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Home , Appeasement, Disarmament, Eric Phipps, Kamerun

Colonial coming to power in 1933, even though the Nazi leader’s territorial ambitions focused (1935–38) on Eastern , as indicated in his infa- PAUL W. DOERR mous memoir .Afewsenior Acadia University, Canada Nazis also hoped for a colonial foothold in Africa, but the early years of Hitler’s regime were taken up with other, more urgent Colonial appeasement is a largely forgotten matters. aspectofBritishappeasement.Duringthe British officials and policy-makers had, years from 1935 to 1938 the British govern- throughout the 1920s, strongly rejected any ment gave serious attention to the possibility suggestion of returning colonies to . of granting Germany colonial possessions But the deteriorating world economic situa- in Africa as part of a “general settlement” tion after 1929, combined with the growing with the Nazi regime. Various schemes for threat to the from Hitler’s Germany, transferring African territories to German forced the British to rethink their position. jurisdiction were considered, but serious Gradually the idea began to emerge that per- obstacles arose and, with the exception of haps colonies could be returned to Germany one formal proposal from the British in early as part of a much larger general settlement of 1938, talks with the Germans on the subject the situation in Europe. never moved beyond vague generalities. On March 7, 1936, Hitler sent German Prior to the First World , Germany troops into the of Ger- held four territories in Africa, namely Ger- many. He then issued a series of demands, man East Africa, German South-, oneofwhichwasacallforequalityofcolonial Kamerun, and . All were surren- rights for Germany. The Nazis had dropped dered to the victorious Allies at the end a similar hint the previous year when then of the war, who then held them as League British foreign secretary John Simon had of Nations mandate territories. The same visited Germany. The German demands applied to the scattered German island pos- prompted the new foreign secretary Anthony sessions in the Pacific. The Germans had Eden to suggest to prime minister Stanley always been ambivalent about their overseas Baldwin that a colonial redistribution might possessions. German chancellor Otto von be worth examining. Baldwin ordered the Bismarck had only reluctantly embarked on formation of a committee, headed by Lord the European imperial sweepstakes of the Plymouth, parliamentary under-secretary late nineteenth century. However, a vigorous for colonies, to look into the matter. The colonial lobby gained traction in Berlin, committee was composed of senior officials especially during the era of Wilhelm II. Fol- drawn from a variety of British government lowing the war, some Germans continued ministries. to hope that their colonies, at least those in A 36-page report followed three months Africa, would be returned in the future. A later. The results were largely negative. The number of pro-colonial lobbying groups were Plymouth Committee could find few, if set up in Germany in the early 1920s. Such any, reasons to retrocede colonies to Ger- hopes were given a huge boost with Hitler’s many. There was some mystification as to

The Encyclopedia of . Edited by Gordon Martel. © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2018 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/9781118885154.dipl0057 2 COLONIAL APPEASEMENT (1935–38) why Germany wanted colonies anyway, as problemscouldbesolvedbythereturnof their economic benefits were dubious and colonies. An agreement over colonies, he administrative costs would be substantial. suggested, could lead to further agreements The committee cited major legal problems on . Blum listened patiently and involved in transferring mandated territories apparently encouraged Schacht to take up his to German control. The local inhabitants cause with the British who, he implied, would would not likely want a return of German be sympathetic. Accordingly, in January and rule, especially given Nazi racial ideology. February of 1937 Schacht repeated his argu- Strategic issues were given considerable ments in a series of meetings with Frederick emphasis by the report. If the British, for Leith-Ross, chief economic adviser to the example, transferred Tanganyika (the former British government. Leith-Ross was skeptical, ) to German control, and once again pointed to the high costs theNaziswouldthenhaveapotentialnaval of administering colonies, but nevertheless base for Indian Ocean commerce raiders, or relayedSchacht’smessagetoLondon. air bases to disrupt Britain’s Cape-to-Cairo The ball was now in the British court. connection. The former German possession The Cabinet seemed puzzled and could find of South-West Africa was now firmly under no path forward given the results of the the heel of the South Africans who were Plymouth Committee. For his part, Eden not going to allow a German return, so the doubted that Schacht had any real influence committeeruledthatterritoryoutentirely. on Hitler and thought the problem should The British had been granted small chunks of be negotiated exclusively between the foreign the former German possessions of Kamerun ministries of the two countries. The Cabinet and Togoland, but most of those territories instructed the British ambassador in Paris, were under a French mandate. The French, , to see if might be inter- like the South Africans, were unlikely to ested in transferring some of its territory give up the former German colonies. The to Germany. Phipps reported back that the Plymouth report led the government to answer, after a very friendly luncheon with proclaim in the House of Commons on July Blum, was a firm “no.” 27, 1936, that no return of German colonies The next step took place with the visit of was forthcoming. The Conservative Party Lord Halifax, who held the senior Cabinet conference the following October voted to post of Lord President of the Council, to support the government’s decision. Foreign Germany in . In the mean- Secretary Eden was particularly supportive of time had succeeded the committee’s report. Baldwin as prime minister on May 28, 1937. The whole issue might have died at that Chamberlain was determined to achieve a time. However, Germany’s Hjalmar Schacht, general settlement with Hitler and believed then minister of economics, and believed that the attitude of his own Foreign Office was by the British to be a moderating influence anobstacleontheroadtothatgoal,although on Hitler, kept the idea alive. In August of for the time being Eden and Chamberlain 1936 Schacht traveled to Paris and had a were able to paper over their differences. series of conversations with newly elected However, Chamberlain preferred personal French prime minister Leon Blum. Schacht and informal diplomacy as opposed to going was an enthusiastic supporter of colonies through the allegedly slow-moving channels for Germany and pleaded his case to Blum. of formal diplomacy. In the late fall of 1937 Schacht argued that Germany’s economic LordHalifax,inhiscapacityofmasterofthe COLONIAL APPEASEMENT (1935–38) 3

Middleton hounds, received an invitation the . Schacht thought that from one Hermann Goering, in his role the latter two territories might be held by as Reichsjägermeister of the International Germany under the terms of a League of Hunting Exhibition, to visit Germany. The Nations mandate. This proposal did not go trip was actually a ruse under which Cham- down well at all with the assembled officials berlain hoped Halifax (an important political whopointedoutthattheBelgiansandPor- ally of Chamberlain’s) would be able to dis- tuguese could not possibly be expected to cuss the outlines of a European settlement agree. However, the British Foreign Office with Hitler. wasinstructedtoexaminethelikelihoodof Halifax’s memoir, FulnessofDays,pub- such a settlement of the colonial issue. lished in 1957, is remarkable for its blandness The resulting Foreign Office memorandum but this visit with Hitler on November 19 at was even less enthused than the Plymouth is described in some detail. Committeereport.Theauthorsofthememo- The issue of colonies, Halifax said, “came up randum flatly refused to comment on former intwoorthreeformsinthecourseofour German territories held by either Britain or discussion. If the question could be settled the Dominions, on the grounds that these between us, good. If not, he (Hitler) must were outside the purview of the Foreign note and regret. But he hoped that France Office. The memorandum then pointed out and Great Britain would examine the ques- that handing over Belgian or Portuguese tion together and arrive at a solution which territory was fraught with strategic and legal they could propose” (Halifax 1957: 187–88). issues, and concluded that any colonial redis- Hitler then stated that he did not want a tributionwithGermanywasrashunlessitwas colony at a strategic point that would drag part of a larger settlement of European issues. him into trouble. Possessions in the Sahara, The problem next went to the Cabinet’s the Mediterranean, and the Far East were Foreign Policy Committee at a meeting all ruled out by Hitler. Halifax replied that of January 24, 1938. Neville Chamberlain Britain could not discuss the issue of colonies now made a direct intervention, and the except in the context of a general settlement results were fairly dramatic. Chamberlain of affairs in Europe. “Hitler said that talks and proclaimed he was taking an entirely new conferences needed very careful preparation, approachtotheissueofGermancolonies. and he did not believe in a conference every The prime minister seems to have taken three months that achieved nothing. The real up aspects of Schacht’s idea about a bloc of danger was that of an unsuccessful confer- territory in central Africa. He suggested that ence. Let us be content to go slowly. It was “two lines should be drawn across Africa, the surest way.” Halifax concluded that the the northern line running roughly to the chances that Hitler would go to war for the south of the Sahara, the Anglo-Egyptian sake of regaining colonies unlikely. Sudan, Abyssinia and , Addressing a debriefing meeting of senior and the southern line running roughly to the British and French foreign policy officials south of Portuguese West Africa, the Belgian in London after his return from Germany, Congo, Tanganyika and Portuguese East Halifax mentioned that Schacht, in a sepa- Africa” (Crozier 1988: 1186). The territory in rate meeting with him, had now raised the between would be governed by a number of possibility of Germany regaining Togoland European powers, including Germany. Each and Kamerun, plus a swath of central African power would be given specific territories to territory taken from Portuguese Angola and administer provided they followed certain 4 COLONIAL APPEASEMENT (1935–38) principles including freedom of trade and options for his country. Henderson thus met communications, respect for native rights with Hitler on March 3 in an atmosphere of andprivileges,andabanonmilitarybases. international crisis and the prospect of an This would now be the first step to a general imminent German invasion of . settlement with Germany (as opposed to Henderson began the meeting by express- Eden’s approach, which had advocated a ing concern for the fate of Austria. When general settlement before any colonial con- it came to colonies, he outlined the British cessions). Chamberlain denied there had proposal in the following terms: “A solution beenanychangeinpolicyandarguedthat whichseemedtothem(Britishgovernment) sincecoloniesweretheonlyissueofsub- to have many attractions might be found stance between Germany and Britain, solving in a scheme based upon the idea of a new the problem would drive the prospect of a regime of colonial administration in a given general settlement forward. area of Africa, roughly corresponding to Chamberlain’s proposal met with a frosty the conventional zone of the Congo Basin reception from his colleagues, many of whom , acceptable and applicable to all the feareditwouldhaveaseverenegativeimpact Powers concerned on exactly the equal terms. on opinion in the rest of Africa, Asia, and Each Power, while solely concerned for the the West Indies. A close examination of the administration of its own territories, would scheme revealed that and Portugal be invited to subscribe to certain principles wouldbegivingupmostoftheterritoryin designed to promote the well-being of all” question, and the British the least. France (Schmokel 1964: 118). He then enumerated wouldalsoloseterritory,althoughsome the governing principles that Chamberlain Cabinet members thought that Paris could had earlier outlined. It was the clearest offer be compensated with territory from British of colonial appeasement that the British ever holdings. Vigorous opposition from Belgium made to Hitler. and Portugal could certainly be expected, as Alas, Henderson quickly discovered that was pointed out by some ministers. Chamber- Hitler had little interest in discussing a gen- lain brushed aside these objections and the eral settlement, much less colonial proposals. Foreign Policy Committee decided to proceed Instead Hitler ranted about the British press, regardless. The British ambassador to Ger- theoppressionofGermansinAustriaand many, Neville Henderson, was summoned , the failures of disarmament, home for a briefing. He was subsequently andtheallegedthreatsfromtheFrenchand instructed to raise the issue of colonies again the Soviets. “As for colonies he did not seem in his next meeting with Hitler. the least interested in them, and the sum A succession of crucial events took place of his reply was that the colonial problem before Henderson could meet with Hitler. could wait for 4, 6, 8, or even 10 years. He First, Eden resigned as foreign secretary promised,however,togivemeawrittenreply on February 20, 1938, after a series of dis- onthesubject,andIleftBerlinayearand agreements with Chamberlain. Eden was a half later without having ever received it” succeeded by Lord Halifax. By this point Ger- (Henderson 1940: 117). A few days later on man threats against Austria were reaching March 13, 1938, German troops marched a peak. The Austrian chancellor, Kurt von unopposed into Austria and Hitler achieved Schuschnigg, had already had a disastrous his long-sought ,orunion,with meeting with Hitler on February 12 and his homeland. Afterwards the colonial issue was now considering the rapidly narrowing dropped far down the agenda as the British COLONIAL APPEASEMENT (1935–38) 5 and French turned their attention to the next Doerr, P. (1998) British Foreign Policy, crisis point in Europe, the and 1919–1939: “Hope for the Best, Prepare for Czechoslovakia. the Worst.” Manchester: Manchester University Early historians of the subject were harshly Press. Eden, A. (1962) The Eden Memoirs: Facing the Dic- critical of colonial appeasement, which they tators. London: Cassell. saw as a particularly craven aspect of British Ekoko, A. E. (1979) “The British Attitude Towards policytowardsHitler’sGermany.However, Germany’s Colonial Irredentism in Africa in a deeper examination of the issue shows the Inter-War Years.” Journal of Contemporary that the British were for the most part using History 14: 287–307. colonial appeasement as a stepping stone Feiling, K. (1947) The Life of Neville Chamberlain. to resolving issues in Europe as a whole. If London: Macmillan. Harvey, J. (Ed.) (1970) The Diplomatic Diaries the strategy failed, it was largely due to the of Oliver Harvey, 1937–1940.NewYork:St. fact that Hitler personally was not overly Martin’s. interested in colonies in Africa (even if some Herman, J. (1998) The Paris Embassy of Sir Eric of his supporters were serious) and was using Phipps: Anglo-French Relations and the Foreign theissuetomisleadhisenemies. Office, 1937–1939. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press. SEE ALSO: Abyssinian Crisis (1935); African Louis, R. (1971) “Colonial Appeasement, Diplomacy; Alliance Diplomacy; Anschluss 1936–1938.” Revue Belge de Philology et (1938); Appeasement; Bismarck-Schönhausen, d’Histoire 49 (4): 1175–191. Otto von (1815–98); Chamberlain, Neville Neville, P. (2000) Appeasing Hitler: The Diplomacy (1869–1940); Eden, Anthony (1897–1977); of Sir Neville Henderson, 1937–39.NewYork: Halifax, Lord (1881–1959); Hitler, Adolf Palgrave Macmillan. (1889–1945); ; Ovendale, R. (1975) Appeasement and the English Crisis (1936); of Versailles (1919) Speaking World: Britain, the , the Dominions, and the Policy of “Appease- REFERENCES ment,” 1937–1939. Cardiff: University of Wales Press. Crozier, A. (1988) Appeasement and Germany’s Parker, R. (1993) Chamberlain and Appeasement: Last Bid for Colonies.NewYork:St.Martin’s. British Policy and the Coming of the Second Halifax, Earl of (1957) Fulness of Days. London: World War. London: Macmillan. Collins. Self, R. (2006) Neville Chamberlain: A Biography. Henderson, N. (1940) Failure of a Mission: Berlin Aldershot: Ashgate. 1937–1939.Toronto:Musson. Stedman, A. D. (2011) Alternatives to Appeasement: Schmokel, W. (1964) DreamofEmpire:German Neville Chamberlain and Hitler’s Germany.Lon- , 1919–1945. New Haven, CT: Yale don: I. B. Tauris. University Press. Weinberg, G. (1970) The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, SUGGESTED READINGS 1933–36. Chicago: University of Chicago Adamthwaite, A. (1977) France and the Coming Press. of the Second World War, 1936–1939. London: Weinberg, G. (1980) The Foreign Policy of Frank Cass. Hitler’s Germany: Starting World War II, Callahan, M. (2004) ASacredTrust:TheLeagueof 1937–1939. Chicago: University of Chicago Nations and Africa, 1929–1946.Brighton:Sussex Press. Academic Press. Weizsacker, E. (1951) Memoirs of Ernst von Colvin, I. (1971) The Chamberlain Cabinet.New Weizsacker. London: Victor Gollancz. York: Taplinger. Dilks, D. (Ed.) (1972) The Diaries of Sir , 1938–1949.NewYork:Putnam’s.