477

THE SUBMARINE

AND

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921

Lawrence H. Douglas

Following the First World War, the tation of this group, simply stated, was tide of public opinion was overwhelm­ that second best in naval strength meant ingly against the submarine as a weapon last. A policy of naval superiority was of war. The excesses of the German necessary, they felt, for "history consis­ U-boat had stunned the sensibilities of tently shows that war between no two the world but had, nonetheless, pre­ peoples or nations can be unthink­ sented new ideas and possibilities of this able.,,1 A second group, the Naval weapon to the various naval powers of Advisory Committee (Admirals Pratt the time. The momentum of these new and Coontz and Assistant Secretary of ideas proved so strong that by the the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.) also opening of the first major international submitted recommendations concerning disarmament conference of the 20th the limitation of naval armaments. century, practical uses of the submarine From the outset their deliberations were had all but smothered the moral indig­ guided by a concern that had become nation of 1918. more and more apparent-the threat Several months prior to the opening posed to the security and interests of of the conference, the General Board of this country by Japan. This concern was the American Navy was given the task evidenced in an attempt to gain basic of developing guidelines and recommen­ understandings with Britain. dations to be used by the State Depart­ The submarine received its share of ment in determining the American attention in the deliberations of these proposals to be presented. The orien- two groups. One approach to the 478 weapon, considered in a draft proposal the improyed capabilities and the pri­ submitted by Capt. F.H. Schofield, mary uses of the submarine, Bemis called for the total and permanent opposed its abolition " ... chiefly on abolition of submarines and the destruc­ account of the impossibility of doing tion of all submarines, built and build­ SO.,,6 "History," continued Bemis, ing. 2 In support of his proposal, Scho­ "shows only· too well the value of a field noted that the relative strengths of 'scrap of paper' when the life of a the world's navies would not be materi­ nation is at stake." Alluding to England, ally affected by such a move, and he also noted that, "Two weapons are increasing the numbers of submarines now in hand that challenge her su­ would involve large expenditures for premacy, one of which is the submarine, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) vessels. and, naturally, she would be glad to see However, save this one proposal, the that 'outlawed. ,,, In concluding this elimination of any armament by type section of his memorandum, Captain received scant attention in these early Bemis observed that relative to the recommendations as it was thought to Pacific, "the United States will make a hold little promise of success.3 criminal mistake if she becomes a party A second approach to the problem to an agreement to abolish sub­ was to scrap submarines then in exis­ marines. ,,7 tence and place restrictions upon new Assistant Secretary of the Navy construction, thereby establishing maxi­ Roosevelt expressed his agreement with mum tonnage allowances in vessel types Bemis in a paper entitled "Limitation of permitted each power. The Advisory Armaments." "In an assumed war Committee drew up three plans in­ against the world," he wrote, "the volving this basic principle and sub­ submarine would be of most value mitted them to the General Board and ... against the two island empires­ the Secretary of the Navy on 20 Octo­ Great Britain and Japan." It was impera­ ber 1921. Under plan I the submarine tive that we "not permit our hands to tonnage recommended for this country be tied as regards submarines."s and England was a maximum of 90,000 In this same paper Roosevelt ob­ tons, while Japan, France, and Italy served that Japan was our most proba­ were each allotted' 54,000 tons.4 Those ble enemy at present, and if the Con­ submarines building at the time of the ference did not provide us with a Conference could be completed up to dominating naval strength in the Pacific, the assigned tonnage, but no new con­ we should conclude a "treaty such that struction would be permitted except to Japan cannot break it as regards us replace those units reaching 12 years of without breaking it with others." In service. Plans II and III were quite other words, an "entangling alliance." similar to plan I but for the maximum With an eye on the development of new allowed tonnage (85,000 tons for Eng­ weapons, Roosevelt wrote that the land and the United States and 51,000 United States should be the " ... last tons for the other powers). The Navy nation to advocate any limitation upon Department was of the opinion that the extension of recent weapons or the plan I "is the best plan and is the one development of new ones.,,9 The Presi­ which ... it advises be adopted."s dent, Secretary of the Navy Hughes, and A memorandum prepared for the Roosevelt agreed that disarmament was General Board by Capt. H.H. Bemis of an impossible objective and that the the Submarine Section of the Office of reduction or limitation of armaments Naval Operations expressed the opinion was all that could be hoped for. of those professionals who favored re­ The independently formulated Gen­ tention of the submarine. After citing eral Board plans were, however, un- 479 acceptable to Hughes and Roosevelt for number of commerce escort vessels, they were, as Roosevelt noted years while the primary concern of the Ameri­ later, "what one would have expected can Navy was defense of the continental from the Naval Board-an estimate of United States. limitations (based) on' 'naval needs,' Proceeding to the limitations pro­ which represented not a limitation of posed for submarines, Balfour reported armaments for the United States but an that his country's experts thought the increase.',10 Such a plan was folly, and amount of submarine tonnage permitted Roosevelt decided to consult Admiral was too large. He thought that the Pratt whom he thought to be "the tonnage should be reduced further and ablest naval statesman," and together suggested that the Conference might they hit upon and developed the idea of possibly "forbid altogether the con­ using existing naval strength as the basis struction of those ... submarines of for the American proposals. great size ... whose sole purpose is at­ The plan laid before the Conference tack ... by methods which civilized na­ by Hughes at the first plenary session tions regard with horror."14 Only detailed a reduction and limitation of fleeting reference was made to the naval armaments for Great Britain, the abolition of the submarine and then United States, and Japan in a ratio of only to note that such a decision 5:5:3, respectively, but left the ratio for "would be impossible, or, if possible, it Italy and France for the Conference to might well be thought undesirable to determine. 11 Tonnage limitations con­ abolish it altogether. ,,15 sistent with the 5:5:3 ratio were as­ Delegations from the other countries signed for each type of vessel with the at this second public meeting of the submarine tonnage allotment being the Conference voiced general satisfaction same as that allowed in plan I of the with the American proposals, but their Advisory Committee (Le., 90,000 tons remarks, and particularly those of for Great Britain and the United States France and Japan, indicated that each and 54,000 tons for Japan). 12 nation expected special consideration At the second plenary session (15 because of its particular situation (e.g., November) the representatives of the geography, current naval strength, na­ various countries presented their replies tional interests, et cetera). to the American proposals. Arthur J. Two memorandums prepared for the Balfour, representing the British Em­ American representatives contained pire, noted the willingness of his coun­ what eventually became the basic posi­ try to accept the naval ratio suggested tion of the United States regarding the by Hughes but made such acceptance question of submarine limitation used conditional upon the continued su­ for the remainder of the Conference. A premacy of England in European General Board memorandum (No. 43B, waters. The British also wished to retain ser. 1088-dd) transmitted to the Secre­ complete freedom in the building of tary of the Navy on 15 November cruisers and other auxiliary types and assumed that while unrestricted subma­ limit only their battle fleet or capital rine warfare was indeed to be abolished, ships.13 This disagreement regarding the submarine itself was an "effective cruisers was to plague Anglo-American and legitimate weapon of warfare." The relations for years following the Wash­ depredations visited upon the world by ington Conference and emphasized the the submarine in the last war were to be differences between the roles and needs prevented from recurring not by out­ of these two naval powers. Great lawing the weapon but by clearly de­ Britain, with a large global empire, fining the rules under which the subma­ needed both a battle fleet and a large rine was to operate in time of war. 480 The second memorandum, prepared that a 10:10:7 ratio be instituted. The by Capt. Sinclair Cannon of Colonel General Board saw such a ratio as Roosevelt's staff, responded to several placing Japan in a position to "carry questions regarding the submarine that forward her aggressive policies in the had been raised during the first meeting Far East, thereby endangering the peace of the Subcommittee of Technical Ex­ of the world." 19 perts (16 November) and was explicit as The ratio deadlock was broken by to why this country should retain a permitting Japan to keep a new con­ strong submarine force. The British had struction battleship (Mutsu) originally proposed that the tonnage be reduced slated for destruction and an agreement from 90,000 tons to 45,000 tons for by England and the United States to both themselves and the United States nonfortification of their Pacific posses­ and that Japan be allotted 27,000 tons sions. as opposed to the 54,000 tons originally Extending the ratio to France and proposed by the United States. In his Italy in the balanced proportion (1.67) memorandum to the Director of War also proved difficult. France demanded Plans, Captain Cannon advised that such that she be allowed a ratio of 3.5, and a substitution should not be allowed. Italy insisted on parity with France. One reason he discussed was the defense After considerable debate and a per­ of the American island possessions in sonal appeal to Premier Briand by Secre­ the Pacific where he considered the tary Hughes, France accepted the 1.67 submarine an absolute necessity.16 In ratio but made formal reservation to the the event of hostilities in the Pacific, extension of the limitation ratio to observed Cannon, "the presence of sub­ surface auxiliaries and to submarines marines with our fleet would be of vital which France considered to be of a iIpportance . ~ ... 17 The submarine as-a purely defensive nature and necessary to determining f§lC!or in future operations insure her communications and se­ 2 of the British Navy also received Can­ curity. 0 It became evident that French non's attention. With submarines re­ strategy had called for concessions in duced to a minimum, observed the the capital ship ratio argument to sup­ captain, the British Fleet would be more port their later demands for increased at liberty to carry on offensive opera­ auxiliary tonnage and to "introduce the tions in the event of war, whereas, "if submarine controversy ... 2 1 submarines are allowed, that fact in In spite of the acknowledged impor­ itself might prevent Great Britain from tance of the submarine limitation ques­ going to war ...... 18 tion, both the United States and Great Although agreed upon in theory, the Britain chose to defer discussion until specific provisions of the proposed limi­ the capital ship ratios had been at least tation ratio among the three major tentatively agreed upon. In response to powers proved to be a source of con­ a request by the Netherlands that she be tinuing difficulty. With certain reserva­ granted a large allotment of submarine tions, Great Britain accepted the ratio tonnage, Roosevelt recorded this inter­ of 5:5:3 (10:10:6) as originally set pretation of the submarine ratio situa­ forth by Hughes, but Japan proved to tion. "My view of the matter," wrote be considerably more recalcitrant in Roosevelt, arriving at an understanding. Demanding is that we should get our estab­ security in her own waters and dis­ lished ratio for the three major satisfied with the assurances that a naval powers and stick to it religi­ four-power consultative pact might pro­ ously. If we depart from it we will vide (as a substitute for the now defunct immediately get into a vexed Anglo-Japanese alliance), Japan insisted situation [with] France ... Fun- 481

damentally England's real fear of would want only about 60,000 tons.25 France is based on submarine ton­ Roosevelt was of the opinion that nage. If this were eliminated a France would want at least as much and mutual agreement would quickly that to allow such an amount would be be reached. [But if the Nether­ "as good as not cutting down at all." lands is allowed to build 45,000 Nor would Britain "hear to 60,000 tons tons] I could foresee trouble at for the French.,,2 6 His conversation once. We are accordingly pre­ with de Bon only served to reinforce paring a reply for the State De­ what he had felt for several days. "We partment in which we urge that will have to make our agreement on the matter be held in abeyance, callital ships ... and let the auxiliary and that America stand as she has tonnage insofar as submarines [are con­ stood, upon the ratio established cerned] ... go, pass by the board, with by the three great powers.2 2 certain restrictions.,,2 7 In addition, the General Board had The first extended discussion of sub­ indicated that the submarine tonnage marine limitation took place during the proposed by the Secretary of State fifth meeting of the Committee on expressed the "maximum reduction in Limitation of Armament (22 December) submarine armament to which the where Albert Sarraut of the French United States [could] subscribe.,,2 3 delegation pointed out that further dis­ It was common knowledge among cussion of naval limitation "could not the conferees that Great Britain wished be pursued without taking into account to pursue her often stated goal of the question of submarines.,,2 8 Lord submarine abolition. On 19 December Lee of Fareham, First Lord of the Secretary Hughes and Roosevelt dis­ British Admiralty, noted that the ques­ cussed the British position. Both agreed tion of submarines was of "transcendent that it was a "foolish thing" but, from importance" to the British Empire, and their meetings with Lee and Balfour, it he regretted that this appeared to be the was clear that the British were "set on only question on which his delegation the matter." Lee had told Roosevelt was out of sympathy with the American that the English did not feel that bring­ proposals and the views of France and ing the abolition question before the the other powers.29 Lee then presented Conference would embarrass their posi­ figures to illustrate his contention that tion because "at no time did they the American submarine proposals actu­ expect [that] a decision in this matter, ally provided for an increase in the 3 contrary to what they consider correct, submarine fleets of the major powers. 0 would force them to leave the con­ In a lengthy statement designed to ference." The British were convinced counter the prosubmarine arguments of that they would eventually have the the other powers, Lee recounted the submarine abolished by repeatedly ham­ wartime experience of the submarine mering at it.24 and noted that its real value was, and That the French, however, were not would continue to be, its utility as a prepared to outlaw the submarine was commerce destroyer. The submarine, made clear 2 days later (21 December) Lee maintained, was essentially an of­ when Roosevelt met with Admiral de fensive weapon involving murder and Bon of the French delegation. The piracy upon the seas. It was the only admiral informed Roosevelt that the class of vessel for which the Conference French did not wish to "cut down on was asked to give permission to thrive submarines" and asked for the "up-set and multiply, and it would be a great figure" of American submarine needs, disappointment to the British Empire if expressing his assumption that we they could not persuade the Conference 482 to abolish this weapon.3 1 Lee then presented their official views of the offered to scrap the entire British sub­ submarine question. Senator Schanzer, marine fleet of 80,000 tons, which was speaking for Italy, supported the French the "largest and probably the most contention that the submarine was a efficient submarine navy in the world," defensive weapon necessary to protect provided the other powers would do the lines of communication upon which 3 likewise. 2 The sympathies of the other Italy depended. The Italian delegation, nations were visibly prosubmarine, how­ observed the Senator, thought that a ever, and Lee hardly expected to con­ Conference involving only five of the vince all the powers to come round to world's navies could not settle a ques­ the British point of view. With this in tion which concerned so many others. mind the British delegate noted that In spite of its appreciation of the they had no intention of jeopardizing humanitarian arguments of the British the capital ship agreement if they failed delegation, concluded Schanzer, Italy to carry the point regarding the subma­ could not associate itself with the pro­ rine and would, therefore, welcome any posal for submarine abolition. 36 suggestions for the reduction and re­ The Japanese deleg~te, Masanao striction of the submarine.3 3 Hanihara, presented similar arguments Following the presentation of the regarding the positive defensive capabili­ English case for abolition, the French ties of the submarine. As far as the representative Albert Sarraut presented legitimacy of the weapon was con­ his country's views on the submarine. cerned, Hanihara pointed out that "any His words reinforced the prosubmarine weapoIl might become illegitimate if attitude the French had supported for used without restriction.,,3 7 Further­ many years. The submarine was an more, for an insular nation like Japan, excellent defensive weapon, contended submarines were relatively inexpensive, Sarraut, particularly for those nations yet effective. Japan would favor, there­ without a large fleet of battleships. It fore, "more vigorous international rules was, therefore, an "excellent means of governing their proper use. ,,3 8 preserving her independence ... espe­ Hughes reinforced this position by cially in view of the sacrifices to which reading the report on submarines she has been asked to consent in the adopted by the Advisory Committee of matter of capital ships.,,3 4 As for the the American delegation on 1 Decem­ employment of the submarine in the ber.39 As a man-of-war, the submarine war, noted Sarraut, there is "reason for has a "very vital part to play,,,40 and as condemning [the] belligerent, but not a scout, continued the report, "the for condemning the submarine." The submarine has great possibilities ... it French spokesman concluded his re­ has value, a legitimate use, and no marks with the statement that nation can decry its employment in this ... The French Government can­ fashion ... 41 Again alluding to the Japa­ not consent to accept either the nese threat in the Pacific, the report abolition of submarines, or a re­ declared that although the United States duction of the total tonnage of would never undertake unlimited sub­ submarines which it considers to marine warfare, delay tactics until major be the irreducible minimum neces­ fleet operations began could, sary to insure the safety of the ... at some future time result in territories for which it is respon­ the United States holding its out­ sible, or a limitation of the in­ lying possessions. If these colonies dividual tonnage of submarines. 3 5 once fall, the expenditure of men In somewhat briefer statements, the necessary to recapture them will Italian and Japanese representatives be tremendous and may result in a 483 drawnout war which would really answers had been given, and the implica­ be a United States defeat. The tions were a definite threat to British United States needs a large subma­ seapower.47 rine force to protect its inter­ Secretary Hughes terminated the de­ ests.42 bate on the abolition of the submarine The United States had completely by saying that further discussion of the reversed its position on submarine aboli­ matter was futile and that it was im­ tion from that taken 3 years earlier at possible to "expect a result favorable to the Paris Peace Conference. England was the adoption of ... a resolution to now without support in her campaign to abolish the submarine.,,48 abolish the submarine. With the abolition controversy At the next meeting of the commit­ ended, the Committee on Limitation of tee (23 December) Admiral de Bon, Armament turned its attention to the speaking for his country, indicated that problem of quantitative and qualitative the Conference could not "reasonably restrictions to be placed on submarines. limit submarine tonnage," but if such a As England had rejected the original limit were to be fixed, the American American tonnage figure of 90,000 tons proposal of 90,000 tons was "the abso­ as being too large, Secretary Hughes lute minimum for all navies who may now proposed that both Great Britain want to have a submarine force.,,43 and the United States accept 60,000 Great Britain responded by accusing tons as their maximum submarine ton­ France of favoring the submarine be­ nage while France, Italy, and Japan cause of its ability to wage a successful maintain their present tonnage as the war against merchant fleets.44 Balfour maximum. 49 then attempted to win Italy to the This offer was readily accepted by abolitionist point of view by pointing the British delegation at the next out that country's vulnerability to sub­ meeting of the committee (also 24 marine operations in its dependence on December) but met with considerable seaborne commerce. Italy, however, sug­ argument from the other powers. Ad­ gested that the best course to follow miral de Bon stated that a minimum of would be to place restrictions on the 90 submarines (90,000 tons) were re­ offensive operations of submarines quired to safeguard French security. To rather than abandon what they con­ reduce their force below this limit, "was sidered a defensive weapon.4 5 equivalent to abolishing the whole The confrontation between Great French program ... ,,50 The admiral in­ Britain and France over the question of formed the committee that the figures submarine abolition dominated the were so far below what they had origi­ seventh session (24 December) of the nally contemplated that the French committee also. Sarraut restated delegation must refer them to Paris for France's position that "An agreement study. Italy announced that she would had been reached on the reduction of accept the new tonnage figures only on offensive naval armaments, but the the condition that they represent parity question of means of defense [i.e., with France.51 The Japanese delegate submarines] must be left to the con­ pointed out that their acceptance of the sideration of the countries inter­ original tonnage allowance of 54,000 ested.,,46 Balfour countered by asking, tons called for a considerable sacrifice "Against whom is this submarine fleet and compromise on their part and was being built? What purpose is it to serve? the minimum tonnage acceptable to What danger to France is it intended to them. 5 2 Japan was so remotely situ­ guard against?" These were questions, ated, concluded her spokesman, "thatit noted Balfour, to which no satisfactory must be evident to all that her subma- 484

rines could not constitute a menace to from the ~rj.tish delegation (Balfour) any nation.,,5 3 Secretary Hughes termi­ summarizing that country's position re­ nated the discussion on submarine garding the submarine. Balfour re­ limitation at this juncture to await the iterated the British desire for total French reply to the new American abolition. If this was not possible, how­ proposal. ever, they would favor any diminution On the following Tuesday (27 De­ in their number. But, noted Balfour, cember) Admiral Pratt submitted to "no mere diminution in their numbers Roosevelt a memorandum reviewing the during peace would relieve us from the discussions in the Committee of Fifteen necessity of devising and preparing all since its formation by the Committee practicable methods of dealing with on Limitation of Armament. Pratt them in war, so that no limitation of noted that "a certain amount of tension anti-submarine vessels would seem con­ had resulted owing to the uncompro­ sistent with our national safety.,,58 mising attitude of Great Britain and Antisubmarine vessels could, of course, France on the submarine question,,,5 4 include just about every type of vessel and suggested that they put the subma­ except capital ships, aircraft carriers, rine question "under the ice to cool" and fleet support ships. and stop discussing it.5 5 Also, in recom­ That this was the only policy Eng­ mending that the question of other land had chosen to pursue was con­ auxiliary tonnage (cruisers, destroyers firmed by the contents of a secret et cetera) not be raised until the subma­ dispatch from Churchill to Balfour sent rine question was settled, Pratt warned at the time of Balfour's initial pleas for that the United States should guard submarine abolition. This dispatch was against the setting of a precedent by not made public until it was mentioned allowing Japan an out of ratio tonnage by Churchill during a speech in the in an attempt to yield to France, for House of Commons in 1930.59 that country (France) might make a In this letter, Churchill lauded the similar claim at a later date.5 6 British delegation's decision to press for Admiral Pratt was of the oplIDon total abolition of the submarine. "We that the submarine problem adversely apprehend, however," continued affected aircraft carrier tonnage limita­ Churchill, tion which, in his mind, was second that there is very little chance of only to capital ship tonnage. It was the abolition of submarines being important to settle this question first, agreed upon, and in this event we and whether or not a decision was later must insist at all costs upon abso­ reached in submarines, the purpose of lute freedom in regard to the the Conference would have been fairly character and number of all ves­ accomplished. "The ratio is the Big sels under, say, 10,000 tons. We Thing of this conference," wrote Pratt. cannot, in the face of French "It is the power back of us which freedom to construct a great sub­ assures the Anglo-Saxon peoples that marine fleet, to say nothing of the the rule of Constitutional government submarine and cruiser concentra­ and its ideals during years of peace or of tion of other powers, enter into war shall be the law of land and of sea." any agreement fettering our To emphasize his point regarding the liberty to build whatever numbers importance of the ratio, Pratt offered and classes of cruisers and anti­ his resignation if it was departed submarine warfare craft we may from.57 consider necessary .... During the evening of the same day Even at the cost of a complete (27 December), Hughes received a letter rupture, we feel certain that you 485 will not agree to any restriction in viewed as a "somewhat singular contri­ this sphere without previous con­ bution to a Conference called for the sultation with the cabinet.6 0 diminution of armament.,,63 Why, con­ It is evident that the submarine was the tinued Balfour, did a fleet of capital key to any meaningful limitation be­ ships of 175,000 tons require 90,000 yond the agreement already reached for tons of submarines to scout for it and capital ships. protect it? It was perfectly obvious, Formal discussion of submarine stated the English representative, "that limitation resumed 28 December with the proposed 90,000· tons of submarines the ninth gathering of the Committee were intended to destroy commerce." It on Limitation of Armament. France should be perfectly clear, concluded aggravated an already strained situation Balfour, that if the French were per­ by refusing to accept the status quo mitted to build 90,000 tons of subma­ offer (31,500 tons) for submarine ton­ rines, "no limitation of any kind on nage made by Hughes at an earlier auxiliary vessels capable of dealing with meeting (24 December). Sarraut in­ submarines could be admitted by the formed the committee that his govern­ government which he represented.,,64 ment had concluded that The division in attitude toward the ... it is impossible to accept a submarine engendered by the French limitation below 350,000 tons for refusal to accept limitation of their auxiliary craft and 90,000 tons submarine force and the British plan to for submarines, without im­ maintain freedom in constructing aux­ periling the vital interests of the iliary craft rendered any agreement to country and its colonies and the limit the tonnage of submarines at the safety of their naval life. The Conference impossible. Realizing this, at French Delegation has been in­ a meeting of the Committee of Fifteen structed to consent to no conces­ on the same day, the various national sion in regard to the above representatives "agreed to disagree" on figures. 61 the submarine issue. Even though the French indicated The Committee of Limitation of their acceptance of the capital ship Armament reconvened for its afternoon allowance assigned to them (175,000 session at 3:30, and following the dis­ tons) in the same announcement and cussion of a proposed limitation of thereby kept the ratio intact, there was cruiser tonnage and maximum gun cali­ little warmth in the remarks accorded ber for use aboard cruisers, Hughes the French decision on the submarine. suggested that the committee consider Hughes was "disappointed" with the the action to be expressed by the French statement. If France had 90,000 powers as regards the illegal use of tons of submarines, both the English submarines. Elihu Root then presented and Americans would have to greatly three resolutions designed to place cer­ increase their submarine fleets. This, tain restrictions upon the operations of noted Hughes, could hardly be called submarines through universal adherence limitation or reduction62 and raised the to international laws65 regarding the serious question whether anything search, seizure, and destruction of mer­ might be accomplished in regard to chant vessels in time of war; the pro­ submarines and auxiliaries. hibition of the use of submarines as Balfour was "profoundly dis­ commerce destroyers; and the outlawing appointed" and pointed out that the of unrestricted submarine warfare. 6 6 threefold increase in submarine tonnage The reading of the resolutions garnered proposed by France would make her enthusiastic and warm replies from the equal to the major naval powers. This he assembled representatives, but all the 486 nations-except Great Britain-wished stated Lee, with the observation that to study them in detail and deferred the instrument is finally at hand that discussion until a later date.6 7 would "overthrow for good and all the At the next meeting of the commit­ naval power of England. ,,71 tee (20 December) Admiral de Bon, Lee stated that he hoped these were supported by the Italian and Japanese not the views of the French Govern­ representatives, recommended that the ment and that he expected immediate resolutions be submitted to a group of repudiation. He also observed that there jurists for further study. Root, however, was only one way that the French could declared that neither he nor the resolu­ effectively disavow these statements and tions were "going to be buried -under a that was by adopting the resolutions committee of lawyers." "Either the proposed by the American delegation. It delegates assembled here," stated Root, was only through such action that they " ... must speak clearly and intel­ could remove the British feelings of ligently the voice of humanity which apprehension and bitterness. had sent them here, and to which they Admiral de Bon was the first to reply must report, or that voice would speak for France. He stated that he was glad for itself, and speaking without them, to know the basis for the misunder­ would be their condemnation.,,6 8 standing that had lasted so long between Roosevelt described the debate over the the two countries. The Castex article, resolutions as "voluble and acrid" but asserted de Bon, "in no way repre­ personally did not think the submarine sented ... the views of the French resolution (No.2) amounted to much. Navy. This article, written by a man of It was, however, the "kind of a subject 'letters,' was, in the eyes of the French which gives to diplomats an opportunity Delegation," a "monstrosity," and he for cantankerous disagreement.,,6 9 formally repudiated it in the name of On 30 December the committee the French Navy. 72. Chairman Hughes opened discussion on the second Root then put aside any further discussion of resolution relating to the elimination of the Root resolutions until the delega­ the submarine as a commerce destroyer. tions had received advice from their This meeting was the setting for one of respective governments. 7 3 the most heated exchanges between When the discussion of the Root Great Britain and France due, in part, to resolutions resumed on 5 January, so a series of articles in Revue Maritime, did the battle OL semantics. The only one of which was written by a Capitaine issue of real consequence arose when de Fregate Castex and published in Japan questioned the resolutions on the January 1920.70 The series, entitled use of submarines for blockading pur­ "Synthese de la Guerre Sous-Marine" poses.74 Italy and Japan were both (Synthesis of the Submarine War), was opposed to Balfour's position that pro­ cited by Lord Lee to support the British hibition was the intent of the resolu­ interpretation of French intentions, i.e., tion. As the "conflict raged without the submarines were not for defensive success," Roosevelt overheard a remark purposes, as the French claimed, but for passed from Sarraut to de Bon to the offense and that the French favored a effect that he would be glad to remain submarine war on commerce as a legiti­ silent and let Italy and Japan fight mate weapon in time of war. The France's battles. 7 5 Germans, wrote Castex, were absolutely Despite the protracted debate on the justified in resorting to unrestricted Root resolutions, they were finally submarine warfare and to neglect to do approved and adopted during the 15th so would have been to commit a great and 16th meetings (5 and 6 January) of blunder. The French writer concluded, the committee76 and incorporated into 487 a separate Treaty Regarding the Use of respect each other's rights in their island Submarines and Noxious Gases in War­ possessions in the Pacific (Four Power fare. 77 Following the meeting of 5 Treaty, 13 December 1921). The na­ January, Roosevelt had strongly urged tions represented at the Conference also Hughes to exclude them from the naval agreed to respect China's independence treaty because " ... they deal with in­ and to uphold the principle of equal ternationallaw and suggest amendments industrial and commercial opportunity to international law. [and] ... are not a in that country, thus formally accepting generic part of our treaty which is America's Open Door policy in China composed of stipulations concerning (Nine Power Treaty, 6 February 1922). matters over which we have no con­ A third achievement was, of course, trol. 78 naval limitations as outlined in the Five The submarine resolutions were laid Power Treaty also approved on 6 Feb­ before the entire Conference during the ruary 1922_ This agreement fixed the fifth plenary session (1 February) by status quo in fortifications in the West­ Elihu Root and subsequently approved. ern Pacific, established a capital ship Just prior to the reading of the treaty construction holiday, made provisions incorporating the resolutions to the for the scrapping of certain battleships assembled representatives, Root ex­ and battle cruisers of the three major plained to Captain Rodgers, Chairman naval powers, set tonnage limitations for of the General Board, that the resolu­ certain ship types (capital ships, aircraft tions were designed to "meet public carriers), limited the maximum gun cali­ opinion with regard to [the] horrors ber for cruisers, and established the and lawlessness of the Germans. " naval strength ratio of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67 In his presentation before the Con­ on aircraft carriers and capital ships.8 0 ference, Root pointed out that the The major failure of the Washington treaty "undertakes further to stigmatize Conference was its inability to reach a violations of these rules ... as violation limitation agreement on the submarine, of the laws of war which, as between the key to the limitation of the re­ these five great Powers and all other maining classes of surface warships. For civilized nations who shall give their the agreements at the Conference on adherence thereto shall henceforth be battleships and aircraft carriers to be punished as an act of piracy.,,79 The effective in reducing the chances of war, acceptance of the treaty closed the it was necessary that these two types of subject of submarine limitation but was vessels be universally accepted as the ratified by only four of the powers key factor of seapower. Furthermore, (France refused) and consequently limitation of these types only enhanced never became binding. With the defeat the combatant value of the other un­ of this treaty through lack of ratifica­ limited vessels. Capt. Dudley W. Knox tion, the only accomplishment of the observed that "It is very, very doubt­ Washington Conference regarding the ful," whether this failure [to limit sub­ limitation or restriction of submarines marines] did not actually nullify the was eliminated. The Conference ad­ effects of limitation on battle ships and journed on 6 February 1922 after the air-craft [sic] carriers .. _ ,,8 1 adoption of 13 resolutions and seven Any contribution the so-called sub­ treaties. marine treaty might have made to the A major ~ccomplishment of the limitation of armaments would have Washington Conference was the reo been at best psychological, backed as it placing of the Anglo·Japanese alliance was only by "world opinion," for it with a pledge between the United made the submarine "an ordinary ship States, Britain, Japan, and France to of war and took from it the stigma of 488 being a murderous and foul weapon. ,,82 The rather unrealistic attempt to As Admiral Sims wrote to Raymond L. restrict the submarine by international Buell, author of The Washington Con­ law enforced only by world public ference, any nation menaced by defeat opinion was hardly an adequate substi­ and domination, "would use the subma­ tute for strict limitation by tonnage or rine to save itself; ... the 'tremendous size of the individual submarine or of a power of public opinion' would not nation's submersible fleet. Lacking any prevent it being used ... ,,83 regulations upon construction of this Another pessimistic evaluation of the type of vessel, it was clear that those treaty came from a paper written several nations which chose to do so were free days after the Conference ended by to engage in unlimited building pro­ Adm. William V. Pratt of the U.S. Navy. grams not only in this category but in The treaty, wrote Pratt, "is not practical the other unrestricted classes as well. [and] will not work." Pratt likened the With competition underway anew, it submarine treaty to the Prohibition law, soon became apparent that further in­ for it was forcing something on the ternational attempts to limit naval arma­ majority of nations which they did not ments were necessary if the naval arms or would not want in war. The treaty, race was to be halted. concluded the admiral, "is made to be The lessons from the attempts to broken, and this in itself leads to a limit the submarine at Washington disregard for the law .... ,,8 4 should be abundantly clear. If a weapon Admiral Sims concurred in this nega­ lends itself to the protection or ad­ tive evaluation of the submarine treaty. vancement of a nation's interests, It would probably prove a failure, wrote meaningful limitation is doubtful. Sims, "because it is really impossible to Similarly, if political differences be­ understand what it means.... It is tween nations cannot be settled, there useless to talk about the rules of warfare can be little genuine hope that im­ if the terms used are not accurately portant disarmament agreements can defined. . . ,,85 be reached.

NOTES

1. u.s. Dept. of the Navy. Records of the General Board of the United States Navy. International Conferences and Discussions, Records and Publications, 1921-22. Series I, Item 1, Policy and Discussion Book, 1921, Recommendation of the General Board, 15 July 1921, pars. 11, 13. Hereafter cited as U.S.N., Policy and Discussion Book. 2. Ibid., Schofield draft, 23 August 1921. 3. Ibid., H.P.H. Memorandum, 20 August 1921, p. 7. 4. U.S. Dept. of the Navy. Records of the General Board of the United States Navy. International Conferences and Discussions, Records and Publications, 1921-22, Series I, Item 2, Advisory Book, July 1921-February 1922, par. 16. Hereafter cited as U.S.N., Advisory Book, 1921-1922. 5. Ibid., p. 20. . 6. Memorandum, Capt. H.H. Bemis to General Board, 4 November 1921. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. The Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. Papers, "Limitations of Armaments," box 21, General Correspondence, 1922, Letters, v. I, p. 2, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 9. Ibid., p. 3. 10. Letter, T. Roosevelt, Jr., to Philip C. Jessup, 10 August 1937. Ibid., box 37, General Correspondence, 1936-37. This letter served as a point of clarification to Jessup, the author of Elihu Root (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1938). 11. Conference on the Limitation of Armament, November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1922), pp. 26-66, 78-92. Hereafter cited as Conference. 12. Ibid., p. 86. It is interesting to note that although Plan I had also allotted 54,000 tons to both Italy and France, no mention of it was made at this time. 489

13. Ibid., p. 60. All vessels except battleships, aircraft carriers, and fleet support ships were considered auxi1iaries at this time. 14. Ibid., p. 102. 15. Ibid. 16. Letter, Capt. Sinclair Cannon to Director of War Plans, 17 November 1921. U.S.N., Advisory Book, July 1921-February 1922, p. 3. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Letter, General Board to Secretary of the Navy, 22 November 1921, No. 438. U.S.N., Final Action of General Board, July 1921-January 1922. 20. United States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1922), v. I, pp. 135-36. Telegram, Premier Briand to Secretary Hughes, 18 December 1921. Both the Hughes' telegram of 16 December and Briand's reply were inserted into the records of the Conference during the course of the fourth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Armament (22 December). Hereafter cited as U.S., For. Rels. 1922. 21. Raymond L. Buell, The Washington Conference (New York: Appleton, 1922), p. 83. See also memorandum of conversation between Secretary Hughes and French Representatives Sarraut, Jusserand, and de Bon, 19 December 1921, U.S., For. Rels., 1922, v. I, p. 137. 22. Roosevelt Papers, box I, Diaries, 1921-24, v. I, pp. 40, 73. 23. Memorandum, General Board to Secretary of the Navy, 12 December 1921, No. 438, Ser. No. 1088·mm. U.S.N., Final Action of the General Board, July 1921-January 1922, p. 293. 24. Roosevelt Papers, box I, Diaries, 1921-24, v. I, p. 97. 25. Ibid., p. 100. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid., p. 101. 28. Conference, p. 466. 29. Conference, p. 474; U.S. Congress, Senate, Conference on the Limitation of Armament at Washington, November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922, Senate Document 126, 67th Cong., 2d sess., 1922. 30. According to Lee's calculations, the major naval powers could, under the Hughes plan, increase their submarine tonnage by the following amounts: Japan, 21,800 tons; Great Britain, 9,500 tons; United States, 6,500 tons. Italy and France could also increase their fleets in proportion. Conference, p. 476. A discrepancy between the tonnage figures used by England and the United States was discovered and later corrected. The British had been using the surface displacement tonnage of submarines while the Americans had used the larger, submerged displacement figures. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid., p. 486. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid., pp. 490-92. The Advisory Committee report supposedly reflected American public opinion, but its findings appear to be quite similar to General Board memoranda found in U.S.N., Series I, Item 3, Final Action of the General Board, July 1921-January 1922, which could hardly claim to be a reflection of public opinion regarding the submarine. See Buell, note, p. 217. 40. Conference, pp. 492-98. 41. Ibid., p. 498. 42. Ibid., p. 500. 43. Ibid., p. 518. 44. Ibid., p. 520. 45. Ibid., p. 538. 46. Ibid., pp. 532·38. 47. Ibid., p. 542. 48. Ibid., p. 552. 49. Ibid., p. 556. The tonnage possessed by those nations was: France, 31,391; Italy, 21,000; and Japan, 31,452. This proposal had been suggested to Hughes by Roosevelt earlier in the day at a subcommittee meeting. See Roosevelt Papers, box 1, Diaries, 1921-24, v. I, p. 106. 50. Ibid. 490 51. Ibid., p. 562. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Memorandum, Admiral Pratt to Colonel Roosevelt, 27 December 1921. U.S.N., Advisory Book, July 1921-February 1922, p. 1. 55. Ibid., p. 2. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid., p. 2-3. 58. Letter, Lord Balfour to Secretary Hughes, 27 December 1921. U.S., For. Rels., 1922, v. I, p. 143. , 59. See Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), Fifth Series, CCXXXVIII, 2099, 15 May 1930 and Dudley W. Knox, "The London Treaty and American Naval Policy," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1931, pp. 1079-1088. 60. Knox, p. 1081. 61. Conference, p. 570. 62. Ibid., p. 572. 63. Ibid., p. 574. 64. Ibid., p. 576. 65. This attempt to limit the submarine through international law was in keeping with Roosevelt's idea to have restrictions of some kind if limitation failed and also in accordance with the recommendation of the General Board noted in Memorandum No. 438, Ser. No. 1088·dd of 15 November 1921. 66. Conference, p. 596. 67. Ibid., p. 598. 68. Ibid., p. 618. 69. Roosevelt Papers, box 1, Diaries, 1921-1924, v. I, III. 70. At the time the article was written, Castex was chief of a bureau on the French Naval Staff and at the time of the Conference was Chief of Staff of the Admiral of the Second Division in the Mediterranean. 71. Conference, p. 654. 72. Ibid., pp. 658-660. 73. Ibid., p. 668. On 31 January 1922, at the 20th meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Armament, there occurred a further exchange between France (Jusserand) and England (Lee) over the Castex article. Jusserand claimed that the British translation and interpretation of the article was imperfect and misleading and had done France an undeserved injustice. The debate was ended by Hughes when he moved the question of f'mal approval of the naval treaty. See Conference, pp. 820-834. 74. Roosevelt Papers, box 1, Diaries, 1921-1924, v. I, p. 126. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid., pp. 684-740. It is probable that the French felt constrained to approve the Root resolutions in an attempt to dispel the negative public image engendered by the submarine debate and the Castex affair. See Buell, p. 223. 77. See Conference, pp. 1605-1611, for the complete treaty. 78. Roosevelt Papers, box 1, Diaries, 1921-1924, v. I, p. 127. 79. Conference, p. 268. 80. For the text of the various resolutions and treaties see Conference, pp. 1570-1658 or U.S., Senate Document 126, pp. 869-910. 81. Dudley W. Knox, The Eclipse of American Sea Power (New York: American Army and Navy Journal, December 1922), p. 96. 82. Rolland A. Chaput, Disarmament in British Foreign Policy (London: Constable, 1927), pp. 121-122. 83. Letter, Adm. William S. Sims to R.L. Buell, 9 May 1923. The Papers of Rear Admiral William S. Sims, Series I, folder SS. Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Hereafter cited as Sims Papers. 84. The Papers of Admiral Hillary Pollard Jones, box I, paper by Adm. William V. Pratt, "An Attempt to Interpret the Treaty," 13 February 1922, pp. 10, 14, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 85. Letter, Adm. William S. Sims to Sir Graham Bower, 26 July 1923, Sims Papers, Series J, folder SS. ----tJl----