National Perspectives on Nuclear Disarmament
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NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT EDITED BY: Barry M. Blechman Alexander K. Bollfrass March 2010 Copyright ©2010 The Henry L. Stimson Center Cover design by Shawn Woodley All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent from The Henry L. Stimson Center. The Henry L. Stimson Center 1111 19th Street, NW 12th Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone: 202-223-5956 fax: 202-238-9604 www.stimson.org TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface .....................................................................................................................v Introduction ...........................................................................................................vii BRAZIL | A Brazilian Perspective on Nuclear Disarmament Marcos C. de Azambuja.....................................................................1 CHINA | China’s Nuclear Strategy in a Changing World Stategic Situation Major General Pan Zhenqiang (Retired)........................................13 FRANCE | French Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Disarmament Bruno Tertrais ..................................................................................37 INDIA | Indian Perspectives on the Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Rajesh M. Basrur .............................................................................59 IRAN | Iranian Perspectives on the Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Anoush Ehteshami............................................................................87 ISRAEL | Israeli Perspective on the Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Shlomo Brom..................................................................................115 JAPAN | Realistic Proactivism: Japanese Attitudes Toward Global Zero Matake Kamiya ..............................................................................137 NORTH KOREA | North Korea’s Perspectives on the Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapon Leon V. Sigal and Joel Wit.............................................................195 PAKISTAN | Pakistan’s Perspective on the Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Feroz Hassan Khan........................................................................211 RUSSIA | Russian Perspectives on the Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Dmitri Trenin..................................................................................249 TURKEY | Turkey’s Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament Henri J. Barkey...............................................................................271 UNITED KINGDOM | British Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Disarmament Sir Lawrence Freedman.................................................................289 UNITED STATES | US Perspectives on the Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Barry Blechman, Alexander Bollfrass, and Frank Valliere.........327 About the Authors...............................................................................................365 PREFACE I am pleased to present National Perspectives on Nuclear Disarmament, the final Stimson publication in a series addressing obstacles to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Stimson project on nuclear security, Unblocking the Road to Zero, has explored the practical dimensions of this critical 21st century debate, identifying both political and technical obstacles that could block the road to “zero” and outlining how each of these could be addressed. Led by Stimson's co-founder and Distinguished Fellow Dr. Barry Blechman, the project provides useful analyses that can help US and world leaders make the elimination of nuclear weapons a realistic and viable option. This volume is a compendium of a previously-published six-part series of country assessments. It follows the release of Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty, a volume on the technical issues of governance, verification, and enforcement of a disarmament regime. The authors of each chapter in this book are leading authorities on the factors influencing their subject governments’ nuclear decision-making and are well positioned to predict those nations’ reactions to the disarmament scenarios they have been asked to evaluate. Most chapters were written by knowledgeable nationals of each country. The result is an honest appraisal of the geo-political obstacles to global disarmament that sheds light on the nuclear decision-making mechanisms of key nuclear countries and bypasses the platitudes exchanged by diplomats in public forums. The Unblocking the Road to Zero series makes an important contribution to the renewed debate about how to rid the world of the dangers of nuclear weapons. It frames nuclear disarmament as a realistic, strategically sound goal for the world, rather than an idealistic vision and distant pursuit. This enduring strategic issue has been a central concern of the Stimson Center since its founding twenty years ago. I hope that this new publication will provide insights and pragmatic ideas to facilitate wise policymaking, in keeping with Stimson tradition. Sincerely, Ellen Laipson President and CEO The Stimson Center INTRODUCTION | vii INTRODUCTION Barry M. Blechman and Alexander K. Bollfrass n September 2009, the 15 members of the UN Security Council, including the I five declared nuclear weapon states, unanimously pledged, “to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.” The road to nuclear disarmament will no doubt be long and arduous, but its feasibility does not depend upon scientific discoveries or the invention of new technologies; it hinges strictly upon governments’ willingness to embark upon it.* During 2009, Stimson’s Unblocking the Road to Zero project reviewed advanced nuclear nations’ degrees of resistance to the idea of negotiated, multilateral nuclear disarmament. The results show that with serious effort, hard work, compensating security arrangements, and a measure of luck, nuclear disarmament a viable endeavor. The nine governments with nuclear weapons would all need to consent to a disarmament process, but the achievement of a concurrent consensus would not be necessary. They each would have to agree on incremental and reciprocal steps at appropriate junctures. The nations with the largest arsenals could begin the disarmament process. As they dismantled weapons, pressures would grow for others to join. Concurrently, negotiations could be held to resolve the security concerns motivating some states to acquire nuclear weapons, and also to place tighter controls on civilian nuclear materials and facilities so that they could not be diverted for weapon programs in a disarmed world. The approach taken must be tailored to each nuclear power individually. United States and Russia: No matter how one envisions the initiation of nuclear disarmament or its timeframe, it is certain that the US and Russia – which jointly own more than 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons – must take the lead. Although talks for a treaty to reduce their nuclear arsenals are underway, the START agreement that should emerge later this year will only be a modest, initial bilateral step toward the ultimate goal. The next round of negotiations must address shorter range weapons and reserve warheads, as well. As Dmitri Trenin points out in his essay, before it will make truly deep nuclear cuts, Russia must overcome its sense of inferiority in conventional forces, particularly in its relationship with NATO. For its part, the US must become convinced that Russia no longer seeks to reassert control or undue influence over states that formerly were members of the * Technical obstacles to nuclear disarmament and how they might be overcome are explored at length in Barry M. Blechman and Alexander K. Bollfrass (eds.), Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty (Stimson, 2010). viii | BLECHMAN AND BOLLFRASS Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. In both countries, presidential leadership for nuclear disarmament must be impressed upon key institutional players. The two countries must come to terms about the relationship between nuclear reductions and the deployment of missile defenses, either accepting limitations on missile defenses or working cooperatively to develop multinational defenses. France and the United Kingdom: America’s NATO allies currently have contrasting views regarding their nuclear arms’ utility. As described by Lawrence Freedman, British mainstream political debate has moved closer to considering unilateral disarmament to avoid diverting resources from its strained war-fighting capacity. Bruno Tertrais stresses that France has been far more resistant to the idea, although it is worth noting that France has recently joined the ranks of countries with former national security leaders publicly calling for disarmament. Both Freedman and Tertrais conclude that if the US and Russia made significant progress toward deep reductions in their own arsenals, these two US allies would find it difficult to resist joining multilateral negotiations with the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from all nations. China and India: The similarities in these emerging global powers’ approach on nuclear weapons are notable. Both have been satisfied so far with surprisingly modest nuclear postures and only the slow modernization of their forces, and both espouse support for far-reaching disarmament objectives. But as Rajesh Basrur points out for India, and Pan Zhenqiang to China, the path for a broad dialogue on nuclear elimination among all of the major nuclear powers will only be cleared