Strengths and Constraints of Turkish Policy in the South Caucasus

CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk

Provided by SPIRE - Sciences Po Institutional REpository

COMMENTARY STRENGTHS AND CONSTRAINTS OF TURKISH POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

BAYRAM BALCI*

ABSTRACT Just after the end of the Soviet Union and the emergence of three independent states in the South Caucasus Turkey started to manifest a real interest for this region. Energy issue, which is the key issue in this Turkish policy since the beginning, is expected to remain the key priority for Turkey because of its growing economy. Ankara tries to have a balanced relations with the three South Caucasian countries, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, but for multiple reasons, Turkey’s policy in the South Caucasus is still de- termined by its relations with Azerbaijan who is the best ally and economic partner for Ankara.

urkey, despite being an imme- geographical configuration in the diate neighbor of the South area fed the expectation that a new TCaucasus or Caucasian coun- struggle for influence in this region tries and having a shared history would soon be revived amongst the because of the Ottoman domination old empires: the Russians, the Sa- of this region, has only recently ex- favids, and the Ottomans and their pressed an interest and developed heirs, Russia, Iran, and Turkey. But a foreign policy towards the three this confrontation has not taken South Caucasus republics. Since their place. To date, political pragmatism accession to independence in 1991, and economic cooperation have Ankara has established unique ties prevailed. In particular, Turkey and * Visiting with these nations. However, Turkey Russia have succeeded in avoiding Scholar, is not the only regional power to be all direct conflict in the affairs of the Carnegie looking into its neighborhood. Two Southern Caucasus. Still, they can be Endowment for International other neighbors, which have also his- considered the sources of polariza- Peace, torically dominated this region, are tion in conflicts, such as the conflict Washington DC manifesting a likewise legitimate in- in the Nagorno-Karabakh or the se- Insight Turkey terest: Russia and Iran. In fact, with cessionist movement in Abkhazia Vol. 16 / No. 2 / the end of the Soviet Union, the new and South Ossetia in Georgia. 2014, pp. 43-52

2014 Wınter 43 COMMENTARY BAYRAM BALCI

A General Perspective of Turkey’s the wrong way. As it turned out, the Foreign Policy in the Southern results were mixed, and even disap- pointing politically, however there Caucasus was success in the economic and cultural spheres. Turkey’s priority was The end of the bipolar world was a in the area of energy and its partici- watershed moment in the history of pation in the realization of the “proj- Turkey’s foreign policy. No longer ect of the century,” the construction having to serve the role of the buffer of the Baku, Tbilisi, Ceyhan (BTC) zone between East and West, Turkey pipeline. Following long and intense aspires to become a major political negotiations and political maneuver- actor and to impose itself on the re- ing, in 2005, the BTC turned Turkey gional scene in the post-Soviet era. into a key country for the transit of The Turkic republics of the area are hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea of particular importance to Turkey. to European markets2. The BTC was In the heart of the Caucasus stands extended by the Baku, Tbilisi, and Azerbaijan, culturally and political- Erzurum pipeline for the transport ly the closest to Turkey. Fearful that of natural gas. This very pipeline is in this new region would fall under the the process of being further extended influence of countries hostile to the by the construction of two new pipe- West, like Iran or Saudi Arabia, or lines that are underway: TAP and to avoid a return of Russia, Turkey’s TANAP, respectively the Trans Adri- western allies strongly encouraged atic Pipeline and the Trans Anatolian Ankara to present itself as a model Pipeline. Once completed, they will of secular development. However, for allow for an improved transit of gas a multitude of reasons, including a from the Caspian Sea to the Markets lack of sufficient resources, the reti- of Europe – passing though Georgia, cence of these newly formed repub- Turkey, Albania, Greece, and Italy. By lics to relinquish their sovereignty in reducing European dependence on exchange for an outside model, and Russian natural gas, these pipelines their apprehension of Russia’s return will turn Turkey into an energy hub to its “old neighborhood,” Ankara and a major actor for exchanges be- has revisited its far sighted ambi- tween Europe and the Caspian basin3. tions and returned to a more realistic approach.1 Politically and geo-strategically, Tur- key is still not the major actor its for- When the AK Party acceded to power eign policy architects dreamt of be- in 2002, it put into place a more as- ing at the end of the Soviet era. Two sertive foreign policy largely due to events illustrate this current failure the economic miracle of the “Anato- in Turkey’s foreign policy ambitions lian Tigers.” At the same time, Turkey and have forced it to be more modest. was cautious not to be overly ambi- First, as a close ally to Azerbaijan, Tur- tious in the Caucasus to avoid stir- key did little to help resolve the con- ring up trouble and rubbing Russia flict in the Nagorno-Karabakh. The

44 Insight Turkey STRENGTHS AND CONSTRAINTS OF TURKISH POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

Minsk group, which did not include Turkey and had the mission to pro- Turkey and Russia have mote the advancement of the peace negotiations between Armenia and succeeded in avoiding all Azerbaijan, produced little in accom- direct conflict in the affairs of plishing any significant improvement the Southern Caucasus in a conflict that has been frozen for over twenty years. Second, the short war in the summer of 2008 between Russian and Georgia also revealed also in the Muslim regions of Georgia Turkey’s political effacement in the (in the region of Adjara and the bor- Southern Caucasus. Having normally der areas of Azerbaijan). Indirectly good relations with both Russia and linked to this soft power are the cul- Georgia, Turkey attempted to play a tural and educational activities of the mediation role in the conflict but rap- Gulenist movement, which reaches idly became aware that it was ineffec- both Azerbaijan and Georgia where tive. Confronted by Russia’s growing five schools and one university have ambitions, Turkey has little leverage, been established. However, since an especially in the Southern Caucasus. open political rift has erupted in Tur- Thus, Ankara launched the “Cauca- key between Prime Minister Erdogan sus Stability and Cooperation Plat- and Fethullah Gülen (the spiritual form,” which brought together the leader of the Gulenist movement), three Caucasus Republics, Turkey, serious repercussions could emerge and Russia. Unfortunately, these ef- in the region, especially in Azerbai- forts only revealed Turkey’s position jan where the Gülen movement af- of inferiority in relation to Russia in filiated activities have already been this region.4 Most recently, in March severely scrutinized by local author- 2014, Ankara has felt its impotency in ities. Nevertheless, it is undeniable the region following Russia’s annex- that a generation of political elites has ation of Crimea. Turkey’s diplomats been formed because of these educa- were forced to curtail their criticism tional establishments created by the of this act to avoid all direct confron- Gülenist movement. Still, despite the tation with a major economic part- State University of Yerevan opening ner: Russia.5 of a Department of Turkish Studies with more than 200 students study- However, when it comes to “soft pow- ing Turkish language and civilization, er,” Turkey has considerable influence soft power in Armenia remains weak. in the Southern Caucasus. Turkey’s television broadcasts of shows and There are evident disparities in the programs are exceptionally popular bilateral relations between Turkey in Azerbaijan. Reciprocal tourism is and each of these Republics of the flourishing between Turkey and the Southern Caucasus. Each of these Caucasus. Turkish religious influence three countries has striking differ- is notable, not only in Azerbaijan but ences. More importantly, they each

2014 Wınter 45 COMMENTARY BAYRAM BALCI

represent diverse interests for Tur- At the beginning of Azerbaijan’s in- key. Thus, they each have taken on dependence, relations were warm a unique place in Ankara’s foreign between the two countries. The policy. first President of Azerbaijan, Abul- faz Elchibey, was known for his Turkey-Azerbaijan, a Quasi- Pan-Turkism and his strong attach- ment to Turkey. However, in 1993, he perfect Convergence of was overthrown by a coup d’état and Viewpoints and Interests in the was replaced by Heydar Aliyev, who Southern Caucasus put in place a more pragmatic foreign policy that was less tied to Turkey. Still, Azerbaijan holds a unique place in he maintained good relations with Turkey’s foreign policy, not only Ankara. Since 2003, his son Ilham has in the Caucasus and in the general followed a similar political line and Turkic speaking region but also be- has been able to manage Azerbaijan’s yond. This closeness is not only due neighbors. Concretely, Turkey has ac- to the shared cultural and linguistic tively supported Azerbaijan’s position affinities but also to the strong polit- in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as ical and strategic interests that exist well as other regional security issues; between these two countries. Their for example, when tensions emerged bilateral relations are often character- between Azerbaijan and Iran.6 In ex- ized as “two states, one nation.” With change, Azerbaijan supports Turkey’s the end of the Soviet Empire, Turkey initiatives, like the Turcophone Sum- sought to recreate a solidarity based mits, even if these summits are not on “Turkishness,” connecting all met with much enthusiasm in Central Turkish-speaking nations. Azerbaijan Asia. In sum, Turkey and Azerbaijan was the most enthusiastic in heeding share similar positions on the Arme- this call. Good bilateral relations are nian question of genocide, conflict in not limited to official government the Nagorno-Karabakh, and regional interactions, as the two societies are security issues. very close and intertwined culturally. Many Turks are of Azerbaijani ori- In terms of economics, the two coun- gin, and since the end of the Soviet tries are linked through a multiplicity era, there is an increasing number of of accords, which permit exchang- marriages between Turks and Aze- es in all sectors, however the energy ris. Ethnically, these two people are section is by far the most dynamic. almost identical. This is true to the A number of Turkish companies are extent that religious differences are investing in Azerbaijan, but the BTC, erased, as Turkey is a Sunni majority the BTE and the other pipelines that country and Azerbaijan is 65% Shiite. are under construction, like the TAP All these factors explain the gener- and the TANAP, represent the keys to ally good relations between Turkey relations between these two counties, and Azerbaijan; however, they do not and even their future. Moreover, pet- mask certain emerging tensions. rol revenues have permitted Azerbai-

46 Insight Turkey STRENGTHS AND CONSTRAINTS OF TURKISH POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip jan to massively invest in the Turkish tween the two countries. The Turkish Erdoğan and 7 İlham Aliyev, the economy. Religious Affairs Administration, Prime Minister “Diyanet,” cooperates with the Spiri- of Azerbaijan in In the area of ideas, relations are even tual Leader of Baku, and a number of Baku, Azerbaijan. more developed and have history. Turkish Islamic movements are im- AA / Vugar Ibadov The Turkish Republic was ideologi- planted in Azerbaijan, like the disci- cally founded by the intellectuals who ples of Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan, or were in same cases originated from those of the mystic Nakshibendi Os- Azerbaijan. The Soviet “parentheti- man Nuri Topbas. Finally, in the area cal” was not an obstacle to renewing of education, there is the strong pres- the cultural and religious relations ence of the educational institutions between the two countries when the set up by Fethullah Gulen. A number Soviet Union collapsed. Turkish tele- of his followers have set up universi- vision networks are avidly followed ties as well as dozens of schools and in Azerbaijan, and the similarity of exam preparatory schools.8 the language is apparent in the streets of Baku. In the religious domain, Thus, relations between the two coun- Azerbaijani Shiism and Turkish Sun- tries are excellent at all levels. They are nism do not hinder cooperation be- grounded but it does not mean that

2014 Wınter 47 COMMENTARY BAYRAM BALCI

No longer having to certain tensions do not exist. In par- serve the role of the ticular, when Ankara moves towards normalizing its relations with Arme- buffer zone between nia, it meets with strong resistance East and West, Turkey from its Azerbaijani ally. The next section will demonstrate how Tur- aspires to become a key’s foreign policy towards Armenia major political actor is decided, really, in Baku rather than and to impose itself in Ankara. on the regional scene Turkey-Armenia, an Impossible in the post-Soviet era Reconciliation?

Relations between Turkey and Arme- sacres, but it contests the extent of the nia remain, to say the least, very del- tragedy, which it argues took place in icate and complex, as history and the the context of the Russian-Turkish frozen conflict in the Nagorno-Kara- wars and these tragic events had an bakh weigh heavily on the present. impact on all parties involved. Turkey did recognize Armenia’s independence at the end of the Soviet Also, but none the less not a margin- era and considered establishing dip- al issue, the exact demarcation of the lomatic relations with Yerevan. How- border between the two countries is ever, these relations were short lived. a subject of controversy. Turkey ful- In 1993, in solidarity with Azerbai- ly recognizes its actual borders, but jan, Turkey closed its borders with Ankara still considers that Yerevan is Armenia to protest against the occu- ambiguous on this issue and has in- pation of Karabakh and certain other vited it to clarify its position on the Azerbaijani towns by the Armenian official border.10 forces. Ever since, this cold conflict has been an insurmountable obstacle Having been stuck in an impasse in the normalization of relations be- throughout the 1990s, relations with tween the two countries and has had Armenia have improved since the AK an impact on Turkey’s foreign policy Party came to power and introduced in the Caucasus. its foreign policy of “zero problems with neighbors.” Turkey has tried to The other thorny issue is the question improve its relations with all of its of the Armenian genocide. Armenia neighbors. The first steps were made qualifies the massacre of the Arme- in 2008, within the framework of nian populations in 1915 under the “football diplomacy.” Taking advan- Ottoman Empire as genocide and ac- tage of soccer matches between Tur- tively advocates in the international key and Armenia in 2008 to qualify community to have it recognized as for the Euro Cup, President Abdul- such.9 Turkey does not deny the mas- lah Gul and his counterpart, Serzh

48 Insight Turkey STRENGTHS AND CONSTRAINTS OF TURKISH POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

Sargsyan, held mutual visits. These development and opens the door to visits, undoubtedly, opened the door many other initiatives. True, next for dialogue and other bolder initia- year’s commemoration in 2015 of the tives. Secret negotiations led to the hundred year old tragedy of 1915 risks preparation of the “Negotiation of polarizing the two camps but the first the Protocols” to normalize relations efforts of negotiations gives us hope between Turkey and Armenia.”11 that dialogue is possible. Indeed, in However, these efforts, no matter April 2014, the Turkish Prime Minis- how sincere they may have been, fell ter’s official expression of condolences to the weigh side under the reaction for the descendants of the Armenian and pressure coming from Azerbai- died in 1915 under Ottomans was a jan, who accused Turkey of treason step forward in the rapprochement and trying to marginalize Baku from between Turkey and Armenia.13 the negotiations, especially exclud- ing the Nagorno-Karabakh from the equation. In retaliation, Azerbaijan Turkey and Georgia, the Bridge threatened to increase the price of Between the Caspian and Europe oil and other derivative products ex- ported to Turkey. Azerbaijan even Turks and Georgians have a long threatened to use Russia as a trans- common history marked by conflicts port route for oil and gas instead of of bordering countries. The Ottoman Turkey. 12 Thus, Azerbaijan’s leverage Empire dominated for a longtime over Turkey compromised the suc- part of the current Georgian terri- cessful resolution of these Protocols tory, notably the province of Ajaria, and the revelations to the public of which was islamicized as of the 16th these secret talks forced the two par- century. Despite this tumultuous ties to retract themselves from pre- past, the advent of an independent vious positions, holding a much less Georgia from the Soviet Union in conciliatory stance. In fact, the Pro- 1991 allowed a development of good tocols failed to obtain the approval of relations between Ankara and Tbili- the two parliaments without which si, which Turkey privileged for two any normalization is impossible. reasons. First, for Turkey, the Geor- gian territory is an entrance corridor However, this failure to achieve nor- to the Caucasus and Central Asia malization cannot be viewed as a total or Turkic World, beyond the Caspi- failure. The process allowed Turkish an Sea.14 Second, Georgia possesses and Armenian negotiators to meet. It fundamental importance for Turkey also encouraged civil society on both since the hydrocarbons of the Cas- sides of the border to start a serious pian Sea pass through the country to discussion and to reflect upon these reach the Turkish ports and the inter- painful topics. Initiated before these national markets. political discussions took place – the dialogue between historians, intel- Reciprocally, Turkey is a key country lectuals, and academics now is a new for Georgia for at least two reasons

2014 Wınter 49 COMMENTARY BAYRAM BALCI

as well. First, it is a window toward a rapprochement policy with Russia. Europe for Georgia. Turkey’s nego- Georgia’s pro-Western stance and tiations for EU membership are of its desire to enter NATO have ren- great importance for Tbilisi, as it as- dered Turkey’s dual attempt to have pires to go beyond its own Caucasus good relations with both Russia and enclave. Second, in the context of its Georgia difficult to navigate. Thus, in conflictual relations with the other August 2008, when Russia invaded a part of Georgia, which was seeking to recuperate its secessionist prov- The diplomatic initiative to ince of South Ossetia, Turkey found itself in a very awkward position. create the “Caucasus Stability The diplomatic initiative to create the and Cooperation Platform” by “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” by only grouping region- only grouping regional actors al actors to manage regional prob- to manage regional problems, lems, quickly showed the limitations quickly showed the limitations of Turkey’s power in its immediate surroundings.15 of Turkey’s power The generally good relations between Turkey and Georgia encounter on regional superpower, Russia, Georgia occasion minor tensions. The activ- needs Turkey as a balancing power, in ism of the Abkhazia minority of Tur- particular, to overcome its economic key regularly stirs up trouble, as they problems and counter the Russian maintain commercial activities with markets, which have been closed to Abkhazia. But this region of Geor- it since the war between Georgia and gia is secessionist. As Tbilisi tries to Russia in 2008. quell the insurgency, it looks at the exchanges with Turkey with a critical Thus, since their establishment in the eye, recognizing that they are out of early 90s, relations between Geor- its control. gia and Turkey have been warm and carefully maintained through regular Meanwhile, there also exist some mutual visits. The change of power religious tensions between the two that occurred with the Revolution of countries. Georgians, in particular the Roses in 2003, and the failure at the Georgian Church, which has the ballot box for Saakashvili in Octo- seen an increasing political role over ber 2012 with the arrival to power of recent years, does not appreciate the his rival Bidzina Ivanishvili only had religious activism of certain Turkish a limited amount of repercussions on groups on its territory, in particular in the good relations with Turkey. Still, Ajaria. More prosaically, the building these relations are sometimes diffi- of new mosques or the restoration cult to manage for Turkey since the of older ones abandoned during the AKP came to power and established Soviet era, which are financed by the

50 Insight Turkey STRENGTHS AND CONSTRAINTS OF TURKISH POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

private initiatives of certain groups, relations, which Prime Minister Ivan- like Suleyman Tunahan’s group, are ishvili had begun and will instead re- badly perceived by certain segments inforce relations between Ankara and of the population, who feel that their Tbilisi. Christian identity is being threatened. Similarly, Turkey is seeking to rebuild the Aziziye Mosque in Ba- Conclusion tumi, a vestige of the Ottoman past and domination of the region.16 To At the end of the Soviet era, the Cau- counterbalance and resolve these casus and Central Asia have taken an tensions, Turkey has offered to re- important place in Turkey’s foreign store old Georgian Churches in Tur- policy. However, Ankara’s ambitions key. These cooperation efforts are have been beyond its actual capaci- continuing but their final outcome ty for action. So, it has returned to a remains uncertain. Their success de- more pragmatic and realist posture. pends on the strengthening of bilat- Consequently, Turkey’s foreign pol- eral relations. icy in this region has somewhat ne- glected Central Asia but maintained Finally, the question of Meshkete a keen interest in the Caucasus, in is divisive. The Meshketians, also particular, because of its importance known as the Ahiska, are a small in the energy sector. Furthermore, Turkish minority from Georgia – de- the diplomatic initiative of Foreign ported in 1944 from their villages in Minister Davutoğlu has it as a cen- the steps of Central Asia. After the tral goal to better Turkey’s relations end of the Soviet era, similarly to a with its neighbors, and notably Ar- large number of peoples of the Cau- menia. The normalization of its re- casus, many who were deported are lations with these countries remains seeking to return to their homes. one of Turkey’s priorities, not only Supported by Turkey in their quest to for economic reasons but also for return home, these numerous Mesh- political and symbolic ones – as Tur- ketians have not obtained Tbilisi’s key wants to appear as a country at agreement to return to their lands, peace with its neighbors. This situa- despite multiple promises. tion has become ever more pressing in the Caucasus, as Turkey is trying Overall, relations between Turkey not to become more embroiled in the and Georgia are very good. The de- Syrian civil war and also is seeing its velopment of the pipeline projects, in relations with countries of the Middle particular the TAP and the TANAP East deteriorate. will render the Turkish and Georgian economies even more complementa- For Ankara, however, for its rela- ry and interdependent. Similarly, the tions to improve with Armenia, the annexation of the Crimea by the Rus- conflict of the Nagorno-Karabakh sians will most likely slow the prog- must be resolved. Thus, Turkey’s best ress of a renewal of Russian-Georgian bet for partnership in the region is

2014 Wınter 51 COMMENTARY BAYRAM BALCI

Azerbaijan. The conundrum is that 6. Konrad Sasztowt, “Iran, Turkey and Azerbai- jan: Heading Towards a Regional Crisis?” PISM, Azerbaijan’s strategy is to isolate Ar- N° 35, (September 2012), http://www.pism.pl/ menia. It won’t hesitate to block Tur- files/?id_plik=11387 key’s efforts towards Armenia and 7. Vusal Gasimli, “Azerbaijan Eyes to Become Top will use its energy ticket as a form of Investor in Turkey”, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, blackmail, taking Turkey as a “hos- (14 November, 2012), http://www.turkishweekly. tage” in the process. Nevertheless, net/op-ed/3044 maintaining the status quo on the 8. Bayram Balci, “Between secular education and Islamic philosophy: the approach and achieve- Nagorno-Karabakh conflict serves as ments of Fethullah Gülen’s followers in Azerbai- a political lever for Baku in defense jan”, Caucasus Survey, Vol. 1, N° 1, (2013), http:// of its domestic and foreign interests. www.caucasus-survey.org/vol1-no1/downloads/ Between%20secular%20education%20and%20 This situation, which looks like it Islamic%20philosophy.pdf may last, makes Baku the center of 9. ICG, International Crisis Group, Turkey and Ar attention and decision making on a menia: “Opening Minds, Opening Borders”, Europe number of unavoidable issues in the Report, N° 199, April 2009), 44 p. Available from: region, including how Turkey can http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication- type/media-releases/2010/europe/Turkey%20 carry out its foreign policy in the and%20Armenia%20Opening%20Minds%20 South Caucasus. Opening%20Borders.aspx 10. Nigar Göksel, “Turkey and Armenia Post Proto- Endnotes cols: Back to Square One?” TESEV, (October 2012), http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/ 1. Mustafa Aydin, “Foucault’s Pendulum: Turkey TurkeyArmenia.pdf in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, Turkish Studies , . Yigal Schleifer, “Why the 2009 Turkey-Arme- Vo. 5, Issue 2, (2004), pp. 1-22 11 nia Protocols Broke Down?” Eurasianet, (March 2, 2. Greg Bruno, ”Turkey at an Energy Crossroads”, 2012), http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65078 Council on Foreign Relations, November 20, 2008, . Nona Mikhelidze, “The Turkish-Armenian Rap- http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkey-energy- 12 prochement at the Deadlock”, Istituto Affari In- crossroads/p17821 ternazionali, (March 2010), http://www.iai.it/pdf/ 3. Gareth Winrow, “The Southern Gas Corridor DocIAI/iai1005.pdf and Turkey’s Role as an Energy Transit State and . Joshua Kucera, “Turkey & Armenia: Are Erdo Energy Hub”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 15, N°1, (2013), pp. 13 ğan’s “Condolences” a Turning Point?” Eurasianet, 145-163, http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/ (April 24, 2004), http://www.eurasianet.org/node/ insight-turkey-vol_15_no_1_2013_winrow.pdf 68304 4. Eleni Fotiou, “Caucasus Stability and Coop- . Nigar Göksel, “Turkey and Georgia: Zero Prob- eration Platform, What is at Stake for Regional 14 lems?” The German Marshall Fund of the United Cooperation”, International Centre for Black Sea States, (June 19, 2013), http://www.gmfus.org/ Studies (ICBSS), Athens, Greece, N°16, 2009, http:// wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1372172079 www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/ Goksel_TurkeyGeorgia_Jun13.pdf Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8 c7060233&lng=en&id=104737 15. Igor Torbakov, “The Georgia Crisis and Rus- sia-Turkey Relations”, The Jamestown Foundation, 5. Bayram Balci, “The Russian Intervention in (2008), http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/me- Crimea: Erdogan’s Dilemma”, Eurasian Outlook, dia/GeorgiaCrisisTorbakov.pdf Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 14, (2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/ 16. Salome Achba, ”Dispute about Aziziye 2014/03/14/russian-intervention-in-crimea- Mosque”, Religiebi Info, http://religiebi.info/index. erdogan-s-dilemma/h3u8?reloadFlag=1 php?a=main&pid=58&lang=eng

52 Insight Turkey