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Home , Appeasement, Maxim Litvinov, May 1939

11/5/19

Peace, , Senior Scholars: • Goal of Paris Conference was “” Interwar : – Showpiece was Working Out Modernity in the Midst of Crisis

Fall 2019 Prof. Kenneth F. Ledford [email protected] 368-4144

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY HISTORY DEPARTMENT

Peace, Appeasement, War Peace, Appeasement, War

• Collective security was threated by the existence of • The British public reverted to its traditional aversion to revisionism continental entanglements – Nations who rejected the legitimacy of the settlement and sought to – Britain repudiated its guarantee pledge to France revise it – Britain relied on the League of nations and multilateral action rather • Differences emerged among victors as to the meaning of than bilateral security arrangements collective security – Even with the League, Britain relied on moral suasion, opposing attempts to apply military or – Differences, combined with economic tensions and revisionism, weakened collective security until it proved meaningless after 1936 – Also weakened by

HISTORY DEPARTMENT HISTORY DEPARTMENT

Peace, Appeasement, War Peace, Appeasement, War

• The French viewed things differently • So France resorted to creating a network of military alliances – Not cut off by water from German invasion outside of the League – Their recent victory was only with vast aid and great effort – September 1920: Defensive alliance with Belgium – Felt pressing need to supplement their defensive resources – February 1921: Defensive alliance with – France had to find a substitute for the pledge – January 1924: Military alliance with – Sought to strengthen the League in its power to punish aggression – Brokered a Polish alliance with Rumania • Draft of Mutual Assistance, 1923 – Brokered the “Little Entente” of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia • Protocol of 1924, compulsory submission of all disputes to PCIJ or League • Aimed at Hungarian revisionism Council for arbitration – All aimed at encircling Germany and distancing the • Both efforts blocked by Britain and the Dominions – Seem stronger than it actually was

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Peace, Appeasement, War

• Hitler’s Foreign Policy Views – Key Doctrines: • Race and Space • Space meant agriculturally usable land • Survival meant war for new land • Land meant land in Europe • Not limited to regaining pre-1914 borders • Expansion to be in the east of Europe

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Peace, Appeasement, War Peace, Appeasement, War

• Hitler had two goals: • Viewed Britain as potential ally – Prepare home front for war • Viewed /Soviet Union and other Slavs as inferior races • Basic political change • “Coordination” or “Gleichschaltung” • Viewed France as inevitable enemy – Acquire more efficient allies than in – Defeat first before drive to the east • “Putrid state corpses”

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Peace, Appeasement, War Peace, Appeasement, War

• First years combined doctrinal rigidity with tactical elasticity • Early stages of foreign policy, 1933-35 • Three-fold goals: – Caution – Complete Gleichschaltung – May 1933, renewed Berlin Treaty of 1926 with Soviet Union – Regain foreign policy freedom of action by withdrawing from – June 1933, signed “Four Power Pact” with Britain, France, and Italy, entered into by Stresemann and Brüning signaling equality – Test other Powers’ will to in order to calculate speed at which he – July 1933, signed Concordat with Vatican could move forward – , signed 10-year nonaggression pact with Poland

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Peace, Appeasement, War

• Austrian Nazis attempted putsch on July 25, 1934 – Engelbert Dollfuss murdered, replaced by • Italy and France composed differences – Laval-Mussolini Agreements, January 7, 1935 • Reiterated support for independent Austria • France gave Italy a free hand in Abyssinia

Signing Concordat 1933, Future Pope Pius XII

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Peace, Appeasement, War

• Hitler’s military surprises of provoked response – March 8, announced “new” air force – March 15, denounced military limitation clauses of Versailles Treaty • France had already in May 1933 agreed with Soviet Union to to enter coalition against each other – , 1935, Franco-Soviet Pact in Paris, immediate assistance in case of unprovoked attack – , Czech-Soviet Pact in , immediate assistance in case of unprovoked attack, only in event that France assisted attacked party

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Peace, Appeasement, War Peace, Appeasement, War

• Other Great Powers responded • Britain broke the “Stresa Front” in by negotiating a – British White Book justified increased military expenditure bilateral Naval Pact with Germany – France extended military service from 1 to 2 years – Accepted the violation of the – Britain, France, Italy met at Stresa to condemn German action and reaffirm Locarno – Council of League of Nations criticized German actions

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Authoritarian Challenge Peace, Appeasement, War

• 1935-36, entered a new, violent phase – Given free hand by France, Mussolini invaded on Oct. 3, 1935 – First step toward creation of a glorious colonial empire – Emperor appealed to the League of Nations, which condemned Italy as an aggressor on October 7 and imposed economic sanctions on Italy on October 11 • Excluded coal and oil – Some states refused to apply sanctions – Britain and France agreed to the Italian conquest in , Hoare-Laval Agreement – British responded harshly, anti-Italian

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Peace, Appeasement, War Peace, Appeasement, War

• Italian and German intervention in , 1936-39 – Only Soviets and independent leftists supported Republic • Final, fatal blow to principle of collective security

Guernica by Pablo Picasso

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Peace, Appeasement, War Peace, Appeasement, War

• October 24, 1936, Fascist Italy and signed “Rome-Berlin Axis” • November 25, 1936, Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan – Italy joined November 6, 1937

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Authoritarian Challenge Peace, Appeasement, War

Rome-Berlin Axis

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Peace, Appeasement, War Appeasement and Expansion

• With the open flouting of the principle of non-intervention without any meaningful response, European entered into the period known as appeasement – A.J.P. Taylor even suggested that appeasement began with the first readjustment of reparations – The British government under in 1937 began to rearm, but rearmament was not complete by 1938

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Peace, Appeasement, War Peace, Appeasement, War

• “Lessons” of appeasement • Appeasement was not treason – Pronounced by Churchill in 1938, when he was out of power – Rational policy-making response to economic – Very term has become a term of abuse and to “lessons” learned from it – Father of all domino theories • Domestic constraints on foreign policy were key – But to contemporaries, appeasement was not pejorative – Arising from revulsion against slaughter of World War I and social • Meant to appease just grievances strains caused by the crisis of capitalism • Settle differences by negotiation rather than force • In , appeasement was true to self-determination • Hitler manipulated guilty feelings of the Allies from the Paris Peace Conferences

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Peace, Appeasement, War Britain’s View of the Next War

• Four reasons to re-examine the traditional interpretation: • After the end of World War I, the relationship between Britain – It was the “cowards” of who led their countries to war against and its Empire changed Germany only a year later, and without being attacked – Another restraint on British policy-making – Hitler, usually viewed as having triumphed at Munich, believed he had – Britain and the Dominions both very aware of material and manpower been defeated; wanted war in 1938 instead of 1939 support provided by the Empire in war effort – Opponents of appeasement also pressured the to make – Dominions in 1920s and became more assertive in dealing with concessions Britain • Chamberlain would have gone to war had Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia in 1938, – December 1931, the Statute of Westminster made Dominions legally rather than continue to negotiate equal to the – Britain and France knew that time was on their side, having begun to • British Commonwealth of Nations rearm

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Britain’s View of the Next War Britain’s View of the Next War

• Learned common “lessons” of World War I – Any future war would be a general European war – As destructive of life, wealth, and well-being as World War I – To be avoided at all costs – Best way to avoid a new war was to disarm – Spend money on easing social distress rather than on armaments – Some also subscribed to a doctrinaire – Conservative governments cut military budgets out of fiscal orthodoxy – Widespread fear of : • “” Harris: “The bomber will always get through.”

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Britain’s View of the Next War Britain’s View of the Next War

• All of these “lessons” made sense while there was any hope for general – Collapse of the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1933 changed the parameters – But as noted in 1933, hard to change public opinion – Preliminary steps toward rearmament in 1934 – In 1935, all three parties campaigned on disarmament and collective security – Churchill was in the political wilderness because he favored rearmament, extremely unpopular

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Britain’s View of the Next War Britain’s View of the Next War

• In , Chamberlain replaced Baldwin as Prime Minister – Chosen because he was a hawk, a rearmer – Began rearmament, but more slowly than the Germans – But more technologically advanced, so actually it was an advantage to trail – Still, began fully in earnest only in , so benefit realized in 1940

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Britain’s View of the Next War French View of the Next War

• British public opinion and policy informed by three • French military planners were deeply impressed by the assumptions about any war in Europe: military stalemate and heavy losses on the western front – Any war with Germany would be as terrible as World War I and as long – Drew the lesson that World War I had shown for all time the supremacy • And worse: with of the defensive over the offensive – Any war would be general – Crucial role of Pétain • Britain could not keep out – Conclusion was the to construct the Maginot Line of fortresses • So essential to keep any war from breaking out in Europe – Pétain unconcerned about – No one would want such a thing as 1914, so any quarrel that might lead • Germans only preparing their own defeat to war could, and should, be reconciled.

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French View of the Next War French View of the Next War

Maginot Line

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French View of the Next War French View of the Next War

Panorama of Maginot Line

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French View of the Next War French View of the Next War

• French foreign policy paralyzed by deep domestic political divisions, with the election of the Popular Front under Léon Blum in 1936 – But defense policy under Left or Right minimized French defense commitments – Only foreign policy goal was to avoid a separation from Britain

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Hitler’s View of the Next War Hitler’s View of the Next War

• Hitler also learned “lessons” from World War I • Hitler did not believe the next war would be like World War I – Firmly believed in the “stab-in-the-back” (Dolchstoß) theory but with airplanes • The German army was undefeated in the field, betrayed at home – Clearly prospects were dim for Germany in any general war – Thus home front conditions like those of World War I to be avoided – Only solution would be to stockpile, and that would be preempted – Accomplish this by a war of conquest and exploitation of the – Third way was to let other nations worry about starting a general war conquered territory • Isolate victim, scare off allies, fight one at a time, leaving to others the choice to – Blitzkrieg: Economic as much as military policy respond by starting a general war • Rapid small war, and rapid victory, would make others deal with issue of whether to choose a general war

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Hitler’s View of the Next War Hitler’s View of the Next War

• Strategy of Blitzkrieg also coped with German disadvantages, • Danger of a long, stalemated war turning some into virtues – Hitler believed that tanks and airplanes had made war mobile again – Lack of trained reserves because of Versailles limitations before 1935 – Without investment in armaments and armaments industry, Germany • Unneeded in a Blitzkrieg was free from institutional or bureaucratic constraints that militated – Lack of raw material basis for a long war against this new, radical theory of equipment and organization • Series of limited and victories would expand raw material base – Once rearmament began, Germany had a technological and numerical lead on Britain and France

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Hitler’s View of the Next War Hitler’s View of the Next War

• Hitler also learned a lesson from the Austrian dithering in July • For Hitler, then, the question of war was one of timing 1914 – Not whether, but when – Do not hesitate – Complex question of the advantage of rearmament – Do not wait for an outrage to unleash an aggressive war; create a • First to rearm has a window of opportunity pretext for the war you choose • Then its weapons become obsolete, must scrap the old and invest in the new – Blitzkrieg meant that war would be over before the other Powers could – Hitler’s view was to use the head start before you lose it think about getting into the war in any meaningful way • Thought the German head start would be gone forever by 1943 if it had not expanded its resource base – But after a series of Blitzkriege, and lightning victories, Blitzsiege, Germany would have expanded its resource base, and its enemies could not catch up with it

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Hitler’s View of the Next War Hitler’s View of the Next War

• Importance of 1938-39 – , discovered a polyp in his throat • Parallel to Friedrich III in 1888 – Private Testament, – April 20, 1939 • Fiftieth birthday – Emergent economic crisis of overheating in Germany in late 1938 • Labor and manpower shortages – Believed that time was against him

Hitler’s 50th birthday, April 20, 1939

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Hitler’s View of the Next War Hitler’s View of the Next War

• Germany must act before it loses its rearmament head start • Corollary for Hitler in 1938-39 was that time was on the side – Must have war before 1943-44-45 of Britain and France – It was in their favor to postpone war – In particular feared the RAF and radar in Britain

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Western Dilemma Coming of the War

• Key political question for western leaders: • After the in , the defenses – How do you take your country to war when you are not directly of Czechoslovakia were gone attacked? – The pliant regime became a virtual protectorate of Germany • Chamberlain was unwilling to do so in 1938 – Renounced the Soviet alliance in • Chamberlain was willing to do so in 1939 – Only leader in the world willing to do so – Germany awarded Teschen to Poland – Dragged the French along with him – Germany and Italy awarded southern to Hungary on November 2 – France signed a Nonaggression Pact with Germany on December 6

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

• Germany stirred up agitation I rump Czechoslovakia • Emil Hacha – Right-wing clericalist Slovaks – March 1939, Slovak Prime Minister, Monsignor Josef Tiso, appealed to Hitler for protection from Czechs – Hacha summoned to Berlin on March 14, threatened and browbeaten, agreed to a German Protectorate of and – German troops moved in on the morning of March 15, in Prague by 9:00 a.m. – Slovakia became independent • Hungary received Subcarpatho-Ruthenia

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Coming of the War

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

• Western Allies reacted unequivocally • Emboldened by German success, on April 7, Mussolini sent – March 31, 1939, Chamberlain issued a unilateral guarantee of Poland Italian troops into Albania • Spoke for France as well – Deposed King Zog – Reflected a change of British public opinion – Added the Albanian crown to the Italian Empire – German claims no longer “legitimate” claims of national self- determination • Had now seized territory occupied by non-Germans – Similar guarantees for Rumania and Greece on April 13 – Mutual assistance treaty with Turkey in May

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

• Hitler began to tighten pressure on Poland – April 28, 1939, denounced two treaties: • Non-Aggression Pact with Poland of 1934 • Naval Agreement of 1935 with Britain – Notified Poland of a formal German claim to and extraterritorial rights of communication across the Polish Corridor – Beginning of , ordered the to be ready to attack Poland on September 1

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

Hitler’s Order to Attack Poland

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

• In response, on April 28, 1939, Britain announced peacetime • , 1939, Italy and Germany signed an offensive alliance conscription in Berlin • Escalating campaign of press agitation between Germany and – “” • Either would join the other if it became involved in hostilities with one or more Poland, and subversion in Danzig Powers • No date set for war – But tied Italy to Germany • Mussolini hoped to gain greater weight in Axis war planning – Already accepted inevitability of war – Wanted to delay it until 1943 for Italian arms build-up

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

• Last piece of the puzzle was the campaign to commit the Soviet Union to one side or the other – Both camps courted Soviets – Soviets separated from the Axis by mutual ideological hostility – Soviets also suspicious of the West – Western performance at Munich aroused Stalin’s suspicion – British, especially Chamberlain, had ideological distrust of the Soviets

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

• April 1939, negotiations began between West and Soviet Union – April 14, Chamberlain proposed that Soviets announce that if a European neighbor of its were attacked, it would help repel aggression “if desired” – April 17, Soviets counterproposed a defensive alliance among Britain, France, Soviet Union if attacked by a European power • Would provide military assistance in case of aggression against a European neighbor even without a request

Soviet Poster after the Munich Agreement

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

• Neither Poland, Rumania, nor the Baltic States wanted Soviet • Beginning May 1939, dramatic signals of change in Soviet “assistance” or a guarantee policy • Negotiations dragged on and petered out in May – , stepped down as Commissar for Foreign – Britain refused to force Baltic states to accept Soviet guarantee Affairs • Litvinov was Jewish • Talks reopened in June • Replaced by – by end of July – As early as April, Soviets made overture to Germans – Adjourned for vacation • In May, Germans responded seriously – Resumed in August – Negotiations were slow – But Britain and France sent low-level delegations • By summer Hitler convinced that Britain and France would declare war if he attacked Poland – Sent by sea rather than air to – July 22, German government sought political agreement with Soviets

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

Maxim Litvinov Vyacheslav Molotov

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

• August 14, Nazi proposed to fly to Moscow to set out Hitler’s views to Stalin – Took a week to work out details – August 21, German radio announced a visit to Moscow to sign a Nonaggression Pact – Flew to Moscow August 23, signed Nazi-Soviet Pact • Hitler-Stalin Pact • Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact

Joachim von Ribbentrop

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

Molotov signing Nazi-Soviet Pact, August 23, 1939

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

• Simultaneously signed “Secret Additional Protocol,” defining spheres of influence – Soviets to receive Finland, , , Poland up to the line of the Narew and Vistula Rivers, Bessarabia – Germany to receive Lithuania and Poland west of the Narew-Vistual line – A secret protocol to a Russo-German Treaty on September 28 placed Lithuania in the Soviet sphere in return for Germany receiving a larger share of Poland

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Coming of the War

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

• Nazi-Soviet Pact had incalculably dramatic effect • Secure from a two-front war, Hitler moved ahead with plans – Enraged Japanese against Poland – Humiliated Italians – Pressed demands for Danzig and the Polish Corridor – Alienated anti-Communist conservative supporters of Nazis • Polish army mobilized on August 30 – Disillusioned western Communists – On the night of August 31-September 1, 1939, the Germans staged an attack on the Polish border – Deepened social divisions in France – Split Communist Parties in France and U.S. – Strengthened British resolve, united public opinion

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Coming of the War

• Friday, September 1, 1939 – 4:40 a.m. Central European Time – Wielun – – 4:45 a.m. Central European Time – Westerplatte – – Gleiwitz Radio Tower

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Coming of the War

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

• Mussolini had proposed a conference on August 31 • Concentrated attacks by Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe rolled over – refused on September 1, because of the invasion the Poles – September 3, British sent an ultimatum to the Germans – September 11, Germans reached Warsaw – September 4, British declared war on Germany – September 14, Polish government withdrew to southeast, September 18 to Rumania – September 17, Soviets invaded Poland from the east – September 27, Warsaw surrendered – October 6, Hitler called on Britain and France to accept the conquest of Poland as a fait accompli and to make peace • Britain and France refused

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

Soviet Tanks invade Poland, September 17, 1939

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Coming of the War Coming of the War

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Coming of the War

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