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Isolationism & Appeasement in Australia E. M. Andrews

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Isolationism & Appeasement in Australia E. M. Andrews > Isolationism & Appeasement ü w* in Australia C /3 Reactions to the European Grises, 1935-1939 ‘They tell me things are not too good in Europe, Dave.’ ‘What’s wrong? Drought?’ ‘Unk’ White, Bulletin, 26 July 1939 E. M. Andrews Australian foreign policy in the late 1930s has till now been a neglected topic in historical writing. In this book the author examines Australian reactions to the aggressions which led to World War II — Abyssinia, Spain, Austria, Czecho­ slovakia, and Poland. He describes the early support in Britain and Australia for the League of Nations, and goes on to discuss the causes of the change to a policy of appeasement, culminating in the Munich crisis of 1938, and Australian reactions to that crisis. Additionally, he compares Australian foreign policy at that time and in the sixties, when Australia again supports a powerful ally, this time in Vietnam. To those who lived through the crises of the thirties and now wish to see those years in perspective, as well as to readers of a younger generation, who seek the causes for the development of present-day attitudes to Australian foreign policy, this book will make absorbing reading. For teachers and students of the history of the period it will provide a welcome insight into the reactions of Australian politicians and people to the European crises and to Britain’s part in them. Price in Australia $6.95 This book was published by ANU Press between 1965–1991. This republication is part of the digitisation project being carried out by Scholarly Information Services/Library and ANU Press. This project aims to make past scholarly works published by The Australian National University available to a global audience under its open-access policy. ‘They tell me things are not too good in Europe, Dave. ‘What's wrong? Drought?’ ‘Unk’ White, Bulletin, 26 July 1939 ISOLATIONISM AND APPEASEMENT IN AUSTRALIA Reactions to the European Crises, 1935-1939 E. M. ANDREWS 1970 AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY PRESS CANBERRA © Eric Montgomery Andrews 1970 This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Inquiries should be made to the publisher. Printed and manufactured in Australia Registered in Australia for transmission by post as a book sbn 7081 0029 5 Library of Congress Catalog Card no. 78-82888 National Library of Australia reg. no. aus 69-942 To Jack, Alice, and Shirley PREFACE This work is a study of Australian governmental and public opinion on the Abyssinian crisis, the Spanish civil war, and Hitler’s aggres­ sions till the outbreak of World War II in 1939. The inclusion of the government widens the scope of the inquiry beyond the bounds of what is generally regarded as ‘public opinion’, since the government was open to arguments and pressures outside Australia, in particular from the flow of information from Britain and contacts with the British government. It was also influenced, to a certain extent, by professional advisers, both the British Foreign Office and the Aus­ tralian Department of External Affairs. On the other hand, the wider Australian public, too, was influenced by Britain, if not directly, then because British policy formed the framework within which the Australian public discussed foreign affairs, and provided the points upon which it argued. A study of public opinion in the 1930s has certain pitfalls, how­ ever. The term ‘public opinion’ has become common usage in the democracies of the twentieth century: hardly a day passes without a claim to public support by a political party, a newspaper, or a group advocating a specific policy, so that sociologists have been led to attempt, by means of controlled sampling, to discover the elusive ‘public opinion’ on a wide range of subjects. It is only natural, there­ fore, that historians should cast a speculative eye on the new tech­ niques that have developed. But whereas the historian of the future may be able to attain to a degree of certainty on public opinion today, present-day historians, looking at the past, are not so for­ tunate. The evidence on which generalisation could be based is too fragmentary to permit a detailed analysis to be made with any confidence. For example, Gallup polls did not begin in Australia until 1941, after the period covered in this book had ended. Fragmentary evidence is, however, the occupational hazard of an historian. To wait on scientific certainty is to wait for ever. More­ over, for the student of Australia in the thirties, much evidence, of vii Viii PREFACE varying worth, does remain. To begin with, there are numerous contemporary estimates of public opinion. These may or may not be the result of sound observation and judgment; all too often they con­ tradict one another. However, their accuracy can be verified to a certain extent by studying incidents and statements reported in the press, letters to the newspapers, opinions expressed in newspaper editorials themselves, speeches made by personalities in the public eye, books and magazines produced at the time, and meetings and official statements of different organisations. Indeed, policies adopted or supported by organisations are of particular interest because, as Almond suggests,1 foreign policy is a complicated subject, not usually the concern of the average citizen. The issues need to be simplified for him to make judgments, a task that is often performed by various ‘leadership’ or ‘interest’ groups within the community. In other words, in foreign policy matters, which are difficult and remote from their experience, people tend to adopt the attitudes of the groups to which they belong — clubs, political parties, churches, etc. Later work has suggested that Almond’s theory is over-simplified, and is more applicable to the system of government in the United States than to the parliamentary system in Australia, which is not organised to be so open to pressure groups. But his general point, that group thinking is evident on foreign policy, is valid. This book, therefore, does not pretend to use modern sociological methods; it looks instead at the various sections of the Australian population to see what policies they were advocat­ ing. Foremost among the organised groups in Australia in the 1930s was the government, together with its professional advisers and its supporters in Parliament. Governmental policy affected the course and scope of debate on foreign affairs within the community. Organised opposition to the government and its supporters came from the Australian Labor Party and labour movement, within the ranks of which were a minority of communists and a substantial minority of Catholics. (Neither the Catholic Church nor the Com­ munist Party was primarily concerned with foreign policy, but in the 1930s each held strong views, both on the European crises and on each other, and tried to influence the Labor Parties and trade unions to adopt their interpretation of events.) Also in the Austra- 1 G. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, pp. 5-6. PREFACE ix lian community were a variety of other organisations. Some, like the Returned Servicemen’s League, were only intermittently concerned with foreign affairs, while others, such as the League of Nations Union, made foreign matters their main interest. All these groups, therefore, receive attention. They held public discussions on foreign affairs, and at times made statements on the policy they wished to see adopted: their activities received notice in the press. The material examined, however, also includes a number of original submissions, which have survived in the official records, made by interested parties to the Prime Minister. The contemporary record has been supplemented by interviews with surviving actors in the original drama. Such interviews have pitfalls, for, with the best will in the world, men forget events after thirty years, and have their views tinged by subsequent history. Moreover, courage is needed to admit mistakes. Accordingly, wherever possible, the contemporary record has been followed, except where an interview appears to throw a reasonable light on a confused situation. At this stage it may be as well to point out that the parts of this study which give brief accounts of the European crises are intended not as substitutes for more adequate histories, but as a background to events mentioned in the Australian public debate. Two warnings need to be kept in mind. Fear of Japan, and interest in her policy, which influenced Australian attitudes to European events and to world affairs in general, has been largely ignored in this work. To a certain extent the picture is thus falsified. For example, the Australian Institute of International Affairs in Vic­ toria was orientated more towards the Pacific than to Europe. The government, too, was very concerned with the possible threat from Japan. This influenced its attitude to Britain’s Abyssinian policy, concerned some of its members in 1936, and led to Australian sug­ gestions for regional pacts in the Imperial Conference of 1937. However, Australian reactions to Japan have been considered in several books,2 and it seemed better to concentrate on attitudes to the European dictators, in order to delve in greater detail into the material available. Fear of Japan will be mentioned at various 2 J. Shepherd, Australia’s Interests and Policies in the Far East, New York, 1939; W. Macmahon Ball, Japan, Enemy or Ally?, Melbourne, 1948; R. N. Rosecrance, Australian Diplomacy and Japan, 1945-51, Melbourne, 1962. X PREFACE places in the text, and should always be kept in mind. Finally, a book which deals exclusively with foreign policy may give the impression that a continuous and lively debate on foreign events occurred in Australia in the late 1930s.
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