TitelblattderDissertation   FachbereichSozialwissenschaften    “Brokenpolicies:ReͲescalationofviolenceintheSouthOssetia conflict1989–2008. MechanismsofWesterninfluenceonGeorgianstateleaderships priortoescalationsintheGeorgianͲOssetianconflictin2002,2004 and2008.”  Dissertation zurErlangungderDoktorwürde durchden PromotionsausschussDr.rer.pol. derUniversitätBremen  vorgelegtvon LaraSigwart  Tbilisi,Georgien 8.Oktober2012  Erstgutachter:Prof.Dr.KlausSchlichte,InstitutfürInterkulturelleund InternationaleStudien,UniversitätBremen Zweitgutachter:Prof.MarkR.Beissinger,DepartmentofPolitics,Princeton University 1  TableofContents–Overview  1. Introduction 11 2. Analyticalframework 20 3. Empiricalanalysis 63 4. Discussionoffindings 142 5. Conclusion 183 6. Bibliography 192 7. Annexes 216 8. Statementonauthorship 287   TableofContents–Detailed  i. Acknowledgments 5 ii. Listofabbreviations 8 iii. Listofgraphiccontents 9 iv. MapofGeorgia 10 1. Introduction 11 2. Analyticalframework 24  2.1.Literaturereview 24  ExistingliteratureontheSouthOssetiaconflictandpoliticsin 25 Georgia  1)Argument1:Democratizationandelectionsleadingto  violence–“Playingtheethniccard” 27  2)Argument2:Illiciteconomiesleadingtoviolence–“Ethnic  warfareissimplyacoverstoryforcriminalviolenceand 30 predation”  CritiqueofArgument1and2:Predatorypoliciesoflocalstate  elitesinGeorgia 32  3)Argument3:Emotionsleadingtoviolence– “Whether[the  emotion]producesviolenceornotdependsinlargepartonthe  intensityoftheemotion” 35  CritiqueofArgument3:Russia’sclaimofregionaldominance 37  4)Argument4:Involvementofexternalactorsleadingto  violence–“TheWestdidnotdoenough” 39  CritiqueofArgument4:PoliciesofWesternnegligence 41  Conclusionofthecritiqueofexistingarguments 42  2.2.Theargument 44  2.3.Analyticalframework 45  a) Keyaspectsoftheargumentandworkinghypotheses 46  ViolenceintheSouthOssetiaconflict 46  TheGeorgianstateanditsleaderships 48  ExternalinfluenceintheSouthOssetiacontext 51

2   b) Analyticalframeworkandmethods 55  Changeinlocalbehavior:Tracingshifts 55  Causality:Framingthecausallink 57  Narrativeanalysis:Locatingandascribingmeaningtocausal  links 59  Socialmechanisms:Aggregatingrecurringcausallinks 63  Modelofanalysis 66 3. Empiricalanalysis 68  3.1.Analysisanduseoftheeventdataset 68  3.2.Backgroundofthestudy:Trajectoryofpoliticsandviolenceinthe  SouthOssetiaconflict1989Ͳ2008 74  Episode1:1989to1994– IndependenceofGeorgia,startof  conflictinSouthOssetia,andfirstGeorgianͲOssetianwar 76  Episode2:1994Ͳ2002–ShevardnadzeͲChibirovagreement,  Kokoitytakespower,andreͲescalationin2002 81  Episode3:2002Ͳ2006–OustingofShevardnadze,closureof  Ergneti,LjubljanaDocument,Sanakoevadministration 88  Episode4:2006Ͳ2008–Kosovorecognition,NATOsummitin 93 Bucharest,Augustwarandaftermathofthewar  3.3.Analysisofsequencesofpolicies 96  Interviewsandsequencesofpolicies 97  Sequence1–2002:FailureoftheBadenprocess,  Shevardnadze'santiͲcorruptionagendaandantiͲcrime  operations 103  Sequence2–2004:Regimechange,Ergneticlosureandshelling  ofTskhinvali 114  Sequence3–2008:Westernsupportforroadmaps,Sanakoev  administrationandAugustwar 125  Westernpoliciesafter2008 138  3.4.Empiricalfindingsandmodel 140 4. Discussionoffindings 150  4.1.Theoreticalscopeofthefindings 150  a) Beforechangeoflocalbehavior:The(reͲ)formationand  implementationoftheWesternagenda 156  b) Afterchangeoflocalbehavior:Beforeturningpointsto  escalation 159  c) Afterescalations 160  4.2.Empiricalscopeofthefindings 163  SriLanka 165  Kashmir 174  MechanismsofviolenceinSouthOssetia,SriLankaandKashmir 181  Divergences 185 5. Conclusion 192 6. Bibliography 201

3  7. Annexes 225  ANNEX1:Chronologyofpoliticalandviolenceevents1989Ͳ  2007 225  ANNEX2:CasualtiesintheGeorgianͲOssetianconflictzone  basedonreportsoftheOSCEMissiontoGeorgia1994–2006 290  ANNEX3:Politicalevents1989–2008 293  ANNEX4:Listofinterviews 296 8. Statementonauthorship 298  

4  i.Acknowledgments  Over the course of the dissertation project I received various forms of support, advice and encouragement. I would like to first of all thank my twoadvisers,KlausSchlichteandMarkBeissinger,whoputgreatamounts of time and effort into bringing this dissertation into being. Their encouragement, valuable insights, trust in my abilities and consistent supportovertheyearsmadethisprojecthappen.  IreceivedgenerousfundingoveraperiodofthreeyearsfromtheHansͲ Boeckler Foundation in Germany which was my first choice in my applicationforfundingandwhichmadeextensivefieldresearchpossible, includingtwomonthsinPragueandeightmonthsinGeorgiaaswellasa sevenͲmonth visiting scholarship with Mark Beissinger at the Princeton University. At HansͲBockler Foundation I would like to thank Iris Henkel andInsaBreyer.IalsoreceivedfinancialsupportthroughtheMarieͲCurie scholarship program of the European Commission and the Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia. Without these funds, the dissertation would not have been realized in its empirical scope and could not have profitedfrominputofdifferentscholarlycontexts.Thiswasaninvaluable gainfortheproject.  ThisresearchwasgreatlysupportedbyEmmaPratt,RachelNaylor,Jeremy Johnson, Rebecca Kraut and Camrin Christensen who proofread thefinal draft,themanypeoplewhowerereadytoreadanddiscussearlyversions informsofconferencepaperssuchasLauraDaniels,KatharinaHoffmann, Arwa Abdelmoula, Augustas Balelis, Andrea Weiss, Eli Feiman, Megan Dean, Barbara Christophe, Ulla Pape, Lili Di Puppo, and of course my interview partners who gave critical insight and put time and effort into explainingandmakingmeunderstandtheirpointsofview.  MostofallIwouldliketothankLikaSanikidze,LelaChakhaia,EleneNodia and Gia Gotua who greatly enabled the field research through personal 5  support.Thesearealsothefourpeoplewhoweremyveryfirstfriendsin Georgia when I came in 2003, who involved me in discussions, shared knowledgeinanefforttomakemeasanoutsiderunderstandthecomplex situationinGeorgiaandwhoalwaysputthetrustinmethatIwouldcome to fair conclusions, even across the occasional political differences between us or even among themselves. I am certainly very grateful for this.  I would like to thank the various institutions and their coͲworkers who supportedmyresearchotherthanthroughfinancialmeans.AttheHansͲ Boeckler Foundation, Iris Henkel worked administrative miracles in the course of more than three years of my fellowship; at the University of Bremen, Carmen Ohlsen was of constant and immediate support to organizethedissertationbetweenTbilisiandBremen;attheUniversityof Groningen,JoostHerman supported my preͲdoctoral research fellowship fromJanuarytoJuly2008;atthearchiveoftheOSCEofficeinPrague,Alice Nemcova and the intern Ulrike Wiese supported my archival research in JanuaryandFebruary2009;attheTbilisiStateUniversity,NinoChikovani hosted my first research stay in 2009; at the Ilia State University, Ghia Nodia hosted my second research stay which took place also with great help of Maia Nikolaishviliin 2010. Institutionssuch as theISETlibraryof the Tbilisi State University, the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy andDevelopment(CIPDD)andtheIDPWomenAssociation‘Consent’were ofinvaluablestructuralsupportinconductingtheresearch.Iwouldliketo thankEleneKhoshtaria,theformerFirstDeputyStateMinisterofEuropean and EuroͲAtlantic Integration, who, as my previous employer, showed greatunderstandingfortheloadoffinishingadissertationnexttoafullͲ timejob.  Last but not least I thank my father, Herbert Sigwart, who has always supportedmyeducation,inspiritandfinancially,ingoodandinbadtimes, who in my teenage years awakened my interest in politics, formed my

6  liberalstanceandcriticaleyeforissuesofsocialjustice,andwastheone whosuggestedtometostudypoliticalscienceͲ“..becauseyoualways screamattheTVwhentheyshowthenews..”  LaraSigwart,Tbilisi,October2012 

7  ii.ListofAbbreviations

 AR–ActivityReport(oftheOSCEMissiontoGeorgia)

CSCE–ConferenceforSecurityandCooperationinEurope

ERP–EconomicRehabilitationProgram

EU–EuropeanUnion

EUMM–EuropeanUnionMonitoringMission

IDP–InternallyDisplacedPerson

JCC–JointControlCommissionoftheJointPeaceKeepingForceinthe

GeorgianͲOssetianconflictzone

JPKF–JointPeaceKeepingForce

NATO–NorthAtlanticTreatyCouncil

OSCE–OrganizationforSecurityandCooperationinEurope

PACE–ParliamentaryAssemblyoftheCouncilofEuropePKF–Peace

KeepingForce

SR–SpotReport(oftheOSCEMissiontoGeorgia)

UN–UnitedNations

UNGA–UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly

US–UnitedStatesofAmerica





8  iii.Listofgraphiccontents   Graphic1 Modelofanalysis. 61  Table1 Phasesofviolence1989–2008. 66  Graphic2 Trajectoryofviolencebasedontheinvolvementof 67 typologiesofactorsofviolence.  Table2 Sequencesleadingtoassertivepolicies:Initialcondition, 94 junctureandeventwithinterviewsources.  Table3 CharacteristicsofWesternpoliciespriortoescalations. 132  Graphic3 ModelofreͲescalationofviolenceintheSouthOssetia 138 conflict1989Ͳ2008.  Table4 Mechanismsofviolenceduringthreephasespriorto 145 escalation  Table5 Differencesandcommonalitiesofmechanismsof 174 violenceinSriLanka,KashmirandSouthOssetia.   

9  iv.MapofGeorgia 



10  1. Introduction

On 8 August 2008, the conflict in South Ossetia turned into war for the secondtimesinceGeorgia’sindependencefromtheSovietUnionin1991. Whenreportsofinternationalmediaconfirmedheavyskirmishesbetween Georgian,OssetianandRussiantroopsnearSouthOssetia,aboutanhour’s drivefromGeorgia’scapitalTbilisi(Syukaeva2010,KarumidzeandWertsch 2009, BBC News Special reports), it took nearly everyone – from international and domestic observers to local residents – by surprise. However, escalation didnot occurout of the blue. For months prior the war,residentsoftheconflictͲaffectedareashadbeenqueuingupinfront ofnotariesinTskhinvalitomaketheirwills(ConciliationResources2009).  In fact, the region of South Ossetia, which is currently internationally recognized as part of Georgia’s territory, has undergone a continuous history of violence since the breakͲup of the Soviet Union. In 1989, the Ossetian and Georgian independence movements escalated the conflict betweenthetwogroupsforthefirsttime.Subsequently,theleaderships engagedinawarthatwasendedbyaGeorgianͲRussianpeaceagreement in1992 andthat leftSouthOssetiadefacto independent fromGeorgian centralrule(HRW1992,ICG2004).Meanwhile,Georgiaitselfhadgained independencefromtheSovietUnionandpreparedtoalignitselfwiththe West. Whereastheconflict in South Ossetiaseemed undercontrol, with the OSCE facilitating political talks and monitoring the ceasefire agreement, Georgia endured a civil war, a severe economic crisis, and a warinAbkhazia,whichendedin1994(CoppietersandLegvold2005).  When Georgia’s leadership changed for the third time in 2003 from Shevardnadze to the WesternͲoriented leader Saakashvili, the country finallyseemedontracktowardstability(i.a.Stewartetal.2012).However, fourmonthsafterthenewgovernmenthadtakenpower,inMay2004,the conflict in South Ossetia escalated again due to antiͲsmuggling raids. Subsequentlyanddespiteintensedomesticandinternationalefforts,the

11  situation in the deteriorated year after year through increasing violence andradicalizingrhetoric(Asmus2010,Garthon2010).Thewiderangeof effortstoresolvetheconflictincludedpeaceplanspromotedattheUnited Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe and widely supported by the United States of America (US) and European leaders of the European Union (EU) and EU member states; enormous reform efforts curbing corruption on the Georgian side and progress within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) framework; ongoing political, negotiations facilitated through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with the Russian and Ossetian sides of the South Ossetia conflict;andajointGeorgianͲOssetianeconomicrehabilitationprogram.  Nevertheless, the conflict escalated into a short but devastating war for thesecondtimeinAugust2008.Thistime,theendofthewarcemented South Ossetia’s separation from Georgia even more, with the Russian FederationrecognizingSouthOssetianindependenceandtheOSCEending its mission as a facilitator in the conflict. As of 2012, the threat of escalationisunmitigatedandthesituationintheconflictareaisasvolatile asever(RFE/RL2012).  Considering the dynamic state of the South Ossetia conflict, this dissertation attempts to propose a plausible explanation as to why the conflict recurrently escalates. In face of the extensive settlement efforts undertaken by Georgian, Ossetian, Russian and Western actors, the conflictcouldhavebeenexpectedtoberesolvedbyoneplanoranother, beitannexationbytheRussianFederation,reͲestablishmentofGeorgian central control, or international recognition of Ossetian independence. Instead, the conflict remains an impediment to Georgian statehood, a source of instability on Russia’s border, a constant worry for European leadersontheoutskirtsofEurope’spolity,andaburdenonthelivelihood ofGeorgiansandOssestiansalike. 

12  Importantly, the setting of the conflict exhibits persistent key characteristics over time: Russia and Georgia struggle over control of Georgia’s unaccomplished statehood, WesternͲGeorgian ties increasingly intensify in the postͲSoviet period, and control in the conflict remains a beacon of power to nationalist Georgian leaders. Simultaneously, readyͲ made arguments as to why the conflict persists dominate the general debate, among them Russia’s assumed political aim to regain influence overitsneighbors,Georgiannationalistambitionstoreunifytheterritory of Georgia, and a WesternͲRussian struggle for dominance in the region (Fischer2009).However,neitherthepersistentpropertiesoftheconflict noranyoftheseargumentativeperspectivessucceedinexplainingwhythe conflictrecurrentlyescalates.  Thisintroductionapproachestheresearchinterestfromtwoangles,first discussingtheSouthOssetiaconflictinthepostͲSovietcontextandthenin the global context. Thereafter, the discussion introduces the central argumentandpresentsthestudywiththeroadmapofthedissertation.  SouthOssetiainthepostͲSovietcontext

The factors contributing to the continuous reͲescalation of the South Ossetia conflict are not unique as to this particular case but pertain a varietyofconflictsinthepostͲSovietspace,includingNagornoͲKarabakh, Transnistria, and Abkhazia, the second secessionist conflict with which Georgiagrapples(foranoverviewofthecontextofsecessionistconflictsin thepostͲSovietcontext,seeforexample:DeWaal2010,King2001,Lynch 2002,Zuercher2007).Likewise,conflictsnorthoftheCaucasus,suchasin Chechnya and Circassia, or the IngushͲOssetian conflict, reveal similar patterns such as Russia’s claim to regional power spots, postͲSoviet strongmen’sandelites’griponpower,theriseofnationalismsbasedon selfͲdeterminationandterritorialclaims,or,dependingonthelegitimacy ofthesearguments,localpopulations’searchforindependencebybuilding newstates,andEurope’ssometimesvagueattemptstomanagestabilityin

13  its bordering regions (King and Menon 2010, Tishkov 1999 and 2002, Schultz2010).ManyofthenewactorsinthepostͲSovietspace,aboveallin EasternEuropeandtheSouthCaucasus,turntoeithertoRussiaortothe WesternaxisoftheEUandtheUStosecureindependence(Fischer2010, Markedonov 2008). The fact that these characteristics are pervasive throughout the postͲSoviet space points to the decisive and sustained impactoftheregionalandinternationalcontextonlocaldevelopmentin individualcountries.Policypatternsestablishedoverlongperiodsoftime canbeexpectedtocontinuouslyexertsimilareffectsondifferentsettings.  The case of Georgia and the South Ossetian conflict varies in specific aspects from similar casesinthe postͲSoviet area. A briefdiscussionwill show why outcomes are expected to be influenced considerably by a numberoffactorsthatsettheSouthOssetiancaseapartfromthepostͲ Sovietsetting.First,Georgia’srelationswithRussiaduringtheSovietUnion werecloseintermsofeconomyandculture(DeWaal2010).1Thebreakof thislink,andtheshift toadversarialpolicies,exposed conflicting linesin Georgiansocietythathadbeensuppressedfordecades.PartsofGeorgian society had benefitted from close ties with Moscow during the Soviet period, whereas other groups were persecuted or disregarded by the Soviet bureaucracy. A bitter sense of competition took hold in Georgia’s political environment.2 Therefore, issues of redistribution between formerly advantaged Soviet elites and newly emerging elites, as well as

1Georgiamarkedthebiggestshareofexportsinwine,vodka,andmineralwaterofallof theSovietrepublicsandwasthemostprestigiousvacationdestination(Derluguian2007). ManyRussianwriterswhoareasourceofRussiannationalprideresidedinGeorgiaover the years and highly valued the place.RussianͲGeorgian marriages were commonplace. The Georgian communist elite received enormous endowments over the decades to ensure loyalty, and throughout the Soviet conquest of the Caucasus from the midͲ19th century,GeorgianelitesplayedacrucialroleinsupportingRussiamilitarily. 2Thisstrugglebecameevidentinitsmostdevastatingformduringthecivilwarafter1993 whentheMkhedrioniforcesbackedpresidentShevardnadzeagainsttheRussianͲousted previouspresidentGamsakhurdia’sZviadistgroups.Thestrugglewascarriedforwardin variousforms,suchastheSovietintelligentsia’saversionfortheSaakashvilieliteorthe continuousallegationsagainstpoliticalopponentsofbeingpaidbyandactingonorders fromRussia. 14  antiͲRussian policies in the South Ossetia context, both mingled in the competinggroups’struggleforpower.  Second,thefirstGeorgianpresidentZviadGamsakhurdia’sveryfirststepto bolsterGeorgianselfͲdetermination was anattempt to push Russia from South Ossetia and bring the region back under Georgian rule. When the conflict in South Ossetia turned into war in 1990, this contributed most strongly to the fallingͲout between Georgia and Russia. Crucially for Gamsakhurdia, losing South Ossetia meant losing power, and he was subsequentlyoustedandin1992replacedbythesecondpresident,Eduard Shevardnadze.Therefore,theconflictoverSouthOssetiaholdsaparticular importance for Georgian domestic leaders, both with regard to antiͲ Russianpoliticsandintermsoflegitimizingtheirrulethroughattemptsto integratethestate.  Third, Georgians’ relations with Ossetians during the Soviet period were culturally closer thanwiththeAbkhaz minority. Ossetiancommunitiesin the oblast of South Ossetia and in villages in central Georgia were geographically closer to Georgians than Abkhazian communities, and infrastructural and social links through marriages and trade were particularly tight (HRW 1992). The history of close GeorgianͲOssetian relationscontributestothestrengthofGeorgia’sclaimontheterritoryof SouthOssetia.  Fourth,ofalltheformerSovietrepublics,Georgiahasenjoyed(orsuffered, depending on one’s point of view) the largest amount of international engagement, with the highest level of US financial support, two internationalmissions–UNandOSCE–deployedonitsterritory,andthe mostinstitutionalizedtieswithEuropeanstructureswithinEUandNATO frameworks (Fischer 2010, Cooley and Mitchell 2010b, Hanf and Nodia 2000).Georgia’sreformeffortswereawardedwithhighlevelsoffinancial, economic,militaryandpoliticalsupportfromtheinternationalcommunity.

15  International engagement included the conflict in South Ossetia (Koenig 2005,Jawad2008)butalsoandinparticularfocusedontheliberalproject ofbuildingtheGeorgianstateanddemocracy(Lazarus2010,Broers2005). Fifth, South Ossetia is, in stark contrast to other postͲSoviet secessionist territories, extremely secluded from the outside world, with little or no access to international organizations, and mostly dependent on Russian assistanceandillicittrade(USDepartmentofStateReport2011).Within this context, the dynamics of the conflict are significantly swayed by regional stakeholders’ policies and generally external influence in the dynamicsoftheconflict.  Sixth, among the former Soviet republics, Georgia experienced the most severeoutburstsofviolenceafterthesplitfromtheSovietUnion,withthe twowarsinSouthOssetiain1992and2008,oneinAbkhazia,onecivilwar, and ongoing violence in the separatist areas. Therefore, the political contextofGeorgiaandthedynamicsofviolenceinSouthOssetiaprovidea particularlysignificantsettingforthestudyofreͲescalationofviolence.  Seventh,theconflictinSouthOssetiaisnourishedconsiderablybySouth Ossetianlinkswithitsadjacent“brothernation”NorthOssetia,locatedin theRussianFederation(seeforNorthͲSouthOssetianhistoryforexample: King and Melvin 2000, Higgins and O’Reilly 2009). CrossͲborder cultural andpoliticaltiesarestrong,andappealsforunificationofNorthandSouth Ossetiainto‘GreaterAlania’recurthroughoutbothterritories.Noneofthe other ongoing postͲSovietconflicting parties, includingAbkhazia, cancall on as strong a crossͲborder diaspora as the Ossetians in South Ossetia. ClaimsofselfͲdeterminationandterritorialseparationfromGeorgiastress Ossetian links across the Caucasus and reinforce the impetus for South Ossetiansecessionism.  Eighth,bothGeorgiaandSouthOssetiabordertheRussianFederation,in contrasttoTransnistriaorNagornoͲKarabakh,whichalsoreceiveextensive

16  amountsofpoliticalandfinancialresourcesfromtheRussianFederationto bolster political rule. This not only provides Russia the opportunity to influence South Ossetia and Georgia via North Ossetian politics and territory, but also puts Moscow in a state of alert as to international activities at the southern borders. This circumstance is particularly significanttoWesternexternalactivityinGeorgia.  Inalloftheserespects,thecaseoftheSouthOssetianconflictdiffersfrom itssiblingsinthepostͲSovietcontext.Theissuesdiscussedabovehighlight the key factors that reinforce conflict dynamics, such as territorial proximity,WesternandRussianinterests,andGeorgia’shistoricallyclose Sovietties.Moreover,thesefactorsemphasizethat1)theSouth Ossetia conflictimpactslocalpowerpoliticsinpostͲSovietGeorgia,and2)Western external influence plays a key role in Georgia and the South Ossetia conflict.Aswillbeshown,thediscussionwillestablishthesetwofactorsas key components of the central argument, after discussing the South Ossetiacaseintheglobalcontext.  SouthOssetiaintheglobalcontext

The puzzle of recurring violence in South Ossetia, however, is not exclusively relevant to the postͲSoviet context. Recurring violence is an issue of wider importance beyond this particular case, as even upon superficialexaminationwecanfindexamplesofreͲescalatingconflictsin similarsettings,suchasinKashmir,SriLanka,LebanonorEastTimor(see i.a. Habibullah 2004, Shastri 2005, Cederman et al. 2010, Wimmer et al. 2010). All of these conflicts experienced recurring violence after stalematedperiodsoflowͲlevelorabsentviolence.Theyarealsosubjectto ethnicstrifeoverterritorywithintheboundaryofastateandexperience varyinglevelsofWesterninfluenceanddomesticpowerstruggle.  First, the subject of recurring violence in ongoing conflicts forms a key aspectofthestudyofthedynamicsoftheSouthOssetiaconflictandsets

17  thisstudyapartfromstudiesseekingtoexplaintheonsetofviolence.Why violencerecursisasubsetofthequestionofwhyviolenceoccursatall(see the seminal work of Kalyvas 2006). In this respect, the reͲescalation of violencediffersfromviolencethatemergesoutofpreviouslynonͲviolent contexts(Cedermanetal.2010,Eck2009,Zartman2002).Inanongoing conflict, a system of patterns and mechanisms has evolved and can be expected to have a determining and even intensifying effect on the occurrenceofevents(Cedermanetal.2010:1).Therefore,insystemsof recurring violence, these factors are held to explain reͲescalation only if examined at different points throughout the process as they can be expected 1) to be part of the explanation why violence recurs and 2) change their retraining and incentivizing effects on actions, policies and choicesovertime.  Second,externalandspecificallyWesternengagementindomesticconflict contextsisacommonphenomena.Westernagendasinsidevolatilestates largely overlap, as Western countries mostly dedicate their efforts to incentivizing democratic reform and state formation (Duffield 2002, Carothers2000,Crawford2002,Bader2010,LevitskyandWay2010).This isalsothecaseinthecontextoftheSouthOssetiaconflictandGeorgia’s politicalprocess,asEuropeanstatesandtheUShavelaunchedenormous effortstoWesternizethepoliticalsysteminGeorgiaaftertheendofthe SovietUnion(Lazarus2010,Fairbanks2012).Inthisrespect,Georgiaisone ofWesternstates’postͲColdWar‘projects’ofliberalgovernance(seefor example Anderson 2012). However, little is known about the specific effectsofWesternengagementinthecontextoflocalviolence,andeven lessisknownaboutitseffectsonreͲescalationasGoodhandandWalton (2010) show this inthe case study on Sri Lanka. Moreover, the specific policies Western actors utilize and their impact on particular events is a field largely unaddressed by social research. The following study will addresssomeoftheseissuesanddiscussthefindingsinlightoftheconflict

18  contexts in Sri Lanka and Kashmir to illustrate the general scope of the results.   Argumentofthestudy

The aboveͲlisted characteristics of the dynamics of recurring violence in South Ossetia, both in the global and the regional context, highlight the importanceofexternalWesternengagement,thedomesticpowersetting, and historical relations with Russia. However, none of these arguments provides an explanation as to why escalations occur at specific points in time and why they recur. Escalations do not necessarily coincide with agency of the Russian Federation or shifts in power. Those factors only explain that the context deteriorated in favor of escalation, but do not explainorprovidecrediblelinkswhyandhowescalationsoccurredatthe pointsintimeobserved.Therefore,thesestudiesrefrainfromaddressing the specific conditions of the South Ossetia case and link secession to exogenous factors. This view represents the dominating perspective of scholars, politicians and the public in European states and the U.S., but cloudstheviewtotheactual,powerfultriggersofviolenceintheconflict. As a result, no systematic study on violence in South Ossetia has been done. ThisdissertationwillarguethatthepoliciesofWesternexternalactorsat specific points in time repeatedly encouraged or allowed local state leadership in Georgia to shift toward more assertive policies, with the resultofescalationofviolenceinSouthOssetia.Thestudyarguesfurther thatWesternpoliciessignificantlyaffectdomesticpoweroptions.Because theSouthOssetiaconflictplacesterritorialclaims,competinggroupissues, internationalanddomesticpoliticalsupport,andfinancialassetsatstake, externalpoliciesincentivizeGeorgianstateelitestoutilizeandcomplywith externalinfluenceinthecontextoftheconflict.Theargumentholdsthat Western policies thereby trigger shifts in the behavior of Georgian state leadershipand in this waycreate the contextfor repeated shifts toward

19  escalation. On this basis, the study further contends that recurring patternsofexternalinfluencecanbeseenpriortomorethanoneinstant of escalation. These patterns are chains of actions which work through local state policies and translate into mechanisms of external influence thatenablethedynamicsofreͲescalationintheconflict.  Inthefirstchapter,thediscussionwilldealindepthwiththeempiricaland theoretical aspects of the argument, based on the review of existing argumentsastowhyviolenceinethnicconflictsreͲescalatesandempirical considerationsoftheSouthOssetiacase.  Roadmapofthedissertation

The dissertation begins with the review of existing arguments as to why violence in ethnic conflicts reͲescalates and critically discusses these in lightoftheirapplicabilitytoreͲescalationinSouthOssetia.Subsequently, thechapterjuxtaposesthecausalargumentagainstexistingexplanations andintroducestheanalyticalframeworkofthestudy.Thediscussionfirst sustainstheargumentthroughtheoreticalconsiderationsandestablishes working hypotheses to guide the empirical analysis. Then the discussion addressedthemethodologicalconsiderationsofconductingtheempirical analysis and concludes the introductory chapter with the model of analysis.  Thereafter, the second chapter covers the empirical analysis of the influenceofWesternpoliciesonthepowerpoliticsoflocalleadershipin Georgia prior to escalations in 2002, 2004 and 2008. The chapter comprisestwoparts:First,thetextgivesanoverviewofthebackgroundof political development in Georgia and the events of violence in South Ossetia between 1989 and 2008. This part reflects the local context of eventsandagencyrelatedtothethreepointsofescalationin2002,2004 and 2008. For this purpose, the text discusses, prior to the background

20  account,thedatacollectionandcasingofthethreepointsofescalationin 2002,2004and2008.  ThesecondpartofthechapterconductstheempiricalanalysisofWestern policies prior to the three points of escalation by using the method of a narrativeaccount.Here,thechapterproceedsbychronologicallydepicting theimpactofWesternpoliciesonGeorgianleadership’spowerpoliticsfor eachofthethreereͲescalationinstances.Theanalysistakesintoaccount reinforcingfactorsofconflictdynamicspriortoescalations,suchasRussian or Ossetian agency, as well as domestic constraints such as private interests,nationalistclaimsanddemandsofthepopulation.However,the focusoftheaccountisondepictingWesternpolicies’impactonGeorgian leaderships’powerconsolidationattemptsinthecontextoftheconflict,in ordertosustaintheargumentclaimingacausallinkherethatprovidesfor reͲescalation. The chapter concludes by proposing an explanatory model for violence reͲescalation between 1989 and 2008 in the South Ossetia context.  The third and final chapter discusses the theoretical and empirical applicability of the findings of the South Ossetia case, first in light of existing theories of violence in ethnic conflicts, and second in light of violenceintheSriLankaandKashmirconflicts.Thediscussionspecifically turnstotheenhancementofexistingmechanismsofviolence,pointingout their specific functions under given circumstances, and concludes with a critical reflection on the theoretical aspects of Western engagement in internalcontextsofviolence.Theconclusionsummarizesthefindingsand pointstosuggestionsforfurtherresearch.  Altogether,thestudyfindsthatthefutureoftheconflictinSouthOssetia depends largely on GeorgianͲWestern relations. The study, in a nutshell, findsthatWesternpoliciesrepeatedlytriggerescalationsinSouthOssetia by providing strong incentives for Georgian leaderships to enact powerͲ

21  consolidation policies in the context of the conflict. Therefore, Western policiesrepeatedlyprovidetheimpetustoshifttowardassertivepolicies priortoescalations,especiallybypromotingahighlevelofinconsistencyin termsofpoliticalagencyandclaimspriortoescalations.  TheWesternagendaofbothUSandEuropeanactorsgenerallyappearsto reinforcelocaldynamics.InacarefuldistinctionbetweenUSandEuropean policies,USpoliciesappeartotakeeffectparticularlythroughtheirdirect politicalimpactonpoliciesoftheGeorgianstateleadershipsinthecontext of the conflict. European agencies appear to rather take effect through institutional frameworks that then seem to shape Georgian leaderships choices, such as starting with the CSCE (Conference for Security and CooperationinEurope)frameworkattheverybeginningoftheconflictin 1992.  In this respect, the findings suggest that in order to help overcome the deepͲsetpatternsofconflictandviolenceintheGeorgian/SouthOssetian context, the European Union should decentralize competencies and strengthen its locally based institutions, namely the EU Delegation to GeorgiaandtheEUSpecialRepresentativetotheSouthCaucasus.These institutions should be given more responsibility for decisionͲmaking and policyͲformation visͲàͲvis Georgian actors. Greater efficiency and consistency of EU policies through a clear separation of competences betweenEUagencieswouldgreatlyenhancetheeffectofsuchpolicies,as 1)thesameactorswouldactatonelevelandbeaconsistentaddresseefor local concerns, and 2) agendas would not be shuffled between agencies andlocalities,therebyincreasingtheconsistencyofclaims.  ThisfirststepofprovidingreliablegroundsforEUͲGeorgiarelationswould greatlydiminishtheharminflictedbyEuropeanpolicies.Inasecondstep, with strengthened consistency, the European Union would be able to introducealegitimizedsystemofsanctionsincaseoflocalencroachments.

22  Thesystemwouldtakeeffectoneyelevelwithlocalactorsandtherefore notpunishinhindsight,butrathercapacitateapoliticalcontractincluding apriorifixedsanctionsintransparentcases. 

23  2. Analyticalframework

Thefollowingchapterservestobuildthecausalargumentofthisstudyand developananalyticalframework.Forthispurpose,thechapterpresentsa review of literature on ethnic violence and a critique thereof, thecausal argumentofthestudy,andtheoreticalandmethodologicalconsiderations regarding the key aspects of the argument in order to conduct the empiricalanalysis.Thechapterconcludeswithapresentationofthemodel ofanalysisandanaccountofexpectedoutcomes.  2.1. Literaturereview

The existing literature on ethnic violence differs mainly as to where explanationsidentifythe“culprit”towhichtheoccurrenceofviolencecan be assigned. Many arguments follow the agencyͲoriented turn from the late1990s(Beissinger2000:24),examiningthepoliticalconditionsofhow actors’interestsandsubsequentactionsleadtoviolence.Otherarguments focusratheroncontextualfactorsasdeterminingviolentoutcomes,such as regime change, resources, and external influence. However, most studiesdealingwithexplainingethnicviolenceincludebothstructuraland agencyͲbasedfeaturesandratherleantoonesideortheother(seeforthis argumentforexampleBrass1996).Evenifweidentifywhoispullingthe trigger, the “culprit” of emerging violence is not easily located if we consider the dynamics and interactions prior to outbreaks of violence. Whereastheexistingliteratureseemstowidelyacknowledgethis,thisisat the same time not reflected in the research agenda of most studies on ethnicallybasedviolence,aswillbediscussedbelow.

The following literature review discusses existing arguments aiming to explain violence in ethnic conflicts. The review identifies four core arguments:1)Democratizationandelectionsleadingtoviolence,2)Illicit economies leading to violence, 3) Grievances leading to violence, and 4) Involvement of external actors leading to violence. The discussion will review how those arguments may help to explain recurring violence in 24  ethnicallyframedcontexts.Withregardtoformingthecausalargument, thediscussionwillfocusontheexplanatoryscopeofexistingresearchfor recurringviolenceinthecaseofSouthOssetiaandinwhichrespectsthese studiesareorarenothelpful.  ExistingliteratureontheSouthOssetiaconflictandpoliticsinGeorgia

Anarrow,butwellͲinformedstrandofstudiesaccountsforeventsofthe conflictinSouthOssetia.3Anincreasingnumberofstudiesaccountsforthe SouthOssetiaconflict,however,withmoststudiesfocusingonGeorgia’s political context and including South Ossetia merely as a marker of Georgia’s transitional problems.4 By discussing the Georgian postͲSoviet andinparticularthepostͲRoseRevolutionpoliticalsystem,studieslargely focusontwojuxtaposingtopicsrelatingtotheconflict,first,stateͲbuilding anddemocratization5,aswellas,second,ethnicgroupsandnationalism.6 Thefirstfieldhighlightstheconflictasaresultoflocalandinternational effortsintherealmsofstateͲbuildinganddemocratization.StateͲbuilding policies thereafter fuel the conflictbypushingterritorialintegration(see Mitchell 2009 and Lazarus 2010). Democratization, on the other hand, might deteriorate the conflict if key reforms such as integration of minoritiesandinstitutionalrightsfail(seeHuber2004andBroers2005). Thesecondfieldstressingethnicgroupsandnationalisminrelationtothe conflictmore specifically discussescausesofSouth Ossetiansecessionin light of postͲSoviet nationalisms7, as a byͲproduct of WesternͲRussian

3 For literature encompassing different instants of the conflict in South Ossetia see for example:English2008,Birch1996and1999,ICG2004,HRW1992,Mayorov2002,Kolst and Blakkisrud 2008, Higgins and O’Reilly 2009, Saparov 2010, Welt 2010, Cheterian 2008a,alsoseeFuller2005,Peuch2005. 4ForliteraturedealingwiththeconflictinorhistoryofspecificallySouthOssetiasee:Suny 1994, Beissinger 2002, Nodia 1995, Coppieters 1996, Coppieters and Legvold 2005, Zuercher2007,HanfandNodia2000,Cornell1999,BremmerandTaras1997,Karumidze andWertsch2005,Hensel2009,Slider1997,Mitchell2004. 5Huber2004,Jones1993,Cheterian2008,Lazarus2010,Mitchell2009,Areshidze2007, Tatum2009,Welt2009,KalanadzeandOrenstein2009,Broers2005. 6SeeSuny1994,Jones2005,Zhorzholianietal.1992,Beissinger2002. 7 See for example: Birch 1996 and 1999, Shatirishvili 2003, Khinchagashvili 2006, Jones 1997,Aves1992,HRW1992. 25  competitionoverinfluenceintheregion8,orascausedandupheldthrough RussianinfluenceinGeorgia.9 Thesestudiesdonotprovideanexplanationastowhyescalationsoccurat specificpointsintimeandwhytheyrecur.Escalationsdonotnecessarily coincidewithagencyoftheRussianFederationorshiftsinpower.Those factors only explain that the context deteriorated in favor of escalation, but do not explain or provide credible links why and how escalations occurredatthepointsintimeobserved.Therefore,thesestudiesrefrain fromaddressingthespecificconditionsoftheSouthOssetiacaseandlink secession to exogenous factors. This view represents the dominating perspectiveofscholars,politiciansandthepublicinEuropeanstatesand theU.S.,butcloudstheviewtotheactual,powerfultriggersofviolencein theconflict.Asaresult,nosystematicstudyonviolenceinSouthOssetia hasbeendone. Studieson corruptionand smuggling in thecontextof the South Ossetia conflictreflectstabilityandformsofpoliticalruleinpostͲSovietGeorgia10, holding that corruption triggers escalation or protracts violence.11 These studiesprovidesolidinsightintodomesticpowerfunctionsthattriggeror alleviate violence through corruption, however neglect to systematically encompass external influence on violenceͲtriggering policies. Studies on Western influence in the South Ossetia conflict rarely move beyond specific sectors of engagement, performance of individual actors, or specificeventssuchasthe2008war12,withthenoteworthyexceptionof Lazarus’paper(Lazarus2010)thatwillhelptoframethefindings.

8 For this specific view see for example: Fischer 2009, Nichol 2008, Sabanadze 2002, GowerandTimmins2009,Haukkala2008,Sikorski2009,Loewenhardt2005,Cooleyand Mitchell2010aand2010b,Allsion2008,Blank1995. 9ForliteraturecenteringonRussia’sinfluenceonGeorgia’sdevelopmentseeforexample: Mayorov 2002, Olcott Brill et al. 1999, Cummings 2001, Gower and Timmins 2009, Haukkala2008,Sikorski2009. 10Seeforexample:Easter1996,Holmes1997,Gordadze2003,Hensell2009,Christophe 2005, ICG 2004, Vilanishvili 2005, Chkhartishvili et al. 2004, Timm 2012, Hensell 2012, Gordadze2003,Turmanidze2001,Cheterian2008b. 11 For literature on this specific argumentGeorge 2009, Baev 2003, Wennmann 2004, Kukhianidzeetal.2006;Kukhianidze2003,2004and2007. 12ForliteratureencompassingtheSouthOssetiawithintheseconfinedaspectssee:King 2008, Asmus 2010, Jones 2008, Garthon 2010, Allison 2008, Cornell and Starr 2009, CooleyandMitchell2010b,Jawad2005and2008,Nichol2009,BoundsandHendrickson 26   The dissertation will selectively draw on these studies to support the causal argument by sustaining the statements over the course of the discussion,particularlyinthetheoreticaldiscussionoftheargumentandin theempiricalchapter.Giventhatforthepurposesofthisstudythereisan insufficient scope of literature which focuses on the case, the following discussionwilldrawonmainargumentsinliteraturethatseekstoexplain ethnicviolenceandwillcriticallyreflectontheirusefulnessforstudyingreͲ escalation in South Ossetia. At the end of the discussion, the study will presentacausalargumentforreͲescalatingviolenceintheSouthOssetia conflict.

1) Argument 1: Democratization and elections leading to violence – “Playingtheethniccard”(MansfieldandSnyder2005:70)

With the Soviet Union disintegrating and postͲcolonial processes taking effect, newly formed states emerged and endeavored to establish democraticsystems.Consideredapillarofdemocracy,electionswereheld in these new entities to choose new leaders to these states. However, many of the electoral processes proved not only to lack democratic standards of being free and fair, but also coincided with outbreaks of violence.Moreover,violenceoftenseemedtooccuralongethniclines. Subsequently,alargestrandofstudiestooktoexplaintheoccurrenceof violence in these newly emerging contexts examining the link between democratizationandethnicviolence(seeaboveall:SnyderandMansfield 1995, Snyder 1993 and 2000, Brubaker 1996, Woodward 2003, Walter 1999):Isthereanylink,orarethefactorsleadingtoviolencehiddentothe eye,andnotnecessarilyrelatedtodemocratizationitself?Whoisinvolved with violence, and does this explain why violence breaks out and why violence coincides precisely with periods of elections? Does ethnicity actuallyplaythekeyroleitseeminglyhas?

2009, Huber 2004, Milcher and Slay 2005, Barbe and JohanssonͲNogue 2008, Whitman andWolff2010. 27  Largely,theargumentcanbesummarizedasfollows:Localgroupsstruggle forpowerintheemergingorderandmakeuseofinstablestructuressuch as media, resentments toward minorities, unequal distribution of resources and the like. Through these means, and often strategically, actorsstrivingforpowerembarkonmobilizingtheirconstituenciesinthe processesofelectoralcompetition,oftenbyincitingviolence.Asaresult, violenceescalates,mostlyinformofcivilstrifeinvolvingethnicriots,and fostersandsustainsinequalitiesandconflictalongethniclines.  The link between the democratization processes and violence does not becomeclearimmediately.Inthebeginningofthe1990swhennewstates started to establish democratic systems, democracy was widely held to fosterpeace(forstudiesdiscussingthisargumentsee:KaldorandVejvoda 1997,Russett1995).Buttheparadigmof“democraticpeace”tookinterͲ state relations into focus, without taking into consideration internal conditions of democratizing states that had not yet been enshrined in theory. Social research throughout the 1990s came to acknowledge that transitionalphasesofpoliticalsystemsarepredominantlycharacterizedby instability, regularly involving outbreaks of violence (see for a seminal study on this argument: Snyder 1998). Hence, the context in which democratizationstakeplaceishighlyvolatile,asnewgroupsemergeoutof thefadingorder,oftenthroughformingnewallianceswhichstrugglefor powerintheemergingorder(seeforliteraturediscussingthisargument: Snyder and Ballantine 1996; Wucherpfennig, Cederman, Metternich and Gleditsch2010:3;Gagnon1995and2007). Gaining power in democratizing orders largely hinges on securing resources which groups can make use of in political competition (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010: 106; also see: Brubaker and Laitin 1998). Here, a key resource is support of respective constituencies (see above all Wilkinson 2004: 21Ͳ22), as holding office gives authority over decisionsaboutthedistributionofresources.Innewstates,powerͲseekers tendtoformidentitiesby“playingtheethniccard”(MansfieldandSnyder

28  2005:70). Ifagroupstrivingforpowercanunifyaconstituencyoveran identityͲformingclaimunderitsbannerapowerfulresourceisatthehands of the power elite. Thereby, ethnicity functions as a groupͲconstituting force when promoted against an adversary, an ethnic “other” in competitivecontexts(seeaboveall:Anderson1991,Ignatieff1993).  Social sciences widely accept the perception of identities to be part of group membership processes (see the study of Berger and Luckmann 1987). Particularly David Laitin has specified that mechanisms of interͲ group conflict promoted by elites tie groups internally together, or respectively,thatintraͲgrouppolicingbyvilifyingcompetingelites,ethnic groupsoranyoppositionalforcesand“enemiesofthenation”(Laitin1995 in Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 433) can play a crucial role for securing support of constituencies. Hence, if leaders succeed in forging strong group identification among the respective members and if they successfully link these categories to a power bid, constituencies tend to provide support (Walter 2009: 71, also see Mansfield and Snyder 2005, Goemans 2000). Further, if leaders make use of “elite manipulation” (BallantineandSnyder1996:22)bystagingathreattothegroupthrougha secondgroupundertheclaimtobeabletoprotecttheirpeergroupfrom harm, constituencies tend to provide even stronger support (on this argument see for example: Toft 2003, Figueiredo and Weingast 1997, Brown1996).Othermanipulativemechanismsintheelectoralprocessmay bethemisrepresentationofone’sownplayersandcapacitiesinorderto gain support (Snyder 2000: 67, also see Walter 2003, Fearon 1995), and theweakbrokerageofpoliticalbargains(MansfieldandSnyder2005:67).  Therefore, the debate on democratization and elections sees ethnicity throughthecreationofidentitiesasastrategicpowerresourceforthose competingatthecoreofpowerstruggles.Ethnicityisviewedasbutone power resource, though possibly the most powerful in democratizing contexts(forthisargumentseeforexample:Kendhammer2010,Holliday

29  2008).Ifthisisthecase,howdoethnicallyframedelectoralprocesseslead to violence? Studies explore which mechanisms work through political actorsthatthenleadtomobilizationandescalation. Characteristically, actors competing for power strategically work through ethnic entrepreneurs fomenting sentiments among constituencies (Brass 1997:31,BrubakerandLaitin1998:440),forexampleintroducing“ethnic wedges” into public debate to stress the salience of ethnic issues (Wilkinson 2006: 23, Gagnon 1998), or utilize media to direct public awarenessintheirfavor(SnyderandBallantine1996:14).Politicalelites make use of institutions established during democratization, such as the electoral or constitutional system or, political parties. A wellͲstudied example of institutional manipulation of the electoral process is vote poolingthroughethnicoutbidding(onthismechanismsee:Horowitz1985: chapter8,BrubakerandLaitin1998:434)orinbidding(Wilkinson2004:4) by overstating claims of liberalism, or logrolling with minority parties (Snyder 2000: 67). Furthermore, the debate identifies mechanisms not necessarily related to ethnic framing, such as elite manipulation of constituenciesthroughwagingwarinaforeigncrisistoconsolidatepower byfomentingfearamongconstituencies(forthisargumentseeaboveall: Walter2009,MansfieldandSnyder2006,Brass1997,Wilkinson2006). Escalationsofviolenceinelectoralcompetitionofdemocratizingstatesare usually precipitated by a combination of several of these mechanisms (Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 67 and 169ff.). The debate does not systematically examine reͲescalation of violence, but juxtaposes that the potential for violence to escalate recurs with each election cycle unless gainsoftheuseofviolenceforpowerelitesbecomesobsolete.  2)Argument2:Illiciteconomiesleadingtoviolence–“Ethnicwarfareis simplyacoverstoryforcriminalviolenceandpredation”(Brubaker2004: 19)

Theargumentthatilliciteconomiesexplaintherecurrenceofviolencein ethnicconflictsemergedduringthecourseofthe1990sasaresponseto

30  the assumption that ‘ancient hatreds’ between ethnic groups lie at the heartofinterͲgroupwarfare(Kalyvas2001:102ff.,alsoseeSchlichte2006). Seminallyforthedebate,FearonandLaitinmadethecasethateconomic interestssignificantlyoutdoethnicfactorsintheirimpactonthelikelihood ofarmedconflict(FearonandLaitin2003:75,alsoseeFearonandLaitin 1998 and the instrumentalist approaches of Brubaker 2004 and Keen 1998).AnewstrandofdebatetooktodefendingthesoͲcalled“newwars” ofthe1990snottobetheresultofethnicandculturaldifferences,butto be the result of strife over newly accessible resources serving groups’ power claims (Kalyvas 2001: 103, also see Kalyvas 2008, Sinno 2008, Cunninghametal.2009andSambanis2000). Similartotheethnicityargument,theviolentpotentialofilliciteconomies isrootedintheexistenceofresourcesthatcanbeexploitedforpolitical gains. Competing groups predate resources through diasporas, state capture, and smuggling as these supply lines bypass controlled markets (for this argument see the excellent study on Sarajevo of Andreas 2008, also see Wennmann 2004, Demmers 2007). Hence, the illicit economies argument contends that it is not perceptions of social inequality arising fromethnicdiversitythattriggerconflict(Wilkinson2006:32,Cedermanet al. 2010: 92), but rather the goal of financing interͲgroup warfare of insurgent rebellion or selfͲenriching war lords (for this argument see: CollierandHoeffler2001,Weinstein2007,Walter2006). Thedebateputsaclearemphasisongroupscapturingthestateinorderto gainaccesstoresourcesthatserveasproxiesforstatepower(Fearonand Laitin2003:76,Cedermanetal.:87,alsoseeWoodward2003).Schlichte pointsoutthatgaininglegitimacyenablesagentsofviolencetogainaccess tostateresourcesthroughoffice,toaccesslocalconstituencies,ortobe entitled to use violence for these purposes (Schlichte 2009, first version 2007:7).  This argument offers various explanations for recurring violence over extendedperiodsoftime.Thecoreoftheargumentsupportsthatactors

31  persistentlyengageinviolence,becausethey1)gainmaterialassetsfrom theuseofforceand2)becomeahabitualpartofaneconomyofviolence (for this strand of debate see above all: Elwert 1997 and 1999; Jung, Schlichte and Siegelberg; Schlichte 2005; Zuercher and Koehler 2003). In markets of violence, violence becomes both a resource to extract more resourcesandacurrencythatcanbeusedbyactorstopursuetheirgoals andsimultaneouslyperpetuatestheinstablecontextnecessarytomaintain shadow economies. Weinstein points out that violence from rebel organizationstendstorecurifresourcesbecomeavailable(seeWeinstein 2007). The tipping moment of a system skipping from armed conflict into a market or an order of violence occurs when actors not only opt for violenceasalowͲcostmeanstoachievetheirgoals,butwhenmaintaining powerrequiresactorstoengageinarmedaction.Thedebateofferslargely differingexplanationsforthis:RationalchoiceͲbasedexplanationscontend thatstateelitesmayoptforresurrectionthroughwarfare(Mansfieldand Snyder 2005: 43, Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 434, also see Walter 2003). ProcessͲcenteredperspectivesarguethatviolencestartsoutasmotivated bygreed,buttransgressesovertimeintoaselfͲreinforcingmechanismof needs and thus perpetuate violence (Kalyvas and Balcell 2010: 416, also seeBerdalandMalone2000,ArnsonandZartman2005).Afewvaluable studies on international engagement in conflicts with illicit economies showhowexternalengagementtendstoaggravatethelevelorlikelihood ofviolenceandoftenmaintainspredatoryelitesinspecificcases(seefor example:Andreas2008,CockayneandLupell2009).  Critique of Arguments 1 and 2: Predatory policies of local state elites in Georgia

Inthecourseof2004,criticismofnewpresidentSaakashvili’spoliciestook hold.13ThereͲescalationoftheconflictinSouthOssetiawasheldtobea

13 For a detailed account of the background of Georgian politics in the context of the SouthOssetiaconflict,pleaseseethefirstsectionoftheempiricalanalysis,accountingfor 32  result of more assertive, nationalist policies of the new Georgian leadershipstrivingforterritorialreintegration(seeforexampleWheatley 2005).ThenewlyemergingeliteannouncedaplantoestablishGeorgiaas a viable member of the Western community, making the country fit for NATO and EU integration, and claiming to wrestle it from the paralyzing grip of the status quo imposed by Russia throughout the 1990s (Nodia 2000). Because settlement prospects were dim and there was time pressuretokeepupwiththepopulation’sandinternationalexpectations, itwasunderstoodthattheGeorgiangovernmenttookanimpatientcourse that led to hawkish policies and engaged in a cycle of armed atrocities involvingRussianandOssetianforces(seeforexample:Jones2009).After 2004,illicitpracticesdeterioratedthebalanceofinterestsintheconflict,as Georgian and Ossetian groups aimed to gain control over smuggling throughtheSouthOssetiaregion.  There is an appealing scope of explaining escalation through predatory powerpolicies:ManyobserversholdthattheGeorgiangovernmentmade the situation in the conflict worse by atrocious policies, with the aim to prove themselves in their new positions of power. In addition, it was widely held that highͲranking state actors and regional state actors attemptedtogaincontroloverillicitassetsintheconflictarea(Fuller2005, alsoseeinterviewsinchapter2).  The explanation is however flawed as it does not grasp why Georgian politics under the second president Shevardnadze were more peaceful thanunderthethirdpresidentSaakashvili’srule.Bothpresidenciesranked territorial reͲintegration and integration into Western structures high on theiragendasandbothadministrationsincludedmemberswhopersonally gained from the conflict (see for this view for example Wheatly 2005, George2009).WhenthepowershifttoSaakashvilitookplacein2004,the

keyeventsandtrajectoriesbetween1989and2009.Theaccountgivenhereservessolely to support the argument of the study and choses therefore a selective account on the basisofselectiveliterature. 33  neweliteenjoyedsimilarscopesoffinancialandpoliticalsupportfromthe international community and even far more from the population than Shevardnadze’s administration had at its peak. Why then did the stalemated conflict turn into repeated escalations over the successive years?  TheargumentcouldexplainthereͲescalationofviolenceoutofpredatory policies.ThenewSaakashvilielite,firstunderSaakashviliastheMinisterof Justicethenaspresident,attemptedtooverhaultheoldorderandtogain control over smuggling activities in the contested areas bordering South Ossetia. In this instant, the argument cannot explain why the 2008 escalation occurred:Smugglingmarginsexplicitlydependedonuncontrolledborders providedbythestatusquooftheconflictandalowͲlevelofviolence.The escalation in 2008 created disorder, which undermined smuggling activities,harmedandbusinessrelationswithpartnersontheothersideof thebargainasaccessrouteswerecloseddown.Ifgainsfromillicittrade hadbeenthemotivationforpoliciesofviolence,attemptsatreintegration oftheareawouldnothavebeenaviablepolicy.Hence,interestingaining controloverillicitassetscanatmostpartiallyexplainwhytheconflictreͲ escalatesatdifferentpointsintime.  Similarly,theargumentthatelectionsleadtoviolencedoesnotholdinthis case. The core aspect of this argument contends that violence emerges prior to or in the context of elections. Most of the studies concur that electioncyclescoincidingwithmobilizationcyclescanresultinviolence.14 What if escalation occurs without elections in temporal proximity? The recurrenceofviolenceintheSouthOssetiacaseisnotalwaysoroftennot clearlylinkedtoelectionperiods:Violenceintheconflictpeakedafterthe new postͲSoviet elite had taken power after 1989 (see the discussion in chapter2).Also,violencereͲintensifiedafterelectionswereheldin2000

14 Beissinger identifies escalation toward the end of the mobilization cycle, though in termsofmobilizationtowardsapoliticalgoal,notnecessarilyelections(Beissinger2002). 34  and escalated only after the regime change was settled in 2004. Many mechanismslinkedtoelectioncyclesmayoccurcontinuouslythroughout theprocess,buttheymightnot1)bespecificforelectioncontexts,or2) leadtoescalation,unlessunderadditionalcircumstances.

3) Argument3:Emotionsleadingtoviolence–“WhetherResentment produces violence or not depends in large part on the intensity of the emotion”(Petersen2002:256)

The debate on grievances emerging from political inequalities gained influencewhenatthestartofthe1990satrocitiesbetweenethnicgroups brokeoutacrosstheworld,suchasprominentlyintheformerYugoslavia (for this argument see for example: Kaufman 1996 and 2001; Gurr 1970 and 2000; Kaldor1999; Westley 1966). Strong emotions based on group identity were held to trigger acts of violence by group members in case their peer group is – real or perceived – subject to an outside threat, mostly from a second ethnic group.15 Ethnicity is held to be a naturally inherited type of affection to the kin or cultural group into which an individualisborn,andthusendowsespeciallystrongemotionalbondson its members (see for example: Huntington 1996, Ignatieff 1993, Westley 1966).Tothisend,notionsofethnicityareheldtointensifyemotionsand thus the likelihood of the use of violence when group members act on theiremotionstoprotectthegroup. Also,afterthedebateturnedtoseekingexplanationsforethnicviolence not in identityͲbased approaches, but in political or private interests of actorsoratleastanexusofprivategainsandpoliticalgoals(forsomeof thesecriticalviewssee:Kalyvas2001;CollierandHoeffler2001;Korf2005; Regan and Norton 2005), studies often have drawn on emotionͲbased explanations (Jeffrey 2007, Dion 1996). Proponents of this approach suggest that grievances take hold over time if volatile interͲgroup relationships are protracted through continuous – real or perceived –

15 Formsofviolence such as domestic violence,gangviolence, street criminalitycan all dependongroupidentification,butarenotrelevantforcontextsofnationalistviolence. 35  subjugation of one group, for instance through unequal distribution of power or goods or direct acts of physical violence (see for example: Petersen2002,Wood2003).Thelongerandthemoregravelyonegroup sees itself oppressed by another, the higher the likelihood of violence. ‘Ancienthatreds’betweengroups,basedonnarrativesoftendatingback centuries, motivate patterns of grievances that then lead to acts of violence.  Thereby, the argument focuses on social inequalities, often within the boundariesofastatethatcauseviolenceinthelongrun.In manycases those–perceivedorreal–inequalitiesareheldtofollowethniclines,and can be reinforced through strategic state policies. Wucherpfennig et al. point out that “Ethnicity can indeed prolong civil wars. This effect is entirely driven by conflicts with stateͲinduced grievances, in cases of systematicallyexcludingspecificethnicgroupsfromaccesstostatepower” (Wucherpfennig et al. 2010: 3). Institutional approaches hold that institutions, often used by elites, may trigger or prevent violence dependingontheirscopeofsocialequalitypromotionandpreventionof grievances(Wilkinson2006:203).  Violenceisheldtobreakoutwhen,both,emotionsintensifytothetipping point and when context provides the opportunity (Petersen 2002: 18). Therefore, violence is more likely to occur when the social context changes,suchaswhensocialhierarchyisaltered,newresourcesbecome available,orauthorityatthesocialcenterweakens(ibid.:40).Proponents ofthegrievanceargumentparticularlypointtotheendoftheinternational system during the Cold War as having given rise to interͲgroup conflicts within new states through the absence of a sovereign. The Security Dilemmaargumentholdsthatfeartriggersarmedgroupconflict(forthis argument see above all: Figueiredo and Weingast 1997). Strands of this approach points to the use of ethnicity by political elites, which lead to assumptions about the adversary group’s behavior which then has an

36  effectontheprocessesofviolence(seeforexample:Fearon1995,Posen 1993,Mearsheimer1990,HarffandGurr1994,Walter2003).Primordialist approaches hold that the friction ensuing from the erosion of the traditionalstructureofsocialrelationshipsresultsininterͲgroupstruggles overselfͲdeterminationorselfͲpreservation(Isaacs1975).  Similarto the illicit economy argument, once grievanceͲinduced violence hasstarteditintroducesadeterministicselfͲreinforcingcycleofatrocities based on revenge. The longer the process drags on, the higher the likelihood of an order of violence to take hold: the more incidents of casualties, inequalities and sufferings amass and again turn into grievances,themorethisenforcesgroupidentity,incentivesfortheuseof violenceandforreͲescalation.  CritiqueofArgument3:Russia’sclaimofregionaldominance

Russia’s role in the Caucasus has been contested latest since resistance againstRussianͲledrulestartednorthandsouthoftheGreaterCaucasusin the18thcentury.16ThecommonexplanationforrecurringviolenceinSouth Ossetia centers on Russian historical influence fuelling ethnic tensions in theCaucasus(Popescu2007:6,alsoseeMarkedonov2008,Tishkov2002, Blank 1995). Russia holds a tight political, economic and occasionally militarygripontheformerSovietrepublics(seeforexample:Fischer2010) as it sees its influence threatened by Westernizing efforts in its near abroad.TomaintaininfluenceoverGeorgia’scourse,Russiasupportsthe breakaway entities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a divideͲandͲrule strategy supporting titular nations over others. Russia’s meddling, according to this argument, destabilizes the context, or prevents it from stabilizing in the first place, to the extent that reͲescalation of violence becameimminent(Nichol2008:9and27).

16Theabovecritiqueoftheelectionandilliciteconomyargumentshasalreadyraisedthe critiqueofthegrievanceargument,seminallyinthedebatesbetweenCollierandHoeffler andFearonandLaitin.Itshallnotberepeatedhereasthisdiscussionaimsattheuseof thegrievanceargumentinlightofreͲescalationinSouthOssetia. 37  Thehistoricallegaciesofgrievancesexperiencedanimportantshiftafter the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Soviet institutions fuelled competition among titular nations in the Caucasus, and led to territorial claims based on selfͲdetermination after the patronage of Moscow had ended(seeforexample:DeWaal2010,Shatirishvili2009).Tothisend,the Soviet period laid the foundations for interͲgroup relations that were deeplyentrenchedwithrealandperceivedinequalities.TheSouthOssetia conflict entails a compelling history of grievances of Georgians and Ossetians, including narratives of the right to live in a certain place, unequal rights during the Soviet period and beyond, extend to ethnic cleansingandaccountsofmutualatrocities(forseminalstudiessee:Birch 1996and1999).  The debate offers an explanation of how emotions that turn into grievancesoverextendedperiodsoftimecanthencauseviolence.Inthis respect, Jeffrey brings up for debate the representative argument that “reescalationofconflictandfailureofpostͲsettlementdemocratizationare morelikelywhenthereareincompatiblenationalidentities”(Jeffrey2007: 679). However, the above discussed widespread argument of assertive Russiatriggeringdomesticandexternalconditionsof(reͲ)escalationdoes not provide an explanation as to why escalations occur at those specific pointsintimeandwhytheyrecur.Russian,GeorgianandOssetianpolicies have been assertive ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The potential, the will and the attitude to use force in the context of the conflictexistedatallpointsintimeafter1989amongallthestakeholders. Asarguedabove,escalationsalsodonotnecessarilycoincidewithshiftsin powerwhichmightpointtogrievancesasacause:Georgianrelationswith RussiadeterioratedafterRussianpresidentPutincameintopowerin2000 andagainaftertheregimechangeinGeorgiain2004.Thisdoesnotexplain why the conflict never escalated after changes in power among stakeholdersbetween1992and2002.Inaddition,thisonlyexplainsthat the context deteriorated in favor of escalation, but does not explain or

38  providecrediblelinkswhyandhowescalationsoccurredatthepointsin timeobserved.  Yetanotherweaknessshowsinthegrievanceargumentwhenlookingat SouthOssetiainitsregionalcontext:HistoricallegaciesofRussianregional dominance relate to all regional conflicts such as in NagornoͲKarabakh, TransnistriaandAbkhazia.Howeveraspointedoutintheintroduction,the SouthOssetiaconflictprovestobethemostdynamicandintenseamong its siblings and the grievance argument does not help explain how this came about. Therefore, the discussion turns to the external influence of international actors as a possible explanation for reͲescalation in South Ossetia.

4) Argument 4: Involvement of external actors leading to violence – “TheWestdidnotdoenough”(Asmus2010)

The impact of external influence on domestic events is a rarely studied subject.TheoriesofexternalinfluenceinthepostͲColdwarperioddiscuss rapiddiversificationofforeignrelationsofpostͲSovietsuccessorstateafter they lose Moscow as their external patron (for this approach see for example:SteinandLobell1997,WallensteenandAxell1993,Bymanetal. 2001).Withregardtoexternalengagementininternalarmedconflictsin thepostͲSovietareaandbeyond,studiesdealwithformsofinfluencesuch as outside military intervention (see for example Zuercher 2007, Markedonov 2008), international assistance through financing or humanitarian aid (Crawford 1997 and 2000), peaceͲkeeping missions (Koenig 2005, Jawad 2005), diaspora support (Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch 2009), and crossͲborder relations of ethnic communities (King andMenon2010,Schultz2010,CarmentandJames1995,Saideman1998).  RepresentativeliteratureperceivesthepostͲcommunistspaceasasphere of interest for the West and Russia (for example see: Blank 1995, Markedonov 2008). The debates differ in which forms of influence they 39  assign to both the West and Russia in pursuing their political goals. Western agency is said to rely on conditionality policy that ties the implementationofstabilityͲenhancingmeasurestopolitical,economicand financial support for state elites (Sasse 2008, Levitsky and Way 2007, Schimmelfennig2005,Crawford2000,MilcherandSlay2005).TheUSand EU’sfocustheirglobaleffortsonastateͲbuildingagenda(Jung,Schlichte and Siegelberg 2003; Schlichte 2005) through which integration into WesternstructuressuchasNATOorEUdependsonterritorialintegration. AlthoughWesternpoliciesoftheU.S.,EUandindividualEUmemberstates differatgreatlength,Westernconditionalpolicyinthefieldofterritorial integration largely focuses on enhancing stability through strengthening centralstatepower.  Altogether, the scope of external impact on internal violence is not systematicallyexploredbeyond,either,specificformsofactionoragendas ofinterests,orstructuralinfluenceondomesticpolitics(Carment,James andTaydas2009:72).InternationalRelationstheorywasthefirststrandof debate to theoretically grasp the role of external influence in changing domestic landscapes (see above all: Putnam 1990, Gourevitch 1978, Suhrke and Noble 1977). Studies focus on the proximity of military competitionordemocraticstatesthatcanresultindiffusionofnormsand values through ‘spill over’ or ‘contagion’ effects enhancing trends in transitional states (Jacoby 2006, Snyder 2000: 74 and 341 ff., also see: Checkel1999,GleditschandWard2006,Whitehead1996). However,thesestudiesfocusonstructuralexternalinfluenceondomestic politicalconditionsandremainvagueintermsoftheirfunction(Carment, James and Taydas 2009: 70; also see: Heraclides 1991; Zartman 1992; Saideman1997;KeohaneandMilner1996)orprovideweakexplanations for the influence of external policies on internal conflicts as opposed to triggeringinterͲstatestrife(Carment,JamesandTaydas2009:72).Inthis respect, a large strand of single case studies exists that explore specific characteristicsofviolencethroughexternalandinternalactorsatthesame

40  asacknowledgingcommonalitiesbetweenconflictcontextsacrossregions (Sorli, Gleditsch and Strand 2005; Korf 2005; Sanchez R. 2006; Bohara, Mitchell and Nepal 2006). However, they remain confined in their conclusions to individual contexts, or respectively explore how external Western influence affects failed democratization and authoritarian regimes, but do not systematically focus on the effects of external engagement on the processes of violence (for example see: Crawford 2005, Olsen 1998, Presnall 2009, Lewis 1996). Therefore, even when employinganexplorativeapproach,studiesrefrainfromgeneralizingtheir findings across cases (Sambanis 2004b, Lawson 2006: 409). Here, these studies mostly confine themselves to testing or confirming existing hypotheses (i.a. Senechal de la Roche 2001, Lawson 2006, Beissinger 2009).  CritiqueofArgument4:PoliciesofWesternnegligence

AstothequestionofexternalinfluenceintheSouthOssetiaconflict,there are usually two sets of opposing opinions. The first holds that external engagement does too little to end conflict, the second that it does too much,bothheldbylocalandinternationalobservers.Thefirstperspective describesrecurringviolenceintheconflictasaresultofthelackofinterest oftheWesterninternationalcommunity(aboveallsee:Asmus2010,Nodia 2004), holding that if Western actors had put more and different effort intoresolvingtheconflict,thesituationcouldhaveremainedcalmandthe conflictcouldhavebeensettledafterthefirstwarin1992.Nonetheless, internationalandlocalactorsengagedintheconflictonanintenselevelall through the period since 1992, through negotiations, monitoring the peaceͲkeeping force, and initiating conflictͲrelated institutions and roadmaps. The second perspective criticizes overly intense engagement aiming at realizing geopolitical interests by Russia and the U.S. with the result of fuelling the conflict in South Ossetia (for this view see: MacFarlane1999,CornellandStarr2009).Thereby,theterritoryofSouth Ossetia serves as a proxy for underlying superpower interests of

41  hegemonic claims to the Caucasus region. In addition, the secessionist entities enjoyed external support through Russia and bordering entities, suchasNorthOssetiasupportingSouthOssetia(seethestudiesofSchultz 2010aswellasKingandMenon2010).However,similartothegrievance argument,theseattitudesdonotexplainwhydynamicsinSouthOssetia differfromAbkhaziaorotherpostͲSovietconflictswhichallaresubjectto theseinterests.  Existing studies largely focus on the likelihood of outcomes through specific factors, as well across cases, and not on particular policies initiatingprocessesinarecurringmanner(seeaboveall:Crawford2000). Asa result,themechanisms thesestudies offer remain highly opaquein theirfunctioning,offeringdiffusecausallinksbetweenexternalactorsand violent outcomes (Bader 2010: 22). How specifically external influence plays out in different arenas to lay open causal links should be systematically embraced. Studies usually do not focus on external engagementassuch,butonindividualeventssuchasonegrouprisingto poweroradecisiontogotowar,andalsodonotembracewhypatterns recur persistently. The studies of Levitsky and Way (2010), Bader (2010) and Goodhand and Walton (2009) for the Sri Lanka case form welcome exceptions.LevitskyandWayfocusonmechanismsofinfluenceofexternal policies that are used by local state elites in transitional states in their favor. Levitsky andWay as well as Bader propose to specifically conduct analysesatthelevelofleadershipagencyandcarveoutrepetitivepatterns ofpoliciesatthelocallevel.Thediscussionoffindingswilldrawonthese studiestoframethefindingsoftheSouthOssetiacase.  Conclusionofthecritiqueofexistingarguments

The arguments in the existing literature give a fair picture of the predominant reasoning on escalations in ethnically framed, internal conflicts. However, they are not able to adequately address why the conflict in South Ossetia reͲescalated at those points in time and

42  repeatedlyescalates.Mostimportantly,theargumentsconfinethemselves to analyzing the political factors, and treat violence as an outcome of conflict,butnotasasubjectofstudy.Inthesamevein,argumentsloose themselvesatamerelysituationalorpsychologicallevel,holdingthatthe conflict escalated because individuals acted irrationally. Also, arguments crumble at the macro level holding powers responsible with barely a traceable connection to events on the ground, relating to decisions that aremadeinfarͲawayplaces.  Thecritiqueoftheseandotherrecentstudiesonethnicviolencebegsfor inclusionofthestudyofdynamicsofethnicconflictsinthegeneralstudy of ethnic violence (for studies raising this critique see for example: Eck 2009, Zartman 2004 and 2007, Kalyvas 2006, Balcell and Kalyvas 2010, Walter 2003 and 2009, Schlichte 2005) and also will enhance existing theorieswithgeneralizedhypothesesaboutthetriggersofethnicviolence. This assessment is supported by the critique of two recent and seminal papersbyCedermanetal.(2010)andWucherpfenningetal.(2010):The debatesaboutethnicviolenceneglecttoaccountforhistoricalpatternsof ethnicconflictleadingtoviolenceandprotractingarmedconflict(alsosee Cedermanetal.2010:97,WimmerandMin2006).Moststudiesfocuson singularevents,isolatedorexogenousfactorsordecisionstaken,orvery specific forms of violence. Accordingly, Capoccia and Keleman stress the importanceoflongitudinalcomparisonoftwoormoreeventswithinthe sameunitofanalysis(CapocciaandKelemen2007:360). As a result, the seemingly differently vectored explanations for Western behavior in the South Ossetia context all rely on a hypothetically stable relationship between the explanatory factors and their impact on processesofviolence.Thismeans,1)thecourseofeventsisexpectedto changeonlywhenthesefactorschange(andnotiftheyinteractdifferently inthecourseoftheprocess)and2)thechangeinimpactofthesefactorsis not assumed to happen outside the system, but not through their interactionwitheachotherortheprocessofviolence.

43  Thediscussionrevealsthatrecurringviolenceinstalematedconflictsisa veryrarelystudiedsubjectandrequirestheinputofaninͲdepthempirical inquiry into political agency. Also very little research has been done on howinternationalinfluenceaffectsdynamicsofviolence,consideringthe key role of external actors in internal conflicts over extended periods of time. The extent to which external policies frame local developments in the context of the South Ossetia conflict since at least 1991, suggests a continuousandsignificantimpact.  Altogether,theseargumentsneglectordonotaccountfor1)theeffectsof internationalengagement,2)theinteractionofexternalWesternpolicies withGeorgianstateagency,and3)specificcharacteristicsthatapplytothe conflict in South Ossetia, such as continuous reͲescalation in a highly intense setting. The larger bulk of studies on violence in stalemated conflictsdoesnotembracethesecharacteristicsoftheSouthOssetiacase. Inthisrespect,thedebateisnotclearaboutwhenviolencehappensand how shifts in dynamics come about. Based on these considerations, the studywillpresentacausalargument.  2.2. Theargument

Altogether, the literature offers a rich debate on factors, causal chains, history, and context influencingviolenceinethnic conflicts.Nonetheless, the previous discussion tried to show why those arguments do not adequatelyaddressthedynamicsoftheSouthOssetiaconflict.Therefore, the study presents its own argument pertaining to why violence in the SouthOssetiaconflictreͲescalates.  Thedissertationarguesthatpoliciesofexternalactorsatspecificpointsin time provided for behavior of local state elites in Georgia to shift to assertive policies with the result of escalation. External policies significantly affect domestic power options as the South Ossetia conflict putsterritorialclaims,competinggroupissues,internationalanddomestic

44  political support and financial assets at stake. Thereby, external policies incentivize Georgian state elites to utilize and to comply with external influence in the context of the conflict. The argument holds that this schemerepeatedlyprovidesforescalationthroughouttheprocess.Onthis basis,thestudyfurthercontendsthatpatternsofexternalinfluenceshow prior to escalations. These patterns are chains of actions which work through local state policies and translate into mechanisms of external influencethatenabledynamicsofreͲescalationintheconflict.  The purpose of the following study is to plausibly sustain the argument. Therefore, I would like to conclude the presentation of the argument basedonanextensiveliteraturereviewanditscritiqueandintroducethe methodological part that informs the analytical framework of the study. Theanalyticalframeworkwillpresentworkinghypothesesandmethodsto implementthesubsequentempiricalanalysis.  2.3. Analyticalframework

Thefollowingsectionpresentstheanalyticalframeworkofthestudy.First, I will discuss and present the working hypotheses that derive from the causal argument. Further, I will present a theoretical foundation for the causallinkthattiesagencyrecurrentlytoitsviolentoutcome.Thisincludes a discussion of identifying shifts in dynamics, defining the causal link, locating the causal link, presenting analytical tools and, finally, ascribing meaningtocausallinksthroughtheconceptofsocialmechanismsthatwill help conducting the empirical analysis. The section concludes with the presentationoftheanalyticalframework.  

45  a) Keyaspectsoftheargumentandworkinghypotheses

ViolenceintheSouthOssetiaconflict

The debate on armed conflict explores the issue from various analytical angles, such as why violence occurs in a particular location, but not in another(Wilkinson2004:20and58,alsosee:Kalyvas2006),whyviolence occurswithinthesameconflictataparticularpointintimeandnotatan earlier or later point in the process (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 432, Beissinger 1998: 39, Wilkinson 2004: 26), why violence occurs in some cases, but not in others (Figueiredo and Weingast 1997: 1, also see: Weinstein2007,FearonandLaitin1996),whysomegroupsorindividuals participateinviolencewhileothersdonot(forthislargestrandofdebate seeforexample:Wucherpfennigetal.2010:4,Kalyvas2006,Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, Walter 2006, Brubaker and Laitin 1998), intensification of armed conflict in ethnic contexts (BenͲYehuda and MishaliͲRam 2003; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick 1997; Eberwein 1981; Fearon 1994; Morgan 1994; Reed2000;Senese1997),andwhyinparticularconflictsparticularforms ofviolenceoccur(Beissinger1998:8,alsosee:FearonandLaitin1996). Fundamentally, this study examines violence, not war or conflict. The violence that is subject to the study is carried out by state actors and occurs in the context of armed interͲgroup conflict. The debate likes to distinguish between types of warfare, and the more recent discussions center on organized violence often within state boundaries including at leastonenonͲstateparty(Kalyvas2001:102Ͳ103,alsosee:Sambanis2000 and 2004, Kaldor 1999). Older definitions focus on conventional wars involving state actors engaging in armed action across international borders (see for example: Holsti 1996, Kaldor 1999). In addition, many studiesassumeviolencetobealinearpartoftheprocessesofanykindof warfare: Onceviolencehasstarted, dynamicsprogress via intensification toescalationuntilviolencedecreases.Moreover,moststudiesencompass only a singlecycle of escalation (for thiscritiquesee: Eck 2009, Zartman 2007). 46  However, this definition excludes three important features worthy of study: First, it excludes violent incidents that can trigger (re)escalation prior to war or other forms of escalations of violence. These categories omit characteristics of violence such as intensity of violence, duration of wars,andeffectsofviolenceatparticularpointsintime.Second,themore recentdefinitionofwarswithinboundariesofthestateas‘internal’limits thestudyofexternaldimensionsofinternalwars.Third,the‘old’definition of conventional war omits the politics of domestic power consolidation leadingtoviolence. Thatsaid,violenceseemstobelikelytooccurundercertaincircumstances. As discussed above, recurring violence is a powerful characteristic of ethnonationalistconflictsand,conversely,ethnonationalistcontextsmake for protracted, highly dynamic and intense contexts for violence. The debate is most vivid in the attempts at making a legitimate distinction betweenethnicandnonͲethnicwars.Ifweassumeethnicitynotaslocated withinindividuals,butwithinissuesoverwhichactorsstruggle(aboveall see:Brubaker2004and2009),wecancometoanempiricaldefinitionof ethnic conflict: “For a conflict to be classified as ethnic, armed organizationsmustbothexplicitlypursueethnonationalistaimsandrecruit fightersandforgealliancesonthebasisofethnicaffiliations.”(Cederman etal.2010:101).Asaresult,thisstudyseesethnicitynotasacharacteristic that determines dynamics and motivations, but as a claim that is instrumentalizedbyactorstopursuetheirprivateandpoliticalgoalsand that, thus, alters the dynamics of a conflict toward escalation through agencywiththeaimofpowerconsolidation.Therefore,thisstudychooses toemploythetermethnicallyframedconflicts.  Therefore, ethnically framed conflicts exhibit characteristics that other typesofarmedstrugglesdonotexhibit:1)Ethnicclaimscanprolongcivil wars if the state induces grievances by systematically excluding ethnic groupsfromaccesstopower(Wucherpfennigetal.2010:3,Cedermanet al.2010:87),2)Ethnonationalistclaimsplayapervasiveroleinchangein

47  motivationsofactorsintheprocessofaconflictandcanleadtoshiftsin dynamics(seetheseminalstudyofKalyvas2008),3)Violenceinethnically framedconflictsismoreintenseasvariousformsofviolencecanconcur, includingriots,looting,andgenocide,andfightersarefoundtobemore committed(seeaboveall:Eck2009),4)Theprocessofviolenceinethnic conflicts is dynamic and not linear: As ethnic claims can be deliberately manipulated by political elites, historical pathͲdependencies sustain the spoilers of violence that act as sleeper agents continuously enabling breakouts of violence (Cederman et al. 2010: 97, also see: Snyder and Ballentine1996,WimmerandMin2006).  To this end, the study conceives of the emergence of violence 1) as an indicator in the process leading to reͲescalation, 2) as including triggers externalandinternaltostateboundaries,and3)asrelevanttoexplaining reͲescalation independent from whether violence takes place as an incidentofwar,civiluprising,insurgencyetc.Further,thisstudycenterson reͲescalation of violence, and accordingly assumes violence to recur, becausethecausesofviolenceprotractandprolonglegaciesthatsustain thepermanentpossibilityofreͲescalation,takingeffectoverperiodsoflow intensity or absence of violence (Wucherpfennig et al. 2010: 5). To conclude, the study centers on violence carried out by state actors in ethnically framed, reͲescalating contexts of armed conflict within the boundariesofastate.  TheGeorgianstateanditsleaderships

Two recent and seminal papers by Cederman et al. (2010) and Wucherpfenningetal.(2010)complainthatthedebateonethnicviolence largely neglects the role of state actors in fuelling ethnic violence both strategicallyandindirectly(Cedermanetal.2010:88,Wucherpfenninget al. 2010: 4; also see: Brass 1991, Wimmer 2002).Thisstudy closely links thenotionofviolenceandthepropertyofthestateanditsagentsstriving toconsolidatepower.Secessionistviolenceoftenoccursinthecontextsof

48  ethnicconflictandforstateactors,territorybecomesaresourcebeyond itsnominaleconomicorstrategicvalue(Walter2006:313).

ParticularlyinthecontextsofstateformationasinthepostͲSovietcontext ofGeorgia,territoryisthecentralclaimtopower.Inthisrespect,Schlichte proposes the concept of empirical statehood to analytically grasp processesinthenewlyformingstatesofthe1990s.Schlichteappliesthe conceptof“empiricalstateness”inordertoanalyticallygraspandidentify practices emerging from purposeful action in violenceͲprone state formation processes (Schlichte 1998: 107 ff., also see Migdal 1988). This study agrees with Schlichte’s definition of the state as “a field of power whosebordersarefixedalsobymeansviolence,andwhosedynamic(…)is informedbythepracticesofsocialactors”(Schlichte2005:106).  DuringthebreakupoftheSovietUnion,secessionistclaimssuchasthose over the territory of South Ossetia came to pose a direct threat to the authorityofthecentralstateinGeorgia(e.g.Nodia1989and2000).The claimtotheGeorgianstateshowedinseveralinstances:First,itshowed theimportanceofcontrolovertheterritory.ForthenewGeorgianstate elite,controloftheterritoryactedasamarkerofGeorgianindependence fromRussiandomination;forSouthOssetianleaderstheterritoryenabled claims of political selfͲdetermination visͲaͲvis Georgian rule; for Russian actors control over the territory’s status equaled influence over the independentGeorgianstateandaholdonWesterninfluenceintheregion; andWesternactorssawtheterritorialreintegrationofGeorgiaasapriority onthewaytostatehood. In Georgia, each of the three postͲindependence presidents put the territorial reͲintegration of South Ossetia at the top of his agenda in an attempttolegitimizerule.ThethreepostͲindependencegovernmentsall relied on an internal circle, a leadership or elite within the executive, of handͲpicked personalities at the core of presidential power (Christophe 2005, draft version 2003: 74ff.). The key ministries occupied by the

49  leadership were in all three presidencies specifically tasked to attend to operations in the conflict area, negotiations with Russia or Western engagement(Sigwart2006). Second, state actors had the most effective influence over the conflict’s dynamics and outcomes. Formal entitlement via state institutions gave military and police actors varying degrees of legitimacy. International actors endowed far more legitimacy to official actors than to the mercenaries, militias, political representatives or other forces of the separatistleaderships.Inaddition,materialandsymbolicresourcesofthe stateenabledtheefficiencyofstateagency.17 Third, control over the territory of and around South Ossetia gave economic advantages to the state and its actors. In Georgia as in other postͲcommunistcountriesthemainsourceofstateincome,togetherwith externallyͲdrivenfinancingwereshadoweconomies(seeGordadze2003). Until 2004, smuggling was the largest source of income of the South Ossetian leadership and a big asset of Shevardnadze’s state employees (Christophe 2005, draft version 2003: 85Ͳ87; also see: Kuhkianidze et al. 2004, George 2009). International funding relates in large scales to the conflict,suchasrehabilitationpayments,paymentsfordisplacementsand financingthroughdevelopmentassistanceprojects.Theseassetsallwent throughthehandsofstateactors,oftentotheirpersonalgain. Fourth, the conflictgave the Georgian state internationalleverage. PostͲ SovietGeorgiacameunderpressuretoreintegrateterritoriallyinorderto formaWesternͲstylestate.However,Georgiareceivedenormousamounts of attention and financial incentives as a result of this flaw. Western engagementandsupportcametobefundamentallylinkedtotheexistence ofsecessionistconflictinGeorgia. 

17 The aftermath of the 2008 war provided a salient example of yhis inadvertent legitimizationofstateactionsataninternationallevel:BothRussianandGeorgianactions were backed by claims of their statehood, as Russia asserted defending its citizens (thoughondeͲjureforeignterritory),andGeorgiaarguedselfͲdefenseagainstanexternal threattoitssovereignty(Tagliavinireport2009). 50  As a result, the state, as a normative factor and proͲactive organization, relates in an intense manner to the South Ossetia conflict: Territory and ethnicclaimsservedashingecategoriesofselfͲdeterminationinGeorgian recent history, new leaders put the conflict at the top of their domestic and international agendas, and stateͲrelated resources were most effective for gaining control in the conflict and for private gains through the conflict. Therefore, state leaderships as elites within the executive provide the analytical surface where multiple agencies tie together and spinoffintothedynamicsthataresubjectofthestudy.  ExternalinfluenceintheSouthOssetiacontext

Prior to 1991, Georgia had been embedded into the Soviet order which entailed a rigid dependence of domestic policy on Moscow’s patronage (seeSuny1994,DeWaal2010).Afterindependence,rapiddiversification offoreignrelationsofpostͲSovietsuccessorstatessetin(onthisprocess see:SteinandLobell1997,WallensteenandAxell1993).Thisradicalshift to an internationalized agenda had important implications for Georgia’s domestic context. First, the external context of Georgia diversified on various levels. The highly bureaucratized Georgian Soviet Republic operatingonfamilyrelationsandotherpatrimonialstructuresturnedinto a privatizing state with developing foreign relations and international activityontheground.Hence,thefieldinwhichGeorgianpoliticsunfolded heterogenized to an enormous extent, offering new partnerships and alliancesforlocalelites.

Second, after the shift in Georgia’s external context, internal and to a lesserextentexternalpatronagepersisted.Whereastheexternalandthe internalpatronshadchanged,thepatrimonialstructuresthathadprovided for power resources continued to determine domestic politics (on these continuities see above all: Christophe 2001 and 2005, Stefes 2008, ZuercherandKoehler2004).WesternsupportofasingleWesternͲleaning elite pushed Georgian political groups to unify into one ruling power 51  apparatus,whichpotentiallykeptintactlimitedpatronagecircles(seethe commentaryofMuskhelishvili2012).18 Third,Westernengagementfocusedonstrengtheningthestate.Western organizations demanded measures to stabilize the rule of law through crackingdownoncorruptionandsmuggling.Internationalfundsweretied to providing incentives for domestic state actors to implement WesternͲ style reforms. As a result, the state was massively boosted from the outsidetobecomeafirmauthorityoverothersocietalgroupswithinthe designatedboundariesofthestate.19  Altogether,externalpoliciesappeartohavetovaryingdegreessustained, directed and created incentives for power consolidation of local state agency.Externalactorsenabledlocalelitestoutilizeresourcesprovidedby them such as funds, political support and outside leverage. As the empiricalanalysiswillshow,theseintensifyingtiescreatedacomplexfield ofinteractioninthecontextoftheSouthOssetiaconflict.Inthisrespect,it is important to reiterate that the argument of the study holds Russian influence, first, not to be fully external to the context as the Russian FederationandRussianactorsareimmediatestakeholdersintheconflict and, second, to be a key component of the escalation process in reinforcingconflictdynamics.Particularly,aswillbeshown,theinteraction of Russian and Western state actors at the international level of conflict reinforceslocalescalationdynamics.However,asarguedearlier,changein local behavior is held to be induced by Western policies. Therefore, the empiricalanalysiswillaccountforthereinforcingeffectofRussianpolicies

18Atleastuntil2004Russiaremainedthelargesttradepartnerandeconomicfactor in GeorgiaafterthebreakͲdownoftheSovietUnion.AftertheGeorgianͲRussianfalloutin 2004, the import volume shifted to Turkey, also as a result of the Russian blockade of Georgian import goods. Remittances of the Georgian diaspora in Russia remain a large economicfactorinGeorgia.However,althoughstronglyinfluencedbystatepolitics,trade relationsbetweenthetwostatesbuildonlyaminorpartoftheeconomicactivityafter 2004,whereasprivatebusinessrelations,alsointhebankingsector,buildthemajorpart (EBRDTransitionreports). 19 Western support also massively targeted democratizing projects of the nonͲ governmentalsectorinGeorgia(seeforexample:Angley2010,Wheatley2005). 52  at various levels in the context of determining WesternͲdomestic interaction.  Against these considerations, the study reads external influence in two ways: On the one hand, external engagement relates to actors who are closely involved in the conflict’s affairs, but are not immediate stakeholdersintheconflictwithterritorialproperties,whichareWestern actors such as the EU, US, OSCE, UN, and NATO. On the other hand, externalactorsarethoseoutsidethejurisdictionoftheGeorgianstate,but whosepoliciessignificantlyinfluenceonthelocalpowercontext.Thestudy therefore employs a unified definition of Western external actors. Bader assiststhisapproach in hisstudy of external party assistanceinGeorgia: "The distinction between U.S. and European [actors] masks striking similarities in approaches and conceptual underpinnings. (…) [P]rograms, whetherbyU.S.orbyEuropeanactors,areshapedbyasharedunderlying normaboutthetypeoforganizationthatrecipient[s](…)transforminto." (Bader 2010: 20). In this respect, the study encompasses boundaries of individual actors and addresses the agenda of “Western policies” as a commongroundregardingstatebuildingandconflictmanagementissues. Therefore, the study puts forward that external influence of WesternactorsseemstohaveplayedadecisiveroleinthereͲescalationof violence.Whereaslocalstakeholders have, asargued above, persistently pursued assertive policies, this does not offer a satisfying explanation of reͲescalation.Theanalysis,therefore,lendsitselftoexaminingthespecific effectsofWesternpoliciesincontextsofreͲescalationinSouthOssetia.  The dissertation argues that repeated escalation is brought about by specificmechanismsofexternalpoliciesworkingthroughdomesticagency to the effect of recurrently shifting the context towards escalation. This section will summarize the framing of the argument in four working hypothesesthatinformtheanalyticalframework:1)Localstateactorsseek toconsolidatedomesticpower,2)Externalpoliciesintheconflictcontext

53  affectpowerresources,3)ChangeinlocalbehaviorisinducedbyWestern policies,and4)Recurringpatternsofexternalpoliciespriortoescalations.

WHY1:Localstateactorsseektoconsolidatedomesticpower.InthepostͲ SovietcontextofGeorgia,statepowerispermanentlyatstake.Thevolatile setting makes state resources attractive, vulnerable and significant for localelitestoconsolidatepower.Inthiscontext,thesuccessinterritorial integrationofSouthOssetiaisabigpowerresourceforlocalstateelites and is shaped through the influence of external policies of Western agency.Therefore,thestudyholdsthatexternalinfluenceonlocalpower consolidation in the context of the conflict has to be observed at the centralstatelevel, directing the analytical focus toexternal influence on capitalpoliticsinGeorgia.

WHY2: External policies in the conflict context affect power resources. Theanalysis holds thatthe conflictis relevant to power consolidation at particular points in time that seem to strongly correlate with policies of Westernagency,mainlyatthenational,butalsotheinternationalandlocal leveloftheconflict.Hence,thestudycontendsthatthedomesticpower claimisdecisivelyshapedandreinforcedthroughstateformationpolicies ofexternalactors,particularlyintheconflictcontext.

WHY3:ChangeinlocalbehaviorinducedbyWesternpolicies.Thestudy arguesthatpriortoescalations,localbehaviorchangestoassertivepolicies thatdirectlyorindirectlyleadtoescalation.Changeinlocalbehaviortakes place when specific Western policies bring into effect incentives of local power consolidation. In this context, local state actors react to Western policieswhichprovidesforshiftstoassertivepoliciesthatdrivethecontext towardsescalation.

WHY4: Recurring patterns of external policies prior to escalations. Dynamics in South Ossetia exhibit a consistent pattern of reͲescalations rupturedbyperiodsoflowͲintensityviolence.Shiftsindynamicsoccurdue toshiftsinpoliciesandbehaviorinducedbyWesternpolicies.Hence,the analysis attempts to single out which external policies recur prior to

54  escalations by linking Western impact to domestic assertive shifts. Thus, thestudyfurtherhypothesizesthatifWesternpoliciestakeeffectpriorto escalationandthispolicyisobservableatleastatoneotherpointpriorto escalation,thestudymayplausiblysustainthepolicytobepartofatleast one of the violenceͲgenerating mechanisms of Western impact on the conflictdynamics.  b) Analyticalframeworkandmethods

In order to establish the analytical framework of this study, working hypotheses were developed with the following methodological considerations. The section starts out by defining the here employed understandingsofagencyintheformofpolicies,causality,andthetoolsof narrativeanalysisandsocialmechanismsthatinformtheempiricalanalysis of agency prior to escalations. Hereafter, the section sums up these reflectionsbypresentingthemodelofanalysis.Thesectionconcludeswith remarks on the use of data. In the subsequent chapter, the discussion proceedstotheempiricalanalysisofagencyinthecontextoftheconflict.

Changeinlocalbehavior:Tracingshifts

Bydeployingthenotionofpolicies,thestudyseekstoavoidinterpretiveor normativerevaluationssuchascategoriesofidentityorinterestsandaims atspecifyingtheconfluenceofeventsthroughagency.Policiesaredefined aspurposeful,framedandagendaͲbasedactionsofWesternactorsinthe context of the conflict during periods prior to escalation. The analysis envisages policies that operate as part of an informed policy agenda of Western agency in the local, national and international arenas of the conflict. As is generally assumed, disaggregating policies will reveal that repetitive patterns of behavior appear throughout the process.20 Therefore,examiningtheinfluenceWesternpoliciesbareonlocalpower

20Thestudyrefrainsfromemployingtheconceptofpractices(Bourdieu1998,Reckwitz 2002),asthenotionofpolicieshighlightstheeffectofstateagendasatspecificpointsin time.Therepetitiveelementofagencyiscapturedbymechanismsandchainsofsimilar actionsthatrecuratdifferentpointsintheprocess. 55  consolidation requires an analytical lens that reveals empirical reality. ObservableactionintheformofpoliciesofWesternagencyishencethe firstobjectofanalysiswiththeaimofdisaggregatingrepetitivepatternsof agencyonanempiricallevel.  Therefore, identifying policies is the first analytical step to unveil causal linksthatgobeyondsituationalreasoning.Inthisrespect,centeringonreͲ escalation enables the study to make more valid statements. Individual motivationsanddecisionͲmakingprocessesthatmayhaveledtoviolence are always covert to the observer. In analyzing agency prior to a single event, social research can never plausibly sustain why an agent acted in theobservedmanner.Incontrast,ifthesamemodeofbehaviorrecursin similar situations, social research can postulate patterns of behavior in relation to the outcome that make agency plausible (above all see: CapocciaandKeleman2007,MahoneyandRueschemeyer2003). Withthisinmind,thenextstepofthestudyistoenabletheidentification ofthepointsintimewhenlocalbehaviorchangesandprovidesthecontext forashifttowardescalation.  Change in local behavior making for shifts to escalation takes place at specificpointsintime andsignifiesthetemporalframeinwhichpolicies thatbringaboutshiftstakeplace.Hence,thestudyidentifiesthosepoints intheprocessthrough,1)identifyingpointsintimewhenviolenceinthe conflict spiked and, 2) seeking out shifts in assertive policies prior to escalations.Forthispurpose,thestudyemploystwosetsofdata:analysis ofthereportsoftheOSCEMissiontoGeorgiaandinterviewsconductedin Georgiaduring2009and2010(seeannex4).Thisdataenablesthestudyto identifyphasesofviolencethatsignifyescalationsand,inaccountingfor localperceptionsthroughinterviews,toplausiblysignifypriorshiftsinlocal behaviorinrelationtoWesternagency. Before the study turns to the analysis of the data in chapter 2, it is necessarytodefinecausalityofexternalagencyinlocalcontexts,present

56  themethodofnarrativeanalysisthatenablesidentifyingplausibleinstants ofcausalagencyandattributeinterpretativemeaningtothem,anddraw ontheconceptofsocialmechanismstoaggregaterecurringviolenceinthe contextoftheconflict.  Causality:Framingthecausallink

The study employs Stathis Kalyvas’ useful concept of causality in multiͲ actorandmultiͲlocalitysettingsofprocessesofviolence(2000,2001,2004, 2006, Kalyvas/ Balcell 2010). Kalyvas’ inquiry deals with generating a plausible causal link through explaining contentious outcomes through spatially and temporally complex sets of episodes: “The direction of causality (…) matters when deriving empirical, theoretical and normative implications about civil wars” (Kalyvas 2001: 104). This approach allows, firstly, to purport policies that take place simultaneously at different localitiessuchastheinternational,nationalorlocalarenaoftheconflict, secondly,tolocatethecausallinkatthelevelofdomesticpowerpolitics, andthirdly,tobridgespecificallytheanalyticalgapbetweenexternaland domesticpoliciesandprivateandpoliticalinterests.Kalyvasthusdevelops aconvincingframeworktograspcausalitiesofmacroͲpoliticaloutcomes.  The first consideration envisages the problem of timing and locality if events leading to the same outcome are to happen simultaneously in different localities. Kalyvas’ concept contends that policies at different localitiesandpossiblytakingplacesimultaneouslycanbepartofthesame causal structure generating the same observed outcome (Kalyvas 2006: 364ff.). Importantly, Kalyvas’ approach sets itself apart from classical definitions of causality that assume a linear sequence of events constituting a causal chain that brings about the observed outcome (Mayntz 2005: 209, Mahoney 2000a: 536). In contrast, Kalyvas assumes events or, in this case, policies in different places at the same time can generate a unified causal structure under which the observed outcome comes about. In other words, events or policies with no obvious

57  connection can bare causal effects. This means, simultaneous instances mightnotshowandinfactmightnothaveaninherentcausalconnection between each other, but all of the instances together bring about the outcome. In this sense, this study assumes that the cause of escalation is powerͲ consolidatingbehavioroflocalelites,whereasWesternagencydecisively triggerschangeinlocalbehaviorpriortoescalation.Thismeans,thestudy perceives Western agency in different arenas and possibly at the same timetoexhibitthecausallink,thechainofeventsleadingtoescalation.  The second consideration locates causality at the level of policies of domesticpowerconsolidationofstateleaderships.InKalyvas’terms,the explanatoryelementsgeneratingviolencetietogetheratthelocalandnot thegloballeveloftheconflict(Kalyvas2006:383ff.).Kalyvascontendsthat to sustain a causal link happens if events at different levels invariably exhibitarepetitiveeffectonlocalevents.Therefore,Kalyvassuggeststhat studyingviolenceatthelocallevelinvolvesanalysisofrelationshipsamong awiderangeofactorsindifferentarenas,whilelocatingtheanalysisatthe domestic level of power politics. At the heart of Kalyvas’ theory lies the propositionthatescalationsresultfromlocalattemptstobridgecleavages arising from interests at different levels of politics and through external policies. As a result, Kalyvas’ concept looks at factors driving multiͲlevel conflictsatthedomesticlevelbybridgingtheanalyticalcleavagebetween localandsupranationalconflictsofinterests.  Kalyvas’approachstrengthensthisstudy,first,throughattributingcausal significance to events happening at locations other than those where violence takes place. Second, the approach suggests locating causality whereandwhenfactorshaveaneffectonthelocalpowercontext.Hence, thisapproachlinkschangeinlocalbehaviorpriortoescalationstoexternal policies and supports that external policies do not cause, but determine thepointintimeandthemannerinwhichchangeinlocalbehaviorpriorto

58  escalationoccurs.Inthisrespect,thisstudycentersonthenationallevelof capital politics in Georgia at the same as investigating the international, national or local centers of agency. In the next step, it is necessary to discussthemethodofnarrativeanalysisinordertoidentifyandinterpret thecausallinkbetweenWesternagencyandchangeinlocalbehavior.  Narrativeanalysis:Locatingandascribingmeaningtocausallinks

Thestudyemploysnarrativeanalysis(forthisapproachsee:Buethe2002, CapocciaandKeleman2007,Mahoney2000a,Griffin1992,alsoseeSewell 1996a)asahelpfulapproachtoanalyzecomplexsetsofevents.Narrative analysisisa“heuristicdevicethatcanmakeusmoreconsciousofwhatwe are already doing implicitly in rhetorical battles between rival historical narratives” (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 362). The study chooses narrative analysis to help to plausibly identify where the causal link betweenchangeinlocalbehaviorpriortoescalationislocatedandhowit isbroughtintobeing.Thebelowdiscussionwillclarifytheanalyticalvalue of several features of narrative analysis such as critical juncture, pathͲ dependenttrajectory,andsequences.  Narrativeanalysisoriginatesinhistoricalsociologyandembracesanykind of structured, theoryͲguided narrative that traces processes through reconstructing chains of social properties (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 354;King,KeohaneandVerba1994:77Ͳ80)and“canofferastylizedbut compellingreconstructionofthekeydecisionsandchoices”(Capocciaand Keleman 2007: 358) as it aggregates complex settings and empirically demonstratesthehypothesizedcausallinksatwork(forthisapproachsee thetheseminalstudiesofGeorgeandBennett2005,Elster2000). As a result, Capoccia and Keleman introduce the term of the ‘critical juncture’ to grasp the very period of time when significant change is possible and alters the equilibrium of the process into a different state (CapocciaandKeleman2007:346).Mahoneydescribes‘criticaljunctures’ as “moments of relative structural indeterminism when willful actors

59  shapeoutcomesinamorevoluntaristicfashionthannormalcircumstances permit”(Mahoney2002:7).Changetakesplacewhentheprobabilityrises thatchoicesexertalastingandstableimpactontheprocess.Thescopeof choices for key actors during those junctures narrows down, closes off alternative options, and subsequent agency generates selfͲreinforcing pathͲdependentprocesses(ibid.:348).  Basedonthenotionofcriticaljunctures,oncethepointintimeofchange inlocalbehaviorisidentified,analysescanreconstructthetrajectoryofa paththroughtracingeventsorpoliciesbacktotheinitialconditionofthe sequence. In this respect, several scholars propose to use narrative analysis through the ‘sequencing’ of series of relevant policies into episodes (Mahoney 2000a: 2, Buethe 2002: 482, Verba 1971: 308). SequencingintroducesastepͲbyͲstepapproachwhichprovides"asceneby scenedescriptionoftheparticularcausalpaths"(Reisch1991:17).Three properties are proposed to describe a pathͲdependent trajectory: First, tracinganoutcomebacktoandalongaparticularsetofhistoricalevents (Goldstone1998: 834). Hence, the task is to show a plausible chain of a specificsetofeventsleadingtotheobservedoutcome.Here,eventsinthe earlystagesofahistoricalsequencemattermorethaneventsthathappen closerintimetotheoutcome(Mahoney2000a:510,Pierson2000:263). Thismeans,criticaljuncturesarethemomentfrom whichlocalbehavior changes, but not the moments when outcomes occur. Therefore, this studydoesnotfocusonthesegmentoftheprocessafterlocalbehavior has changed, but focuses on the path leading up to change in local behaviortriggeredthroughWesternpolicies. Second, a pathͲdependent trajectory is characterized by what Mahoney calls“inherentsequentiality”(Mahoney2000a:529).Aseriesorstringof eventsleadingfromtheshifttotheoutcomeshouldexhibitdeterministic characteristics:Onceapathhassetin,theoutcomeislikelytocomeabout (Abbott1992:445,Mahoney2000a:511).Thisconceptputsforwardthat conditions at the start of a pathͲdependent sequence do not cause the

60  outcome as the causal properties leading to the outcome do not exist then.Causalityevolvesonlyduringtheprocess,throughthegradual,small steps constituted through agency (on the view of agency observable in stepsofaprocessseeforexample:Goldstone1998).Hence,thesesmaller stepsarethecentralobjectsofanalysisofthisstudy. Third, the last property of a pathͲdependent trajectory is assigned to identify a meaningful starting point in a sequence of events, as a contingent event marking the initial condition of a process. Initial conditions of a sequence pose a “surprising break” with theoretical or intuitiveassumptionsaboutthecourseoftheprocess(Sewell1996b:843). Thoseexpectationsareinconflictwithempiricalrealitywhenatleasttwo separate trajectories temporally intersect (Mahoney 2000a: 527). More precisely,initialconditionsareindeedheldtotrigger,shapeandconstitute the process, but they change during the process when they react with otherfactorsthatoccuratlaterpointsintheprocess. Specifically,Westernagencybyitselfisnotsufficienttosetoffasequence of events. Western policies have to interact with local agency in a significant context in order to initiate a path, for example in a historical contingent instant of collision between competing agendas (Mahoney 2000b, Abbott 1983: 130). As a result, Western agency constitutes an initialconditionwhenitinteractswithlocalactorsinacontingentmoment resultingin1)settingoffanescalationcycleand2)bringingaboutchange inlocalbehaviorpriortotheescalation. Lastly, historical narrative analysis particularly supports specifying the causal link in an empirical context of agency. A theoryͲguided narrative “focuses on the aspects considered salient by the theory itself; (…) such aspects include the main actors, their goals, preferences, decisions, and the events that directly influenced them.” (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 357, also see Buethe 2002: 483). In this respect, Capoccia and Keleman explicitly encourage narrative analysis to locate shifts in properties of agencytoexplainoutcomes. 

61  Inthisregard,historicalnarrativeanalysisallowsfortheinterpretationof meaning of narrated events. To identify meaningful events, interviews wereconductedaccordingtothemethodofqualitativecontentanalysis, allowingfornarrativeelementstobegivenprioritywhileconductingthe interviewsandfocusing on the specific issues of processes of escalation, Western policies, and local state politics (for this approach see: Meuser andNagel1991;Bogner,LittigandMenz2005;Geddes2004;Ragin1987 and1992;Oevermannetal.1979).Specifically,eachnarrativeaccounted for within one interview identified the initial condition of an escalation cycleandthepointofchangeinlocalbehaviortowardassertivepolicies. Therefore, the interviews provide plausible causal reasoning for the processesofescalation. In addition, the interviews account for local perceptions through evaluations and assessments of locally based actors. Theoretical assumptionsorachronologyofeventscannotunearththeindividuallogic of local dynamics. Without social reasoning, change in local behavior towardassertivepoliciesarenottraceable.Theinterviewprocesstookinto account local perceptions and local cultural contexts that influenced the reasoningbehindthecourseandcausesofagencyandescalation(onthe approach of raising local perception in social research see: Geertz 1991: chapter1,Salmon2006:13,alsosee:MacPherson,BrookerandAinsworth 2000).Thisenabledananalysisofsequencesofactioninordertoidentify plausible instances of causality and generate narratives of Western and Georgianpoliciespriortoescalations.  Hence,thethirdandlaststepdealswithhowtoaggregaterecurringcausal links between the narrated policies and escalations. Therefore, the last sectionframeshowtoidentifyspecificsocialmechanismsofescalationand presentsanoperationalconceptofsocialmechanismsofspecificinstances ofagencylinkedtorepeatedescalation.Hereafter,thechapterwillpresent themodelofanalysis. 

62  Socialmechanisms:Aggregatingrecurringcausallinks

This study seeks not only to explain escalations, but also to explain the recurring instant of escalation. Hence, the study envisages the chronologicallynarratedaccountspriortoseveralinstancesofescalations inordertodetectpossiblepatternsthatmightplausiblyexplainconditions forreͲescalation.Theaimofthestudyistoplausiblypresentmechanisms thatgenerallyleadtoescalationintheSouthOssetiacontextandinthis context the study expects that Western policies prior to each of the escalations exhibit similarities that allow to deduct mechanisms. Therefore, the discussion conceptualizes social mechanisms to 1) explain occurrencesatthemetalevelofagencypriortoescalations,inorderto2) explaintherepeatedoccurrenceofthosemetalinksatdifferentpointsin timepriortoescalations.  HedstroemandSwedberg,thepioneersofconsequentresearchonsocial mechanisms,alongwithJonElster,offeracompellingdefinitionofsocial mechanismsatwork(HedstroemandSwedberg1998,Elster1989).Their conceptdistinguishesbetweensocialmechanismsthatrevealthegeneral logicofaprocessasopposedtospecificsocialmechanismsthatrevealthe stepͲwise, practical functioning of a process. This study employs specific mechanismsofanalysis,andaimsatconcludingwithgeneralmechanisms thatplausiblyexplainthelogicofreͲescalationinSouthOssetia.  Hedstroem and Swedberg state that a social mechanism ascribes an instantofagencywithinacausalchainofsocialeventsconnectinganinitial condition to an observed outcome (Hedstroem and Swedberg 1998: 6). Schelling’s definition, therefore, captures the explanatory importance of mechanismsbystatingthat"[a]socialmechisaplausiblehypothesis,or setofplausiblehypotheses,thatcouldbetheexplanationofsomesocial phenomena, the expalantion being in terms of interactions between individuals,or[between]individualsandsomesocialaggregate."(Schelling

63  1978: chapter 2 in Hestroem and Swedberg 1998: 22Ͳ23). The definition putsforwardthreecentralideasofthetheoryofsocialmechanisms: First,thecausalvalueofmechanismslinksastartingpointtoanoutcome. Social mechanisms not only are the ‘social glue’ that holds processes together,buttheyalsoexplainhowprocessesworkspecificallyandstepby step: Social mechanisms reveal the meaning of individual instances of events because they establish them as a part of the process and take accountoftheminpracticalrelationtotheoutcome.Further,mechanisms go beyond signifying a mere link, but they also reveal how causality is expressed in empirical reality and therefore they exhibit practicality in analyticalcontexts.Therefore,plausibilityofthislinkisacorefeatureofits actual validity: If the informed description of empirical reality through a mechanismisnotreasonablyconvincing,theaccountisnotplausible. Second,thedefinitionisbasedongenerativepropertiesofmechanisms.A mechanism,thus,actuallybringsaboutorproducestheoutcomestepby step. These steps are traceable to the extent in which the narrative accounts for a consistent picture of the sequence. Schlichte agrees that mechanismscanbeseenassequencesofpracticesleadingtoorimpeding escalations of violence (Schlichte 2009, first version 2007: 91). In this respect, two aspects are noteworthy: On the one hand, mechanisms encompassthe micro levelof motivations, the meta level of agency and themacrolevelofasocialoutcome(HedstroemandSwedberg1998:22). Especially‘transformational’mechanismslinkingthemetaandmacrolevel, and explaining how agency translates into macroͲsocial outcomes: “A number of individuals interact with one another, and the specific mechanism (which differs depending on the nature of the interaction) shows how these individual actions are transformed into some kind of outcome,beitintendedorunintended”(ibid.:23).Thislinkisatthecenter ofthisstudy.Ontheotherhand,mechanismsdealinaflexiblewaywith the normative instant of the direction of causality. Social mechanisms allowforacomplexunderstandingofpresenttenseinempiricalanalysis: Prioreventscaninvaryingmannerstakeeffectonlaterevents.Thisrelates

64  toreproducingmechanismsthatstresspathͲdependentfeatures,reactive mechanisms that focus on present interaction, and reinforcing mechanismsthatincreaseinintensitycomparedtoearlierpointsintime (Mahoney2000:526ff.).Thestudywillmakeuseofthisoperative,multiͲ facettedunderstandingandemployitinthediscussionoffindings. In this respect, the first two properties of mechanisms comply with the causalunderstandingofhistoricalanalysisaspresentedearlier.Inathird and for explanatory purposes most farͲreaching property mechanisms enable generalizing behavior in given social contexts (Hedstroem and Swedberg1998:20).Moreprecisely,amechanismmayrecuracrosstime and cases, but the functions of the same mechanism differ as they are specificfortheempiricalcontext.Inthisregard,HedstroemandSwedberg supportMerton’searlycallformechanismstoconstituteamiddleground between laws and descriptions (Hedstroem and Swedberg 1998: 6). By accountingforsocialprocessesinadescriptiveway,mechanismslayopen componentsofprocessesandenabletheirgeneralization.Therefore,the analysis of mechanisms is an intrinsic part of tracing pathͲdependent trajectoriesofsocialprocesses. Asmechanismsgraspcommonfeaturesofthelogicofagencyacrosstime and cases, the general assumptions based on them can be applied to differentsettingsofanalysis.Therefore,HedstroemandSwedbergchiefly concludethat“amechanismisafunctionofageneralbehaviorindifferent situations” (ibid.). In this vein, the study establishes policies of Western actorsasspecificfunctionsofmechanismsleadingtoescalationsandwill discussthoseinthemodelattheendoftheempiricalchapteraswellasin thediscussionofthefindings.  Thus,thestudy willidentifyspecificmechanismsofexternalinfluenceat workpriortoescalationsandwilldrawconclusionsandextensivelydiscuss the scope of generalizability of these mechanisms in the theoretical discussionofthefindingsandtheempiricalcrossͲcontextdiscussion. 

65  Modelofanalysis

Theabovemethodologicalconsiderationsaresummarizedinthefollowing modelofanalysis:

Graphic1:Modelofanalysis  Thecausalargumentandtheempiricalanalysisaresupportedbyamodel of analysis that seeks to plausibly frame whenand how a sequence or a cycleofescalationistriggeredbyahistoricallycontingentevent,theinitial condition that occurs through Western agency and enables local power consolidationattheinternational,nationalandlocallevel,whichinforms the causal path to triggering the critical juncture of change in local behavior of Georgian state elites that, lastly, provides for the context to shiftandbringaboutescalation. To this end, the model frames how Western agency at the start of an escalationcycleintersectswithspecificcircumstancesontheinternational,

66  national or local level of the conflict and how this process affects local powerconsolidationoptionsatthenationallevel.Theintersectioncauses aruptureintheprocessthatopensapathforWesternpoliciestotrigger change inlocal behavior of powerͲseeking states elites. Western policies can exhibit restricting or enabling qualities in affecting local behavior as theyeffectivelylimitoptionsoflocalpowerconsolidationinthecontextof the conflict and enable power consolidating options as Western policies provide incentives for Georgian elites to consolidate power. The process startingfromtheinitialinstantofWesternpoliciessettingoffasequence ofsmallstepsleadingtochangeinlocalbehavioristhecentralfocusofthe empiricalanalysis.Thosestepswhichtietogetheratthenationallevelof state policies build a selfͲreinforcing, deterministic sequence of actions thattriggerschangeinlocalbehaviorpriortoescalation.  Thestudyaimsatidentifyingspecificchainsofactionspriortoescalations andtotranslatethosewhenͲthenlinksintoageneral,logicalpatternofthe dynamics of the conflict by establishing plausible ifͲthen connections betweenagencyandoutcomes.Forthispurpose,thestudywillgenerate sequencesofpoliciesonthebasisofphasesofescalationandanalyzethe sequencesinchapter3.Thestudyexpectstofindsignificantlinksbetween Westernpoliciesandescalations,particularlyatthelevelofnationalstate politics in Georgia. The study will present these links by generating at modelofthedynamicsofreͲescalationsinSouthOssetiaonthebasisof mechanismsofexternalpolicies.Thesefindingswillbediscussedreflecting their theoretical and empirical scope in chapter 4. Therefore, the study proceedstotheempiricalanalysisinthefollowingchapter. 

67  3. Empiricalanalysis

Theempiricalanalysisstartsoutwithadiscussionoftheeventdatasetand identifiesthreephasesofviolence.Second,initsaccountoftheidentified phases of violence the chapter gives a background account of the trajectoryofpoliticsandviolenceintheSouthOssetiacontextafter1989. The third part entails the empirical analysis of the sequences of policies determined through qualitative interviews and presents narratives of Western policies’ effect on Georgia state leaderships’ behavior prior to escalations.Thechapterconcludeswithpresentingtheempiricalfindings ofthestudyandproposesamodelofreͲescalationinSouthOssetia.  3.1. Analysisanduseoftheeventdataset

The explorative outreach of the study and the utter lack of data on dynamics of violence in South Ossetia made extensive use of primary sources indispensable. For this purpose, the research undertook archival research at the OSCE archive in Prague in January and February 2009. Research at the OSCE archive provided a consistent body of data for identifying phases of violence in the South Ossetia context. The sevenͲ weekarchivalresearchachievedtoestablishanoverviewofincreaseand thedecreaseofviolenceintheconflictbetween1989and2008andofkey politicaleventsinthepoliticalcontextoftheconflict.

ThematerialentailsactivityreportsoftheOSCEMissiontoGeorgiatothe ViennaheadquarterastheOSCEmilitarymonitoringmissionreportedon events of violence in the conflict area and gave assessments of their contextsince1992.Inaddition,theHeadoftheOSCEMissiontoGeorgia reportedonpoliticalactivities.ThereportsaccounttheOSCE’sfacilitation ofpoliticaltalksbetweenGeorgian,RussianandOssetianrepresentatives, meetings with political leaders and general overviews of the political developments.Therefore,apartfromaccountsofviolencethereportsalso giveavaluableinsightintothecourseofnegotiationsintheframeworkof theRussianͲmandatedJointControlCommission(JCC),apoliticalbodythat 68  functioned under the auspices of the OSCE from 1994 to 2008 and that wasservedtomonitorandfacilitatethepoliticaltalksandtheactivitiesof the GeorgianͲOssetianͲRussian Joint PeaceͲKeeping Forces (JPKF). The reportsaccountfortalksinthefieldsofeconomicrehabilitation,political settlementofthedeͲjurestatusofSouthOssetia,andthepoliticallymost contentious issue, the negotiations on return and compensations of the GeorgianIDPs(InternallyDisplacedPersons). Asstatustalkspermanentlyputthisformatatrisktobecancelled,akey task of the negotiations was to keep a platform of dialog alive and to organize everyͲday life in the conflict area under the absence of de jure state authorities. Therefore, many reports reveal how local issues were solved through the cooperation of the sides, such as gas, water and electricity supply issues, police cooperation in criminal incidents, and exchangeofprisoners.  Moreover, the reports give an account of violence in the designated conflict zone from 1992 with biͲweekly reports from 1994. The OSCE reports therefore provide ample raw material on political decisions. For example, the assessment repeatedly shows that decisions taken in the framework of the JCC were as much informed by strongͲhand interventions by the Russian representatives as by internal political developmentsinSouthOssetia–aclearhintthateventsatthelocallevel determinedpoliticaldynamicsatleastasmuchasinternationaldecisionͲ making at the level of Russia or the West. The task of the subsequent discussionwillbetoshowhowWesternpoliciestriggeredthesetendencies setoffbyeventsatthelocallevelintoescalation. Inassessingthedataonviolenceintheconflictarea,severalissueshaveto be noted: The reports classify casualties as criminally motivated, ethnic strife, police or military action (see annex 2).21 The reports suggest that criminally motivated casualties had high potential to turn into ethnic tension, and also that the members of criminal groups were organized

21TheOSCEreportsquotefollowingnewssources:BlackSeaPress,CaucasusPress,Imedi TV,ItarͲTass,RegnumRussia,RustaviͲ2. 69  along ethnic lines. The reports do not openly state, but give hints that violence between police or PeaceͲKeeping Forces often took place along ethniclinesinordertogainaccesstoinfrastructureandterritory. The monitoring mission was not able to monitor or account for all instances of violence, casualties, movement and actions of agents of violenceintheconflictarea.Therefore,thefiguresarenotquantifiable,for examplethereportsdonotindicateanydeathsin1993or1994andless than 5 dead in 2002, and only from 1997 do the reports systematically reportoncasualties,butonlythengiveselectiveaccounts(seeannex1). However, the accounts give a reliable assessment of the qualitative trajectoryofviolencerelatingtothedecreaseandincreaseofviolencein thetrajectoryoftheconflict.  Theanalysisofthedatasucceededinshowinganincreaseanddecrease violencebetween1989and2008.Onthisbasis,anextensivechronologyof political events and events of violence at the local, the national and internationalleveloftheconflictbetween1989and2008wasgenerated (seeannex1).Asaresult,thematerialgeneratedthreephasesofviolence in the conflict by pointing out escalations throughout the period of analysis. Based on the accounts of casualties, the analysis identified escalations in 2002, 2004 and 2008. However, it is important to keep in mindthatviolenceneverceasedatanypointintimebetween1989and 2008.

70  PreͲPhase Phase1: Phase2: Phase3: PostͲphase: from 1989–2000 2000–2002 2002Ͳ2004 2004Ͳ2008 2008 Easeofviolence ReͲstart of ReͲ Ongoing ReͲ Deterioratinginto Ongoingviolence 1992–1993, violence escalation violence escalation war LowͲintensity 2000–2002 2002 2002Ͳ2004 violence 2004 1994Ͳ2000 Ͳ1992–1995: ͲFrom2000, ͲPolice, Ͳ ongoing Ͳ Police, Ͳ Increasing ͲVeryfew decreasing increasing internal casualties Internal casualtiesamong casualties22 casualties,1995Ͳ casualties troopsand ͲPolice, troops policeandPKFs ͲMilitias,Russian 2000few ͲPolice, militia internal ͲIncreasing andGeorgian casualties. internal troops, militaryinthe military,police, ͲCivilianactors, troops,PKFs militia conflictzone, civilians alsopoliceandPKF andmilitia militaryaction  Table1:Phasesofviolence1989–2008  The graphic depicts violence starting with civil uprisings from 1989 and escalating into the first GeorgianͲOssetian war between 1991 and 1992 thatwasfollowedbyastretchoflowͲlevelviolenceuntil2000.Duringthe firstphaseofviolenceafter2000,violencereͲintensifiedforthefirsttime after the war with increasing levels of casualties, also among military personnel,butespeciallythepoliceintheconflictzone,andescalatedin 2002 due to the start of largeͲscale antiͲcrime operations. During the second phase, the conflict remains at a tense level after 2002 and reͲ escalates again in 2004, first intensifying through the closure of the GeorgianͲOssetianErgnetimarketandinAugust2004withtheshellingof Tskhinvali.Duringthethirdphase,violencekeptincreasingafter2004,with unprecedentedlevelsofmilitaryactorsinvolved,culminatinginthesecond warinAugust2008withinvolvementofRussianandGeorgianmilitary.  To support the account of these phases of violence based on casualties, thestudyadditionallylinkedthedecreaseandincreaseofviolencetothe additionalvariableoftheinvolvementoftypologiesofactorsofviolence (seeannexes1and2).TheanalysisoftheOSCEmaterialshowedthepoints intimewhenactorsinthetypologiesofcivilian,policeandmilitarywere involved in violence. This served two purposes: First, the numbers of

22 The reports of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) are restricted and coveronlytheGeorgianͲcontrolledterritories. 71  deaths are highly flawed and cannot depict trajectories prior to escalations. In contrast, typologies of actors can reflect the level of intensityifweunderstandthatthestateͲrelatedstatusofactorssignifiesa higher intensity of violence than perpetrated by civilian actors. Second, typologiesofactorssupporttheexplanatoryaimofthestudyastheypoint outviolencecarriedoutbystateactors. Theoveralltrajectoryof violence based on thedecrease and increase of violence are measured through involvement of typologies of actors and canbedepictedasfollows:

 Graphic 2: Trajectory of violence based on the involvement of typologies of actorsofviolence.  Thecurveshowsthreemajorpointsofescalationin1991,2004and2008. Themostpronouncedincreaseofintensityshowsthatpriortothefirstwar in 1991, state actors were significantly less involved in the onset of violencefrom1989.Aftertheintensityhaddecreasedin1994,thecurve persistentlyremainsatanintenselevelasaresultofwhichthefollowing escalations in 2004 and 2008 do show less radical increases. Even more significant, after each escalation the curve never falls back to the level priortotheescalation,butalwaysdecreasestoacomparablyhigherlevel. Therefore,thecurvegathersintensitywitheachescalation.

72  Therefore, the major differences between the three escalations can be summarizedasagradualshiftfromlocaltointernationalconflict23,from civilianactorsofviolencein1989togradualinvolvementofstateactors, andanoverallincreasingdeathtollfrom1992.Togetherwiththeoverall increasinginvolvementofstateactors,thissuggeststhattheconflictover time progresses into a conflict less between the communities or private agentsthanmorebetweenstakeholdersatthestatelevel.Inotherwords, eventhoughviolenceiscarriedoutonthelocallevel,thedrivingissuesof theconflictseemtobeincreasinglylocatedatthenationalorinternational level. Altogether,thecurvesupportstheconclusionthatpointsofescalationin 2004 and 2008 identified through the analysis of the numbers of casualties. However, the curve does not show an escalation in 2002, althoughthegraphaccountsforanincreasedlevelofintensityfrom2000. Apparently, the involvement of actors remains at fairly the same level between 1994 and 2004, with permanent involvement of police, militias and other nonͲstate armed groups. Nevertheless, for 2002 the graph showsincreasedcasualtiesandwhichpointsthestudytoaccountforan escalationin2002.Thatbeingsaid,weshouldkeepinmindthatthestudy doesnotseektoexplainvaryinglevelsofintensity,butlooksattheperiods priortoescalationsofviolence.Toconclude,thegraphaltogethersupports the argument for the division of three phases of violence identifying escalationsin2002,2004and2008.  The following section will use these findings to frame the background discussionoftheepisodesofpoliticaleventsandviolencewiththethree pointsofescalationin2002,2004and2008.Inthisrespect,theaccount focusesonthelocalcontextofexternalanddomesticpolicies.Thereafter, thestudywillcontinuewithanempiricalanalysisoftheinterviewmaterial

23 The escalation of 1989 to 1991 that started the conflict does not count as an internationalconflictasGeorgiawas formallystill part oftheSovietUnion and Russian interventioncountedasinternalaffair;onlyafterGeorgiahaddeclaredindependencein 1991involvementofRussianactorsputtheconflictonaninternationalscale. 73  using the method of narrative analysis to examine the influence of WesternpoliciesonGeorgianstateleaderships’behaviorintheconflict.  TheaccountisbasedontheanalysisoftheOSCEmaterial(seeannex1)to add to the scarce reference material on the conflict. In addition, the accountisbasedontheinterviewsheldinGeorgiain2009and2010(see the discussion in 3.3. and annexes 3 and 4) and on the primary and secondary sources on Georgia’s and the conflict’s political context which has been discussed in the literature review. Particularly the second sequenceofeventsdrawsontheresearchdoneintheframeworkofthe M.A.thesis(submittedtotheboardoftheOttoͲSuhrInstituteattheFree UniversityofBerlininFebruary2006,referencedasSigwart2006),which centered on power policies of the Saakashvili leadership in the South Ossetia conflict between January and August 2004. The interviews were conductedintheframeworkofaDAADͲfundedresearchprojectinGeorgia fromAugusttoOctober2005.  3.2. Backgroundofthestudy:Trajectoryofpoliticsandviolenceinthe SouthOssetiaconflict1989Ͳ2008

Violence in South Ossetia took its start when national movements throughouttheSovietUnionclaimedselfͲdeterminationattheendofthe 1980s.AftermovementsinTskhinvaliandTbilisistartedtofomentpublic debateandviolentclashesensued,violencebecameaconsistentpattern oftheSouthOssetiaconflictthatnevercametocease. Thetaskofthebackgroundaccountistoprovidecontextualknowledgeof the conflicthighlighting major politic events and trajectories of violence. ThepurposeofthesectionistopointoutthecontextofWesternandlocal agency in light of the argument of the study. Therefore, the section will showhowafter1989Georgiastateelitesattemptedtoconsolidatepower inthecontextoftheconflictandathowtheWesternagendaintheconflict reacted to local power claims. The background account of key political events covers four major episodes, comprising the periods of increasing

74  anddecreasingviolencebeforeandaftertheescalationsin2002,2004and 2008.  Thekeyeventswithinthefourepisodescanbesummarizedasfollows: Episode 1: 1989 to 1994 – Independence of Georgia, start of conflict in South Ossetia, and first GeorgianͲOssetian war (Independence demonstrations, March to Tskhinvali, Gamsakhurdia becomes first president of Georgia, Gorbachev referendum, Ousting of Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze becomes second president of Georgia, Sochi agreement endingthefirstSouthOssetiawar,StartofwarinAbkhazia,StartofJCC).

Episode 2: 1994Ͳ2002 – ShevardnadzeͲChibirov agreement, Kokoity takes power,andreͲescalationin2002(ChibirovbecomesdeͲfactopresidentof South Ossetia, ShevardnadzeͲChibirov agreement, Second war with Chechnya,Putinbecomes(acting)presidentoftheRF,BadenDocument, ReͲelection of Shevardnadze, Kokoity replaces Chibirov as deͲfacto presidentofSouthOssetia).

Episode 3: 2002Ͳ2006 – Ousting of Shevardnadze, closure of Ergneti, Ljubljana Document, Sanakoev administration (Ousting of Shevardnadze, SaakashvilibecomesthirdpresidentofGeorgia,ClosureofErgnetimarket, Shelling of Tskhinvali, Mamsurov becomes president of North Ossetia, LjubljanaDocument,SanakoevbecomesheadofalternativeSouthOssetia administration).

Episode 4: 2006Ͳ2008 – Kosovo, NATO summit in Bucharest, August war andaftermathofthewar(NovemberdemonstrationsinTbilisi,Okruashvili goesintoexile,RecognitionofKosovo,NATOsummitinBucharest,Second warinSouthOssetia,RussiarecognizesAbkhaziaandSouthOssetia,Endof OSCE Mission, mandate of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)).  

75  Episode 1: 1989 to 1994 – Independence of Georgia, start of conflict in SouthOssetiaandfirstGeorgianͲOssetianwar

Summary. Between 1989 and 1994, claims of selfͲdetermination intensified the GeorgianͲOssetian conflict. While Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union, Russian leaders supported South Ossetian attempts to cede from Georgia. The first Georgian president GamsakhurdiastartedtheconflictandthesecondpresidentShevardnadze ended the first war in 1992, both attempting to legitimize their rule through gaining control over South Ossetia. The peace agreement mandatedRussia’spresenceonthegroundandupheldthepoliticalstatus quo of South Ossetia. When Western actors entered the conflict as facilitators, the Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian leaderships had already secured their interests of opportunities for illicit gains, shared control of territory and deͲfacto independence, particularly with Shevardnadze proving to be a strong leader and being able to provide payoffstohiscivilservantsthroughtheprofitsfromsmuggling.  Inearly1989,tensionsroseintheSovietRepublicofGeorgiawhenpeople in the capital of Tbilisi demonstrated for independence from the Soviet Union (see Suny 1994, Beissinger 2002, Nodia 1996). In March, the demonstrationsinfrontoftheGeorgianparliamentreacheditspeak.24In thebeginning,claimswerebroughtagainstAbkhazianselfͲdetermination asfearsgrewthattheregionmightdriftawayfromGeorgiancentralrule. However,Soviettroopscrackeddownondemonstrationscausingcivilian casualtiesonApril9,1989.Asaconsequence,thepublictideturnedinto demands of independence from Moscow rule (I 25). As the Georgian nationalmovementgatheredstrength,claimsofindependencecoincided with demands of Russian withdrawal from Georgia’s regions under the titular ethnoterritorial rule granted by the Soviet system.25 Effective

24 Three interview partners who were active in politics during and after the fall of the SovietUniondescribedtheeventsatthetime(I25,I29). 25 Under the Soviet system, administration of territorial entities was divided by ethnic groups. Adjara and Abkhazia held the status of autonomous republic, with more 76  centralcontrolovertheseterritorieswasheldtobenecessarytoachieve ofGeorgianindependence.  The situation intensified when Zviad Gamsakhurdia became Georgia’s national figurehead on the way to the presidency of an independent Georgia. A popular writer, his ideas of independence of the Georgian nationattractedhisfollowersandmadehimapowerfulfigureandactivist wellbeforehewaselectedpresidentinOctober1990.Hefiercelypushed an antiͲSoviet agenda with a nationalist rhetoric (see Nodia 1996, Jones 2005, Zhorzholiani et al. 1992, Beissinger 2002, English 2008). After the springdemonstrationsof1989,GamsakhurdiamadeSouthOssetiathetest caseforhisantiͲRussianpolicy.AfterGamsakhurdia,SouthOssetiawasthe cradleofGeorgianidentitythatwasnowinthegripofRussia´sethnically divisivepolitics(seeforexample:Jones1997,Aves1992).On10November 1989, the South Ossetian leadership for the first time called on the GeorgianSupremeSoviettograntSouthOssetiathestatusofautonomous republic(onthisprocessaboveallsee:ICG2004).TheGeorgianSupreme Sovietrefusedtherequest. After a public appeal on television by Gamsakhurdia on 23 November 1989,15,000GeorgiansgatheredandmarchedtoTskhinvali,inwhatcame tobeknownasthe‘MarchtoTskhinvali’(Birch1996:44,Wheatley2005: 46).GeorgianprotestersclashedwithOssetianresidentsandfollowersof the South Ossetian National Front Ademon Nykhaz (HRW 1992: 6, Fuller 1991: 21). The march caused the first casualties in the conflict through clashesofGeorgians,Ossetians,Soviettroopsandmilitiasandtheconflict startedtograduallyescalateintowar.  Almost one year later on 20 September 1990, South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia and full sovereignty within the Soviet Union amid ongoing clashes. Yet, once more, both the Georgian and Russian leadershipsformallyrejectedrecognition.Ossetianswerenotpartofthe

independencefromthecenterinTbilisithanSouthOssetiawhichheldthestatusofan autonomousregion. 77  Georgian elections that on 30 October 1990 brought Gamsakhurdia into power,andlatermadehimthefirstpresidentofGeorgiaon26May1991 (ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontoGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE Communication No. 186).26 On 11 December 1990, six weeks after the parliamentaryelectionsandinreactiontotheSouthOssetiandeclaration of independence, the Georgian parliament abolished the status of the autonomousregionofSouthOssetia,declaringthestateofemergencyfor theregionandputtingitundercentralrule(Times28.01.1991).Georgian centralauthoritiesdispatchedpoliceforcestoTskhinvali.Inthecourseof December, the first casualties among Georgian police occurred, and just before January 1991 armed hostilities among Georgian guards, Ossetian militias and Russian troops broke out in Tskhinvali. When Georgian independencefromtheSovietUnionwasfinalizedon25December1991, Georgiawasalreadyengagedinitsfirstinternalwar.  Inwhataggravatedthegeneralsituation,MikhailGorbachev,headofthe SupremeSovietinMoscow,offeredahigherdegreeofselfͲruletonational entities. All autonomous republics could hold referendums over national independence.InMarch1991,GorbachevofferedAbkhaziatoreceivethe samesovereignstatusasGeorgiawithintheSovietUnion(LaneandRoss 1994,I13,I2427).WhenGorbachev´soffercame,violenceinSouthOssetia hadalreadybeenwagingformonthsandtheofferembitteredTbilisieven more as it undermined the claim of Georgia’s territorial unity (NYT 10.04.1991).UntilMarch1991,sourcesestimate50casualties;bytheend ofGamsakhurdia’sruleinDecember1991somesourcesputthedeathtoll atonethousanddeaths.28

26ThereferencesabbreviateCSCE,laterOSCEreportswithARforthebiͲweeklyActivity ReportsoftheHeadoftheOSCEMissiontoGeorgiatotheViennaheadquarter,andSR forSpotReportsthatwereissuedbythemissiononoccasionofincidentsofviolencethat affectedthesituationintheconflictarea. 27Both,aformermemberoftheGamsakhurdiagovernmentandacoͲworkeroftheEU Representative to the South Caucasus, emphasized Gorbachev’s offer as an event that alienated the Georgian national movement from Russian politics and the minorities. In addition,theofferalienatedtheSouthOssetianindependencemovement. 28DataontheSouthOssetiaconflictisnotreliable.Herewidelyquoteddataonthefirst GeorgianͲOssetian war 1990 to 1992: Casualties of "at least 700“ (International Herald 78  WesternͲGeorgianrelationsdidnotexperienceagoodstartunderthisfirst presidency. Gamsakhurdia’s policies were met with stark Western contempt (on European and U.S. reaction see: HRW 1992, English 2008, Nodia1995).Gamsakhurdiaintendedtoestablishorderwithastronghand before introducing democracy. The West reacted by adamantly rejecting Gamsakhurdia’scrackdownondemonstrations,mediaandhisnationalist rhetoric against ethnic minorities. As well, Gamsakhurdia’s refusal to introduce market oriented reforms and his intention to keep a planned economysystemdidnotgainhimsupport.WhenviolenceinSouthOssetia escalated,theWestmainlyblameditonGamsakhurdia’sethnicallydivisive rhetoricandwelcomedtheregimechangetoShevardnadzewithrelief.  The end of Gamsakhurdia’s rule came at the hands of his internal opponent when political groups that were part of Gamsakhurdia’s umbrellacoalitionusurpedhispower(seeShatirishvili2003,Nodia1996). When Gamsakhurdia was ousted, violence in South Ossetia continued unmitigated. Shevardnadze arrived in Georgia to become the second president of Georgia in January 1992. He enjoyed the backing of the MkhedrionimilitiaswhohaddefiedGamsakhurdia.AstheformerMinister ofForeignAffairsoftheSovietUnionShevardnadzeenjoyedanexcellent standingwithRussiaaswell(Suny1994:328Ͳ330).OneofShevardnadze’s first actions was to send the Georgian military to fight the war in South Ossetia.Untilthen,militiasandtheGeorgianNationalGuardhadengaged inskirmishessincethewinterof1990.  Shevardnadze, as the second president of Georgia, seemed to follow a more moderate course than his predecessor. However, Shevardnadze attemptedtoprovebeingacapableleaderbysubduingseparatistforces andregainingSouthOssetia.AsaresultfromJanuary1992,Georgianand

Tribune 1992), 1,000 (ICG 2004), or "up to 2000“ (Le Monde 1992), 3,000 (Svetkovsky 1993); estimates of wounded quote 1500 (Le Monde 1992), missed persons 100 (ICG 2004).TheUNHCRestimatesOssetianrefugeesinNorthOssetiaat40,000,ICGandBirch at100,000(ICG2004;Birch1996);GeorgianandethnicallymixedIDPsinsideofGeorgiaat 10,000and5,000(UNHCR2004). 79  RussianmilitaryengagedinasixͲmonthwarinSouthOssetiauntilapeace agreement was negotiated in June 1992 that left South Ossetia lost to centralGeorgianrule(seeforexample:ICG2004,Cornell2001and2002, MilcherandSlay2005,BarbeandJohanssonͲNogue2008). In June 1992, President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, and Shevardnadze built on their good personal relations and negotiated the SochiAgreementwhichendedthewar(AnnexIIofCSCECommunication No.228,05.08.1992,ReportoftheCSCEFactͲFindinqMissiontotheregion oftheGeorgianͲOssetianConflict,25.Ͳ30.07.1992).Theagreementsetupa joint PeaceͲKeeping Force under the auspices of CSCE, from 1995 OSCE, and later included the EU as a participating member; however only Georgian,RussianandSouthOssetianrepresentativesheldvetopower(on theCSCE/OSCEprocesssee:Koenig2005,Mayorov2002,OlcottBrilletal. 1999, Cummings 2001). South Ossetian, Russian (constituted mainly by North Ossetians) and Georgian troops were to control the buffer zone underRussiancommand.ThePeaceͲKeepingForcesweretheonlysecurity personneltheSochiAgreemententitledtocarryarmsintheconflictzone. Joint checkpoints with members of each battalion were established throughout the area. Later from 2000, the peaceͲkeeping forces were supplementedbyjointoperationsofGeorgianandOssetianlocalpolice.  This arrangement marked the start of Western engagement in South Ossetia from the end of the first war in midͲ1992. However, within six weeks after the Sochi agreement the war in Abkhazia started in August 1992 which proved to be an ongoing volatile situation also under Shevardnadze’s rule. By settling the war in South Ossetia, Shevardnadze cementedhisclaimtopowerbysettlingtheconflictandmaintainingclose tieswithMoscowandwiththenewSouthOssetianleader,LudvigChibirov, beinginstalledin1993.  Episode 2: 1994Ͳ2002 – ShevardnadzeͲChibirov agreement, Kokoity takes power,andreͲescalationin2002

80  Summary. Between 1994 and 2002, lowͲintensity violence persisted in SouthOssetia,duetothegoodrelationsbetweentheGeorgianandSouth OssetianleadershipsandintensesupportofWesternactors.Fromthevery start of the 1990s, Western support of the Georgian elites centered on territorial integration, with a special focus on antiͲcorruption and antiͲ smugglingmeasuresintheconflictareaofSouthOssetia.Simultaneously, Georgian and Ossetian leaders made enormous private gains from cooperatively organizing smuggling through South Ossetia and therefore kepttheconflictfromescalating.Howeverfrom2000on,thesituationwas aggravated due to a hardening stance of Moscow, cancelling the settlement negotiations in Baden and replacing Chibirov with hardline leader Kokoity. As Georgian elites turned away from Russia, Russian politicsinSouthOssetiacontinuedtoreinforcethesituationintheconflict. TheconflictreͲescalatedin2002withShevardnadzeclingingtopowerby tryingtoreͲorganizesmugglingtosatisfytheclientsofhisregimeaswellas staging antiͲcorruption measures to the West and the harshly criticizing civilsociety.  From 1994, Western engagement increasingly stepped up its activity in GeorgiaandintheGeorgianͲOssetianconflictamidtherealityoftheshaky powerͲsharing deal monitored through the Joint Control Commission (Koenig2005,Jawad2005,Mayorov2002).Whilethedealwasinplaceand Westernactorssustained the process, the conflict remained in a volatile state.Frequentoutbreaksofviolencepersisted,butweredownplayedas local disputes. After Gamsakhurdia had been ousted, Georgia went throughboth,acivilwarbetweennonͲstategroupsandawarwithbreakͲ awayAbkhazia(onthefirstAbkhaziawarsee:Slider1997,Hensell2009, Coppieters 2004, Coppieters et al. 1998). Once those struggles of competing elites were overcome, Georgian capital politics settled into a routine from 1996 and Shevardnadze established uncontested rule with Westernsupport. 

81  Afterthepeaceagreementhadbeenputinplacein1992,ittooktwoyears foradropinviolence.In1993,atleast48casualtiesinsixteenincidents were reported and in 1994, the death toll went down to thirteen. CasualtiesduringthistimemainlyoccurredbecauseofshootͲoutsbetween OssetianorGeorgianlocalgangsorbetweengangsandlocalauthoritiesor PKFs, reported to be mostly related to smuggling activities. Casualties frequently occurred during controls at road posts and were then considered to be related to criminal activities. However, as mentioned earlier,theOSCEreportsgaveadetailedaccountoncasualtiesonlyfrom 1997.29Beforethis,thecasualtiesratesandindicationsofcauseswerevery vague. While casualties stayed at a low level throughout the 1990s, violence however simmered beneath the surface throughout the entire period.Altogether,atleast59casualtieswerereportedinthe‘calm’period between1994and1999.  In the 1990s, the balance in South Ossetia worked through active cooperation between Shevardnadze’s leadership and South Ossetia’s moderateleaderChibirov.RelationsweresupportedbytheJCCinsettling organizationalandsecurityissuesforthepopulationsintheconflictarea. Amid the ongoing war in early 1992, Torez Kulumbegov became the deͲ facto president of South Ossetia. Already then Western actors’ intense interestinengagingintheconflictshowed.JCCnegotiationsstartedand, on 23 January 1993, Kulumbegov signed the memorandum on the cooperation between CSCE and the South Ossetian leadership (OSCE AR 12/92).TheCSCEpresenteda“CSCEPlanforGeorgia”envisaginggradual reintegrationofSouthOssetiaintoGeorgiainJuly1993.30

29 The major incidents during this period were an Ossetian being killed by a Georgian policemanduringthefirsthalfofAugust1997.InthefirsthalfofApril1998,aRussianPKF soldierkilledaGeorgianresidentintheGeorgianvillageofTamarasheni.Inthefirsthalfof December1998,twoGeorgianresidentswerekilledbyotherlocalresidents.Thesuspects were subsequently arrested in a joint GeorgianͲSouth Ossetian operation of law enforcement bodies. Finally, on October 13, 1999, a North Ossetian was killed by local OssetiansattheErgnetimarket. 30ThefiveͲpagedocumentincludesthe“CSCEconceptofaSettlementoftheGeorgianͲ Ossetian and GeorgianͲAbkhazian Conflicts” and was viewed in the OSCE archive in Prague. 82  However,onlytwomonthslater,Chibirovwaselectedthenewheadofthe SouthOssetianSupremeSoviet.ChibirovannouncedthatKulumbegovhad been too much in favor of the CSCE plan (CSCE ARs 24.08., 28.11., 11.10.1993, CSCE Supplemental Report, 30.09.1993). After two years of halfͲhearted negotiations, from early 1996, Shevardnadze announced “perspectives for the relative quick settlement of the GeorgianͲOssetian conflict” and signed the “Initiative for a Peaceful Caucasus” (OSCE ARs 13.02.and03.04.1996).OnMay16,ShevardnadzeandChibirovsigneda Memorandum on confidenceͲbuilding and security measures in Moscow. Thiswasconsideredasamajorsteptowardthesettlementoftheconflict, butmostofallitwasanexpressionofclosetiesbetweentheleaderships andwasregardedfavorablybyWesternpartners.  GoodrelationsbetweentheSouthOssetianandtheGeorgianleaderships also enabled significant incomes for both sides through organized smugglingthroughtheregionofSouthOssetiatoGeorgia.Thepowerbasis of the Shevardnadze regime was rooted in a ‘pyramid system’ of reͲ distributionofrevenuesintothehandsofregimeͲloyalclients(Christophe 2005:78,alsosee:Easter1996,George2009,Holmes1997).Therewere very few people at the top of the pyramid in the state apparatus that entertained a large network of corruption via police and regional state actors.Atthebottomofthispyramid,mostofthepopulationhadtobribe state employees for access to virtually anything, including roads, gas or jobs.Thissystemensuredthepowerbasisofthestateeliteandgranted largeincomes(ontheroleofcorruptionforgovernmentsseethestudies ofBanfield1975,CharapandHarm1991,Lapalombara1994). Smugglingplayedasignificantroleinallocatingrevenuesinthehandsof capitalͲloyalstateactorsintheregions,andgrantedgainsforeverybody involved. Therefore, Georgian, North and South Ossetian and Russian militia, police and civilian actors, and parts of the PeaceͲKeeping Forces engagedinsmuggling,withsmugglingactivitiespeakingbetween1995and 2004(ICG2004:9Ͳ10,alsosee:Vilanishvili2005,Chkhartishvilietal.2004).

83  Aboveall,ErgnetimarketflourishedfromthemidͲ1990sandbecamethe most active transͲshipment center in Georgia, the hub of GeorgianͲ Ossetian illegal and legal trade relations (on the role and functioning of Ergneti market see: George 2009, Kukhianidze et al. 2006, Kukhianidze 2003,2004and2007).Themarketwasthebiggestsourceofincomefor the leadership in Tskhinvali, many of Shevardnadze’s civil servants and businessmeninNorthOssetia(ibid.,Wennmann2004).Therefore,allsides acrosstheconflictboundarieshadavestedinterestedinkeepingtheillicit trade system alive. In order to organize smuggling activities along the routes between North Ossetia and Georgia, the main concern was to maintainorderintheconflictareaandkeepviolenceatalowlevel(onthis viewseeaboveall:George2009).  Atthesametime,however,Chibirovsignedatreatyofcooperationwith NorthOssetia.TheChibirovleadershipopenlystatedtheintentiontounite withNorthOssetiaandbecomeamemberoftheRussianFederation.From the end of the 1990s, the Russian political elite had undergone a transformationthat,atleastforGeorgianpolitics,provedtobefatal(on this period see for example: Gower and Timmins 2009, Haukkala 2008, Sikorski2009,Loewenhardt2005,CooleyandMitchell2010aand2010b, Allison2008,Blank1995).ThechangefromYeltsintothePutinpresidency radicalized Russian policy towards Georgia very quickly (see Cummings 2001,Allison2008,Filippov2009). Withalmostimmediateeffect,thetighteningRussianstancewasrevealed in the South Ossetia context: the so called Baden process of the JCC, a negotiation format envisaging the settlement of the region’s political statusandatleasttomostinternationalobservershighlypromising,was halted(oninternationalviewtotheBadenprocesssee:Koenig2005;also see:I8,I14,I1Ͳ1631).Inaddition,Chibirovwasreplacedwithhispolitically

31Thetwolocalinterviewpartners,thoughwithdiversebackgroundsofacurrentanda formergovernmentofficial,aswellasamemberoftheEUDelegationhadamorecritical viewstressingthedisblanaceinvotingdistributionleavingtheGeorgiansideasaruleina weakerpositionagainsttheRussian,theSouthandtheNorthOssetianvotes.Thisalong with the hawkish turn in the Georgian governmental line, the interview partners 84  radicalsuccessorEduardKokoitywhotookpowerinDecember2001(on thisturnintheprocesssee:I8,I9,I28,I29).ThefailureoftheBaden process was the first sign announcing the end of Chibirov’s era under whom the process toward a peace settlement had been striving. The replacement of Chibirov proved to be a major setback in the otherwise successful GeorgianͲOssetian process that had taken place through the 1990s. By 1997, the institutions managing conflict affairs had been consolidatedandinternationalized;TheOSCEbranchofficehadtakenup workinTskhinvali,thethreePeaceͲKeepingForceshadheldthefirstjoint training,thefirstmeetingonthepoliticalstatusofSouthOssetiahadbeen heldinMoscow,andGeorgianandOssetianintellectualsmetforyetthe secondtime. After the South Ossetian elections in December 2001, in one of his very first public statements Kokoity announced Georgia´s acknowledgment of the ‘genocide’ against the South Ossetian people during the 1990Ͳ1992 war as conditional for dialog (OSCE AR 18.12.2001). The new South Ossetian course reiterated reunification with North Ossetia and would never again come as close to negotiating South Ossetia’s autonomous status within Georgia as under Chibirov. As relations deteriorate, Shevardnadze for the first time openly criticized Russia in June 2002, saying that Russia “secretly annexes” South Ossetia and thus made its mediatingrolelesscredible(ibid.).  Seconded by Georgia’s mutual interest of integration into the West, Western engagement gradually intensified over the 1990s. Formation of theGeorgianstatewasacorepriority,andhere,intenseactivityshowedin solving Georgia’s ruleͲofͲlaw problems by enhancing capacities of the centralstatethroughfightingcrimeandcorruptioninSouthOssetiawhere statehood was contested through territorial conflict. The Georgian state elite responded with a vivid interest in cooperation. During the 1990s, ShevardnadzehadpursuedamildcoursetowardRussia(seeforexample:

suggested,ledovertimeandregardlessofchangeinpersonnelrepresentedintheJCCto theGeorgians’refusaltocarryonwiththeformat. 85  Mark 1996, Timmermann 1992, English 2000, Allison 2008), keeping a balance between Russian influence in Georgia, revenues for selected echelons of the elite and political stability in the territorial conflicts. However,whenRussia’spoliticalsystemtransferredfromYeltsintoPutin in2000,thegroundofpoliticallystablerelationsgraduallyeroded. As the Georgian elites’ relations with Russia started to fall apart under Shevardnadze, Georgia’s turn to the West was accomplished through promoting an antiͲRussian discourse and altogether opening a new, modernized perspective that was boosted through Western pledges of support for independence and progress (Christophe 2001, Jones 1993, ZuercherandKoehler2004).Moscow’spolitics,incontrast,weakenedlocal independence politics as they supported competing groups in the secessionistregionsaswellasoppositiongroupsinthecapital,cuttinglinks ofGeorgiawithitsNorthCaucasusneighborsandaltogetherattemptingto diffusesocialandinfrastructuralcapitalnecessarytosustainindependence (Proladze 2001, Sikharulidze 2001, Hanf and Nodia 2000). As local elites gradually experienced new power consolidating opportunities through relations with Western partners, their policies adopted a stern proͲ Western course that, particularly from 2000, included meticulous fulfilment of Western conditionalities in the reform process that was to leadtoWesternintegrationintoNATOandEU.  WiththebackgroundofWesternintegration,from2000,Georgiaboosted antiͲcrime activities and therefore intensified efforts to control the situationintheGeorgianͲSouthOssetianconflictzoneanditsvicinity.The campaign was endorsed by then Georgian Minister of Justice and later president Mikheil Saakashvili and took place in the context of Western demandstorestoreruleoflawinGeorgia’speripheralregions.Therefore, from 2002, the Georgian leadership announced a largeͲscale antiͲ corruption and antiͲsmuggling campaign as a senior member of a local researchNGOpointedout(I7),ofwhichtheoperationsinSouthOssetia wereoneresult.

86  AstheresultoftenseGeorgian,OssetianandRussianrelationsandantiͲ crimeoperationsaftertheendofBaden,reͲintensificationoftheconflict occurredfrom2000.Asdiscussedearlier,thereportsgiveonlybutaweak hinttotheintensificationthroughcasualties:WhileOSCEreportsindicate at least 59 casualties between 1994 and 1999, the death toll rises to a minimumof29casualtiesonlybetween2000and2003.Throughout2000, veryfewcasualtieswerereported,butonMay20ahighlysymbolickilling tookplaceintheGeorgianvillageofKheitiwhenfiveGeorgianresidents werekilledinacarambush.Itwasthecommemorationdayofthe1992 killings of 36 Ossetian residents. The killings were widely held to have happenedinretaliation(OSCEAR10/00,OSCESR21.05.2000).In2001,the reported death toll in the conflict zone rose remarkably up to 13, more thandoublingthe2000rate.32  Particularly,theintensificationshowedanincreaseintheengagementof police and internal forces in the conflict area. In September 2002, OSCE observerslocatedforthefirsttimeheavyarmamentintheconflictzone andGeorgiantroopsofinterior(troopsoftheMinistryofInternalAffairs) increased.SouthOssetialeaderKokoityannounceda“partialmobilization” of Ossetian forces, allegedly to secure the territory against fighters from theNorthCaucasus(OSCEAR08.10.2002).InmidͲOctoberGeorgianforces startedtocarryoutlargeͲscaleantiͲcrimeoperationsintheregionofShida Kartli.Fromthatpoint,OssetianandGeorgianforcesbothengagedinantiͲ crimeoperationsandstruggledoveraccessandinfrastructureacrossthe area. As a result, by March 10, 2003 the Georgian Ministry of Defense (MoD)unilaterallysubordinatedtheGeorgianbattalionofthePKFunder its authority (OSCE AR 06.03.2003), a breach of the JCC agreement that

32 On April 3, a gangland shootͲout in Tskhinvali left three Ossetians dead (OSCE AR 07/01).OnMay13,agunbattlebetweentheSouthOssetianpoliceandChechenscaused fourcasualties(OSCEAR09/01).Itwasthefirsttimesince1997thatalawenforcement member was killed. In July, two were found dead in Tskhinvali and in the end of NovembertwoOssetiansandtwoGeorgianswerekilledintwogunfightswiththelocal police(OSCEAR13/01and10/01). 87  initially envisaged the PKF troops under the biͲannually rotating Russian JPKFcommand.  The trend did not reverse and violence annually increased, significantly involvingincreasingdeathtollsamongGeorgianandOssetianpoliceforces, withShevardnadze’sclaimtopowerleftinlimboamidWesterndemands for reform, harsh criticism of Georgian civil society organizations and an exacerbatingsituationintheconflictzoneandwithRussia.Asthesituation inSouthOssetiabecameexacerbated,Shevardnadzegraduallylosthisgrip onpower.Failingtoachieveterritorialreintegration,Shevardnadzecould notprovebeingacapableleadertothepopulationandtheinternational community.Ongoing corruption of hisgovernment and highcrime levels relatedtosmugglingaroundSouthOssetiaturnedsupportofcivilsociety organizationsandWesternorganizationssour.  Episode 3: 2002Ͳ2006 – Ousting of Shevardnadze, closure of Ergneti, LjubljanaDocument,Sanakoevadministration

Summary. With Shevardndaze ousted in 2003, the new Saakashvili government tried to consolidate rule by fulfilling Western demands of a strengthened,democraticstatehood.Introducingasweepingchangeinthe stance on South Ossetia, Saakashvili closed down the smuggling hub of ErgnetimarketinMay2004.ReͲescalationensuedinAugustthroughthe shelling of Tskhinvali. Subsequently, the government sought to draw Westernsupporttofurtherconsolidaterulethroughpromotingpeaceroad mapstoreintegrateSouthOssetia.Thegovernmentsuccessfullyplayedon a twoͲsided agenda, assuring Western partners of a democratic strategy whilekeepingopenoptionsforamilitaryoptionontheground.By2006, all players in the conflict had radicalized, including the GeorgianͲled alternative South Ossetian Sanakoev administration, with new North OssetianleaderMamsurov,andduetoanerosionofthebufferinstitution of the JCC. The Georgian government enjoyed Western support in its stance.

88   In 2003, Shevardnadze’s power base finally broke away (Wheatley 2005: chapter7,alsosee:Mitchell2004,CoppietersandLegvold2005).The2000 presidential elections already had raised doubts of Western observer organizations and partners about Shevardnadze’s commitment to democratization and the November 2003 parliamentary elections were openly branded as falsified (OSCE/ ODHIR reports, 10.04.2000 and 23.11.2003). After the elections, Mikheil Saakashvili, Shevardnadze’s formerMinisterofJustice,ledtheensuingprotests.AmidstrongWestern support of the protesters, the ‘Rose Revolution’ leaders ousted ShevardnadzeandSaakashvilitookofficeasthethirdpresidentofGeorgia in January 2004. Mitchell observed in 2004: “The Rose Revolution representedavictorynotonlyfortheGeorgianpeoplebutfordemocracy globally. [It] ... demonstrated that, by aggressively contesting elections, exercising basic freedoms of speech and assembly, and applying smart strategic thinking, a democratic opposition can defeat a weak, semiͲ democratickleptocracy”(Mitchell2004:342).  In Saakashvili’s generally ambitious reform agenda of rule of law and democratization,territorialintegrationrankedatthetop(Wheatley2005: 195ff., also see: Huber 2004, Jawad 2005). Saakashvili continued the course initiated under him as Shevardnadze’s Minister of Justice in establishingruleoflawthroughaddressingtheconflictsandgenerally,just likeGamsakhurdiaandShevardnadzebeforehim,bankedonfortifyinghis rule through reintegrating the territories. Thenew impetus introduced a sweepingchangeinGeorgianpolicyonthesecessionistentitiestoaproͲ activecourse(I9,I1333).Westernpartnerspromisedfullsupporttothe newgovernment.Saakashvili’sfirstsuccessisthepeacefulreintegrationof thesecessionistregionofAdjarainGeorgia’ssouthwestandonthewave oftriumphtheSaakashvilileadershipturneditsattentiontoTskhinvaliin May2004.

33Thecriticalviewsoftwointerviewpartners,bothmembersoftheopposition,framed thisaccount. 89  TheimplicationsofthenewpolicyshowedforthefirsttimewheninMay 2004GeorgiantroopsofinteriorcloseddownthemarketinErgnetionthe border of South Ossetia and Georgia (several interviews gave insight on thisevent:I1,I6,I8,I9).WhiletheGeorgianstateservantswhogained from the system had been replaced due to the regime change (for this view see: Papava 2006), the crackdown mainly cut off incomes of the South Ossetian side. South Ossetians already had eyed Saakashvili’s new agendasuspiciouslyfromearlierthatyear(Peuch2004,Fuller2005).After Ergnetiwasclosed,thesefearsseemedtobeconfirmed.InAugust2004, six days after South Ossetian leader Kokoity and new Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania had signed a ceaseͲfire agreement, Georgian MinisterofInternalAffairsIrakliOkruashvililedanoperationduringwhich GeorgiantroopsshelledTskhinvaliforhours(RFE/RL20.and27.08.2004,I 18).Thenextdayontelevision,Saakashvilideclarestheincidenta“brilliant operation”(RFE/RLNewswire,20.08.2004).Withthis,theconflictinSouth Ossetiaescalatedforthefirsttimesince1992duetotheinvolvementof theassertivearmedactionofstateactors.34  Already at the end of 2003, the new Georgian government had sought Western support for their stance toward South Ossetia (Wheatley 2005: 218Ͳ219, also see: Milcher and Slay 2005, Barbe and JohanssonͲNogue 2008, Popescu 2007, Zuercher 2007, Sigwart 2006). Saakashvili launched anallͲencompassinginternationalcampaigntopromoteapeaceroadmap for the settlement of the South Ossetia conflict as a Georgian representative at the OSCE meeting in Ljubljana observed (Socor 2005). Thepeaceroadmapincludedthenewgovernment’sagendaintheconflict and envisaged confidenceͲbuilding measures, negotiations, economic rehabilitation,legalizedtraderelationsandbroadautonomy.Inthecourse

34Themoretheconflictintensifie,themoreOSCEreportsrefrainedfromaccountingfor casualties.Fortheperiodof2004,thereportsaccountforfivecasualties(twociviliansand thedeputycommanderoftheSouthOssetianspecialforcesarekilledbyGeorgianpolice inseparateincidents,twoOssetianpeaceͲkeepersarekilledinanambush).Theshellingof Tskhinvaliisaccountedwithunspecifiednumbersofboth“militaryandcivilian”casualties. However,intensificationoftheconflictshowsinincreasedinvolvementofstateactorsin violence. 90  of2004and2005,theroadmapswerewidelypresentedtointernational audiences such as the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), and the OSCE Permanent Council. The 2005 peace campaign managed to ensure Western support forthenewgovernment.  While Saakashvili´s peace campaign resounded in the international community, the signs of deterioration continued. Moscow took away influence from the Georgian official side in South Ossetia affairs step by step. Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and Kokoity signed a demilitarization agreement in November 2004 (OSCE AR 15/04, Civil.ge 06.11.2004).Theagreementdictatedthatallmilitarypersonnelapartfrom thePeaceͲKeepingdeploymentsmustleavetheconflictzone.Asapartof the deal, Georgian troops withdrew from the Sarabuki post in South Ossetia and left it to South Ossetian PeaceͲKeepers (I 9, I 1835). The arrangementwaslobbiedbytheRussiansideandasaresultsupportedby theWesternsideasaconcessionaftertheAugust2004escalation.While demilitarization was in fact never concluded on neither side, this gave a severeblowtoGeorgianmilitarycontrolinthearea.Moreover,inAugust 2006theGeorgianmilitarycarriedoutamassivecampaigninAbkhaziaand gainedbackUpperKodoriValley,aregioninhabitedbyethnicGeorgians, but located in the AbkhazianͲcontrolled area of the UNͲmonitored boundaryline(I14,I1Ͳ13,I2336;alsoseeOSCEAR26.04.1994). Furthermore, Moscow enhanced its influence in South Ossetia and the NorthCaucasus,throughinstallinganewleaderinNorthOssetia,themost MoscowͲloyalNorthCaucasusentity.Afteroversevenyears,themoderate AlexanderDzasokhovwasreplacedbyhardlinerTeimurazMamsurovMay 31,2005 (OSCE AR 11/05, Civil.Ge 11.06.2005, Kommersant 17.06.2005). JustasSouthOssetia´sdeͲfactopresidentKokoitybeforehim,Mamsurov

35 Two interview partners emphasized the importance of the Sarabuki post for the Georgiangovernment’spolicytowardSouthOssetia. 36 Several interview partners, among them members of an international NGO and organization as well as amember of the opposition framed their account of events in SouthOssetiawitheventsinKodoriValley. 91  insistedinoneofhisfirstpublicstatementsonthereunificationofNorth andSouthOssetia(RFE/RL14.06.2005).  On the international level as well, relations between Russia and Georgia also very clearly deteriorated from 2006. In February 2006, Georgia underlineditsdeterminationintheconflictcontextandvetoedtheRussian mandate of the PeaceͲKeeping Force in South Ossetia (OSCE AR 02/06). After the vote, the Georgian parliament instructed the government to revise the 1992 Sochi Agreement and replace the RussianͲled PeaceͲ KeepingForce(Civil.ge07.and15.02.2006). In addition, the Georgian side started to question the JCC format from October 2006. In November 2006, the Georgian government held alternativeelectionsintheGeorgianͲcontrolledpartsofSouthOssetiaand established an alternative South Ossetia government under Dimitry Sanakoev(OSCEAR19/06,20/06,22/06).TheGeorgiangovernment,ina provocative move for the JCC counterparts, introduced Sanakoev as the Ossetian representative to the JCC. However, neither Russia nor the Western representatives of the JCC reacted to the decision. As a result, RussiadidnotpulloutitspeaceͲkeepersuntilafterthewarin2008.37 Altogether,aftertheescalationin2004theconflictremainedatanintense levelduetoongoingmilitarizationandoperationsofsecurityforces.The establishment of the Sanakoev administration, the eroding of the CC formatandincreasedunilateralismofRussiathroughatighteninggripin the North Caucasus and Georgia’s Kodori campaign in Abkhazia also aggravated the situation after the 2004 escalation. Western support for Georgia’s strategy further progressed at the international level and remainedreluctant,butsupportiveontheground. 

37 In September 2006, in an unparalleled move, Georgian intelligence arrested four Russian officers on spying charges, initiated a big media campaign and expelled them fromGeorgiatoRussia(Civil.ge27.09.2006,BBCNews02.10.2006).InApril2007,Georgia further irked Russia and vetoed Russia´s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO)(RFE/RL30.04.2007). 92  Episode 4: 2006Ͳ2008 – Kosovo recognition, NATO summit in Bucharest, Augustwarandaftermathofthewar

Summary.From2006,thesituationcontinuedtobecomemoreandmore tenseatafastpace.Harshinternationalcriticismanddomesticopposition challengedSaakasvhili’spowerbase.Thesituationcreatedthepressurefor Saakashvilitoactinhisfavorandhecontinued,justashispredecessors,to direct special efforts to territorial integration. At the same time, the recognitionofKosovoandtheBucharestNATOsummitputWesternpolicy underpressurevisͲaͲvisRussia’sstanceofmaintainingsecessionisminthe Caucasus.TheaftermathoftheAugustwarleftWesterninfluenceinthe conflict diminished, however, WesternͲGeorgian ties continued to exert considerableinfluenceonGeorgianelites’powerbase.  Throughout 2007, tensions continued to steadily increase, with the Georgia parliament giving legal status to the Sanakoev administration in May2007.Also,inJuly,aRussianmissilehitclosetotheconvoyofanEU delegation returning from a visit to Tskhinvali (I 14, I 2038). At the same time tensions in Tbilisi rose as the Saakashvili regime grappled with its opposition (for this period see: Lazarus 2010, Mitchell 2009, Areshidze 2007, Tatum 2009, Welt 2009, Kalanadze and Orenstein 2009). In September,thelaunchingofthenewoppositionalpartyofformerMinister ofDefenseOkruashviliwasstalledthroughchargesofcorruption,money laundering and abuse of office against him (Civil.ge 27.09.2007). In November, oppositionͲled street protests ensued and were subdued by military police with what international actors, including the US and EU fiercelycondemnedasdisproportionaluseofforce(seeBiggandSindelar 2007). Therefore prior to the August war, the political situation put Saakahvili’spowerbasestronglyatrisk(Jones2008:3,alsosee:Lanskoy 2008).Justasthetwoleadershipsbeforehim,Saakashviliresortedtoan

38Especiallymembersofinternationalorganizations,heretheEUDelegationandOSCE, recalled this incident as a marker of increasing tensions in South Ossetia at the time, stressingthepotentialforviolencefromtheSouthOssetianside. 93  evermorehardeningstanceinSouthOssetia,includingfiercedemandsfor thesupportoftheinternationalcommunity.  In February 2008, the recognition of the international protectorate of KosovoshookthecontextoftheSouthOssetiaandAbkhaziaconflicts(on the effect of Kosovo’s independence see: Averre 2009, Cerone 2009). Russia opposed Kosovo’s recognition, but then turned the situation by claiming the same rights for the South Caucasus separatist entities. As a result, Moscow took up official diplomatic relations with Tskhinvali and SokhumiinApril2008.TwomonthsoninApril2008,theNATOsummitin BucharestdeniedmembershiptoGeorgiainthenearfuture(I6,I739;also see:Asmus2010,Nichol2009,BoundsandHendrickson2009).Aheadof thesummit,expectationsinGeorgiawerehighasNATOSecretaryGeneral Scheffer´s earlier remarks had boosted hopes for sooner membership, evenwithoutachievingterritorialintegrity(Civil.ge12.02.2007).Aheadof the summit, Russia fiercely campaigned against a possible membership. GeorgiasawthisfailurelargelyatthehandsofRussia´spressureonNATO member states, particularly Germany, with threatening to cut energy supplies.Althoughthesummitstressedthememberstates’willtoadmit Georgia at a later point, the rebuff to Georgia testified Russia´s strong ambitions and put a preliminary end to Georgia´s way into Western structures. The same month, Russia started legal relations with South OssetiaandAbkhazia(I540).  InearlyAugust2008,thesecondwarinSouthOssetiatookplaceduring five days(on thisperiod see for example: King2008,Asmus 2010, Jones 2008, Garthon 2010, Allison 2008, Cornell and Starr 2009, Cooley and Mitchell 2010b, International FactͲFinding Mission 2009). Armed action involved Ossetian militias, Georgian and Russian air forces and ground

39AmemberofalocalNGOandoftheoppositionaccountedfortheBucharestsummitas achronologicalmilestoneinthecycleofescalationleadingtothe2008war. 40AseniormemberoftheMinistryofInternalAffairsofGeorgiadescribedRussia’sdeͲ factorecognitionofthetwoentitiesasaconsequencefromtherealitythat,accordingto theinterview,RussiacreatedinBucharest. 94  troops. Georgian military temporarily invaded Tskhinvali engaging in skirmisheswith South Ossetian militias, but was pushed back by Russian military. Russian troops subsequently moved into central Georgian territory and occupied strategic locations beyond Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Thewarleaves several hundred dead (HRW 2009: 5).41 The war was ended with an initiative of the head of the EU presidency, French president Nicolas Sarkozy, when a ceasefire agreement was put in place betweenGeorgiaandRussiaon12Augustand,afterinconsistencieswitha new version, on 8 September. Despite the condition for troops to withdraw to their preͲwar positions, Russian forced only withdrew from centralGeorgiabymidͲOctober,butremainedpresentinAbkhazia,South OssetiaandformerlyGeorgianͲcontrolledareasinSouthOssetia.  Asearlyas26August2008,barelytwoweeksaftertheendoffighting,the Russian Federation recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.InOctober,theEUandUSinitiatedanewformatofinternational talks on the future of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts to periodicallytakeplaceinGeneva. In May 2009, parliamentary elections in South Ossetia and the formerly GeorgianͲcontrolled region of Akhalgori fortified the new deͲfacto status (Barry2009).Thesamemonth,theOSCEMissiontoGeorgiacloseddown as Russia vetoed the semiͲannual prolongation the mandate had been livingonsince1993.TheUNMissiontoAbkhaziawasalsovetoedbyRussia and ended in June 2009. In October 2009, as a followͲup international monitoring tool to the OSCE Mission, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was implemented (Parmentier 2009, Simons 2012). However,theEUMMmandateislimitedtomonitoringGeorgianͲcontrolled territory,whereastheformerOSCEmissionhadhadaccesstopartsofthe South Ossetian and Abkhazian regions, and the EUMM does not carry a

41Accountsofthewarextensivelydivergewithrespecttonumbersofcasualtiesandthe threesequencesofevents,particularlycontestedonthepointwhetherGeorgiantroops movedintoSouthOssetiabeforeorafterRussiantroopsmovedintoSouthOssetia(see Jones2008,IIFFMCG2009,Asmus2010,CornellandStarr2009). 95  local negotiation mechanism as the JCC. After the 2008 war, control of theseareasislefttotheRussianmilitaryandlocalleaderswithcloseties withMoscow(Garthon2010,Makarychev2009).  Toconclude,thesecondwarinSouthOssetiacameaboutamidincreasing externalandinternalpressureonSaakashvili’spowerbase.From2006,the conflict intensified enormously due to Russia’s opposition to the Kosovo recognitionandconsolidationoftheSanakoevadministration.Bothinthe Kosovo precedence and later at the NATO summit in Bucharest, the contentiouspoliticsbetweenRussiaandWesternactorsappearedandhad a reinforcing effect on the local situation, with the result of the war in August2008thathasleftthesituationintheconflictunsettleduptodate.  3.3. Analysisofsequencesofpolicies

As the background account has attempted to show, assertive agency frames the intensifying situation before each escalation. However, the sum,intensity,orsheernumberoftheseactionsdoesnotexplainwhythe conflictescalatedatthepointsintimeobserved.Therefore,theempirical analysis explores sequences that circumscribe a chain or closed unit of eventspriortoescalations.Forthispurpose,theanalysisidentifiedthree points of escalation in 2002, 2004 and 2008 prior to which a specific sequenceofeventstakeseffect.Theanalysisisaimedtoidentifyspecific policies of Westernactors thatrepeatedly occur priortoescalationsand canbeplausiblylinkedtotriggeringchangeinlocalbehavior.Thissection willstartbyintroducingtheinterviewmethodandanalysisoftheinterview material with the result of identifying the three specific sequences. Thereafter,thesectionwillpresentthereconstructedsequencesbasedon narrativesprovidedbyinterviews.  Interviewsandsequencesofpolicies

Apartfrom theanalysis of theOSCE reports,a second body of data was generatedthroughconductinginterviewsin2009and2010inTbilisi,Gori 96  and in villages along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) in the GeorgianͲOssetian conflict area. In total, 76 qualitative interviews were conducted,ofwhich39wereusedforthestudy(seeannex4).Thepurpose of the interviews was to explore local perceptions of escalations and relatedpoliciesinordertoenabletheanalysistoestablishplausiblecausal linkstorevealchainsofactionsleadingtoescalations.  Intervieweeswereselectedaccordingtowhethertheywereactiveinthe context of the conflict prior to at least one of the escalations. The interviewswereconductedwith:

x residentsoftheareaalongtheinternalborderwithSouthOssetia abouttheirexperiencesofviolenceintheaftermathofthe2008 war, x GeorgianIDPsofthefirstandthesecondwarabouttheiraccounts ofviolence, x journalistspresentduringescalationswhohaveanalyticalinsights intoGeorgianinternalpolitics, x oppositionleadersabouttheirassessmentsofstateleaders’power policies, x current and former members of all three governments since independence about governmental policies, including representativesoftheMinistryofInternalAffairs, x current and former members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whohadbeenrepresentativestotheJCC, x membersofparliamentarycommissions, x representatives of the Ministry for Refugees on the conflict and Westernrelations, x current and former representatives of the local district administration next to South Ossetia on cooperation with the SouthOssetianside, x localpoliceintheconflictzone,

97  x local and international nonͲgovernmental actors such as analysts at local think tanks on Western and Georgian policies or academics, x lawyersandhumanrightsactivistsonethniccleansingcasesduring thesecondwar, x members of international state organizations such as the OSCE, the EUMM (the EU Monitoring Mission which is the OSCE successororganizationintheconflict)andtheUN, x the EU Delegation to Georgia on Western and governmental policies, x soldierswhohadbeeninactionduringthesecondwar, x andformerinternationalandlocaladvisors.

Based on the prior experience of research for the Master’s thesis, the respondentswereexpectedtogivemoreinformationiftheconversations werenottapedandheldwithprioragreementtobeing‘offtherecord’, the agreement to use the materials without quotations and under strict anonymity. Therefore,thisstudyrefrainedfromrecordingtheinterviews electronically and instead recorded through handwritten notes and memoryprotocols.Theelectronictranscriptofthehandwrittennotesand protocolscomprisesadocumentof35pages.  At the start of the interview, the main research interest was briefly introducedafterwhichtherespondentswereaskedtogenerallyrecount theeventsthatintheiropinionledtotherespectivepointsofescalationin 2002, 2004 or 2008. The rest of the interviews alternately drew on deepeningissuestherespondentsbroughtupthemselves,bypointingthe conversation to specific issues of Western or local policies, and by encouragementstocontinuespeaking.Thestudychoseaquestionscheme establishingachronologicalreconstructionofeventstoenableanaccount ofeventsomittingpoliticalbiasoftheintervieweesandcenteringontheir localknowledge.

98  For example, if asked what are considered the most important factors relatedtoescalation,thevastmajorityofrespondents–internationalor local–statedthecontentionofUSandRussiaoverinfluenceinthepostͲ Soviet space, with some pointing to either Putin’s or Saakashvili’s (from 2004) aggressive politics. However, if asked to depict the major events priortoescalation,interviewpartnerswouldaccountalmostexclusivelyfor local events. This substantially supports the key feature of the causal argument:whereasWesternactivityintheconflictskyrocketedfrom2004 and exerted considerable influence on Georgian actors’ power choices, Western agency showed little presence or activity at the local level and thereforewashardlyvisibletotakeeffect.Therefore,thestudyreiterates onceagain,thefollowinganalysisfocusesonthetriggeringroleofWestern policies withineventsatthe local,national and internationallevel of the conflict.  Theanalysisoftheinterviewmaterialfocusedonrecurringnarratives(for a discussion of this methodology see chapter 2). As each interview accounts for an individual narrative, the interviews do not necessarily narrate a detailed, stepwise or chronological sequence of events, but highlight specific events as crucial and present a reasoning why these eventsledtoescalation. Specifickey elementsof narrativesrecur across interviewsandhenceenabletheanalysistoidentifyaplausibleandunified reading of the policies which trigger the same cycle of escalation. Therefore,thesenarrativesenablethebelowempiricalaccounttoreflect thisprocessinlightoftheinfluenceofspecificWesternpoliciesonlocal behavior. In this respect, respondents provided similar assessments of thoseeventsthatthroughtheanalysisofthematerialoccurredtobekey causaleventspriortochangeinlocalbehavior,basedonaccountsbylocal and international respondents across political boundaries alike. This means, respondents did not only account for the same events, but they alsogaveasimilarreasoningoftheirimpact.Thisisanimportantoutcome as the value and interpretation attributed to individual events did not

99  stronglydiffer,butrespondentslargelyoverlappedontheimportanceand quality of those events that the analysis later identified as the initial conditionsandpointsinchangeoflocalbehavioroftheescalationcycles.  The analysis of the OSCE material had identified intensifying and decreasing intensity around points of escalation of violence. In a further step,theinterviewsidentifiednarrativesofcausalchainsofevents.Inthis manner, the interviews both pointed out the specific role of Western impactonlocalpoliciesinkeyturningpointsoftheprocess.Theinterviews provideandframethefollowingstarting,shiftingandendpointsofthree sequencesofeventsleadingtoescalationin2002,2004and2008:

Time/ Initialcondition/ Juncture/Changeof Event/Escalation, Sequence Westernpolicy,Start localbehaviorÆ Endofescalation ofescalationcycleÆ cycle  Sequence1 FailureofBaden Shevardnadze’santiͲ AntiͲcrimeoperations 2000Ͳ2002 process corruptionagenda Sequence2 Regimechange ClosureofErgneti ShellingofTskhinvali 2003Ͳ2005  market Sequence3 Peaceroadmapsof Sanakoev Armedactionof 2006Ͳ2008 theSaakashvili administration Georgian,Ossetian leadership andRussianforces

 Table2:Sequencesleadingtoassertivepolicies:Initialcondition,junctureand eventwithinterviewsources(In).  Onthisbasis,theempiricalanalysisexploresthesethreesequencesthat circumscribe specific trajectories prior to the 2002, 2004 and 2008 escalations, with the interviews that account for these narratives being indicatedinthetable.Thesequencesspancyclesofescalationthat1)are setoffbyaninitialconditionorcontingenteventwhenaWesternpolicy interactswithitscontext,which2)subsequentlyformsapath,asequence events when Western policies significantly and gradually influence local powerpoliciesonthelocal,nationalandinternationalleveloftheconflict context, which 3)subsequently triggers the critical juncture of changein localbehaviorthatcreatesashifttoassertivepoliciesthat4)lastly,witha 100  certain delay after the change in behavior brings about an escalation of violence.  Here, the study presents the trajectory of the sequences of escalation cyclesinbriefandthenindepthinthebelowanalysis.Thefirstsequence took its start with the failure of the OSCEͲfacilitated Baden process that was to conclude in the reintegration agreement between South Ossetia andGeorgiain2000.TheprospectsseemedpromisinguntilGeorgiadenied Russia support for the war in Chechnya. As a result, Moscow initiated SouthOssetiatopulloutofthedealandtheagreementwasnotsigned. ThecoreelementoftheBadenprocesshadbeentheintroductionofatax system for shipments from Russia through South Ossetia to Georgia in ordertodiminishsmugglingactivities.AfterBadenfailed,theOSCEandEU continued tonegotiatean agreement ifnot on reintegration thenatthe very least on custom controls. This deal was not popular, neither within the South Ossetian nor the Georgian side as it would have cut illicit revenues. Negotiations, however, proceeded until 2002, when then MinisterofJusticeandlaterpresidentMikheilSaakashvilispearheadedthe antiͲcorruptioncampaignoftheShevardnadzegovernment,andasapart of this conducted largeͲscale antiͲcrime operations in the GeorgianͲ Ossetianconflictzone.Subsequently,GeorgianandOssetianforcesstarted tostruggleoveronͲtheͲgroundcontrolonanintenselevel. The second sequence set off with the regime change in Georgia from President Shevardnadze to Saakashvili after the Rose Revolution of November2003.ThenewrulingeliteunderreformerSaakashvilicameinto poweronawaveofmassiveWesternsupportfromtheU.S.andEurope. Western demands settled on implementing rule of law by establishing centralrulethroughterritorialintegrationandacrackdownoncorruption. BoththesegoalsrankedatthetopofSaakashvili’sinaugurationagenda.In May2004,threemonthsintoSaakashvili’sterm,Georgianinteriortroops closed down themajorsmugglinghub theErgneti market on the border withSouthOssetia.Althoughthisactionestablishedcontroltoasignificant

101  extent, the conflict however escalated with permanent skirmishes between the Ossetian militia and the Georgian police. When Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs Okruashvili shelled Tskhinvali in a brief and unanticipatedoperation,theconflictpermanentlyreachedahigherlevelof violencethansincethefirstwarendedin1992. The third sequence started in the wake of intensifying relations with WesternactorswhiletheSaakashviliregimeslowlysettledintopower.The Georgian government launched foreign policy efforts promoting peace road maps for settlement of the South Ossetia conflict, successfully gatheringsupportintheinternationalarenathroughframeworkssuchas NATO, EU, OSCE and UN. Additionally, in the course of 2005 Western engagement intensified in the conflict zone, through implementing joint GeorgianͲOssetian economic rehabilitation projects. However, the Georgian government deemed Western support in territorial integration issues to be too hesitant. In the end of 2005, Tbilisi hardened its stance andinstalledthealternativeSanakoevadministrationwithauthorityinthe GeorgianͲcontrolled areas in the conflict zone, outraging Ossetian JCC representatives and shifting the situation toward assertive policies. Until the 2008 war, international activity in all arenas thrived whereas the situationintheconflictareadeteriorated.TherecognitionofKosovoand Russia’s commencement of legal relations with the secessionist Sokhumi and Tskhinvali leaderships provided contentious terrain for the NATO summitinBucharestinApril2007thatfinallydeniedaccessiontoGeorgia inthemidͲterm.Fourmonthsafterthesummit,theSouthOssetiaconflict escalatedintowarinAugust2008.  The previous section has given a background discussion of episodes of political events and violence framing on the basis of the three points of escalationin2002,2004and2008.Itshouldbereiteratedthatthepurpose of the subsequent account is not to explain actions or motivations of actors, but to plausibly frame why agency came to exhibit the observed effects. Therefore, the study proceeds with the empirical analysis of the

102  interview material by presenting the study with a narrative analysis of sequencesoftheWesternandlocalpoliciesintheconflict. Itshouldalsobereiteratedthattheinterviewspointoutcontingentevents as wellastheircausalsignificance, but the interpretation follows on the basisofthepreviouslydiscussedargumentandrelatedworkinghypothesis of the study. Therefore, in contrast to the background account that elaborated on the local context of events, the analysis of sequences emphasizes Western effects on those events. As discussed above, the accountwilldepicttheinteractionofWesternandlocalleadershippolicies atspecificpointsintimeandpointsoutwhichWesternpoliciesatwhich levels of the conflict start and sustain cycles of escalation through triggeringachangeinbehavioroflocalstateleaderships.  Thethreesequencesarebasedontheanalysisoftheinterviewmaterials (see annex 4). Each sequence is based on interviews and the materials fromtheOSCEarchive(seeannexes1and3).Thesecondaryliteratureis selectively quoted and draws on the sources used in the background chapter. It serves to frame the account of the interviews. The table of events which the interviews account for is included in the annex (see annex1).  Sequence1–2002

Initialcondition:FailureoftheBadenprocessÆChangeinlocalbehavior: Shevardnadze's antiͲcorruption agenda Æ Escalation: antiͲcrime operations

Summary.ThefirstsequencebeganwiththefailureoftheOSCEͲfacilitated Baden process that was to conclude in the reintegration agreement betweenSouthOssetiaandGeorgiain2000throughintroducingextensive measures to curb smuggling. After Baden failed, the OSCE and EU continued to negotiate an agreement on custom controls. Negotiations proceeded until, in 2002, thenͲMinister of Justice and later president Mikheil Saakashvili spearheaded the antiͲcorruption campaign of the 103  Shevardnadze government, and as a part of this operation conducted largeͲscale antiͲcrime operations in the GeorgianͲOssetian conflict zone. Afterthesubsequentescalation,GeorgianandOssetianforcesstartedto struggleoveronͲtheͲgroundcontrolonanintenselevel.  WesternintegrationofGeorgiatookshapeonasmallscaleatthestartof the1990s,asCSCEandlaterOSCEbecameactiveinGeorgiaasoneofthe firstWesternstateorganizationsontheground(I8,I14,I1Ͳ16,I5,I20).42 TheOSCEservedasagateͲkeeperfortheWesternactorstofollowandas anintroductoryinstrumenttoimplementtheconditionalitiesenvisagedby the Western agenda, to promote democracy by establishing rule of law andassistinginsolvingterritorialconflictsinGeorgia(Jawad2008,Koenig 2005). While expectations ran high from the very beginning of their cooperation and rhetoric from the Western and the Georgian sides adoptedagrandstyle,theOSCEadoptedasubduedmanneranddidnot externalizefundsbutworkedmerelyasapoliticaltooloffacilitationand observation. On the whole, OSCE’s ‘soft’ entry to Georgia’s political contextatthebeginningofWesternintegrationtriedtoeasepostͲSoviet structuresinconflicts,relationsandpoliticsintotheWesternframework, andeventuallytriedtomakethecountryfittoadapttoWesternstructures informalterms.  ThemostambitiousprojectinthisplanwaspavingthewaytoGeorgia’s territorialintegrity.Functionalstatestructures,itwasagreed,requireda predictable security setting for livelihood and prosperity, and would be provided if Georgia came to guard its internationally recognized borders withRussia,inbothAbkhaziaandSouthOssetia.Functionalstatehood,the OSCE agenda held, was to be maintained through acquiring revenues at thehandsofthestatetosustainafunctionaleconomy(Socor2005).Inthe

42 The UN was active in safeͲguarding the postͲconflict setup in Abkhazia, whereas the OSCE was mandated in South Ossetia, however, both operations were under Russian command.InterviewsontheactivitiesofEuropeaninternationalorganizationsatthestart of the 1990s in Georgia were held with current and former senior members of the Saakashviligovernment,theEUDelegation,andtheOSCEMissiontoGeorgia. 104  case of Georgia this was a farͲaway reality at the start of the 2000s: Smuggling through Abkhazia, but mainly through South Ossetia occupied upto 70percentofincominggoodstoGeorgiathatwerecheaperthan locallyproducedonesandthatevadedtaxation(Kukhianidze2006). Asaresult,WesternpartnersintheOSCEframeworkrecognizedsettling illicittradeinSouthOssetiaasthemostsensitiveandurgentissueinterms of building the Georgian state. Therefore, the OSCE attempted to encompassthevolatileaspectsofthepostͲwarsituationinSouthOssetia, including status, violence, illicit trade and territorial issues as a former memberoftheShevardnadzegovernmentrecalledintheinterview(I29). OSCE engagement, thus, was an integral part of Georgia’s postͲSoviet politicssincetheCSCEhadtakenoverfacilitationofpoliticalnegotiations andmilitaryissuesinSouthOssetiaasearlyas1992andlaterintheJCC framework.  FormerseniorofficialsoftheShevardnadzegovernmentandamemberof internationalorganizationconfirmedthattheOSCE’sfocusonsettlingthe South Ossetia conflict fed on close relations between Chibirov and the Georgianadministration(I8,I14,I1Ͳ8).In1996,ShevardnadzeandSouth OssetianpresidentChibirovhadfallenveryshortofreachinganagreement toreintegrateSouthOssetiaintoGeorgiawithinabroadͲautonomysetting (I943,Koenig2005).TheclosecooperationbetweenTbilisiandTskhinvali over smuggling revenues and financial perks for Chibirov from Tbilisi resulted inthe mutual GeorgianͲOssetian interest of lowintensityofthe conflict throughout the 1990s: The internal border was kept open and formal or informal organizational issues came to be settled between GeorgiansandOssetianeitherdirectlyorwithintheJCCframework(also see Episode 2). Additionally by 1999, the settlement talks had been enhancedintoabroaderinternationalsetting,withOSCEandECmember statesattendingthenegotiationsandbackingthemupwithlobbyingand facilitationactivities.

43InterviewwithamemberoftheoppositionandpoliticalanalystinJuly2009inTbilisi. 105  EndofBadenprocess

Againstthisbackground,theendoftheOSCEͲled‘Badenprocess’in2000 created a juncture in Western efforts in implementing territorial reintegration of South Ossetia and setting off a series of events that intensifiedtheconflictuntil2002.TheprocessoftheBadentalksenvisaged framing the settlement of the South Ossetia conflict through gradual integrationintoGeorgia(I8,I9,I14,Koenig2005).Atthecenterofthe agenda, the negotiations envisaged strengthening the capacities of the centralstatebyendingillegalshipmentsfrom Russia to Georgia through introducingafreetradezoneinSouthOssetia(Socor2005).Thispractical approach, that initially did not address South Ossetia’s political status, included introducing freight controls of shipments from the North Caucasus by Georgian personnel at the international border between GeorgianandRussia.Thisschemewastoguaranteeaminimaldegreeof GeorgianinvolvementinbordercontrolattheRussianborderandrevenue from taxing the shipments. However, the Georgian and Ossetian sides maintained a cautious attitude toward finalization as the arrangement wouldhavedeprivedtheleadershipsoftheirsmugglingrevenues.Atthe same time, particularly the Georgian side had the vested interest to comply with Western demands at least on the surface and show the commitment to fight smuggling (I 8, I 9, I 14, George 2009, Kukhianidze 2006).Therefore,negotiationsdraggedon.However,theOSCEpushedfor implementation, and prepared for signing the result of three years of negotiationsatthebigmeetinginBaden,SouthGermanyinJuly2000,with Russian,Georgian,SouthOssetian,andNorthOssetianrepresentatives. However,Russia’ssecondwarinChechnyain1999providedthecontext for Moscow to put an end to the Baden process and reinforce the strengthening GeorgianͲOssetian relations. When Putin became acting presidentinDecember1999,heofferedbutonechancetoShevardnadze bydemandingfromhimtosupportRussia´ssecondwarinChechnyaand grantoverflightanddeploymentrightstoRussianforcessouthofPankisi valley on Georgian territory (Kuzio 1995, Proladze 2001, Sikharulidze

106  2001). Only one month before Putin´s rise to power in November 1999, Shevardnadze reiterated his commitment to Western structures at the 1999OSCEsummitinIstanbul(OSCEAR20/99,VanSanten2000).Justas Gamsakhurdia before him, Shevardnadze refused to support Putin, with one eye on the Georgian population which would have condemned bonding with Russia over waging war with the Chechen ‘brother nation’ andwiththeothereyeevenmorefocusedontheWesterncondemnation ofRussia’sChechnyaatrocitiesasacurrentandaformerseniormemberof the Georgian governments indicated in interviews (I 8, I 29). Thus, ShevardnadzerefusedandultimatelydisgruntledPutin.Inadirectreaction toGeorgia’srefusaltocooperatewithRussiaontheChechnyawar,Russian representatives pulled out from the Baden deal and urged their South Ossetian counterparts to follow suit. The document that had been regardedasthegreatestsuccessinnegotiationsaftertheendofthe1992 warwasnotsigned.  As a result, the Western side cancelled the format. However, the OSCE stucktoitsapproachoffocusingontheissueoffreightcontrolinorderto curb smuggling and strengthen central state authority. However, the following steps revealed a change in strategy as they detached from political issues such as the status of South Ossetia even more than the Baden approach had envisaged. Keeping close with practical more than political issues, the OSCE recovered from the Baden failure and soon organizedaworkingmeetingoftheJCCPoliticalExpertGroupinBucharest asinSeptember2001andasecondmeetinginCasteloBrancoinOctober 2002aseniormemberoftheEUDelegationtoGeorgiaemphasizedasan importantmilestoneintheprocess(I14).Themeetingswereattendedby EU representatives giving credibility to the talks. Particularly the Castelo Branco meeting celebrated the results on establishing joint GeorgianͲ Ossetiancustoms’post. Meanwhile,Moscowfolloweduponitsblowtothenegotiations.Though Russia had veto power in the JCC, the Castelo Branco and Bucharest

107  meetings envisaged the joint GeorgianͲOssetian freight controls without participation of Russia on the territory of the South Ossetia region. The implementation of this border regime would have greatly diminished Russian influence on Georgian territory. To keep control, at the end of 2001,MoscowsackedthemoderateChibirovandreplacedhimwithhardͲ line leader Eduard Kokoity as the deͲfacto president of South Ossetia, among others a former senior member of the Kokoity administration accountsintheinterview(I8,I9,I28,I29).  Therefore, in the aftermath of the Baden process until 2002, Western policiesaimedatbuildingafunctionalstateinGeorgiawere,onapolitical level, almost exclusively directed to recovering relationships among the conflictingpartiesandrestoringborderauthorityoftheGeorgianstate. Inthisrespect,theWesternagendaputstrengtheningthecentralstatein Georgiathroughfightingcrime ontop of its agenda, over multiple other measures of external state building such as enhancing military capacity, launching largeͲscale investment, or integrating the state into existing treaties.Alocaljournalistsuggestsintheinterviewthatbefore2002,the bruntofWesternengagementinstateͲbuildingthroughterritorialintegrity took place at the local level in the conflict zone (I 2). Western actors continued to address stakeholders in the capital, but the very active, intense part of Western engagement concentrated on bringing together the conflict parties, mostly in Tskhinvali or Gori, but also in Tbilisi or Moscow.Therefore,theOSCEwaslocallyinvolvedinsettinguptalks,joint projectssuch as jointcheckpoints of the Russian, Georgian and Ossetian peaceͲkeeping forces, joint police patrols, talks on water and power suppliesforvillagesorsolvingcrimeissues,thelocaljournalistaccountsfor indetail,backedbytheaccountofaseniormemberoftheEUDelegation toGeorgiawhohadbeeninchargeofthoseinternationalefforts(I2,I14). EngagementontheinternationallevelofWesternagencyorthelevelof thecapitalinTbilisiwascomparablylowornonͲexistent. 

108  AftertheEuropeanͲinitiatedprojectsofthe1990shadfailedintheirinitial scope,Westernengagementgatheredpaceatthebeginningofthe2000s. WhiletheOSCEwasstillpushingforwardbordercontrolsbetweenSouth OssetiaandGeorgia,theUS,EUandlargeinternationalstateorganizations such as the IMF, World Bank and NATO started to show presence in Georgia. This trend was genuinely supported by the Georgian state elite whose efforts tointegrateinto Western structures were unbridled. With this new and wide range of actors entering, the West’s focus on stateͲ buildingmeasuresinGeorgiashiftedfromthelocal,issueͲorientedfocusof the1990stofocusingonacapitalͲcenteredapproachofstrengtheningthe centralstateinTbilisi.  Shevardnadze’santiͲcorruptioncampaign

TheshifttocapitalpoliticsbecamemostevidentasWesternactorsmore frequentlyandmorestridentlyaddressedthemainstateactors,uttering expectations,demandsandconditionalitiesmorefiercelythanintheprior decade.Evenbeforecooperationindefinedframeworkstookitsstart,this stance had an altering effect on central state politics. Envisaging a WesternͲstyle government in Georgia, the West took to vehemently criticizing corruption levels in Georgia from 2000 as several then active membersofadvocacyandinternationalorganizationsrecall(I1Ͳ7,I14,I 11). This stance was accompanied by large amounts of funding for Georgian civil society organizations engaging in democratization and opposing the Shevardnadze regime for embezzling the state budget and upholdingasystemofcorruptionthatresultedinbroadinjustice(I14).In 2002,IMFandWesterngovernmentsmountedharshcriticismofthelack of rule of law, particularly in regards to corruption and crime levels. Georgian civil society groups at the same time raised pressure on the Georgiangovernment.Asaresult,theIMFstalledloanstoGeorgiain2001 and Western donors threatened to permanently withdraw financial support(alsoseefootnote14).

109  In order to secure Western support, Shevardnadze announced a largeͲ scaleantiͲcorruptioncampaignin2002(I7,I1Ͳ7).Thecampaignaimedat internallyreͲorganizingsmugglingwithevenbetterrevenuesforthestate elite, mainly through dividing control of smuggling of gas and cigarettes between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice. However, toward Western partners the campaign aimed at staging an ambitious and successful ruleͲofͲlaw reform to restore trust in the Shevardnadzegovernment.  AntiͲsmugglingoperations

The tide in the conflict turned toward escalation when then Minister of Justice and later president Mikheil Saakshvili implemented a largeͲscale antiͲcrime campaign inthe area bordering SouthOssetia (I 7, I 1Ͳ7).The campaign implemented part of the antiͲcorruption agenda of the Shevardnadzeregime.InFebruary2002,theGeorgianMinistryofDefense tookcommandoftheGeorgianPKFbattalionswhowereunderthepeace agreement subordinate to the JPKF command and from midͲOctober, GeorgianforcescarriedoutalargeͲscaleantiͲcrimeoperationintheregion of Shida Kartli with subsequent raids (OSCE AR 16/02, 17/02, 18/02, 21/02). At the same time in February 2002, representatives of Georgian and Ossetian Law Enforcement Bodies were named to jointly head a Special Coordination Center for antiͲcrime activities in the conflict zone (OSCEAR03/02). Fromthen,OssetianandGeorgianforcesengagedinantiͲcrimeoperations struggling over access and infrastructure across the area. The new Georgianpolicyoverturnedthelocalsituation:Amutualspiralofassertive actions on the Ossetian and Georgian sides kickedͲoff as actions were reciprocatedbyOssetianmilitiasandnonͲregularactionsbyPeacekeeping Forces.OssetianaswellasGeorgianforcesactedunderthesamebanner of antiͲsmuggling or antiͲcrime campaigns. The situation amounted to increasednumbersofsecuritypersonnel,continuousroadblocks,arbitrary raidsandincreasedshootͲouts.

110  AssessmentofWesternpolicies

GeorgianstateeliteswerehighlyresponsivetoWesterndemandsasthey sawWesternpoliciesdecisivelyinfluencingtheirdomesticpowerbase.The crucial influence of Western policies, therefore, concentrated in the concerted Baden process involving the Russian, Georgian and Ossetian sidestocurbsmugglinginSouthOssetiaandlikewiseintroducedarupture when the process failed. Thus, the state politics of Tbilisi’s elites underwentanalterationatthestartofthe2000s.Analystsfromlocalcivil society organizations suggested in interviews that, adapting to the new Westernconditionalities,statepoliciesadoptedanassertivestanceand,as aresult,broughtaboutanintensificationofviolencein2002(I31,I32). Sustaining the argument of the study, Western policies did not cause escalation, however, dynamics changed at the very point in time when Westernpoliciesintroducedanewstancetothesituation.  IntheaftermathoftheBadenfailure,theinteractionofWesternpolicies with Georgian state agency reinforced the escalation process, including mountingWesterncriticismofcorruptionlevelsinGeorgiauptothepoint whentheGeorgiangovernmentintroducedanantiͲcorruptioncampaignto complywithWesterndemands.44ThedoubleͲstrategyoftheGeorgianside alsoshowsinincreasingescalative,unilateralactivitiesofthePKFonthe onehand,whileontheotherimplementingajointCoordinationCenter. WesternpartnersprovedsatisfiedwiththeGeorgiangovernment’sefforts, among them Minister Saakashvili’s highͲprofile initiative in the conflict zone. Funding to the Georgian state was, as a result, not stalled at any pointintime(I7,I1Ͳ7).However,interviewsmakeitseemthishappened whenmultilateraleffortsofWesternpoliciesprovednottobesuccessful and Western policies went on to address responsibility for meeting the goalsatthelevelofcentralstateactorsinGeorgia–practicallysettingoffa unilateraldevelopment(I7,I14).AftertheendoftheBadenprocess,the

44Thiswasheldtosignificantlyweighinontheprocessduringinterviewswithbothalocal analystandaformerseniormemberoftheShevardnadzegovernment(I7,I26). 111  Western agenda maintained the same focus of stateͲstrengthening antiͲ corruption measures (Socor 2005, Jawad 2008), but at the same time mounted the pressure at the national level and hence reinforced local dynamicstowardescalation. Morespecifically,WesternpoliciesaftertheBadenfailureshiftedfromthe localtothenationallevelbychangingthearenaofWesternagencyfrom onͲtheͲground negotiations to cooperation with central state actors. WesternͲRussian relations at the international level of the South Ossetia conflictwerenotdevelopedasanarenaofagencyoftheconflictasyet. Following the shift to the national level, Western actors increasingly addressed demands of antiͲsmuggling and antiͲcorruption measures to Georgian state actors, in contrast to the prior multiͲlateral approach of includingtheotherparties.  Inthiscontext,theoutlineofanambiguousinfluenceofWesternpolicies ondomesticpowerconsolidationshowedforthefirsttimewithinthepostͲ Sovietpoliticalcontext.Priortothe2002escalation,Westernpolicieson the one hand stressed democracyͲbuilding policies through seeking settlementthroughextensivenegotiationschemesandthroughenhancing the rule of law by cutting down on crime and corruption. On the other hand, Western policies focused on stateͲstrengthening policies through supportofcentralrulebystressingterritorialintegrityasinterviewswith former members of the OSCE Mission to Georgia and the EU Delegation suggested(I14,I20,I4).  Altogether, the analysis of the first sequence of actions finds three characteristicsshapingdynamicsinthisperiod:1)Westernagencysetsoff and maintains the cycle of escalation by first, creating the salience of territorialintegrationpolicies,second,cancellingthepolicyinreactionwith other stakeholders and third, reinforcing the cycle by interacting to a significant extent with local state elites, 2) Prior to escalation, Western agencychangesthearenaofagencytoahigherlevel,fromthelocaltothe

112  nationalarenaoftheconflict,and3)AfocusonstateͲcenteredpoliciesof Westernactorspriortotheescalation.  The discussion, hence, is set to further look into whether these three characteristics of Western policies might turn out to be generalizable mechanisms of the dynamics of the conflict. The study seeks to further sustain the argument of Western policies triggering dynamics, although domesticpowerpoliciesorRussianinfluenceholdasignificantswayinthe conflict. As for Russia’s impact, it is crucial for the dynamics that the RussianinterventionendedtheBadenprocess,butdidnotdeterminethe policiesthatshapedthesubsequentpathtoescalation.Instead,Georgian elites responded to and complied with the Western policies of stateͲ centered antiͲsmuggling measures that had laid the foundation of the Baden process and continued to head the Western agenda in the aftermath. Therefore, Russian policies reinforced the trajectory, but are notseenasacauseinthecycleasdefinedabove. Further,GeorgianstateelitescopedwiththedemandsofWesternactors totheirownadvantageofpowerconsolidationasformerseniormembers ofGeorgiangovernmentssuggest(I12,I25,I26):Shevardnadzereshuffled portfolios within his cabinet so that smuggling revenues appeared to be retracted even more effectively; Shevardnadze’s successful protégé, Saakashvili,gainedinternalandinternationalrecognitionthroughhisantiͲ crimeagenda;theGeorgianleadershipimplementedaunilateralstancein theconflictzoneatthesametimeas,intheformalframework,upholding joint GeorgianͲOssetian activities in the JCC framework; with the result that the government – though not supported by the international communityintoanextterm–temporarilysucceededinmutingWestern criticismandgainedsupport.  However, while Western policies offered opportunities for power consolidation,theyatthesametimeputrestraintsonoptionsforagency in the conflict. Georgian power politics depended to such a significant

113  extentonWesternsupportthatthedynamicsafterthe2002Badenfailure suggest that Westernpolicies triggered theescalation cycle by decisively curbinglocalpowerconsolidationopportunities.Inthismanner,Western policies worked through the power consolidation policies of local state actorswhosechangeinbehavior,then,ledtoescalation.  Sequence2–2004

Initialcondition:RegimechangeÆChangeofbehavior:ErgneticlosureÆ Escalation:ShellingofTskhinvali

Summary.Thesecondsequencewassetoffbythe2003regimechangein GeorgiafromPresidentShevardnadzetoSaakashvili,whichoccurredwith awaveofWesternsupportfromtheU.S.andEurope.Westerndemands settled on implementing rule of law by establishing central rule through territorialintegrationandcrackdownoncorruption.InMay2004,Georgian troops of the Ministry of Interior closed down the major smuggling hub ErgnetimarketontheborderwithSouthOssetia.WhenGeorgiantroops shelled Tskhinvali in an overnight operation in August 2004, the conflict permanentlyescalatedforthefirsttimesincethewarendedin1992.  From the early 2000s, Georgia’s Western partners started to bolster the Georgianstateaspartofamoredevelopedagendaandthuscastrelations intermsofmoreformalizedintegrationprocesses.Thoseeffortsgranted GeorgiaenhancedrelationswithEuropeandmadeanactiveforeignpolicy regarding Georgia a more important element of European and American foreignpolicy.  Regimechange

IntensifiedandmorefocusedWesternengagementtookakeyroleinthe sea change in Georgia’s domestic politics with the turn from the

114  Shevardnadze to the Saakashvili presidency (I 1, I 6, I 8, I 9, I 13, I 1445, Wheatley2005,MilcherandSlay2005,BarbeandJohanssonͲNogue2008, Mitchell 2012). Whereas the new government came into power on a promise of stability, the South Ossetia conflict escalated within months after the change in power presidency (I 1, I 6, I 8, I 9, ICG 2004, Peuch 2004, Fuller 2005, Mayorov 2002, Kolst and Blakkisrud 2008). Western policiesengagingintheregimechangeseemtohavecruciallysetoffthe cyclethat,startingfromtheRoseRevolutionprotestsinNovember2003, triggeredthechangeinlocalpoliciesthatresultedintheclosureofErgneti marketwhichmarkedthechangeoflocalpoliciestoanassertivestancein theconflict.  Whereas the Shevardnadze era had introduced close relations with the West,theregimeturnedouttobesupersededbytheveryconsequences of the intensified relations it had initiated in the first place. In the parliamentary elections of 2003, Western actors, particularly European states but also the US, did not support the Shevardnadze model into another term(I 1, I6, I 29, Mitchell2004, Coppieters andLegvold2005, Wheatley 2005). Instead, Georgia’s Western allies turned to newcomer and ardent democrat Saakashvili who already under Shevardnadze had provencapableofimplementingtheWesternagenda. From2000,WesternorganizationssuchasIMF,TransparencyInternational and governments to Soros’ Open Society Foundation or the National Democratic Institute had harshly criticized the Shevardnadze regime for lack of democratic rule and had supported civil society organizations workingforachangeinGeorgia.AfterthepostͲelectionprotestshadtaken off in November 2003, Western support played a key role in supporting

45Thefollowingsectiondrawsoninterviewstakenmainlywithpersonswithoppositional viewstotheincreasinglyunpopularSaakashviligovernmentafterthe2008SouthOssetia war.Amongthoseweremembersoftheopposition,butalsocoͲworkersofinternational organizations and two members of former governments now in the opposition. All of these persons had been fierce supporters of the movement that Saakashvili headed to oust Shevardnadze and, in the aftermath, got disappointed by what they felt as undemocraticpoliticsoftheSaakashviligovernment.Thereforetheinterviewsgavevivid testimonyoftheriseofSaakashvili’srule. 115  Saakashvili’s ousting of Shevardnadze (I 1, I 29, Karumidze and Wertsch 2005,Mitchell2004and2012).AsWesterncriticismgatheredpaceinthe years before the 2003 parliamentary elections, Western players consistently addressed the lack of rule of law and high levels of embezzlementandcorruption,withaverysmallproportionoffundsspent ontheactualtargetprojects(Timm2012,alsoseeStewartetal.2012).  As after 2002, Western allies had lost trust in the Shevardnadze government to be a reliable partner in strengthening state structures in Georgia,Westernactorswishedforanewelitetospearheadthecountry’s reform process. Funding, loans and political support for Georgia soared after Saakashvili took power in January 2004.46 Western agendas of integration into NATO and European structures carved out specific conditionalitieslinkedtothissupport,specificallyaimedatstrengthening state structures. These structural changes included: military reform throughprofessionaltraining,reliablechainofcommandandequipment; economic reform generating sustainable revenues for the state through privatization, regulated import and export flows, and raising the budget through tax collection; investments into infrastructure and construction throughtransparentprocurementandthelike(EuropeanNeighbourhood PolicyͲReferencedocuments2003and2004,NATOPressReleases2005 and2006).  In response to Western incentives, when taking power Saakashvili introduced not only a new elite, but also a new code of conduct for

46InJanuary2004duringhisvisitinTbilisi,Powellreconfirmedapaymentof164mUSD toGeorgiaduringthe2004fiscalyear,andallocating64mintrainingandequipmentof Georgian troops (Civil.ge 26.01.2004). In August 2005, the US State Department announced the allocation of the ‘Millenium Aid Fund’ of 130 m USD economic rehabilitation,inadditiontotheregularannualfund(USStateDep16.08.2005).EUfunds to Georgia started in 1991. The EU assistance programme TACIS allocated 131 million Euro to Georgia until the start of the European Neighborhood Policy Initiative in 2006 whichincludesannualpaymentsof30Ͳ40mEuro.ImplementingtheLjubljanadocument ofNovember2005,inJune2006adonorconferenceinBrusselspledged10mEurofor the OSCEͲled joint GeorgianͲSouth Ossetian economic rehabilitation programme. On averagethroughoutthepostͲindependenceperiod,thepaymentsamountto70percent ofthegrossannualstatebudget. 116  political life in Georgia. These new ways of power fed considerably on previouslyexistentresources:FierceantiͲRussianrhetoricandasternproͲ Western stance, even more radical than under Shevardnadze, set the agenda of the new elite (Lazarus 2010, Wheatley 2005). The new government proved keen to implement Western conditionalities to their fullextent.Centralizedpresidentialpowerdirectedtheimplementationof policies in the capital and in the regions and reshuffled personnel and postsinamanagerialmannerasaseniormemberofanoppositionalparty whohadbeenclosetoSaakashvili’salliesatthestartofhisrulerecounts(I 6). The Saakashvili elite, from December 2003, almost built a state from scraps. As state structures were weak or nonͲexistent, Saakashvili and a small group of people concentrated power in their hands and managed stateͲformingtasksalmostontheirownaccord. Reform–democraticor functional–thusturnedintoamatterofstrongstatestructuresfirst.  On these propositions, Saakashvili both floated into power as well as broughtthoseexpectationsintooffice.However,theimplementationofa strong, centralized state was crucially realized through the support of Westernactors.ThenewͲstylepoliticsconcentratedpowerinthehandsof evenfeweractorsasopposedtoShevardnadze’s‘pyramidmodel’(Stefes 2008,Timm2012,alsoseeStewartetal.2012,Sigwart2006).Thislefta smaller number of people in deͲfacto decisionͲmaking positions and resultedinanominaldecreaseofembezzlementandabuseofpublicoffice which was noted and wellͲreceived by Western partners. In the same manner, more money was spent on stateͲrelated issues such as infrastructure, military expenditures and institutional capacities such as police than under Shevardnadze (Liklikadze 2007, Fuller and Giragosian 2007). The Saakashvili leadership justified expenses with institution buildingmeasuresandthenationalrighttoselfͲdefense.Likewise,policies, andalsoWesternͲorientedreform,cametobeimplementedmorequickly andsomewhatmoreeffectivelywhichsustainedWesternsupportforthe newgovernmentinspiteofdemocraticcaveats.

117  Whereas the Western agenda prior to the 2003 regime change had focusedonstateͲstrengtheningmeasures,Westernsupportoftheregime transition from Shevardnadze to Saakashvili strongly emphasized democraticreform:Protestswereinternationallysupportedbecausethey abstainedfromviolenceandbecausetheyfollowedwhatwererecognized asfalsifiedelections.ThenewleaderSaakashviliwasheldtoputanendto corruption and respect the choice of the people. In this scheme, stateͲ buildingstillwastopofthelistofWesterndemands,butthisdesirewas bolsteredbystrongproͲdemocracyrhetoric.  Inthisrespect,asmuchasWesternactors’supportoftheRoseRevolution was based on the call for democracy, just as in the years prior to the revolution the West’s support aimed at integration into Western organizational structures. The Western agenda was set not only to democratize, but essentially to gradually adapt to Western structures by firstestablishingfunctionalandcapablestatestructuresatthehandsofa committed elite. Therefore, Western support first of all centered on the central tasks of the state, such as collecting revenues, guarding international borders, enhancing predictability through preventing war, unfairelectionsorotherinstabilityͲraisinginstances.  ClosureofErgnetimarket

Against this background, the Western support of the regime change introducedashiftinthebehaviorofthelocalelites.WhereasSaakashvili had already started antiͲcorruption policies under Shevardnadze, the strongWestern demands of ruleoflaw which had carried him topower reinforced the necessity to act appropriately and quickly in order to maintainthesupportofWesternpartners.Accordingly,whenSaakashvili introduced his agenda upon taking office in January 2004, territorial integration of the secessionist regions of Georgia ranked on top of the leadership’s list of reforms (Peuch 2004, Fuller 2005). The day after his inaugurationinajointpressconferencewithU.S.SecretaryofStatePowell

118  inTbilisi,SaakashviliannouncedaplantointegrateGeorgiaintoWestern structuresaswellastorestoreGeorgia’sterritorialintegrityaspartofthe sameprocess(Civil.ge26.01.2004,Mitchell2012).Theleadershiptargeted notonlyWestern,butalsodomesticsupportbasedonnationalistclaimsof territorialreintegration,just astheprevious two postͲSoviet leaderships, withWesternsupportreinforcingtheclaim.  With respect to Western engagement in Georgia, the smuggling hub of Ergnetimarketinterferedwitheffortstoestablishcentralauthorityinthe region (I 1, I 2, I 6, I 8, I 9, I 10, I 18, I 2947, Kukhianidze et al. 2006, Kukhianidze2004,Christophe2005,Wennmann2004,alsoseeEpisode2). Ergneti market continued to flourish also after antiͲcrime campaigns startedin2002.TheGeorgianandOssetiansideshadaninterestingaining controlovertheflowofgoods,or,respectively,tostagecommitmentto rule of law to Western partners, but the mutual interest of keeping smuggling through Ergneti alive persisted also after 2002 (George 2009, Kukhianidzeetal.2006).IthadbecomeatransͲshipmentcenterofgoods fromtheNorthCaucasus,includingsmugglingofgas,cigarettes,flourand sunflowerseedoil.Atthesametime,Ergnetiprovidedthebasisforsmall tradebetweenGeorgiansandOssetians.  Thus,Ergnetiadoptedadualmeaning:Ontheonehand,itensuredcontact and relations between the ethnic communities on the ground and maintained movement of people across the border. On the other hand, ErgnetisuppliedGeorgia’seconomywithlargeflowsofuntaxedgoods,and thus supported corruption, incentives for state leaders to uphold the

47ManyoftheinterviewpartnersmentionedtheroleofErgnetimarketascrucialinthe developmentofconflict.Theyrankedfromseniorpoliceofficers,regardedasamongthe mostrigidalliesofthegovernment,tooppositionmembersfiercelypitchedagainstthe government,topoliticalanalystswhohaveconductedresearchonthegroundbeforethe marketwascloseddown.Everybodyunanimouslyagreedthatclosingdownthemarket escalatedtheconflictafteradecadeofrelativecalm,thatalternativemeasureshadnot beenfullytakenintoaccountandthattheconflicthadtakenapointofnoreturnafter whichitcouldnothavebeenexpectedtodeͲescalatebacktothepreviouslevel. 119  status quo and averted staterevenues and integration into international trade(I7,Kukhianidze2002and2004). BothduringShevardnadze’sandSaakashvili’srule,centralactorsinTbilisi did not meddle in local affairs, ensuring the loyalty of the district administration in Gori by providing opportunities for them to gain from smuggling, and in turn enjoying money transfers and the assurance of general order (Christophe 2005, George 2009, Stewart et al. 2012, Vilanishvili 2004).It washeld thatunregulated trade via the market was oneofthemajorinstrumentsRussiausedtowieldinfluenceinGeorgia’s affairs.TheErgnetisystemwastheonepracticalobstaclethatprevented buildingafunctioningeconomyinGeorgia.  Therefore, the Ergneti scheme came down to linking smuggling to lower levelsofviolenceintheconflictarea,butsimultaneouslykeepingviolence confined.Asaresult,whentheSaakashvilielitetookpowerandclosedthe market, the trajectory toward escalation leapt forward. Envisaging an ambitious process of reform particularly in integrating South Ossetia, in May 2004 the new elite decided to circumvent the dragging JCC format andadoptaswifterstrategy.TheinternaldebatewasledbyOkruashvili’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Security Council under SecretaryBezhuashvili(I6,I7). Okruashvili,anethnicGeorgianoriginatingfromTskhinvaliandcloseallyof presidentSaakashvili,wassaidtoprivatelygainfromsmugglingnetworks togetherwithnewGorigovernorMikheilKareliand,officiallyasapartof antiͲcorruption reforms (Vilanishvili 2005, Papava 2006), Tbilisi installed the so called Financial Police in the Gori region to target smuggling activities(foranaccountoftheseactivitiesseeSigwart2006).Fourmonths after Saakashvili had taken office, Georgian troops of the Ministry of Interior, supported by Gori police, moved into Ergneti in a largeͲscale operationonMay31,2004(OSCEAR10/04).Troopsraidedthemarketina matter of hours. Nocasualties ormajor shootͲouts occurred and Ergneti marketcloseddownforgood.

120  WiththeErgnetiaction,theSaakashviliregimeforthefirsttimeshoweda shifttoassertivepoliciesintheconflict.Thepreviousdiscussionsuggests that the operation was the attempt to consolidate power in satisfying domestic, nationalist claims and selfͲenrichment prospects by way of complying with very specific Western demands with respect to central rule. More specifically, the concrete focus of Western actors on central authoritythroughantiͲcorruptionpoliciesinSouthOssetiaandsubsequent GeorgiancompliancesuggestsakeyroleofWesternpoliciesintriggering thisshift.  ShellingofTskhinvali

In the immediate aftermath of the Ergneti closure, the imminent intensification of the South Ossetia conflict turned into escalation when MinisterofInternalAffairsOkruashvililaunchedanoperationonTskhinvali inAugust2004(OSCEAR15/04,OSCESRs4,5,12,16).Inanunparalleled movesincetheendofthe1991/1992war,GeorgiantroopsoftheMinistry of Interior shelled Tskhinvali from the surrounding heights. The Russian commandoftheJPKFthreatenedtocallinbattalionsoftheRussianarmy deployed130kmnorthnearVladikavkazshouldGeorgiantroopsadvance any further. Okruashvili ended the campaign, but the following day Saakashvili praised Okruashvili’s stealth campaign on TV (RFE/RL 20. and 27.08.2004).  AssessmentofWesternpolicies

With the regime change from the Shevardnadze to the Saakashvili governmentafterNovember2003,GeorgianpoliciesinreintegratingSouth Ossetia changed to a fiercer stance. This change was set off through Western support of the regime change that linked political backing of Saakashvili’s power to the implementation of largeͲscale stateͲ strengtheningreforms.Westerndemands,therefore,decisivelyframedthe change in local behavior that showed itself in the closure of Ergneti market, an antiͲsmuggling campaign with the aim of restoring central 121  authorityintheregionofSouthOssetia.Theconflictintensifiedandinthe aftermath escalated when Georgian troops shelled Tskhinvali in August 2004.  Inlightofthediscussionthatconcludedthepreviousfirstsequence,the analysis of the second sequence finds once more a significant reactive instantofWesternpolicywithlocaldynamicsinthecontextofthe2003 regime change which set off a reinforcing, interactive cycle of Western policiespromotingstrongleadershipandassertiveGeorgianstatepolicies ofterritorialreintegration. Secondly,alsosimilartothe2002escalation,thefocusofWesternagency in the conflict prior to the escalation shifts from the national to the international level. The Georgian government and Western partners alreadyhadtakentoprepareforsettlementplansoftheconflict,socalled peace road maps that were to be presented in important international frameworks in 2004 and 2005 (in detail see Sequence 3). The focus of Western actors, therefore, was already shifting from the national to the internationalleveloftheconflict,withtheWestgrantingconfidencetothe Saakashvilileadershipinresolvingtheconflictwithoutuseofforce(seethe interview references above, among these I 1, I 8, I 14, I 24, I 32, I 33). Hence, after concentration of support at the national level during the protestandSaakashvili’sinauguration,theUSandOSCEsupportGeorgian conflict politics at the international level. Therefore, this Western policy performsstrongerin2004thanin2002asitchangesfromthenationalto theinternationallevelasopposedtofromthelocaltothenationallevel, displaying the increasing internationalization of Georgian politics with SaakashviliandshowingamoreclearͲcutshiftinspanninglocalities. Third, in 2004 it for the first time showed how the paradox of Western policiesoscillatingbetweenstateanddemocracyͲcenteredpoliciescreated an instable context for local agency in the conflict. The link was also evidentpriortothe2002escalationthroughthefosteringofnegotiations atthesame timeas putting unilateral pressure on state actors in Tbilisi.

122  Howeverbackthen,thelinkhadbeenweakerasitenvisagedmultilateral versusunilateralpolicyformats.Inthecontextof2004,theparadoxofthis Western policy intensifies as it emphasizes on the one hand formats promoting democracyͲcentered nonͲuse of force and on the other hand directlytargetsbolsteringthestateelite(seeinterviewreferencesabove:I 6,I9,I12,I14).  Therefore,theanalysisofthesecondsequencesuggeststhattwoinstances of Western policies trigger instability in the conflict: First, through a paradoxicalfocusonhardandsoftmeasuresatthesametimeandsecond, through a superseding, persistent focus on strengthening the state elite. Significantlyfrom2005,influentialWesternfundingorganizationssuchas the Open Society Foundation cut back their fundings to civil society organizations, which had been a major pillar in strengthening agents of change.Thisleftoutsidesupportconcentratedonthestateleveltoamuch largerextentthanbefore.  However,thediscussionpointedoutthattheErgnetiraidwasmotivated by the reͲstructuring of smuggling revenues into the hands of certain membersofthenewelite.Therefore,apossibleexplanationcouldcontend that the new leadership used the time window of strong support right aftertheregimechangetoastacitlyaspossiblereͲorganizeflowsofassets with assertive measures, with the convenient byͲproduct of establishing centralauthority.48Theshifttoassertivepolicies,thus,wouldhavebeen generatedthroughlocalfactorsandnotthroughexternalWesternimpact.  Nonetheless, the reͲorganization of smuggling for private gains does not sufficiently explain the shift in local behavior. First, the closure of the Ergneti market would have fulfilled this purpose without the ensuing escalationofviolence.ThesubsequentengagementoftheGeorgianstate is a strong indicator that the leadership aimed at restoring territorial

48SeveralinterviewspartnerswhogavetheiraccountoftheearlyphaseofSaakashvili’s governmentsuggestthis,seeI1,I6,I26. 123  integrity, not only acquiring financial assets. However, another locallyͲ basedexplanationcouldattributetheescalationtonationalist,emotionally triggeredmotivesofMinisterOkruashviliwhowasborninTskhinvaliasa closeallyoftheearlyphaseoftheSaakashviligovernmentsuggests(I6). Stronghintsthatthisisnotasufficientbasistoexcludethetriggeringrole ofWesternimpactisprovidedbytwofurtherarguments. Therefore, second, the preparation of the WesternͲGeorgian jointly prepared peace road maps over the summer of 2004 hinted to the necessitytosecureWesternsupportintheconflictandthatreintegration of South Ossetia, therefore, was at least in part a reaction to Western demands(I4,I14).Westernpoliciesintheconflict,thissuggests,wereasa strong a factor for local policies to move in the conflict as locally based demands. Third,intargetingsmugglingactivities,theleadership’schoiceofpolicies specificallycompliedwiththeWesternagendaalreadyenumeratedinthe Baden document.Therefore, the concrete choice of policies, as opposed to,forexample,closingtheborderorstrikinganinformaldeal,alsomight allowthestudytodeductthetriggeringroleofWesternpoliciespriorto theescalationin2004(I14,I26,I31).Westernexpectationsatthepoint oftheregimechange,therefore,playedadecisiveroleinaugmentingthe pressureontheregimetoact.  Altogether, the discussion seems to maintain that Western policies not onlysignificantlyframethepointintimewhentheconflictescalated,but alsoshapelocalstatepoliciesthatshiftthecontexttowardescalation.In this respect, the three characteristics of Western policies of the 2002 escalationperformedinanevenmoreclearlyͲshapedmanner,namelyof interaction,shifttoabroaderlocalityofagencyattheinternationallevel, and the paradox of at the same time democracy and stateͲcentered policiesofWesternagencyintheconflict.Theconflict,therefore,escalated whenthesecharacteristicstookeffect. 

124  Sequence3–2008 Initialcondition:WesternsupportforpeaceroadmapsÆChangeoflocal behavior:SanakoevadministrationÆEscalation:Augustwar

Between 2004 and 2006, Georgia implemented an ambitious reform agenda,takingonstrengtheningandrestructuringinstitutionstoeliminate corruptionandbuildefficientstatecapacities,strengtheningthepoliceand militarycapacities,launchingasecondprivatizationreform,reconstructing infrastructureonalargescale,attractingtourismandbolsteringWestern relations. WhiletheSaakashviligovernmentconsolidatedpoweroverthecourseof 2004,Westernengagementsteppedupactivity.Bothnegotiationsatthe international level on NATO and European integration as well as cooperation with the new government on internal Georgian affairs acquired a foothold. With regard to territorial integration, Western supportcontinuedtobethefocalpointintheGeorgianagendaithadbeen sincethe2004regimechange.Inaddition,WesternandRussianrelations intensified in the 2000s, including in the context of the South Ossetia conflict. Georgia’s NATO process came to be one particular arena of WesternͲRussian contention taking effect on Georgia’s South Ossetia policies.  Westernsupportforthepeaceroadmap

One month after the shelling of Tskhinvali, Saakashvili presented a road map for conflict settlement at the UN General Assembly in New York, envisaging confidenceͲbuilding, demilitarization and intensified OSCE monitoring,andtheautonomousstatusofSouthOssetiaintheGeorgian constitution (UNGA 21.09.2004, Sigwart 2006). The soͲcalled Peace Plan was part of an encompassing campaign launched by the Georgian governmenttopromoteitsnewcourseinSouthOssetia.  InJanuary2005,Saakashvilipresentedthe‘PeaceInitiativeSouthOssetia’ at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe with deepened

125  aspects of institutional cooperation with South Ossetia on economic rehabilitation and restitution (PACE 24.01.2005). In July, Saakashvili launched an international conference in Batumi, receiving international support for the plan, amongst others from OSCE Chairman Rupel. In October 2005, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli presented the Peace Plan at the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna (OSCE Permanent Council2005aand2005b). The2005effortsingatheringinternationalpoliticalsupportintheconflict peakedattheOSCEͲlaunchedMinisterialmeetinginLjubljanainNovember asamemberoftheGeorgiandelegationrememberedintheinterview(I9, also see: Socor 2005,). The Ljubljana document envisaged an ambitious role of the EU, US and OSCE in establishing a free trade zone in South Ossetiaandtherebyhelpingtoreintegratetheregiongradually.  ThepeaceroadmapswereakeyinstrumentintheGeorgianleadership’s attemptto attractWesternsupportbypresentinganagendadevotedto democraticstandardsofmultilateralcooperationandnonͲuseofforcein territorial integration. Meanwhile, assertive actions continued on the ground,asanattemptofGeorgianforcestoholdtheircurrentpositionsas well as to keep open the option of a military solution to territorial integration. The Western partners continued to support the Georgian strategy unanimously, as reaffirmed at a highͲlevel international conference on South Ossetia in Batumi in July 2005 (Civil.ge 10.07.2005, Fuller2005,Sigwart2006).Inresponsetothepeaceplan,theUSMission to the OSCE criticized Russia’s destabilizing role, praised Georgian democratic reforms and commitments and gave its “full and sincere support”(OSCEPC31.10.2005).InNovember2005theLjubljanadocument formalizedsupportoftheUS,EU,andOSCEforSaakashvili’sgovernmentin theframeworkofterritorialintegration.  As part of the agenda set in the Ljubljana document, Western policies increased measures to settle the situation locally at the same time as

126  launching efforts at the international level. Specifically, the document envisaged establishing confidenceͲbuilding measures between the GeorgianandSouthOssetianleadershipsthroughlaunchingan“Economic RehabilitationProgram”(ERP)intheGeorgianͲSouthOssetianconflictzone (I1,I3,I4,I8,I14,I17,I2049).Asearlyas2004,OSCEofficialsstartedto carveouttheplantointroduceeconomicrehabilitationinordertofoster cooperation and economic prosperity in theregionofSouth Ossetia and the bordering GeorgianͲcontrolled territories and provide for gradual integrationoftheregionintoGeorgia(I4,ERPFinalAssessment2009).The plan had significance as it made Georgian and South Ossetian political actors share responsibility for the first time since the end of the Soviet Union.Economicrehabilitationpaymentshadbeenplannedallthewhile sincethewarin1992,butwererecurrentlyheldbackinadraggingprocess byeithertheRussianortheGeorgianside–duetoopaqueprocurement processes, distribution policies and general lack of supervision which membersofinternationalorganizationsinchargewithcloselymonitoring theprocessreportedduringtheinterviews(I1,I14,CSCECommunication No.REF.SEC/183/95,OSCEAR05/98).  TheLjubljanadocumentof2005finallyagreedontheimplementationof the ERP facilitated by the OSCE with funding not from the local stakeholders,butfromoutsidedonorstogothroughanelectedboardwith representatives from all sides. The main condition of the ERP was cooperationbetweenGeorgiaandSouthOssetiaontheimplementationof these rehabilitation projects in the framework of the JCC. In November 2005,theNeedsAssessmentStudyfortheERPprojectswasconducted,in May 2006 the Ossetian, Georgian and Russian JCC representatives

49ThefollowingsectionisbasedoninterviewsmainlywithformermembersoftheOSCE Mission to Georgia, but also other international organizations. These OSCE coͲworkers hadbeenbasedbothinTbilisiandTskhinvaliandhadbeenpartoftheintensiveprocess ofnegotiationsbetweentheGeorgian,Ossetian,Russian,EuropeanandU.S.counterparts beforeandduringthesetͲupoftheERP.Theyhadalsobeenpartofongoingtalksduring theimplementationoftheERPwhichnamelytookplaceinTskhinvalianddealtwithadͲ hoc issues concerning specific projects in the GeorgianͲOssetian conflict zone and, therefore,couldgiveinsightintothepoliticalaspectsoftheconflictatthemicroͲlevelof decisionͲmakingprocesses. 127  approved of the portfolio and one month later the European donor countries were informed of the JCC decision at a conference in Brussels (OSCE AR 10/06, ERP Final Assessment 2009). In December 2006, the programstarted.Theprojectsembracedawiderangeofsectors,including agriculture, infrastructure (such as hospitals and roads), microͲeconomy projects targeted at improving the livelihood of individual citizens, and restoringwater,gasandpowersupplylines.  However,theseeffortstookplacealongsideadeterioratinglocalsituation after2006.Relationssouredoverspyingaccusations,overflightanddrone incidents on the territory of South Ossetia, shootͲouts in the volatile borderregions,importblockadesforsmalltradeandsharprhetoric(OSCE AR10/06,SR257/06,SR297/06).TheOssetianleadershipparticipatedin the ERP because they could siphon off funds, while they simultaneously receivedtrainingsfromtheRussianmilitarytoprepareforescalation(BBC 10.08.2012).Disruptionofgas,waterandpowersuppliesalongthelinesof ethnically divided villages created a continuous bone of contention and displayed the arbitrary attitude of all sides to the process, most of all leaving farmers without irrigation as several coͲworkers of international donorsandorganizationsobservedatthetime(I14,I3,I4).  Simultaneously illustrating the tendency of Georgian policies to use assertive measures in territorial integration and Western willingness to comply with it, Georgian police forces restored control in the GeorgianͲ inhabitedKodoriValleyinAbkhaziainJuly2006(I5,I7,I9,I14,I1Ͳ13,I 23,I2950;alsoOSCEAR26.04.1994).Theoperationbroughtthesituation tothevergeofwarasGeorgianforcesmoved,inbreachoftheUNOMIG agreement, into AbkhazͲcontrolled territory on the other side of the

50Interviewpartnerswithaverydifferentbackgroundraisedtheeventsoftheterritorial conflict over Kodori Valley as an indicator for the state of conflict policies in Georgia. ParticularlytheJuly2006incidentwasaccountedforbyaGeorgianoppositionmember,a coͲworkerofinternationalNGOandoneoftheEUDelegation(I9,I14,I23). 128  Administrative Border Line. Georgian police permanently remained deployedinthearea. TheGeorgiangovernmentdeclaredthedefeatoflocalwarlordKitsovanias themainreasonforthecampaignandonthesegroundsreceivedfullU.S. support.U.S.DeputyAssistantSecretaryforEuropeanandEurasianAffairs MatthewBryzaannounced:“Sothereisalackofacapabilitytocreatethe conditions, the secure conditions, free from crime, that allow IDPs to return[toGaliregion,Abkhazia].AndwhatI'msayingnowistherewasa similarsituationinKodori,wheretherewaslawlessness.Inthiscase,the Georgiangovernmentiseliminatingthelawlessnessandrestoringtherule oflaw.”(Civil.ge02.08.2006)  WhereasWesternactorsshowedareluctantstanceatthelocallevel,these dynamicsweresignificantlysupersededbyeventsontheinternationaland national level. Western actors relied on brittle onͲtheͲground arrangements while hailing steps undertaken by Saakashvili in the international framework, for instance of UNGA, two months earlier. Instead, Western actors pursued multiͲlevel engagement with their attentionandeffortsmainlytotheinternationallevelasthelocalsituation intensified.Westernengagementafter2004inthefirstplacecontinuedto buffer deteriorating effects in the conflict zone by onͲtheͲground facilitationandstressingnonͲforcemeasures.  Sanakoevadministration

AfterthelaunchofthenewGeorgianagendafrom2004,thereluctanceof Westernpoliciestranslatedintopassivesupportoftheunilateralstanceof theGeorgiangovernmentandgraduallyledtoasignificantchangeinlocal behavior in the conflict in the second half of 2006. Amid the volatile situationontheground,Georgianpolicieshadalsobeenassertivepriorto 2006,buthadremainedrestrainedaftertheAugustshellingin2004.This however changed when, subsequently, the Georgian government

129  intensifieditsinitiativetogaincontrolintheconflictbothintheconflict areaaswellaswithintheJCC.  In October 2006, the newly established ‘Salvation Union of Ossetians’, organized by ethnic Ossetians living in Georgia, announced alternative pollsinSouthOssetia(I1,I2,I3,I4,I8,I14,I2851,OSCEAR19/06,20/06, 22/06). On 12 November, in a parallel move to the elections of the Tskhinvali leadership, the Union held presidential polls in the GeorgianͲ controlled regions of South Ossetia (Civil.ge 12.11.2004). In December, Dmitri Sanakoev was announced alternative president of South Ossetia, whereasKokoitywasreͲelectedinSouthOssetia.DmitriSanakoev,former South Ossetian defense minister and a military commander in the first GeorgianͲOssetian war, had defected to the Georgian side. The Tbilisi government declared its willingness to formalize the selfͲdeclared alternative government (Civil.ge 01.12.2006). Sanakoev’s administration was inaugurated in December 2006, the same month when the ERP projects started. On May 8, 2007, the Georgian parliament passed a resolution formally setting up the administration (I 28). The ‘Sanakoev administration’tookofficeintheethnicGeorgianvillageofKurta,located inSouthOssetia,seenasaprovocativemovebytheSouthOssetianside.  TheGeorgiansidepresentedSanakoevastheofficialrepresentativeofthe South Ossetian side to the EU and OSCE representatives of the JCC. Sanakoev announced the nonͲviolent resolution of the conflict and a peaceful unity of Ossetians and Georgians inside of Georgia as his top priority. The Georgian government announced to leave the format if he wasnotaccepted(I4,I5,I8,I9,I14,I34).NotonlydidRussianandSouth Ossetiancounterpartsboycottthenewadministration(Civil.ge13.11.and 05.12.2006), but the introduction of Sanakoev into the JCC format

51 The alternative elections on the administration in Tskhinvali was held to be a major turning point in the conflict by several interview partners, both with a local and an international background. They all suggested that this step by the Georgian leadership wasstrategic,butalsowillfullyprovocative. 130  outragedtheOssetiancounterparts.Westernrepresentativesfearedthat theformatwouldloseTbilisiiftheydidnotcomply.Ultimately,Western partnersacceptedthe institutionof the Sanakoev administration, on the grounds of not denying the Georgians to establish a body of control of theirownontheirterritory.  Inthecourseof2007,thesituationintheJCCfurtherdeterioratedtothe point of the JCC format being deͲfacto cancelled. In January 2008, the GeorgianleadershipfortifieditsassertivestanceandreplaceddovishState Minister for Reintegration Giorgi Khaindrava, the Georgian JCC representative,withthemorerigorousTemurYakobashvili(I8,I1Ͳ8,also seeSigwart2006).GeorgianrepresentativesunderthenewStateMinister insistedthatWesternpartners,particularlytheDelegationoftheEuropean CommissionandtheOSCEMissiontoGeorgia,didnotsufficientlysupport Georgiandemands.Thus,Georgiabailedoutofpoliticaltalksandonlythe administrative meetings on practical issues continued, including the ERP programme.  Asaresult,byinstallingtheSanakoevadministration,Tbilisiattemptedto swerve a stagnating situation into one with a perspective toward both Western and territorial integration: First, in introducing an alternative administrationinSouthOssetia,centralcontrolintheareawastoensueas apostͲfactumreality,graduallytobetransferredintoformalizedtermsas an oppositional political analyst observed (I 9). Second, several international and local decisionͲmakers suggested that the formal JCC recognition of GeorgianͲbacked Sanakoev as the South Ossetian representative practically coerced Western partners into support of the leadership’spolicy(I4,I5,I8,I1452).  As much as the Georgian side portrayed Western engagement as falling short in supporting Georgian interests, Western policies however

52Also,abackgroundtalkwithasenioranalystofanECͲfundedthinktankwasheldonthe topic. 131  supported the shift to the increasingly assertive policies of the Georgian leadership.Atthesametime,Westernactorsmaintainedthegeneral,allͲ encompassing conditional policy of territorial integration and central authority.Inthismanner,Westerndemandsweretheconstantaddressees of Georgian territorial integration efforts. As a result, Western policies, startingfromthesupportoftheroadmapsin2004,graduallytriggeredthe change in local behavior that installed Sanakoev and undermined permissiveoptionsthroughmultilateralformats.  Augustwar

From2006untilthe2008Augustwar,theinternationalleveloftheconflict createdareinforcingspiralwithstrongWesternandRussianinvolvement intheframeworkofGeorgia’sNATOintegration.Simultaneously,assertive policiesatthenationallevelweresupportedbytheshakyinternalpower base of the Saakashvili regime and harsh Western criticism of national politics. In this regard, during 2007 the internal power basis of the Saakashvili regime suffered from strong internal opposition when antiͲ governmentprotestsbypoliticalgroupsandthepopulationthatlastedfor months. The situation escalated on 7 November 2007, with Georgian militarypolicecrackingdownondemonstrators(Mitchell2009,Areshidze 2007,Tatum2009). The incident sparked outrage in Georgian society, and solicited sharp critique from Western partners for disproportionate use of force (HRW 2007).ThistemporarilystrainedrelationswithWesternpartnersand,asa senior member of the EU Delegation suggested, put pressure on the Georgiangovernmenttorestoretrustinitsdemocraticcapacities(I14).  However, after 2006, the Western focus on Georgia’s integration into Western structures concentrated at the international level with strong Russian opposition to further WesternͲGeorgian integration. At the local levelwhereOSCEandRussiainteracteddirectly,therelationsofWestern andRussianactorshaddeterioratedovertheSouthOssetiaconflictfrom

132  asearlyas2004.InNovember2004,theKokoityͲZhvaniaagreementhad handed over the strategically important GeorgianͲheld Sarabuki checkpointintheconflictzonetoOssetianforces(I9,OSCEAR21/04). This agreement was a result of Russia’s initiative visͲaͲvis Western representativesthatraisedtheGeorgianassertiveactionofclosingErgneti market as worrisome evidence of Georgian aggressive tendencies. Therefore,RussiademandedfromOSCEandEUrepresentativestoprovide security for the Ossetian population and demanded that they hand over thecrucialcheckpointtotheOssetianPKF.TherepeatedshiftsofGeorgian policies to assertive measures provided grounds for Russia to push its claimsandwhereasWesternbilateralsupportofGeorgiaremainedstable, theargumentweakenedtheWest’sproͲGeorgianstanceinoppositionto Russia.  By2008,WesternandRussianstrugglesoverastanceonGeorgia’sinternal politics were taken to the international level. The intensified Western courseofGeorgialedtoWesterninterferencewithRussianinterests,and therefore not only Georgia increasingly collided with Russia on an internationallevel,butalsotheEUandUSwhoenteredtheRussiansphere of interest over the Georgia row (I 29, I 1453, Fischer 2009, Nicol 2008, Allison2008,Loewenhardt2005,Asmus2010). In February 2008, the declaration of independence of the Serbian international protectorate, Kosovo, created a precedent for secessionist entities.Russia disagreed withEUmember states supportive of Kosovo’s independence. Disgruntled Russia threatened with consequences for the situationintheSouthCaucasusconflicts(I5,I14,I16,I24,I2954,Aaron 2008,Averre2009,Cerone2009,Aaron2008).Russianofficialsparticularly hintedtothepossibilityofKosovobeingablueprintfortheSouthOssetia

53 In particular international analysts and decisionͲmakers depicted in interviews the arising conflict of European states and the US with Russia by way of a close WesternͲ Georgianalliance. 54 Numerous interview partners emphasized the immediate effect of Kosovo’s independenceontheconflictinSouthOssetia,especiallyvividbyaseniormemberofthe EuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentativetotheSouthCaucasusandtheCrisisinGeorgia(I 24). 133  case.InthewakeoftheWesternͲRussianrowoverKosovo,Moscowused thesituationtoitsadvantageandestablishedofficialdiplomaticrelations withTskhinvaliandSokhumiinApril2008.  That same month, the NATO summit in Bucharest was to decide over further steps of Georgia’s accession to the transatlantic treaty. ExpectationspriortoBucharestranhigh,notonlyinGeorgia:Georgiawas themostactiveNATOpartnerinEurope’sneighborhood, hadfulfilledall requirements superbly and had received adequate approval through assessmentsandNATOofficialsovertheyears(I1,I5,I6,I7,I9,I2955). Military reforms had been successful. Political impediments such as territorialintegritywerefactuallydisregardedbyNATOSecretaryGeneral DeSchefferaheadoftheBucharestsummit.Inasurprisingstatement,De Schefferannouncedthatlackofterritorialintegritywasnotahindrancefor GeorgiatoreceivetheformaladmissiontotheNATOmembershiptrack, opposingcriticalvoicesthathintedtothepersistingproblemswithCyprus’ unresolvedterritorialstatus.WhereastheBushadministrationvehemently lobbiedforMembershipActionPlan(MAP)statusforGeorgiaandUkraine, Germany’sChancellorMerkelstrictlyopposedthis(I1,I29,I656,Asmus 2010)assheputforwardthatGeorgiawasnotreadytojointheWestin the near future due to poor performance in democratic reform (see the insightfulstudyofAsmus2010).However,atthetimeofBucharestsummit Merkel already held the opinion that Georgia was not ready to join the West in the near future due to poor performance in democratic reform (ibid.). However, the Western leaders established that Georgian would eventuallybecomeaNATOmemberandleftthequestionoftimingopen. Although Germany and France had openly opposed MAP prior to the

55ThefollowingaccountontheimpactofGeorgia’sambitionstobecomeaNATOmember ontheSouthOssetiaconflictisbasedonnumerousinterviewsthattracedGeorgia’sNATO processfromthebeginningofthe2000soraccountedforaninsideviewofcertainparts ofthepoliticalprocess. 56 Three interview partners, two senior analysts of GeorgiaͲbsed think tanks and an opposition member, reported on the perspective of the Georgian leadership on the eventsontheinternationallevel.Theseaccountsframethefollowingparagraph. 134  summit, the dropͲout was nevertheless reinforced by dynamics on the ground.  The result of the Bucharest summit had closed the door not only for Westernintegration,butalsoposedarebufftoGeorgia’soverallpolitical choicetoanoverwhelmingextent:NATOmembershiphadbeentheone fixed,palpablegoalofGeorgia’spostͲSovietpoliticsandacornerstoneof securityperceptionsinthecountry.Bucharestwipedoutallthisatonce,so theGeorgianperception.Inaddition,theSaakashviliregimewassubjectto ongoing internal protests and ensuing Western criticism. The inability to reintegrate the territories as initially promised to the population additionally weakened Saakashvili’s power base. The reluctance of Western partners provided grounds for Russia to be reassured in its unilateral, arbitrary stance in fostering secessionism. Therefore, the decisionoftheNATOsummitinBucharestputareinforcingimpetustothe situation,withtheresultofescalation(seefootnote14:I1,I6,I9,I29).As aresult,amidthedeterioratingdynamicsandRussia’sadvancestobolster separatismontheground,Westernpoliciesswayedthesituationdecisively and within four months of the summit the conflict escalated into war in August2008. During the first week of August, the situation escalated into war when Georgian and Russian military clashed on the territory of South Ossetia. Thewarlastedfivedaysandtookatollofseveralhundreddead,including a high number of civilians (HRW 2009, Asmus 2010, Garthon 2010, King 2008).RussianforcesmovedintoGeorgiancentralterritoryascloseas40 kmfromTbilisi.AfteradiplomaticinterventionbyheadoftheFrenchEU presidency Nicolas Sarkozy, Russian troops retreated, but permanently remaineddeployedinSouthOssetiaandAbkhazia.  AssessmentofWesternpolicies

Prior to the August war the escalation cycle had been kicked off by WesternsupportforadivisivestanceoftheGeorgianleadership,rootedin

135  increasingly assertive measures on the ground with the simultaneous promotionofapeacefulsettlementininternationalframeworks.Thiscycle led to Western policies triggering change in local behavior to assertive policies in 2006 when the Georgian state elite introduced the Sanakoev administrationintheGeorgianͲcontrolledareasofSouthOssetia.Afterthe installation of Sanakoev, Westernpolicies reinforced localdynamics with agency at the international level, especially at the NATO summit in Bucharest. Withdrawal of Western support in the Bucharest summit, for the Georgian elite, meant loss of the powerͲsustaining prospect of territorial reintegration and helped push the clash between Russian and GeorgianmilitaryintheescalationoftheAugust2008war.  Altogether, Western policies prior to the 2008 escalation confirm the patternoftheprevioustwoescalationsin2002and2004onanevenmore intense scale. In reaction to the Georgian foreign policy agenda of promotingthepeaceroadmapsfrom2004withstrongWesternsupport,a wide array of interviews gave the impression that Western policies interactedwithpoliciesoflocalandinternationalactorstotheextentof settingoffacycleofescalation(forinterviewreferencesonthisargument seeintheanalysisabove:I1,I3,I4,I8,I9,I14,I17,I20).Thereafter,the interaction of Western policies with Georgian, Ossetian and Russian stakeholders gradually reinforced local dynamics toward assertive measures. Repeatedly after 2002 and 2004, Western policies at the start of the escalationcycleconcentratedonthelocalandnationalleveloftheconflict andafterthechangeinbehaviorshiftfromtheretotheinternationallevel. Intheinternationalcontextoftheconflict,namelythroughtheKosovoand Bucharest instances as several interviews supported (for interview referencesonthisargumentseeintheanalysisabove:I5,I6,I7,I9,I14,I 16, I 24, I 29), Western efforts at the integration of Georgia in NATO structuresandRussia’sopposingstancereinforcedthedeterioratinglocal dynamicsthatledtotheescalationin2008.

136  Similar to the previous escalations, Western policies continuously oscillatedbetweenstressingdemocracyͲandstateͲcenteredpoliciesinthe period between 2006 and 2008. The paradox of democracyͲ vs. stateͲ centered demands addressed simultaneously to the Georgian leadership by Western policies pertained to these dynamics. On the one hand, WesternpoliciespromotedthenonͲviolentsettlementofthesecessionist conflicts, thereby vigorously supporting Saakashvili’s proposals for peace road maps and enhancing the ERP format. On the other hand, Western claimstaketheformofstrengtheningcentralstatepowerinthehandsof the government. Here, Western policies, as before, continued to voice demands of crackdown on crime and corruption and economic growth, targetingregainingcentralcontroloverthebreakawayterritoryofSouth Ossetia.57  Thediscussionsuggeststhatlocaldynamicswerecrucialinbringingabout escalations,butalsothatthetimingoftheescalationcannotbeexplained solelythroughthelocalspiralofmilitarizationbetweenGeorgian,Ossetian andRussianforces.Rather,Westernpoliciesplayedakeyroleincreating the necessary conditions for enabling these local dynamics at specific points in time, crucially through supporting the Sanakoev administration and the Bucharest decision. In this fashion, Western policies at these pointsintimecreatedavacuumfordomesticpolicychoicesintheconflict andputthedomesticpowerbaseinperil.Hence,Westernpoliciespriorto escalations increased the pressure for the local state elite to act and fosteredassertivepoliciesasaviableoption.  Thediscussion gives abrief overview of Westernpolicies after 2008 and then turns to the discussion of the empirical findings to conclude the empiricalanalysis.

57 Several local experts with an accurate scrutiny of events stressed this ambiguity of EuropeanandUSpoliciesinGeorgia(I1,I6,I29).Interestingly,thisanalysiswasrarely sharedbymembersofinternationalorganizations.Thesewouldmoreoftentendtoblame policyfailureoninefficientstatestructures,corruptdecisionͲmakersoranopaquespiral ofevents(I20,Sigwart2006). 137  Westernpoliciesafter2008

Inthefouryearsafterthe2008war,incidentsofviolenceintheconflict area considerably decreased. Nonetheless, the risk of escalation has remainedhigh.ThesituationinandaroundSouthOssetiaoperateslargely oninformalarrangementsasitisrecognizedasanindependentstateonly byRussia(KolstandBlakkisrud2008).Shortlyafterthe2008war,Moscow formally recognized the two entities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states and established close ties with their administrations. Also, Russia vetoed the prolongation of both the OSCE mandate in the South Ossetia conflict and the UN mandate in Abkhazia. With this, the presenceoftheinternationalcommunityintheseareasended,exceptfor accessoffewhumanitarianorganizations.ThefollowͲupinstitution,theEU MonitoringMission(EUMM),from2009hasinfactenhancedEUtieswith Georgia, but operates only on GeorgianͲcontrolled territory and includes the international framework of the Geneva talks to enhance security measuresintheconflictzone(GowerandTimmins2009,Haukkala2008, Fischer2009).  When the EUͲmediated the ceaseͲfire agreement in 2008 installed the EUMM,Westernactorsagainassumedtheroleofafacilitator,butwithout fixedguarantees(NYT07.11.2008,IIEECGS2009).TheWeststaysinvolved on the ground and on the central level, but internationalͲlevel activity concerningGeorgiaisreducedtotheGenevatalksandeconomicissuesof European integration. Thus, just as after the 2002 and 2004 escalations, Westernengagementretreatedfromtheinternationaltothenationallevel of the conflict. Thus, Western integration seems to continue, territorial integrationleftaside.Therefore,inanoverallperspectivecomparedtothe steadyincreaseofWesternengagementontheinternationallevelofthe conflictfrom2000,asharpdecreaseininternationalactivityshowsafter the2008escalation.DirectWesternconditionalitiesofterritorialintegrity havegrownmoresuccinct,whereasWesternpolicyunchanginglyexhibits

138  the paradox of those oscillating policies that gave opportunity for escalationinthepast.  Therefore,therealityofpossibleescalationinGeorgiaremainsagainstthe backdrop of Western support in Georgia. In March 2010, the Georgian governmentreiterateditswilltoreturnthesecessionistentitiespeacefully andtostartadialogwithbothleaderships(OfficeoftheStateMinisterfor Reintegration 2010). Western actors continue to support Georgia, with SecretaryofStateClintonspeakingonJuly5,2010ofthe“occupation”of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russian troops (U.S. Senate 11.12.2010) and a resolution of the European Parliament in November 2011 condemned that “Russia continues to occupy the Georgian regions of AbkhaziaandtheTskhinvaliregion/SouthOssetia”(EuropeanParliament resolution 17.11.2011). Prior to the Georgian parliamentary elections in October 2012, the EUMMutteredwarningsof increased militarizationin theconflictzone(RFE/RL2012).  In light of the previous analysis, therefore, the current situation shows characteristics of a new escalation cycle, particularly with respect to Western characteristic policies. This is even more the case as the characteristics of Western policies prior to the 2002, 2004 and 2008 escalationsarenotonlyrepetitive,butalsointensifywitheachescalation. Thespecificfindingswillbediscussedinthesubsequentsection,including aninterpretivesummaryoftheeventsintheSouthOssetiaconflict.  3.4. Empiricalfindingsandmodel

Theprevioussequentialdepictionanddiscussionofeventsleadingupto escalationsofviolencein2002,2004and2008inSouthOssetiahighlighted theparticularroleofspecificWesternpoliciesinfluencingthereͲescalation ofviolencethroughtheeffectsonlocalpowerconsolidationofGeorgian stateelites.

139  Thetablebelowsummarizestheresultsofthespecificanalyticalfocuson, first,instancesofpoliciestakingplaceindifferentarenasregardinglevels of agency (local, national or international) and possibly simultaneously and, second, Western democracyͲ and stateͲcentered policies. Both features have been analyzed regarding their effect on local power consolidation.Therefore,thefindingsaresummarizedasfollows:   2002 2004 2008 Sequence End of Baden processͲ> Regime changeͲ> Ergneti SupportofpeaceroadmapͲ> Shevardnadze’s antiͲ closureͲ> Shelling of Sanakoev administrationͲ> corruption agendaͲ> AntiͲ Tskhinvali Augustwar crime operations in conflict zone Western ͲWcallselectionfraud ͲWsupportsSaakaintopower ͲWstartsERP policy ͲW pushes taxing system ͲW supports Saakas ͲW supports Geo peace road betweenSOandGeo democraticagenda maps,widerreforms ͲW calls for antiͲcorr reforms ͲW demands terr integr and ͲWspecifiesconditionalities orfundingwillbecut centralpower ͲWraisesdemreformdoubts ͲWstartsNATOintegr ͲW intensifies EU and NATO inBucharest cooperation  Character Start: loc+demͲstate Æ End: Start: nat+demͲstateÆ End: Start: locͲnat+dem (ERP), Ͳistics at nat+demͲstate intͲnat+stateͲdem int+demͲstate (roadmap)Æ start/end End:int+stateͲdem ofcycle   Table3:CharacteristicsofWesternpoliciespriortoescalations:W(West),demͲ state (democracy and stateͲcentered policies, first mentioned performs stronger),locͲnatͲint(local,national,internationallevel).

The analysis finds that for all escalation cycles a pattern of reactive interactionofWesternpolicieswithotherunitsofagencyatthestartof thecycleandasubsequentpatternofenforcingeffectsofWesternpolicies triggeringchangeinlocalbehaviortoassertivepolicies.Thetabledepicts thedynamicsoftwomorecharacteristicstheanalysisdetected:First,the shift between levels of agency of Western policies from the local or nationallevelatthestartofthecycletothenationalorinternationallevel attheendofthecycle.Second,theparadoxofWesternpoliciesoscillating between democracyͲ and stateͲcentered policies, with a clear priority of stateͲcentered policies (territorial integration, antiͲcorruption, antiͲ smuggling,centralrule,leadershipcapacity),butthetendencytoemploy democracyͲcentered claims and formats (nonͲuse of force rhetoric and

140  conditionality, negotiations, confidenceͲbuilding measures, multilateral cooperation)whenattemptingtoraisethepressureonthenationallevel of state elite agency. In addition, the analysis detects that after each escalation,Westernagencyshiftsbacktothenationallevelwithreinforced stateͲcentereddemands.  Prior to the 2002 escalation, the analysis accounts for the failure of the BadenprocessasthestartingpointoftheescalationcyclewhenWestern policiesinteractedwithlocalstakeholdersatthelocallevelbyfacilitating this negotiationͲbased format. Subsequently, Western policies shifted to the national level of governmental politics in Georgia and to addressing stateͲcentereddemandsofantiͲsmugglingpoliciesoftheBadenformatto be implemented by the state elite. The framework of the Georgian government’s larger antiͲcorruption campaign was identified as the reactionoftheGeorgianleadershiptothisandintroducedthechangein localbehaviorthatgavewaytoanassertivestanceintheconflictthrough thenMinisterofJusticeSaakashvili’srunofantiͲcrimeoperationsin2002. The analysis identified distinctive Western policies addressed to the GeorgianstateelitesthattookeffectafterthefailureoftheBadentalks: Western actors called significant irregularities in the 2000 parliamentary elections in Georgia; Western actors pushed the introduction of freight controlsandataxingsystembetweenGeorgiaandSouthOssetiathrough the Georgian side within the OSCE; Western institutions demanded antiͲ corruptionreformsandthreatenedwithcancellationofexternalfinancing; Western partners intensified the NATO integration process of Georgia. ThesepoliciesillustratetheincreasingdemandsthatWesternagencyput onthestateeliteatthenationallevelinthecontextoftheSouthOssetia conflict.  Altogetherforthe2002escalation,thetablethereforedepicts1)ashiftof WesternpoliciesfromthelocallevelofagencywithintheBadenformatto thenationallevelofGeorgiannationalpolitics,and2)ashiftfromstateͲ

141  centered policies of territorial integration through antiͲsmuggling measureswithinthedemocracyͲcenteredformatofthemultilateralBaden negotiationstodemocracyͲcenteredantiͲcorruptionclaimsatthenational level.Overall,priorto2002Westernpoliciesshifttoamoredisaggregated levelofagencyfromthelocaltothenationallevelandalsoexhibitfeatures of oscillating between democracyͲ and stateͲcentered claims with the effectofcreatingthepressureforGeorgianstateelitestocomply.  Prior to the 2004 escalation, the analysis identified the 2003 regime change to the Saakashvili leadership as the point when Western agency interacted with Georgian actors at the national level to the extent of providing support in the framework of democracyͲcentered demands of antiͲcorruptionpoliciesatthenationallevel.Subsequently,theclosureof Ergneti market posed as the point from which local behavior of the GeorgianstateelitechangedwiththeresultoftheshellingofTskhinvaliin August 2004. The empirical account identified the following specific Western policies triggering this change in local behavior: Western actors unanimously supported Saakashvili into power on democracyͲbased demands; Western actors supported Saakashvili’s democratic agenda of nonͲviolenceinconflictsettlementandantiͲcorruptionreforms;Western partnersdemandedestablishingterritorialintegrityandcentralizedpower; WesternactorsintensifiedEUandNATOcooperationwithGeorgia.  Altogetherinthecontextofthe2004escalation,aftertheregimechange Western policies 1) shifted the field of action from the national to the international level of the conflict, pursuing territorial integration in international frameworks. 2) Western policies exhibited a mix of democracy and stateͲbuilding policies focused on the national level, particularly stressing enhancing the state capacity of the leadership in order tofulfil democratic standardsofeliminatingcorruption. Therefore, the stress of democracyͲrelated issues during the regime change period shifts to stateͲformation issues in the consolidation phase such as

142  establishingcentralpower.Asaresult,bothcharacteristicsperformeven strongerthanin2002,asWesternpoliciesshiftfromthenationaltothe international level and as the ‘democracy versus state’ paradox is more visible through the simultaneous demands of nonͲuse of force and territorialintegrationdemands.  Priortotheescalationin2008,theanalysisidentifiedWesternsupportof the South Ossetia peace road map at the international level and the implementation of the ERP at the local level as the democracyͲbased formats targeting stateͲcentered aims. Subsequently, the analysis identifiedthestartoftheSanakoevadministrationasthepointfromwhich local behaviorofthe Georgianstate elitechanged with theresult of the August 2008 war. The analysis identified the following Western policies takingeffectonlocalbehavior:WesternactorssupportedGeorgianconflict settlement proposals und the general reform agenda; Western initiative startedtheEconomicRehabilitationProgrammeintheGeorgianͲOssetian conflict zone; Western actors supported the Sanakoev administration; Western actors increased conditionalities for integrating into Western structures; Western actors refused progress on NATO integration at the Bucharestsummit. Altogether,priortothe2008escalation,Westernpolicies1)shiftedfroma simultaneoustrackof,both,policiesattheinternationalandlocallevelto afterthechangeinlocalbehaviormostactivityattheinternationallevelof theconflict.2)WesternpoliciesshiftedfromdemocracyͲbasedformatsto fosterterritorialintegritytoomittingterritorialintegrityandtooktostress democracyͲcenteredclaimsattheinternationalleveloftheNATOsummit. Hence, thetwocharacteristics again performed morestrongly compared to the previous escalation, with a more intense reinforcing effect of Westernpoliciesonlocalbehaviorpriortotheescalation,theshiftfrom thelocalandnationaltotheinternationallevelandanextensiveparadox ofdemocracyvs.stateͲcenteredpolicies. 

143  To conclude, the analysis suggests that the three characteristics of 1) interactionandreinforcingpolicies,2)shiftsfromthelocalornationalto thenationalorinternationallevel,and3)thedemocracyͲstateparadoxof Westernpoliciesoscillatingbetweenthesetwopropertiesareinstancesof the conflict dynamics that lead to violence by triggering change in local behaviortoassertivepoliciesatspecificpointsintheprocess. Therefore,theconclusionoftheempiricalanalysisproposesacausallink betweenthesepropertiesofWesternpoliciesandchangeinlocalbehavior with the result of repeated escalation. The discussion on this basis proposescaseͲspecificgeneralizationsinformofmechanismsofWestern policiesinthecontextofreͲescalationinSouthOssetia.Inthisregard,the study takes the step to move from specific empirical statements (“The empirical analysis showed that when x happened, then y resulted”) to establishingcausalclaims(“Theempiricalstudyrenderstheclaimplausible thatifxhappens,thenyresults”)ofviolenceͲgeneratingmechanismsinthe SouthOssetiaconflict:

1) If strong interaction of Western policies takes place in a reactive mannerwithotherstakeholdersintheconflict,thiscontingencystarts anescalationcycle,createsareinforcingdynamicofWesternagencyin interactionwithotherstakeholdersandleadstoescalation.

2) IfWesternpoliciesa)shiftbetweenarenasofactivityandb)shiftwithin acycletotheinternationallevelofagency,theyprovideforthecontext toshiftinfavorofescalation,becausea)localstateelitesprofitfrom/ areimpededbyinconsistentdemandsofpoliciestobeimplementedat the local and national level, b) the interestͲbased agenda of Western actors generates inconsistent support for either stakeholder in the conflict including the respective Georgian government, c) when a Western policy strategy fails, Western agency changes the arena and putsmorepressureonthenationallevelandd)theyshifttothemore disaggregated,‘higher’levelofagencyattheinternationallevel.

144  3) If Western policies favor stateͲbuilding strategies over democracyͲ buildingstrategies,butuseofdemocracyͲcenteredclaimstopushtheir interests, they provide for the context to shift in favor of escalation, becausea)localstateelitesmakeuseofenhancedpowerresources,b) theycreatethenecessitytoterritoriallyintegrateinordertoaccomplish foreignpolicygoals,andc)theycreateatensionbetweenintegrityand nonͲviolence demands that makes assertive local decisionͲmaking a viableoption.

The previous discussion suggests general causal links that enable reͲ escalationofviolenceinSouthOssetia.Basedonthesestatementsonthe role of agency, the discussion seeks to present an inherently coherent, plausiblemodelofreͲescalationonthebasisoftheSouthOssetiacase.The key characteristic of recurring escalation is the inconsistency of external policiesthatexpressesitselfinseeminglycontradictoryobjectclaimsand simultaneousagencyatdifferentlevels.Thesepropertiesofinconsistency interactwithlocalagencyintheprocessinamannerthattriggerspathsto escalation.Therefore,themodelofreͲescalationinSouthOssetiaspecifies social mechanisms, the most immediate empirical expressions of actors’ attemptstomaintainpowerastheylinkagencytoviolentoutcomes,and canbepresentedasfollows: 

145    Graphic3:ModelofreͲescalationofviolenceintheSouthOssetiaconflict1989Ͳ 2008.  The model describes how policies of Western actors translate into mechanismsofWesterninfluencethat,accordingtothestudy,repeatedly trigger change of behavior of Georgian local state elites prior to escalations.Inthisrespect,themodelspecifiesthelinkbetweenWestern agency and local state policies through three mechanisms, Interaction, LevelshiftandObjectshift.Themechanismstakeeffectinastepwiseand pathͲdependentmannerfromthestarttotheendofanescalationcycle.In additiontotriggeringchangeinlocalbehavior,themechanismsexhibita reinforcingeffectonlocalbehaviorovertimepriortoescalation.58

58Itshouldbenotedthatthepropertiesofmechanismsattheendoftheescalationcycle are observed to take place after the change in local behavior. This confirms, as earlier discussed,thatWesternpoliciestakeeffectonlyinreactionwithandtolocaldynamics. Thegraphichighlightsthepathoftherespectivemechanisms. 146  These mechanisms describe a recurring process prior to escalations enablingthepivotalanglebetweenlocalagencyandviolentoutcome:1) The Interaction mechanism embraces reactive Western policies progressingtoreinforcingpoliciesduringthecycle.Themechanismshows howexternalpoliciesinduceashiftinthecontextoftheconflictthatstarts an escalation cycle. Agency that starts the escalation cycle is of reactive character as it brings about the shift through interacting with the other involvedagents.Incontrast,astheescalationproceeds,externalpolicies aremuchmoreresilienttointeractionwithotheragentstotheextentof stillbeingaffectedbytheiractions,butnotamountingtothecontingency ofcreatinganothershift.Rather,eventsfollowingtheinitialconditionat the startof thecycleareof reinforcing character intensifying thecourse toward escalation, 2) the Level shift mechanism embraces a shift of Western policies from the national to the international level during the cycle. The mechanism shows how external policies at the start of the escalationcycletakestrongeffectatthenationallevelofpoliciesandshift totheinternationalleveloftheconflictattheendoftheescalationcycle, often after the change in local behavior took place. However, external policies engage permanently at all levels of the conflict, but with a regularity of these varying intensities, and 3) the Claim shift mechanism does not proceed in a linear way and exhibits democracyͲ and stateͲ centered policies simultaneously, however, with a tendency toward democracyͲcentered policies when exhibiting increasingly reinforcing effects.Themechanismshowshowexternalpoliciesgenerallyemphasizea stateͲcentered agenda at the start of an escalation cycle and induce democracyͲcentered policies to push claims at certain points in the process. Hence, both agendas are put forth simultaneously, but with varyingintensityatthestartandendoftheescalationcycle.Therefore,the analysis suggests a paradox of agency. However, what seems to be an ambiguous property of Western agency appears to be a compensating mechanismofWesternagencyaimingatpreventingrisksposedtopower consolidationoflocalactorsatvariouslevels.Inotherterms,whereasthe

147  paradox pressures local actors and creates instability, the policies are carried out with the intention of stabilization. Therefore, the paradox of Westernpoliciesshowsthatpracticetheyprohibitassertiveactiononthe onehand,whileontheotherhanddemandingaquicksettlementofthe conflict in view of Western integration and, second, of supporting leadershipcapacitiesinordertofortifycentralpowerontheonehand,but ontheotherhandstrengtheningaregimewithavolatilepowerbasisand potentialforassertivepolicies.  Interestingly,thespecificpoliciesofbothWesternandlocalagentsdonot exhibit significant variation throughout the period. Western agency repeatedlyshowsthesameinconsistencies,whereaslocalactorspursuea unilateral agenda and utilize the makeshift paradox. This suggests that whereas structural conditions throughout the period of analysis change (suchasthelocalityofagency,theshifttoastateͲcenteredcharacter,and increasingly framed agendas), however, agency follows the same mechanisms.Inotherwords,theamplitudeorintensityofthemechanisms increases,buttheircharacterremainsconsistent.  Inthisrespect,Westernpoliciesseemtorepeataconsistentpatterninan increasingly intensifying manner. They stabilize the logic of sudden local shifts and marginalize potentially consistencyͲgenerating factors. Part of this isthatWesternactors donot and cannotalterstakeholders’claims: Thegeneralescalativetendencyoftheconflictisgivenatanypointintime after the situation turned violent in 1989 through persistently assertive policiesofRussian,GeorgianandOssetianactors.Theworseningrealityof external influence of Western agency for the case of the South Ossetia conflict lies in providing the incentive for the situation to shift. In other words, incentives for an assertive stance of Russia, Georgia and Ossetia remainequallyhighorbecomehigherunderWesterninfluence.Western policiesdonotprovideassurance,butfeedthelocallegacyofinsecurity– ofagencyandcontextualoutcomes.

148   To conclude, the causal link established at the start of the study is supported:Throughouttheperiodofanalysis,Westernpoliciesrepeatedly affect local power politics to the extent of shifting the conflict’s context towardescalation.Thefollowingandlastchapterdiscussesthefindingsin lightofexistingtheoriesandembedstheminthestateofresearch.Then thechapterwilldiscussthefindingsempiricallyonthebasisoftheconflict contextsinSriLankaandKashmir.  

149  4. Discussionoffindings

Thefollowingchapterpresentsthediscussionofthefindingsofthestudy, in both a theoretical and empirical context. First, the discussion reflects existing research on mechanisms of violence, uses selected research to framethefindingsandshowsthegeneralizingoutreachofthemechanisms proposedfortheSouthOssetiastudy.Second,thediscussionreflectsthe empiricaloutreachofthefindingsinlightofthecontextsoftheSriLanka andKashmirconflicts.  4.1. Theoreticalscopeofthefindings

The literature review at the beginning of the study already stated two importantshortcomingsofresearchinthestudyofviolence:Ontheone hand, existing research grapples with the phenomena of violence at a theoreticallevelandoftenfailstodefineacogentexplanandumintheface ofempiricalreality.Existingstudiesattempttoaddressformsofviolence, types of agents of violence or levels of intensity. However, studies frequentlyfailtoprovidearigorousdefinitionoftheprocessofviolenceat the center of scrutiny. Explanations differ greatly depending on whether violenceisatitsonsetorpartofaprotracted,ongoingconflictprocess(see the discussion in chapter 2: Beissinger 2000, Cederman et al. 2010), a shortcomingwhichrequiresresearchtogetstrongeronrelatingrigorous scrutinyofthedynamicsofviolencetotheirunderlyingtriggers.  Ontheotherhand,existingresearchstrugglesonamethodologicallevelto identify the underlying triggers of the dynamics of violence and the respective mechanisms of processes of violence. Research rarely encompassestheprocessofdisaggregatingfactorsbeforepresentingthem inaggregatedtheoreticalmodels(Balcells/Kalyvas2010:416).Particularly, researchdisregardsthespecificpropertiesandprocessesofagencyinthe contextofstrugglesforsocialpowerthatcatalyzeviolence(Capocciaand Keleman2007:347,Mahoney2000a:514).Inthis,scholarssuggesttolook at the functioning of state agency to span the gap between meta and 150  macro processes of violence (Cederman et al. 2010: 3Ͳ4, Wimmer et al. 2010:89,alsosee:HedstroemandSwedberg1998).  Specifically,studiesofmechanismsofviolenceoftencenteroninstancesof nonͲstateviolencesuchasmasscivilianuprisingsandriots(seeaboveall: White2006,Horowitz1985),insurgencyviolence(Weinstein2007,Wood 2003) or genocide, terrorist attacks or other forms of collective violence (Lemarchand2009,Martinetal.2009,CollierandSambanis2003).These studies do not establish an outreach from micro level findings to macro leveloutcomesastheycenteronchangeofbehavioratthemicrolevelof motivationswiththeresulttoengageinviolenceatthemetalevelofforms of agency(Tarrow2007: 593, alsosee: Weinstein 2007, Covington2002, McCauleyetal.2008,BranchandWood2010).Therefore,mechanismsas aggregated,repetitiveformsofagencyleadingtoviolenceareeithernot thesubjectofstudyoraretreatedasblackboxes,asexplanatoryinstances whose functioning remains opaque (Mayntz 2005: 207, also see: Fearon 2000). Tarrow concludes it to be "ambitious enough" to seek to identify mechanisms of violence at the onset of civil war and continues: "But identifyingtheoperativemechanismsisevenmoredauntingwhenweturn to the process of escalation, for example, how and when nonviolent protestandlowlevelsofviolenceescalateintocivilwar.Sambanis[Collier andSambanis2003]observesthatsuchtransitionsarepoorlyunderstood” (Tarrow2007:595).  Thisdiscussionhighlightstheseminalwork of Tilly,McAdamandTarrow (2001)onsocialmechanismsofviolencetoframethefindingsofthestudy onSouthOssetia.IndrawingonTillyetal.’smechanismsandafewother helpful studies (see above all: Kalyvas 2006, Tarrow and McAdam 2003, Levitsky and Way 2010, and Mansfield and Snyder 2007) that specify mechanisms of external agency’s effect on local power consolidation in fragile states, the discussion highlights the possibilities of enhancement and gains for the study of violence. Other studies rarely address the

151  findingsofTillyetal.inacomprehensivemanner.Rather,researchtreats the work as one example of research of violence (see for example: Sambanis2004,LevyandThompson2010).  The 2001 study of Tilly et al. is a rare instance of rigorous scrutiny of a varietyofmechanismsofviolenceusingthemethodologyofcasestudy.As such, the research highlights specific mechanisms of social agency of political elites for different phases of the escalation process. The study groundsmechanismsintheaggregatingpropertyofpowerͲseekingagency andlocalactors’attemptstoutilizetheconflictcontexttotheirends. Therefore, considering existing studies of mechanisms of violence, the studyofTillyetal.posesintwokeyaspectsanexceptiontothegeneral shortcomings of the debate that, moreover, connect their study to the explanatoryoutreachoftheSouthOssetiafindings:First,thelevelatwhich Tillyetal.lookatviolencemovesbeyondmicroͲmetalevelresearchand createsalinkbetweenagencyandoutcomes.Agency,intheirstudy,takes the role of a pivotal, if unintentional determinant link between actors’ agendas and the outcome of escalation. In addition, the study links relational factors of interaction between actors to the macro level to explain violence and encompass agencies as environmental factors of violence.Hence,mechanismscanidentifycategoriesofactionsandspecific sequencesofactionsthatframethepathtoescalations.Thosestudiesthat use the theoretical gains of Tilly et al.’s research systematically mainly drawonthemicroͲmetaconnectionofmechanismsofbeliefs,valuesand identitiesbringingaboutmotivationsofagencyinthecontextofviolence (for this see: Inglehartand Welzel2005, Lamont and Molnar 2002). This fails the theoretical challenge to address the metaͲmacro level link that Tillyetal.’smechanismspropose.Moreover,Tillyetal.acknowledgethat violentoutcomesarecloselylinkedtoleaderships’attemptstoconsolidate theirpowerresources.Inthisrespect,Tillyetal.’sstudycansupportthe South Ossetia findings in that Western agency performs as a dynamic, interestͲbased albeit structural property that triggers local behavior in

152  relation to the violent outcome. Second, the study of Tilly et al. distinguishes itself in how it aggregates patterns of violence as part of a given process. The study envisages forms of agency in relation to their function in the process, e.g. whether they puncture, reinforce or show reactive patterns in the trajectory toward escalation. This favorably connects to the findings of the South Ossetia case as generalizing mechanismsacross cases solidify reliability, but generalizing mechanisms within the same case facilitates understanding if and how mechanisms change over time. Lastly, we have to take note that the South Ossetia study focuses on mechanisms of external policies that initiate change of local behavior, but the Tilly et al. study centers on local mechanisms of violence.  The study of Tilly, McAdam and Tarrow includes mechanisms that are utilizedbylocalelitesduringdifferentphasesoftheescalationprocesses. Out of these, particularly the brokerage and the object shift mechanism take effect during all phases of escalation and aggregate multiple, more fineͲtunedmechanisms.Therefore,brokerageandobjectshiftturnoutto be key mechanisms in processes prior to escalations of violence and are seen as complementing the findings of the South Ossetia case. The followingtablelistsTillyetal.’smechanismsinrelationtootherrelevant researchfindings:

 Brokerage Objectshift Attributionofthreatand Mobilization Socialappropriation opportunity Categoryformation Scaleshift(Tarrow/McAdam2003) Leverage(Levitsky/Way2010) (ReͲ)Formation Certification Linkage(Levitsky/Way2010) ofagenda Categoryformation BridgingthelocalͲglobalgap(Kalyvas 2006) Interaction(Sigwart) Identityshift(alsoKalyvas2006) Turningpoint Radicalization Convergence toescalation Levelshiftmechanism(Sigwart) Claimshiftmechanism(Sigwart)  Table4:Mechanismsofviolenceduringthreephasespriortoescalation

153  Tilly et al. include social appropriation among mechanisms during the phase of mobilization, which accounts for the mobilizing role of social localitiesandactorswheresocialcapitalandpotentialagentsconcentrate (e.g.inchurchesormosques,atpubliceventsetc.)andwhichcanbeseen asbrokeringresourcesthroughlocality.Further,attributionofthreatand opportunity describes the process of the invention or importation and subsequentdiffusionofashareddefinitionofconcerningalterationsinthe likelyconsequencesofpossibleactionswhich,througharbitraryalteration of claims, performs similarly to the mechanism of object shift (92 ff., in detaildiscussedbelow).Fallinglast,inthemobilizationphaseisbrokerage, the linking of two sites, units or actors through a broker (142), a mechanismthroughwhichpoliticalorganizersdrawdisconnectedfactions andlocalitiesintoacommonfront(155).Functionsofbrokeragearealso reportedwhenlocalpoliticalactorsseektoconsolidatepowerbybridging thegapsinthelocalityofagencybetweennationalandinternationallevel (Kalyvas2006:chapter2),whentheprocessofscaleshift“throughwhich contentionatonelevelistransposedtoahigher(oralower)one”takes effect(TarrowandMcAdam2003:2),orthroughleverageandlinkagethat describehowclosetiesbetweenlocalregimesandWesternactorsmight generate (nonͲ)democratic outcomes (Levitsky and Way 2010: 15ff.). For mechanismsduringtheformationofactors’claimsandresources(155), Tilly et al. likewise account for brokerage and, moreover, category formation which performs through an aggregating function similar to brokerage and creates identitiesthrough unifyingseparatedpopulations. Importantly,Tillyetal.listobjectshift,thealterationinrelationsbetween claimantsandobjectsofclaimsduringwhichactorsalternatetheirclaim makingamonginternationalactors,nationalauthorities,andlocaltargets, with corresponding shifts among repertoires, rhetoric, and categories (ibid.). certification in this phase of escalation which catalyzes the legitimization of actors taking shape centrally, both in international response to national regimes and domestic (re)validation of national actors. Lastly, Tilly et al. list for mechanisms during turning points of

154  conflicts (161) as well brokerage, and furthermore, identity shift, when actors adopt changed group perceptions in reaction to the process or interactionwithotheractors,leadingtoalteredmotivationsandactions. This mechanism supports the process of object shift when identities change throughout processes as they are reͲnegotiated and, ultimately, resultinreshapedactionsandpoliciesand,consequently,haveanimpact atpoliciesatdifferentlevelsoftheconflict(Balcells/Kalyvas2010:427). Radicalization,accordingtoTillyetal.,istheduringtheescalationprocess increasingcontradictionbetweenprevailingclaimsacrosstheboundaries between two actors, and convergence, the ‘radical flank effect’ of radicalization through increasing contradictions to drive less extreme actorsintocloseralliances.  AccordingtoTillyetal.’sstudybrokerageandobjectshiftappeartobethe most effectual mechanisms of escalation. Altogether, mechanisms of external influence linked to escalation seem to chiefly evolve around a) locality of agency and actors’ claims and b) points in time when taking effect. As a consequence, specific functions of the brokerage and object shift mechanisms appear in the South Ossetia case. Therefore, the empiricalfindingsenhancethesemechanismsastheoreticalconceptsthat explaindifferentphasesofescalationprocesses. The South Ossetia findings point to mechanisms taking effect in two different phasesthatsuccessivelyoccur andshape thetrajectory toward escalation: First, the (reͲ)formation and implementation of the Western agendaintheperiodfromthestartoftheescalationcyclebeforechange in local behavior occurs, and second, what Tilly et al. describe as the turningpointtoescalation,theperiodbetweenchangeinlocalbehavior and escalation when Western agency exhibits reinforcing effects in the aftermathofchangeinbehavior.  

155  a) Before change of local behavior: The (reͲ)formation and implementationoftheWesternagenda:

ThestudyofTillyetal.regardsbrokerageastheleastobvious,butmost influentialmechanisminseveralcasesstudied(Tillyetal.2001:254).The overarching function of brokerage is demonstrated by aggregating different forms of action through which political actors aim at unifying resources to gain the means to consolidate power. Brokerage can be observedduringallphasesofescalation,butinthephaseof(reͲ)formation and implementation of the Western agenda, the efforts of brokering advantageoussettingsperformstronglyandthusgiveparticularimpetusto theprocess.Assuch,brokerageconnectscarriersofclaimssuchasagents or localities of agency (Tarrow and McAdam 2003: 12, also see: Kalyvas 2006,Tillyetal.2001).Atthispoint,externalpoliciesintheSouthOssetia caseexhibitspecificfunctionsofhowbrokerageenablesdrawingtogether resourcesforaction. IntheSouthOssetiacase,theinteractionmechanismspecifieshowspecific functions of Brokerage take effect from the start to the end of the escalationcycle.ParticularlypriortochangeinbehaviorofGeorgianstate elites, Western policies exhibit a pattern of influence on local behavior over an extended period of time spanning months or years. Linkage, meaningclosetieswithWesternactors,turnsouttodrawstakeholdersof the conflict at the start of escalation cycles into cooperation formats of negotiationsin2002andofintensepoliticalandfinancialsupportin2004 and 2008 through Western actors. After change in behavior to assertive policies,linkagepersiststhroughclosetiesinthecourseoftheescalation cycle,butsubsequentpoliciesaffectlocalbehaviorinareinforcingmanner asopposedtochangingthetrajectory.Inaddition,levelshiftofWestern agencycombinesresourcesofinfluenceonlocalpoliticsatdifferentlevels betweenwhichWesternactorsshift.ThismeansthatBrokerageduringthe formation phase of Western agency prior to escalations can take the specific function of the Interaction and Level shift mechanisms through spanning extended periods of time, drawing local actors into close ties

156  through cooperation formats and intense political and financial support, determiningareinforcingtrajectorythrough,inafurtherfunction,drawing together efforts at different localities of agency simultaneously, with a tendencytowardtheinternationallevel.  Inaddition,duringtherunuptotheescalationsinSouthOssetiain2002, 2004 and 2008, leverage of Western influence also appears to take a specific function of the brokerage mechanism. The leverage mechanism holds that the stronger the local regimes’ bargaining power, the lower Western leverage or, respectively, effect of Western influence on local behavior (Levitsky and Way 2010: 28). After 2004, Western actors intensified conditionalities which contributed to the unilateral, antiͲ Western stance of Georgian state actors. This culminated in the installment of the Sanakoev administration in 2006, which the analysis identifiedastheturningpointtoassertivepolicies.Indeed,thepoliciesof GeorgianstateelitesintheconflictrepeatedlyshowlowWesternleverage: LocalpoliciesreflectastanceindependentfromWesterndemands,aswell as Western agency shows reticence toward local assertive tendencies. Levitsky and Way maintain that leverage rarely translates into effective democratizing pressure (2010: 29) as Western powers usually allow regimestoescapesanction:“EveninsubͲSaharanAfrica,whereWestern leverageisgreatest,scholarshavefoundnopositiverelationshipbetween conditionality and democratization” (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997 in LevitskyandWay2010:30;alsoseeCrawford1997,Lawson1999,Ethier 2003).  However,LevitskyandWaystudydemocratizing,notstateͲstrengthening policiesofWesternactors.Inthisrespect,theSouthOssetiastudyreflects high Western leverage visͲàͲvis stateͲcentered policies. Whereas the unilateral, strong bargaining stance of the Georgians in the case of Sanakoev demonstrates low Western leverage regarding democracyͲ centered policies, it simultaneously proves high Western leverage

157  regarding stateͲcentered policies, as the Sanakoev administration is the larger response to Western policies in the JCC framework to establish effective state control over Georgian territory. This also relates to the otherheavyͲhandedstatepoliciesoftheGeorgiansideinconflictmatters in2002or2004,sincetheunderlyingclaimofWesternagencyinvariably provedtobestateͲcentered. Therefore, leveragein theSouth Ossetia caseproves to be a functionof brokerage,sinceWesternactorswillemploydemocratizationrhetoricand promoterelatedpoliciesevenwhenstateͲcenteredaimsareatthecenter of the agenda. Western agency, thus, brokers resources by bridging the seeminggapbetweendemocracyandstateͲcenteredpolicies,particularly priortochangesinlocalbehavior,totheendofpushingtheirclaimsand withtheresultofreinforcingescalation.  Also prior to change in local behavior, object shift exhibits specific functionsintheSouthOssetiacase.Categoriesinformsofclaimsthathad been introduced as main stakes in the process at the point of initial conditiongenerallydonotappeartochangeuntilafterthechangeinlocal behavior shortly before escalation. Western actors will employ both democracyͲandstateͲcenteredpoliciesthroughoutthecycle.However,in theirimplementationtheywillfocusonstrengtheningstatecapacityand utilize democracyͲcentered claims, particularly nonͲuse of force, when exerting political pressure on local actors to fulfill demands of state capacity. After change in local behavior, democracyͲcentered demands additionallyreinforcetheescalationtrajectory.Therefore,bothcategories, antiͲcorruption as stateͲcentered and nonͲviolence as democracyͲ centered, are employed from the start of the cycle. In this respect, categories such as antiͲcorruption measures for the purpose of state strengtheningwillbestressedthroughoutthecycle,butevenmorethey will be backed up by implementation of respective formats and institutions. In contrast, the nonͲuse of force demand banks more on

158  situational (though repetitive) use of rhetoric than on agency informing rulesofbehavior.  b) Afterchangeoflocalbehavior:Beforeturningpointstoescalation

Thefunctionsofbrokerageserveadifferentroleafterthechangeinlocal behavior has occurred. During (reͲ)formation of the Western agenda, brokeragespecificallyservesbolsteringpowerresourcestotakeeffecton thelocallevel.Whendynamicsturntoescalation,brokerageexhaustsits aggregating effect of unifying resources to implement policies. Instead, brokerage is still in effect, but Western policies prove inconsistent and diffusive by switching both levels and claims. The phase of unifying resources seems to have concluded. Instead, the brokerage mechanism takesanegative,disaggregatingfunction:Westernpoliciesshiftthelocality ofagencytoadifferentarenaoftheconflict,movingtotheinternational levelinsteadofconcentratingactivityononelevel.  Prominently within the South Ossetia study, before the 2008 escalation, WesternpoliciesaddressedtheconflictcontextattheleveloftheNATO summit in Bucharest, reinforcing the escalating trajectory. In 2004 after theclosureoftheErgnetimarketandamidtheescalatingtrajectory,the WestconcentratedonsupportingPresidentSaakashvili’speaceroadmaps attheinternationallevel.In2002,theOSCEscheduledworkmeetingson combating smuggling in Castelo Branco and Bucharest while the Shevardnadze government launched antiͲsmuggling operations in the conflict zone. In all these instances, Western policies disaggregated resourcestheyhadfocusedatthenationalorlocallevelpriortochangein local behavior and henceforth addressed actors at different levels simultaneously,albeitmostlyattheinternationallevel.Inthis,brokerageis still intact before escalation as Western agency spans sites, units and actors, but in a disaggregating, negative function. As a result, ‘negative brokerage’seemstobeanattempttopreservepowerinreactiontothe changing context of escalation, a proͲactive policy of raising Western

159  actors’ stakes in dislocating from an assertive context and reinforces escalationbytriggeringinstabilitythroughinconsistence.  AccordingtoTillyetal.,objectshiftoccursduringthephasepriortochange in local behavior when actors gather resources prior to escalations. Howeverthisstudyfoundthatobjectshiftalsoplaysaprominentrolein shaping the process after change of local behavior to assertive policies. Particularly,claimshiftasaspecificfunctionofobjectshiftshowsthatthe closertheshiftoflocalbehaviorintime,themoreWesternpoliciesshift theirstresstodemocracyͲcenteredpolicies(whilekeepingtheirfocuson stateͲcentered policies),arguably to solidify their position from which to influencelocalpoliciesintheconflictcontext.Westernagencyaltersclaims and rhetoric through shifts between addressees at international or national levels, for instance addressing the NATO summit in Bucharest while enhancing local cooperation in the ERP. Even more significantly, Western agency performs through shifts in claims or forms of claims in how political actors change claims, how claims are asserted or how differentactorsareaddressedbythesameclaimatdifferentpointsinthe process. This includes conditionalities, reͲnegotiated stakes, shifts in categoriesorchangeinrhetoric.Withinthesameconflictprocess,Western actors appear to accommodate this switch in rhetoric of claims with a reinforcingeffectwheneverescalationapproaches.  c) Afterescalations

Asmentionedearlier,bothlevelshiftandclaimshiftareactivealsoafter escalations when a) Western policies switch their focus back to the national level, b) tone down on forcing demands through democracyͲ centeredclaims(thoughtheypermanentlyplayacrucialrole)andc)turn tostateͲcenteredpolicies.However,studiesofdynamicsofviolencelook at the onset of violence, at escalations as singular phenomena or at the duration of violence instead of systematically studying reͲescalation processes.

160  Therefore, the mechanisms of this study 1) need to be regarded as properties that at least take a crucial part in triggering reͲescalation of violence, not only repeated escalation under similar conditions, and 2) introducethepostͲescalationperiodasanadditionalphaseofviolenceto thestudyofdynamicsofviolence.Thisperioddeservesspecialscrutinyas itexhibitsspecificfunctionsofmechanismsnotexistentinotherphases, suchasthereturntothenationallevelandalterationinclaims,andasit opens the path to a renewed escalation cycle. Research has to systematicallyconsiderthat,inreͲescalativesystemsofviolence,afterthe escalationisbeforetheescalation.Therefore,mechanismsthattakeeffect afterescalationarelikelytobepartofandeventuallyleadtoreͲescalation.  Lastly, this discussion does only links the functioning of mechanisms to specificphasesofescalation,butalsoallowsestablishingamorespecified conceptofexternalagency.First,thediscussionsuggeststhattheseeming paradoxofsimultaneousdemocracyandstateͲcenteredpoliciesworksasa compensating mechanism of Western power claims in response to perceived risks to power resources. Prior to change in local behavior, Western actors try to achieve implementation of their agendas by employing both tiers of democratic and state policies. Western policies never lose focus of either democracy and stateͲcentered claims and policies, but take the identified form as they employ both claims. Oscillation between both strands (which creates the paradox) serves to consolidate the Western stance and destabilize the local context during theextendedprocesspriortoescalations.Therefore,theclearswitchtoa stressofdemocracyͲcenteredclaimsbeforeescalationandtheclearswitch to a stress of stateͲcentered policies after escalation reasonably explains the significant role the ‘democracy vs stateͲclaims paradox’ plays for consolidatingWesternpolicies.  Second, the South Ossetia study focused on mechanisms of external policies that initiate change of local behavior. This makes an important

161  distinction to the works of Tilly et al., Levitsky and Way, Kalyvas, and Mansfield and Snyder as these studies center on local mechanisms of power consolidation in and through violent contexts. However, mechanisms of external actors overlap significantly with local power mechanisms.Westernactorstoalargeextentutilizethesamemechanisms toinfluencethelocalcontextaslocalpoweractorsutilizetoconsolidate theirpowerbasis.Thedifferenceinconditionsofexternalagencycanbe presumed to derive from lower commitment through lower levels of legitimizationpressure(Schlichte2009,firstversion2007:199ff.,alsosee: Toft 2003), access to different resources and different use of resources suchasIMF orEUconditionality policies (above all see: Crawford 2000), anddifferentculturesandpracticesofpoliticsformingagendas(Goodhand andWalton2009:313).  However, the similarities of external Western mechanisms of influence with local power mechanisms, such as aggregating resources, utilizing differentstrategiesofdeterrenceorcoalitionͲbuilding,identityformation mechanisms or employing rhetoric and specific formats of action,are strikingandshouldbetakenintoaccount.Likelocalactors,externalactors pursue interests through (however differently tuned) power policies. Domestic and external state actors follow and are subjected to a stateͲ centeredagendaofstateformationintheirstatesoforiginandoutsidein different arenas. Additionally, Western actors equally underlie reͲ negotiation of identities, interests and alliances as they are part of the sameconflictprocessaslocalactors.  The findings of the South Ossetia study have been generated through tracing of plausible causal links prior to escalations. In generalizing the findingstocontextsofviolenceofothercountries,thediscussiontherefore looks at key decision points in these conflict processes. The following discussion, though refraining from an inͲdepth study, examines the contexts of theSri Lankaand Kashmir conflicts anddiscusses therole of

162  Westernpoliciespriortoturningpointstoescalationinthoseconflictsin lightoftheSouthOssetiafindings.  4.2. Empiricalscopeofthefindings

ToreflectthemechanismsidentifiedintheSouthOssetiacaseanddeepen the theoretical gain for further research, the discussion chooses the conflictcontextsinSriLankaandKashmirtoprovideabasisfordiscussion oftheSouthOssetiaprocess.SriLankagrappleswithaviolentsecessionist conflictinthenorth,characterizedbyperiodsoflowͲintensityviolenceand escalation since the 1970s, with strong incentives for domestic elites to engageinviolence(GoodhandandWalton2009:304,alsosee:Korf2005, Selby 2008; for an overview of the Sri Lanka context see: Rösel 1997, KreuzerandWeiberg2005,Uyangoda2008,Nieto2008).Kashmirhasbeen experiencing uprisings for selfͲdetermination since the 1940s and is a continuoushotspotofviolencesincethe1965IndoͲPakistaniWar,withUS policiesexertingastronginfluenceontheIndianagendainKashmir(above all see: Mohan 1999, Habibullah 2004, for an overview of the Kashmir conflictsee:Mohan1992,ICG2010a,Wirsing1994,Schofield2003).Both conflicts are subject to strong outside interests, including India and the IndianstateofTamilNaduinSriLankaandIndiaandneighboringPakistan in Kashmir. Western actors also pursue their stability agendas in these territorialconflicts,theUSincooperatingwithIndia,butalsowithPakistan on Kashmir whereas in Sri Lanka the US and a wide range of European actorsarepresent.  The contexts of the South Ossetia, Sri Lanka and Kashmir conflicts are similar in features such as dynamics of reͲescalation, territorial disintegrationof the central state through and ethnically framed conflict andsignificantlevelsofWesternengagement.59Itistobeexpectedthat

59 The selection of these two conflicts is a result of the author’s review of secondary literatureavailableonthesecases.However,otherconflictcontextswouldmeetsimilar criteria, for instance Lebanon or East Timor (Zahar 2005, Murden 2000, Sahin 2007, Glassman2003,Wade2002). 163  similar features of domestic power consolidating behavior regulate dynamics in the conflicts and that external policies affect on power consolidation opportunities in this context. The characteristics of the Sri Lanka and Kashmir conflicts, therefore, offer opportunities to identify patterns similar to the South Ossetia case. Power mechanisms of local state behavior can be expected to be similar across conflicts which provides a basis for generalizing the findings of the South Ossetia case (BrubakerandLaitin1998:431).Similarly,GeorgeandBennett(2005:81Ͳ 82) and Imig and Tarrow (2001) point to the importance of establishing comparisons of similar cases with different contexts or environmental conditions, but similar outcomes. Voronkova argues, "This perspective is likelytoproducemoreconvincingargumentswhentheyareshowntobe associatedwithsimilarand/ordivergentoutcomesemergingunderdiverse conditionsacrossdifferentgeographicregions"(Voronkova2011:14).  This discussion, however, refrains from systematic comparison, aiming instead at identifying plausible linkages across cases. On this basis, the reflectionoffindingsinanempiricalcontextmightenableaninsightinto how mechanisms of Western influence play out in processes of violence beyondthesinglecasestudy.Assuch,theaddedvalueofthisdiscussion liesinaccountingoftheSriLankaandKashmircontextswithregardtolinks of external and domestic policies that seem likely to have significant effects on local power behavior in the contexts of the conflicts. If it is possible to show plausible common externalͲdomestic effects similar to the South Ossetia findings by way of illustration in these empirical contexts,thegeneralscopeofthemechanismscanbesustained.Further, thediscussionexpectsthemechanismstobepresentedinthesecases,but anticipatesthattheywillshowvariationsintheirimpact.Similarly,ifitis possible to offer plausible reasons for why the functions of these mechanisms might differ between cases, it will enhance the range of interpretationthefindingsofferandwidenthescopeforfurtherresearch. The conclusions of this however brief empirical discussion will point out

164  links for further and inͲdepth research, also on the basis of the above theoreticaldiscussion.  Thesectionissettolooselydiscusstherelevanceofthethreemechanisms identifiedinthecontextoftheSouthOssetiaconflictfortheSriLankaand Kashmir contexts: First, the Interaction mechanism of early reactive patterns of Western actors with their counterparts and later reinforcing interaction patterns; second, the Level shift mechanism with Western policiesshiftingbetweenarenasofactivity,afterwhichprovidingforthe contexttoshiftinfavorofescalation;andthird,theClaimshiftmechanism whenWesternpoliciesduringtherunuptoescalationgraduallyincrease stressondemocracyͲcenteredclaimstopushtheirstateͲcenteredagendas andtherebyprovidingforthecontexttoshiftinfavorofescalation.Inthe SouthOssetiacontext,thesemechanismscanbeplausiblytracedtowhen Western policies impact on local power consolidating opportunities in specificways.Thefollowingdiscussionaccountsforpossiblesimilaritiesof local power consolidating behavior of the Colombo and Delhi elites in reactiontoWesternpoliciesinthecontextsoftheSriLankaandKashmir escalations. The following discussion will consecutively take account of the Sri Lanka andKashmirconflictsandthelinksbetweenexternalpoliciesandrepeated escalations. For each conflict the text discusses the chronologies of violence by accounting for similarities of their dynamics, local power setting and external Western influence with the South Ossetia case, locates if possible the respective mechanisms, and lastly provides for plausibleexplanationsforsimilaritiesanddivergences.  SriLanka

The following account, first, gives a reading of the process of violence, depictinghowpowerconsolidationofSriLankanlocalelitesplayedoutin theconflictcontextandhowexternalengagement,particularlyofWestern actors,evolvedovertime.Then,theSriLankaaccountwillconcludewitha

165  reflection on the special role of Western external influence for the dynamicsofviolence,takingspecificexamplesofWesternpoliciesandby identifyingpossiblelinkswiththemechanisms.  After gaining full independence from the British Empire in 1948, Ceylon, renamed to Sri Lanka in 1972, started to develop a local elite (for this period in the modern history of Sri Lanka see: Roesel 1997, Uyangoda 2008, Shastri 2005). During colonial rule, competences and participation amongethnicgroups,particularlybetweenthemajoritySinhaleseandthe Tamils being the second largest ethnic group of Sri Lanka, was divided along and cemented through administrative structures, legislative regulationsandterritorialdivisions.Whencolonialinstitutionsbrokeopen, thenewSinhaleserulingelitesoughttoconsolidatepowerbyestablishing ethnic majority rule, based on SinhaleseͲBuddhist nationalism (Weiberg 2005:9).  As a result, access to resources such as property and land became gradually regulated through the patronage rule of the two Sinhalese majoritypartiesSriLankaFreedomParty(SLFP)andUnitedNationalParty (UNP)60.TheSinhaleseagendacalledformassivesettlementpoliciesinthe TamilͲpopulatednorth(from6percentSinhaleseinthe1940supto25per cent in 2001), made Sinhalese the official language and Buddhism the officialreligionand,establsihedacentralizedstructurein1972,thelatter consolidated in the 1978 introduction of the presidential constitution. In addition to marginalizing the Tamil and Muslim minorities, these shifts spurred an innerͲSinhalese struggle (on the factors of innerͲSinhalese conflicts see: Smith 1999). Both political parties, alternatingly in power sinceindependence,pursuedacentralized,eliteͲorientedpowerstructure without distributing power to local Sinhalese party representatives. In 1990, the central state de facto lost control over insurgencies by the

60ThefollowingbackdropofmodernSriLankanhistoryismainlybasedontheinsightful accountsofRoesel1997,Weiberg2005andWeiberg2009. 166  radicalSinhalesemovementoftheJanathaVimukthiPeramuna–People഻s LiberationFront(JVP)inthesouth(ibid.:24).  Altogether, the process of violence in Sri Lanka from the late 1970s underwent four main cycles of escalation, punctured by extensive negotiationsandbypoweroscillatingbetweenthemajorSinhaleseparties (above all see: Kreuzer and Weiberg 2005, ICG 2010c, Shastri 2005). Externally, India’s influence served as a destabilizing force and Western engagementestablishedincreasinginfluenceatthesametimeasviolence escalatedintowar.  Inthefirstphaseofviolencefrom1983,theseparatistTamilmilitarygroup LiberationTigersofTamilEelam(LTTE)launchedawaragainstthecentral governmentofSriLanka,aimingatestablishinganindependentTamilstate inthenorthofthecountry.Previouslyin1976,intensifyingviolenceand politicaltensionhadculminatedintheformationoftheLTTE.In1987,with violenceshowingnosignofabating,theSriLankangovernmentsignedan agreementwithIndiatodeployapeaceͲkeepingforce.Thisresultedina furtherthreeͲyearengagementwiththeLTTEuntilIndiantroopsretreated, leaving the country in a worse state than before.61 The second phase of violencestartedin1990,whenfightingbetweenthegovernmentandLTTE escalated again. Fighting acquired a new quality: In 1991, the LTTE was implicatedintheassassinationofIndianPremierGhandiandin1993,Sri LankanPresidentPremadasawaskilledinanLTTEbombing.Thissurgeof violence considerably deepened the rift in TamilͲSinhalese relations. Meanwhile, the LTTE continuously gained military and political strength through diaspora and Tamil Nadu support (on the dispora support for TamilNadusee:Zunzer2004,ICG2010b).Thethirdphaseofviolenceasof

61India’sshortperformanceunderlineditsambiguousrole,supportingalternatinglythe centralgovernmentandtheLTTE.Delhi’saccesstoSriLankaleadsthroughthesouthern IndianstateofTamilNaduandoftenthroughthepreferencesofthelocaladministration there.India’sengagementshouldbeseenasaninconsistentsetofstrategiesofaregional stakeholder that, while different from the role of Russia in the South Ossetia case, neverthelessreinforceslocaltensions(Iyer1988,Ganguly1995,Smith1999:18Ͳ20). 167  1994 continued with the Sri Lankan army suffering considerable losses. Laterthatyear,PresidentKumaratungarosetopoweronthepromiseof bringingpeace,vowedtoendwarandopenedpeacetalkswiththeLTTE. In 1995, peace talks failed with the LTTE sinking two naval crafts. Amid intensifyingviolenceintheendofthe1990s,in2001,KumaratungawasreͲ electedintoacoalitionwithUNP,thenwithopponentWickremasingheas PrimeMinister(onthedomesticpowerstrugglewithinandviatheformal institutionsseethestudyofShastri2002).Until2002,thewarcontinuedat anintenselevel,takingplaceinthenorthandeastofthecountry,reaching thecapitalthroughsuicideandotherbombings,includinganattempton thelifeofKumaratungaandthedestructionofhalftheSriLankanairforce atabombingatColomboairport(ICG2010c).InFebruary2002,thesecond attempt at peace talks opened with the government and LTTE signing a NorwegianͲmediatedceasefireagreement.Peacetalkswounddownwhen the LTTE withdrew from the negotiations in 2003, with the first suicide bombing since 2001 in Colombo in 2004. In the fourth and to date last phase, violence gradually escalated into war from January 2008, ending withthefullmilitarydefeatoftheLTTE,dismembermentofitsleadership andcontrolofthenorthbythecentralgovernmentinMay2009. Throughoutthesepointsofescalation,localpowertrajectoriesreinforced thedynamicsandlaidthegroundforWesternpolicies’influenceatthose decisivepoints.Thedevolutionofpower,acorepartoftheconstitutional reformtabledin1995,aimedatcalmingthenorthandeastofthecountry. However, the government utilized the judicial procedure to reͲallocate powertoSinhalesebodiesandSinhaleseͲcontrolledterritories(seeSmith 1999).In1996,theconstitutionalreformwasvoteddowninparliament. The planfailed because the Sri Lankan elite nonetheless gave priority to themilitarysolution,theLTTEwasnotgivenequalleverageinnegotiations (Weiberg 2005: 33Ͳ34) and the autonomy arrangement offered through thedevolutionplanwastoolimitedtobeacceptedbythebroadersection ofTamilgroups(ICG2006a:1).

168  The plan played a key role during and immediately after the election periodin1994asapartofthepeacepackagethatbroughtKumaratunga into office. However, nationalist Sinhalese groups did not support devolution (ICG 2006a: 6, Smith 1999: 26Ͳ28). The subsequent refusal of the devolution scheme by radical Sinhalese constituencies are credited with bringing about the loss of the incumbent government in the 2004 electionsmuchmorethanthegovernment’sunsuccessfulperformancein the peace process. The plan came to be refused once more in 2006. (GlasiusandKostovicova2008:94,GoodhandandWalton2009:321,also see:Bastian2006,Kelegama2006).Ropersetal.,therefore,maintainthat thecoreissueofviolenceinSriLankaistheinnerͲSinhalesestruggleover powerdistribution,andtheconflictwiththeTamilsinthenorthistheside stageofthisconflictwherethosetensionsareescalating(Ferdinandsetal. 2004: 14). Yet, throughout 1994 and 1995 violence continued simultaneouslywiththeconstitutionaleffortsandevenintensified,giving reasontoassumethatthepoliticalsolutionwasneverconsideredaserious alternative to the military option (ICG 2006a: 4). Therefore, the innerͲ SinhalesepoliticallandscapeimpedednonͲassertivepolicies. ThisdiscussionsupportsthecentralargumentbroughtoutfortheSouth Ossetiacaseasthedomesticlandscapeprovestobethekeyfactorofstate elite’s ability to maintain power and leaderships’ policies in the conflict build a major part of their power basis. The following discussion shows how the triggering effect of Western policies can be seen to affect on conflictdynamicsthroughtheirimpactonlocalpowerpolicies.  This trajectory of local power struggle perpetuated through Western involvement when the devolution plan was rejected in parliament in August 2000, again amid intensifying violence in the north. Until 2000, externalengagementofWesternactorshadremainedatalowlevel.The newroundoftalkstookitsstartonmassiveinitiativeofWesternactors(on the international process see: Weiberg 2005). Moreover after 2002, Westernactors,mostofalltheUS,EU,theUK,Germany,JapanandWorld

169  Bank, for the first time became directly engaged in the negotiations (Goodhand et al. 2011: 14). Starting from 2000, Western engagement aimed at taking influence on the process of violence through conditionalities linked to negotiations and funding and herein, intensely aiming at taking influence on the central government’s policies in the conflict. From the initial discussions of a constitutional reform to decentralizepowerinthemidͲ1990s,SriLankanelitesstartedcampaigning inelectionstosettletheconflictthroughtalks.Apatternoflocalpolicies evolved that established ongoing military action against the LTTE with negotiations simultaneously taking place. Western actors, particularly in the context of Norway’s mediation initiative in 2002, linked continuing fundingtocontinuingnegotiations(Uyangoda2009).  AtthepointofintensifyingWesternengagement,Kumaratungafacedyet anotherelectionround,firstpresidentialelectionsinDecember1999and then parliamentary elections in October 2000. Amid a weak record, Kumaratungafeared losing the vote (onthe analysis of thisperiod inSri Lankan domestic politicssee: Shastri 2005). At this stage of the process, the continuation of violence had become profitable for both sides. Particularly, the government sought to divert attention from the poor economic situation and allegations of fraud against Kumaratunga, which couldcomeupintofocusincaseofanendofthewar(seeWeiberg2005). Instead, the government renewed the offer of peace talks in the end of 1998, just prior to elections while prolonging the military campaign. Kumaratunga suffered a setback in the 2001 parliamentary election and hadtogointocoalitionwithherUNPFpoliticalopponentWickremasinghe whoheadedthenewgovernmentasPrimeMinister.  However, talks only started from 2000 when Western engagement was solicitedbytheSriLankangovernment(Weiberg2005:40,ICG2006a:5). The peace initiative was led by Norway and coͲchaired by Japan, the US

170  and India. The EU had a lesser coordinating role,62 but was a main financing party together with the UK and Germany. The funding parties broughtoutconditionalitiesofpaymentsbylinkingcontinuingpaymentsto ongoingpeacetalks,mostbluntlyexpressedintheemblematicWorldBank statementofFebruary2003,‘Notalks,nomoney’(Weiberg2005:49).  Nonetheless, Western support was focused on the government and internationalengagementlargelymarginalizedtheLTTE,pushingittogive upterrortactics,whereasthegovernmentenjoyedleveragedespiteopen useofforceandseverehumanrightsviolations(HRW2012).Atthesame time in 2002, the US opened negotiations with the government on a defense agreement to allow US military access to Indian and Sri Lankan territories, simultaneously stepping up pressure on the LTTE. Analysts continued to assess the government to pursue the double strategy of upholding talks to attract international funding and political support for regaining the north and remaining in power, whereas the military campaigncontinued(GoodhandandWalton2009:311).Westernpolicies, thus, had created close ties with the government, which enabled the westernagendatotableconditionalities. The pattern of Western policies further reinforced local dynamics. From 2001,theWickremasinghegovernmentpursuedtheeconomizationofthe conflict by introducing economic development and making fighting irrelevantbytransformingthenorthinaflourishingregionthroughandfor the means of the business entities that had supported the government during the elections (Goodhand and Walton 2009: 308). The LTTE withdrewfromthetalksinApril2004,citingexclusionfrommeetingswith international donors (ICG 2006a). The LTTE leadership broke from peace talks as their possible gains seemed minor in an internationallyͲdriven processthatfavoredstateactorsovernonͲstateactors(Uyangoda2009). Also in 2004, the government decided that intense international

62EUengagementsurgedinthecontextoftheTsunamidisasterin2004whenjointEU efforts became more visible, more institutionalized and funding volumes and readiness outdootherparties(GlasiusandKostovicova2008). 171  engagement was not in their interests as it was not believed that there couldbeapoliticalsolutionwithoutamilitaryvictory(Uyangoda2008). TheWickremasinghegovernmentlosttheelectionsof2004whentheylost thesupportofSouthernradicalconstituencies,whereasthenewlyelected Rajapakse government moved away from seeking legitimacy through Western support and focused on domestic support through nationalist goals and the financial support of nonͲWestern actors. However, the government sought to avoid Western criticism by launching yet another roundofpeacetalksin2006 whilstcontinuingthemilitarycampaign.By 2007, Germany, the UK and the US reacted by suspending particular developmentͲrelated funds, but overall support continued. From then, violencespiraledintothewarof2008thatresultedinmilitaryvictoryof thegovernment.  GoodhandandWalton(2009:310)listmajorpointsofcriticismofWestern engagement during this period as, first of all, being too closely engaged withthegovernmentleadingtodeͲfactosupportofassertivepolicies(also see: Lunstaed 2007) and, along with this, an overemphasis on structural management ofthe peace process whilst turning a blindeye on realͲlife eventsofsimultaneouslymountingviolence.Inthisrespect,Goodhandand WaltonindicateinstancesthatembedWesternagencyinSriLankawithits characteristicsintheSouthOssetiacontext.  Western influence in Sri Lanka’s conflict context displays the pattern of triggering shifts in local dynamics at decisive points in the process, particularly in cooperation with the government in 2001 and 2004. This impactseemstobepossibletotakeeffect,asinthesouthOssetiacontext, through Western agency’s intense sway over local leadership’s power interests. This particularly showed when the Rajapakse government in 2004 took a distance from Western support to secure their domestic power basis. Goodhand and Walton hold that Western engagement triggered ambiguous effects when the same policy was received in

172  differentways:Whenmilitarysupportorfundingisprovided,theWestern actorsmightintendtopushattachedconditionalitiesofnonͲviolence,but various local actors only see deͲfacto support for the governmental military line and the central state (Goodhand and Walton 2009: 314), a pattern similar to the South Ossetia case when local dynamics are reinforcedthroughWesternsupportheldtocurbRussianinterests.  Against this backdrop, Western engagement in Sri Lanka, very similar to South Ossetia, proved “incoherent” when actors linked aid to violence (Goodhand and Walton 2009: 312Ͳ314). Western donors, for lack of a consistent strategy, started to work “around” conflict, meaning partially andtemporarilywithdrawingfunds,butnotsuspendingotherbudgetlines or political support (Goodhand 2011), creating inconsistencies similar to theshiftingpoliciesofWesternagencyintheSouthOssetiacontext.  As a result, the Sri Lanka characteristics translate into similarities with mechanismsidentifiedfortheSouthOssetiacase.First,Westernpolicies proved inconsistent through switching claims during periods of risk of violence.InastrikingsimilaritywiththeSouthOssetiacontext,themajor impactonlocalbehaviorseemedtooccurthroughinconsistencybetween democracyandstateͲcenteredagendasofWesternactorsaddressingthe Sri Lankan government. Furthermore, Western actors opted for pushing thecentralstatethroughsubstantiatingdemocracyͲrelatedissuessuchas nonͲuse of force. Further, the imperative of nonͲuse of force, however pursuedinconsistently byWestern actors, causedabacklash at the local levelthroughmobilizingradialconstituenciesandthemilitaryagainstthe government.Second,GoodhandandWaltonlistthatNorway’sdoublerole inthepeaceprocessasbothfacilitatorinthetalksandasmonitoringparty onthegroundimpededaclearͲcutWesternpolicyinthepoliticalprocess. Similarly in the South Ossetia process, the same Western actors that implemented conditionalities for the postͲSoviet Georgian leaderships at the national level, implemented policies outdoing those conditionalities

173  during negotiations at the international level. Third, the account gives indications that Level shift might have played a role in creating inconsistencies:Apparently,donorandpoliticaldecisionsaretakenoutside the country in Western capitals, such as at the UN or World Bank headquarters.  Here, an inͲdepth analysis would have to show which Western policies specificallyplayedoutpriortoescalationsinSriLanka,andhowWestern policiesprogressedpriorandafterchangeinlocalbehavior.Withregardto Levelshift,itshouldbedetectedwhichpoliciestookeffectatwhichlevel priortoescalations.However,theaccountsuggeststhatInteractioninits reinforcingfunction,LevelshiftandObjectshiftplaydecisiverolesinthe contextofescalationsofviolenceinSriLanka.  Kashmir AftertheendofBritishrulein1947,theregionofKashmir63accessedto IndiaandthefirstwarbetweenIndiaandPakistanbrokeoutovercontrol of the region. The MuslimͲmajority Kashmir, from 1957 by its own constitutionapartofIndia,becamethemostcontentiousissuebetween HinduͲmajorityIndiaandMuslimͲmajorityPakistanwithtwoofthethree IndoͲPakistanwars(thefirstin1947,thesecondwarin1965)beingfought overKashmir(seeforexample:Ganguly2006,Lamb1991).In1962,India foughtanotherwaroverKashmirwithChina(seeSchofield2003).In1965, thespecialstatusoftheregionofJammuandKashmirwasestabslishedin the Indian constitution under article 370, erasing large parts of its autonomy allowing India to ban laws or call emergency rule (Schofield 2003:121Ͳ126). 

63 Kashmir denotes a larger area that includes the IndianͲadministered state of Jammu andKashmir(theKashmirValley,JammuandLadakh),thePakistaniͲadministeredGilgitͲ Baltistan and the Azad Kashmir provinces (Azad Jammu and Kashmir, AJK), and the ChineseͲadministered regions of Aksai Chin and TransͲKarakoram Tract. The subject of thisaccount,however,istheIndianͲruledstateofJammuandKashmir. 174  The dynamics in the Kashmir conflict follow the continuous struggle between India and Pakistan for control over the region, with India maintaining its nominal status. Violence also includes internal Kashmir struggles of Muslim groups opposing Indian rule or the Kashmir administration with the aim of accession to Pakistan or independence. However,muchoftheconflict’sdynamicsisshapedbytheongoingregime consolidation of India’s and Pakistan’s state elites which overcasts and influences local power struggles (ICG 2003a: 4). The unresolved conflict over Kashmir is often assessed to be the one main obstacle for India to consolidateasastate(Mohan2006:20). Indian state elites maintained a HinduͲoriented nationalism to legitimize thestrongͲhandapproachofmaintainingruleinMuslimͲmajorityKashmir. Therefore,India’snonͲrecognitionofpostͲcolonialPakistanandPakistan’s supportforMuslimgroupsinKashmir,fueledIndiannationalistclaimsover Kashmir(seeforexample:Ganguly1995and1996).TheWesternagendais largelyrepresentedbyUSinfluenceonIndianstatepolitics,alsoonDelhi’s Kashmiragenda,andtoalesserextentonPakistan.Externalinfluencein the Kashmir conflict takes place mainly through the U.S. and to a lesser extent throughEurope. Some tiesof India withFrance and the UK exist, but have marginal influence in the context of Kashmir politics (Mohan 2006:25). InternalpoliticsinKashmirlargelyhingeontheapplicationofarticle370in India’sconstitution(ICG2002:6,onKashmir’sdomesticpoliticsalsosee: Lamb 1991, Ganguly 1997). The article is the most important means for Delhi to maintain control in Kashmiri affairs. The special constitutional status as a measure of autonomy rule guarantees local elections in Kashmir.ViolenceregularlybreaksoutduringthepreͲelectionperioddue to the fueling of sentiments through Pakistan and insurgent movements seeking to break from Indian rule, both playing on ethnic lines. Indian authoritiesarequickincallingastateofemergencyonthebasisofarticle 370 when the situation during the election period destabilizes. This situationgrantsDelhifullmilitaryandlegalpowersinKashmir.Therefore,

175  Kashmir’s special status is less a provision of autonomy, but more an instrumentofterritorialcontrolthroughtheIndiancentralstate,utilizing lines of ethnic conflict for the purpose of central control. Therefore, the special status increases Kashmiri nationalist sentiments and furthers Pakistan’sirredentistclaimsinKashmir.  AfterthesecondIndoͲPakistanwarof1965,Kashmir’sstatuswasdeͲjure fixed as a part of India. In the aftermath, there have been five major phasesofescalation,including:first,the1984conqueringofSichenGlacier regionbytheIndianarmy;second,the1990killingofprotestersbyIndian troops,markingthestartoftheKashmirinsurgencyunitinglargestrandsof the otherwise ethnically divided population; third, the 1999 Kargil war between India andPakistan in the Kargil district of Kashmirwhen Indian troopsbetweenMayandJulyaimedatpushingbackPakistanitroopsthat hadinfiltratedtheIndianͲadministeredpartofJammuandKashmir;fourth, the2001terroristattackontheIndianparliamentinNewDelhi,bringing PakistanandIndiatothebrinkofanallͲoutwar;and,fifth,theMay2008 escalation over the transfer by Indian authorities of forest land in the KashmirValleytotheHinduShriAmarnathShrineTrust.  In 1984, the conflict in Kashmir reached its first escalation point after India’s victory in the third war with Pakistan in 1971 (ICG 2003b: 5Ͳ6). Following the war, India had observed an allͲcontrol line as opposed to reconciliation. This claim extended to internal politics in Kashmir with heavyriggingofthe1972electionsandsubsequentSrinagargovernments following a loyal proͲDelhi course. The situation reached a tipping point when in 1984 the DelhiͲcritical Minister Farooq Abdullah was dismissed. Abdullah’sdismissalwaswidelyheldtohavesparkedthebeginningofthe Kashmir insurgency (ICG 2002: 6). Also in 1984, Indian troops took the disputedSiachenGlacierinamilitaryactionthatdefeatedPakistanitroops in the area (ICG 2006: 4). The taking of Siachen Glacier – including the following dispute over the glacier that continued as of 2012 – and the

176  heavyͲhandedapproachinSrinagarpoliticswereadisplayofIndia’sallͲout attemptstoconsolidatepowerinitsdisputednorth.  ThesituationhadbeenstrainedwithPakistansupportingmilitantgroups and with civil uprisings against the government, when in 1990, Kashmir governor Jagmohan’s orders caused the shootings of demonstrators (Schofield 2003: 143Ͳ154). From 1995, the situation between Kashmir resistanceandIndiancentralrulewasexacerbatedbyIndiasystematically usingmilitantgroupsforcounterͲinsurgencystrategies(ibid.158Ͳ163).  Throughoutthistensetrajectoryinthe1990s,theUnitedStatestookup thepatternofdistinctlysupportingtheIndianlineofconsolidationthrough forceinKashmirundertheBillClintonadministration(Mohan2006:20). Generallyitmustbenoted,thatexternalinfluenceintheKashmirconflict continuouslytookplaceatthenationallevelofDelhipolitics,incontrastto theSouthOssetiacontextwhereWesternactorswerepresentatthelocal and international levels prior to escalations. US support for India, thus, focused on state politics at the Indian national level and on nonͲ proliferationandconfidenceͲbuildingmeasuresinthemilitaryframework with Pakistan. In 1998, Washington refused an active mediation role in Kashmir and also refrained from supporting a referendum on Kashmir’s status(Ganguly,R.2001:312and318;Thakur1992:165Ͳ82). Againstthisbackdrop,in1998,theyearpriortotheKargilescalation,the United States’ external engagement was continuously focused on supporting the national level of India’s state policies and on sending dismissivemessagestoIslamabad,asopposedtotakingactiononthelocal level of the conflict. The 1999 Kargil war started when Indian troops pushedbackPakistanitroopsandPakistanͲbackedmilitantsinfiltratingthe IndianͲcontrolledsideoftheLineofControl(LoC).StrongUSbackingand international support for India continued and condemned Pakistan’s actions during the war. The border clash ended only after intense US mediation over fears of a nuclear conflict (ICG 2002: 10) and Pakistan

177  withdrew its troops following the personal intervention of President Clinton(Ganguly2006:47Ͳ48).  During the Kargil dispute, all major parties in India, including the opposition,agreedtopointtoPakistan’sbackingofterrorisminorderto attractUSsupportforIndia(ICG2003b:13).SimilartotheSouthOssetiaor SriLankacontexts,Westernexternalinfluenceconcentratedpoliciesatthe national level instead of the local level. Therefore, and similar to South OssetiaandSriLanka,theIndianstateelitesseemedtofollowthestance ofexternalpoliciesinimplementingtheirlineintheconflict.Inattempting todirectUSpressuretowardPakistan,IndianstatepoliticslooktotheUS approachincenteringontheinternationallevelinsteadofthelocallevelof theconflict.Inotherwords,thesideofIndiaortheUSdidnotinitiateor support direct cooperation with domestic actors in Kashmir, but, rather, theinternationalͲlevelpoliticsoftheKashmirconflictprovidedforuseof violenceoftheIndianlocalstateelites.  The Kargil war ended after a twoͲmonth campaign in July 1999. Even though the Kashmir insurgency had already been abating from 1996, overall violence in Kashmir further increased, mainly due to the reorganizationofmilitantgroupsinPakistan(ICG2003b:6).Inthewakeof Clinton’sSouthAsiavisitin2000,Delhiattemptedtosolidifyrelationswith theUnitedStatesbytakingactioninKashmir.IndiasteppedupcounterͲ insurgency actions in Kashmir in order to convey a message of counterͲ terrorismstrategyandatthesametimereleasedleadersoftheKashmir independence movement (Ganguly, R.2001: 324). Whereas engaging in localpoliticsthroughthismoderatestancecanbeseenasaninclusive,proͲ democratic move, India at the same time intensified the counterͲ insurgencyandthusdirectlycontributedtoincreasedviolenceinKashmir. Hence, it seems as though India’s Kashmir policy was more focused on keepingUSsupportforDelhi’sactionsthanonendingviolenceinKashmir. 

178  Therefore, India’s policies, similar to the South Ossetia and Sri Lanka contexts,turnouttosimultaneouslyimplementaproͲdemocratic,liberal peace agenda and to impose central rule through force. Whereas in Kashmir,incontrasttoSouthOssetiaandSriLanka,externalengagement throughWesternagencyandinparticularlytheUSwasnonͲexistentonthe locallevel,theWesternagendapervasiveintheothercasesdidhavean impact in Kashmir. The Western stance, nevertheless, appeared to be implemented indirectly through the local policies of India, just as in the casesofSouthOssetiaandSriLanka,eventhoughWesternactorswerenot involvedonthegroundinKashmir.  The 2001 escalation of the terrorist attacks on India’s parliament were considered to be a result of the prior, misled Kashmir policies of both Pakistan and India (ICG 2002: 5Ͳ6). International condemnation of the attacksputpressureonPakistantoenditssupportforterroristgroups.In the years after the attacks of September 2001 and the change from the ClintontotheBushadministration,theUnitedStatescontinuedtotighten theirrelationswithIndiapromotingantiͲterrorismalliances.Tostressthis, in2005,BushandIndianPremierSinghsignedanuclearpactthatallowed India, with the backing of nuclear power, to pursue an even more selfͲ assuredlineinKashmir(Mohan2006:24Ͳ25).  AfterthenuclearizationpoliticsofthemidͲ2000s,theoveralltrajectoryof the Kashmir conflict persisted, with Indian local rule holding strong in Kashmir and escalations of violence both on the local and the national level. In the escalation of May 2008, the Indian government transferred KashmirterritorytotheShriAmarnathShrineTrust,aHindureligioussite. This provoked anger among Kashmiri Muslims, led to violent street protestsextendingovermonths,andtoabreakupoftherulingcoalitionin Kashmir. As a result, once more soͲcalled ‘Governor’s rule’ was imposed withpolicekilling several protesters(ICG 2010a: 4). The contention over

179  the land row led to the break between the Valley on the one hand and JammuandLadakhontheother,addingtotheinternaldivideofKashmir.  Altogether,theaccountsuggeststhatonemajordifferenceintriggersof violence in Kashmir lies in the structure of external influence, largely divergingincrucialaspectsfromtheSriLankaorSouthOssetiacontexts. This,togetherwithstrongindicationsofthesamemechanismsatworkas in South Ossetia, gives further insight into their functioning. On the one hand,dynamicsinKashmirarepinchedbetweenthetwogreatpowersof Pakistan and India, but without a greater power pressuring the smaller central state via its territorial divide. Interestingly, dynamics of violence still seem to be decided on the national level of the conflict with cooperation of the Delhi elites with US foreign policy. For instance, the massiveMumbaiterroristattacksofNovember2008couldbeseenasone of the arenas of the Kashmir conflict that continuously mars relations betweenIndiaandPakistan.  However, the ‘great power’ standͲoff in Kashmir seems to coincide with verylittledirectinvolvementofWesternpoliciesintheconflict,atthelocal level,andinWesternrestraintininitiatingnegotiationformatsorproviding funding.Westernpolicies,nevertheless,seemtoplayadecisiveroleinthe dynamics when influencing on local power politics of Indian state elites. Importantly, the Western state formation agenda including its focus on centralstatesupportstillplaysoutontheground.Eventoagreaterextent than in South Ossetia or Sri Lanka, the Western agenda seems to be adoptedand translatedby the centralstate elites in the conflict context andtotheeffectoftriggeringviolenceontheground.Westerninfluencein thisrespectseemstoworkthroughtheformalizedlegislativesettingofthe special status and the dispute with Pakistan over territorial integrity in which the Western antiͲterrorist agenda interferes. Furthermore, on the national level Western policies play on both a democracy and a stateͲ centeredagenda,whichaggravatestheconflict.Thisparticularlyshowedin

180  2000when,asaresultoftheClintonpolicy,Delhisimultaneouslystepped up assertive and permissive measures at the local level, striving to generatelegitimacyfromtheirWesternpartners.  HoweversimilartotheSriLankacontext,aninͲdepthanalysiswouldassess which specific external policies induced escalations on the ground in Kashmir. Analyses should look not only to US policies toward India, but also to the dynamics of IndiaͲPakistan relations. In addition, inͲdepth analysisshouldrevealhowIndianinterferenceinKashmiraffairsleadsto local escalations, not only focus on postͲescalation Indian intervention onceviolencehasflaredupinKashmir. FromspecificIndianpoliciesand theirpointsintimeanalysescandeducehowWesternpolicies,mostofall withregardtoClaimshift,affectescalations.  MechanismsofviolenceinSouthOssetia,SriLankaandKashmir

BoththeSriLankaandtheKashmirconflictsshowstrikingsimilaritieswith mechanisms of external Western policies in the context of dynamics of violenceinSouthOssetia.ThethreeconflictsaresimilarlysetintheirreͲ escalation dynamics of intraͲstate territorial disputes linked to ethnic groups claiming selfͲdetermination after independence. Moreover, reͲ escalation can be seen to be caused by local state elites’ power consolidationpolitics,beingtriggeredbyexternalanddomesticresources of legitimization, nationalist mobilization of ethnic groups, states agents’ use of force for territorial control, and attracting political and financial resources from external supporters of state formation. The broadened perspectiveoftheSriLankaandKashmircontextssuggeststhatWestern policies of liberal peaceͲbuilding initiate local state elites to comply with demands of state formation, which seem to be globally present. These demandsarefacilitatedthroughexternalagendasandinstrumentsofstate formation and locally driven through those domestic elites’ private and politicalpowerinterests. 

181  ThefindingsoftheSouthOssetiastudysuggestedthreemechanismsofreͲ escalation through external influence, first, Interaction of reactive interaction between Western and other stakeholders kicking off the escalation cycle and subsequent reinforcing interaction until change in localbehavior,second,Levelshiftofexternalagencyswitchinglocalitiesof agency prior to escalations and, third, Claim shift with external agency switching between democracy and stateͲenforcing policies. The South Ossetia findings revealed specific functions framing plausible causal explanationsofthemechanisms’effects.However,ithastobereiterated that only an inͲdepth study of the Sri Lanka and Kashmir contexts could revealfunctionsofthemechanisms.Nevertheless,thethreemechanisms, evenintheirmicrofunctions,arelargelyrepresentedbothinSriLankaand Kashmir. The below table accounts for the intensity of the three mechanisms in Sri Lanka and Kashmir and for differences in available power resources of local state elites that might enable explanation of differences in intensity of the mechanisms and thereby enhance their hypotheticalfunctioning:  InterͲ Level Claim  Divergencesinpowerresources action shift shift S.Oss strong strong strong

ͲprofessionalizedWesternengagement:unchanged reinforcingeffectofWesternpolicies,eventoamore intensedegree Sri ͲnonͲWesternpartners:unchangedassertivetendencyon strong strong strong Lanka locallevel(relativelynewphenomenon,possiblechange overtimehastobestudied) ͲWesternantiͲterroragenda:functionsasbutone reinforcinginstanceatthenationallevel 

ͲmoreconsistentWesternsupportforIndia(thanfor Georgia):unchangedpressureonthenationallevel KashͲ ͲlackofterritorialproxyofPakistan(suchasNorth weak weak strong mir OssetiaorTamilNadu):unchangedescalationcycle ͲWesternantiͲterroragenda:functionsasbutone reinforcinginstantatthenationallevel   Table5:DifferencesandcommonalitiesofmechanismsofviolenceinSriLanka, KashmirandSouthOssetia.

182  TheInteractionmechanismismostdifficulttolocateasthediscussiondoes nothavethescopetotracethesequenceoftheprocessesindepth,which makesitdifficulttoascertaintheextenttowhichstakeholderinteraction led to the start of the escalation cycle, or merely reinforced their interactions inthesubsequentcourse of the process. In order tosustain themechanisms,itwouldbecrucialtoidentifytherespectivereinforcing instances.However,itseemsthatintheSriLankaandSouthOssetiacases thereactivepatternismoreexistentthaninKashmir.InKashmir,itseems as though a shift at the national or local level is sufficientto kick off an escalation cycle, making the context very vulnerable to the escalating effectofarelativelyisolatedeventwithrelativelylittlereinforcingimpact, or a high level of inertia, in the subsequent trajectory, specifically by externalactorsatthenationallevel.  TheLevelshiftmechanismwouldrequiremorescrutinyofthelocalityof specificWestpoliciespriortoescalationstomakeasustainedstatement, particularly in Sri Lanka. Western policies at the international level are used by both Sri Lanka and India elites to maintain their claims in the conflicts.LocalstateelitesintenselyrespondtotheWesternparadigm,by whichtheWesternagendaworksthroughthenationaltothelocallevelof theconflictsinbothcases.TheswitchoflevelsofWesternagencyismore pervasive in Sri Lanka than in Kashmir as Western agency is directly involvedatalllevels,whereasinKashmir,Westernactorsarerepresented exclusivelyontheinternationallevel.Thismight,first,hintthatthemore anexternalregionalpowerpushesitsagenda,themorelevelshiftoccurs. This strongly relates to the South Ossetia case where Russia is a stakeholder via the West and to Sri Lanka where India is a negotiating partnerofWesternactors.AsLevelshiftislesssignificantinKashmir,one could, second, further hypothesize that the existence of a territorial neighboring proxy – such as the Indian state Tamil Nadu or the Russian FederationrepublicNorthOssetia–diversifiesactivitiestothelocallevel. In case of no such proxy, the national state elites do not address these

183  local stakeholders and Western activity might be rather confined to the national and even more the international level. Considering both hypotheses,theKashmircontextshowsequaltendenciesofescalationas thetwoothercontexts,butLevelshiftoccursnotinvolvingthelocallevel. Therefore, the discussion suggests that particularly shifts between the national and international level of the conflicts reinforce escalation trajectories.  TheClaimshiftmechanismisprominentinallthreecontextsandseemsto bethemostimportantmechanismtakingeffectpriortoescalations.The oscillation of Western policies between peace talks and negotiations on theonehandandsupportofmilitarizing,centralstateelitesontheother hand seems a general pattern of Western destabilization of volatile trajectories of violence. As Goodhand and Walton point out for the Sri Lanka case, Western agency takes on a double role, often even on the same level of agency. This circumstance becomes visible in the case of negotiations over conflict settlement in an international context when Westernactorsoftenassumealeadingrole,asinitiatorsorfacilitators,but at the veryleast pointedly address their expectations of the outcome of negotiations to the central state elites involved in them. In this vein, Western actors often link success in negotiations to funding or political support.However,Westernactorsalsoheavilyemphasizetheprocessand style of negotiations: Western partners establish issues on the agenda (local elections, territorial access of groups of population, economic rehabilitation etc.), direct small decisions along the way of negotiations (deploymentofamilitarycheckpointinaspecificarea,ethniccomposition ofpeaceͲkeepingforces,tasksofpoliceforces,etc.),orestablishdirectives of validation or legitimacy of the negotiations or of local state agency withinthenegotiations(monitoringreportsofobserversinconflictareas, assumedsignsofcommitmentbylocalactors,electionmonitoringreports, etc.). All these measures have considerable impact even without a formalized mandate of the involved Western agents, but more

184  importantly, none of these policies is addressed or implemented to a consistentextent.Instead,internationalnegotiationsmoreoftencreatea platform for the dual role of Western actors in simultaneously stressing democracy and stateͲcentered demands, which fosters the ambiguous strategy of local state elites in prolonging negotiations while seeking a militarysolution.  Possiblythemostconvincingsuggestionoftheimportanceofclaimshiftin triggeringescalationcanbeattributedtotheKashmircontext.Outofthree mechanisms,onlyclaimshiftshowsasasignificantindicatorofescalation in Kashmir. Interaction and level shift perform weakly. However, escalations occur with high effects of assertive policies of local elites in response to Western policies playing at both democracy and stateͲ centered policies throughout the trajectory. In this respect, claim shift seemstobeaprevalenttriggeroftheescalationtrajectory.  Divergences

These crossͲcontext similarities seem plausible even given the contextͲ specific divergences, and seem even more plausible in light of those differences.Therefore,table5alsoaccountsfordivergencesbetweenthe contexts.Specificdivergencesbetweencontextsmightmakefordifferent readings of similar results, but more importantly, these differences in functionsofmechanismsbringtothesurfacetheexplanatoryoutreachof the causal links they propose to embrace. The following brief list of structural differences in available power resources for local state shows that even though these differences exist, the underlying mechanisms of Western policies nonetheless trigger local policies in similar ways. The followingdiscussiondoesnotclaimcompleteness,butwillconfineitselfto thosedifferencesthatarisefromtheabovediscussion.  ResourcestowhichlocalelitesinSriLankaandKashmircanresortinorder toconsolidatepowerdiffergreatly.Inoneexample,SriLanka’stwoͲparty

185  systemcreatesamajordifferencetoKashmirorGeorgiainhowthetwoSri Lankan family clans at the head of state swap office almost every other electionasanintegralpartoftheestablisheddemocraticprocedure.Even thoughthisprovidesasolidpowerresourceelitescanutilizeinSriLanka, butwhichdoesnotoccurinGeorgiaorKashmir,thisdoesnotmakefora differenceinpowerconsolidatingbehavioroflocalelitesinthecontextsof theconflicts.First,elites’powerdependsonstrengtheningthestateand statepolicieseveniftheyarenotinoffice.Thismightplausiblyexplainwhy inallthreecasesoppositionpartiessupportthegovernmentlinewhenit comes to strongͲhanded policies in the conflicts, also with respect to correspondingwithWesternengagement,suchasinIndiaduringtheKargil war.Second,morethanonWesternsupport,elite’spowerconsolidation dependsonotherlocal,moreradicaldomesticactorssuchasthemilitary, the JVP or radical Buddhist groups (above all see: Rösel 2004, Piechotta 2003, Weiberg 2009) in Sri Lanka or the Orthodox church in Georgia. A caseinpointwaswhentheRajapaksegovernmentinSriLankaturnedto anantiͲWesternstanceafterthesuccessorgovernmenthadlostdomestic support over too close cooperation with Western agencies. In Georgia, leaderships regularly come under pressure from conservative or radical Orthodox groups, which accuse them of selling out Georgia to Western interests, with the Georgian Orthodox church ranking by far the most trusted institution in Georgia (CRRC 2012). When the church outlet ‘Episkopali’afterthe2008warpromotedtheideathatGodhadsentthe RussiantroopstopunishGeorgiaforitstieswiththeWest,thisfoundwide approval among the population, despite the fact that the conflict was alreadyconsideredtobeaproductoftheWestandRussiaclashingover Georgia. ThenationaliststanceGeorgianstateelitesemployintheconflicttokeep domestic support significantly impacts on options in those critical momentsofshiftsthataretriggeredbyWesternpolicies.Thisappearsto supportthecentralargumentasitmightbeahintthattheconditionalities oftheWesternliberalpeaceprojectcreateexactlythepressurepointon

186  local elites that gives way to assertive measures as it alienates the governmentfromthepopulation.  In a first divergence, the pattern of Western policies toward conflicting states differs across contexts. In Sri Lanka, the Western peace project is muchbetterimplemented,structuredandprofessionalizedthaninGeorgia or Kashmir. As the discussionshows, it does not make fordifferencesin effects.Rather,intheSriLankacaseitisplausibletoassume,alsoonthe basis of the Goodhand and Walton study, that the higher level of organizationconcentratesWesternimpact,makesitmoreeffectiveandto anevenhigherextentreinforcesescalationtrajectories.Furthermore,even thoughWesternactorsdonotengageonthegroundinKashmir,Western conditionalities reinforce trajectories in how the Indian national elites translate Western policies via their democracyͲcentered policies of local elections, human and civil rights of local party leaders and the like. A seconddifferenceinWesternpoliciesisfoundintheKashmircasewhere the West has a clear and far more consistent line in supporting India against Pakistan than supporting Georgia against Russia. Mohan even claimsthisledtoamorecompromisingstanceofIndiainnegotiationswith Pakistan (Mohan 2006: 20), but effects remain unchanged as the toll of violencehasnotabated.Inageneralview,supportwithamoreoraless clearͲcutbiasononesideofconflictdoesnotseemtocorrelatewithless influence of Western policies on the national/ central state level. Therefore, bias does neither seem to lead to consistency in Western policieswithregardtolevelsandclaims,nordoesitreleasetheincentives for local elites to shift to escalation. A third difference is posed by the Western antiͲterrorism agenda that is a crucial stake in DelhiͲIslamabad relationsoverKashmirandinColombo’sstancetowardLTTE.Theterrorism agenda has led to a tougher approach of the West toward LTTE and Pakistan,andmuchsototheuseofthecentralstateelitesinColomboand Delhi who secure Western support by joining the antiͲterrorism alliance. International terrorism, on the other hand, is not an issue in the South

187  OssetiacontextwherenoIslamistmilitantsorpoliticalMuslimgroupsare involved(ontheNorthCaucasuscontextoftheSouthOssetiaconflictsee: Dzutsev 2012). Nonetheless, reading the effects of the terrorism agenda on the elites in Sri Lanka or India suggests the conclusion that Western antiͲterrorismpoliciesarereinforcingtheWesterngloballypursuedstate formation project. In other words, the antiͲterrorism agenda makes Western actors concentrate their policies specifically at the level of the centralstateasthisorganizationsharesthecommoninterestofsubduing elements that undermine traditional features of stateness. This leads to the strengthening of state elites that generally tend to opt for assertive measuresincircumstancesofterritorialdisintegration.Afourthdifference isthetrendoftheSriLankangovernmenttoseekoutexternalsupportof nonͲWestern actorssuchas China to keep domesticsupport andprivate gains,whereasGeorgiamaintainsaninvariablystrongproͲWesterncourse. However,thedifferencedoesnotwithstandcloserscrutiny:SriLankastill adherestotheWesternagendawiththeRajapaksegovernmentinitiating newroundsoftalksafter2006.Also,Georgiaentertainstraderelationsof comparably considerable volume with China and Iran (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 12.07.2012, Xinhua 05.04.2010;Kachia2011).Rather,thetrendofsmallstateswithterritorial problemsturningtononͲWesternsupportrevealshowlittlecommitment and opportunity to pursue nonͲassertive measures in territorial disputes existsattheleveloflocalstateelites.Therefore,attractingresourcesfrom actors that do not link their support to democracyͲcentered conditionalities,donotattempttoinfluencedomesticaffairs,anddonot triggercriticismbylocalconstituenciesseemsafavorableoption.  Altogether, divergences in patterns of external policies to a substantial extentaccountforthesamemechanismsofWesternagencywithrespect toinconsistencyofclaimsandarenas.Ashadbeenmentionedearlieras part of the theoretical discussion, even though conditions such as availability to resources or agendas might differ between contexts or

188  within the same process, this exhibits surprisingly little effect with the same mechanisms functioning prior to reͲescalation. Therefore, the findings of the South Ossetia research at times come about under divergingfunctionsofexternalagencybyweighingdifferentlyonspecific policies, categories of actors, or level of agency, or operating under differinglocalmechanismsofpowerwhenelitesarecomposedorrespond differentlytoWesternactors.Generally,thecausallinkofWesternpolicies and local elite behavior that was detected in the South Ossetia case is commonly repeated to the same effect of reͲescalation. Therefore, it seems plausible to assume that when Western policies proceed in the generalwaydescribed,localelitesreactintheobservedwaytotheeffect of providing for the context to shift toward escalation. In other words, similarcrossͲcasepatternsarenotonlyrootedinsimilarcasestructures, butalsoinsimilareffectsonsimilarlocalbehaviorofrepetitivepatternsof externalpolicies.  TheSriLankaandtheKashmircontextsprovideexcellentexamplesofhow Western influence in contexts of violence follows a defined agenda of, both, state formation and liberal peaceͲbuilding. Goodhand and Walton have already stated in their Sri Lanka study that this agenda envisages implementingvestedintereststhroughaliberalvisionofimportingconflict resolution, liberal democracy and market economy and their effect on localelites’policies(GoodhandandWalton2009:304).  The study of Lazarus (2010) examines neoͲliberal state building and democracypromotionspecificallyinthecaseofGeorgia.Regardingilliberal effectsofWesternpoliciesondomesticformsofruleinGeorgia,Lazarus comestosimilarconclusionsasthisstudy(Lazarus2010:2).Importantly, Lazarusemphasizesthat,first,theselfͲinterestoftheagendasofallstates resultsinsupportofautocraticregimesand,second,technocraticneedsof external actors “produce[s] a centralising rather than a democratic or participatory bias in their modus operandi” (ibid.). Lazarus, therefore,

189  criticizes an increasing gap of legitimacy of Western engagement in the fieldofdemocracypromotion(ibid.:3).  This study agrees with these findings and found that these illiberal outcomestakesignificanteffectspecificallyinthecontextofescalationsof violence in the South Ossetia case. Moreover, the empirical discussion illustratedimportantconsiderationsforstudiesoftheWesternproject.In the contexts of South Ossetia, Sri Lanka and Kashmir, the Western state formation/liberalagendaisapracticalexpressionoftheWesternpursuit ofpoweroutsideitsdomesticsphere,generatingmechanismsofexternal influence that significantly contribute to triggering local violence. The discussion of the Kashmir context illustrated that even if Western engagement on the local or national level of the conflict is limited, the structural normpressure of the Western agenda works through national policiesandinfluencescontextsofviolence.TheSriLankacaseprovidesa clear example of how ongoing violence provides the basis for Western actorstopushconditionalitiesconnectedtotheiragendas.Onceviolence ceases,Westernactorslosetheirstakes.Therefore,Westernpoliciesnot onlytriggerviolence,buttheyalsoonlyfunctionincontextsofviolence.  Thegeneralizingempiricaloutreachofthefindingssuggeststhatitisless specific forms of external policies that rule the game and lead to escalations (such as specific forms of military, political or financial support),butthestateformationandliberalpeaceagendasthatlocalstate actors themselves locally interpret make for reͲescalating dynamics of violence. It is surprising to what an enormous extent and simultaneous precision local state elites, in their attempts to consolidate power, are capable of transforming the stateͲformation agenda through the lens of localpoliticsonthegroundoftheirrespectiveviolentconflicts.Thiscanbe observed in all instances mentioned above, such as a more professionalized Western peace agenda at the central state level, consistent Western support for the central state in the conflict, and the

190  focus on democracy features of nonͲviolence. In all cases, the Western twoͲpronged role on various levels fosters the central state elite’s assertionͲleaningstanceintheconflictsandprovidesforreͲescalation.  

191  5. Conclusion

Thisdissertationproposesanexplanationtothequestionofwhyviolence in South Ossetia has escalated recurrently since its start in 1989. After careful discussion of the existing arguments in light of the empirical context, the study examines the influence of Western policies in reͲ escalations in the conflict. Western policies, the argument maintains, influence the power politics of Georgian state elites to the extent of providing incentives for assertive policies toward South Ossetia. This interaction, intersecting with the policies of Russian and Ossetian stakeholders and domestic political and private incentives, repeatedly leadstotheescalationofviolenceintheconflict.  The research argued that studies on the South Ossetia conflict largely juxtaposestateͲbuildinganddemocratizationandalso,ethnicgroupsand nationalism as key factors of the conflict. Neither strand of debate provides an explanation as to why escalations occur at specific points in time and why they recur. Those factors merely explain that the context deterioratedinfavorofescalation,butdonotexplainorprovidecredible links why and how escalations occurred at the points in time observed. Therefore,thesestudiesrefrainfromaddressingthespecificconditionsof the South Ossetia case and link secession to exogenous factors. The research undertaken here is an attempt to contribute to the debate a systematic study on triggers of violence in South Ossetia as a representativecaseofaprotractedarmedconflict.  The study traces the process of Western policies’ influence on Georgian leaderships’optionsforpowerconsolidationpriortoescalations.Thestudy further suggests that the patterns of Western agency that repeatedly occurredpriortothreeinstancesofescalation–in2002,2004and2008– are mechanisms of reͲescalation in South Ossetia. More precisely, the studymaintainsthatthethreemechanismsofInteraction,Levelshiftand

192  Object shift each take effect from the start to the end of the escalation cycleandhencegraduallyleadtoescalation.  Initsmostcrucialfinding,thestudyclaimstohaveplausiblysustainedthis causallinkbyshowingthat,first,shiftsinWesternpoliciesdeterminedthe points in time of escalation (as opposed to the impetus of Georgian, OssetianorRussianagency)and,second,shiftsinWesternpoliciessetoff escalation cycles (in continuous interaction with other stakeholders). Therefore,thestudyconcludesthattheinfluenceofWesternactorssuch as the OSCE, the EU, the US, NATO and EU member states had and continues to have a direct and decisive impact on the dynamics of the conflict through enabling and restricting the options of power consolidationforlocalleaderships.  Theseclosingremarkswouldliketopointoutthreeissuesofrelevancefor furtherconsideration,relatingtoconclusionsaboutthecase,thegeneral properties of the case and resources for further research. First, the revelation of the Bucharest fallacy emphasizes the importance of unseating the false perception of the influence of RussianͲGeorgian or RussianͲWestern contentious politics in the context of the conflict. The 2008AugustwaralteredthestructureofEuropeanͲRussianrelationssince theSecondWorldWarinalastingmanner,asitgavewaytotheendofthe European Security Charta. Because of this, it is widely held that Russian pressure at the NATO summit in Bucharest pushed the dynamics of the SouthOssetiaconflictoverthebrinktowar,andthatWesternactorswere theguiltybutweakbyͲstanders.Inlightofthisstudy,however,itappears thattheBucharestsummitinApril2008wasnotthetriggeringfactorbut merelyareinforcinginstanceofWesternactors’passivesupportoflocal assertive politics one and a half years earlier. The study points out how Western policies, once the escalation cycle had started, reinforced dynamicsthroughtheBucharestrefusal,butthatinfactWesternpolicies’ triggeringeffecttookplaceattheverylocallevelininteractionwith(and

193  support of) the local leadership. At least in this important instance, the muchͲemployed argument of a WesternͲRussian struggle, occurring over theheadsoflocalstakeholdersanddetachedfromlocalaffairs,doesnot hold.Aremarkablefindingofthisstudyisthat,apparently,Georgianstate elitesaremoreeasilyledintoassertivepoliciesthroughWesterninfluence thanthroughdomesticorRussianincentives.  The prevalence of Western influence on the conflict’s dynamics is also apparent through the enormous impact of the paradigm of stateness translatedintopolicy.Westerninfluencenotonlycruciallydeterminesthe choice of policies (antiͲsmuggling, antiͲcrime, antiͲcorruption, territorial integration, taxation and customs, etc.), but also of agendas. Stateness ranksbeforeprivategains,nationalistambitions,democraticgoals,oreven Westernintegration.Thenormofstatehood,facilitatedthroughWestern policies,createsthenecessityforlocalstateleadershipstocomplywithit, regardlessofWesternactors’motivesorlocalleaderships’aims.Asactors work through the norm of the state, not only does the specific role of Western policies prior to escalations become apparent in facilitating in local contexts. It is also clear that the state paradigm weakens the immediateeffectoflocalRussianorGeorgianinterestsintheconflictand renderstheWesternimpactonreͲescalationdynamicsmoreforceful.  Therefore, thegeneralprevalenceof the paradigm of stateness, working throughWesternpoliciesintolocalchoicesandaffectingthedynamicsof violence,isthemostimportantfindingwithgeneralapplicabilityforother contexts of violence. In this respect, the study sustains the paradox of liberal external state building leading to illiberal outcomes such as assertive measures of state leaderships in contexts of violence. As GoodhandandWalton’sdiscussionsofSriLankaandLazarus’discussions ofGeorgiaimpressivelyshow,thefocusofWesternpoliticsonlocalstate eliteslargelytriggersilliberaloutcomesinvolatilestates.Thisstudywould liketoaddthatWesternpoliciesthemselvesarefoundedontheparadigm

194  ofstatehoodandthereforenotonlyconveyanormtolocalcontexts,but alsounderlieverysimilarpowerrestrictionsandinterestsasthelocalelites whothenguideWesternpoliciestowardilliberaldomesticchoices.More precisely, even in their foreign policy agendas, Western policies in local contexts of violence exhibit mechanisms largely overlapping with local mechanismsofpowerconsolidationinthesamecontexts.Ingeneral,itcan beheldthatWesternactorsseekinfluence,orpower,inconflictcontexts whilebeingsubjectto,andsubjectingothersto,thenormofstateness.In acrucialdifferencefromlocalelites,Westernactorsenjoyahigherdegree offreerangebetweenlevelsofagencyandclaims,which,underspecific conditions,hasaparticularlyintensereinforcingeffectonlocaldynamics. ItispossiblethatWesternagentsmightenjoyagreaterfreedomofrange than local elites in part because they are less accountable to their constituencies,whoaremoreremovedfromtheirleaders’actionsabroad (there are of course exceptions such as high expenses in warfare or casualtiesofsoldiers).Inthislight,akeyfindingofthestudytellsusthat notonlythepowerinterestoflocalelitestriggersescalation,butalsothe powerinterestofexternalWesternactors.  ThestudyspecificallyestablishedalinkbetweenWesternpoliciesandreͲ escalationsofviolence.Thefindingsshowthatonlysimilarcircumstances ofagency(interactionofstakeholders,agendas,policies,etc.)underwhich theconflictescalatesrecuratdifferentpointsintime.Westernagency,as well, exhibits a pattern that specifically upholds the dynamics of reͲ escalation over extended periods of time and encompassing individual points of escalation. This was revealed by the overall trajectory of intensification of the conflict, which was discussed at the start of the empiricalanalysis,showingthatoverthereͲescalationprocess,increasing Westernengagementcoincideswithanincreasingfocusonissuesofthe stateandtheinvolvementofstateactors.Similarly,thestudyshowsthat with each escalation the paradox of democracy versus stateͲcentered policies increases whereby Western agency not only aggravates the

195  dynamicspriortoeachescalation,butalsoseemstomaintainthegeneral tendencytowardreͲescalation.  ThislinkbetweenWesternpoliciesandreͲescalationsofviolencemightbe explainedbyconsideringtheSriLankacontext,for whichGoodhandand Walton (2010) argue that the formation and implementation of the Westernagendanecessitatestheexistenceofviolence.Itisworthlooking atthepreliminaryendofthecycleofviolenceinSriLankaafterthe2009 war. During the military campaign, international state actors reluctantly condemnedthegovernmentforhumanrightsviolations.Punitivestepsof Western agencies against the Sri Lankan government were implemented with years of delay, among them the cancellation of preferential trade relationswiththeEUortherefusaloftheconditionslinkedtoanIMFloan (see ICG 2010). Similarly, when the UNHCR announced that it would investigate human rights violations in March 2012, the Colombo government refused the request citing concerns of infringement of sovereignty.ItseemstoraiselegitimatequestionsaboutWesternagency that when the Sri Lankan government ceased seeing the necessity of militaryviolenceasameansofsecuringinternalcontrolafterthemilitary victory of 2009, the implementation of the Western agenda in Sri Lanka lostitsfoothold.  Thissituation,incontrasttotheSouthOssetiacase,canbeseentohave arisenbecausetheSriLankangovernmentexpectedthemilitaryconflictto have ended. In contexts of ongoing violence such as South Ossetia, the ‘nonͲuse of force’ demand by international actors continues to direct WesternͲlocalrelations,suchasintheframework ofthe Genevatalksin which the Georgian government signaled goodwill to Western actors by unilaterally declaring nonͲuse of force after the war of 2008. If the link betweentheefficiencyoftheWesternliberalpeaceagendaandongoing violenceprovestobeasstrongasthediscussionsuggests,itiscriticalthat theagendaberevised.

196  AsdiscussedintheexamplesofGoodhandandWaltonandLazarus,avery small but insightful body of research looks at the effect of the Western liberalpeaceagendaonlocalregimes.Westernactorsdonotseemableto navigatebetweentheirdesireforastrongstateasareliantpartner,and theirpoorunderstandingoflocalnecessitieswhich,onewayoranother, seemtoregularlyleadtoauthoritarianfeaturesofrule,particularlyinlight of Western support. However, with respect to local contexts of violence facilitatedbytheseregimes,itshouldbenotedthatlocalviolenceisoneof the outcomes of the Western agenda. Vice versa, violence seems to be among the most powerful catalyzing forces, providing a determining context of agency. As this study shows, once violence has started, the initialinterestsandconditionspersist,intensify,andseeminglyinevitably leadtoescalation.Thisisparticularlyvalidfortheparadigmofstatehood andthepowerclaimsoflocalandexternalactorslinkedtoit–especially, astheresearchsuggests,fortheimpactofexternalpoliciesonlocalpower mechanisms.  ThestudycallsforfurtherresearchtobedoneinthefieldofreͲescalation ininternalcontextsofviolence.First,thelinkbetweenexternalandlocal policiesneedstobefurtherexplored.Furtherresearchshouldfocusona disaggregationoftheprocessesinthechainofagencyleadingtoviolence. Inthisrespect,thereisaneedtoidentifythepreciseexternalmechanisms that elicit change in local behavior prior to escalation. Research should answerwhethertherearespecificmechanismsthataremorelikelythan otherstotriggerchangeinbehavior,whetherthiseffectofmechanismsof externalagency variesaccordingto points intime (earlier or later inthe escalation cycle), and whether further research can derive more generalized statements on the characteristics of the mechanisms identified, analyzing the effect of 1) claim or actionͲbased properties of state and democracyͲcentered policies (e.g. rhetoric, formats, facilitation projects, implementation of frameworks, etc.) or 2) the effect of and connection between levels of agency, in further exploring how external

197  agencyswitchesarenasofagencyandhowagencyatdifferentlevels,such as the international, national and local level of the conflict, exhibits differenteffectsonthedynamicsofreͲescalation.Inthisrespect,itmight beimportanttolookatthedifferenteffectsofstateͲcenteredpoliciesin contrasttodemocracyͲcenteredpoliciesintermsofthelevelatwhichthey are carried out. For instance, democracyͲcentered policies could exhibit differenteffectsattheinternationalasopposedtothenationallevelofthe conflict.Thisstudygavesomeattentiontothattopic,butfurtherresearch shouldexploretheissueindepth.  Thesecondsuggestionforfurtherresearchalsopointstostudyatthelevel ofagency,butwiththeaimofaggregatingsocialmechanismsofviolence. In order to expand the scope of the findings, it would be necessary to comparekeydecisionpointspriortoescalationsbyworkingacrosscases (also see Capoccia and Keleman 2007). In the context of the previous analysis,thiswouldincludeidentifyingshiftsinlocalbehaviortowardmore assertivepolicies,aswellaspossiblyrelatedWesternpoliciespriortothe turning points. As aresult, social research could make statements about whenintheescalationcyclebehaviorisgenerallymorelikelytoshiftand under which circumstances, including not only external Western policies butalsotheirinteractionwithlocalandregionalfactorsintheconflict.  Lastly,thisstudybringsupthequestionofwhySouthOssetiaseemstobe themajorplaceofcontentionandnotAbkhazia,thelocusofthesecond secessionist conflict on Georgia’s territory. Escalations of violence in Abkhaziatookplaceregularlyfromtheendofthewarin1994until2008, involving the UNͲmandated Georgian and Abkhaz police forces, regular GeorgiantroopsoninterioraswellaslocalGeorgianandAbkhazmilitias, and, since 2008, Russian troops deployed in Abkhazia. Nonetheless, escalationsinAbkhaziaseemtoexhibitmuchweakereffectsonthepower basisofGeorgianelitesanddrawlessvociferousWesternreactionsthan violence in the South Ossetia context (see on the conflict in Abkhazia:

198  Derluguian 2000 and 2007, Suny 1994, Beissinger 2002, Coppieters and Legvold2005,HanfandNodia2000).Therefore,thediscussionwouldlike to briefly point out parallels between the South Ossetia and Abkhazia contexts and their potential for framing causative statements on South Ossetia’sdynamics.  Twoaspectsarecentral:First,apossibleanswertodifferinglinksbetween dynamicsandagencymightbethattheconflictwithAbkhaziaplaysavery differentrolefromthatinSouthOssetiaintermsofpowerconsolidation for Georgian leadership. The Georgian nationalist narrative usually establishes Abkhazia as a separate nation within the Georgian state, whereas this attitude does not extend to South Ossetia (Khinchagashvili 2004,Shatirishvili2003).Second,separationaftertheendoftheAbkhazͲ Georgian war in 1994 took the form of a far more formalized and institutionalized framework of deͲfacto autonomy than in South Ossetia, with the emergence of a local political culture, the formation of foreign relationsbetweentheAbkhazeliteandWesternagencies,andadeͲfacto visa regime with Georgia through the UN Mission. In postͲSoviet South Ossetia, all these features were closely linked to and controlled by the Russian Federation. A third indicator might be that organized armed conflict in Abkhazia at the start of the 1990s was an arena for local Georgian strongmen struggling for power in the capital (I 1, also see: Coppieters and Legvold 2005). This suggests that whereas secessionism mighthavebeenbasedonandimplementedthroughethnicnationalism, thedynamicsoftheconflictinAbkhaziageneratedpowerresourceslinked toethnicnationalismandexternalinvolvementthroughWesternactorsto afarlesserextentthaninSouthOssetia.Thismighthaveledtodifferent dynamics in the Abkhazia context and a different link between Georgian powerconsolidationandWesternimpactintheAbkhaziacontextthanin SouthOssetia. 

199  However,someinterviewpartnerssuggestedthattheconflictinAbkhazia couldbeseenasasmokescreenfortheSouthOssetiacontext(I1,I2,I3). ThisviewholdsthatRussiahasastrongerinterestincontroloverAbkhazia becauseof access to Black Sea waters thanin landͲlocked South Ossetia (alsoseeDerluguian2007).Proponentsarguethat,therefore,Abkhaziais infactthecenterofRussianͲGeorgiancontentionandthatwhendynamics inAbkhaziashift,theramificationsresonateinmultipliedformintheless stable South Ossetia. This view could be sustained, as just two months priortotheinstallmentoftheSanakoevadministrationin2006,Georgian troops recaptured Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia. In this context, a shift in Abkhaziacouldbeseenashavingprecededandpossiblybeingpartofthe same Georgian agenda of territorial integration as the shift to assertive behaviorofGeorgianelitesinSouthOssetia.Similarly,theviewholdsthat the2008warstartednotinSouthOssetia,butwithRussiantroopsquietly moving into Abkhazia days prior to the start of armed action in South Ossetia.  These arguments plausibly sustain that there is a link between the Abkhazia and the South Ossetia dynamics that is not only forged by the commoncontext,butalsoshowninpalpabletrajectoriesofeventsonthe ground. However, the diminished scope of politicized Western engagementwithAbkhaziawhenaddressingstateelitesinTbilisisuggests agreaterimpactofWesternpoliciesonlocalpowerconsolidationinthe South Ossetia context. It seems as though the differences between the Abkhazia and South Ossetia contexts actually fortify the findings of the South Ossetia study:Theyexplicitly reiteratethatshiftsinlocal behavior bringaboutescalationsinSouthOssetia,butthat,simultaneously,Western engagement is the key trigger to escalation and reͲescalation in South Ossetiaandpossiblyinothercasesaswell. 

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224  7.Annexes  ANNEX1:Chronologyofpoliticalandviolenceevents1989Ͳ2007  BasedonresearchatthearchiveoftheOSCEofficeinPrague,CzechRepublic,JanuaryandFebruary2009  When Event Casualties Source Remarks 1989     SOappealtotheGeo  ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe – “Sincethentensionsescalate” SupremeSovietforthe RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE –numerousclashedbetweenGeoandSOpopulations upgradingfromAutRegion CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992 toAutRepublic

1990    Aug SOappealtoMoscowfor  ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe RejectionbybothMoscowandTbs recognitionas RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE independentsubjectof CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992 SovietFederation

Oct ParliamentaryElectionsin  ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe Geo RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992 Oct Declarationofsovereignty  ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe (ofindependence)bySO RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE SupremeSoviet CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992 Dec VotetoabolishSOspecial  ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe RUunderGorbachevtermedvoteunconstitutional,Geointurnrejected administrativestatuswith RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE GeobyGeoSupreme CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992 Soviet

1991    26 KhazbegiAgreement  Dok RUlanguage Mar signedbyYeltsinandGams 31 ReferendumonGeo’s  ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe Mar sovereignty RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992 9Apr Declarationof  ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe IndependenceoftheGeo RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE SupremeSoviet CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992

225  May PresidentialElections.  ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe Gamselected RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992 May SOSupremeSovietvotes  ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe GeoSupremeSovietrejects torestoreSO’s RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE autonomousstatus,but CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992 underjurisdictionofthe RussianSovietRepublic

fall Buswith20Osspeople  CSCECommunicationNo.Prague, 30September – 13bodiesfound27Ͳ29Sept1993 goesmissing 1993,SupplementalReport,September27Ͳ30,1993

22 –SOParliamentadopts  ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe Dec Declarationof RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE independenceandcalling CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992 forunificationwithNO

(21?) –Gamsleavescountry  Dec Geointernalconflictwith  ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe – 22Dec1991Ͳ6Jan1992Gamsleftcountry,violenceandsubstantialcasualtiesoccured, Gams RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE andShevtookover. CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992 –GamshadsoͲcalled“’RoundͲtable’coalition”,mainslogan“GeorgiaforGeorgians”seen ascoreconflictingissuebyreport.ReportinfavorofShev’sapproachtowards“equalityand tolerance”

1992    Jan OustingofGams ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe ParlElectionsinitiallyplannedforMayͲJunearenowscheduledfor11Oct RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992 midͲ SOreferendumof  ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe – boycottedbyGeopopulation Jan independence RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE –NOSupremeSovietoftenexpressedsupportforSOpositions CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992 –RU:CongressofPeople’sDeputiesoftheRFmadethediplomaticrecognitionofGeo dependentonthepeacefulresolutionoftheSOconflict

24 OSCEadmittedtoOSCE DecisionbytheCSCECouncilofMinisters Mar Apr Decisiontodisbandthe  ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe paramilitaryMkhedrioni RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992  ShevvisitsSO>WHEN  ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe EXACTLY? RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992 May 7killed ActivityReport(issued20Apr1993,noindicationon OssPKFsoldiersstatesorrowstillalthoughoneyearlaterin1993becauseofthatincident whichtimeperiod)Whenexactly,who,and background

226  May eventually ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe – preparationprocessofSochiAgreement casualtiesby RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE –Geosidereadyforsoftformofautonomy(“functionalautonomy”) interventionof CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992 –SOside(referstoDeclofInd)callsforthirdforcetoneutralizethefightingandprovisionof Geosecforces legalguaranteesforpeoplelivinginthatarea in –“TheRepublicofGeorgiahasapopulationofnearly5,5mio.ofwhich64%areGeorgian, demonstrations 10%RussianandUkrainian,9Armenian,5%A'zerbaidjani,3%Ossetian,3%Adzharsand2 %Abkhaz.InadditiontherearealsoJewish,Greekandsomeotherethnicgroups.”

3May FirstcallͲupfornewGeo   MkhedrionitobepartoftheGeoarmy nationalarmy 20  36civilians ReportoftheCSCERapporteurMissiontothe – “Massacre”inSO(ByGeotroopsorvillagers) May killedonroad RepublicofGeorgia17Ͳ22May1992,CSCE Osscivilians northofTskh CommunicationNo.186Prague,29May1992;OSCE –Geogovimmediatleycondemnsact CommunicationVienna6June,2000,OSCEMISSION –GeogovassurestotakeheavyarmamentawayfromGeovillagersinSOtoprevent TOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/0015MayͲ5 violence June2000

25  Geostudent CSCECommunicationNo.115,CSCEMissionto OneyearlatermemorialheldinTamaresheni,callsforreconciliation May killedinSO Georgia/ActivityReport,May21Ͳ28,1993 24Jun SochiAgreementsigned AnnexIIofCSCECommunicationNo.228Prague,5 SignedbyYeltsin,SevandcoͲsignedbySOandNOrepresentatives August1992,ReportoftheCSCEFactͲFindinqMission –fullceaseͲfirefrom28Jun,securitycorridoralongthelinesofcontact,withdrawalof totheregionofGeorgianͲOssetianConflict,25Ͳ30July armedformations,disarmament/disbandmentofmilitias.JCChasbeensetup.OssͲGeoͲRU 1992 PKFcreatedanddeployed.MilitaryoberverssubordinatetotheJCCsupervises implementationofceaseͲfire –JCChasbeensetupthrough“DagomysAgreement”WHEREISIT?WHEN? Jul EstimateofRUundSOon  CSCECommunicationNo.150Prague,14June1993, – 34billionrublesfrombothRUandGEOover5years reconstructionneeds CSCEMissiontoGeorgia–ActivityReportJune5–13, –neverpaidoutforSOgovrefusingtransfersthroughGeobankingsystemandthreeͲ 1993 monthlyaccountsforit 25Ͳ30 1stCSCEfactͲfinding  CSCECommunicationNo.228Prague,5August1992, – ImplementationoftheMonitoringMission Jul Mission ReportoftheCSCEFactͲFindinqMissiontotheregion –SOmostcautious,insistsonfullautonomywithperspectivetopossibleunificationwith ofGeorgianͲOssetianConflict,25Ͳ30July1992 NO –RUrejectschangeofGeoborders –allsupportunanimouslytripartiteJPKF 15Ͳ DeploymentofJPKLFF  JointPeaceKeepingandLawEnforcementForces Aug Oct JCCmeetingscometoa   – aftertwoorthreemeetings completehalt 11Oct ParliamentaryElectionsin  InformationbytheOfficeforDemocraticInstitutions Electionsheldinconsistencewithinternationalstandardsanddemocraticprocedures Geo andHumanRights/ODIHRontheelectionsinGeorgia, –except:complexelectionsystem,refugeesituation,lackofexplanationforvoters CSCECommunicationNo.302Prague,16October –electionpostponedinninedistricts 1992

227  8Dec MoUsignedbetweenPR  CSCECommunicationNo.408,11Dec/Activity Reports:– ActivityReportofHoM:LengthydiscussionsonStatusandreportingmandateof andSO ReportoftheHoM,12Dec. thePKFs(whichinformationistobegathered)–InterimReportofPR:Firstsentence:“On ourwaytoTbilissiwetransitedMoscow,wherewehadafirstroundofnegotiationswith theaimtofinalizetheProtocolonassistanceofferedbytheRussianFederation”

1993    Jan 2villagers CSCECommunicationNo.41,ActivityReport,Jan22Ͳ Incidentintheendoftheweek killed 29 25Ͳ StartofCSCE'smandated   Feb activityinGeo 30 MeetingSOͲOSCEinTskh CSCECommunicationNo.41,ActivityReport13April – ReͲestablishmentofworkinggroupsofJCC Mar 1993  StartofeffortstorevivetheJCC 6Ͳ9 GeoͲRUtalksinSochi ActivityReport1Ͳ9April1993,CSCECommunication – Negotiationsstalled#NoJCCmeetings Apr No.6120April1993 –afterthissharpincreaseofviolence 14  3Ossfarmers CSCECommunicationNo. 107Prague,25May1993, – Killingsbyunidentifieduniformedmen,6kmWestofTskhwhilefarmerswereworkingin May killed CSCEMissiontoGeorgia–ActivityReportMay12Ͳ20, thefields 1993 –quarrelsbetweenPKFs,OssdenyGeoaccesstoroads,GeounidentifiedtakeOssPKF hostage –TensionsinSOhaveincreased –GrowingsocialandeconomictiesbetweenNOandSO;NOdownplayspolitical significance 21Ͳ22 CongressoftheOssetian  CSCECommunicationNo.107Prague,25May1993,  May PeopleinVladikavkaz CSCEMissiontoGeorgia–ActivityReportMay12Ͳ20, 1993 21Ͳ25 Ioseliani,headof  CSCECommunicationNo.115,CSCEMissionto – Tensionsremainafterkillingsof14May May Mkhedrioni,visitsNikosi Georgia/ActivityReport,May21Ͳ28,1993 whereGeoPKFislocated 30  2bodiesofGeo CSCECommunicationNo.145Prague10June1993, – wentmissingon15May May JPKFmilitary ActivityReportoftheGeorgiaMission,31May–4 –accordingtoJPKFofficialsretaliationforkilledOsssoldier personnel June1993 found//1Oss soldierkilled

3Jun GeoPMsignsGovernment  CSCECommunicationNo.150Prague,14June1993, – PMSiguasigns"Onthereestablishmentoftheeconomyandthesocialsafetyofthe Decreeforfinancialand CSCEMissiontoGeorgia–ActivityReportJune5–13, populationoftheTskhinvaliregion." economiclinkswithSO 1993 –500millionrublesforreconstruction –retroactivebenefitsforethnicGeoinSO

228  9Jun VisitofRUMFA CSCECommunicationNo.150Prague,14June1993, –SpecialEnvoysfromRUandGeoonSOmatter(Kavsadze/Pastukhov) CSCEMissiontoGeorgia–ActivityReportJune5–13, 1993 10Ͳ11  8killingsinSO CSCECommunicationNo.150Prague,14June1993, – gunbattelsbetwennlocalpoliceandnarcitics’’gangs Jun CSCEMissiontoGeorgia–ActivityReportJune5–13, –“strictlycriminalnature” 1993 Jun/   CSCECommunicationNo.169Prague,June23,1993, – Negotiationsinahalt,manyplansonbothsidestomakeappealsordcrees,butnever Jul CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,June14Ͳ23, finalized 1993 attention:graphwithviolentincidents

14Ͳ23 RUrefusestosignstate  CSCECommunicationNo.169Prague,June23,1993, – Shakhray(inchargeofRUnationalities’policy)responsible Jun treatyoveracceptanceof CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,June14Ͳ23, –SOpointsatincreasingnationalisticstatementsinTbs GEo’sboundariesuntilGeo 1993 –Chochiev(DeputyChairmanofSOSupremeSoviet)ishardlining hasgrantedautonomyto –"SomeleadersthreatentolaunchacampaigntodestabilizetheNorthCaucasusifevents AbkhandSO donotgotheirway." –Ideaofaconferenceonthesettlementoftheconflictalongwithinternational involvement –StatusQuo#GeoacceptsSO’spreͲwaradminstrativesetͲupandSOtacitlydropsseekofr independence(reportsaysthereiswideacceptanceinSOleadership) –JPKF#forSOimportantpartofstatusquoisbeingpartofJPKFandguardingtheirborders –Guarantees#SOdemandsguaranteesonintmonitoringofGeotroopmovementand possibleuseofforceagainstSOandpresenceofPKF,Russianorint. –ReporturgestopressEmbassiesofCSCEmemberstatestoraisethetopicofSOwithGeo gov(notonlytheCSCEmission)

 OPKFobviouslygets  MilitaryAddendumtoJune23ActivityReport,June – OPKFbetterequippedthanGeo armamentfromRU 30,1993.SeeCSCECommunicationNo.169Prague, –Leningoriregion:territoryisequallycontrolledbyGeoandSO.SOclaimedthatterritoryis June23,1993,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/Activity completelyinGeohands. Report,June14Ͳ23,1993

24 CSCEMission’songoing KillingofSO CSCECommunicationNo.PragueJuly61993,CSCE – twosides:eitherindependencewithongoingeconomicblockadefromGeoorafederal JunͲ6 effortstosetupanint policechiefin MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReport,June24ͲJuly6, subjectwithinGeo Jul conference gunbattle 1993 –SOpress:deathofpolicechiefisaresultofthestruggleofthetwosides.Peaceof independence. –IrinaSarishvilioftheNationalDemocraticParty,consideredtobethenumbertwoofthe Geoparliament;fromSeptviceͲprimeminister –SandroKavsadze,PersonalRepresentativeoftheHEadofStateforAbkhandSO

18ͲJul CSCEconceptofa  CSCECommunicationNo.PragueJuly181993,CSCE settlementoftheSOand MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ACSCEPlanforGeorgia,July Abkhconflicts 18,1993

229     CSCECommunicationNo.PragueJuly261993, – strongeffortsofCSCEmissiontoaccomplishagreement,severalmeetingsinTskh MissionActivities(18Ͳ26July1993)andVisitofUN conducted PlanningGrouptoAbkhazia.26July1993.   16killedduring CSCECommunicationNo.Prague,August5,1993, – 4shootingincidentsatJPKFposts,2atvillages previousmonth ActivityReport,July27–August5,1993 –CSCEmissionfocussesonmoderateelementsonSOside (1inTskh,rest –SOandGeosayinformalcontactstheonlywaypossibletorestorecontacts invillages) –SoandGeobothreluctantasforintconferenceimmediately

6Ͳ14   CSCECommunicationNo.Prague,August14,1993, – nosupportforCSCEconcept forthesettlementoftheSOconflict(Jul18) Aug ActivityReport,August6Ͳ14,1993 –CSCEmissionpushesSOleadershiptomakeprogressontimewithprogressinAbkh(Abkh isusedasacomparison)    CSCECommunicationNo.Prague,24August1993, – Kulum:GeotakesmoreterritoryforGEOsettlements;GeodoesnotallowOsstoreturnto ActivityReport:15Ͳ24August1993 GeovillagesinSO –hasaddressedRUforreestablishingJCC,butnoresponse –Begoyeva(InformationSecretarytoSOSupremeSoviet):IntCommdoestakeGeo perspectiveintheconflictandseesSOasaninternalGeoproblem/Kulum:RuYeltsindoes seeSOasaninternalGEOmatter,too

7Sept GeoParliamentapproved  CSCECommunicationNo.Prague,13September – Interethnictensionsremaintoostrongtostartthereturnofrefugees lawtoformnew 1993,ActivityReport,August25ͲSeptember13 government 14Ͳ GeoRUAgreementon   gainsmomentumasabasisforSOGeopoliticalsettlementnegotiationsinMay1998(see Sep EconRehaboftheconflict No.5/98) areassigned 17 ChibelectedHeadofSO  CSCECommunicationNo.303Prague,28September – inthe2ndhalfofSeptSOleadershiptotallyconsumedwithstrugglingforpower,no Sept SupremeSoviet 1993,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport, effortsonthelocallevel,nocontactwithJPKFs September14Ͳ26,1993;CSCECommunicationNo. –SessionoftheSOSupremeSoviet:KulumleavesSO,Chochiyev(DeputyHead)ousted Prague,30September1993,SupplementalReport, –civilianscuttingwoodarearmed;noothersourcesforheatingavailable September27Ͳ30,1993 –“Inconclusion,itappearsthattheintroductionofpeacekeepingforceswithouta subsequentpoliticalregulationoftheconflict,normalizationofeconomicactivity,and establishmentoftheruleoflawhasledtothestrengtheningoflawlesselementsinthe largerpartofthezoneofconflict.(...)Atendencytowardhidden,anarchicormafiaͲstyle methodsofgoverninghasarisen,thealternativetowhichcanonlybedictatorship.“(No. 303) 27 Sukhum/ifallstoAbkh  CSCECommunicationNo.307Prague,29September Sept forces 1993,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/SituationinGeorgia (28September1993)  GamsreturnstoAbkh CSCECommunicationNo.Prague,30September 1993,SupplementalReport,September27Ͳ30,1993

230  27Ͳ29  13bodiesof CSCECommunicationNo.Prague,30September – nearEredvi,fromabusmissingfortwoyears,severalbodieswitharmsandlegstied Sept Osscivilians 1993,SupplementalReport,September27Ͳ30,1993 found 1Ͳ11 Geoforceslostcontrolof  CSCECommunicationNo.Prague,11October1993, Oct allofAbkhduringfirstdays CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,October1Ͳ ofOct 11,1993  Gamslostmomentumin  CSCECommunicationNo.Prague,11October1993, – GeoRurelationsareimproving WesternGeo CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,October1Ͳ –GeostartsconsideringCISmembership(goodrelationswithYeltsin),parliamentary 11,1993 sessionplanned    CSCECommunicationNo.Prague,11October1993, –newSOleadershipunderChibmistrustfulbecauseofunstablesituationinGeo CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,October1Ͳ and“proͲGeo”CSCEconflictsettlementconcept–UruzmanDzhioyev(MFA) 11,1993 hardlining –KulumwasdismissedbytheSOparliamentbecausehewastoomuch infavoroftheCSCEconcept,newSOleaderssay

12Ͳ27 ShevdecidesCIS  CSCECommunicationNo.352Prague,28October – supportedbymajorityofparliament,butdividingmainpoliticalforcesinTbs Oct membership 1993,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport, October12Ͳ27,1993 24Oct VisitofCIOtoSO CSCECommunicationNo.352Prague,28October – ChibandGassiev(ChairmanParliamentaryCommitteeonForeignRelations)moderate 1993,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport, –Butofficiallineverytough,veryharline,demandingmorerecognition,CSCEseatect. October12Ͳ27,1993 2ͲNov SOparladopts"First  OSCECommunicationVienna5April,2001,OSCE proclaimsparliamentarianrepublicwithSupremeSovietashighestauthority ConstitutionofSO" MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.06/01for 1996:SOchangesconstituionintopresidentialrepublic theperiodof16March2001–31March2001 2001:On8Aprreferendumshallbeheldonnewamendmentstoconstituionforthe1996 versionisnowconsideredtoinsufficient

22 Openingofgaspipeline  CSCECommunicationNo.399Prague,14December – FurtherseparationofSOfromNO Nov fromNOtoSO 1993,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,23 November–13December,1993 5Dec 4Osskilled CSCECommunicationNo.399Prague,14December – bygunfireinAchabeti.4Geoarrested,butreleasedforfearoflynching,Geoauthorities 1993,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,23 say November–13December,1993 7Dec FirstGeoparliamentary  CSCECommunicationNo.399Prague,14December – threemajorpoliticalgroupingsinGeoparliament:1)majorityproShev,supportedhispro sessionaftertwomonths 1993,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,23 CIScourseconnectedtoUnionofCitizensofGeo,Zhvheadofparty;2)followersuntilpro November–13December,1993 CISdecision,mostofthemNationalDemocraticParty;3)opposingallalong:NationalFront (headNodarNatadze),ChartͲ91,AssociationofM.Kostava,AssociationofI.Chavchavadze, TRaditionalistParty

9Dec 2or4Ossdie CSCECommunicationNo.399Prague,14December – vehicleattackassumedretaliation inmineattack 1993,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,23 onvehicle. November–13December,1993

231    3Geobodiesin  – GeobodiesassumedprovocationagainstGeo Ossvillage found. “afew  5killedonJPKF CSCECommunicationNo.419Prague,4January1994, – DeputyHeadofSOSupremeSovietwounded,restofSOgovleftneighboringroomonly days baseby CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,December momentsbeforeblast before explosion 14Ͳ29,1993 –connectionwithescapeofsuspectinthekillingofAlanDzhioev.Dzhioevwasleadingthe 22 radicalgroupwithintheOJPKF.(CrossͲcheck!!!) Dec” 22 ModeratemembersofSO  CSCECommunicationNo.419Prague,4January1994, – “Inacandiddiscussionthey(themoderates)toldusthattheydesiredtomovetowards Dec govmeetwithCSCE CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,December negotiationswiththeGeorgiansideassoonaspossible,butwerepreventedfromdoingso mission 14Ͳ29,1993 bythemoreextremistelementsintheleadership,whoapparentlyhavelinkstoMafia groupsthatprofitfromthesituationofunresolvedconflict.” –accusedoftreasonbyhardliners –15or16peoplewithintheOPKFcontingentsupporthardlinersinSOgov,threatentouse forceagainstanyoneholdingaproͲpeaceline.Theyprofitfromsituation.#probably responsibleforblast –ModerateshopeNOauthoritiescantakeJPKFhardlinersintocustody(NOonly counterweight/executivepowerinSO) –moderates’strategy:promoteroundtablediscussionswithoutmandate.Hardliners supportthis.

29 Gamsdead.Shevcalls  CSCECommunicationNo.422Prague,10January DecͲ8 commissiontoinvestigate 1994,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,29 Jan thecirumstancesofhis December1993to8January1994 death.

1994    9Ͳ21   CSCECommunicationNo.437Prague,24January – SOleadershipcondemnsunannouncedGeoPM(Patsatsia)visittoGeovillagesinSO Jan 1994,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport, anticipationofhardlineͲmoderatedecisionafterelectionson27Mar January9Ͳ21,1994  NocontactsbetweenSOpoliceandGeovillages,meetingofJPKFofficers,representatives oflocalcomm,lawenforcementbodiesinSOandrepresentativeofGeovillages lackofcooperationreasonforfailuretocopewithcriminalty.JPKFdoesnotfeel responsibleforpolicework,butpoliceseesJPKFasentitledtouseforce criminalactivitiestieintoNO,acrossborderviaRokypass  allsidescontinuouslyaffirmwillingnesstoreͲestablishJCC.GeosaystheJCCcanfirstbe meetingwithoutSO,onlyGeo,RU,NOandSOjoinsinlater(?)

22   CSCECommunicationNo.457Prague,4February NewSOparty:RepublicanPartyofPeople'sUnity.Moderate,butdeclaredgoalisunity JanͲ4 1994,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport, withNO Feb January22ͲFebruary4,1994

232  3ͲFeb YeltsinvisitsGeo  CSCECommunicationNo.457Prague,4February DemonstrationsinSOagainstYeltsinvisitandagainstgoodrelationbetweenRUandGeo, TreratyofFriendshipand 1994,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport, becausegoodrelationsbetweenGeoandRuareconsideredtohavenegativeeffectsonSO's Negotiation January22ͲFebruary4,1994 interests YelstressesterrintegrityofGeo,RUparticipationinPKFsandnegotiations,agreements singedonfreetrade,militarysupport(develppmentofarmedforces,grantingcredits[this roleobviouslyincrementallytakenoverbyUS!]

  Geodeputy CSCECommunicationNo.457Prague,4February onthemorningofYeltvisit,DefenseMinisterhadtenderedhisresignation Ministerof 1994,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport, probablyforceswhoareinoppositiontothegoodRUGeorelations Defensekilled January22ͲFebruary4,1994 inbombblast, Minister slightlyinjured

6ͲFeb CSCEvisitsShev CSCECommunicationNo.469Prague,16February Shev'sproposal: 1994,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,5Ͳ15 "Thesettlementoftheconflictshouldtakeplaceinfourstages:restorationoftheJCC,direct February1994 politicaldialoguewiththeSouthOssetians,a programforthereturnofrefugees,and,finally,agreementonthepoliticalstatusofthe territory." CSCEpromotesitsparticipanceinJCC,allsidesagree,firstSO,thenGeo

7ͲFeb PRandmilitaryvisitsTskh/  CSCECommunicationNo.469Prague,16February seperatereportsbyGeneralSchaerliandGeneralBergh ontheirvisitoftheJPKF:WHERE? JPKF 1994,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,5Ͳ15 February1994 21Ͳ   CSCECommunicationNo.500Prague,2March1994, preͲSOelections Feb CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,16Ͳ28 Chib:12registeredpolpartiesinSO,newleaderexpectedtobefromtheradicalspectre February1994 ethnicallybaseddivisionofforcesinTskhdeepens.GeopopulationofSOorganizedas "UnionofGeoCitizens"sentlettertoGeopraliamenttopreventtheSOelections  JCC:SOunderlinestheywanttobeanequalpartofit.SOcomplainsGeodidnotwant politicalaspectsintheworkoftheformerJCC.SOwantsauhtorityinlawandorderand clearlyseparatedmandateofJCCandJPKF SOforthefirsttimedidnotdemandareturnofSOterritorieslostduringthewarasa preliminarysteptonegotiations JPKLFmeetingsupportsCSCEparticipationonJCC,Geosays40oberverstoomuch,15 usfficient  GeoNationalIndependencePArty:Radicalopposition,leaderIrakliTsereteli,antiͲRU

   CSCECommunicationNo.512Prague,16March1994, TurmoilinGeoparliamentbecauseofCISdecision,partieschangetoopposition CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,1Ͳ15March  1994 PCrequirementsonmandateofJPKF:WHERE

233  9Mar CSCEvisittoTskh CSCECommunicationNo.512Prague,16March1994, SOleadershipdisplaysamoremilitantlinethanduringthelastmeetings CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,1Ͳ15March 1994 23Ͳ28 HostageIncidentinSO CSCECommunicationNo.541Prague,30March1994, Znauriregion:firsttwoGeoseized,then8OssbyGeovillagerskepthostageuntil28Mar, Mar CSCEMissiontoGeorgia:1)ReportonHostage thedayaftertheelection IncidentinSouthOssetia,2)ReportonTripto incidentexpectedtohaveseriousconsequencesonelections Tshinvali,Elections,March22Ͳ28,1994 releaseofallcaptiveson28Mar,mediatedbyJPKF SeehostagecrisisreportNo.560:detailsonnegotiations,noethnicbackground

25 GovernmentalConference  CSCECommunicationNo.535Prague,28March1994, ConferencewithparticipantsmostlyprosoftautonomyandprocontactswithSO Mar ontheRegulationofthe CSCEMissiontoGeorgia:GovernmentalConference leaderships GeoͲOssconflict onResolutionoftheOssetianConflict; CSCECommunicationNo.546Prague,5April1994, CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,16Ͳ31 March1994

27 SOparliamentaryelections CSCECommunicationNo.541Prague,30March1994, radicalsafterpreliminaryresultswithaslightmajority Mar CSCEMissiontoGeorgia:1)ReportonHostage IncidentinSouthOssetia,2)ReportonTripto Tshinvali,Elections,March22Ͳ28,1994

31 GeopolicesurgesGeo  CSCECommunicationNo.546Prague,5April1994, From22MarParliamentarystruggles,debateonconstitutionofcabinet Mar parliament CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,16Ͳ31 policeupsurgesinprotestofconfirmingMIAShotaKvirayaintooffice,attackonShev March1994 ShevwithstandsandpushesthroughhiscandidateforDeputyPM,Margiani Inthisperiod:FirstcongressoftheCUG

4ͲApr RUGeosingAbkh  CSCECommunicationNo.587Prague,26April1994, HeatedreactionsinGeoandAbkh,violenceinKodorivalley Agreementonreturnof CSCEMissiontoGeorgia:ActivityReport,April1Ͳ refugeesandIDPs April15,1994 10Ͳ 2ndroundofSO  CSCECommunicationNo.587Prague,26April1994, Chibwon75%oftheseats Apr parliamentaryelections CSCEMissiontoGeorgia:ActivityReport,April1Ͳ GeodiscreetpressstatementdenouncingSOelections,nottoenhanceamoreradicalvote; April15,1994 buthighͲlevelattitudesmoretense VazhaKhatchapuridze,PRofHeadofSteofGeoforSOaffairsnamed stressingthatanyAbkhagreementsarenoprecendentsforSO

14Ͳ FirstmeetingofJPKF,CSCE  CSCECommunicationNo.587Prague,26April1994, Apr withBoluievski,headofRU CSCEMissiontoGeorgia:ActivityReport,April1Ͳ troopsintheSouth April15,1994 Caucasus

234  16Ͳ30   CSCECommunicationNo.606Prague,3May1994, strengtheningofbrodercontrolatRokitunnelmeetsSOcriticism,becauseitcouldhinder Apr CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,April16Ͳ SOcontactswithNO April30,1994 Chibreelected,Gassievreelectedasdeputy CISsummitwithShev,recognizingAbkhstatehood,deploymentofUNtroopsapproved: WHENACTUALLY?

20Ͳ   CSCECommunicationNo.606Prague,3May1994, DeputyMIAshotincarwithdriverandbodyguard Apr CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,April16Ͳ April30,1994 12 FirstmeetingofSOGeo  CSCECommunicationNo.627Vienna,13May1994, informal,decisiontosetupexpertgroup.Inpublicmeetingwasdeclaredasdiscussingthe May representatives,in CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/GeorgianͲSouthOssetian refugeeproblem;NOministerfornationalityaffairs Vladikavkaz AgreementinVladikavkaz situationinSOafterparlelectionstense:shootingincidentinthestreetsofTskh,turmoilin parliamentandinternalstruggleingov strugglesbetweenRUandSOPKF,SOtriedtodisarmRUsoldiers SOwantstodissolvedefactoMFAwithhardlineministerDzhioyevintoaparliamentary departmentheadbymoderateGassiev meetingofGassievandGalazov,NOpresident,NOhardlineprounityof"oneOssetia"

   CSCECommunicationNo.658Vienna,25May1994, followͲupmeetingforVladikavkazdidnottakeplace;confirmationofbothsidesof CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,16Ͳ21May willingnessoftalks,butreluctanceasfordifferenceespinstatusquestions 1994 openingofCSCEofficeinTskhdelayed,becauseofnonͲsecurelocation 30  1to3Osskilled CSCECommunicationNo.671Vienna,1June1994, RUPKFblocksallroads intoTskh,Ergenticlosed May CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/TripstoTskhinvalion30Ͳ31 immediatelyhostagetakingonbothsidesinconflictzone,threatsoffurtherkillings;CSCE May1994;CSCECommunicationNo.677Vienna,3 mediatedreleaseon2Jun June1994,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/TriptoTskhinvali stallspreparationofsecondGeoSOmeetinginVladi;aftersolutionSOparldecides on2June1994 participationonsecondVladimeeting killingslikelytobeconnectedtostallingtheVladitalks,mainlyfromSOside

8Ͳ10 GeoConstitutionaldraft CSCECommunicationNo.700Vienna,20June1994, forseesspecialstatusforAjaraandAbkh,butnotforSO Jun CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport(1JuneͲ16 June,1994) 14ͲJun SecondmeetingSoGeoin  CSCECommunicationNo.700Vienna,20June1994, strengthensroleofmonitoringmission;confirmswillofpoliticalsettlement,inthisrespect Vladi CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport(1JuneͲ16 revivalofJCCenvisaged[JCCasatoolforpolsettlement] June,1994) 20ͲJun Shevforthefirsttime  CSCECommunicationNo.727Vienna,4July1994, inhisweeklyradionaddress;VladiresultsinGeopositivelymet admitsGeomistakes CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportfor16Ͳ30 newmarketnorthofTskhwhereGeofarmersselltheirproducts,protectedbyRUPKF; June,1994 greaterbustravelfromandtoTskh RUPKFredeployedtopostsformerlyheldbySOandGeo,becauseoflackingimpartiality, f.ex.SOtroopswereusingcheckpointsascustomcontrol monitorsmeetvillagersregularlyandforthefirsttimetookpartintheweeklysecurity committeemeetingoftheJPKF

235  27ͲJun SOGeoagreeonjoint  CSCECommunicationNo.727Vienna,4July1994, sincetwoyearssabotageofwaterpipeline;agreementonrestoringsupplyfromGeolines repairofthewatersystem CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportfor16Ͳ30 toOssvillages;coredemandofmoderateSOleaderhiptogetbackholdovercoopwithGeo June,1994 inpopulation 4Ͳ8Jul GeoRUmeetingin  CSCECommunicationNo.749 Vienna,21July1994, Geo+RUdeputyPMs;agreementoverreconstitutionofPKF;SOdidnotparticipate,was Moscow CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport1Ͳ15July, informed 1994 majortaksoftheJCCshallbedirectingtheJPKLEF[!]anditslawenforcingandcrimeͲ fightinmechanisms[beforeSOinsistedonthedivisionofboth.Seelater,in2004whenGori policeandfinancialpoliceinterferewithregionalauthorityontheground] CSCEshallplaymajorroleindefiningthefuturestatusofSO

12ͲJul BritishAmbtoRuvisits  CSCECommunicationNo.749Vienna,21July1994, Tskh CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport1Ͳ15July, 1994 16Ͳ31  3killedin CSCECommunicationNo.759Vienna,2August1994, monitoringoftheJPKLF;"criminalincidents" Jul Nikosi,shot CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportforthe interͲcommunaltensionsbecauseofwatersupplyinnortheastofSO Period,16Ͳ31Juḻ1994 interͲethnictensionswhenstealingshappen(sheep,cars) 19Ͳ21 NOMinisterfor   withKhatchapuridze Jul NationalitiesvisitsGeo 26ͲJul JCCAgreementsingedin  CSCECommunicationNo.759Vienna,2August1994, GeoVicePM,MenagarashviliandRUDeputyMFA,Pastukhov Tbs CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportforthe JCCpermanentsecretariattobeinTskh;workinglaguageRU,noofficialtranslation; Period,16Ͳ31Juḻ1994 meetingsatleasteverytwominths questionofJCCcharimanship CSCEtobepartofJCC

   CSCECommunicationNo.769Vienna,10August CSCEhandedoverthe26JulAgreementtoSOleadership;nowSOleadershipinturmoilto 1994,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/Reconstitutionofthe defenditagainstinternalforces JointControlCommissionontheResolutionofthe Georgian/OssetianConflict,dated10August1994The TermsofReference,inboththeoriginal,Russian'and inanunofficialEnglishtranslation,areincluded

236  1Ͳ15   CSCECommunicationNo.775Vienna,16August IncreasingradicalizationofpoliticalsceneinSO;radicaloppositionstartstowieldpower, Aug 1994,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/1)ThePolitical startstomilitarize,haspowrintheSOsecurityforces SituationinSouthOssetia,2)ActivityReportforthe GassievresignedafterpressurebecauseofsingingtheVladiAgreementof14Jun,plusSO Period1Ͳ15August parliamentannulledSOconsentwiththedocument;SOparlisreviewingtheDocnowͲͲͲRu andGeoexpreshopetoholdJCCmeeting15Aug mainSOradicalsBagayev,MinisterofNationalSecurityandKabisov,aparldeputy chariman;brotherofBheadsoneoftwomajorSOcriminalgroups,theotherbythesonsof ahighͲrankingpoliceofficer;B'sloyalsaswellinPKF "Anythingenhacningstabilityis(therefor)perceivedasathreat" radicalsareeuqallyantiͲRUasantiͲGeo,eveninfavorofanantiͲRuCaucasuscoalitionifRu letsSOdownagainstGeo.DudayevinChechniaismajorally tensionsbetweenRuandSOPkFsrise

22Ͳ24 RUdelegationvisitsTskh CSCE CommunicationNo.Vienna,6September1994, deputyministeriallevel;triestoconvinceSOgroupsofprogress,reconstructionandJCC Aug CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportforthe reconveingdiscussed,butlittleeffect Period,16Ͳ31August1994 DeputyHOMinroundtablediscussioninskhtelevisionsessionon19Aug  CSCEdistributesconceptofSOconstitutionalstatus[WHYNOW,WHENEVENTHEJCC MEETINGISSTALLED??]

15Ͳ   Memorandum,AmbassadorEiff'smeetingswithMr Kabisovsaysstatuspaperinacceptableevenforparlreview,becauseitconsidersSOasa Sep AtsamazKabisov,deputychairmanoftheState partofGeo,reluctancefortalkswithGeo;SOdelcurrentlyinMoscowbecauseofJCC Nykhas(Parliament)andMr.DmitriyMedoev,foreign decision ministerinTskhinvalion15september1994,Tbilisi17 September1994

1Ͳ15  1Geovillager CSCECommunicationNo.Vienna,20October1994, (Whenexactlynotindicated) Oct killed CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport1Ͳ15 inDicevi,12kmeastofTskh.Geovillagersabducted40Ͳ50Osswhichwerereleasecover October1994 theday.SpilledovertoArtsevi,Geohostagestaken.PKFmeditionRUssianͲled  SORUnegotiationsonJCCnoresults.RUsupportofOPKFcontinuestobefrozen.But1.5 ofthe5mioforreconstructionpaidthroughNO.

13Ͳ14 Delegatesfromsecessionst  CSCECommunicationNo.Vienna,20October1994, Transnist,Nagorno,Gagauzia,treatyoffriendshipandcoopsigned.Nodelegationsfrom Oct regionsinTskh,220th CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport1Ͳ15 RU,NOorAbkh. anniversaryof"RUOss October1994 union"

16Oct 3Oss,3Geo CSCECommunicationNo.Vienna,3November1994, oneMkhedrionitakenhostagebyOsscriminals,financialclaims.MkheͲ Ossshootoutat killed(OssPKF CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportfor16Ͳ31 OssPKFcheckpoint.OneSOPKFseizedinretalaiton,civilainsonbothsidestookhostages, andGeoMkhe) October1994 too.Whereaboutofkeyhostagesunclear. CSCEindirectcontactwithMkhe OfficialsagreethatPKFsofallsidestoomuchpartofthelocalenvironmenttobeimpartial

237     CSCECommunicationNo.Vienna,18November1994, Ossthreatentokillgeohostage,Hostagesnotheldbyauthoritiesofeitherside. CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportfor1Ͳ15 November1994 31Oct Agreementofreconvening  CSCECommunicationNo.Vienna,18November1994, withoutSO,SOparlwaitedtoapprove.SOagainstJCCsecretariat(plannedtobeinTskh) oftheJCCsignedin CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportfor1Ͳ15 andagainstpoliticalworkinggroupwithinJCC.SOdeputyheadofgovthreatensto Moscow November1994 withdrawsignatureincaseofdeathofSOhostage. 7ͲNov FirstJCCmeetingin  CSCECommunicationNo.Vienna,18November1994, SOdelegationtoMoscowexertedpressureonRU.CSCEnomemberofJCC,nopolitical Moscow CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportfor1Ͳ15 workinggroupestablishedduringfirstmeting(econ,refugee,PKFworkinggroups) November1994 GeothreatentokillOsshostageisGeoisnotreleased.GeoauthoritiesnoaccesstoOss hostage. OssillegalPKFcheckpointatUbiati,0.5kmtoGeovillageNuli,9kmwesttoTskh,in reactiontohostageͲtaking,deniesGeoaccesstofields.GeoPKFhaswithdrawnfromjoint OssͲGeocheckpointatMuguti,baklashbecauseCSCEfavorsasmanyjointckepointsas possible.NoregularJPKFcommandmeetingsduringtheperiod. ##### ColloquiumGeoMFAand  CSCECommunicationNo.Vienna,18November1994, CSCEonconstitutional CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportfor1Ͳ15 statusofSO November1994 ##### SecondJCCmeetingtook  CSCECommunicationNo.Vienna,6December1994, SOtookpartdespitepriorthreatsofboycott placeinVladikavkaz CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport16Ͳ30 majorissuesimproveddisciplineofPKFs(whichmeansimpartiality,increaseofcriminality, November1994 weaponsmuggling)andRUforunifiedcommandandcontrolmechanisms Dec Geooppositionleader   Giorgadzekilled 2Dec ColloquiumSOCSCEon  CSCECommunicationNo.Vienna,21December1994, constitutionalstatusofSO CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/BiweeklyActivityReport(1Ͳ (followup11Nob) 15December1994) 6Dec ThirdJCCmeetingin  CSCECommunicationNo.Vienna,21December1994, RUgivenfullcommandofallthreeJPKFforfirstperiodofthreemonths,thenRUnames Moscow CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/BiweeklyActivityReport(1Ͳ commandereachsixmonths.Meanttocreateacceptanceoflocalforces.ͲͲͲbackground 15December1994) morecontraoloverdisciplineofPKFs 21 GeoOssmeetwithout  CSCECommunicationNo.Vienna,4January1995, tacklecrimeissueswherethetwo jurisdictionsinteract Dec outsideinitiativeonlocal CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportforthe SOveryreluctanttobilateralcontactswithGeoonhighlevel criminality periodDecember16Ͳ31,1994 majorissueantiͲcrime,increasingcrimeamongPKFmember,sincreasingofarmed robberiesingeneral  constitutionalprocessinGeoprocedes.ConstitutionalCommissionincharge.Federalism, selfͲruleect.majorissuesofconcern.Checkothersources

 1995  

238     CSCECommunicationNo.Vienna,17January1995, JointOssGeomeetingonconstitutionalissuesdelayed,probablyuntilafterGeoparl CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport(1Ͳ15 decidedoverconstitutionaldraft.Oss(likeAbkh)refusedtotakepartinGeoconstituional January1995) processafterGeoofferedthisverybelatedly. Startofdismantlingofillegalcheckpoints,delayofdisarmamentofcivilianpopulation OssandGeopolicemenattendJPKFregularly Geohostagereportedlykilled,SOPKFheldcaptivebytheGeohostage'sbrotherͲͲgrown intoprivatevendettaincludingcriminalactivities

   CSCECommunicationNo.Vienna,20February1995, GeoandOssPKFignoredirectordersofjointRUPKFcommand.RUwantstoreplaceall CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportforthe forceswithRussianones.Noliaisonbetweentroopsonthelowerlevelswithalllinesleading period1Ͳ15February,1995 bacltoJPKF. Secondreportonillegalcheckpoint:GeosetupcheckpointtoGeovillage.MIAdispatched GeopoliceinGeovillagesinconflictzone.RUCommandapprovesofthat,butnotofillegal checkpoints

1Mar GeoOssRoundtablein  CSCECommunicationNo.Vienna,10March1995, Geoparticipantsadmittedseriousmistakesin1990/91 Vladikavkazonfuture CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport16February  bilateralrelations Ͳ1March1995 formerGeoministerGiorgadzeaccusedofmurderofoppositionleaderChanturiainDec 1994andattemptedmurderofAbahsidzeinAjara.

20Ͳ23 RUMFDinTbssigns25Ͳ  CSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/18/9518April 13000RUtroopsbasedinGeo,unclearwhetherGeoreceivespayment Mar yeartreatyforRuss 1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonlyVienna,13April SOcontinuestobehardline,nextJCCmeetingputofffromFebtoMay militarybases 1995,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,15 BadriKahtidzenew"PRofGeoHeadofStetoShidaKartli",GeoreͲdeistrictsSOtobring MarchͲ31March1995 areaswithmajorityofGeopopulationundercontrol.Unilateralaction. sporadicshootͲoutsbetweenSOandGEopostsregular

   CSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/21/9520April RU'senhancedpolicytowardsconflictwithfocusonterrintegrityandsettlementseemto 1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonlyVienna,20April have"serious"impactonSOattitudes 1995,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport,1Ͳ15  April1995 Thurmeetingdiscussedlandtenures,antiͲcrime,disarmamentofcivilianpopulation, exchangeoflistsofrefugees,stolencars;Geoissued1.5forrecosntruction,tobefollowed by1.2creditsfromRU firstmentioningoffirmUSstatementsupportingGeoterrintegrity,USAmbtoGeo

   CSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/59/9511May JCCmeetingagaindelayedfromearlyMaytolateMay 1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonlyVienna,11May reportsees"growingacceptancebytheSouthOssetiansthattheregionsfuturelieswhtina 1995,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport(16Ͳ30 Georgianstate" April,1995) GeoandSOPKFsfailtorotatetheirpersonnel,drawpersonnelfromthelocalpopulation problemofcontradictingchainsofcommandͲͲͲGeoPKFadherestoGeoMFD,nottoJPKF command.

239     OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/81/9523May SOupsetaboutMemobetweenRUandGeo,doesnotacceptitasastartofnegotiations. 1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly,Vienna23May SOdemandsguaranteethatGeoinfuturedoesnottrytochangetheregion'sdemography 1995,OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport1Ͳ15 Thurmeeting,11May:tlephonelinesbetweenTskhandTbspartiallyrestored,nofunding May1995 forwatersupllyproject mostcommonissueaboutPKF:feecollectingfrompassingtraffickatcheckpoints.Geoand OssPKFsoldiersblameOsspolicecahrginhighfeesfortransportinglorriestoandfromRoky tunnel 19 trilateralPKFpatrolsstart  OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/91/955June RUexertinconsiderablepressureonSOtogiveupclaimsofindependenceandintegrate May //Bichenow,SOPKF 1995OOSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly,Vienna5June intoGeoanddraftownbasicdemandsforfuturestatus.SOtriestoslowdowntheprocess, soldierheldhostage 1995,OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportfor f.ex.ImpedingaJCCmeetinginTskhon30MaybynotlettingparticipantsenterSO released theperiodMay16Ͳ31,1995 ("finessingtheRUssians"),downgradedtoconsultativegathering. RUGeneralsopenlydemandingSOtoacceptitnegrationintoGeo,angeredthatSOhas donenothingtopreparetheSOpublicforthestep.SOonlystiffens.  Thurmeeting:SOrepresaentativesreport,244Geofamiliesreturned.ButSOofficialsdo notallowGeotoinspectthelistbecausetheywanttoprotectthereturneesfromretaliation fromtheGeoside(somewhatunclearwhyGeoshouldretaliateGeo) Georepres,PRKhatidze,announcesfudingforwatersystem  Monitoring:IllegalcheckpontsinUbiatiandNuliremoved,nowtrilateralpatrollingcan continue Unregularpayment,espoftheSOPKFisheldresponsibleforthecriminalactivites

9ͲJun FourthSessionofJCCin  OSCECommunicationNo.:REF8EC/l18/9522June discussionaboutJPKF:OssPKFmeanttobeNO,butinfactentirelySO,forSOsignof Moscow[therewasafifth 1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly,Vienna22June statehood already,butwhatever] 1995,OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport1Ͳ16 recontructionfunding:RUhasgivensofar4mioUSD,Geonothingceptforconditional June1995 promises Monitoring:residentsinruralareaslivewelltogether,increasinglyhelpingouteachother, residentssay. RUPKFpermosprofessionally,SOdesastruous,Geofarfromstandard,too.

   OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/140/957July1995 RUconcernedwithChechenprovocationsinSO,ChechenattemptstopenetrateGeo OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly,Vienna7July1995, throughSO.WantstoincreasePKFsunilaterally,seesjointJCCdecisionwithSOandGeoas OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReport16Ͳ30June impediment. 1995 Monitor:somePFKpostsnotoccupied,nopropercontrolofsmallweapons Thurmeeting:water,energy,telephone.GeoproposestoupgradeelectricitylinesfromNO andinexchangerepairnaturalgaspipelinetoSO. TwocompaniesinTskhandGoriagreedonccop problem:Allocationofformerlycommunalland 30ͲJun SOparlissuesdeclaration  OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/168/9524July badrelationswithGeo,aggressionssufferedfromGeo1989to1992anddeterminationto onstatus,unpublished 1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly,Vienna24July joinRFasapartofNO 1995,OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportfor thePeriodofJuly1Ͳ15,1995

240     OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/168/9524July RuclearlyfrustratedoverSOattemptstofootͲdragnegotiations 1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly,Vienna24July SOinsiststhatJCCwasalwaysmeatasameansforpoliticaltalks,notasaframefor 1995,OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ActivityReportfor substantivediscussions thePeriodofJuly1Ͳ15,1995 NOinafinancialsqueeze,Moscowcovers80%oftheirbudget.WhenNOinfinancialcrisis, itisreflectedinfianancialcrisisinSO,MajorityofSOleadershipackonwledgesthatlongͲ termsolutionisintegrationintoGeo,butactionsareobverse. SOreferstoAbkhwithstandingRUpressuretojoinGeo

early    SOsendsresolutiononitsownlegalstatustoRUDumainordertoswayRU'sactions Jul  19Ͳ20 FifthJCCsessioninTskh  CSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/183/95 8August Georeadytopay1mioUSDreconstructionfunds,promises5miomoreifRUgivescredits Jul andTbs//Firstvisitof 1995OSCERESTRICTEDENGLISHonlyVienna,7 CSCEmissionsstartsfirstindependentinititiativeinJCC,issuingproposalforeconomic officalSOdelegationto August1995,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/Activityreport rehabprogrammeinitiated+E214ͲͲͲDOK?? GeoͲcontrolledterritory 16Ͳ31July,1995 since1989

27ͲJul SOwithdrawssignatureof  CSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/197/9522August insideͲSOpressurebyparlindicatedbyreports.Nowallsideswithdrawfromsigning 5thJCCsessiondeclaration 1995OSCERESTRICTEDENGLISHonlyVienna,22 SOplaysondelayingdecision(oftenthecase,reportsindicate)noclearvisiononSOside, August1995,CSCEMissiontoGeorgia/Activity noproorcons,sofootͲdraggingtheprocess ReportfortheperiodAugust1Ͳ15,1995 Kochievleadingfigure,MinisterofInformation,leaderofcommunistpartywhoholds70% oftheseats,prointegrationintoRU;SOmafiaeitherwantstoreintegratewithGeo  WeeklyThursdaymeetings(PROTOCOLS?)underchairmanshipofRUJPKFcommander, bringtogetheropearationalofficialsfromSOandGeoneighboringregions subjectmatters:irrigationwater,farmlanddivision,citywatersupplies,telephone connections,repairofhighwayandrailwaylinks,industrailenterprisecooperation, exchangeofnaturalgasversuselectricitysupplies.F.ex.permissionofpassagethroughGeo territoryforisolatedSOvillage,ondeputyminsterlevel  "Interestinglyenough,toplevelGeorgianreactioninprivatehasbeenthatthequestionof therestorationofGeorgia'ssovereigntyoverAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiaisbasicallyin Russianhands."  AssociationofCaucasianRepublicstowhcihAbkhandSOhavebeenadmittedfullmembers  DecisionoverGEoconstitutionnotthisyear

29Ͳ AttempttoShev'slife//  OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/202/951 ShevmanagedtopassGeo'sconstitution,extremistsreactedinexasperation Aug Geoparlpasses September1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly, noparagraphonGeo'sterritorialstructureasinitiallyplanned,likereferringtoselfͲrulein constitution Vienna1Septmeber1995,OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ Abkh,SO,Aja.Newelectionlawforthcoming. Activityreport16Ͳ30August1995 RUtriestonaildownSOtoitsownformerdemandtohavebilateralnegotiationswithGeo, butnowtheyrefuse

241  15Ͳ RUMFAvisitsGeo OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/246/9525 Chernomyrdin,onlyAbkhdiscussed,SOhardlyatopic,"strategic"relations,BTCfirsttime Sep September1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly, mentioned Vienna25September1995,OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ nodirecttalksinsight,timeofnextJCCmeetingstillunclear BiweeklyActivityReport(31AugustͲ15September 1995)

20Ͳ FifthanniversaryofSO  OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/246/9525 RU,JPKFandOSCEboycottthecelebration Sep independence September1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly, SObackedoutfromownproposalof1MartoimplementGeoSocommissiononoriginsof Vienna25Septemeber1995,OSCEMissionto theconflict.TskhdemandedthecommtostartoutwithexaminingSOsettlementfromthe Georgia/BiweeklyActivityReport(31AugustͲ15 1stcenturyBC. September1995) SomeSOPKFsoldiersmarched,NOpresdidnotparticipate,butNOPM

   OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/262/954October HoMachievedSOconsenttobilateraltalksduringmeetingwithChibinTskh 1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly,Vienna4 October1995,OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/Biweekly ActivityReport,16Ͳ30September1995

2Oct AttemptoflifeofSOPM  OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/306/9527October Backgroundunclear Gabarayev 1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly,Vienna27 2OctIntroductionofLari October1995,OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/Activity conflictskeptoutofelectioncampaigns,SOandAbkhforbadeGeoelections Report(1Ͳ24October,1995) RUcancelled18OctJCCmeetinginVladi 

4Oct SecondEconRehabProg  OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/306/9527October OSCElaunched,firstmetingwasheldinSeptemberinTskh Meeting 1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly,Vienna27 October1995,OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/Activity Report(1Ͳ24October,1995)

30Ͳ31 GeoSOmeetinginVladi OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/363/9521 RU,NO,OSCEasintermediaries.Decisiontostartnegotiatingprocessonpoliticalstatus Oct November1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly, SeenasÄthestartofthepoliticalnegotiationprocessthreezearsafterthenendofthe Vienna20November1995,OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ hostilities"(421) ActivityReport25OctoberͲ18November1995

5ͲNov Geoparlandpresid  OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/363/9521 elections November1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly, Vienna20November1995,OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ ActivityReport25OctoberͲ18November1995

##### SOrefusestoopenOSCE  OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/363/9521 LetterofMFAMedoyev.OnlyacceptableifofficeisrundirectlybyVienna,otherwise branchofficeinTskh November1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly, "indirectconfirmationoftheextensionofthesovereigntyofofthestatewhereitis Vienna20November1995,OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ accreditedtoSouthOssetia."(translOSCE) ActivityReport25OctoberͲ18November1995

242  13 GeoSOmeetingin  OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/421/9527 plus3(RU,NO,OSCE).MoUonsecurityandconfidenceͲbuildingmeasures,signedbythe5, Dec Moscow December1995OSCERESTRICTEDEnglishonly, demilitarizedzone,facilitatedborderregimebetweenNOandSO Vienna27December1995,OSCEMissiontoGeorgia/ SOmakesitclearthatSO'sfinalapprovalwillbenoeasymatter ActivityReportfor19NovemberͲ17December1995 GeomadeclearfreelythathostilitieswerecommittedbytheGeopolicymakersofthe Gamsarea.

 1996      OSCECommunicationNo.January15,1996,OSCE GeowillnotratifybasingagreementwithRUuntilterrintegrityisrestored.CISmatterͲͲͲ in MissiontoGeorgia/ACTIVITYREPORTfortheperiod theframeworkofCISmailnyAbkhdiscussed of18December1995through13January1996 SOdidnotapproveofagreementfrom13Dec,watitngforpoliticalshiftafterRuparl elections Monitoring:fourtimesperweek,2personneleachday 26ͲJan ShevspeechonSO OSCECommunicationNo.February13,1996,OSCE Shevsees"perspectivesforarelativelyquicksettlementoftheGeorgianͲOssetianconflict. MissiontoGeorgia/ACTIVITYREPORTfortheperiod MeetingYeltsinͲShevonJan18onthesidesofCISsummitinMoscow,whereYeltsassures of14Januarythrough10February1996 cuttingeconassistancetoSOandandwithdrawRUPKFifSOdoesnotparticipatein negotiationprocess drugbusinessinSO,firsttimementioned

   OSCECommunicationNo.April3,1996,OSCEMission signingofMoUfrom13Decstilldeadlocked.GeotalkedtoMoscow,Missionsent toGeorgia/ACTIVITYREPORTfortheperiodofMidͲ representative,noresult.ThenSOappealedtoRUdeputyMFA.ThenMissiontookup FebruaryͲEndofMarch1996 wokringmeetingswithnegotiatorsfromTBsandTskhandontherespectiveministerial levels. Thurmeetingsonpropertyandlandforspringapproaches 8Mar Shev'sInitiativeofra  OSCECommunicationNo.April3,1996,OSCEMission peacefulCaucasussigned toGeorgia/ACTIVITYREPORTfortheperiodofMidͲ inTbs FebruaryͲEndofMarch1996 12 NOpresidentGalazovvisits  OSCECommunicationNo.April3,1996,OSCEMission seenasademonstrationofOssͲGeofriendship Mar TbsforNOͲGeofootball toGeorgia/ACTIVITYREPORTfortheperiodofMidͲ game FebruaryͲEndofMarch1996 22Ͳ PCAAgreementwithEU  OSCECommunicationNo.May15,1996,OSCE 11May,RUMFAPrimakovvisitsTbsandpraisesmutualtolerance Apr signed MissiontoGeorgia/ACTIVITYREPORTfortheperiod inbeginningofMayfirstinformalmeetingofSOandGeoparl,fiveeach ofAprilͲMidͲMay1996 SOPKFpoorprovisionwithfood,incomptoRUandGeo 16 MoUsigned  OSCECommunicationNo.ViennaJuly9,1996,OSCE inMoscow,ShevͲChib,securityandconfidence,laterecon May MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ACTIVITYREPORTforthe SOverysatisfiedwithMoU,inturnofferednewtalksaboutOSCebranchofficeionTskh[it periodofmidͲMayͲendofJune1996 seemslikeOSCewantstopushittoanOSCEbranchoffice,althoughthetalksinitiallywere aboutaJCCoffice,OSCereallysneakedin] GeorefusesofficialSOstatementontheMoUimplementation,becausedefacto recognition 13/14JunRUCISministervisitsTbsandTskh  Ombudsmanlawadoptedon16May,butintroductiononlyin2004,parldidnotapproveof Shev'scandidateKavsadze 

243  16ͲJun RUpresidelectionsforRU  OSCECommunicationNo.ViennaJuly9,1996,OSCE atJPKFheadquarterinTskhoutof800ballots600wereRUPKFsoldiers citizensinSO MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ACTIVITYREPORTforthe replacementofJPKFcommander,oldone,erkuyevtransferredtoVladiaschiefͲofͲstaffof periodofmidͲMayͲendofJune1996 3rdarmy

23Ͳ24 JCCmeetinginVladi "murdersin OSCECommunicationNo.ViennaAugust2,1996, reportofmilmonitoring Jul firsthalfof OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ACTIVITYREPORTforthe asfirststepofdemilthewithdrawalofheavyarmamentisenvisaged 1996reaches periodofJuly1996 firstJCCmeetafteroneyear'sinterval,focusonmilitaryissues.Noagreementon 15" demilitarization RUinstitutepublishespollinJul,that1.5wanttoreturntoGeo,38.6unitewithRU,30 keepupindependence journalists'coop:GeomediacoverSOissuesandSOnewspaperYuzhnayaOssetiacovers GEonews econrehab:telecommunications,agriculturalandindustrialexperteachstartworkat mission  27Ͳ ShevͲChibmeetinginVladi OSCECommunicationNo.ViennaSeptember5,1996, meeting:reestablishmentofhighlevelnegotiationsonthestatus,econandparl=journ Aug OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ACTIVITYREPORTforthe meetings periodofAugust1996    OSCECommunicationNo.ViennaSeptember26, SOannouncesdelayofstatusnegotiationsbecauseofannouncementofSOelectionson10 1996,OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ACTIVITYREPORT Nov.ShevsaysheunderstandsthatChibwantstosecurehispresidencybeforestartingneg. fortheperiodofSeptember1996 Gabarayev,chairmanofSOcouncilofministers,isChib'sfiercestinternalopponentand rivalintheelections SecondSOGeojournalistsroundtableon18SeptinTbs econrehab:NorwayandGTZinvovledfromtheveryfirst monotoringpatrolsreducedfromfourtothree.Osspostsoftenundermanned,still irregularpayforOssPKF

22Ͳ Ajaraelections OSCECommunicationNo.ViennaSeptember26, AjarleadershipdeniesOSCEtomonitorelectionsandaccusesHoMofplottobreakthe Sep 1996,OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ACTIVITYREPORT elections fortheperiodofSeptember1996    OSCECommunicationNo.ViennaNovember1,1996, SOelections:ChibandGagloitymoderate,Gabarayevandthreeothershardline.Telephone OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ACTIVITYREPORTforthe pollsees65%infavorofChib periodofOctober1996  [constantimpressionthatSOledershipcoversnegotiationsupfromSOpublic]

16Oct SOOSCEAgreementto  OSCECommunicationNo.REF.SEC/621/9621October negotiationssinceApr1995 openOSCEbranchofficein 1996OSCERESTRICTEDENGLISHONLYAnnexes: staffedbyTbsoffice,rununderOSCEoffice,seenasreconciliatorystepofSOleadership Tskh RUSSIANonly,Vienna,21October1996,OSCE becauseofelectionson10Nov MissiontoGeorgia,BranchOfficeinTskhinvali

244  ##### SOpreselections//SOand  OSCECommunicationNo.ViennaNovember21,1996, Chibreelected NOsigntreaty OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ACTIVITYREPORTforthe situationstableduringelections,noincidents periodof1Ͳ15November1996 GeoincreasedcontactswithRU   "everyweek OSCECommunicationNo.ViennaDecember5,1996, milmonitsays,becauseofcriminality,povertyandsmuggling.JPKFheadthinksabout peopleare OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ACTIVITYREPORTforthe extendingthecurfew. woundedor periodof15Ͳ30November1996 evenkilled"

5Dec RUmakespublic  OSCECommunicationNo.ViennaDecember18,1996, RUsendnotetoGeoembassyinMosc,RUaltertedNOthatitconsidersSONOtreatytobe disavowmentofSONO OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ACTIVITYREPORTforthe illegalandthatNOshallinformSOaboutit(inviolationofRUandinternationallegal treaty periodof1Ͳ20December1996 norms") jointOssGeopowerplantinKartliregionopened  7Dec FirstmeetingofSOand  OSCECommunicationNo.ViennaDecember18,1996, DelegationsheadedbyDeputyMinistersofJusticeandGeneralProsecutors.PlusJPKFhead Geo"lawprotection OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ACTIVITYREPORTforthe andheadofGoriadministration(governor?) authorities"inGori periodof1Ͳ20December1996 lawprotectionintheconflictzone.SOdemandedlegalprotectionofcitizensofbothsides inhteconflictzone,imrpovecoordinationwithinlawprotectionauthorities,mutual handoverofSOresidentstorespectiveauthoritiesplusfiles

19 Thirdjournroundtablein  OSCECommunicationNo.ViennaJanuary17,1997, programmelaunchedbyOSCE Dec Tskh OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/fortheperiodof16 December1996Ͳ15January1997  1997   15ͲJan Ossspeakerofparlvisits  OSCECommunicationNo.ViennaJanuary17,1997, DzugayevholdstalkswithShevandZhv,counterpart. Tbs OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/fortheperiodof16 ChibreshuffeledSOleadership,allkeypositionswithmoderatesnow,allapprovedbyparl. December1996Ͳ15January1997 Kochievdismissed,Gagloityincreasesinfluence duetowintershortfallsenergysupplyfromRucut,Rokytunnelblocked

17ͲJan OssMDFSanakoyevvisits  OSCECommunicationViennaFebruary6,1997,OSCE firstvisitofhighrankingSOofficialtoGeoterritory,preparationsofJCCmeeting Tbs MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.2/97for 18JanassassinationattemptonSOHeadoforgworkingondomesticcrimes theperiodof16Ͳ31January1997 20ͲJan ZhvvisitsTskh OSCECommunicationViennaFebruary6,1997,OSCE secondvisit,metwithchibandDzugayev MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.2/97for meetingofGeOssintellectualsinTskh theperiodof16Ͳ31January1997     Note:ThereisaJCCallͲpartyworkinggroupregularlyconvening,andthereareintheother handtheofficialJCCmeetings

245  13Ͳ SeventhJCCmeetingin  OSCECommunicationViennaFebruary25,1997, JCCdecidedtoreduceJPKF,gradualtransferintocivilianbodies,reductionfrom26to16 Feb Vladi OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.3/97 checkpoints,onlyOssandGeocheckpointsreducedͲͲͲOssandGeovoluntarilyoffreredto fortheperiodof1Ͳ21February1997 reducetheforces,formalagrrementpreventedbyOssdrawback. Note:Numberofcheckpointsandpoststhatareindicatedarehighlyunreliable. compisitonofSOPKF:oldfightersgraduallyreplacedthroughconscripts,nootherarmed formationsintheconflictzone(noremilitarization),RUaskedtofinanceOssPKF econworkinggrouphalted,currentbudgetfor1997RU9billionrubles,Geo1mioGEL workonbranchofficestarted  HOWMANYCHECKPOINTS/POSTSARETHERE??

4Ͳ5 Firststatusmeetingin  OSCECommunicationViennaMarch19,1997,OSCE proceduralmatters,tenseandshaky,onlythroughmediators Mar Moscow MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.4/97for ChibͲHoMmeeting24Feb:ChibcomplainsaboutfianancialmeanstoSOfromRUandGeo, theperiodof22FebruaryͲ15March1997 HoMsaysfinancesconditionalonsettlement,thenmoreintmoney,SOmustopenuptoint organdthattheyareworkingonlythroughTbs JPKF:fiveOsspoststhatweretobecloseddownstillopened. exchangeofprisonersGeoͲSO

   OSCECommunicationViennaApril4,1997,OSCE Article"CISthebeginningortheendofhistory",26Mar,NezavisimayaGezetaͲͲ neoͲ MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.5/97for imperiallineofRU,destabilizingGeo,makinguseofsecessionistconflictsonlychancetoact theperiodof16Ͳ31March1997 uponantiͲRussianmovement JPKF:Geoarmyunitsseeninconflictzone,GeoMFDremindedthatnotroopsanweapons shallbeintroduced

4ͲApr FirstSoGeomeeting  OSCECommunicationViennaApril18,1997,OSCE for19976mioUSDrehabforallconflictarea withinUNDPSteering MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.6/97for delayinclosureofposts/checkpoints,becauseOsssoldiershavenoaccommodation Committeeoneconrehab theperiodof1Ͳ15April1997     OSCECommunicationViennaJune4,1997,OSCE workinggroupdraftedguidelinesforjointLEBlawenforcementbodiesworkͲͲͲ Dokonlyin MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.8/97for RU,badquality theperiodof12Ͳ31May,1997 30  1Ossrefugee OSCECommunicationViennaJune18,1997,OSCE thisandseveralothercriminalincidentseastofTskh,JPKFheadhassetupajointmobile May killedinGeo MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.9/97for taskgroup,observersandPKFs,toreactfast;troophasapostbetweenArtseviand village theperiodof1Ͳ15June,1997 PlavismaniͲͲͲobviousdesinterestoflocallawenforcementagencies JPKFcommtriedtosolvetheincidentbybringingtogetherlawenforcementbodiesatthe RUpostinArtsevion4Jun,butOssdelegationdidnotcomeandOssvillagersthreatenedto takeGeodelegationandJPKFcommandOSCEreprhostage,JPKFcommresolvedtensions OsspostsatTsenelisiandDsviletiremainopen Chibliftscurfewfortskhfrom9Jun[firsttimeinatleastoneyear..]

4ͲJun Firstjointtrainingof  OSCECommunicationViennaJune18,1997,OSCE militaryobserversfromall MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.9/97for threeparties theperiodof1Ͳ15June,1997

246     OSCECommunicationViennaJune30,1997,OSCE partiesoftheworkinggroupsforthefullscaleresstillconsideradocumentintroducedby MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/97for RUMFAinearlyJun theperiodof16Ͳ30June,1997   1Ossheadof OSCECommunicationViennaJuly18,1997,OSCE villagekilledby MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.11/97for predecessor theperiodof1Ͳ15July,1997 21ͲJul OpeningofOSCEbranch  OSCECommunicationViennaAugust6,1997,OSCE mainlyrefugge/IDPmatters officeinTskh MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/97for meetingsofUNDPSteeringCommtobeheldthere theperiodof17Ͳ31July,1997 24ͲJul partilaSOparlelections OSCECommunicationViennaAugust6,1997,OSCE sixexclusivelyGeoseatsremainvacant MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/97for theperiodof17Ͳ31July,1997    OSCECommunicationViennaAugust6,1997,OSCE blastatGeomuseuminTamarashenidirectedagainstjointworkofGeoandOssLEBs, MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/97for criminal theperiodof17Ͳ31July,1997 SOMIAforcestoolittletoensuresecurity,askJPKFforpersonnel   1Oss OSCECommunicationViennaAugust23,1997,OSCE SOcurfewreintroducedduetocrimeincrease policeman MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/97for AnotherbombblastinTamrasheni killedbyGeo theperiodof1Ͳ22August1997NoSR unresolcedisprovisionofsecurityforreturningrefugeesbyJPKF,possiblyrelocationof policeman postsandexpandingoftasks meetingofGeoandOssrepresentativesoftheCommissionfortheDeadandUnaccounted on14Aug,duringnextmeetingalistwillbepresented

   OSCECommunicationViennaSeptember15,1997, Abkhleader's,Ardzinba,visittoTbsmakesiteasierforChibtohavesimilarmeetingwith OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. Shev 14/97fortheperiodof23AugustͲ12September, econrehab:energyprojectatrisk,becauseinsufficientnumberofbidforprojecttender 1997 [why?] AssessementforfutureTACISprojectabouttostart 26Ͳ 8thJCCmeetinginJava OSCECommunicationViennaOctober6,1997,OSCE transferoflawandordermaintopic.Protocolsigned.Meanttofacilitatethefinal Sep MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.15/97for demilitarizationaction theperiodof13Ͳ30September,1997 Surprisingly,GeoandOssdecidedtoclosedownthreepostsalongthemainroutethrough SO.Monitoringofthetransportofarms,narcitics,explosivestransferredtopolice authoritiesofbothsides.[becausetheyhaveadealamongthemselves?] SOindependencedayignoredbyGeopres.InSOdelegationsfromPridnestrovje,KabardͲ BalkandNO,RUdumasentfivepeopleheadedbychairmanoftheCommitteeonCISissues TikhonovwhosaidheisinfavorofthecreationofanewSovietUnion SeveralOssPKFsoldiersparticipatedinthecelebration  FindDoksthatinitiatedtheLawdimensionoftheJPKFandanyformalagreementsonit

247     OSCECommunicationViennaOctober31,1997,OSCE SecondmeetingofOssandGeointellectuals MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.17/97for JCCAdhocCommonRefugeesmetinVladion21Oct theperiodof16Ͳ31October,1997 Shevissueddecreeonestablishingastatecommissiononrehab,inchargeofall communicationwithSOandintorgs FifithSteeringCommitteeheldon20Oct

#####  OSCECommunicationViennaNovember25,1997, PublicProsecutorofGoriregionkidnapped7kmnorthofTskh.Nosolutiontoityet. OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 18/97fortheperiodof1Ͳ20November,1997 ##### ShevChibmeetinginJava OSCECommunicationViennaNovember25,1997, jointdeclaration,operativepartsholdSOconcernabouteconassistance,aboveallfurther OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. jointworkonrefugeesstressed 18/97fortheperiodof1Ͳ20November,1997 8Ͳ9 RUDeputyPMSerovto  OSCECommunicationViennaDecember15,1997, RUpostextendedintoneutralzoneonGeorgianmilitaryhighwaybetweenKhazbegiand Dec Tbs,talksabooutborder OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. Vladi,Geopostmovedhundredmetersnorth,too,demonstrationsinfrontofRUembassy.ͲͲ dispute 19/97fortheperiodof21NovemberͲ10December, ͲShevͲSerovagreeonmovingbackbothtroopstotheirformerpositions,patrolneutral 1997 stretchjointly,settledelimitationofbordersoon NO:48familiesreturnedtoSO,4toGeo.  forthefirsttimethisyearnoseriouscriminalincidentsreportedduringthetwoweeks 

   OSCECommunicationViennaJanuary6,1998,OSCE negostillstalledbecauseofRU'sintermediarydoc.Chibfacesinternaloppositiontohis MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.19/97for course.SO'scorusenowuncompromising,meetingwithDzugayevnowhardlines. theperiodof11Ͳ31December,1997 Takingadvantageofeconcrisis,nationalistyouthorganizationantiChib SOfurtherprivatizesland,Geoanti  firstconsecutiveperiodwherenoseriousviolationswereregistered

 1998      OSCECommunicationViennaJanuary30,1998,OSCE OsswaitforGeotodraftanintermediarydoc[asresponsetoRU's];allsidesinfavorof MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.1/98for expertmeetingpriortoformalsecondroundofnego theperiodof1Ͳ25January1998 18ͲJan newNOpresDzasokhov  OSCECommunicationViennaJanuary30,1998,OSCE proclaimswilltosettleGeoͲSOconflict elected MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.1/98for Dzugayev(speaker)stressesinfrontofpael"ravnosubjektnost",equalsubjectrelationship theperiodof1Ͳ25January1998 toGeo,alinetakenfromnegoinMar1997inMosc JPKF>Geounilaterallyremovedtwoposts,Disevi,Dvani

248     OSCECommunicationViennaFebruary18,1998, JPKF:criminaltensionsinTamarasheni OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.2/98 ShevseesSOsonflicteasiertoresolvethanAbkh;SOconflcitmightbecaughtin"Abkhazia fortheperiodof26JanuaryͲ15February1998 trap"withtheOsswaitingforwhattheAbkhgetanddelayingthenegoprocesswith inacceptablereconstructionaiddemands,Shevsays RU,AmbMayorov,visitsTbs5Ͳ12Feb,confirmsrehabprogrammethroughtenders,RU's efortsforenergysupplytoSO,confirmsSOitnegrationtoGeo Jan30DzasokhovsaysSOrehabthroughGEOͲRUimplementationplan,NOsupports settlementofconflict,ChibstressesNOͲSOintegrationprocess

9ͲFeb AssattemptonShev OSCECommunicationViennaFebruary18,1998, 6Zviadistsarrested OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.2/98 Chibcondemnsattempt fortheperiodof26JanuaryͲ15February1998

   OSCECommunication ViennaMarch5,1998,OSCE Econrehab:reconstrofindividualhousesduetostarton15Mar,problemswithNOenergy MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.3/98for firmwithsignedcontractanddisappeared,handovertolocalGeoorOsscompany. theperiodof16FebruaryͲ28February1998 TakingofinthostagesinVladiandZugdid ICRCpulledoutofSObecausecalmandstable

   OSCECommunicationViennaMarch18,1998,OSCE becauseAnkhhot,SOͲGeokeeplowprofile,JCCpostponed MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.4/98for landdisputesinaoreaswithmixpopulation,detentionofOssbyGeopolicewithoutcoop theperiodof1MarchͲ15March1998 ofLEBs questionwhetherOssPKFwillbeunderSOMIAorNOMforEmergencies

   OSCECommunicationViennaApril7,1998,OSCE SOGeotalksgoonexclusivelyaboutfinancialissuesonreconstr MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.5/98for JPKF:SOaskedJPKFtoreestablishfourcheckpoints,duetounilateralGeopolice theperiodof16MarchͲ31March1998 movements 20 SOinNorthCaucasus  OSCECommunicationViennaApril7,1998,OSCE SOjoinedthe"AssociationofSocialandEconomicDevelopmentofNorthernCaucasus" Mar meetinginRostovͲonͲDon MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.5/98for theperiodof16MarchͲ31March1998    OSCECommunicationViennaApril15,1998,OSCE inearly1998seriousescalationsbetweenZviadistsandGeo police,between MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.6/98for demonstratorsinTbsandinGaliregion.Hostages,leadingfiguresofZviadistskilledbyGeo theperiodof1Ͳ15April1998 police,internalZviadiststrugglebetweenmoderateandextremistwing(actsofrevenge againstmoderates)

1Ͳ22  3killed,1Geo OSCECommunicationViennaMay4,1998,OSCE inTamarasheni Apr byRUPKF MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.7/98for soldier theperiodof16Ͳ30April1998 21Ͳ MayorovvisitsGeo OSCECommunicationViennaMay4,1998,OSCE Geofailedtopresenttheirintermediarydoc,supposedlystilldiscussedwithinGeogov. Apr MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.7/98for Rehabdiscussed theperiodof16Ͳ30April1998  MayorovisAmbassadorforwhat??

249  27Ͳ GeoMDFresignsbecause  OSCECommunicationViennaMay4,1998,OSCE newMDFTevsadzeAbkhandSOveteran Apr hefailstoensureShev's MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.7/98for UNHCRheadafter90daysstillhostageinVladi securityescort theperiodof16Ͳ30April1998 4May DeclarationbySOMFAon  OSCECommunicationViennaMay15,1998,OSCE SOleadershiphighmembersaysinformally,furtherapproachmentbetweenSOandGeo lackingGeofinancesfor MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.8/98for onlywithrealcommitmentsofGeointhefieldofeconrehab,thisshallprevent rehab theperiodof1May–15May1998 radicalizationofpublicopinioninSOwheneconcondicitonsworsen 30  SODeputy OSCECommunicationViennaJune4,1998,OSCE inchargeofecondeveloftheregion,hardlinerastostatus. May charimanof MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.9/98for  Govshotin theperiodof16May–31May1998 nego:Becauseviolencebrokeoutingalidistrict19Ͳ20May,Geoversionofintermediary Vladi docnotendorsed

5ͲJun FourthsummitofBSEC  OSCECommunicationViennaJune18,1998,OSCE UkraineensurespartnershipandsupporttosolutionofGeoAbkhconflict BlackSeaEconomic MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/98for CooperationinYalta theperiodof1June–15June1998 20ͲJun ShevChibmeetingin  OSCECommunicationViennaJuly7,1998,OSCE thirdmeetinginthreeyears;jointdeclarationfocusedoneconmattersandappealedtoint Borjomi MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.11/98for donors theperiodof16June–30June1998 statusnotmetioned,theybelievepublicopinionnotreadyyet,Chibfavorablytowards conceptof"assymetricalfederalism"

7ͲJul PressserivceofAdamon  OSCECommunicationViennaJuly21,1998,OSCE radicalvoicesinSOandNO,andtheirbackersinRUcallintoquestionBorjomiresultsand NichiasreleasesantiChib MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/98for roleofOSCE;althoughmajorityofSOpopulationsupportsChibcourse statement theperiodof1July–20July1998 ChochievleaderofAN,recentlypardonnedbyChibandreleasedfromprison,radicalswant himtobepres 8JulantiͲOSCEarticelinRUNezavismayagazeta"

   OSCECommunicationViennaAugust18,1998,OSCE RUdelaysappointingnewheadtoJCCͲͲͲ WhatcausedtheRussianantiͲconsensusturn? MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/98for InternalRUdebatethathasradicalized? theperiodof21July–10August1998 BaramidzewasheadofCUGparlgroupͲͲͲbecauseheisonaoneyearstudyleavetothe USheisreplacedbySaaka

3ͲAug FirstCoEvisittoTskh OSCECommunicationViennaAugust18,1998,OSCE Dzugayevoffers10seatsforGeoinparl MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/98for theperiodof21July–10August1998

10Ͳ Chibdismissesgov OSCECommunicationViennaAugust18,1998,OSCE becauseofinabilitytofighteconcrisisandcorruptionofstatebodies Aug MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/98for theperiodof21July–10August1998

12Ͳ ArmeniansthreatenGeo  OSCECommunicationViennaAugust31,1998,OSCE 20armedmenstopGeounitonthewaytitheRUAkhlakalakibase;partsofArmnationalist Aug soldiers MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.14/98for movementJavakh,mailnylocalcitizens theperiodof11August–31August1998 samenightblastatmainbuildingoflocaladministrationinAkhal

250     OSCECommunicationViennaAugust31,1998,OSCE econrehabfinancing:GeowantsshareoffundsearmarkedforSOalthoughSOsufferend MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.14/98for 80%ofthedamage theperiodof11August–31August1998  MachavarianiPRofpresontheGeoͲSOconflictsettlement[alreadyforalongtime]

5ͲSep 1Ossvillager OSCECommunicationViennaSeptember20,1998, incidentiallybyRUPKF'strainingmissile;adeuqatereactionbuRUPKF,apologies,financial killed OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. compensation.Chibvisitsscene. 15/98fortheperiodof1September–20September 1998

18Ͳ EconRehabProgandMoU  OSCECommunicationViennaSeptember20,1998, Sep signed OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 15/98fortheperiodof1September–20September 1998

   OSCECommunicationViennaOctober7,1998,OSCE someSOlocalshandinweaponstoSOauthorities(why?) MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.16/98for 4thsessionoftheJCCAdHocCommitteeonrefugeesandIDPsattheendofSept theperiodof21September–7October1998  Machavariani:SpecialRepresentativeofthePresidentonPolitical,SecurityandConflict SettlementIssues 

##### GeoelectionsonlocalselfͲ  OSCECommunicationVienna2December,1998, JPKFcommanderpromisesthatintelectionobserversarenotgoingtobekidnapped[?] governmentbodies OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 19/98fortheperiodof14–30November1998

##### MachavarianivisitsTskh  OSCECommunicationVienna2December,1998, GeoNSCdiscussesintermediarydoc,Mengarishviliindicatesbeforeasimportantstep andhandsoverintermed OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. SOcontinuouslystressesthateconrehabistconditionalforpoliticalsettlement[Why? doc 19/98fortheperiodof14–30November1998 Becauseofembezzlement?Internalopppushes?ͲͲͲDasmachtesklar,warumvieleinGeo nichtvomArgumentder"weichen"Konfliktloesungueberzeugtsind,weilsiedenDiskurs seitJahrenkennenundvemutenwasdahitnersteht] ZhvtwoweeksagoproposedtheintroductionofGELinSO,DzugayevatfirstinGeopres positive.NowhewithdrewandsaidhealwayswantedtokeeptheRubel

   OSCECommunicationVienna16December,1998, preparationsforSOparlelections,outof33seats(before41)4areoffredtoGeoenclaves OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. econcrisisinGeo:inordertocoverthebudget,taxrevenueshavetoincreaseby45% 20/98fortheperiodof1–15December1998   2Geokilled OSCECommunicationVienna16December,1998, inArtsevi.PKF/localpolicecoopandarrestedpeople. OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 20/98fortheperiodof1–15December1998  1999  

251  9ͲJan FirstmeetingChiband  OSCECommunicationVienna11January,1999,OSCE consideredtobetherestartofnegotiationsbecauseofespeciallyhighlevel LordkipanidzeinSO MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.1/99for Lordksays,GeodraftonGeoͲRUEconRehabAgreementwillbeissuedfast;and[treatfor theperiodof16–31December1998and1Ͳ10 theRussians]thatGeoandRUwillnegotiatecondictionsforenergysupplytoSOfromNO. January1999; RUhasfinallynominatedJPKFhead[maybeinturnforLordk'sconcessions] OSCECommunicationVienna11January,1999,OSCE JPKF:Inthelast5months,3morepostshavebeendismantled.11militarypostsremainat MISSIONTOGEORGIA/SpotReportNo.2/99,ASpot presentintheconflictzone ReportonTskhinvaliHighLevelMeetingon9January,  1999 Lordkipanidze'sappointmentisasignthatGeo"equalizes"SoandAbkhmatters(quote No.2/99)

27ͲJan GeoentersCoE   2[Oss?]killed OSCECommunicationVienna17February,1999, intheOssvillagesofZnauriandJava OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.3/99 fortheperiodof1–15February1999 1ͲFeb DeclarationofCouncilof  OSCECommunicationVienna17February,1999, onallegeddiscriminationoftheGeopopulation NativesofSamachablo OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.3/99 fortheperiodof1–15February1999 16Ͳ17 FirstmeetingofSOand  OSCECommunicationVienna5March, 1999,OSCE >>SpotReportNo.4/99 Feb Geoexpertgroupsonthe MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.4/99for Geowantsparallelpolsettlementandeconrehab,SOwantsrehabpriortosttlement comprehensivesettlement theperiodof16–28February1999 JPKF:socalled"freemarketarea"attheentranceofTskh[ergnetimarket?]hasproblemof violenceͲͲͲ[firstmentioningofErgneti] JPKFcommanderproposestoestablishajointcheckpointwiththreeOssandthreeGeo PKFsoldierstocontrolthearea

   OSCECommunicationVienna31March,1999,OSCE preparationofSOelections: MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.6/99for out33districts,4toGeorgians theperiodof16–31March1999 6politicalmovementscompeting:CommunistParty;AllOssetianMovement“StyrNykhaz”; YouthUnionofSouthOssetia;UnionoftheDefendersoftheFatherland(leader–Mr.V. Gabaraev,former“PrimeͲMinisterofSouthOssetia”);Socialistmovement“Fatherland” (leader–Mr.V.Gobozov,“ViceͲMinisterofExternalAffairs”,PersonalRepresentativeofthe SouthOssetianleaderMr.Chibirovtopoliticalnegotiations);NationalͲDemocraticParty (leader–Mr.H.Gagloiti,employeeofthe“MinistryofExternalRelations”andsonofthe former“MinisterofExternalRelations”). JPKF:numberofcheckpointsnowdownto10,ongoingclosures

252     OSCECommunicationVienna19April,1999,OSCE secondexpertmeeting(oftheplenipotentiarydelegationsofGeoandSOsides)willbe MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.7/99for postponedduetoSOelections thePeriodof1Ͳ15April1999  abjetzthatmandasGefuehlbeginnensielangsamdasSchreibenderReportsernstzu nehmen,achtenaufdierichtigenTitel,Daten,Detailinfos..  "Asociologicalpollamong200respondentsinTskhinvali,carriedoutbytheTskhinvali InformationCenter,hasshownthat48,8%ofthemconsiderthatoverthelastyearthe GeorgianͲOssetianrelationshaveimproved,while41,6%sawnosignificantchanges.18,4% believethatthisyearthesituationwillimprovecrucially,10,4%arepessimistic,52,8%do notforeseemajorchanges.9,9%areforanindependentstate,3,2%acceptSouthOssetia undercontrolofbothRussiaandGeorgia,3,2%Ͳpreservingthestatusquo,4,8%Ͳasa territoryunderinternationalcontrolandprotection,4,8%Ͳasasubjectofaconfederation ofSouthOssetia,Abkhazia,AjaraandGeorgiawithequalrights,21,6%preferSouthOssetia withintheRussianFederation,49,6%ͲSouthOssetiaasapartofRepublicofNorthOssetiaͲ Alania."

31 JCCmeetinginMoscow OSCECommunicationVienna4May,1999,OSCE agreementofsigningRUͲGeoAgreementonrehabsoon Mar MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.8/99for theperiodof16–30April1999 16Ͳ Machavstallsnego  OSCECommunicationVienna4May,1999,OSCE TibilovunderlineseconrehabbyGeotoSOasanobligation,MachavsayssigningRUͲGeo Apr becauseofSOelections MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.8/99for agreementonrehabwillbepostponed theperiodof16–30April1999 17Ͳ  DeathofJCC OSCECommunicationVienna4May,1999,OSCE nofurtherinformation,hewasreplaced Apr commander MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.8/99for SRsays,thathewaskilledbyacompanycommanderofthesamebattalioninTskh.Drunk, MajorGeneral theperiodof16–30April1999;SR19Apr1999 overreactedtocriticism. Anatoly Krassovsky

27Ͳ Khazbegicompanyowner  OSCECommunicationVienna4May,1999,OSCE employsOss Apr Topadzeopensrestaurant MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.8/99for inTskh theperiodof16–30April1999 May  Onecadidate SR30Jul1999 runningfor"Deputy"duringparlelections[maybedeputyheadofparl] killed 6May  ArtseviMayor SR6May1999 criminal,[notclearifitisthesameliketheprevious?] killed

253  12 SOparlelections OSCECommunicationVienna18May,1999,OSCE Geoparlissueselectionsillegitimate,bothreconfirmelectionsdonothaltnego May MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.9/99for Dzugayev,amoderate,lostintheelections theperiodof01Ͳ16May1999 9partieswereadmittedtotheelections,11seatsand18deputies,.CommPartywon largegroupofGeojournvisitedTskhforelections,NOandTRandistriadelegations observeselections,saysSO  JPKF>twoillegalcheckpointsatSunisiandOtrevi,bothdismantled.Sunisi:GEorefugees returneeearea,postbyGeoPKFestablished,thendismantledOtrevi:Geoshepherdused OSsgrazeland,beatenupbyOss,localOssestablishedcheckpointwithwasdismentledby JPKFobservers  "Reportedlythe“CommunistPartyoftheRepublicofSouthOssetia”emergedfirst, receiving7seats,followedbythenewSocialistPeoples’sMovement“Fatherland”(2seats), theAllͲOssetianAssembly“StirNihas”(1seat)andtheYouthUnion(1seat).Onlyfour “deputies”havebeenelectedbyconstituencies,whiletheremainingcandidateswill competefor14seatsattherunͲoffelections."  Gobozov,PersonalRepresentativeoftheSouthOssetianleaderfortheGeorgianͲOssetian conflictsettlement

29 SOparlelections,second  OSCECommunicationVienna2June,1999,OSCE NOvisitonreturn,meetingwithUNHCRandOSCE.NOsaysitisforspeedyreturnprocessͲ May round//NOhighͲleveldel MISSIONTOGEORGIA/No.10/99fortheperiodof17 ͲͲobviouslycooperationintensifiesandmeetingsontheIDP/refugeereturnbecomemore inTbs –31May1999 frequent ChibinMoscowonenergysupplytalks SOelect:Gobozovnotreelected,butmainfigureinnego.hedoubtsseriousintentionsof Geo. JPKF>RUPKFconstittuesofincreasinglymoreOss.Imbalanceincommandstructure, becausecommanderisonlylowrank,increaseofinstabilityoftheJPKF[hae?] 3ͲJun RUaffirmsEUasan  OSCECommunicationVienna17June,1999,OSCE allothersidespositive,too observertotheJCC MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.11/99for JPKFcommanderdecidedtoestablishregularThursmeetingsbetweenLEBsdueto theperiodof1–15June1999 increasedcriminalactivity[DidtheformerThurmeetingsstop?Orarethereonlyofficials fromthelocaladministrationsparticipating,andnotfromthepoliceasisisthecasewith thenewformat?]

9ͲJun Kochiev,headofComm  OSCECommunicationVienna17June,1999,OSCE KochwinsagainstGobozov;replacesDzugayev,whoisnowadvisortoChib,Chibsupports Party,electedSpeakerof MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.11/99for Koch SOparl theperiodof1–15June1999  MikhailMayorov,AmbassadorͲatͲlargeoftheRUMFA 22ͲJun ShevatEUsummitin  OSCECommunicationVienna5July,1999,OSCE furtherdeepeningofGeoͲEUties,ShevwantsmoreEUsupportoneconrehabinSOͲͲͲ Luxembourg MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/99for onlyforAbkhhevoiceswishofEUparticipationinconflictsettlement theperiodof16–31June1999.    OSCECommunicationVienna5July,1999,OSCE LordkandChigoyev,headofSOgov,discussenergysupplyfromGeotoSO,SO'selectricity MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/99for debttoRU,econrehab,jointfightagainstcontraband theperiodof16–31June1999.

254  25ͲJun Geoelectionlawhas  OSCECommunicationVienna5July,1999,OSCE passedparl MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/99for theperiodof16–31June1999. 13ͲJul Firstworkingmeetingof 1Geoformer OSCECommunicationVienna19July,1999,OSCE RU,Geo,SO,andNOparticipates;bilateraleconcooperationdiscussed,promotedjoint JCCCoͲchairmeninTskh IDPkilled MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/99for LEBsactivities ("withoutclear theperiodof1Ͳ15July1999 Chibsays,onrehab,RUhasfulfilled10%,Geo1% motivation") JPKF>3casesofkidnapping,intNGOsrecalltheirintstafffromSO;JPKFtriestoensure securityforintOrgsinTskh  Anymeetingthattakesplaceduringthesemonthswasbefreoehandpostponedfor monthsandseveraltimesfromeitherside(expertgroup,JCC,RUͲGeoeconrehab..)

23ͲJul10thJCCsessionin  OSCECommunicationVienna5August,1999,OSCE workinggroupsonjointLEBsandrehabconvenedbeforeJCC Tsinandali,Geo MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.14/99for rehab:draftworkonRUͲGeoagreementofEconRehab,SOgroupseverelyaccusesGeoof theperiodof16Ͳ31July1999 tryingtolocatemoneyoutoftheconflictzone,dangerofSOdroppingoutofrehab agreement JPKF/LEBcoop:JCCagreeasthatJPKFstays"majorguarantorofpeaceandstabilityinthe area". rotationoftheJPKFcritizedandstabilityintheconflcitzone,commandercalmsGeoabout ethniccompositionofRUPKF,Geodemands,rotationnotonthebasisofunitsfromNorth Caucasus.Inadditiontothe10posts,JCCdecidestoopen4morepostsinareaswerethe landdisputesarehot [Interestingly,theJPKFaccordstothesameethnicdivisionlogiclikeethnicterritorialiy duringtheSU] CoordinationbodyforjointLEBactivitiestobesetupatJCC,IOsreturntoSOasaresult ofenhancedsecuritymeasures  seriuosissueisethnGeoreturntoSO:cantheychoosewheretoreturn?,SOsiderefuses

3Ͳ4   OSCECommunicationVienna23August,1999, OSCE the"LargeRussianͲGeorgianIntergovernmentalCommissiononEconomicCooperation" Aug MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.15/99for washeldinMoscow,withnofinalagreementonjointGeorgianͲRussianeconomic theperiodof01Ͳ21August1999 assistancetothezoneofconflict. 18Ͳ GeoclosesdownGoriͲTskh  OSCECommunicationVienna23August,1999,OSCE GeoStateCustomsDepartment,preventsmuggelentreringGeoproper,DeparmentandSp Aug highwayforshippingtraffic MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.15/99for continuetodiscusstheRokitunnelasataxcolelctionpoint;GeoproposesthatITS,a theperiodof01Ͳ21August1999 BristishconmpanytocontroltaxcollectionatRoki,ITSalreadydoescontrolsthroughout Geo 10Ͳ11 SecondGeoͲSOexpert's  OSCECommunicationVienna27September,1999, "resumptionofthesettlementprocess"(CIO)[phase] Sept meetinginJava OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. meetingprocedural,demilitarization:maitainJPKFuntildecision;andrehab:multilateral 16/99fortheperiodof22August–24September controlmechanismonexpenditures;SOcondemnsdefactoeconblockadelikethecutof 1999. electricitysincerecently[justifiedbyGeothroughnonͲpaymentbySOtoGeo] JPKF:lesscriminalactsinrepperiod;tensionsbetweenvillagersinArtseviduetoalleged unequallanddistribution 20Sept:NOandTRansnistriaattendedSOindependencecelebatraion

255   GeoͲOsstalks OSCECommunicationVienna15October,1999,OSCE earlyOct:GeoSOmeetinTbs,discusselectricityandcustomscontrol,SOabouttoharden MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.17/99for line;midOct:informalGeoͲOsstalksinVarna,BulgarialaunchedbyAmericanNGOConflict theperiodof25September–15October1999 ManagementGroup,MachaandDzugayev(nowChairmanoftheStateCommitteeon InformationandPress) AmbofAustriaandFrancevisitSO

13Oct 1NOkilledat OSCECommunicationVienna15October, 1999,OSCE robberyatFalloymarketoutsideTskh,SOpolicesayssuspectsarelocalOss Falloymarket MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.17/99for theperiodof25September–15October1999;SR13 Oct1999

30Oct SOdemandsdefactovisa  OSCECommunicationVienna5November,1999, inconformitywiththe“DecreeofthePresidentofSouthOssetia”of1August1997 applicationofforeign OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. citizens 18/99fortheperiodof16Ͳ31October1999 #####  OSCECommunicationVienna18November,1999, bombfoundunderfueltruckinmarketarea OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. sincethebeginningofSeptelectricitysupplyfromGeotoconmflictzoneunpredictable, 19/99fortheperiodof1–17November1999 absentfordaysinrow;Chibbecauseofthisunderopenpublicpressuretoresign,leaflets circulateinTskh GeocurrentlyinregresswithelectricitypaymentstoRU RUͲGeoeconrehabagreementdelayedagain

##### Geoelectricitysupplyto  OSCECommunicationVienna7December,1999, 17Nov:150demonstrateincenterofTskhagainstChib, whenon22Novelectricitysupply SOresumes//OSCE OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. resumesitisfivedaysbeforeanotherdemonstrationisannounced.SinceNov22no summitinIstanbul 20/99fortheperiodof17Ͳ30November1999 demonstrationsanymore. LeafletactioncondemedbySOparlinYuzhanyaOssetianewspaper26Nov 23Nov:"10thanniversaryoftheoutbreakofGeoͲOssconflict"(reportitself)ͲͲͲWaswar am23.Nov1989genau?MarchtoTskh?GeopolicetoTskh? ͲͲͲCheckOSCEsummitinIstanbul,whichdecisions,ShevsaysonNov18summitwasmost impotanteventintheworldsincetheendofthecoldwar"  Nov26,HommeetsMenagarishvili:"TheHomagainunderlinedthatlackofelectricityis providinganexcellentopportunitytoChibirov'sopponentstoopenlychallengethe moderateSouthOssetianleader."[Also,entwederbringterihnaufeineIdeeodererwarnt ihn]  JPKF>3of4temporarypostsclosed,meantduringtheharvestseason

17Ͳ19 GYLApresentsdraft  OSCECommunicationVienna24December,1999, JPKF:GeofamiliesfromEredvihavebeguntohandoverweaponstoJPKFandlocalpolice; Dec restitutionlaw OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. temporarypstatIoncharemains 21/99fortheperiodof01Ͳ23December1999 [RUmediatesbilateralmeetingofGeoͲS,GeoacceptsRUasmeditor]14DecMachaChib KochmeetinTskhwithmediationofMayorov

 2000  

256     OSCECommunicationVienna17January,2000,OSCE energysupplyfromGeostillsporadic,fromRU,too MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.01/00for JPKFvoluntaryhandoverprogrammecontinues theperiodof24December1999Ͳ15January2000

   OSCECommunicationVienna7February,2000,OSCE SOMFApublishesstatementinwhichitstronlgycondemnsGeoaccusationsthatweapons MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.2/0016Ͳ aresmuggeledthroughSOfromRUmilitarybasenearTbstotheNorthCaucasus 31January2000 Weaponcollection:sincestart50piecesofarmsandsomekilosofexplosives 22Jan:OSCeofficeinTskhburglered,secondtimeinthreemonths bombdetonationnearrestaurantinTskh,tensionsbetweenGeoandOssatFalloy 28Dec:GeoͲRurehabdraftinitialledinMoscow,butnotsingedyet ShevpressestoclearifystatusofAjara

   OSCECommunicationVienna18February,2000, 9Feb>ShevsaysthathisandPutin'sviewstoSOandAbkhthesame OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 7FebshevannouncesthatGeoRUrehabagreementwillbesignedafterGeoandRU 03/00fortheperiodof01Ͳ15February2000 elections JPKF:GeoOssjointlycontrolroadbetweenTskhandKekhvitorpeventvehiclerobberies 19Ͳ SOGeomeetinTskhon  OSCECommunicationVienna2March,2000,OSCE firsthighͲlevelmeetingoncooperationinthefieldofcustioms,Lordkproposescoop Feb customs MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.4/00for becausesmuggelisGeomostimprotantsecurityproblem,Chibsaysjintocustompolicy theperiodof15Ͳ29February2000 possible 28Ͳ NOpresvisitsTbsonSO OSCECommunicationVienna2March,2000,OSCE customsandtransportdiscussed,andTRACECAproject Feb MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.4/00for theperiodof15Ͳ29February2000 29 JointCoordinationCenter  OSCECommunicationVienna2March,2000,OSCE onjointLEBs Feb withJPKFinforce MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.4/00for theperiodof15Ͳ29February2000 1Mar RUvisarestrictionsforGeo  OSCECommunicationVienna7February,2000,OSCE Sohopestobeexception andAze MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.2/0016Ͳ 31January2000    OSCECommunicationVienna18March,2000,OSCE SOrefusesjointGeoSOcustomscontrolatRokitunnel MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.5/00for PressServiceofSOPresandGovcondemsarticleinRUnewspaperIsvestiyaof4Mar, theperiodofIͲ15March2000 whichsaysthatrecentmeetingbetweenGeoandSOpressofficialsissecretmeetingto discussstatusofSO JPKF:"Sincethebeginningofthisyear,morethan90piecesoffirearms,over40kilograms ofexplosives,mines,grenadeshavebeenhandedoverbylocalOssetianandGeorgian populationwithoutanycompensation"

   OSCECommunicationVienna3April,2000,OSCE JPKFbeganpatrollingtheroadbetweenTskhandArtsevion11Marduetoincreasedcrime MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.6/00for theperiodof16Ͳ31March2000 10Ͳ Shevannouncesearly  OSCECommunicationVienna19April,2000,OSCE says,thisoffersarealmodeltoAbkhandSO Apr solutionofAjarastatus MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.7/2000,1 recurringspringthemeislanddisputes –15April2000

257  12  1Geokilledin OSCECommunicationVienna17 May,2000,OSCE criminal,noconsequences May Tskh MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.9/00for JPKF:GeoplatedcaratSunisicarried15kgofexplosives;Falloystilltense,someexplosives theperiodof5Ͳ16May2000 found 12MayCoEmeetinginTskh,ChibverycriticalofGeo

12 GeospiesonFalloy OSCECommunicationVienna17May,2000,OSCE GeoSpecialServicesrepresentativedisguisedasjournaliststookpicturesetc.ofFalloy May MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.9/00for marketarea,discovered,beaten,detainedbySOLEB;releasedwithapologies;offocialon theperiodof5Ͳ16May2000 bothsidesadmittheyspyontheaereaasforterroristattacks inNikoziarmedpersonscheckeddocsofGeopassingbydemandingRUlanguagedocs

20  5Geokilled OSCECommunicationVienna6June,2000,OSCE carambushinGeovillageKheiti,jointGeoSO investigationgroupestablishedon1Jun May MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/0015 uponinsistanceofJPKFcommander. MayͲ5June2000 commemorationdayof1992killingof36OssbyGeoͲͲͲ"oneofthemostpainfulmemories oftheconflict",reportsays Asaconsequence,voluntaryweaponhandoverhasvirutallystopped

26   OSCECommunicationVienna6June,2000,OSCE groupofSOmilitiatriedtooccupyabuildingrentedbythecompanyKuravodjstryTrestat May MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/0015 thefalloymarket.AnarmedunitofRUPKFsconvincedthemtoleave. MayͲ5June2000 Whatorwhois"SouthOssetianmilitia"?Thepolice?ͲͲͲThereportsstartheretocall themmilitia,maybeadowngradingfortheyarenottoconsideredlegitimatepolice forces?

31 ThirdGeoSOexperts'  OSCECommunicationVienna6June,2000,OSCE intermediarydocforrefugeereturnwithRU,NO,OSCEinJava[whenthetermintermed May meetingonpolnegoin MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/0015 docwasintroduced,1.theinformalmeetingsstartedand2.itbecameaninstitutionin Java MayͲ5June2000 playingout] SOauthoritiesletGeojounralistsvisitTskhprisonstoprovethatconditionsforGeogood 12ͲJun GeoSOprotocolonjoint  OSCECommunicationVienna19June,2000,OSCE Itstatesthatcrimescommittedintheareaarenotethnicallymotivated LEBactivitiessigned MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.11/005– weaponcollectionstartedagain 15June2000    OSCECommunicationVienna5July,2000,OSCE JPKFcommofficiallycomplainsaboutSOpoliceharrassingJPKFforces,warnsthattheywill MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/00for bedisarmed theperiodof16Ͳ30June2000 15ͲJun ZhazhievarticleinNeza  OSCECommunicationVienna5July,2000,OSCE SOgovsaysarticleindividualopinion Gazeta MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/00for Zhazhievwasrecentlyappointed"DirectoroftheInformationAgencyIrPresswiththe theperiodof16Ͳ30June2000 PresidentofSouthOssetia".ReferringtoapossibleViennaexperts'meetinginthe frameworkoftheGeorgianͲOssetianpoliticalnegotiations,Mr.Zhazhievwrote,interalia, that"nodoubt,thedelegationoftheRepublicofSouthOssetiadoesnotexpecta constructivenddeliberativeapproachinViennatotheproblemsoftheGeorgianͲOssetian conflict,butratherahithertounknownpressureandarmsͲtwistingbyOSCEclerksinorder toexactcatastrophicconcessions.Andallthisisbeingdone,sothatGeorgiacouldtryon theNATOuniformassoonaspossible!?However,suchattempts...aredoomedtofail. SouthOssetiacanhardlyimagineitselftobewithinastate,thatismemberofa militarypoliticalalliance,ofwhichRussiaͲmildlyspeakingͲisnotquiteonfriendlyterms with".

258  11Ͳ13 4thexpertmeetingin  OSCECommunicationVienna19July,2000,OSCE reportssatisfiedwithepxertmeetings'progresses: Jul Baden MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/00for "Threeissuesemerged,whichtheexpertsfoundexpedienttobedealtwithaspartofone theperiodof1–15July2000 package,suchas: •RecognitionoftheterritorialintegrityofGeorgia:BuildingofstateͲlegalrelationships withinitsinternationallyrecognisedbordersand,concurrently,acceptanceofthevitallinks betweenSouthOssetiaandNorthOssetiaͲAlaniaoftheRussianFederation; •AttributesofafutureSouthOssetianstatus:Creationofownconstitution,institutions, emblemsandcontractualpowerswithintrade,economy,scienceandtechnologyand culture.Inthiscontext,aparticularboneofcontentionisthenameofthefutureentity. •Internationalguarantees:Tobeintroducedtosupporttheabovearrangement."  SO,GEO,ECDel,OSCE:EUPlatformoneconomicrehabilitationprojectssigned:1) electricityGeotoSO,1)rehabGoriͲTskhrailwayandTskhtrainstation,3)rehabTskhgas supplygrid

   OSCECommunicationVienna1August,2000,OSCE 19Ͳ17JulTranscaucasianmotorhighway(Rokitunnel)betweenSOandRUwascloseddue MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.14/00for tomudslide,onlyconncetionviaGeomilitaryhighway(Khazbegi) theperiodof15Ͳ31July2000 inhabitantsofErgneti,MaranaandTamarasheniwantedtoblocktheroadstoTskhin protest,becauseofenergycutsandmudslide 30JulLiakhvipondsopenedinrepsonsetothedrought,Terefoniirrgiationcanalwillbe filled SOwantsOSCEasmediator,Geowantsinterntionalinvolvement,bothwantRU;Macha: SOmustnulliofydeclarationofindependenceandGeointurnwillgrantextensive autnonomyrights KakabadzeͲHoM,GeoMinisterforSpecialAffairssays,Geoelectricitysupplystartsfrom25 Jul,toTskhandneighboringvillages,alsowater,passportsdicussed JPKF:Kekhviregion:antiͲtankminefoundanddestroyed,plantedasawarningagaistillegal woodͲcutting 25Jul:OssOMONstopGeodriverinGeopartofErgneti,harrasshim,Geocrowdgathers, JPKFrapidresponseforceresolvesit[itseemslikelocalpopulationadaptedtothe unsettledsituationandcreatedtheirmechanismofSelbstjustiz,demonstrating,hostageͲ taking..] RUstopsJPKFfueltransportatRokitunnelandSOauthoritiesreplacedsomeSOJPKF tankerswithunauthorizedtankers[notreallycleartomewhatwasgoingonthereactually] weaponcollgoeson,morethan200collectedan106kgexploseves    OSCECommunicationVienna18August,2000,OSCE 8Ͳ10AugRUJPKFpostforedontwicefromthedirectionoftheSOvillageDmenisi;crime MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.15/00for increasesrecentlywithtwolethalincidentsinrepperiod, theperiodof1–15August2000  VladikavkazCenterforSocialandHumanitarianResearch?? 18Ͳ ShevͲPutindiscussSOat  OSCECommunicationVienna4September,2000, Shevsays,stnaceofRUandGeolessfierceandNOpresDzasokhovverywillingtohelp Aug CISmeetinginYalta OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 16/00fortheperiodof15Ͳ31August2000

259  26Ͳ SOGeomeetinTbs OSCECommunicationVienna4September,2000, SOPMChigoyev,StateMinisterArsenishvandKakabadzetalkonelectricityfromGeoto Aug OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. SO.KakabnotesjopintcontrolofRokitunnel;participantswantnewRUGEOrehab 16/00fortheperiodof15Ͳ31August2000 agreement Chib:RUacceptsSovietpassportsofSOresidentsasfrom1974asvalidtraveldocs GobozovreinstalledasPRofChibonSO SO"specialmilitiaforces"havebeensverelyharrassingGEoshepherds,havebeenfired afterJPKFhasuncoveredthisandSOofficalspayapologies 19Ͳ20 10thcelebrationof  OSCECommunicationVienna4October,2000,OSCE delfromRUstateduma,NO,Abkh,Nagorno,Transnisttakepart,SOPKFtakespart,parts Sept indepence MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.18/00for ofSOpowerminsitries.Chibreiterates"resolutionoftehconflictandintegrationwithNO". theperiodof15Ͳ30September2000 RUMPAlksnissaysSOintegrationintoRUlegallypsossible. SOcharimanofParlCommforDefenseandsecuritystatesthatJPKFmissioniscomingto anend,deniedbyChigoyev GeoNSCreviewstheresultsoftheBadernmeetingandinitiatesfurtheraction[itseems likeNSCismainbodyofdecisionͲmaking] Targamadze,GeoMIA,saysnumberofGeopostshastobeeincreasedinordertoprotect GeopopulationͲͲͲcurrently3RU,3Geo,5SOposts 23SeptSanakoyevpromotedbyChibtoMajorgeneral

27Ͳ GeopolicedetainsfiveOss  OSCECommunicationVienna4October,2000,OSCE 5OssdetainedbygeopoliceonTRanschighway,robberies,jointLEBgroupwasinformed, Sep inSO MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.18/00for JPKFconfirms,SOdenies theperiodof15Ͳ30September2000 7Oct  OSCECommunicationVienna15October,2000,OSCE SOMFAissuesstatementthatGeopoliceitnereferesintoSAOinternalaffairsanddoesnot MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.19/00for sticktoformeragreements theperiodof1–15October2000 JPKF:13OcttemporaryGeopostestablishedinGeovillageKaleti,becauseGeoIDPs concernedaboutsecurity

   OSCECommunicationVienna7November,2000, 19OctRUGeomeetingjointlycondemnscontrabandthroughRokitunnel OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. JPKF:JointOperationcenterofthetwoLEBssituatedattheSPKFcompound,ishameredby 20/00fortheperiodof16Ͳ31October2000 insufficientequipmentanddatastoragefacilities 9Ͳ10 GeoRUnegoonvisa  OSCECommunicationVienna21November,2000, Nov regimefail OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 21/00fortheperiodof1Ͳ15November2000    OSCECommunicationVienna12December,2000, 20Ͳ22NovGroupHopeofSouthOssetiaspreadsleafletsagainstChib,beginningofcold OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. period,insufficientelectricitysupplies.ChibverballyattackesSOspeakerofparlon22Nov. 22/00fortheperiodof16Ͳ30November2000 20Ͳ22NovMFAsofNogaron,Transn,AbkhandSOmeetinTiraspoltocoordinatetheir activities 17NovLEBmeeting,severalmurdersinLiakhvivalley,JPKFcommandercallstonotrelease criminalsdetainedanddeliveredbytheotherside.Protocolonadhocgroupadopted.

   OSCECommunicationVienna20December,2000, 2DecpressconferenceChibreiteratesexpectationofsimplifiedvisaregimeforSOtoRU OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. andpossiblityofSOcitizenstoobtainRUcitizenship 23/00fortheperiodof1Ͳ15December2000 JPKF:becauseofincreasedcriminalincidentsonTranshighway,JPKFconductsmorpatrols

260  5Dec RUvisaregimeforGeo   citizensineffect 23 2ndGeoRUrehab  OSCECommunicationVienna17January, 2001,OSCE bilateral"AgreementonMutualAssistanceintheRestorationoftheEconomyintheZone Dec agreementinTbssigned MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.01/01for oftheGeorgianͲOssetianConflictandonReturnofRefugees".SOpositive. theperiodof15December2000Ͳ15January2001 Falloymarkethotarea,shootingincidents

 2001    MEETINGSOSCECommunicationVienna18February,2001, SOstartedintheendoflastyear[hasnotbeenmentionedbefore]taxinggoodsdestined OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. toGeo,uponrequestoftheJPKFcommanderthetaxationispostponeduntil20Feb 03/01fortheperiodofIͲ15February2001 onlysupplytoTskhnowthroughmainlinefromRU,whichrunsthroughGeoenclave consistingofseveralvillagesnorthofTskh.SOhasannouncedattehadminstrativemeeting thatitintendtobuildanotherlinecircumventingtheGeovillages  [Nowitseemstherearefollwoingcategoriesofmeetings: ͲͲweeklyadmistrativemeeting(builateral)Ͳ"weeklyadministrativeandsecuritymeeting betweentheGeorgianandSouthOssetiansidesunderthechairmanshipoftheJPKF commander" ͲͲweeklyjointLEBmeeting(JPKFattached) ͲͲweeklyJPKFmeetingwithmonitors ͲͲoccasionallyJCCmeetings,asfornownonein18months ͲͲbilateralRUGEomeetingsoneconrehab ͲͲbilateralSOGEoworkinggrouponstatusissues,"polexpertgroup"(JCCattached) ͲͲpreparatoryworkinggroupstotheJCCmeetings(econ,refugees,LEB/security) ͲͲbilateralworkinggrouponrefugee/IDPreturn(ontheintitiativeofGeo,itwasdiscussed andIthinkithasalreadyatleastwotimesconvened) ͲͲthreemeetingsbetweenShevandChib1996ͲJun1998

26Ͳ JCC'sjointLEBmeetingin  OSCECommunicationVienna9March,2001,OSCE [thereportsays,thelastmeetingtookplaceinJul99,buttheyhavemetinthemeantime..] Feb Tskh MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.04/01for  theperiodof16Ͳ28February2001 GeowantslessmilitarypresenceintheSOGeoconflictzoenandadvocatesmoreint supportforjointGeoͲOsspoliceforce  TheJointControlCommission's"WorkingGroupontheActivitiesoftheJointPeace KeepingForcesandCoopeartionbetweentheLawEnforcingBodiesintheGeorgianͲ OssetianZoneofConflict

   OSCECommunicationVienna23March,2001,OSCE JPKF:crimeincreases,esp.robberiesonmainroads;TskhLEBsinvolvedincrime,one MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.05/01for arrested. theperiodof1March2001Ͳ15March2001 Electricitytemporarilyrestoredforfewhoursperday.669arms,136kilosofexplosives handedover

261  15 EnergysupplylinefromRU  OSCECommunicationVienna5April,2001,OSCE wasdestroyedinpartsbyavalancheinFeb Mar toSOrestored MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.06/01for theperiodof16March2001–31March2001

20Ͳ22 JCCprepͲworkinggroups  OSCECommunicationVienna5April,2001,OSCE WGonLEBsandecon Mar metinMoscow MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.06/01for Econ:Didnotagreetoestablishjointagencytoimplementeconrehabprograminconflict theperiodof16March2001–31March2001 zone.Geowantsbilateralcomposition,RUwantsmultilateralonelikeJCC.[Oneofthefirst timesthatitseemstomethatRUtakesclearstanceonfootͲinͲdoortpolicy]

   OSCECommunicationVienna5April,2001,OSCE SOofficial:223crimesin200(1999:23less),2000:84,3%cleared(1999:74,6%) MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.06/01for 24Mar:NOJPKFwasfiredonheavily theperiodof16March2001–31March2001

3ͲApr 3Osskilledin OSCECommunicationVienna19April,2001,OSCE "apparent"ganglandfight,shootout Tskh MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.07/01for 11Apr:SOshowstrialagainstburglersonTV theperiodof1April–16April2001 8ͲApr SOreferendumon  OSCECommunicationVienna5April,2001,OSCE SOreferendumheldonamendmentto1996constitution.SOauthoritiessetupfive constitutionheld MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.06/01for constituenciestoholdreferendum(see2Nov1993andSpotreport) theperiodof16March2001–31March2001;OSCE SOofficials:69,1%turnout(23,660people),66,7%approvedoftheconstitution.Geo CommunicationVienna19April,2001,OSCEMISSION villages(approx.9,000people)boycotted TOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.07/01fortheperiod Changes:presidentialcandiatesmusthavelivedtenyearsinSO(barringRussian of1April–16April2001 competers),OssandRUofficiallanguages,thoughinmainlyGeopopulatedareasGeohas [NoSRͲͲsignofsortofaboycottbytheMission] officialstatus RUMFAandOSCEissueconcernaboutreferendumhamperingresolutionprocess JPKF:situastiontense,telephonethreatstohospitalsandschoolsonminingandbombing, IDP/refugeereturntoplacesoforiginwhicharetakenoverbyothers 20Ͳ21 11thJCCsessioninVladi OSCECommunicationVienna30April,2001,OSCE ECfirsttimejoinedJCCmeeting Apr MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.08/01for Results: theperiodof17Ͳ30April2001 SpecialCoordinationcentertobeestablished,jointpolicebody.Bilateral econ:tobeestablished:RuͲGeoagencytofinancerehabprogramsfromtheirstatebudget andintresources,andGeoͲSOagencytoattractintDonorsandinvestorsͲͲͲonIDP/refno decisions Allsidesagreethat"theJPKFisthemainstabilisingfactorinthezoneofconflict".Mission stressesthatcriminalincidentscan"triggeroffwidespreadviolence" GeoandRUwantstoestablishthreeadditionalpostsalongmainroute,butSOrefuses. 22Ͳ23 Fifthmeetingofexpertson  OSCECommunicationVienna30April,2001,OSCE Title:"Experts’GroupoftheAuthorisedDelegationsoftheSideswithintheFrameworkof Apr polissuesinVladi MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.08/01for theNegotiationProcessonafullͲscaleResolutionoftheGeorgianͲOssetianConflict" theperiodof17Ͳ30April2001 decidestocontinuepursueingthetalks 5May  OSCECommunicationVienna 17May,2001,OSCE Gobozov(chibadvisor)seesnegowithGeoindeadlock.Says,situationhaschangedasfor MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.09/01for RUhasanewleadershipandintorgshavebecomemoreinvolved.Gstressesthatneither theperiodof1Ͳ15May2001 sidehasalegaldocumentandthisiswhyGeocaninterpretetheexistingagreements whicharebasedongoowillandaremerelypolitical)deliberately.

262  9May GeopolicearrestsGeoPKF  OSCECommunicationVienna17May,2001,OSCE onchargesofsellingweapons commander MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.09/01for theperiodof1Ͳ15May2001 13  1SOpolice,2 OSCECommunicationVienna17May,2001,OSCE ChechenͲ SOpoliceshootout;SOpolicecontrolsfourRUcitizenswithChechensnamesin May (supposedly) MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.09/01for Tskh.SOpolicekilledduringcontrol.ThenSOpolice,JPKFfasteractionunitandJPKFmilitary Chechen,1 theperiodof1Ͳ15May2001 observertookaction,arrivedonthescene.Afterthegunbattle,twooftheChcechensand hostagekilled theirhostagewerekilled. inTskh Travelrestrictionsuntil15May,temporarypostsestablisheduntil29May

   OSCECommunicationVienna1June,2001,OSCE 16MayinterviewwithKasayev,DeputyChairofNOparlinYuzhnayaOssetia:Geodoesnot MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/01for acknowledgethenewrealities/thedevelopmentsinSO theperiodof16Ͳ31May2001 29MaySakinformcritizesJPKFfornotbeingabletoprotectethnGeoinProniGorgeinSO, 100familiesreturnandwereexpulsedbylocalSOauthorities(JPKFmonotoringon1Jun saysarticlewasfalseandrealsituationdifferent,seeNo.11/01)  JPKF:[thereseemstobeaconstanthazzleasfortheposts/checkpointsͲtheirnumber andtheirlocationseesmtobecontinuouslyunclear,eventotheMissionitself] SOproposestoestablishtrilateralcheckpointatKekhvitocontrolErgneti

   OSCECommunicationVienna16June,2001,OSCE negoprotracted MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.11/01for 21MayChibsignsMuOinMoscwithMoscmayorontradeandtravel.ChibsaysGeoͲRU theperiodof1Ͳ15June2001 agreementonrehabcanbeabasisforthis[?].Machasaysafter3yearsofSONOtalkson mereeconmoicsniowGeoissidelined.TheplannedGeoRUmeetinginMoscon6Junwas postponed.SOMFAsays,GeorefusedduetoSORUMoU 

4ͲJun Chibdismissesgov OSCECommunicationVienna16June,2001,OSCE possiblyduetoupcomingpreselectionsorto"theChechenfactor" MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.11/01for TibilovnamedActingHeadofGov.TwasJCCCochairmanandheadofpolexpertgroup. theperiodof1Ͳ15June2001    OSCECommunicationVienna4July,2001,OSCE 28Jun,3JulJCCCoChairmenmeetinTskhandagreeonagendaforJCCprepWGs; MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/01for earmarkthethreepreviouslydiscussed(andbySOrejected)additonalcheckpountsalong theperiodof16JuneͲ3July2001;OSCE themainroadatKekhvi(Geo/Oss),TamarasheniandErgneti,nofinaldecision.additional CommunicationVienna18July,2001,OSCEMISSION JPKFobserversͲͲͲintensifiedsecuritymeasuresafter13May[Chechniainstabilityspillsover TOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/01fortheperiod andsetthesituationinSO] of4Ͳ15July2001 [JPKFrapidreactionforcereportedlyoftenarrivesonthespotandcalmsescalating situationbetweenlocalpoliceandothers.Whocallsthem?]

16ͲJun SanakoyevappointedPM OSCECommunicationVienna4July,2001,OSCE Sanaasareformertorenewsystemofgovernance."He(ChibinaninterviewwithYO20 MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/01for Jun]describedMr.Sanakoevasanablemanwithoutanyambitions,whowoulddealpurely theperiodof16JuneͲ3July2001 witheconomicissues." JPKF:jointSOͲGeopoliceactioninwhichlocalcriminalinDzhavaregionwasdetained,on requestofGeo  In2000,24familiesreturnedfromNOtoSO,6tootherpartsofGeo

263  2Ͳ3Jul SecondsecessionistMFA  OSCECommunicationVienna18July,2001,OSCE acknowledge:roleofintandRU meetinginStepanakert MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/01for theperiodof4Ͳ15July2001 8ͲJul 2founddeadin OSCECommunicationVienna18July,2001,OSCE nofurtherinformation Tskh MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/01for theperiodof4Ͳ15July2001    OSCECommunicationVienna6September,2001, UNHCRclosesofficeinTskhbytheendofOct.Numberofreturneestoolittle. OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. JPKF:bombattackonDzugayev'sfather'shouse(DzformerlycharimanofSOparl,now 15/01fortheperiodof16Ͳ31August2001 HeadofSOStateCommitteeonInformatiopnandPress) 14Ͳ19 Sixthexpertmeetingon  OSCECommunicationVienna18September,2001, Koch:establishlegalrelationsbetweentwoindependentcountries,nodiscussionofpol Sept polissuesinBucharest OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. status,enhanceGeo9ͲRUagencyforimplementinghterehabprogram,andjointworkon 16/01fortheperiodof1Ͳ15September2001 econrehab JPKF:13Septweeklyadminstrativeandsecuritymeetingreachesgeneralagreementfor registeringpermissiontocarryfirearms    OSCECommunicationVienna2October,2001,OSCE 4SOpoliceofficersdetainedforarmedrobbery MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.17/01for theperiodof16Ͳ30September2001    OSCECommunicationVienna18October,2001,OSCE GeoaccusesSOoftoleratingthepresenceChechenfighters,SOdeniesanylinkwith MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.18/01for "terrorism" theperiodof1Ͳ26October2001 25Oct:EUfinancingmeetinginTskh,firstmeetingcanceledbySObecauseofsituationin Abkh ##### FirstroundofSOpres  OSCECommunicationVienna19November,2001, preliminary:Kokoyev[theycallhimkokoev,in01/02thegetthatitiskokoity]49%,Chib elections OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 26% 19/01fortheperiodof27OctoberͲ18November 35,000votersregistered,75pollingstations 2001 14Nov:Kokoyev'sofficeattacked JPKF:fiveunauthorizedhelicoptersobserved,twolandedatKehiti,Geovillage;twomore incidentslikethisonfollowingdaysclosetoGeoviallges

   OSCECommunicationVienna2December,2001, officialresults:Chib20.9,Kochiev24.1(Chairmanofparl,runsforCommunistParty), OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. Kokoyev45.3(EduardKokoyev,formerbusinessmanandheadofTskhCityCommitteeof 20/01fortheperiodof18Ͳ30November2001 Komsomol).Chibdeclaresresignation Kochievunderpressuretowithdrawfromtherace

  4killed OSCECommunicationVienna2December,2001, 1event:OssyouthgangshotsdownGeo/Osspolicecontrol,oneOssattackerkilled;2 OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. event:1Ossand2Geopassengersinacarkilled 20/01fortheperiodof18Ͳ30November2001

6Dec SecondrpundofSOpres  OSCECommunicationVienna18December,2001, Kokoyevwinswith55%,Koch40% elections OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 15Dec:friendlyrelationswithGeo,firstconditionfordialogueisGeoaknowledgementof 21/01fortheperiodof1–15December2001 genocideagainstSOpeople Khugayev,RevaztobePM(alreadzin1993/94,hadbeenlivinginMoscowduringthepast years)

264  20 EC/OSCEgrantconcluded  OSCECommunicationVienna9January,2002,OSCE 210,000Euro,tostrengthentheactivitiesofGeoͲSOconflictsettlementmechanisms Dec inBrussels MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.22/01for theperiodof16–31December2001

 2002      OSCECommunicationVienna18January,2002,OSCE JPKF:SOcontinuouslycomplainsabouthelicopterflights.OverTskh.Since12Octnine MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.01/02for unidentifiedhelicopterflightsover"thezoneofconflict"[Didtheflightsstartintheendof theperiodof1Ͳ15January2002 2001orhavetheybeenalwayshappening,butnoonecomplained?] Rokiisclosedduetoavanlaches,asaresult,Falloyisalmostemtpyandpricesesponfuel haveincreased

   OSCECommunicationVienna6February,2002,OSCE KokoityreportedlyabsentfromSOtoRUalreadyfortwoweeks,SOleadershipininertia MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.02/02for andrefusescontinuingthenegoprocesswithouthim theperiodof16Ͳ31January2002 JPKF:duringlasttwomonthsweaponhandoverprocesshassloweddownbecause residentsnowdemandmoneyinreturn/asacompensation.Missionwillingtogivefuel, flour,agricutlrualetc.equipmenttovillageswhojointlyhandover. SpecialCoordinationCenterforLEBsNOTsetupyet;SOhasnotnamedanewJCCoͲ Chairman GeoMDFhasallegedlyassumedacommandroleoftheGeoPKF,thiswouldcircumvent chainofcommandasagreedinSochi  Abkh:GeoissuesdoconstatusofAbkhinGeoalthoughAbkhhasrepeatedlysaiditwillnot considerthedoc[GeostrategyunilateralallthesameinSOinmidͲ90,OSCEsupportiveto that]

27ͲJan Dzasokhovreelectedpres  OSCECommunicationVienna6February,2002,OSCE ofNO MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.02/02for theperiodof16Ͳ31January2002 14Ͳ LEBrepresentativesto  OSCECommunicationVienna18February,2002, atweeklyadministrativemeeting.PresentationofthenamestotheCouncilofPermanent Feb SpecialCoordination OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. Representatives[firsttimeIamawareofthis;"supervisorybodytotheSpecialCoordination Centernamed 03/02fortheperiodof1Ͳ15February2002 Center] KokoityreturnstoSOafterthreeweeksinRU[withoutreallygivingword]

   OSCECommunicationVienna2March,2002,OSCE 28FebJCCCochairsconveneinTskh[JCCCochairspreparetheworkingmeetingsofthe MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.04/02for workinggroupsthatpreparetheJCCsession] theperiodof16–28February2002 5Ͳ6 CIOGamavisitsGeo OSCECommunicationVienna18March,2002,OSCE inFocusweaponhandͲoverprogram,communityͲbasedprojectsforweapons Mar MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.05/02for  theperiodof01Ͳ15March,2002 10Mar:[First?]MeetingofKokandDzakhinVladi,decidetointensifyrelations,regularity, informationexchange

8Mar SCCofficiallyinaugurated OSCECommunicationVienna18March,2002,OSCE EUhandsoverequipment MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.05/02for monthlyrunningcosts25,000Euro.EUfunded. theperiodof01Ͳ15March,2002

265     OSCECommunicationVienna8April,2002,OSCE 16Mar:YOpublishsappealtoRUDuma,thatunerthepretextoffightingterrorismin MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.06/02for PankisiNATOtroopsshallbedeployedinGeo,thisis"arealthreatofmilitaryaggression theperiodof16–31March2002 againstSO" [WasthereaNATOmeetingorvisitrecently?Whatinitiatedthisarticle?] JPKF:cartheftsfrequent 26Mar:14thobservationofunidentifiedhelicopter,nearOssvillageMuguti[since mid/endof2001thereportsindicatetheethnicityoftherespectivevillage,ethnicizing] 15Mar:hiddenweaponsfoundnearTranschighway,incaseofexplosionthemain electricitylinefromRUtoSOdestroyed    OSCECommunicationVienna18April,2002,OSCE 6AprKokinterviewwithSevernayaOssetiya:NoworkingcontactswithGeoestablishedso MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.07/02for far;explosivesonhighwaybear"noChechenorGeoimplication" theperiodof1–15April,2002 17Ͳ IrrigationprojectforGeo  OSCECommunicationVienna2May,2002,OSCE inTskh,i.a.signedbyUKEmbassy,inframeworkofweaponhandͲoverproject Apr andOssvillagessignedby MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.08/02for JPKF:fewincidentsofcriminalnature MoU theperiodof16Ͳ30April,2002  TheMissionͲfacilitated"ProgrammeofVoluntaryHandͲOverofSmallArmsandLight Weapons"

   OSCECommunicationVienna15May,2002,OSCE JPKF:calmandstable MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.09/02for [TheMissionconsiderstheGeoͲSOconflictsettlementprocesstobe"supportedbytwo theperiodof1–15May,2002 mechanisms":JCCandExperts'GrouponComprSettlem]    OSCECommunicationVienna31May,2002,OSCE "endofMay",PCatInterfax,Moscow,KokandJergenia(AbkhPM):Kok:Geoupgrades MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/02for military,preparesforcloutagainstSO,trainedby"foreigninstructors".Hesays,onlyclose theperiodof16Ͳ31May,2002 cooperationwithRUmilitaryattackofGeo. JPKF:calmandstable

5ͲJun meetingJCCWGonMil  OSCECommunicationVienna22June,2002,OSCE CoͲChairmen'smeeting'sprepareJCCWGsandorganizeeconrehab andSec//JCCCoͲ MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.11/02for "since28February,threeJCCCoͲchairmensessionshavebeenheld;twoadhoccommittee ChairmeninTskh theperiodof1Ͳ15June2002 meetingsonrefugeesandIDPsandonemeetingoftheworkinggrouponmilitaryand securityissues[prep,notadministrative]" JPKF:calmandstable.JCCdecidestoincludetwoMIͲ24attackhelicoptersintoinventory becauseofunidentifiedflights

266     OSCECommunicationVienna1July,2002,OSCE InrecentweeksthereareincreasingnumbersofAbkhandSOthathaveobtainedRU MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/02for citizenship;ChochandRUsay,morethan50%ofthemalreadyholdRUpassports.From1Jul theperiodof16Ͳ30June,2002 therewillbenewRUcitizenshiplawintroducedthatmakesiteasiertoobtaincitizenship. [QuotefromtheARthatpresumablyquotesfromthelegaltext]"simplifiedprocedureto obtainRussiancitizenshipforapplicants“whowerecitizensoftheSovietUnion,residedand continuetoresideinthestatesformerlyconstitutingtheUSSR,butdidnotreceive citizenshipofthesestatesandremain–asaresultofthis–personswithnocitizenship”." 28Jun,NG,Dza:SOconflictofallpostͲSovietconflicttheone"closesttoasettlement" 10Jun:ShevsaysthatRU"secretlyannaxes"SOandmakesitsroleasamediatorless credible.[ShevopenlycritizesRUforthefirsttime,Ithink] JPKF:severalcasesofseriouscrime,threearmedattacks[Ingeneral,ofteninterͲethnic quarrelsbecauseGeoorOsspassthroughrespectivevillagesbycarandareattackedor insultedbyresidents.Smallweaponsaporblem,nodeathssofar] floodsdamagedroadbetweenTskhandVladi  SOJCCCoͲChairBorisChochiyev

8Ͳ9Jul JCCCoͲChairsmeetin  OSCECommunicationVienna15July,2002,OSCE Fromnow,meetingsofJCCCOͲChairswillbeconsideredas"JCCmeetings"becausethey Mosc MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/02for areonequalfootingwiththe"JCCsessions" theperiodof1–15July2002 Choch,Macha,forNOTeimurazKuzov SOandGeoreluctanttoagreeonmodalitieson2.5mioEuroEUgrant SOandGeojointlystoodagainstEU/OSCEproposaltoestablishafreightandcontrolcenter GoriͲTskhͲVladi.UntilnowitisataxͲfreezone,centercouldretrieverevenues.Vested interestsontheroadseemtoremainstrong. OSCE/EUsayrehabshouldbeearmarkedtonegoprocess.[OSCE/EUfirsttimeopenlystate thattheyarewillingtodorehabͲfirstͲthenͲnego.Before,itwasSOwhoalwayssaidthis.] JPKF:calmandstable 10thcelebrationofJPKF:GeoMoDordersGeoPKFnottoparticipate.Machasays,decision "confrontational"[WhoheadstheMoD?Whichpoliticalgroup?ͲͲͲMoDandPRforConflict settlementarepitchingagainsteachother] 

18ͲJul KokreplacesMIAand  OSCECommunicationVienna16August,2002,OSCE withformerOMONcommander.FourthappointmenttothispositionsinceKokresumed deputy MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.14/02for office. theperiodof16July–15August2002 Water:SOsays,waterpipethroughGeovillagewasdamagedsowatersupplytoTskhwas stoppedforfourdays.Onweeklyadminmeetingon1Aug,SOthreatenedtoclosewater pipetoGori.Onnextmeetingon8AugGeoauthoritiesinformedthattheyrepairethepipe andprosecutethesaboteurs [weeklyadminmeetingsseemnottohavebeeninterruptedsincetheitstart]

267  30ͲJul ExtraordinaryJCCsession  OSCE CommunicationVienna16August,2002,OSCE seriousproblemsinJPKF:GeoPKFstaysawayfromJPKFcelebration,JCCsays,breachof inTskh MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.14/02for Sochiandbreachoforders. theperiodof16July–15August2002 Aswell,understaffedandillͲequippedGeoPKFhasnocombatability,andthesameforOss battalion;inmidͲJuleightRUPKFsoldiersabandonnedtheirpostbecausetheywere unsatisfied. 29Jul:ChochinformsJCCthatSOdefenceauthoritieshaveorder"toopenfiregainst helicopterswhichareconductingunauthrozedflights"overSOterritory 19Ͳ ShevsaysSOcanbecalled  OSCECommunicationVienna5September,2002, JPKF:severalcasesofcrimeraisingtensions.15Augabductionof1GeoPKF.Geocritizes Aug SO OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. thatJPKFsearchnitsextendoverEasternborder.20AugGeovillagersinprotestcloseroad 15/02fortheperiodof15Ͳ31August2002 toAvnevi/mainlyGEo.22Augatweeklyadminmeeting,JPKFcommanderjustifiesthe extensionwithurgendcy,Geosaysitdidnotreceivepriornotice. OccasionalmovementsofarmedpersonsinandaroundCZ

2Ͳ9  5killed OSCECommunicationVienna8October,2002,OSCE 5Sepweeklyadministrativemeeting:LEBsofbothsidesdiscussmeasurestoincreaseanitͲ Sept MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.16/02for crime;JPKFcommannouncesthatjointpatrolsshallbeimplemented theperiodof1Ͳ30September2002  [nowforthefirsttimesincethestartofthereports,thelengthoftheSOsectionexceeds theAbkhsectionanditexceedsitbyfar.Moreviolence/tensionsinSO]

13Ͳ Kokannouncespartial  OSCECommunicationVienna8October,2002,OSCE against"internationalterrorism".SecuringtheNorthernborder Sep moblization MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.16/02for 27SeptJPKFcommanderannouncessearchoperationincludingJPKFcheckpointsatthe theperiodof1Ͳ30September2002 GeorgianmainEastͲWestroadbetweenTbsandGori.JCCrefused,SOandGEo,too. 20Sept:SOshowsheavyarmamentatmilitaryparade,Geosaysbreachofagreement [reportcreatsdirectlinkbetweenShevspeech(SG,30Sept)onantiͲterrorfightinPankisi andKokstatementatthesameday(Interfax)thatSOmobilizationprovesthatSOcan "restoreorderifneedbe"(thereportindirectlyquoting)] Irrigationcanalprojectfinishedon12Sept,supervisedbyOSCE,financedbyUK,30km canalbothforSOandGeovillages

29Ͳ BurjavisitsGeovillagesin  OSCECommunicationVienna8October,2002,OSCE Buja,ChairpersonofGeoparl,OSCEaccompanied Sep CZ MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.16/02for theperiodof1Ͳ30September2002 3Ͳ4 JCCmeetsinTskh OSCECommunicationVienna15October,2002,OSCE aswell,polexpertgroupmeetsinTskh Oct MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.17/02for JPKF:MIAhasincreasedpolicepresenceinGoriregionandSecurityzone,three"Block theperiodof1Ͳ15October2002 posts"[means:roadblocks]tobeestablished,JPKFandSOinformed    OSCECommunicationVienna4November,2002, WeeklySecandAdminmeetingcanceledbecausetheJPKFcommanderwhoisthechair OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. wasreleasedfromthisoccupationbyhissuperior. 18/02fortheperiodof16–31October2002 JPKF:tensionhasremained. MidͲOct:GeoMIAcarriesoutlargeͲscalesecoperationinShidaKartliregion,antiͲcrime action.PoliceandMIAtroopsestablishadditionalroadblocks,i.a.atTkhiavi.Ineffect,entire NorthͲSouthaxisundercontrol,fromGoritoVladi.JPKFcommsaysthisisincreasing tensions. 24OctSCCmeetinginTskh,seriousintentionsapprehended  18OctJCCADHocCommitteeonRefugeesandIDPsmetforthefourthtimethisyear

268  26Ͳ29 Expertgroupmeetingin  OSCECommunicationVienna4November,2002, Results: Oct CasteloBranco,Portugal OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. taxcontrolinSO:taxvignetsystemfortrukstobeintroduced 18/02fortheperiodof16–31October2002 EUnottobefullmemberofJCC    OSCECommunicationVienna22November,2002, JPKF:calm.JPKFwasinvolvedintohuntingChechenfighters.Tensionsabatedbecausethe OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. djacentareastoSO/CZarecalm.[WhodecidedtoinvolvetheJPKFintothehuntof 19/02fortheperiodof01Ͳ15November2002 Chechenfighters?] 12NovKok:SOwantstosetupregulararmy Missionabouttopreparesecondcanalsysteminframeworkofarmscontrolproject

   OSCECommunicationVienna2December,2002, JCCCoChairssaytheywanttocontinuewiththeJointCustomsControlProject.Goingto OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. beTACISfinanced. 20/02fortheperiodof16Ͳ30November2002 Weeklyadminmeetingafterbreakoftwoweekswasagainchairedby(thenew)JPKF commander[itturnedoutthattheformercommanderwasaltogetherdismissedandthe newproceedsintheusualway] JPKF:calm,noflights GEOMFA:hopethatnewcommander"willactstrictlywithinthethelimitsofhispower" [Geostepsupretorics]

13 Rcheulishvili,Vakhtang  OSCECommunicationVienna17December,2002, RcheuleaderoftheSocialistPartyandDeputyChairofParl Dec namedPRofthepresfor OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. JPKFrelativelycalm.Noflights.Lessreportsofcriminality,maybeduetoincreaseinGeo GeoͲOssconflict 21/02fortheperiodof1–15December2002 andSOLEBsintheregion. GeoPKFsupportsGeopoliceonGoriͲTskhroadinantiͲcrimeoperation WeeklyAdmin:electricitysupplytosomeGeovillages;deforestationasforheating [endof2002:Geolinehardensremarkably,MIAtroopsclosetoCZ,GeoPKFusedforother purposes,fierceretoricsofGEOMFAandMoD,GeoPKFrefusesparticipanceinJPKF anniversary..] thisyear6JCCmeetings PersonalRepresentativeofthePresidentforthesettlementoftheGeorgianͲOssetian conflict    OSCECommunicationVienna16January,2002,OSCE JPKFstable,noflights MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.01/03for JPKFcommanderwantstomakeJPKFvisibklebyestablsihing"mobilecheckpoints" theperiodof16December2002to15January2003 WeeklyAdmin:SomesmallervillagesaroundTskhwithoutelectricityforlackofpayment

 2003   6ͲJan Chib'ssonarrestedinTskh OSCECommunicationVienna16January,2002,OSCE bySOauthorities,AlexeiChibirov,formerdeputyheadofSOSecretService MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.01/03for theperiodof16December2002to15January2003

269  18ͲJan RcheuandKokmeetin  OSCECommunicationVienna31January,2002,OSCE stepupSCCwithtrainingsofofficers Tskh MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.02/03for Chibsonaccusedofcoupd'etat theperiodof16Ͳ31January2003 JPKF:calm.HeavyarmamentunderOssauthorityfoundinGrubela,"notinaccordance withtheagreementcoveringsizeandtypeofweaponsinthezoneofconflict" 22JanGroupoftradersblocksFalloyinrpotestagainstrisingpricesforenteringthemarket [whatmeansentering?tradingthere?]

5ͲFeb RheuandDzameetin  OSCECommunicationVienna17February,2002, agenda:econrehab Vladi OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. JPKF:SOhasadmittedpresenceofhaevyarmament,saysitisgoingtodestroyitinthe 03/03fortheperiodof01Ͳ15February2003 nearfuture VehiclehijackingisstartingtocauseethnictensionsintheTamarasheniͲKekhviarea,27Jan and13FebdemonstrationsonroadatTamaragainstcartheft Chibsonreleasedfromjail,butnotallowedtoleaveregionandwaitingfortrial

9ͲFeb JCCmeetinginTskh OSCECommunicationVienna17February,2002, enhancingtheSCC,fightingorganizedcrime OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. WGonmilandsecissueswillreviewtheexpediencyofthebilateralLEBpostKekhvi,Geo 03/03fortheperiodof01Ͳ15February2003 LEBtoconsiderblockpostsatTkiaviandArtsevi    OSCECommunicationVienna28February,2002, RcheuandKochsay(bothon13Feb)thattheyarewillingtohaveGeoandSOMPs OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. meeting.RcheuwantsRUDeputyMFALoshchinininthemeeting,too. 04/03fortheperiodof16Ͳ28February2003 13FebMayorovinSG:RUsideis"stronglyinfavorofthecontinuationofnego,process", thisisimportantbecausesituationintheCZhasdeterioratedlately. MsaysRUsidehasfacilitatedallthreehigͲlevelmeetingsbetweenChibandShev,butnow theconditionsofrsuchmeetings"donotallwoforit" JPKF:stable.[sincetherecentdeteriorationthereportsstatenotanymore:calmand stable",but"stableandnothingunusualwasreported",andthenlistingthecriminal incidents]Increaseincrime,TamarͲKehviremainstense.

6Mar SCCmeeting OSCECommunicationVienna15March,2002,OSCE reviewofworkduringpast12months.Sofar,nopermitforLEBmemberstocarryweapons MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.05/03for intheCZ theperiodof01Ͳ15March2003 10MarRehbmeetingforrestorationofGoriͲTskhhighway 11Mar:ShevsaysaftermeetingwithPutinatCISmeetinginSochi(6Ͳ7Mar)[nofurther informationgiven,noSRfound],that“paralleltotheAbkhazproblem,weshallbeworking forthesolutiontoothercomplexissues,suchas,forexample,theultimatesettlementof theGeorgianͲOssetianconflictandtherestorationofrelationswiththisregion”. JPKF:stable

10 GeoJPKFsubordinatedto  OSCECommunicationVienna31March,2002,OSCE Missionwillinvestigatewhetherchainofcommandisaffected Mar HeadofGeoMilitary MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.06/03for theperiodof16Ͳ31March2003

270  21 JCCCochairmeetingatRU  OSCECommunicationVienna31March,2002,OSCE agenda:delayofGeoͲRuinterstateprogramandthirdphaseofECrehabprogram[What Mar EmbassyinTbs MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.06/03for werethefirstandthesecondphase?Checkreports] theperiodof16Ͳ31March2003 JPKF:stable,severalheavycasesofarmedrobbery. TrilateralcheckpointatMegvrekesiiswithdrawnandinsteadamobilecheckpointis deployedwhichcovertheareaErgnetiͲEredviͲTkiavi GeoͲOssdisputeoverlandownershipinNulipreventedtoturnviolent

1ͲApr SOpolicelaunches  OSCECommunicationVienna15April,2002,OSCE JPKF:stable,maybeduetoSOoperation "security"operation MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.07/03for Falloy:SO"immigration"officialshaveintroducedthecollectionoffeesforescorting startedforonemonth theperiodof01Ͳ15April2003 vehiclesfromthemarket,atthesametimeGeocontinueswithitscumstompostsbetween GoriandTskh.Discussedatweeklyadminmeeting,commsaysitcanonlybedecidedbythe JCC. GeocustompostismeetingprotestfromlocalpopulationfrombothGeoandOSsside. PostatBrotsleti.[GeostartedwithroadblocksontheGoriͲTskhroute] 1AprRoundTableof12SONGOsinTskh

18Ͳ JCCWGonMilandSec  OSCECommunicationVienna30April,2002,OSCE endorsesporposalsforenhacnincgSCCfrom18JanbytheMissionandhandedinon31 Apr meetsinTskh MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.08/03for Jan:trainingsinKosovo,externalInstructorsinCZandconductingOSCEassessment theperiodof16Ͳ30April2003 NOproposestohaverepresentativeoftheNOMIAtotheSCC workingmeetingstobeinTskhonThursdays discussionaboutcheckpointsatTkiaviandArtsevi JPKF:stable,decreaseincrime,maybeduettoSOpoliceoperation

3May 3Geoshot OSCECommunicationVienna15May,2002,OSCE rapidJPKFreactionpreventedfurtherescalationamongpopulofTamar.Noevident deadatTamar MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.09/03for criminalbackground,threesonsandfather. theperiodof1Ͳ15May2003 7May:RcheusaysthatGeoPKFisunderstaffedandnotabletoprotecttheGeopopulation intheCZ DeputyMIAsays,Geopolicewillsteptheirpresenceto30personnelinKurta(northof TamarontheroadbetweenTskhandNO) JPKFcommanderssaysthatGeoPKFissince10MarsubordinatedtotheHeadquartersof theGeenralStaffinTbsisnotinaccordancewiththeJCCof1994

   OSCECommunicationVienna15May,2002,OSCE RcheumeetsKadokhov,FirstDeputyChairmanoftheCommitteeonRegionalIssuesofthe MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.09/03for CouncilofFederationoftheRussianDuma,onGeoͲSOconflict,ideaofGeoͲOsseconomic theperiodof1Ͳ15May2003 forum    OSCECommunicationVienna31May,2002,OSCE JPKF:stable,flights MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/03for theperiodof16Ͳ31May2003 14Ͳ16 JCCmeetinginGori OSCECommunicationVienna31May,2002,OSCE agenda:implementationofRUͲGeointergovAgreementfrom23Dec2000bysettingupan May MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/03for agency; theperiodof16Ͳ31May2003 canceledtouseECrehabfundsforsettingupthetaxvignettesystemontheTransc highway,becauseSOrefusedtosubordinateitstaxauthoritiestoajointGEoͲSObodyeven thoughunderJCCsupervision.

271     OSCECommunicationVienna15June,2002,OSCE 5JunKochsays,KokreadytomeetShev.Sincetakingoffice,KokhasstressedthatGeo MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.11/03for acknowledgementoftisguiltispreconditionofmeetingbetweenhimandShev theperiodof1Ͳ15June2003 23Ͳ25 28thJCCmeetingin  OSCECommunicationVienna30June,2002,OSCE [Whendidtheydoalltheothers???Probably,becausetheyrenamedtheJCCCoͲChair Jun Moscow MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/03for meetingsintoJCCmeetings](seeSR30Jun2003) theperiodof16Ͳ30June2003 30ͲJun KOKdismissesheadsof  OSCECommunicationVienna16July,2002,OSCE decreeissuedthatdismisses"theheadsof“State”Security,Defense,JusticeandCustoms securitystructures MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/03for administrations.Thedecreeorderedthepersonnelofthe“ReconnaissanceDepartment”of theperiodof1Ͳ15July2003 the“MinistryofDefense”andofthe“EscortUnit”ofthe“StateSecurityCommittee”to disband." Kokdeclareshewantstocutthelinkbetweenofficialsandcrime GeoMIAandotherGeoofficialspraiseKok JPKF:tensionincreasedasaresultinthevicinityofTskh.ForcesloyaltoKokprotectedTV station,postofficeandstatebuildings AllPKFsparticipatedintheJPKFanniversary GeohasincreaseditsPKFpersonnel,newlytraiendanddeployedtroops 4ͲJul Kokinformspublicabout  OSCECommunicationVienna16July,2002,OSCE noofficialresponsefromRU,internalsourcetomediathatitwillnotbeconsidered appealtoPutintojoinRF MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/03for theperiodof1Ͳ15July2003 14Ͳ15 29thJCCmeeting//9th  OSCECommunicationVienna16July,2002,OSCE Jul Polexpertsmeetingin MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/03for Tskh theperiodof1Ͳ15July2003    OSCECommunicationVienna4August,2002,OSCE 18Jul,CaucasusPress,SOMFADjoevsaysthat“theOssetiansideisconcernedwiththe MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.14/03for presenceofGeorgiancommandos,trainedbyAmericaninstructors,intheregionofthe theperiodof16Ͳ31July2003 GeorgianͲOssetianconflict.”,referringtonewlydeplioyedGeoPKFtroops[CheckonNATO activitiesinGeo,whendidtheystart,whenandhowwasitdecided?] 13Ͳ Kokinformsparlabout  OSCECommunicationVienna15August,2002,OSCE inlinewithantiͲcorruptionfight Aug dismissalofgov MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.15/03for rehabofSosectionofTransCamgoesonwithNOandRUmoney theperiodof1Ͳ15August2003 JPKF:calm,OssPKFrelocatedpostatIonchatoanewlocationnearbywithmoredefensive featureswhichtheOssPKFhasnotdonebefore

   OSCECommunicationVienna1September,2002, Khugayev,SOPM,movestoVladiafterbeingdismissed OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. TensionsonTransCambecauseofunilateralactions:SOdoesroadrepairs,GeoanitͲ 16/03fortheperiodof15Ͳ31August2003 smugglingoperations JPKF:calm. Nabdzorov,ActringJPKFCommander,sayshewillraiseflgihtissuewithJCCandGeoMoD, heprotestsagainstadditionaldeploymentofGeoofficerstoGeoPKF,notinaccordance [verylatecomplaint] [ItisreallywiththestartofECfundingfromapprox.2000thatintmoneystartstoflowinto Geo]

272     OSCECommunicationVienna15September,2002, 3Sept:Kokreconfirmspeacefulsettlement OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. JPKF:calm.JPKFcommcomplainsaboutunauthGeopolicecheckpointatAdzvi,eastern 17/03fortheperiodof1Ͳ15September2003 partofCZ.JPKFpostatKekhviwithdrawn. WeeklyAdminMeetingskipped. SOdeputyMoDtellsGeonewsagencythattheplanned6000troopsarmyisalmost completed,reportstatesnosignofit.

17Ͳ IgorSanakoyevappointed  OSCECommunicationVienna30September,2002, RUcitizen,appointedbyparl. Sep PMofSO OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. ZelimMuldarovappointedMoD,beforeinthe58tharmyofRF 18/03fortheperiodof15Ͳ30September2003 JPKF:calm.QuarrelsabputwithdrawalofpostinKekhvi,SOdemandsthatGeocompletely withdrawsitstroopsjustlikeSOhasdoneit.GeoPKFcommanderpubliclyrefusestodeploy sayingthecheckpointcontrolsmovementstotherestofGeo 

20Ͳ SOIndepDayheldinvery  OSCECommunicationVienna30September,2002, incontrasttolastyear,nomilitaryparade Sep lowkeymanner OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 18/03fortheperiodof15Ͳ30September2003

25Ͳ JPKFCommandannounces  OSCECommunicationVienna30September,2002, Akhmetov,Yuri,ChiefofStaffoftheJPKFannouncestocheckallpostsuntil2Oct Sep todeployallunauthposts OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 18/03fortheperiodof15Ͳ30September2003

   OSCECommunicationVienna15October,2002,OSCE 2OctKokappointsVazhaKhatchapuridzeDeputyHeadoftheTskhregionaladmin, MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.19/03for Kahtchawas1993Ͳ1997RepresnetativeoftheGeopresintheregionofShidaKartli.Black theperiodof1Ͳ15October2003 SeaPress:"HeresignedforseriousdifferenceswiththeGeorgiancentralauthorities". Rcheustronglycriticizeshisappointment JPKF:calm.flights. GeopolicestillstaffsKekhvicheckpoint,SOpolicehaswithdrawn. SOdeclaresitsintentiontoshotdownunauthheilicopters

2Oct Trilateralmeetingonpol  OSCECommunicationVienna15October,2002,OSCE Geo,SO,RUCoChairsoftheJCC,Macha:preptoExperts'Meeting statusofSOinTbs MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.19/03for theperiodof1Ͳ15October2003 14Ͳ17 10thExpertMeetingon  OSCECommunicationVienna31October,2002,OSCE SO:relationshavedeterioratedduringpast2Ͳ3years. Oct PolIssuesinTheHague MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.20/03for Firsttime,theExpertmeetingwasnotconcludedwithadocument.ThisisbecauseSO theperiodof15Ͳ30October2003 insistedonincludinggenocideandGeoinsistedonBadendocument[whichisactuallythe statusissue] [CheckBadendoc] 22Oct SCCmeeting OSCECommunicationVienna31October,2002,OSCE OSCEofficialSMPU(StrategucPoliceMattersUnit)visited,attendedthemeetingͲͲͲ SOside MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.20/03for canceledthemeetingandtheoffertosendSOSCCpersonnelfortrainingtoKosovo theperiodof15Ͳ30October2003 OSCEMissionconsiderablydisappointed

273  26Oct 1Geopolice OSCECommunicationVienna31October,2002,OSCE inKhviti2kmofGoriinconductofanoperation killed MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.20/03for theperiodof15Ͳ30October2003    OSCECommunicationVienna15November,2002, HoMsaystoKokthatdonorperspectiveslessenconsiderablygiventhepoorprofileofSO OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. inTheHagueandattheSCCmeeting,SOmustbemoreactiveinnegoprocess.Kok 21/03fortheperiodof1Ͳ15November2003 reassureswillforpeacefulsettlement. JPKF:calm,flgihts. SOsaystroopsinstateofemergencyasforGeoelections SOJCCChairtellsGeomediathatSOwantstosendofficerstotrainingtoKosovoasinvited. DirectlycontrastingwithpreviousSOdemandthatinexchangethereshouldbeachangein thestructureofSCCwithNOMIAofficialparticipating

##### KokmeetsRUMFAIvanov  OSCECommunicationVienna1December,2002, Kok:SOworriedaboutsituationinGeo,willwaitforwhomtheGeopopulationwillelect, inMoscow OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. restatingwillforpeacefulsettlement 22/03fortheperiodof15Ͳ30November2003

   OSCECommunicationVienna15December,2002, MissiondiscussesrehabfundswithSO OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. JPKF:calm 23/03fortheperiodof1–15December2003 11Dec:GeosecurityforcescarryoutantiͲsmugglingcampaignatMegvrekisi,3kmsouthͲ eastofTskhonGeocontrollesterr.JPKFCommandnotifiedbefore. SOMoDsazsSOarmedforcesinalertbeforeGeoelections,Missiondidnotobserve increasedactivity

18 PutinsaysRUrespectsterr  OSCECommunicationVienna31December,2002, atthesamesays,"thehighlandpeopleformakindofcommunityandRussiacannotignore Dec intofGeo OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. this"(ItarͲTass) 24/03fortheperiodof15Ͳ31December2003 GeonamesMalkhazKakabadzeMiniterforSpecialAffairstobeinchargeoftheECfunds fromGeoside JPKF:antiͲsmugglingoperationbyspecialunitoftheMinstryofSateSecurityatTirdznisi (10kmsouthͲeastofTskhintheCZ).Unlikethefirstonethismonth,thisonenot coodinatedwiththeJPKFcommand. temporaryJPKFpostsatKekhviandMegvrekisitomonitorGeoSpecialforces

  1killed OSCECommunicationVienna31December,2002, atArcheviinfirefight,threeinjured OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 24/03fortheperiodof15Ͳ31December2003  2004   3ͲJan SaakavisitsCZ  OSCECommunicationVienna15January,2002,OSCE forthefirsttimeidicatedthatthevisits,Tamarasheni,withMIABaramidze.SOMiniterfor MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.01/04for InternalAffairsaskshimtoleavetheterritory;4Jan:Kok:"provocativemove" theperiodof1–15January2004 [Note:ThisvisithappenedonedaybeforetheGeopreselections] JPKF:calm,flights

274  26ͲJan SOMFAstatement:  OSCECommunicationVienna31January,2002,OSCE againstSOsincetheresignationofShev,inparticularIliaIIwhosaidthatunderthenew increaseinbelligerent MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.02/04for Geoflag"wewillenterbothSukhumiandTskhinvali". statementsbyGeo theperiodof15Ͳ31January2004 JPKF:calm.19JanJPKFredeployscheckpointatKekhvi.Geopolicehadneverwithdrawn. Now,again,itisajointJPKF/Geopolice/SOpolicecheckpoint.Redeploymentcausedstrains intheregion

31ͲJan MoUonRehabsigned OSCECommunicationVienna31January,2002,OSCE JCC,EC,OSCE,UNHCR,UNDP.2.5mioEuro MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.02/04for MoUontheImplementationofthethirdECfundedrehabilitationprograminthezoneof theperiodof15Ͳ31January2004 GeorgianͲOssetianconflict. Procedures:"UNDPwillimplementtheprojectsthroughalocalProjectImplementingUnit (PIU),assistedbyaninternationalexpert.ThePIUwillworkunderthesupervisionofa SteeringCommittee,chairedbytheMission.TheGeorgianandSouthͲOssetiansides,the EC,andUNDPwillalsoparticipateintheSteeringCommittee."

6ͲFeb DepCommof OSCECommunicationVienna15February,2002, GeopolicecontrolledthecaratacheckpointatEredvi,shootout.Geopolice claimscarwas theSOSpecial OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. stolen. Forceskilledby 03/04fortheperiodof1Ͳ15February2004 JPKF:sometimesmixͲupofauhtoritiesbetweenSOimmigrationserviceandJPKF Geopolice

14Ͳ KhainnamedState  OSCECommunicationVienna15February,2002, forConflictResolution,entireGeogovappointed Feb Minister OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 03/04fortheperiodof1Ͳ15February2004 21Ͳ  2Geodie OSCECommunicationVienna29February,2002, inTamarasheni,instreetfight,Geovillagersblocktheroad,SOpoliceblocksallroads Feb OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. surroundingTskhbyorderofSOMIA 04/04fortheperiodof16Ͳ29February2004 GeochangesitsJPKFpolicy:GeoJPKFrepresentativesays,GeoPKFhasbeendisbanded, onlyoneisstillthereandtwobattalionswillbereinstalledelsewhereintheCZ.TheGeoPKF willinfuturenotcompriseconscripts,butrecruitedlocals.Pressreportssay,theGeoPKF hasnotbeendisbanded. 24Ͳ26OSCEͲRUMFAmeetinginMoscow,RUreiteratesappreciationforworkofOSCE

   OSCECommunicationVienna15March,2002,OSCE 9MarImedi:SaakasaysinParishewillnolongertolerate"nonͲsensetalkbyfeudallords", MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.05/04for referringtoSO theperiodof1–15March2004 JPKF:calmandstable Heavyarmamentdiscovered10kmNWfromTskh.OSCEmonitoringofficersandJPKFboth werepreventerdfromcheckingthesite.Kokexpressesregret.(SeeSR12Mar2004)

5Mar Geopolicecarriesout  OSCECommunicationVienna15March,2002,OSCE antiͲsmuggling.Onthespot,SOpoliceandJPKFRapidreactionarrived operationatFalloy MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.05/04for theperiodof1–15March2004

275     OSCECommunicationVienna31March,2002,OSCE 29MarBlackSeaPressSaaka:“assoonaspowerisconsolidatedintherestofGeorgia,we MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.06/04for shallreachanagreementwiththeOssetians,ourfriends.Wehavenothingtoargueabout”, theperiodof15–31March2004 aswellsmugglingaproblem,NOinvolvementwelcome,improvementofGeoͲRUrelations JPKF:c/s,severalflights[observationsofheavyarmamentbecomesmorefrequent, observersusuallyaccessdeniedbyOssmilitary,SeeSR16Mar] landdisputeinNuli,OSsbeatenupbyGeo [Note:ThereareOSCEMonitoringOfficersandJPKFMilitaryObservers]

3ͲApr SOcallsforconscription OSCECommunicationVienna15April,2002,OSCE JPKF:c/s,flights.JPKFcomminformsMissionthatmonitoringwillbecarriedoutfromnow MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.07/04for onlytogetherwitharepresentativeoftheSOMoD.Detailsoftheroutetobeannouncedin theperiodof1Ͳ15April2004 advance [upuntilnowHoMhasheldatleastthreemeetingwithKhain]

8ͲApr 2killedbyGeo OSCECommunicationVienna15April,2002,OSCE whenpolicetriedtostopthecarPtsaforitwasreportedlystolen police MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.07/04for theperiodof1Ͳ15April2004 15Ͳ JCCmeetinginTskh//  OSCECommunicationVienna30April,2002,OSCE aftersixmonthsbreak Apr here,KokandKhainmeet MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.08/04for endorsesappointmentofNOrepresenataivetoSCC.Untilveryrecently,Geowasopposed forthefirsttime theperiodof16Ͳ30April2004 tothisproposalfromSOwhichwasblockingprogressintheSCC. JPKF:c/s.SOMoDdies,"deathbelievedtobefromnaturalcauses",Alimbegovichnew MoD 14 JCCCOChairsmeetatRU  OSCECommunicationVienna17May,2002,OSCE agenda:draftproposalsforstructureofSCC May EmbassyinTbs MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.09/04for JPKF:c/s theperiodof1Ͳ15May2004 23 SOparlelections OSCECommunicationVienna31May,2002,OSCE 26May:SaakaaddressesSO""brothers"tostartimmediatetalksontherestorationofa May MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/04for singlestate"pledged,statusofOsslanguagewillbeguaranteed,speaksOss.SOMFA theperiodof16Ͳ31May2004 DjioyevsaysSOisinterestedonlyingoodnewighborlyrelations. 31 GeoMIAdeploysinCZ  OSCECommunicationVienna31May,2002,OSCE deployedtoprotectGeopolicecheckpoints. May MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/04for MIAspecialforcesbyhelicoptertoTkviari,protectpolicecarryingoutantiͲsmuggling theperiodof16Ͳ31May2004[SeeallSRsandARs operation fromhere] 1ͲJun RoelofstriestovisitCZ OSCECommunicationVienna31May,2002,OSCE Geochildreninvillage,isheldbackbySOauthorities MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/04for theperiodof16Ͳ31May2004    OSCECommunicationVienna15June,2002,OSCE SaakaintroducesVicePMtocrossͲtaskSOactivitiesamongGeobodies;VanoMerabishvili, MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.11/04for formerSecretaryoftheNCS,nowSecMinister theperiodof1Ͳ15June2004SR4,7,11June AntiͲsmugglingongoing;SOagainstGeocheckpointatTkiavi,reduceslinkswithGeo authorities,doesnotallowthemtoentrSO,postponesmeetingswithintframeworks 12JunSaakaannouncesonRUstaviͲ2thatGeo"hasstoppedcontraband"fromSO. JPKF:tensebutstable.flights.GeoPKFnowprovidedbyMIAtroops.11Jun:Choch complainsaboutbiasoftheOSCEagainstSO.

276  24ͲJun JCCCoChairinformal  OSCECommunicationVienna30June,2004,OSCE JPKFtensionfurtherescalated.GeopolicedetainstruckssuchasJPKFfueltrucks,increases meetinginTskh MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/04for personnelandarmamentatcheckpoints.>>>"Noneofthesearmamentsexceedthe theperiodof15–30June2004SR16,17,23June limitationsoftherespectiveagreementsbetweentheconflictingsides." ConstantlymovementofunidentifiedarmedtroopsintheCZ[reportsindicatethatillegal checkpointsareduetoͲͲfromGeo:police/MIAtroops,andͲͲͲfromSO:unidentifiedarmed persons].SOdeployscheckpoints,andofficiallysaysso,asforprotectionofpopulation.SO andGEodeploycheckpointsrightnexttoeachother,whtinhoursandwithdrawingagain.  SaakaintroducesVicePMtocrossͲtaskSOactivitiesamongGeobodies;VanoMerabishvili, formerSecretaryoftheNCS,nowSecMinister AntiͲsmugglingongoing;SOagainstGeocheckpointatTkiavi,reduceslinkswithGeo authorities,doesnotallowthemtoentrSO,postponesmeetingswithintframeworks 12JunSaakaannouncesonRUstaviͲ2thatGeo"hasstoppedcontraband"fromSO.  JPKF:"tensebutstable".flights.GeoPKFnowprovidedbyMIAtroops.GeoantiͲsmuggling ongoing.SOcondemnsthe"blockade"onSO,continuesbanningjournalistsandforeigners, enforcescheckpointsatborders,restrictsmovementsofGeolivinginSO 11Jun:ChochcomplainsaboutbiasoftheOSCEagainstSO. 25JunLoshchininRUDepMFAvisitsTskhandZurabishvili,Zurabsays,Geomadeconrete porposalforjointcontrolofRoki(pressconferenceatImediTV)

30 JCCmeetingMoscow OSCECommunicationVienna15July,2002,OSCE Khain(GeoJCCCochair)inopeningstatementdemandsthereleaseofthreemembersof JunͲ1 MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/04for GeoSecMinistry,detainedinTskh.SOrefuses,themeetingwascanceled. Jul theperiodof1–15July2004     OSCECommunicationVienna15July,2002,OSCE 5JulTalivieti(EUSREuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentative)inSO,mainissuefinishingof MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/04for GorͲTskhrailway theperiodof1–15July2004 6ͲJul InformalJCCCoChair  OSCECommunicationVienna15July,2002,OSCE Geo,SO,NO,JPKFCommand.Seriesofproposalsforremovalofcheckpoints. meetinginTskh MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/04for theperiodof1–15July2004 8ͲJul HostageͲtakingof42Geo  OSCECommunicationVienna15July,2002,OSCE JPKFExtremelytense."Closetodevelopintoviolent". nationalsinCZ MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/04for 7Jul,increaseoftensions:twoRUlorriestakenbyGeoMIA,SOdeploysinPrisi,GeoSenior theperiodof1–15July20048SRsinreporting MilitaryRepresntativeinJPKF[nottheGeoKFcommander!!]detainedbySOfor1.5hours, period andreleased 8Jul:39releasedOSCEmediatedon9Jul 10Jul:ExtraordinaryJPKFmeetinginTskh.RUcommanderofRUGroundforcesurges easingoftensions.MMO(MissionMonitoringOfficer)apprehendedbySO

14Ͳ15 JCChighͲlevelmeting  OSCECommunicationVienna15July,2002,OSCE urgesimplementationofJCCdecisionsof2Jun2004 Jul Moscow MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/04for 16Jul:demonstrationoutsideOSCEofficeinTskh[nofurtherinformation] theperiodof1–15July2004

277  25Ͳ28 Zhelev,Presidentof  OSCECommunicationVienna31July,2002,OSCE urgespartiestosticktonegocommitments,meetsSaaka,Burja,Zurabi,Kahin.OSCEissues Jul Bulgaria,SpecialEnvoyof MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.14/04for statementcallingforallsidestocontroltheirarmedpersonnelintheCZ. CIOvisitsTbs theperiodof16–31July2004SRs20,21,30Jul JPKF:Extremelytense.situationworsened. 22Jul:RUPKFhelpsSOauthoritiestoremoveOssraodblockbetweenTskhandTamaraon TransCam,Geipostremains. 27Jul:GEopoliceandMVDtroopsfoundatEredvi.DeputyheadoftheEredvi AdministrationthreatensSeniorRussianMilitaryOberserverthathewillbeshotatifhe showsupagain. 27/28JulovernightfireonTamarasheni,AchabetiandKurta(allGeo,northofTskh) >>>massesofillegalheavyarmamentfoundbyMOs.troopsmovementswithoutgiving priornotivetoJPKFcommandfrequent. 13Ͳ KokandZhvsignceasefire casualties OSCECommunicationVienna15August,2002,OSCE JPKF:situationgraduallydeteriorated.Exchangesoffireincreased,civilianvillagesunder Aug agreement MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.15/04for fire,bothmilitaryandciviliancasualties.[FirsttimecasualtiesmentionedintheARsince theperiodof01Ͳ15August2004SR4,5,12,16(2 31May] reportsfor16Aug)Aug 2morestaffformilobservermssion 13Ͳ Geoparlsetsup  OSCECommunicationVienna15August,2002,OSCE Firstsessionon16AugonSO.IssuesforbothforAbkhandSO.23members. Aug CommitteeonRestoration MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.15/04for ofTerritorialIntegrity theperiodof01Ͳ15August2004 17Ͳ18 ExtraordinaryJCCmeeting  OSCECommunicationVienna31August,2002,OSCE decisiontocontinuehighͲlevelmeetings Aug withKokandZhvinTskh MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.16/04for decisiontoclearheightsoverlookingtheGeorgianbyͲpassroadinajointGeo/Oss andTbs theperiodof16Ͳ31August2004 operation.Plannedfor19Aug,butabandonedon18Aug,afterrenewedGeoshellingofthe heights.JCCthenagreedonloactingJPKFobserversatthesamesite.

19Ͳ Saakaissuesstatementto  OSCECommunicationVienna31August,2002,OSCE exceptforPKFandGeopolice. Aug withdrawallarmedtroops MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.16/04for JPKF:situationgraduallycalmeddown.15Ͳ18nightlyfirefightswithuseofheavyartillery. fromCZ theperiodof16Ͳ31August20045SRs Noexchangeoffirebeingreportedsinceeveningof19Aug. However,thesidesusetheceasefiretoimrpovepreviousandnewdefensivepositions throughouttheCZ.Aswell,deliberatenonͲcooperationbybothsideswithJPKFandOSCE ontheground(duringmonitoring..) nofullwithdrawalbeieitherside.GeoPKFratotatesreplacingMIAtroopswithMoDtroops SOMFAdoesnotallowGeovillagers'religiousprocessionfromNikozitoTamarthrough Tskh,Khaintoclarifyit.ProcessionusedbyͲpassroad. GeomediacalltheprovisionoghumanitarianaidbytheGeogovtoGeoandOssvillagesin theCZthe"humanitarianattack"

   OSCECommunicationVienna16September,2002, JPKF:stable.Despiteoccasionallightarmsfire,ceasefireheld."TheMissionbelievesthat OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. thebulkoftheGeorgianInteriorMinistrytroopshavebeenwithdrawnfromthezoneof 17/04fortheperiodof1Ͳ15September2004 conflict." 5Ͳ9 23OSCEAmbassadorsvisit  OSCECommunicationVienna16September,2002, meetwithentireGeoleadership,withSOleadershipandraiseissuesofescalationand Sep Geo OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. settlement 17/04fortheperiodof1Ͳ15September2004

278  8ͲSep Kulakhmetovreplaces  OSCECommunicationVienna16September,2002, [IrecallanincidentlinkedtoNabdzorov,relatedtoSOstatusͲͲͲ hesaidsmththatheisno NabdzorovasJPKF OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. suretowhichcountrySObelongsandwasdismissedshortlyafterthat] commanders 17/04fortheperiodof1Ͳ15September2004Weekly MissionMilitaryReportsfrom7Sep 21Ͳ SaakaaddressesUNGA OSCECommunicationVienna1October,2004,OSCE 1.confidenceͲbuilding,2.demilitarization/decriminalization;increasedroleofintcomm, Sep MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.18/04for which“inthecaseofSouthOssetiameansimmediatelyincreasingandexpandingtheOSCE theperiodof16Ͳ30September2004 mandatealongtheRokitunnelborder”,3.broadestfromofautonomy 30Ͳ JCCmeetinginMoscow OSCECommunicationVienna1October,2004,OSCE preparationofZhvͲKokmeeting Sep MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.18/04for JPKF:tensebutstable.Improvisedexplosives(IED)foundonTransCamnearRUpostat theperiodof16Ͳ30September2004 Kekhvi.Thereportsayspossibilitiesare:"a)theconditionandageoftheexplosive,thelack ofcamouflageoftheIEDandthetimingofthefind,pointtothelikelihoodthatthiswasan IEDmeanttobefoundratherthantobeused;b)thiswasanattempttosetanIEDbynonͲ professionalpersonsintendedtodisrupttrafficontheTranscamortoambushaJPKF convoy;c)thiswasanattempttoprovokesomesortofreaction,eitherfromlocal inhabitantsinbothcommunitiesorfromtheJPKF;d)thiswasanattempttomaintainahigh leveloftensioninthezoneofconflictamongstthepopulation(frombothcommunities).It alsomightbeamixtureofanyoralloftheabove."

12Oct 2OssPKF OSCECommunicationVienna18October,2002,OSCE ambushonfourOSsPKFsbelongingtoNOPKFbattalion.4kmSEofDidiGromi,closeto soldierskilled MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.19/04for Kirbali.GeopolicedetainedthewoundedatGorihospitalandreleasedthemlater.>>>SR theperiodof01Ͳ15October2004 12Oct duetothis,SteeringCommitteeforrehabdidnottakeplace GeopolicedetainsbusestravelingthroughRokitoArmenia.Karelisays,passengersonly allowedtotravelthroughLarscheckpoint.[firsttime,Kareliismentionedasanauthority] JPKF:situationhasworsened.Daytimeshootingresumed,nighttimeshootingincreased. Noflights. NOandGeoreporthavingcomeunderfirefromrespside.[Soldierswoundedhappens moreoftenthanthatsoldiersdisappear,butdisappearancesgiverisetohostageͲtaking accusationsandhavefarmoreescalatingpotential.TheygoimmediatelyuptotheJPKF levelwhichcommunicatesittotherespauthroities]

20Oct JCCCochairmeetingatRU  OSCECommunicationVienna2November,2002, 25OctSteeringcommitteeonrahbtookplaceinTskh,agreementsonbudgetadjustments EmbassyinTbs OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. JPKF:stablebuttense.Flight.Overnightshooting.InhabitantsofAchabetiandKurta(norht 20/04fortheperiodof16Ͳ31October2004 ofTskh)closedTransCamthreetimesinprotestoffriringontheirhouses. 17Ͳ18OctNuli:Disputeoverappleorchard.90OssandGeovillagersfiringateachother. JPKFcommandercouldnotgettheGeoandSOauthoritiestoagreeonadivisionoftheland.

5ͲNov KokͲZhvmeetinginSochi OSCECommunicationVienna15November,2002, agreetowithdrawallarmedunitsfromtheCZ.EC,Loshchinin,JCCCOchairs.>>>SR8Oct OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. JPKF:stablebuttense.Overnightshootinwithlightarms.Flights.RUandGeoPKFstated 21/04fortheperiodof01Ͳ15November2004 jointdemining. 19Ͳ10 JCCmeetingVladi OSCECommunicationVienna 30November,2002, demilitarization Nov OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. JPKF:firstweekverytense.Secondweek"calmeddownconsiderably…downtooneor 22/04fortheperiodof15Ͳ30November2004 twoincidents[ofnightlyexchangesoffire]pernight" renewedGeopoliceactivityinthesouthernCZ,19NovambushonGeoPKFwithtwo

279  wounded

   OSCECommunicationVienna16December,2002, 15DecSecondmeetingoftheSterringCommonRehabonthethirdprogramforrehab OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. JPKF:situationimprovinguntil8Dec,thenslightdeterioration,sincethenstablebuttense 23/04fortheperiodof1Ͳ15December2004 [asforshootingincidents,OSCEreportsrelateto:SOandGeoside,JPKFandOSCEMission MonitoringOFficers(MMOs)] 7Dec:GeopolicestopsRUPKFsaccusingthemoftransprotingcontraband.SeniorRUMO facilitatedthereleaseofthevehicle.SOput200menoninstantreadinessroreleasethe JPKFs. GeoantiͲsmugglingongoing  >>>2ndmeetingoftheSteeringCommitteeonthe3rdECfundedrehabilitationprogramin thezoneoftheGeorgianͲOssetianconflict  2005      OSCECommunicationVienna18January,2005,OSCE JPKFtensebutcalm.Flight.Haltofdemil. MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.01/05for [GeoDzeverabasenowformonthsongoing.ReservisttrainingofGeoinsideCZ] theperiodof1Ͳ15January2005 19ͲJan HostageCrisis OSCECommunicationVienna3February,2005,OSCE SOresidentdetainedbyGeopolicebeingsuspectedoftwomurdersinTamarashenilast MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.02/05for year.Samenight,GeochiefofpoliceofEredvitakenhostagewhilebeingondutyinErgneti. theperiodof15Ͳ31January2005 27Janlasthostagereleased. JPKF:Smallarmsshooting.RefuselofMoDtograntOSCeaccesstoDzevera.NewillegalSO positions

24ͲJan EmergencySessionofthe   >>heldtobetheeasingpointofhostagecrisis JCCinTskh 24Jan:SOparlappealstoCoEtosenditsrepresentativestostudythesituationonthe ground. 26ͲJan Saakadeliversspeechat   PACE 7ͲFeb USdiplomatsmeetChoch  OSCECommunicationVienna15February,2005, 5FebthirdmeetingofSteeringcommittee inTskh OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. JPKF:relativelycalm,shootingincidentsdiminuished. 03/05fortheperiodof1Ͳ15February2005 OpenappearanceofSOMoDuntis    OSCECommunicationVienna2March,2005,OSCE 24FebSPMUmetwithKhain>>>SCCprocessonjointpolicingrestarted MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.04/05for JPKF:calmbuttense.Mainlysmallarms,butsomegrandeexplosions.RestrictionofOSCE theperiodof16Ͳ28February2005 personnelbySOMoD    OSCECommunicationVienna16March,2005,OSCE WeeklyAdministrativeMeetings(Thursdaymeetings)underthechairmanshipofthe MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.05/05for JPKFcommanderhaveresumedafterabreakofoneyear. theperiodof1Ͳ15March2005 1Mar:FourthmeetingoftheSterringCommittee JPKF:calmbuttense.Lowlevel,butshootingincreasedinsomeareasfromtheDmenisiͲ SatikhariͲEredvitrianglealongtheLesserLiakhviRivertothenorthͲeastofTskhinvali

280  16Ͳ17 JCCCoChairsmeetingin  OSCECommunicationVienna6April,2005,OSCE agreeon:draftingactionplanfor"completing"demil,aswellspecialfocustojpintLEBand Mar Moscow MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.06/05for rehab theperiodof16Ͳ31March2005 17Mar:GeogovissuesdecreeoncontrolinghumanitarianaidintoCZ,coordinatingGeo bodies,certifyinggoodsetc.,KhaintaskedwithcoordinationandliaisonwithJPKF JPKF:calmbuttense.flights.

   OSCECommunicationVienna15April,2005,OSCE JPKF:calm[thisgenreallymeans,smallarmsfireremaisnatalowlevelwithseveral MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.07/05for grenadexplosions] theperiodof1Ͳ15April2005    OSCECommunicationVienna3May,2005,OSCE InformalmeetingoftheSteeringCommittee MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.08/05for JPKFcalm.Sidesagreeforthefirsttimeonsmallstepsfordemil. theperiodof16Ͳ30April2005 19AprMoDsaysithasclosedthereservisttrainingbaseinTvintercview,too.    OSCECommunicationVienna15May,2005,OSCE 5MaySixthmeetingoftheSterringCommittee MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.09/05for JPKF:calm.Dzeverafullydismantled.Demilstalledagain. theperiodof1Ͳ15May2005 7May:GeostudentsholddemonstrationatJPKFpostinMegvrekisiagainstRUbasesin Geo 29 GeoandSOsecurityforces 4Oss OSCECommunicationVienna1June,2005,OSCE inGeoviallagesnorthofTskh.SOopensfireatGeopoliceinKurta.AtTamarasheni May clash uniformed,1 MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/05for stoppedbyGeopolice,opensfireagain,Georeturnedfire.Deaths.OnedeadSOdriverof Geopolice theperiodof16Ͳ31May2005;OSCECommunication SOMoD. killed Vienna30May,2005,SEC.FR/225/05RESTRICTED, JPKF:calmbutfragile,after29Mayunpredictable.LargenumberofGeopolicepostsand OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/SpotReport:Atleastfive SOMoDand"militia"postsincl.inTskhitselfremainwithoutJCCauhorization. deadaftershootingincidentinthezoneofthe GeorgianͲOssetianConflict,30May2005Seeother SRs

30Ͳ31 JCCCoChairsmeetinTskh OSCECommunicationVienna1June,2005,OSCE initiallyinVladi,butduetoshootingon29MayrelocatedtoTskh,prepofmeeting May MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/05for betweenGeoandSOMIA theperiodof16Ͳ31May2005  Mamsurovsaysonly  OSCECommunicationVienna15June,2005,OSCE [whenexactlyunclear]MamsurovrecentlyappointedNOpres optionisunificationofSO MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.11/05for (Amongothersources,reportedbyNovayaGazeta10June2005,CivilGeorgia11June2005, andNO theperiodof1Ͳ15June2005 NewsRu16June2005,Kommersant17June2005) JPKF:calmbutfragile.6Jun4GeodisappearinTskharea,havenotbeenfoundyet; discussionwithSOMoDandJPKFaboutSCCrefreshed 7thmeetingoftheSteeringCommittee

22Ͳ23 JCCMeetinginMoscow 1Geodead OSCECommunicationVienna5July,2005,OSCE shepherd,bodyfound,asaresultofamineaccident. Jun [supposedlythe44th,I MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/05for JCC:withparticipationofLEBs.Agenda:JointLEBs,demil,rehabSEC.FR272/05 neverseehowtheycount] theperiodof16Ͳ30June2005 JPKF:c/f.TensionsincreaseasaresultfromfailortofindthefourmissingGeo.Geolocal policechiefsays,"localpopulationoutofhiscontrol",theyrefusetotalkwithanyauhtority andthreatentotakehostages.

10ͲJul BatumiConferenceonSO  OSCECommunicationVienna18July,2005,OSCE "InternationalConferenceonthePeacefulResolutionoftheGeorgianͲOssetianConflict" conflict MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/05for SeeSEC.FR/298/05 theperiodof1Ͳ15July2005 organizedbyGeogov."Strategicplan"presentedbytheGeogovanddiscussed.

281     OSCECommunicationVienna18July,2005,OSCE 7Jul8thmeetingoftheSteeringCommittee MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/05for JPKF:c/f.fourGeostillmissing,tensionsongoing. theperiodof1Ͳ15July2005    OSCECommunicationVienna2August,2005,OSCE JPKFc/f.fourGeostillmissing,tensionscontinue. MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.14/05for theperiodof16Ͳ31July2005    OSCECommunicationVienna17August,2005,OSCE 7AugSaakaassuresofGeonotreparingmilitaryoperation,duetoearlierstatementsof MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.15/05for Kok theperiodof1Ͳ15August2005 JPKF:c/f.LimitedtrafficonTRansCamunderJPKfescortthroughGeovillages. 2Aug9thmeetingoftheSteeringCommittee    OSCECommunicationVienna2September,2005, 24AugKhainsaysGeowillingtopayrehabfromCentralStateFundandGeoriganSocial OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. InvestmentFund(GSIF)(fundedbyWB,KFWandInternationalDevelopmentAssociation) 16/05fortheperiodof16Ͳ31August2005 JPKF:c/f.19AugGeoboykidnapped. 9ͲSep Saakaonstrategy OSCECommunicationVienna21September,2005, firstspeechaftersummerbreak.Threestages,1.stateapparatusreform,2.infrastrucutre OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. andenergy,3.jobsandeconomy.Allthreestagesoftheplanservethe"ultimategoalof 17/05fortheperiodof1Ͳ15September2005SeeAR unitingGeorgia".RUfostersthemilitarizationofCZs.WantsAmericansintoSOsettlement: "Forthefirsttimeinmanyyears,theAmericanshaveexpressedtheirreadinesstoget directlyinvolvedinthesettlementofconflictsinGeorgia." JPKF:tense 15Sept:10thSteeringCommittee

20Ͳ 15thSODayofInd//MoD  OSCECommunicationVienna5October,2005,OSCE MoD(Okrua)closesTranscamatAchabetiaftermilparadeinTskh,didvehiclesearches Sep operationinSO MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.18/05for withoutpriorJPKFconsultation;earlyeveningmortarsstrikecivilianbuildingsinTskh theperiodof16Ͳ30September2005 21Sept:SevenexplosionsnearGeovillagesnorthofTskh

11Oct Geoparlresolutionon  OSCECommunicationVienna20October,2005,OSCE Resolution“RegardingtheCurrentSituationintheConflictRegionsontheTerritoryof JPKF MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.19/05for GeorgiaandOngoingPeaceOperations”. theperiodof1–15October2005 GeogovtoholdtalkswithallsidestoimrpoveperformanceofJPKF.Reportbacktoparl10 Feb.Ifnegativeassessmentofnego,parl"shalldemandthecessationofthepeaceͲkeeping operationand(...)abolitionofthexistingstructuresfrom15Feb2006"

24Ͳ25 45thJCCmeetingin  OSCECommunicationVienna3November,2005, threestageapproachforsttlement:1.demil,2.rehab,3.polsettlementbystatus,onthe Oct Moscow OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. basisofSaaka'sUNGAproposalfromSep2004andKok'sstatementfrom24Dec2004. 20/05fortheperiodof15–31October2005 JPKF:firsttimesince20Sepmorestable,butstilltense 26Oct FirstLEBmeetinghosted  OSCECommunicationVienna3November,2005, SOMIAMindzayev,representativesoftheneighboringpolicedepartmentsofShidaKartli, byOSCEinTskh OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. RachaͲLechkhumi,MtskhetaͲTsianeti,ChiefShidaKartliregionalpolice:Jugheli. 20/05fortheperiodof15–31October2005 ConsentofGeoMIA,onerepresentative Signingofjointactionplan. 27Oct:GeoPMNoghaidelirequestsJCCCOchairofvisitingGeovillages,whosayshe shouldcontactSOMFA.Visitwaspostponed.

282     OSCECommunicationVienna16November,2005, 11Nov:NASworkingteamscompletedandstartingwork:1.Road(NO/RF),2.Business OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. development(RF),3.Agriculture(US),4.Energy(Austria) 21/05fortheperiodof01–15November2005 ͲͲͲOSCEinitiatedNeedsAssessmentStudy. 10Nov11thSteeringCommittee,GeoͲOssgasexpertshavejointlybeguntoassessthe JavaͲTskhpipelineinviewoftheconnectionofGeovillagesthgoughtheKekhviͲTskh segmentofthepipe OSCEstillexpectstoreceiveafinalGeoinvestigationreportonexplosionsof20Sep JPKF:t/s.flight.

15Ͳ17 JCCCoChairsmeetin  OSCECommunicationVienna5December,2005, onlyjointpositonsinNASandrehab,inotherissuestheprotocolonlypointsoutthe Nov Ljubljana OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. differences. 22/05fortheperiodof15–30November2005 JPKF:t/s.Geoboyfrom19AugreleasedafterjointSOansGeopoliceoperation(SRs) 15NovnearescalationwhenGeocarwithnonͲvalidJPKFplateswasstoppedbyRUPKF, oneoccupantwasGeoDepChiefofSpecialForcesoftheMIA,20maskedandarmedmen arrivedandtheOPcoammanderorderedhismenintocombatalert.GeoMOsdiscussed withGeoMIApersonnelandeasedtensions.

12 Kokproposesjoint  OSCECommunicationVienna16December,2005, JPKF:situationdeterioratedsignificantly,thentoT/s. Dec settlementsteps OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 9DecagainallcarsirrespetiveoftheirplatesandorigineletthroughGeocheckpoints 23/05fortheperiodof1–15December2005 7Decalldetaineesreleased. >>>SR/5004/05 6DecSOdetainsfourGeopoliceand20Geocivilians.LaterthatdayGeopolicedetains fourSOofficials.SOMIAorderstoopenfireonunauthorizedarmedformations. 5DeconeSOpolicearrestedbyGeoMilitarypoliceforcounterfeit. 4DecGeopoliceearlierthatdayclosedroadalongtheLesserLiakhviRiverforcarswithRU andGeoplates. 4DecRelativesofthefourmissingGeoblockTranscam.Blockadeofrelativessuntil13Dec. 15DecSOpolicerecoversbodiesofthemen,GeoandOssdetained. 2DecSOMoDpostattackedbyGeoSepcialforces,MOscannotfindsingsofattack. 

24 KokagreeswithGeoon  OSCECommunicationVienna4January,2005,OSCE 22Ͳ23Dec:JCCCochairsmeetinTbsonSochi5NovandVladi20Nov.Chochcriticizes Dec settlementroadmap MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.24/04for OSCEpolicyofdublestandards,ignoresGeoviolationsandistightonSO. theperiodof16Ͳ31December2004 24Dec:JCCCochairsmeetinTskh.AgreementthatGeoandOssJCCCOchairsinspectall keypositionsintheCZincludinghillssurroundingLiakhviGorge. 29Dec:Djioyev:MMOsnotneededatRoki,theirnumbersufficientenoughtobeunbiased JPKF:tensebutcalm.Flight.Completehaltofdemilitarizatuionactivities.

 2006  

283  27Ͳ28 47thJCCSessionin  OSCECommunicationVienna13January,2006,OSCE noagreementonactionplanalthoughacknowldgementthattherearenewinitiatives. Dec Moscow MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.24/05for Mostdivergentissuedemil.MistrustofSObecauseofResolutionofGeoparlfrom11Oct theperiodof16December2005–8January2006 concerningpossiblewithdrawalofPKF.Geocallsforpromptdemil,independentfromajoint peaceplan.Othersidesconsideredthsiasarefusaltoworkonajointpeaceplan. 19DecOSCEreceivesacopyoftheFinalInvestigationReportoftheGeoMIAonthe shellingofTskhon20SeptWHEREISTHEDOC? JPKF:c/s 5Jan:ChiefofStaffofJPKFtriestocanceljointmonitoringbyJPKFandOSCEbecausethe securityofOSCEcouldnotbeguaranteedanymore.HoMrepliesthatJPKFistheonly authrotizedmilitaryforceintheCZandisverymuchabletomaintainitsownsecurtiy.CoS referstomisunderstanding. JPKFhasmonitoredthepositionsmentionedintheexchangeoflettersofthetwoJCCCo chairs,whichis24Geositesand38Osssites. RUandNOPKFsdonotcontrolanSOplatedvehiclecarryingarmedmen

28ͲJan 1Ossfound OSCECommunicationVienna6February,2006,OSCE closetoGeovillagestothenorhtofTskh dead MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.01/06for 5Jan:SOJCCCOchairrefusesmeetinginTbsduetohissecurity.GeoCoChairreiterates theperiodof9Ͳ31January2006 invitationandasuresthatsecwillbeguaranteed.18JanNOCoChairinvitestoVladi,but GeoCoChairrefusesduetosnow.SOCoChairofferstotravelthroughTranscam,butGeo CoChairsaysthiswouldmeancrossinganinternationalborderillegally. JPKF:t/s.flight.SOcomplainsaboutfrequentrotationsofGeoPKF,allegedlyinprepof futuremiloperations. 16JanJPKFcommaddressstronglettertoGeobecausedeploymentofGeopolice.

15Ͳ Geoparlcallsforabolition  OSCECommunicationVienna22February,2006, SeethisARonSecuritySituationforatypicalcompilationofincidentsasanexampleto Feb ofJPKF(revisionofSochi) OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. whatthesituationsttlledintograduallysince2004. 02/06fortheperiodof1Ͳ15February2006 callsforintensifiedcoopofthegovwithIosandpartnerstatesto"replacethe peacekeepingtroopsoftheRussianFederationbyan“effectiveinternationalpeacekeeping operation”,andtodevelopanewnegotiationformatwhichcanhelpimplementingthe “peaceplanapprovedbytheForeignMinistersoftheOSCEmemberstates”" JPKF:moretense.

   OSCECommunicationVienna6March,2006,OSCE 17FebRUCochairproposestorelocateJCCmeetingfromViennatoMoscow.Geo MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.03/06for immediatelyrefuses.ScheduledViennameeting20Ͳ21Febcanceledandtookplacein theperiodof16Ͳ28February2006 MoscowonlywithNO,SOandRU,withoutGeo,OSCEandEC.[LocationsofJCCmeetings starttobecomeatenseissue,lastoneTbsorVladi] JPKF:increasedSOmilitaryactivityobserved. SecondrotationofGeoPKFinsixweeks,temporarySOroadblockstorpeventit,Geoblock sinresponseNandSofTskh

   OSCECommunicationVienna17March,2006,OSCE JPKF:t/f.flight. MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.04/06for GeoMilPolChiefsays,RUPKFsmustholdvalidGeovisa,JPKFCommannouncesthatnonͲ theperiodof1Ͳ15March2006 Geopersonnelcanleavepostsonlyonofficialduty.

284  27Ͳ29 48thJCCmeetinginVladi OSCECommunicationVienna4April,2006,OSCE GeocriticizesfulfilmentofJPKFmandate,SOinturncriticizesMMOsandpatrolingactivites Mar MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.05/06for onlyinpresenceofJPKF.Agreedonforwardingrecommendationstotheirrespleaderships theperiodof16Ͳ31March2006 JPKFt/f,thenc/s EspeciallyNOPKFsaremistrustfulagainstMMOs. BecauseofGeopoliceantiͲsmugglinginSouthofCZlackofoopbetweenSOandGeoLEBs andduetothistheresultingdamagebetweenthelocalpopulationsonbothsides.[defacto means,lackofcooprisesetnictensions] 17Mar:13thSteeringCommittee,agreesthatmostprojectsarecompleted,remainingis gasificationofKekhviandhydroͲpowerstation.

30Ͳ31 GeoͲOssdialoguemeeting  OSCECommunicationVienna20April,2006,OSCE “GeorgianͲOssetiandialoguemeeting”on“Compensation,RestitutionandRestorationof Mar inVladi MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.06/06for rightsforthevictimsoftheGeorgianͲOssetianconflict”,organizedbyInternationalInstitute theperiodof1Ͳ15April2006 forStrategicStudies(IISS).ͲͲͲSOauthoritiesrefusedtotakepart 14Ͳ15AprThirdNASmeeting JPKF:c/s 

   OSCECommunicationVienna3May,2006,OSCE JPKF:c/s MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.07/06for 21Apr:NASCommdicidestoreduceprojectsfrom12.5to10mioEuro theperiodof16Ͳ30April2006 5May NATOParlAssemblyvisits  OSCECommunicationVienna23May,2006,OSCE visitheadedbypresidentof..MeetingwithKok,JPKFcomm,Mmos. Tskh MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.08/06for theperiodof1Ͳ15May2006 11Ͳ13 49thJCCsessioninTskh OSCECommunicationVienna23May,2006,OSCE agreeonNASrehabpackage,theCoChairs"endorsedthelistofparticipantsinthe May MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.08/06for WorkingGroupentrustedwiththeharmonizationofexistingpeaceinitiativesfromthe theperiodof1Ͳ15May2006 sides"[IsthisthesubstituteforthePolExpertWGonthepolstatus?] disagreeonsecurityguarantees[wording,sic]andtheadoptionofadeclarationofnonͲ useofforce. JPKF:c/s 11MayKoksays,MMOsconductmonitoringwithGeoIntelligenceServiceandmustquitor MMOswillbeexpulsed.

285  27Ͳ28 SOdetainsGeocitizens OSCECommunicationVienna2June,2006,OSCE SOLEBsdetainGeocitizensfor30minfordocumentcheck.Fourhourslater,Geopolice May MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.09/06for detains2OssatKhelchua,thenfurthereightdetainedandtakentogori.Morepeople theperiodof15Ͳ31May2006;OSCECommunication detainedinotherplaces.SOpoliceandtheRUPKFOPatTamrasheniclosetheTranscam.At Vienna1June,2006,SEC.FR/257/06RESTRICTED, Kurtafurhter8SOdetained.DepGovofShidaKartliarrivesatKurta.Orderfordetentions OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/SpotReport:Sudden fromGoriChiefofRegionalPolice.Operationhoweverdiffuse,notclearwhoisincharge. increaseintensionandassociatedincidentsaround GeoPMandMIAexpressconcerntoMission.OtherGeosourcessay,Ossarecheckedasfor Tskhinvali27Ͳ28May2006 enteringthroughRoki.60GeoSpecialForcessurroundPaukOPandholdJPKFpersonnelat gunpoint,takedetaineestoEredvi.Inthecourseof28May,alldetaineesarereleasedand TransCamreopened.ͲͲͲSRassessGeoactionsasextremelyirrespibleandoverͲhanded,asa reactiontothedetentionofasmallnumberofGeobySOs. SR257:detailsonresponsibilities,chainofactors,behavior 17May:14thmeetingofSteeringComm

14ͲJun OSCEDonor'sConference  OSCECommunicationVienna23June,2006,OSCE NASprocesspreparationforDonor'sConf/ongoingrehab onSOinBrussels MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.10/06for GeoPMNoghandCIOopenconf.FourJCCCochairs.Morethan10mioEuros. theperiodof1Ͳ15June2006 SOcontinuouslyaccusesOSCEofspyingforGeo,passingonbiasedinformationtoCIO. JPKF:c/s.IncreasedactivitybyGeoSpecialForces,sothaton14junagroupofOss residentscameuptoOPandaskedMMOsforhelp,MMOsaccompaniedthembacktotheir villagesuntilarmedSOvolunteersarrived[That'sthatabouttheOSCEweaponhandͲover program..][outͲofͲhandsituation,vigilantismtolerated,OSCEconceptfailed]

20ͲJun 50thJCCsessioninTskh OSCECommunicationVienna5July,2006,OSCE attendedbyGeoandSOLEBheadsandrespectiverepresentativesoftheRUandNO MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.11/06for bodies.Mostimmediatesecuuritydecision:Removaloftworecendtylmovedandreinforced theperiodof16Ͳ30June2006 checkpointsatAvnevi(bySOpolice)andZemoPrisi(byGeopolice)SR297/06 JPKF:tandunpredictable.ConitnuedimprovemetsofSOpositions,increasednumberod GeoLEBsatpostsinCZ. 22Ͳ23JunTskhinvaliradiocallsfordemonstrationinfrontofOSCEofficeagainstthe"proͲ GeorgianactivitiesoftheOSCE",demoagainstpostinPrisionlydisperseswhenconfirmed thattheposthadbeenremoved.[BeforetheescalationinMay2004,SOleadershippraised theOSCE'sactivitieseveninpublicstatements]SeeSR298oninternalSOatmosphere againstInt 7ͲJul FirstmeetingofSteer  OSCECommunicationVienna24July,2006,OSCE onlyonͲtheͲgroundprojectissues. CommwithSOandGeo MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/06for 13Jul:HoMdiscusses11JundetentionofMMOswithChochandJPKFcomm. represent theperiodof1Ͳ15July2006 JPKF:tandunpredictale. 9//  headofSONSC OSCECommunicationVienna24July,2006,OSCE until15JulmajorGeomilitaryexerciseatOrpolo 14Jul killedinbomb MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.12/06for mediawarningsthatsituationcouldbedetabilzedbyeithersideinthecontextofSt blast//2in theperiodof1Ͳ15July2006 PetersburgG8meeting explosionin Tskh

286   MerabAntadzenew  OSCECommunicationVienna3August,2006,OSCE JPKF:t/u.manyoverflights. MinisterforCRandJCCCo MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.13/06for 14Jul:expiryof"Georgianperiodof'grace'"forpeoplealreadytravelingtoandfromRU chair theperiodof16Ͳ31July2006 23Jul:SOvolunteersatDidmukha(Oss)openfireatGeopoliceofficerdrivingby,seriously injured,managestoreachAvnevi(Geo) 28Jul:discoveryof250mofnewtrenchesSEofTskhbuiltbySOMIA [Wheredoesactuallyderivetheword"Immigrationpost"?fromRussianuse?Usedfor SOpolicecheckpoints,introducedonlyseveralyearsago]

4ͲAug 16thSteeringComm  OSCECommunicationVienna21August,2006,OSCE RuslanAbashidze,GeoDepMinisterforCRisthenewrepresentativeoftheGeoside. meetinginTskh MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.14/06for Settingoftheformatofthemeetings,enlarginglistofparticipants. theperiodof1Ͳ15August2006 JPKF:t/u.severalflights. 6Aug:GeoFinancialPolicedetains100SosaftertheirreturnfromshoppingnearTbs. 7Aug:ThreeGeopolicefiredat,atAvnevipost.twoseriouslyinjured.Allroadsclosed.

17Ͳ18 51thJCCinMoscow OSCECommunicationVienna7September,2006, participantscouldnotevenagreeontheagenda.SessiondelayedevenuntilmidͲsept.SR Aug OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 391 15/06fortheperiodof16Ͳ31August2006 15AugSOauthoritiesstartissueingSOpassports,Kokannouncespreparationsfor ReferenduminSO 19AugRUssiaPensionFundopensofficeinTskh 20Ͳ23AugConstitutionalExpertsvisitontheintitiativeofOSCE.MeetGeoMFAandMCR, SOMFAandMoJ.Talksonstatusissues. 27AugJohnMcCainandCongressionaldelegationvisitTskh,Kok JPKF:t/u. 24Aug:GeoPKFreinforcedby100moremen. 28Ͳ ShootingatSaaka  OSCECommunicationVienna7September,2006, HelicoptercarriedSaakaandUSsenators.Missilefound,handedovertoUSmilitaryfor Aug helicopteratCZoverflight OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. investigation 15/06fortheperiodof16Ͳ31August2006 4Sep(AR16/06):USEmbassydiscountsclaimsthatmissleswerefiredatthehelicopter. HelicopterinviolationofJPKFagreementsoverflyingCZ.

8ͲSep 3SOpolice,1 OSCECommunicationVienna22September,2006, Geopolicedie OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. inshooting 16/06fortheperiodof1Ͳ15September2006 incident 14Ͳ InformalJCCCoChair  OSCECommunicationVienna22September,2006, agreeonfullJCCmeetingwhichdidnottakeplace,becauseSObannedamemberofGeo Sep meetinginTskh OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. delfromenteringSO. 16/06fortheperiodof1Ͳ15September2006 1Sep:GeoMfaissuesstatementwhereitdeclaresthenewpipelinefromRUtoSO(AlagirͲ Tskh)illegal.SOPM:startOct2006Ͳend2007 11SepEUparldelmeetsSOleadershipandJPKFcomm. JPKF:t/u. 3Sep:GeoMoDhelisopterhitbyheavymachinegunoverCZ.

  2Geodieclose OSCECommunicationVienna5October,2006,OSCE 26Sep17thSteeringCommwithGeoandSO toCZof MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.17/06for JPKFt/u.23Sep:TwoSOpoliceinjuredinshootingincident. gunshot theperiodof16Ͳ30September2006

287  12Ͳ13 Thirdroundoftalksof  OSCECommunicationVienna20October,2006,OSCE reaffirmationofantagonisticpositions Oct the51stJCCsession MISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.18/06for 6Oct:FirstmeetingofthenewSteeringComm[SteeeringCommchangedformatto theperiodof1Ͳ15October2006 includingSOandGeoatthesametimewhenJCCgotdeadlocked.DotheThursday meetingscontinue?] JPKF:t/u 5Oct:GeolocalselfͲgovernmentelections,increaseofGeopoliceinGeoͲadministered areas. [ShevwasmuchmorefaceͲtoͲfaceandnonͲpublicthanSaaka.Shevseemedtohavea morebalancedapproach,moretalkͲoriented,calmer,morecompromiseͲoriented,letalone hischoiceofwords] 20Oct NOannouncestocreate  OSCECommunicationVienna6November,2006, GerasimKhugayevtobehead,wasSOPM1993Ͳ95,NOPMNikolayKhlintsov:"enhance LiaisonOfficeinTskh OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. coopbetweenthetworepublics" 19/06fortheperiodof16Ͳ31October2006 "SalvationUnionofOssetians"setsupalternativeelectionsinoppositiontoKok.Election CommmitteesitsinEredvi.SOclaimsTbstriestoestablishpuppetgovernmentinTskh. Candidates:MaiaChigoevaͲTsaboshvili,GeorgiyChigoyev,TeymurazDzheragov,Tamara CharayevaandDmitriySanakoyev. 28OctNOparlcallDumatocondemn1920actsof"Geonationalextremistforces"as genocide. 30Oct13thSteerComm JPKF:t/u.  "OssetianRoadofLife"bypassesGeovillagesalongTranscamnofTskh 

23Oct 1Ossdies OSCECommunicationVienna6November,2006, inhospitalafterincidenton9OctbetweenGeoandSOlocals OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 19/06fortheperiodof16Ͳ31October2006 26Oct 1Geodies OSCECommunicationVienna6November,2006, asaresultofmineexplosionbetweenKurtaandKekhvi. OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo.  19/06fortheperiodof16Ͳ31October2006 [mostcommonreactionofbothsidesaftercasualtiesoccur:closingdownoftheir respectivelycontroledroads,mostlytheTransCam.Ifmembersoftheservicesdie,controls ofgoodsanddocumentstighten,arearbitrarilyperformed,withsubsequnetarrests,abuse indetentionͲͲͲitismainlythefreemovementintheCZthatisaffectedfirst]

27Oct StartofDzaurikauͲTskhgas  OSCECommunicationVienna6November,2006, MamsurovandKokattended pipeline OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 19/06fortheperiodof16Ͳ31October2006

288  ##### SOpreselectionsinTskh  OSCECommunicationVienna24November,2006, SO"presidentialelection"resultinlandͲslidevictoryofKoktogetherwiththeapprovalof andalternativeelections OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. independenceinthe"referendumofindependence" Eredvi 20/06fortheperiodof1Ͳ15November2006 "Alternativeelection"declaresDimitrySanakoyevthewinner(OssandformerPMand MoDofSO)and"alternativereferendum"asksforstartofnegowithGeoonfederal grounds. ͲͲͲtworivalOssetiancampsinSOmightseriouslydeterioratetensionsinCZ.[AretheproͲ SanaguysreallyOssetians?] OSCEstrengthensrehabteam JPKF:t/u.Duringelection11Ͳ13NovSOpolicestrengthenedpositionsandarmed personnel.    OSCECommunicationVienna7December,2006, 28Nov:WorkingMeeting(WM)ofSteerComm[whichistheexecutivebodytotheecon OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. RehabProgramme/NAS]inTskh. 21/06fortheperiodof16Ͳ30November2006 Allsidesagreethatprojectcontributestobuildingtrustbetweemthesides[onlysetting wherethisissaidinalongtime] 24Nov:theParliamentofGeorgiadiscussedthedraftlawonPropertyRestitutionand CompensationontheTerritoryofGeorgiafortheVictimsofConflictinFormerSouthOssetia Districtatitssecondhearing. JPKF:t/u.flight. GeoMOsrepeatedlyrefusetotakepartinJPKFmonitoring. [MilitaryMonitoringisconstantlyhamperedbySOauhtoritiesnotallowingthemtopass, followingthemincars]

6Dec RUDumacallsonint  OSCECommunicationVienna19December,2006, commtorecognizeind OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 22/06fortheperiodof1Ͳ15December2006 7Dec Sanaappointsgov OSCECommunicationVienna19December,2006, KurtaͲbased OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 22/06fortheperiodof1Ͳ15December2006 12 SOhandsindraftto  OSCECommunicationVienna19December,2006, draftMoUonthebasisof1993MoU.Sorepeatedlytriedtochangethe1993MoU. Dec redefineroleofOSCEinSO OSCEMISSIONTOGEORGIA/ActivityReportNo. 22/06fortheperiodof1Ͳ15December2006

289  ANNEX2:Casualties  AccountofcasualtiesintheGeorgianͲOssetianconflictzonebasedonreportsoftheOSCEMissiontoGeorgia1994–2006  Year Date Total JPKF otherLEBs Civilians Unspecified Oss Geo Location Remarks 1994   16Oct 33Mkhe 3 3  1995  none  1996            firsthalf >15 15  "everyweekpeoplearewoundedor evenkilled,milmonAR15Ͳ30Nov           1996 1997  3   30May 11eastofTskh refugeeinGeovillage firsthalfof  Jul11 headofvillagebypredecessor firsthalfof  Aug 1 1 byGeopoliceman 1998  6  firsthalfof  Apr 11 Tamarasheni by"drunk"RUPKF      2maybe   5ͲSep 11 ? byRUtrainingmissile firsthalfof  Dec 22 Artsevi localsarrestedinjointLEBactivity 1999  4  firsthalfof Znauriand  Feb 2maybe Java(Oss)  13ͲJul 11 ? formerIDP Falloy  13Oct 1 1NOmarket robbery,suspectsarelocalOss 2000  6   12May 11 Tskh criminal

290  carambush,commemorationdayof  20May 55 Kheiti(Geo) 1992killingsofOssbygeo 2001  13   3ͲApr 33Tskh gangs'shootout 2Chechen,1hostage;supposedly 1police Chechen,shootoutatcontrolbySO  13May (SO) 31Tskh police  8ͲJul 2Tskh founddead gangshootsatGeo/SOpolice  endNov 11 ? control  endNov 31 2 shootout forsureahigherfigure,butno coverage(notindicated,but indirectlybecausecrimeincreases 2002  >5 constantly)  earlySep 5 criminal 2003  5   3May 33 Tamarasheni sonsandfather 1police  26Oct(geo) 1 Khviti duringoperation  endDec 1Archevi firefight 2004  >5  DeputyCommanderoftheSO SpecialForcesshotbyGeopolice  6ͲFeb 1 1Eredvi duringcontrol  8ͲApr 2Ptsa byGeopoliceduringcontrol bothmilitary firsttime,casualtiesarementioned  13ͲAugandcivilian sinceMay31  12Oct2(Oss) 2Kirbali NOPKF,ambush 2005  6  5(4Oss uniformed, 1Geo Geovillnof  29Maypolice) 4 1 Tskh  endJun 11 bodyfound,mineaccident

291  2006  12  Geovillnof  28ͲJan 11Tskh founddead  9ͲJul1(Oss) 1Tskh headofSONSCinbombblast  14ͲJul 2Tskh explosion 3(Oss) police,1 (Geo) special  8ͲSepforces 3 1 Tbeti  endSep 22 closetoCZ gunshot inhospitalaftershootingonOct9  23Oct 11 betweenGeoandOsslocals between Kurta/  26Oct 11 Kekhvi mineaccident

CZ=Conflictzone LEB=LawEnforcementBody/Bodies NO=NorthOssetian 

292  ANNEX3:Politicalevents1989–2008  DatafromOSCEreportsandinterviewsofthefieldresearchinGeorgiain2009and2010(In) 

from 1993, So militia starts low-level viol, to fight against only crime (I Geo police (I 13) 29)

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 InterFront founded Jan in Latvia (I 24)

Feb

Start of Gorb anti-Abkh referendum (I Ru expels Mar demos (I 13, 24) ; Geo from 25, 29) ( Khazbegi Rubel (I 7) SPE) Agreement

Demos turn into Gorb offers Apr pro-Geo Gamsa deal (I indep (I 19) [Apr/ May] 25)

May

Yeltsin elected Sochi agreement, Jun president JCC started (I 29)

Jul

Start of war in Aug Abkh (I 29)

SO declares indep; RU low key Chib into Sept when SO power (I 8) declares indep

Yelt´s last Elections/ Gamsa warning to Geo Oct into power (I 25) on Chech support (I 19)

March to Nov Tskh (I 13, 25)

Parl abolishes SO aut (I 25) ; Violence started Gamsa ousted (I First Chechen Dec formally with Geo 19) ; Shev into war police killed, Tbs power (I 29) declared state of emerg (I 13)

293  Snipers killed Anti-corr 1995 - Change in CZ 25 police in council of 1998: no perimeters (I Gori Jan-Sept From 2004 in Nodia, events 17) ; West (I 7); Restart general more Geo Usupa (I 7) ; starts to of SO-Geo police actions (I accounte Intense demand contacts/ start 14) d in NATo policy changes (I 7) of mil build-up inteviews (I 29) (I 23)

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Rose Rev policy Jan on separatists (I 9, 13)

Constitutional Feb reform (I 6)

Mar

Apr

Ergneti closure (I May 1, 6, 8, 9)

Jun

Baden Jul Document (I 8, 14, 01-16)

Int/ IMF say Second "Verge of war" Geo to tackle Aug Chechen war through Okrua (I corr or funding (I 8) 18) cut (I 7)

Bucharest Pol exp Sept group Saaka bei UNGA meeting (I 14) Castelo Branco Pol Oct Exp Group meeting (I 14) Kok-Zhv sign disarmament OSCE summit Nov Shev ousted agreement/ Istanbul "Sarabuki" (I 9, 18)

Kok into Putin power (I 8, becomes 9, 28, 29) ; Dec (acting) Start of RU president visa regime (I 29)

294  West cuts funds for democracy (I 6);

Start of negos with Abkh (I 12)

2005 2006 2007 2008

Yakobashvili appointed Jan Saaka bei PACE SMR

Semneby appointed Kosovo recognition (I 5, Feb EUSRSC (I 14) 14)

Mar

NATO Summit Bucharest (I 6, 7) ; Ru- Apr SO start legal relations (I 5) ; Drone incident in Abkh (I 5, 14, 20)

Shamba visits Tbs/ Geo parl formally sets Negos on doc with Abkh May Saaka at mil base (I up Sana admin (I 28) (I 12) 6, 23)

Mamusrov into Jun power

Ru missile hit close to Jul EUDel on way back from Ambush on Sana (I 5. 9) Tskh (I 14, 20)

Recapture of Kodori August war (I 7, 8, 13, Aug (I 9, 14, 23) 27)

Okrua launches party/ is Sept Sarkozy initiative (I 14) arrested 2 days later

OSCE reports published Oct (I2)

Okrua steps down (I November Nov Karkusov break (I 9) 7, 11) ; SO demonstrations alternative polls

Sana inaugurated Ljub doc presented (I1, 2, 4, 14, 28) ; Dec (I 9) ; Kok statement Saaka annual on Ljub (I 17) address (I 6)

295  ANNEX4:Listofinterviews  Totalnumberofinterviews:76,outoftheselistedasreferences:39 Interviewsthatwereconductedaspartoftheresearch,butthat donotappearasreferencesgowithoutcodes.  Reference Occupationattimeofinterview Dateandplaceofinterview code Senioranalystwithinternationalhumanrights May2009,Tbilisi I1 organization (twomeetings) I2 Journalist,Tbilisi May2009,Tbilisi SeniorcoͲworkerofUNDP,formerOSCEprojectmanager I3 June2009,Tbilisi onERP I4 FormerseniorcoͲworkerofOSCEMissiontoGeorgia July2009,Tbilisi I5 SeniormemberoftheMinistryofInternalAffairs July2009,Tbilisi SeniormemberoftheRepublicanParty(opposition), I6 July2009,Tbilisi formerMP I7 SeniormemberoflocalNGO July2009,Tbilisi I1Ͳ7 SeniormemberoflocalNGO June2010,Tbilisi SeniormemberoftheOfficeoftheStateMinisterfor I8,I1Ͳ8 JulyandSeptember2009,Tbilisi Reintegration PoliticalanalystandmemberofRepublicanParty July2009,Tbilisi I9 (opposition) GeorgianͲEnglishtranslation I10 SeniormemberoftheRegionalPoliceofShidaKartli,Gori July2009,Gori MemberoftheoppositioninGori,Seniormemberofthe I11 July2009,Gori citycouncilinGori SeniormemberofOurGeorgia–FreeDemocratsParty I12 July2009,Tbilisi (opposition) SeniormemberofUnitedGeorgianTraditionalistsParty; July2009,Tbilisi I13,I1Ͳ13 FormerseniormemberofGamsakhurdiagovernment (twomeetings) I14 SeniormemberoftheEUDelegationtoGeorgia July2009,Tbilisi I15 Lawyer,formercoͲworkeratlocalhumanrightsNGO July2009,Tbilisi Expertwithoppositionparty,formerseniormemberof July2009,Tbilisi I16,I1Ͳ16 theSaakashviligovernment (twomeetings) Expertonsecurityissueswithinternationalorganization, I17 July2009,Gori Gori;formercoͲworkerwithOSCEonSouthOssetia I18 JournalistwithinternationalNGO July2009,Gori I20 FormerseniormemberofOSCEMissiontoGeorgia July2009,Tbilisi I21 JournalistwithlocalhumanrightsNGO,Gori July2009,Tbilisi I22 SeniormemberoftheMinistryofRefugees July2009,Tbilisi I23 ProjectmanagerwithinternationalNGO July2009,Tbilisi CoͲworkerwithEuropeanSpecialRepresentativetothe I24 August2009,Tbilisi SouthCaucasusandtheCrisisinGeorgia

296  TwoleadingmembersoftheSocialDemocrats’Partyof I25 August2009,Tbilisi Georgia  August2009,Tbilisi FormersenioradvisortotheShevardnadzegovernment I26 (twomeetings) SeniormemberoflocalNGO,formersenioradvisortothe I27 August2009,Tbilisi Shevardnadzegovernment SeniormemberofthealternativeAdministrationofSouth I28 August2009,Tbilisi Ossetia Seniormemberoflocalthinktank,formersenioradvisor I29 August2009,Tbilisi totheShevardnadzegovernment Seniormemberoflocalthinktank;formerseniormember I31 July2009,Tbilisi oftheShevardnadzegovernment I32 ProjectmanagerwithlocalNGO July2010,Tbilisi I33 FormerseniormemberofOSCEMissiontoGeorgia July2009,Tbilisi I34 JournalistwithpublicTVstation,Tbilisi July2010,Tbilisi I35 CoͲworkerwithEUDelegationtoGeorgia July2010,Tbilisi  SeniormemberofinternationalresearchNGO,Tbilisi June2009,Tbilisi Professorofhistory,formerlyadvisortothe  June2009,Tbilisi Gamsakhurdiagovernment  FreeͲlancejournalist,Vladikavkaz June2009,Yerevan  SeniorProgrammeCoordinatorwithinternationalNGO June2009,Tbilisi  CoͲworkerwithEUMM,Gori July2009,Gori  CoͲworkerwithEUMM,Gori July2009,Gori  SeniorcoͲworkerwithEUMM,Gori July2009,Gori July2009,Gori–GeorgianͲ  Editoroflocalnewspaper,Gori Englishtranslation July2009,Ditsi–GeorgianͲ  ResidentofDitsi Englishtranslation July2009,Ditsi–GeorgianͲ  ResidentofDitsi Englishtranslation July2009,Ditsi–GeorgianͲ  ResidentofDitsi Englishtranslation FormerseniormemberofdistrictadministrationinGori, July2009,Ditsi–GeorgianͲ  formerOSCEcoͲworkeronSouthOssetia Englishtranslation MemberofalternativeadministrationtoSouthOssetia July2009,Tbilisi  underauthorityoftheGovernmentofGeorgia GeorgianͲEnglishtranslation  ProjectmanageratlocalIDPadvocacyNGO July2009,Tbilisi  CoͲworkeratlocalIDPadvocacyNGO July2009,Tbilisi  SeniormemberofregionalNGO,Tbilisi July2009,Tbilisi  Seniorjournalistwithlocalnewspaper,Tbilisi August2009,Tabakhmela  SeniormemberofinternationalresearchNGO,Tbilisi July2010,Tbilisi July2009,Gori–GeorgianͲ  19interviewswithIDPsattheGoriIDPcamp Englishtranslation  297  8.Statementonauthorship  SchriftlicheErklärungzurAutorenschaftderDissertation  Ich,LaraSigwart,erklärehiermit,dassichdieDissertationohneunerlaubteHilfeangefertigthabe, dassichkeineanderenalsdievonmirangegebenenQuellenundHilfsmittelbenutzthabeunddass ichdiedenbenutztenWerkenwörtlichoderinhaltlichentnommenenStellenalssolchekenntlich gemachthabe.

 LaraSigwart  Tbilisi,den8.Oktober2012    Statementontheauthorshipofthedissertation  I,LaraSigwart,herebytestifythatIwrotethedissertationwithoutunpermittedassistance,thatI didnotusesourcesorinstrumentsotherthanindicatedandthatIreferencedtheworksquotedor usedotherwise.

 LaraSigwart  Tbilisi,October8,2012   

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