Bosnia's Nationalist Governments
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BOSNIA'S NATIONALIST GOVERNMENTS: PADDY ASHDOWN AND THE PARADOXES OF STATE BUILDING 22 July 2003 Balkans Report N°146 Sarajevo/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE 2002 ELECTIONS ................................................. 2 A. IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS ..........................................................3 B. THE ALLIANCE FOR CHANGE IN OFFICE AND DECLINE..........................................................5 III. THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN .................................................................................... 7 A. NATION AND STATE ..............................................................................................................7 B. PROMISES, PROMISES............................................................................................................8 C. FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN THE CAMPAIGN ..........................................................................9 D. THE CAMPAIGN IN THE MEDIA............................................................................................10 IV. THE RESULTS............................................................................................................. 12 V. THE REACTIONS ....................................................................................................... 14 VI. THE SEVEN KEY PLAYERS: PARTY PROFILES ............................................... 16 A. THE SDA: MAKE MINE A HALF..........................................................................................16 B. THE HDZ: WHERE’S THE BEEF?.........................................................................................19 C. THE SDS: BOSNIA’S BA’ATH PARTY? ................................................................................21 D. THE SBIH AND PDP: OUR PROGRAM IS POWER..................................................................24 E. THE SDP AND SNSD: OPPOSITION Á LA OUTRANCE...........................................................26 VII. FIRST BLOOD: CLASHES AMONG THE NATIONALISTS............................... 28 VIII. PADDY RULES, OK?.................................................................................................. 30 A. THE REMOVAL OF ALIBABIC...............................................................................................33 B. THE PURSUIT OF REFORM ...................................................................................................35 IX. CONCLUSION: THE PARADOXES OF STATE-BUILDING .............................. 41 APPENDICES A. MAP OF BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA......................................................................................43 B. LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................44 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP.......................................................................45 D. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS.................................................................................46 E. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .......................................................................................................52 ICG Balkans Report N°146 22 July 2003 BOSNIA'S NATIONALIST GOVERNMENTS: PADDY ASHDOWN AND THE PARADOXES OF STATE BUILDING EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS The return of the nationalist parties to power after listened to their voices and intuited their hearts, he the October 2002 general elections in Bosnia & insists that Bosnia’s politicians should do likewise. Herzegovina (BiH) was widely assessed as a He has skilfully manoeuvred the nationalists into calamity. Some observers went so far as to claim signing up for the reforms that he and his that it signified the failure of the international colleagues in other international organisations peace-building mission over the previous seven propose. The invocation of requirements set by years. But the new High Representative, Paddy NATO, the EU, the Council of Europe, the U.S. Ashdown, refused to be downcast. Not only was and others has provided Lord Ashdown with the nationalists’ victory narrow, but he was leverage as potent as that he enjoys by virtue of the confident he could work with them if they proved so-called Bonn powers, which allow him to sack faithful to their pre-election pledges to embrace the officeholders, impose laws and make reform agenda he had been charting since taking administrative edicts. In their hunger for votes and office in May 2002. This agenda seeks to make up office – and maybe even because they agree – the for lost time: implementing the economic, legal new governments have endorsed his aims. and governance reforms required both to make BiH a prosperous, lawful and peaceable state and There may, in any case, be some advantage in a to set the country on track for European reform process driven by the international integration. Lord Ashdown aims to put himself out community but carried out by nationalist- of a job by putting BiH on the road to the EU. dominated governments. The elections confirmed that the national parties retain the confidence of the Nine months on, but only six months into the terms largest part of a divided electorate, whose separate of the belatedly established state and entity nations still resonate to assertions either that they governments, it remains too early to say whether were the war’s main victims or that they are most the compact Ashdown believes he has established at threat from the others. This means that the with the nationalists will produce results. It is nationalists could be best placed to reassure their certainly a new approach. Ashdown’s predecessor, constituents that the reforms under way will not Wolfgang Petritsch, had tried something new as endanger their respective national interests. The well: “partnership” between the international new governments may thus find it easier to muster community and the non-nationalist Alliance for support for reform than did the Alliance. Change coalition cobbled together with foreign assistance after the November 2000 elections. This So far they have accepted or tolerated the reforms had some modest success, but not enough to satisfy insisted upon by Lord Ashdown – either because either the would-be partners or the electorate. they are necessary for the Euro-Atlantic integration all parties claim to want or because of the Ashdown has sought partnership not so much with retribution that would otherwise follow. the governments as with the people. Claiming, as Compelling the nationalists who made and fought any good Western politician would, to have the war to take responsibility for reform may thus Bosnia’s Nationalist Governments: Paddy Ashdown and the Paradoxes of State Building ICG Balkans Report No146, 22 July 2003 Page ii be the only option and the best revenge. But it is Lord Ashdown is in a hurry to accomplish what also a high-risk strategy. The High Representative might, in better circumstances, have been can command, but he cannot actually implement attempted at the outset: to establish the rule of law; reforms. For this he needs the genuine engagement to regenerate a non-productive, aid-addicted, post- of the domestic authorities. communist economy; to streamline and enhance the competence of public services; and to equip the Yet if the governments do no more than pay lip virtual state inherited from Dayton with the service to reform and the numerous bureaucracies attributes necessary for BiH to aspire to EU do nothing at all, the game will be up. The membership. He must do these things before performance of the Council of Ministers (CoM) to international patience and resources run out and date does not inspire much confidence. It has while there are still citizens inclined to hope rather adopted several strategic documents prepared for it than despair. by the international community, but has failed to translate these into a legislative program. Initially The terminal phase of the international hailed as signal contributions to BiH’s burgeoning community’s belated effort to build a self- statehood, the new justice and security ministries sustaining state in BiH will be replete with created by Lord Ashdown remain empty shells, paradox. In order to get out, the country’s foreign without staffs or budgets of their own. Meantime, guardians will have to get in more deeply. In order national parallelism appears to be emerging once to abjure use of the Bonn powers, Ashdown will again in other ministries, many of which are also need in the short run to use them more intensively. rudderless because they still lack organisational In order to realise the promise of Dayton, the High rulebooks, work plans or both. Representative will have to lift the ceiling of what is meant to be permissible under the Dayton The now non-rotating chairman of the CoM, constitution. He is doing all these things, most Adnan Terzic, whom Ashdown prefers to refer to importantly through special, internationally- as Bosnia’s prime minister, has thus far failed to chaired commissions which are seeking to find the exert the leadership necessary to break such constitutional justifications and political consensus impasses or to move from declarative endorsement necessary to redress the balance of power between of reform to its realisation. The CoM reacts, but the state and the entities