Antanas Smetona and Foreign Diplomats

chapter 9 Antanas Smetona and Foreign Diplomats

After Lithuania received diplomatic recognition and established diplomatic relations with other states, diplomatic missions from foreign countries began to gather in Kaunas, forming a diplomatic corps. Heading the missions were plenipotentiary representatives, or ministers. (The ussr called the heads of its diplomatic mission “polpreds,” a contraction for the Russian title “plenipotentiary representatives.”) The United States had no diplomats in Kaunas, only consuls, since the United States mission resided in Riga, and so the highest-ranking American diplomat in the Baltic states would come to Kaunas only on occasion. Over the years, the diplomatic corps gradually grew, but it remained small enough that the diplomats knew each other intimately. They socialized together since there was not much entertainment in Kaunas, which in the 1920s had barely 100,000 inhabitants. The diplomats considered their service in Kaunas a hardship, uncomfortable, and even difficult. In the 1920s most houses in Kaunas did not have modern conveniences; water from wells was unsuitable for drinking; sidewalks consisted of wooden planking. Americans drank only mineral water, at first even using it for washing up. Since Lithuania had no diplomatic relations with Poland, there were no Polish diplomats in Kaunas. The Americans did not socialize with Soviet diplomats because their countries had no diplomatic relations. Diplomats of low rank represented Great Britain and France. But their significance for this study is great. Diplomats and consuls wrote reports to their governments about life in Kaunas and in Lithuania, about political developments. They had contacts with representatives of the government; at will they socialized with opposition leaders, invited them as guests, and became friendly with some. Their reports constitute a special historical source of Kaunas life. Kaunas was only a small city, not yet very civilized, but even without essen- tial investments it was nevertheless slowly growing. Western diplomats mar- veled at the Lithuanian determination to call Kaunas “the provisional capital,” always still looking forward to regaining Vilnius from Poland; in the eyes of many diplomats Lithuania itself appeared to be “a provisional state,” which sooner or later the much larger and stronger Poland would probably grab. With that question in mind late in 1925 the Soviet representative in Lithuania, Sergey Aleksandrovsky, prepared a special plan foreseeing a Soviet economic and political monopoly in Lithuania. In May 1926, with Lithuanian and Soviet negotiations for a non-aggression pact underway, the ussr Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Litvinov, pointed out to the

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Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, that the basic purpose of a treaty with Lithuania was to block agreement of the lat- ter with Poland and to disrupt any unified bloc of Baltic states. The Soviet diplomats in Kaunas were successful in that they were considered serious allies supporting Lithuania in its relations with Poland.350 In 1995 the historian Zenonas Butkus published an article in which, using Soviet diplomatic correspondence in archival documents, he described Soviet financial support for the Tautininkai press in the early 1920s.351 At first this shocked our society: The reaction was negative, angry; there was talk of betrayal of national interests. Then after careful examination of the published material, Smetona’s and Voldemaras’s closer contacts with the ussr mission and with other countries’ representatives did not appear as treasonous as they had at first glance. The Tautininkai press needed money: Krėvė asked; the Soviets gave. Smetona and Voldemaras consulted with people at the Soviet mission before the coup – not to gain permission to carry it out but rather to inquire how the ussr would act if Poland reacted to the coup. Let us put ideological sympathies aside – the Tautininkai knew well with whom they were dealing. But Lithuanians now had only one argument in the Vilnius dispute, namely that in the 1920 Peace Treaty Soviet Russia had recognized Vilnius as part of Lithuania, and in that question any Lithuanian government could rely on only Soviet support.352 Smetona and Voldemaras had discussions with Soviet diplomats about a possible coup over the course of four years. On December 1, 1926, Voldemaras informed Aleksandrovsky that a group of Lithuanian officers had come to him and Smetona, not hiding their determination to overthrow the leftist Sleževičius government. The Soviet polpred immediately reported to Moscow that the purpose of Voldemaras’s visit had been to learn the Soviet position if Poland should try to exploit disturbances in Lithuania. Tautininkai leaders had already raised that same question with Aleksandrovsky in 1925. Since Soviet diplomats and the Tautininkai both did not like the possibility that the Seimas elections of 1926 might return the Christian Democrats to power, both sides further played their games.353 The Tautininkai flirtation was not a danger for Lithuania because Germany was still weak, as was apparent when Lithuania moved into Klaipėda. Germany would of course restrain Poland as much as it could, because it was not interested in Poland’s becoming stronger by annexing Lithuania. It seemed acceptable to have discussions with the Soviet Union and to take money from them for the press – the Tautininkai could have taken even more. The Tautininkai and the Soviets viewed Poland as a common enemy. Although the Soviet support for the coup could only be verbal and diplomatic, even that emboldened Tautininkai leaders. The ussr was not a danger to