Air and Space Power Journal: Fall 2011

Home , 33rd Rescue Squadron, 563rd Rescue Group, 71st Rescue Squadron, Dean Winslow, Skyhook (structure)

Fall 2011 Volume XXV, No. 3 AFRP 10-1

From the Editor

Personnel Recovery in Focus ❙ 6 Lt Col David H. Sanchez, Deputy Chief, Professional Journals Capt Wm. Howard, Editor

Senior Leader Perspective

Air Force Personnel Recovery as a Service Core Function ❙ 7 It’s Not “Your Father’s Combat Search and Rescue” Brig Gen Kenneth E. Todorov, USAF Col Glenn H. Hecht, USAF

Features

Air Force Rescue ❙ 16 A Multirole Force for a Complex World Col Jason L. Hanover, USAF Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3002.01E, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense, highlights personnel recovery (PR) as one of the DOD’s highest priorities. As an Air Force core function, PR has experienced tremendous success, having performed 9,000 joint/multinational combat saves in the last two years and having flown a total of 15,750 sorties since 11 September 2001. Despite this admirable record, the author contends that the declining readiness of aircraft and equipment as well as chronic staffing shortages prevents Air Force rescue from meeting the requirements of combatant commanders around the globe. To halt rescue’s decline, a numbered Air Force must represent this core function, thereby ensuring strong advocacy and adequate resources for this lifesaving, DOD-mandated function.

Strategic Rescue ❙ 26 Vectoring Airpower Advocates to Embrace the Real Value of Personnel Recovery Maj Chad Sterr, USAF The Air Force rescue community has expanded beyond its traditional image of rescuing downed aircrews to encompass a much larger set of capabilities and competencies that have strategic impact on US operations around the world. The author contends that “airpower advocates now have a strategic rescue capability . . . to counter our adversaries’ efforts to influence our way of life. It is up to these same advocates to maximize the emerging potential of what we might term ‘strategic PR.’ ” Air Force Fixed-Wing Rescue ❙ 37 A Multifaceted Approach for Full-Spectrum Personnel Recovery Capt Kyle J. Porter, USAF Currently, personnel recovery operations involve a broader range of scenarios than the current HC-130, HH-60, and Guardian Angel weapons systems can effectively support. Vast regions of the globe remain almost entirely inaccessible to the larger C-130 airframes, and refueling requirements prevent HH-60s from reaching them. Further compounding these geographic limitations is the complex support required by these systems. If the Air Force wishes to give its rescue operations truly global capability, it must adopt a blended-wing concept which includes smaller, commercially available aircraft that can land on practically any flat terrain and that do not depend upon intricate logistical support.

How to Say “National Security” in 1,001 Languages ❙ 48 Lt Col D. J. Western, USAF The military must fully comprehend that maintaining global leadership and security demands a broader understanding of other cultures, thought processes, and, of course, languages. Toward that end, the author details how the Department of Defense can overcome institutional inertia and reduce the deficit in foreign language skills through practical incentives, such as implementing at each level of in-residence professional military education meaningful programs that recognize the attainment of proficiency in foreign languages.

Fiscally Sound Options for a Flawed Tanker Recapitalization Strategy ❙ 62 Lt Col Michael W. Grismer Jr., USAF The current process of replacing the KC-135 tanker with the KC-46, the Air Force’s top recapitalization priority, will not be complete until the last KC-135 is about 120 years old. Consequently, the author contends that Air Force leaders should consider innovative options, including fee-for-service refueling performed by commercially owned and operated KC-X and KC-135 aircraft. Doing so allows time for delivery of the new KC-46s while commercial providers support ongoing refueling needs in the interim, thus helping to ensure that airpower’s force multiplier—aerial refueling—doesn’t become its single point of failure.

The United States Should Develop a Missile Defense System That Builds Confidence ❙ 74 Col Mike Corbett, USAF, Retired Paul Zarchan Over the past two decades, disappointing tests of experimental missile defense systems and the subsequent criticism of those systems have reduced the United States’ commitment to develop a viable defense against ballistic missile threats. To restore confidence and foster continuing innovation in missile defense, the Department of Defense, in conjunction with the Air Force, should adapt the air sovereignty alert mission by including missile defense that uses air-launched hit-to-kill (ALHK) missiles fired from fighter aircraft. The author demonstrates how ALHK-equipped aircraft could effectively defeat incoming ballistic missiles from both near and distant launch sites. Departments

13 ❙ Ira C. Eaker Award Winners

14 ❙ Ricochets and Replies

91 ❙ Views & Analyses We Were Deans Once . . . and Young: Veteran PME Educators Look Back ...... 91 Dr. James W. Forsyth Jr. Dr. Richard R. Muller Alternative Futures Analysis as a Complement to Planning Processes for the Use of Military Land ...... 100 Lt Col John S. Thomas, PhD, USMCR, Retired Dr. David Mouat

110 ❙ Book Reviews Men at War: A Soldier’s-Eye View of the Most Important Battles in History ...... 110 Bill Fawcett, ed. Reviewer: Dr. David R. Mets Final Countdown: NASA and the End of the Space Shuttle Program ...... 110 Pat Duggins Reviewer: Maj Paul Niesen, USAF, Retired War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology . . 111 Keir A. Lieber Reviewer: Dr. Damon Coletta The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad ...... 112 Steven K. O’Hern Reviewer: Lt Col Stephen C. Price Jr., USAF The U.S. Citizen-Soldier at War: A Retrospective Look and the Road Ahead ...... 114 Malcolm Muir Jr., ed. Reviewer: Lt Col Michael C. Veneri, USAF America’s Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress ...... 115 Winslow T. Wheeler, ed. Reviewer: 1st Lt Michael J. Arth, USAF Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security ...... 116 Dennis M. Gormley Reviewer: Dr. John H. Barnhill Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice . . . . 117 John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer, eds. Reviewer: Dr. Clark Capshaw Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975 . . . . 118 John Prados Reviewer: Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired Night Fighters: Luftwaffe and RAF Air Combat over Europe, 1939–1945 ...... 119 Colin D. Heaton and Anne-Marie Lewis Reviewer: Col John S. Chilstrom, USAF, Retired Effects-Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War ...... 120 Edward A. Smith Reviewer: Capt Albert C. Harris III, USAF Road to Mach 10: Lessons Learned from the X-43A Flight Research Program ...... 121 Curtis Peebles Reviewer: Kenneth P. Katz Robots in Space: Technology, Evolution, and Interplanetary Travel . . . . 122 Roger D. Launius and Howard E. McCurdy Reviewer: Capt Bryce G. Poole, USAF Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers ...... 123 Robert J. Bunker, ed. Reviewer: David J. Schepp The Brenner Assignment: The Untold Story of the Most Daring Spy Mission of World War II ...... 124 Patrick K. O’Donnell Reviewer: Lt Col Thomas Swaim, USAF Gods of Tin: The Flying Years ...... 125 James Salter Jessica Benton and William Benton, eds. Reviewer: Lt Col Daniel J. Simonsen, USAF, Retired War Wings: Films of the First Air War: A Guide to the World War I Aviation Documentary Motion Pictures Held by the U.S. National Archives ...... 126 Phillip W. Stewart Reviewer: Capt Gregory W. Ball, PhD, USAFR

127 ❙ Mission Debrief Editorial Advisory Board

Gen John A. Shaud, PhD, USAF, Retired, Air Force Research Institute Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired Dr. J. Douglas Beason (Senior Executive Service and Colonel, USAF, Retired), Air Force Space Command Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, US Naval Academy Lt Col Dave Mets, PhD, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus)

Board of Reviewers

Lt Col Eric Braganca, USAF Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland Department of Homeland Security Dr. Kendall K. Brown Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF, Retired NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Burke, Virginia Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth US Army War College RAND Dr. Mark Clodfelter Mr. Douglas E. Lee National War College Air Force Space Command Dr. Conrad Crane Dr. Richard I. Lester Director, US Army Military History Institute Eaker Center for Professional Development Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired Mr. Brent Marley USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Redstone Arsenal, Alabama (professor emeritus) Mr. Rémy M. Mauduit Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF, Retired Air Force Research Institute Duke University Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired Dr. Stephen Fought West Chicago, Illinois USAF Air War College (professor emeritus) Dr. Daniel Mortensen Col Richard L. Fullerton, USAF Air Force Research Institute USAF Academy Dr. Richard R. Muller Lt Col Derrill T. Goldizen, PhD, USAF, Retired USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Westport Point, Massachusetts Dr. Bruce T. Murphy Col Mike Guillot, USAF, Retired Air University Editor, Strategic Studies Quarterly Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Air Force Research Institute Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. Lt Col Brian S. Pinkston, USAF, MC, SFS Ohio State University The Pentagon Dr. Amit Gupta Col Bob Potter, USAF, Retired USAF Air War College Pensacola, Florida Dr. Grant T. Hammond Dr. Steve Rothstein USAF Center for Strategy and Technology Colorado Springs Science Center Project Dr. Dale L. Hayden Lt Col Reagan E. Schaupp, USAF Air Force Research Institute Naval War College Mr. James Hoffman Dr. Barry Schneider Rome Research Corporation Director, USAF Counterproliferation Center Milton, Florida Professor, USAF Air War College Dr. Thomas Hughes Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Toffler Associates Lt Col Jeffrey Hukill, USAF, Retired Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, Retired Air Force Research Institute CyberSpace Operations Consulting Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired Dr. Christopher H. Toner LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education University of St. Thomas Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, Retired Air Force Space Command Auburn University Col John Jogerst, USAF, Retired Col Mark E. Ware Navarre, Florida Twenty-Fourth Air Force Mr. Charles Tustin Kamps Dr. Harold R. Winton USAF Air Command and Staff College USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Dr. Tom Keaney Johns Hopkins University

Fall 2011 | 5 From the Editor

Personnel Recovery in Focus Lt Col David H. Sanchez, Deputy Chief, Professional Journals Capt Wm. Howard, Editor

Saving the lives of your fellow Airmen is the most extraordinary kind of heroism that I know. —Gen Curtis E. LeMay

n this issue, Air and Space Power Journal and control. PR affects every Airman and (ASPJ) focuses on the Air Force’s core every joint and multinational partner by function of personnel recovery (PR). fostering operational confidence and offset- Since 2009 the service has emphasized ting battlefield risk with the asymmetric IPR along with 11 other core functions: nu- advantage provided by these rescue heroes. clear deterrence operations; air superiority; Since PR is an indispensible core function, space superiority; cyberspace superiority; Airmen in particular should understand its global precision attack; rapid global mobility; capabilities and deliberately incorporate special operations; global integrated intel- rescue into every phase of operational plan- ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; ning and execution. We encourage you to command and control; building partner- delve into the world of PR and join the pro- ships; and agile combat support. By elevat- fessional discourse. ing PR to a core function, the Air Force This edition also includes superb articles clearly affirms its commitment to maximize about language and culture, tanker recapi- the unique advantages of airpower in sup- talization, missile defense, and the base- port of joint and multinational rescue re- planning process, as well as book reviews to quirements worldwide. inform your professional reading selections. Rescue Airmen are among the service’s In addition to reading the print journal, most courageous and self-sacrificing war- please review the ASPJ website at http:// riors. Throughout PR’s history, they have www.airpower.au.af.mil for our upcoming risked their lives to extract wounded per- focus areas and enter the realm of schol- sonnel, recover downed aircrews, and pro- arly, professional discourse via the written vide vital command and control for collab- word. And don’t forget that we are always orative forces during a rescue event. These interested in your feedback. individuals continue to do so worldwide Finally, the ASPJ staff takes this opportu- and across the entire range of military op- nity to inform you of the transformation of erations (ROMO). Today, PR encompasses our online publication beginning in 2012. much more than the familiar mission of We anticipate significant capability enhance- combat search and rescue, delivering sig- ment as we continue the advancement of nificant capability across the ROMO, includ- intellectual debate regarding airpower and ing noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian national security in the digital domain. We assistance, relief operations, medical and encourage you to request your electronic casualty evacuations, and rescue command subscription today! 

6 | Air & Space Power Journal Senior Leader Perspective

Air Force Personnel Recovery as a Service Core Function It’s Not “Your Father’s Combat Search and Rescue”

Brig Gen Kenneth E. Todorov, USAF Col Glenn H. Hecht, USAF

fter 50 collective years in and remain unaware of “these things we do,” around the superb community of failing to appreciate sufficiently the com rescue Airmen, both authors have plexities of PR and therefore not under experiencedA and witnessed the boundless standing that it is most certainly not “your passion for saving lives—a passion that mo father’s combat search and rescue (CSAR).” tivates the uniquely skilled Airmen of per Why is an understanding of “these things sonnel recovery (PR) to endure great sacri we do” vital to the future of Air Force PR fices for others during peace and war across and, in turn, Air Force rescue? First, leaders the globe. It remains a privilege and true who wish to effectively employ this highly honor to personally know most of the self demanded military capability must recog less and amazing Airmen who share a zeal nize and leverage it in combination with for a principle conveyed by the rescue other joint capabilities. This involves choos motto “These things we do, that others may ing the best means of operationally postur live.” Stories abound of gallant heroes per ing fielded forces to benefit from PR should forming astonishing acts to save just one an isolating event occur, preparing potential life, leaving an indelible mark on the hearts customers who are deploying to hostile loca of those who benefit personally or opera tions so they can maximize the chances of tionally from the effects produced by one of conducting a successful rescue mission, and our nation’s moral imperatives. Legendary supporting developments in PR capabilities Airmen such as A1C William Pitsenbarger, such as integrated command and control sys recipient of the Medal of Honor, and SrA tems, modern rescue platforms, and jointly Jason Cunningham, recipient of the Air accepted tactics, techniques, and procedures. Force Cross, along with others who anony Second, leaders and customers who fully mously risk life and limb, put themselves in comprehend Air Force PR are more likely to harm’s way to save someone else. In light of advocate our needs successfully at the high such a legacy of sacrifice and heroism, why est levels, seek our expertise early in both do so few people outside the rescue com strategic and operational planning, and ef munity understand the tremendous value fectively cooperate for expedient recovery that PR brings and will bring to America’s when a teammate becomes isolated in either current and future fights? The answer is permissive or hostile environments. simple: many individuals across the Depart How do we promote sufficient awareness ment of Defense (DOD), Airmen included, of PR across the Air Force and the rest of the

Fall 2011 | 7 DOD? We begin by ensuring PR’s inclusion Field, Florida, for senior commanders and the in the architecture of the service core func staffs of their air operations centers.3 Al tions and by having a core function master though many Air Force personnel, along with plan. Should this architecture exclude an es those of joint and coalition partners, receive sential function like PR, recovery’s capabili some aspects of training under PR and rely ties would decline as the other functions upon our capabilities in crises, most of them more productively compete for resources. still do not completely grasp PR as a service Furthermore, this lack of institutional visi core function—a fact that generates misunder bility would result in service, joint, and coali standing of PR-unique terminology, opera tion partners failing to understand a particular tional concepts, and practices. Ultimately, capability, inappropriately comprehending this situation jeopardizes our ability to fully its full value across the range of military op integrate life-saving PR early in the mission- erations (ROMO), and ineffectively advocat planning process. Conceptual misunderstand ing for resources to match requirements set ings accumulate over time, serving to limit by combatant commanders. Consequently, users’ knowledge of what PR can do for them. in 2009 Michael B. Donley, secretary of the Terms such as search and rescue, combat Air Force, and Gen Norton A. Schwartz, Air search and rescue, medical evacuation, casualty Force chief of staff, added PR to the list of evacuation, and sea rescue, to name just a few, Air Force core functions.1 In turn, Robert M. give users the impression that PR rescues air Gates, former secretary of defense, agreed crews only or, worse, that we are neither with their decision by approving DOD Direc available nor postured to rescue joint, coali tive 5100.01, Functions of the Department of tion, or even civilian partners during an iso Defense and Its Major Components, the policy lating event. We want our leaders and custom document that codifies Air Force core func ers to understand fully what PR encompasses tions and those of our fellow services.2 This rather than rely on dated expressions to incor designation allows senior leaders to promul rectly characterize our specialized capabilities gate essential PR concepts and practices to and unique life-saving skills. the joint community, standardizing interaction Under PR, the ability to recover downed among PR experts and the customers we serve. pilots remains the hallmark of the rescue Furthermore, the Air Force and others in the Airman. Having such a high-end capability DOD can direct forces to integrate training ensures flexibility in fulfilling the rescue specific to PR, thus enhancing comprehen mission across the ROMO. For the brave sion and effective implementation of recov men and women who answer that call, it is a ery across the ROMO and maximizing usage way of life like no other. An examination of of this life-saving Air Force core function that legacy from the jungles of Vietnam, and during each phase of any military operation. even before, confirms the fact that rescue However, because PR—as a service core Airmen save lives, regardless of the risk to function—systematically encapsulates “these themselves. Such commitment instills trust things we do,” some people at times have dif in others that “someone will come.” It also ficulty truly comprehending and fully under complicates the decision cycles of our adver standing its expansive nature. PR spans the saries. These facts are as true today as they fundamental war-fighting requirement to pre ever were. But saving a life is the effect—one pare, plan, execute, and adapt. It encom that can occur across the ROMO, not just passes survival and captivity training con during major combat operations. In order to ducted at Lackland AFB, Texas; Fairchild AFB, truly appreciate the full range of capability Washington; and the Air Force Academy, that today’s rescue Airmen bring to the fight Colorado; as well as large-force rescue exer under the PR service core function, one cises flown at Red Flag and Angel Thunder, must think far beyond the notion that Air together with PR education and command Force PR exists only to sit alert in some aus and control training available at Hurlburt tere environment, launch a rescue helicop

8 | Air & Space Power Journal Senior Leader Perspective

ter into contested territory, and return a fel consider important. They speak to our low pilot to safety. In that context, PR is not unique contributions to the joint cause and simply a new abbreviation for CSAR. Per the need to achieve war-fighting effective haps this is why rescue Airmen, past and ness. Any service that seeks war-fighting in present, were delighted when our Air Force dependence instead of embracing interdepen recognized the importance of the rescue mis dence serves only to reduce war-fighting sion by including PR among the service core effectiveness and increase the likelihood of functions. Nevertheless, even though PR has costly redundancies and capability gaps. The enjoyed this designation for two years, not last thing we need to do is turn back the every Airman—as well as some rescue Air clock by allowing services to develop exces men—understands the significance. sively redundant capabilities, thereby reject At this point, reviewing the meanings of ing the premise of joint war fighting. It is im the terms service, core, and function might perative that services build the right mix of prove beneficial to all Airmen. A standard people, systems, and infrastructure under English dictionary defines the nounservice lying their core competencies and functions.5 as “the occupation or function of serving, or Armed with this understanding, one might in active service.” Clearly, all of us who wear assume that everyone knows the high-order the cloth of our nation, even our civilian Air significance of having PR listed among other men, share this bond. The definition of the Air Force core functions. However, many in noun/attributive core—“a central and often dividuals both within and without the rescue foundational part” or “a basic, essential, or community have lazily thrown around such enduring part”—points to our deepest rooted terms as PR mission, PR forces, and CSAR convictions about who we are and what we when the enterprise should in fact refer to stand for, those ideas that shape our guiding itself as the PR service core function. Failure to principles, opinions, and beliefs. These ele do so affects how members of other Air Force ments comprise our “DNA.” Last, the noun communities (e.g., fighter; bomber; special function is “the action for which a person or operations forces; and intelligence, surveil thing is specially fitted or used or for which a thing exists.” We Airmen are “specially lance, and reconnaissance [ISR]) view the fitted” for the missions we perform every value of both PR as a core function and res day—in particular, for those designated as cue as a mission. This situation has a detri service core functions. mental effect on how other core functions The Air Force designed the list of service become interconnected and mutually sup core functions to support its essential mis portive during all facets of preparation, plan sion areas—those that truly reflect both the ning, execution, and adaptation. DNA of Airmen and what it means to be an Although Airmen recognize and mem air, space, and cyberspace warrior. Broadly bers of our sister services widely compre defined, our service core functions attempt hend the functional concepts behind most to describe and fulfill the strategic objectives of the Air Force’s core functions (e.g., global found in both the national defense and na precision attack, air superiority, nuclear de tional military strategies.4 The formula for terrence operations, command and control, understanding what a service core function global integrated ISR, etc.), PR falls short. encapsulates is simple: winning effects = Yet, every Airman should have at least a purpose + mission + capabilities (systems baseline understanding of everything essen and skills) required for success. Each service tial to our service, which now includes PR. core function is accompanied by a list of This requirement accords with our service’s underlying elements intended to tie that solemn responsibility to organize, train, and function to specific missions and tasks car equip our Airmen throughout the preparation- ried out by Air Force units. Service core planning-execution-adaptation continuum. functions go well beyond what we Airmen Doing so will meet the PR policies and de

Fall 2011 | 9 mands set forth by our national leaders and are core to an Airman’s practiced ability to fly combatant commanders. aircraft, run a hoist, deliver survival rafts Recalling our formula for what a service while airborne, call for suppressive fire, para core function encompasses (winning effects = chute, air-refuel, maintain aircraft, employ purpose + mission + capabilities [systems weapons, collect and disseminate intelli and skills] required), we can now put PR to gence, transfer knowledge, survive, evade the test. First, in terms of winning effects, PR capture, resist exploitation, escape, and so on. protects human capital and denies an adver All of this accurately depicts PR—they are sary the operational and strategic advantages “these things we do.” Clearly then, describing of exploitation. Second, PR exists for the pur- PR simply as a mission or event involving a pose of saving lives and supporting people helicopter picking up a downed pilot behind who must struggle to survive, evade capture, enemy lines is an understatement. resist exploitation, and escape when neces In this context, every Airman plays a part sary. Third, PR performs the rescue mission within the greater PR service core function. by finding individuals, getting them out of More specifically, Airmen placed in harm’s trouble, returning them to safety, and ren way need to prepare for becoming isolated. dering medical care as required. Fourth, ca- The Air Force’s current posture statement pabilities include the systems and skills nec indicates that “the United States faces di essary to run through the “save chain’s” five verse and complex security challenges that critical tasks rapidly and successfully: report, require a range of agile and flexible combat locate, support, recover, and reintegrate indi capabilities” as well as effects designed to viduals forced to survive, evade capture, re win.6 Our service is fully engaged in this ef sist exploitation, and escape. fort, and PR is making a vital contribution. The specific weapon systems currently Given the ongoing issues confronting us apportioned and tasked to deliver PR effects worldwide, Airmen stand at the forefront of and perform the rescue mission include the the joint arena, providing combat air, space, HH-60G helicopter, the HC-130N/P aircraft, and cyber power in a host of dangerous en and Guardian Angel (consisting of combat vironments. More than ever before, Airmen rescue officers, pararescuemen, and survival- of all disciplines find themselves in situa evasion-resistance-escape specialists). In and tions outside safe confines and in places of themselves, these systems do not complete where circumstances might forcibly separate the save chain, which requires additional sys them from friendly control. Therefore, be tems typically provided under other core cause Airmen may become “customers” of functions specifically designed and tasked to what the PR service core function brings to carry out the air-to-air mission (under the air the fight, they must understand the capa superiority core function), the interdiction bilities and effects that recovery brings to and close air support missions (under the bear. Additionally, as noted by the posture global precision attack core function), the ISR statement, “the increased utilization of mili mission (under the global integrated ISR core tary and civilian personnel in support of function), medical care support (under the [overseas contingency operations] has sig agile combat support core function), com nificantly increased the demand for Air mand and control for air/space/cyber (under Force rescue forces beyond the conventional the command and control core function), and combat search and rescue mission.”7 There other specialized capabilities (under the spe fore, all Airmen, commanders included, are cial operations core function). Complement responsible for applying their unique capa ing these systems are intellectual and prac bilities (systems and skills) to support a res ticed skills characteristic of three separate yet cue mission across the ROMO—not just related areas: rescue forces, commanders and during combat. their staffs, and people at risk of becoming Air Force PR is indeed a core function of isolated. During a rescue mission, those skills airpower, validated by the fact that, in to

10 | Air & Space Power Journal Senior Leader Perspective

day’s fight, Airmen trained in the true art of standing of PR to the masses, especially recovery can readily adapt and innovatively joint military and interagency planners who support every contingency operation, in assess the recovery needs of their leader cluding those in the homeland. Our ser ship in the field. But we do not clearly com vice’s PR, which embodies an integrated municate beyond the rescue helicopter and, and systematic approach to blending inter on a good day, the HC-130 and Guardian dependent capabilities expected to save the Angel weapon systems. We must become lives of people forced to survive or evade proficient in accurately portraying the Air capture, remains fully applied in Afghani Force’s ability to quickly run through the stan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. It is also save chain, using nontraditional systems ingrained in the support that our nation of and platforms not specifically designed or fers during land and maritime search and intended to perform the rescue mission. rescue, humanitarian assistance / disaster Consequently, as Air Force PR continues to relief, and mass-casualty evacuation opera fly toward the future, leaders at all levels tions either at home or around the globe. must be mindful of how best to guide this Surprisingly, despite such success, some critical and necessarily inclusive service individuals—especially in the joint commu core function. PR is war fighting. It is a key nity and higher—continue to think of Air ingredient in our nation’s ability to win. It Force PR only in terms of flying helicopters is a system-of-systems approach that ad and picking up pilots shot down behind dresses all aspects of preparation, planning, enemy lines. In actuality, the PR service execution, and adaptation necessary in res core function embraces every process, sys cuing a human being. PR is much more tem, platform, and structure necessary for than war-movie images of an HC-130 refuel the Air Force to prepare its personnel in ad ing an HH-60 so it can lower a pararescue vance, plan for the rescue mission, execute man on a hoist to snatch a downed pilot the save chain’s critical tasks, and adapt our from near capture. programs and methods in a way that keeps The Air Force took a significant step by America’s PR observe-orient-decide-act loop tighter than anybody else’s. recognizing PR as one of its service core So where are we missing the mark? We functions. To enjoy true success, all Air need look no further than our collective in men, along with personnel in joint and ability to communicate accurately and con interagency communities, must be aware of sistently the full scope of PR as a service the evolved nature of warfare and of com core function. We still fail to think and talk batant commanders’ escalating need for PR holistically in terms of individual prepara beyond the myopic notion of CSAR. With tion, operational planning, joint execution, this demand comes a call for new and codi and adaptation. It is easy to speak in terms fied terminology, a vision that looks beyond of actually executing a rescue mission, pick historical paradigms, and a retooling of how ing up an isolated person here, supporting a the Air Force organizes, trains, equips, and noncombat evacuation operation there, employs its forces to give war fighters the leading rescue operations during national PR they deserve. If we limit ourselves to disaster X, and facilitating the development thinking narrowly, PR’s value to the nation of partner-nation rescue crews in country Y. will stagnate and eventually become irrele However, we must become equally adept at vant. So the next time Air Force PR comes communicating all the other aspects of to mind, try to move past medical evacua preparation, planning, execution, and adap tion, casualty evacuation, or a rescue mis tation as described by PR’s operational con sion with helicopters and an A-10 fighter cept and core function master plan. As a escort, and realize that this service core service, we experience victory when we can function entails much more than “your fa easily convey our knowledge and under ther’s CSAR.” 

Fall 2011 | 11 Notes

1. Department of the Air Force, United States Air http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2008nationaldefense Force Posture Statement, 2009 (Washington, DC: De- strategy.pdf; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National partment of the Air Force, 19 May 2009), 3, http:// Military Strategy of the United States of America www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/af/posture2009.pdf. (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), http:// 2. Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, www.jcs.mil//content/files/2011-02/020811084800 Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major _2011_NMS_-_08_FEB_2011.pdf. Components, 21 December 2010, http://www.dtic 5. Lt Gen David A. Deptula and Harold “Buck” .mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510001p.pdf. Adams, “Joint’s True Meaning: Jointness Requires 3. Angel Thunder, a PR exercise sponsored by That Separate Services Focus on Core Competencies,” Air Combat Command that takes place at Davis- Armed Forces Journal 146, no. 10 (May 2009): 38–39. Monthan AFB, AZ, focuses on the application of 6. Department of the Air Force, United States Air recovery capabilities across the full range of mili- Force Posture Statement, 2011 (Washington, DC: De- tary operations to support the whole-of-government partment of the Air Force, 17 February 2011), 1, response to isolated personnel. http://www.posturestatement.af.mil/shared/media 4. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy /document/AFD-110301-088.pdf. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2008), 7. Ibid., 20.

Brig Gen Kenneth E. Todorov, USAF Brigadier General Todorov (BA, Siena College; MBA, National University; MS, Naval War College; MSS, Air War College) is the deputy director of operations at US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), Colorado Springs, Colorado. His portfolio at USNORTHCOM includes air, land, maritime, space, and cyber operations for homeland defense, as well as ballistic missile defense; information operations; nuclear command and control; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations; and defense support of civil authorities. Prior to his assignment at USNORTHCOM, he commanded the 23rd Wing at Moody AFB, Georgia. The wing had units at Moody, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, and Nellis AFB, Nevada, including all active duty rescue assets in the continental United States. He is a command pilot with more than 3,800 flight hours in the HH-60 (multiple models), TH-55, UH-1H, CH-3E, HH-3E, HC-130, MI-8, and MI-24. General Todorov also led the initial Coalition Air Force Transition Team into Iraq to assess the capabilities and requirements for all special operations and rotary-wing assets of the Iraqi air force. The general is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, the College of Naval Com- mand and Staff, and the Air War College.

Col Glenn H. Hecht, USAF Colonel Hecht (BS, University of Pittsburgh; MBA, University of Phoenix) is deputy director of Analyses, Lessons Learned, and Air Force Smart Operations for the Twenty-First Century, Headquarters Air Combat Command (ACC), Langley AFB, Virginia. Previous assignments include chief of the Combat Search and Rescue Operations Division, Headquarters ACC; director for personnel recovery policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC; commander of the HH-60G Combined Test Force, 53rd Wing, Nellis AFB, Nevada; and chief of the Conven- tional Recovery Branch, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He has deployed in support of Operations Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan and the Philippines), and Iraqi Freedom, accruing over 190 combat and 250 combat-support flight hours while performing the rescue mission. A command pilot with more than 3,500 hours in the HH-60G, HH-60A/L, UH-1N, UH-1H, and TH-55, Colonel Hecht is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, Joint Forces Staff College, and Air War College.

12 | Air & Space Power Journal Ira C. Eaker Award Winners for the top Air & Space Power Journal articles of the past year

First Place Second Place Third Place Lt Col George H. Hock Jr. Lt Col Kristal L. Alfonso Lt Col Timothy Franz “Closing the Irregular Warfare “Femme Fatale 2010” “The Cyber Warfare Professional: Air Capability Gap: (Fall 2010) Realizations for Developing The Missing Puzzle Piece: Rugged the Next Generation” Utility Aircraft and Personnel” (Summer 2011) (Winter 2010)

Congratulations to this year’s winners! The award honors airpower pioneer Gen Ira C. Eaker and is made possible through the generous support of the Air University Foundation. If you would like to compete for the Ira C. Eaker Award, submit a feature-length article to Air and Space Power Journal via e-mail at [email protected]. All military personnel below the rank of colonel (O-6) or government civilian employees below GS-15 or equivalent are eligible. If ASPJ publishes your article, you will automatically be entered in the competition.

Fall 2011 | 13 We encourage you to e-mail your comments to us at [email protected]. We reserve the right to edit your remarks.

STRATEGY AND AIRPOWER values, heroes, hopes, fears, etc.) is the hu man terrain where most Airmen exhibit I first read Col John Warden’s book The Air weakness. The technological requirements Campaign: Planning for Combat in the sum of tactically succeeding as Airmen often mer of 1989 as a cadet at the Air Force dominate and sometimes inhibit their intel Academy. It was, to my youthful eye, a lectual development of a strategic perspec revelation of how to think about airpower tive. Colonel Warden’s article gives addi in a systematic way. Colonel Warden’s five tional evidence to Carl Builder’s classic rings remained a strategic framework characterization of Airmen “worship[ping] throughout my early career, and I think we at the altar of technology” (The Masks of are all indebted to him for his contributions War [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University to airpower theory. In fact, the speed and Press, 1989], 19). Airpower in air, space, and surgical nature of the first Gulf War seem cyberspace makes significant contributions ingly proved the verity of his approach. to our nation’s efforts in conflict, yet it is Other airpower enthusiasts often cite the but “one tool in the tool kit” in the joint, air wars in Bosnia and Kosovo as further interagency, and multinational operating supporting examples of the ability to use environment that we use to influence the airpower for strategic effect. opposition’s thinking. More than two decades after originally Airpower has an important role, some reading his work and 10 years into our long times leading and sometimes supporting, struggle in Afghanistan and around the but commanders and strategists need to world against violent extremism, modern understand the history, cultural context, conflict has proven far more complex and and “human terrain” before asserting that intractable than to be holistically addressed any simplified framework will produce de by Colonel Warden’s framework alone. His sired strategic effects. update of the five rings in his article “Strategy and Airpower” (Spring 2011) now “rings” Lt Col Jim Dryjanski, USAF Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany hollow; it is overly simplistic and formulaic since airpower is just one “lever” among many in today’s conflicts. In terms of coun Colonel Warden’s article is well written and, tering ideological support for terrorism, air in places, compelling. It is also ahistorical, power has had little positive effect, and col relies on the selective engagement of lateral damage from even the “precise” use Clausewitz’s On War, and draws conclusions of airpower has been, at times, counter that are misleading if not downright danger productive. Thinking systematically is im ous. Although Colonel Warden caveats his portant, but we must be very cautious of use of Clausewitz as tangential to his main reducing a thinking enemy to a system to argument, the Prussian’s theories refute be serially coerced, bribed, or destroyed nearly every aspect of Warden’s claims. To solely through the use of airpower. Today argue that “airpower can and should funda our warriors, diplomats, and aid workers on mentally change the very nature of war” (p. the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq and 64) ignores Clausewitz’s observations that around the world understand this intui war’s character changes but that its nature— tively as they engage complex, adaptive, centered on the uncertain interplay of vio and unpredictable foes. lence, chance, and reason—is timeless. Air Sun Tzu’s admonition to “know your power has continued, and must continue, to enemy” (his mind-set, language, history, operate in environments dominated by

14 | Air & Space Power Journal Ricochets & Replies

Clausewitz’s trinity. Never in history has airpower promise to change the nature of technology, or airpower, altered the nature war itself. These historically unsupportable of war—and Colonel Warden offers no com arguments damage the credibility of Airmen pelling arguments to explain its doing so in in the joint environment. To paraphrase the the future. On the very first page of On great Prussian, war is—and always will be— War, Clausewitz tries to disabuse future about using force, or threatening to do so, to practitioners of war of the possibility of compel an enemy to do our will. Airpower “bloodless force,” a notion that Warden links can deliver force or coercively threaten the to some future iteration of airpower: “Kind- use of force in novel ways that deserve em hearted people might of course think there phasis in the joint environment. This sim was some ingenious way to disarm or de ple truth—not the seductive message of feat an enemy without too much bloodshed, well-intentioned advocates of airpower like and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a Colonel Warden—should serve as the start fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a ing point for airpower advocates. The lack dangerous business that the mistakes which of Airmen postured to command in joint come from kindness are the very worst” environments, particularly at the geo (On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard graphic combatant commander level, and Peter Paret [Princeton, NJ: Princeton should serve as an indicator that it is we University Press, 1976], 75). Airmen, not our counterparts on the Colonel Warden joins the ranks of Douhet, ground or on the sea, that “don’t get it.” Trenchard, and a host of other airpower ad Maj Mason Dula, USAF vocates convinced that future iterations of USMC Base Quantico, Virginia

Fall 2011 | 15 Air Force Rescue A Multirole Force for a Complex World

Col Jason L. Hanover, USAF

lthough the Air Force rescue com- filled theater PR requirements and an in- munity boasts over 9,000 joint/ ability to deploy rescue forces rapidly in re- multinational combat saves in the sponse to crises like the Haitian earthquake lastA two years and over 15,750 sorties in highlight dangerous operational shortfalls. Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Additionally, a lack of Air Force rescue par- Freedom since September 2001, these im- ticipation in combatant commander exercises pressive statistics cannot overshadow debili- (despite the mandate found in Department tating, systemic problems caused by res- of Defense Directive [DODD] 3002.01E, Per- cue’s ineffective organizational structure.1 sonnel Recovery in the Department of Defense, As demand for personnel recovery (PR) to “rehearse personnel recovery as an inte- continues unabated across the globe, chronic gral part of operational staffing shortages and aircraft mission- planning, training, and capable rates hovering at 60 per- exercise”), acquisition cent paint a bleak picture failures such as the of this indispensible cancelled combat capability. Un- search and rescue replacement (CSAR-X) ple retasking: “Army ground forces conduct program, and stalled funding for replace- recovery the same way they would execute a ment HH-60s and HC-130Js foretell more combat patrol similar to a raid or movement to gaps in capability.2 Inadequate advocacy contact to execute a link up operation. They from major commands (MAJCOM) on be- use the same organization, planning, prepara- half of rescue continues to frustrate even tion, and support.”5 Similarly, a Marine PR mis- modest improvement in this heavily tasked sion “is planned and executed as a form of tac- and operationally indispensible asset. tical raid and involves thorough maneuver, fire To reverse the decline in rescue’s ability support, and contingency planning.”6 Clearly, to meet worldwide requirements, the Air the tactics, techniques, and procedures for Force must restructure its PR core function both Army and Marine PR are compatible with under a numbered Air Force (NAF) in order those of their primary mission set. Moreover, to consistently meet mandates outlined by the Navy operates in the sea domain where the chief of staff and secretary of the Air surface or subsurface assets can be retasked to Force in PR policy and doctrine documents.3 recover a Sailor isolated in open water.7 The This article examines the statutory and op- Air Force, however, does not deal with isolating erational requirements for Air Force rescue, events in its air and space domain but in either noting how this capability fits into joint and the land or sea domain. There is no existing Air Force doctrine. It then addresses how combat air force (other than rescue) whose shortfalls in the current configuration pre- tactics, techniques, and procedures are com- vent the rescue community from meeting patible with interdomain operations, and these the operational demand, leaving huge capa- capabilities and requisite skills cannot be cre- bility gaps in regions of the world where ated ad hoc. Without a dedicated rescue com- rescue by other means is impossible. Keep- munity organized, trained, and equipped to ing in mind the current organizational fail- operate in this environment, the Air Force ure to leverage essential manpower and re- would have no one to execute the service’s PR sources, the article recommends placing Air core function. No other Air Force weapon sys- Force rescue under Eleventh Air Force to tem has a primary mission set that includes ensure strong advocacy for the ongoing re- integrated air, land, and sea operations and covery of isolated personnel. that stands ready for retasking to conduct recovery. Without a standing rescue force, the Air Force could not recover its personnel, and Air Force Rescue: more complex joint missions would be jeopar- dized because of the informal nature of its sis- A Department of Defense Mandate ter services’ PR capability. and an Operational Necessity If all services rely on ad hoc relationships to execute their PR responsibilities, Joint Publication 3-50, Personnel Recovery, interservice rescue in a more complex and assigns each military service primary responsi- challenging (higher-threat) environment bility for recovery of its personnel.4 To meet becomes unacceptably risky. According to this requirement, the Air Force needs a desig- the (Adm James L.) Holloway Report, re- nated force capable of interdomain operations leased in the aftermath of the failed Iranian since it is the only service that must recover hostage rescue attempt in April 1980, personnel outside its normal domain. Unlike the Air Force, the Army and Marine Corps An existing JTF [joint task force] organization, even with a small staff and only cadre units have ground forces that dominate the land do- assigned, would have provided an organiza- main where they can use a multitude of tional framework of professional expertise fielded maneuver elements during rescue. Lo- around which a larger, tailored force organiza- cally operating units can effect an expeditious tion could quickly coalesce. The important recovery of any Soldier or Marine through sim- point is that the infrastructure would have

Fall 2011 | 17 Hanover

existed. . . . The JTF Commander would have in uncertain or hostile environments.”11 Con- had a running start and could have devoted sequently, the secretary declared his intent to more hours to plans, operations, and tactics “establish a global Air Force PR capability . . . 8 rather than to administration and logistics. [through] well-equipped, fully-manned, and This analysis remains relevant today in that dedicated PR forces.”12 Additionally, an Opera- a standing Air Force rescue community pro- tional Concept for Personnel Recovery, signed by vides the “existing JTF organization” that the chief of staff, not only acknowledges that Admiral Holloway referred to over 30 years the sister services routinely call upon Air ago. Disparate, ad hoc PR resources can nei- Force rescue to recover their personnel, but ther represent the Air Force nor provide also expands PR tasks to include civil and sufficient assistance to the joint commu- military search and rescue, medical/casualty nity. A standing Air Force rescue commu- evacuation, noncombatant evacuation opera- nity will add methodical organization, expe- tions, disaster response, mass rescue opera- rience, education, and planning to the joint tions, humanitarian relief operations, theater PR system, thus helping to avoid the costly security cooperation, specialized air and mistakes of the past. ground mobility, and reintegration of recov- ered individuals.13 These documents refute the depiction of Air Force rescue as a single- Current Personnel Recovery purpose force used only to pick up downed fighter pilots during major combat operations. Doctrine/Policy Unfortunately, decisions based on such a DODD 3002.01E, the governing docu- misperception lead to significant operational ment that establishes how the military ex- shortfalls between DOD / Air Force require- ecutes PR, clearly defines the latter as “one ments and the Air Force’s actual capability. of the highest priorities of the Department of Defense.”9 Additionally, it tasks service chiefs with the responsibility to Operational Shortfalls a. Ensure personnel recovery preparation Although Air Force PR boasts a proud efforts keep pace with changes in the global heritage and an impressive list of recent operating environment. . . . achievements since the beginning of Endur- b. Be prepared to plan and execute personnel ing Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, these ac- recovery operations with other interagency complishments should not mask significant partners. . . . problems that undermine the realization of c. Be prepared to conduct interoperable and mu- leadership’s vision. PR currently falls short in tually cooperative personnel recovery operations three specific areas mentioned earlier: (1) “a with partner and host nations, including leverag- global Air Force PR capability,” (2) “uncertain ing host-nation capabilities to rescue DoD per- or hostile environments,” and (3) “keep[ing] sonnel unilaterally whenever possible.10 pace with changes in the global operating environment.” Taken together, these deficien- Based on this direction, the Air Force secre- cies pose a risk to Air Force, DOD, and US tary and chief of staff developed their guid- personnel operating across the globe. ance for the service. Air Force policy and doctrine documents A Global Air Force Personnel further detail the service’s responsibility Recovery Capability within the PR system. Air Force Policy Direc- tive (AFPD) 10-30, Personnel Recovery, ac- Elements of Air Force rescue stationed over- knowledges that “the Department of the Air seas cannot respond rapidly to taskings across Force has primary responsibility for recover- their assigned areas of responsibility. Rescue ing Air Force personnel who become isolated forces allocated to US Air Forces in Europe

18 | Air & Space Power Journal Air Force Rescue

(USAFE) and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) are from appropriately employing rescue.18 For based at Royal Air Force Lakenheath, United example, the commander of US Africa Com- Kingdom; and Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, mand sent a request for additional rescue as- Japan, respectively. In the United Kingdom, sets to the Joint Staff for action, but the force the 56th Rescue Squadron—the smallest in provider, Air Combat Command (ACC), denied the US Air Force—has only five HH-60 heli- it, based on deployment rates and equipment copters and an associated Guardian Angel availability. Thus, an inadequate overseas pres- team; Kadena is home to 10 HH-60s assigned ence and concerns about fleet reliability di- to the 33rd Rescue Squadron and Guardian rectly lead to operational shortfalls. Angel teams assigned to the 31st Rescue Squadron. These forces, which lack a fixed- Uncertain or Hostile Environments wing aircraft element, have a combat radius of 195 miles without external sourcing.14 The Air Force’s rescue aircraft do not have Additionally, limitations in deployment the equipment they need to operate in ad- range necessitate use of either helicopter verse weather conditions. Current configura- tanker aircraft such as the HC-130 (which tions on both the HH-60 and HC-130 lack the neither USAFE nor PACAF owns) or mul- terrain-following radar critical to all-weather, tiple ground-refueling stops at established low-level, and landing operations. Conse- airfields. To carry out strategic deployment, quently, regulations limit operations to those the air component may submit a special air- conducted via visual low-level and visual self- lift mission request to compete with other contained approaches to suitable airfields and priorities. In effect, the preponderance of helicopter landing zones.19 To recover person- the area covered by Pacific Command and nel during bad weather, rescue forces would European Command / Africa Command have to accept extremely high levels of risk or (other than Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa) wait for better conditions—options that fall remains outside the timely response of Air well short of the chief’s intent of “rescuing Force rescue forces, falling well short of the anyone, anywhere, anytime.”20 secretary’s intent of maintaining a global PR Currently, rescue cannot meet that intent capability. Unfortunately, aging aircraft exac- without placing an undesirable burden on erbate deficiencies in range and capability. other forces. Improperly equipped rescue air- Low availability of weapon systems and low craft require augmentation from outside forces reliability rates hamper Air Force rescue’s ef- to lower mission risk. Special operations forces forts to project global PR. For calendar year conduct high-risk operations because their 2010, rescue’s rotary-wing weapon system, the equipment is designed to operate in that envi- HH-60, recorded an availability rate of 53 per- ronment. A rescue scenario involving a pen- cent and a reliability rate of 74 percent.15 That etrating mission inside defended airspace is, on any given day approximately half of the would likely task such forces because they helicopters are available to fly, and, of those, have the electronic countermeasures equip- only three-quarters don’t break before complet- ment and defensive gear that rescue forces ing the mission. Rescue’s fixed-wing weapon lack even though the latter have the requisite system, the HC-130, has an equally low avail- skills to conduct these missions. Such a situa- 16 ability rate of 51 percent. Finally, the combat tion makes special operations forces unavail- air force’s Guardian Angel weapon system (in- able for their own primary mission. cluding pararescue personnel; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape specialists; and Keeping Pace with Changes in the combat rescue officers) continues to hover Global Operating Environment around 60 percent manning with no increase expected in the near term.17 These factors, National strategic documents recognize the coupled with higher-than-programmed usage need for proficiency in irregular warfare (IW). and major depot delays, deter commanders The new national security strategy confirms

Fall 2011 | 19 Hanover

US dedication to “more effectively advance tragedy. Philippine ground forces would not our interests in the 21st century” through se- engage terrorists at night knowing there was curity, prosperity, values, and international no night [casualty evacuation] capability avail- order.21 The national defense strategy extrapo- able. Ground combat teams began night opera- lates these objectives into defending the tions immediately after the Philippine Air Force acquired this capability provided by Air homeland, winning the long war, promoting Force [Special Operations Command] combat security, deterring conflict, and winning our aviation advisor . . . trainers.25 nation’s wars.22 These two documents share the theme of needing to develop and main- With all evidence pointing to the significant tain partnerships as the cornerstone of peace strategic impact of an Air Force rescue com- and security. Nurturing partnerships and munity tasked with BPC, this capability building partner capacity (BPC) through ef- nevertheless remains unexploited, leading forts designed to support, train, advise, and one to inquire about the Air Force’s view of equip a host nation’s security forces promote this significant shortfall. a strong coalition team that maintains the ca- A report by the Air Force’s IW tiger team, pacity, will, and capability to act. Although it chartered by the chief of staff to determine is the premiere force for carrying out this IW requirements and gaps, characterizes task, Air Force rescue remains unexploited. Air Force rescue as a correctable problem in Rescue’s untapped IW capability for BPC the context of successful operations in to- underlines a significant Air Force problem in day’s global environment.26 The report con- keeping pace with the operating environ- tends that having more US forces perform ment. The global environment has driven BPC and theater security cooperation activi- strategic leadership to direct investment in ties widens the gap between PR requirements forces capable of building partnerships and and capability. Additional numbers of per- increasing their capacity, but the Air Force sonnel operating in remote locations over- has yet to task and resource its most fitting seas increase the demand placed on an al- BPC asset—rescue.23 Additionally, the lead for ready strained PR, medical evacuation, and IW operations—Special Operations Com- multimission fixed- and rotary-wing force. mand—calls for general-purpose forces to Research further reveals that the Air Force perform missions primarily viewed as special rescue community provides an organiza- operations activities: “Rebalancing [general- tional framework with skill sets that could purpose forces] to conduct IW will expand be applied to fill an additional gap in air ad- joint force operational reach. . . . The results viser capability.27 Finally, the report advo- will be improved capability to operate against cates that expanding and resourcing that adversaries . . . and an expanded ability to . . . community to execute IW/BPC missions achieve US strategic objectives.”24 IW/BPC facilitate elimination of a strategic shortfall applied to rescue enhances a partner’s ability in persistent presence.28 To fully implement to support its military and civilian population. the recommendations of the tiger team, the It reinforces national sovereignty and im- Air Force must acknowledge shortages in its proves security, prosperity, and international current equipment inventory. order, as exemplified in Air Force Doctrine In the report, such deficits come to light Document 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense: when both the PACAF vice-commander and the Air Forces Africa commander discuss their The availability of dependable CSAR and [casu- desire for light, fixed-wing aircraft. PACAF’s alty evacuation], especially at night, has dra- vice-commander deems PR essential in all matically improved the willingness and ability of host nation ground combatant forces to en- countries (both developed and developing) but gage in operations they may otherwise be less acknowledges the ineffectiveness of Air Force motivated to perform. This was particularly rescue as currently equipped: “The tyranny of noticeable in the Philippines during the years distance, terrain, and island environment drive immediately following the September 11, 2001, demand for light STOL [short takeoff and land-

20 | Air & Space Power Journal Air Force Rescue ing] fixed-wing and light rotary-wing aircraft as Advocate for training, standards, and require- forces operate in remote areas of Sri Lanka, ments to maintain an effective PR command Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and control (C2) architecture.31 29 Bangladesh, and the Oceanic island nations.” Although well intentioned and supportive of Similarly, the Air Forces Africa commander PR, ACC has global responsibilities that have calls for fixed- and rotary-wing platforms that prevented it from fulfilling those tasks. For ex- allow the Air Force and partner nations’ air ample, 78 HC-130J and 141 CSAR-X recapital- forces to conquer the “tyranny of distance” and ization requirements validated by the Joint lack of infrastructure. The solution, the com- Requirements Oversight Council remain un- mander contends, does not involve acquiring filled.32 The failure to emphasize PR and advo- more strategic lift but creating regional reach cate/prioritize at the MAJCOM level resulted with rugged, affordable light and medium in cancellation of the CSAR-X program and a fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Applying this reduction of the HC-130J program to 37 air- air capacity to medical evacuation as well as craft with as few as one aircraft delivered a search and rescue yields high payoffs in terms year in the current program objective memo- of protecting our personnel, building partner- randum. Statements made by former secretary 30 ships, and legitimizing the government. The of defense Robert Gates in his budget recom- lack of “technology appropriate” equipment mendation reveal the debilitating second-order leaves US personnel operating in remote loca- effects: “We will terminate the Air Force Com- tions without PR support. Furthermore, it bat Search and Rescue X (CSAR-X) helicopter leaves our partner nations without affordable, program. This program has a troubled acquisi- reliable equipment to build their capacity tion history and raises the fundamental ques- through rescue air advisers. The shortfalls de- tion of whether this important mission can scribed above reflect a larger problem identi- only be accomplished by yet another single- fied by analysis of the Air Force’s PR structure. service solution with single-purpose aircraft.”33 The classification of Air Force rescue as a “single-purpose” community starkly contrasts The Root of the Problem the chief of staff’s multidimensional descrip- We can trace Air Force rescue’s deficien- tion found in the Operational Concept for Per- cies to an ineffective organizational struc- sonnel Recovery, mentioned previously. Unfor- ture. Current efforts to “fix” these issues do tunately, in a system where perception is (or not work because they attack symptoms becomes) reality, such a viewpoint assures that rather than the problem. Unless this ap- programming decisions will continue to cause proach changes, the community will con- shortfalls in meeting combatant commanders’ tinue to experience the same difficulties— requirements. If the root problem persists, hence the need for a root-cause analysis ACC will continue to lack the equipment nec- that will remedy core issues. essary to meet the demands of AFPD 10-30. Air Force rescue’s ailments and resultant Although ACC acknowledged inefficiencies shortfalls stem from an inability to meet the with organizational structure in its memoran- responsibilities specified in AFPD 10-30. In dum announcing establishment of a PR divi- this policy document, the secretary of the sion at command headquarters, this represents Air Force tasks ACC to only one of the two major organizational steps required to correct the problem.34 The fact that Advocate for PR policies and strategic guid- ACC has responsibility for five of 12 service ance and assist with determining PR forces core functions (including PR) means that a requirements. small community like rescue struggles to re- Advocate for adequate programming, stan- ceive attention. Compounding the problem, dards, and policies that foster both interoper- the rescue mission lies outside the “main- ability and enhanced PR capabilities. stream” menu of ACC’s capabilities and re-

Fall 2011 | 21 Hanover quirements. The combat air force leadership’s architecture that will eliminate operational lack of familiarity with rescue results in an ab- shortfalls. ACC’s new PR staff division (ACC/ sence of strategic guidance as reflected in the A3J stood up in December 2010) operates recently published strategic plan, which de- within the Directorate of Operations; it is scribes PR as “part of our pillars but . . . not neither chartered nor empowered to meet necessarily on par with the previously men- AFPD 10-30’s cross-functional requirements. tioned core functions” (e.g., air superiority, A rescue NAF structure, however, would global precision attack, C2, global integrated mirror ACC and Headquarters Air Force ISR, etc.).35 By identifying “our priorities, chal- staffs to ensure that personnel executing the lenges, and the imperatives the [combat air Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Ex- force] must deliver in support of our Nation’s ecution (PPBE) processes have justifiable/ security requirements,” the plan also points to defendable PR inputs. Additionally, the 36 a major organizational deficiency. Clearly, if structure expedites establishment of a rescue the Air Force wishes to become a part of this air and space operations center (ASOC). This strategic dialogue, it needs a rescue organiza- concept, similar to Air Force Special Opera- tion led by a senior leader. Otherwise, rescue tions Command’s Twenty-Third Air Force / will continue to be the “lesser pillar” directed 623 ASOC would simultaneously execute by a staff unequipped to meet the require- PPBE procedures while forming the core of ments of AFPD 10-30. PR C2 architecture. By filling the manpower, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans/requirements, communications, and analysis/ A Rescue Numbered Air Force for assessment billets, the NAF will focus func- Strong Leadership and Advocacy tional expertise on meeting the Air Force’s PR responsibilities. The synergy gained will The only way to implement permanent yield a plan that eliminates existing short- fixes to operational shortfalls is by meeting falls, answers PR C2 architecture concerns the secretary’s and chief’s PR mandates originally raised by the Holloway Report, through a reorganization of the Air Force res- and provides the NAF commander with in- cue community under a rescue NAF. At first glance, creating a new NAF seems to be at formation to drive advocacy properly. cross purposes with the former secretary of The unfiltered, direct (commander-to- defense’s statement on budget efficiencies of commander) communication (formal and 6 January 2011.37 However, Air Force actions informal) between the NAF and MAJCOM enumerated in that statement include con- command structures assures advocacy for solidating three NAF staffs. Although creating PR prioritization in the MAJCOM and Air a NAF might prove too costly, remissioning Force road maps, both critical to the PPBE an existing one in order to meet war-fighter process. Additionally, persistent general of- needs is exactly in line with the secretary’s ficer interaction with air component com- intent. A NAF having operational control of manders yields greater understanding of the all rescue forces will correct two critical prob- service’s PR capabilities. The resultant inclu- lems caused by the current structure by pro- sion in theater security cooperation plans, viding a robust, cross-functional (rescue) staff operational plans, and combatant command- and an experienced flag officer who reports ers’ integrated priority listings (which high- directly to the ACC commander. These im- light capability gaps) will also feed the PPBE provements will equip ACC to fulfill the advo- process. The NAF commander’s advocacy of cacy demands of AFPD 10-30 and the require- PR policies, strategic guidance, force/pro- ments of PR’s C2 architecture. gramming requirements, and training stan- A robust, cross-functional staff can create dards will assure compliance with AFPD 10-30 PR policies, strategic guidance, force/pro- and position the Air Force rescue commu- gramming needs, training standards, and C2 nity to eliminate operational deficits.

22 | Air & Space Power Journal Air Force Rescue

Implementing a Rescue Numbered Air Force each contributing to a synergy capable of mitigating current “global PR capability” deficits. A solution that acknowledges current fiscal Increased speed and range of fixed-wing res- constraints is vital to successful implementa- cue elements, along with in-flight helicopter- tion of this plan. After the former secretary of refueling capability, give the air component defense tasked the services to find more than commander a more responsive and flexible $100 billion in overhead savings over the next force. The associated increase in capability five years, each one proposed to eliminate and resources directly results in theater cov- no-longer-needed headquarters.38 Proposing erage across greater distances and terrain. Ad- another headquarters on the heels of Global ditionally, a rescue group structure’s inherent Strike Command, the secretary’s guidance to C2 capability would prove invaluable during the contrary, seems daunting. However, in deployment. To repeat the observation of the accordance with that guidance, if the Air Holloway Report, quoted earlier, it would Force identifies a superfluous headquarters, it “[provide] an organizational framework of pro- can “keep the savings . . . generate[d] to rein- fessional expertise around which a larger, tai- vest in higher priority warfighting needs.”39 In lored force organization could quickly co- this case, if the Air Force eliminated an un- alesce . . . [giving rescue] a running start and necessary NAF, it could apply the funds saved . . . [the ability to devote] more hours to plans, to a functional rescue NAF. The key then, be- operations, and tactics rather than to adminis- comes finding an expendable NAF. tration and logistics.” Finally, the additional Release of the new Unified Command Plan offers the perfect opportunity to re-mission manpower associated with a rescue group an existing NAF. The plan realigns Alaska and brings an inherent capacity increase that can associated forces (Eleventh Air Force) under simplify compliance with the chief of staff’s the operational control of US Northern Com- Operational Concept for Personnel Recovery. Af- mand (NORTHCOM) / North American Aero- ter the establishment of the rescue group space Defense Command (NORAD) and the structure and the attainment of global PR ca- administrative control of ACC. ACC should pability/capacity, the proper equipping of shift “Alaska defense forces” and realign them forces will rectify shortfalls associated with under First Air Force, NORTHCOM/NORAD’s operating in hostile or uncertain environ- existing air component. This action would ments while enabling rescue to keep pace permit separation of the Eleventh Air Force with the changing global environment. staff structure from the maneuver forces and Previously acknowledged capability gaps its redesignation as a rescue NAF. The Elev- identify inadequate equipment as the main enth’s current approved standing strength of roadblock to operating in hostile environ- 477 officers, enlisted personnel, civilians, and ments and remote locations, a problem cor- contractors provides enough billets to meet rected by adding radar and radar-jamming the service’s PR policy requirements, giving countermeasure suites to both the HC-130 ACC a no-cost avenue to remedy Air Force and HH-60; additionally, incorporation of a rescue’s debilitating issues. Once in place, the roll-on/roll-off precision strike package for the NAF will have to take action to eliminate ex- HC-130 would provide for limited organic self- isting shortfalls. defense. Finally, conducting both PR and BPC tasks in remote locations calls for light fixed- wing rescue squadrons. Current Air Force Eliminating Shortfalls programming includes procurement of light Creating Air Force rescue groups overseas mobility aircraft for delivery to Air Mobility that are tasked and resourced to meet both PR Command. If the service refocused these ef- and BPC needs would eliminate deficiencies forts and shifted delivery to ACC, both PACAF and standardize force presentation. Rescue and Air Forces Africa would have the remote operates as a “triad” of fixed-wing, rotary- PR/BPC access they need to operate in their wing, and Guardian Angel weapon systems, theaters. The key to doing away with all exist-

Fall 2011 | 23 Hanover ing shortfalls lies in putting a mechanism in ments, combined with chronic personnel place to work within the system to guide the shortages and declining aircraft availability development of Air Force rescue. rates, foretells a worldwide decline in Air Force rescue’s capability and capacity for contingency operations. Unquestionably, Conclusion those forces cannot meet the secretary of the Air Force’s requirement for global PR The Air Force rescue community is es- without dramatic improvement in their or- sential to joint doctrine and operations. ganization, training, and equipment—which Commanders and their troops clearly benefit a rescue NAF would provide. By elevating tactically from the availability of rescue, the needs of Air Force rescue and its contri- and the US government benefits operation- bution to the joint and coalition communi- ally and strategically from its ability to deny ties at the Air Staff, the service can meet the enemy an opportunity to exploit cap- the growing demand for its global rescue. tured US personnel. Unfortunately, weak Renewing our commitment to the rapid re- advocacy at the MAJCOM level for person- covery of isolated personnel will inspire nel and equipment leaves over 40 percent confidence among our international part- of the rescue demand unmet. Failure of pro- ners that Air Force rescue professionals will grams such as CSAR-X and HC-130 recapi- answer the call around the world so that talization to meet validated force require- others may live. 

Notes

1. “Combined Forces Air Component Commander www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents Airpower Statistics,” slide (Shaw AFB, SC: Combined /MCO%203460.2.pdf. Air and Space Operations Center, United States Air 7. Ibid., C-5. Forces Central, 12 January 2011); and House, Presen- 8. Department of Defense, Rescue Mission Report tation to the Committee on Armed Services, United [Holloway Report] (Washington, DC: Department of States House of Representatives, Fiscal Year 2012 Air Defense, 23 August 1980), 60. Force Posture Statement of the Honorable Michael B. 9. DODD 3002.01E, Personnel Recovery, 2. Donley, Secretary of the Air Force, and General Norton 10. Ibid., 11. A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 11. AFPD 10-30, Personnel Recovery, 1. 112th Cong., 1st sess., 17 February 2011, 7, http:// 12. Ibid., 2. www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/af/posture2011.pdf. 13. Schwartz, Operational Concept for Personnel 2. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) Recovery, ii. 3002.01E, Personnel Recovery in the Department of 14. Col Michael A. Corbett, chief, Personnel Re- Defense, 16 April 2009, 16, http://www.dtic.mil/whs covery Division, ACC/A8R, memorandum, subject: /directives/corres/pdf/300201p.pdf. Statement of Capabilities for Currently Fielded 3. Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-30, Per- sonnel Recovery, 22 December 2006, http://www HH-60G Pavehawk, 23 September 2009. .e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFPD10 15. Briefing, 23rd Maintenance Group, 23rd -30.pdf; and Gen Norton A. Schwartz, Operational Wing, subject: 23 MXG Metrics, 13 January 2011. Concept for Personnel Recovery (Washington, DC: 16. Air Force Fleet Viability Board, “Phase 2: Headquarters US Air Force, 3 September 2009). HC-130P/N Assessment Report” (Washington, DC: 4. Joint Publication 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 5 Air Force Fleet Viability Board, Department of the January 2007, II-2, http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/laws Air Force, 12 December 2007), i. _directives/documents/joint_pu_3_50.pdf. 17. “CFM Inventory Sheet,” spreadsheet (Wash- 5. Ibid., B-12. ington, DC: Headquarters US Air Force, Special Op- 6. Marine Corps Order 3460.2, Policy for Personnel erations and Personnel Recovery Division [AF/A3O- Recovery and Repatriation, 2 December 2002, 14, http:// AS], December 2010).

24 | Air & Space Power Journal Air Force Rescue

18. Briefing, Lt Col John C. Frazer, 723rd Aircraft 27. Ibid., 8. Maintenance Squadron, 23rd Wing, subject: 23 MXG 28. Ibid. CCAD Visit, ca. 2010. 29. Ibid., 31. 19. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 11-2HC-130, vol. 30. Ibid., 12. 3, HC-130—Operations Procedures, 30 June 2007, 31. AFPD 10-30, Personnel Recovery, 2–3. http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media 32. Gen T. Michael Moseley, Capability Develop- /epubs/AFI11-2HC-130V3.pdf; and AFI 11-2HH-60, ment Document for HC/MC-130 Recapitalization Capa- vol. 3, HH-60—Operations Procedures, 5 January bility (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2011, http://www.af.mil/shared/media/epubs 20 November 2007), iii; and Department of the Air /AFI11-2HH-60V3.pdf. Force, Capability Development Document for Combat 20. Schwartz, Operational Concept for Personnel Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X) / Recovery, 1. Personnel Recovery Vehicle (PRV) (Washington, DC: 21. Barack H. Obama, National Security Strategy Department of the Air Force, 16 June 2005), ii. (Washington, DC: White House, May 2010), 1, 17–47, 33. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “De- http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss fense Budget Recommendation Statement” (speech, _viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. Arlington, VA, 6 April 2009), http://www.defense 22. Department of Defense, National Defense .gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341. Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 34. Maj Gen David L. Goldfein, memorandum, June 2008), 6, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2008 subject: ACC/A3 Announcement: New ACC/A3J— nationaldefensestrategy.pdf. Personnel Recovery Division, 3 December 2010. 23. Gen Norton A. Schwartz and Michael B. Donley, 35. Gen William M. Fraser III et al., Securing the The 21st Century Air Force: Irregular Warfare Strategy High Ground: Agile Combat Airpower; 2010 Combat (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Air Force, Janu- Air Force Strategic Plan (Langley AFB, VA: Headquar- ary 2009), 9–10. ters ACC, 6 August 2010), 13, http://www.acc.af.mil 24. Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare /shared/media/document/AFD-100915-011.pdf. (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Version 1.0 36. Ibid., foreword. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 11 Sep- 37. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “State- tember 2007), 23, http://www.michaelyon-online ment on Department Budget and Efficiencies” .com/images/pdf/iw-joc.pdf. (speech, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 6 January 25. Air Force Doctrine Document 3-22, Foreign 2011), http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech Internal Defense, 17 September 2010, 27, http:// .aspx?speechid=1527. www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs 38. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Effi- /AFDD3-22.pdf. ciencies Statement as Prepared” (speech, Pentagon, 26. David J. Scott, US Air Force Irregular Warfare Washington, DC, 9 August 2010), 2, https://dap.dau Tiger Team: Observations and Recommendations .mil/policy/Documents/Policy/Efficiencies%20 (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Air Force, 22 Statement%20As%20Prepared.pdf. May 2009), ii–iv. 39. Ibid.

Col Jason L. Hanover, USAF Colonel Hanover (USAFA; MBA, Loyola Marymount University) is commander of the 563rd Rescue Group, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. The group consists of an HC-130P rescue squadron, two HH-60G helicopter rescue squadrons, an operations support squadron, and two Guardian Angel squadrons. He is responsible for the overall combat training and readiness of more than 700 personnel. The 563rd plans and executes worldwide deployments in support of the United States’ national security and global military objectives. Previously, he commanded the 71st Rescue Squadron, flying the HC-130P Combat King, completed a Joint Staff assignment at Joint Special Operations Command, and served eight years as a special operations MC-130H Combat Talon II instructor pilot. Colonel Hanover is a graduate of Squad- ron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, Command and General Staff College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, and Air War College; he was also an Air Force Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Fall 2011 | 25 Strategic Rescue Vectoring Airpower Advocates to Embrace the Real Value of Personnel Recovery

Maj Chad Sterr, USAF

ew Airmen would dispute the intrinsic importance of rescuing comrades in distress. Stories of selfless efforts to recover downed personnel are rooted in US military lore, most strikingly in Southeast Asia and Somalia. This article suggests that although air- powerF advocates generally identify with the tactical rescue mission, they often fail to understand its inherent strategic value as part of the broader personnel recovery (PR) function. This needs to change. Current US policies clearly define the necessity for and strategic purpose of a concerted approach to rescuing people in physical distress, especially where America’s security interests are at risk.1 These policies identify the beneficial effects that a nation with organic rescue capability creates within the international community.2 To fulfill this national policy, the Department of Defense (DOD) tasks the Air Force to employ dedicated rescue forces to perform global PR, which requires a holistic approach towards organizing, mobilizing, and conducting rescue responses that can systematically recover and then return all isolated personnel.3 Although some of these expectations resulted from top-down initiatives, we should note that PR professionals effectively climbed many bureaucratic walls to nudge the US government towards placing strategic emphasis on PR. Airpower advocates now have a strategic rescue capability that joins strategic attack; global reach; persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- and political costs created when an adver- sance; and other airpower competencies to sary exploits isolated personnel to generate counter our adversaries’ efforts to influence propaganda, gain intelligence, or restrict our way of life. It is up to these same advo- their physical freedom of action or maneu- cates to maximize the emerging potential ver. This makes Air Force rescue forces a of what we might term “strategic PR.” key component of the US government’s “whole-of-government” approach to recovering isolated personnel across the range of The Rise of Strategic military operations, including the concept Personnel Recovery of building partnership capacity. Despite rescue forces’ high operations tempo and The United States needs new strategic the DOD’s impending budget cuts, the Air emphasis on PR due to the advent of today’s Force must continue to lead PR efforts by overseas contingency operations and con- addressing a pressing need for rescue prep- tinuing emphasis on the need to conduct aration, response, and adaptation before, major combat operations, in addition to the during, and after a crisis, respectively. necessity of dissuading America’s adversar- On 1 February 2011, headlines in news- ies while stabilizing war-torn populations. papers worldwide proclaimed “Dept of State We must reduce the operational and politi- Issues Worldwide Caution for U.S. Citizens cal risks that stem from captivity and hos- Anywhere.”5 Americans have always been tage situations. The US government now at risk in war zones and lawless lands, from takes a more proactive and unified ap- Iraq and Afghanistan to Somalia. Has our proach to mitigating these risks to individu- world become a place where Americans are als who conduct official business abroad, really threatened “anywhere,” from Olym- including all Airmen who serve overseas. pics sites to sandy beaches? The interna- The term isolated personnel reflects this stra- tional security environment continues to tegic emphasis, as defined in joint doctrine: change unpredictably, increasing Ameri- “Those US military, DOD civilians, and cans’ chances of encountering terrorist ac- DOD contractor personnel (and others des- tion and violence throughout the world. Ad- ignated by the President or Secretary of De- versaries target venues, both official and fense . . . ) who are separated (as an indi- private, ranging from embassies and sport- vidual or group) from their unit while ing events to business offices and places of participating in a US-sponsored military worship. Public transportation has a high activity or mission and who are, or may be, potential for attack—buses, subways, trains, in a situation where they must survive, aircraft, and cruise ships have all come un- evade, resist, or escape.”4 der terrorist scrutiny. Confronted by these Consequently, the Air Force’s rescue shadowy dangers, Americans can either force has evolved beyond the traditional im- hide within the United States or refuse to ages of recovering downed aircrews or res- give in to these threats. Those who choose cuing special operations forces from behind the latter course may do so with greater enemy lines. A force capable of combat confidence, interacting with the world as search and rescue, the highly complex op- beacons of freedom, if they know that their erational capability employed to recover country will support them. This is just one these personnel, facilitates the execution reason that we conduct PR. To an even aspect of a broader PR function that also greater degree than most military missions, includes preparation, response, and adapta- PR arises from a complex mix of motivation. The Air Force has effectively devel- tions ranging from realistic statecraft to oped the rescue force into the service’s PR moral obligation. In making a case for experts. Rescue is now a highly adaptable adopting a broader view of PR, this article resource that can mitigate the operational illuminates some of these motivations.

Fall 2011 | 27 Sterr

Historical Reinforcement guys behind. So I took the sling off my arm and went on back out. . . . A selective look at the long history of the . . . I was determined to keep my promise United States’ PR operations is revealing. that this battalion would never leave any man behind on the field of battle, that everyone Search and rescue operations during the 9 Vietnam War were a phenomenon peculiar would come home. to American involvement: “Few other na- Both the Soldier’s Creed and Airman’s tions, faced with similar conditions of war- Creed reinforce this ethos, declaring that a fare, would have developed such an exten- Soldier will never leave a fallen comrade sive rescue capability. Even fewer nations and that an Airman will never leave an- could have afforded it.”6 The value that the other Airman behind. American military places on human life, Dr. Earl Tilford, a noted historian of even at the expense of losing rescue forces, search and rescue in Vietnam, asks in the originates in Western philosophies that wake of the famous yet costly rescue of stress the cohesive nature of society as re- Bat 21, “Was one man’s life worth more than flected in American religious and social the lives of two OV-10 crewmembers, five

Both the Soldier’s Creed and Airman’s Creed reinforce this ethos, declaring that a Soldier will never leave a fallen comrade and that an Airman will never leave another Airman behind.

background.7 Indeed, al-Qaeda in North Af- crewmen in the HH-53, and the crew of the rica offers enormous sums of money to any Army Huey chopper that were lost during terrorist group that turns over Westerners— the rescue operation?”10 Specifically, on as long as they are not Americans. Al-Qaeda 2 April 1972, the navigator of an unarmed understands America’s clear commitment EB-66 electronic jamming aircraft found to recovering its people, by forcible means himself on the ground in the midst of an if necessary.8 Furthermore, a pervasive and invading North Vietnamese force of over often stated aspect of the American warrior 30,000. The other five crew members per- ethos asserts that we will never leave a ished in the shoot-down. The survivor comrade behind, dramatically illustrated in evaded capture for 12 days while hundreds Col Hal Moore’s book We Were Soldiers of personnel from all services, including the Once . . . and Young: Coast Guard, searched for him in what Stars and Stripes called the “biggest U.S. air res- We had been taught never to leave any cue effort of the war.”11 The object of that wounded or dead on the battlefield. . . . We rescue effort, Lt Col Iceal Hambleton, often located Taft, dead. While bringing him back we saw another soldier who had been left be- asked himself if his life was worth the ef- hind. . . . Gell and I went back again and we fort. However, given the chance to rescue picked up the other man. . . . one of our own, few of our personnel would . . . The more I sat there the more I real- not risk their lives to save a comrade’s. ized that I couldn’t in good faith get on a Team members feel a responsibility to chopper and fly out of there and leave those the team rather than to the individual. Cit-

28 | Air & Space Power Journal Strategic Rescue ing Gen S. L. A. Marshall’s book Men against Functional Complexity Fire, Victor Davis Hanson points out that “Americans fought simply to survive at the The value placed upon human life makes PR a highly complex operation focused on a unit level, at most to protect and save their time-sensitive target that airpower must re- friends on the left and right, not for higher cover rather than destroy. The perceived 12 notions of good versus evil.” Veterans of costs of failure are high. Success and speed the war in Southeast Asia noted that their go hand in hand, but the complexity of the South Vietnamese allies, on the other hand, PR cycle makes it difficult for a joint force “had to depend on their own ingenuity at commander to reduce rescue response time evasion to get them safely back to friendly across an area of operations. Not only must territory.”13 The South Vietnamese had nei- the recovery force be organized, trained, ther the same philosophy about rescue nor and equipped to respond but also the command and control element must have estab- the extensive resources available for a dedi- lished an efficient PR architecture that fa- cated rescue complex. cilitates time-critical response, thereby The value placed on a single American complementing the capability of isolated life did not change over the two decades personnel to assist in their own recovery. since Vietnam. Service members in that Preparation of commanders and staffs, res- conflict and others speak movingly about cue forces, and isolated personnel then the American attitude towards rescue. For joins with extensive planning, execution of example, CWO Michael Durant, held cap- the rescue mission, and adaptation of lessons learned in order to further affect mis- tive in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993, has the sion success. After the rescue of Bat 21, Brig following to say about his nation’s culture: Gen R. G. Cross Jr., deputy director of air “The acts described in these pages appear operations at Military Assistance Command– unique in many ways, but they have been Vietnam commented, “As airmen or sol- repeated throughout our proud history in diers or sailors we should expect that there the countless displays of courage and sacri- are times when as one person, we must be 15 fice that are the hallmarks of the American sacrificed for the overall.” We turn to na- patriot.”14 Eighteen Americans died on a tional policy to determine when this sacri- fateful day in October during the “Battle for fice is appropriate or, better yet, when it is not appropriate for national security. Mogadishu,” during which Durant was captured. The Somalis shot down two Black- hawk helicopters attempting to rescue National Policy Americans. Two Air Force pararescuemen, “The United States Government remains Scott Fales and Tim Wilkinson, received the committed to the safe and rapid recovery of Air Force Cross for fast-roping to one crash private Americans and United States Gov- site under intense fire to save the wounded; ernment personnel taken hostage or iso- moreover, two Delta snipers, Randy lated overseas.”16 America has emphasized Shughart and Gary Gordon, volunteered to PR by developing an annex to National Se- attempt a rescue of the other downed air- curity Policy Directive (NSPD) 12, which crews against overwhelming odds, making includes prevention of, preparation for, and response to isolating events. It recognizes the ultimate sacrifice. Recognizing that they an adversary’s desire to weaken our na- could manipulate American values for their tional will and threaten international secu- own ends, the Somalis did not kill Durant; rity with events that fund insurgencies, they understood the strategic benefits of criminal groups, and terrorist organizations. negotiating for his life rather than taking it. The increased presence of Americans

Fall 2011 | 29 Sterr abroad and the dynamics of irregular war- force protection, and PR education and fare require the United States to develop an training. Directions for implementing prep- effective PR infrastructure and a coordi- aration identify the need to establish a base- nated response to isolating events, thus line for all departments and agencies, in- driving national policy’s above-mentioned cluding the prioritizing of at-risk locations strategic objectives for PR: prevention, for PR education/training, defining the preparation, and response.17 Prevention de- need for this education/training, and as- creases the vulnerability of US personnel sessing the interoperability of education/ abroad by leveraging education and training training already available within the US resources. Preparation concentrates on at- government. National policy expects im- risk individuals who need an understanding provements to leverage existing education/ of PR processes; the development of plans training programs.20 This expectation ties and procedures, including knowledge of the directly to response, the third objective, in- risk environment; education and training in sofar as policy requires the strengthening surviving captivity, minimizing exploita- and further integration of existing PR re- tion, and enabling recovery; and either sponse mechanisms with the goal of inte- building or leveraging the infrastructure grating capabilities into a unified national necessary to mount an effective response. PR system. For postincident response, the Response, which simply entails execution of DOD must assist other departments and the preparation for an isolating event, re- agencies, as well as partner nations as ap- quires the strengthening and further inte- propriate, in developing reintegration poli- gration of existing PR mechanisms, includ- cies and programs.21 ing the reintegration process that follows Evidence of the national PR policy is ap- 18 the incident. parent throughout Pres. Barack Obama’s Most importantly, NSPD 12 offers imple- national security strategy, which addresses mentation guidance that vectors the whole- America’s enduring interests such as the of-government approach to PR. According value of life; the security of US citizens, al- to Amb. Charles Ray, deputy assistant secre- lies, and partners; respect for universal val- tary of defense for POW / missing personnel ues at home and around the world; and an affairs, “The difficulties our government en- international order that promotes peace, counters in interagency cooperation usually security, and opportunity through coopera- stem from divergent departmental policies tion to meet global challenges.22 The uni- and different institutional cultures. . . . How versal value of saving lives lies at the heart can we really expect cohesion under those of these interests, and employment of the circumstances?”19 The annex to NSPD 12 military component of PR supports the ef- gives the entire US government a common fective use and integration of American policy and language, guiding every depart- power, which occurs during prevention of, ment towards three strategic PR objectives: preparation for, and response to isolating prevention of, preparation for, and response events as specified in defense PR policy. to isolating events. It contains 68 implementation tasks, of which 29 directly involve the DOD. The annex begins with a Defense Policy simple renaming of the Hostage Working Group to the Hostage and Personnel Recov- Former secretary of defense Robert Gates ery Working Group, a change that ensures a focused his national defense strategy on a broadened perspective on hostage taking unified approach to planning and implement- with the goal of institutionalizing PR. Im- ing policy extrapolated from the broader plementing prevention in accordance with national policy. He recognized that military guidance from the NSPD 12 annex includes success alone is not sufficient for achieving an evaluation of current personal security, national objectives, stating that he did not

30 | Air & Space Power Journal Strategic Rescue want the DOD to allow important “soft pating in U.S.-sponsored activities or mis- power” capabilities, often viewed as prepa- sions, is one of the highest priorities of the ration for and response to isolating events, Department of Defense.26 23 to atrophy or disappear. Adm Michael The DOD also acknowledges that it has an Mullen’s national military strategy further obligation to train, equip, and protect its articulates this position, recognizing the ne- personnel, prevent their capture and ex- cessity of applying military power in con- ploitation by adversaries, and reduce the cert with other instruments of statecraft: potential for leveraging isolated personnel “In this multi-nodal world, the military’s against US interests. The department ex- contribution to American leadership must pects commanders to maintain situational be about more than power—it must be awareness of all personnel during military 24 about our approach to exercising power.” operations, linking force protection pro- Admiral Mullen envisions a military capa- grams and PR as a means of preserving the ble of exercising power gradationally, break- force.27 In line with national policy, the ing things and taking lives only when nec- DOD will not support payment of ransom essary. History has proven the DOD or grant concessions for the return of any incapable of consistently meeting this in- of its personnel, with the exception of hon- tent with respect to rescue capabilities de- oring compensation obligations from the spite the thousands of lives saved by Ameri- use of a blood chit.28 can rescue forces through the end of the Vietnam War. Indeed, the Navy disestab- lished its HC-7 unit in 1975 as the service’s A Whole-of-Government only active duty rescue organization, while Approach the Air Force’s Air Rescue and Recovery Service reached noncapable status in 1986. Developing PR capabilities inside the Operation Desert Storm then caught the US DOD is part of the US equation to account military without an effective conventional for the strategic value of PR, but we need rescue capability in 1990, a situation further something more—specifically, an inter- complicated by the lack of an overarching agency whole-of-government approach. The theater rescue command and control struc- national security strategy highlights the fact ture.25 A defense policy highlighting the that fostering coordination across the de- need for PR capabilities prevents the United partments and agencies demands more ef- States from again learning this lesson the fective alignment of resources and improve- hard way. ments in education and training.29 Beyond The DOD emphasized its PR policies in this requirement, President Obama calls for 2009 by publishing DOD Directive the military to continue strengthening its 3002.01E, Personnel Recovery within the De- capacity to partner with foreign states, partment of Defense, which outlines over- train and assist security forces, and pursue arching guidance for the department in military-to-military ties.30 At the same time, building PR capacity and developing capa- the United States will nurture economic bilities to ensure that the DOD can provide and financial transactions for mutual eco- the military-response component of PR nomic benefit while intelligence and law identified in national policy: enforcement agencies cooperate with other governments to anticipate events, respond Preserving the lives and well-being of U.S. 31 military, DoD civilians, and DoD contractor to crises, and provide safety and security. personnel authorized to accompany the U.S. PR plays a major role by linking the military Armed Forces who are in danger of becom- and other US agencies in addressing these ing, or already are, beleaguered, besieged, last few issues, ranging from defense sup- captured, detained, interned, or otherwise port to civil authorities within the home- missing or evading capture . . . while partici- land to humanitarian assistance and disaster

Fall 2011 | 31 Sterr relief operations abroad. The US military’s Humanitarian assistance has another PR capacity is part of the soft power that key benefit: saving a life can make friends strengthens the whole-of-government ap- for life. Saving one life affects that person’s proach to future conflict and crises by en- family, friends, acquaintances, and even abling the United States to gain what it the local government, thus having an in- wants through cooperation and attraction as ordinately advantageous effect on the opposed to hard power’s use of coercion “hearts and minds” of the populace. This and payment. PR also supports a whole-of-government can happen even in unlikely places, as was approach to deterrence. A robust deter- the case in Iran following the devastating rence policy blends economic, diplomatic, earthquake there in December 2003.34 Re- and military tools to influence the behavior garding US assistance to Pakistan after the of potential adversaries.32 Traditional per- earthquake that hit Kashmir in 2005, Admi- spectives recognize that threatening the ral Mullen remarked, “ ‘We started showing use of force can prove just as effective as them a side of American power that wasn’t applying force in order to prevent an adver- perceived as frightening, monolithic, or sary from attaining an objective contrary to 33 arrogant.’ That is what rescue can bring to American desires. We can deter an adver- the table on behalf of the Air Force.”35 Fur- sary by developing a closer relationship ther, the increased confidence in and de- with him and thus avoid conflict. Further- more, combining PR capability with eco- pendence on the government to protect nomic and diplomatic tools in a nonthreat- and save lives instill mutual respect and ening manner offers another state the reduce the breeding grounds for insur- lifesaving opportunities it may have never gency and terrorism.36 considered. In this scenario, another state The DOD is a key actor in implement- relies on the United States’ military power ing the president’s guidance. Secretary for PR at the onset of preparation for disas- Gates wanted to develop and refine the deter relief. In the event of an actual crisis, partment’s PR capabilities with innovative the state requests US assistance. The Japa- means, concepts, and organizations, seek- nese disaster of March 2011 illustrates the ing flexibility and speed via the use of all use of PR to shore up international rela- government assets in response to isolating tions. Since Japan and the United States are democracies and allies, the possibility of events. We will tailor our capabilities, con- their going to war with each other remains cepts, and organizations to the demands of low. However, friendly states still occasion- our complex international environment, ally pursue conflicting objectives that cause which often features asymmetric chal- tension which, if not defused through exist- lenges. The former secretary of defense ing linkages, might escalate into counter- therefore required an expanding under- productive courses of action. When the standing of jointness that seamlessly com- earthquake and subsequent tsunami struck bines our agencies’ civil and military capa- northern Japan, the United States re- bilities. Specifically, Secretary Gates sponded with all available rescue forces at wanted to consider realigning DOD struc- the same time the Japanese openly asked tures, as well as interagency planning and for American help. Neither of these actions response efforts, to better address risks would have occurred without prior effort to 37 integrate both states’ lifesaving capabilities and meet needs. As addressed in the na- and avoid force posturing. Once the popu- tional PR policy, we must rescue and re- lace recognizes that this capability exists, it turn isolated Americans, regardless of will expect the same level of coverage from whether we do so by means of the diplo- its own government in the future. matic, military, or civil component of PR.

32 | Air & Space Power Journal Strategic Rescue

Building Partnership Capacity ments may challenge the ability of weak or developing states to respond to natural di- President Obama identifies “combating sasters.”42 The national military strategy violent extremism; stopping the spread of dedicates an entire section to strengthening nuclear weapons . . .; and forging coopera- international and regional security through tive solutions to the threat of climate theater security cooperation and humani- change, armed conflict, and pandemic dis- tarian assistance for the purpose of develop- ease” as major national interests that cross ing international interoperability before cri- 38 borders. A goodwill gesture such as sav- ses occur, thereby maximizing collaboration ing lives by finding cooperative solutions before lives hang in the balance. The need with partner nations can promote lasting to save people’s lives, regardless of their na- partnerships or future alliances: “Each life tionality, can drive erstwhile adversaries to saved communicates our values instead of build trust and confidence during humani- the enemy’s values, and strengthens faith tarian assistance and disaster-relief activi- in our nation and in those states who part- 39 ties. These efforts will gain and maintain ner with us.” These states will become access to an otherwise closed nation, devel- our closest allies—countries that the oping a relationship to support broader na- United States will depend upon in address- tional interests.43 ing global and regional security crises The increased probability of Americans which affect other common interests. As becoming isolated around the globe and the the national security strategy notes, worldwide impact of natural and/or man- “Where governments are incapable of made disasters motivated Secretary Gates’s meeting their citizens’ basic needs and ful- desire to have the DOD work with allies to filling their responsibilities to provide se- improve military capabilities, with empha- curity within their borders, the conse- sis on training, education, and the building quences are often global and may directly 44 threaten the American people.”40 Humani- of partner capacity when appropriate. In tarian crises offer a perfect example of the national military strategy, Admiral events that, left unaddressed, will over- Mullen adds the expectation that partnerships can withstand political upheavals or whelm a government and influence the 45 international community. The strategy even disruption. The military component specifies the need to foster long-term re- of PR allows us to meet these expectations. covery from these events. Leaving Ameri- PR offers a perfect example of the US armed can agencies deployed in support of a hu- forces developing foreign capabilities as a manitarian crisis without a reasonable critical component of global engagements expectation of their relief by the state re- with collective security benefits. A global ceiving the support does not fulfill this ob- response to saving lives requires invest- jective. We can use PR as a theater security ment in regional capabilities: “Regional or- engagement tool to assist in this process.41 ganizations can be particularly effective at The national military strategy of 2011 de- mobilizing and legitimating cooperation scribes a multinodal world characterized among countries closest to the problem.”46 more by interest-driven coalitions based on The military component of PR can partially diplomatic, military, and economic power realize President Obama’s expectation that as opposed to security competition between the United States enhance regional capabili- opposing forces. Much of this transition ties by developing a division of labor among stems from a growing global population and local, national, and global institutions. PR the demand it places on Earth’s resources: does not exist as a completely military func- “The uncertain impact of global climate tion, but the military does provide a level of change combined with increased popula- expertise that the nation can continue call- tion centers in or near coastal environ- ing upon in pursuit of America’s interests.

Fall 2011 | 33 Sterr

What Does Personnel Conclusion Recovery Achieve? PR is a DOD function primarily because National and defense policies do not America values human life and because stipulate the point at which saving a human loyalty to comrades is the bedrock of mili- life is not worth the cost in resources ex- tary culture. These facts will never change, pended. However, these policies do provide nor should they. We can more easily under- for a whole-of-government and partner- stand the emphasis that military members nation organized approach to prevent or place on life through the countless examples hinder adversaries from realizing four key of heroism immortalized in Medal of objectives: Honor citations and military lore. Our heroes, both living and deceased, are 1. Gaining strategic advantage from a among a large group of warriors who would tactical event in order to weaken na- have given their lives for another team tional will and increase risks to a free/ member had they found themselves in the open society. same situation. People not involved with such missions, however, have questions 2. Influencing international partners to about a policy that may cost rescuers their withdraw from US-led coalitions and lives. Beyond these noble motivations, the withhold support of US policy. United States conducts PR because it has 3. Degrading America’s international im- strategic value beyond the tactical level. age by increasing an adversary’s The United States faces a threat from adver- strength and operational capability. saries who weaken national will and jeopardize international security by exploiting 4. Affecting the availability of opera- captured Americans and allied personnel. tional manpower due to loss of life, These adversaries run the gamut from in- combat ineffectiveness from injury, surgents to criminal groups to terrorists. removal of the will to fight, or refusal The threat has become such a security con- to accept tactical risk.47 cern that the United States has established PR can prevent our adversaries from hav- policy for the prevention of, preparation for, ing a significant effect on national security. and response to isolating events. DOD policy The national defense strategy says that the recognizes PR as one of the department’s military will work with other US departments highest priorities because “any one pris- and agencies, state and local governments, oner, military or civilian, can be that partners and allies, and international and dreaded publicity nightmare, beheaded by multilateral organizations in pursuit of na- hooded fanatics bereft of humanity.”49 tional objectives: “A whole-of-government Through whole-of-government and building- approach is only possible when every gov- partnership-capacity approaches, the ernment department and agency under- United States conducts PR to stop or miti- stands the core competencies, roles, mis- gate an adversary’s attempts to gain strate- sions, and capabilities of its partners and gic advantage, influence international part- works together to achieve common goals.”48 ners, degrade America’s international PR serves as a common goal for the United image, and affect operational resources. States and its allies. For that reason, the Clearly, airpower advocates should embrace DOD has recently paid more attention to their strategic rescue force and the value PR by designating a lead agent. that PR offers beyond tactical operations. 

34 | Air & Space Power Journal Strategic Rescue

Notes

1. National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 12, Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990). He further de- 2008; and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) veloped the concept in Soft Power: The Means to Suc- 3002.01E, Personnel Recovery within the Department cess in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). of Defense, 16 April 2009. 24. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military 2. DODD 2310.2, Personnel Recovery, 22 Decem- Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, ber 2000. DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 5. 3. Air Force Doctrine Document 3-50, Personnel 25. Galdorisi and Phillips, Leave No Man Behind, Recovery Operations, 1 June 2005. 465–86. 4. Joint Publication 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 5 26. DODD 3002.01E, Personnel Recovery, 2. January 2007, I-1. 27. Ibid. 5. See the Emergency Email and Wireless Network, 28. Ibid. A blood chit, a sheet of material depict- http://www.emergencyemail.org/newsemergency ing an American flag, includes statements in several /anmviewer.asp?a=878. languages explaining that anyone assisting the 6. Earl H. Tilford Jr., Search and Rescue in South- bearer of the chit will be compensated upon the east Asia (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force His- return of the individual and presentation of the tory, United States Air Force, 1980), 116. claim to an agent of the US government. 7. George Galdorisi and Tom Phillips, Leave No 29. White House, National Security Strategy, 14. Man Behind: The Saga of Combat Search and Rescue 30. Ibid., 11. (Minneapolis: MBI Publishing, 2008), 431. 31. Ibid. 8. Tiemoko Diallo, “Al Qaeda Holding Europeans 32. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Taken in Mali—Military,” Reuters, 29 January 2009, Strategy, 8. http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLT 33. Many theorists approach deterrence with a 774538. perspective on nuclear weapons and the use of lethal 9. Lt Gen Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Gallo- force. Bernard Brodie observes that maximum deter- way, We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young (New York: rence is created by the ability to target enemy societ- Random House, 1992), 88, 207, 213. ies/cities while protecting our own, as supported by a 10. Tilford, Search and Rescue, 118. decision maker’s credibility (Strategy in the Missile Age 11. Darrel D. Whitcomb, The Rescue of Bat 21 [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959]). (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 2. Lawrence Freedman sees deterrence as convincing 12. Victor Davis Hanson, The Soul of Battle: From an adversary not to take specific actions, based on a Ancient Times to the Present Day; How Three Great legitimate threat of reprisal if he does (The Evolution Liberators Vanquished Tyranny (New York: Free of Nuclear Strategy [London: Macmillan Press, 1981]). Press, 1999), 456n87. Thomas Schelling sees deterrence as a bargaining 13. Tilford, Search and Rescue, 117. strategy that doesn’t involve expending power be- 14. Michael J. Durant, In the Company of Heroes cause of the threat of harm (The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Penguin Group, 2003), vi. [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960]). 15. Tilford, Search and Rescue, 119. 34. The 81-member United States Agency for 16. NSPD 12. International Development (USAID) / Disaster As- 17. Ibid. sistance Response Team (DART) arrived in-country 18. Ibid. via C-17 and C-130 aircraft on 30 December, and all 19. Charles A. Ray (remarks to the 2009 SERE had departed by 14 January 2004. In Bam, the [survival, evasion, resistance, and escape] Specialist USAID/DART team conducted need and structural Graduation Ceremony, Spokane, WA, 12 June 2009). assessments while its field hospital treated 727 pa- 20. NSPD 12. tients, 30 percent of whom had earthquake-related 21. Ibid. injuries. “Assistance for Iranian Earthquake Vic- 22. White House, National Security Strategy tims,” USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/iran/. (Washington, DC: Office of the President of the 35. Lt Col Marc C. DiPaolo et al., “A Rescue Force United States, May 2010), 7. for the World: Adapting Airpower to the Realities of 23. US Department of Defense, National Defense the Long War,” Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 3 Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, (Fall 2007): 84. June 2008), 17. The term soft power was coined by 36. The author witnessed this effect during a Joseph S. Nye Jr. of Harvard University in his book 2006 rotation in Afghanistan. He launched on a res- Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American cue mission responding to a call to help a young

Fall 2011 | 35 Sterr

Afghan girl injured during an engagement between 45. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military the coalition and insurgents. Rescue forces evacuated Strategy, 6. both the critically injured girl and her father to an 46. White House, National Security Strategy, 46. American hospital and visited them a couple of days 47. Col Glen H. Hecht, USAF (comments during later. Their action saved her life, and her father de- development of the Air Force PR Operational Con- clared, “I love America.” cept, Langley AFB, VA, 2009). Colonel Hecht was 37. US Department of Defense, National Defense chief of the Air Combat Command Personnel Recov- Strategy, 17–18. ery Division following assignments to the DOD 38. White House, National Security Strategy, 3. POW / Missing Personnel Office and Joint Personnel 39. Ray, remarks. Recovery Agency as well as operational and tactical 40. White House, National Security Strategy, 26. assignments flying the HH-60. 41. Ibid., 41. 48. US Department of Defense, National Defense 42. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, 17–18. Strategy, 2. 49. Galdorisi and Phillips, Leave No Man Behind, 43. Ibid., 15. 527. 44. US Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 16.

Maj Chad Sterr, USAF Major Sterr (USAFA; MMOAS and MAAS, Air University) is a combat rescue officer serving as commander of the 58th Rescue Squadron, Air Combat Command, Nellis AFB, Nevada. He spent his early career as a security forces officer and nuclear convoy commander. His assignments as a combat rescue officer include the 38th Rescue Squadron, Moody AFB, Georgia, as a flight commander; the 48th Rescue Squadron at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, as director of operations; and Head- quarters Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Virginia, as the Guardian Angel functional area manager and combat rescue officer functional manager. Major Sterr is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and the Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.

36 | Air & Space Power Journal Air Force Fixed-Wing Rescue A Multifaceted Approach for Full-Spectrum Personnel Recovery

Capt Kyle J. Porter, USAF dispatching a Guardian Angel (GA) team via CH-53 helicopters or via HC-130 airdrop to he US Air Force has a rich heritage of carry out a recovery. Thankfully, the squad- highly effective rescue forces sup- ron commander has a solution. In 30 min- porting global operations. In the past utes, one pilot and two pararescuemen take T off in a less-conspicuous light aircraft. decade, the political and economic landscapes have changed significantly, requiring Touching down on a dirt road near the inci- a retooling of both equipment and tactics dent site, it garners no special attention be- for Air Force rescue. Imagine, for example, cause the locals have become accustomed that an expeditionary rescue squadron lo- to bush pilots delivering hunters, scientists, cated in the Horn of Africa (HOA) receives medicine, and other services to remote ar- word that a remotely piloted aircraft carry- eas. In a matter of minutes, the pararescue- ing a sensitive payload has gone down in men return to the aircraft with the sensitive central Ethiopia. The Combined Joint Task equipment and depart into the African Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) com- sky—mission accomplished. mander requests recovery of the payload, This scenario is notional, but the concept but he is under political pressure to prevent is entirely plausible. Present-day personnel any show of military presence in the area. recovery (PR) operations involve a spec- These concerns eliminate the possibility of trum of use neither envisioned nor em-

Fall 2011 | 37 Porter braced by the current aircraft and tactical wing-mounted hose-and-drogue system, air- construct in Air Force rescue. To meet pres- borne mission command of PR operations, ent and future operational demands, the delivery of specialized aerial packages, and service must shift its tactics and equipment other roles. These missions, with the excep- to offer more flexible options to command- tion of Skyhook, remain mostly intact to- ers during the execution of America’s no- day. From its inception in the late 1960s to fail missions at home and abroad. Changes the present, the King has provided rescue in the geopolitical climate, global economic coverage for the National Aeronautics and state, and civil support policies demand an Space Administration’s manned spaceflight evolution in equipment and tactics to en- program, ensured the safe ocean passage of sure Air Force rescue’s viability in today’s innumerable fighter aircraft, and furnished and tomorrow’s state affairs. The HC-130 alert coverage for US operations around the “King” has served as the Air Force’s pillar globe. Wherever American military person- fixed-wing rescue asset since its introduc- nel go, Air Force rescue and the HC-130 tion late in the Vietnam War. This aircraft have kept the ultimate promise that they brings a host of advantages to its very famil- will come home. iar operating scenarios but leaves specific During the past decade, the United States capability gaps in three areas: access, vis- has found itself in almost continuous con- ibility, and utility. Bridging these gaps flict spanning the entire range of military would involve introducing a small fleet of actions from major combat operations to varied, light fixed-wing aircraft into existing counterinsurgency and ideological warfare. deployed and garrison units flying HC-130s. The King has deployed constantly since The concept of a blended fixed-wing rescue 1993, supporting such major operations as squadron applies to major combat opera- Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Iraqi tions, low-intensity conflicts, influence op- Freedom, Enduring Freedom (including erations, and support to civil authorities engagements in both Afghanistan and the throughout the range of military operations. Horn of Africa), and many others. Despite This article examines fixed-wing rescue these deployments, the HC-130 has also from a historical perspective, identifies op- supported numerous humanitarian and erational shortfalls, and presents the advan- disaster-relief operations, including Hurri- tages of varied fixed-wing platforms through canes Katrina, Rita, and Ike. As the Air case-study analysis and a focus on irregular Force’s premier fixed-wing rescue asset, it warfare (IW). has fulfilled roles on the front lines and the home front, facilitating the recovery of US and coalition forces and winning the hearts History and minds of people around the globe. Pres- ent operations find Air Force HC-130s oper- Currently, the Air Force inventory in- ating regularly on four continents (North cludes three major weapons systems (the America, South America, Africa, and Asia) HC-130, HH-60, and GA) having the sole and occasionally worldwide. In a plethora mission of meeting the PR requirements of of missions, the King and its dedicated US combatant commanders.1 The fixed- crews perform civil search and rescue, casu- wing workhorse of this elite operational alty evacuation, traditional combat search community, the HC-130 King, entered the and rescue (CSAR), and building partner inventory in 1967 to fill multiple roles in capacity (BPC) during the course of con- the recovery of downed aircrews.2 HC-130s ducting military-to-military training and hu- performed diverse missions, including re- manitarian assistance in Africa. Fixed-wing covery of ground personnel using the inge- rescue trains in a wide variety of skills in nious Skyhook system, simultaneous refuel- order to provide such a sweeping range of ing of two rescue helicopters in flight with a capabilities and effects.

38 | Air & Space Power Journal Air Force Fixed-Wing Rescue

Operational Limitations represents a significant step in the right direction for Air Force rescue, but, unfortu- Despite the force-multiplying capability it nately, some validated combatant com- supplies to combatant and task force command requirements will remain unfulfilled. manders, Air Force fixed-wing rescue is not A vital link in the rescue triad, the HC-130 without limitations. A variant of the Lockheed enables the successful recovery of person- Martin C-130 (L-100 series) cargo aircraft, the nel and equipment through its support of current production model (HC-130J) mea- the GA and HH-60 and its role in autono- sures 132 feet wide (wingtip to wingtip), 97 mous mass-casualty and disaster-response feet long, and 39 feet high (empennage), with operations that demand large-capacity air- a maximum gross takeoff weight of 175,000 craft with specially trained crews. Addition- pounds.3 The relatively large size of the C-130 ally, the CSAR method of PR and the CSAR makes it a flexible platform for the range of task force (CSARTF) in particular depend fixed-wing rescue missions; however, the air- upon the strengths of the King to conduct craft does not lend itself well to low-visibility/ cross-forward-line-of-troops point-recovery low-impact operations. operations. The Joint Requirements Over- For instance, when a C-130’s engines go sight Council has validated a requirement into reverse during landing, noise increases of 78 HC-130s, but present budget and ac- and the airport building may begin to vibrate, quisition priorities have lowered that num- catching the attention of people intrigued by ber to only 37 aircraft scheduled for procure- the presence of a large, grey military aircraft. ment.7 Similarly, rotary-wing rescue has a Curious glances follow the C-130 as it taxis to validated requirement for a fleet of more than park, eager to see what happens. The implica- 148 helicopters but is authorized an end tions of this action can become even more strength of only 112.8 Undoubtedly the in- complicated when the aircraft operates in ability to acquire a full fleet of aircraft will countries where a US presence is unpopular hinder near- and long-term fixed-wing rescue or unannounced. Furthermore, HC-130s exact operations, limiting services to the United significant operating and support costs. Given States and its interests at home and abroad. the aircraft’s complex systems and hardware, Furthermore, it is important to analyze the during a typical deployment the number of monetary cost of operations in terms of benefi- support personnel equals or exceeds that of cial effects. According to the National Military aircrew members. The expense of flying an Strategy of the United States of America (2011), HC-130P is staggering—fuel alone can cost “Defense budget projections indicate that lead- $4,800 per hour.4 Therefore, having an option ers must continue to plan for and make diffi- to tailor aircraft types and deployment foot- cult choices between current and future chal- prints to match the operating environment lenges.”9 An HC-130J, which costs $3,585 per can enhance mission effectiveness, decreas- hour to operate, can provide a combination of ing risk from threats and realizing monetary nine hours airborne time (extended by in-flight and logistical savings. air-to-air refueling), multipayload airdrop, and In addition to the prohibitive size of the limited recovery operations via infiltration/ aircraft and the cost of operating it, the av- exfiltration.10 At an estimated unit cost of $70 erage HC-130 flying in combat is 45 years million (constant fiscal year 2011 dollars), a old, a fact that generates a host of mainte- fleet of HC-130Js can cover approximately nance issues.5 Present fleet availability and three areas of operation for a lifetime commit- mission capable rates of 54 percent and 68.6 ment of $15.4 billion.11 Clearly, this pillar of Air percent fall well below their respective es- Force rescue comes at a premium price. The tablished standards of 67.8 percent and 74 service should consider other cost-effective percent.6 An effort is under way to replace solutions to bridge capability gaps and fill the the HC-130P/N “legacy” fleet with new void between the number of required and au- HC-130Js by the mid-2020s. This acquisition thorized rescue aircraft.

Fall 2011 | 39 Porter

Small Airplanes, Big Impact actors. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America emphasizes this Adm Michael Mullen, chairman of the point, observing that “the Joint Force will Joint Chiefs of Staff, notes that “our Joint continue to build partner capacity in Africa, Force must prepare for an increasingly dy- focusing on critical states where the threat of namic and uncertain future in which a full terrorism could pose a threat [sic] to our spectrum of military capabilities and attri- homeland and interests.”14 Air Force rescue butes will be required to prevent and win has executed and supported this mission for our Nation’s wars.”12 More than likely, US years as part of CJTF-HOA. military forces will operate in areas where Having a long-time, constant presence in their presence is unacceptable to the local the CJTF-HOA combined joint operating population, host government, or both. For area, King combat rescue aircrews have a this reason, among others, Air Force Special well-developed understanding of the time- Operations Command recently initiated a and-distance problem that is Africa, and of plan to include smaller, commercially ac- the limited number of areas that can sup- quired assets in its fleet of special opera- port an aircraft as large as the HC-130. Typi- tions mobility aircraft—a fleet previously cally a C-130 landing zone requires a semi- monopolized by variants of the C-130.13 Air prepared surface 3,000 feet long by 60 feet Force rescue could benefit greatly from this wide.15 CJTF-HOA’s combined joint operat- Non-Standard Aviation (NSAv) program, ing area contains 1,186 charted airfields, but which contains a mix of varied-capability only about 80 of them (7 percent) are suit- aircraft in civil livery capable of deploying able for the C-130 (table 1).16 Assuming a with a small footprint and operating in an rescue coverage area of 11,759,420 square expeditionary, “outside the wire” environ- kilometers, each landing zone suitable for ment. NSAv low-visibility platforms can the C-130 would need to provide access to conduct a search at more efficient air- about 147,000 square kilometers. The HC- speeds, land on non-purpose-built surfaces, 130’s speed allows reasonably quick point- and reduce target highlighting. Additionally, to-point coverage in Africa, but the absence the Air Force can leverage these strengths of a nearby, usable airfield would limit or- to lower the risk to recovery personnel / ganic recovery options. Conversely, light materiel, improve aircrew management, fixed-wing aircraft, such as those identified ease maintenance requirements, and em- in the extralight and medium categories ploy with decreased economic impact. (see table 2), can operate out of nearly all of Africa’s 1,186 charted airfields, bringing the coverage area per airfield down to about Rescue for Combined Joint 10,000 square kilometers.17 Well suited to land on roads and other surfaces, some light Task Force–Horn of Africa: fixed-wing aircraft do not need a prepared Highlighting the Value of landing zone at all, further reducing this Light Aircraft coverage area to a walkable distance. Unlike the previous example of a C-130 Africa represents perhaps the greatest landing at a local civilian airport, NSAv air- challenge for PR professionals because of its craft attract hardly a glance when they fly. vast distances, sparse recovery assets (pres- Because their visual and audible detection ently only HC-130s, GA, and CH-53s exist on range is much less prominent than that of the the continent—and not in a centralized loca- much larger King, light fixed-wing aircraft tion), and large number of sovereign states offer a level of security on a distant conti- and autonomous tribal nations. Nevertheless, nent with varying threat levels. An airplane the African continent and its people are es- landing on a dirt field might simply signal sential to US efforts against nonstate terrorist the arrival of hunters, a geological expedi-

40 | Air & Space Power Journal Air Force Fixed-Wing Rescue

Table 1. Charted airfields in CJTF-HOA’s combined joint operating area (area of responsibility / area of interest)

Runways Countrya Total Airfields <3,000 feet C-130 Suitableb Territory (sq km)c Burundi 8 4 1 27,830 Chad 56 11 3 1,284,000 Comoros 4 0 2 2,235 Eritrea 13 2 3 117,600 Ethiopia 61 8 10 1,104,300 Democratic Republic of Congo 198 62 9 2,344,858 Djibouti 13 2 2 23,200 Kenya 191 56 9 580,367 Madagascar 84 21 3 587,041 Mauritius 5 1 1 2,040 Mozambique 106 44 7 799,380 Rwanda 9 4 1 26,338 Seychelles 14 6 1 455 Somalia 59 7 2 637,657 Sudan 140 39 5 2,505,813 Tanzania 124 34 10 947,300 Uganda 46 9 1 241,038 Yemend 55 11 10 527,968 Total 1,186 321 80 11,759,420 Source: Data compiled by the author from Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa, http://www.hoa.africom.mil/; The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html; and “Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report,” Air Mobility Command, https://gdss2.c2.amc.af.mil/. a CJTF-HOA’s combined joint operating area is defined as the 18 sovereign states listed in this table. b C-130-suitable runways have a 3,000-foot-long by 60-foot-wide landing surface stressed for twin-tandem landing gear at a maximum gross weight of 175,000 pounds. c Territory includes both land and maritime surface claimed under international law and as published in the CIA World Factbook. d Though not on the African continent, Yemen is included in CJTF-HOA’s area of interest. tion, or missionaries in rural Africa.18 Thus, blended fixed-wing rescue squadron could the chances of adversaries singling out an contain a mix of HC-130-type aircraft to re- NSAv rescue vehicle as a target of opportu- tain the flexibility and strengths of this plat- nity diminish rapidly. By the time they dis- form, while introducing smaller single or cover that they are looking at a US aircraft, multiengine commercially available air- their window of opportunity to act has al- craft. These blended squadrons would allow ready closed. (One must note that such ac- the construction of specialized deployment tions are not an attempt to conduct or sug- packages of two to three aircraft types, gest clandestine recovery operations. This based on theater requirements. A deploy- type of employment merely demonstrates ment to Africa might contain one HC-130J, the difference between advertising a pres- one Twin Otter (DHC-6), and one Quest Ko- ence [show of force] and selective disclosure.) diak—a mix that would retain a full range of capabilities in a given theater. Aircraft providing rescue coverage could employ to- Structured Response gether or as separate elements from common Fielding a fleet of mixed fixed-wing air- or distributed forward operating bases, as craft would give commanders more options necessary. For example, an HC-130 might be when planning and initiating a rescue. A most advantageously colocated with rotary-

Fall 2011 | 41 Porter wing assets that depend upon air refueling with other aircraft commonly seen in the and at locations where maritime missions African bush, such as the Cessna 206 “Sky- are possible. NSAv aircraft would have more wagon,” Cessna 208 “Caravan,” and LET-410 utility in remote areas in which small teams “TurboLet.”20 Much like the aircraft in table work in isolation, away from large airfields, 2, these planes are well suited to remote, and in rough terrain. The package works off-airfield operations and come properly together when a light fixed-wing aircraft re- equipped from the factory floor (or they sponds to an incident and meets an HC-130 could easily be modified).21 at an established airfield to conduct a trans- The National Military Strategy of the load of patients or equipment.19 Utilizing all United States of America emphasizes that available assets, commanders can bridge “forces must become more expeditionary in the time-and-distance gap in remote operat- nature and will require a smaller logistical ing areas. Additionally, these recovery ve- footprint in part by reducing large fuel . . . hicles have the innate capability of blending demands.”22 Many expeditionary locations in with their surroundings and intermixing don’t have the fuel supplies, much less the

Table 2. Comparison of HC-130 and light fixed-wing aircraft

Aircraft Crew Payload En Route Landing Takeoff Endurance Size (feet)f (lb.)a Speed Distance Distance (hours)e (KTAS)b (feet)c (feet)d Extra Light / Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL) A-1C 1 925 126 500x30 200 +6 22x35 MT-7-420 1 960 139 500x30 600 +5 23x33 Medium / STOL C-208 1 3,284 186 1,700x40 2,100 +5 37x52 GA-8 1 1,764 134 1,600x30 1,700 +4 29x40 Quest Kodiak 1 3,535 172 705x30 1,001 +7 45x33 DHC-6 1 3,250 182 1,200x40 1,200 9 52x65 Heavy / STOL HC-130P/N 7 34,000 290 3,000x60 6,000 +9 97x132 HC-130Jg 5 37,000 310 3,000x60 5,000 +9h 97x132

Source: Data compiled by the author from “Husky A-1C,” Aviat Aircraft, http://www.aviataircraft.com/hspecs.html; “Performance Specifications,” Maule Air, http://www.mauleairinc.com/Literature/performance.pdf; “Cessna Caravan Specifications,” Cessna Aircraft Company, http://www.cessna.com/caravan/ caravan-675/caravan-675-specifications.html; “GA8 Specifications,” GippsAero, http://www.gippsaero.com/ZoneID=153.htm; “Kodiak Specifications,” Quest Aircraft Company, http://www.questaircraft.com/kodiak/specs/; “Twin Otter—Series 400,” Viking Air, http://www.vikingair.com/content2. aspx?id=276; Technical Order (TO) 1C-130(H)H-1, Flight Manual USAF Series HC-130P/N Aircraft, 1 February 2004, 5-26, 5-39; and TO 1C-130(H)J-1, “Draft Flight Manual USAF Series HC-130J Aircraft,” 1-1, 1-8. a Payload, also known as useful load, is the weight available for cargo, passengers, and so forth, after accounting for fuel, crew, and required equipment. All numbers estimate typical or capacity fuel loads. b En route speed is the published cruise airspeed (knots true airspeed [KTAS]). c Data is derived from information published by the aircraft manufacturer. When possible, numbers represent landing distance to clear a 50-foot obstacle (short field). Runway width is a number estimated by the author, based on wingspan and experience. d Data is derived information published by the aircraft manufacturer. When possible, numbers represent takeoff distance to clear a 50-foot obstacle (short field). e These figures reflect the manufacturer’s published maximum endurance rounded down to the nearest hour or calculated with a 45-minute fuel reserve, when able. f Size (aircraft dimensions) is expressed in length x total wingspan rounded to the nearest foot. g The HC-130J’s performance data was not published as of this writing. The author offered an estimate, based on existing C-130J data and the experience of subject-matter experts. h The HC-130J is capable of aerial refueling, which greatly extends endurance; thus, flight time is limited only by the crew duty day.

42 | Air & Space Power Journal Air Force Fixed-Wing Rescue ramp space, to stage PR effectively from a Infusion of NSAv aircraft into the rescue remote airfield using the current comple- fleet could improve the overutilized and ment of fixed-wing rescue aircraft. NSAv underresourced status of its helicopter as- aircraft meet the intent of the national mili- sets. A deficiency of around 40 aircraft will tary strategy and the operational demand remain after restoration of the HH-60 fleet for PR in austere locations. Furthermore, from combat loss to its authorized number they are smaller, easier to operate, and sim- of 112 aircraft.29 Economical NSAv aircraft pler to maintain than existing rescue air- can play a significant part in filling the tra- craft. These advantages translate to savings ditional helicopter role as the recovery ve- because of the need for fewer crews and hicle in permissive environments and in maintainers, especially when coupled with those allowing a short or unimproved land- a reliance on the established support infra- ing. This employment strategy would let structure for fixed-wing rescue. Use of on- combatant commanders mass rotary-wing demand maintenance facilities available force on objectives that absolutely require throughout the world and of contract main- the advantages that helicopters bring to res- tenance personnel in expeditionary envi- cue. Cost-effective NSAv aircraft, with their ronments would easily meet aircraft sup- 23 greater speed and endurance, can reduce port requirements. In most cases, such the overstressing of rotary-wing assets and aircraft require only one or two maintenance help make up for this substantial gap be- personnel—a stark contrast to the tens of 24 tween requirements and procurement. individuals needed for military aircraft. Additionally, a knowledge base concern- The past 50 years of airpower have been ing light fixed-wing aircraft and operational dominated by aircraft purpose-built for a experience with these planes already exists small and very narrow set of military appli- within the Air Force family. The Civil Air cations.25 These expensive planes typically Patrol (CAP) presently operates the GA-8 employ with a large (often excessively so) aircraft as a utility and incident-awareness- support network. Arguably their design and and-assessment platform rigged with the procurement have had a detrimental effect on unique missions calling for a small foot- Airborne Real-Time Cueing Hyperspectral print, agility, and, frequently, a high level Enhanced Reconnaissance system, a surveillance technology used to gain vital in- of operations security. Fielding a small fleet 30 of commercially available aircraft offers the formation about an incident site. Much advantages of low cost; minimal time for like the HC-130, the GA-8 employs an op- research, development, testing/evaluation erator and console on board the aircraft to of tactics; and almost no aircraft modifica- control, assess, and relay information. tion from the factory floor.26 Along with GA-8s and other CAP aircraft have proven well-trained crews and proper tactics, the themselves cost-effective assets to national simple addition of an ultrahigh frequency defense and homeland security through their (UHF) radio could make a civil aircraft mili- use in disaster response and counterdrug tarily viable for rescue operations. All of the operations. Any infusion of NSAv aircraft aircraft in table 2 (except the HC-130) cost into Air Force rescue should not overlook less than $1.7 million—most of them are the CAP’s level of experience. Furthermore, less than $500,000.27 In line with the 2010 light video surveillance systems have been Quadrennial Defense Review Report’s recom- tested and installed on the Quest Kodiak mendations, acquisition could take place in (see table 2) aircraft for use in monitoring less than one year, with forces fielded and operations involving domestic vehicular deployed in months.28 Light aircraft could traffic.31 Much of the technology and knowl- become part of existing fixed-wing rescue edge necessary to operate NSAv aircraft as squadrons and share established adminis- rescue and IW enablers already exists in to- trative and support resources. day’s Air Force and American industry.

Fall 2011 | 43 Porter

The introduction of light fixed-wing air- • overland/water search craft presents a unique opportunity to capi- • light airdrop/resupply (precision-capable) talize on personnel and talents that already exist in the fixed-wing rescue community. • communication relay Air Force Special Operations Command’s • spotting/marking isolated persons leadership in fielding light aircraft systems • preparation for authentication/extraction demonstrates the proven model—one that the Air Force tends to revisit each time a • low-visibility insertion/extraction new asset is introduced. With a new air- • nontraditional intelligence, surveil- plane come new units and a (typically) sig- lance, and reconnaissance nificant increase in personnel. A tactically • on-scene commander advantageous and more fiscally responsible approach could mean the addition of rescue • humanitarian relief (first responder) NSAv aircraft without the overhead and Many of these roles, presently filled by the infrastructure that accompany new squad- HC-130, could be performed by NSAv-type rons and significant additional support. It aircraft that blend into indigenous sur- may be possible to place these aircraft in roundings and that do not highlight activi- existing HC-130 squadrons with minimal ties in nontraditional operating areas. increase in aircrew manning. Preferably, Furthermore, defense support to civil au- current rescue-qualified crew members thority and maritime missions could profit would be available to fly the NSAv aircraft, from the introduction of NSAv seaplane- thereby retaining knowledge of the mission type aircraft. A typical scenario might in- and operational command and control, cap- volve assisting a mariner with an acute italizing on and improving interoperability medical issue, searching for a distressed tactics, and developing subject-matter ex- vessel, or investigating a suspected aircraft perts in fixed-wing rescue. Light aircraft of- incident at sea. Present equipment limita- fer this possibility due to their relatively tions dictate that at least one HC-130 and a simple systems and similar operating proce- pair of HH-60 helicopters respond to open- dures. In this rare case, introducing an en- water missions when the Coast Guard requests tirely new aircraft into the Air Force inven- assistance.34 Weather and tactics permitting, tory would entail minimal investment in this costly footprint could be reduced to one capital and personnel.32 seaplane with a GA team on board that would land at the incident site outside the response envelope of Coast Guard assets. Roles and Missions Moreover, the Air Force could employ these Addressing desired force capabilities, the aircraft in remote areas that presently lack National Military Strategy of the United States adequate coverage (notably United States of America observes that “our strategy, Pacific Command) at minimal cost. forged in war, is focused on fielding modular, adaptive, general purpose forces that can be employed in the full range of mili- Irregular Warfare: tary operations.”33 A blended squadron of The Force of Choice light to midsized rescue aircraft, properly deployed, could have a tremendous impact The United States Government will make a on a wide range of military operations. Be- sustained effort to engage civil society and citi- sides the recovery of sensitive equipment zens and facilitate increased connections already mentioned, the following represent among the American people and peoples just a few types of tactical operations that around the world—through efforts ranging could benefit from employing these vehicles: from public service and educational exchanges,

44 | Air & Space Power Journal Air Force Fixed-Wing Rescue

to increased commerce and private sector [search and rescue] are high payoff capabili- partnerships. In many instances, these modes ties in legitimizing the government. To move of engagement have a powerful and enduring at will on the continent in support of the en- impact beyond our borders, and are a cost- gagement strategy, US personnel require effective way of projecting a positive vision of MEDEVAC, SAR, and CSAR [combat search and rescue] support.38 American leadership. Time and again, we have seen that the best ambassadors for American The ability to provide military-to-military values and interests are the American people. training, humanitarian assistance, and liai- —National Security Strategy, May 2010 son operations while conducting organic rescue alert for US assets is exactly the kind This statement emphasizes the impor- of solution that provides low-to-no-cost ef- tance of engagement between Americans fects with tailored visibility and minimal and citizens of foreign nations. In the realm negative influence. We have heard that our of IW, Air Force rescue—particularly fixed- partner nations do not want to fly anything wing rescue—has an important role to play that we don’t fly ourselves.39 Giving part- in building partnerships and engagement. ners the opportunity to purchase aircraft The report of the Air Force’s Irregular War- that cost less than $2 million could boost fare Tiger Team recommends “expand[ing] our economy at home via exports as well as and resourc[ing] the USAF Rescue commu- facilitate continued theater security coop- nity’s mission to include IW and BPC avia- eration and BPC activities.40 When asked tion advising.”35 Because rescue forces by about the type of aircraft that would best nature are nonoffensive weapons systems support IW activities in US Africa Com- that react to externally triggered events, mand, US Air Forces Africa personnel re- when packaged correctly they can open sponded that “four [Cessna 208] Caravans doors to previously denied areas and popu- may be better than one C-27. We should lations. Even the poorest of countries need analyze what poor countries really need rescue services—including those that can- and what they are able to sustain.”41 Air not afford C-130s or an aircraft program Force rescue can supply training and sup- dedicated solely to rescue. The Quadrennial port through air-adviser-type roles after the Defense Review Report identifies the creation sale of aircraft. Rescue’s unique, simplified of “mechanisms to expedite acquisition and command and control, as well as its inher- transfer of critical capabilities to partner ent ability to deploy to austere locations 36 forces” as a key initiative in BPC. Further- with little to no support, make it the right more, the report states that “we will also choice for BPC operations and more. enhance our air forces’ contributions to security force assistance operations by fielding within our broader inventory aircraft Final Thoughts that are well-suited to training and advising partner air forces.”37 The fixed-wing rescue community re- Introduction of NSAv aircraft to the fixed- mains in high demand, presenting many wing rescue fleet has the potential to create capabilities to combatant commanders dean IW “weapon of choice” for commanders. spite a capability shortfall. The infusion of According to representatives of US Air fiscally responsible and capability-rich Forces Africa, NSAv aircraft to the present fleet could fill shortfalls while creating opportunities for For likely operations on the African continent, the most appropriate aircraft are rugged, international partnership. Capitalizing on affordable, light- and medium-mobility and current industry, NSAv aircraft are an expe- rotary-wing aircraft to reach areas where roads dient and cost-effective means of bringing and other infrastructure are non-existent. the fixed-wing rescue fleet to full capacity MEDEVAC [medical evacuation] and SAR while giving commanders an effective IW

Fall 2011 | 45 Porter tool at no additional cost. Creative solu- blended fixed-wing rescue squadron can tions can fill capability shortfalls in access, provide unique, specialized effects in PR visibility, and utility while bringing the res- and IW. By offering a multirole solution to cue inventory up to fully authorized num- both rescue and IW mission sets, NSAv air- bers. Since these assets require little re- craft enable airpower at a responsible cost search and development, an accelerated to taxpayers. Most importantly, a mixed air- acquisition could place them in the hands craft inventory enhances the responsive- of commanders with very little delay. By ness of rescue forces and increases overall assessing the history of fixed-wing rescue system capability consistent with the goal and operational shortfalls, and by analyzing of Air Force rescue: “that others may case studies, this article has shown that a live.”42 

Notes 1. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 3-50, 29 June 2011. The cost per flying hour is in fiscal year Personnel Recovery Operations, 1 June 2005, 13. 2011 constant dollars. 2. “HC-130P/N King” fact sheet, US Air Force, 8 11. Ibid.; and Lt Col Brian Pitcher (Headquarters January 2010, http://www.af.mil/information/fact Air Combat Command Requirements), to the author, sheets/factsheet.asp?id=106. e-mail, 28 March 2011. 3. “Products,” Lockheed Martin, 2011, http:// 12. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy, www.lockheedmartin.com/products/; and “C-130 cover letter. Hercules” fact sheet, US Air Force, 22 October 2009, 13. US Special Operations Command, Fiscal Year http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/fact (FY) 2009 Budget Estimates (MacDill AFB, FL: US sheet.asp?id=92. Special Operations Command, February 2008), 45. 4. Figure calculated by the author based on a 14. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military fuel-burn rate of 6,000 pounds per hour and the Strategy, 12. price of Jet A fuel at Tucson International Airport 15. Air Force Instruction 13-217, Drop Zone and on 19 April 2011 at $5.49 per gallon. Landing Zone Operations, 10 May 2007, 42. 5. “HC-130P/N King” fact sheet. 16. “CJTF-HOA Factsheet,” CJTF-HOA Public Af- 6. Mr. Kenneth R. Mortensen (Headquarters Air fairs Office, http://www.hoa.africom.mil/About Combat Command Requirements) to the author, e-mail, CJTF-HOA.asp. The number 80 is an estimate based 24 June 2011; and Air Combat Command AA/MC Stan- on compatible airfield length and width and data dards. Availability rate (AA) is a fleet measurement— found in the Air Mobility Command airfield suit- the percentage of aircraft that are unit-possessed and ability restrictions report (see also note 14). mission capable (on the ramp and capable of flying). 17. Coverage area per airfield calculated based Mission capable rate (MC) is the number of aircraft on data presented in table 1, compiled and averaged assigned that are ready to fly (percentage of the avail- to determine an estimated amount of land area ser- able fleet). Definitions and research provided by Mr. viced by each accessible airfield. Mortensen, HQ ACC/A8RT (A4YR). 18. CC Milne Pocock, Bush and Mountain Flying 7. Gen T. Michael Moseley, “Capability Develop- (South Africa: 2009), 21; and “MAF Profile,” Mission ment Document for HC/MC-130 Recapitalization Aviation Fellowship South Africa, http://www.mafsa Capability” (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Air .co.za/content/profile-maf-south-africa.php. Force, 20 November 2007), iii. 19. Joint Publication 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 5 8. “Capability Development Document for Combat January 2007, VI-20. Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X) / 20. “Fly with MAF,” Mission Aviation Fellowship Personnel Recovery Vehicle (PRV)” (Washington, South Africa, http://www.mafsa.co.za/content/fly DC: Headquarters US Air Force, 16 June 2005), ii. -with-maf-south-africa.php; and Pocock, Bush and 9. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Mountain Flying, 26, 44. Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, 21. Pocock, Bush and Mountain Flying, 24–29, 36–38. DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 2, http://www.jcs 22. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military .mil//content/files/2011-02/020811084800_2011_NMS Strategy, 18. _-_08_FEB_2011.pdf. 23. “Authorized Service Facilities,” Cessna Air- 10. Mr. David C. Vanik (Headquarters Air Combat craft Company, http://www.cessna.com/customer Command Requirements), to the author, e-mail, -service/aircraft-service/service-facilities.html; and

46 | Air & Space Power Journal Air Force Fixed-Wing Rescue

“Global Tactical Aircraft Support Solutions,“ DynCorp 30. Lt Col Brian Ready (wing vice-commander, International, http://www.dyn-intl.com/tactical CAP Arizona), to the author, e-mail, 2 March 2011; and -aviation.aspx. “Fact Sheet: Civil Air Patrol ARCHER System Techni- 24. In accordance with Title 14, Aeronautics and cal Specifications,” Civil Air Patrol National Head- Space, Code of Federal Register, pt. 43, sec. 3, “The quarters, Operations Support Division, August 2005, holder of a mechanic certificate may perform main- http://atg.cap.gov/downloads/FINAL%20VERSION tenance, preventative maintenance, and alterations.” %20ARCHER%20Technical%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf. Additionally if that mechanic is appropriately 31. Dave Hirschman, “Quest Kodiak: A Higher trained for the type of aircraft, it is reasonable to be- Calling,” AOPA [Aircraft Owners and Pilots Associa- lieve that a maintenance crew of two personnel could tion] Pilot Magazine 54, no. 3 (March 2011): 52, provide maintenance support for one or several small http://www.aopa.org/members/files/pilot/2011 aircraft. This assumes fully trained and licensed airframe and power-plant mechanics with at least one /march/feature_higher_calling.html. having an appropriate inspection authorization. 32. Minimal investment when compared to ma- 25. Lt Col George H. Hock Jr., “Closing the Ir- jor aircraft acquisition programs such as the F-22A. regular Warfare Air Capability Gap,” Air and Space Analysis conducted by the author. Power Journal 24, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 57–68. 33. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military 26. In this example, aircraft could flow to opera- Strategy, 18. tional units either from the factory without modifi- 34. Col Jason Hanover (commander, 563rd Res- cation or with very light modification (possibly the cue Group), to the author, e-mail, 25 April 2011. installation of a UHF radio, satellite communica- 35. Department of the Air Force, US Air Force tions capability, or a video downlink, as described). Irregular Warfare Tiger Team Observations and Rec- The cost would be low, relative to the acquisition ommendations (Washington, DC: Department of the and sustainment of a major aircraft program such Air Force, 2009), iii. as the HC-130J or F-22A (hundreds of thousands of 36. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense dollars compared to billions of dollars). Analysis by Review Report, viii. the author. 37. Ibid., x. 27. Unit cost of light aircraft compiled from 38. Department of the Air Force, Tiger Team Ob- multiple sources. See notes 15 and 16 as well as the servations and Recommendations, 67. sources in table 1. 39. Ibid., 61. 28. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of De- 40. Aircraft listed in table 2 are all US manufac- fense, February 2010), 80, http://www.defense.gov tured except the GA-8 (Gippsland Aviation of Austra- /qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf. lia) and the DHC-6 (Viking Air of Canada). 29. “Capability Development Document for 41. Department of the Air Force, Tiger Team Ob- Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle,” ii; servations and Recommendations, 67. and Col Jason Hanover (commander, 563rd Rescue 42. Present adaptation of Brig Gen Richard Group), to the author, e-mail, 2 May 2011. Kight’s “Code of an Air Rescue Man.”

Capt Kyle J. Porter, USAF Captain Porter (BS, University of Wyoming; MPA, Valdosta State University) is an operational test navigator / combat systems operator with the 88th Test and Evaluation Squadron / Combat Search and Rescue Combined Test Force, Operat- ing Location A, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. Originally qualified in the HC-130P/N, he is now responsible for initial and follow-on operational testing and tactics development on the HC-130J. Captain Porter previously served as an instructor with the 71st Rescue Squadron, Moody AFB, Georgia. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and a distinguished graduate of the C-130 Navigator Initial Qualifi- cation Course.

Fall 2011 | 47 How to Say “National Security” in 1,001 Languages

Lt Col D. J. Western, USAF

pluribus unum, semper fidelis. . . . At any age, the human mind has the ca- Whether it’s words on our currency pacity to become multilingual. If the De- or a motto for an entire branch of our partment of Defense (DOD) wanted to im- Emilitary, Americans love dabbling with for- prove its language capabilities from within, eign expressions. In today’s threat environ- it could. This article demonstrates how, ment, however, such a superficial approach with proper motivation, the department leaves the American military and, ulti- can do so. It explains the importance of mately, the American people vulnerable in why we must begin this process now, how a hostile global neighborhood where others anyone can learn a second language, why frequently understand more than we do.1 attempts of the past have failed, and what It’s time for our military to comprehend steps we must take to improve our national fully that maintaining world leadership and security through increasing the DOD’s lan- security requires a broader understanding guage capability. of other cultures, thought processes, and, of course, languages. The Need The general understood that improving relations with any group of people necessi- In 2006 the Iraq Study Group clearly in- tates face-to-face interaction and under- dicated that our military still experiences a standing. Indeed, “while they may not carry severe shortage of qualified Arabic linguists: rifles, explosives or other combat gear, in- All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civil- terpreters are integral to mission success in ian, are handicapped by Americans’ lack of a war in which winning the support of the language and cultural understanding. Our Afghan people is equally important as de- embassy of 1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, feating extremists in combat.”8 just six of whom are at the level of fluency. Simple linguistic ability can also help save In a conflict that demands effective and ef- lives. According to Gerardus Wykoff, a com- ficient communication with Iraqis, we are mand sergeant major and the Military Intelli- often at a disadvantage. There are still far gence Corps senior enlisted adviser, “It is im- too few Arab language–proficient military portant to have basic language skills. If you and civilian officers in Iraq, to the detri- have a basic understanding of what folks are ment of the U.S. mission.2 saying out there, you can save lives. . . . You Gen David Petraeus concurs, emphasiz- can listen and see if insurgent activity is going ing how even basic “survival Arabic” is a on in a town. You can save lives by having this significant force multiplier for troops in the information.” His experience also taught him field.3 Soldiers have to be careful because that “if you can understand the basic writings small misinterpretations can create large and scribbling on the walls, it could be more controversies. In one instance, as the Army than just scribbling. It could mean anything, attempted to coordinate an insertion of US like an [insurgent] meeting or an IED [impro- troops into a local Iraqi tribe’s area, tribal vised explosive device] emplacement.”9 leaders strongly objected to the US pres- Without question, our military leaders ence. The Army resolved the impasse only understand the need for linguists on the when an interpreter discovered that the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq. But our leaders’ real concern was the presence of global responsibilities are clearly much military working dogs, which Muslims con- broader than the ones in these two consider unclean. After the Soldiers removed flicts. Every day we spend millions of dol- the dogs, the tribal leaders allowed the lars in equipment and training around the troops to enter the village. Thus, a percep- world, providing our allies defense support tive interpreter proved key to mission suc- and interoperability. Here too, linguists are cess. Situations like these occur repeatedly essential. Col Walter Kraus, former com- on the battlefield.4 mandant of the US Army Language School, The effort in Afghanistan needs linguists stated unequivocally that “every day, thou- as well: “The recurring theme [there] is, de- sands of American officers and men are mand [for linguists] is great, competition is brought into cross-cultural situations with keen, supply is limited.”5 Gen Stanley people around the globe and are, whether McChrystal once noted that “[in Afghani- they realize it or not, our principal weapons stan] the people are the prize.”6 He knew in the struggle for the minds of men.” He that reaching the people demanded prop- also identified stewardship as a major factor erly communicating with them. Along for improving language proficiency in the those lines, to win the Afghanis’ hearts and military: “If we send billions of dollars in minds, General McChrystal developed a equipment to allied countries, it is essential unique approach that required at least one that we also send persons who can explain person from every platoon, in addition to the maintenance, operation and tactical em- any interpreters or linguists already work- ployment of that equipment.”10 Colonel ing with the unit, to maintain at least a basic Kraus wrote those words over 50 years ago, level of proficiency in the local language.7 recommending improvements to our lan-

Fall 2011 | 49 Western guage capabilities. The DOD has imple- War on Terrorism might well determine the mented some of his ideas, but, chillingly, in success or failure of counterinsurgency opera- all the years since then, it has yet to close tions. Our combat training will be for nothing our language gap. if our linguist does not tell us the truth or Improving a military’s overall linguistic fails to recognize it because of a lack of train- competence offers rewards. For example, ing. A lack of foreign language skills is our Colonel Kraus told the story of a Soviet Army’s Achilles’ heel. Timeliness and accu- transport plane landing in Indonesia. Down racy is everything in intelligence, and thus, a to the very last man on board—a janitor— linguist’s skills are more important than firepower. With the former, you might not need everyone spoke fluent Indonesian. Shocked, 13 the Indonesians processed the passengers the latter. in record time. The Jakarta leadership never forgot that calculated gesture of goodwill.11 When, if ever, has the United States Anyone Can Do It performed such an incredible yet simple act of diplomacy and propaganda? “Language comes so naturally to us that Indeed, one wonders how much of an it is easy to forget what a strange and mi- advantage al-Qaeda has in a world in which raculous gift it is.” This opening statement

One wonders how much of an advantage al-Qaeda has in a world in which English is already the language of trade, navigation, and international communication, yet we struggle to produce an adequate number of Arabic linguists able to interact in the terrorists’ world.

English is already the language of trade, of Steven Pinker’s book Words and Rules navigation, and international communica- serves as a primer for discussing the sim- tion, yet we struggle to produce an ade- plicity of language acquisition. Pinker quate number of Arabic linguists able to points out some important truths: interact in the terrorists’ world.12 Are they Though it is sometimes easy for Americans to really that much smarter than US forces forget, English is not the only language spo- simply because they tend to speak multiple ken in the world. Humans babble in some six languages while we do not? The answer is a thousand languages falling into thirty-odd resounding no; however, the question does families. raise an important point. If anyone can First, no one is biologically disposed to learn a language, why aren’t members of speak a particular language. The experiments the DOD doing just that? Without a doubt, called immigration and conquest, in which improving our language capability will en- children master languages unknown to their hance our chances of winning a modern ancestors, settled that question long ago. . . . war. Maj John Davis, a retired Army intel- Finally, no one supposes that language ligence officer, points out that evolved six thousand times. We find different languages because people move apart and how accurately and well we analyze the indig- lose touch, or split into factions that hate each enous people we deal with during the Global other’s guts.14

50 | Air & Space Power Journal How to Say “National Security” in 1,001 Languages

Although the existence of 6,000 languages thor, provides a keen view of the grueling seems incomprehensible, the fact that all of process involved in turning Army Soldiers them are somehow related means that, given into Green Berets—one that includes lan- the right circumstances, most people can guage training. Each time he introduces ei- learn at least one additional language.15 The ther Soldiers in special forces training or problem is not that language is inherently their instructors, he points out their lan- difficult to acquire but that after we become guage proficiency. One young Green Beret comfortable conversing in one language, we whom he met in western Iraq could speak may not see the need to learn others. We Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Korean, and ourselves, then, oftentimes represent the Tagalog—not to mention his growing flu- biggest obstacle to second-language acquisi- ency in Arabic. The young man’s response tion—by switching on what one linguist to Couch’s question about how it felt to have calls the “affective filter.” such a knack for languages embodies just the type of motivation needed to learn a for- The Affective Filter eign language: “ ‘It’s not a knack,’ he informed me evenly. ‘It’s commitment. Any- Prof. Stephen Krashen, a noted linguist, one can learn a foreign language if they [sic] theorized that adults have difficulty learn- want to. It takes a genuine desire to learn ing a second language because they turn on and the discipline to practice. And you have an affective filter that allows their motiva- to go out of your way to find and practice tion, attitude, self-confidence, and anxiety with native speakers. The second language is to inhibit that process. Take away the filter easier than the first, and they get easier each 16 and anyone can learn a second language. time, but you have to make a personal com- For example, despite the deplorable condi- mitment to learn the language.’ ”19 tions endured by Warren Fellows—a West- Throughout Chosen Soldier, Couch em- ern journalist imprisoned in Thailand— phasizes the commitment necessary to en- upon his release, he left with one new skill ter the special forces, with language acqui- set: fluency in a new language.17 Naturally, sition just one of the many demands. we would hope that our Soldiers do not Failure to complete the language require- learn languages by becoming prisoners, but ment negates all of the other hours of in- how much more effective would they be if tense training. Special forces focus on a they learned a language before interacting number of areas extremely important to with people from other countries? We should our missions overseas, which include train- give them that skill now—by removing the ing and assistance with foreign military affective filter. defense. Clearly, their specialized work Professor Krashen linked a variety of af- demands fluency to enable them to com- fective variables relating directly to the suc- municate with the forces they train. But all cess with which an individual can learn to service members, regardless of their loca- speak a foreign language, ranking motivation, might very well find themselves in a tion as the principal factor.18 It follows then, situation calling for communication with that, lacking motivation, service members non-English-speaking allies, enemy prison- will likely never even attempt to learn an- ers, or other civilian strangers—a situation other language. that could determine the success of the The US Army’s special forces exemplify joint mission. We cannot simply rely on an organization whose members have fully our special operations forces to do all the embraced language proficiency. To become work for us. Each service member needs to a special forces Soldier, each individual be ready to engage in a foreign environ- must demonstrate proficiency in a foreign ment if necessary. Language engagement, language. In his book Chosen Soldier, Dick even on a rudimentary level, can contrib- Couch, former Navy SEAL and noted au- ute significantly to the overall mission.

Fall 2011 | 51 Western

Since the beginning of the conflicts in mon excuses. Some linguists and other Afghanistan and Iraq, we have repeatedly skeptics point to age as the ultimate predic- found that simply learning a few words and tor of proficiency, declaring that Soldiers phrases can “break the ice” in any social who did not learn a language in their youth context. Saying hello to someone in his or will never master one in adulthood. But this her native tongue demonstrates not only “younger is better” argument is not entirely respect for that person’s culture but also a accurate. sincere attempt to reach across barriers to Professor Krashen concludes that be- form friendships and alliances. Along those cause older children learn faster, can better lines, if Soldiers learned to speak only 10 regulate quality and quantity of their words and phrases in the language of the speech, and can persuade native speakers country where they are deployed, the pos- to modify their speech (by saying, for ex- sible benefits, even of such a simple engage- ample, “Please slow down; I don’t under- ment, are immeasurable. Indeed, nothing is stand you”), they have greater “conversa- more personal than one’s native language. tional competence.”22 Such children and But consider the value of learning addi- adults may also find it easier to follow in- tional terms. Specifically, conversing on an structions, search dictionaries, and under- introductory level would require profi- stand the intricacies of grammar. Unfortu- ciency in only 100 words—and the more nately, though, as Krashen points out, the terms, the greater the fluency.20 affective filter “hardens” after puberty.23 Notwithstanding English’s extensive lexi- These individuals can still learn a foreign con, mastery of only 1,000 key words would language, but their affective filters grow enable someone to understand roughly 72 stronger, becoming artificial mental barriers percent of practically any standard written to learning new languages. Removal of text. A vocabulary of close to 2,000 words those barriers (by education or necessity) brings understanding to around 79 percent allows adults to learn to speak a new lan- of most written texts. Clearly, at least from guage more easily. a lexical standpoint, it is not difficult to de- Science shows that an adult probably velop basic understanding of a language. cannot learn to speak a language as fluently 24 Going beyond 1,000–2,000 words is just lin- as a child who has learned it from birth. guistic icing on the cake. A thorough under- Indeed, young children seem better at the standing of most English texts requires nuances of acquiring proper phonetics and 25 knowledge of roughly 16,000 terms.21 phonology. This does not mean, however, Granted, after 1,000 words, the process that adults cannot become proficient in a slows considerably, but the point is that one second language. can bolster comprehension by learning a Regarding age and its effects on linguistic relatively small number of terms. fluency, Prof. Lydia White, a linguistics pro- Mastering those 1,000 words demands fessor at McGill University, cited strong re- basic motivation—something we would ex- search indicating that acquisition of lan- pect of hardworking service members. Un- guages does not decline with age but that fortunately, they have no incentive to do the possibility of becoming a near-native so. Instead, they put up their affective fil- speaker of a second language decreases af- ters and make excuses for not learning a ter reaching a “critical or sensitive [period]” of brain development, which ranges from new tongue. In that case, the military 26 should accept no excuses. six to 15 years of age. For these reasons, older immigrants may not speak with a per- The Effect of Aging and Brain Function fect accent but can still learn the dominant language of their new environment. Service members who have decided not to Fortunately, in the context of military learn a foreign language offer many com- readiness, functional communication doesn’t

52 | Air & Space Power Journal How to Say “National Security” in 1,001 Languages depend upon phonetic perfection. Learning such investment involves finding linguists a new language later in life will certainly who have the desired proficiency. leave the speaker with an accent, but local citizens rarely care about that. Rather, they Recruiting Natives will appreciate the Soldier’s attempt to speak After the terrorist attacks of 11 September their language. Only extremely atypical and 2001 (9/11), the military realized it faced an inconsiderate foreigners would refuse to acute shortage of Middle Eastern linguists. converse with a nonnative speaker because Because training individuals from scratch of his or her strong accent. could not meet the immediate need, the Accents and native-like language preci- military resorted to contracting with lin- sion aside, few would doubt that learning a guists willing to fly to Afghanistan and Iraq. first language is an inherent human charac- Unfortunately, this strategy was not always teristic. Indeed, Noam Chomsky (consid- very effective. One report noted that some ered the father of modern linguistics) first contracted translators in Afghanistan were in arrived at the idea of a “universal grammar” their 60s and 70s “and in poor physical con- because he believed that children could not dition—and some [didn’t] even speak the so easily learn to speak a language if it were right language”; in fact, the military immedi- not for an “innate language faculty to guide ately sent some of them back to the United them.”27 Although not completely accepted, States because of their physical problems.29 universal grammar does offer one strong Realizing that contracting translators is theory to describe how people learn to com- not an ideal long-term solution but also rec- municate and explains second language ac- ognizing that native speakers are an ex- quisition. Regardless, developing at least tremely useful resource, the DOD has pro- rudimentary skill in one additional lan- mulgated new programs to recruit and guage is a function not only of motivation enlist them. In 2008 the Army initiated the but also of our minds’ predisposition to 09L military occupational specialty (recruits learn new languages, even into adulthood. are referred to as “09 Limas”): “This new military occupation employs heritage speakers as interpreters and translators, Past Attempts representing a new phase in the service’s reinvigorated approach to foreign lan- In 1957, after the Soviet Union launched guage.”30 During the 09L program’s pilot Sputnik, the United States felt threatened stage, the Defense Language Transformation by the possibility of losing the space-and- Roadmap of 2005 directed that all services technology race. In response to our new study the program for possible DOD-wide second-place position behind the Soviets, a implementation.31 Such initiatives are effec- wave of legislation and patriotic fervor tive if they identify the very best civilian spread across the country, leading within a linguists, but finding them can prove quite year to initiatives in many areas that difficult. For example, according to a 2000 needed improvement. Among these was the census, only 7,700 Pashto speakers live in National Defense Education Act, which the United States.32 “suddenly poured millions of dollars into Other programs championed by the DOD support for foreign language learning and call for funding more travel abroad for ser- teaching.”28 Not much has changed during vice academy cadets and midshipmen dur- the more than 50 years since passage of the ing their studies. Reserve Officer Training act. In fact it seems that every time the mili- Corps programs have also allowed cadets to tary becomes aware of a language shortage, learn more about foreign lands.33 Some in- it throws millions of dollars at the problem, novative schemes currently encourage de- hoping to overcome the deficiency. One velopment of language capabilities from

Fall 2011 | 53 Western elementary school through high school. For Non-Commissioned Officer Academy.36 instance, the National Language Flagship Face-to-face instruction seemed to work Program seeks to nurture students of the well at the Air War College, whose students future in strategic languages such as Arabic, enjoyed it. Unfortunately, the mandatory Hindi, and Urdu.34 Unquestionably, we usage of language software proved less suc- need strategies like these to seed our nation cessful. Air Command and Staff College stu- with future talent, but what about current dents (required to use Rosetta Stone) be- efforts within the DOD to improve the lan- came frustrated with the software and lost guage capabilities of those who already their motivation to learn. In fact, many of wear the uniform? them began to concentrate on “beating” the software rather than learning from it.37 The Defense Language Institute Similarly, students enrolled in distance learning programs had a less than satisfy- Offering exceptional instruction, the De- ing experience. According to one observer, fense Language Institute (DLI) leads the “Although this voluntary program initially charge for language training in the mili- generated enthusiasm, as evidenced by a tary. Students will not progress in their lin- rather lengthy waiting list for license use, guist career field without successfully completion rates for software modules passing a particular language course at the were abysmal. Over a 15-month period, a institute, which sets its students up for total of 2,667 SOC [Squadron Officer Col- success. Despite the difficulty of finding lege] students signed up for licenses, but qualified instructors, the DLI is fulfilling only 67 of them (2.5 percent) completed 50 its training mandate. or more hours.”38 The institute has also enjoyed great Self-help language software can provide success in its predeployment basic lan- very successful instruction. The key factor, guage instruction. For example, from 2005 however, as noted previously, is the motiva- until 2008 the Army’s Language Familiar- tion of the learner. Those who lose either ization and Cultural Awareness training their focus or motivation will not learn. saw a 78 percent growth in outreach. As Currently, other than certain professional of 2008 the training had reached over military education programs, few areas de- 66,572 service members.35 mand that military members use language Today’s environment demands that pre- learning software. Even those areas lack in- deployers receive the DLI’s training in key centives for students to learn a language, strategic languages at the survival skill other than completing the particular level. However, the military should also en- course. Clearly, service members need ad- courage troops not yet deployed to take additional motivation to help inspire them to vantage of language instruction, which, for learn a language. Simply providing access the most part, is entirely voluntary. Fortu- to self-help software is not enough. nately, the military has tools to help those who so choose. Other Language Training Programs

Rosetta Stone and Other Self-Help Programs For over 40 years, the Army has had a very robust foreign area officer program that al- Self-help computer programs like Rosetta lowed officers to specialize in the language Stone, popular in the military for several and culture of certain regions. The Air years, are nothing new and have produced Force attempted to copy this model with a mixed results. In 2006 the Air Force chief of part-time program wherein members could staff directed Air University to begin lan- also obtain a secondary specialty as a for- guage instruction in the Air War College, eign area officer. Realizing that this effort Air Command and Staff College, and Senior did not meet the needs of our increased op-

54 | Air & Space Power Journal How to Say “National Security” in 1,001 Languages erating tempo following 9/11, the Air Force count of the American experience in South- went back to the drawing board and devised east Asia.41 Despite its setting during the a new regional affairs strategist program. Vietnam War, the book’s lessons remain The Air Force selects officers for this pro- valid today. In order to win the hearts and gram at about the seven-to-10-year point in minds of any people, all of our troops must their careers, giving them 24–33 months of first understand what is within those hearts additional training that usually results in a and minds. Sheer brute force or bulk gifts of master’s degree in the area of their lan- rice are not enough. As previously men- guage and cultural specialty.39 The service tioned, Congress enacted the National De- then assigns them to areas in which they fense Education Act a year before publica- can best utilize their new talents. tion of The Ugly American. Since that time, The Air Force has also recently imple- our military’s efforts to bridge the linguistic mented the Language Enabled Airmen Pro- gap appear to have been Sisyphean. The gram, which identifies junior officers moti- continual focus on pouring money into vated to learn or improve their language training select groups of linguists will help capability and begins their training with a but not solve our problem. There is only language-intensive training event. As of Oc- one way to do that—by changing the way tober 2010, 25 of the service’s newest sec- we motivate our military members to learn ond lieutenants had completed the first of foreign languages. these classes.40 The program seeks to identify and train officers at an early stage in their careers and then, throughout their Way of the Future stay in the Air Force, give them training and assignments that will strengthen their To increase the number of its members language skills and put them to use where who can speak a foreign language, the mili- needed worldwide. tary must remove its institutional affective Both the Regional Affairs Strategist Pro- filter. Even language experts allow them- gram and the Language Enabled Airmen selves a certain amount of filtering. Con- Program likely will help produce an effec- sider, for example, this statement by Lt Col tive cadre of language and cultural special- Jay Warwick, USAF, retired, of the Air Force ists within the Air Force. These programs Culture and Language Center: accommodate individuals who wish to be- Attendees of the AU [Air University] language come language and cultural specialists; summit agreed that it was impractical and furthermore, they serve as a valuable mech- undesirable for all Airmen to be language spe- anism to address the service’s shortage in cialists. Depending upon the language, an this field. Such efforts help the Air Force individual could take longer than a year in an develop personnel comparable to the Ar- immersion-style course to become minimally my’s foreign area officers. None of these functional. . . . Additionally, experience has programs, however, can ever fully meet the identified motivation and capability as the military’s need for expertise in language key factors in language learning. Not all Air- and culture. In addition to grooming indi- men possess the motivation to learn a foreign language or maintain proficiency; neither are vidual specialists, the Air Force should also all of them predisposed to language learning.42 encourage and motivate its other members to value the importance of language and It is indeed impractical for all Airmen to culture. Allowing them to continue in the become language specialists, but nearly ev- mind-set of “English only / our culture is ery member can develop some proficiency best” will only harm our ability to master in a foreign language. Claiming that some the art of global engagement. people are not “predisposed” to learning a William Lederer and Eugene Burdick’s new language is just the affective filter novel The Ugly American presents an ac- speaking. Even apes learning sign language

Fall 2011 | 55 Western build a vocabulary of 500–600 words.43 quiring officers to attain a two level of profi- Given the right motivation, most humans ciency would not entail asking them to are predisposed to language learning. learn a new language perfectly but merely Perhaps Warwick’s most accurate state- to attain limited working proficiency. ment is that “not all Airmen possess the If this policy were implemented today, motivation to learn a foreign language.” junior officers would have at least six to 10 Herein lies the true problem as well as the years to study a new language before be- solution to our shortage of proficient speak- coming eligible for promotion to O-5 rank. ers. Motivate the troops, and the problem On 5 January 2011, the Air Force an- solves itself. nounced that officer selection briefs would include a section that captures an officer’s Promotion language certification levels (for reading and listening). Recognizing that “officers The Defense Language Transformation Road- who have foreign language skills and cul- map mandates that mastery of a foreign lan- tural experience relevant to world opera- guage be phased in as a “criterion for gen- tions play a key role in supporting joint eral officer / flag officer advancement.”44 combatant commanders,” the service de- This requirement is a good start, but we cided to include a foreign language section

“Not all Airmen possess the motivation to learn a foreign language.” Herein lies the true problem as well as the solution to our shortage of proficient speakers. Motivate the troops, and the problem solves itself.

could expand it to become a huge motivator to help identify these in-demand officers to for all military personnel to pursue language promotion boards.47 Certainly this is admi- proficiency. Why not direct that an officer’s rable, but the Air Force can do more. If of- eligibility for promotion to lieutenant colonel ficers realized that promotion to O-5 de- (O-5) depend upon attainment of a Defense pended upon language certification, they Language Proficiency Test level of two in 45 would obtain it. any second language? Such a score is rea- The service can assist in this matter by sonable on this test, which measures profi- doing away with its anachronistic emphasis ciency in reading, listening, and speaking, on earning a master’s degree as a criterion and whose results range from zero (lowest) to five (highest), in addition to plus signs used for advancement into the senior ranks. As as midlevel range markers. These levels outlined by Col Dennis Drew, USAF, retired, correspond to the system devised by the most of the subject areas that our officers Interagency Language Roundtable: “Put an- pursue for master’s degrees are “largely ir- other way, an individual with 1/1/1 scores relevant to [the Air Force’s] raison d’être. The in Arabic possesses ‘survival skills,’ while Air Force seems unable or unwilling to dis- one with 4/4/4 could debate the US Middle tinguish the value of a graduate degree in East policy on al-Jazeera television.”46 Re- business from the value of a graduate degree

56 | Air & Space Power Journal How to Say “National Security” in 1,001 Languages in national security studies or military his- erations pilot, commented that “officers tory.”48 Or, for that matter, foreign languages. should set the example by learning at least By replacing the institutional emphasis one language fluently.”51 Linking language upon these degrees with one on foreign lan- skill to promotion will make the process guage advancement, the Air Force could natural and eliminate the affective filter. provide funding for language training in Similarly, if a noncommissioned officer much the same way it offers tuition assis- with LCTL proficiency could earn an addi- tance for graduate-level education. Cur- tional five points toward promotion to se- rently the service assists with tuition for nior rank, he or she would find a way to re- language courses if they are tied to obtain- move the affective filter.52 Some might ing college credit. Unfortunately, though, argue that attaching language acquisition to this is not true of many specialized language promotion would benefit only linguists, for- courses, so the Air Force should underwrite eign nationals entering our services, and any such credible course, whether associ- those raised in bilingual families. The ser- ated with a degree program or not. Junior vices could address this potential problem officers could then concentrate on obtain- in a simple manner. First, since the addi- ing skills they could use in an operational tional points for senior promotion become a setting rather than on certifying skills best benefit only after the member has invested practiced in the civilian world. many years in the service, language capa- The service could also channel the bility would not disproportionately skew language-development process of its junior promotions in early career stages when de- officers by offering training at its larger in- velopment of vocational and leadership stallations. By contracting with local univer- skill is of primary importance. Foreign lan- sities to conduct special training on less guage speakers in the lower grades would commonly taught languages (LCTL), the Air still be eligible for proficiency pay. Second, Force could create opportunities for officers the new standard could be based on a lan- and enlisted troops to seek proficiency in guage someone did not learn as a child—a languages of most benefit to the service. second language for most people, perhaps a Given the difficulty of learning many of third or fourth for a select few. The point is these LCTLs and the time necessary to do that failure to give our Airmen a mecha- so, the Air Force could permit (or direct) nism to disengage the affective filter will 49 members to study them during duty hours. produce a military full of foreign language Furthermore, the service could designate mottoes and clever catchphrases but no res- officers proficient in “high-need” LCTL lan- ervoir of language capability for engaging guages with a special identifier on their of- our allies and defeating our enemies. We 50 ficer selection brief. Needs change with may have a cadre of elite linguists ready to regard to languages, so, to be fair, once a lead the charge, but we will never have language was identified as high-need, that enough of them to go around. identifier on the brief would stay with the officer who earned it, but new languages Professional Military Education could always be added or subtracted from a master list. We need not wait until our officers enroll in The military could phase in these poli- midlevel and senior-level professional mili- cies over time, minimizing disruption of the tary education to give them exposure to a current officer promotion process within foreign language. Instead, we could require each service. Additionally, the new policy that officers who aspire to matriculate in- would motivate all Reserve Officer Training residence demonstrate a level of proficiency Corps cadets entering the military to study beforehand. For officers attending basic de- languages as a means of enhancing their velopmental education, the military could careers. Maj William Downs, a special op- require a score of at least “0+” or a “1” on a

Fall 2011 | 57 Western

Defense Language Proficiency Test, a “1+” solving it. Promotion and individual recog- or “2” for in-residence intermediate devel- nition are hallmarks of membership in the opmental education, and a “2+” or “3” for service. If the DOD required linguistic skills in-residence senior developmental education. of its future leaders, then they would step Combining promotion with selection for out of their comfort zones and acquire developmental education (as the Air Force those skills. does) makes this process even more stream- Interestingly, of all the medals and rib- lined. An individual’s officer selection briefs bons offered by the DOD, none are awarded could list the level of language ability at- for language proficiency. If the department tained, and promotion boards could then does nothing else, it should at least offer use this information accordingly. recognition in the form of a badge or ribbon Initiating this approach would not impose to those who have demonstrated linguistic any significant cost on the DOD. The DLI capability. True, fully trained foreign area already offers a number of free programs officers have functional badges, but what for those who seek language proficiency. about those troops who are not full-time lin- Self-help software can also lend sufficient guists? Surely they deserve recognition for support to motivated individuals who wish their efforts.54 Herein lies the key to a shift to achieve lower-level proficiency. Finally, in the DOD’s culture with regard to lan- if the Air Force shifts gears to emphasize guage proficiency. If the military ever language acquisition rather than superflu- wishes to motivate people to learn a new ous master’s degrees, this new mandate will language, the DOD needs to prove that it become smoothly incorporated into our values the service of those who do so. troops’ already busy work/life schedule.

Cultural Change Conclusion For many years, the DOD has used various In 2002 a legend and true American hero financial incentives such as foreign language passed away. Gen Vernon Walters never went proficiency pay to attract language speakers to college but worked his way up through and encourage service members to learn or the ranks in the Army to become a two-star retain their capabilities.53 At certain times, general. He served with honor during World this pay applied to a wide variety of lan- War II and later became one of America’s guages—at others, only for certain languages greatest diplomats. This man learned 16 in short supply. Nevertheless, foreign lan- languages, speaking eight fluently—includ- guage proficiency pay has served as just ing Chinese and Russian.55 He even trans- about the only mechanism to motivate ser- lated for President Harry Truman and Presi- vice members. Certainly it is a good pro- dent Richard Nixon. At one point in his life, gram that we should continue, but it cannot “his simultaneous translation of a speech by be the only method that the DOD uses to Nixon in France prompted President Charles encourage its members to learn a language. de Gaulle to say to the US President, ‘Nixon, Because of individual and institutional you gave a magnificent speech, but your affective filters, the DOD has not actively interpreter was eloquent.’ ”56 undertaken a serious language-proficiency Today, instead of looking up to men like campaign. Thus, each year a new study dis- General Walters, many of our young troops cusses the importance of languages in the do not even know who he is. During de- military and the fact that the department ployments, they waste countless hours faces a critical shortage of skilled linguists. playing video games and watching movies. The DOD then decides to throw money at Imagine the impact these service members the problem. Now is the time, however, to could have if they applied the same drive demonstrate a stronger commitment to and motivation to learning more about for-

58 | Air & Space Power Journal How to Say “National Security” in 1,001 Languages eign languages and cultures. Tieing their and more time consuming than purely tac- career advancement to linguistic capability tical, behind-the-gun skills, it’s what really would help. Changing our culture to reflect sets the special operator apart from his that importance would help even more. conventional counterpart.”58 Perhaps if the The Army’s special forces have already DOD demonstrated its commitment to lan- incorporated this culture into their train- guage growth and learned from its special ing. Even the legendary Robin Sage train- operations forces, all levels of the military ing exercise now makes use of languages could reap the linguistic rewards. The im- like Arabic.57 Special forces do indeed under pact on our overseas operations would be stand that “while developing the language truly extraordinary.  and cross-cultural skills is more difficult

Notes

1. I use the number “1,001” in the title of this findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3723/is_200807 article in the same sense as it appears in the classic /ai_n27995742/?tag=mantle_skin;content. book The Thousand and One Nights. In that collec- 11. Ibid. tion of stories, the Persians did not use “1,001” liter- 12. See Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Extremists Pan- ally but simply to mean “a lot.” Indeed, original der for Mission and Money: Terrorists Deploy News transcripts do not contain that number. Rags to Hold Adherents’ Attention,” Washington 2. Iraq Study Group, The Iraq Study Group Report Times, 20 January 2011, http://www.washington (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 92, http://permanent times.com/news/2011/jan/20/extremists-pander .access.gpo.gov/lps76748/iraq_study_group_report.pdf. -for-mission-and-money/. Al-Qaeda even has its own 3. Lt Gen David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counter- online English language magazine titled Inspire. insurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” 13. Maj John W. Davis, “Our Achilles’ Heel: Lan- Military Review, October 2006 (supplement), 45–56. guage Skills,” Military Review 86, no. 2 (March/April 4. “US Scrambles to Find Linguists for Afghan 2006): 110. Surge,” VOANews.com, 29 May 2009, http://www 14. Steven Pinker, Words and Rules: The Ingredients of Language (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 1, 211. .voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-05-29-voa 15. Ibid., 211. 32-68643567.html. 16. Stephen D. Krashen, Principles and Practice 5. Ibid. in Second Language Acquisition (New York: Pergamon 6. Kate Brannen, “Petraeus’ COIN Guidance ‘Pre- Institute of English, 1982), 31. maturely Released,’ ” DefenseNews, 30 July 2010, 17. Warren Fellows, The Damage Done: Twelve http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4729883. Years of Hell in a Bangkok Prison (Sydney, NSW Aus- 7. Gen Stanley McChrystal, Headquarters US Forces tralia: Pan Macmillan, 1997). Fellows, who spent 12 Afghanistan / International Security Assistance Force, years imprisoned, discusses how he acquired profi- memorandum, subject: COMISAF/USFOR-A Counter- ciency in Thai and its value to him. How did he do insurgency Training Guidance, 10 November 2009. it? He had no choice. 8. Sgt Kevin Stabinsky, “Afghan Linguists Key to 18. Krashen, Principles and Practice, 31. Success,” American Forces Press Service, 2 Novem- 19. Dick Couch, Chosen Soldier: The Making of a ber 2006, http://www.defense.gov/news/NewsArticle Special Forces Warrior (New York: Crown Publishers, .aspx?ID=1998. 2007), 382. 9. Quoted in Brian Lamar, “3rd Inf. Div. Prepares 20. Tony Buzan, Use Your Memory (London: to Deploy to Iraq with Language and Culture Train- Guild Publishing, 1986), 129. ing in Mind,” 27 August 2009, accessed 2 February 21. Paul Nation and Robert Waring, “Vocabulary 2011, http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/08/27 Size, Text Coverage and Word Lists,” WordHacker, /26598-3rd-inf-div-prepares-to-deploy-to-iraq-with 2007, http://www.wordhacker.com/en/article -language-and-culture-training-in-mind/. /vocabularysizewordlists.htm. See “Table 1: Vocabu- 10. Walter E. Kraus, “Bridging the Linguistic Gap lary size and text coverage in the Brown corpus.” (50 Years Ago in ARMY),” Army, 1 July 2008, http:// 22. Krashen, Principles and Practice, 43.

Fall 2011 | 59 Western

23. Ibid., 44. 31. Department of Defense, Defense Language 24. William H. Thorpe, “The Learning of Song Transformation Roadmap (Washington, DC: Depart- Patterns by Birds, with Especial Reference to the ment of Defense, January 2005), 9, par. 2.E, accessed Song of the Chaffinch Fringilla Coelebs,” Ibis 100, 14 December 2010, http://www.defense.gov/news no. 4 (October 1958): 535–70. Consider the biological /Mar2005/d20050330roadmap.pdf. evidence. Thorpe did an extensive study on the chaf- 32. Straziuso, “Lost in Translation,” 15A. finch and its unique song, finding that if a young 33. Kruzel, “Defense Department Navigates.” bird is not introduced to the adult male’s song dur- 34. Ibid. ing a critical period after hatching, it will never sing 35. House, Language and Cultural Awareness Ca- properly. Like the chaffinch, children seem to have pabilities in the Military, Statement of Gary Patton, the same need for exposure to linguistic nuances, Senior Language Authority, Office of the Chairman, such as nonnative phonemes, at an early stage; if Joint Chiefs of Staff / J-1, House Armed Services Sub- not, such sounds will prove more difficult to pro- committee on Oversights and Investigations, 110th nounce and/or replicate later on. For example, in Cong., 2nd sess., 10 September 2008. 1799 Jean-Marc-Gaspard Itard discovered a boy 11 or 36. Lt Col Jay J. Warwick, “The Dilemmas of Pro- 12 years of age whom he named Victor, known as viding Language Instruction for the US Air Force,” Air the “Wild Boy of Aveyron” because he had appar- and Space Power Journal 23, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 47. ently been raised by wolves. Victor never really de- 37. Ibid., 49. veloped significant ability to communicate beyond a 38. Ibid. few words. More recent examples also confirm the 39. Secretary of the Air Force for International chaffinch phenomenon. In 1940 scientists were in- Affairs, “Regional Affairs Strategist Factsheet,” ac- trigued by “Isabelle,” who had been hidden away by cessed 15 December 2010, http://www.safia.hq.af.mil her parents since early infancy. Discovered at age six, /factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=12756. she had cognitive skills below those of a two-year-old. 40. Air Force Personnel Center, “Lieutenants Com- Although she learned to speak, her linguistic skills plete Inaugural Language Training,” 1 October 2010, were comparable to those of a child immigrant accessed 15 December 2010, http://afpc.randolph.af learning a second language. See Ray Jackendoff, .mil/news/story.asp?id=123224700. Patterns in the Mind: Language and Human Nature 41. William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The (New York: BasicBooks, 1994), 116–20. Ugly American (New York: W. W. Norton and Com- 25. Jackendoff, Patterns in the Mind, 117. pany, 1958). 26. Lydia White, Second Language Acquisition and 42. Warwick, “Providing Language Instruction,” 50. Universal Grammar (New York: Cambridge Univer- 43. Jackendoff, Patterns in the Mind, 139. sity Press, 2003), 245. 44. Department of Defense, Defense Language 27. Rosamond Mitchell and Florence Myles, Sec- Transformation Roadmap, 8, par. 1.S. ond Language Learning Theories (London: Hodder 45. “Attaining the grade of lieutenant colonel is Education, 2004), 55. often considered to be the hallmark of a successful 28. Tom Scovel, Learning New Languages: A Guide career.” Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, to Second Language Acquisition (Scarborough, On- Commissioned Officer Professional Development and tario: Heinle and Heinle, 2001), 37. Career Management, 1 February 2010, 18, par. 3-7, 29. Jason Straziuso, “Lost in Translation: Lin- http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/p600_3.pdf. This guists Hired under Contract Struggle to Keep Up Army pamphlet is but one confirmation of the no- with Troops,” Sun Sentinel, 26 July 2009, 15A. tion that attaining the rank of lieutenant colonel is 30. A “heritage speaker” generally refers to an a “hallmark” of success. As such, this author recom- individual raised in a home in which the dominant mends making fluency in at least one foreign lan- language of a country (e.g., English in the United guage a requirement for promotion to this impor- States) either is not spoken or is not the primary tant rank. language. Heritage speakers generally have native 46. Col John L. Conway III, USAF, Retired, “The proficiency in the language spoken in their home View from the Tower of Babel: Air Force Foreign and acquire the dominant language (of the country Language Posture for Global Engagement,” Air and in which they live) either simultaneously with the Space Power Journal 19, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 60. acquisition of their home language or later in life. The International Language Roundtable levels of John J. Kruzel, “Defense Department Navigates Lan- proficiency roughly equate to the following: “0” = guage Roadmap,” American Forces Press Service, 25 “no proficiency,” “0+” = “memorized proficiency,” November 2008, http://www.defense.gov/news/news “1” = “elementary proficiency,” “1+” = “elementary article.aspx?id=52090. proficiency, plus,” “2” = “limited working proficiency,”

60 | Air & Space Power Journal How to Say “National Security” in 1,001 Languages

“2+” = “limited working proficiency, plus,” “3” = prompt enlisted troops to obtain such a high level of “general professional proficiency,” “3+” = “general proficiency. A more substantial incentive (i.e., more professional proficiency, plus,” “4” = “advanced pro- points) would basically guarantee promotion for fessional proficiency,” “4+” = “advanced profes- troops who mastered a language. Furthermore, man- sional proficiency, plus,” and “5” = “functional native dating only a 2/2/2 level of proficiency makes the proficiency.” See “Interagency Language Roundtable goal easier to reach. Finally, the fact that five points Language Skill Level Descriptions—Speaking,” Inter- is roughly equivalent to a Bronze Star demonstrates agency Language Roundtable, accessed 20 January the value the Air Force puts upon foreign language 2011, http://www.govtilr.org/Skills/ILRscale2.htm. proficiency. 47. Daniel P. Elkins, “Air Force Officials Approve 53. See Air Force Instruction 36-2605, Air Force Changes to Officer Selection Brief,” 5 January 2011, Military Personnel Testing System, 24 September 2008, accessed 20 January 2011, http://www.af.mil/news 82–83, par. A14.4, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil /story.asp?id=123236950. /shared/media/epubs/AFI36-2605.pdf. The Air 48. Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired, “Educat- Force has authorized various forms of proficiency ing Air Force Officers: Observations after 20 Years at pay over the years; this instruction details the most Air University,” Airpower Journal 11, no. 2 (Summer current version. 1997): 40. 54. Colonel Conway recommends granting lin- 49. John Conway provides an excellent table out- guists an oak leaf cluster on their Air Force training lining the number of study hours necessary to at- ribbons. Conway, “Tower of Babel,” 65. However, this tain proficiency in various categories of languages. author believes that they deserve a separate ribbon Col John Conway, USAF, Retired, “Civilian Language or badge of distinction. Education in America: How the Air Force and Aca- demia Can Thrive Together,” Air and Space Power 55. Henry L. Applebaum, “Vernon Walters—Re- Journal 24, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 77. naissance Man,” Central Intelligence Agency, 27 50. These languages are spelled out in the DOD June 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for and Air Force strategic language lists. They change -the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi as do the needs of the Air Force / DOD. -studies/studies/vol46no1/article01.html. 51. Maj William Brian Downs, “Unconventional 56. Ibid. Airpower,” Air and Space Power Journal 19, no. 1 57. The final hurdle that a recruit must negoti- (Spring 2005): 22. Unfortunately, Major Downs died ate, Robin Sage is arguably one of the most strenu- near Baghdad while training Iraqi pilots. ous, realistic exercises in all of the DOD, extending 52. Col John Conway recommends awarding one over a vast terrain and incorporating all facets of Weighted Airman Promotion System point to en- special forces training. To make it even more realis- listed personnel for obtaining a 3/3/3 level of profi- tic, foreign language is now becoming part of this ciency. Conway, “Tower of Babel,” 65. Although a exercise. Couch, Chosen Soldier, 365. good idea, it does not offer enough incentive to 58. Ibid., 392.

Lt Col D. J. Western, USAF Lieutenant Colonel Western (BA, University of Utah; JD, Lewis and Clark North- western School of Law; LLM, George Washington University) is the staff judge advocate at the US Embassy in Canberra, Australia. He previously served as an assistant professor of law and adjunct professor of foreign languages at the US Air Force Academy. A certified translator, Lieutenant Colonel Western speaks French, Arabic, and Spanish fluently. He was the recipient of the 2010 Thomas P. Keenan Jr. Award, which recognizes the top Air Force attorney who “made the most notable contribution to the development of international law or military operations law during the prior year.” Author of the book Arabic Vocabulary Made Easy (Createspace, 2011), he has published in the Air Force Law Review and the Journal of Legal Studies. Lieutenant Colonel Western is a distinguished graduate of Squadron Officer School and an outstanding graduate of the Air War College distance learning program.

Fall 2011 | 61 Fiscally Sound Options for a Flawed Tanker Recapitalization Strategy Lt Col Michael W. Grismer Jr., USAF

The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances. We maintain superior capabilities to deter and defeat adaptive enemies and to ensure the credibility of security partnerships that are fundamental to regional and global security. In this way, our military continues to underpin our national security and global leadership, and when we use it appropriately, our security and leadership is reinforced. —President Barack Obama National Security Strategy, May 2010 he current US economic crisis brings has ever known, one capable of projecting U.S. a national impetus to reduce govern- strength and resolve—anywhere, anytime. ment deficit spending, an undertak- T —Gen Charles T. Robertson Jr. ing of great importance; indeed, both the Former Commander legislative and executive branches have Air Mobility Command and taken immediate action in fiscal year (FY) US Transportation Command 2011. This fixation on fiscal responsibility will surely include the previously sacro- An important linchpin to US military sanct defense budget, which set record hegemony, the tanker enables joint and highs and nearly doubled with wartime sup- coalition forces by facilitating power pro- plemental defense spending since the ter- jection over long distances, guaranteeing rorist attacks of 11 September 2011.1 With access to any location in the world. Ac- the Department of Defense’s (DOD) fixed cording to Gen Raymond Johns Jr., com- costs at an all-time high and recapitalization mander of Air Mobility Command, with- requirements in every direction, the chal- out the tanker, America could not execute the Air Force’s core competencies of lenge to win two wars and reset for the next global vigilance, reach, and power.2 For contingency in a fiscally constrained envi- example, during FY 2010, the KC-135 fleet ronment demands innovative leadership at enabled combat power in Iraq and Af- every level. ghanistan by air-delivering 255 million The top recapitalization priority for the gallons of jet fuel to a host of Air Force, US Air Force is replacing the 50-year-old Navy, Marine, and coalition aircraft.3 Dur- KC-135 tanker fleet, a force multiplier ing congressional testimony, Gen Duncan critical to US military power projection. McNabb, commander of US Transporta- Aerial refueling represents a single point tion Command, reiterated the importance of failure for any rapid global mission, a of air refueling: “My number one recapi- capability critical to the DOD’s joint force. talization priority is replacing the fleet of The latter depends on the tanker to enable 415 Eisenhower-era KC-135s with a new global reach and rapid global response, es- platform to preserve a unique asymmetric sential tenets of the US national security advantage for our nation.”4 strategy. Unfortunately, the existing road Regrettably, KC-135 recapitalization map for recapitalizing the aging KC-135 (commonly referred to as KC-X acquisition) fleet is untenable, and senior leaders have has been one of the most controversial, po- estimated that the last aircraft will not be litical, and ineffective acquisition programs replaced until it is more than 100 years in Air Force history. It had unconventional old. From a pure time perspective, this beginnings as an unsolicited lease proposal would be analogous to flying the Wright from Boeing in 2001, receiving congressio- Flyer in combat today! Given the pressures nal approval before the Air Force had vali- from budget constraints and the national dated or budgeted the requirement.5 Follow- deficit reduction, the DOD must seek alter- ing significant congressional oversight, natives for expediting recapitalization. KC-X acquisition underwent a competitive bidding process in 2008, won by Northrop Grumman / European Aeronautic Defence The Tanker and Space Company (EADS); a protest in Recapitalization Challenge 2008 cancelled the award, which underwent competitive bidding again in 2009.6 The Simply put, America’s National Security failed awards in 2001 and 2008 were nulli- Strategy, built on the imperative of world-wide fied by indictments for corruption and er- engagement, demands nothing less than the rors made during bid evaluations, respec- best global transportation system the world tively, events that highlighted serious flaws

Fall 2011 | 63 Grismer in the Air Force acquisition process. In the Lengthy KC-135 Recapitalization Timeline latest gaffe (2010), procurement officials The KC-X acquisition strategy does not re- mistakenly returned confidential data to capitalize the KC-135 fast enough, adding rival bidders, resulting in further delay.7 Fi- risk to an aging fleet. In 2007 Gen Arthur nally, after nearly 10 years of recapitalization efforts, the Air Force successfully Lichte, commander of Air Mobility Com- awarded a $31.5 billion contract to Boeing mand at that time, said, “If the [KC-X] pro- in February 2011 to build 179 KC-X aircraft.8 gram runs into any problems and slips by However, this acquisition falls 236 air- just three years, and Air Force officials craft short of recapitalizing the entire KC-135 are unable to procure 15 aircraft a year, the last KC-135 will retire in the year 2082, fleet. From a capability standpoint, the Boe- 14 ing replacement, dubbed the KC-46A (Boe- when it is more than 120 years old.” The ing 767), is a modern, cost-efficient, and KC-X award did in fact slip nearly three versatile aircraft, capable of multipoint refu- years since the general’s statement, so the eling of joint and coalition aircraft, cargo Air Force faces the prospect of flying a and passenger airlift, and aeromedical 50-year-old tanker another 70 years. evacuation missions.9 The KC-46A has sig- To the DOD, gaining initial operational nificantly more airlift capability than the capability of the KC-46A offers the most KC-135 and meets current DOD joint doc- pragmatic solution for beginning KC-135 trine requirements for refueling platforms recapitalization. Regrettably, current bud- to augment the airlift fleet. Most impor- get constraints limit recapitalization fund- tantly, it delivers 1.14 to 1.38 times the air- ing to $3.5 billion annually, allowing for a refueling capacity of the KC-135.10 Addition- maximum procurement rate of 12 to 18 15 ally, Boeing’s KC-46A carries 190 passengers aircraft per year. Even if the Air Force and 19 bulk cargo pallets; the KC-45 (Airbus took delivery of the KC-X tomorrow, the A330-200), the aircraft of losing competitor last KC-135 would be flying for over a cen- EADS North America, carries 226 passen- tury, a strategy full of risk and expense. gers and 32 pallets.11 Some KC-X advocates would like to see Former secretary of defense Robert Gates the KC-135 in a museum, not on the front affirmed that US strategic strength is linked lines of combat for the next 35 to 70 years. to the fiscal health of the nation and that Many members of Congress and DOD per- “the Department of Defense’s track record sonnel are well aware of this reality, but as a steward of taxpayer dollars leaves attempts to shorten the timeline have not much to be desired.”12 Since the DOD bud- been productive. get accounts for more than half of federal To recapitalize the fleet more quickly, discretionary spending, Congress has begun the DOD investigated split-buy acquisition to scrutinize defense spending more closely options to contract KC-X aircraft from both to find savings for debt reduction.13 Secre- Boeing and EADS. The budget-limited tary Gates also emphasized the fact that fu- strategy of 12–18 aircraft annually is also a ture DOD budget growth will stop. Zero minimum economic order of quantity growth, together with the increasing cost of (EOQ), which allows bidders to size produc- energy, operations, and sustainment, will tion and validate cost to produce aircraft on disproportionately affect future procure- time and within budget. A DOD budget al- ment accounts. Significantly, the DOD bud- lowing a higher purchase rate would lower get crisis has no end in sight, a menacing the unit price of aircraft, and recapitaliza- hurdle for future acquisition programs. tion would proceed more quickly. Although These programs include timely recapital- a split buy with minimum EOQs does not ization of the remaining KC-135 fleet, represent a best-case scenario for the Air which continues to operate at great expense Force, it would prove beneficial for the com- and risk. petitors, each of which has a considerable

64 | Air & Space Power Journal Fiscally Sound Options for a Flawed Tanker Recapitalization Strategy stake in the defense industrial base, since nel at a premium in the Air Force, main- both would build KC-X aircraft. Boeing will taining a KC-135 necessitates more than employ 44,000 US workers from 300 US double the manpower per flying hour than suppliers, and EADS estimates that aircraft the larger but more modern C-17.24 production would create 48,000 direct and Along with burgeoning maintenance indirect jobs from 230 suppliers in 49 costs looms significant risk of the unknown states.16 Michael Wynne, former secretary of regarding the length of time that metals the Air Force, noted that the cost of a split used in production of the KC-135 fleet will purchase “would be prohibitive, unless endure. In 2006 the RAND Corporation there was sufficient funding to essentially completed an analysis of alternatives for buy between 24 and 30 [annually].”17 The KC-135 recapitalization, concluding that in- DOD lacks not only up-front funding for a sufficient data existed for projecting the split purchase but also the sustainment bud- KC-135’s technical condition over the next get for dual maintenance, training, and lo- several decades with high confidence.25 gistics support systems. Similarly, the Defense Science Board concluded “that corrosion [did not pose] an im- Costly Recapitalization Strategy minent catastrophic threat to the KC-135 Under current Air Force maintenance prac- fleet. . . . However, because the KC-135s are tices, sustaining fleet reliability standards as true first generation turbojet aircraft . . . the KC-135 ages will be exorbitantly expen- concerns regarding the ability to continue operating these aircraft indefinitely are in- sive. Projections indicate maintenance costs 26 will increase to $6 billion yearly over the tuitively well founded.” Following a next decade, well over the annual $3.5 bil- KC-135 crash in 1999, which killed the crew lion budgeted for KC-X procurement.18 Even and destroyed the airplane, the Air Force congressional appropriation language ac- grounded 40 percent of the fleet for six knowledges it is “in the best interest of the months while it inspected and repaired taxpayer to pursue recapitalization at a rate faulty stab actuators, which caused the 27 of 36 aircraft per year . . . [to avoid] a large flight-control malfunction. A similar sustainment and modernization cost of the grounding of the KC-135 fleet today would legacy KC-135 fleet.”19 The Air Force main- severely jeopardize the capabilities of DOD tains fleet availability at a mission capable joint and coalition forces, particularly for rate of 81 percent but not without signifi- landlocked operations in the Middle East. cant cost.20 Considering the fact that the av- The lengthy KC-X acquisition timeline erage age of the US commercial airline fleet will also cost the Air Force more in future is 12 years, with reliability rates in the high maintenance expenses for both KC-X air- 90s, maintaining a 50-year-old KC-135 at craft, which represent a first-generation this rate is a remarkable feat.21 Maintenance wide-body, twin-engine design from Boeing expenses continue to grow, largely as a re- and EADS. The Boeing 767, first produced sult of costly corrosion damage. During FY in 1978, is approaching the end of its com- 2010, nearly 20 percent of the KC-135 fleet mercial life because customers find mod- (81 aircraft), spent an average of 227 days in ern, fuel-efficient aircraft more attractive.28 depot-level maintenance.22 However, the The Defense Science Board concluded that growing amount of depot time spent repair- “obtaining an aircraft nearing the end of its ing corrosion and landing-gear problems production run, coupled with very low pro- represents only half the story. The time de- curement rates and an expected service life voted to flight-line repairs (non depot main- of several decades, there is a good possi- tenance) increased over the last several bility that repair parts and infrastructure years to 12.5 maintenance man-hours per will become scarce and exceedingly expen- flying hour in FY 2010.23 With such person- sive.”29 This is another area that the DOD

Fall 2011 | 65 Grismer and defense industrial base must resolve by an existing commercial platform offers a employing industry best practices. sound strategy for a defense industrial base replete with a record of cost overruns and Untapped Industry Best Practices schedule delays. To illustrate, over the last decade, the Air Force managed a prepon- Former secretary of defense Gates called for derance of the DOD’s 74 major acquisition tighter scrutiny of all defense spending, programs, which exceeded cost-growth limi- seeking $100 billion in savings over the next tations and triggered Nunn-McCurdy con- five years. The focus areas for saving em- gressional reporting, a mechanism for in- phasize efficiency in the contracting of forming Congress of cost overruns in major goods and services, which account for $400 acquisiton programs.35 We must reverse this billion of the DOD’s annual budget of $700 trend, beginning with improving trust and 30 billion. His original plan allowed the ser- accountability between DOD acquisition vices to keep their savings and apply them officials and industry. The reality of fewer to critical areas such as force structure and resources and more requirements means 31 procurement. The secretary changed this that, to recapitalize the KC-135 fleet, we guidance, directing the services to apply a must partner with industry to take advan- portion of the savings to pay for increased tage of the best commercial acquisition and operation and maintenance (O&M), leaving maintenance practices. 32 less for acquisition programs. As require- The KC-135 recapitalization plan primar- ments continue to exceed funding, the DOD ily emphasizes bringing the KC-46A online must leverage acquisition strategies that but does not address problems associated work. Dr. Ashton Carter, the Pentagon’s with keeping the legacy fleet flying for an- chief acquisition official, summarized the other 30 years or more. Because the KC-135 problem: “The department must achieve will remain the backbone of air-refueling what economists call productivity growth: service well into the future and because Learning to do more without more.”33 Af- nearly 20 percent of the fleet is in depot- fordable acquisition strategies built on valid level maintenance every year, the Air Force requirements that deliver capability on must leverage commercial maintenance time and within budget must be the rule, methods to increase aircraft availability and not the exception. decrease cost, thereby preserving mission The future success of US military forces capability. Industry experts have experi- will depend upon a military industrial com- ence maintaining the older Boeing 707 plat- plex capable of meeting DOD requirements form (the commercial sibling of the KC-135) and delivering capability on time and through commercial programs that match within budget. The quid pro quo relation- the quality of the Air Force’s organic and ship between the DOD and the US defense contract depots—but at a fraction of the cost industrial base is becoming more strained, and fewer days in depot.36 Furthermore, the and the deficit reduction climate presents DOD would do well to investigate another more challenges. Maintaining America’s existing commercial program—civilian con- military dominance demands that the detract air refueling, otherwise known as fee- fense industrial base retain a skilled work- for-service air refueling. force and sustain its investment in military Faced with an aging tanker fleet of 19 platforms.34 KC-135 recapitalization offers aircraft, more tanking requirements than an opportunity to strengthen the industrial capacity, and limited money to recapitalize, base while the DOD benefits from commer- the United Kingdom finds itself in a situa- cial competition. More importantly, KC-X tion similar to that of the United States. The aircraft will become more cost-effective be- United Kingdom looked to the commercial cause of their link to a commercial produc- aviation industry by contracting for the Fu- tion line. Building military capability from ture Strategic Tanker Aircraft program, a

66 | Air & Space Power Journal Fiscally Sound Options for a Flawed Tanker Recapitalization Strategy privately financed initiative with the con- jectives).42 While the future reliability of US sortium group AirTanker Limited, to pro- air refueling clearly remains at risk, our vide a new fleet of 12 Airbus A330-200 closest near-peer competitor (China) is multimission tankers/airlifters.37 The building a force of stealth fighters having an United Kingdom pays a fee for service— operational date of 2017.43 Most disconcert- specifically, AirTanker’s provision of air- ing is China’s nascent tanker fleet, which refueling and airlift capacity for 27 years will soon give that country’s stealth fighters and its payment of all capital costs, includ- unlimited range.44 The DOD’s tanker force ing infrastructure modifications to the host structure also seems uncertain, specifically UK airfield.38 The United Kingdom will rein terms of determining the gap between tain permanent access to nine aircraft and tanker requirements and capabilities. Al- will make the other three available for com- though the MCRS-16 quantifies a tanker mercial use by AirTanker, which may offer shortfall, which DOD officials confirmed in them to other governments. The Future testimony before Congress, the GAO review Strategic Tanker Aircraft business model of MCRS-16 notes that “DOD officials re- may serve as a productive baseline for a sponsible for the [MCRS-16] report told us DOD fee-for-service option, especially since that a tanker shortfall does not exist despite that program’s aircraft is the same basic the language and data in the report” (em- platform as EADS’s KC-X candidate.39 phasis added).45 The Air Force cannot afford to procure The Failure of Recapitalization Strategy KC-X aircraft fast enough to replace aging to Meet the Required Force Structure KC-135s one-for-one. Solving the tanker shortfall involves more than dispatching a The DOD does not have adequate air-refueling more capable airborne gas station—we must capability to meet today’s requirements, also put enough gas stations in the air. In and the KC-X acquisition plan does not FY 2008, the Air Force proposed to Con- ameliorate the problem. The DOD’s Mobility gress a money-saving case to retire the old- Capabilities and Requirements Study of 2010 est and most costly KC-135E aircraft. To (MCRS-16) examined three representative keep the E models flying would cost ap- scenarios that employ mobility assets, find- proximately $45 million each to reengine, a ing the DOD tanker fleet 93 aircraft short hefty sum compared to the $120–$150 mil- of meeting requirements in the two most 46 40 lion procurement cost of a new tanker. To constrained cases. In addition, a recent save money, the Air Force accepted risk by Government Accountability Office (GAO) dropping below the required force struc- review of the MCRS-16 concluded that ture, retiring the entire KC-135E fleet. planned recapitalization rates would not correct the tanker shortfall for the analysis period (2010–16).41 The delay of KC-135 re- Recommendations capitalization for nearly 10 years further exacerbates the problem by driving up lost Granted, the Air Force has a valid need opportunity cost in dollars and risk. to recapitalize an aging KC-135 fleet, but Unfortunately, the Air Force cannot de- abject events—including the delayed KC-X pend on maintaining current reliability acquisition, a limited budget, and shrinking rates as the KC-135 fleet ages; moreover, no defense spending—must drive a new look at quantitative analysis assesses the risk of op- the tanker fleet structure as well as a holis- erating a 50-year-old fleet into the future. tic review of the recapitalization strategy. The GAO report also found (and the DOD The service’s leaders must investigate op- confirmed) that no tanker risk assessment tions that leverage innovation, efficiency, was performed for the air-refueling portion and capital budgeting of the commercial of the MCRS-16 (a requisite of the study ob- aviation industry. Two such options entail a

Fall 2011 | 67 Grismer force structure shift from a completely or- realize manpower savings because the con- ganic tanker fleet to a mix of civilian contractor will bear all O&M and sustainment tract tankers and military aircraft, with the costs. Second, a KC-X commercial deriva- bulk capacity remaining in the Air Force’s tive brings additional capability faster, al- organic fleet. Both options capture aviation lowing the Air Force to retire KC-135s industry’s strengths and bring more capa- sooner, saving O&M costs, and reducing the bility at lower cost. The service could award risk associated with operating an aging a fee-for-service competitive bid contract fleet. Third, the defense industrial base gets for either alternative. Most importantly, ei- a boost during a recession by generating ther choice expedites KC-135 recapitaliza- another customer. tion, augments the DOD’s organic fleet, and From a political, economic, and national provides savings in manpower and equip- security perspective, a split buy with a fee- ment. An absolute prerequisite for the suc- for-service contractor is a credible scenario. cess of either option calls for proceeding Many key congressional leaders have ad- with rapid acquisition of 179 KC-46A air- vocated such a strategy but were deterred craft. A final general recommendation that because the DOD considered it fiscally ir- applies to future recapitalization efforts in- responsible. However, because the fee-for- volves partnering with industry to innovate service contractor would pay for long-term and build accountability. aircraft costs associated with a dual acquisition strategy (for training, maintenance, KC-X Commercial Option: and logistics), a dual fleet presents less of a A Functional Split Buy challenge for the Air Force. Furthermore, a split buy that involves a civilian contractor One option involves a contractor purchas- procuring aircraft from competing manufac- ing KC-X aircraft, assured of a guaranteed turers promotes price competition and puts number of DOD flight hours annually on a more Americans to work. fee-for-service basis. This plan enables a Finally, a KC-X commercial option does cathartic split-buy opportunity sure to gain not presuppose a split-buy solution. Cer- approval from Congress and interest from tainly Boeing could add aircraft beyond the the defense industrial base. Even as the los- EOQ to its KC-46A production line and offer ing KC-X bidder, EADS would win by selling a cost-efficient option to a commercial con- fee-for-service refueling to the Air Force. tractor. Moreover, this strategy would give Additionally, Boeing could sell KC-46As to a Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard commercial contractor, ramping up produc- operators of the KC-46A opportunities as tion to more cost-efficient quantities be- civilians to fly and maintain a commercial yond the minimum EOQ it will build for version for a contractor. This scenario ap- the Air Force. pears especially practical in terms of opera- In 1998 US Transportation Command in- tions, cost, and risk. vestigated a civilian contract air-refueling option but rejected it as “meet[ing] no signifi- KC-135 Commercial Option cant wartime requirement and provid[ing] no cost benefit to the services.”47 Today, a Retired KC-135Es could add commercial ca- commercial KC-X variant represents a tre- pability to the Air Force. In 2009 the Air mendous fiscal benefit for three reasons. First, Force retired the last KC-135E after 51 years a fee-for-service option will be cheaper than of service, relegating it to the “boneyard,” new organic capability because a contractor where the aircraft sits with 73 other E mod- amortizes capital costs over time, employs els, ready for reactivation if necessary.48 Es- economical commercial maintenance prac- tablishing a competitive-bid fee-for-service tices, and has lower operating costs than contract for industry to upgrade retired the Air Force. Additionally, the service will KC-135s and sell air-refueling service to the

68 | Air & Space Power Journal Fiscally Sound Options for a Flawed Tanker Recapitalization Strategy

DOD saves up-front capital cost, manpower, training missions, just as it currently does and maintenance—not to mention the fact for the Navy. that it quickly adds capability. Several industry experts determined that Omega Air Refueling (a commercial con- businesses can make a favorable case for tractor) has already proved the business spending commercial capital to upgrade case for using a civilian tanker to fulfill mili- legacy KC-135E components and then retary requirements. Omega provides world- couping costs by charging a fee-for-service wide fee-for-service probe-and-drogue air rate competitive with the Air Force’s hourly refueling to a host of customers, including flying costs.55 However, the service has the US Navy, US Marine Corps, Germany, been reluctant to establish a commercial Canada, Australia, and the Royal Air Force.49 fee-for-service air-refueling capability. In Paid through the Navy’s flying-hour program, previous discussions with industry, the Air the contractor offers capability on par with Force identified several areas in need of at- the KC-135 and KC-10 at a rate of $7,890 per tention prior to development of an air- flying hour for its (KC-135 equivalent) refueling pilot program—key among them KC-707 and $12,500 for its (KC-10 equiva- 50 obtaining congressional funding approval lent) KDC-10. Omega’s fee-for-service rates for an eight-year contract and certification are nearly the same as the cost of similar of a commercial boom.56 Congress recently probe-and-drogue air refueling conducted showed its willingness to support such a by the Air Force, but the contractor has concept, directing the DOD in the FY 2008 supported the Navy when the Air Force 51 National Defense Authorization Act to in- could not. Also at the cutting edge of com- vestigate fee-for-service options for air refu- mercial-practice maintenance schedules on eling.57 Though not considered, the option older Boeing 707 airframes, Omega em- to transfer or sell a KC-135 to a contractor ploys an inspection and depot schedule now appears to offer an economical and that significantly reduces down time and pragmatic opportunity to save money in cost, compared to the practices of the Air developing and certifying a commercial Force’s KC-135 depot.52 Perhaps most importantly, Omega serves as a model for boom. Despite the Air Force’s past con- safety and the successful integration of cerns, it now has a chance to embrace avia- standardized operations between military tion industry contractors eager to suggest and commercial aircraft. innovative, cost-effective commercial op- The Air Force needs to take advantage of tions for air refueling. commercial aviation’s best practices for In light of the new multirole tanker/ wide-body aircraft technology, mainte- transport aircraft available on the commer- nance, and operations. One of many com- cial market today, US Transportation Com- mercial contractors with extensive experi- mand should investigate alternatives for a ence using older aircraft innovatively and commercial air-refueling capability similar efficiently, Omega currently has the capital, to that established for airlift in the Civil Re- equipment, and technology to offer fee-for- serve Air Fleet. Adding tanker capability to service air refueling to the DOD at a lower that fleet is not a revolutionary concept. In cost per flying hour than the Air Force’s or- 1997 Transportation Command formed a ganic fleet.53 Additionally, it has paid for Contract Aerial Refueling Working Group to the Federal Aviation Administration’s sup- explore commercial air-refueling options.58 plemental type certification to alter the Without an established requirement, how- KC-135E and owns proprietary rights to a ever, the group did not pursue the fee-for- new commercial maintenance program for service model. Since then, requirements modernizing engines and avionics on that and technology have undergone significant aircraft.54 Furthermore, Omega will supply change while the KC-135 fleet has aged 14 boom service on worldwide operational or more years. A KC-X would easily be the

Fall 2011 | 69 Grismer most capable aircraft in the Civil Reserve KC-X tankers are in operation today using Air Fleet, perhaps worthy of a premium. probe-and-drogue technology. Japan and Italy operate Boeing KC-767s while Austra- Partnering with Industry for Innovation lia, Britain, Saudi Arabia, and the United and Accountability Arab Emirates purchased EADS’s KC-45s.60 Successful acquisition of the KC-46A is The Air Force must leverage commercial critical to follow-on KC-135 recapitalization aviation’s best practices throughout the air- plans, which replace the remaining two- craft life cycle, from initial cost estimating thirds of an aging KC-135 fleet at an esti- to maintenance procedures. Additionally, mated cost of over $100 billion.61 Adopting and perhaps most importantly, the service industry best practices and holding con- should build mutual trust and accountability tractors accountable throughout the entire with industry partners—a difficult but at- research, design, testing, and production tainable goal in an environment which en- process should not be limited to new ac- courages innovation and creativity. Such a quisitions. Since the KC-135 will remain strengthening of relationships begins with the backbone of the air-refueling fleet well bringing the purchase of 179 KC-46As on- into the future, the Air Force also needs to

Air refueling is a critical joint force capability. In terms of enabling global operations, it is as important as the air we breathe.

line, on time, and within budget. However, adopt proven commercial maintenance the initial KC-X buy represents recapitaliza- and depot practices to gain efficiencies and tion of only one-third of the fleet, leaving reduce maintenance costs. Partnering with the Air Force more opportunity to partner the aviation industry to leverage commer- with industry to create more capability at a cial best practices takes innovation and lower price. Industry, the DOD, and Con- leadership, but opportunity abounds. gress continue to work through many acquisition challenges in which cutting-edge research, development, and testing of new Conclusion technologies still result in more requirements and higher costs, accentuated by de- Air refueling is a critical joint force capa- layed delivery. For example, the $382 bil- bility. In terms of enabling global opera- lion F-35 acquisition is behind schedule, tions, it is as important as the air we and expenses have nearly doubled—from breathe. Without it, the joint war fighter $50 million per aircraft to $92 million.59 cannot execute the US national security Compared to the F-35 program, KC-X ac- strategy. To maintain viability, the Air Force quisition remains relatively low risk, espe- needs to make tough choices with respect to cially considering that versions of both tanker force structure and future recapital-

70 | Air & Space Power Journal Fiscally Sound Options for a Flawed Tanker Recapitalization Strategy ization of the KC-135. The service should would provide economical, reliable capa- investigate a commercial KC-X air-refueling bility. Former secretary of defense Gates option that leverages industry’s capital bud- said it best: “My hope and expectation is geting and meets requirements at a fraction that . . . what had been a culture of endless of the cost of a fully recapitalized KC-135 money where cost is rarely a consideration fleet. A commercial option represents the will become a culture of savings and re- only way to facilitate a split buy with two straint.”62 If America wishes to attain capable multirole tanker/transport com- physical security, it must have fiscal secu- mercial platforms available. The Air Force rity. Facing long-term deficit-reduction chal- and US Transportation Command should lenges, the DOD must lead the way by thor- revisit the economics for a tanker Civil Re- oughly validating joint requirements and serve Air Fleet or similar fee-for-service op- exacting fiduciary responsibility for future tions. Finally, given the fierce competition acquisitions, measured against the same for shrinking DOD budgets, the proposed yardstick as the rest of government spend- options would free scarce resources to re- ing. Doing so demands innovative and ac- capitalize the KC-135 more quickly and countable leadership at every level. 

Notes

1. Tom Vanden Brook, “Defense Secretary Gates 8. Agence France-Presse, “EADS Will Not Protest Targets Jobs,” USA Today, 9 August 2010, 1, http:// Boeing Tanker Contract,” Industry Week, 7 March 2011, www.usatoday.com/news/military/2010-08-10-gates http://www.industryweek.com/articles/eads_will 10_ST_N.htm. _not_protest_boeing_tanker_contract_24049.aspx. 2. Gen Raymond E. Johns, commander, Air Mo- 9. Air Mobility Command, The Imperative for a bility Command, “AMC: Delivering Hope, Fueling the New Tanker Now (Scott AFB, IL: Headquarters AMC; Fight, Saving Lives” (address to the 2010 Air and Space Strategic Plans, Requirements, and Programs Direc- Conference, Washington, DC, 14 September 2010). torate; September 2009), 17. 3. 618th Air and Space Operations Center 10. Thomas P. White, “KC-X Tanker Capabilities” (Tanker Airlift Control Center), Historical Tanker (CAS, June 2007), http://www.google.com/url?sa=t Data, 2001–10, Scott AFB, IL, 30 November 2010. &source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBoQFjAA&url=http 4. House, Statement of General Duncan J. McNabb, %3A%2F%2Faviationweek.typepad.com%2Fares%2 Ffiles%2Fkcx_tanker_capabilities_white_paper_6507 USAF Commander, United States Transportation Com- v2.doc&rct=j&q=Thomas%20P.%20White%2C%20 mand, before the House Appropriations Committee, %E2%80%9CKC-X%20Tanker%20Capabilities&ei= Defense Subcommittee, on the State of the Command, tK8ATpTKPIW5tgeqmrD5DQ&usg=AFQjCNHCCJA 5 March 2009, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 6, http://democrats J5_RzNMTC5_AznnXvlupGag. .appropriations.house.gov/images/stories/pdf/def 11. Col Michael Isherwood, “KC-X: The Game /Duncan_McNabb_03_05_09.pdf. Changer for Mobility,” Air and Space Power Journal 5. Roger H. Ducey, Col Dana Struckman, and 23, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 58. CDR John Sergerson, The Next Tanker, 12th ed., ed. 12. Colin Clark, “Gates Fires at Carriers, Subs, EFV,” Policy Making and Process Faculty, Case Studies in Military.com, 3 May 2010, http://www.military.com Policy Making (Newport, RI: Naval War College, /news/article/gates-fires-at-carriers-subs-efv.html. 2010), 252–54. 13. Carl Conetta, “The Dynamics of Defense Bud- 6. Shane Harris, “Own the Sky,” Washingtonian, get Growth, 1998–2011,” in Economics and Security: 1 November 2010, http://www.washingtonian.com Resourcing National Priorities, ed. Richmond Lloyd /articles/people/17244.html. (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010), 129. 7. Nathan Hodge, “New Twist in Effort to Replace 14. Maj Dave Huxsoll, “AMC Commander Dis- Refueling Tankers,” Wall Street Journal, 24 November cusses Modernization, Recapitalization Issues,” Air 2010, B2, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240 Force Print News, 23 November 2007, http://www 52748704369304575632974271312054.html. .af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123076947.

Fall 2011 | 71 Grismer

15. Jeremiah Gertler, Air Force KC-X Tanker Air- ary 2011, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library craft Program: Background and Issues for Congress, /resources/documents/Defense/modernizing-aerial CRS Report for Congress RL34398 (Washington, DC: -refueling-fleet.pdf. Congressional Research Service, 22 December 2009), 28. “The Boeing Logbook: 1977–1982,” Boeing, 4, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34398.pdf. accessed 20 January 2011, http://www.boeing.com 16. Jeremiah Gertler, Air Force KC-X Tanker Air- /history/chronology/chron12.html. craft Program: Background and Issues for Congress, 29. Report on Aerial Refueling Requirements, x. CRS Report for Congress RL34398 (Washington, DC: 30. Ashton B. Carter, “The Pentagon Is Serious Congressional Research Service, 15 July 2010), 8, about Saving Money,” Wall Street Journal, 21 Septem- http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location= ber 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424 U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA525032. 052748703904304575497754176193396.html. 17. Christopher Bolkcom and William Knight, 31. “Fact Sheet: Savings and Efficiencies Initia- Air Force Air Refueling: The KC-X Aircraft Acquisition tive,” Department of Defense, July 2010, http://www Program, CRS Report for Congress RL34398 (Wash- .defense.gov/news/savings.pdf. ington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 4 August 32. “DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and 2008), CRS-31, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon,” US Department of ?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA486067. Defense, 6 January 2011, http://www.defense.gov 18. Gertler, KC-X Tanker Aircraft Program, 22 De- /transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4747. cember 2009, 3. 33. Carter, “Serious about Saving Money.” 19. Paul Thornton, “Air Force Refueling Tankers: 34. Mackenzie M. Eaglen and Eric Sayers, Main- Pay No Attention to Taxpayers,” Los Angeles Times, 5 taining the Superiority of America’s Defense Industrial October 2009, http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla Base, Backgrounder no. 2276 (Washington, DC: Heri- /2009/10/air-force-tankers-protectionism.html. tage Foundation, 22 May 2009), http://s3.amazon 20. Bruce Rolfsen, “Osprey Availability Still Hov- aws.com/thf_media/2009/pdf/bg2276.pdf. ering at 50 Percent,” Air Force Times, 29 November 35. Government Accountability Office, Trends in 2010, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2010/11 Nunn-McCurdy Cost Breaches for Major Defense Ac- /air-force-osprey-availability-about-50-percent-112910w/. quisition Programs, GAO-11-295R (Washington, DC: 21. Transportation Statistics Annual Report (Wash- Government Accountability Office, 9 March 2011), 7, ington, DC: US Department of Transportation, Re- http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11295r.pdf. search and Innovative Technology Administration, 36. Ulick McEvaddy (chief executive officer, 2008), table 3-1-1, “Average Age of U.S. Commercial Omega Air Refueling), interview by the author, Aircraft: 1995–2006,” http://www.bts.gov/publications 23 December 2010. /transportation_statistics_annual_report/2008/html 37. “You Can’t Kick Ass without Tanker Gas,” /chapter_03/table_03_01_01.html. defencemanagement.com in association with De- 22. David Gibson AMC/A4MY, to the author, fence Management Journal, 16 September 2010, e-mail, subject: KC-135 Cost of Fleet FY95–FY15, http://www.defencemanagement.com/feature 6 December 2010. _story.asp?id=14863. 23. Edwin Bernal AMC/A4M, to the author, 38. Ibid. e-mail, subject: Comparison of Maintenance Man- 39. Robert Wall and Douglas Barrie, “Refueling Hours per Flying Hour, 15 December 2010. Ramp-Up,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 172, 24. Ibid. no. 10 (8 March 2010): 27–28, http://web.ebscohost 25. Michael Kennedy et al., Analysis of Alterna- .com/ehost/detail?vid=6&hid=12&sid=2f18c45d tives (AoA) for KC-135 Recapitalization: Executive -ed71-48d4-9450-664953ce391b%40sessionmgr10&bda Summary (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, ta=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth 2006), 16, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand &AN=48882373. /pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG495.pdf. 40. Col Carl Lude and Col Jean Mahan, USAF, 26. Defense Science Board Task Force Report on “Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 Aerial Refueling Requirements (Washington, DC: Of- (MCRS-2016), Executive Summary” (Washington, fice of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisi- DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, [2010]), 6, tion, Technology, and Logistics, May 2004), v, 17, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/SiteCollection http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/aerial.pdf. Documents/TheDocumentFile/Mobility/MCRS-16 Hereafter referred to as Report on Aerial Refueling _execsummary.pdf. Requirements. 41. Government Accountability Office, Defense 27. Modernizing the Aerial Refueling Fleet (Arling- Transportation: Additional Information Is Needed for ton, VA: Lexington Institute, n.d.), accessed 11 Janu- DOD’s Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study

72 | Air & Space Power Journal Fiscally Sound Options for a Flawed Tanker Recapitalization Strategy

2016 to Fully Address All of Its Study Objectives, GAO- 50. Bud Orr (president, Omega Air Refueling), 11-82R (Washington, DC: Government Accountability telephone interview by the author, 16 September 2010. Office, 8 December 2010), 12, http://www.gao.gov 51. Doragh, interview. /new.items/d1182r.pdf. 52. McEvaddy, interview. 42. Ibid., 24. 53. Ulick McEvaddy, chief executive officer, Omega 43. Jeremy Page, “A Chinese Stealth Challenger?,” Air Refueling, to the author, e-mail, 11 June 2011. Wall Street Journal, 5 January 2011, http://online 54. Ibid. .wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703808704576061 55. Ibid. 674166905408.html. 44. Naval War College subject-matter expert on 56. “Status of the Pilot Program on Commercial Chinese air refueling, interview by Col Tim White, Fee-for-Service Air Refueling Support for the Air Force,” USAF, 11 January 2011. USAF Draft Congressional Report, 30 July 2009, 6. 45. Government Accountability Office, Defense 57. Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authoriza- Transportation, 9. tion Act, Public Law 110-181, sec. 1081, Pilot Program 46. Christopher Bolkcom, Air Force Aerial Refueling, on Commercial Fee-for-Service Air Refueling Sup- CRS Report for Congress RS20941 (Washington, DC: port for the Air Force, 2008. Congressional Research Service, 20 March 2007), CRS-5, 58. USTRANSCOM J-5/4, Concept Development http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS20941.pdf. Report on Contracted Aerial Refueling (Scott AFB, IL: 47. Lt Col Robert D. Pollock, “Point of View: Inno- US Transportation Command, 1998), 1. vative or Insane? Civilian Contract Air Refueling,” Air 59. Nathan Hodge, “Cost Cutters Fix Sights on F-35 Force Journal of Logistics 26, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 45. Fighter,” Wall Street Journal, 18 December 2010, A6. 48. Howdy Stout, “KC-135E Tanker Set to Retire,” Tinker AFB Public Affairs, 24 September 2009, http:// 60. Isherwood, “KC-X,” 4. www.tinker.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123169457. 61. John M. Donnelly, “Cost Control Becomes 49. Steve Doragh (US Navy deputy program man- New Focus as Northrop Drops Refueling Tanker Bid,” ager, Multimission Aircraft PMA 207), interview by CQ Today, 9 March 2010. the author, 28 September 2010. 62. “DOD News Briefing.”

Lt Col Michael W. Grismer Jr., USAF Lieutenant Colonel Grismer (USAFA; MS, University of Texas–San Antonio; MA, US Naval War College) is assigned to the US Transportation Command J-3 staff, Scott AFB, Illinois. He commanded the 375th Operations Support Squadron and has served on staffs at Fifteenth Air Force, Air Mobility Command, and most recently at Headquarters US Air Force as a congressional budget liaison. Lieutenant Colonel Grismer completed the Air Force legislative fellowship on Capitol Hill while serving as a military legislative assistant to a member of the House Appro- priations Subcommittee on Defense. He is a senior pilot with more than 4,000 hours, primarily in the C-5 and C-21. Prior to earning his pilot rating, he served as a civil engineering officer. Lieutenant Colonel Grismer is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.

Fall 2011 | 73 The United States Should Develop a Missile Defense System That Builds Confidence

Col Mike Corbett, USAF, Retired ment envelopes where we expect success if Paul Zarchan everything works, but it takes many tests. The ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) missile defense system has not per- ystem performance is an essential fac- formed to expectations in recent tests, and tor in determining military utility; it is some individuals even question the feasi- even more critical with respect to de- bility of midcourse intercepts themselves S under realistic combat conditions. However, terrent effects. Test failures, unless refuted GMD’s greatest challenge may not be iden- by a string of successful tests, can erode our tifying and correcting the causes of recent confidence and the system’s value for deter- test failures but testing enough to regain ring our adversaries. In addition to compo- military confidence and define its opera- nent failures, defensive systems must also tional envelope. cope with unknown target characteristics This article examines an alternative con- and maneuvers that can yield missed intercept and the defensive capabilities we could cepts even when all systems are functional. gain by equipping air sovereignty alert Realistic operational testing defines engage- (ASA) forces with missile defense sensors and small, air-launched interceptors cur- and hit incoming enemy warheads under rently under evaluation by the Missile De- expected combat conditions, or demon- fense Agency (MDA) and the Air Force as strate such capabilities in realistic testing, the Airborne Weapons Layer. It depicts this had undermined their confidence in the concept’s predicted capabilities under two ballistic missile defense system (BMDS). scenarios: (1) a short-range ballistic missile After the GMD test failure in December launched from a ship offshore, and (2) an 2010, even optimistic supporters expressed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) concern over the system’s performance.5 launched from Iran without warning. Fi- The mission is obvious—defeat the threat nally, the article discusses an operational that current and future ballistic missile sys- testing concept focused on building confi- tems pose to our homeland, deployed dence in the proposed defensive system. forces, and allies.6 The question is how to perform that mission, but it is not simply a matter of physics. The details of detecting, Criticisms of Our tracking, intercepting, and destroying a ballistic missile or warhead are fairly well de- Missile Defense System fined. However, defeating these missile threats The November/December 2010 issue of in a cost-effective manner with neither ad- the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists includes vanced warning nor carefully controlled test an article entitled “How US Strategic Anti- preparations poses a challenge. If we do it missile Defense Could Be Made to Work” by right, we assure our allies and deter our ad- two leading critics of the US missile defense versaries. If we do it wrong, we waste pre- system.1 Authors George Lewis and Ted cious defense resources and delude ourselves Postol have a long history of criticizing that with false confidence during crises. If we do system, and many people close to the pro- it very well, we may be able to build ties with gram consider them opposed to the missile prior adversaries and dissuade future ones defense mission in general. However, in from pursuing ballistic missile weapons. this article they do not declare missile de- In the decade following the decision in fense unnecessary or impossible but argue 2001 to deploy GMD, the MDA investigated that the MDA chose an inadequate approach. several alternative concepts but always con- In 2003 Senator Carl Levin “expressed centrated development activities on large, grave concern” about the Bush administra- surface-based interceptors. These decisions, tion’s plans to field a missile defense capa- made without the usual participation of the bility in 2004, stating that “the missile de- military services in requirements develop- fense system the administration plans to ment, have resulted in very large intercep- field . . . will not be fully tested or proven to tors simply too expensive to test frequently work under realistic conditions” and that it enough to inspire statistical confidence in “won’t contribute to the defense or security their operational performance. For example, of our country.”2 He reiterated these con- to date we have spent over $35 billion on cerns six years later during his address to a the GMD system to provide a system with missile defense conference.3 an alert force of 30 interceptors, with 16 ad- Lewis, Postol, and Levin are not against ditional ones for spares and testing.7 Costs the missile defense mission; in fact Lewis for the most recent test involving a single and Postol adamantly maintain that a dire target and one interceptor likely exceeded ballistic missile threat exists.4 For Senator $300 million.8 The same large interceptor Levin, the issue concerned a decision to de- size that drives high unit costs also severely ploy a defensive system without sufficient, limits mobility and prompts deployment realistic testing. For these men, the MDA’s decisions not subject to quick alterations, failure to provide a convincing technical thus increasing the system’s vulnerability to explanation of how the system will identify unexpected adversary actions. In contrast, a

Fall 2011 | 75 Corbett & Zarchan concept of operations (CONOPS) emphasizing a relatively small interceptor carried by ing an air-launched interceptor would enable a low-observable, remotely piloted aircraft. much smaller, less expensive interceptors In fact, their proposed interceptor is very that we could deploy quickly, opening op- similar to the air-launched hit-to-kill (ALHK) tions for boost- and terminal-phase intercepts upper-tier interceptor previously studied by not possible with a surface-based CONOPS. a joint Air Force–MDA team.12 The ALHK To better understand today’s missile de- concept builds upon previous concepts of fense systems, we need to consider the im- air-launched interceptors explored under the pact of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Raptor-Talon program and, most notably, by Treaty.9 Carefully written by US and Soviet the work of Dean Wilkening in 2004.13 negotiators who feared that effective ballistic missile defenses would lead to an arms race and even greater deployment of nu- Today’s Missile Defense Systems clear weapons, the ABM Treaty constrained the capabilities of any system that could Today’s BMDS works in both the mid- alter the strategic balance. The treaty limited course phase (GMD, Aegis SM-3, and theater defenses against ICBMs to a single ground high-altitude area defense) and the terminal site, restricted the number and capability of phase (theater high-altitude area defense, defensive sensors, and precluded theater Patriot advanced capability three, and Aegis missile defense systems capable of engaging SM-2 Block 4) (see fig. 1). The airborne la- long-range ballistic missiles.10 When Pres. ser was intended to destroy ballistic mis- George W. Bush withdrew the United States siles in the boost phase, but the acquisition from the treaty, he removed those restric- program was cancelled in 2009.14 Despite tions, but the concept and design under the lure of engaging targets at the speed of lying the current GMD system had already light, concerns about high unit cost, coun- been set, and the initial system acquisition termeasures, and operational limitations led was already under contract. The United the secretary of defense to focus BMDS de- States had committed to deploying a defen- velopmental efforts on maturing directed- sive system compliant with the ABM Treaty energy technology prior to resuming acqui- yet capable of defending the entire country sition of the airborne laser system. Also against missiles launched from North Korea. intended to provide a boost-phase capability, However, developers needed to solve the the kinetic energy interceptor, despite its problem of midcourse discrimination be- large size (40 feet long, 40 inches in diameter, tween warheads and decoys—an impossible and 25,000 pounds), fast acceleration, and task, according to Lewis and Postol.11 high speed, still needed to be located rela- Alternatively, they suggest intercepting tively close to launch areas to catch ballistic missiles during their boost phase (fig. 1), us- missiles during that phase.15 Earlier manage-

Boost Midcourse Terminal

Figure 1. Phases of a ballistic missile’s flight

76 | Air & Space Power Journal A Missile Defense System That Builds Confidence ment decisions had focused this interceptor the Phased Adaptive Approach, starts with a solely on booster development, but further deployment of Aegis ships carrying SM-3 cutbacks terminated the program in 2009.16 interceptors, followed by augmentation All missile defense systems depend on with forward-deployed radars, and ends sensors to track their targets precisely, and with a ground-based SM-3 currently under in most cases (except the kinetic energy inter- development. Later, the longer-range SM-3 ceptor, which planned to rely on existing Block 2A, currently planned as a 21-inch- missile warning satellites and the airborne diameter “full caliber” missile, would up- laser, which carried an Infrared Search and grade deployments, as would a liquid-fueled Track System [IRSTS]) these sensors are upper stage in the SM-3 Block 2B.22 large, surface-based radars.17 Such radars Deployment of the SM-3 Block 2B would offer a persistent and highly accurate track- regain the midcourse intercept capability ing capability, but they are either fixed on against Iranian ICBMs that we lost with can- the ground or floating at sea; furthermore, cellation of the European GMD detach- the transportable ones require significant ment, but many challenges remain.23 The airlift capacity. These sensors are also vul- Navy does not intend to put liquid-fueled nerable to adversary attack, and any loss interceptors on board ships, and the Army can disable a large number of associated has no interest in a land-based variant of interceptors. In the case of GMD, data from the SM-3.24 Additionally, what, if anything, the radars must be sent to the fire-control Europe would contribute to this defense computers located in either Alaska or Colo- concept has yet to be resolved. Finally, rado, and in-flight updates go out to the ki- Russia remains highly skeptical of plans netic kill vehicle. Data transfer alone makes that could threaten its nuclear deterrent use of multiple, potentially vulnerable com- capability in the future or that would de- munication links.18 ploy US forces along its borders.25

The Missile Defense Agency’s The Air-Launched Development Plans Hit-to-Kill Alternative In 2009 the MDA made significant changes In late 2009, the US Air Force and the MDA in its advanced technology efforts, termi- completed a joint study on the viability of nating ALHK as well as other technology ALHK against regional ballistic missile explorations and concentrating develop- threats, declaring the concept technically mental efforts on larger, higher-velocity, feasible and operationally viable. Initial war and longer-range derivatives of the Aegis game analysis showed the usefulness of SM-3.19 In addition, the agency adjusted the ALHK, including desirable effects on sec- objectives of its long-enduring, space-based ondary metrics such as sortie-generation sensor development, seeking a smaller con- rates of theater aircraft, even though many stellation of satellites in equatorial orbits.20 details remain unverified. The initial study Airborne infrared tracking sensors carried emphasized both classes of interceptors on remotely piloted aircraft systems were (upper and lower tier), supported by an added to support earlier intercepts and IRSTS carried by the launching aircraft.26 A take advantage of the planned longer-range follow-on joint Airborne Weapons Layer study SM-3 interceptors.21 is in progress, but the MDA has committed Plans for a European GMD deployment no resources or even restored those previ- were scrapped in favor of a land-based de- ously cancelled. The Air Force, in contrast, ployment of SM-3 interceptors, emphasizing has expressed significant interest in the pro- wide-area defense of Europe but having gram and is continuing limited follow-on midcourse-only capability. This new plan, studies at Eglin AFB, Florida.

Fall 2011 | 77 Corbett & Zarchan

The ALHK components briefly described fense when equipped with a lower-tier here include a lower-tier interceptor modeled interceptor. Future tests will reveal the sys- with a 1.75 kilometer per second (km/sec) tem’s actual capabilities. burnout velocity that primarily uses aero Existing, demonstrated technologies sup- dynamic maneuvering, possibly supple- port these systems although they are not yet mented with divert thrusters. It can gener- integrated into a weapon system. Raytheon’s ate 10 g’s of lateral acceleration at a 20 km Net-Centric Airborne Defense Element altitude, but its agility decreases rapidly showed how a modified AIM-9X seeker above that altitude. Roughly the size of an head could track a boosting missile and dis- AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air cern its body in the presence of the rocket 27 missile, it is carried in the same manner. plume. It performed a successful boost- The upper-tier interceptor, modeled with a phase intercept in 2007 (the MDA’s first) in 3.5 km/sec burnout velocity, uses divert just under three years and for a cost of thrusters for all maneuvers following roughly $25 million.32 Significant develop- booster burnout. Capable of 10 g’s of lateral ment work lies ahead for the upper-tier inter- acceleration, it can engage only above 50 ceptor in particular, but the fundamental, km altitude due to seeker heating limita- well-defined technology has been demon- tions.28 Roughly four times the weight of the strated in a relevant environment. advanced medium-range air-to-air missile but not much longer, the upper-tier interceptor fits within the F-35’s internal weapons bay. Moreover, fourth-generation fight- Air Sovereignty Alert ers could carry it externally.29 Interceptors, sensors, and aircraft are only The supporting IRSTS pod could resemble part of the larger system. We propose incor- the Sniper or Litening, with 20 centimeter porating these components with ASA aircraft optics carried externally, or an integral in- on duty continuously around the United ternal system such as the F-35’s Distributed States. Although the number and locations of Aperture System—or both. It lends itself to actual ASA sites undergo occasional adjust- integration with the aircraft radar, or it can ment, the basic distribution has remained work in pairs via triangulation, depending fairly constant over the past five years. upon the weapon (upper tier or lower tier) The 16 alert sites within the continental supported, the phase of intercept (boost, United States and one each in Alaska and ascent, or terminal), and the engagement Hawaii (fig. 2) typically maintain two pri- range.30 mary alert aircraft and a spare on “immedi- The Distributed Aperture System is of particular interest due to its complete cov- ate” status. However, 14 of the 18 ASA sites erage in every direction around an F-35 and are colocated with active duty or Air Na- because it will be standard equipment on tional Guard squadrons capable of rapid each F-35 produced. On 4 June 2010, a test augmentation in the event of heightened aircraft equipped with this system detected tensions. Currently, we have a mix of F-15, and tracked the entire boost phase of a Fal- F-16, and F-22 fighters on alert, but F-35s con 9 space launch vehicle from well in ex- will begin to replace the older F-15s and F-16s cess of the maximum kinematic range of an in coming years.33 The command and con- upper-tier interceptor.31 The system’s small trol system for ASA, a principal part of aperture will limit its range when tracking North American Aerospace Defense Com- in the postboost or terminal phases, but it mand’s (NORAD) Integrated Threat Warn- may support uncued terminal intercepts at ing and Attack Assessment system, features a short range with a lower-tier interceptor. secure and redundant communications con- If so, it would enable a relatively “stock” tinuously linking missile warning sensors, F-35 to provide autonomous terminal de- air surveillance sensors, the national civil-

78 | Air & Space Power Journal A Missile Defense System That Builds Confidence

Burlington Duluth Portland

Madison

Atlantic City Toledo Buckley AFB Andrews AFB Fresno Langley AFB

March AFB Tucson Shaw AFB

Hickam AFB

Ellington AFB New Orleans

Elmendorf AFB Homestead AFB

home station alert detachment

Figure 2. Steady-state air sovereignty alert sites (2008). (Adapted from Government Accountability Of- fice,Homeland Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations to Pro- tect U.S. Airspace, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-09-184 [Washington, DC: Government Ac- countability Office, January 2009], 13, fig. 3, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09184.pdf.)

ian air and space control system, and na- from Iran against Washington, DC, the total tional decision makers. flight time is slightly less than 33 minutes.35 Figure 2 depicts both home stations—sites The infrastructure at each ASA site in- colocated with their associated squadron— cludes aircraft shelters for at least four air- and detachments located at another base or craft, security, living quarters for the pilots airfield separate from the squadron. Origi- and maintenance personnel, and secure, nally planned following the terrorist attacks redundant communications. These commu- of 11 September 2001, these sites enable nication links include ties to the Eastern fighter aircraft to respond to the vicinity of and/or Western Air Defense Sectors, which most major metropolitan areas within 20 monitor the airspace, as well as the local minutes.34 This planning, driven by the airfield control tower and air route traffic threat of hijacked aircraft, also enables ASA control centers. The 601st Air and Space aircraft to position themselves optimally Operations Center at Tyndall AFB, Florida, during an ICBM’s time of flight (30-40 min- plans and monitors all operations within utes) to launch both upper- and lower-tier the Continental NORAD Region, maintain- interceptors as terminal-phase defense of ing direct communication with NORAD / US territory. In the case of an ICBM Northern Command headquarters.36 Alaska launched on a minimum-energy profile supplies similar capabilities through the

Fall 2011 | 79 Corbett & Zarchan

Alaskan NORAD Region, as does Hawaii through Pacific Command. The time required for the fighters to be- Burlington come airborne following a scramble order varies but usually takes on the order of six to seven minutes.37 Given an unrestricted climb, fighters configured with two external Atlantic City Potential fuel tanks, two upper- and two lower-tier Andrews AFB threat-launch interceptors, and an infrared tracking pod location would typically need another five minutes Langley AFB to climb to an altitude of 15 km (approximately 48,000 feet) and accelerate to supersonic speed. Twelve minutes after a scram- Shaw AFB ble order, the fighters would be 75 km away from their ASA launch base, moving in ex- cess of 20 km per minute—a speed they Figure 3. Scenario one: sea-launched ballistic could sustain for roughly 20 minutes before missile threat their fuel supply became a concern. With- out performing a supersonic dash, fighters in this configuration could cruise for two in figure 3. After US forces find the ship, hours or more before refueling.38 they could always sink it with an air strike, but without boarding and inspecting it, we cannot know the intentions of the ship with Homeland Defense Scenarios certainty. Since the scenario postulates a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse attack, Two scenarios illustrate potential real-world terminal defenses would not help even if applications of the proposed ALHK system. we knew a specific target and could deploy our defenses in time. Scenario One Simulating engagement of the threat with an upper-tier interceptor shows that Intelligence analysts receive indications that the maximum employment range depends an adversary plans to launch a ballistic mis- upon the time interval between the threat sile from a ship, resulting in a high-altitude launch and interceptor launch. The high- detonation of a nuclear weapon over the US altitude electromagnetic pulse scenario con- east coast. The enemy anticipates that the strains the planning to require an intercept resulting electromagnetic pulse will disrupt no later than 100 seconds after the threat communication and power transmission in launch.40 Using existing weather conditions major metropolitan areas. He might wish to to predict infrared detection (i.e., a cloud- demonstrate a nascent nuclear capability to free line of sight between the threat and the deter US involvement in a pending theater fighter) and sufficient tracking time to de- conflict or disrupt US force deployments termine a threat-state estimate (roughly five without actual killing or destruction.39 seconds) prior to launching the interceptor, Given the threat as described, we would planners calculate maximum engagement use all of the nation’s technical capabilities ranges and determine engagement zones to find the ship. However, even if we locate for the expected threat region.41 it, the vessel could still launch a ballistic Planners use these engagement zones to missile. For example, transporting a US develop a combat air patrol (CAP) plan that boarding party to the vicinity may require covers the potential threat-launch area. The days. In the interim, the ship could launch center of each ellipse in figure 4 roughly a missile once it enters the ellipse depicted represents a CAP point for a single fighter.

80 | Air & Space Power Journal A Missile Defense System That Builds Confidence

boost phase, it also rises above the horizon, as viewed from the Fylingdales space sur- Burlington veillance radar located in the United King- dom, and a radar track begins. At this point, when it becomes clear the missile is headed toward Washington, DC, a state estimate of Atlantic City the ICBM along with its probable impact Andrews AFB point passes through the NORAD system to the scrambling ASA aircraft. The fighters take off roughly 10 minutes Langley AFB after the ICBM launches and receive the latest ICBM tracking update by data link at Shaw AFB roughly the same time. Onboard systems for each of the fighters then calculate an optimal launch point for upper-tier inter- Figure 4. Defense plan for scenario one ceptors, and the planes from Toledo and Shaw AFB proceed in a supersonic dash toward their interceptor launch points (fig. 5). Fighters launch from the ASA sites indicated Fighters from Langley AFB, Virginia; An- on the map and proceed to the CAP points. drews AFB; Burlington; and Atlantic City Simultaneously, the Air National Guard climb and then loiter near their planned squadrons at Burlington, Vermont; Toledo, launch points. If the threat enters the field Ohio; Andrews AFB, Maryland; and Atlantic of view of the space-surveillance radar sites City, New Jersey, mobilize and, along with at Thule, Greenland, and Cape Cod, Massa- the active duty squadron at Shaw AFB, chusetts, updated ICBM tracking informa- South Carolina, begin preparing additional tion passes to the fighters, again by data aircraft for launch. Tanker aircraft on one- link, to refine the interceptor aircrafts’ tar- hour alert are launched to refuel the alert geting solutions. fighters at the CAP points. After roughly six Simulations with the upper-tier intercep- hours, new fighters launch to replace those tor show an acceptable interceptor launch on station. This operation could continue for a area of about 1,000 km cross range and week or longer if necessary to find and neu- 1,500 km up range from the intended tar- tralize the threat ship or to determine whether get, an area that 10 of the 12 fighters have or not it is in the predicted launch area. reached 15 minutes after their takeoff. Op- erating at 15 km altitude, well above any Scenario Two clouds, the fighters focus their IRSTS on a search pattern around the predicted posi- Fighters are on normal ground alert at each tion of the threat. At the optimum time, indicated ASA site when an ICBM launch each fighter launches two upper-tier inter- from Iran occurs without warning. Initial ceptors about 10 seconds apart toward pre- detection by infrared missile-warning satel- dicted intercept points as the aircrew con- lites prompts a “quick alert” warning before tinues to scan with the IRSTS. As the threat the missile completes its boost phase. Al- warhead, upper rocket body, and decoys though tracking accuracy is not yet suffi- reenter the atmosphere, they begin to heat cient to estimate the ICBM’s actual target, it up, and the IRSTS rapidly detects them. Us- does indicate a missile type capable of ing intensity patterns and, possibly, spectral reaching the United States and an initial azi- signatures observed by the IRSTS to identify muth toward the US east coast. At that potential reentering warheads, the fighters point, fighters at their bases (fig. 5) receive uplink the target designation to the upper- a scramble order. As the ICBM finishes its tier interceptors.

Fall 2011 | 81 Corbett & Zarchan

Burlington

ICBM Trajectory

Boston

Toledo

New York City

Atlantic City

Andrews AFB

Langley AFB

Shaw AFB

Figure 5. Initial ASA response to Iranian ICBM launch (scenario two)

The geographic areas plotted in the up- cates maneuvering.42 This is the “heart of per part of figure 6 represent the allowable the envelope” for the upper-tier interceptor interceptor launch points for an upper-tier in a terminal intercept. interceptor intended to intercept at 100 km The area depicted at the bottom of figure altitude (left) and 50 km altitude (right). 6 shows allowable interceptor launch points The region between these altitudes repre- for an exoatmospheric (i.e., midcourse) in- sents the desired intercept zone, characterized by optimal atmospheric interaction for tercept using only BMDS sensor data. All identifying the warhead; moreover, in this simulations were limited to ascending inter- area, seeker heating does not require signifi- ceptor flight paths, but this zone would still cant cooling measures, and one can avoid have a lower probability of success for the atmospheric jet interaction, which compli- upper-tier interceptor.

82 | Air & Space Power Journal A Missile Defense System That Builds Confidence

100 km intercept; 125-second maximum time of ight 50 km intercept; 85-second maximum time of ight (earliest launch: 1,794 seconds) (earliest launch: 1,856 seconds)

Burlington

Charts indicate allowable Lower-tier interceptors launch locations for Boston launch at any remaining Toledo specic intercept altitudes. Atlantic City potential warheads at Washington, DC New York City 1,900 seconds. Andrews AFB Langley AFB

Shaw AFB

Exoatmospheric intercepts; time of ight not limited (earliest launch: 1,312 seconds)

Figure 6. Simulation results for scenario two with upper-tier interceptor. “Earliest launch” measures the time since the ICBM’s launch. For example, the lower graphic shows that aircrews may not launch upper-tier interceptors for an exoatmospheric intercept sooner than 1,312 seconds into the ICBM’s flight.

Although the differential response to at- sponse to atmospheric friction as the actual mospheric heating of individual elements warhead. In essence, finding the right target associated with the reentering ICBM pro- becomes easier during the terminal phase, vides the principal discriminant for upper- but intercepting it becomes harder. tier engagements, deceleration of reentering Intercepting an ICBM during the terminal objects due to atmospheric drag becomes phase can prove challenging because of the another discriminating factor for a lower- missile’s tremendous deceleration (more tier engagement yet also increases the dif- than 50 g’s). This deceleration can appear ficulty of performing hit-to-kill intercepts. as an evasive target maneuver to the pursu- The midcourse phase of an ICBM’s flight ing interceptor. However, on near-inverse diminishes the chances of distinguishing trajectories between the interceptor and tar- lightweight decoys from the real warhead. get, the pursuing interceptor does not see Conversely, the terminal phase makes it this apparent maneuver, thus making inter- difficult for those decoys to display the ception possible. Therefore, the challenge same deceleration profile and thermal rein terminal intercepts of ICBMs lies in get-

Fall 2011 | 83 Corbett & Zarchan ting the interceptor on these near-inverse tion themselves within 70 km of the ICBM’s trajectories—which only an air-launched intended target (Washington, DC) during interceptor can do consistently. the time between their scramble order and A typical ICBM warhead encounters 20 the time when they should launch lower- g’s of deceleration at 20 km altitude, grow- tier interceptors at any incoming warhead ing to over 50 g’s at 10 km (fig. 7). With a that survives the upper-tier engagement. high aspect angle, very little acceleration Figure 8 is a quantitative depiction of the occurs perpendicular to the interceptor’s engagement opportunities. Twelve aircraft flight path, enabling even the relatively low have scrambled from six separate locations, lateral acceleration of lower–tier intercep- each plane carrying two upper-tier and two tors to engage an ICBM warhead success- lower-tier interceptors. Ten fighters launch fully at 20 km altitude.43 In fact, the authors’ both their upper-tier interceptors, eight of simulations show that using only propor- those intercepting the ICBM between 50 tional navigation, without requiring ranging and 100 km altitude. Six of these fighters to the warhead, allowed lower-tier intercep- follow by firing two lower-tier interceptors tors to engage successfully at a 20 km inter- each, yielding a total of 32 possible intercept altitude if launched within 70 km of cept opportunities. The fighters from Shaw the warhead’s target—and at a 10 km inter- AFB do not reach an acceptable launch cept altitude if launched within 30 km.44 point in the time available. During the scenario, fighters from Langley The actual number of interceptors AFB, Andrews AFB, and Atlantic City posi- launched in such a scenario depends on

60 10,000 km ICBM Minimum Energy Trajectory 50

40 β=1,000 lb/ft2

Deceleration (g) Deceleration β=500 lb/ft2 20

10 β=2,000 pounds/square foot (lb/ft2)

0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Altitude (km)

Lower-Tier Engagement Window Upper-Tier Engagement Window

Figure 7. ICBM deceleration profile. Beta (β) refers to a characteristic used to estimate deceleration due to aerodynamic drag. Large β numbers indicate objects that have greater density, less drag, or both. Warheads have a high β number while decoys like balloons or chaff have a very low number.

84 | Air & Space Power Journal A Missile Defense System That Builds Confidence

90° W 80° W 70° W 60° W 50° W 50° N

326 km 40° N tL=1,726 seconds, tF=1,904 seconds intercept altitude=142 km

461 km 100 km intercept altitude launch area t =1,756 seconds, t =1,914 seconds L F 50 km intercept altitude launch area intercept altitude=116 km Lower-tier interceptor launch area

30° N

Figure 8. Simulation summary of scenario two. Notations at Toledo and Shaw AFB represent distances to the nearest launch point, elapsed time from the ICBM launch for the planes to arrive and launch upper-tier interceptors (tL), time from the ICBM launch to the intercepts (tF), and intercept altitudes. many factors, including whether we antici- abilities analytically but can determine them pate another ICBM attack and whether the definitively only through realistic opera- flight of one interceptor might conflict with tional testing. The Air Force continuously that of another. However, given the scenario evaluates its planes, pilots, and air-to-air described, all interceptors would probably missile systems though a realistic weapon launch unless we firmly believed that all system evaluation program known as Com- possible warheads were destroyed prior to bat Archer, which tests roughly 300 missiles the last launch opportunity. In light of pre- per year and tracks these probabilities for liminary estimates for both upper- and each weapon system.46 In contrast, the MDA lower-tier interceptors, the total cost of all conducted just seven flight tests of hit-to- 32 interceptors would be less than the cost kill ballistic missile intercepts between Oc- of two of today’s GMD interceptors.45 tober 2008 and April 2010; of those, only two were GMD and only one GMD interceptor hit the target during that period.47 What Does All of This Mean? ASA aircraft equipped with ALHK would build on the existing US air defense infra- Distinct probabilities are associated with structure and enable homeland defense an aircraft scrambling with all required sys- that we could deploy in minutes if neces- tems functioning and continuing to func- sary. Compatible with our current fourth- tion throughout the intercept, the intercep- and fifth-generation fighters, this system tor launching with all systems functioning, would provide a terminal-phase layered ap- and so forth. We can estimate these prob- proach to complement GMD. It would inte-

Fall 2011 | 85 Corbett & Zarchan grate well with the mission and capabilities countermeasures, very-long-range visual of the Air National Guard, providing a base- identification, suppression of enemy air de- line alert response for surprise threat fenses, and even space control in low Earth launches that we can augment by mobiliza- orbit. We need to make decisions regarding tion for heightened homeland defenses or trade-offs in these areas from a broader per- expeditionary deployment. spective than solely that of missile defense. Because of the interceptor missiles’ small The Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report size, they cost much less than GMD, per- noted the benefit of further innovation in haps on the order of 5 percent of the unit managing the missile defense program and cost per interceptor.48 This cost advantage the fact that the Department of Defense is enables higher production rates, which in pursuing the creation of additional hybrid turn lowers unit expenses even further, MDA/service program offices.54 Such a con- which allows more frequent testing, which cept could work well with a potential ALHK increases confidence in the system’s opera- acquisition, provided the services have a tional performance. bigger voice in missile defense acquisition Imagine our combining the periodic Min- programs. To do so and to improve the pro- uteman “Glory Trip” reliability tests with gram’s results, the MDA should relinquish ALHK operational tests and deploying fight- its JCIDS waiver and follow the full DOD ers to Kwajalein or Guam for quarterly em- 5000 acquisition reporting process. ployment tests.49 Imagine the confidence that would build—and for very little additional cost. Conclusion System development, like system confidence, must begin with consensus on the The ability to respond quickly and flexibly CONOPS, with key decisions belonging to to a wide variety of potential adversary de- the combatant commanders. In most weapon velopments is critical to preventing any de- acquisitions, the Joint Capabilities Integra- fensive CONOPS from becoming the tion and Development System (JCIDS) es- twenty-first-century equivalent of the Magi- tablishes the CONOPS and key performance not Line. Despite the persistence of fixed requirements, and the Joint Requirements defensive establishments, a variety of forces Oversight Council closely oversees the de- can target them or, as in the case of the rived requirements.50 The MDA, however, Maginot Line, simply avoid them. From the has operated with a waiver from the JCIDS military perspective, enduring value de- process, which allows it to make system ac- pends upon the ability of any ballistic mis- quisition decisions involving cost, schedule, sile defensive system to respond with little and performance independently of the mili- notice and provide capability in a variety of tary services, with oversight by the Missile scenarios. As shown in an earlier article by Defense Executive Board.51 The Ballistic Mis- the authors, the ALHK concept would also sile Defense Review Report of 2010 found no work against theater missile threats.55 Allies benefit in bringing the MDA into the JCIDS could participate with their own aircraft, or into the full Department of Defense 5000 allowing them to make their own invest- acquisition reporting process at this time.52 ments—in affordable increments—for their However, that review also concluded (per- own defense. haps prematurely) that the United States We gain confidence in a system’s effec- currently enjoys protection against limited tiveness through reaching consensus on the ICBM attacks.53 underlying principles in the CONOPS and ALHK could contribute capabilities to through conducting rigorous operational other missions beyond missile defense that testing in which the operator has no control this article does not address, including very- over the test environment. It is not fiscally long-range counterair, electronic counter- possible to obtain statistical confidence in

86 | Air & Space Power Journal A Missile Defense System That Builds Confidence an operational environment when a single ing. Finally, it demands competitive test costs over $200 million, but frequent source selection and initial production testing with a much less expensive small rates sufficient to demonstrate operational air-launched interceptor would generate a performance. Following initial operational 56 high degree of confidence. capability, it requires an ongoing commit- Building a missile defense system that ment to incremental improvements and inspires confidence starts with a CONOPS continued operational testing to ensure grounded in accepted physical principles, that confidence remains as systems age demonstrated technology, and war-fighter and adversaries adapt. needs. It progresses with needs optimized from the combatant commander’s perspec- We should reexamine not only the MDA’s tive, balanced against realistic estimates of decision to focus all development funding the cost of development. It then requires on midcourse interceptors but also the deci- competitive prototypes that have under- sion process itself. ALHK may not be the best gone sufficient developmental testing to answer, but it represents a path to a system verify the contractor’s approach and a that could build confidence, thus warrant- commitment to full developmental funding continued development. 

Notes

1. George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, “How Accountability, Report to Congressional Committees, US Strategic Antimissile Defense Could Be Made to GAO-11-372 (Washington, DC: Government Account- Work,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66, no. 6 (No- ability Office, March 2011), 80, http://www.gao.gov vember/December 2010): 8–24, http://bos.sagepub /new.items/d11372.pdf. .com/content/66/6/8.full.pdf+html. 8. Ibid., 87. 2. “General Accounting Office Report Criticizes 9. Treaty between the United States of America Direction of Missile Defense Program,” press release, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Carl Levin, United States Senator, 3 June 2003, Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 3 Octo- http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id ber 1972, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms =216428. /treaties/abm/abm2.html. 3. “Remarks of Senator Carl Levin at the MDA/ 10. Lisbeth Gronlund et al., “Highly Capable AIAA Annual Missile Defense Conference,” press Theater Missile Defenses and the ABM Treaty,” Arms release, Carl Levin, United States Senator, 23 March Control Today, April 1994, http://www.ucsusa.org 2009, http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm /nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/missile ?id=310304. _defense/technical_issues/theater-missile-defense 4. Conn Carroll, “The Very Real North Korea Nu- -and.html. clear Missile Threat,” Foundry, Heritage Foundation, 11. Lewis and Postol, “US Strategic Antimissile 27 March 2009, http://blog.heritage.org/2009/03/27 Defense,” 9. The term midcourse refers to the period /the-very-real-north-korea-nuclear-missile-threat/. of a ballistic missile’s flight between termination of 5. Riki Ellison, “Ground-Based Interceptor Test the boost phase and reentry into the atmosphere, Fails,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 15 Decem- which marks the beginning of the terminal phase. ber 2010, http://www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org 12. Sam LaGrone, “Fighters Eyed for Ballistic /news_Category.aspx?categoryID=2&news_id=2906. Missile Defense,” Air Force Times, 16 June 2009, 6. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile De- http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/06/air fense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of force_fighter_missile_061609w/. Defense, February 2010), http://www.defense.gov 13. Dean A. Wilkening, “Airborne Boost-Phase Bal- /bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630 listic Missile Defense,” Science and Global Security 12, _for%20web.pdf. nos. 1–2 (2004): 1–67, doi: 10.1080/08929880490464649; 7. Government Accountability Office, Missile and Dean A. Wilkening, Ballistic-Missile Defence and Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Transparency and Strategic Stability, Adelphi Paper 334 (London: Inter-

Fall 2011 | 87 Corbett & Zarchan national Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2000). 24. Ibid., 23; and Amy Butler, “Army Three-Star For the challenges of boost-phase intercepts, see the Pushes for Navy to Be Ashore SM-3 Lead,” Aerospace excellent unclassified work Report of the American Daily and Defense Report, 6 November 2009, 1–2. Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept 25. Jon Ward, “Russian Says Shield Makes Poland Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Target,” Washington Times, 16 August 2008, http:// Technical Issues (College Park, MD: American Physical www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/aug/16 Society, 5 October 2004), http://www.aps.org/about /russian-says-shield-makes-poland-target/; Denis /pressreleases/upload/BPI_Report.pdf. The Ameri- Dyomkin and Oleg Shchedrov, “Medvedev Sees Mili- can Physical Society’s threat models are the same tary Response to U.S. Missile Shield,” Reuters, 26 ones we use in this article to demonstrate ALHK August 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008 capabilities. For a more detailed treatment of ALHK /08/26/idUSLQ470459; and “Moscow, Minsk to Build components, see Col Mike Corbett, USAF, retired, Air Def in Response to Missiles in Europe,” ITAR-TASS, and Paul Zarchan, “The Role of Airpower in Active 20 August 2008. Missile Defense,” Air and Space Power Journal 24, no. 26. Corbett and Zarchan, “Role of Airpower,” 69. 2 (Summer 2010): 57–71. 27. Ibid., 65. 14. Office of Management and Budget, Termina- 28. Infrared seekers typically work best at cryo- tions, Reductions, and Savings: Budget of the U.S. Gov- genic temperatures. Atmospheric friction would ernment, Fiscal Year 2010 (Washington, DC: Office of heat the seekers, degrading their effectiveness. Management and Budget, 2009), http://www.gpoaccess 29. Corbett and Zarchan, “Role of Airpower,” 65–66. .gov/usbudget/fy10/pdf/trs.pdf. 30. Ibid., 66. 15. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “Kinetic 31. Graham Warwick, “VIDEO: F-35 DAS [Distrib- Energy Interceptor,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki uted Aperture System] as Missile Defense Sensor,” 2 /Kinetic_Energy_Interceptor. November 2010, Ares: A Defense Technology Blog, 16. John T. Bennett, “MDA Request Kills KEI [ki- accessed 1 February 2011, http://www.aviationweek netic energy interceptor], Focuses on Ascent Phase,” .com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController= Defense News, 7 May 2009, http://www.defensenews Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUser .com/story.php?i=4079560. Id=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPost 17. “Kinetic Energy Interceptor,” GlobalSecurity.org, Id=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7 2 November 2008, http://www.globalsecurity.org Post%3Ae29254ad-2824-4669-8b44-968bb0eaa81f&plc. /space/systems/kei.htm; and “Sensors,” Missile De- 32. Corbett and Zarchan, “Role of Airpower,” 65. fense Agency, 19 April 2011, http://www.mda.mil A Congressional earmark initiated the Net-Centric /system/sensors.html. Airborne Defense Element and provided its only 18. Briefing, LTG Kevin T. Campbell, commander, funding. Joint Functional Component Command for Inte- 33. Government Accountability Office, Homeland grated Missile Defense, subject: Globally Integrated Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Management of Ballistic Missile Defense, accessed 1 February 2011, Air Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace, http://www.ndia.org/Divisions/Divisions/Missile Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-09-184 Defense/Documents/Content/ContentGroups (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Of- /Divisions1/Missile_Defense/LTG%20Campbell fice, January 2009), 27, http://www.gao.gov/new -NDIA%20MD%20Luncheon%20%286Dec07%29%20 .items/d09184.pdf. This report also contains addi- Public%20Release%20SMDC-7467.pdf. tional details on ASA infrastructure. 19. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile 34. Colonel Corbett’s firsthand experience in Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for operations after 11 September 2001 as the vice- Congress, CRS Report for Congress RL33745 (Wash- commander, First Air Force, from 2000 to 2003. ington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 17 35. Corbett and Zarchan, “Role of Airpower,” 58. March 2011), 4, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons 36. “601st Air and Space Operations Center,” First /RL33745.pdf. Air Force, http://www.1af.acc.af.mil/units/601staoc 20. Amy Butler, “2011 Funding Request Includes /index.asp. New Sat System,” Aviation Week, 11 February 2010, 37. Thomas H. Kean et al., The 9/11 Commission http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story Report: Final Report of the National Commission on _channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/awst Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, /2010/02/08/AW_02_08_2010_p27-202005.xml. DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004), 20–27, 21. Ibid. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report 22. O’Rourke, Navy Aegis, 23. .pdf. This document discusses the response times for 23. Ibid., 8–9. fighters scrambled during the terrorist attacks of 11

88 | Air & Space Power Journal A Missile Defense System That Builds Confidence

September 2001. Although the open literature refers 48. Corbett and Zarchan, “Role of Airpower,” 67. to an immediate readiness posture of 15 minutes, 49. The “Glory Trip” program entails the Air alert fighters typically do much better. On 11 Sep- Force’s removing operational ballistic missiles from tember 2001, fighters from Otis Air National Guard their silos, removing their warheads, and shipping Base, MA, were airborne in seven minutes, and the missiles to Vandenberg AFB, CA, for a test launch. those from Langley AFB, VA, in six minutes. The Air Force does this about once per quarter to 38. See performance data referenced to Technical demonstrate ICBM system reliability. Order 1F-15C-1 and TO 1F-16C-1 (dash one) perfor- 50. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. “Joint mance tables for representative drag indices and Capabilities Integration Development System,” ac- nominal atmospheric temperatures. cessed 1 February 2011, http://en.wikipedia.org 39. The difficulty of predicting an adversary’s /wiki/Joint_Capabilities_Integration_Development reasoning and subsequent actions lies outside the _System. scope of this article. We intend only to demonstrate 51. Government Accountability Office, Defense how ASA aircraft equipped with ALHK could counter Management: Key Challenges Should Be Addressed act such a threat. When Considering Changes to Missile Defense Agency’s 40. Scott Stewart and Nate Hughes, “Gauging the Roles and Missions, GAO-09-466T (Washington, DC: Threat of an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack,” Government Accountability Office, 26 March 2009), STRATFOR, 9 September 2010, http://www.stratfor 2, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location .com/weekly/20100908_gauging_threat_electro =U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA495698. This magnetic_pulse_emp_attack. document includes testimony by John H. Pendleton, 41. A threat-state estimate is a measurement of director of defense capabilities and management, the threat missile’s position, velocity, and accelera- before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Commit- tion at a specific point in time. Once the missile is tee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. past the boost phase, this estimate can be used to 52. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile De- accurately predict the missile’s target as well as its fense Review Report, 43. The Defense Acquisition location in flight. System is the management process that guides all of 42. “Atmospheric jet interaction” refers to the the Department of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition pro- complex forces resulting from divert thrusters firing grams. DOD Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisi- into high-speed atmospheric flow around the inter- tion System, 12 May 2003, includes policies and prin- ceptor, at times creating adverse accelerations. ciples that govern the defense acquisition system. 43. “Aspect angle” refers to the angle between the DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense warhead’s flight path and the interceptor’s flight Acquisition System, 8 December 2008, in turn estab- path. High aspect angles approach 180 degrees, indi- lishes the management framework that implements cating a head-on engagement. 44. Proportional navigation is a form of inter- these policies and principles. The Defense Acquisi- ceptor guidance that requires only the relative bear- tion Management Framework provides an event- ing from the interceptor to the target for determin- based process by means of which acquisition programs ing guidance commands. In essence, the interceptor proceed through a series of milestones associated seeker observes a change in the line of sight be- with significant program phases. See sec. 3 of the tween it and its target and maneuvers a “propor- instruction for details on the milestones and pro- tional” amount in the direction of that observed gram phases. The instruction also identifies the spe- movement. When the relative movement in line of cific statutory and regulatory reports as well as other sight ceases, the interceptor is on a collision course information requirements for each milestone and with its target. decision point. The MDA is waived from these re- 45. Corbett and Zarchan, “Role of Airpower,” 67. quirements until milestone C, the point at which a 46. “53rd Weapons Evaluation Group,” fact sheet, weapon system receives approval to enter produc- 9 June 2009, Tyndall AFB, FL, http://www.tyndall tion. See “DoD 5000 Defense Acquisition System,” .af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4892. Defense Acquisition Portal, accessed 19 April 2011, 47. House, Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, https://dap.dau.mil/aphome/das/Pages/Default.aspx. USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency, [Testimony] 53. Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile De- before the House Armed Services Committee, Strategic fense Review Report, 15. Forces Subcommittee, April 15, 2010, 111th Cong., 2nd 54. Ibid., 43. sess., 11, http://www.mda.mil/global/documents 55. Corbett and Zarchan, “Role of Airpower,” 62–64. /pdf/ps_hasc041510.pdf. 56. House, Lieutenant General Patrick J. O’Reilly, 39.

Fall 2011 | 89 Corbett & Zarchan

Col Mike Corbett, USAF, Retired Colonel Corbett (BS, Oregon State University; MS, Purdue University; MS, Auburn University–Montgomery) is the assistant system program director for the Geo stationary Operational Environmental Satellite R-Series (GOES-R), a $7.6 billion weather satellite acquisition program of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. From 2006 through 2009, he served as the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) director for advanced technology weapons, leading a small staff in support of kinetic- and directed-energy technology development for advanced ballistic missile defense systems. He led the air-launched hit-to-kill concept development and the MDA’s evaluation of the Net-Centric Airborne Defense Element, a congres- sionally directed program to develop a new missile defense interceptor using an existing air-to-air missile seeker. Colonel Corbett joined the MDA in 2005 following his retirement from the Air Force. His military experience includes command positions at various levels within Air Combat Command and the Air National Guard, and over 5,000 hours in a variety of aircraft, predominantly fighters.

Paul Zarchan Mr. Zarchan (BSEE, City College of New York; MSEE, Columbia University) is associate editor of the Journal of Guidance, Control and Dynamics. He has more than 40 years of experience designing, analyzing, and evaluating missile-guidance systems. He has worked as principal engineer for Raytheon Missile Systems Division, has served as senior research engineer with the Israel Ministry of Defense, and was a principal member of the technical staff for C. S. Draper Laboratory. Until recently Mr. Zarchan was a full-time member of the technical staff at MIT Lincoln Labora- tory, where he worked on problems related to missile defense. He is the author of Tactical and Strategic Missile Guidance, fifth edition, an American Institute of Aero- nautics and Astronautics (AIAA) text, and coauthor of Fundamentals of Kalman Filtering: A Practical Approach, third edition, another AIAA text.

90 | Air & Space Power Journal Views & Analyses

We Were Deans Once . . . and Young Veteran PME Educators Look Back

Dr. James W. Forsyth Jr.* Dr. Richard R. Muller

he publication of a book chapter ti- within the Air Force, educating the officer tled “Professors in the Colonels’ corps.3 Most of our examples come from TWorld” by Daniel J. Hughes, a retired our time at Air Command and Staff College Air War College professor, began a debate (ACSC) at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, a school regarding the quality and future of profes- that sits a few hundred yards from AWC. sional military education (PME) in the US Although every school has its own unique Air Force.1 The chapter sparked a lively ex- culture, most of the points Hughes raises change on journalist Tom Ricks’s widely apply to both ACSC and AWC—indeed, to read Foreign Policy blog The Best Defense.2 any military college. We state up front that Among his most serious charges, Hughes Hughes is onto something, but his conclu- claims that Air Force PME is hamstrung be- sions are a bit overdone. This is an attempt cause its major educational institutions, to address some of his concerns.4 It is not particularly Air War College (AWC), are led an attempt to refute Hughes’s charges by senior leaders with little or no academic point by point but simply to offer a differ- background. He further claims that the mili- ent perspective. We suspect that these ob- tary faculty members at these schools are at servations might resonate with colleagues best ill prepared for their educational tasks at other PME schools, anyone interested in and at worst openly hostile to academic Air Force education, and even those in ci- enterprise. Finally, Hughes argues that aca- vilian academe. demic standards and scholarly rigor are no- Most of us who decide to make a career ticeably absent from PME. The culprit? in Air Force education realize that we are Something one might call the “clash of cul- not producing academic specialists. Histori- tures” that exists between civilian and mili- ans in a civilian history department strive tary faculty. Certainly, serious differences to educate and train graduate students to exist between these two groups of people, become professional historians and mem- but are those differences so stark as to bers of the academic guild. A historian who make life intolerable? Are they insurmount- accepts a job at a PME school will teach stu- able? Perhaps, but we think not. dents who are already credentialed mem- This article represents an attempt to dis- bers of a different guild—the profession of till some of the observations and lessons we arms. These students may not realize it, have gleaned through many years teaching but they can benefit from exposure to a his-

*Dr. Forsyth is a professor of national security studies at the USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS), Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Dr. Muller is a professor of military history and associate dean at SAASS.

Fall 2011 | 91 torical or theoretical perspective that can many would prefer to be elsewhere. These give them insight into their profession and warrior-students are exceptional people, inform their decision making. Both are re- but while they are here with us, they are warding undertakings, but they are differ- students first and foremost. This distinc- ent. And let’s be clear: staff and war tion is worth emphasizing. Students are colleges are hybrid organizations, following here to learn; networking and recharging many academic conventions but unmistak- batteries can be part of the process, but ably military in orientation. If one accepts they are not why we have a university. these conditioning factors, the challenge of This is important to remember, especially educating air, space, and cyberspace profes- when answering the popular philosophical sionals seems less daunting. question “What am I supposed to get out of this?” The answer is, whatever you can. Truth be told, some students will get more Schools Only as Good from their year here than others. This is as Their Faculty the inevitable result of nature or choice, but the central point remains that the inte- Like the international environment, PME gration of knowledge is the students’ re- has undergone a series of dramatic changes sponsibility. The faculty owes them a during the past two decades. It no longer sound and coherent curriculum. focuses on teaching just the mechanics of Without top-quality faculty, little else officership, narrowly defined in terms of matters—technology, infrastructure, and leadership or staff skills, as well as the fun- even money pale by comparison. When it damentals of airpower doctrine and applica- comes to educating students, a quality fac- tion. The men and women attending to- ulty is the alpha and omega—and PME is no day’s service colleges are steeped in history different. Along these lines, PME has made and international relations, together with some strides. Few people are aware of the joint, interagency, and multinational opera- fact that in 1990 only two faculty members tions. Studies on peacekeeping, human at ACSC had PhDs. By the 2002–3 academic rights, and military intervention have year, the number of individuals holding ad- shored up obvious security concerns such vanced degrees (including those who had as terrorism, failed states, and interstate completed all requirements except the dis- war. Officer education has made strides in sertation) had grown to 40, representing 38 becoming more theoretically and practically percent of the faculty.6 How did that hap- sound, but as Hughes makes clear, serious pen? It resulted from years of work, keep- issues and challenges face students and facing one thing in mind: faculty first. ulty, the most important of which is the This became evident at a staff meeting quality of faculty. one day nearly 15 years ago when we were What makes for a great school? It’s the discussing student assignments with our amalgam of teachers and students. As new commandant. Listening carefully as Hughes notes, in PME we are fortunate to the dean of students outlined the process have students at the top of their year group. for managing student assignments, he then They are professionals with years of accom- asked, “What are we doing for the faculty?” plishments behind them and bright futures His point was well taken. “AFPC [Air Force ahead. Most will go on to serve as colonels, Personnel Center] will take care of student and some attain flag rank.5 Yet their assign- assignments. Starting today—I’m in charge ments to Maxwell can be a difficult task for of faculty assignments.” During his tenure, them: “Put down your weapons, spool down faculty assignments were his priority, with the jet, and return to school.” They have a colonel working them personally. He much to learn and sometimes even more to knew that word would spread and that vol- teach, yet we suspect, like Hughes, that unteers would emerge. He wasn’t wrong.

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From 1998 to 2003 or so, ACSC had an un- the PhD.10 What accounts for this change? commonly high promotion rate to lieuten- Certainly, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan ant colonel—for three or four years it hov- have played a significant part. However, ered around 100 percent in the promotion there are other reasons: a colonel no longer zone.7 What’s more, the commandant had works faculty assignments, the incentive devised several attractive assignment op- program disappeared for several years be- tions, one of them designed to entice future fore ACSC and AWC reinstated it, maintain- AWC attendees to spend two years on the ing high standards has proven more diffi- faculty at ACSC before attending AWC. The cult, and the process has become something lesson is simple, the implications enor- other than a self-fulfilling prophecy.11 mous: to attract a quality faculty, you need From our perspective, this is not an im- to take care of them. Word spread, and possible situation to remedy. At Air Uni- quality became a self-fulfilling prophecy. versity, teaching in the classroom is akin Incidentally, this episode serves as a tonic to flying the jet—everything else supports to Hughes’s contention that commandants this mission. Manning the instructor force without formal academic training cannot with nonresident/nonvolunteers without possess good educational instincts. the necessary academic credentials, keep- In 2000 the desired minimum require- ing the best for staff positions, is akin to ments for faculty duty consisted of resi- creaming off the best officers in a flying dent PME and a master’s degree in an ap- unit to serve in the command post while propriate field of study. Though many the cockpits sit empty. A flying outfit nonresident graduates enjoyed highly suc- would never tolerate that—and neither cessful faculty tours at ACSC, all things should Air Force education. being equal, having experienced a resident program as a student gives a new faculty member a leg up.8 Moreover, the school Core Curriculum Called equally sought volunteers. Despite some “Core” for a Reason exceptions, the hiring process tried to hold true to those standards. During the years The core curriculum of any PME institu- 2000–2004, we received approximately tion generally stems from external and in- three or four candidates for every faculty ternal guidance. At Air University, external hire we made—nonvolunteer, nonresident guidance comes from Congress, the Depart- graduates were virtually extinct. A good ment of Defense, the university, the Joint number of the military faculty held PhDs. Staff, major commands, Headquarters Air At the same time, ACSC launched an ambi- Force, and the chief of staff himself. Inter- tious faculty hiring process culminating in nally, guidance comes primarily from the the appointment of approximately 16 civil- commandant, the dean, and faculty and stu- ian professors.9 dent feedback.12 The point here is that This is not a story of constant improve- nearly everything happening in the class- ment, however. Gains vanished, progress room is linked to a requirement. Neither stalled, and wheels underwent reinvention. the master’s degree nor regional accredita- By 2006 the quality of the faculty had tion drives what the schools teach. This is slipped considerably. By comparison, ap- worth mentioning because students, admin- proximately 50 percent of today’s faculty istrators, and even faculty sometimes are nonresident graduates, and a fair num- wrongly associate subject matter with the ber of them are nonvolunteers. Whereas the master’s degree—quite simply, if that de- school used to count on 30 high-quality fac- gree went away, the core curriculum would ulty hires out of each graduating class, the look much as it does now. It is important to numbers today are in single digits. More- stress, however, that faculty holds this to- over, only 30—less than 25 percent—possess gether. The faculty interprets and imple-

Fall 2011 | 93 ments guidance, has a proprietary interest semester system, the fall term focusing on in the curriculum, and must answer to the broadening and the spring on depth. It had various accrediting agencies that visit the become apparent that courses could be re- university regularly.13 designed and the faculty reassigned along Despite popular belief, military organiza- functional lines—with PhDs teaching within tions exhibit strong biases for change be- their specialty and war fighters theirs.15 cause of the wholesale turnover of com- How did this turn out? During the years manders and key personnel every few years. 1999–2003, Air Education and Training Each understandably wants to make his or Command rated the dean’s directorate out- her mark, but this is a dangerous inclina- standing, the directorate won the Muir S. tion for curricula. Once in a great while, a Fairchild award twice (in 2003 and 2004), massive curriculum revision is warranted the Southern Association of Colleges and (e.g., the ACSC revolution in 1992, led by Schools accredited the college’s master’s then-commandant Col John A. Warden III). degree and gave its faculty-management Educators obviously want to ensure that process a rare “commendable” rating, and course materials and readings are up to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s date and of the highest quality. Yet the ba- Process for Accreditation of Joint Education sics of a good core interdisciplinary PME reaccredited the degree twice. These ac- curriculum change remarkably little over complishments culminated in a visit by the years. The core curriculum needs to the chief of staff of the Air Force, who, af- provide our top officers a structured oppor- ter receiving a two-hour briefing on the tunity for reflection. It should allow them to curriculum, proclaimed, “You’ve got it consider their operational experience in a right”—one reason, perhaps, that he gave changing international environment in light the college an additional 24 faculty and a of a rigorous examination of history, theory, considerable sum of money to institute his fact, and analysis—seasoned with a healthy revolutionary force-development initia- dose of service and joint doctrine/planning. tive.16 Review of the data gives the impres- Our schools can do all of that within the sion that ACSC was moving in the right di- confines of the external and internal guid- rection, but in less than a year it began to ance—perhaps with some finessing, but unravel. What happened? they can do it. Part of the explanation lies in a bias to- An educated strategist or commander ward change exhibited by senior leaders consists of many things, none more impor- whose managerial instincts, though excel- tant than a mind that seeks to understand lent in their respective fields, did not trans- the complexities of humankind—one that late well into education. Outside agencies recognizes the fragility of civilization and have injected themselves more and more grasps the importance of science and the into curriculum decisions; “too many cooks humanities. Such a mind is conscious of the in the kitchen” is a common lament from fact that self-determination and freedom educators contemplating an elegant way to may not be the same thing but nevertheless insert mandatory “modules” dealing with remain essential elements of social life. everything from sexual assault to customs This mind is practiced in the art of work and courtesies. This situation is not un- well done and strives to build bridges across common, and in contrast to what Dr. bodies of knowledge that at first glance ap- Hughes implies, it is not strictly a military pear only loosely related. At the same time, problem. One cannot pick up the Chronicle we should also seek, as Clausewitz put it, of Higher Education without reading of a dis- “to distinguish precisely what at first sight tressing trend in academe: activities such as seems fused.”14 institutional research, outcomes assess- To put those sentiments into play, in ment, and data collection—formerly rele- 1999 ACSC reorganized into a book-based gated to their proper place on the periphery

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of the enterprise—have lately tended to formed faculty, the advanced academic de- crowd into the center. The Air Force has an gree program—by means of which a major institutional bias toward metrics, quantifica- or lieutenant colonel goes through a three- tion, and stratification. In our time, we have year PhD program at a civilian university— seen experienced course directors unable to remains the surest route to raising our own teach because they are too busy “evaluat- cadre of PME leaders. These newly minted ing” instructors; well-constructed and military PhDs then continue a rigorous pro- highly rigorous courses abandoned because gression through the academic ranks. Civil- they have low student-approval ratings; and ian faculty, already credentialed, must pass the “relevance” of faculty research scored a similar series of tests. First, they serve as on the basis of factors unrelated to scholarly course director—time spent directing a core merit. Additionally, we have seen countless course is essential to learning the ropes. stoplight PowerPoint charts that measure From there, they move into an assistant de- nearly everything but the quality of the fac- partment chair seat, and if they pass that ulty. We should certainly strive to create test, they become department chair. A few meaningful metrics, but one ought to recog- will go on to become deans and even pro- nize the number of qualified faculty as the gram managers. Such a process offers an- most meaningful thing one can count on. other benefit: military and civilian faculty who endure the same rites of passage tend to develop a healthy mutual respect. Ask Organizing for Success anyone in the halls of ACSC to name the During our tenure, ACSC organized into best seminar teachers—we guarantee they’ll 44 seminars, each with a student seminar list civilian professors, military academics, leader who tended to students’ needs inside and war fighters. Their mix of academic and outside the classroom. A faculty orga- preparation, practical experience, and semi- nized into departments did the teaching. nar dynamics marks them as masters of Like a squadron commander, the center of their craft. The idea here is straightforward: gravity of the entire operation—the depart- we wouldn’t trust our children’s education ment chair—was responsible for building a to amateurs, so why not hold PME to the teaching team from whole cloth, a team same standard? that planned, trained, flew, and evaluated the mission. In many respects, the chair Old Methods Still the Best position is the most senior “honest” job in PME. As is the case at the wing, the fur- Education is notorious for chasing fads. ther one moves away from the squadron, During our tenure, we routinely fought off the harder it becomes to see and assess some colleagues’ impulses to tech-out the mission impact. classroom, streamline readings, go paper- Currently, no formal mechanism exists less, and institute “revolutionary” teaching for raising up department chairs from the methods. More than a few times, we suc- ranks—no ladder to ensure we are groom- cumbed to baubles such as “just-in-time facing the right breed. As for deans, each year ulty development” or “student-driven learn- or two the school searches far and wide for ing”—and found to our dismay that these a colonel who holds the requisite PhD and labor- and time-saving devices were illu- who may or may not have spent any time sory. We are in complete agreement with in the classroom. After being in business Professor Hughes here: high standards must this long, isn’t it time to change that model? be maintained and defended, however un- A clear fix begins with teaching—and en- fashionable they may seem. suring teaching excellence, the key to the Though some of us might balk, Kindle process, is job one. Regarding our uni- and e-readers may in fact eventually sup-

Fall 2011 | 95 plant cloth and paper. But make no mis- way around. Many have it backwards, in- take—in whatever medium they may ap- sisting that a jazzier way of learning will pear, books have for centuries remained the produce dramatic effects. In fact, blocking backbone of advanced education for one and tackling win games, not trick plays. very compelling reason: they work. Engag- Those who call for more critical thinking ing with an author’s argument, weighing are no more in tune with classroom needs the evidence, and connecting the book to than those who call for more “cowbell” in other readings and to one’s experience—this the making of gold records. Reading, think- is the essence of education. The most suc- ing, writing, and speaking—that’s what we cessful course directors realize that they need more of, and that is hard work. earn most of their pay by selecting the cor- With respect to hard work, few things rect readings. It’s no accident that reading require more time and attention than hon- well-written books and journal articles ing the writing skills of our students. After makes one a better writer. So we must fight years of reading papers that would shock the impulse to assign snippets, summaries, our old high-school English teachers, we and digests in place of the real thing. have come to some conclusions. Legions of Likewise, classrooms of the future might the Tweet generation struggle to compose a be our fate but should not be our priority coherent, well-written sentence. Let’s forgo because they will look a lot like the ones talk of the five-paragraph essay, elements of from the past. Even the world of distance exposition, or even grammar. In fairness, learning, arguably the most demanding the roots of this problem extend back to teaching environment, emphasizes repli- grammar school. The fact is that too many cating the classroom experience, not the students arrive on the steps of PME schools other way around. Nevertheless, the desire as remarkably poor writers—and for many to create a classroom for the future re- reasons.18 The most prevalent one seems to mains real. Once upon a time, a well- be that they do not read much either. Crip- meaning team at ACSC designed such a pled writers are oftentimes crippled read- prototype. It was so cluttered with gad- ers, and that impairment takes much time getry and “smart” accessories that quite to fix. What’s more, they are shocked to some time passed before anyone realized it discover that their writing skills, in a word, had no room for the teacher. stink. Many of them will claim that they In general, the problem with calls for de- never received a bad grade in their lives. signing “revolutionary methods for learn- That might be true, but it does nothing to ing” and the “classroom of the future” stems temper the facts: in a typical seminar of from reform movements within public edu- 12, a few students write well, a few are cation—“teaching experts” have convinced truly handicapped, and a bunch in the administrators that critical thinking and middle write prose so muddled it is painful levels of learning are more important than to read. Of all the “problems” we have seen content. If there were ever two words we in PME, this one is paramount and, sur- could strike from the English language, prisingly, misunderstood. they would be critical thinking. We watched An ACSC commandant once insisted that as the concept moved from obscurity to students write a formal research paper (he meaninglessness in the blink of an eye, seemed to recall writing one himself and done in largely by the same “experts” who thought that if he had to do it, so did they). could not agree on its meaning or impor- An important part of intellectual growth, tance. Levels of learning, another meaning- writing research papers instills good habits less phrase, has no purpose in education— of mind and patterns of inquiry that stay training, perhaps, but not education.17 The with students throughout their lives. But to formula for success in PME is all too famil- produce one requires considerable time and iar: it’s content over method, not the other hands-on attention. Back then, we were still

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building up the faculty and felt that we did AWC developed a presentation highlighting not have the talent to supervise 600 re- the incompatibilities between civilian aca- search papers. That fact did not sway the demic and military cultures. The presenta- commandant, who remained adamant, so tion had good points, but we prefer to con- one day we said to him, “Boss, give us two centrate on those things that unify rather numbers from one to 44.” “Six and 33,” he than divide us. At ACSC nearly every im- replied. We pulled the latest exams from portant leadership position (with the excep- those two seminars and gave them to him tions of commandant, vice-commandant, to read. The next day he came by. “Are and student squadron commander) was they all like this?” “Yes, sir, they are.” filled by civilian and military faculty at vari- Shocked by the poor quality, he began a ous times—and this practice continues to writing mentor program immediately. To the present. Not to put too fine a point on this day, all of the PME schools struggle to it, but we do not recognize the world that improve students’ writing; it remains a Hughes describes—a Balkanized faculty work in progress. Suggestions include re- consisting of civilian “academics” and mili- quiring entrance examinations, assigning tary “operators,” with “ersatz civilian colonel writing projects designed to produce pub- doctors” hovering in between. lishable work, and rewarding superior writ- Lately, it does seem that academic ad- ers with favorable performance reports. In ministrators have grown apart from the our years at Maxwell’s School of Advanced teaching faculty, an inevitable occurrence Air and Space Studies, we have learned the to some extent as spans of control increase value of multiple writing opportunities, and internal and external demands on ad- coupled with extensive feedback.19 ministrators grow. Yet we must resist this trend. Veteran teachers must accept the fact that serving as administrators will of- One Faculty, “All In” ten be part of their careers; similarly, administrators, including the top military Unity of effort, a critical factor in the suc- leadership, must get their feet wet in semi- cess of air operations, should apply to edu- nars. A few times at ACSC, the commandant cation as well. Hughes’s critique makes a mandated that everyone in the building central point that an unbridgeable gulf had would teach at some point. Impractical, opened up between the military and civil- some said. Perhaps. But it sent a very good ian sides, the leaders and the led. Indeed, a and powerful message. PME faculty is spun from two different yet Even senior leaders must teach. It can be essential fabrics—the active duty force and done. At a few—not many—PME schools, civilians. At every opportunity—in dean’s commandants and deans lecture in their calls and department meetings—the phrase specialty and make the time to teach at “We are ONE faculty!” appeared on a slide least one course in seminar. Senior leaders or otherwise came into play. To return to do not need to be “the best sticks” in the our flying-unit analogy, everyone in the seminars, but their presence there gives building was responsible for generating the them tremendous credibility with the stu- sorties—educating students from the stage dents and the faculty. Just as numbered air and in seminar. Not everyone literally ap- force and wing commanders of flying units peared in front of the students, but—like the fly, so should PME administrators, no mat- maintainers, munitions folks, life-support ter their rank, teach. There is nothing like personnel, security forces, and so on— the common experience of the seminar to everyone knew the mission and played a blur distinctions among faculty members. part in making it happen. Faculty unity is Senior leaders must also take time to edu- all important. Years before Dr. Hughes’s ar- cate themselves about the business. Opera- ticle appeared, some other friends of ours at tors would rightly bristle if a newcomer

Fall 2011 | 97 asked, “Why do you guys waste so much time to upgrade the leadership program, we time mission planning?” and an AC-130 happened to have a creative faculty mem- squadron commander would be baffled by ber who had done something like this else- the question “How come you people fly where. After we gave him a team of skilled only at night?” Yet people often ask us, in people and the necessary resources, they all seriousness, why faculty members could went to work to build the most comprehen- not teach every day of the year or why they sive leadership program ACSC had ever need time to get ready for class. Certainly a seen. The day came to brief the boss—the senior leader has no business telling the lights went down, and they began unpack- students, “I slept in that seat when I was ing a first-rate program complete with new here,” or the perennial “It’s only a lot of courses, lectures, and writing assignments. reading if you do it.” Such academic mal- When they had finished, they expectantly practice does a disservice to Air University. awaited the commandant’s verdict. The ACSC leadership has the sometimes deli- boss looked over and said, “Now boys, let’s cate task of reminding speakers that “this is not work the students too hard!” One is not your father’s PME.” tempted to end the anecdote here, but, in fact, the department—military and civilians—went ahead and delivered that first- Students: rate program.20 The commandant supported The Only Consumers Who it, hard work and all. Want to Be Cheated Lastly, all students seem to prefer teach- Concluding Thoughts ers who cut corners and hand out high One finds the purpose of PME in the let- grades like they were candy. How else can ter “E.” On that point, we and Professor one explain the universal joy engendered Hughes are in complete agreement. Quality by the snow day? Nothing pleases young- faculty, sound curriculum content, and en- sters more than not going to school, an at- lightened leadership set the proper tone titude that carries forward to college stu- and get the most out of the civilians, mili- dents who insist they must wait no longer tary personnel, and students. No one can than 15 minutes for a full professor to show deny the importance of education, and the up for class. No professor, no problem! After surest way to educate is getting students to many years of reading course critiques, we read, think, write, and speak—a lot. The fac- recognize that student comments such as ulty represents the key to ensuring the “Great time management!” often mean “She soundness of this process; there are no showed a film, gave us an action-packed 20 shortcuts, no magic by which one can by- minutes, and let us go early!” This is not pass hard work and reach an authentic, ed- always the case, but it is mostly true most ucated end. And get to the end we must, for of the time. However alluring, we must not the future rests in the hands of those who cave in to the temptation. pass through our doors. Let us never take This dynamic extends beyond students. that for granted.  Sometimes the senior staff wants to cheat them too. One year at ACSC, during the Maxwell AFB, Alabama

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Notes

1. Daniel J. Hughes, “Professors in the Colonels’ 11. In reference to the colonel working assign- World,” in Military Culture and Education, ed. Douglas ments, not long ago ACSC had a dean of students Higbee (Farnham, United Kingdom: Ashgate Pub- who, among other things, worked manning issues lishing, 2010), 149–66. directly for the commandant. 2. Thomas E. Ricks, “Need Budget Cuts? We Can 12. For an example, see “Guidelines for Academic Probably Start by Shutting the Air War College,” The Year 2000 Resident Curriculum Development,” Best Defense (blog), 11 April 2011, http://ricks.foreign ACSC/DE, 29 January 1999, copy in the authors’ policy.com/posts/2011/04/11/need_budget_cuts_we possession. _probably_can_start_by_shutting_the_air_war_college. 13. Air University is aided by the Board of Visi- 3. One of us is a retired colonel with a PhD; the tors, Southern Association of Colleges and Schools, other is a civilian professor who has never served in and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Pro- the military. One or both of us were at ACSC from cess for Accreditation of Joint Education. 1991 to 2008. During that time, we both served (at 14. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. various times) as course director, department chair, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: vice-dean, and dean of education and curriculum. Princeton University Press, 1984), 141. 4. Readers ought to know that we agonized over 15. “ACSC Academic Year 2000 Curriculum Over- this piece for some time, particularly its tone. We do view,” PowerPoint briefing, 12 July 1999, copy in the not intend to sound like a couple of old session play- authors’ possession. ers blowing their own horns. If that is what you 16. “ACSC Modular Curriculum VTC,” PowerPoint hear, then we missed the mark. Our intention is presentation, 18 December 2002, copy in the au- modest: we saw some good practices along the way, thors’ possession. and “here they are.” 17. Our use of the terms critical thinking and 5. At the School of Advanced Air and Space Stud- levels of learning is obviously pejorative. If nothing ies (SAASS), where we both teach now, approxi- else, liberal education is a process of developing mately 28 percent of our graduates have attained useful habits of mind and patterns of inquiry. Deci- flag rank. phering what those might be is certainly part of 6. One of us was the third civilian PhD hired at learning how to think critically, but we depart from ACSC in 1991. See AU-10, Air University Catalog, Aca- mainstream advocates of “critical thinking” with demic Year 2002–2003 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Univer- regard to the means of developing those skills. For sity Press, August 2002), 75–80, http://www.au.af instance, in a widely distributed pamphlet titled .mil/au/cf/au_catalog_2002_03/au_cat_2002-03.pdf. “How to Study and Learn,” the authors make the The annual editions of the AU catalog provide valu- following claim: “The skills of critical thinking are able information on faculty demographics. the keys to learning every subject.” Although this 7. Both authors vividly recall the announce- observation may have some validity, its importance ments of the results of the promotion lists in the is truncated by the other 17 ideas listed as essential ACSC auditorium. The high promotion rate for for becoming a master student. As mentioned above, ACSC faculty was there for all to see and no doubt master students are a product of reading, thinking, helped with recruiting for faculty duty out of the writing, and speaking—that amounts to consider- current ACSC class. able work, something not mentioned in the pamphlet. 8. One should note that Colonel Forsyth did not 18. Some people have argued cogently that the attend resident intermediate developmental educa- Air Force, as a highly technical and action-oriented tion or senior developmental education. service, tends to attract individuals with little inter- 9. A perusal of the faculty lists published in the est in written expression. Air University Catalog from 2000 to 2004 reveals the 19. In a typical SAASS year, a student will write scope of this effort. at least 10 essays of 10 pages each and a thesis of 10. AU-10, Air University Catalog, Academic Year 60–100 pages, all extensively critiqued by the men- 2010–2011 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, tor, adviser, and reader. October 2010), 264–74, http://aupress.maxwell.af 20. Commandant PowerPoint presentation, 16 .mil/digital/pdf/book/AU10.pdf. Discussions with June 1998, copy in the authors’ possession. current ACSC faculty members and administrators confirmed this impression.

Fall 2011 | 99 Alternative Futures Analysis as a Complement to Planning Processes for the Use of Military Land Lt Col John S. Thomas, PhD, USMCR, Retired* Dr. David Mouat

When I took a decision or adopted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant—and many an irrelevant—factor. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards—all were at my finger-ends. The enemy I knew almost like my own side. —T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia), 1933

hat transpires outside an installa- veil a variety of plausible regional outcomes tion’s perimeter influences mis- or “futures” affecting installation projects. sion readiness over the long term. Given the successful application in these ThatW is why Air Force installations invest test locations, the DOD should apply AFA to heavily in collaborative partnering with off- any future land use study. This article ex- base agencies to develop plans within a re- plains alternative futures, including their gional context.1 Ensuring the long-term mis- development and use, and illustrates how sion effectiveness of military lands requires the process works by comparing it to mili- that commanders and planners at higher tary operational planning. Finally, it exam- echelons anticipate future conditions, in- ines the utility of this approach for installa- cluding growth of the regional population tions—how AFA can enhance current and development patterns that may contrib- installation-planning processes. ute to encroachment.2 In addition to considering off-base conditions, commanders also recognize that a linear focus in their plan- Alternative Futures Analysis ning can lead to tunnel vision, leaving the base vulnerable to surprises. How can one A scenario-based planning tool, AFA im- counter this potential myopia? This article proves planning at the regional scale. En- presents an approach called alternative fu- suring mission sustainability requires com- tures analysis (AFA), which the authors are prehensive planning. An effective way to currently conducting at Nellis AFB, Nevada. stimulate the planning process involves The Department of Defense (DOD) has em- presenting complex issues in the form of a ployed this innovative approach at several relatively small number of alternative “vi- Army and Marine Corps installations to un- sions” of how the future may unfold. Com-

*Lieutenant Colonel Thomas is an assistant research professor in the Division of Earth and Ecosystem Sciences at the Desert Research Institute, Reno, Nevada, as well as a senior scientist with Stetson Engineers, San Rafael, California. Dr. Mouat is an associate research professor in the Division of Earth and Ecosystem Sciences at the Desert Research Institute. He has worked with several projects involving the Department of Defense and alternative futures in the Southwest. Dr. Mouat has served on several United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization panels dealing with deserts and desertification.

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paring the potential consequences of optimize military infrastructure projects planned actions against alternative future against the backdrop of potential future con- contexts can provide a basis for discussion ditions.6 The figure on the next page indicates among planners and give commanders where recent AFAs have been performed. more information as well as a better under- The AFA process involves describing standing of the effects of uncertainty upon what the future could become (rather than decision making.3 predicting what it will become) so that lead- Scenarios are outlines of events—plau- ers can fashion courses of action (COA) to- sible, fictional plots for the future “con- day that address a range of potential fu- structed for the purpose of focusing atten- tures.7 Planners enumerate multiple tion on causal processes and decision possible scenarios, and the alternative fu- points.”4 Leaders commonly and informally tures provide a means whereby military use scenarios to evaluate individual and or- planners can compare how various factors ganizational performance against a range of might influence or encroach upon training likely variables, or to “chair-fly” a key policy operations, facility development, and pos- or practice through a complex, imaginary sible base expansion. Rather than generate environment. Scenarios in the alternative probabilities for occurrence, as does statisti- futures context contain more carefully de- cal forecasting, AFA contrasts one future fined sociological, political, and environ- with another to establish a basis for evaluat- mental factors on which planners can build ing relationships among system dynamics, adaptive policies. The scenarios integrate policy choices, and potential consequences. what is occurring and what may come to No uniquely optimal set of alternative fu- pass in the region of an installation; they tures exists; the best set reveals a wide give decision makers a glimpse of futures range of possible outcomes that evoke cre- that differ from the extrapolated present, ative, forward-looking plans to cover the which is the typical default “trend future.” broadest range of intersecting futures. Blindly relying on a trend future built upon assumptions that might expose the installation to surprises is shortsighted. Generating Scenarios and Scenarios also offer a context for dis- Alternative Futures cussing planning options on base and with regional stakeholders. One can use them Developing alternative futures is a two- as an evaluation tool for predicting short- step process. Planners develop scenarios for falls and inherent inflexibilities before a how the future could unfold and then spa- project begins. The cross-disciplinary plan- tially allocate alternative futures based on ning dialogue integrates typically isolated the trajectory of each scenario. expertise (“stovepipes”) within a single, The premise for an alternative futures structured planning framework. Using study is that landscape change and resul- AFA, planners can integrate information tant modifications in elements of the eco- from each planning discipline to build and system and socioeconomic systems, as well execute detailed scenarios with concise, as military training and support infra measurable, and plausible outcomes. As a structure, stem from alterations in regional result, decision makers can then consider land use patterns, usually related to the implications of plans in more concrete, changes in urban growth. Therefore, AFAs less abstract terms.5 focus on potential variations in land use This methodology, currently under de- and land cover, together with the way these velopment at Nellis AFB by a team of ex- affect the installation. Useful scenarios ternal researchers and the Nellis Public clarify the most important ambiguities for Partnerships Office, has proven useful to the future—conditions that commanders military and civilian communities as they may not be able to influence but may need

Fall 2011 | 101 Figure. DOD-oriented alternative futures analyses in the southwestern United States

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to cope with. Scenarios can be normative, (4) using the most potentially significant emphasizing trajectories toward desired and uncertain forces to frame the logic of goals, or exploratory, examining possible the future, (5) fleshing out the scenarios, challenges on the horizon.8 and (6) assessing their implications. Understanding the major drivers of trans- Steps one through three develop through formation in the region enables planners to workshops, questionnaires, or guided sur- generate realistic scenarios and explore veys designed to elicit stakeholder opinion. critical choices that could influence the fu- In this process, planners may include man- ture. Demographic trends are fundamental agers of installation resources and facilities, drivers of change, as are trends in technology military operations personnel, representa- and the economy. Unlike the procedure in tives of higher headquarters, representa- trend analysis, planners must also sort tives of a regional planning agency, and through the potential for (and implications members of advocacy groups.11 of) abrupt shifts in factors ranging from so- Examining a variety of scenarios can re- cial attitudes to climate change. Critical un- veal strategies for promoting desirable out- certainties are the most potentially signifi- comes across a range of possible futures. cant of these forces—events that, should Having an array of scenarios helps prevent they occur, might strongly influence the fu- tunnel vision, and leaders can concentrate ture of the region; however, planners are on critical decision points. Commonly, a fundamentally uncertain about whether or group initially develops a rather large set of how these events will unfold. One can potential scenarios and then condenses frame critical uncertainties with questions them into a manageable few—typically about, for example, the region’s having suf- three to eight which capture the most im- ficient water and energy to support military portant uncertainties spanning the range of training or about government regulations conditions that the installation and sur- being more or less restrictive than at present.9 rounding region might face. Presenting complex issues in the form Planners then establish a “future” associ- of several scenarios can lay bare conflicts, ated with each scenario. Whereas one may inconsistencies, and uncertainties, and review scenarios as plots or story lines, fu- veal how the actions and policies of neigh- tures are “snapshots” of specific points boring land managers might affect an in- along the story line (often 20–30 years into stallation’s mission over time.10 Local the future).12 Applying the term alternative government actions can influence the pat- futures to the set of futures connotes the im- terns of urban growth, including develop- plicit comparison among them. Divergent ment that might encroach upon military scenarios present a range of conceivable training lands. These government inter- trajectories that a system might take, but ventions are often reactions to trends (or, carrying each scenario to a logical conclu- conversely, sudden shifts) in the social, sion reveals the consequences of choices economic, and cultural landscape. and provides a tangible vision of an installa- The process for scenario development tion and its neighbors operating within entails working with military planners and transformed circumstances at a future point regional stakeholders to develop a set of in time.13 Planners compare the alternative scenarios that incorporate multiple influ- futures to one another relative to the effects ences upon an installation’s infrastructure, upon valued resources. For military studies, support, and military-training operations. such effects often include encroachment The basic framework consists of six steps: upon military facilities and training activi- (1) specifying focal issues or decisions, ties, as well as other factors (see table). (2) identifying driving forces of local and By examining scenarios and their resul- regional change, (3) ranking the factors of tant alternative futures, commanders, plan- change by importance and uncertainty, ners, and regional land use managers can

Fall 2011 | 103 Table. Factors typically considered in alternative futures analysis

Society Military Biophysical Social Trends Training-Range Capabilities Land Cover Cultural Trends Base Population Hydrology Economic Trends Flight Routes Biodiversity Politics New Weapons Systems Air Quality Demographic Trends Encroachment Soils Urbanization Regulations Aesthetics Regulations better interpret consequences associated decision-support process for understanding with policies and take action to ensure mis- the battlespace and the options it presents sion sustainability. The desired outcomes to friendly and enemy forces. IPB is a sys- from the AFA process include enhanced tematic, continuous process of analyzing understanding of several factors important enemy capabilities and the environment in for planning: a specific geographic area. The products of IPB become part of an intelligence estimate • drivers of change (major trends and used as a reference by various staff disci- forcing factors) plines (such as logistics and operations) to • alternative patterns of land use, mis- develop staff estimates of the situation and sion activities, and resultant effects COAs. The IPB process enables the commander to apply and maximize combat • long-term planning needs (for installa- power selectively at critical points in time tion and region) and space. • increased capacity for collaboration The first step in IPB, defining the battle- and consensus field, focuses the process by identifying aspects of the environment that could influ- • mission sustainability ence both friendly and enemy forces. Describing battlespace effects, the second step, entails an in-depth evaluation of the Processes for Military constraints and opportunities offered by the environment. In the third step, intelligence Operational Planning planners concentrate on the capabilities Although it represents a new method for and behavior of the enemy forces, such as planning at installations, AFA shares prin- size and weapons systems available and the ciples with military operational planning. way they organize for battle. Incorporating To present AFA in familiar terms, the fol- the results of IPB into COA development lowing discussion compares it to two mili- ensures that each friendly COA takes advantage of the opportunities offered by the tary operational planning processes—intel- 14 ligence and war gaming. environment and threat situation. Just as IPB emphasizes aspects of the en- Intelligence vironment and enemy capabilities that most influence the mission, so does AFA AFA is analogous to intelligence preparation address factors that propel the current sys- of the battlespace (or battlefield) (IPB), the tem (key drivers) as well as those not yet

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understood (critical uncertainties).15 IPB sensus (or until additional convergence of assembles intelligence from a variety of opinion is unlikely).17 sources to define constraints and opportuni- Analysts use the input gathered to iden- ties relevant to operational planning; simi- tify focal issues and to rank factors of larly, AFA draws upon diverse information change by importance and level of uncer- sources to define constraints and opportuni- tainty. They identify the critical uncertainties useful in planning for base facilities and ties to frame the logic of the scenarios— range management. Furthermore, IPB in- “What are the most important variables to forms staff planning during development of examine?” In this context, one can view an operations plan in much the same way the Delphi approach as an analog for war that AFA informs staff planning (as exam- gaming. Both activities are iterative, facili- ined in the Nellis AFB case study, below). tated processes for assembling and scoring Although AFA takes more time to employ expert opinion and facts drawn from mul- than does IPB, the processes are similar. tiple disciplines. Much as war gaming examines the rela- War Gaming tive strengths and weaknesses of COAs, AFA examines key drivers and critical uncertain- AFA resembles war gaming in several ways. ties to frame scenarios, defining direction The war game helps the commander iden- and the pace of change. In essence the pro- tify strengths and weaknesses, associated cess presents a geographic vulnerability as- risks, and asset shortfalls for each COA. sessment that can help planners and stake- During the war game, the staff assembles holders understand the implications of land information from IPB as well as other use choices and tailor the development of sources and “fights” the set of enemy COAs COAs to address these futures. (developed during the IPB process) against each friendly COA. The war game proceeds according to an event matrix, not unlike a Notional Case Study: scenario story line. Matching each friendly COA against each projected enemy COA, Nellis Air Force Base the game enables refinement of staff esti- To demonstrate how one performs an mates and recommendation of the optimal AFA, this article now examines a notional friendly COA to the commander. War gam- case study—notional because the results of ing stimulates the staff to consider ideas an alternative futures study currently under and insights from new perspectives.16 way at Nellis AFB are not yet available.18 The process whereby AFA assembles Details of the research design and the re- information is similar to but usually more sults of that study will appear upon its protracted than that employed in war gam- completion. In the meantime, however, we ing. Alternative futures analysts use tech- explain the conduct of the study and antici- niques such as questionnaire surveys, pate application of the results to installation planning “studios,” and facilitated work- planning processes. shops based on a Delphi approach—a The research team and representatives method developed by the RAND Corpora- from Nellis AFB identified regional stake- tion in the 1960s to make effective use of holders from a broad range of interests. The informed, intuitive judgment. The study team and base personnel met with the team distributes questionnaires to a par- stakeholders several times to explain the ticipant group and compiles the responses, study process and begin assembling the returning the results to participants with- data necessary for analysis, collecting their out attribution for additional consideration input using an e-mail survey instrument in light of the group responses. The itera- that followed the Delphi approach. Stake- tions continue until the group reaches con- holders submitted their views regarding ex-

Fall 2011 | 105 isting conditions and the future of the re- The Public Partnerships Office at Nellis gion. Concurrently, the research team (in coordination with planners at higher assembled quantitative and spatial data con- echelons) could use the study to employ cerning regional socioeconomic and envi- strategies for managing “encroachment ronmental conditions. partnering” and to acquire buffer lands. In The team generated a set of scenario nar- these processes, the installation enters into ratives describing possible changes during partnerships with agencies or conservation the years 2010 to 2040. The scenarios were organizations to obtain real estate interests defined by the key trends and critical un- that prevent incompatible uses of the land. certainties identified and prioritized by the Such interests often entail restrictive ease- Nellis AFB team and the stakeholders. Ana- ments. Another approach, taken by the lysts designed the scenarios to explore Joint Land Use Study program, involves causal processes and identify key decision installations issuing community-planning points. The figure included earlier in the article depicts the study area—the context assistance grants to help state and local area of Nellis AFB; Creech AFB, Nevada; governments better understand and incor- and their training ranges. porate into their planning the technical as- Analysts created alternative futures for pects of studies on an air installation’s com- each scenario, using urban development patible-use zones (air and/or range) and on models to define changes in land use. This operational noise management.19 process evaluated the attractiveness of Importantly, the acquisition of buffer available land for development and allo- lands preserves significant off-base habitats, cated changes in land use according to potentially alleviating the pressure of envi- model assumptions in keeping with the ronmental encroachment and ameliorating logic of the various scenarios. The research possible regulatory restrictions upon mili- team then examined these alternative fu- tary training. Nellis AFB could use alterna- tures for the effects of potential encroach- tive futures to examine how nearby land ment upon the installations, flight routes, use might change, thus obtaining insight and training ranges, as well as their differ- into prioritizing encroachment partnerships ential effects on hydrology, biodiversity, and land acquisitions. and other factors important to installation planners and regional stakeholders. This Management Planning for Range Complexes brief explanation of the study process provides a basis for discussing how the com- Installations develop management plans for mander and staff of Nellis AFB might use range complexes in order to sustain the ca- the results. pabilities of military training ranges. One aspect of this planning has to do with iden- Encroachment Management tifying and establishing baseline require- At the establishment of Nellis AFB, many ments for range maintenance—a baseline miles separated it from Las Vegas; however, used to justify funding and resources neces- urbanization has crept up to the base perim- sary to sustain the range and training-area 20 eter and appears likely to continue to en- complex. Nellis could use AFA to provide croach upon the installation, causing prob- context concerning how its ranges and the lems. The latter include civilian use of surrounding lands might change over time. airspace interfering with military training, Such information could facilitate prioritiza- development occurring too close to flight tion of requirements for range maintenance paths, and the construction of infrastruc- relative to projected future conditions, po- ture such as power lines and towers that tential sources of encroachment pressure, jeopardize low-level flight. and fiscal constraints.

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Comprehensive Planning for Installations ment planning (INRMP), basically a master plan for natural resources.22 Analysis of plau- Scenarios and alternative futures can prove sible futures can assist in goal setting and useful to facilities and infrastructure plan- choosing the means to realize those goals by ners at the installation and higher echelons. Long-range facilities-development plans emphasizing key system drivers and critical represent a long-term investment strategy uncertainties. Robust strategies would pos- for developing an installation’s physical ture the installation adaptively, with the in- plant and training lands to support the mili- stallation formulating exploratory policies tary mission.21 Regulations emphasize the and monitoring programs to address un- vital relationships among component plans knowns and standing ready to meet a range that address sustainable range planning, of future possibilities, as projected within the management planning for real-property as- alternative futures. AFA conveniently fits sets, environmental planning, and sustain- within the INRMP process. Managers at able design and development. Installations Nellis could use AFA during the next five- coordinate such planning with the local year update to their INRMP. community and must account for regional development and change, identifying strate- Programmatic Environmental Consultation gies for addressing sustainability issues and Programmatic agreements for conserving possible effects on the base’s mission. wetlands and habitats offer a means of con- AFA generates the baseline data and sulting efficiently with regulatory agencies context for any alterations of these same by bundling a number of resources for regu- parameters. The assessment of how the latory consultation and the issuance of per- region may change over time can inform mits. For example, a single umbrella Bio- assumptions about facilities planning and logical Opinion or Clean Water Act permit key components of comprehensive planning such as transportation, environment, could identify and manage all endangered future development, and encroachment. species or wetlands subject to effects pro- Knowledge gained through scenario devel- duced by military training or infrastructure. opment can assist the Nellis staff in priori- However, regulatory agencies might require tizing specific projects. that the base undertake a comprehensive Additionally, AFA could enhance com- assessment of the potential impact upon prehensive planning by graphically depict- natural resources, as well as the cumulative ing the multiple ways in which the sur- effects of change over time. Such an assess- rounding community and region might ment would allow the agency to certify that alter over time, presenting new challenges the agreement would not put resources in or opportunities to the installation. In this peril. If Nellis AFB were to engage in this case, planners could check the plan against sort of compliance strategy, it could use each future, performing a vulnerability as- AFA to supply the regional context for such sessment based on the dictum that a plan an assessment. designed to be robust enough to accommodate multiple potential futures is superior Higher-Echelon Planning Processes to and more resilient than a plan that con- The perspective gained through AFA may siders only the trend future. prove particularly relevant to planners and program managers at the major command Integrated Natural Resource or service headquarters level—individuals Management Planning tasked with addressing issues defined by Like all bases with terrain that supports sig- greater temporal and spatial scales than nificant natural resources, Nellis AFB imple- installation commanders must deal with. ments integrated natural resource manage- Although these planners and program

Fall 2011 | 107 managers play a vital role in planning at especially well. Since AFA can stimulate the installation level, they are also respon- cross-discipline planning, it is particularly sible for planning among installations and useful in bridging the stovepipes of tradi- training ranges at the regional level. tional staff functions and in integrating dis- Therefore, regional studies might be espe- parate facilities, operations, and environ- cially valuable for integrating plans and mental-planning activities. programs among bases and across service Commanders and planners can use AFA (and agency) boundaries. In fact, state and to examine how to orient an installation’s federal agency representatives participat- internal planning process to accommodate ing in the Western Regional Partnership, changes, both gradual and abrupt, within a led by the Office of the Secretary of De- region and to determine the most valuable fense, desire this sort of utility from an on- strategic relationships as the future unfolds. going alternative futures study that encom- Moreover, such analysis can integrate plans passes the Southwest Range Complex—an across spatial and temporal scales, assimi- integrating, large-scale analysis that will lating regional perspectives and addressing anchor the installations within a coherent, long-term prospects of interest to major albeit dynamic, context.23 Such a study has commands, headquarters, and interservice the goal of enabling leaders and program coordination. AFA enables planners to as- managers to envision future support resemble an array of plausible futures and quirements for the training of military determine whether plans in use today are forces across a complex of bases, ranges, robust enough to encompass the implica- and operating areas in an altered land- tions of each alternative future. Command- scape at some point in the future. ers may direct proactive measures to pursue or avoid particular futures. Granted, a few military installations have Conclusions used AFA, but the Air Force would benefit The methods employed in conducting an by employing it more widely. Future efforts AFA are similar in process and function to in this area of research should focus on those currently used by military operational methods for doing so in an efficient and economical manner.  planners; for this reason, they complement existing planning processes at installations Reno, Nevada

Notes

1. For collaboration requirements and plans, see http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf US Department of Defense, Resources for INRMP /320015p.pdf. Implementation: A Handbook for the DoD Natural 2. Allan W. Shearer et al., “Examining Development- Resources Manager (Washington, DC: Legacy Re- Related Uncertainties for Environmental Management: source Management Program, 2005), http://www Strategic Planning Scenarios in Southern California,” .denix.osd.mil/nr/upload/INRMP_Handbook Landscape and Urban Planning 77, no. 4 (September _September2005_highres.pdf. See also John S. 2006): 360. See also Shearer et al., Land Use Scenarios, Thomas, “Ecosystem Management on Military 38; and Thomas, “Ecosystem Management,” 270–81. Bases” (PhD diss., George Mason University, 2004), 3. For background on scenario studies, see Peter 90–93; Allan W. Shearer et al., Land Use Scenarios: Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Environmental Consequences of Development (Boca Future in an Uncertain World (New York: Doubleday, Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2009), 37–39; and Department 1991), 29–117. For discussion of support to decision of Defense Directive (DODD) 3200.15, Sustainment making, see Shearer et al., “Examining Development- of Ranges and Operating Areas, 10 January 2003, Related Uncertainties,” 362, 378–79.

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4. Schwartz, Art of the Long View, 3–6; and of the Operational Environment, 16 June 2009, Shearer et al., “Examining Development-Related https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp2_01_3.pdf. Uncertainties,” 362. The quotation is from Herman 15. Shearer et al., “Examining Development- Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000: A Related Uncertainties,” 365. Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three 16. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 December Years (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 6. 2006, sec. 3, https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp5 5. Shearer et al., “Examining Development-Re- _0.pdf. lated Uncertainties,” 362. 17. For a discussion of the Delphi approach, see 6. Researchers from the Desert Research Insti- Olaf Helmer, Analysis of the Future: The Delphi tute (Reno, Nevada), the University of Nevada–Reno, Method, no. P-3558 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, and the University of Texas–Austin are conducting March 1967), http://www.rand.org/content/dam the ongoing project. For the Camp Pendleton and /rand/pubs/papers/2008/P3558.pdf. For a descrip- Marine Corps Air Station Miramar study, see Shearer tion of various methods for eliciting stakeholder et al., Land Use Scenarios as well as Carl Steinitz et input and developing scenarios, see Shearer et al., al., Biodiversity and Landscape Planning: Alternative Land Use Scenarios, 69–77. Futures for the Region of Camp Pendleton, California 18. Researchers at the Desert Research Institute, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Graduate School of De- the University of Nevada–Reno, and the University sign, 1996). The Fort Huachuca study is the subject of Texas–Austin are conducting the Alternative Fu- of Carl Steinitz et al., Alternative Futures for Chang- tures of the Southwest Range Complex study, funded ing Landscapes: The Upper San Pedro River Basin in by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and managed by the US Army Corps of Engineers Combat Arizona and Sonora (Washington, DC: Island Press, Engineering Research Laboratory. 2003). Ongoing studies by the authors’ research 19. Regarding easements and land use, see the team involve the Barry M. Goldwater Range, Marine Trust for Public Land, Department of Defense Encroach- Corps Air Station Yuma, the Marine Corps Air ment Partnering, accessed 20 November 2010, http:// Ground Combat Center, and Yuma Proving Ground. www.tpl.org/what-we-do/policy-legislation/federal 7. Shearer et al., “Examining Development- -funding-programs/department-of-defense.html. Related Uncertainties,” 379–80; and Garry D. Peterson 20. See DODD 3200.15, Sustainment of Ranges. et al., “Assessing Future Ecosystem Services: A Case 21. See USAF Directorate of Engineering and Study of the Northern Highlands Lake District, Wis- Services, Long Range Facilities Development Planning consin,” Conservation Ecology 7, no. 3 (January 2003): Bulletin, August 1989, http://www.afcee.af.mil/shared 1, http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol7/iss3/art1 /media/document/AFD-070924-059.pdf. See also /print.pdf. For simplified, concise examples of sce- par. 2.6 of Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 32-10, narios supporting management programs, see Brian Installations and Facilities, 4 March 2010, http:// Walker and David Salt, Resilience Thinking: Sustain- www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs ing Ecosystems and People in a Changing World /AFPD32-10.pdf; and AFPD 32-90, Real Property Asset (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2006), 53–63. Management, 6 August 2007, http://www.e-publishing 8. Shearer et al., “Examining Development- .af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFPD32-90.pdf. Related Uncertainties,” 363; and Walker and Salt, 22. Required by Title 16, United States Code, sec. Resilience Thinking, 102. 670, Sikes Act, http://www.fws.gov/endangered 9. Shearer et al., “Examining Development- /esa-library/pdf/2004SikesAct%20NMFWA.pdf, Related Uncertainties,” 365. INRMPs are prepared according to Air Force Instruc- 10. Ibid., 363. tion 32-7064, Integrated Natural Resources Manage- 11. Ibid. ment, 17 September 2004, http://www.e-publishing 12. Ibid., 379. .af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI32-7064.pdf. 13. Ibid., 363. 23. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, with 14. Field Manual 34-130, Intelligence Preparation other state and federal partners, formed the Western of the Battlefield, 8 July 1994, chap. 2, http://www Regional Partnership. See Western Regional Partner- .fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-130.pdf; and Joint ship, accessed 16 January 2011, https://wrpinfo.org Publication (JP) 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation /Default.aspx.

Fall 2011 | 109 Book Reviews

We all wonder about ourselves and how we would react to combat. Further, we can hardly doubt that the vicarious experience of reading cannot substitute for the real thing. But we cannot start wars to explore our behavior in them; thus, aspiring leaders must supplement their experience with professional study. Readers who want entertaining but informative reading during temporary duty should carry along Men at War. If they desire professional enhancement, then The Face of Battle is a better choice. Dr. David R. Mets Niceville, Florida

Men at War: A Soldier’s-Eye View of the Final Countdown: NASA and the End of the Most Important Battles in History edited Space Shuttle Program by Pat Duggins. Uni- by Bill Fawcett. Berkley Caliber (http:// versity Press of Florida (http://www.upf.com), us.penguingroup.com), 375 Hudson Street, New York, New York 10014-3657, 2009, 336 15 Northwest 15th Street, Gainesville, Florida pages, $15.00 (softcover), ISBN 978-0-425- 32611-2079, 2007, 264 pages, $24.95 (hard- 23013-8. cover), ISBN 978-0-8130-3146-0; 2009, $19.95 (softcover), ISBN 978-0-8130-3384-6. Men at War is a readable work that will provide the air-warrior with an evening or two of enter- The space shuttle is an intriguing craft. Part taining reading relevant to the military life. As spaceship, part glider, sometimes boxcar or bus, usual, the advertising hype overstates the case, it is a wondrous vehicle. Originally billed as the but readers may learn something about the sol- new vehicle to carry Air Force satellites, the dier’s life from it. Not really a first-person account, shuttle came into its own in 1993 by transporting the narrative is filtered through the minds of the segments of the International Space Station as professional writers of the several chapters. Many that program took off. The shuttle’s life is com- are novelists, all write well, and some are better plex and multifaceted, fraught with lofty suc- informed on military history than others. The chap- cesses and equally grim tragedies. ters run from Roman times to Vietnam. The one on Pat Duggins, National Public Radio’s resident the Civil War Soldier is the best of the lot. Others space expert since 1996, does yeoman’s work in include Roman soldiers of antiquity; battling knights chronicling the story of the space shuttle. Well of the Third Crusade; a French artilleryman at suited to write this book, he has covered a multi- Waterloo; Soldiers who fought at Gettysburg; a rifle- tude of shuttle missions, two of its tragedies, and man in the last American battle of World War II; the twists and turns of the spacecraft’s career the invasion of France; a Marine in Korea; and a from inception to scheduled retirement. Navy SEAL in Vietnam. Sometimes fiction repre- An easy read, Final Countdown does not serve sents the truth better than formal history, but it is up dry history or include facts or dates without hard to tell. In this work, despite the historical reason. This book is packed with insider infor- soundness of the story, the reader has difficulty mation about the space shuttle, the National distinguishing fiction from fact.Men at War is not Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) as unique as the hype claims. space program in general, and many of the key John Keegan’s The Face of Battle, one of the figures in the shuttle’s history. classics in this category, covers the Battles of The first chapter, “The Future,” splendidly Agincourt and the Somme, as well as one also lays out a synopsis of the space program from described in Men at War—Waterloo. Possessing Mr. Carl Walz’s announcement in 2005 about the top-of-the-line credentials as a military historian, future of the moon and Mars programs to devel- Keegan taught the subject at the British military opment of the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). academy at Sandhurst for many years. His prose Duggins weaves in pieces of Apollo and space is as readable as that in Men at War. shuttle program history and lessons learned,

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aptly applying these in the context of the up- Keir Lieber’s sophisticated critique of tech coming CEV and its missions. nology as a determinant of national security The author sets the stage for discussion of the policy is worth noting for several reasons. His shuttle’s birth and development as well as monograph aims to unhinge a laboriously con- NASA’s plans for the CEV after the shuttle pro- structed, fiercely guarded citadel of social sci- gram ends. He cites a press meeting in February ence wisdom: the idea that new technology, 2006, during which a reporter asked Astronaut most importantly nuclear weapons technology, Steve Lindsey and his crew if any of them were can alter the fundamentals of political competi- thinking of training for a moon mission. Evi- tion. Lieber mostly succeeds in this endeavor, dently caught off guard, after exchanging looks but, as he implies in the conclusion, his achieve- with his crew, Lindsey responded, “I think we’re ment leaves those concerned with international too old” (p. 27). Duggins repeatedly shows that relations and defense policy with much work to do. as NASA changed missions and vehicles, it also Lieber’s demolition strategy forces so-called traded in its old astronauts for new ones. The offense-defense theory into social science re- pattern is already set for the postshuttle era. quirements espoused by leading methodologists, He also launches into the troubled history of so it can be rigorously tested against the historical record. He identifies the core of the theory the space shuttle program, doing so in an engag- with military technologies that dramatically in- ing manner by coupling personal observation crease either the mobility or firepower of land- with stories recounted by many astronauts and based forces. Expansion of railroad networks shuttle personnel. For instance, Duggins includes during the late nineteenth century increased the a lighthearted exchange from 1959 between quantities of men and materiel that could be soon-to-be-hired NASA (eventually shuttle) engi- moved, and reduced the time for mobilizing neer Sam Beddingfield and astronaut Gus Grissom. armies. Incorporation of the tank into combined- Beddingfield confesses to Grissom that he wants arms operations freed fighting from the static a job at NASA; Grissom says that NASA has jobs. trench warfare of World War I. Railroads and Beddingfield further admits that he doesn’t know tanks, then, are candidates for offensive technolo- anything about rockets. “That’s OK,” Grissom gies. By contrast, the small-arms and artillery responds, “neither does NASA” (p. 45). revolution of the late-nineteenth century and the To his credit, the author does what he says he nuclear revolution of the twentieth century are would do: tell the story of NASA and the end of evaluated as harbingers for defensive dominance. the space shuttle program. However, it seems to In case after case, Lieber finds that new mo- me that Duggins spends too much time on the bility at the tactical or operational levels can be shuttle and too little on what might follow. The harnessed at the strategic level to serve defen- book left me wanting more of the story. I felt sive as well as offensive political goals. On the that Duggins missed a golden opportunity to ex- other hand, firepower, up to and including nu- plore where few have explored so far—for instance, clear warheads packing the explosive punch of NASA’s plans beyond the CEV and the prospect over one million tons of TNT, can be overcome— of landing people on Mars. Despite this short- using duck-and-cover tactics in the conventional coming, I recommend Final Countdown as a valu- realm or brinkmanship in the nuclear era. In able insider’s view of the space shuttle program. sum, Lieber finds little evidence that technology, in and of itself, ever exacerbated or ameliorated Maj Paul Niesen, USAF, Retired international competition. What matters is what Scott AFB, Illinois mattered to Machiavelli—opportunities for gains in influence afforded by the international balance of power. Unfortunately for the purist version of real- War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Poli- ism that War and the Engineers espouses and for- tics over Technology by Keir A. Lieber. Cor- tunately, perhaps, for international politics, nell University Press (http://www.cornell readers may question whether national-power press.cornell.edu/), Box 6525, 750 Cascadilla comparisons confound scholars as much as net Street, Ithaca, New York 14851-6525, 2005, 256 assessments for offensive advantage. When ana- pages, $57.95 (hardcover), ISBN 978-0-8014- lysts attempt to measure the systemwide distri- 4383-1; 2008, 256 pages, $21.00 (softcover), bution of capabilities or break this down into ISBN 978-0-8014-7487-3. smaller dyadic comparisons, they find that power,

Fall 2011 | 111 like advantage, involves other variables besides able punishment to a would-be conqueror. For numbers of troops or classes of equipment. As Lieber, few technical arrangements could soften Raymond Aron persuasively argued during Ameri- fears of an opportunistic, space-supported strike ca’s Cold War trials with irregular warfare, the or discourage aggression even after nuclear balance of power for a given conflict also depends weapons entered the arena. on skill, geography, and domestic comity—in On the other hand, Lieber’s critics will recall other words, the kinds of variables Lieber es- instances when the “president’s explicit and pub- chews as so much unscientific hand waving. lic rejection of mutual assured destruction” (p. Lieber reserves his most devastating criticism 147) succumbed to joint declarations averring for Stephen Van Evera’s Causes of War: Power that a nuclear war cannot be won and must and the Roots of Conflict (Cornell University never be fought. Beyond bans on equipment, Press, 1999), an ode to defensive dominant tech- exchanges of information as part of the negotia- nology as a means for warding off tragedy in tion and verification processes in arms control great-power politics. Yet, Van Evera’s argument can buttress defense estimates and leaders’ per- is not engaged on its own terms. Lieber assidu- ceptions respecting the full costs of a first strike. ously separates technology from organization War and the Engineers speaks directly to mili- and doctrine while Van Evera does not. tary strategists and students of international poli- In justifying the spare approach, Lieber asks tics. Within these audiences, modern skeptics of readers to consider how equipment variables are arms control will find systematic, historical sup- easier to measure compared to doctrine. Also, he argues, powerful militaries generally get it right: port of their inclinations. For foreign policy and they rapidly optimize their use of acquired tech- defense analysts who hold out hope, War and the nologies to support offensive or defensive politi- Engineers provides the right kind of provocation. cal objectives. Still, Adam Stulberg and Michael A less rarefied, more practical version of offense- Salomone of the Georgia Institute of Technology defense theory may yet rescue deterrence policy. analyze defense transformation as a complex, An improved version of offense-defense theory, managerial challenge that some militaries ad- however, will still confront Lieber’s gauntlet: un- dress ahead of others. Their blow-by-blow ac- der what conditions, if any, can technology be count of German reorganization and experimen- engineered to preserve peace? tation across the interwar years in Managing Dr. Damon Coletta Defense Transformation (Ashgate, 2007) contrasts US Air Force Academy, Colorado sharply with Lieber’s epiphanic debut for blitz- krieg in the May 1940 Battle of France. In isolating equipment from doctrine, Lieber does demonstrate how little developments in The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad pure technology alter the fundamentals of inter- by Steven K. O’Hern. Prometheus Books national competition. Those who favor arms (http://www.prometheusbooks.com), 59 John control as a means of mitigating certain deadly incentives for aggression are obliged to push Glenn Drive, Amherst, New York 14228-2197, back against Lieber’s thesis at least enough to 2008, 292 pages, $25.98 (hardcover), ISBN show how variation in science and technology 978-1-59102-670-9. management drives increases in offensive military power as well as perceptions of its effective- The Intelligence Wars should have been a true- ness. In this context, Van Evera’s prodding to life spy adventure set in war-torn Baghdad, but think holistically about technology—in terms of author Steven K. O’Hern was not satisfied with what happens under varying combinations of recounting his time as leader of a human intel- doctrine or geography and in terms of how cer- ligence (HUMINT) unit tasked with hunting in- tain weapon technologies sow seeds of over surgents. When the book discusses HUMINT optimism—has to be carefully reevaluated. tradecraft and demonstrates such techniques via Today, the United States engages other mili- personal experiences or anecdotes, it is an en- taries in a mixed world, featuring space-based gaging, often educational, read. Unfortunately, targeting systems that might allow standoff plat- Colonel O’Hern, now retired, wastes too many forms to pick apart another state’s defenses with pages either regurgitating “generational warfare” impunity, alongside the presence of robust nu- myths or railing against issues often better ad- clear arsenals capable of administering unbear- dressed in professional journals.

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A career officer in the Air Force’s Office of for establishing the context of the author’s expe- Special Investigations, the author subsequently riences conducting HUMINT operations in Iraq. assumed command of the Strategic Counter Furthermore, the opening fictional account of intelligence Directorate (SCID) of Multi-National chapter 8 is insulting in its depiction of intelli- Force–Iraq. His years as a special agent and the gence officers and, again, contributes nothing. six months he spent in Baghdad in 2005 lend Readers will find similar pettiness in the latter credibility to discussions of HUMINT, a tradition- part of the chapter, which discusses analysts, ally Army-dominated field. But Colonel O’Hern’s although the treatment of analyst-handler fusion lack of experience with other intelligence disci- is valuable. plines stands in stark contrast to his HUMINT A lesser failing of the book, one that affects background. The author’s consistent laments Colonel O’Hern’s contributions to professional regarding an intelligence community focused thought, concerns the inescapable difficulty of excessively on technology, though possibly accu- writing a “history” about a war in progress. Lim- rate, are not sufficiently substantiated in the book. iting the story to a chronicle of his experiences Chapters 5 and 6, about HUMINT operations, would have largely eliminated this predicament, are certainly the most rewarding ones. Through but the emphasis on “fixing” the problems en- a careful, comprehensible explanation of source countered in his six-month tour, four years before selection and handling, Colonel O’Hern sets the publication, only wastes ink. The author’s rec- stage for a number of interesting demonstrations ommendations for better integration of reservists of tradecraft in use. Sadly, many of his stories, and guardsmen with law-enforcement backgrounds truncated to two or three paragraphs, easily into intelligence, and for the establishment of a could have filled the remainder of the book and single officer in charge of all intelligence opera- provided a much better opportunity for learning tions in-theater are worth investigating. Unfortu- lessons developed by the author and his SCID nately, many of his other concerns, particularly team. Instead, these chapters serve only as a regarding the bureaucratic nature of the US mili- minor respite in what is otherwise a largely aca- tary, the sharing of intelligence among agencies, demic discussion about theories of the evolution and the pairing of analysts with operators have of war and the US military’s ill-preparedness to already been addressed in the years since Colonel engage in “fourth-generation warfare.” O’Hern’s tour of duty. Current solutions have Although Colonel O’Hern acknowledges the not yet proved fully successful, but his recom- contributions of other intelligence disciplines and the importance of intelligence “cross-cue” mendations are now outdated. only in passing, his insights into HUMINT offer When he concentrates solely on HUMINT, excellent education to intelligence professionals the author does an excellent job of highlighting throughout the community. Equally enlighten- both its importance to counterinsurgencies and ing are his observations about the cultural and its weaknesses, such as a lack of precision and interpersonal dynamics of a divided Iraq. The reliability. His “lessons learned” from Iraq re- author’s recounting of visits to the Iraqi Ministry garding the use of analysts to feed guidance di- of the Interior, each floor occupied by different rectly to handlers and their sources, the pitfalls sectarian factions, or his trip to Kurdish-dominated of using contractors to support HUMINT opera- regions that consider Iraq a foreign country is tions, and the lack of actionable intelligence from both informative and frustrating with regard to the vast majority of “casual sources” could serve US goals for the region. as important guides for intelligence personnel. Chapter 3, “Fourth-Generation Warfare,” and Oddly, in chapter 7, which criticizes the existence chapter 9, “The Next War,” represent the low of “stovepipes,” Colonel O’Hern writes about the points of the book. Although Colonel O’Hern is importance of protecting information from mis- intellectually honest enough to acknowledge the use by outside agencies, thus validating the ra- existence of criticisms of generational-warfare tionale for such stovepipes. Aside from his own theory, he continues to cling to a concept likely designated lessons, readers can learn more from to alienate his more studied audience. The great- his stories about the operations of SCID personnel. est disappointment, however, is that these chap- An interesting read for anyone studying ters contribute nothing to the book; indeed, their counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, The Intel- absence would not detract from important topics ligence Wars has value primarily to intelligence that should be its sole focus. A simple examina- professionals. Appropriately, it concentrates on tion of insurgency would have proven sufficient the Army’s management of HUMINT, but most

Fall 2011 | 113 members of the Air Force community will have Guard, whose eight divisions and 28 brigade little use for it. combat teams make up 38 percent of the Army’s force structure and whose aviation assets com- Lt Col Stephen C. Price Jr., USAF prise 43 percent of all Army aircraft (pp. 94–97). US European Command, Stuttgart,Germany Yet, as Doubler observes, the Army National Guard struggles to match the active component in both equipment and manpower utilization as it contends with its traditional role of protecting The U.S. Citizen-Soldier at War: A Retro- the homeland while deploying overseas. The Air spective Look and the Road Ahead edited National Guard does not have a problem matching by Malcolm Muir Jr. McCormick Foundation the active component. According to McKinley, the (in conjunction with Virginia Military Institute) Guard had cultivated an operational capability and (http://www.mccormickfoundation.org/), 205 spirit through its “volunteer” process well before North Michigan Avenue, Suite 4300, Chicago, the end of the Cold War by deploying its refueling Illinois 60601, 2008, 142 pages (softcover). units in support of operational missions and assuming the interceptor mission for the continental The U.S. Citizen-Soldier at War: A Retrospective United States. The increased requirements as a Look and the Road Ahead examines issues with result of 9/11 have largely been transparent. the All Volunteer Force and the current posture Nieberg, Williams, Millett, and the late Moskos of the Guard and Reserve. This compilation of 12 raise the key theme of citizen-soldier manning, papers, presented in October 2007 at the First each addressing the equity-of-service argument Division Museum as part of the McCormick Tri- and erosion of the citizen-soldier concept. A frac- bune Conference Series, touches upon three tion of the population bears the burden of mili- broad themes for the All Volunteer Force—roles, tary service and sacrifice. Moreover, skewed eco- manning, and future concerns—pointing out the nomic and geographic demographics—reflecting need for and reliance on the Guard and Reserve. overrepresentation of the poor and the South— As Duncan reminds the reader, from Panama in continue to plague recruiting. Williams calls en- 1989 to 11 September 2001 (9/11), the United listees “economic conscripts,” noting that recruit- States intervened with significant military force ers use economic rather than patriotic incentives an average of once every 18 months (p. 70). Sev- to attract them (p. 32). All four contributors con- eral of the contributors note that increased US sider this societal and economic misrepresenta- military involvement has led to more reliance on tion a problem that needs fixing. However, none the Guard and Reserve as part of the Total Force of them offers a realistic solution. Moskos, one originally envisioned in 1970 by Secretary of De- of America’s great military sociologists, proposes fense Melvin R. Laird. His concept of the Guard a military draft while Bell suggests that society and Reserve as a strategic reserve has changed, needs to change its view of who should serve. In particularly since 9/11, since the military de- terms of utilization and resources, instituting a pends more heavily upon those forces for opera- draft is economically unfeasible, and expecting tional missions. Pointing out that they were not society to change is unrealistic. Further, is this a created, funded, or organized as operational problem that needs correcting? Nieberg notes forces (p. 75), Wormuth points out that consis- how the Reserve Officer Training Corps has un- tent use of the Guard and Reserve in this man- intentionally integrated the officer corps with ner will require institutional changes. minorities and members from lower economic Several of the authors’ discussions of the ca- means, and Williams acknowledges that the All pabilities offered by the Guard and Reserve give Volunteer Force is working better than expected readers an idea of how much the active compo- (p. 32). Societal misrepresentation within the nent and the country truly depend on these military has long been a problem and will con- citizen-soldiers. Wormuth notes that part of the tinue as such until the option not to serve exists. problem with the Total Force concept is that cer- Military readers should pay attention to the tain military capabilities such as civil affairs, concern expressed by several authors about the medical expertise, and military police reside al- future force structure. Millett notes that the in- most solely within the reserve component, forc- creased call-up of Reserve members has affected ing automatic mobilizations in support of active- retention while Bell observes that citizen-soldiers component deployments. Vaughn affirms how cannot be expected to endure the sacrifices of much the nation depends on the Army National the “long war” without greater support from the

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population (p. 84). More importantly, Duckworth, The book’s 11 chapters adhere to Boyd’s Millett, and Williams ask how the military will maxim regarding defense priorities: “people, continue to attract and retain members, espe- ideas, hardware, in that order” (p. 19). The first cially now, in a time of extended conflict. This chapter, written by Lt Col John Sayen, USMC, question leads Williams to wonder about the sus- retired, cogently defends Boyd’s priority prin- tainability of the All Volunteer Force, given cur- ciple, and the chapters that follow paint a por- rent circumstances. As The U.S. Citizen-Soldier at trait of a people-ideas-hardware US military. War illustrates, we must truly discern whether Airpower-minded readers will want to pay par- or not the All Volunteer Force is meeting the ticular attention to chapters 7 and 8. nation’s defense needs. This book offers insight Col Robert Dilger, USAF, retired, and Pierre M. into some of the key challenges that policy Sprey, who contributed chapter 7, “Reversing the makers will contend with as they forecast fu- Decay of American Air Power,” examine air- ture manning and equipping requirements for power in twentieth-century conflicts, seeking to the US military. undermine Giulio Douhet’s theory that strategic bombardment of enemy heartlands can win wars Lt Col Michael C. Veneri, USAF by itself (p. 129). They contest the claim that US Air Force Academy, Colorado strategic bombardment played a central role in defeating Iraq in the first and second Gulf Wars and question the usefulness of airpower in a wide range of circumstances. They praise air- America’s Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Re- power only for close air support (CAS) missions, form for President Obama and the New pointing to German Stukas and US P-38s, P-47s, Congress edited by Winslow T. Wheeler. Stan- and P-51s in World War II as examples of success- ford University Press (http://www.sup.org), ful interdiction platforms. Dilger and Sprey con- 1450 Page Mill Road, Palo Alto, California trast this success with the tremendous losses and 94304-1124, 2009, 272 pages, $19.95 (soft- limited results of Royal Air Force, US Army Air cover), ISBN 978-0-80476-931-0. Forces, and German Luftwaffe strategic bombers (pp. 131–44). Similarly, they criticize the first In a speech of 21 April 2008 to the Air War Gulf War’s strike campaign for utilizing the F-117 College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Secretary of and applaud their own A-10 CAS efforts against Defense Robert Gates implored his listeners to fielded units of the Iraqi Army (pp. 149–52). “become . . . forward-thinking officer[s] who Based on this historical analysis, the authors [help] the Air Force adapt to a constantly chang- envision a new procurement schedule of 4,000 ing strategic environment,” offering Col John CAS fighters; 2,500 forward air control aircraft; a Boyd as an example of the kind of officer needed reduced buy of 100 KC-X tankers; 1,000 dirt-strip airlifters akin to the C-27J; 1,100 austere air su- to lead our military to success in the twenty-first periority fighters; and 200 F-35s—an outline century (“Remarks to Air War College,” Depart- rooted in a preference for large-number acquisi- ment of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secre- tions, an aversion to high-tech airframes, and a tary of Defense [Public Affairs], http://www belief in the supremacy of CAS over indepen- .defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid dent air operations. Dilger and Sprey seek to =1231). The notion of whether or not Secretary “procure only aircraft and weapons of the utmost Gates’s fondness for Boyd extends to respect for austerity, stripped down to the only capabilities the ideas of his associates and modern-day aco- directly required by actual combat experience” lytes will be tested in the months ahead as the (p. 159). Defense Department faces the budget realities of The premise for the authors’ procurement an economic downturn. A Center for Defense outline emanates from faulty historical analysis Information book, America’s Defense Meltdown filled with assertion and little documented sup- includes essays from Boyd’s successors in the port. Focusing particularly on the Gulf Wars, military-reform movement that chart fresh ap- Dilger and Sprey question—without citation—the proaches to old defense issues. Many of the ideas stealth capabilities of the F-117 and criticize the detailed here will probably crumble under scru- fighter-bomber for its small payload and low pro- tiny; nonetheless, this short tract is worth read- duction numbers. Their analysis excoriates all ing for the sheer number and variety of innova- stealth capabilities without discussing alternative ideas it offers. tives for penetrating contested airspace. Further-

Fall 2011 | 115 more, they advocate the purchase of large num- Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Prolifera- bers of airframes—claiming unimaginably low tion and the Threat to International Secu- purchase prices—without discussing the result- rity by Dennis M. Gormley. Praeger Security ing long-tail costs in personnel, ramp space, fuel, International (http://www.praeger.com/PSI), and maintenance. Emphasizing numbers of 88 Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut tails—rather than capabilities inherent in the 06881, 2008, 272 pages, $54.95 (hardcover), fleet—ignores the lessons of the effects-based- ISBN 978-0-275-99836-3. operations construct. Despite the logic of their A leading expert on cruise missile prolifera- advocacy for an austere CAS airframe, particu- tion, Dennis Gormley has written Missile Conta- larly in the face of conflicts with nonstate actors, gion, a highly readable volume that presents creating an entire Air Force around this singular clearly and concisely his concern that cruise mission set seems shortsighted. missiles are on the edge of becoming a primary In chapter 8, “Air Mobility for a New Adminis- threat to international stability. Gormley has tration,” James P. Stevenson, author of The Penta- considerable experience in this area. In fact, this gon Paradox, offers a primer on air-mobility book is his second exploration of the cruise mis- terms and concepts, introducing readers to stra- sile—and it is more than just an update. Rather, tegic and tactical airlift, air refueling, and special it is a cry for the world to wake up and recognize air-mobility operations. He makes a few key rec- the new menace. ommendations for the new administration, advo- Ballistic and cruise missiles date to World War cating “increased emphasis on aerial refueling, II, the notorious V-1 and V-2 representing the strategic sealift and specialized air, with a de- earliest military iterations. At that time, the V-1, creased emphasis on strategic and tactical airlift” a primitive cruise missile, was slow, noisy, and easily destroyed. The V-2 ballistic missile, having (pp. 172–73). Recognizing the need for cost sav- longer range and greater speed, posed much ings in mobility operations, Stevenson sees fi- more of a danger. Since World War II, the powers nancial gains in cutting back on the C-5 and C-17 have focused on ballistic missile technology and for strategic airlift of outsized cargo and supple- have attempted to counter enemy ballistic tech- menting these airframes with fast sealift and an nology. Finally, a semblance of defense seems to expanded Civil Reserve Air Fleet. Similarly, he be developing. Problem solved. claims significant cost benefits by increasing the In the 1980s, cruise missiles belonged only to “building partner capacity” capability, which Russia and the United States. In the first Iraq would emphasize utilization of allies’ tactical war, the United States handled Iraq’s primitive airlift to decrease demand on the US fleet. Al- cruise missiles readily. Between the two wars though brief, insufficiently sourced, and at times against Iraq, however, the technology blossomed vague—at one point recommending that the Air and simplified, and the United States found itself Force “develop innovative options” (p. 176) to defenseless against that country’s cruise missiles reduce the cost of strategic airlift—this chapter in the second war. contains ideas worthy of serious examination. Cruise missiles are small, fast, low-flying, re- targetable, and nearly impossible for radar to In his Air War College speech, Secretary detect, particularly when it is seeking high-flying Gates claimed that “an unconventional era of ballistic missiles. The relatively simple technology warfare requires unconventional thinkers” (see costs considerably less than ballistics and de- “Remarks to Air War College,” above). America’s fenses. Launched in large numbers, the missiles Defense Meltdown succeeds as a repository of un- can overwhelm modern defenses, and they are conventional ideas in Colonel Boyd’s tradition. easily outfitted to carry chemical or biological Its recommendations, which address Army, Ma- agents. They present a fearsome threat that the rine Corps, Navy, and Air Force issues, are worth US government and others ignore, still treating due consideration in the budget battles ahead if them as low-risk export items. only for their power to stimulate debate that will While the United States busily negotiates trea- eventually lead to workable solutions for today’s ties involving ballistic missiles and develops de- defense challenges. fenses against them, technology makes both the treaties and the defenses largely meaningless. 1st Lt Michael J. Arth, USAF The cruise missile offers a more immediate threat, Cannon AFB, New Mexico and the technology is proliferating—in part due

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to American absentmindedness, in part because focus on technology will leave one wandering in America allows business to sell technology and a labyrinth” (p. 2); and (3) “the broad, amor- provide technical expertise to nations that other- phous realm of what has been called ‘informa- wise would only slowly develop the technology tion operations’ ” (p. 2). without major assistance. Chapter 1, “The Rhetoric of Terror,” takes is- Gormley says it’s time to wake up. He docu- sue with the use of the war metaphor with re- ments his case by detailing the performance of spect to combating terrorism. Authors Frank J. cruise missiles and defenses against them in the Barrett and Theodore R. Sarbin argue that fram- two Iraq wars, citing the characteristics by model ing the issue as a “war on terror” filters out im- and nation, and dealing with the geopolitical portant distinctions and possibly effective strate- rivalries in Asia and the Middle East. He even gies. In a key passage, they note that “one of the talks of the Bush Doctrine of preemption as a green consequences of framing the struggle against light to regional rivals as well as to countries terrorism as war and the depiction of terrorists such as North Korea who represent a potential as evil is that it might obfuscate efforts to under- threat to the United States. In less than a decade stand the conditions that have given rise to ter- after the invasion of Iraq, already Pakistan, India, rorist activities” (p. 25). China, Japan, North Korea, Israel, and Iran are In chapter 2, “Al-Qaeda and Its Affiliates,” busily developing cruise missile capabilities. David Ronfeldt attempts to reframe the under- Because of the ongoing concern about missile standing of al Qaeda as more a manifestation of proliferation and because the situation changes tribalism than of extremist religion. He argues rapidly, Gormley is developing a Web site to of- that under such societies, maximizing honor is fer current information after the release of the more important than power or profit. paperback version of this work (see http:// “Winning Hearts and Minds,” the third chap- missilecontagion.com/Missile/Home.html). In ter, identifies nine centers of gravity for social- the meantime, the hardcover edition of Missile influence campaigns, offering richly illustrated Contagion will provide a sufficient primer on the examples of each. Anthony R. Pratkanis con- danger that widespread ownership of cruise mis- cludes his essay by introducing and explaining siles presents. 19 influence tactics used in war and conflict. Chapter 4, “Jihadi Information Strategy,” ex- Dr. John H. Barnhill plores the idea that “the relative success [that al Houston, Texas Qaeda has] enjoyed despite the unpopularity of [its] view of what constitutes a proper Muslim society can be attributed largely to [an] innovative and nimble information strategy” (p. 86). It Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to argues that, in spite of the organization’s popu- Theory and Practice edited by John Arquilla larity for confronting the West, “al-Qaeda faces and Douglas A. Borer. Routledge (http:// structural-ideological limits to its power” (p. 86) www.routledge.com/), 270 Madison Avenue, that will restrict its influence to a small minority New York, New York 10016, 2007, 272 pages, of Muslim adherents. Author Glenn E. Robinson $150.00 (hardcover), ISBN 978-0-415-77124-5; shows how jihadist elements reinterpret Islamic 2009, 254 pages, $39.95 (softcover), ISBN 978- history to meet their ideological and power 0-415-54514-3. needs, such as the reinterpretation of the idea of jahiliyya (historically referring to Arab societies Information Strategy and Warfare includes nine before Mohammed) to mean any society that essays by 10 authors, most of whom have a con- rules today through non-Islamic means. nection to the Naval Postgraduate School in Beginning the second half of the book, the Monterey, California. Divided into two halves, fifth chapter, “Reorganizing for Public Diplo- the book first assumes a conceptual point of macy,” focuses on policy responses. It chronicles view and then examines “prescriptive, policy- the poor state of public diplomacy in the United oriented ways to improve American information States and explains how it could be improved. strategy” (p. 11). Further, it explores three The author, Carnes Lord, roundly criticizes the themes: (1) “the rise of the information domain failure of the US Department of State to accept itself and information strategy’s emergence as the mantle as leader in public diplomacy. an equal partner alongside traditional military Chapter 6, “The One Percent Solution,” by strategy” (pp. 1–2); (2) “the notion that an undue Barton Whaley, addresses military deception,

Fall 2011 | 117 using quantitative data from several conflicts to [JWICS]), how thorough can a study of informa- assess the costs and benefits of different actions. tion operations be without assessing the vulner- Whaley concludes that “deception is worth the ability of such systems vis-à-vis the conven- cost and effort in almost all situations” (p. 154). tional Internet? In chapter 7, “Strategy and Psychological Op- In the “Conclusion,” Douglas Borer writes, erations,” Hy S. Rothstein assesses the changing “Harnessing the power of information in terms role of psychological operations amidst the new of desired outcomes is much more of an abstract environment of terrorism, “shock and awe,” and art than it is a predictive science” (p. 237)—a network-centric warfare. true statement. In spite of its flaws, Information In “Assessing the Computer Network Opera- Strategy and Warfare does offer some sound ad- tions Threat of Foreign Countries,” chapter 8, vice and direction to the practitioners of that Dorothy E. Denning argues the need for “sound very art. assessments of vulnerabilities in critical infra- structures and how risks can be mitigated” (p. Dr. Clark Capshaw 188). She examines, for foreign countries, Alexandria, Virginia whether network attack operations were “toler- ated, encouraged, or even supported” on behalf of the host government (p. 194). Furthermore, Denning looks in depth at the capabilities of Iran Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable and North Korea for computer network opera- War, 1945–1975 by John Prados. University tions, based on recent student research at the Press of Kansas (http://www.kansaspress.ku Naval Postgraduate School. .edu), 2502 Westbrooke Circle, Lawrence, In chapter 9, “Blogs and Military Information Kansas 66045-4444, 2009, 704 pages, $34.95 Strategy,” James Kinniburgh and Dorothy Denning (hardcover), ISBN 978-0-7006-1634-3. explore “the possibility of incorporating blogs and blogging into military information strategy, John Prados, a senior fellow of the National primarily as a tool for influence but also for gath- Security Archive at George Washington Univer- ering intelligence” (p. 212). They also review sity, has produced the most comprehensive, au- different methods for measuring the reach and thoritative, and readable single-volume narrative influence of blogs. history of the American war in Vietnam yet As evidenced by this brief synopsis, the vari- seen. Benefiting from many recently declassified ous chapters are somewhat diffuse. Although documents and presidential tapes in the United each brings an important component to the over- States, as well as significant foreign-source docu- all discussion of the book’s central subject— mentation, Prados brilliantly draws together information strategy and warfare—the collection what he calls a “unified field theory . . . [that] at- would benefit from tighter focusing. The divi- tempts to weave an account of both action and sion of the book into halves, first examining con- context that includes all necessary elements” cepts and then policy responses, helps alleviate (italics in original, p. xiii). The result is a narra- some of the lack of focus. However, the three tive history of remarkable scope and consider- themes, identified above and in the introduction able depth that weaves together military threads to the book, do not always come through clearly with political, social, economic, and foreign in each of the essays. One might expect this policy threads, forming a policy envelope that problem in a collection of essays about a broad “narrowed over time due to developments in all subject, but the editors could have done more to those fields” (p. xi). This ever-more limited ensure greater cohesion. range of potential policy choices for the United By necessity, the chapters avoid any use of States in Vietnam essentially made the war unclassified material, but one wonders, given the winnable. In a very real sense, Prados demon- nature of the subject matter, whether the con- strates the inconvenient yet fundamental truth tributors could reasonably address it in any sig- of the Clausewitzian dictum about the relation- nificant way without the use of such sources. ship of war and politics. Moreover, because of the classified status of He makes very clear in a three-page “Note to many information systems used by the defense the Reader” (p. xxi) that he writes from a strong community (e.g., the Secret Internet Protocol antiwar point of view and takes pains to discuss Router Network [SIPRNET] and the Joint World- how, as an Army officer’s son who wanted to wide Intelligence Communications System attend West Point, he came to that perspective.

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Such candor is very refreshing and highly un- have only one volume about the Vietnam War, usual even though all historians write from a Prados’s book would be it. definite point of view (whether they admit it or not). As a college student in the 1970s, he be- Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired came deeply involved in the antiwar movement Professor Emeritus School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University and helped the Vietnam Veterans against the Montgomery, Alabama War (even though he was not a veteran) as they organized demonstrations during the Nixon administration. In the narrative discussing the antiwar demonstrations of the 1970s, he notes his Night Fighters: Luftwaffe and RAF Air Com- roles in several, sometimes lengthy, insertions bat over Europe, 1939–1945 by Colin D. set off from the main body of his discussion by Heaton and Anne-Marie Lewis. Naval Insti- italic type (pp. 426, 476–80, 496–503, and 514–16). tute Press (http://www.usni.org), 291 Wood Some readers may think that Prados gives too Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402, 2008, 224 much credit to the antiwar movement for forcing pages, $27.95 (hardcover), ISBN 978-1-59114- the Nixon administration to bring an end to 360-4. American participation in the war. But this reviewer—a Vietnam vet from the mid-1960s who During World War II, the British nighttime witnessed the near chaos in the United States in aerial bombardment of Germany and occupied the early 1970s—thinks that, if anything, Prados Europe, against a determined and skillful de- undersells the influence of the movement. fense, represented a distinct campaign of great Given his theme of an “unwinnable war,” it scope and sacrifice. At odds with the American is only natural that the author not shy away daylight precision bombing strategy, the Royal from confronting revisionist historians (e.g., Air Force (RAF) steadfastly pursued night attacks Mark Moyar) who claim that the United States from 1939 to 1945 at a loss of “nearly 10,000 had virtually won the war at various points but bombers and over 55,000 airmen killed, wounded, that we either didn’t recognize or take advan- or captured” (p. 13). In Night Fighters, Colin tage of those situations. The reader should be Heaton and Anne-Marie Lewis—a photographer, sure to check the endnotes, for it is there researcher, and digital image specialist—recount (rather than in the basic text) that Prados di- the history of the ever-evolving tactics and tech- rectly takes on the revisionists. nology of this air war, primarily from the per- As one would expect of a historian and senior spective of the Luftwaffe fighter forces and RAF fellow at George Washington University’s National Bomber Command. Security Archive, Prados has heavily documented The book’s hallmark is tracing the evolution his work with 60 pages of often very illuminating of night-fighting tactics, doctrine, and technology endnotes followed by an 18-page bibliographic across the course of the war. Over the years that essay. Anyone who reads the text without refer- this campaign persisted, a deadly balancing act ring to the endnotes will miss many clarifying played out between belligerents as first one side, parts of the story. (As a personal aside, the impor- and then the other, adapted and became supe- tance of the endnotes to this narrative history ar- rior with deadly innovation in “the greatest tech- gues in favor of publishers using footnotes rather nological arms race in history” (p. 28). Heaton than endnotes. Readers would vastly prefer hav- painstakingly studied and conducted face-to-face ing explanatory footnotes readily available on the interviews with many of the air war leaders and same page to searching for endnotes at the back noble night-fighter pilots such as Wolfgang Falck, of the volume.) Hajo Herrmann, and Hans-Joachim Jabs. In this Prados has produced a wonderful one-volume aspect, Heaton (a professor at the American history that makes a significant contribution to Military University, a major online institution) the literature of the Vietnam War. Clearly, Vietnam: shows obvious admiration for German aviators’ The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945–1975 is valor in the air and engineers’ ingenuity in the the most comprehensive single-volume history laboratory. of the war yet published. The author’s acknowl- Night Fighters asserts that the tactics and tech- edged point of view may irk some readers, but nology of this battle “underwent a greater revo- he is candid about his views and argues them lution . . . than in any other area of operations in well, using excellent evidence. Frankly, if I could any preceding era in history” with the exception

Fall 2011 | 119 of the nuclear age (p. 78). Heaton traces postwar .dodccrp.org), c/o Evidence Based Research, advances in fly-by-wire technology, all types of 1595 Spring Hill Road, Suite 250, Vienna, Vir- radar, microwave ovens, transistors, ejection ginia 22182-2216, 2002, 558 pages. Available seats, shatterproof glass, motion sensors, and free from http://www.dodccrp.org/files rocket and jet engines “to World War II and /Smith_EBO.PDF. mostly to the night war in Europe” (p. 137). Heaton is as critical of British leadership and Effects-Based Operations is the third entry in tactics as he is full of admiration for the valor of the Command and Control Research Program’s the Luftwaffe pilots. The book occasionally be- series of books that addresses information age comes sidetracked from the subject of air-to-air transformation. David S. Alberts—former direc- combat to examine the failures and savagery of tor of research for the Office of the Assistant Sec- RAF Bomber Command’s nighttime area attacks retary of Defense for Command, Control, Com- on German cities versus the daylight precision munications, and Intelligence—notes that this bombing favored by the US Army Air Forces. It study “speaks directly to what we are trying to further touches on the desperate lot of the Brit- accomplish on the ‘fields of battle’ and argues for ish bomber aircrews, their loss rates, the mis changes in the way we decide what effects we understanding associated with treating woes want to achieve and what means we will use to stemming from low morale, and its connection achieve them” (p. ix). to faulty leadership: “The class-conscious British Author Edward Smith—a retired captain with hierarchy did little to instill faith in one’s supe- 30 years of Navy experience, holding a doctorate riors, who may have been promoted through in international relations—begins by defining family connections or had the privilege of an effects-based operations (EBO) and the need for upper-class education” (p. 105). Conversely, them: “[they] are coordinated sets of actions di- Heaton finds fault with a less-than-competent rected at shaping the behavior of friends, foes, Nazi hierarchy that denies critical resources and and neutrals in peace, crisis, and war” (p. xiv). support necessary for the fighter force to prevail. After systematically describing an effects-based In the Germans’ defeat, he finds that under their concept of operations that deals with an enemy high command “it was as much an internal im- who uses asymmetric or symmetric (or both) plosion as an external eradication” (p. 138). tactics, he rationalizes the need for EBO by stat- Although the author gives due credit to the ing that in a post-9/11 world, America realizes skill of the fielded Luftwaffe fighter force,Night that the enemy is no longer the obvious uni- Fighters is too small a volume (140 pages of narra- formed military posing a threat, as the Russians tive) to document the many conclusions that dis- did during the Cold War. Rather, we now face an tract it from its thesis. The book’s strength lies in asymmetric foe, and that fact is driving an its colorful and energetic descriptions of night- American technological revolution in sensors, time air-to-air combat in World War II Europe, but information technology, and weapons, providing its shortcomings are its expansive findings in tan- new tools and operational models for imple- gential but related fields of strategy, leadership, menting EBO in a network-centric approach to and aircrew morale. Night Fighters gives serious warfare. Not just another study of EBO, this book attention to the worthy and underrepresented offers an intelligent, thoroughly researched dis- field of study involving how this arms race was cussion of the modern applications of this much- fought and won in the night skies of World War II debated approach. Europe. Airmen today would do well to heed the Numerous illustrations drive home impor- lessons of their predecessors—how they adapted tant concepts of warfare, especially the system- and where they came up short. atic description of the three domains of conflict— Col John S. Chilstrom, USAF, Retired cognitive, information, and physical—derived Austin, Texas from the observe, orient, decide, act loop dis- cussed in previous Command and Control Research Program publications. The narrative effectively walks the reader through each do- Effects-Based Operations: Applying Network main, referring to illustrations and building a Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War presentation of an EBO concept of operations by Edward A. Smith. Command and Control that goes far beyond a mere definition and a Research Program Publications (http://www few historical examples.

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Speaking of such examples, they complement ramjet engines constructed of any known mate- the discussion rather than overwhelm the reader. rial. Although a variety of rocket-propelled ve- Dr. Smith contrasts the symmetric, attrition- hicles have flown at hypersonic speeds (e.g., bal- based world wars and the American Civil war listic missile reentry vehicles, the X-15, and the with asymmetric aspects of the Cold War and the space shuttle), no air-breathing vehicle until the war on terror. For instance, in a meticulous analy- X-43A has proved capable of sustained hyper- sis of the major components of Attain Document— sonic flight. a series of operations launched by the US Navy At least in theory, the scramjet (supersonic off Libya in 1985 in response to anti-American combustion ramjet) can serve as a hypersonic jet terrorism perpetrated by Hizballah and the Abu engine. Conceived more than 50 years ago, it Nidal organization—the author demonstrates the differs from the ramjet in that the latter’s inlet success of an effects-based approach from the slows the air down to subsonic speed, while the tactical to the strategic levels of war. scramjet inlet only decelerates the flow to super- Although the book makes a compelling argu- sonic speeds, which reduces heating. The scram- ment for the continued application and evolu- jet introduced many complications, however, tion of EBO, it treats network-centric warfare especially the problem of sustaining combustion only sporadically throughout the text, not giving in a supersonic flow. it significant attention until the final chapter. After decades of analysis, wind tunnel tests, Nonetheless, the author has a knack for making and concepts for flight research projects that complex material understandable, thereby pro- never reached fruition, the National Aeronautics moting a reading experience that feels like par- and Space Administration (NASA) began work on ticipating in a fascinating “master class.” the Hyper-X project in 1996. Hyper-X consisted Effects-Based Operations, which challenges of the X-43A (a 12-foot-long unmanned research current thinking on the operational art of war vehicle with a scramjet engine) and a rocket and provides insight into conducting operations booster to push the X‑43A to hypersonic speeds more efficiently and effectively, is relevant not at an altitude of approximately 100,000 feet. At only to the Air Force but also to the entire de- that point, the vehicle would separate from the fense community. I highly recommend it, espe- booster and start its scramjet engine. A B-52 cially to individuals who serve at command and bomber lifted the entire stack, releasing it over control nodes or at the operational or strategic the Pacific Ocean off the coast of California. levels. Dr. Smith sought to portray “how network- Curtis Peebles drew on his unique vantage centric operations and effects-based operations point as NASA project historian to write this fit together, and how they complement one an- book about the Hyper-X. Based on both internal other in meeting the needs of the new security and published documents, interviews with proj- environment” (p. xxii). Let there be no mistake, ect participants, and the author’s own observa- he has achieved his desired effect. tions, Road to Mach 10 offers an insider’s detailed view of one of the most exciting flight research Capt Albert C. Harris III, USAF projects in several decades. As befits a book pub- Vandenberg AFB, California lished by an organization of aerospace engineering professionals, this one is highly technical in places. Although he has not written an engineering textbook, Peebles assumes that the reader Road to Mach 10: Lessons Learned from the has a good background in the full range of aero- X-43A Flight Research Program by Curtis space technologies. If readers have difficulty Peebles. American Institute of Aeronautics with such sentences as “The computational- and Astronautics (http://www.aiaa.org), 1801 fluid-dynamics data were used to quantify the Alexander Bell Drive, Reston, Virginia 20191- ground-to-flight scaling and unsteady-flow phe- 4344, 2008, 250 pages, $39.95 (softcover), nomena during the dynamic separation” (p. 64), ISBN 978-1-56347-932-8. then they may want to pass by this book. Those undaunted by the required level of At hypersonic speeds, defined as Mach 5 or technical knowledge are rewarded with a de- higher, the compressive heating generated by a tailed but readable story that begins with a back- vehicle as it passes though the atmosphere is so ground of scramjet research and continues to intense that the air itself undergoes chemical Hyper-X design, manufacturing, integration and changes. Such heating would destroy turbine or checkout, and flight operations. The first flight

Fall 2011 | 121 tumbled out of control shortly after release from a detailed account of each space mission), in- the B-52, but the second and third flights suc- cluding changes in the roles of humans and ro- cessfully demonstrated scramjet-powered flight bots over the past 50 years of spaceflight. Launius at Mach 6.83 and 9.68, respectively. Peebles of- and McCurdy’s articulate narrative examines the fers an excellent description of all the missions paradigm that effectively dominated the civil as well as the mishap investigation. space agency for the first few decades of its exis- The book includes numerous good photo- tence, the dream of human spaceflight, and hu- graphs; unfortunately, they are reproduced in man interplanetary colonization. black and white rather than color. More signifi- To some extent, advocates of human space- cantly, it omits line drawings of the vehicles and flight were simply lucky in their timing: As the their systems. Specifically, at several points, the authors point out, “The ‘space age’ opened a few book describes intricate mechanisms, but the decades after the closing of what commentators absence of supporting illustrations makes it dif- termed the ‘heroic era’ of earthly exploration” (p. ficult to visualize the systems. 100). The explorers’ exploits inspired more than Quibbles about illustrations aside, Road to a generation of science fiction writers, who Mach 10 is an outstanding recounting of an excit- “primed the pump” with wild tales of space ex- ing and notable project. Individuals with a pro- ploration and overtly utopian depictions of life fessional interest in modern flight research at on the frontier. And the American public re- the leading edge of technology will benefit mained in awe of the technological marvels of greatly from reading it. the atomic age. Finally, escalating Cold War tension gave impetus to the national space race, Kenneth P. Katz captured the attention of the American public, Longmeadow, Massachusetts “energized the creation of a larger coalition that forced policy change,” and created a “pro-space majority” made up of “pro-space true believers,” scientists, senior military leaders, businessmen, Robots in Space: Technology, Evolution, and industrial engineers, and politicians “hoping to Interplanetary Travel by Roger D. Launius benefit from the symbolic resonances of the and Howard E. McCurdy. Johns Hopkins Uni- space race” (p. 41). If ever there was a moment versity Press (http://www.press.jhu.edu/), when all the stars aligned to create a zeitgeist 2715 North Charles Street, Baltimore, Mary- favoring a bold, new direction for American “Big land 21218-4363, 2008, 336 pages, $35.00 Science” and the space program, this was it. And (hardcover), ISBN 978-0-8018-8708-6. so it was that proponents of human spaceflight won the debate, and robotic missions received Roger Launius, former chief historian of the little priority and negligible funding. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Human spaceflight, however, reached its zenith (NASA), and Howard E. McCurdy, a professor at with the Apollo moon landing in 1969. Launius American University, have produced a remark- and McCurdy compare the competition between ably well-written and lucid book with a catchy, if human and robotic spaceflights to the fable of misleading, title. It is not a technical manual or the tortoise and the hare. The hare dashed to an catalogue of the various robots that humans have early lead in the race but then took a break, only sent to orbit Earth, prowl extraterrestrial land- to be overtaken by the stolidly plodding tortoise. scapes, or pierce the heavens. Rather, the book is Similarly, human spaceflight raced ahead to an actually about the ongoing debate within the impressive lead with the moon missions but then American civil space agency between propo- stalled; in the decades since, human spaceflight nents of human spaceflight and those who advo- has failed to develop long-term, cost-effective cate robotic or “unmanned” spaceflight. And solutions to the numerous problems associated what a debate it is—one that has spanned more with keeping humans alive in the hostile envi- than five decades and that has ranged from ronment of space. Robotic spaceflight, mean- boardrooms at NASA to backrooms on Capitol while, made steady, incremental gains as robotic Hill to the living rooms of the general public! technology improved. The authors skillfully lead us through an emi- The exploration of Mars offers a perfect ex- nently readable and entertaining history of the ample of this stark contrast: despite the exhorta- early “space race” and the nascent space program tions of several presidents to begin a manned (although they focus on broad brushstrokes, not mission to Mars, the government has yet to pony

122 | Air & Space Power Journal Book Reviews

up the (estimated) $500 billion that such a mis- Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers edited sion would require. Yet for a fraction of that cost by Robert J. Bunker. Routledge (http://www ($820 million), NASA has had two rovers, Spirit .routledge.com/), 270 Madison Avenue, New and Opportunity, exploring Mars in more or less York, New York 10016, 2008, 322 pages, continuous operation since 2004. Since 1972, $150.00 (hardcover), ISBN 978-0-415-45765-1; human spaceflight has been limited to the aging $49.95 (softcover), ISBN 978-0-415-46206-8. fleet of five space shuttles, which have flown a Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers is a col- total of 113 missions (two of which were cata- lection of essays intended to reflect the changing strophic failures resulting in the deaths of 14 face of international relations. Specifically, Robert people), have cost $40 billion (adjusted for infla- Bunker—editor and contributor—offers selection) to develop and build, and have flown only tions that highlight problems in the context of a to near-Earth orbit at a cost of roughly $1.5 bil- “state” related to criminal nonstate actors. Bunker lion per flight. In contrast, the United States has organizes the book according to three clustered fielded scores of more economical robotic space- topics: (1) “Theory and Law” discusses the status flight missions, including orbiters and probes of of the Westphalian state in the current global the moon, sun, various asteroids and comets, all context and expounds the new types of polities of the major planets in our solar system (even emerging; (2) “Criminal-States” loosely links including a mission to the planetoid Pluto, ex- Clausewitzian thought as it relates to conflict pected to arrive in 2015), and beyond; moreover, with rogue states and gangs (additionally, the it has established a complex Global Positioning operation of selected criminal-states receives System, an impressive array of sophisticated attention); and (3) “Criminal-Soldiers” looks at space telescopes, and more. gangs as nonstate actors, the nature of inter national crime, and the meaning of some crimes Launius and McCurdy contend, however, that from an international perspective (e.g., the sym- the competition between robotic and human bolic meaning of beheadings). spaceflight is ultimately a “false dichotomy” (p. Unfortunately, this work suffers from three xi). The correct paradigm involves not humans problems, beginning with the timeliness of the versus robots but humans and robots working publishing. The book’s liner notes describe it as together. Indeed, the book’s thesis takes this “cutting edge.” Perhaps so in 2008, but its perish- thought even further: “given enough time, hu- able information is now three years stale. Granted, man and robotic characteristics tend to merge” it takes time to put material together, print cop- (p. 254). The timeline contemplated in this ies, and distribute them. But this seems to be a metamorphosis spans centuries, not decades. persistent issue with these types of current- This may be one of the strongest aspects of the events books: cutting-edge information in 2008 book: although it explicitly concerns the civil no longer dazzles our understanding amid a new space agency, eschewing discussion of military US administration, a changed international set- space programs (thus appearing to have limited ting, an entrenched recession, and so forth. Sec- utility for a uniformed audience), the discussion ond, the contributors offer essays written at very different “levels”— some scholarly, others (e.g., of the merging of human and robotic characteris- “The Use of Beheadings by Fundamentalist Is- tics will likely interest military readers. The au- lam”) reading like slide notes for an intelligence thors devote the concluding two chapters to ex- briefing. (Indeed, one can almost imagine the ploring ideas that the future of space travel slides to go along with the text.) Third, and belongs to “transhumanist” and “postbiological” mostly a minor annoyance, is the quality of the entities that blend human and robotic capabili- publication. For some reason, the pages of the ties. When earthlings eventually get around to book are sprinkled with spelling errors that seem colonizing other worlds, those beings will likely not so much misspellings as errors on the part of take the form of “evolved” or genetically engi- the spell-checking software. neered humans so changed that they bear mini- The essay “Does Clausewitz Apply to Criminal- mal resemblance to their forebears—or they may States and Gangs?” stands as the gem of the not be biological organisms at all. book. Clashing with both John Keegan’s and Martin van Creveld’s opinions that Clausewitz Capt Bryce G. Poole, USAF has a reduced place in contemporary thinking, Minot AFB, North Dakota the author demonstrates that nonstate actors

Fall 2011 | 123 using violence do indeed employ war (read as rendezvous with Hall resulted in one of the most acts of violent terrorism, crime, etc.) as policy. fascinating real-life adventure stories to come Despite criminal states and gangs lacking the out of World War II. This is an intriguing tale of status of a legitimate polity, they can—and in the intertwining destinies and ultimate fates, some cases do—share features with the com- both tragic and heroic, of two young officers as monly accepted idea of a state. In other words, they attempt to seal the Germans’ escape route criminal states, gangs, and warlords exercise sov- through the Brenner Pass. ereignty over territory, control borders, and in- Skilled author Patrick O’Donnell masterfully teract with other state or nonstate actors. These tells the story of the brief and adventurous mili- “state-like” activities, including the use of vio- tary careers of Hall and Chappell, energetically lence as policy, tie them directly to Clausewitz’s weaving historical fact into an exciting, page- thinking. Clausewitz can apply at the microlevel, turning drama that reads like the best of adven- such as a gang that controls turf inside a city. To ture fiction. In 1944 both officers are recruited restrict Clausewitz to large-scale conflict re- by the clandestine Office of Strategic Services moves the idea of a nontraditional actor using (OSS), the World War II precursor to the current violence as a matter of policy. This especially US Central Intelligence Agency. Hall, a cre- comes to light when Marx and, in turn, Lenin atively energetic and possibly somewhat intro- and Mao give credence to Clausewitzian think- verted young officer, submits to the OSS his ing in their revolutionary theorizing. novel idea of using US secret operatives to de- Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers is a mar- molish key railroad tunnels in the Italian Alps, ginal work. The unevenness of the essays detracts essentially bottlenecking the German army into from its overall quality. Readers interested in the mountain valleys as easy targets for Allied international relations or nonstate actors might airpower. Intrigued by his proposal, the OSS re- find the book appealing. However, given the cruits and trains Hall for this very mission, and abundance of materials on the topics it addresses, within months he is covertly roaming the Italian one could just as easily browse for better infor- Alps, evading the ruthless searches of thousands mation elsewhere. of German troops, and systematically destroying targets of opportunity as he postures for the ulti- David J. Schepp mate mission of closing the Brenner Pass. RAF Lakenheath, United Kingdom Of a distinctly different cut is Captain Chappell, a daring, almost reckless, self-sacrificing warrior and a naturally charismatic leader. As commander of a small band of special operations The Brenner Assignment: The Untold Story troops, Chappell and his team are covertly in- of the Most Daring Spy Mission of World serted into northern Italy to join Hall in his mis- War II by Patrick K. O’Donnell. Da Capo sion to bring German troop movements to a halt. Press (http://www.perseusbooksgroup.com The fighters of various Italian resistance factions /dacapo/home.jsp), Eleven Cambridge Cen- who facilitate Chappell’s team challenge his dip- ter, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142, 2008, lomatic skills as well as his patience as he seeks 304 pages, $25.00 (hardcover), ISBN 978-0- to meet up with Hall amidst a maze of some of 306-81577-5; 2009, 320 pages, $14.95 (soft- the world’s most tortuous mountain terrain cover), ISBN 978-0-306-81841-7. while eluding the gaze of the ever-vigilant Ger- man soldiers. On 2 August 1944, in the dark, silent skies The fast-paced action and serial combat en- over the jagged Alps of northern Italy, Capt gagements experienced by these men almost Stephen Hall, a daring young American special obscure the underlying strategies and counter- forces operative, parachutes into Nazi territory. strategies of insurgency warfare at play. Hall and Hall’s mission: to seek and destroy targets of op- Chappell’s nemesis, Nazi major August Schiffer, portunity and degrade or disable key routes of whose area of responsibility coincides with the transportation that the German army would Americans’ primary target, the Brenner Pass, soon rely on for its pending retreat from Allied employs ruthless and persistent means to cap- forces steadily advancing northward from Rome. ture both Italian partisans and any foreign opera- Capt Howard Chappell and his team of demoli- tives who might be assisting them. Schiffer and tion and espionage experts would follow in his his Nazi forces rely on intimidation and torture path just weeks later. Their dramatic efforts to in their efforts to coerce the Italian civilians not

124 | Air & Space Power Journal Book Reviews

only to abandon their support of the partisans James Salter’s Gods of Tin is a compilation of and Allied agents known to be operating in the two works of fiction (The Hunters [Harper, 1956] area, but also to turn them over to the German and Cassada [Counterpoint, 2000]), a memoir forces. Schiffer also conducts persistent and (Burning the Days [Picador, 2007]), and a personal highly effective counterinsurgent sweeps, called journal—all by the author. Relating Salter’s expe- rastrellamentos, through the mountainous wilder- riences as a Korean War–era F-86 “Sabre” fighter ness, netting several of Chappell’s men—and pilot (with one MiG-15 kill), the book traces both Chappell himself. his and his fictional characters’ various flying Filled with firefights, captures and escapes, assignments around the globe. Editors Jessica close calls, dangerous liaisons, stealthy airdrops, and William Benton weave the four sources to- and coded radio communications, The Brenner gether chronologically, separating them with Assignment is a thrilling read. The intricate de- artistic symbols and dividing the narrative into piction of the converging fates of Hall and four sections to encapsulate the author’s major Chappell, the immensity of the wilderness set- periods of flying: the beginning (cadet pilot ting, the complexities of the political and mili- training), the post–World War II Air Force, the tary interactions, and the tenacity of the German Korean War, and post–Korean War Europe. antagonists, all make this book highly entertain- Written by a combat-proven aviator, which ing. Although some of the subtle concepts and gives the book a measure of validity, the flying themes throughout could serve as intriguing, passages are vivid. At times Salter fills them with perhaps unsettling, parallels between the Nazi metaphorical detail that reads like poetry, draw- counterinsurgent efforts in the desperate, waning ing the reader into the cockpit: “Gathering days of World War II and the US efforts against speed, they moved down the runway together. It enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan, O’Donnell in was the highest moment of confidence forever no way attempts to present or propose strategies renewed upon taking off, the soaring of spirit” or tactics for current operations. (p. 98). At other times, he writes in a piercing, The Brenner Assignment reads like an adven- staccato style, bringing the reader into the split- ture novel. The fact that one is reading about the second decision-making process of fighting MiGs lives, heroics, and tragic deaths of real Soldiers over Korea: “24 June 1952. Left the briefing ner- can sometimes be overlooked amidst the heart- vous. Dressed, flight briefing. Finally we were pounding action of rapid-fire gunfights, middle- off. North in ominous silence” (italics in original) of-the-night bridge demolitions, and edge-of- (p. 99). Although this switching of styles demon- your-seat escapes under the enemy’s very nose. strates the author’s skill as a writer, it fails to pro- Thoroughly researched, the book is rich in fact duce a smooth, uniform piece of literature—the and soundly credible. I most definitely recom- result of cutting and pasting excerpts from mul- mend The Brenner Assignment to readers inter- tiple books. ested in the early days of US special operations, Since two of the book’s sources are novels, I especially from the perspective of the individual would classify Gods of Tin as fiction. Disappoint- operator, and to anyone looking for a great ac- ingly, it’s challenging at best—and close to im- tion story. This true tale of parallel lives, both possible at times—to distinguish between the tragic and heroic, contending with intense com- fictional and nonfictional passages. For readers bat and the demands of extreme physical exer- hoping to discover the exhilaration and occa- tion in a harsh environment is a solid read and sional terror of flight, this issue won’t matter. For worth the time. those looking for a more autobiographical work, the book falls flat. Read individually, the ex- Lt Col Thomas Swaim, USAF cerpts are interesting—often engrossing; how- US Air Force Academy, Colorado ever, character development often suffers at the hands of the editors’ cutting and pasting. Without a doubt, James Salter is a talented writer. Nevertheless, Gods of Tin is far from be- Gods of Tin: The Flying Years by James Salter, ing his best effort. In fact, it appears to be more edited and introduced by Jessica Benton and the work of the editors who cobbled it together. William Benton. Counterpoint (http://www Readers who prefer an engaging story about the .counterpointpress.com/), 1919 Fifth Street, life-and-death struggles over the jet-filled skies of Berkeley, California 94710, 2004, 150 pages, Korea should read The Hunters. Even though it’s $14.00 (softcover), ISBN 978-1-59376-079-3. a relatively quick and easy read, Gods of Tin

Fall 2011 | 125 misses the mark and certainly does not live up an alphabetical listing of the 71 A-List films in to the quality of Salter’s other works. the NARA collection, a basic chronology of World War I aviation, and a reprint of an essay Lt Col Daniel J. Simonsen, USAF, Retired written in 1919 by Brig Gen William “Billy” Ruston, Louisiana Mitchell, in which the outspoken aviator describes the American Air Service in World War I. Of course, the heart of the book is the 71 A-List films. Clearly, the author has spent countless War Wings: Films of the First Air War: A hours in the National Archives painstakingly ex- Guide to the World War I Aviation Docu- amining every reel of every film. Indeed, the mentary Motion Pictures Held by the U.S. level of detail with which the author breaks National Archives by Phillip W. Stewart. PMS down each film is impressive, as reflected by the Press (http://www.pmspress.com), P.O. Box following categories: “Training Airmen,” “Build- 1496, Crestview, Florida 32536, 2008, 218 pages, ing Aircraft,” “Getting to France,” “American Ex- $24.95 (softcover), ISBN 978-0-9793243-4-5. peditionary Forces (AEF) in the Skies over France,” “Combat Films of Other Nations,” and I should make clear up front what this book is “Films Shot after the Armistice.” For each film, and what it is not. Phillip W. Stewart’s War Stewart provides a brief description of the con- Wings: Films of the First Air War is not an exami- tents, length, and number of reels, followed by nation of how World War I aviation films were an exhaustive frame-by-frame description. Con- made, nor is it a study of their meaning or effec- sider the following from a film about the artil- tiveness. Rather, it is a reference work that cata- lery training centers at Valdahon and Saumur, logues and documents the National Archives and France: “Taxi of a Caudron G.4; G.4 takes off; G.4 Records Administration’s (NARA) holdings of taxis; G.4 takes off; French troops man the bal- World War I aviation films produced during the loon ‘spider’ and walk it” (p. 32). (Obviously, the Great War. As the author notes in his introduc- book is not meant to be read from cover to cover.) tion, the book deals with what he considers a Finally, the author sprinkles the work with stills “forgotten, or at best, rarely used resource of in- taken from the films. Of varying quality, some of formation for those of us who are keenly inter- the photos are striking and probably have not ested in this period of aviation history: the motion been seen before. picture” (p. xiii). Noting that many belligerents From a reference standpoint, this impressive shot millions of feet of film during the war, work would certainly prove useful to research- Stewart sought to document the NARA’s aviation ers, particularly those who can visit the National holdings, about 95 percent of which were filmed Archives to view the films, since the book would by the US Army Signal Corps. help them prepare and make the experience The work’s three general sections encompass worthwhile. Furthermore, the author deserves six chapters. The first section briefly examines praise for his research and for reminding us of “combat photography” of the US Army and Navy. the existence of some vastly underutilized pri- The brief introduction, a reprint of historian mary source documents. Finally, readers inter- K. Jack Bauer’s introduction to the book List of ested in and knowledgeable about the Army Air World War I Signal Corps Films (1957), is a Service during World War I should examine a dated—though still useful—overview of the sub- copy of War Wings: Films of the First Air War. ject. The second section examines what the author However, those who seek thoughtful study and terms “A-List” films (p. xv)—those concerned critical analysis of the aerial campaigns during primarily with aviation. The third section exam- that war should look elsewhere. ines “B-List” films (p. xvi)—those that focus on other topics but that include brief aviation Capt Gregory W. Ball, PhD, USAFR scenes. The author also offers three appendices: Alexandria, Virginia

126 | Air & Space Power Journal Mission Debrief

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