FIRE and ICE | the RUSSIAN-TURKISH PARTNERSHIP European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)
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CHAILLOT PAPER / PAPER CHAILLOT 168 FIRE AND ICE The Russian-Turkish FIRE AND ICE partnership | THE RUSSIAN-TURKISH PARTNERSHIP THE RUSSIAN-TURKISH By Stanislav Secrieru, Sinikukka Saari and Dimitar Bechev CHAILLOT PAPER / 168 June 2021 European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) 100, avenue de Suffren 75015 Paris http://www.iss.europa.eu Director: Gustav Lindstrom © EU Institute for Security Studies, 2021. Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union. print ISBN 978-92-9462-010-1 online ISBN 978-92-9462-011-8 CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-21-004-EN-C CATALOGUE NUMBER QN-AA-21-004-EN-N ISSN 1017-7566 ISSN 1683-4917 DOI 10.2815/584906 DOI 10.2815/29792 Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Belgium by Bietlot. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2021. Cover image credit: Brunetto Ziosi/Unsplash FIRE AND ICE The Russian-Turkish partnership By Stanislav Secrieru, Sinikukka Saari and Dimitar Bechev CHAILLOT PAPER / 168 June 2021 The authors Stanislav Secrieru is a Senior Analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). Sinikukka Saari is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, and was formerly a Senior Associate Analyst at the EUISS. Dimitar Bechev is a non-resident Senior Fel- low at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC, and Europe’s Futures Fellow 2020-2021 at the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM), Vienna. The EUISS Chaillot Paper series The Chaillot Paper series, launched in 1991, takes its name from the Chaillot hill in the Trocadéro area of Paris, where the Institute’s first premises were located in the building oc- cupied by the Western European Union (WEU). Acknowledgements The hill is particularly known for the Palais de Chaillot which was the site of the signing of the The authors are grateful to Federica Prandin for UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights in her invaluable assistance in carrying out the re- 1948, and housed NATO’s provisional head- search for this publication. quarters from 1952 until 1959. 1 CONTENTS Executive summary 2 Introduction 3 Stanislav Secrieru, Sinikukka Saari and Dimitar Bechev CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 4 Russia and Turkey compared 6 Russia and Turkey in the Middle East and Conflictual camaraderie North Africa 41 Stanislav Secrieru, Dimitar Bechev Navigating between war and peace and Sinikukka Saari Dimitar Bechev CHAPTER 2 CHAPTER 5 Russia and Turkey in the economic realm 17 Russia and Turkey in the Balkans 51 More than just money Parallel tracks Stanislav Secrieru Dimitar Bechev Conclusions 60 Stanislav Secrieru, Sinikukka Saari CHAPTER 3 and Dimitar Bechev Russia and Turkey in the post-Soviet Abbreviations 64 neighbourhood 29 Uneasy tango Sinikukka Saari Notes on the authors 65 2 Fire and ice | The Russian-Turkish partnership EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This Chaillot Paper provides an in-depth anal- The ramifications of the Russian-Turkish part- ysis of the Russian-Turkish partnership. It nership for the EU, an immediate neighbour explores the dynamics underpinning the rela- of both, are multiple. Moscow and Ankara’s tionship and looks at how it is likely to evolve embrace of authoritarianism runs counter to in the coming years. The ties that bind Moscow the EU’s promotion of democracy beyond its and Ankara are a complex tangle involving con- borders. Moreover, the Russian-Turkish en- verging and competing interests and objectives. ergy partnership weakens Europe’s efforts at Several factors explain the Russo-Turkish diversification (though the energy projects rapprochement. The two countries are drawn that Turkey conducts separately from Rus- together due to their shared authoritarian sia are beneficial for the EU) and undermines features, similar strategic cultures and oper- neighbouring countries’ efforts to implement ational codes. Russian-Turkish cooperation is reforms and build resilience. Russia’s and Tur- furthermore rooted in economic interdepend- key’s muscular foreign policy backed by mili- ence, which enhances the domestic legitimacy tary coercion often leads to the EU’s agenda in of both countries’ leaders and delivers benefits its southern and eastern neighbourhood being to businesses and societies at large. Albeit sus- eclipsed. The two powers’ preference for uni- picious about each other’s intentions, Russia lateralism is at odds with the EU’s strong com- and Turkey view one another as indispensable mitment to multilateralism. partners in managing flashpoints in the Middle East and North Africa as well as in the broader These challenges mean that Europe urgent- Black Sea region. These combined factors help ly needs to rethink how it deals with the Moscow and Ankara maximise shared interests Russian-Turkish ‘tandem’. First, it will need while keeping conflicts in check. to take more robust action to limit the scope of hostile activities conducted by both on Europe- Despite the resilience and mutually beneficial an soil. Second, the EU should pursue a ‘cus- nature of the Russian-Turkish partnership, the tomised’ strategy towards Ankara, with which future might bring disruptive change, whether it has a stronger chance of developing produc- temporary or longer-term. Potential risk fac- tive relations. Third, when necessary, Europe tors include the centralisation of power in each should not shy away from using coercive tools, country which makes sharp U-turns possible: such as sanctions. Last but not least, a better a change of leadership in either country would and more closely coordinated transatlantic re- inject a high degree of uncertainty into the bi- sponse will increase the chances of a successful lateral relationship at least in the short run. EU policy towards both Turkey and Russia. Change might also be induced by shifts in the regional environment which could alter mutu- al threat perceptions and breed more conflicts. With Russia and Turkey’s respective pivots to Asia, the significance of their commercial ties may decline, thus weakening the economic ba- sis of the partnership. The imposition of sanc- tions or other forms of economic coercion could lead to a sectoral decoupling of the two coun- tries’ economies, further undermining one of the pillars which has underpinned relations over the last two decades. Introduction 3 INTRODUCTION by STANISLAV SECRIERU, SINIKUKKA SAARI AND DIMITAR BECHEV The EU finds itself facing two powers on its back from the brink and avoid a large-scale di- eastern and southern flanks, Russia and Tur- rect confrontation, the negotiations can hard- key. Despite high levels of economic interde- ly have been easy or pleasant. Although Russia pendence and some shared interests, the EU’s and Turkey inaugurated the TurkStream pipe- relations with both have been quite strained line, Ankara completed the ‘Southern Gas Cor- over the last decade; this has been a constant ridor’ that delivers Caspian gas to European source of disappointment and frustration. In clients and thus runs against Russia’s interests. contrast, Russia-Turkey relations, despite bit- Turkey assisted Azerbaijan in defeating Arme- ter episodes of regional rivalry and economic nia, Russia’s key ally in the South Caucasus. On warfare, have recently been blossoming. the wings of victory, Ankara also began to build a military foothold in what the During a Valdai Club discussion he personal Kremlin regards as its own back- in late 2020, President Putin yard. After lengthy negotiations, commented on his country’s re- T chemistry Moscow reluctantly agreed lations with Turkey as follows: between the two to a joint Russian-Turkish ‘Despite a lot of pressure, we authoritarian ceasefire-monitoring centre in implemented the TurkStream leaders, reinforced Azerbaijan. Last but not least, project together rather quickly Turkey signed contracts to sup- […] Erdoğan, who was aware of by similar strategic ply Ukraine with corvettes and his national interests, said that cultures, enables attack drones, boosting Kyiv’s we would do it, and we did it. them to see eye military muscle and abiliity to […] Working with such a part- to eye even on withstand Russia’s aggres- ner is not only pleasant but also sion. In reality, many things safe.’ Putin lavished praise on contentious issues. that Turkey does in the Middle the Turkish leader and contrast- East and North Africa and in the ed their fruitful collaboration post-Soviet region are neither with the frustratingly slow and uncertain pace pleasant nor safe from Russia’s point of view – of cooperation with Europe (1). His uncritical and this cuts both ways. comments raised some eyebrows in the room given quite a turbulent year in Russian-Turkish Why is it that both Turkey and Russia, criti- relations. cal of almost any action undertaken by the US and Europe, systematically opt for mitiga- In 2020 Russia and Turkey clashed in Syria and tion and damage-limitation when their inter- Libya. While they ultimately managed to step ests clash? Why, despite punching each other (1) The Kremlin, website of the President of Russia, ‘Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club’, 22 October 2020 (http://en.kremlin. ru/events/president/news/64261). 4 Fire and ice | The Russian-Turkish partnership systematically, do they nevertheless manage third explanation is related to Russian-Turkish to enjoy productive, enduring, and cooperative competition and cooperation in both their im- relations? mediate and more distant neighbourhoods, such as the Western Balkans, Middle East and Several factors are often cited to explain the North Africa as well as the broader Black Sea Russian-Turkish détente and in particular the region and Central Asia. This sort of interaction overall cordial tone of diplomatic exchanges is as much about geopolitical goals as economic between the top leaderships in Moscow and An- dividends. Being present across all those the- kara.