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CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by SPIRE - Sciences Po Institutional REpository COMMENTARY STRENGTHS AND CONSTRAINTS OF TURKISH POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS Strengths and Constraints of Turkish Policy in the South Caucasus BAYRAM BALCI* ABSTRACT Just after the end of the Soviet Union and the emergence of three independent states in the South Caucasus Turkey started to manifest a real interest for this region. Energy issue, which is the key issue in this Turkish policy since the beginning, is expected to remain the key priority for Turkey because of its growing econo- my. Ankara tries to have a balanced relations with the three South Caucasian countries, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, but for multiple reasons, Turkey’s policy in the South Caucasus is still de- termined by its relations with Azerbaijan who is the best ally and economic partner for Ankara. urkey, despite being an imme- geographical configuration in the diate neighbor of the South area fed the expectation that a new TCaucasus or Caucasian coun- struggle for influence in this region tries and having a shared history would soon be revived amongst the because of the Ottoman domination old empires: the Russians, the Sa- of this region, has only recently ex- favids, and the Ottomans and their pressed an interest and developed heirs, Russia, Iran, and Turkey. But a foreign policy towards the three this confrontation has not taken South Caucasus republics. Since their place. To date, political pragmatism accession to independence in 1991, and economic cooperation have Ankara has established unique ties prevailed. In particular, Turkey and * Visiting with these nations. However, Turkey Russia have succeeded in avoiding Scholar, is not the only regional power to be all direct conflict in the affairs of the Carnegie looking into its neighborhood. Two Southern Caucasus. Still, they can be Endowment for International other neighbors, which have also his- considered the sources of polariza- Peace, torically dominated this region, are tion in conflicts, such as the conflict Washington DC manifesting a likewise legitimate in- in the Nagorno-Karabakh or the se- Insight Turkey terest: Russia and Iran. In fact, with cessionist movement in Abkhazia Vol. 16 / No. 2 / the end of the Soviet Union, the new and South Ossetia in Georgia. 2014, pp. 43-52 2014 Wınter 43 COMMENTARY BAYRAM BALCI A General Perspective of Turkey’s the wrong way. As it turned out, the Foreign Policy in the Southern results were mixed, and even disap- pointing politically, however there Caucasus was success in the economic and cul- tural spheres. Turkey’s priority was The end of the bipolar world was a in the area of energy and its partici- watershed moment in the history of pation in the realization of the “proj- Turkey’s foreign policy. No longer ect of the century,” the construction having to serve the role of the buffer of the Baku, Tbilisi, Ceyhan (BTC) zone between East and West, Turkey pipeline. Following long and intense aspires to become a major political negotiations and political maneuver- actor and to impose itself on the re- ing, in 2005, the BTC turned Turkey gional scene in the post-Soviet era. into a key country for the transit of The Turkic republics of the area are hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea of particular importance to Turkey. to European markets2. The BTC was In the heart of the Caucasus stands extended by the Baku, Tbilisi, and Azerbaijan, culturally and political- Erzurum pipeline for the transport ly the closest to Turkey. Fearful that of natural gas. This very pipeline is in this new region would fall under the the process of being further extended influence of countries hostile to the by the construction of two new pipe- West, like Iran or Saudi Arabia, or lines that are underway: TAP and to avoid a return of Russia, Turkey’s TANAP, respectively the Trans Adri- western allies strongly encouraged atic Pipeline and the Trans Anatolian Ankara to present itself as a model Pipeline. Once completed, they will of secular development. However, for allow for an improved transit of gas a multitude of reasons, including a from the Caspian Sea to the Markets lack of sufficient resources, the reti- of Europe – passing though Georgia, cence of these newly formed repub- Turkey, Albania, Greece, and Italy. By lics to relinquish their sovereignty in reducing European dependence on exchange for an outside model, and Russian natural gas, these pipelines their apprehension of Russia’s return will turn Turkey into an energy hub to its “old neighborhood,” Ankara and a major actor for exchanges be- has revisited its far sighted ambi- tween Europe and the Caspian basin3. tions and returned to a more realistic approach.1 Politically and geo-strategically, Tur- key is still not the major actor its for- When the AK Party acceded to power eign policy architects dreamt of be- in 2002, it put into place a more as- ing at the end of the Soviet era. Two sertive foreign policy largely due to events illustrate this current failure the economic miracle of the “Anato- in Turkey’s foreign policy ambitions lian Tigers.” At the same time, Turkey and have forced it to be more modest. was cautious not to be overly ambi- First, as a close ally to Azerbaijan, Tur- tious in the Caucasus to avoid stir- key did little to help resolve the con- ring up trouble and rubbing Russia flict in the Nagorno-Karabakh. The 44 Insight Turkey STRENGTHS AND CONSTRAINTS OF TURKISH POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS Minsk group, which did not include Turkey and had the mission to pro- Turkey and Russia have mote the advancement of the peace negotiations between Armenia and succeeded in avoiding all Azerbaijan, produced little in accom- direct conflict in the affairs of plishing any significant improvement the Southern Caucasus in a conflict that has been frozen for over twenty years. Second, the short war in the summer of 2008 between Russian and Georgia also revealed also in the Muslim regions of Georgia Turkey’s political effacement in the (in the region of Adjara and the bor- Southern Caucasus. Having normally der areas of Azerbaijan). Indirectly good relations with both Russia and linked to this soft power are the cul- Georgia, Turkey attempted to play a tural and educational activities of the mediation role in the conflict but rap- Gulenist movement, which reaches idly became aware that it was ineffec- both Azerbaijan and Georgia where tive. Confronted by Russia’s growing five schools and one university have ambitions, Turkey has little leverage, been established. However, since an especially in the Southern Caucasus. open political rift has erupted in Tur- Thus, Ankara launched the “Cauca- key between Prime Minister Erdogan sus Stability and Cooperation Plat- and Fethullah Gülen (the spiritual form,” which brought together the leader of the Gulenist movement), three Caucasus Republics, Turkey, serious repercussions could emerge and Russia. Unfortunately, these ef- in the region, especially in Azerbai- forts only revealed Turkey’s position jan where the Gülen movement af- of inferiority in relation to Russia in filiated activities have already been this region.4 Most recently, in March severely scrutinized by local author- 2014, Ankara has felt its impotency in ities. Nevertheless, it is undeniable the region following Russia’s annex- that a generation of political elites has ation of Crimea. Turkey’s diplomats been formed because of these educa- were forced to curtail their criticism tional establishments created by the of this act to avoid all direct confron- Gülenist movement. Still, despite the tation with a major economic part- State University of Yerevan opening ner: Russia.5 of a Department of Turkish Studies with more than 200 students study- However, when it comes to “soft pow- ing Turkish language and civilization, er,” Turkey has considerable influence soft power in Armenia remains weak. in the Southern Caucasus. Turkey’s television broadcasts of shows and There are evident disparities in the programs are exceptionally popular bilateral relations between Turkey in Azerbaijan. Reciprocal tourism is and each of these Republics of the flourishing between Turkey and the Southern Caucasus. Each of these Caucasus. Turkish religious influence three countries has striking differ- is notable, not only in Azerbaijan but ences. More importantly, they each 2014 Wınter 45 COMMENTARY BAYRAM BALCI represent diverse interests for Tur- At the beginning of Azerbaijan’s in- key. Thus, they each have taken on dependence, relations were warm a unique place in Ankara’s foreign between the two countries. The policy. first President of Azerbaijan, Abul- faz Elchibey, was known for his Turkey-Azerbaijan, a Quasi- Pan-Turkism and his strong attach- ment to Turkey. However, in 1993, he perfect Convergence of was overthrown by a coup d’état and Viewpoints and Interests in the was replaced by Heydar Aliyev, who Southern Caucasus put in place a more pragmatic foreign policy that was less tied to Turkey. Still, Azerbaijan holds a unique place in he maintained good relations with Turkey’s foreign policy, not only Ankara. Since 2003, his son Ilham has in the Caucasus and in the general followed a similar political line and Turkic speaking region but also be- has been able to manage Azerbaijan’s yond. This closeness is not only due neighbors. Concretely, Turkey has ac- to the shared cultural and linguistic tively supported Azerbaijan’s position affinities but also to the strong polit- in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as ical and strategic interests that exist well as other regional security issues; between these two countries. Their for example, when tensions emerged bilateral relations are often character- between Azerbaijan and Iran.6 In ex- ized as “two states, one nation.” With change, Azerbaijan supports Turkey’s the end of the Soviet Empire, Turkey initiatives, like the Turcophone Sum- sought to recreate a solidarity based mits, even if these summits are not on “Turkishness,” connecting all met with much enthusiasm in Central Turkish-speaking nations.

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