymied by limited while also implementing evolutionary actions. It diffused its leadership cadre out governance.6 In Somalia, al-Shabaab changes. Al Qaeda senior leaders have to a variety of geographic locations, em- reportedly controls up to 30 percent of long benefited from haven in Iran, powered leaders, created cohesion among the country (a region with a coastline where they have largely been inoculated its global affiliates, and developed more comparable in size to the Eastern Sea- from CT pressure.13 Shortly following durable havens by gaining inroads with board of the United States) and is oper- the attacks on September 11, 2001, vulnerable populations and exploiting ating with an estimated 7,000 to 9,000 some al Qaeda senior leaders sought fragile states. Al Qaeda’s slower and more fighters.7 In Syria, despite some opera- shelter in Iran, where they likely rec- long-term strategy was much less salient tional setbacks and a lack of cohesion, al ognized that the region would provide than the one pursued by the Islamic State, Qaeda helped to broker the early 2018 a sanctuary from U.S. drone strikes. but it is likely to be more dangerous in creation of Hurras al-Din—a merger of Although the relationship between al the long term, particularly if it helps the smaller armed groups that has bolstered Qaeda and Iran was at times conten- group to expand its support base and en- its ranks by attracting members who tious (with some al Qaeda leaders even hance local control through cooperation fought alongside al Qaeda in Afghani- being placed under occasional house rather than coercion. stan and Iraq.8 In Yemen, al Qaeda in arrest), the common enemies of the According to the December 2017 the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) controls United States and the Islamic State National Security Strategy, groups such wide swaths of the southern part of the likely drove a sense of collaboration.14
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Forbes 85 Since at least 2009, Iran has allowed Cohesion Among calling for attacks on the United States, al Qaeda to “operate a core facilitation Global Affiliates suggesting the long-term aspirations of pipeline through the country,” enabling Al Qaeda appears to be increasing the group to target the U.S. homeland the group to “move funds and fighters cohesion among its disparate affiliates, have not diminished. In a March 20, to South Asia and Syria,” according to with several issuing joint statements 2018, statement, al-Zawahiri called for the State Department.15 In addition, al regarding external issues. This cohe- the worldwide Muslim community to Qaeda officials indicated that Iran was a sion is likely being driven in part by the unite, stating, “Let us fight America “main artery for funds, personnel, and increased access to senior leaders. For everywhere the same way it attacks us ev- communication” for the group, accord- example, in February 2017, AQAP and erywhere. Let us unite in confronting it, ing to documents recovered during AQIM issued a joint statement eulogiz- and never divide. Let us unify and never the Abbottabad raid against Osama bin ing Omar Abdel Rahman, also known disperse. Let us gather and never become Laden.16 as the “Blind Sheikh,” who died while shattered.”21 Starting in 2015, al Qaeda emir in U.S. Federal custody. The statement The ambitions to develop more Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has likely largely called for fighters to conduct attacks global visions and operational capabilities been confined to the remote tribal re- against U.S. interests to avenge his are likely being adopted by al Qaeda’s gions of Pakistan, appeared to empower death. Also, in September 2017, both affiliates as well. For example, in May some Iran-based leaders such as Saif al-Shabaab and AQAP issued nearly 2017, al-Shabaab issued a 55-minute al-Adel to make decisions and command identical statements calling for support video featuring statements from several operations on his behalf. Al-Adel, a for- of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. al Qaeda senior leaders. The narration mer colonel and special forces soldier in Furthermore, when AQIM announced called the United States the “Satan of our the Egyptian army, is a founding member the merger of several armed groups time” and stated that al-Shabaab’s jihad of al Qaeda who helped mastermind the in Mali in March 2017, the groups is a global one that is not restricted to U.S. Embassy attacks in Nairobi and Dar pledged loyalty to both al Qaeda and geographical boundaries. es Salaam.17 He almost certainly has the the Taliban, underscoring that even in a Al Qaeda is also endeavoring to experience and capabilities that could be remote area such as Timbuktu, al Qaeda reabsorb fighters from the Islamic State, central to any efforts to regenerate opera- affiliates are in line with the movements’ calling for the unification of jihadist tional activities.18 This has likely helped strategic messaging. ranks and advocating for a common fight to reverse the previous isolation (and Al Qaeda is also attempting to resume against the United States. This outreach pressure) faced by al Qaeda officials who its public role as the vanguard of global has probably enabled the potential for op- were reliant on haven in Pakistan and jihad, an effort underpinned by more erational cooperation between elements Afghanistan and is probably an enabler robust and diverse media outreach. Al of IS and al Qaeda. For instance, in the of al Qaeda’s efforts to raise its public Qaeda media statements portray the Sahel region of Africa, al Qaeda and IS profile operational tempo. In addition to group as the only force capable of fight- fighters are reportedly conducting joint diffusing decisionmaking capabilities, al ing against tyrannical regimes in North operations against the Sahel G5 security Qaeda has also expanded perceptions of Africa and against the United States, forces there.22 According to the United its leadership cadre by drawing on images which was referred to as the “first enemy Nations mission in Mali, al Qaeda’s af- and statements from Hamza bin Laden of Islam” in March and May 2018 state- filiate JNIM and the IS branch in the (now deceased), using his lineage as the ments.20 Starting in late 2017, al Qaeda Sahel (known as the Islamic State in the son of Osama bin Ladin and the al Qaeda began to quicken the pace at which it Greater Sahara) are reportedly cooperat- heir apparent to inspire a new generation disseminated media statements. For ing and conducting “more sophisticated of fighters. example, between mid-January and mid- and deadly attacks.”23 Although a formal Furthermore, in early 2015, several October 2018, al Qaeda published 13 unification of IS and al Qaeda is unlikely members of the al Qaeda military council statements attributed to al-Zawahiri. This in the near term, any potential coop- in Iran were relocated to Damascus, pace reflects a significant change from eration between the two groups could where they were credited with helping previous years when guidance and out- expand operational capabilities, and the lead the fight against IS, and began com- reach from al Qaeda leaders were much recruitment of former IS fighters could manding “an unprecedented number of more elusive (al Qaeda only issued nine help bolster al Qaeda ranks with seasoned veteran” fighters.19 This infusion of lead- statements attributed to al-Zawahiri in all and experienced operatives. ership helped al Qaeda weather the loss of 2017). of several senior leaders to airstrikes and Al Qaeda’s deliberate reintroduction Developing More mitigate the loss of some commanders of its external vision is also reinforced Durable Havens to IS. It also helped al Qaeda develop a by several statements advocating for at- In addition to the leadership changes, broader and more adaptive identity rather tacks on the “far enemy” in the West. al Qaeda has made efforts to cultivate than just being an Afghanistan/Pakistan- Since 2017, al Qaeda affiliates have durable havens by slowly integrating based organization. issued at least 12 public statements with local groups. Nowhere is there a
86 Features / The Revival of Al Qaeda JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 MQ-9 Reaper flies training mission over Nevada Test and Training Range, July 15, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/William Rio Rosado)
better example of al Qaeda’s strategic relationship with groups so that it could that killed 18 civilians.27 In March 2016, patience than its efforts in Mali and combine the groups’ regional efforts with al Qaeda elements also targeted hotels Sub-Saharan Africa. Al Qaeda’s strategy al Qaeda’s “global jihadi project.”26 This and tourist venues in the Ivory Coast, in the Sahel reflects a shrewd long-term effort came to fruition in February 2017, resulting in the deaths of 22 civilians.28 vision, with the group calling its efforts when AQIM announced the merger of The group is also responsible for several there similar to caring for “a baby” that several Salafist armed groups under the al attacks in Bamako, the capital of Mali. needs to mature and grow.24 According Qaeda umbrella. This merger represented Following a June 19, 2017, attack against to documents recovered in Timbuktu, a variety of ethnic and tribal backgrounds, a Western-affiliated hotel, JNIM stated al Qaeda saw the 2012 Tuareg rebel- including Arab, Fulani/Peuhl, and that it was sending a “message dripping lions in Mali as a “historic” opportunity Tuareg identities. with blood and body parts” that Western to exploit vulnerable populations and The creation of JNIM has helped to “crusaders” would never be secure in develop a haven for its fighters. Since advance operations in the Sahel, where Mali. Furthermore, the group is likely then, al Qaeda has methodologically since 2015 al Qaeda–affiliated attacks holding at least six Westerners hostage, integrated with disenfranchised tribal have expanded not only in number including one U.S. citizen.29 and ethnic groups via endeavors such but also in geographic scope, shifting The development of a haven in the as intermarrying with them, fighting further into Burkina Faso and por- Sahel represents a dangerous precedent alongside them in support of local tions of Western Niger. In addition to that, if left unabated, could help enable grievances, and providing rule of law.25 the March 2, 2018, attack, al Qaeda is future global aspirations of al Qaeda. Central to al Qaeda’s strategy for the responsible for two other high-profile For instance, the recovered guidance Sahel is the co-option of several ethnic external attacks that specifically tar- indicated that al Qaeda leaders saw the and Salafist armed groups. In 2012, al geted Western-affiliated locations in opportunity to shape Mali and the Sahel Qaeda stated that it needed to put aside Ouagadougou, including a January 2016 into a base from which it could conduct rivalries and “win allies” and “be flexible” assault on a hotel that killed 29 civilians training and eventually launch global enough to establish an organizational and a February 2017 assault on a café jihadist operations against the West.30
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Forbes 87 Nigerien soldiers receive counter-IED class as part of exercise Flintlock 17 in Diffa, Niger, February 28, 2017 (U.S. Army/Kulani Lakanaria)
In line with its patient and calculated baskets to locals who are in need, accord- does not equate to the degradation of strategy for establishing a caliphate, al ing to Twitter users. global Salafist jihadist movements. Al Qaeda’s guidance directed developing Qaeda will almost certainly continue to strong ties to locals, while hiding broader Outlook evolve and may emerge from behind the jihadist ambitions until favorable condi- Al Qaeda has likely laid the founda- shadows of IS with a renewed vision, tions are sufficiently set. Al Qaeda stated tion for its movement to present a empowered leaders, a more cohesive it was better for fighters in the Sahel to more durable threat. As outlined in the global network, and a perceived moral currently “be silent and pretend to be 2018 National Security Strategy, both high ground among fighters. Moreover, a ‘domestic’ movement” in the short time and territory help enable terrorist we must recognize the potential bias we term, hiding the fact that al Qaeda had groups to threaten the U.S. homeland. have placed on IS. Saliency bias describes “expansionary, jihadi” aspirations for the As such, it is imperative to gain a better the phenomenon in which humans focus region.31 understanding of how groups such as al on items or information that are more This strategy is not limited to the Qaeda are using “quieter” methods such noticeable or prominent and dismiss Sahel. It mirrors AQAP’s approach in as exploiting sociopolitical and ethnic those that are less obvious. Undoubtedly, Yemen, where the group also forged al- grievances to develop havens. This will the actions of the Islamic State were liances with tribal militias to help expand require a strategy underpinned on initia- salient—the brash and often shocking its presence.32 In addition, AQAP has tives outside of military force, including tactics of the group have made it dif- been able to implement development diplomatic engagement, humanitarian ficult for the United States to ignore. As projects, including providing access to aid to vulnerable populations, enhanced such, IS has been at the forefront of our water and electricity, and has established collaboration with law enforcement, and counterterrorism focus. While al Qaeda governance bodies to help provide goods international partnerships. was not completely dismissed, its longer and services to locals. The group also To reverse the positive trend for term approach made it more difficult to reportedly provides rule of law through al Qaeda, it will be important for the understand the impact and pattern of its shariah courts and has promoted humani- United States and our partners to actions, possibly enabling the group to tarian efforts such as handing out food understand that the degradation of IS adapt and evolve.
88 Features / The Revival of Al Qaeda JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 12 Finally, the United States and its Jason Burke, “Mogadishu Truck Bomb: 500 Casualties in Somalia’s Worst Terrorist At- partners must carefully monitor the tack,” The Guardian, October 16, 2017. New from NDU progression of al Qaeda affiliates, par- 13 Cathy Scott-Clark and Adrian Levy, ticularly JNIM in Mali, where al Qaeda The Exile: The Stunning Inside Story of Osama Press is expanding its geographic footprint Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in Flight (London: Center for the Study of Chinese and has momentum. As outlined in the Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017); see also “Iran Military Affairs Denies Saudi Allegations of Harboring bin National Strategy for Counterterrorism, Laden’s Son,” Reuters, March 20, 2018. Strategic Forum 303 “veteran Al-Qa’ida leaders are working 14 Scott-Clark and Levy, The Exile. The PLA Beyond Asia: China’s to consolidate and expand the group’s 15 Country Reports on Terrorism 2017, Growing Military Presence in the Red presence in several regions . . . from “Chapter 2: State Sponsors of Terrorism,” Sea Region which it aspires to launch new attacks on Department of State, September 19, 2018. By Joel Wuthnow 16 Callum Paton, “Iran’s Secret Funding for the United States and our allies.” Should China has Al-Qaeda in Exchange for Attacks on U.S. Tar- al Qaeda successfully build a haven and gets Exposed in Bin Laden Files,” Newsweek, gradually establish a state built on its own brand of November 2, 2017. expanded shariah law, it could serve as the flagship 17 Most Wanted Terrorists, Saif Al-Adel, its military enterprise that will regenerate confidence Federal Bureau of Investigation. footprint in 18 Scott-Clark and Levy, The Exile. in al Qaeda as a movement, and possibly the Red Sea 19 Charles Lister, “Al Qaeda Is About to Es- enable the group to shift from developing tablish an Emirate in Northern Syria,” Foreign region, an sanctuary to expanding its ability to con- Policy, May 4, 2016. area of critical duct external attacks against the United 20 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “America Is the First importance States and Western interests. JFQ Enemy of the Muslims,” Eng. trans., As-Sahab for global maritime commerce and Media, March 20, 2018; see also Ayman al-Za- energy production. Key aspects wahiri, “Tel Aviv Is also the Land of Muslims,” Eng. trans., As-Sahab Media, May 13, 2018. include a People’s Liberation Army Notes 21 Al-Zawahiri, “America Is the First Enemy role in United Nations peacekeep- of the Muslims.” ing, anti-piracy patrols, and a new 1 “Al Qaeda Affiliate Claims Responsibility 22 Olivier Monnier, “Islamic State, Al- base in Djibouti. China’s military for Burkina Faso Attacks,” Reuters, March 3, Qaeda Support Fuels Attacks in West Africa,” presence—its largest outside the 2018. Bloomberg.com, February 5, 2018. 2 Richard Perez-Pena and Jamie Yayha Berry, 23 Ibid. Indo-Pacific—supports Beijing’s “Militants Carry Out Deadly Attack in Burkina 24 Rukmini Callimachi, “In Timbuktu, diplomatic relations in the region, Faso,” New York Times, March 2, 2018. Al-Qaida Left Behind a Manifesto,” Associated contributes to China’s maritime 3 National Security Strategy of the United Press, February 14, 2013. security interests, and provides useful States of America (Washington, DC: The White 25 Jami Forbes, “Revisiting the Mali al- lessons in building an expedition- House, December 2017). Qa’ida Playbook: How the Group Is Advancing 4 “Al-Qa’ida Chief Launches Al-Qa’ida in on Its Goals in the Sahel,” CTC Sentinel 11, ary capability. U.S. officials need to South Asia,” BBC News, September 4, 2014. no. 9 (October 2018). address operational safety and coun- 5 Tim Craig, “An Offshoot of Al-Qa’ida Is 26 Callimachi, “In Timbuktu, Al-Qaida Left terintelligence issues and determine Regrouping in Pakistan,” Washington Post, June Behind a Manifesto.” whether China’s presence—which 3, 2016. 27 Nadia Khomami, “Burkina Faso Hotel also includes military diplomacy and 6 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan’s Attack, at Least 18 Nationalities among Dead,” Terrorism Resurgence: Al-Qaida, ISIS and Be- The Guardian, January 16, 2016. arms sales—is eroding traditional yond,” Brookings Institution, April 28, 2017; 28 Michael E. Miller, “Horror at the Beach: U.S. advantages as a security partner. see also Dan Lamothe, “‘Probably the Largest’ 22 Dead in Terrorist Attack on Ivory Coast Opportunities for military coop- Al-Qaeda Camp Ever Destroyed in Afghani- Resorts,” Washington Post, March 14, 2016. eration should be explored in areas stan,” Washington Post, October 30, 2015. 29 “Hostages Shown in Al-Qaeda Mali where U.S. and Chinese interests 7 Global Conflict Tracker, “Al-Shabab in Video as Macron Flies In,” BBC News, July 2, Somalia,” Council on Foreign Relations Web 2017. align, such as disaster management site, updated daily. 30 Callimachi, “In Timbuktu, Al-Qaida Left and maritime safety. 8 Mohanad Hage Ali, “Guarding the Al- Behind a Manifesto.” Qa’eda Flame,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 31 Ibid. June 6, 2018. 32 Yemen’s Al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base, 9 Eric Schmitt and Saeed Al-Batati, “The Report No. 174 (Brussels: International Crisis U.S. Has Pummeled Al Qaeda in Yemen. But Group, February 2, 2017). the Threat Is Barely Dented,” New York Times, December 30, 2017. 10 Rinaldo Depagne, “Burkina Faso’s Alarming Escalation of Jihadist Violence,” International Crisis Group, March 5, 2018. 11 Alan Yuhas, “How Yemen Spawned the Visit the NDU Press Web site for Charlie Hebdo Attacks,” The Guardian, January more information on publications 14, 2015. at ndupress.ndu.edu
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Forbes 89 Soldiers with 25th Infantry Division conduct air assault operations onto deck of 8th Theater Sustainment Command’s Logistical Support Vessel-2, off coast of Honolulu, Hawaii, January 11, 2020 (U.S. Army/Jon Heinrich)
Frustrated Cargo The U.S. Army’s Limitations in Projecting Force from Ship to Shore in an A2/AD Environment
By Brian Molloy
n recent years the joint force has this renewed focus, it is entirely possible infrastructure, nearly the entire U.S. rediscovered and discussed at length that the joint force could overcome Army could become frustrated cargo the challenges of contested air and the A2/AD threat, achieve local sea at sea, putting the success of the joint I 1 sea control and the antiaccess/area- control, push Marines ashore, and land force at risk. denial (A2/AD) environment. With Army airborne forces in support of Denied ports as part of an A2/AD airfield seizures only to become stalled strategy is a reality in numerous potential in its ability to offload Army combat flashpoints around the globe. The Korean Major Brian Molloy, USA, is a graduate student at power at its critical vulnerability: in Peninsula, Taiwan, or any number of the U.S. Naval War College. port. In this scenario, with denied port contested islands and landmasses in the
90 Features / Frustrated Cargo JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Pacific provide instructive examples. The III, effectively ceding the responsibility artillery and armor, came through a current joint concept relies on a relatively to the Marine Corps. This approach is port. In an A2/AD environment, these small initial entry force to establish a shortsighted and insufficiently joint to static ports, easily targeted by precision lodgment with the preponderance of gain the most benefit from the strengths munitions, mined by submarine, or the combat power flowing as follow- of each Service. The Marines are adept denied through scuttling commercial on forces through established or hasty at conducting Phase II initial assault ships, present critical vulnerabilities to infrastructure.2 This dynamic will be chal- operations, while the U.S. Army has continuing operations. This significant lenged in an A2/AD environment, which the staying power for protracted land reliance on a small number of ports will require entry forces to mobilize over operations in Phase IV and beyond. The for major combat operations is an the shore without the benefit of a lengthy question becomes where in the forcible unacceptable and avoidable risk in the reception, staging, onward movement, entry continuum the Army is best suited current operating concept. and integration (RSOI) process, a task to enter this power into theater. The best Contrasting the permissive entry in the U.S. Army is unprepared to perform. approach leverages the relative strengths the Gulf War and Afghanistan to the The Army has largely ceded the forc- of each Service while operating in a denied experience entering theater dur- ible entry over-the-shore responsibility joint capacity to deliver the best result ing World War II and Korea, the reliance to the Marine Corps; they are tasked to to the joint force commander. Waiting on static infrastructure becomes starker. open a lodgment for follow-on forces. until Phase IV to enter the Army into Arguably, these conflicts were the last However, in an A2/AD environment, the fight is insufficient and introduces a time the United States faced a peer threat. the Army will be unable to capitalize on significant vulnerability into the power The invasion of Normandy provides an this initial lodgment due to the likelihood projection capabilities of the joint force. excellent example of this need. Planning of contested or denied ports and airfields included five reinforced divisions making inherent in these operations. Avoiding the Static up the initial amphibious assault element, To overcome this vulnerability, Infrastructure Trap with an additional 30 divisions flowing the Army must harness its capacity to The Army currently relies too heavily over the beach as the reinforcing force.9 maneuver from ship to shore without on static infrastructure, specifically Only after 3 weeks would Cherbourg be mobilizing through port facilities. To do well-defended decisive points at ports opened to allow unopposed follow-on so, the Army needs to avoid overreliance and airfields. From the end of the forces to enter through ports. A similar on static infrastructure that may not be Korean War until very recently, the case occurred during the Incheon land- available in an A2/AD environment, pre- United States has enjoyed the luxury of ings during the Korean War, where the pare to reinforce the Marines at the beach fighting in environments with friendly initial assault elements came ashore in for the joint force to operate as doctrine allies willing to provide defended ports mid-September. It was not until October demands, and develop new training and outside the envelope of enemy A2/ 10—25 days later—that the port at doctrine to posture itself to fill this role. AD weapons. The first Persian Gulf Incheon was cleared and opened to allow War and Operation Enduring Freedom follow-on operations.10 In a peer-on-peer Doctrinal Framework in Afghanistan provide instructive fight, the time-force balance of rapidly Joint forcible entry operations break examples. In the Gulf War, over 90 pushing combat power ashore requires down into five phases: Phase I, prepara- percent of all supplies moved through the ability to deliver the preponderance tion and deployment; Phase II, assault; only three accessible ports, all located in of combat power over the beach. In a Phase III, stabilization of the lodgment; Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi navy destroyed peer conflict, the preponderance of that Phase IV, introduction of follow-on portside infrastructure and scuttled combat power will be the U.S. Army, and forces; and Phase V, termination.3 Joint vessels in the harbor at Ash-Shauybah, the joint force will not have the luxury doctrine calls for either the Marines or denying the only deep-draft port avail- of waiting 25 days to enter that combat the Army to act as the principal element able in Kuwait.7 Only after a significant power into theater. of assault, stabilization, or follow-on effort to clear it after hostilities ended Airfields present a similar challenge to forces.4 Both the assault and reinforc- did the Army reopen the port. This ports as static infrastructure and are likely ing forces must be postured to execute port denial action, while tactically to be among the first targets of an A2/ operations over the shore without insignificant, shows the ability of a AD campaign. While aerial forcible entry benefit of a lengthy RSOI.5 The follow- poorly equipped naval force to deny can move troops and supplies rapidly, it is on force can then enter theater through static infrastructure easily. Similarly, in severely limited in its ability to move heavy hasty or established aerial and sea ports Afghanistan, the United States relied on equipment, particularly armor, and as such of debarkation and conduct RSOI in only one deep-water port in Pakistan is unable to fill the gap if ports are denied. Phase IV before continuing operations.6 to supply the war with the vast majority Even if airfields themselves are not denied, Currently, however, Service doctrines of of its supplies moving by sea.8 In both the Air Force cannot move armor through both the Army and the Marines neglect cases, the majority of Army combat the air in quantity. Joint Publication (JP) the role of Army forces in Phases I to power, including nearly every piece of 3-17, Air Mobility Operations, assumes as
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Molloy 91 much, stating, “Ninety percent of inter- incredibly versatile in projecting light times are to define the term or its theater cargo goes by sea.”11 Indeed, it forces to shore, they are limited in their graphical symbols.19 The Marine Corps, would take 54 sorties of C-17s to replace capability with armor. Since divesting the meanwhile, has a complete and detailed just one LPD-17 amphibious ship in stra- Landing Ship Tank, the Marine Corps amphibious framework, albeit one that tegic lift capability, and over 500 sorties currently does not have surface connec- is not well suited to the Army.20 The of C-17s to replace one large, medium- tors that can put more than two M1 Marines and Army operate with differ- speed, roll-on/roll-off ship (LMSR).12 Abrams on the beach at a time. The Army ent equipment, command and control, The need to move armor rapidly into Logistics Over-the-Shore (LOTS) fleet, and organizational structures that theater becomes a significant operational however, includes the LCU-2000, with would make a cut-and-paste usage of constraint in a peer conflict. In the case the capacity to land five M1 Abrams,14 as Marine Corps doctrine a good starting of an A2/AD environment, the option of well as the largest surface connector in point, but not a complete solution to force projecting the Army over the shore the U.S. military inventory—the Logistics the problem. Additionally, the Army’s as a complement to the Marines becomes Support Vessel (LSV)—that can land up role is not as the initial assault force, an attractive one. to 24 M1A2 Abrams at a time.15 The LSV which is where the preponderance of is an incredibly versatile workhorse of the the Marine Corps doctrine focuses. The Finding the Army’s Role LOTS fleet, which is not only blue-water Army must develop the doctrine to Considering this challenge, the Army capable and able to operate independently, allow it to supplement existing Marine must again develop an over-the-shore but also can operate as a surface con- Corps and Navy doctrine where it pro- capability to reinforce Marines as the nector in concert with gray-hulled Navy vides unique capabilities. assault force at the beach well before amphibious vessels, all with the ability to Compounding the doctrinal problem, follow-on operations in Phase IV. The completely bypass ports and deliver armor the Army recently considered significant Army must be prepared to enter theater directly into the fight through the surf cuts to its LOTS capabilities, further to assist in the expansion of the lodg- zone. The challenge is that these vessels hampering the ability to conduct sustained ment in Phases II and III to be able are not currently seen as tactical assets.16 operations in a denied environment.21 to capitalize on operations effectively. If reimagined, the potential to re-mission Following the successful operations Amphibious assaults during the Korean them as assault craft would provide the in World War II and Korea, the Army War precisely demonstrated this concept. operational commander a significant ca- gradually shifted focus from amphibious At Incheon, the 1st Marine Division exe- pability. If this approach is taken, though, operations to amphibious logistics. Shortly cuted the initial assault, with the Army’s doctrine must be developed to harness after the Korean War, the Army transferred 7th Infantry Division acting as a reinforc- those assets in their new role. its entire amphibious capability away from ing force early in what we would now the maneuver support-focused Army call Phase II.13 This approach leveraged Confronting the Challenge Corps of Engineers to the logistics-focused the expertise of the Marines in amphibi- of a Neglected Mission Transportation Corps.22 This transition ous operations with the combat power of The Army is currently unprepared to effectively ended the Army’s interest in the Army division to exploit the objec- provide forces earlier than Phase IV conducting amphibious operations as an tive. In planning this operation, General despite the demand in joint doctrine entry method to theater, yet it retained Douglas MacArthur understood his limi- that it must do so. Both JP 3-02, Joint hundreds of LOTS vessels in a logistics tation in the number of Marines avail- Amphibious Operations,17 and JP 3-18, capability. Recently, the Army again has able. The ability to put Army Soldiers Joint Forcible Entry Operations, state shifted focus, announcing the near-total across the beach following the Marines that either the Marine Corps or the divestiture of its remaining waterborne allowed him significant flexibility as an Army can make up the landing force.18 fleet.23 This divestiture widens the capabil- operational commander by leveraging Despite this, the Army has neglected ity gap and reduces options to re-mission relative capabilities of both the Army and doctrinal development on amphibious logistics vehicles for maneuver over the Marines under his command. operations, has not trained in amphibi- shore if the Army is forced to do so. The Army reinforcement at the beach still ous operations, and would not be able Marine Corps is not trained or equipped complements Marine Corps capabilities to fully integrate into the joint fight to pick up the responsibility of carrying well, with each providing different capa- with the Navy and Marine Corps team. Army units ashore either, as evidenced bilities to the fight. While the Marines are The doctrinal challenge is particularly by limited surface connectors and capac- adept at pushing light forces ashore, the stark. The Army functionally has no ity on amphibious lift. The divestiture of Army’s unique role is in providing sub- amphibious doctrine. It last published the LOTS fleet also opens the potential stantial armor to the fight. In addition to an amphibious operation manual in to reimagine the use of these vessels. As the armor itself, the Army also maintains 1966 and has since discontinued its the Army divests these assets from the the most substantial maritime surface use. In the most recent Army doctrinal Transportation Corps, the time is right to connectors in the joint inventory. While framework, the word “amphibious” begin the conversation of reutilizing them the Marine Corps surface connectors are appears only 14 times, and 5 of those in a maneuver role.
92 Features / Frustrated Cargo JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 During Korean War, Marines use scaling ladders to storm ashore at Inchon in amphibious invasion on September 15, 1950 (U.S. Marine Corps/National Archives and Records Administration/W.W. Frank)
The Army must also begin to train Corps team has not incorporated Army Corps is left without a sufficient follow-on for amphibious operations. Without the forces into its annual amphibious training force to capitalize on their gains. benefit of a doctrinal foundation or the events. Even though joint doctrine calls ready access to equipment, the hard-won for both the Army and the Marines to be Moving from a “Corps” lessons of past conflicts atrophied and capable of performing jointly with each Competency to a Core the skills necessary to succeed in the lit- other in amphibious operations,25 neither Competency torals vanished. The last major planning is prepared to do so. Some—indeed, most—senior Depart- exercise in the Army for amphibious The rapid buildup of combat power ment of Defense officials would argue operations was in 1964, conducted by from the sea to shore is a fundamental that the Army has little business oper- the Army Engineer School. Even this characteristic of amphibious operations. 26 ating in amphibious landings.27 The exercise existed only on paper and was The Army maintains the preponderance of Marine Corps is rightfully seen as the never tested on the ground with Army U.S. ground combat power, and nearly all standard bearer in amphibious opera- equipment.24 In fits and starts, the Army conflicts have required the Army to carry tions, and most would argue that the has tried to get back into the business the burden of sustained fights. Without Marines alone are capable of provid- of amphibious operations, but never to the ability to enter this combat power into ing lodgments for follow-on forces. the extent of standing up a headquarters theater, the entire Army runs the substan- Allowing the Army to generate its own or providing a proponent to maintain tial risk of becoming frustrated cargo afloat amphibious capability would compete proficiency. Meanwhile, the Navy–Marine on commercial ships while the Marine for resources with the Marine Corps and
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Molloy 93 ment the strengths of all the uniformed services to dominate the beaches. First, the Army must lean on the Marine Corps in development of its own Army-specific doctrine. Before World War II, the Army directed the establish- ment of the Army Engineer Amphibian Command.28 Today, the Army should direct a proponent under the auspices of the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence to develop Army doctrine for how it will integrate into the joint fight in maneuver over the shore. The Army does not need to start from scratch, as doctrine already exists, but it must adapt the existing doctrine to modern capabilities. Beyond doctrinal changes, it needs to integrate the other levers of the joint capabilities framework: organiza- st During Nautical Horizon 2018, distinguished visitors from 1 Theater Sustainment Command, Kuwait tion, training, material, leadership and military, and other coalition forces, got firsthand look at U.S. Army vessels participating in logistics education, personnel, and facilities.29 The over-the-shore mission, Shuaiba Port, Kuwait, June 24, 2018 (U.S. Army/Charlotte Reavis) Army is lucky to have a partner in the would ultimately provide limited value in in amphibious operations. The Army, U.S. Marine Corps that it can lean on to the joint fight. This argument, however, however, must be capable of providing develop this expertise. It should leverage misses the point. The reality is that the the spear’s shaft. Just as a spearpoint is this expertise by training Army officers in Army–Marine Corps team, working ineffective without its shaft, so too is the planning and executing amphibious op- together at the beach, provides more joint force ineffective when it neglects its erations by embedding them on Marine value to the operational commander than greatest contributor of ground combat Expeditionary Unit deployments to gain either force working alone. The current power during amphibious operations. operational experience in maneuver from model works well when noncontested ship to shore and developing competency ports are available. In an A2/AD envi- Recommendations to in amphibious planning. ronment, this will not be the case. In a the Joint Force Second, the Army must immediately contested environment, the Army needs The Army has always wrestled with its reverse its course on the divestment of its the ability to act as a reinforcing force role in over-the-beach operations. It is at LOTS capability, and instead re-mission earlier in the operation to expand the a crossroads again, but if the joint force the fleet to perform a dual function. The lodgment initially gained by the Marines. is to be successful against a peer enemy, Army needs to view its waterborne fleet as Instead of waiting for the initial assault the Army must confront the reality that more than solely a transportation and lo- force to secure a port, entering both the unopposed port and airfield operations gistics asset,30 and instead view it as a vital Army and the Marines in an over-the- are unlikely to be available. As was the maneuver support asset. Assessing the fleet beach approach allows the operational case in 1942, the Army today finds as a maneuver support asset allows Army commander considerable flexibility in itself unprepared to fight over the shore combat power to maneuver over the shore projecting the preponderance of their despite the foreseeable situation where in Phases II and III of an amphibious as- heavy combat power directly into the the need is manifest. Prior to World War sault and transition to LOTS activities in fight. Though leaders’ concerns of a II and during the Korean War, the Army Phase IV. The Army must also become duplication of effort are valid, they are adapted and developed the capability to adept at operating off nonstandard misplaced. The Army’s role in over-the- project force in a denied environment. platforms. Due to the well-documented beach operations seeks not to replace The Army cannot stay complacent and shortage of amphibious lift capability for Marine Corps capabilities but rather to overreliant on the static infrastructure the Marine Corps, it is unlikely that the reinforce those capabilities as a force used for the last decades of war. The only Army will be able to utilize the large, gray- multiplier. Conventional wisdom would viable alternative is to maneuver over the hulled amphibious ships commonly used state that it is not the tip of the spear that beach as a complement to the Marine by Marine forces.31 General Mark Milley does the killing but the weight of the Corps, and the Army must develop the went to great pains to explain this at his shaft behind it. The Marines have devel- doctrine to support such actions. The confirmation hearing to be Army Chief of oped the capability, specialty, and exper- joint force must likewise plan and imple- Staff.32 Because of this, the Army needs to tise to continue to be the tip of the spear ment truly joint capabilities that comple- practice operating from roll-on/roll-off
94 Features / Frustrated Cargo JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 20 Military Sealift Command vessels, con- Harry M. Murdock, Doctrine for Com- Notes bined Airborne and Amphibious Operations (Ft. verted civilian vessels,33 or the amphibious Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and 34 vessels of allies. Congressional support 1 John M. Richardson, A Design for General Staff College, 1990), 41. for investing in new large-scale Army Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0 21 Colin Clark, “Army AMC Head Wants to maritime fleets is doubtful.35 However, the (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Stop Buying Ships,” Breaking Defense, May 24, use of nonstandard platforms combined Operations, December 2018), 3, available at 2018, available at
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Molloy 95 Struck by bomb in Battle of Bismarck Sea, Japanese merchantman burns fiercely, March 2, 1943 (U.S. Army/National Archives and Records Administration)
Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era Lessons from the Battle of the Bismarck Sea
By Ben Ho
reat Power competition is back such as China and Russia seeking to Operations Admiral John M. Richard- after a hiatus of over a quarter challenge the current U.S.-led world son contends in the 2016 A Design for G of a century since the end of order.1 These two documents are in line Maintaining Maritime Superiority that the Cold War. The United States has with what various individuals in and “Russia and China both have advanced acknowledged this fact with the release outside of the U.S. defense establish- their military capabilities to act as global of the 2017 National Security Strategy ment have been asserting in recent years powers,” adding that their “goals are and the 2018 National Defense Strat- about the state of international geopoli- backed by a growing arsenal of high- egy, which speak of revisionist powers tics. For instance, former Chief of Naval end warfighting capabilities, many of which are focused specifically on our vulnerabilities.”2 In the same vein, the Ben Ho is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Studies Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of 2018 edition of this strategic docu- International Studies at the Nanyang Technology University, Singapore. ment, Version 2.0, notes that “China
96 Recall / Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 and Russia seek to accumulate power Map. Battle of the Bismarck Sea at America’s expense and may imperil the diplomatic, economic, and military bonds that link the United States to its allies and partners and that “while rarely rising to the level of conflict, Chinese and Russian actions are frequently confrontational.”3 Admiral Richardson also stresses in the 2016 document that naval combat must address “‘blue-water’ scenarios far from land and power projection ashore in a highly ‘informationalized’ and con- tested environment.”4 This contested environment is invariably framed by the antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) chal- lenge that Beijing and Moscow pose to U.S. maritime dominance. Indeed, Admiral Richardson stresses in Version 2.0 that the U.S. military’s “competitive advantage has shrunk and in some areas, Japanese ship movements (black) and Allied air attacks (red) during the battle is gone altogether.”5 How best to deal with this state of af- Source: Douglas MacArthur, Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), plate 51. fairs has been a major debate in the U.S. national security community in recent is widely regarded as the quintessential several hundred kilometers away, the years. Defense thinkers often look to his- access-denial platform, it can be similarly Allies were fighting to defend the crucial tory to solve current military problems, deployed to circumvent the A2/AD New Guinean city of Port Moresby and insights from a less popular but barrier. In the same vein, while Beijing that could be used to threaten Australia crucial engagement during World War II may employ an A2/AD strategy to keep should it fall into Japanese hands. With in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) enemies far away from its shores, the the successful defense of Port Moresby, could guide Pentagon leaders toward concept can be turned on its head to keep the Allies went on the offensive in mitigating this threat. This is the almost the People’s Republic of China bottled up New Guinea with the goal of neutral- forgotten Battle of the Bismarck Sea within the so-called First Island Chain.7 izing Rabaul. Following the decision in of March 2–4, 1943, which saw Allied This article begins with a brief account January 1943 to withdraw from Guadal- airpower decimating the Japanese convoy of the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and canal, Tokyo decided to focus its efforts designated Operation 81 in the waters off then works through the three lessons in the SWPA on the New Guinea cam- New Guinea.6 delineated above with brief policy recom- paign. Therein lies the strategic context Three insights from the battle stand mendations vis-à-vis each of them. of the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. out: General Douglas MacArthur called Historical Narrative the Battle of the Bismarck Sea “one of the land-based aircraft can play a key role •• Despite the overwhelming success of most complete and annihilating combats in maritime interdiction the Americans at the Battle of Midway, of all time.”8 Similarly, one Japanese we must innovate and improvise •• the Japanese were still a force to be navy captain termed his country’s defeat to deal with current and urgent reckoned with in the Pacific after June in the battle as “unbelievable,” adding problems 1942, especially in the SWPA of opera- that “never was there such a debacle.”9 the enemy should be overwhelmed •• tions where they were ensconced in Operation 81 consisted of eight troop with multidomain threats. several key bases such as Rabaul. In transports and a similar number of de- While one can argue that the Allies at August 1942, the United States went stroyers as protective escorts.10 There were the Bismarck Sea engagement were more on the strategic offensive, with Marines 6,900 Japanese soldiers traveling with the akin to the A2/AD force by today’s defi- capturing Guadalcanal in the Solomon convoy from Rabaul, and they were meant nition of the term, their actions during the Islands. Over the next 6 months, the to be reinforcements for the vital garrison battle and the lessons learned are relevant Americans were embroiled in a fiercely in Lae, New Guinea, from which imperial to today’s counter-A2/AD forces. After fought campaign that saw both sides forces were trying to halt the Allied offen- all, the concept of A2/AD can work both taking heavy losses, but that the United sive in that former Australian territory (see ways. To illustrate, while the submarine States ultimately won. Concurrently, and map). Some 100 Japanese fighter planes
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ho 97 Part of cowling for B-25 bomber motor is assembled in engine department of North American Aviation’s plant in Inglewood, California, October 1942 (Library of Congress/Alfred T. Palmer) provided air cover for the convoy, though One scholar opines that the battle was during a conflict with a Great Power. the numbers overhead differed at vari- the turning point of the protracted New One student of the Bismarck Sea ous times. Operation 81 was detected on Guinea campaign, calling it the cam- engagement contends that it “still March 1, 1943, and almost 100 U.S. and paign’s “Midway.”11 In the same vein, stands as a striking example of the Australian bombers attacked the convoy in the authoritative postwar U.S. Strategic deadly effectiveness of land-based air the following days. Bombing Survey notes that regarding power against naval targets.”13 As the When the smoke had cleared, all the the SWPA, “From 1 March 1943 to the Allies did not have any aircraft carriers transports and four destroyers had been end of the war, the enemy remained on or major surface combatants in the area sunk. Of the 6,900 Japanese troops with the defensive, strategically and tactically, of operations at that time, aircraft flying the convoy, only 1,200 made it to Lae, except for desperate counterattacks by from New Guinea bases undertook while another 2,700 were rescued and separate and isolated units.”12 the task almost entirely of interdicting returned to Rabaul, from where they had Japanese convoy Operation 81. Prior come. The rest were killed. On the other Lesson One: Land-Based to the battle, the in-theater Allied air hand, the Allies lost only a handful of air- Aircraft Can Play a Key Role forces that comprised the U.S. Fifth craft. The Battle of the Bismarck Sea was in Maritime Interdiction Air Force and Royal Australian Air Japan’s last air offensive in the SWPA, This lesson is especially relevant today Force Command had a mixed record and it set the stage for the Allied offensive given the debate over how the United in attacking ships.14 The Battle of the in that theater from June 1943 onward. States could best fight for sea control Bismarck Sea changed that, and using
98 Recall / Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 tactics employed during the engage- commercial shipping exacted by shore- lines of communication open. Indeed, ment, the Allies prevented subsequent based airpower is higher when accounting the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean Japanese attempts at reinforcing their for the fact that sea mines, laid mainly by and the limited number of friendly bases positions in New Guinea. USAAF B-29 bombers, accounted for in that theater—for instance, Guam is While the Battle of the Bismarck Sea another 9.3 percent.18 over 2,000 kilometers away from the arguably marked the apogee of land- Land-based airpower proved its East and South China seas—would mean based aviation in the antisurface warfare worth in ASuW during World War II, that there will be a premium placed on (ASuW) role during World War II, there and Pentagon thinkers would do well to the extended striking reach of Air Force were also several other cases of terrestrial bear this in mind and let it complement “heavies.” airpower successfully attacking ships U.S. naval power in the quest to attain As much of the Joint Concept for during that conflict. Witness the deadli- maritime dominance in this age of Great Access and Maneuver in the Global ness of the Luftwaffe’s Focke-Wulf Fw Power rivalry. Terrestrial airpower could Commons (JAM-GC) is classified, one 200 Condor during the initial stages of help in efforts to nullify the surface war- may never know the true extent to which the Battle of the North Atlantic. This ship component of an adversary’s A2/ the Air Force is involved in the maritime medium bomber posed such a threat AD system. After all, land-based aircraft interdiction portfolio. What is known, to Allied convoys that British Premier possess a number of advantages over however, is that the Air Force has not Winston Churchill called it the “scourge their sea-based counterparts, especially in been practicing maritime strike frequently of the Atlantic.” Indeed, two retired terms of range and payload. To illustrate, since the end of the Cold War.19 This senior U.S. Navy officers, Wayne P. the mainstay U.S. naval strike fighter, state of affairs should be addressed. Hughes and Robert P. Girrier, assert the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, can Hughes and Girrier maintain that the that Luftwaffe head Hermann Goering’s deploy with a few antiship missiles out to neglect of dedicated training to this focus on land operations meant that several hundred kilometers away. In stark mission during World War II had con- “the service did not take as seriously the contrast, the Air Force’s intercontinental- tributed to the limitations of land-based ship-attack remit.”15 Consequently, “the ranged B-1B Lancer can carry up to 24 air against shipping during that conflict.20 possibility that Germany might wake up of the newly inducted long-range antiship This situation could well replicate itself to the opportunity haunted the harried missiles (LRASMs). With the Lancer set during a conflict involving the United Royal Navy throughout much of the to remain in service into the early 2030s, States and a Great Power adversary. war.”16 In the Pacific theater, Japanese the United States will retain a potent Given its long-range bomber capabilities, navy medium bombers flying from long-range ASuW capability for over a the Air Force should therefore seek to Indochinese bases decimated British decade with the B-1B/LRASM com- entrench itself more firmly in the ASuW Force Z with the sinking of the Prince of bination. Indeed, given the increasing business. The introduction of a standoff Wales and Repulse, marking the first oc- significance of the maritime domain, joint shallow-water mine capability to its B-52 casion where capital ships were sunk by force chiefs should also seriously consider complement that was shown during aircraft while they were under way at sea. the possibility of arming the upcoming Exercise Valiant Shield 2018 is a step in Allied land-based bombers proved equally B-21 Raider strategic bomber with anti- the right direction, as was the integration devastating during the campaign to ship weapons such as the LRASM. of the LRASM with the Air Force’s B-1B retake the Philippines from the Japanese. Another shortfall that sea-based air bombers.21 At the November 1944 Battle of Ormoc has is that U.S. carrier strike groups What should follow naturally from Bay, U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) me- (CSGs) may not be located near a crisis this is perhaps new iterations of the dium bombers inflicted substantial losses spot and may require a few days’ steam- Resultant Fury exercise that was held in on a Japanese troop convoy. ing to reach their destination. With 2004 and demonstrated the capability Moreover, the significance of Allied midair refueling, Air Force long-range of Air Force heavy bombers to attack land-based airpower in the ASuW role bombers based even in the continental moving targets at sea with laser-guided during the Pacific War is often under- United States can, however, provide pres- bombs.22 Future Resultant Fury–like stated as it is commonly believed that ence, albeit temporary, in most parts of drills would do well to incorporate the sea-based aviation was the key player in the world within half a day. To be certain, LRASM and more challenging conditions this respect. To be sure, carrier planes critics can argue that heavy bombers like so as to simulate a major war contin- were behind the destruction of much the B-1B by themselves are highly vul- gency. Such are the options provided by of the imperial fleet. The U.S. Strategic nerable to enemy fighters, but the long a long-range bomber force. In fact, the Bombing Survey reveals, however, that striking reach of their weapons (such as noted defense analyst Robert Haddick land-based aircraft accounted for 14.5 the LRASM) would enable them to stay has argued rather heretically for the U.S. percent of Japanese merchantmen losses, farther out within any A2/AD envelope. Navy to possess such a capability to bet- which is only slightly lower than the cor- Moreover, the socioeconomic well-being ter counter China’s burgeoning A2/ responding figure of 16.3 percent for of America’s key strategic rival, China, AD edifice.23 In the same vein, other carrier aviation.17 The toll on Japanese is highly dependent on keeping its sea commentators, echoing former Deputy
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ho 99 Defense Secretary Robert Work, have was a testament to adaptability,” adding for Maintaining Maritime Superiority called for the B-1B being transferred to that “the weapons and tactics perfected in that due to budgetary pressures in the the Navy as a “sea control bomber” that the first months of 1943 were a tremen- foreseeable future, “[we] will not be able focuses on maritime strike rather than dous success because Fifth Air Force’s to ‘buy’ our way out of the challenges we being retired in the 2030s.24 airmen quickly and willingly adapted face,” adding that “the budget environ- themselves and their aircraft to the battle ment will force tough choices but must Lesson Two: Innovate and at hand.”27 also inspire new thinking.”34 And new Improvise to Deal with Current The lesson from this aspect of the thinking was exactly what the Allies in the and Urgent Problems Bismarck Sea engagement vis-à-vis the SWPA did in March 1943, much to the The next takeaway from the Battle counter-A2/AD discourse is that inno- detriment of Japanese convoy Operation of the Bismarck Sea is that innova- vating and making do with what one has 81. Modern U.S. Armed Forces have tion and improvisation could be key on hand could make much operational gone down this path of innovation and in allowing one side to gain an edge sense because they could mitigate—at improvisation before, with one good in military competition. The battle is least in the short term—some of the example being the transformation of four noted for the perfection of emerging shortfalls that the U.S. Navy is currently Ohio-class strategic submarines into cruise tactics that Allied fliers adopted against facing. There are currently doubts over missile platforms. Modifying the SM-6 Japanese vessels. One innovative tactic the survivability of U.S. CSGs in the surface-to-air missile to have a ship-attack used was skip-bombing, whereby an face of modern A2/AD capabilities. For capability is another.35 At the end of the airplane dropped its bombs from a low instance, there is much talk about U.S. day, while it is well and good to have new altitude so that their forward trajec- carrier strike aircraft lacking the range to platforms and systems, there is a need tory would make them skip along the strike at an adversary without exposing to, in the words of former Chairman of sea surface like a stone and impact on their motherships to threats.28 The Navy the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford, the side of the enemy ship. To be sure, has taken steps to address this capability “get the right balance between today’s skip-bombing was not entirely new, as gap with the upcoming MQ-25 Stingray capabilities and tomorrow’s capabilities the British had used it in the European unmanned aerial tanker, but it will take so we can maintain that competitive theater with some success; however, the many years before it comes into active advantage.”36 first decisive use of this tactic had to service. Reinstating the mothballed S-3 All in all, the Battle of the Bismarck be credited to the Allies who perfected Viking to serve as an aerial tanker is an- Sea shows how having bold thinkers who it during the Battle of the Bismarck other sensible measure being put forth to can improvise and overcome the chal- Sea.25 Allied airmen also modified the mitigate the A2/AD conundrum,29 as is lenges presented by the enemy on the B-25 Mitchell medium bomber to help the proposal to retrofit the SM-6 surface- battlefield is a force multiplier. However, it suppress enemy antiaircraft fire as it to-air missile to the F/A-18 Hornet to in today’s dynamic and rapidly advancing made its low-level attacking run. This enhance its counter-air capabilities.30 In world, technologies that are new today involved installing eight forward-firing the same vein, introducing the airborne could be outdated and replaced in a year 0.50-caliber machine guns on the plane early warning and control variant of the or two, so there is a definite need for that enabled it to carry out a combina- V-22 Osprey is one way to enhance the thinkers who can keep pace with these tion strafing/bombing attack. The A-20 survivability of U.S. amphibious forces changes or even think one step ahead Havoc light bomber was similarly modi- against access-denial threats.31 Seemingly in the quest to attain and maintain the fied to have six 0.50-caliber weapons heretical ideas, such as that of converting edge. In this light, the following observa- firing ahead. Prior to this, heavy merchant ships into cruise missile shoot- tion cannot be truer: “Innovative teams bombers such as the B-17 Flying For- ers, should also be assessed.32 After all, in and individuals able to integrate current tress were used in the low-level antiship- an operationally challenging and uncer- resources in new ways or to creatively ping role in the SWPA, but they were tain milieu like today’s, all options should make the most of technological advances vulnerable to antiaircraft fire given their be considered. are critical for corporate and government lack of forward-firing guns to suppress What is viable about such proposals is success in solving wicked problems. . . . enemy gunners.26 that they are not about the introduction If we cannot find those solutions, others The results of these innovations were of entirely new capabilities—a process will do so and lead the way into a disrup- devastating for Operation 81, as the straf- that is invariably drawn out and expen- tive future.”37 ing runs of these up-gunned bombers sive—but about making do with what caused significant topside casualties and one has at hand. In a nod to this line of Lesson Three: Overwhelm damage among Japanese ships, leaving reasoning, the National Security Strategy the Enemy with Massed them more vulnerable to bombing runs. contends that “Where possible, we must and Multidimensional/ Writing about the U.S. contribution to improve existing systems to maximize Vectored Threats the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, Matthew returns on prior investments.”33 Similarly, Robert Kaplan once stated, “Never Rodman fittingly notes that “the battle Admiral Richardson stresses in A Design provide your adversary with only a few
100 Recall / Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Air Force B-1B Lancer, assigned to 37th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron and deployed from Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, lands at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, as part of continuous bomber presence mission, December 4, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Richard P. Ebensberger)
problems to solve . . . because if you involving antiaccess and counter-anti- RAAF Beaufighters.42 The effectiveness do, he’ll solve them.”38 Several decades access forces, he stresses.40 of the multipronged Allied attacks was before the noted strategic affairs com- While the Bismarck Sea encounter such that one pilot described Japanese mentator made this point, U.S. and does not evince a cross-domain approach defensive fire at his plane during the Australian fliers coupled this maxim in the true sense of the term given its encounter as “practically nil.”43 Hence, of overwhelming the enemy together predominant airplane-versus-ship nature, according to Rodman, the Bismarck Sea with the innovations just described to it does show the benefits of a multidi- operation was “a triumph of coordinated devastate Japanese forces during the rectional modus operandi. During the bomber assault against a determined and Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Therein lies battle, Allied aircraft executed their well-defended enemy convoy. With the the third and final lesson from the battle coordinated attacks from various heights incorporation of modified medium and vis-à-vis maintaining U.S. maritime to befuddle as well as diffuse enemy light bombers designed specifically for dominance: joint force leaders should defenses. To illustrate, there were air- low-altitude attack, other platforms could draw up operational concepts that lever- craft dropping ordnance from medium move back to higher altitudes. As a result, age mass and different dimensions to altitude. While these bombs were less the Japanese convoy found it almost defeat the enemy in a sea-control fight. likely to hit Japanese vessels, the convoy impossible to mount a proper defense, In other words, they should harness was forced to break defensive formation simply overwhelmed by the multiaxis, cross-domain synergy, which, in the and take evasive action.41 This essentially multialtitude bomber attacks.”44 words of Sam J. Tangredi, is “the ability “kicked the door open” for the devastat- The amassing of airpower against to strike the enemy simultaneously or ing skip-bombing and strafing runs at Japanese convoy Operation 81 also con- sequentially from dominant positions in low altitudes. According to the official tributed significantly to Allied victory. all combat mediums or domains in such Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) re- Prior to the engagement, few Allied air a way that operations in each domain lease on the battle, “Enemy crews were attacks involved coordinated multisquad- provide mutual support for each slain beside their guns, deck cargo burst ron action.45 The Battle of the Bismarck other.”39 This synergy (or lack of it) will into flame, superstructures toppled and Sea, however, involved 16 squadrons, determine the outcome of any scenario burned” as a result of strafing runs by and the various waves of attackers were
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ho 101 F/A-18E Super Hornet assigned to “Eagles” of strike fighter squadron 115 transits Bismarck Sea en route to Royal Australian Air Force Base Townsville, Queensland, Australia, during exercise Black Dagger, March 24, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Chris Pagenkopf) coordinated to strike just moments apart, joint force planners must dare to think quest to negate U.S. military superiority delivering a large pulse of firepower to differently. In this respect, the National in wartime. For instance, the People’s the enemy.46 In fact, much of the devasta- Defense Strategy is right on the mark Liberation Army (PLA) is believed to tion the Japanese suffered took place on when it argues for “chang[ing] . . . the have drawn up plans involving forces at- the morning of March 3—just 1 day of way we organize and employ forces” tacking from multiple dimensions—land, the entire battle. and “developing operational concepts to surface, sub-surface, and air—and vectors Today, many believe that the U.S. sharpen our competitive advantages and to overwhelm U.S. maritime forces. This military has lost the ability to overwhelm enhance our lethality.”47 That being said, involves pitting high-density, cheaper, enemies. Part of that mindset is likely the U.S. naval forces must plan for challeng- and more expendable assets against the lack of resistance encountered during op- ing the integrated, layered defenses of U.S. Navy battle force, which largely has erations carried out after 2001. Another near-peer rivals, and this is far removed the opposite of these characteristics and reason is the collective U.S. obsession from handling the relatively weak systems the magazine capacities of which could be with fewer numbers of large, highly of extremist groups and Third World depleted rapidly during a high-intensity expensive—read much less expendable— nations. To this end, Washington should missile exchange. James Holmes and platforms. How can you present massed, reconsider the U.S. way of war that Toshi Yoshihara note that “PLA satura- multidimensional/vectored threats to emphasizes qualities such as agility and tion attacks will involve the concerted the enemy when you simply do not have precision over overwhelming force à la use of cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic enough numbers? the application of Allied airpower during missiles; aerial attack from manned and With the return of Great Power the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. unmanned warplanes, mines; torpedo competition and the concomitant quest The likes of China and Russia are attack; electronic warfare and cyber war- to reestablish maritime dominance, emphasizing the latter attribute in their fare.”48 As an example, they postulate that
102 Recall / Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 an aerial missile attack “would compel Syria, where U.S., British, and French Nevertheless, the fundamental challenges U.S. tacticians to look skyward while air and naval forces attacked the Bashar presented by a Great Power competitor Kilo-class diesel boats loosed salvoes of al-Asad regime from the Mediterranean, remain the same, and the battle offers wake-homing torpedoes . . . against U.S. Red Sea, and Persian Gulf. After the op- ample food for thought for Pentagon surface combatants from below.”49 In eration, Admiral Richardson stated that leaders in terms of coming up with a vi- fact, this scenario somehow mirrors what the U.S. Navy was studying the lessons able operational concept (think JAM-GC happened during the opening stages of learned to better prep itself for higher and related concepts), not only as a the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, when intensity conflict.52 One hopes the Service warfighting implement but also to act as medium-altitude bombing runs paved the has noted that the three-pronged, three- a deterrent during peacetime against A2/ way for the low-level devastating attacks dimensional (there was also a submarine AD-centric near-peer rivals. discussed earlier in this article. Therefore, involved) nature of the attack had con- All in all, the three key takeaways of Washington would do well to take a cue tributed to the overwhelming of Syrian the Battle of the Bismarck Sea may seem from Beijing in its endeavor to obtain air defenses, much like Allied aircraft trite at first glance, but a deeper look maritime superiority in the face of A2/ did during the Battle of the Bismarck will arguably show their worth in the AD and adopt even more actively a cross- Sea 76 years ago. All that being said, the discourse to preserve the exalted U.S. domain approach to maritime operations. Army and the Air Force have publicly status of primus inter pares in the mari- After all, such an approach would greatly committed to MDO, but the Navy has time domain. Going forward, Admiral facilitate breaking the “walls” of an A2/ not.53 This situation does not bode well Richardson in Version 2.0 has alluded to AD-centric peer competitor, such as its for the U.S. military’s goal of achieving a large-scale exercise in 2020 that will integrated air defense systems. cross-domain synergy, as MDO cannot seek to test the Distributed Maritime Fortunately, the United States has become an official joint concept of all the Operations concept, as well as deliver an taken a few tentative steps in the right Services and it will not be encapsulated in “initial cross-domain solution.”55 While direction. For a start, U.S. ground forces, the joint force’s budgeting, procurement, not much is currently known about the which have hitherto been left out of and doctrine.54 exercise, the joint force would do well the counter-A2/AD calculus, are finally to incorporate, if possible, land-based being factored in. This can be seen in the Conclusion bombers as well as the capabilities of all promulgation of concepts such as the Military entities can be prone to inertia, Services into this particular drill as per the Marines Corps expeditionary advanced and the Armed Forces are no exception. first and third lessons, respectively. The base operations, where they would In the face of extant and emerging A2/ U.S. sea services have arguably lost their help the Navy establish sea control.50 It AD systems that could seriously under- high-end warfighting edge in the long also bears notice that the U.S. Army is mine U.S. control of the seas, Pentagon calm lee of the end of the Cold War. With forging into doctrine the multidomain leaders should step up their game in the military edge of the United States fast operations (MDO) concept that will see addressing this issue. To be sure, the eroding in relation to its strategic com- the Service operating against near-peer U.S. sea services have taken some action petitors, the Nation must adapt to this enemies in nonpermissive environments in this respect, but perhaps more could new reality by taking more appropriate across all domains—land, sea, air, space, be done. To this end, while it is always measures or risk coming to grief. JFQ and cyber.51 In a nod to this new concept, good to think of novel ideas, it is often the Army fired an antiship missile at a instructive to look to history, especially sea target during the 2018 Rim of the some of its less famous episodes, for Notes Pacific exercise. Facing the possibility takeaways. Indeed, such lessons are of 1 of attack from different dimensions, the immense value and free for learning, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White adversary’s operational and tactical pic- provided they are considered. House, 2017), 2, available at
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ho 103 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval cvAIoKR3lCz5zszLI3_gZiU6EJ0-5Jj8Y12t5K- 40 Ibid., 182. Operations, December 2018), 3. 8ouYE>. 41 Gilbert, The Battle of the Bismarck Sea, 4 Richardson, A Design for Maintaining 25 Matthew K. Rodman, A War of Their 46. Superiority, Version 1.0, 6. Own: Bombers Over the Southwest Pacific (Max- 42 Quoted in Alan Stephens, “The Battle of 5 Richardson, A Design for Maintaining well Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, the Bismarck Sea,” The Central Blue, March 2, Superiority, Version 2.0, 4. 2005), 36, available at 104 Recall / Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 comparisons are drawn with contempo- other extreme social groups, months of rary and historical terrorist groups, too. intense positive reinforcement, rewards, While the strength of the book lies in its “insider” identity markers, routiniza- interdisciplinary approach, the analysis tion of violence, and military and Sharia sometimes muddies the distinction be- training teaches children to be passion- tween children as terrorists and children ate participants in the movement and as soldiers. to shame those who express doubt. As Children play a wide variety of roles Small Arms makes clear, parents in the as informants, spies, peer recruiters, Islamic State played a disturbing and executioners, jihadi brides, frontline central role in radicalizing their own fighters, and suicide bombers. The main children. difference between child soldiers and This raises a “ticking time bomb” terrorists, however, is the recruitment dilemma in that children associated with process, which Bloom and Horgan terrorist groups may present an ongo- examine in detail. While both are drawn ing security risk in a manner atypical of into conflict for similar reasons, children children associated with other armed in terrorist groups are more likely to be groups. While these children usually lack supported by the community, religious formal education, skills learned under leaders, peers, and family. The authors the Islamic State are transferrable to do well in recognizing that while these other criminal enterprises. Recidivism children are victims, some have also for these young people could include perpetrated heinous crimes, and they do not only re-engagement but also other Small Arms: Children not assume a one-size-fits-all process for forms of violence and criminality. and Terrorism addressing their actions. While the Department of Defense has Contemporary scholarship regard- expressed interest in deradicalization ac- By Mia Bloom with John Horgan ing children’s involvement in terrorist tivities in Iraqi and Syrian refugee camps Cornell University Press, 2019 groups tends to revolve around chil- where foreign women and children may 248 pp. $27.95 dren’s victimhood. While Small Arms become more radicalized over time, it ISBN: 978-0801453885 does play to an emotional dimension, is not currently a priority. Countering Reviewed by Kira I. McFadden the scholarship is sound and should violent extremism requires that planners evoke concern about the future of ter- examine the process of radicalization and rorism and efforts to combat it. First, institute measures for deradicalization, ach year, tens of thousands of terrorist groups will continue to recruit reintegration, and repatriation. At the youths under the age of 18 take children because they provide opera- same time, security concerns should not E part in armed conflicts. Yet the tional advantages. Children, especially influence the question of accountability use of children in war, particularly in girls, are able to move more freely and for past acts of terrorism. acts of terrorism, remains woefully attract less suspicion than adult males, Small Arms is a must-read for understudied and not well understood. making them useful as spies and suicide policymakers and planners working on In Small Arms: Children and Terror- bombers. Child martyrs and preach- counterterrorism strategy, particularly ism, political scientist Mia Bloom with ers are powerful recruitment tools to those grappling with how to work with psychologist John Horgan compare shame those with wavering allegiances. regional partners to mitigate the fallout children in terrorist organizations and Physically, children are also well suited from the Islamic State. With so little ex- child soldiers, examining how children for bomb making and hard labor. isting political science scholarship in this are recruited, trained, and exploited, Perhaps more concerning is the arena, Bloom and Horgan earn the du- as well as how their experiences shape implication of rigorous indoctrination bious distinction of providing the most reintegration and rehabilitation efforts. and exploitation for the endurance of comprehensive overview of children and Drawing on in-depth field research, extremist ideology. The generational na- terrorism. Their “white paper” recom- as well as new primary and secondary ture of terrorism—strategies, ideologies, mendations for effectively countering sources, the authors offer detailed case resource streams, and alliances learned violent extremism among children, all of studies to illustrate the phenomenon of and strengthened in one conflict tend to which require integrating interagency, children in terrorist groups. Organized appear in the next—is well documented. nongovernmental, and foreign partners, around chapters depicting various di- Bloom and Horgan’s most important should generate considerable discussion. mensions to the life cycle of the child contribution is detailing the process by The role of family, including children, terrorist, Small Arms’ thematic focus is which children under the Islamic State in terrorism must be understood if we on the so-called Islamic State, although “learn terrorism.” As with cults and are to combat cyclical violence and the JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Book Reviews 105 resurgence of the Islamic State. Small alliance adapt to meet the challenges decades after World War II, the United Arms is one of only a few pieces of schol- that threaten our security and shared States provided Japan with security arship to examine the long-term challenge values. Japan Rearmed: The Politics of guarantees in exchange for basing rights of children in terrorist organizations. Military Power examines how Japan and economic assistance. Smith’s diag- While the authors admit much remains is responding to the challenges of nosis suggests that historic cooperation unknown, this book is an excellent dive Chinese military modernization, a is now called into question because of into an underexamined issue and a must rogue regime in North Korea, and the changing threat environment and read for those working to end genera- environmental crisis by improving the current alliance structure. The U.S.- tional cycles of violent extremism. JFQ Japanese Self Defense Force’s (SDF) Japan alliance differs from the Nortah joint structure and, politically, by Atlantic Treaty Organization and the adapting the Japanese constitution to U.S.–Republic of Korea alliance because Kira I. McFadden is a Research Analyst in the support the SDF’s engagement in the the U.S.-Japan alliance has no combined Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Indo-Pacific and beyond. As the book command structure or contingency makes clear, the security interests of plans. Moreover, the SDF’s ability to the United States and Japan are closely adapt remains constrained by lack of intertwined. command structure and planning, let Sheila A. Smith, a Senior Fellow for alone by restrictions against using mili- Japan Studies at the Council of Foreign tary force. Politicians, especially Prime Relations, analyzes Japan’s position as a Minister Abe Shinzo, seek to alter this cornerstone of the Indo-Pacific alliance. through revisions to the 1947 constitu- Smith is objective in her assessment of tion. However, modifications, even new the alliance, and the book is unique in interpretations, are strenuously disputed its focus on the relationship between in the National Diet of Japan. the SDF, Japanese politics, and Japan’s The Japanese constitution’s Article alliance commitments. It is an exemplary 9 is the central legislative guidance for work, drawing on an array of primary civil-military relations and the regula- sources, government documents, and tion of military force. It states that the a deep understanding of Japanese his- “Japanese people forever renounce war tory to produce a comprehensive and as a sovereign right.” During the Cold engaging analysis. The only substantive War, Japan could rely on U.S. nuclear criticism one might levy is the sparse deterrence to provide national security, assessment of changes in the U.S.-Japan so revising Article 9 and deploying the alliance as a result of the Vietnam War SDF was largely unnecessary. Today, and rapprochement with China after however, changes in the threat environ- 1972. Readers unfamiliar with those ment have forced debate in the National events will benefit from her suggested Diet concerning not only reinterpret- reading list. ing Article 9 but also creating the laws Established in 1954, Japan’s SDF required to permit the SDF to deploy faced restrictions against collective beyond the Japanese archipelago. The Japan Rearmed: The security participation and offensive SDF’s support for Iraqi reconstruc- Politics of Military Power operations because of Japan’s actions tion demonstrates how Japanese law By Sheila A. Smith during World War II. While Smith adapted in the past and may adapt again Harvard University Press, 2019 provides enough history to contextual- for future deployments. This issue of 352 pp. $29.95 ize contemporary advancements, her deployment, along with greater respon- ISBN: 978-0674987647 focus centers on explaining how Japan sibilities and self-reliance for the SDF, is adapting to new threats, primarily are central debates in Japan today. Reviewed by Nathaniel L. Moir through constitutional interpretations While Smith devotes ample atten- that permit increased collective security tion to the Chinese and North Korean cooperation. These changes are evolving threats, she also provides a unique look ccording to the June 2019 quickly as Chinese and North Korean at the role of the SDF in environmental Indo-Pacific Strategy, the U.S.- threats to Japan metastasize. As a result, crisis management. This aspect is central Japan alliance is the cornerstone A Smith emphasizes the evolution of the for arguments underpinning efforts to of peace and prosperity in the Indo- SDF and regional alliances after 1989. revise Article 9. The Great Hanshin Pacific. The strategy also explains why The end of the Cold War com- earthquake of 1995, the Fukushima nu- it is imperative that the U.S.-Japan plicated the U.S.-Japan alliance. For clear disaster, and the recent devastation 106 Book Reviews JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 of Chiba by a typhoon in October 2019 extraordinary influence on American have necessitated broader interpreta- foreign and national security policy. tions of national security that require Gans, a former chief speechwriter the capabilities of the SDF in ways the for Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, architects of Article 9 did not envision. draws on interviews, oral histories, and Smith argues convincingly that Japan’s declassified archives to provide a me- ability to increase its crisis management ticulously researched insider view of the capability will entail SDF expansion NSC. Gans explores its evolution and and greater freedom of action. These growing influence from the trials of the changes are not uncontested politically Truman administration to the tribula- but are emerging out of necessity and tions of the Trump administration. He come with broad implications for the spotlights the NSC staff during critical U.S.-Japan alliance. moments in history, using case studies Japan Rearmed is not prescriptive, to examine the influence of regular staff but Smith does an extraordinary job of- on the development of national security fering a diagnosis of the many challenges policy and raising perennial questions ahead for the SDF and U.S.-Japan alli- about the efficiency and structure of the ance. For national security professionals organization, as well as the centraliza- and those in the joint force focused on tion of power and the need for greater the region, Japan Rearmed is the most transparency. authoritative account available on the The case studies aptly demonstrate SDF, its political, organizational, and the strengths and weaknesses of different legal challenges, as well as a reminder of White House Warriors: staff compositions and organizational the importance of U.S.-Japan coopera- How the National Security types. Gans argues that effectiveness de- tion in the Indo-Pacific. JFQ Council Transformed the pended on a manageable size and diverse American Way of War mixture of officials (staff on temporary duty from the military, intelligence, By John Gans Dr. Nathaniel L. Moir is an Ernest May academic, and diplomatic communities, Postdoctoral Fellow in History and Policy in Liveright Publishing Corporation, etc.) with an effective National Security the Belfer Center for Science and International 2019 Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Advisor. Gans highlights General Brent 299 pp. $28.95 Government, Harvard University. Scowcroft, the only man to be National ISBN: 978-1631494567 Security Advisor under two different Reviewed by Edward G. Salo Presidents, as running the most effec- tive NSC. Scowcroft had served on the Tower Commission investigating the ver the past several years, the Iran Contra scandal, which resulted position of the National Secu- from the NSC overstepping its role, a O rity Advisor has been subject to concern that has persistently dogged sensational media attention. From war the NSC. Gans also points to the NSC hawks to war heroes, recent national in the second term of George W. Bush’s security advisors routinely command administration as successful, highlight- the headlines. While media attention ing its instrumental role in guiding the centers on their singular power to Surge in Iraq. While other administra- shape foreign policy, we have ignored tions had some success, many were the members of the National Security crippled by either micromanagement, Council (NSC) staff who work tire- an ineffective National Security Advisor, lessly behind the scenes to craft that or distrust among the Cabinet-level policy. In White House Warriors: How departments that inhibited effective the National Security Council Trans- coordination. formed the American Way of War, In addition to his comprehensive John Gans explores how the NSC staff organizational analysis, Gans succeeds evolved from a group of clerks tasked in putting human faces on an otherwise with recording meetings and passing obscure piece of the national security proposals to a cadre of national secu- enterprise. For example, he highlights rity professionals, sometimes wielding the work of Richard Haass, a regular JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Book Reviews 107 staffer, who became an architect of successfully conveys the NSC’s dedica- much of the policy during the first tion to keeping the Nation safe from New from NDU Persian Gulf War. Likewise, Gans starts threats we do not yet know exist. White the book by introducing the reader to House Warriors is an important read for Press Meghan O’Sullivan, a staffer who helped national security professionals looking for the Center for Strategic Research redevelop the strategy during the 2003 to peer behind the curtain of the foreign Strategic Forum 304 war in Iraq after the initial failures of policy and national security decision- Baltics Left of Bang: Nordic Total the conflict. This focus on individuals making process. JFQ Defense and Implications for the strengthens the argument that the NSC Baltics Sea Region works best when staffers are empowered By Håkon Lunde Saxi, Bengt as “honest brokers” and that “nameless Dr. Edward G. Salo is an Assistant Professor Sundelius, and Brett Swaney and Historic Preservationist at Arkansas State staff” can have a significant influence on University. The efforts national policy and the way the Nation of Norway, engages in conflict. Sweden, and While the selective use of case studies Finland to effectively demonstrates the strengths enhance soci- and weaknesses of the NSC as a policy etal resilience coordinating body, it lacks attention to through the role of the NSC in crisis manage- unique “total ment. A close look at NSC influence defense” during the Iranian hostage crisis or and “comprehensive security” the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for initiatives are unlikely to change example, would have provided a more the near-term strategic calculus balanced perspective. of Russia. Over time, however, White House Warriors is an impor- a concerted application of total tant read for the joint force at all levels. defense in harmony with Article 3 The lessons learned can serve as a guide of the North Atlantic Treaty will to future officers serving on the NSC aid in the resilience to, and deter- or at regional commands. Gans offers rence of, Russian hostile measures up colorful anecdotes of how the NSC and hybrid warfare, and serve worked most efficiently when it was as a complement to a regional empowered to find solutions. Of course, denial-based deterrence strategy. each Presidential administration is differ- The Nordic states could “export” ent, and there is no roadmap of what to resilience to the greater Baltic Sea expect. Many administrations intended Region by strengthening participa- to reform or reduce the size of the NSC, tion in European Union energy yet its size and influence continued to and infrastructure projects with the expand. When paired with autobiogra- Baltic states, amplifying efforts to phies of national security advisors, the connect infrastructure links among full scope and influence of the NSC is allies and partners and decouple illuminated. Nerve Center: Inside the from adversaries. White House Situation Room (University of Nebraska Press, 2004) by Michael Bohn would complement White House Warriors by exploring the role of the NSC as a conduit and gatekeeper of in- formation to the President and his aides. Today, the need for an efficient and effective NSC supported by dedicated staff is paramount. Gans demonstrates the importance of experts with bureau- cratic, functional, and area expertise to maintain a strong national security Visit the NDU Press Web site for policy. Rather than the threat to democ- more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu racy many see in these officials, Gans 108 Book Reviews JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 U.S. military relief efforts in Haiti 4 days after January 12, 2010, earthquake (DOD/Fred W. Baker III) could face when operating in a megacity Failed Megacities and would stretch the limits of U.S. military support to humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR) operations. Although joint doctrine addresses the the Joint Force subject of traditional urban terrain, it neglects to address the highly complex By Matthew N. Metzel, Todd J. McCubbin, Heidi B. Fouty, Ken G. Morris, challenges associated with megacities. John J. Gutierrez, and John Lorenzen Given the potential crisis of a failed megacity, the probability for military support, and the risk associated with inadequate doctrine, the Department n what might become one of the densely populated urban areas are of of Defense (DOD) must develop joint greatest international challenges of such size and scale that they create new doctrine that adequately addresses the the 21st century, sociologists have challenges requiring careful consid- I challenges posed by operations in a documented a dramatic shift in popula- eration by both civilian and military failed megacity. tion centers termed megacities.1 These planners. The problems the joint force There are several key points that un- derscore the need to develop joint force doctrine to address failed megacities. First, Colonel Matthew N. Metzel, USAR, is Director of Army Reserve Affairs at Headquarters, U.S. Army Japan, Camp Zama. Major General Todd J. McCubbin, USAF, is the Mobilization Assistant to the megacities should be categorized differ- Commander of Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Florida. Colonel Heidi B. Fouty, ently than other urban terrain due to the USAR, is in the 416th Theater Engineer Command. Major Ken G. Morris, USAR, is in the U.S. Army size and scale of those affected by either th Reserve–Civil Affairs, Human Resource Command. Major John J. Gutierrez, USMCR, is in the 4 Marine 2 Division of the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. Mr. John Lorenzen, USA, is an Instructor at the U.S. Army natural or man-made disasters. Second, Command and General Staff College. existing joint doctrine does not adequately JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Metzel et al. 109 Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory executed Dense Urban Operations limited operational experiment 2019 called Project Metropolis II, with Marines assigned to 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment; squad-size element from 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment; and British Royal Marines assigned to 8 Troop Charlie Company, at Muscatatuck Urban Training Center, Indiana, August 20, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Matt Lyman) address the problem of conducting opera- Finally, given these key points, U.S. leaders for best practices by both civilian and tions within an urban environment with a will likely need to quickly employ joint military planners. population of 10 million or more people.3 force capabilities to support humanitarian For the first time in recorded history, Third, megacities will become more com- assistance operations for failed megacities more than half of the world’s population monplace in developing nations and, due to protect U.S. interests abroad. lives in an urban environment, with over to the weight of economic and humani- 8 percent of mankind now living in one tarian needs, cause an increase in social Megacities: Definition of the world’s 37 megacities.10 The 10 destabilization.4 Fourth, unstable nation- and Problem largest megacities are: states will exploit potential migration crises General Mark Milley stated that the Tokyo-Yokohama (38 million) from failed megacities in an effort to re- joint force is insufficiently prepared for •• Jakarta (32 million) ceive political favors and financial aid from operational activity in megacities.8 His •• Delhi (27 million) the international community.5 Fifth, vio- words of caution signal the need for •• Manila (25 million) lent extremist and criminal organizations military leaders to develop joint doc- •• Seoul-Incheon (24 million) will persist in and leverage ungoverned trine that adequately addresses opera- •• Shanghai (24 million) spaces in megacities to achieve their politi- tions within this highly complex terrain. •• Mumbai (23 million) cal and economic objectives.6 Sixth, these Megacities are defined as areas of con- •• New York City (22 million) organizations will leverage migration tinuous urban development that contain •• Beijing (21 million) activity from megacities by embedding over 10 million people.9 These large and •• Sao Paulo (21 million).11 themselves within and recruiting from densely populated areas create new chal- •• displaced civilian populations in order lenges that require careful consideration In 1990, New York ranked as the to breach established security measures.7 second largest city in the world, with Los 110 Joint Doctrine / Failed Megacities and the Joint Force JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Angeles ranking eighth. By 2018, New prehensive review of urban operations.16 intelligence are critical components, York dropped to the eighth largest, while Since then, General Milley and, before but doctrine should better address the Los Angeles slipped to seventeenth.12 his retirement in July 2019, Marine significant differences between operating These statistics show that the developing Corps Commandant General Robert in megacities and operating in traditional world is outpacing Western population Neller openly stated their shared goal to urban centers. growth in dramatic fashion. For example, improve urban operations doctrine in In 2017, a RAND report addressed China now holds the largest number order to address the challenges of mili- the concern of military operations in of megacities (four), with an additional tary operations in megacities.17 megacities by looking at five recent con- eight cities on the cusp of megacity Joint urban operations (JUO) doc- flicts in urban environments.22 The report status.13 trine is largely silent on the subject of stated, the “Army is not ready to fight The reason megacities matter to the megacities and provides only a general in urban combat. Its doctrine, tactics, joint force is tied to the scope and scale overview of items to consider when and training have not absorbed the les- of these large and potentially ungoverned conducting military operations, primarily sons these case studies [the five recent spaces. The enormous challenges that combat operations, in an urban setting. conflicts] teach. In part, this is because military leaders faced during humanitar- Joint doctrine does discuss the chal- urban combat is messy and destructive ian assistance efforts following the 2010 lenges of what it describes as the “urban and seen as something to be avoided.”23 earthquake that struck Port-au-Prince, triad,” which consists of three significant However, two common mitigation Haiti, would pale by comparison if a challenges for military operations in an themes emerged from RAND’s research similar earthquake struck a megacity. urban environment. The triad includes into urban operational requirements that Port-au-Prince ranks as a relatively small man-made physical terrain—the buildings can aid in preparing for future urban urban population of just over 2.8 million and layout of the urban area; population conflict, and both may apply to urban (globally, Port-au-Prince ranks 176th in size and density—the magnitude of the HA/DR operations. First, maintaining population).14 A natural disaster disrupt- population size, and the density/layout a mobile protected firepower capability ing a megacity, such as Lagos, Nigeria, of the population; and infrastructure when conducting urban operations is a with a population of 13.9 million people, that the area/city depends on for basic necessity for combat operations and force or Seoul-Incheon, with 24 million inhab- operations—utilities that include sewer, protection.24 Second, forces need to be itants, would lead to exponentially more power, and communications.18 The triad creative and adaptive and exploit intel- damage.15 Military capabilities would be is not only significant for planning urban ligence to gain the desired operational consumed relatively quickly under the operations, but it is also exponentially effect.25 This recent research suggests that sheer size and scale of any such response more critical in a megacity environment. current JUO doctrine and the Army’s operation. Joint Publication (JP) 3-06, Joint Urban Field Manual 3-06, Urban Operations, Given the gaps in current joint Operations, uses the term megacities are largely inadequate to address complex doctrine in addressing the significant to warn that criminal groups operating military operations involved in response challenges of a potential failed megacity within this type of urban terrain have the to a failed megacity.26 such as Lagos, leaders should prioritize potential to gain significantly more power In a 2015 article from Parameters, the development of relevant doctrine over the population in a short amount the authors point out that a megacity to the threat of failed megacities. The of time than those who operate within “can be best described as systems of urbanization of populations across the rural settings.19 The triad would serve as systems, comparable to a living organism. globe and the resulting concentration of fundamental to criminal groups gaining They are dynamic environments that threats to millions of people in relatively control, but be difficult for joint forces to change not only block by block, but day confined areas pose a problem that mili- wrest from them. to day.”27 The authors discuss five com- tary leaders have traditionally tried to In addition, JP 3-06 highlights a plex challenges presented by megacities avoid because of the associated risks. A few critical points that could apply to that are either not adequately addressed natural or man-made disaster in a megac- both urban and megacity operations. or not addressed at all in current JUO ity such as Lagos would prove to be a For example, it discusses the critical doctrine. These five challenges include: complex disaster in an unknown or, more nature of understanding the operational regional and international intercon- likely, hostile operational environment. environment and the joint intelligence •• nectedness and centers of gravity preparation of this environment.20 It (not addressed) Joint Urban Operations also emphasizes that urban operations extended urban infrastructures sup- Doctrine and Megacities should be a coordinated effort with •• porting dense, diverse populations In 2013, former Army Chief of all political, military, economic, social, (partially addressed in joint doctrine) Staff General Ray Odierno directed infrastructure, and information elements formal and informal sources of power the Army’s Training and Doctrine and across all instruments of national •• (not addressed) Command (TRADOC) to study the power.21 Understanding the operational problem of megacities as part of a com- environment and the collaboration of JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Metzel et al. 111 Octávio Frias de Oliveira bridge, commonly known as “Ponte Estaiada,” spans Pinheiros River, February 3, 2015, São Paulo, Brazil (Courtesy Emilio García) •• congested and constraining terrain and lists eight short references to the doctrine for a highly probable future (partially addressed in joint doctrine) complexity of operating within urban requirement. •• interconnected, embedded threats terrain.29 While JP 3-29 does cover the Joint doctrine guidance for megacity across super-surface, surface, sub- framework for DOD support to an HA/ operations is currently limited to the single surface, and cyber/space (not DR effort, and reviews the possible HA/ joint publication that directly addresses addressed).28 DR missions, such as Federal disaster JUO. While this might suffice for current relief, dislocated civilians, security, and smaller urban military combat operations, These five areas highlight the fact technical assistance, it does not directly it does not provide sufficient guidance for that each megacity is unique and that address the complexities of providing megacity combat operations or megacity the challenges faced will be multilayered these services in a megacity or urban HA/DR (or its related HA/DR opera- issues for joint military and civilian lead- environment. JP 3-29 also discusses “re- tions). While Army and Marine Corps ership to address. A review of JP 3-06, lated operations,” such as humanitarian leaders have identified a gap in the doctrine recent research findings, and assessments and civil assistance and security assistance addressing combat operations in a megac- from General Milley and General Neller (military training), foreign internal ity, the requirement equally exists for HA/ all indicate that the joint force is not defense (JP 3-22), peace operations (JP DR and related operations for a megacity. prepared, nor does current joint doctrine 3-07), noncombatant evacuation opera- The gap in doctrine should be addressed adequately address military combat or tions (JP 3-68), civil-military operations as soon as feasible across the spectrum of humanitarian operations in a megacity (JP 3-57), and foreign consequence military response requirements. environment. management (JP 3-41). A comprehensive To address the complexities of mega- Joint publications do not address the review of these related operational areas city humanitarian relief-type operations, challenges of a humanitarian and disaster and the corresponding joint publications JP 3-29 should be updated to include relief response to the megacity environ- reveal little guidance applicable to urban discussions on megacity operations. ment. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian operations and none for megacity opera- Currently, JP 3-29 chapter 3 discusses Assistance, covers foreign HA/DR tions, which is a substantial gap in joint the major areas that military operations 112 Joint Doctrine / Failed Megacities and the Joint Force JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 in a HA/DR event will need to ad- organizations—stood ready to provide aligned staff postured for theater security dress, such as deployment, sustainment, assistance in the aftermath of the earth- cooperation rather than crisis response command and control, intelligence, quake, these agencies and partners made it difficult for the staff to plan protection of the force, engineer op- depended on the planning capabilities continuous operations as other partners, erations, rules of engagement, legal of a joint task force (JTF) headquarters organizations, and supplies were flood- considerations, liaison, communications for international coordination structure. ing into Haiti.38 synchronization, and public affairs.30 Second, the joint force employed ef- Lessons learned from recent urban fective methods for liaison activities Urban City Relief Operations operations should be incorporated into among the numerous international Compared to a Megacity 3-29.31 Joint doctrine needs to expound organizations.33 Recognizing that most While the Haiti earthquake took an on these topics to more adequately assistance would not be provided by the enormous toll in human lives and address the complexities of megacity joint force, the Operations Order 01-10 destruction of property and infrastruc- operations. For example, the intelligence was published as an unclassified order ture, the failure of a megacity such as collection and fusion will be significantly so that partners would be able to share Lagos would pose infinitely more chal- different in a megacity environment information.34 In addition, the JTF used lenges to the joint force. Lagos would based on scale and scope. Collection by numerous liaisons to ensure that there characterize all three challenges noted space, air, and signal intelligence assets was unity of effort throughout the opera- previously. First, the physical terrain will be hampered in a large metropolitan tion. Finally, the integration of the JTF would limit and impede freedom of area that contains large areas of ungov- with the functionally degraded Haitian movement for the joint force. The city erned spaces. Leveraging social media, government showed the U.S. resolve of Lagos is filled with extensive infra- news media, and nongovernmental orga- to provide the gateway for humanitar- structure and is Africa’s major financial nization intelligence will be required in ian assistance without usurping Haitian center. The buildings and layouts of this any megacity disaster relief operation, as independence. operational environment would further well as sharing/synchronizing the intel- Despite these positive aspects of the complicate any of the command and ligence with other civilian organizations operation, several issues point to the control issues that were faced in Haiti. and law enforcement agencies. In addi- lack of a comprehensive joint doctrine In addition to the terrain obstacles, the tion, HA/DR-related doctrine will need that addresses all of the challenges that population size and density of Lagos to incorporate megacity operational fac- may be encountered. According to JP would make the operation environment tors into HA/DR “related operations” 3-29, disasters could be slow onset, extremely complex. While Haiti’s total mentioned above to better prepare the rapid onset, or complex.35 In addition, population exceeded 10 million, this joint force for the complexities associated the assistance may be required to be population was dispersed over more with megacity operations. provided in one of three types of envi- than 10,000 square miles. Lagos has a ronments: permissive, uncertain, and concentrated population of nearly 15 Joint Force Response hostile.36 Although the damage and loss million confined to 452 square miles. to Haiti Earthquake of life in Haiti was a massively tragic Any threat posed by natural disaster, The humanitarian assistance provided event, the disaster could arguably be and the resulting chaos due to illness, to Haiti after the 7.0 magnitude earth- classified as neither complex nor in a criminal activity, and the collapse of any quake on January 12, 2010, provides a hostile environment. Yet the joint force form of government, would be concen- recent example of the employment of still faced several obstacles in executing trated in an extremely densely populated joint force capabilities, using current the operation. First, although the U.S. area. Finally, the infrastructure of Lagos doctrine, to support a large urban Agency for International Development would further complicate any assistance population. The immediate and decisive was established as the lead agency, the operation. As seen in Haiti, the control response to the disaster directly saved command structure on the ground of incoming organizations and sup- lives and set the stage for follow-on was unclear.37 The agency was neither plies lacked any sort of prioritization or operations. Several key aspects of this prepared nor equipped to manage the control. This problem was on an island response can be cited as examples for myriad U.S. and international organiza- with limited airport or seaport capabil- the use of the joint force for these non- tions. Another problem encountered ity. In contrast, Lagos boasts some of traditional missions, despite the issues was the lack of clarity of priorities. The Africa’s busiest airports, seaports, and encountered. call for any and all types of assistance highways. In addition, Lagos serves First, the military’s planning ca- available, without the ability to accu- as a communication hub for Africa. pability provided the framework for rately assess the ground situation, caused Given the difficulty of controlling the the integration and cooperation of the logistical and communication friction at limited infrastructure in Haiti, a disaster rest of the international community.32 airports, seaports, and along the limited in Lagos would pose an infrastructure While the international community— land routes. Finally, the organization of control and rebuilding issue of massive both military and nongovernmental the JTF headquarters into a functionally proportions. JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Metzel et al. 113 19 Given the gaps in current joint Joint Publication (JP) 3-6, Joint Urban Notes Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, doctrine in addressing the significant 2014), II-7. challenges of a potential failed megacity 1 Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, Mega Cit- 20 Ibid. such as Lagos, leaders should prioritize ies: The Politics of Urban Exclusion and Violence 21 Ibid. the development of doctrine relevant in the Global South (New York: Zed Books, 22 Gian Gentile et al., Reimagining the to the threat of failed megacities. The 2009), 1, 8, 10. Character of Urban Operations for the U.S. 2 Kevin Felix and Frederick Wong, “The Army: How the Past Can Inform the Present and urbanization of populations across the Case for Megacities,” Parameters 45, no. 1 Future, RR1602 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, globe and the resulting concentration (Spring 2015), 20. 2017), xiii, available at 114 Joint Doctrine / Failed Megacities and the Joint Force JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Infantryman with 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, clears bunker September 25, 2019, during platoon live-fire training, Rodriguez Live Fire Complex, Republic of Korea (U.S. Army/Scott Kuhn) Harnessing Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems Across the Seven Joint Functions By Brian David Ray, Jeanne F. Forgey, and Benjamin N. Mathias lthough the 2018 National adequately positioned to share best manning documents across the force Defense Strategy emphasizes practices and lessons learned among should add an AI/AS cell made up of technological innovation as well key players in the artificial intelligence/ officers, warrant officers, and senior A 1 as the way it will change the overall autonomous systems (AI/AS) space. noncommissioned officers in order to character of war, the joint force is not To address this shortcoming, joint effectively incorporate technological best practices across the seven joint functions. This increase of specialized staffing is similar to the approach that Colonel Brian David Ray, USAR, is the Senior Army Reserve Advisor for the Transformation Initiative the Army took in 2003 at the brigade at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School. Colonel Jeanne F. Forgey, USAR, is the Assistant Chief of Staff G8/Comptroller for the 335th Signal Command (Theater). Major Benjamin N. Mathias, West level with the creation of knowledge Virginia Air National Guard, is a C-17 Mobility Pilot at the 167th Airlift Squadron. management as a distinct discipline JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ray, Forgey, and Mathias 115 and staff function.2 With knowledge Institution’s John Allen and Darrell Robots and artificial intelligence offer management, the Army sought to West note, “AI will significantly impact the potential for an inflection point in “help commanders drive the operations the world’s economy and workforce, delivering military transformation and process through enhanced understand- the finance and health-care systems, advantage. Developing the right blend of ing and visualization . . . thereby national security, criminal justice, trans- human-machine teams (i.e., the effective enabling them to envision a set of portation, and how cities operate. All of integration of humans and machines into desired future conditions that represent this change is likely to redistribute and our warfighting systems) is the key . . . and the operation’s end state.”3 concentrate wealth, challenge political we should not forget that we are in a race Embracing similar new approaches systems, and generate new cyber threats with our adversaries to unlock this advan- and techniques in the AI/AS space and defenses.”10 tage. The clock is ticking as new technology is in keeping with advice offered by Future kinetic conflicts, especially capabilities accelerate. This joint concept Rear Admiral Andrew Loiselle, the those that include near peers such as document should be read by everyone who deputy director for Future Joint Force China or Russia, will likely be replete needs to understand how AI, robotics, and Development on the Joint Staff J7, who with AI/AS architectures and methods data can change the future character of stated, the joint force “cannot expect that will include engagements best conflict for us and our adversaries.16 success fighting tomorrow’s conflicts characterized as a “swarm” of lethal- with yesterday’s weapons and equipment. ity with unprecedented “coordination, The military application of autono- Neither is modernization defined solely intelligence, and speed.”11 In a March mous systems has an array of protection by hardware. It requires changes in the 2016 budget hearing before Congress, and lethality possibilities (for example, way we organize and employ forces.”4 General Joseph Dunford, then Chairman unmanned vehicles and swarming weap- This article explores the most likely of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated future ons systems) as well as the potential to impacts of AI/AS on each of seven conflicts will likely have “an increas- provide commanders with the ability to joint functions: command and control ingly transregional, multi-domain, and make decisions much more quickly and (C2), intelligence, fires, movement and multi-functional nature. . . . [F]uture efficiently than a team of humans in a maneuver, protection, sustainment, and conflicts will spread quickly across mul- headquarters ever could. Even though information. These functions represent tiple Combatant Command geographic AI/AS is at the forefront of thought groups of related activities that provide boundaries, functions, and domains.”12 leadership in a variety of disciplines, commanders and staff with the ability to U.S. near peers clearly understand the im- the Department of Defense (DOD) synchronize and execute military opera- portance that AI/AS will have in future has neither taken a proactive approach tions.5 Each of the functions, which is conflicts. in developing policies to govern such aligned with the Joint Capability Areas By way of example, in 2017 the technology, nor has it effectively infused and Functional Capability Boards, allows Chinese government released a docu- it into the formal acquisition process. for effective assessment and investment ment titled “New Generation Artificial This lack of policy guidance and adequate decisions by policymakers.6 Intelligence Development Plan” with the funding has had a limiting effect on the stated ambition of leading the world in full military potential of AI/AS.17 This The Use of AI/AS in AI by 2030. This plan calls for a “civil- lack of joint/synchronized exploration the Joint Force military” fusion of AI to leverage dual-use of AI/AS possibilities should be a signifi- The joint force is accustomed to fight- advances for applications in national cant concern. As of summer 2018, each ing by effectively synchronizing the defense, including support of command Service still seemed to be going it alone, unique set of land, sea, and air capabili- decisionmaking, military deduction, and with the Air Force, for example, having ties inherent in each of the Services. defense equipment.13 The Chinese also more than 600 projects incorporating In the protracted engagements of the have an approach in this domain that is various facets of AI across multiple mis- past two decades, the joint force has best described as “systems confronta- sion sets.18 fought via a set of “interconnected tion and system destruction warfare.”14 The application of AI/AS in a military human-inhabited platforms that pass Seeing the strategic importance of AI, context has significant potential. Some surveillance and targeting data across Vladimir Putin stated, “Whoever becomes researchers envision future AI/AS fights great distances.”7 However, over the the leader in AI will be the ruler of the with “autonomous and uninhabited next 20 years, the pace of technological world.”15 The United Kingdom also systems” that will be networked and change will significantly impact how clearly demonstrated the importance of have the ability to coordinate actions the joint force plans and executes the AI/AS with its May 2018 publication of in response to events on the ground.19 full spectrum of its missions.8 Rapid a joint doctrine document titled Human- For example, swarming/coordinated technological developments in five key Machine Teaming. The document action will enable synchronized attacks areas (info, neuro, quantum, nano, and describes the stakes that are involved in or defense, more efficient allocation of bio) will be primary drivers in various exploring and integrating AI/AS: assets over an area, self-healing networks areas of AI and AS.9 As the Brookings that respond to enemy actions, and 116 Joint Doctrine / Harnessing Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Airman participates in Security Forces Sustainment training at Baumholder, Germany, October 10, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/Deven Schultz) widely distributed assets that cooperate seven joint functions primarily concerns unmanned systems: battlespace aware- for sensing, deception, and attack. As the challenges associated with testing and ness, force application, protection, and then–Secretary of the Army Mark Esper validation. In short, how can leaders be logistics.25 For example, the use of robots stated, “This technology [AI/AS] could confident that a system will do what it is would mean that fewer troops would be very well change the character of warfare intended to do and nothing else beyond needed to defend a certain piece of ter- as we know it.”20 that, which might be detrimental to the rain. This is an advantage given increasing In the U.S. Army War College mission? As then–Vice Chairman of the DOD personnel costs.26 Robots also have publication Key Strategic Issues List Joint Chiefs of Staff General Paul Selva the capability to operate for longer peri- 2018–2020, AI and AS are mentioned stated, “In the DOD, we test things ods of time without the human need for multiple times as keys areas for future re- until they break. You can’t do that with rest.27 Moreover, unmanned systems can search and investment.21 Our allies in the artificial intelligence. We’re going to have operate in harsh and deadly environments United Kingdom also see the benefits of to figure out how to get the software to (for example, chemical, biological, radio- AI/AS for each of the joint warfighting tell us what it has learned.”23 Beyond this logical, or nuclear) with less degradation functions with the following stated goals: necessary step of analyzing what the soft- in capabilities. These and other examples “increase situational awareness, lighter ware has learned, the more critical aspects provide an economy-of-force advantage physical and cognitive loads, sustainment of assessment also include deciding how that would allow joint force command- with increased anticipation and efficiency, to employ AI/AS within all of the gener- ers the flexibility to allocate personnel increased force protection, and ultimately ally accepted ethical, legal, and moral to particular aspects of a battle plan (for superior maneuver options in and across frameworks.24 example, interpretive or conceptual work) all domains.”22 However, one difficulty Regarding the use of AI/AS in the that are not conducive to or appropriate that the United States and others will joint force, there are currently four for unmanned systems.28 An economy-of- have in adopting AI/AS across any of the Joint Capability Areas envisioned for force advantage from AI/AS would help JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ray, Forgey, and Mathias 117 Figure 1. Exponential autonomous. DOD frequently defines one another.34 Integration across the Convergence autonomy in terms of human involve- other six joint functions is imperative if ment in the execution of a machine’s joint task forces are to effectively and tasks. Systems that are marked by full efficiently accomplish their mission. Atoms human control over all the machine’s Of the seven joint functions, C2 is the core tasks are considered “human-in- most complex and most important. For Nano the-loop” systems. Systems that have example, JP 3-0 lists 12 tasks that are the ability to operate independently but part of the joint C2 warfighting func- Qubits Genes still require humans to review decisions tion. Examples include managing risk, Quantum Bio Exponential and intervene in the case of a malfunc- communicating and maintaining the Convergence tion are often called “on-the-loop” or status of information among and across “human-supervised” systems. A system subordinate units, assessing progress Neurons Info that can carry out its tasks with total toward accomplishing mission-related independence, leaving no opportunity tasks, and coordinating/controlling the Neurons Bits for a human to intervene, is referred to employment of joint lethal and nonle- as a “human-out-of-the-loop” system.31 thal capabilities. Given these important However, there are many different tasks, it is clear that AI/AS could play points of view regarding the terms used a significant role in creating efficien- Figure 2. Tasks and Trust throughout the military (for example, cies in a variety of C2 decisionmaking 35 The development of a useful understanding of the automation vs. autonomy, semi-auton- processes. As noted by Samuel White, spectrum of tasks and their associated levels of trust omy, supervised autonomy, on-the-loop vs. “Winning in the decision space is requires a framework to distinguish between the nature 36 of differing military tasks and the intendant effects upon in-the-loop, and mixed initiative). This winning in the battle space.” Similarly, the need for human supervision. diversity of AI/AS phrases led to such a more robust capability for command- Manual confusion that a recent report suggested ers to effectively “understand the oper- that “DOD should abandon the debate ating environment” was one of the 11 over definitions of levels of autonomy” strategic themes of the Decade of War and instead focus on developing a study that looked at key lessons learned “method of analysis of trade-offs over in Afghanistan and Iraq.37 Unique Repetitive multiple stakeholders and objectives.”32 An example of how AI/AS could Currently, DOD has an established prove beneficial in this area includes more “spectrum of activity” for describing timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence autonomy. Variables within the spectrum that results in a more robust common Mental include differentiating between machines operating picture across the joint force, that think and machines that think and something that would provide a staff Source: Andrew Massie, “Autonomy and the Future Force,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Summer 2016), 139. act. Figure 1 offers a visualization regard- with the opportunity to keep command- ing the important distinctions between ers better apprised of developments in what can best be described as manual the battlespace.38 Another example of address one of General Dunford’s stated or “physical tasks” (firing a weapon, for improved C2 via AI/AS is the automated concerns, namely that the joint force cur- example) vis-à-vis mental or “cognitive analysis of more than 90,000 daily rently lacks sufficient capacity to meet all tasks” (for example, deciding if the target Facebook posts by the so-called Islamic the combatant commands’ requirements is friendly, neutral, or hostile). As one can State and its sympathizers, looking for for forces.29 imagine, the spectrum between the two is actionable intelligence that even the quite wide. Therein lies the difficulty for most robust team of humans could not The Definition of Autonomous DOD, and by association the joint force, possibly generate in a similarly efficient in Military Settings in deciding which scenarios and environ- manner.39 General Dunford has described When incorporating any form of auton- ments are conducive to the advantages of these types of scenarios as the ability of omy in a military context, it is impor- autonomous systems and which require commanders to “make decisions at the tant to acknowledge that such a move human discernment and interaction with speed of relevance.”40 also increases unpredictability.30 Auton- machines in order to accomplish the Andrew Massie suggests why AI/AS, omy in the context of the human/ mission.33 and its implications for C2, are not easily machine interaction dynamic has three reconciled: dimensions: the human-machine C2 Command and Control relationship, the complexity of the deci- As Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint The challenge of C2 Mission Command sions made by the machine, and the Operations, states, joint functions involves communicating intent as well functions of the system that are made should reinforce and complement as appreciation for why a task has been 118 Joint Doctrine / Harnessing Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Paratrooper assigned to 37th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division, navigates wire obstacle during Blood on the Water competition at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, September 7, 2018 (U.S. Army/Ryan Mercado) set but does not determine how it must be noncombatant) as well as decisions that systems are not capable of reasoning in conducted; competent subordinates will ex- deal with the appropriate proportionality the human sense.47 Systems of this nature ercise their best judgment dependent upon of a retaliatory strike.42 The Air Force is develop COAs (that is, reason) using a the circumstances. However, when delegat- currently developing the fastest jet com- probabilities approach.48 Accordingly, ing authority, we set bounds on the activity puter processor in avionics, the Advanced DOD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in our subordinates undertake. Approaching Display Core Processor, that will have the Weapons Systems, from May 2017 pro- one of these boundaries invokes the need ability to process 87 billion instructions vides clear guidance on the C2 function to report up the chain for clarification or per second. The result will be faster and with regard to the use of autono- further guidance. Therefore, supervision more reliable mission data processing.43 mous and semi-autonomous systems: is inherent in any command relationship, Another area where AI/AS could prove “Autonomous and semi-autonomous and will vary with circumstance and task advantageous is military operations in weapon systems shall be designed to complexity.41 complex environments such as mega-cit- allow commanders and operators to ies and subterranean operations.44 IBM, exercise appropriate levels of human The difficult balance is determining with its Watson AI initiative, foresees AI/ judgment over the use of force.”49 In a how to harness the speed of AI/AS AS technology soon being adapted to military engagement where lethal force is in the C2 protocol without losing the develop tactical military plans as well as directed or applied, there is a clear chain ability to incorporate new or revised design a set of courses of action (COAs) of accountability from the trigger puller command guidance as circumstances for commanders to consider.45 to the commander who directs that the dictate or as new opportunities present C2 enhancements that utilize AI/AS target be engaged. For autonomous themselves on the battlefield. have the following advantages: endless weapons systems, the locus of responsibil- AI can also assist commanders in mak- and faultless memory, lack of emotional ity is not so clear-cut. How to determine ing decisions about distinction (that is, investment, and potentially unbiased who “ordered” the attack and who or proper identification of friend, enemy, or analyses.46 However, autonomous which entities should be held accountable JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ray, Forgey, and Mathias 119 Combat medic assigned to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Regional Health Command–Europe secures simulated casualty during simulated attack as part of 21st Theater Sustainment Command Best Medic Competition, Baumholder, Germany, August 22, 2019 (U.S. Army/Jesse Pilgrim) beyond the traditional chain of command is a military objective, but rather that the recommendations using historical data, present significant challenges.50 weapon be capable of being employed cultural knowledge, previous operational With these types of concerns in mind, consistent with the principle of distinc- design, and results. As with many ap- the key position that the United States tion by a human operator.”51 plications of AI/AS, the likelihood of has taken in many international set- success with the employment of these tings (for example, the United Nations Intelligence technologies is largely dependent on the Convention on Certain Conventional The joint intelligence process encom- quality and volume of the data available Weapons) is that lethal force can only be passes six categories of intelligence for analysis. Critical to the success of AI/ committed to a target when “appropri- operations: planning and direction, AS efforts in joint intelligence will be the ate levels of human judgment” by an collection, processing and exploitation, normalization of legacy stovepipe data individual have been taken into account. analysis and production, dissemination segregation. In other words, a person, not a machine, and integration, and evaluation and While joint collection activities could has the ultimate decisionmaking author- feedback.52 If correctly established and be enabled or supplemented by cognitive ity. Interestingly, it was clarified at the thoroughly vetted by subject matter AI/AS systems, it is likely to take time for same meeting that the U.S. position was experts from all Services and intel- commanders to become comfortable with not that a human had to make every fir- ligence disciplines, AI/AS tools offer the idea of having a machine prioritize ing decision. Instead, the U.S. position a variety of opportunities and provide their intelligence requirements for collec- is that a weapons system has to act in a the potential for mitigating cognitive tion and develop a supportive collection manner consistent with “reasoned human analyst biases (for example, availability strategy. In reality, AI/AS tools have the decisionmaking.” Specifically, the U.S. heuristic or bandwagon effect). potential to be well suited to perform position paper argues that international Planning and direction will likely as a collection manager in accordance humanitarian law “does not require that continue to be a human-driven op- with the four key tenets of this particular a weapon determine whether the target eration, although AI/AS can provide role: early identification of requirements, 120 Joint Doctrine / Harnessing Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 prioritization of requirements, taking a build a sufficient level of confidence with the programmers to work closely with multidisciplinary approach, and the task- AI/AS-developed products. Processes commanders to ensure this breadth ing of available collection assets.53 The must be put in place to vet analytical data, of employment options is taken into Navy has invested heavily in AI-enabled especially those created prior to achiev- account. In 2005, as the AI/AS sector sensors in both sea (for example, OPNAV ing an acceptable level of confidence was gaining traction, a senior leader N96 initiatives) and air (for example, with joint products. In the end, though, at U.S. Joint Forces Command com- sixth-generation fighter) platforms.54 if the joint force does not find a way to mented on the significant benefits of Processing and exploitation present streamline and automate a portion of automated weapons systems: “They perhaps the most promising use of AI/ the intelligence analysis function, com- don’t get hungry. They’re not afraid. AS systems in the intelligence domain. manders will continue to be deprived They don’t forget orders. They don’t For example, during the past 10 years of volumes of potentially actionable care if the guy next to them has just within the geospatial intelligence dis- intelligence. been shot. Will they do a better job cipline, academicians and technology Within the dissemination and in- than humans? Yes.”60 In 2019 and professionals have participated in an tegration function, AI/AS will enable beyond, the implications of AI/AS in annual contest known as ImageNet to the former, but the latter is required to the fires domain are even higher, with detect and identify certain objects within enable AI/AS usage. Standard dissemina- Bruce Jette, Assistant Secretary of the images.55 Teams from around the world tion is one of the most straightforward Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, and collaborate and compete to build the intelligence functions to automate, while Technology, offering the following best exploitation programs by leveraging ad hoc disseminations will likely continue observations: traditional programmatic coding, detailed to involve human effort. As previously algorithms, and AI/AS tools. The result- cited, integration with large, consistent, There are a number of public organiza- ing open-source repository now contains normalized datasets will require success- tions that have gotten together and said, over 14 million URLs that can be used to ful AI/AS intelligence integration. That “We don’t want to have AI tied to weap- train image recognition AI tools, many of said, there are also security implications ons.” But time is a weapon. If I can’t get which have achieved a 97.3 percent ac- associated with collapsing a variety of data AI involved with being able to properly curacy rate, far surpassing average human sources or networking a greater number manage weapons systems and firing se- capabilities.56 Signals intelligence—in- of intelligence, surveillance, and recon- quences then, in the long run, I lose (in the cluding communications intelligence, naissance assets. Since every sensor within time domain). Let’s say you fire a bunch electronic intelligence, and foreign instru- an automated system has the potential of artillery at me, and I can shoot those mentation signal intelligence—is another to be exploited in a variety of ways (for rounds down, and you require a man in discipline that presents a significant op- example, jamming, intercepting, hacking, the loop for every one of the shots. There are portunity for AI/AS usage in the analysis or spoofing), integrating these tools into not enough men to put in the loop to get of collected electronic signals. The use of a more comprehensive network has the them done fast enough.61 AI/AS tools in conjunction with other potential of increasing vulnerability.58 disciplines, such as human intelligence, While AI/AS tools have the ability to While those statements are true in will be slower to implement. objectively evaluate and provide feedback most respects, they are observations that Analysis and production are also good regarding the quality and effectiveness only look at AI/AS technology as an candidates for the integration of AI/AS of intelligence reports and products, the asset. The liabilities of technology must tools. Currently, the “Chinese People’s more critical and impactful evaluation also be considered. Commanders and Liberation Army is developing algorithms of the quality and effectiveness of intel- the U.S. Government must still be held that enable data fusion, enhance intel- ligence is likely to come from the human accountable for actions taken by AI/AS. ligence analysis, and support command engaged in conflict. If commanders do DOD Instruction 3000.09 directs that decisionmaking.”57 Today’s intelligence not trust and act on intelligence products autonomous weapons must be able to teams are faced with an increasing flow produced with the assistance of AI/AS “complete an engagement in a timeframe of information and data through a variety tools, it will not matter how efficient the consistent with commander and opera- of sensors and sources. Technological ad- processes have become. tor intentions and, if unable to do so, vances have continued to accelerate that terminate engagements or seek additional flow, but human analysts have not been Fires human operator input before continuing able to keep pace with these increases. JP 3-0 lists eight key considerations the engagement.”62 There is undeniable risk associated with when employing fires: targeting, joint Given this directive, the crafting of the integration of AI/AS tools into ana- fire support, countering air and missile rules of engagement for multiple scenar- lytical processes. As with any cognitive threats, interdiction, strategic attack, ios, as well as establishing the appropriate or machine-learning solution, it will take global strike, limiting collateral damage, boundaries for how DOD will utilize AI/ time as well as a variety of learning situ- and nonlethal capabilities.59 As AI/ AS technologies, will be quite challeng- ations to hone analytical capabilities and AS are developed, it is important for ing. For example, when programming an JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ray, Forgey, and Mathias 121 Four unmanned remotely operated high-speed maneuvering surface targets move to blocking positions on James River during Office of Naval Research– sponsored demonstration of autonomous swarmboat technology, Newport News, Virginia, August 13, 2014 (U.S. Navy/John Paul Kotara) autonomous weapons system (AWS) for to mobilize over terrain or obstacles with the Phantom Express and X-37B a multitude of scenarios, at some point without delay, delaying or stopping the platforms, both of which provide en- the weapon will only be effective and/ enemy, and controlling significant areas hanced and efficient maneuver capability.67 or safe to employ in a small number of in the OA.64 Even with these promising examples, instances, calling into question its benefits In the area of movement and ma- there is still an open question on the best vis-à-vis its costs. If an AWS cannot be neuver, an autonomous system such way that AI/AS can be utilized within programmed to meet the “reasonable as a robot has certain advantages over the joint function of movement and ma- commander standard” (that is, properly a human. For example, a robot has no neuver. Unmanned aircraft and ground weighing the likely collateral damage instinctual need for self-protection that platforms are already utilized in the vis-à-vis the potential military advantage), could slow an advance. A robot does not Middle East for resupply missions. The it is highly unlikely that a senior military have the emotions that could otherwise Army recently accelerated its Automated leader will conclude that the potential ad- distract/impair a warfighter’s judgment Ground Resupply program and plans to vantages of an AWS are worth the risk.63 (for example, frustration, fear, revenge, or have 70 self-driving supply trucks opera- rage). Conversely, robots have no innate tional by 2020.68 The future challenge is Movement and Maneuver appreciation for the sanctity of human life finding ways to enable these systems to JP 3-0 states that the objective of or feelings such as compassion or mercy.65 “autonomously predict, plan, track, and movement and maneuver is to gain One example of new AI/AS technology optimize resupply demands from military positional advantage to accomplish both in the movement and maneuver domain users.”69 This idea of interconnected operational and strategic goals. This is is the Navy’s new unmanned underwater autonomy will allow troops to focus more done primarily through five key tasks: vehicle, which is capable of operating for on the mission instead of using precious deploying forces within the operational 5 months at a time without maintenance time planning how they will maneuver area (OA), maneuvering to achieve the or refueling.66 The space domain has also from one place to another across the advantage, providing constant ability seen similar use of unmanned vehicles battlespace. 122 Joint Doctrine / Harnessing Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Protection machines do the “dull, dirty, and danger- AS can provide much more effective early JP 3-0 describes protection as a func- ous” work of resupply so troops can focus identification in protecting civilians as well tion that encompasses traditional force on more complex aspects of the mission as combatants from friendly fire incidents protection and protection of health and have been pointed out.73 Commenting on (for example, more precise targeting or other activities that preserve/conserve a Marine amphibious exercise, Colonel minimizing collateral damage).78 In the the force. Of the seven joint functions, Daniel Sullivan stated, “Going forward, area of developing a more robust and protection is one of the more complex. the first one in the room should never be rapid response to emergency scenarios, For example, JP 3-0 lists 15 tasks/com- an air breather. It should be a robot with a the key for the joint force will be adopt- ponents that are part of the protection lethal capability.”74 In congressional hear- ing AI/AS technology and applying it warfighting function. Examples include ings, Senator Gary Peters (D-MI) offered to respond with COAs that enhance providing air/space/missile defense; the following telling observation: “In the survivability as well as isolating the nega- protecting U.S. civilians and contrac- Iraq War we lost more Soldiers in logistics tive impacts that result from accidents, tors authorized to accompany the force; operations than we did in combat.” To biological hazards, and natural disasters.79 conducting operations security, cyber mitigate loss of life, especially in resupply defense, and cyber security; providing and logistics, one promising AI/AS con- Sustainment chemical, biological, radiological, and cept is “leader/follower.” This solution JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, defines sustain- nuclear defense; establishing capabilities envisions personnel in a lead vehicle with ment as “the provision of logistics and and measures to prevent friendly fire multiple unmanned trail vehicles moving personnel services necessary to maintain incidents; and securing and protecting along the same general route based on the and prolong operations.” The logistics combat and logistics forces, bases, joint electronic signal from the lead vehicle.75 portion of sustainment includes the core security areas, and lines of communica- In the area of passive defensive mea- functions of deployment and distribu- tion. And while those components of sures, JP 3-0 stresses the importance of tion, supply, maintenance, logistical force protection seem on the surface taking proactive/precautionary steps to services, operational contract support, straightforward and appropriate, JP 3-0 make it more difficult for a hostile force engineering, and health services.80 also includes additional aspects of force to locate and engage personnel, assets/ Among the seven joint functions, sus- protection that are broader in nature facilities, and various systems (such as tainment operations present some of the and not easily or narrowly defined, communications). One could imagine the most likely quick wins for employment such as health protection.70 To ensure use of deep learning systems (machines of AI/AS technologies. overmatch against near peers, force pro- that are programmed to discern when The integration of AI/AS analytical tection is one of five key lines of effort certain types of attacks are likely/im- tools provides a significant advantage for envisioned by the Army Training and minent) conducting analysis quicker than dealing with large datasets and compli- Doctrine Command for integrating new could be expected by human monitoring cated algorithms. The Air Force already technologies into future organizations, and/or reaction.76 Other examples where uses the Automatic Logistics Information the other four being increasing situ- deep learning systems could prove benefi- System, which has automated the trans- ational awareness, lightening Soldiers’ cial include cyber defense and electronic mission of logistics data (for example, fuel workloads, sustaining the force, and warfare attacks. Autonomous systems consumption and engine diagnostics) to facilitating movement and maneuver.71 also provide an advantage in defensive free up pilot attention for a greater focus JP 3-0 provides a taxonomy of four postures to “select and engage incom- on combat.81 Since planning for deploy- broad areas that provide a useful approach ing enemy” indirect fires (for example, ment and distribution relies heavily on for analyzing the methods by which the mortars, artillery shells, and rockets). An large volumes of data and algorithms, joint force could effectively utilize AI/AS autonomous system designed to provide AI/AS implementation could provide a to enhance force protection: active defen- a rapid and robust “counter-battery” tangible improvement for the joint force. sive measures, passive defense measures, response against the origin of an attack By leveraging automated solutions to the application of technology to reduce provides commanders with additional track information such as unit basic load fratricide, and a more robust and rapid time to focus on second- and third-order status, supply orders, warehousing stock, response to various types of emergen- decisions given that the initial response to distribution channels, and transportation cies (for example, accidents or natural the attack was “automatically initiated” schedules, a joint logistics command disasters).72 In the area of active defensive with speed and accuracy. Israel uses this would be well positioned to service both measures, the key focus is on protecting type of force protection approach with its peacetime and wartime requirements. information, military installations/assets, Iron Dome defenses.77 Highly automated vehicles (HAVs) and lines of communication from enemy In the area of applying technology are currently in use, with many ex- destruction and/or disruption. There to reduce fratricide, AI/AS technologies perts suggesting that the adoption has been significant progress in the use of have tremendous potential for the joint of autonomous vehicles will soon unmanned automated systems to execute force as well as potential hazards. It is pos- become commonplace in military as resupply missions. The benefits of letting sible to envision scenarios in which AI/ well as civilian settings. One of the JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ray, Forgey, and Mathias 123 Marines with Headquarters Battalion, 3rd Marine Division, provide security for convoy during Samurai 2-20 on Camp Hansen, Okinawa, Japan, December 10, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Kallahan Morris) primary challenges associated with the framework for implementing and scaling The Services have each undertaken widespread adoption of HAVs in sus- AI for complex military supply chains.83 efforts to more effectively attract, man- tainment and logistics operations is the In June 2018, the Army awarded a pre- age, and retain talent. “Cultivating ethical issues associated with “training” dictive maintenance contract to Uptake, workforce talent” is highlighted in the vehicles—how to teach the AI/AS tech- a company that analyzes millions of hours 2018 National Defense Strategy, along nology to effectively evaluate potential of data from diesel engines and other with the clarification that it will require accidents. The Army recently invested major components to predict imminent the inclusion of new capabilities and nearly $50 million in the Autonomous equipment failures. The goal of this trial an openness to updating practices, not Ground Resupply Program to leverage program is to identify ways to streamline just the addition of new technology.86 AI/AS with the goal of saving lives as logistics and help untether the warfighter Following the Air Force’s September well as economy of force.82 The joint from traditional supply lines.84 2017 Workforce Summit, Michael Parker force may want to build on this initial While the most common AI/AS- stated, “Talent management information implementation of HAV technology in enabled personnel services and processes technology must transform to function relatively self-contained environments relate to recruitment, hiring, onboard- in today’s digitally connected world.”87 (for example, moving materials on and ing, and financial management, there Simultaneously, the Navy’s Sailor off ships and aircraft) before implement- are a multitude of rules-based, repeti- 2025 initiative as well as the Army’s ing a more robust program. In this tive human resources tasks that can be Talent Management Task Force seek rollout, the joint force could partner automated to provide more time for to “improve and modernize personnel with civilian freight agencies that are value-added functions.85 For example, management.”88 already moving forward with test pro- AI/AS tools have the potential of as- In another sustainment initiative, grams. The legalities of leveraging HAVs sisting joint force leaders with talent the Army is poised to implement the in an international environment, and the and succession planning programs in an Integrated Personnel and Pay System– related liabilities, would have to be fully unbiased manner. Automation techniques Army, which will allow the tracking of researched by the Judge Advocate Corps could also be used to offer a preliminary individual Soldier and civilian skillsets before this option is rolled out in various evaluation of promotion packets and across all three components: Active, countries. offer suggestions on personnel manage- Army Reserve, and Army National The network-based nature of pri- ment, such as setting the optimal rate for Guard.89 Personnel management has vate sector logistics provides a natural retention bonuses. the unique ability to be both an enabler 124 Joint Doctrine / Harnessing Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 F/A-18E Super Hornet assigned to Stingers of Strike Fighter Attack Squadron 113 launches from flight deck of aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, Arabian Gulf, February 5, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Spencer Roberts) of the future of AI/AS within the joint million annually, medical assessments are other joint functions to influence relevant force—through focused recruitment and a tremendous area of opportunity for actor perceptions, behavior, action or talent management programs—and a expanded AI/AS usage, particularly in inaction, and support human and auto- consumer of AI/AS capabilities. While remote and/or deployed environments mated decision making. The information each of the Services is becoming more where it is not always possible for a full function helps commanders and staffs analytical and objective regarding evalua- range of specialists to be on location. understand and leverage the pervasive tions and promotions, having positioned Whether the focus is logistics, person- nature of information, its military uses, themselves to use AI/AS functions in a nel management, or healthcare services, and its application during all military Service-specific manner, if DOD would the sustainment function is primed for operations. This function provides [joint merge these sources of talent data, the incremental AI/AS enhancements. force commanders] the ability to integrate joint force would have a robust source Additionally, this is a key integration area the generation and preservation of friendly of the information from which to staff where the joint force could and should information while leveraging the inher- future teams. partner with civilian and interagency ent informational aspects of all military The healthcare component of sustain- organizations for the more robust and activities to achieve the commander’s objec- ment has already seen success with AI/ effective systems. tives and attain the end state.93 AS and stands poised for even more. Recovery Engagement and Coordination Information Brigadier General Alexus Grynkewich, for Health, a Veterans Administration With the 2017 release of JP 1, Doctrine who served on the Joint Staff as the J39 (VA) program that uses AI to analyze vet- for the Armed Forces of the United States, Director of Global Operations, stated, re- eran health record data, had proactively information was added as the seventh garding the addition of this seventh joint identified nearly 7,000 veterans at risk of joint function, the first addition of a function, “The elevation of information in suicide as of March 2018, thereby allow- joint warfighting function in 20 years.92 joint doctrine . . . underscores the [DOD] ing for quick and effective intervention.90 JP 1 defines the information joint func- focus on how to adapt in order to more IBM is partnering with the VA—and tion as follows: effectively use the military instrument of with myriad civilian medical research national power in a changing strategic entities—in the area of cancer treat- The information function encompasses the environment.”94 Building on this idea, the ment.91 With the number of new cancer management and application of informa- DOD publication Strategy for Operations diagnoses between one million and two tion and its deliberate integration with in the Information Environment states JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ray, Forgey, and Mathias 125 11 that information could possibly be the spent $12 billion in 2017 on AI and plans Caton, Autonomous Weapons Systems, 80. 12 Posture Statement of General Joseph decisive factor in successful future military to spend at least $70 billion by 2020.102 Dunford, Jr., USMC, 19th Chairman of the Joint 95 operations. Secretary Mattis likewise By comparison, current U.S. expendi- Chiefs of Staff Before the 114th Congress Senate understood the importance of this newly tures are one-tenth of those planned Arms Services Committee Budget Hearing, designated joint function when, as a com- by the Chinese. By taking a bold and March 17, 2016, 4, 65, available at 126 Joint Doctrine / Harnessing Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 (2nd Quarter 2018), 113. available at JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ray, Forgey, and Mathias 127 breakingdefense.com/2018/08/army-wants- Task Force,” Army.mil, August 8, 2016, avail- 70-self-driving-supply-trucks-by-2020/>. able at 128 Joint Doctrine / Harnessing Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Army CH-47F Chinook helicopter assigned to B Company, 1st Battalion, 126th Aviation Regiment, California Army National Guard, assisted by Inyo County Search and Rescue, hovers while hoisting injured hiker at 13,800 feet on Mount Whitney, Inyo County, California, August 25, 2019 (Courtesy Inyo County Search and Rescue) The Future of Interagency Doctrine By George E. Katsos Agencies and Departments must deliberately and jointly invest in civil-military strategy, doctrine, training, and operations to meet the tests of this era.1 —General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. nteragency capability synchro- national security. In 2011, Chairman Colonel George Katsos, USAR (Ret.), is a Program nization continues to challenge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Manager on the Joint Staff. I whole-of-government approaches to General Martin Dempsey addressed JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Katsos 129 Special mission aviator assigned to 33rd Rescue Squadron looks out gunner’s window aboard HH-60G Pave Hawk, capable of performing peacetime operations such as civil search and rescue, emergency aeromedical evacuation, disaster relief, international aid, and counter-drug activities, July 31, 2019, Kadena Air Base, Japan (U.S. Air Force/Matthew Seefeldt) the issue in the context of reform by accomplishments bring to light the maintains a focus on promoting whole- directing the U.S. Armed Forces to potential of future interagency doc- of-government issues.3 expand the envelope of interagency trine development. Joint doctrine’s influence is vast. cooperation.2 This strategic direction U.S. military workforces plan and In a broader context for interagency inspired an abundance of literature train with guidance material called doc- personnel, joint doctrine and its stan- cataloging horizontal and vertical trine. Joint doctrine, which is managed dardization of terminology reduce unity challenges among and between by the CJCS, is a body of institutional organizational uncertainty, focus on military and civilian workforces. Sub- knowledge that provides fundamental strategic and operational perspec- sequently, the Joint Staff convened principles and offers official advice to tives, and provide transparency of best Department of Defense (DOD) and guide the employment of joint military practices for organizational leaders, in- non-DOD (interagency and other forces in support of achieving national dividual members, and society at large.4 civilian stakeholders) personnel policy objectives. While recent national In the realm of national interests, while to brainstorm on how to improve security system reform pursuits often national policies provide direction, joint workforce interoperability within the describe U.S. Government civil-military doctrine in comparison offers official context of joint doctrine—the purpose cooperation emphasis as diminishing advice on how to enhance joint force being to identify and work with those over time, joint doctrine was identified effectiveness. While strategy describes who get things done. The following as one of two military efforts that still national power synchronization, joint 130 Joint Doctrine / The Future of Interagency Doctrine JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 doctrine offers official advice on how Their input influenced military percep- foreign-themed sections to assist stake- to make strategy more effective on tions that steered current practices away holders in understanding counterpart what to attain and with which military from calling non-DOD organizations language usage during steady state coop- capabilities. Furthermore, as plans enu- “force multipliers and partners” to being eration and force employment. Members merate steps in the pursuit of mission known as “stakeholders” within an of specific communities that found util- objectives, joint doctrine offers official operational environment. Initially, the ity in this product included DOD special advice on how those objectives can be “so what” for non-DOD involvement operations forces and academia.10 achieved. Under joint force develop- was whether joint doctrine content was The remaining question is whether ment, lessons captured in operations and important enough to monitor and the the time is ripe to formally develop exercises enhance joint doctrine as well development process worth the time and interagency doctrine. In current joint as expose unproven conceptual ideas effort to inject organizational perspec- doctrine, non-DOD contributions con- that identify doctrinal gaps. Training, tives. After results of the aforementioned tinue to improve content to include what exercises, and education are also devel- and other interactions, the question joint force commanders should know oped and implemented in accordance changed from whether to be involved to about other potential workforces to be with joint doctrine. how these organizations could become encountered during force employment.11 Workforce doctrine and standardized more involved in joint doctrine devel- This U.S. Government interoperability terminology outside of DOD are scarce. opment. Subject matter of continued information can be productive for use by Most organizations can be categorized interest focused on interorganizational National Security Council and Executive as policy- or rules-based rather than cooperation, protection of civilians, Branch department and agency person- doctrine-based workforces that capture defense support to civil authorities, joint nel. The vehicle for this momentum and revalidate frameworks, common planning and intelligence activities, spe- is the new Joint Guide for Interagency language, and best practices. Other than cial operations, counterdrug operations, Doctrine. Released in October 2019 and DOD, the Department of Homeland countering weapons of mass destruction, available at the Joint Electronic Library, Security is the only U.S. Government en- and combating terrorism.7 this inaugural document contains U.S. tity with formal doctrine and terminology Non-DOD involvement in joint Government structures, frameworks, development processes. With present-day doctrine development positively affects relevant coordination mechanisms, force socialization of existing doctrine and the enterprise. Recently, the Joint Staff employment observations, organiza- terminology frameworks with interagency assembled more than 30 authors from tional areas of responsibility regions, and personnel, these participants continue 18 organizations to develop a series notional framework and terminology to develop a basic understanding and of 3 articles on interorganizational mapping constructs. Moreover, the guide appreciation for joint doctrine as well cooperation.8 This series addressed expands on current knowledge and can as a sincere desire to participate in joint the importance of a shared purpose, assist in the strategic art of navigating the doctrine development and to foster a dia- shared process, and working thought- U.S. Government bureaucracy to make logue that is leaning toward something fully with people who follow through. workforces work more efficiently together similar for their own organizations. Authors also examined organizational in achieving national policy objectives. Non-DOD joint publication par- interpretation of higher-level guidance, CJCS General Mark Milley has touched ticipation continues to grow over time. area of responsibility distribution, time upon this issue, indicating that listening Evidence includes non-DOD requests in- horizons, decisionmaking, and work to entities such as those that make up the creasing twofold since General Dempsey’s methods. Furthermore, the group ex- interagency is important to building an departure. General Dunford added to amined attitude and mutual respect as adaptive and agile force.12 In the end, the his direction for non-DOD organiza- well as touchpoints on understanding Joint Staff–driven gathering held 5 years tions to invest in military doctrine.5 The principles, mandates, and organizational ago not only shined a light on improving Joint Staff subsequently broadened op- interests. This interaction and process U.S. Government workforce interoper- portunities for non-DOD entities via the led the way to understanding the impor- ability but also brought the future of Annual Call Memorandum to Executive tance of and need for a common set of interagency doctrine to fruition. JFQ Secretariats, creating a pathway for terms and definitions to close the knowl- working group participation and other edge gap among U.S. Government revision opportunities. One significant workforces.9 Based on the fact that Notes opportunity for change occurred in 2016 successful doctrine is normally built on a 1 when the United Nations, International well socialized, understood, and agreed Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., “Advance Ques- tions for General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., Committee of the Red Cross, and other language, multiple interagency person- USMC, Nominee for the Position of Chairman governmental and nongovernmental nel banded together in 2017 and created of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” July 9, 2015, avail- organization personnel became involved the U.S. Government Compendium of able at JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Katsos 131 2 Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman’s Strate- gic Direction for the Force: Strengthening Our Relationship of Trust with the Nation (Wash- ington, DC: The Joint Staff, February 6, Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision 2012), 5; George J. Flynn, Decade of War, vol. (to be signed within 6 months) 1, Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of JP 1-0, Personnel Support Operations (Suffolk, VA: The Joint Staff, June 15, 2012), 25. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence 3 Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins, Lessons Encountered: Learning from the JP 3-05, Special Operations Long War (Washington, DC: National Defense JP 3-26, Combating Terrorism University Press, September 2015), 10. 4 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine of the JP 5-0, Joint Planning Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, JP X-XX, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations DC: Department of Defense, 2016); Barry R. Posen, “Foreword: Military Doctrine and the Management of Uncertainty,” Journal of Strate- JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) gic Studies 39, no. 2 (2016), 159–173, available at 132 Joint Doctrine / The Future of Interagency Doctrine JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 New from NDU Press A Persistent Fire: The Strategic Ethical Impact of World War I on the Global Profession of Arms Edited by Timothy S. Mallard and Nathan H. White 2019 • 412 pp. Since “the war to end all wars” witnessed the rise of global war among competing nation- states conducted in often tenuous alliances with nascent professional militaries—characteristics that continue to mark contemporary warfare a century later—then studying that conflict’s impact seems a relevant method to decide ways in which the profession of arms will develop in the next 25 to 50 years. Indeed, like a smoldering, persistent fire that threatens to re-erupt into a fresh conflagration, World War I continues to deeply shape and guide the profession of arms today. Download the EPUB, MOBI, or PDF version for free. Scan the QR Code above or go to: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/ Books/A-Persistent-Fire JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE NINETY-SIX, 1ST QUARTER 2020 Flickr Pinterest Facebook Twitter You can also find us on: can also find You Visit us online at: https://ndupress.ndu.edu Visit articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 20,000 unique visitors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 20,000 unique visitors each month, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, The Armed Forces Officer“This new edition of The Armed Forces articulates the ethical and moral underpin- nings at the core of our profession. The special trust in us by the Nation and confidence placed we protect is built upon this foundation. I commend members of our officer corps to embrace the principles of this important book and practice them daily in the performance of your du- I expect you to imbue these values in the next generation of leaders.” ties. More importantly, Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1159223/the-armed-forces-officer/ From NDU Press From NDU Officer The Armed Forces 2017 • 212 pp. Dunford, Jr.: From the Foreword by General Joseph F. C. Marshall, then serving George “In 1950, the great Soldier-Statesman Secretary as the of Officer page for a new book titled The ArmedDefense, signed a cover Forces . That original Marshall, who later explained that was written by none other than S.L.A. version of this book Secretary Marshall had ‘inspired the undertakingpersonal conviction that American due to his military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground morally.’ ethically and it addressed an of the Cold War, emergence at the dawn of the nuclear age and the Written officer a strategy of nuclear deterrence, corps tasked with developing facing unprecedented deployments, and adapting to the creation of the Department- of Defense and other new orga nizations necessary to manage the threats of a new global order. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked