The Submarine and the Washington Conference Of

477 THE SUBMARINE AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921 Lawrence H. Douglas Following the First World War, the tation of this group, simply stated, was tide of public opinion was overwhelm that second best in naval strength meant ingly against the submarine as a weapon last. A policy of naval superiority was of war. The excesses of the German necessary, they felt, for "history consis U-boat had stunned the sensibilities of tently shows that war between no two the world but had, nonetheless, pre peoples or nations can be unthink sented new ideas and possibilities of this able.,,1 A second group, the Naval weapon to the various naval powers of Advisory Committee (Admirals Pratt the time. The momentum of these new and Coontz and Assistant Secretary of ideas proved so strong that by the the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.) also opening of the first major international submitted recommendations concerning disarmament conference of the 20th the limitation of naval armaments. century, practical uses of the submarine From the outset their deliberations were had all but smothered the moral indig guided by a concern that had become nation of 1918. more and more apparent-the threat Several months prior to the opening posed to the security and interests of of the conference, the General Board of this country by Japan. This concern was the American Navy was given the task evidenced in an attempt to gain basic of developing guidelines and recommen understandings with Britain. dations to be used by the State Depart The submarine received its share of ment in determining the American attention in the deliberations of these proposals to be presented. The orien- two groups. One approach to the 478 weapon, considered in a draft proposal the improyed capabilities and the pri submitted by Capt. F.H. Schofield, mary uses of the submarine, Bemis called for the total and permanent opposed its abolition " ... chiefly on abolition of submarines and the destruc account of the impossibility of doing tion of all submarines, built and build SO.,,6 "History," continued Bemis, ing. 2 In support of his proposal, Scho "shows only· too well the value of a field noted that the relative strengths of 'scrap of paper' when the life of a the world's navies would not be materi nation is at stake." Alluding to England, ally affected by such a move, and he also noted that, "Two weapons are increasing the numbers of submarines now in hand that challenge her su would involve large expenditures for premacy, one of which is the submarine, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) vessels. and, naturally, she would be glad to see However, save this one proposal, the that 'outlawed. ,,, In concluding this elimination of any armament by type section of his memorandum, Captain received scant attention in these early Bemis observed that relative to the recommendations as it was thought to Pacific, "the United States will make a hold little promise of success.3 criminal mistake if she becomes a party A second approach to the problem to an agreement to abolish sub was to scrap submarines then in exis marines. ,,7 tence and place restrictions upon new Assistant Secretary of the Navy construction, thereby establishing maxi Roosevelt expressed his agreement with mum tonnage allowances in vessel types Bemis in a paper entitled "Limitation of permitted each power. The Advisory Armaments." "In an assumed war Committee drew up three plans in against the world," he wrote, "the volving this basic principle and sub submarine would be of most value mitted them to the General Board and ... against the two island empires the Secretary of the Navy on 20 Octo Great Britain and Japan." It was impera ber 1921. Under plan I the submarine tive that we "not permit our hands to tonnage recommended for this country be tied as regards submarines."s and England was a maximum of 90,000 In this same paper Roosevelt ob tons, while Japan, France, and Italy served that Japan was our most proba were each allotted' 54,000 tons.4 Those ble enemy at present, and if the Con submarines building at the time of the ference did not provide us with a Conference could be completed up to dominating naval strength in the Pacific, the assigned tonnage, but no new con we should conclude a "treaty such that struction would be permitted except to Japan cannot break it as regards us replace those units reaching 12 years of without breaking it with others." In service. Plans II and III were quite other words, an "entangling alliance." similar to plan I but for the maximum With an eye on the development of new allowed tonnage (85,000 tons for Eng weapons, Roosevelt wrote that the land and the United States and 51,000 United States should be the " ... last tons for the other powers). The Navy nation to advocate any limitation upon Department was of the opinion that the extension of recent weapons or the plan I "is the best plan and is the one development of new ones.,,9 The Presi which ... it advises be adopted."s dent, Secretary of the Navy Hughes, and A memorandum prepared for the Roosevelt agreed that disarmament was General Board by Capt. H.H. Bemis of an impossible objective and that the the Submarine Section of the Office of reduction or limitation of armaments Naval Operations expressed the opinion was all that could be hoped for. of those professionals who favored re The independently formulated Gen tention of the submarine. After citing eral Board plans were, however, un- 479 acceptable to Hughes and Roosevelt for number of commerce escort vessels, they were, as Roosevelt noted years while the primary concern of the Ameri later, "what one would have expected can Navy was defense of the continental from the Naval Board-an estimate of United States. limitations (based) on' 'naval needs,' Proceeding to the limitations pro which represented not a limitation of posed for submarines, Balfour reported armaments for the United States but an that his country's experts thought the increase.',10 Such a plan was folly, and amount of submarine tonnage permitted Roosevelt decided to consult Admiral was too large. He thought that the Pratt whom he thought to be "the tonnage should be reduced further and ablest naval statesman," and together suggested that the Conference might they hit upon and developed the idea of possibly "forbid altogether the con using existing naval strength as the basis struction of those ... submarines of for the American proposals. great size ... whose sole purpose is at The plan laid before the Conference tack ... by methods which civilized na by Hughes at the first plenary session tions regard with horror."14 Only detailed a reduction and limitation of fleeting reference was made to the naval armaments for Great Britain, the abolition of the submarine and then United States, and Japan in a ratio of only to note that such a decision 5:5:3, respectively, but left the ratio for "would be impossible, or, if possible, it Italy and France for the Conference to might well be thought undesirable to determine. 11 Tonnage limitations con abolish it altogether. ,,15 sistent with the 5:5:3 ratio were as Delegations from the other countries signed for each type of vessel with the at this second public meeting of the submarine tonnage allotment being the Conference voiced general satisfaction same as that allowed in plan I of the with the American proposals, but their Advisory Committee (Le., 90,000 tons remarks, and particularly those of for Great Britain and the United States France and Japan, indicated that each and 54,000 tons for Japan). 12 nation expected special consideration At the second plenary session (15 because of its particular situation (e.g., November) the representatives of the geography, current naval strength, na various countries presented their replies tional interests, et cetera). to the American proposals. Arthur J. Two memorandums prepared for the Balfour, representing the British Em American representatives contained pire, noted the willingness of his coun what eventually became the basic posi try to accept the naval ratio suggested tion of the United States regarding the by Hughes but made such acceptance question of submarine limitation used conditional upon the continued su for the remainder of the Conference. A premacy of England in European General Board memorandum (No. 43B, waters. The British also wished to retain ser. 1088-dd) transmitted to the Secre complete freedom in the building of tary of the Navy on 15 November cruisers and other auxiliary types and assumed that while unrestricted subma limit only their battle fleet or capital rine warfare was indeed to be abolished, ships.13 This disagreement regarding the submarine itself was an "effective cruisers was to plague Anglo-American and legitimate weapon of warfare." The relations for years following the Wash depredations visited upon the world by ington Conference and emphasized the the submarine in the last war were to be differences between the roles and needs prevented from recurring not by out of these two naval powers. Great lawing the weapon but by clearly de Britain, with a large global empire, fining the rules under which the subma needed both a battle fleet and a large rine was to operate in time of war. 480 The second memorandum, prepared that a 10:10:7 ratio be instituted. The by Capt. Sinclair Cannon of Colonel General Board saw such a ratio as Roosevelt's staff, responded to several placing Japan in a position to "carry questions regarding the submarine that forward her aggressive policies in the had been raised during the first meeting Far East, thereby endangering the peace of the Subcommittee of Technical Ex of the world." 19 perts (16 November) and was explicit as The ratio deadlock was broken by to why this country should retain a permitting Japan to keep a new con strong submarine force.

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