Political Islam in Central Asia: Post Independence Revivalism (1992-2014)

POLITICAL ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA: POST INDEPENDENCE REVIVALISM (1992-2014)

Doctor of Philosophy In International Relations

by Adam Saud

School of Politics and International Relations Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad 2017 CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v ABBREVIATIONS vii GLOSSARY OF NON-ENGLISH WORDS ix MAP OF CENTRAL ASIA xii

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 19

1.1 Introduction 1.2 Maududi, Jama’at Islami (Islamic Party) and the Islamic State

1.3 Syed Qutb, Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the Islamic State

1.4 Khomeini, Islamic Revolution and the Islamic State

1.5 Fundamentals of Islamic Polity

1.6 Implementation of Islamic state in the contemporary world

1.7 Tahir Amin and the ‘World Orders in Central Asia’

CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 49

2.1. Early Period 2.2. Central Asia Under Czar 2.3. Central Asia Under Soviet rule 2.4. Jaded Movement 2.5. Basmachi Movement 2.6. Sufism

CHAPTER 3: SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 74 CONDITIONS OF CENTRAL ASIA 3.1. Introduction 3.2. Uzbekistan and its Political System

3.3. Economic Conditions of Uzbekistan 3.4. Tajikistan and its Political System

3.5. Economic Conditions in Tajikistan

3.6. Kyrgyzstan: A Real Democracy? 3.7. Market Economy of Kyrgyzstan 3.8. Ethnic Division and Kyrgyz Politics.

3.9. Human Rights conditions in “Democratic” Kyrgyzstan

3.10. Nursultan Nazarbaev and centralized political Setup in Kazakhstan

3.11. Ethnic Division

3.12. Economic Conditions in Kazakhstan

3.13. State responses to Islamism in Kazakhstan

3.14. Turkmenistan and the Personality Cult of Niyazov

3.15. Socio-economic and Political Conditions 3.16. Human Rights Violations and the Rise of Political Islam in Turkmenistan

CHAPTER 4: ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN 119

4.1. Introduction 4.2. Historical Background 4.3. Tauba and hostage taking of 1992 4.4. Establishment of IMU 4.5. Aims and Objectives of the IMU 4.6. Membership 4.7. Sources of Finances 4.8. Social Support to IMU 4.9. Activities of the IMU 4.10. Beyond Andijon: An Uzbek Group?

4.11. State Responses 4.12. Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)

CHAPTER 5: ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN 150 5.1. Introduction 5.2. IRPT and the ideology of Maududi, Banna and Qutb 5.3. Aims and Objectives of IRPT 5.4. Membership and Finances of the IRPT

5.5. Strategy of IRPT 5.6. Transnational Linkages: Religious or Secular? 5.7. Social Support Bases 5.8. Weaknesses/Problems/failures

CHAPTER 6: HIZB-UT-TAHRIR AL-ISLAMI 172

6.1. Introduction 6.2. Historical Background 6.3. Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Islamic State 6.4. Organizational Structure 6.5. Islamic State in Central Asia 6.6. Strategy in Central Asia: Peaceful or violent? 6.7. Membership 6.8. Foreign Policy of Islamic State

6.9. Basis of Support 6.10. Finances 6.11. State Responses to HTI 6.12. Charity Work 6.13. The splinter: Akromiya

CHAPTER 7: THE NEW GREAT GAME AND POLITICAL 206 ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA 7.1. Introduction

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7.2. Russia and its Backyard 7.3. Central Asia-Russia Cooperation Against Political Islam 7.4 Chechen Issue and Political Islam 7.5. Transnational Linkages of Chechen Political Islam 7.6. Reasons for the Rise of Political Islam in Caucasus and Russia 7.8. China and Rise of Political Islam on its Western Borders 7.9. Xinjiang and the Chinese Strategy to Counter Political Islam 7.10. Central Asia-Xinjiang Connection of Political Islam 7.11. Reaction to the State Policies 7.12. World Orders against Xinjiang (Political) Islam 7.13. USA, War on Terrorism and Political Islam in Central Asia 7.14. US Strategy to Counter Islamic World Order in Central Asia 7.15. Challenges and Cooperation From Competing World Orders CONCLUSION 233

BIBLIOGRAPHY 245

Acknowledgments

I owe deep gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Dr. Tahir Amin, for providing me the opportunity to learn from his expertise and work under his guidance to complete this thesis. It was his constant support, encouragement and the help that kept me in the right direction to analyse the research questions. He helped me in reading the authors whose contribution in the field of International Relations is remarkable. It was due to him that I found great treasures of knowledge that will continue to help me in future as well.

I am thankful to the senior faculty of School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR) whose constant support, encouragement and friendly attitude enabled me to as well as other students to fulfill their tasks in a better way.

I am indebted to Mr. Abdujajil Boymotov, Chairman, Human Rights Commission of Uzbekistan for his constant interviews and providing me opportunity to get other human rights activists interviewed from the region.

I am also grateful to Mr. Islam Abu Khalil, member of Hizbut-Tahrir Britain who connected me with Mr. Khamzin Elder, spokesperson for Hizbut Tahrir Central Asia. Thanks to Mr. Eldar by providing me opportunity to interview the members of Hizbut Tahrir in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

I will always be thankful to one of my friends from Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan (not to name upon his request) who did the job of translator while on the field interviews. I am also thankful to Mr. Khikmatullah Saifullah, a senior leader of Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan for providing me information about his party.

I am indebted to the Area Study Center for Russia, China, Afghanistan and central Asia, University of Peshawar, Pakistan for providing me opportunity to use their library for this research. Thank you Sitwat Waqar Bukhari for assisting me in editing.

Last but not the least, my beloved family, my life partner’s support, patience and time without which I could have never completed this thesis. Prayers of my parents are beyond explanation. My sweet daughters; Dua Saud and Maryam Saud and my lovely son Muhammad Ibrahim Saud never asked me to give them time while I was busy with this research, thank you very much my lovely and sweet kids.

Adam Saud October 22, 2015

Dedicated to my father, Muhammad Yousaf (late),

My mentor and my supporter

List of Abbreviations

BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)

CACI Central Asian Counter-narcotics Initiatives

CACO Central Asian Cooperation Organization

CARs Central Asian Republics

CASA-1000 Central Asia South Asia 1000

CER Center for Economic Research

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CPSU Communist Party of Soviet Union

CPT Communist Party of Tajikistan

CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization

DKM Democratic Kyrgyz Movement

ECO Economic Cooperation Organization

ETM East Turkestan Movement’s

HTI Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami

ICG International Crisis Group

ICRC International Committee on Red Cross

IJU Islamic Jihad Union

IMT Islamic Movement of Turkestan

IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

IRPT Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan

ISIS Islamic States of Iraq and Syria

IS Islamic State

JI Jama’t Islami

MMA Mutahidda Majlis e Amal

NDN Northern Distribution Network

vii

OIC Organization of Islamic Conferences

OSCE Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe

PDPT Peoples Democratic Party of Tajikistan

RATS Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SDPT Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan

SPT Socialist Party of Tajikistan

TTP Tehrik Taliban Pakistan

TJ Tableeghi Jama’t

UTO United Tajik Opposition

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Glossary of Non-English Words (by Central Asians) Adil Just person Adolat Court Aftob-e-Sugdian Sun of Sughd Aalim-e-Niswan World of the women Amanat Trust Ansaruddin Facilitator of the religion Asghar Smaller

Auqaf Social welfare Azie Asia Barka Blessings Bukhari Shareef Hadith book Dars Lecture Dar-ul-Harb House of war/enemy state Dar-ul-Islam House of Peace/Islamic state Deen Religion Dilde Fikride IshteBirlik Unity of thought and action Ehya-i-Khojand Revival of Khojant Fasiqeen Hypocrites Fuqahas Jurists Ghazwat-e-Hind Crusades for Indian sub-continent Ihsan Spiritual leader Ijma Consensus Ijtehad Independent reasoning Injeel Gospel Islah To correct Islami Lashkari Islamic Force Islami Riyasat Islamic State

Jaded Modern Jahiliyah Ignorant/Against Islam Jamat Islami Party of Islam Jamia Masjid Central mosque Jeltoqsan December Khaq the Truth Khulfa-i-Rashideen First four righteous Caliphs of Islam Khursheed The Sun Kolkhez Collective farms Kufr Disbelief Maihan Homeland Mawara an-Nehr Beyond the river Mohallah Neighborhood Mudarris Professor Mufti Muslim legal expert who is empowered to give rulings on religious matters Musalmanabad Muslim Land Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal United Council of Action Naqus Ring the Bells Nejot Salvation

Nerui Sukhan Power of the world Nouroz Persian new year Oskkoro Publicity Pirs Spiritual leaders Qadeem Traditional Rah-e-Nijat Path to salvation Roz-e-Nao New day Sada-i-Farghana Voice of Ferghana Sada-i-Turkestan Voice of Turkestan Saleh Righteous

Sayyar Early Muslims’ concept of relations with the non-Muslims states Shariah Islamic Laws Shohrat Glory Shura Consultative body Taghoot Imperialist Takfeer Excommunication or when one Muslim declares another Muslim an unbeliever Tarakki Progress Taraqqiparwar Progressive Tehreek Movement Turkmenbashi Father of Turks Tudzhar Traders Ulema Religious scholars Ulema Jameti Union of Clergy UrtoOziening Umrguzorligi Middle Asian Observer Vilayat-e-faqih Guardianship of the Jurists Wahabi A member of a strictly orthodox Sunni Muslim sect founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–92). It advocates a return to the early Islam of the Koran and Sunna, rejecting later innovations

Wahdat Unity Yurt Homeland Zakat Payment made annually under Islamic law on certain kinds of property and used for charitable and religious purposes Zarb-e-Azb Military operation started by Pakistani Military against terrorists

Zulm Oppression

Figure 1

Map of Central Asia

Source: Google Images

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INTRODUCTION

The Muslim world has witnessed several movements for the revivalism of political Islam during the twentieth and twenty first centuries. Different states and regions witnessed different kinds of movements for the cause of political Islam. These movements were the direct outcome of the socio-economic and political conditions of respective states or regions. Some of these movements emerged due to the foreign involvement in their states and societies as well as alongwith the prevailing internal situation. Muslim Brotherhood is one such glaring example, whereas the others were the direct outcome of international political environment. The best example of such groups is al-Qaeda. Major focus of political Islamic movements is to put an end to the injustice that prevails at the national level or international level. Some of these movements carry their agenda through violent means like al-Qaeda, Hamas, Taliban and others while many revert to peaceful constitutional and legal means like Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Jama’t Islami of Pakistan.

Whether through violent or peaceful means, the end of these political Islamist groups is the same that is to establish a political system based on the principles prescribed by Islam to govern a state or society. Most of the Muslim states where there is a huge gap between the rulers and the ruled practice authoritarian, autocratic and non-democratic regimes. Poverty, inflation, unemployment, lack of proper health and educational facilities, ethnic, regional and sectarian rifts, and social injustice are the principal characteristics of Muslim societies. The failure to deliver on state has forced masses within Muslim societies to think about alternatives. The past glory of Islamic states especially during the early period forces many to think about the revivalism of Political Islam in order to bring social justice in the respective societies. Most of the political Islamists claim to implement social justice if they come to power. Therefore, fulfillment of social demands is the basic agenda of political Islam.

Perceived double standards of the international community especially the west regarding the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights, civil liberties and the ‘negative’ role of international organizations in international Muslim conflicts, especially Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, and Chechnya have supported the cause of political Islam. Central Asia is not an exception in this regard. Most of

1 the above mentioned problems prevail in the Central Asian societies. This region is one of the highly oppressed, fragile and poverty stricken regions in the world. This region had been the hotbed of many regional and international rivalries. The Soviet disintegration brought disaster to the social and economic structure of the region. Regimes continued with the old Soviet styled authoritative policies to govern the states which led to significant discomfort among the masses who were expecting a radical change in their lives.

The failure of governments to meet the demands and expectations of the people led to the emergence of alternative political ideologies including Islamists and western liberals. The regimes suspected both as the challenge to their authority; and thus were banned or harassed immediately. It was easier for the regimes to control the newly emerged weak democrats but extremely difficult to control the Islamists because they had no fear of death or persecution. In fact, it’s an honor for the members of political Islamist groups to be martyred for the ‘noble’ cause. The influence of Islamists increased a lot during the early years of independence especially in Ferghana valley, which remained the epicenter of most of the political movements in Central Asia. During the late 1980s, mosques became powerful institutions to regulate the Mohallah (neighborhood) life in most of the Uzbek and Tajik part of Ferghana valley1that strengthened the hands of Islamists. Following are the major reasons for the revivalism of Political Islam in Central Asia. Soviet disintegration which created ideological vacuum, oppressive policies of the regimes, unemployment and poverty, social injustice, lack of democracy and economic reforms, and the rise of Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

The responses to these conditions by the political Islamists vary from one group to another. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries two movements tried to respond to Czarist and Soviet occupation in Central Asia. One was the Jaded movement and the other was Basmachi movement. Jaded movement tried to improve the conditions of Muslims through reforming the education system by introducing modern subjects of science and technology, mathematics and logic etc. so that the next generation may be able to promote and protect their interests

1 A. Abdurakhitov, “Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan”, in D. F. Eickelman, ed. Russia’s Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993,) p.81.

2 in a better way. The Basmachi resorted to violent means especially when the Red Army invaded Central Asia. They followed the traditional Islamic theory of Sayyar2 which distinguishes Muslim lands from those of non-Muslim lands. But they were defeated by the Red Army.

After the disintegration of USSR in 1991 and the forced independence on the Central Asian states, resurgence of Political Islam was inevitable. People had no contacts with the outside world especially with their Muslim brothers abroad. The ‘Iron Curtain’ cut them off from their traditional partners. The Soviet repressive policies especially towards religions and religious beliefs wiped out the religious knowledge from the Central Asian lands which were the centers of Islamic teachings and learning a couple of centuries ago. The demise of Soviet Union provided a hope to the people that their respective regimes would revive the lost glory of Islam in their lives. When states did not do anything like that, the Islamists started their struggle with the help of their external friends.

Statement of the Problem

Central Asia is deemed as one of the most repressive and autocratic regions in the world. All the international organizations dedicated for the promotion of human rights, civil liberties and democratic practices declare Central Asian states as ‘not democratic’. Every kind of power apparatus revolves around the hyper- presidential systems. People are not given real ‘freedoms’ and activists for the protection of human rights and civil liberties are constantly harassed and in many cases executed. Religious political parties and groups are banned in the entire region except Tajikistan where only Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) is given legal recognition. People have no option to express their discontent with the regimes through legal and constitutional means. Therefore, the best option left for the people to express their voices and concerns is the platform of political Islam. Many of the common Central Asians have soft corner towards these Islamists. So, one hypothesis is that the rise of Political Islam in Central Asia is due to the state repressive policies.

2 This theory would be discussed in theoretical chapter.

Another assumption is that Central Asian region has remained the focal point throughout the international political history. Its geographical location and the hydrocarbons make it hypersensitive to the big powers. War against terrorism in Afghanistan, drugs trafficking from Afghanistan to international markets through Central Asia and Russia, competing regional and global actors for the hydrocarbons of the region, and specific international religious and ideological agendas of ‘specific’ Muslim states have escalated the cause of political Islam in the region. Therefore, it is said that Political Islam is the outcome of International involvement in the region.

As ethnic, clan, sub-clan and regional identities are deeply rooted in the Central Asian societies; people of this region feel a sense of pride belonging to a specific tribe or clan. These identities further cemented during the Czar and especially Soviet periods. Soviet policies of collectivization, forced migration and redrawing of physical boundaries of the Central Asian region into five nation-states are the major reasons of power sharing whether at local, regional or national level. Political Islam profits this situation due to two reasons; firstly it is used by different groups in order to achieve their objectives in the name of religion and in a hope that political Islam will eliminate these differences by fostering the sentiments of Muslim Ummah (one community) and will implement the system of social justice in their societies. The inter-ethnic and inter-regional rivalries/dissatisfaction is the fundamental reason for the rise of Political Islam in today’s Central Asia.

Uzbekistan faced uprising of Islamists in Namangan city in Ferghana valley where small groups of young people started demanding implementation of Islamic system in Uzbekistan. When they failed to pursue their agenda through peaceful means, they resorted to violent means which led to state’s actions against them. They fled to Tajikistan and ultimately to Afghanistan where they formed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) with the help of al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. While Tajikistan plunged into a civil war in which the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) played a crucial role. However, the most popular manifestation of political Islam in Central Asia is Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HTI) which has deep roots in the whole region. All these groups demand implementation of Islamic political system on the pattern of early state of Madina

4 under the Holy Prophet (SAW) and the pious Caliphs. IMU and HTI still claim this demand while IRPT has changed its strategy from creation of an Islamic state to a welfare state based on the guiding principles of Islam.

Significance of the research

Afghanistan is considered as the epicenter of international terrorism and global war on terrorism which is being fought not only in Afghanistan but also in its neighboring states like Pakistan, China and Central Asia. The Afghan war of 1980s and the emergence of Islamic regimes in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal put deep imprints on the Central Asian religious landscape. These political Islamist groups pose real threat to their respective regimes. Jihadis from all the Central Asian states are members of regional and global militant groups. Groups like IMU are no more Central Asian groups. They have multinational membership. Members of IMU include Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Pakistanis, Afghans, Arabs, Germans and Uighurs etc. They would surely try to influence the people in their native states. HTI is a global political Islamist group which wants to establish Islamic Caliphate(s). This group is banned in all the Muslim states. HTI’s popularity has increased a lot in Central Asian region which is real threat to the regimes because it resorts to non-violent means which attract many of the Central Asians who want to change their lives peacefully. Although, IRPT has pacified itself after the Tajik civil war of 1992-1997 and has declared non-violent strategy to achieve its objectives, other regional states suspect that its existence in the region would spark similar demands in their respective states.

Central Asia has immense importance in the ongoing global war on terrorism because of its geographical proximity to Afghanistan and the continuous rise in the number of political Islamists in the region. Not only the Central Asian states but China and Russia are also very much concerned about this rise. Besides political Islam, drugs trade and involvement of political Islamist groups in this trade is a matter of real concern for the regional states as well as international community. In order to cope with these issues, it is extremely necessary to understand the underlying motives of political Islam in the region, reasons for its rise, social support bases, local, regional and international linkages of political

Islam in the region and steps taken by regional states as well as international community to combat political Islam in Central Asia.

This research will help the policy makers of the Central Asian states in particular and neighboring states like Russia, China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Iran in general to chart out such individual, bilateral and multilateral policies which can better pacify political Islam in the region. The research will also explore the structural reasons for the revivalism and rise of political Islam in the region in post-independence era which will also be a guideline for other states facing a similar kind of situation.

The research will also help the future researchers to further investigate the topic. It will help them to explore fresh perspectives and various aspects of the issue in question.

Literature Review

Islamic Revivalism

Islam has remained the central element of the Central Asian social and cultural identity especially in the Ferghana valley. Soviet designation was deemed as the new era of Islamic identification by some segments of the Central Asian people who had been under the tight atheist Soviet control. Islamic revivalism emerged as one of the alternatives after the political and economic vacuum created by Soviet disintegration. Mehrdad Haghayaghi (1994) endorses this point by stating that it (political Islam) had to emerge in a more comprehensive character after 1991. It’s not only the demise of Soviet Union itself which paved the way for reemergence of political Islam but Islam had been at the helm of state affairs in the Central Asian Khanates.

Islam got blended with the local traditions during the late middle ages and gradually got central position in the socio-cultural and political life of Central Asia. Not only Ulemas and Faqih (religious scholars) but also the Pirs and Ihsans (spiritual figures) were very close to the Central Asian aristocracy. Therefore, state patronage gave Islam a central position in the political and socio-cultural life of Central Asia. Ferghana valley became the hub of Islamic teachings and learnings. Ethnic Uzbeks got the religious influence the most. That is the reason

6 why Uzbeks are so close to their traditions and religion in present day Central Asia. Therefore, revivalism of political Islam is a natural phenomenon in the post- Soviet Central Asia.

Ideological Vacuum

Islam Karimov says that “the collapse of the communist ideology- which takes spirituality, is fanatical and anti-national in character-contributed greatly to the formation of the pre-requisites for religious fundamentalism within post-Soviet space”. 3 Martha Brill Olcott thinks that Karimov considers liberal democracy as a ‘dangerous ideology’ for the Uzbek people, therefore, he continues the authoritative styled policies. The ideological vacuum has given a bright chance to political Islam to flourish in the region. As most of the people could not get religious education, independence provided them a superb opportunity to learn and practice their religion.

States’ Policies

Most of the researchers blame state policies for most of the problems Central Asian societies face after the collapse of Soviet Union.

People like Mehrdad Haghayaghi (1994), Ahmad Rashid (2000), Alisher Ikhlamov (2007), Abdumunnab Polat, (2000), American Congressional Committee of International Relations (2003), Martha Brill Olcott (2005), V. Nagendra Rao and M. Munir Alam, (2005), Stephen R. Bower say that the deteriorating economic conditions of the region after the collapse of Soviet Union are major reason for the rise of political Islam in Central Asia. Rashid says that ‘the social and economic dissatisfaction amongst the young people is unrecognized by the regimes’. Congressional Committee of International Relations describes ‘poverty, economic depression and unemployment as the major reasons for rise of terrorism and extremism’. The forced regulation of the shadow economy like the bazars and shuttle trading is seriously disliked by the poor people.

3 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan at The Threshold of Twenty First Century, (Massachusetts: N.K., 1998,) p.22.

The economic disaster in the post- Soviet era has given birth to a new class of poor which is extremely vulnerable. Olcott says that corruption and unemployment have also contributed in the religious radicalization of the Central Asian society.4Economic hardships, authoritarianism and lack of security cooperation are major reasons of Islamic militancy in the region.5

On the other hand, people like Vitaly Naumkin (2003 and 2005) do not agree with the concept of poverty as the driving force behind political Islam in the region. Naumkin says that although people in Saudi Arabia are affluent, nevertheless, they favor political Islam while Mauritania is a poor state but common man does not support it. They are of the opinion that it’s the political deprivation which leads to frustration and then political opponents join political Islam to express their discomfort. According to Andrea Schmitz and Alexander Wotters, the “opposition groups demanding political participation were coopted and marginalized or eliminated through repression. Corruption and nepotism are the entrenched in the social order” 6of Central Asia. Naumkin says that the government repression and crackdowns on Islamists of Central Asia creates further sympathizers and supporters of the Islamists.7 The ‘politically homeless’ people of Central Asia find the Islamist slogan of social justice very attractive.8 Therefore, their support to them is obvious under oppressed conditions.

Political oppression and human rights abuses also contribute to the rise and strengthening of political Islam. Ahmad Rashid (2001), Thomas H. Johnson, Katherlin N. Collins (2007), Christian Bleuer (2012), Lawrance P. Markewitz (2012), Alisher Ikhlamov (2007), Abdumunab Polatov (2000), Gulchehra, Martha Brill Olcott (2005), Paul Quinn-Judge (2010), Andrea Schmitz and Alexander Wotters, are of the view that increased repression by the regimes has contributed a lot in the rise of political Islam. Rashid says that “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s growing strength was the continuing repression by the Uzbek regime

4 Marhta Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, (Washington D. C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005,) p.8. 5 V. Nagendra Rao and M. Munir Alam, eds. Central Asia: Present Challenges and Future Prospects, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2005,) p.1. 6 Andrea Schmitz and Alexander Wotters, p.8. 7 Vitaly Naumkin, “Militant Islam in Central Asia: Case of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”, University of California: Barkely Program in Soviet and post-Soviet Studies Working Paper, Spring 2003, pp.44-45. 8 Stephen R. Bower, p.388.

8 and the desperate poverty of the Uzbek people”.9Uzbekistan is deemed as the most repressive state throughout the region. According to Thomas H. Johnson and Colin Labor “the most important example of Central Asian state’s repression is Uzbekistan. Karimov sent messages to the dissidents after Andijon crisis that they will not be tolerated.”10 This oppression has not only increased support to political Islam but also a coalition between the religious and secular political opponents of the Central Asia regimes. One such example is the Tajik Civil War11 between 1992 to1997. Major reason for the Tajik Civil War was the political marginalization besides economic hardships and social alienation.

Exaggeration of Islamists threats is used as a political tool by the regimes to get a clean chit on human rights issues and to ‘crackdown on opposition’.12People do not have access to free media. One may find independent newspapers and electronic channels in the Central Asian region but they are not free. States have strict control over them. Coercion is used in targeted fashion13 against the ‘independent’ media outlets. Islamic (moderate) opposition has been radicalized due to state oppression.14 Although, they (regimes) have their internal rivalries based in their Soviet history, the regimes support each other’s’ every step to crush political Islam. Tajik officials support to Uzbek government during the Andijon crises was a reward for Tashkent for its support to Tajik regime during the Tajik Civil War.

Judiciary, which is the custodian of human rights, is under the tight control of administration. Like other institutions, judiciary is also corrupt in the region where state manipulates the judicial decisions. Prosecution is also partial. In camera trials are a routine especially in the cases of so called ‘terrorists’. These

9 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, (Lahore: Vanguard, 2001,) p.155. 10 “Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising”, International Crisis Group, Briefing No. 38/Europe and Central Asia, 25th May 2005. URL: www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/centralasia/uzbekistan/uzbekistan-andijon-uprising. 11 For details see chapter Five Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan: implementing political Islam? Of the same thesis. 12 Christian Bleuer, “Instability in Tajikistan? The IMU and the Afghan Factor”, OSCE Academy, February, 2012. URL: www.osce-academy.net/upload/file/bleuer_policy_brief7.pdf. 13 Lawrence P Markowitz, “Tajikistan: Authoritarian Reactions in the postwar State”, Democratization, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2012, p.99. 14 Abdumunnab Polat, “The Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan: A Threat to Stability?”, in Roald Sagdaev, and Susan Eisenhower, eds. Islam and Central Asia: An Enduring Legacy or An Evolving Threat? (Washington D. C.: Washington Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2000,) p.47.

9 undisclosed trials of the ‘terrorists’ put question mark on the independence of judiciary (Mariya Y. Omilechiya, 2007). The lack of an Independent judiciary along with ‘a dim tide of repression, corruption, and poverty has submerged the region’s once bright future.’ (Thomas M. and others, p.1)

Politics in Central Asia revolves only around the presidential families and cronies. (Matteo Fumagalli: 2007, p.4). Personal loyalty is a necessary requirement to reach at the top political positions in the region.15 All the elections are rigged in every state. One cannot find any easy way to protest in the region especially in Uzbekistan. One has to seek prior permission for the demonstrations even if the demonstrator is sole. These conditions are more than enough for hatred towards regime. According to Anatoly Khazanov, “Central Asia experiences hyper- presidentialism, lack of accountability and free press, absence of separation of powers and provision of fundamental rights.”16That is why Olcott has stated that power transition in Uzbekistan is neither possible through democratic reforms nor through peaceful means.17

And it’s not the case of Uzbekistan only. States like Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan also fall in the same category. One of the important reasons for this authoritarianism is the absence of a strong civil society and lack of students’ political activism. Moreover, weak urban class is another reason for such political tendencies in Central Asia.18Rehmanov has consolidated all the powers and has controlled all types of opposition, whether religious or secular.19 Tajik regime’s centralized and controlled policies are due to the experience of Civil War. They cannot afford further disturbances. Therefore, the opposition political parties in Tajikistan, including the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) do not try to derail the political system. This favor has strengthened the hands of Rehmanov regime.

15 Alisher Ikhlamov, “Neopatrimonialism, Interest Groups and patronage networks: the impasses of the Governance System in Uzbekistan”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2007, p.34. 16 Anatoly Khazanov, “Authoritarianism and its Consequences in ex-Soviet Central Asia” in Canfield, Robert L., and Rasuly-paleezek, Gabriele, Ethnicity, Authority and Power in Central Asia: New Games Great and Small, (London: Routledge, 2011,) p.21. 17 Marhta Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, Op. Cit., p.156. 18 Lawrence P Markowitz, Op. Cit., p.106. 19 Gulchehra, Olimova, op. Cit.,

Such conditions have given birth to the radical sentiments in the form of IMU and IJU besides Ikromiya. The more the state represses the public opinion, the more the chances are for civil war.20 Christian Bleuers (2012) says that the most lethal and fearless Islamic movement in Central Asia is the IMU and most of the violent activities in Central Asia are linked with this movement.21During the initial years of independence, accordance to Kathelin N. Collins (2007, p.185), Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) did not have any religious ideology and program and it still claims to be a religious political party which if comes to power will continue with secular policies. But when the Tajik Civil war started mainly due to the inter-ethnic and inter-regional rivalries, it used religion as a tool and catalyst for its political ends.

Ethnic divisions and discontent

Russell Zana (2004) says that Islamists offer the common men to create Islamic state(s) where all the people would be equal and there would be no distinction on the basis of ethnicity, regional, clan and sub-clan identities. There would be social justice and equality in the society on the pattern of the early state of Madina created the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the pious caliphs who followed Him. This Islamic appeal to different ethnicities to bring unity among those people who share so much through practicing Islamic teachings is very attractive.22

Central Asia got extreme importance after 9/11 to carry out the attacks against Taliban regime in Kabul as well as for logistic support to the NATO forces. It became a ‘key theatre in the war on terror.’ The regimes feel free to oppress their potential opponents, whether secular or religious after the US led war on terror started in post-9/11 period. Regimes show least mercy to their opponents now. One such example is the Andijon massacre of 2005 where hundreds of non- combatants including women and children were killed. The war on terror has not only provided the regimes with a free hand but also brought a lot of foreign aid to

20 Marhta Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, Op. Cit., p.149. 21 Christian Bleuer, “Instability in Tajikistan? The IMU and the Afghan Factor”, OSCE Academy, February, 2012. URL: www.osce-academy.net/upload/file/bleuer_policy_brief7.pdf. 22 Russell Zana, “Explaining Islam in Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach for Uzbekistan”, Journal of Muslim Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1, April, 2004, p.101.

11 the CARs. The continued flow of this foreign aid is dependent on the exaggerated threat of Islamists in the region.23

States in Central Asia are deemed by the local regimes as a key to the region’s stability, security and economic development. Therefore, use of force (legal or illegal) is always justified to counter the real and fake security threats to the Central Asian states. Promotion of liberal democracy and protection of all the fundamental rights are given least importance due to the so called threat of religious extremism. Foreign and local NGOs and civil society activists are discouraged through ‘different’ means to criticize the regimes’ policies. Central Asian regimes declare that they have their own kind of social values which may be different or even contrary from international democratic norms. Therefore, it is them who will decide what kind of democracy or civil liberties are needed by the people. (Heathershaw: 2007)

External involvement

9/11 has provided the Central Asian regimes with a second chance to get integrated in the international economic and political scenario (Martha Brill Olcott, 2005). Instead of taking their nations to the new heights of international integration, the regimes re-consolidated their powers. 9/11 has provided them with more opportunities to crush their political opponents in the name of extremism and terrorism. Since trials are not open and impartial, it’s very common to silence the political opponents in the name of terrorism. The great powers involved in the region also neglect these human rights violation and political oppression benignly.

After independence, Central Asian masses were very much optimistic that with international help they would enter into a new era of civil liberties, political freedoms and free religious choices which had been strictly forbidden during the seventy years of oppressive Soviet era. For the sake of ‘freedoms’ the Central Asian general public was expecting a lot from the western countries. However, the west in general and the US in particular opted for a soft critical human rights policy towards the region. After 9/11 the US and other ‘democratic’ countries closed their eyes on human rights violations in order to keep the Central Asian

23 Christian Bleuer, Op. Cit.,

Republics (CARs) support in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

The CARs alignment with the US in OEF provided the regional leadership with opportunity to secure from pro-democratic forces on the one hand and Islamists on the other (Martha Brill Olcott, 2005). Not only the US but Russia and China are deemed as the role models for the regional elite. Having controlled political systems, Russia and China are the main priority of the Central Asian regimes. Cooperation between CARs and China and CARs and Russia in many fields including combating political Islam has involved external powers into this region. Most of the political Islamists propagate this external involvement as Dar-ul- Harb’s penetration into Dar-ul-Islam, a concept of traditional Muslim theory of Sayyar24.

We can say that rise of political Islam in the region is the outcome of ‘failed democracy and nationalism.’25Today the largest opposition group (illegal) in entire Central Asia is the Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HTI) that is banned throughout the region. The ruling elites in Central Asia do not bother about the common masses. Their ultimate objective is to tighten their grip on power and security of the states lies in their personal security.26Corruption is wide spread in the Central Asian societies and has de-jure status.

Research Gap

Despite the work done by many of the researchers, there exist serious gaps in the literature.

Most of the researchers do not connect Social injustice with the rise of political Islam in Central Asia. This research will try to explain in detail how social injustice has played an important role for the rise of political Islam in Central Asia especially in the post-Soviet era. Ethnic distribution and ethnic and clan marginalization by the ruling elite and powerful ethnic groups have profound effects on the rise of political Islam in Central Asian region. However, this aspect

24 This theory will be discussed in details in chapter one. 25 Kathleens Collins, “Ideas, Networks, and Islamic Movements: Evidence From Central Asia and Caucasus,” World Politics, Vol. 60, No. 1, October 2007, p.72. 26 Paul Quinn-Judge, 2010, p.59.

13 has been given least importance by the researchers. This thesis will focus on this aspect as well. Major focus of the researchers is on economic and political hardships as the fundamental reasons for the rise of political Islam in the region. Here again they have missed the important connection between external powers’ role in the region and the rise of political Islam. This research will try to explain the connection between US, Chinese, and Russian policies towards the region and their impacts on the rise of political Islam in Central Asia. It will also try to explore the transnational connections of political Islam with states and non-states actors. Last but not the least, most of the researchers have carried out a holistic approach towards the region which is inappropriate. This region is diverse in all the fields of life. All of the Central Asian states have unique characteristics with different social, cultural and political backgrounds. It is, therefore, extremely necessary to study every state individually. This research has tried to explore all the regional states individually. It has tried to connect the local conditions with different brands of political Islam in Central Asia.

Methodology

The research is qualitative in nature which includes both primary and secondary sources of data collection. Primary sources include elite interviews and indirect observation while secondary sources include books, articles of the renowned research journals, internet material including official websites of political Islamists and official websites of the Central Asian states. Newspapers information as well as documentaries on the issues have also been consulted to collect the data. Explanatory, historical and interpretive research methods have been applied in this research. Case study method is also used in this research.

Explanatory research provides reasons for behavior, attitude or the event: it answers a ‘why’ question.27It also predicts the future events while explaining the current situation. This research has tried to explain the phenomenon of political Islam in Central Asia. It also explains those variables which are the major cause of the revivalism of political Islam in the region. The other method used in this research is interpretive. This research has tried to explain the economic, social and

27 Janet Buttoloph Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn, Political Science Research Methods, 3rd edition, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc. Press, 1995,) p.24.

14 political conditions of the Central Asian societies and their impacts on the physical actions and mindset of the general public. Historical methods explain the oppressive Soviet policies and their continuation after the independence due to the status-quo in the regimes since last twenty three years.

Numerous on field and off the field interviews have been conducted for a better understanding of the problem. Eight on field interviews were taken in Tashkent, Namangan, and Andijon in Uzbekistan and Osh in Kyrgyzstan. Seven off field interviews were taken from Khamzin Elder, spokesperson of Hizb-ut-Tahrir al- Islami (HTI) Central Asia, Izzatilla Rakhmatillaev, a human rights activist from Osh, Kyrgyzstan, Abdujalil Boymatov, chairman of the Human Rights Committee of Uzbekistan (HRSU), Khikmatulla Saifullah, deputy chairman of the Islamic Renaissance party of Tajikistan (IRPT), Rahimullah Yousafzai, renowned journalist, Ahmad Rashid, one of the pioneer writers on the subject and one who has a lot of expertise in political Islam in Central Asia, and Ayaz Wazir, who is also an analyst of the problem. Case studies of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HTI), and Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) are conducted in the research.

Central Questions

What are the major groups which want to implement political Islam in Central Asia? What are the structural factors for the rise of political Islam in the region? Is political Islam a unified movement in Central Asia? What is the potential of political Islam in the region? What transnational linkages does it have? Does it have social support? If yes, who are people which support political Islam in the region? Do state policies, regional and ethnic division and broader international issues of the Muslim World have a connection with the rise of political Islam in this region? Would the political Islamist groups join their hands for a single agenda? Has the involvement of big powers in the region supported the agenda of political Islam? What are the prospects of success for political Islam in the region? However, all these questions will be supporting the main question around which the whole research revolves and the question is why political Islam has revived and got strength in the Central Asian region?

Limitations

Despite maximum efforts done by the researcher, there were several limitations which impeded further deep analysis of the issue. These limitations include; limited data available on the topic as well as region, non-cooperation on the part of regimes to provide information, denial of research visa for the topic, reluctance of people to talk about the issue mainly due to the fear of states reaction and hardship to reach the leadership as well as members of the Islamic movements of Central Asia especially Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HTI), Akromiya, Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and the shadow groups.

Organization of the Thesis

The thesis comprises of seven chapters besides introduction and conclusion. The first chapter discusses the theoretical framework. Theory of Islamic state has been discussed in details. Three models of the Islamic state described by Syed Abu a’la Maududi, Syed Qutb and Khomeini have been explained in details due to the fact that their ideologies are followed by political Islam in Central Asia. Islam has not given any specific political system. A choice has been given to the people of different states to incorporate any of the political system which best suits their social, geographical, cultural and economic needs. However, it does give certain guidelines for that political system to function and it’s the duty of the rulers in Muslim lands to follow these principles. This theory talks about those fundamental principles prescribed by Islam for the political conduct of an Islamic state.

Second chapter explains the advent, advancement and central role of Islam in the Central Asian daily lives. It discusses in details how Islam penetrated the social and political arena of the modern Central Asian region. How religion of Islam was used by the regimes for their political ends and what sort of efforts were done by different religious reformist movements during the history of this region. Two totally divergent but very important movements for religious revivalism in Central Asia are discussed in this chapter. These movements include Basmachi Movement and the Jaded movement. The Basmachi movement was a rebellious movement of early twentieth century against the Soviet occupation of modern Central Asia while Jaded movement of late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries tried to

16 modernize the Muslims of Central Asia and Russia through incorporating modern education in the curriculum of old styled schools and colleges. The religious policies of the Soviet regime and its repercussions on the Central Asian social, cultural, political and religious lives have been discussed in details.

The third chapter explores the narratives of economic, political and social transitions and its impacts on the revivalism of political Islam in Central Asia. All the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan are discussed individually. This chapter links historical economic, religious and political policies of the Czar and Soviets to post independence policies. It explains the current policies of the regimes towards ‘real’ opposition. This chapter tells the story of authoritarianism in Central Asia and its impacts on the rise of religious extremism and fundamentalism which is highly conducive for the revivalism of political Islam in the region. Measures against the genuine opposition in the name of state building and combatting religious extremism are explained in details.

Chapter four is about the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). This group is the founder of political Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia. It emerged out of the smaller groups like Tauba and Islami Lashkai. The most important objective of the IMU is to remove president Islam Karimov from power and install an ‘Islamic’ regime in Uzbekistan. Strategy of IMU to implement its agenda is through violent means. The group is unsuccessful to achieve its objective yet. IMU has become a multi-ethnic political Islamic group having members not only from Uzbekistan but also from the border region as well as Arabs, and Pakistanis. This group is located in Pak-Afghan border area and is carrying out its terrorist activities in Pakistan mostly. This chapter will discuss IMU in details.

Chapter five analyses the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). Created for the revivalism of Islam in Soviet Union, the Tajik branch of IRP was the only branch which got registered and was enrooted in any of the Central Asian society. It started its struggle peacefully but the repressive policies of the regimes forced IRP to join its hands with other secular but illegal opposition political parties to launch a joint armed struggle against the regimes, which led to a civil war from 1992 to 1997 resulting in the death of tens of thousands of people besides displacing hundreds of thousands from their houses. However, the rise of Taliban

17 in Kabul forced all the groups to conclude the civil war and sign a Peace Accord in 1997. The unique characteristic of IRPT is that it is the only registered and legal political party based on Islamic ideology throughout Central Asia. Emergence, historical struggle, organizational structure, successes and failures and current status of IRPT is discussed in chapter five.

Chapter six talks about Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HTI), which is an international organization striving to establish Islamic Caliphate(s) in the Muslim lands. It pursues a non-violent strategy to achieve its objectives. This organization is the most popular political Islamic group. The reason for this popularity is its non- violent strategy. Most of the Central Asian people remained peaceful throughout the history and Tajik civil war after the independence and rise of Extremism and terrorism has forced majority of population to look towards HTI. It says that we pursue a nonviolent agenda to establish the Islamic states(s). According to HTI, when majority of population agrees with their agenda then they will contest the general elections and after winning those elections, they will introduce the Islamic regime and Islamic laws in the state.

The last chapter discusses the external involvement in the region and its impacts on the rise of political Islam in Central Asia. This chapter tries to connect the big powers’ and regional powers’ religious policies in general and towards the Central Asian region in particular with the rise of political Islam. These powers include Russia, China and the USA. This chapter discusses how the global issues of the Muslim world as well as internal issues of the Central Asian states have helped political Islam in this region. The policies of these actors towards Central Asian region and their impacts on the socio-economic and political conditions are discussed here. This chapter builds a connection between the efforts done by the regional states as well as international community, especially the above mentioned states in order to combat political Islam. The divergent interests of these powers in general and convergence of interest against political Islam in particular together with impacts on the region have been discussed. The conclusion follows the last chapter.

Chapter 1

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Introduction

When the Muslim world failed to formulate an effective modern political system, it turned towards the alternatives. The most obvious alternative in particular was the creation of an Islamic State on the pattern of early Islamic State of Madina. Leading movements and their leading proponents stressed the need and struggle to establish an Islamic State. The efforts gained momentum during the late 1970s, especially after the establishment of Islamic regime in Iran in 1979. Islam, along with, nationalism and social justice is preached by these movements to attract the audience. Establishment of a just economic system, if they come to power, is a very attractive slogan of the Islamic movements.

Although, Islam has not given any specific political system, yet it provides the fundamental or foundational principles for the creation of an Islamic political system and responsibilities of that state. These principles are based upon the teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Prophet (SAW) commonly known as Shariah. The struggle of Islamists is also marked by the time and space factor. It is the particular circumstances surrounding the production, consumption and politics of religious knowledge in the locale that led the public to follow a certain type of religious authority, that is, local imams, national religious leaders, TV shows and international imams etc. That is why different movements or orders as well as thinkers have given different kinds of Islamic political systems according to their own understanding of Shariah as well as their contemporary socio-economic and political needs.

Currently the Muslim states differ from each other on the basis of their socio- economic and political and cultural values. Islam is interpreted in these societies accordingly. That means the domestic social and political structure and popular desires also affect the mode of Islamization in a society. The most important demand by Islamists within the Muslim states is creation of an Islamic State based on Shariah. The difference between an Islamic state and a Muslim state is that an Islamic state is

19 run on the principles of Shariah and a Muslim majority is that where Muslims are in majority and is not necessarily run on the principles of Shariah.

Political Islamic movements support or criticize existing regimes in the Muslim world according to their own perceived models. Even Islamic regimes in different Muslim states differ from each other in organization and operations. For example, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Taliban Regime in Afghanistan, Sudan, and even Pakistan differ from each other. All these so called Islamic states have interpreted Shariah according to their own understandings and needs. Different Islamic scholars have also interpreted Islamic polity differently. Rashid Rida, for example, says that Muslims must strive for the establishment of Caliphate which must be distinctive from the modern day nation-state.1Others like Abdur Raziq negate the need of Caliphate but still focus on the establishment of a state based on the principles of Shariah.2 He says that any form of government which does not violate the core principles of Islam is acceptable.

Some of the thinkers even support the idea of nationalism and declare it best suited for Muslims interests in the post-colonial era. Many modernists of Muslim history like Syed Ahmad Khan in India, Jadeds in Central Asia and Russia and Kemalists in Turkey supported this idea. Nevertheless, the most important and impressive voices come from the traditionalists who want to establish an Islamic state on the basis of Shariah. These people have their own arguments and justifications. Interestingly many people of the Muslim world do support these movements. Major reason behind this support is authoritarianism alongwith deteriorating socio-economic and political conditions.

The policies of the states lead to the social revolutions which may or may not be violent. According to Scokpol, political centralism is one of the major reasons for revolutions. In order to maintain ‘the internal order’, regimes use every measure and the best of those measures is control and strict control. This strict control by the regimes creates an authoritative type of state where the gap between haves and haves

1 Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam, (New York: Routledge, 2007,) p.12. 2 Ibid. p.52.

20 not increases substantially, leading towards negative relationship between landowners and the peasants. The negative relationship creates conditions for the social revolutions in that society.

According to Scokpol, three stages are the most important in bringing the revolutions; “collapse of the old regime, class based uprising by the peasantry, and the emergence of a new elite.” Analyzing the revolutions; Russian, French and the Chinese, Scokpol says that “there occurred a crisis in the policy of the ruling elite which causes fissures through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst off.” These ‘Three Revolutions’ were the result of old styled undemocratic, authoritarian regimes which could not cope up with the modern socio-economic and political needs of the people. Hence people stood up against those authoritative and corrupt regimes.

The structural perspective of the social movements in which revolutions happen are the result of the specific structural conditions, especially political conditions which may be supported by economic and social conditions as well. Social revolutions happen when political transformation coincides with social transformation. The revolutions are always “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structure; and they are accompanied and in part carried out through by class-based revolts from below.” They demand a lot of support from the masses without whom revolutions seem difficult to happen. The most important phenomenon of her concept of revolutions is the nature of state-society relationship.

The interesting phenomenon about the social revolutions, according to Scokpol is that, the revolutionaries are uncertain about their motives which are “often complex and ill-formulated.” If the revolutionaries have set certain concrete aims, the outcomes after the successful revolution may be different or even contradictory to those aims.

Political Islamists claim that stability, justice, order and clarity are rooted only in Islam3. More importantly, except for a few like al-Qaida and Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HTI), most of these movements are confined only to domestic audiences and politics like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), i.e. they want to establish Islamic state(s) within specific territories and do not aspire a global Islamic state.

The most important traditional Muslim political reformers are Abul A’la Maududi, Hassan al-Banna, Syed Qutb, Imam Khomeini, Ali Shariati etc. However, Maududi, Qutb and Khomeini are deemed as the ideologue of the modern Islamic political movements. Political Islam in Central Asia is directly or indirectly inspired by these thinkers who want to construct an Islamic state which would incorporate these model(s) as the political system of the Islamic state. Here are the models of Islamic state given by these three (political) Islamists.

1.2. Maududi, Jama’t Islami (Islamic Party) and the Islamic State

The basic stress of Maududi is to implement Shariah through state itself as a central agent. For this purpose, he says, Islamists must take part in the political processes of their respective states and whenever they come to power, through peaceful means, they would Islamize the society by the use of state authority. To bring an Islamic government in power, there must be movements or struggles to create such an environment which is supportive to the cause of Islamists.

Maududi was not only a thinker and scholar but a seasoned politician as well. He shaped modern Muslim discourse according to the socio-economic and political teachings of Islam4which is the most powerful weapon of the Central Asian political Islam. Maududi was bitterly against the British occupation of the sub-continent. He called for an Islamic movement which could use force (if necessary) against a

3 Gurrun Kramer, “Vision of an Islamic Republic: Good Governance According to The Islamists”, in Frederic Vopli, Ed., Political Islam: A Critical Reader, (New York: Routledge, 2011,) p.89. 4 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, The Glory and the Power: the Fundamentalist Challenge to the Modern World, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992,) pp.152-3.

22 fraudulent civilization to achieve its ends i.e. end of the rule of Dar-ul-Harb (House of war)5. For this purpose, he established Jama’t Islami (JI) (Islamic Party). He was not against modern sciences or technological developments but against western culture and civilization. He declared that Islam should rule over all the domestic affairs and should control the production and distribution of resources through state administration, a fundamental demand of Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HTI) in Central Asia. Therefore, major emphasis of Maududi was on provision of social and economic justice to its citizens, a fundamental duty of the modern welfare state.

Maududi says that the sovereignty exclusively belongs to Allah Almighty and the function of a state is to implement the divine order for the social welfare of the people. He says: “The position of a man who is selected to conduct the affairs of the state is no more than this: that all Muslims (or technically speaking, all caliphs6 of God) delegate their caliphate to Him for administrative purposes. He (political head) is answerable to God on the one hand and on the other to his fellow “caliphs” who have delegated their authority to him.”7Maududi says that Islam is against the domination of man over man because it is the fundamental reason for of all evils.8

He says that the (Islamic political) movement must follow the existing constitutional means to reach to the power. Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) is following the similar path. He says under current circumstances, it seems that whatever is given to you in a political system, take it because it makes you legitimized and people will support you.9He says that although nation-state is a secular institution, it can be used as a mean to an end that is establishment of Islamic state. This state will establish a just and equitable political system. The concept of

5 The concept of Darul Harb and Darul Islam is taken from the traditional theory of Sayyar in Islam. This theory will be discussed in details later in this chapter. 6 Here the caliph means an individual. Islam declares all the Muslims as the vicegerents of Allah Almighty who are answerable to Him. 7 J. Donahue and J. Esposito (eds), Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspective, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982,) pp.81-82. See also Peter Mandaville, Op. Cit., p.65. 8 Abul A’la Maududi, Political Theory of Islam, edited and translated by Khurshid Ahmad, (Lahore: Islamic publications Ltd., 1960,) p.30. 9 Syed Abul A’ala Maududi, Islami Riyasat (Islamic State), (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1967,) p.718.

God’s party and Satan’s party was also given by Maududi. He says that the former is the party of believers whose agenda is based on Shariah and latter is the party of those Muslims “who adhere to the Human made laws,” 10 a stance of HTI. He disliked the western civilization and culture and wanted to incorporate Islamic teachings and practices in the Islamic society. However, he was always open towards the positivity of all religions and civilization.

Basic pillar of Maududi’s Islamic state was God’s sovereignty and the concept of Caliphate. According to him, Islam is the only religion which gives unity that leads humanity to the highest principles of excellence, virtue and greatness.11 When an Islamic government is elected, different institutions like management of administrative affairs, intellectual, judicial, financial and economic affairs, as well as models of managing foreign policies and devising appropriate plans for times of peace and war would be established according to Islamic teachings. This is exactly what HTI preaches in his propaganda. Maududi opines that true Muslims must struggle against the ignorance (political elite of modern Muslim world) just like the Holy Prophet (SAW) and His companions did against the pagans of Makkah 12 who were the slaves of ignorance.

Maududi endorses modern political institutions especially legislature. Modern legislature, according to Maududi is the only body which can enact new laws. Fatwas do not have any status of law as these are given by individuals having scholarly caliber but on the other hand, legislature is the body where consultation, a basic tenet of Islamic polity, is done to formulate policies. This law making is like Ijma as most of the members of Islamic legislature belong to the ‘Party of Believers’. Islamic laws cannot be promulgated in any state without the authority of state; therefore, establishment of an Islamic state is must for this purpose. The Islamic state can only

10 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “A Genealogy of Radical Islam”, in Frederic Volpi, ed. Political Islam: A Critical Reader, (New York: Routledge, 2011). See also Nelly Lahoud, Political Thought in Islam: A Study in Intellectual Boundaries, (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005,) p.51-53. 11 Syed Abul A’ala Maududi, Come Lets Change This World, (Selections from Maududi’s Writings), Translated by Kaukab Siddique, (Karachi: Salma Siddique, 1971,) pp.15-18. 12 Nelly Lahoud, Op. Cit., p.52.

24 be established with the help of a disciplined and dedicated Islamic party.13HTI and IRPT follow Maududi in this regard. This illustrates that Maududi supports a republican form of government which has to implement Islamic laws.

Maududi says that the caliph or ruler must be an elected person who is answerable to the general public as well as to Almighty Allah. He has to consult the learned people and advisory council (shura) to run the administrative affairs. Legislature must be an elected one; however, the candidates should not offer themselves for elections. It is the masses or body of leaned people who will select candidates to contest elections. This is done to avoid the greed for power and corruption by selecting pious and caring people as the candidates who, when elected, will work for public welfare.

So far the economy of Islamic state is concerned; it will be based on fair play, a demand and strategy of all political Islamists in Central Asia. There is no permission of concentration of wealth in an Islamic state. Even if the wealth is earned through legal and Islamic means, this cannot be spent on luxuries of life and other extravaganzas.14This wealth must be used for the welfare purposes because God has ordered to care about the weaker and poor segments of society. The wealth, according to Maududi, must be reinvested into the market so that further economic and employment opportunities can be generated. HTI and IRPT have launched several projects where poor people are funded to start small scale businesses. Maududi also advocates that a certain piece of land must be allocated to every peasant so that he can fulfill his needs. This negates the concept of feudalism in an Islamic state.

1.3. Syed Qutb, Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the Islamic State

Syed Qutb, an educationalist by profession, got both religious and secular education. He went to America for higher education on an official scholarship where he spent 2.5 years. There he studied and observed the American socio-economic and political system closely. Capitalism, being the driving force behind Americanization, was the

13 Sohail Mahmood, Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran, (Lahore: vanguard, 1995,) p.111. 14 Ibid, p.112.

25 major focus of Qutb’s study. He identified the negative consequences of capitalism on the American people. By doing a comparative study of different systems, he concluded that only Islam can save the humanity from destruction.15When he came back to Egypt in 1952, he joined Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and reached to its higher ranks within a very short span of time.

According to Karen Armstrong MB was established by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928. Following were the major purposes of MB; i) interpretation of Quran in the spirit of age; ii) unity of Islamic Ummah; iii) raising the standard of living and achievement of social order and justice; iv) struggle against illiteracy and poverty; v) emancipation of Muslim lands from foreign dominance, and; vi) the promotion of Islamic peace and fraternity throughout the whole world.16However, it was Qutb who provided this organization with fresh blood and new dimension.

Banna wanted to develop consciousness among Egyptian masses. Later on, he included anti-colonialism and rejection of western influence as a strategy in his agenda. MB was established for the religious education and greater role of Islam in the public life. He wanted to reform the existing state by utilizing social Islam. He says that since all social tensions and cleavages would be eliminated (after establishment of an Islamic state) from the society, there won’t be any need for political parties or labor unions.17 Main focus of Banna was to redress the socio- economic inequality of Egyptian society, a core demand of Central Asian political Islam. He wanted to redress this inequality through the imposition of the system of Zakat (Islamic tax system). He was also critical to state’s adoption of un-Islamic models.

He declared Islam as the best approach. He also wrote many letters to Egyptian king regarding the importance of Islam in the solution of socio-economic and political problems. According to Khamzin Eldar, HTI spokesperson for Central Asia, HTI

15 M. M. Siddiqui, “An Outline of Syyed Qutb’s Life”, in Syed Qutub, Islam and Universal Peace, (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1977,) p. ix. 16 Karen Armstrong, The Battle for God, (New York: Random House Inc., 2001,) p.221. 17 Peter Mandaville, Op. Cit., p.60.

(following the footprints of MB) also wrote letters to the people in power (in Muslim states) for the implementation of Shariah in their respective states.18 Banna approach towards goal achievement was a peaceful one. He wanted to educate masses through intellectual discussions (a strategy HTI practices widely). For this purpose, he asked the members of MB to engage themselves in public discussions especially in schools, media and the mosques.19After the assassination of Banna in 1949 by military, Syed Qutb became the head of MB. He was more rigid in his approach than his predecessor. He declared the existing rulers as Jahiliyah (anything based on un- Islamic principles) therefore, need reformation. He was very critical to Nasser’s regime and called the devout Muslims to overthrow his Jahiliyah regime. His concept of Jahiliyah is the reflection of un-Islamic principles and the only way to get rid of Jahiliyah is the establishment of a new (saleh or righteous) regime which could struggle against the Jahiliyah as the Holy Prophet (SAW) did against the old Jahiliyah (Pagans of Arab).

Qutb views Islam as an active pursuit of an entire social order and not just a matter of personal spirituality, piety or moralism.20In the Signposts he wrote: “if preaching sets right the beliefs and concepts, “movement” removes from the path other material obstacles, foremost of which is the political power that is established on intricate and complex but interrelated ideological, racial, class and social foundations. And these two, preaching and movements, jointly collaborate in influencing the established system from all four directions, and are conductive to bringing about the new system.”21The whole Muslim community should battle for God’s cause and the execution of His will.22West and western civilization are nothing but evil and the Muslims must not follow them. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) carries an armed struggle to achieve its objectives. It is bitterly against the West and

18 Author’s interview with the respondent through Facebook on 10th September 2014. 19 Nelly Lahoud, Op. Cit., p.18. 20 Peter Mandaville, Op. Cit., p.79. 21 S. Qutb, “War, Peace and Islamic Jihad”, in M. Moaddel, K. Talattof (eds), Modernists and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000,) p.229. 22 Sohail Mahmood, Op. Cit., p.119.

27 westernization. Qutb says that the only force of salvation in this world is Islam. It is the only force which can rebuild the humanity on new and modern lines.

The ultimate goal for the establishment of Islamic state, according to Qutb, is political activism which would establish an Islamic society on the pattern of the leadership of the Holy Prophet (SAW). He says that Jahiliyah is based on the concept of revolt against God and, therefore, it is the duty of Muslims to get rid of this sin. IMU wants to topple the regime of Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan at any cost. It has declared him as the enemy of Islam. Qutb says that nationalism, socialism, secularism, capitalism, democracy and communism make up one thing that has generated in the west in direct antagonism with Islam. Islamic societies have given up their religion and degenerated into a state of Jahiliyah. He says that until and unless the masses would not organize themselves and wage a political struggle, their sufferings and poverty cannot be eliminated.

Qutb’s detention and torture by the regime led him to think that reformation of Jahiliyah through dialogue and persuasion is impossible and only active jihad can do so. Akromiya, a splinter from the HTI and IMU carry out their activities through active ‘jihad’. The poverty of the masses does not end until they organize themselves and stand against the Jahiliyah. This group of poor and organized people eventually succeed in their struggle and seize the political power to establish a just and saleh regime. He does not pay attention to establish caliphate but a political order in conformity of Islamic teachings. He says: “The Islamic civilization can take various forms in its material and civilizational structure, but the principles and values on which it is based are eternal and unchangeable. These are: worship of God alone, the foundation of human relationship on the belief in the Unity of God, the supremacy of humanity of man over material things, the development of human values and the control of animalistic desires, respect for the family, the assumption of the vice- gerancy of God on earth according to His guidance and instruction, and in all affairs

28 of the vice-regency, the rule of God’s law (Shariah) and the way of life prescribed by Him.”23

The constitution of Islamic state must be in accordance to Quranic teachings as Quran is the foundation stone for every Islamic institution. There must be a close cooperation between the ruler and the ruled as the government has to be run through mutual consultation,24 says Qutb. The ruler is only acceptable when he runs the administration according to Shariah laws. If the ruler breaches the principles of Islam, jihad becomes necessary for all the Muslims against such rulers. IMU preaches the similar strategy. Qutb says, to establish an Islamic state, jihad is extremely necessary. The duty of an Islamic state is to provide social justice to its inhabitants and provision of basic necessities of life to all the people without any discrimination. Luxurious life corrupts society and is therefore, prohibited in Islam. Poor people must be kept with special care in an Islamic state. The extravagance exists at the cost of deprivation and misery of the larger but poorer section of the society.25Just and equitable distribution of wealth in the society is the duty of Islamic state.

In Islam and universal peace, Qutb declares that “Muslims must fight injustice, accepting no truce until oppression is no more and man’s dignity is restored….Islam seeks to destroy all injustices, irrespective of its perpetrator’s race, creed or nationality….Islam calls for action against injustice whether inflicted upon Muslims or non-Muslims.”26Qutb declares the rulers of Islamic world in general and Egypt in particular as the non-believers in the light of Qur’anic verse (5:48) which says that all those are unbelievers who do not rule according to the teachings of Islam. The IMU has declared Uzbek President Islam Karimov as Jew.

23 S. Qutb, Milestones, (Beirut: The Holy Quran Publishing House, 1980,) pp.7-15 and 286. 24 Sohail Mahmood, Op. Cit., p.126. 25 Ibid, p.128. 26 S. Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace, (Indianapolis: American Trust Publishers, 1977), pp.72- 73.

1.4. Khomeini, Islamic Revolution and the Islamic State

Khomeini is also very critical of westernization of Muslim societies. Iranian experience of westernization under the King Raza Shah Pahlavi is the basic cause for Khomeini’s denunciation of monarchy as well as westernization. When Shah concluded a treaty with Washington in 1963 which granted US military personnel diplomatic immunities, Khomeini declared such an act as unlawful and degrading for the Iranian nations. The sole responsible for all ills to Iranians and the Muslims, Khomeini says, is America.27 He believed that Shariah furnished the blue print for society and state. It is essential to apply Shariah instead of human laws. Khomeini thinks that the difficulties of Muslims are due to their distantness from religion. Islamic religion, to Khomeini, is dedicated to truth and justice and supports all those who struggle against imperialism.28Cooperation between the Islamic Renaissance party of Tajikistan (IRPT) and other opposition, but secular political parties in Tajikistan against the authoritative regimes is a good example of this thinking.

The socio-economic and political conditions under Raza Shah Pahlavi were so disgusting that the people of Iran really welcomed Khomeini. As Shah’s regime was promoting westernization, Khomeini declared his (shah’s) regime as anti-Islamic and a government based on Kufr (unbelief) and it should be the goal of jihad to overthrow it.29 He was very critical of western imperialism and asked all the Muslims to overthrow those Muslim regimes which are involved in un-Islamic activities and have imposed western laws in their lands.

Khomeini declared that Islam is the religion of justice and equality. The new (Islamic) state of Khomeini will be free of corruption, nepotism, unemployment, starvation, political subjugation, evil, despotism and so on. Khomeini says: “both law and reason require that we do not permit governments to retain this non-Islamic or

27 Hamid Algar, ed. And translator, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, (Berkely: Mizan, 1981,) p.313. 28 Sohail Mahmood, Op. Cit., p.72. 29 John Esposito, Islam and Politics, 4th edition, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998,) p.198.

30 anti-Islamic character…in order to assure the unity of the Islamic Ummah, in order to liberate the Islamic homeland from occupation and penetration by the imperialists and their puppet governments, it is imperative that we establish a (Islamic) government. In order to attain the unity and freedom of the Muslim people, we must overthrow the oppressive governments installed by the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic government of justice that will be in the service of the people.”30Interestingly, most of the Central Asian regimes are the Soviet legacy that is considered imperialists by political Islamists of the region, therefore, the later call to overthrow the former.

According to Khomeini, Islam covers all the aspects of human life which include not only concerns of family and society but also international relations, commerce, trade and agriculture.31 The political authority in Khomeini state rests with religious scholars. He has given the concept of Vilayat-eFaqih (guardianship of the jurists) who is guardian of all political authority in an Islamic state. He says that if the ruler is not an expert of Shariah then he has to rely on the advice of fuqahas (plural of Faqih) to run the government administration. He says that the knowledge of Shariah and ability to carry out justice are the pre-requisites to become a ruler. Ruler must posses’ high moral qualities.

The duty of Faqih (jurist) is to administer Shariah laws in the state administration. Although, the duty to establish an Islamic state rests upon all the Muslims, yet ulema (religious leaders) have special responsibility in this regard. As the twelfth Imam32 has yet to come, the responsibility to rule the Islamic state rests upon Fuqahas. It is their duty to execute Islamic laws for the creation of a fair social system.33Khomeini says that Fuqahas have the same authority in the modern world which the Prophets

30 R. Khomeini, “The Form of Islamic Government”, in Hamid Algar, Op. Cit., pp.48-49. 31 John Esposito, Op. Cit., p.43. 32 Shiite spiritual doctrine rests upon the concept of Imamat. Imamas are the heirs of Ali (RA), the Fourth caliph of Islam and the son-in-law of the Holy Prophet (SAW). Shiite says that since eleven imams came on the earth to guide the believers, twelfth imam, Mahdi has yet to come. Therefore, in the absence of twelfth imam, believers have to follow the Fuqahas. 33 Trevor Mostyn and Albert Hourani, The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998,) p.337.

31 and Imams possessed during the early eras. Therefore, disobedience and non- compliance to them is deemed as disobedience to Almighty. All those people who administer the state must possess religious knowledge while the ruler must excel in all other qualities necessary in this regard. The two basic qualifications of the ruler, according to Khomeini, are knowledge of Shariah and the ability to carry out justice.34

Khomeini says that as Quran is the only guiding principle to the whole humanity and rest is evil, therefore, only Islam is acceptable as political system of land. He further says that an abrupt and politically violent revolution is the only solution to bring an Islamic regime in Iran 35(IRPT’s involvement in Tajik civil war is one such example in this regard). This regime will not be dependent on foreign powers. There will not be any class struggle, social injustice, unfairness and the rulers and ruled will have a close relationship.36The class division in the Muslim societies is divided between exploited and exploiter is the result of draconian economic policies of the west. Khomeini’s philosophy is the product of social, economic and political conditions of Iran.

1.5. Fundamentals of Islamic Polity

Despite these different approaches, one must note that the Islamic state should guarantee equal rights to all ethnic, racial, cultural, tribal, and religious groups. Islamic concept of the welfare state is based not only on the manifestation of economic values but also on moral and spiritual, social and political values of Islam. The Qur’an considers racial, national, tribal, and linguistic differences signs of Allah and indicative of identity for example, Quran says “And among His Signs is the creation of heavens and the earth, and the differences of your languages and colors. Verily, in that are indeed signs for the men of sound knowledge”37.

34 Sohail Mahmood, Op. Cit., p.85. 35 Ibid., p.79. 36 Ibid, p.73. 37 Al-Quran, 30:22

The purpose of an Islamic state is a positive one. Its duties are not only to protect citizens from internal and external aggressions but to ensure that collective justice be implemented which God has taught us through the Holy Quran. It has to eliminate all the evils and establish all the goods which God has described to us. To implement its policies, an Islamic state can carry a policy of carrots and sticks.38 Syed Salman Nadvi writes that “creation of Islamic State is not an end itself but it is a mean to an end that is, elimination of tyranny of man and establishment of a just political and economic system in which ruler is working for the welfare of people.”39After discussing different models of Islamic state we can summarize the following principles as the fundamental guidelines which must be obeyed in an Islamic state.

Contrary to the western concept of popular sovereignty, Islam teaches its followers the sovereignty of God Almighty. The executive in an Islamic state has to implement the orders of God and to create suitable conditions to implement these orders. Quran says “the command is none for but Allah. He has commanded you to worship none but Him; that is the straight (true) religion, but most men know not.”40 And “He who obey the Messenger, had indeed obeyed Allah, but he who turns away, then We have not sent you as a watcher over them.”41God orders the Muslims to obey the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) at any cost. Quran says “And whatsoever the Messenger gives you, take it; and whatsoever he forbids you, abstain that.”42These Qur’anic verses better explain that nothing contrary to the teachings of God and the Prophet be obeyed or implemented in an Islamic society. Political Islamists preach that most of the Muslim rulers go against such commands. The Central Asian rulers are no exception.

The constitution of the Islamic state would be a combination of Islamic teachings and the contemporary socio-economic and political needs. Customs and conventions of a specific area are also a basic source of the constitution of an Islamic state. The laws

38 Syed Abul A’ala Maududi, Islami Riyasat Op. Cit., p.136. 39 Hafiz Mahmood Akhtar, “Jihad aur Qiyam-e-Amn” (Jihad and Establishment of Peace), Al- Adwa, Vol. XXI, No. XXIX, 2008, pp.118-19. 40 Al-Quran, 12:40. For more details see Al-Quran, 5:45-50. 41 Al-Quran, 4:80. 42 Al-Quran, 59:7.

33 of Islamic state should be tailored, adjusted and changed according to changes of time and places. Islamic state differs considerably from context to context depending on the circumstances of its established and configuration of social and political forces within various rational settings in which politics exists.43

Allah Almighty has told Muslims to decide their matters according to His book (Quran) and the teachings of the Messenger (S.A.W).44Quran says, “Let the people of Injeel (Gospel) judge by what Allah has revealed therein. And whosoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed (then) such (people) are the Fasiqun (the rebellious) to Allah.” 45 The deeds of the Holy Prophet (S.A.W) are also used as guidelines for all the actions. Islam strongly supports a jihad against the rebellious to Allah. Islamic state is based on the principle of rule of law. Everybody is equal in the eyes of law. Even rulers have to be accountable according to the laws of the state. The famous verdict of the Prophet (SAW) in a theft case in which a woman from influential tribe was involved is clear evidence that nobody is superior to law in an Islamic state.46However, today’s Muslim world is a very different entity where powerful cannot be brought under the rule of law while injustices are done to the weak.

Government is a sacred trust in the hands of ruler; it must be given to those people who are pious, honest and do justice. Running of government is a religious duty and the rulers have to fulfill it strictly according to the teachings of Shariah. The ruler who does not perform his duties honestly and does not do governance for the betterment of general public will go to the Hell. A lot of Quranic verses and sayings of the Holy Prophet (SAW) are about the responsibility of the government.47 It is the duty of the Islamic State to safeguard the people against dissension, disorder, disturbance, and oppression; to secure them from attacks from outside, and to make

43 Peter Mandaville, Op. Cit., pp.196-97. 44 For details see Al-Quran, 4:59 and 105. 45 Al-Quran, 5:47. 46 For more details see Bukhari Shareef, Kitab-ul-Hadood, Chapter 11 & 12. 47 For more details see Syed Abul A’ala Maududi, Islami Riyasat, Op Cit. pp.403-04.

34 provision for all their intellectual and material needs.48It is the duty of Islamic state to provide all the necessaries of life to its subjects, Muslims or non-Muslims. The institution of Auqaf has to be established for this purpose. This institution collects taxes, zakat and endowment from the wealthy people and distributes among the poor. Quran encourages wealthy Muslims to help their poor brothers. It says: “They ask thee, (O Muhammad), what they shall spend. Say: That which ye spend for good (must go) to parents and near kindred and orphans and the needy and the wayfarer. And whatsoever good ye do, Lo! Allah is aware of it.”49

The Holy Prophet (SAW) said: “a ruler who has been bestowed with power on the Muslims will go to the Hell if he died in a situation in which he did fraud and cheat to the Muslims.”50 The first caliph of Islam, Abu Bkr (RA) said: “obey me till I obey Allah and the Messenger (SAW) and when I disobey them, my obedience is not obligatory on you.”51 He even fought a war with those people who refused to give zakat. He fought them because he thought that zakat is the right of poor people and those who do not pay zakat are usurpers and explicators. Quran says that, “those (Muslim rulers) who, if We give them power in the land, they enjoin Iqamat-as-Salat (prayers), to pay the Zakat and they enjoin Al-Ma’ruf (Good) and forbid Al-Munkir (evil). And with Allah rests the end of all matters.”52Here some of the reformers say that the ruler(s) are asked to implement Quran as the law of Islamic state and in all spheres of life. Similarly, Quran says, “And follow not the command of al-Musrifun (sinners).”53Here again, political Islam that is struggling against the corrupt and authoritative regimes, give this verse as an evidence to legitimize their struggle.

Consultation is given vital importance in all the matters of Muslims. The Islamic government has also responsibility to enact laws as well as govern its subjects with

48 Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, “Islamic Concept of the State”, Review of Religions, February 1993, URL: http://www.alislam.org/library/links/00000148.html. Access date 13th August 2010. 49 Al-Quran, 2:215. 50 Al-Muslim, Kitab-al-Amara, Chapter 5, in Syed Abul A’ala Maududi, Islami Riyasat, Op Cit. pp.404. 51 Kanzul A’mal, part 5, in Syed Abul A’ala Maududi, Islami Riyasat, Op Cit. pp.409. 52 Al-Quran, 22:41. 53 Al-Quran, 26:151.

35 consultation. The Holy Prophet (SAW) himself governed the early state of Madina through consultation. Decentralization done by the second Caliph Umar (RA) is also an evidence of consultation. The Prophet of Islam (SAW) said “There is no Khilafah without consultation”54 and “collect the pious people of my Ummah and refer the matter to them for consultation. Don’t decide the matter on one man’s opinion.”55Allah says, “And those who respond to their Lord and keep up prayer, and whose affairs are (decided) by mutual consultation, and who spend out of what We have given them”56

Islam says that obedience to the ruler is an Islamic duty and he who does not obey the ruler is committing sin but it is only about a just and right ruler. The ruler who does not govern the state according to Islamic teachings and strengthening his personal rule is not to be obeyed. No allegiance is to a person who does not obey God’s orders. “(They are) those who, if We establish them in the land, establish regular prayer and give regular charity, enjoin the right and forbid wrong: with Allah rests the end (and decision) of (all) affairs.”57 The Holy Prophet (SAW) says that “a Muslim must obey his ruler whether his order is liked or disliked by individuals till he (the ruler) obeys God’s orders.”58

The Holy Prophet (SAW) once said, “Your best rulers are those whom you like and who like you, for whom you pray and who pray for you; and your worst rulers are those who hate you and whom you hate, who curse you and whom you curse.”59 The first caliph of Islam Abu Bakr (RA) said that God dislikes that person who is made responsible for Ummah’s any matter and he does not decide the matter according to

54 Kanzul A’mal, vol. 5, Hadith 2577, in Syed Abul A’ala Maududi, Islami Riyasat, Op Cit. pp.407. 55 Ibid. 56 Al-Quran, 42:38. 57 Al-Quran, 22:41. 58 Al-Bukhari, Kitab-al-Ahkaam, chapter 4, Al-Muslim, Kitab-ul-Amarah, chapter,8, Abu-Daud, Kitab-ul-Jihad, Chapter, 95 in Syed Abul A’ala Maududi, Islami Riyasat, Op Cit. p.408. 59 Al-Muslim, in Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi, “The Islamic State in the Contemporary International Scenario”, Policy Perspectives, vol.4, No. 2, URL: www.ips.org.pk/faith-a- society/islamic-thoughts/1001-the-islamic-state-in-the-contemporary-international- scenario.html. Access date 13th August 2010.

Quran.60 If a ruler does not obey the basic teachings of Islam, he must be removed because Shariah is always above the ruler.61 Islam says that highest jihad is to condemn the wrong ruler.62 Imam Abu Yusuf, a great jurist of the second Islamic century, says that the authority of the ruler to take decisions in public affairs is contingent upon the welfare of the masses and public weal. If an action is justified on the touchstone of public weal, it is permissible as valid; otherwise, it is not legally justified.63

It is one of the most fundamental institutions in Islamic state. It means to call towards right and this is done on individual as well collective level. The Prophet (SAW) says that one who sees the evil must stop it by force and if he does not possess such power should condemn it by words and even if he does not condemn by words, he must call it wrong in his heart, but this is the weakest degree of faith.64 An Islamic government ought to function in such a manner that throughout the world it is identified as the staunch opponent of tyranny, arrogance, disbelief, and materialism, as the sincere defender of the deprived and the oppressed.

Allah says, "You are the best Ummah brought forth to mankind - enjoining the good and forbidding the evil and believing in Allah"65 and "The believers, men and women, are protector-friends of each other, enjoining the correct and forbidding the incorrect."66 “Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity.”67All citizens, men and women, are given the right to vote and there is no

60Kanzul A’mal, vol. 5, Hadith 2505, in Syed Abul A’ala Maududi, Islami Riyasat, Op Cit. p.408. 61 Jan-Erik Lane and Hamadi Redissi, Religion and Politics: Islam and Muslim Civilization, Hants: Ashgate publishing Ltd., 2004, p.146. 62 Abu-Daud, Kitab-ul-Malahim, chapter 17. 63 Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi Op. Cit., 64 Al-Muslim, Kitab-ul-Iman, chapter 20. 65 Al-Quran, 3:110. 66 Al-Quran, 9:71. 67 Al-Quran, 3:104.

37 place for dictatorship in an Islamic state. All individuals are provided with equal opportunities to grow, regardless of their religion and ethnicity.68

Islam gives equal social religious and economic rights to all non-Muslims as well. The early Islamic state provided with all rights to its non-Muslim subjects. Ottomans and Mongols governed multi-ethnic and multi-religious empires for many centuries and majority of their population, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, was satisfied. Broad autonomy was given to the minorities. They enjoyed all of their religious, political, social-cultural and cultural rights. Even minorities had their own educational institutions with their own curricula. The non-Muslims were also given high portfolios in the administration.

Al-Tabari states that under the second caliph of Islam, Umar (RA) “the Christian subjects of Islamic state were provided complete safety to their lives, their property, their churches, their crosses and all of their religious relics. No one would ever destroy their churches or decrease any portion of it or desecrate their crosses or harm any one of their followers”.69Similarly, Khalid bin Waleed (RA), the famous commander of Islamic army stated about the Christians of Anat, which was occupied by Islamic army: “they may blow their Naqus (ring the bells) at any time they pleased either during the day or night except at the time of the five daily prayers of the Muslims (so that they may not be disturbed). They might, if they like, take out the procession of the cross during their religious festivals.70

Justice and benevolence are the fundamental principles of an Islamic state. Ironically, the Muslims rulers who are supposed to be the defender and projectors of justice in their lands are in fact the major cause of injustice in their respective societies. The two very fundamental principles of Islamic society are Adil (just person) individual and Muqsit (dispenser of justice) who is also the ruler. Allah in Quran orders the Muslims to dispense justice in the society. One of the verses of Quran says that it is

68 Maududi, Islami Riyasat, Op. Cit., pp.140-42. 69 A. Rahman Doi, Non-Muslims Under Shariah, (Brentwood, MD: International Graphics, 1979,) p.27. in Mashood A. Baderin Op. Cit., p.605. 70 Mashood A. Baderin Op. Cit., p.605

38 the duty of every individual in an Islamic society to support justice, right and freedom and oppose every kind of injustices.71

Allah says, “o ye who believe! Stand out firmly for God, as witnesses to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is next to piety: and fear God. For God is well-acquainted with all that ye do.”72 And “Certainly We sent Our messengers with clear signs and sent down with them the Book and the Balance that men may conduct themselves with justice; and We have made the iron, wherein is great strength and advantage for men, and that Allah may know who helps Him and His apostles in the secret; surely Allah is Strong, Mighty.”73 He further orders “O believers, be maintainers of justice, bearers of witness for God's sake, even though it be against yourselves, or [your] parents or kinsfolk, whether the man be rich or poor; God is over and above them [in preference]. Therefore don't follow [your] base desires, lest you deviate, and if you swerve or turn aside, then surely God is aware of what you do.”74

Allah Almighty further says that “And act justly. Truly Allah loves those who are just.”75 The Holy Prophet (SAW) says, “O My subjects! I forbade injustice to myself, and forbade it among you. Do not do others injustice.”76 The Prophet (SAW) confirmed a place in the Heavens for those who dispense justice to their ruled.77 He (SAW) stated “people, beware of injustice, for injustice shall be the darkness on the Judgment Day”.78 Second Caliph Umar (RA) said, “Since when did you enslave people who were born free?”79The books of Islamic history as well as the western history are filled with examples of a system based on social justice during the era of second Caliph Umar (RA).

71 Al-Quran, 16:19 72 Al-Quran, 5:8. 73 Al-Quran, 57:25. 74 Al-Quran, 4:135. 75 Al-Quran, 49:9. 76 Sheikh Wahbeh al-Zuhili, Op. Cit., p.84. 77 Muslim. 78 Al-Bukhari, Hadeeth number, 2447. And Masnad-e-Ahmad, Haddeth number, 5798. 79 Sheikh Wahbeh al-Zuhili, Op. Cit., p.84.

Quran says “Allah enjoins justice and good”, “Be just! That is closest to Allah’s consciousness”.80 It further says “We sent down the book (Quran) and the Balance so that mankind might uphold justice”.81 The Holy Prophet is reported to have said that a society can persist with kufr (unbelief) but not with zulm (injustice).82 H.G. Wells also remarks: “Islam has created a society more free from widespread cruelty and social oppression than any society had ever been in the world before.”83Some of the scholars even declare that any government which provides social, economic and political justice is an Islamic government.84Gai Eaton says that Peace and justice are the fundamentals of Islam which are ‘interconnected’ in a sense that it is the justice which ensures peace, tranquility and stability in a society.85

1.7. Implementation of Islamic state in the contemporary world

Islamism is gaining popularity in many Muslim countries in one or the other way, and the basic reason for this is the cumbersome socio-economic and political conditions. Different political Islamic movements emerged during the 20th century in response to the fall of Ottoman Empire, followed by colonialism and then nationalistic movements which broke the backbone of the Muslims. Furthermore, the economic, military and political domination of the Muslim world by west after their independence strongly forced the Muslim thinkers to reinterpret Islamic polity. These movements criticize the moral, societal, political and legal structure of contemporary Muslim societies, which is blamed on the absence of proper Islamic values.

These movements say that since the leadership of Muslim world is tyrant, corrupt, incapable, unjust, does not follow Islamic principles, unable to provide the basic necessities of life to its subjects, and cannot protect their respective states from internal disturbances as well as external threats, therefore, this kind of leadership

80 Charles Le Gai Eaton, “The Concept of Justice in Islam”, URL: http://thebook.org/tbf- articles/article-55.html. Access date 13th August 2010. 81 Ibid. 82 Muhammad Nasran Muhammad, “The Concept of Islamic State”, URL: www.arts.ualberta.ca/cms/mohamad.pdf. 83 Muhammad Shareef Chaudhry, Op. Cit. 84 Nelly Lahoud, Op. Cit., p.24. 85 Charles Le Gai Eaton, Op. Cit.

40 must cease to exist. They say that the implementation of Islamic state(s) is the only remedy for all these ills. They justify themselves by giving the example of early state of Madina in which justice prevailed and the rule of law was ensured.

Major international Islamic issues like Palestine, Kashmir, and the war on terror are the major targets for propaganda by these movements. Strategies of these movements are different just like the different concepts of Islamic states given by different thinkers. These movements promise to bring change in the form of end of corruption, reformation of economies, and adoption of Shariah as the source of law.86According to these Islamic political movements, early Islamic state’s experiences can be used as guideline for the future discourse.

The extremists or rejectionists say that the current political structure (domestic as well as international) are based on tyranny, therefore, needs to be changed. They say that international politics is dominated by the west, especially the US. In this anarchic international system Muslims are suffering. Therefore, to end this suffering, armed jihad is necessary to liberate the Muslims from western tyranny. They say that international organizations like the UN are a mere tool in the hands of these powers. Al-Qaida and associated organizations like Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) etc. are carrying this agenda at international level.

Osama bin Laden openly declared jihad against the west. His deputy and now the leader of al-Qaida, Al-Zawahiri says in his book that “The western forces that are hostile to Islam have joined their hands and adopted a number of tools to fight Islam, including: the UN, friendly rulers of the Muslim people, the MNCs, the international communication and data exchange system, the international new and satellite media channels, the international relief agencies, which are being used as a cover to their espionage, proselytizing, coup planning, and the transfer of weapons.”87

86 Noah Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008,) p.3. 87 Jan-Erik Lane and Hamadi Redissi, Op. Cit., p.209.

Hafez says that “the plethoric literature about radical Islam can be resumed in the “postulate of failure”: failure of modernization, secular legitimization, liberalism and democratization. Islamic violence is explained as natural reaction to structural and symbolic violence, terror from society against terror of the state. Sequential phases, psychological frustrations and socio-historical factors explain the emerging violence.”88Syed Qutb and Ibne Taimya are the basic intellectual source of these radical movements. Many radical political movements at domestic level strongly adhere to Qutb’s thought. These radical domestic movements declare their leadership as Jahiliyah and jihad against them obligatory.

The other form of Islamists is those who want to bring political change in Muslim states through constitutional means. Maududi is ideal for them. Such kind of political Islamists have even joined their hands with the secular political parties to materialize their agenda i.e. to overthrow the authoritarian regimes. These movements/parties take continuous part in elections, whether victorious or losers, they support the system. Parties like JI in Pakistan, Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRP), and so many other parties in the Muslim world follow this path. Then there are other parties which say that implementation of Shariah is not feasible at initial stages, therefore, they prefer to speak in terms of pluralism or civility.89But such political parties do not have strong support across the Muslim world.

Maududi in his book “Islamic State” writes that Islamic system can only be implemented through two ways; through government or through a mass movement. He says that it is the duty of government to implement Islamic laws in a Muslim state and if government is not capable of that then those people be given chance to Islamize the society who know the religion. Then new elections may be held so that people can elect those people who, they think, are the best to run an Islamic state. About the mass movement he says that when majority of the population transformed itself according to Islamic principles then there are bright chances that they would change the regime themselves. It may happen either by overthrowing or through

88 Ibid, p.157. 89 Peter Mandaville, Op. Cit., pp.103-04.

42 elections.90This strategy of mass movement is used by Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HTI) in many countries including Central Asia.

Modern political Islamists are educated and hold more fascination for the educated but unemployed youth. They articulate Islamic teachings with those of modern political and socio-economic needs. 76% candidates of the banned Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria, for example, during 1990s elections hold postgraduate degree while its leader Abbasi Madani had a PhD degree from a British university.91These modern Islamic political movements have their social support in urban middle class, educated and youth. For example, support for HTI, MB, JI and even IRP comes mainly from educated and urban strata. Islamic movements are energetic in social services especially where governments fail. They try to bring social reforms through establishing schools and colleges, hospitals, clinics, legal societies, family assistance programs, Islamic banks and insurance companies, disaster rehabilitation and publishing houses etc. As discussed earlier, socio-economic conditions of the public play important role in popularity of these movements. Reza Pahlavi’s policies of so called modernization, land reforms, unemployment, and oppression at the hands of SAWAK were the main reasons behind Islamic revolution because people needed a change. The French Revolution is also taken an example in this case.

Ethno-nationalism, territorial disputes, unequal access to resources, ever growing rich poor gap, political uncertainty, instability, unpredictability, and lack of institutionalized political processes have helped the Islamists.92 Islamic revivalism in Central Asia tells the same story. The authorities there are tyrant, oppressive and corrupt. States are no more welfare states in Central Asia. They are security states where nepotism, poverty, ethnic and regional divisions, oppression, nonexistence of real opposition, human rights abuses, unemployment, and extremism reign. These conditions have made them volatile for the mushrooming of Islamists who demand for the change.

90 Syed Abul A’la Maududi, Islamic State…, Op. Cit., pp.721-22. 91 Esposito, Political Islam; Beyond… 92 Peter Mandaville, Op. Cit., p.269.

Same happened in Iran, Turkey, Algeria and Malaysia, while same would happen in other Muslims states if the population is not provided with the basic necessities of life. American support to the authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world also creates hatred among Muslims towards west and their values. Again there emerges more demand for the establishment of an Islamic system to get rid of authoritarian regimes and western domination. Recent wave of anti-authoritarianism in the Middle East which swept decades older regime from Tunisia, Libya and Egypt and still struggles against regimes of Syria and Yemen is the result of people’s frustration. The west actively supports these anti-authoritarian or pro-democracy movements in these states but is completely silent, rather supportive towards the authoritarian regimes of Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Jordan and many of the African states. This duality has created anti-Americanism among the Muslims.

On the other hand whenever Islamists came to power, they could neither implement Shariah in their respective states nor could they solve the public issues. People in Iran still suffer a lot and they often demand for more social, economic and political freedoms. The Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) coalition government in Centre and its own government in one of the provinces of Pakistan could not bring any change. Though, they got votes in the name of anti-Americanism, yet they actively supported and strengthened Musharaf’s dictatorial rule that was strongly pro-America. Similarly, Sudanese government under Omar Bashir is unable to deliver its subjects. Even Sudan broke up under this Islamic regime. Taliban regime implemented so called Shariah in Afghanistan but some of their human rights violations and brutalities brought defame to them in almost all the Muslim societies.

The Justice and Development party won elections twice in Turkey due to their economic policies not due to Islamic slogans. They have adopted a rational policy because only slogans cannot redress public grievances. Yousaf Qurdawi, a renowned Islamic scholar in his book, Priorities of the Islamic Movements in the Coming Phase, writes that the duty of the movements is to stand against denial of human rights, authoritarian rulers and political despotism. It should strictly oppose the dictatorship

44 and totalitarianism.93Therefore, we can conclude that exploitation, injustice and inequality are the major reasons for the uprisings in autocratic Muslim states.

1.9. Tahir Amin and the ‘World Orders in Central Asia’

The geo-strategic location and the precious natural resources especially the hydrocarbons of Central Asia have given it great importance in the eyes of the great powers. Right after the independence of Central Asian Republics (CARs), all the leading regional and international actors, better called as ‘world orders’ rushed towards the region in order to get benefit of the region. However, all could not be successful as the political, social and economic conditions of the region were not conducive for these orders to get benefit. Nevertheless, every order continued its engagement with CARs in one or the other way. To pursue their interests, these orders compete as well as cooperate with each other. This scenario of the region has been named as ‘the New Great Game’.

The authors of the project “Defining the Post-Cold War World Order”94 have given five major existing paradigms in post-cold war international politics. These include; ‘End of History’ by Francis Fukuyama, ‘Clash of Civilizations’ by Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Complex Interdependence’ by Joseph Nye, ‘Neo-Realism’ by John Mearsheimer, and ‘The Criminal Anarchy’ by Robert D. Kaplan. However, none of these paradigms could explain the changing dynamics of international politics. According to the authors of ‘World order’ project, their analysis of the principal fault lines of the emerging world order range from civilizational clash (Huntington) to great power competition (Mearsheimer), liberal-market democracy versus history (Fukuyama), American leadership versus disorder (Nye), and anarchy (Kaplan).95

All of these paradigms are concerned with the possible political and probably economic decline of the west. Therefore, to continue the western dominance in

93Shah Abdul Hanna, “Democracy in Islamic Perspective”, URL: http://www.witness- pioneer.org/vil/Articles/politics/democracy_in_islamc-Perspective.htm. Access date 13th August 2010. 94 Hayward R. Alker, Thomas Biersteker, Takashi Inuguchi and Tahir Amin. 95 Hayward R. Alker, Thomas Biersteker, Takashi Inuguchi and Tahir Amin, Defining the Post Cold War World Order, Draft version of project’s chapter one, p.8.

45 international politics and preserve the status quo, they have given these theories. Since none of these paradigms is acceptable to broader international community as a whole, a new concept of multiple world orders has been given by Hayward R. Alker, Thomas Biersteker, Takashi Inuguchi and Tahir Amin. They say that the post-cold war era has witnessed multiple world orders which compete, cooperate, interpenetrate and overlap with each other. World orders encompass ideas about political and economic systems, conceptions of religion and its role in society.96

According to these authors, the world orders are “patterned human activities, interaction regularities, or practices evident on the world scale. World orders are also multidimensional. They traditionally have normative, political, and directional aspect: i.e., they are intentional. They often perform a governance function. Finally, their politically contested goals, norms and values are grounded in widely (intersubjectively) shared beliefs, world views, historical missions, cosmologies or modes of thought.”97These world orders operate in Central Asia as well.

Tahir Amin has described the “World Orders” in Central Asia in details. He says that the “World boundaries do not have to be absolute and mutually exclusive, so, we expect to find overlapping and even interpenetrating orders, and smaller, possibly regional orders within more encompassing, truly global world orders.”98 The competing world orders in Central Asia are; Islamic, Sinic, Western liberal, Slavic, and Residual Socialist. Central Asia has become a sandwich amongst these world orders because all of them compete as well cooperate with each other which have brought the regional leadership at a state of confusion. The situation, however, has benefited the region as CARs not only get assistance but do trade with these orders as well.

According to Tahir Amin, all these ‘orders’ are not unified and have different versions. The Residual Socialist order is divided into ‘Elite Privilege’ and “Soviet

96 Hayward R. Alker, and others, Op. Cit., p.34. 97 Ibid, p.33. 98 Tahir Amin, “World Orders in central Asia”, in Renee Marlin-Bennett, ed. Alker and IR: Global Studies in an Interconnected World, (London; Routledge, 2012,) p.71.

Nationalities’ thinking. This order is engaged in the nation building and wants to establish an independent policy. However, the elite are heavily dependent on Moscow and cannot overlook the Russian minorities living in Central Asia while formulating the policies. The Russian Slavic order has three dimensions; western school of thought, Asiatic school of thought and the Eurasian school of thought. All these three schools of thoughts try to chart out a policy towards Central Asia according to their own viewpoint. The western liberal order looks Central Asia from five different dimensions; including End of History, Clash of Civilizations, Complex Interdependence, Neo-Realism, and Criminal Anarchy. The Islamic World order has two dimensions in the region; static Islam and Transnational Islam. While Sinic world order is stuck between the concepts of weak and strong China and this thinking has deep influence over the Chinese policy towards Central Asia.99

The most important phenomenon, according to Tahir Amin, is that all the world orders are at single page against Islamic World Order. They think the Islamic world order in Central Asia is a destabilizing source for other world orders. The latter is deemed as a common enemy. The coordinated efforts to contain the Islamic order by other world orders have forced the Islamic order to think all the other world orders as common enemies who are engaged to destroy the religious and old cultural sentiments from the region. Tahir Amin says that “The western liberal order finds commonality with the Russian, Sinic and Residual Socialist world orders in combatting the Islamic world order in central Asia.”100

99 For details see Tahir Amin, Op. Cit., pp. 71-85. 100 Ibid, p.72.

The following figure explains the competition and cooperation of world orders in Central Asia.101

It is also interesting to note that there is no single world order within the Islamic world. One may find various Islamic world orders which operate across the whole Muslim world. The major reason is that no single variant of Islam has been given by the Muslim world which is generally acceptable to the international community. Terrorism is one variant of transnational Islamic world order. Today’s Islamism is comprised of static Islam and the transnational Islam. Sometimes, these two Islam compete with each other and sometimes cooperate with other. Same is happening in Central Asia.

101 Ibid, p.75.

Chapter Two

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. Early Period

No exact date is known for the advent of Islam in Central Asia; however, it was the seventh century A.D. when the Muslim merchants of Arab influenced some of the locals who adopted Islam as their faith. Central Asia has been ruled by many dynasties and regimes ranging from Iranians to Turks, Greeks to Huns, Koshans to Chinese, and Czar to Bolsheviks. Prior to Alexander’s occupation in 328 B.C.1, the region remained primarily under Iranian and Turkish occupation. King Kanishka snatched the region from Huns and established Koshan rule in Central Asia.2 Later on, Chinese dominated the region for a short period of time. The major motive of Chinese invasion towards westward was to make the Silk Routes safe. Nevertheless, Iranians dominated the region primarily till the advent of Islam and subsequent conquests of the region by Muslims.

Ubaidullah ibn Zayyad led the first ever Arab expedition to Central Asia in 644 A.D.3This expedition was originated from Khurasan (now in Iran) province of the Islamic State. A peace treaty with the ruler of Bukhara was concluded which provided the Muslim Army with gold and silver coins beside more than 4000 prisoners of war.4But the peace treaty did not last for more than ten years due to the practice of the classical theory of Sayyar at that time which does not permit a Muslim ruler to extend the peace treaty with a non-Muslim state/ruler for more than ten years. At the expiry of peace treaty, Qutaiba ibn Muslim, the then governor of Khurasan, attacked and captured the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand in 670s A.D. This occupation was followed by an indigenous rebellion commonly known as ‘White Robbed Men

1 “A History of Islam in Central Asia”, URL:http://www.myiwc.com/forums/archieves/index.php/t- 3356.html, Access date,20th October 2009. 2 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002,) p.21. 3 Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia, (Beirut: Ithaca Press Readings, 1994,) p.5. 4 Ibid.

Movement’, led by Makkanah which lasted for 14 years but faced a defeat at the hands of Muslim rulers.5

This defeat at the hands of Muslims was primarily due to the ethnic division in the region. The major ethnic groups, Turks and Iranians, did support the Muslims against each other. This success opened the doors for Muslim rule in Central Asia. However, it was 9th century A.D. when Islam pre-dominated the Central Asian region.6When Samanid came to power in the region, Islam was declared as official state ideology. 7 This dynasty gave a highly centralized empire with the dominance of Persian culture. Samarkand and Bukhara became the hub of Islamic socio-cultural and educational activities especially during the “tenth and twelfth centuries”.8 Besides development in the field of art and literature, science and technology, architecture and music, a huge number of mosques and madrasahs were built.

Besides Samanid, Sufis (a tolerant, moderate and mystic group(s) in Islam) also played an important role for the strengthening of Islam in Central Asia. Important Sufi groups in the region were; Yasvia, Qadiria, Naqshbandia, and Kubravia. These Sufis moved from Iraq to Central Asia after the fall of Baghdad at the hands of Mongols in 1282.9 These and other Sufi groups always stood against the anti-Islamist moves. The first such move was an anti-Mongol movement in 1298 led by Mahmood Tarabi who declared himself Khalifa.10It was the religious group which tried to save the region from Mongols’ brutalities since “so called” Muslim secular rulers failed to stop the Mongol invasion in the entire Muslim world including Central Asia.

5 Ibid, p.6. 6 Edward W. Walker, “Islam, Islamism and Political Order in Central Asia”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 56, No.2, 2003, p.22. 7 Vitally V. Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005,) p.6. See also Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Op cit., p.10. 8 Roald Sagdaev, “Central Asia and Islam: An Overview”, in Roald Sagdaev and Susan Eisenhower, eds. Islam and Central Asia: An Enduring Legacy or An Evolving Threat? (Washington: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2000,) p.1. 9 Sheel K. Asopa, “Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Central Asia in the Aftermath of September 11”, in Mahavir Singh, ed. International Terrorism and Religious Extremism: Challenges to South and Central Asia, (Kolkata: MAKAIAS, 2005,) p.161. 10 Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Op Cit., p. 16.

Mongols captured the region in 1220 when the Seljuks, the then Turk rulers of Bukhara executed their envoy in 1218.11Later, two of the Mongol rulers, Barak Khan and Mubarak Shah embraced Islam. This brought another era of Muslim rule in the region. Kebek Khan, a Mongol ruler declared Islam as official religion of Central Asian Mongol empire.12Mongols, due to their nomadic culture, were more inclined towards Sufism than clergy. Mongols were replaced by Tamerlane. During Tamerlane era, Islam retained its position in official circles. Now clergy alongwith Sufis also enjoyed the prominent position.

Shaybanis replaced Tamerlane in 1500 A.D. Shaybanis were very supportive to Islam. They not only built more mosques and madrasahs but also established Qazi (Muslim religious) courts.13The importance of Central Asia as the major route of trade between China and Europe declined with the advent of sea trade. Subsequently, the region faced huge decline in the trade revenues. Gradually the Shaybani dynasty got weakened and disintegrated into three separate and independent khanates; Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand.

Area where Islam put deep imprints in Central Asia was Fergana Valley. This area became the hub of Islamic activities in the region. Major centers of Islam like Bukhara, Samarkand, and Kokand also lies in this Valley. Most of the Islamic movements and uprisings were born here. Impact of Fergana valley is not evident only in Central Asia but in the Indian Sub-continent and Iran as well. Life in contemporary Fergana Valley is also deeply influenced by the Islamic and local traditions. Islam had such an importance in the region that nothing was important to the people of Fergana than Islam, even their clans and ethnicity.14Besides Fergana, Islam spread into the urban centers of the region. People in cities were more open towards the new religion while rural population was least interested to adopt Islam, due to their nomadic and tribal life where local customs and traditions were practiced.

11 Ahmad Rashid, Op. Cit., p.22. 12 Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Op Cit., p. 17. 13 Ibid, p.19. 14 Vasiliy V. Batthold, Istoriya Kulaornoy Zhinzi Turkestan (History of the Civilizations of Turkestan), (Leningrad: Leningradski Institute Zhiuykh Vostochnykh Iazykov, 1927,) p.78.

During the early Islamic era in Central Asia, huge advancement was done in the fields of art, literature, poetry, philosophy, science, music and architecture. With the help of local traditions and norms, Muslim conquerors brought in social, economic and political stability in Central Asia. The region predominantly practices Hanafi school of thought of Sunni sect however, a small portion of Shiite population also lives in Gornobadakhshan (Tajikistan), and Samarkand and Bukhara (Uzbekistan) regions.

2.2. Central Asia Under Czar

Czar Russia’s invasion of Central Asia started from Kazakh steppe by defeating the Hordes. The last Horde was defeated by the Russians in 1848. 15 The Russian occupation of Central Asia was completed by 1881. They connected the region with mainland Russia by constructing a railway network through Caspian region. Before it occupied Central Asia, Russia had sent many expeditions to the region during 1860s and 1870s with mixed results of success and failure. It was not only the geo-strategic importance of Central Asia for Russia but the halt of cotton supply from America to Russian factories due to American civil war was another vital reason to occupy it. The alternative source of cotton supply to the Russian cotton industry was Central Asia.

British colonization of the Indian subcontinent was perceived as the potential threat for Russian political position not only in the region but also in the international politics by St. Petersburg. This shift in the balance of power in the region led to the emergence of “The Great Game”. Russia had no option but to keep a tight control over the region. After capturing Kazakh steppe, Russian forces captured Tashkent and subsequently the whole of Central Asia.16Although, a gradual social change started under Czar, Islamic traditions were not touched by the Russians. They knew how deeply Islam was embedded in the region’s social and cultural life.

15 Dilip Hiro, Between Marx And Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia, (London, HarperCollins Publishers, 1994,) p.1. 16 Ahmad Rashid, “The New struggle in Central Asia: A primer for the Baffled”, World Policy Journal, Winter 2000/01, p.36.

There were two important responses to the Russian occupation in Central Asia. First came from traditionalists while other was from reformists. Traditionalists were of the view that Russian dominance will destroy the Islamic identity of the region while reformists wanted to introduce new and modern teachings in the Islamic discourse. However, Czar was very pragmatic. Although, most of the common people trusted and obey religious clergy who were the most learned and pious among them,17 the Russians won the trust of some notable Muslim figures whom they used for their political motives. Those traditionalists who supported Czar had their own justification; to unite the divided Central Asian population.

Nevertheless, Russian troops kept advancement deep into the region. In 1867, Bukhara fell into the hands of Czar Troops who declared Central Asian region Turkestan province. Khiva and Bukhara were made Russian protectorates. An uprising in 1873 under the leadership of Sufi sheikh Mullah Hassan Ogly broke out in Kyrgyz part of Fergana valley which was crushed by Russian forces under the leadership of Gen Mikhail Skobelev.18 This uprising had backing from the clergy as well as political leadership, which declared Russian occupation as an attack from Dar-ul-Harb on Dar-ul-Islam.

The next important uprising against Russian occupation was in 1885. This uprising happened again in Fergana valley. The movement was led by Dervesh Khan, which spread very quickly into Andijon, Osh and Mergelan areas.19This uprising was also crushed very quickly by the Russian forces. The most important uprising against the Russian rule was in Andijon in 1898. This uprising was led by Dukehi Islam. His forces killed 22 Russian troops. 20 This occupation was a direct outcome of the economic hardships of the people of Fergana. Economically improvised people were joined by those who lost their jobs after Russian occupation.

17 Richard Bulliet, Islam: the View From the Edge, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1994,) p.194. 18 Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Op Cit., pp.39-40.

19 Richard A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia: 1867-1917, n.k., p.223. 20 For further details see Sato Tsugitaka, Muslim Societies: Historical and Comparative Aspects, (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004,) pp.29-61.

There were rumors that once the people of Andijon start their uprising, the British from India, Sultan of Turkey and Amir of Afghanistan will send their help. On the other hand, Russian got tip off that there may be an uprising but they underestimated that and did not react on time. On 18th May, 1898 almost 500 to 600 people attacked Russian military barracks killing twenty two soldiers besides injuring many. Retaliation from Russian army was intense. They drove the local attackers out of the city and eventually forced them to run away. From the next day, many of the leaders of this uprising were captures. Dukehi Islam and his five companions were hanged to death on 13th July, 1898.21

On 15th November, 1905, another mutiny broke out this time in Tashkent where local Muslim soldiers of Central Asia refused to obey the orders of Russian high command and later tried to take over the Tashkent Fortress.22Besides clergy and Sufis, some of the poets, through their poetry criticized Russian occupation in Central Asia. The most prominent of them were Muhammad Amin and Muqimy.23The important fact about these uprisings is that all of them were originated in Fergana valley. Islam had and has deep influence in this valley. All of the current Islamic movements also arose from this valley. During the czar occupation Peter I stated that influence of clergy in Fergana valley is so much that this influence needs centuries to be eradicated.24

To counter these and other such insurgencies against their rule, Russians carried out the policy of carrots and sticks. Russian authorities gave incentives to the official clergy to pacify them. They knew it that how much influential this clergy is on the people. For this purpose, “czar endorsed Regulations for the Management of Religious Affairs of the Transcaucasia Muslims” 25 in 1872. These regulations exempted clergy from paying of taxes besides giving the status of noblemen 26 .

21 Richard A. Pierce, Op. Cit., pp.231-232. 22 Ibid. p.241. 23 Robert D. Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia, (London: Harvard University Press, 2006,) p.255. 24 Pashino, Turkestanskii Kari, V 1866godu, n.d, n.k, pp.165-166. 25 Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Op. Cit., p.41. 26 Although, Peter “the Great” declared it obligatory to convert to Christianity to become the nobility in Russia, the czar did not follow the same policy in Central Asia. They wanted to have control over the local population for which they did not want to annoy the clergy.

Oriental Printing House was established to print the copies of Quran alongwith other religious books.

Czar tried to reformulate the education system of Central Asia on modern lines. Reformists saw this move in a positive way. In the beginning, Russia assure the people of Central Asia that if they surrender to czar, their faith will be protected but once consolidated powers, czar reformed the Central Asian society with Russian language, lifestyle and culture. They also replaced Qazi courts with Peoples’ Courts. Similarly, Muslim pilgrimage to Macca was also controlled by the authorities. However, the change of regime in Russia brought a halt to czar motives in the region. They were defeated by the Bolsheviks and Central Asia was occupied by the Soviet forces.

The second response to Russian occupation of Central Asia was from the reformists who appreciated the policies of modernization. They were very much in favor of introduction of modern curriculum in Central Asian schools. They themselves established many of such schools. These schools provided local children with a new way of thinking. This school of thought was commonly known as “Jaded” (new method). Father of this school of thought is known as Ismael Beg Gasprinski, a Tatar intellectual who established this school of thought in Russia. Jaded movement will be discussed in details later in this chapter.

2.3. Central Asia Under Soviet rule

The most repressive period of Central Asian history is the Soviet era. The seventy years Soviet rule used all the measures to curb local culture and norms in Central Asia. Soviet authorities under Stalin left no stone unturned to reform the Central Asian society on Soviet lines. He replaced all the indigenous religious and social norms with those of Soviet norms. Qazi courts were replaced by the Peoples Courts, women were forced to do labor in cotton fields and that too with the men, Islamic education was banned, Muslim rituals like marriage, divorce etc. were also replaced, the script of local languages was changed from Arabic to Cyrillic, thousands of mosques and madrasahs were closed down and the worshipers and places of worship

55 came under attack. He totally changed the centuries old demography of Central Asia by creating five new states through artificial boundaries dividing ethnicities into these five states. The worst hit area was Fergana valley which was divided into Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This division proved a sharp division among ethnic demography of the area resulting into acute tension among ethnic groups.

The Red Army completed its Turkestan’s expedition by April 1918. The first uprising against the Red Army surfaced in January 1919 in Tashkent. The uprising was unsuccessful and was crushed by the Red Army. With the help of local sympathizers like “Young Khivans”, “Young Bukharans” 27 and “Alsh Orda”, which registered themselves with the Communist Party of Soviet Union, 28 soviet authorities consolidated their powers in the region. Once Moscow controlled the Basmachi29, they started Sovietization of Central Asia with collectivization 30 of farms and nationalizing the private entrepreneurs. The collectivization policy forced many ethnic Kyrgyz and Kazakhs to migrate to their neighboring states. This migration along with

a famine during the 1930s killed almost 4.5 million people.31 During the early 1920s, Soviet authorities banned all the political groups in the region except the Communist party. An “Iron curtain” was put along the borders of Central Asia except those connecting it to Russia.

A propaganda war was started against the religion by the Bolsheviks. Islamic practices like fasting and circumcision were declared unhealthy, therefore, banned.

27 Young khivans and Young Bukharans were the jaded groups in Central Asia. These groups will be discussed in details under the heading of Jaded Movement in the same chapter. 28 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.18. 29 Another anti-Soviet movement which wanted to bring independence in Central Asian Khanates, It will also be discussed in details later in this chapter. 30 The policy of collectivization was introduced by the Soviet authorities in order to overcome the food distribution problems and supply of raw materials to the industries in the Republic. Under this policy, most of the rural lands, population, houses and their livestock were brought under the state control. Even nomads were forced to abandon their cattle in favor of state. Many of the nomads killed their cattle instead giving it to the state. It not only brought new problems for different ethnicities in Central Asia but also broke the social power structure by depriving the lands to landlords, begs, ihsans and clergy. 31 Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990,) p.67.

Self-flagellation by Shiite population in the memory of Hussain (the grandson of the Holy Prophet) was declared barbaric act. Islam was declared as primitive, intolerant and conservative religion. It was declared as primitive and revolutionary and an alien religion which was imposed by the warriors on the people of this region.32Other anti- religion measures include shutting down of mosques and replacing them with workshops, children were forbidden to get Islamic education, veil for women was banned and Islamic ceremonies were abolished.

To further change the demography of the region, Soviet authorities encouraged the migration of ethnic Russians to Central Asia. About 1.7 million Russians migrated to the region between 1926 and 1939 33 occupying most of administrative posts and business in Central Asia. The Ulema (religious leaders) of the time asked Muslim population to wage jihad against the rule of Dar-ul-Harb in Dar-ul-Islam and if they fail in their struggle, they would migrate from central Asia to other Muslim regions as the last resort.34

However, during the Second World War Moscow eased its oppressive policies towards Central Asia. It needed the region to shift its industries from the frontline western borders to safe Central Asia and manpower which could serve in the Russian military. To make the central Asian population happy, Muslim Religious Board was established for Central Asia and Kazakhstan in Tashkent.35Once Russia was able to push Germany back, it reintroduced harsh religious policies in Central Asia. “Council for Affairs of Religious Cults” was established by Moscow in May 1944. 36This Council introduced more harsh policies towards Islam in the region.

Another era of religious relaxation was introduced during 1955 to 1958 during Khrushchev era. Limited level pilgrimage to Macca was permitted; some famous Ulema from the Muslim world were invited to Tashkent on official tour to show them

32 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.25. 33 Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her colonies, (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1952,) p.14. 34 Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Op. Cit., p.82. 35 Edward W. Walker, Op. Cit., p.24. 36 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad…, Op. Cit., p.39.

57 the commonalities between Islam and Socialism, 37and a few mosques were opened under the state control. These measures were politically motivated as Soviet Union was experiencing the Cold War during that era.

Despite these harsh measures by the Soviet authorities, Islam survived in Central Asian society in one or the other way. The most important part for the survival of Islam was played by Sufis and Muhallahs (neighborhood). Clandestine mosques were established by ihsans, pirs and clergy. The communist holidays were celebrated by zeal and zest to transform religious and local cultural norms to new generations clandestinely. Many of the underground madrasahs were established at homes where religious values were discussed and practiced at nights. There were 700 unofficial mullahs and about 500 shrines in Tajikistan only during the 1960s.38

By the end of 1970s an underground group of young Uzbeks surfaced in Fergana valley. Their leaders were Abdul Wali and Allama Rahmatullah. This group established clandestine underground madrasahs where the teachings of Islamic scholars and especially Maududi were taught. This group, which claimed itself as a movement, later declared its objectives to establish Musalmanabad (Muslim Land) in Fergana valley. The construct for the land, according to this group were;

i. Unification of Central Asia and all other Muslim countries as a single unified state ii. Application of Shariah laws in this land and iii. The rulers would be educated clergy.39

With the introduction of Perestroika and glasnost by Mikhail Gorbachev, hundreds of new mosques and madrasahs were opened in Central Asia. Islamic literatures and the copies of Quran were sent to the region from other Muslim countries notably, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. The clandestine Mullahs took over these mosques as prayer leaders where they started preaching of Islamic

37 Ibid. 38 Ahmad Rashid, “the Fires of faith in Central Asia”, World Policy Journal, Spring 2001, p.47. 39 Abdul Jabbar A. Abduvakhintov, “The Jadid Movement and its Impacts on Contemporary Central Asia”, in Hafeez Malik, ed. Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994,) p.73.

58 revivalism in the Central Asian society. The Afghan war also provided Central Asian population with a new ideology and a sense of belonging to wider Muslim community. Number of people to pilgrimage to Macca increased many fold. Majority of the faithful deemed perestroika as a result of their prayers and a divine help to them.40

Iranian Revolution also provided Central Asian Muslims with a hope of liberation. Some of the Islamic groups started their activities on the line of Iranian Revolution but it was Afghan War of 1980s which brought new thinking in the region. The Soviet forces recruited native Central Asian for Afghan expedition in order to give a perception that Soviets are not anti-religious or anti-Islam but the consequences of this recruitment were negative. Many of the Central Asian soldiers in Afghanistan either joined Mujahidin or got impressed of them. Those who came back from Afghanistan used to narrate their experiences in Afghan war and the bravery of Mujahidin. These stories acted as catalyst for the Islamic revivalism in Central Asia.

By the time of Soviet disintegration, Islamic revivalism in the region was at its peak. Many groups were involved in the promotion and protection of Islamic activities. These groups and their activities will be discussed in the next chapters. However, two very important movements during the Russian and Soviet rules in Central Asia are worthy to mention. These movements include the Jaded Movement and the Basmachi Movement. Although, both the movements were for Islamic revivalism, yet they were totally different in their motives, strategies and operations. Several times these movements fought against each other. Let us discuss these movements in details.

2.4. Jaded Movement

Many modern reform movements started by the end of twentieth century in different parts of the Muslim world especially in the Indian sub-continent, Egypt, Turkey and Russia. Prominent propagators of these movements were Jamal Uddin Afghani, Muhammad Abdu, Muhammad Iqbal, Syed Ahmad Khan, Ismael Beg Gaspirali (commonly known as Gasprinski), and Rasheed Rida etc. The Russian Tatars

40 Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Op. Cit., p.109.

Muslims introduced this school of thought in Russia which spread over to Central Asia later on. Khiva and Bukhara remained the main centers of Jadedism in Central Asia.

People of Central Asia always remained under the influence of clergy in the form of local imams who adhere to traditional school of Islamic thought. They disliked innovations in Islam or modernization of the religion brought by the Jadeds. Some of the Muslim scholars and intellectuals of Central Asia and Russia challenged the orthodox authority of this school of thought in religious affairs. They wanted reforms in the religion on modern lines. People like Vali khanov, Ismael Beg Gasprinski, Shahabudin Mirjani, Abdul Qayyum Nasiri, Ahmad Danish, Abdur Rauf Fitrat, Saddruddin Aini, Khoja Behbudi, Abdul Qadir Shakuri, Ajzi, Haji Moin, al-Qursavi and Abdur Rashid Khan were the prominent preachers of this school of thought.

Before the Jaded movement was formally inaugurated by Gasprinski, it was Chokan Valikhanov who advocated the unification of Asian and Russian cultures together.41He said that for the sake of modernizing the Central Asian population, religion must be put aside from social and political matters. According to Adeeb Khalid, “they called themselves as Ziyalilar (intellectuals) or Taraqqiparwar (progressive)”.42 Al Qursavi, a Jaded declared that ijtehad (independent reasoning) is inevitable to pull out the Muslims from their miseries. He severely criticized blind submission of the Muslims towards clergy. Traditional mullah did not like him and issued a fatwa (religious declaration) to kill Qursavi. 43 However, he managed to escape to Constantinople.

Another Jaded was Shahabuddin Mirjani. He was a teacher in a religious school. He wanted to revive real Tatar culture in Central Asia. He left that religious school and joined the Jaded (modern) school where he started teaching. These Jaded schools used to teach modern subjects like math, algebra, art, science and Russian literature

41 Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Op. Cit., p.55. 42 Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reforms: Jadidism in Central Asia, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998,) p.40. 43 Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Op. Cit., p.56.

60 beside Islamic teachings. 44 Mirjani wanted religious reforms. He proposed those reforms on these basis; “let every Muslim find his own answer in Quran to question about religion, put an end to tradition to unquestioning submission, remove old dogmatic scholastic books from Madrassahs, introduce the teachings of Quran, Hadith and the history of Islam, permit the teaching of secular science and the Russian language at religious schools and bring the Muslims back to roots of early Islamic culture.”45One of Mirjani’s students was Hussain Feitskhani, who planned to modernize the madrassahs curriculum. Abdul Qayyun Nasiri, a Tatar poet, also played an important role in this modernization.46

Another religious figure who joined Jaded School was Ahmad Danish. Danish had an appointment of Mudarris (Professor) at a religious institution. He also demanded ijtehad in the religion. This school wanted Muslims to participate in political matters so that they can have a check on the appointment, working, and replacement of the leadership according to the modern means. Jaded convened a Pan-Islamic Conference in 1905 under the leadership of Abdur Rashid Ibrahimov where they established the “Alliance of Muslims”. 47 Through this Alliance, they tried to convince the local population that many people across the Muslim world endorse their thinking.

Jaded thought Russia as a “necessary evil” 48 and were of the view that Russian imperialism will eventually bring modernization and development in the region. They wanted to reform education system according to western lines therefore, Russian presence was perceived as a potential help. Although, Czar’s policy towards Central Asian madrassahs was of non-interference49 yet it tried to introduce modern education in them. Another reason to support Russia was Jaded animosity with Qadimists. The major slogan of Jaded was “modernization, pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism.” Russian authorities also showed relatively soft image to Jaded because they were potential

44 Ahmad Rashid, “The Fires of Faith in Central Asia”, World Policy Journal, Spring 2001, p.46. 45 Edwards J. Lazzerini, “The Jadid Response to Pressure for Change in the Modern Age”, in Jo-Ann Gross, ed. Muslims in Central Asia: Expression of identity and Change, (London: Duke University Press, 1992,) pp.161-162. See also Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Op. Cit., pp.56-57. 46 Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, Russian Research Center Studies, N.K., p.24. 47 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.4. 48 Ibid. 49 Serge A. Zenkovsky, Op. Cit., p.76.

61 allies for them in Central Asia. The authorities helped them to publish their material as well.

Jaded used not only books and magazines for their purpose; they also used theatre, stage shows, journals, newspapers, and poetry to spread their message. One of the most prominent jaded poets was Abdur Rauf Fitrat. He tried utmost to revive the social structure of society through his poetry. He wanted geography and history to be included in the curriculum because these subjects, according to him, were extremely important to study. Change was inevitable to him. In one of his articles, he wrote “it is impossible to deny the changes wrought by humans in the world. Are these changes progress or decline? Of course, progress, and they have not stopped at the point to our day. The humanity has progressed from its creation to our days, and after our time too, it will progress.”50He accused clergy for the downfall of Muslims stating that isolation from world cultures, modern technology and sophisticated weapons and sectarianism in the form of Sunni-Shia conflict is the product of clergy.51

One of the plays of Haji Muin described that “when will we the Muslims of Turkestan save ourselves from this ignorance? Ignorance has turned us into drunkards, pederasts, fools and even wastrels. Therefore, positive changes must be brought in education and political and social behavior and this change will come through ijtehad.”52 The Jaded publishers in Central Asia started publishing the work of different modern philosophers, poets and writers. Books imported mainly from Turkey and Iran were translated into native languages by these publishers.

The sectarian rift within traditionalists and sectarian violence of 1910 in Bukhara opened new ways of popularity for the Jaded. The sectarian violence in the form of Shia-Sunni violence proved as blessing for Jaded as they got more support from the common people. However, during the World War I, Jaded along with Qadimists as well as common people fought a war against czar but were crushed down by the

50 Adeeb Khalid, Op. Cit., p.47. 51 Serge A. Zenkovsky, Op. Cit., p.88. 52 Adeeb Khalid, Op. Cit., p.223.

Russian forces. 53 During the czar-Soviet conflict over Turkestan, the region was declared as autonomous region by the local fighters but with the triumph of Soviet forces in Russia, “declared autonomy” of Turkestan was challenged by the Soviet authorities.

During 1910-1916 cotton production and its sale to international markets increased the per capita income of Central Asian population. A new middle class emerged which wanted to free itself from chieftaincy and feudalism. This class of ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks tilted towards modernization. This new class produced many of Central Asian Jadeds. Ahmad Danish, a poet and Bukhara statesman went to Russia on an official visit where he minutely observed the Russian schools and their educational system. He got so impressed of that system that he criticized Islamic clergy for not providing Muslim students with modern education.

Slowly and gradually, Soviet authorities started consolidating their powers in today’s Central Asia. Initially, the Soviet authorities were more open and supportive to Central Asian people. On 16th December 1917, the Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) addressed an appeal from Central Asia, which declared that all the people of the “Republic” have equal rights. They have right to religion, indigenous values, customs and beliefs and their local laws will be implemented instead of old czar laws. This declaration also called czar as “Oppressors of Russia.’54

Although, Soviets tried to win the confidence of local people, the locals again declared Turkestan’s autonomy on 13th December 1917 and started a resistance movement against the Red Army. Not only Turkestan but Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan was also declared as an autonomous region by Kazakh National Congress in December 1917. Both these regions were recaptured by the Red Army by January 1918. Later in February 1918, Kokand was also captured by the Red Army which completed the Soviet invasion of Central Asia. When the invasion was completed in

53 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.6. 54 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. VI, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1962,) p.213.

Central Asia, it was declared as Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on 30th April, 1918.55It was followed by a rapid process of nationalization in Turkestan.

The Andijon uprising of 1898 and its subsequent failure forced many people in the region to think about the causes for the failure of that uprising. One of the conclusions was that since the uprising was led by the traditional mullahs, response to Russian occupation must have been in modern and western style.56 Despite opposition from the conservative clergy, the popularity of Jaded continued to mount. By the end of 1908, there were about 100 jaded schools in Turkestan.

Jaded started massive campaign to project their agenda through several newspapers and journal including; Urto Oziening Umrguzorligi (Middle Asian Observer) in 1905, Tarakki (Progress) in 1906, Khurshid (The Sun) in 1906, Shohrat (Glory) in 1907, Azie (Asia) in 1908, Tudzhar (Trader) in 1908, Bukhari Shareef (Bukhari Shareef) in 1912, Samarkand (Samarkand) in 1914, Sada-i-Fergana and Sada-i-Turkestan (the Voice of Fergana and voice of Turkestan) in 1914 & 1915, Islah (to Correct) in 1915 and Yurt (Homeland) in 1916.57Two magazines for women were also launched. They were Alam-e-Niswan (the world of Women) and Suyum Bike.58 They also brought books from foreign lands and translated them into local languages.

Ismael Beg Gasprinski was born in 1851 in the village of Ajikoi in Crimea region of Russia. He started his early education from a religious school. After completion of primary schooling, he joined a Russian school. After completion of his studies he became a part of Russian military as a lieutenant. The Russian military culture influenced the thinking of Gasprinski on modern lines. He was very uncomfortable with the situation of Muslims of Russia. He travelled to countries France, Turkey, Northern Africa, and Russia which broadened his political vision.

55 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., pp.12-15. 56 Richard A. Pierce, Op. Cit., p.233. 57 Richard A. Pierce, Op. Cit., p.259. See also Alexander Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet States, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983,) pp.78-79. 58 Adeeb Khalid, Op. Cit., p.223.

Gasprinski strongly advocated the inclusion of Muslim lands into Russia.59He wanted these territories to be included into Russia in order to make them strengthened. He also advocated ijtehad in Muslim political matters. His slogan was “Dilde, Fikirde, Ishte Birlik” i.e. “unity of thought and action.” 60 He sought help from Russian authorities to establish new maktab schools. Gasprinski believed that “modern life and capabilities were not secrets reserved for Europe and its offshoots, but were available to all societies willing to face the challenge of change, and willing to sacrifice worthless traditions for progress.”61 In 1884, he was successful to establish the first Jaded school in Crimea. This was the first step towards the revolutionization of Muslim culture and politics in Russia.

The father of Jaded in central Asia is considered as Saddrudin Aini who had a Qadimist background as well. However, the first Jaded School established in Central Asia was in Tashkent which was established by Munawwar Qari in 1901. 62 A similar kind of school was established by Behbudi in Samarkand in 1903. The total number of Jaded schools in Central Asia at the time of Soviet occupation was 5000.63 Qari encouraged his student to visit Turkey and Azerbaijan for further modern studies.64Most of the members of this movement were literate people from all the walks of life. Majority of them belonged to the middle class. There were few businessmen and low level state officials who also supported the movement.

Inspired by the “Young Turks” revolution of 1908, the Jaded also preached a two way strategy in Central Asia; enlightenment and then political struggle.65To further the process of enlightenment through the freedom of press and delivering lectures, “The Aid’, a cultural society was established by the Jaded.66The Basmachis supported by

59 Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Op. Cit., p.59. 60 AbdulJabbar A. Abdurakhitov, Op. Cit., p. 68. 61 Abdul Hafeez Malik, “Central Asia’s Geographical Significance and Problems of Independence: An Introduction”, in Hafeez Malik, Op. Cit., p.7. 62 There is difference between the writers whether this school was established in 1898 or 1901. However, most of the writers date it 1901. 63 Alan A. Fisher, “Ismael Beg Gaspirali: Model Leader for Asia”, in Edward Allworth, ed. Tatars of Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988,) p.69. 64 Richard A. Pierce, Op. Cit., pp.254-255. 65 Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Op. Cit., p.63. 66 Serge A. Zenkovsky, Op. Cit., p.84. see also Adeeb Kahlid, Op. Cit., p.60.

Qadimists were also fighting to gain control of different Central Asian cities. During that time, Junaid Khan was one of the strongest Basmachi leaders in Khiva. Junaid Khan alongwith Isfandyar Khan, another Basmachi, attacked and captured Khiva.

The fall of Khiva into the hands of Junaid khan proved to be very fatal for the Jaded. Junaid khan persecuted most of them. However, some of them were lucky enough o escape to Tashkent where they established “Young Khivan Group”67 to fight against Junaid and to give refuge to other Jaded. When joined by hundreds of other Jaded who fled from khiva and Tashkent, the Young khivans requested help from the Soviet authorities against the alleged oppression of Junaid khan.68Responding to the appeal of Young khivans, Moscow declared Junaid khan an oppressive and tyrant man. The soviets sent a military expedition to khiva on 25th December 1919 which got success and drove Junaid khan out to Karakum desert by the end of June 1920.69

Young khivans established their government in Khiva under the patronage of Moscow. This government was headed by Niyaz Yousapov.70 They also cooperated with the Red Army in its Central Asian occupation. A similar kind of group named “Young Bukharans’ was established in Bukhara by the Jaded in 1909. Following the footsteps of Young khivans, Young Bukharans also invited the Red Army to attack and seize Bukhara. The Red Army swiftly responded and occupied Bukhara and installed a new government of Jaded under Faizullah Khoja. 71 In return to the establishment of Jaded government in Bukhara, the Soviet forces took all the wealth of Bukhara to Moscow declaring that it is a gift by the great people of Bukhara.

This act of the Soviet authorities annoyed some of the Jadeds. Head of the Young Bukharans group, Osman Khoja was at the forefront of those who disliked this act.

67 Zhizn Natsionalnostei, 20th April, 1919, p.1. 68 Devendra Kaushik, Central Asia in the Modern Times: A History From the Early 19th Century, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970,) p.153. 69 Seymour Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and khiva (1865-1924), (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968,) p.288. 70 Fazl-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, The Basmachi Movement in Soviet central Asia: A Study in Political Development, (Peshawar: Emjay Books international, 1985,) p.64. 71 Ibid., p.66.

He started secret negotiations with Enver Pasha72which resulted in a treaty between Pasha and Osman khoja. This treaty declared that both of them will fight against the Red Army. Since then Jaded had been divided into two camps; the nationalists and the pro-revolution.73 Nationalists wanted to struggle for the enlightenment of Central Asian society without the patronage of Soviet authorities while pro-revolutionaries wanted Soviet support and patronage. This division was the strongest jerk to Jadeds struggle. Already few in numbers, the division made them vulnerable to be washed out.

The pro-revolution jaded were given the task by Soviet authorities to recruit maximum number of Communist Party members from Central Asia. The Central Committees of the Communist Party in Khiva and Bukhara, elected in September 1920, mostly had Jaded as their members.74The policies of Turkestan Commission established by Soviet authorities made some of Jaded uneasy. The Central Committee of the Party rejected the demand of Jaded raised by Validov to include the Muslims from Central Asia in the Turkestan Commission. On the other hand General Frunze, the head of the Commission was also unhappy with the monopoly of Uzbek Muslims in the administration which, wanted to retain their monopoly and were against the policies of the commission.75

Once the Soviet authorities consolidated their power in Central Asia, the central committee of the Party started cleansing itself and administration from Jadeds. Although, Jaded were allowed to retain the membership of the Communist Party, they were not included into the new Turkestan government. Moscow perceived Jadeds as potential threat to their authority in the region; therefore, they decided to purge them out of Central Asia. They thought that Jaded may demand independence of Turkestan.

72 Enver pasha was a minister in the Sultan of Turkey’s cabinet. He went into exile to Moscow after the fall of Ottoman Empire and the establishment of secular Turkey by Mustafa Kemal pasha. Moscow sent him to Central Asia to negotiate with the Basmachis but instead of convincing them to throw the arms he himself joined the Basmachi Movement and fought against the Soviet forces till his death. 73 Geoffrey Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964,) p.112. 74 Adeeb Kahlid, Op. Cit., p.298. 75 Serge A. Zenkovsky, Op. Cit., p.247.

In order to divide the Central Asian population in general and Fergana valley in particular on ethnic, linguistic and regional bases, the Soviet authorities under the rule of Stalin divided the region into five new states. This division proved fatal for the struggle of not only Basmachis but Jaded also. This division brought new identities and new problems which still exist in Fergana valley. The division never let the people of this region to get united against any Soviet move.

This was the time of Jaded decline. Due to internal division and the Soviet policies, the movement got weakened and was unable to re-organize itself. Most of the leaders of the movement met with violent deaths. Some of them were killed by Qadimists or Basmachis while others were crushed by Soviet authorities. Some disappeared during late 1920s and early 1930s. In order to have local support, Soviet authorities created a new class of young Central Asians who replaced the old Jadeds and were groomed in total Russian style; Adeeb Khalid called them class of 38.76This class best served the Soviet interests in Central Asia. Although, Jaded tried to revive after the Central Asian independence but they were overwhelmed by Qadimists. Moreover, governments of independent Central Asia did not show any interest in the revival of Jadedism which led to another death to Jaded in Central Asia.

2.5. Basmachi Movement

Lenin and the other communist leaders severely criticized the Czar imperialism in Central Asia. They declared that they will treat all ethnicities on equal footings and would give national self-determination to the local people.77 However, despite these promises and statements, many of the local people did not like Soviet invasion of Central Asia. One of the movements which started at the time of transition from czar to Soviet in Central Asia was the Basmachi Movement. This movement tried to liberate the region from Soviet occupation. Although, the movement was brutally crushed by the Soviet authorities, nevertheless, it put profound effects on Central Asian society for the coming years. It was the strongest anti-imperialist movement of Central Asia throughout Russian and Soviet occupation. The most important

76 Adeeb Khalid, Op. Cit., p.300. 77 Geoffrey Wheeler, Op. Cit., p.99.

68 shortcoming of this movement which led to its failure was that it did not have centralized leadership and was divided among different smaller groups with their own leadership. Furthermore, this division never let the groups to operate in an organized way. The movement has different meanings; ranging from the Beg’s Movement to Freeman’s movement, and from bandits to Violate.

2.5.1. Reasons for the Emergence of Basmachi Movement

Major reasons for the uprising of this movement were; Soviet invasion of Central Asia, economic crisis, and the cruel famine. According to some authors, elimination of exemption from the military services given to the Central Asian population by Czar, 78extermination of Kokand government by Soviets79 and a ban on the local people into administration were other causes of this rebellion. The unrest among the local population started at the time of czar rule during 1914 when the ethnic Russian and Ukrainian workers were encouraged to migrate to this region. This migration was not welcomed by the locals.

With the Bolshiveks in power in Moscow, the Jadids and the Qadimists established a joint organization Shura-i-Islami (Islamic council) in March 1917 in order to develop a future roadmap for Turkestan. However, Qadimists split and made their own group, Ulema Jameti (Union of Clergy). Different rounds of meeting were held to decide the future political system of Turkestan. When the Soviets, who were non-Muslims and came from house of war according to local elite, tried to seize Tashkent in late 1917, a sense of Turkic nationalism emerged in that region.80

All-Muslim conference was convened in Tashkent to assess the situation. This conference demanded Turkestan’s autonomy within the Soviet state but Moscow showed cold response to this demand. The Congress of Soviet responded to this demand in these words; “it is impossible to let the Muslims into the revolutionary government at this time, because the attitude of the local population towards the

78 Armed conflicts Events data, “Basmachi Rebellion 1916-1931”, URL: www.onwarcom/aced/data/bravo/basmachi1916.htm. Access date 25th March 2009. 79 Fazl-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, Op. Cit., p.5. 80 Geoffrey Wheeler, Op. Cit., p. 104.

69 authority of the Soviets is doubtful, and because the indigenous population has no proletarian organization that the (Bolshevik) group could welcome into the highest organs of the regional governments.”81

Later on further such conferences were convened by the Muslim parties. At the forefront were Ulema Jameti (Union of Clergy) and Shura-e-Islami (Islamic Council). These parties with the support of others declared Turkestan’s (Kokand) autonomy in late November 1917. 82 The autonomous government of Kokand announced to implement Shariah laws immediately. However, this government was absolutely weak in terms of defense therefore it had to seek help from armed groups, commonly known as Basmachi.

Declaration of Turkestan’s autonomy was not liked by the Soviets. The Red Army started marching towards Kokand, the capital of Turkestan Autonomous Republic. The battle started between the Red Army and the Basmachi under the leadership of Irgash in Kokand. By the mid of February 1918, the city of Kokand saw about fourteen thousand civilian deaths, desecration of Muslim holy places and burning of Islamic libraries at the hands of the Red Army.83Irgash and his group were defeated in early 1919 by the Red Army which ultimately disintegrated the whole group. However, he was allowed to keep his troops and autonomy within Kokand district in response to his peace treaty with the Army and a promise to remain neutral in all circumstances. 84But he was poisoned by one of his guests in 1920 who was an undercover Russian agent.

Another important and powerful Basmachi group under the leadership of Muhammad Amin Beg (Madamin) emerged. Madamin was more liberal in his political outlook. He welcomed the ethnic Tartars as well as Bashkiri intellectuals to join his force.85After the death of Madamin, Sher M. Beg, commonly known as Khurshirmat

81 Seymour Becker, Op. Cit., p.290. 82 Reinhard Schlze, A Modern History of the Islamic World, translated by Azozeh Azodi, (London: I.B. Taurus & Co. ltd., 2002,) p.78. See also Marwat, Op. Cit., 30. 83 P. T. Etherton, In The Heart of Asia, (London: N.K., 1925,) p.154. 84 Fazl-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, Op. Cit., p.46. 85 Central Asia Review, Vol. VII, London: 1959, p.237.

70 emerged as the strongest basmachi leader in Ferghana valley.86While when Russians left Khiva, Junaid khan, a Basmachi leader took over the city and executed the Jaded. But Junaid Khan was defeated by the Soviets in January 1920. To save his life he fled to Karakum Desert.87He was contacted by the British from Afghanistan. The British invited him to Afghanistan where he was driven in the town by the British officers in their cars.88

Amir of Bukhara, already frightened of the Soviets, was quick to made friendship Treaty with the King Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan. When Bukhara fell into the hands of the Soviets, Basmachi Movement emerged over there. Amir of Bukhara wrote several letters to the Indian viceroy, English Colonel Etherten in Afghanistan and Emperor of Kashger for help. Similarly, some of the Basmachi leaders also sought help from the British government in the form of appeal which was filed at the British Council office in Kuldja in 1921.89 A very limited support was provided to them. Ultimately, Amir of Bukhara had to flee to Afghanistan by February 1921.90 However, the Basmachi under the leadership of Kurshimat continued their fight against the Soviets. They got control of Andijon, Namangan and Mergelan along with whole countryside of Fergana valley. But by late 1921, Soviet troops drove Basmachi out towards the east of Bukhara which weakened their strength a lot.91

Enver Pasha was declared as the leader of the “Muslims’” War of liberation and the “Savior” of Islam by the Bukharans. 92Pasha was looked with suspicions by some other Basmachi leaders, especially Ibrahim Beg as he had come from Moscow. Ibrahim Beg and some other Basmachi suspected him as the agent of Communists. However, Said Alam, the last Amir of Bukhara in his biography writes that both Enver Pasha and Ibrahim Beg had very close relationship. They even fought together

86 A. Zeki Velsi Togan, Bughunku Turkili (Turkestan), Istanbul: 1942-1947. P.389. cited in Fazl-ur- Rahim Khan Marwat, Op. Cit., p.49. 87 Seymour Becker, Op. Cit., p.288. 88 G. Nepsov, Izistorii Khorezmskoy Revolyutsii, (Tashkent: N.K., 1962,) p.266. 89 Mustafa Chokaev, “The Basmachi Movement in Turkestan”, Asiatic Review, vol. 24. London: 1928, p.284. 90 Rheatally Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 1914 till 1921, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1973,) p.160. 91 Fazl-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, Op. Cit., pp.75-76. 92 Joshua Kunitz, Dawn Over Samarkand: Rebirth of Central Asia, (Calcutta: N.K. 1943,) p.132.

71 against the Bolsheviks, says Said Alam. 93 Enver Pasha was joined by Basmachi across the whole Ferghana valley and even Afghanistan. In April 1922, a Soviet delegation met Pasha to pursue him for a peace treaty but he rejected that offer.94

2.5.2 Internal Differences

Pasha died at the hands of Soviet forces in late 1922. People loved Pasha a lot. His funeral was attended by almost fifteen to twenty thousand people who kissed his body and even took home his beard’s hair as memory. 95 The death of Pasha alongwith famine and Typhus and malaria in Fergana valley which effected almost 400,000 people further weakened the Basmachi. The Red Army cut down links between villages and the towns in order to stop the food supplies to the Basmachi. On the other hand, to win the hearts of the local population, Soviets distributed two million Rubles, 3250 tons of rice and 13633 tons of wheat in Fergana valley during the 1923 famine. 96 Junaid Khan continued to be the major Basmachi operating through Fergana. During January 1924, Junaid Khan besieged the city of Khiva but was defeated by the Red Army. He fled to Khreozam. By the end of 1927, when his two sons were killed by the Red Army in ambushes,97 he gave up his expedition.

2.5.3. Impacts of Basmachi Movement

Since the Basmachi Movement was a response to the economic policies 98 of the Bolsheviks in the region, the Soviets had to rethink about their policies. Soviets immediately introduced land reforms policy in Turkestan, which redistributed 280,000 hectares of land to Central Asian household and that too in less than a year period.99Private trading was also introduced in Central Asia which was another tool to regain the confidence of Central Asian local population to counter the Basmachi Movement.

93 Mir Said Alam Jan, Hizn-ul-Malal, Bukahara: translated in Urdu by Quddus Sahbi, Bukhara ka Jamhuri Inqilab (The Democratic Revolution of Bukhara), (Hyderabad Daccan: N.K. 1944,) pp.36-37. 94 Central Asian review, Vol. 2, no. 3, 1959, p.245. 95 Fazl-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, Op. Cit., p. 101. 96 Alexader G. Park. op. Cit., p.301. 97 Fazl-ur-Rahim Khan Marwat, Op. cit., p. 125. 98 Due to these harsh economic policies, the cultivation in the whole Turkestan dropped upto 62% which was a complete disaster for the local economy. For details see Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.18. 99 Geoffry Wheeler, Op. Cit., p.135.

2.6. Sufism

Sufism remained an integral part of the Central Asia societies throughout the history. The most prominent Sufi orders in the region are Naqshbandi, Qadri, Yasvi and Qubaravi. Sufism has the ability to absorb local socio-cultural traditions into its teachings. That is why; it is acceptable by most of the segments of any society. Central Asian societies being divided on the basis of region, clans, ethnicities, sun- ethnicities, tribes etc. had no problems to accept this version of Islam. Sufism played a vital role in spread of Islam in Transoxiana or Mawara an-Nehr (today’s Central Asia). Sufis used different sacred sites (even pre-Islamic tombs) to carry out their activities.

The Mongols, when declared Islam as their official ideology, gave a prominent status to Sufis in religious matters instead of traditional clergy. This was due to the reason that Mongols themselves used to live nomadic life in which local culture and traditions had a great part to play. (details on p 40 and 41 of thesis)

Analysis

Failure of Basmachi movement was mainly due to; i. lack of centralized leadership as well as centralized base, lack of common ideology, weapons and money. They only captured certain cities temporarily and they governed the villages in a decentralized way. 100 Basmachi got support from the British when they sent those arms and ammunition from Afghanistan. Later on, many of Basmachi fighters took refuge in Afghanistan from where they continued their struggle.101 When defeated at the hands of red Army, Basmachi asked their supporters to migrate to Dar-ul-Islam in order to protect their lives; this idea of migration was supported by the Prophet’s migration from Macca to Madina.102By late 1920s, Basmachi were completely wiped out from the region.

100 Reinhard Schulze, A Modern History of the Islamic World, translated by Azizeh Azodi, (New York: I. B. Taurus, 2000,) p.77. 101 Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, 3rd ed. (New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2008,) p.147. 102 Vitally V. Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.20.

Chapter Three

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS OF CENTRAL ASIA

3.1. Introduction

Central Asia, in general, is one of the poorer, fragile, highly authoritative and corrupt regions of the world. The region remained under Russian imperialism for more than a century. Soviet authorities ignored the region for socio-economic and political developments. The region was considered more or less a buffer area between Soviet Union and its southern neighbors. The ‘Great Game’ forced Kremlin to control the region in order to use it as a frontline against any possible invasion from the British India or later on by the Capitalist block. All the infrastructure developments in Soviet Union were directed to western areas of the Republic while this region was given no attention.

Central Asia was considered a single whole during the Soviet rule, which resulted in the eruption of a number of problems after their independence. All the five Central Asian states experienced different kinds of transitions after their independence. Tajikistan started with a civil war, Turkmenistan with a personality cult of Niazov, Uzbekistan with extreme authoritarianism and slow reforms, Kazakhstan with a mixed approach of openness and authoritarianism, while Kyrgyzstan with market- oriented reforms.1The region remained highly improvised during the Soviet rule as it used to export primary products only in the form of crude oil, natural gas, and cotton to the rest of Soviet Union. Therefore, the region remained far behind compared to the other regions of the Soviet Union in terms of development.

As discussed in the chapter two, it was the World War II which forced Moscow to consider Central Asia as an alternative region to re-locate its industry to avoid possible disaster by the German attack. Even this proposal was not implemented fully, thus leaving the region still in dark ages. The industry, which was moved to this region, brought ethnic Europeans with it as well. Since the local economies were

1 Richard Pomfret, The Central Asian Economies Since Independence, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006,) p.2.

74 weak and were unable to generate resources to run the affairs of their states, Moscow used to provide the region with grants, loans, subsidies and other financial assistance. With the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991, flow of economic assistance from Moscow to the region was also cut down. The independent regimes of Central Asia found themselves in the middle of deep blue sea when independence was ‘imposed’ on them.

The regimes were never ready to administer their states independently. The imposed independence brought many disasters to the newly born Republics. These disasters ranged from economic collapse to state building, from administrative skills to political transition, and from social and ethnic disintegration to border and water dispute. Steady fall of GDP after independence gave birth to a new poor class2 during the first decade of independence. This new poor class, however, had a well- established life during the Soviet era. The regimes had no idea, no plan and no road map for their future. Moreover, Soviet disintegration brought an ideological vacuum in these states. There were different voices from within these states to follow either the western economic and political discourse or Islamic political system. But the regimes preferred to continue with the old Soviet styled administration. All the Central Asian states continued with highly centralized social, economic, and political set ups.3 Reasons for this decision were their inexperience in other political systems, lust for power, fear of Moscow’s anger, and the rise of radical Islamism.

“The initial goal of the leaderships (of Central Asia) was to secure a position of power…preferably by peaceful means”.4 When this objective was achieved through fair or unfair means, the next step for the Central Asian leadership was the consolidation of all the affairs of the state in their hands. This was done through a variety of measures. Similarly, when a limited, state controlled transition from a closed to a market economy started, close cronies of the regimes and people

2 Alisher Ikhlamov, “Improvishment of the Masses in the Transition Period: Signs of an Emerging ‘New Poor’ Identity in Uzbekistan”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2001, p.34. 3 Anatoly Khazanov, “Authoritarianism and its Consequences in ex-Soviet Central Asia”, in Robert L. Canfield and Gabriele Rasuly-paleezek, Ethnicity, Authority and Power in Central Asia: New Games Great and Small, (London: Rutledge, 2011,) p.20. 4 Anna Matveena, “Democratization, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia”, International Affairs, vol. 75, No. 1, 1999, p.27.

75 belonging to the ruling elites’ ethnic groups got benefit who, in turn, extended their support to the regimes. Through this way a ‘patron-client relationship’ was established where general public was pushed to a wall and all matters went into the hands of the elite class. Thus leading to the ‘political centralism’, which, according to Theda Scokpol, is the major reason for revolutions.

3.2. Uzbekistan and its Political System

Uzbekistan is deemed as the most repressive and ruthless regime in Central Asia. Islam Karimov is in the power since independence of Uzbekistan in 1991. He has brought almost every field of decision making under his control through gradual legal and constitutional measures. He has some very close and strong friends who control many aspects of the Uzbek society. Uzbekistan has largest population and military in the whole region and is the only state which shares the borders with all the other Central Asian states. Moreover, Uzbeks constitute the largest ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan while they stand at second place in ethnic minorities in Kazakhstan after Russians. This unique status has given unprecedented edge to Uzbekistan in the regional affairs.

Uzbekistan witnessed a steady inclination of the general public towards religion in the late 1980s due to the Soviet policies of Perestroika and Glasnost. This inclination was due to the fact that Uzbeks have always remained at the helm of religious activities throughout the history of Central Asia. Massive corruption scandals and other criminal activities besides oppressive policies by the Soviet authorities brought the common man closer to Islam during the last decade of Soviet Union. Lifting of ban on the religious and political activities provided the local population with a chance to participate in the decision making processes as well as freedom of expression. This freedom gave birth to a limited revival of religion in Central Asia.

More people especially the youth started inquiring and exploring about their religions. Religious practices, which were banned during the Soviet era and were done underground, resurfaced on the ground. New mosques started opening in the whole region. Most of the people who used to conceal their religious identity during the

Soviet period, expressed it openly. For example, during 1987 the Communist regime conducted a survey in Tashkent from the undergraduate students about religious identity and practices. Replying to a question about 60% of young people described themselves as ‘Muslims’, while 33% did not know about their religion. Only 7% of them stated themselves as atheist.5This illustrates that contrary to previous surveys conducted, where usually older people replied themselves as Muslims, a large majority of the youth declared themselves as Muslims. This change was seen as a major shift in the social and religious life of the Uzbek people.

When the old regime collapsed in the form of disintegration of Soviet Union, the communist ideology died in Central Asian States. After independence, people expected a radical change in their lives. They also expected that the independent (so called) Muslim governments would harmonize their policies and laws in line with Islam. The expectations were high. People were enthusiastic to know about their religion and its practices. The young people were at the forefront of that enthusiasm. When governments of the region, which were the remnant of Soviet legacies, did not take steps to change the existing Soviet styled governance as well as Islamization of society, these young, energetic and emotional people came out on the streets of Fergana’s cities and towns especially, Namangan and Andijon to record their protest.

The Adolat Party which came into being in the last couple of years of Soviet Union demanded a quick Islamic revolution. It even disagreed with the political struggle of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), which, according to Adolat would take a very long period to bring change. Since IRP wanted to establish democratic state based on the principles of Islam through peaceful, constitutional and legal means and was not that much active and strong in Uzbekistan, Adolat parted its ways. According to a leader of the Adolat, Abdul Ahad, neither we have enough time for the constitution making nor do we want to be a part of (powerless) parliament. 6 It adopted unconstitutional means to achieve their objectives. The situation worsen so much that the members of Adolat Party took control of Namangan city and forced the president

5 Dilip Hiro, Inside Central Asia: A Political and Cultural History of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Iran, (London: Overlook Duckworth, 2009,) p.134. 6 Ibid. p.146.

Karimov to negotiate with them. Although, Karimov was very hard towards the Islamists and he wanted to get rid of them, he used his cards very wisely. That was the time when Uzbekistan had sought the membership of the UN and wanted to have western embassies in Tashkent. Once it got the membership of UN, OSCE and IMF and some important western countries including the US opened their embassies in Tashkent, the Karimov regime dealt with the Islamists heavy handedly. The Islamists faced a severe crackdown at the hands of Uzbek authorities. They realized that they do not have their place in Uzbekistan and went to Tajikistan to fight in civil war.

3.2.1. State Responses towards Opposition especially Islamists

Karimov regime has taken some legal and constitutional measures to control the opposition whether secular or religious. The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations passed by the Uzbek parliament (Majlis-i-Oli) in 1991 made it obligatory to the religious groups to have at least 100 members for registration. It further declared the unregistered Islamic groups as criminals. To administer a mosque, state sponsored qualifying test has to be passed. Religious clothing like headscarf for women and turban for male persons in the public places became liable to fifteen days of imprisonment. The office of the Grand Mufti of Uzbekistan declared to change 3000 unregistered or ambiguous status mosques into shops, nurseries and sports centers.7

Article 54 of the Uzbek constitution bans any kind of political party or group which is based on ‘nationalistic or religious principles’. Erk was decaled as the nationalistic party, therefore, was banned in 1993. Leader of the Uzbek IRP, Abdullah Utaev was jailed in the same year. 8 The Law on Freedom and Conscience and Religious Organizations passed in 1998 is an interesting document. On the one hand it provides citizens with freedom to religion and worship as well as separation of state from the religion but on the other it says that all religious activities and rights which are judged against the state (the question arises who will decide it when the state does not have an independent judiciary) will be considered illegal.

7 Ibid, p.167. 8 New York Times, 13 February 1993.

It also prohibits the private religious teachings, bans religious education in schools and forbids wearing of religious clothes in public except for clergy. 9 The Uzbek regime shut down the Jamia (Central) mosque in Andijon and was replaced by a museum after 9/11. Another mosque in the same town was replaced with a women and children community center.10 Beard is the sign of extremism in Uzbekistan. It is very daring to have it as it can put anyone in the prison where planted confessions are forcefully been signed by the captors.11 An opposition activist and head of the Uzbek dissident movement ‘Prisoners of Conscience’ stated to Inter Press Services that “opposition in Uzbekistan, whether religious or secular, is banned. Efforts of few independent human rights activists are inadequate. Their protests are few and inefficient and all are scattered. The authoritarian policies force common man not to come on streets against the brutalities”.12

During the early period of independence, responding to a question about democracy in Uzbekistan, Karimov replied that we have to strengthen our nation first. We have different traditions from rest of the world, where democracy is least known. First of all we have to understand what democracy is. To achieve this phenomenon (democracy), we need to wait. Jamal Kamal, chairman of the writers’ union in Uzbekistan says “we do not have a strong security forces. Our borders are weak and vulnerable. We have to achieve strength in security measures and then will move towards democratization step by step”.13 Karimov out rightly rejected the introduction of political Islam in Uzbekistan. During a press conference on 17th April 1998, he stated “we in Uzbekistan will never give the go ahead to those who are already trying by any means to introduce political Islam, religious extremism and fanaticism”.14 He

9 US State Department, URL: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/inf/2000/5724.htm. Access date 21st January 2010. 10 R. Eshmuradov and M. Hamidova, “No Place for Uzbek Muslims”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1st July 2003. URL: http://alwahabiyah.com/main.aspx?typeinfo=1&lid=0&mid=21004. Access date 22nd December 2013. 11 Craig Murray, Murder in Samarkand: A Britisher Ambessador’s Controversial Defiance of Tyranny in the War on Terror, (London: Mainstream Publishing, 2006,) p.81. 12 Pavol Stracansky, “Central Asian Regimes Fear Unrests”, Interpress Services, 27/2/2011. URL: http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/02/central-asian-regimes-fear-unrest/. Access date 14th May 2013. 13 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.154. 14 Jatin Kumar Mohanty, Terrorism and Militancy in Central Asia, (New Delhi: Kalpaz Publishing, 2006,) p.163.

79 wished to shoot the Islamists in the head by himself. He also said that we don’t want to see Uzbekistan becoming Tajikistan.15 Karimov retained the structure of Mohallah (neighborhood locality) to keep an eye on all the activities in the respective localities.

This surveillance through Mohallah system during the Soviet era and later in the post- independence period is seen as extremely against the human rights and civil liberties not only by the Uzbek but international society as well. However, regime says that authoritative policies are the need of the time. These are the key to security and stability in the country. For example, on the occasion of World Trade Center bombings in 1993, Karimov said that ‘had there been more Karimovs, terrorists would have not dared to carry out such incidents.16 Karimov prefers UK over USA for the scholarships to Uzbek students. The logic behind this likeness is that Karimov thinks that the conservative nature of the UK society is better than the US. The US returned Uzbek scholars got some “bad” social and political habits which are unacceptable to the Uzbek regime.

There is an absence of a genuine opposition in Uzbekistan. The regime deals all the criminals, suspected Islamists and political opponents under the same law. The authorities detain these people illegally and torture them inhumanly till their confession and in some cases to their death. Security forces themselves put arms and ammunition or drugs in the cars and homes of such persons during the search in order to legalize their detention.17According to the Uzbek law, the political parties must be “Patriotic and Constructive”. 18 It is the Uzbek authorities which decide about patriotism and constructivism of the political parties. The authorities project that if the (illegal) political parties compete in Uzbekistan, the net result will be like Tajik Civil War.19Those political groups or parties which challenge the highly centralized authority of the president are declared as anti-state, extremist and foreign enemies.

15 Ibid, p.164. 16 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.154. 17 Ibid, p.166. 18 Stuart Horsman, “Uzbekistan’s involvement in the Tajik Civil War 1992-1997: Domestic Considerations”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1999, p.42. 19 G. Hidoyotov, “Sovereignty and Democracy are Inseparable”, Jahon, October, 1996, p.2.

Tajik civil war resulted in further tightening of the opposition political parties in Uzbekistan. Opposition political figures were harassed and attacked. Political parties based on ethnic or religious grounds were banned declaring that these political parties bring rift and division in Uzbek society. Karimov reacted in a very harsh manner when the General Peace Accord was signed in Tajikistan between the opposition and the government in 1997. He feared that inclusion of opposition especially the Islamists into the government will have spillover effects across the whole region which was unacceptable to him. In absence of a real and genuine opposition, shadow political parties facilitate Karimov to carry out his agenda. Initially, it was National Program Party under the leadership of Muhammad Azimov which had Karimov’s blessing. The National Democratic Party, which has Karimov’s blessings, emerged as the second largest political party in the parliament with 34 seats after Peoples Democratic Party with 48 seats.

The former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray says that Uzbekistan does not have any democracy nor is pursuing the democratic process. There are no checks and balances on the authority of president. Parliament is like a rubber stamp and real opposition political parties are banned. He strongly criticized the horrible boiling to death of Muzaffar Avazor and Khusniddin Alimov.20 The Uzbek secret police, SNB uses inhuman ways for confession. It puts the suspects into boiling liquid, put healthy suspects with acute tuberculosis patient in a hospital or jail and uses mask which cut air supply when put on the nose.

In post 9/11 period, Islam Karimov permitted to establish Liberal Democratic Party in November 2003, Independent Farmers Party in January 2004, and let Erk to hold a convention in 2003. All it was to satisfy the west. However, despite these shows, Tashkent has highly centralized administration. Karimov says that for the sake of national unity, strong and centralized authority is must. In fact, he idealizes the

20 For details see Craig Murrey, Murder in Samarkand: A Britisher Ambessador’s Controversial Defiance of Tyranny in the War on Terror, (London: Mainstream Publishing, 2006.)

81 centralized rule of Tamerlane21 who was successful to bring cohesion and unity in Central Asia.

All the elections, whether presidential or parliamentary, are highly rigged by the authorities in Uzbekistan. The very first presidential elections of 1991 were partially fair but all the subsequent elections are highly rigged. However, malpractices and pre- poll rigging was done during the 1991 presidential elections. The two major competitors of Karimov, Pulatov and Muhammad Saleh were controlled by the authorities through different means. For example, Pulatov was barred to contest the elections through a constitutional referendum while Saleh could not contest elections from the platform of Erk. He contested elections on the basis of the membership of Writers’ Union. 22 2007 presidential elections were strictly controlled, says Urdur Gunnarsdottir, an official from the OSCE. She says that “when you have these (contesting) candidates endorsing publicly the incumbent president, then that in reality deprives the electorates of choice”. 23 The three other candidates, Asliddin Rustamov of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Diloram Tashmokhamadov of Adolat Social-Democratic Party and Akmal Saidov independent, were just puppets of Karimov in those elections.

Alisher has described the three ways administration in Uzbekistan. “hyper-centralism of administration where presidential office has absolute powers, gradual economic openness where selective areas are given priority where the Uzbek elite can increase its influence and wealth, and to take those legal and administrative steps which sideline the opposition groups from political and administrative affairs”.24The Uzbek elite cannot risk its interests at the hands of the violent attempts to replace the existing

21 Mariya, Y. Omelicheva, “Combatting Terrorism in Central Asia; Explaining Differences in States’ Responses to Terror”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2007, p.377. See also Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, (Washington D. C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005,) p.49. 22 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.143. 23 Urdur Gunnarsdottir, “Uzbek President Re-elected to Third Term in Elections Criticized as Unfair”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 27th December 2012. URL: www.caclanalyst.org/?q=node/4773. Access date 12th May 2014. 24 Alisher Ikhlamov, “Neopatrimonialism, Interest Groups and patronage networks: the impasses of the Governance System in Uzbekistan”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2007, p.78.

82 regime. Therefore, it is expected that a peaceful transition will take place in Uzbekistan.

3.2.2. Human Rights Issues

Islam Karimov has proven that he is extremely impassionate towards opposition. Whoever criticizes his regime, he deals with him with iron hands. Most of the people in Uzbekistan are charged under the article 15 of the Uzbek criminal code which charges people under “Conspiring to overthrow the government or constitution of Uzbekistan”.25 Abdul Wali Mirza imam of a local mosque in Andijon, for example disappeared alongwith his assistant while travelling by air from Andijon to Moscow via Tashkent. It is suspected that Karimov regime has done all this to Mirza due to his critical stance against Islam Karimov. Abdullah Qari Otaev, head of the Uzbek IRP disappeared in December 1992 and never came back. Abid Khan Qari Nazarov disappeared in 1998.26

Students from high schools, colleges and universities have to spend three weeks to three months in the cotton fields for cotton picking. The time period depends on the age of the students. There are reports that as young as ten years age of children are also forced to do labor in the cotton fields. In May 2012 many human rights and civil society groups under the banner of Cotton Coalition wrote a letter to the Danish foreign minister and Danish ambassador to the European Union about forced labor in cotton fields in Uzbekistan. This letter urged the EU to force Karimov regime to end their forced labor.27

Nigara Khidovatova, leader of the Independent Farmers Party of Uzbekistan stated that “Uzbekistan is like the Soviet Union, but the wrong way round. Everything bad about the Soviet Union we still have. But everything that was good, like its welfare

25 Craig Murray, Op. Cit., p.82. 26 Abumannob Pulatov, “The Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan”, p.50. 27 “Uzbekistan: Joint Letter to Danish Foreign Minister Villy Sandal Regarding State Sponsored Forced Labor and Child Labor”, Human Rights Watch, 29 May 2012. www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/29/uzbekistan-joint-letter-to-danish-prime-minister-regarding-state- sponsored-forced-child-labor. Access date 12th May 2014.

83 and education, has disappeared”. 28 Viktoriya Bazhenova, Abdumalik Babaev, Tatyana Daulatova, Vladimir Hussainov, Surat Ikramov, Gulshan Karaeva and so many other human rights and civil society activists have faced the wrath of authorities in Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan does not have independent media and civil society groups. There is strict monitoring over internet and social media which played a crucial role to bring down the North African regimes during Arab spring of 2010. The government has banned almost 250 internet sites which are unfriendly to the regime. Despite the ban on these sites and other harsh measures by the regime, internet users in Uzbekistan have increased up to 7.7 million in August 2011 and the number is fast to increase29, Uzbek authorities say.

There are no fair trials of the people in Uzbekistan. The accused in the custody whether men or women, are subject to frequent rapes. Craig Murray, the former British ambassador to Tashkent says that “any young woman accused is bound to be raped…male prisoners are raped by different objects; bottles are commonly used for this purpose.”30People working in Kolkhoz (collective farms) are also under threat. Their property which is leased to them for a longer period of time is taken back by the state authorities whenever they deem it necessary not considering the hardships faced by the common people. One such example is the story of three brothers who had a piece of land in a Kolkhoz in the town of Kitab, south of Karshi. The state told them to give the land back to authorities but two of three brothers refused to do so. Consequently one was killed while the other was imprisoned for seven years. The third is hiding in Tashkent for sanctuary. While their apple farms were destroyed by the authorities besides beating their 84 years old mother.31

28 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.191. 29 “A Central Asian Autocracy: Misadventure in Internet Freedoms”, Eurasianet, 7/11/2011. URL: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/11/a-central-asian-autocracys-misadventures-in- internet-freedom/247947/. Access date 22nd December 2011. 30 Craig Murray, Op. Cit., pp.32-33. 31 Ibid, pp.236-40.

When Ayazov was boiled to death in oil, his mother Mukahadirova took photos of his boiled body and handed them over to the British Embassy in Tashkent. She was sentenced to six years in jail for demoing Uzbekistan.32“Wearing an Islamic dress code in public, religious political parties and public movements” are banned in Uzbekistan under the 1998 Law on Freedom of Conscience and religious organization.33

3.2.3. Andijon Crisis 2005 and the Mass killings

The authorities detained twenty two businessmen for their alleged relationship with the terrorists. Thousands of their relatives and friends gathered outside the court where proceedings about those businessmen were going on. Judge deferred the sentences but police captured many leaders of the previous day’s protests outside the court. This sparked the emotionss of many energetic and emotional young men who, on the night of 12th May 2005, raided the jail and freed many prisoners including the detained twenty two businessmen. They seized regional administration office and kept the officials hostage there. Then they demanded Karimov to resign. The next day thousands of people including women, children and the elders gathered in Babur Square where they criticized poverty and high corruption in Uzbekistan.

The security forces encircled those unarmed and peaceful demonstrators and closed down all the ways out of the square. There were rumors that the president is very short to arrive here to address the gathering but he never arrived. The troops, at the end of the day, opened an indiscriminate fire on the unarmed and peaceful demonstrators which killed hundreds of people. An eye witness, Galima Bukharbaeva, says that “two armed personnel carriers (APCs) came and opened indiscriminate fire on the unarmed peaceful demonstrators. Everyone started running in all the directions. We went into a ditch. The alleged Islamists also retaliated with shooting but ultimately we succeeded to escape from the Babur Square to nearby

32 Ibid, p.321. 33 International Crisis Group, Central Asia; islam and the State, Osh: Asia Report No. 59, 2003, p.1, URL: http://crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1442&1=1. Access date 12th May 2014.

85 streets which were safe.”34Some of the people even managed to flee towards Kyrgyz border where they met with the Uzbek security forces who opened fire on them killing many besides injuring the dozens.

3.3. Economic Conditions of Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is blessed with natural resources. It has huge reserves of natural gas, gold and other precious materials. It is also world’s second largest cotton producers and the fourth largest gold producer.35 It exported almost $ 2.9 billion worth of gold in 2010.36 Uzbekistan is the tenth largest exporter of natural gas in the world. But people of Uzbekistan still have lower per capita income. The Uzbek regime is not ready to open its economy to international trade. There is a step by step opening towards free market economy but it is also under the strict state control.

The strategy was considerably successful during the latter part of 1990s when the Uzbek growth rate increased substantially. The inflation rate came down sharply and international trade of Uzbekistan also burgeoned due to the export of cotton and gold to international markets other than the Russian markets. However, the real increase in the growth rate of the region in general and Uzbekistan in particular declined after the incident of 9/11. For example, during the 2001-2005 periods, the average growth rate of Central Asia remained 9.737 which indicate the positive trends in Uzbek economy but after that a steady decline has been seen in Uzbek economy.

Central Asia is one of the most corrupt regions in the world. Uzbekistan remained most corrupt state during the Soviet era as well. A mega scandal of corruption surfaced on the earth during 1987 when the first secretary of the Uzbek branch of CPSU, Shareef Rashidov was charged of corruption which cost the national exchequer about 2 billion US dollars. This scandal outburst those Uzbeks who were

34 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.189. 35 Oliver Roy, The New Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Birth of Nations, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007,) p.193. 36 Dina Rome Speecher, and Martin C., Speecher, “The Foreign Policy of Uzbekistan: Sources, Objectives and Outcomes”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2010, p.166. 37 Shabbir Ahmad Khan, “Economic Transition in Central Asia”, Central Asian Journal, No. 63, winter 2008, p.51.

86 secular and wanted to carry on the Soviet cultural legacy but were fed up of that massive corruption. Many of them turned towards the religion as a salvation force. Not only the youth but “many of the old merchant class of the bazaar” also went towards the religion.38These old merchants also established some of the charities for the welfare purposes.

The demands to purify the society of non-Islamic evils became so much powerful that the Mufti Sharnsuddin Babakhanov of the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate had to resign due to public protest against him for his alleged acts of drinking and mixing up with the women. He resigned in 1989 and was replaced by Mufti Muhammad Sadiq Muhammad Yousaf. The poor economic conditions in Uzbekistan have given rise to narcotics trade. Although, major routes of international drugs trafficking from Afghanistan to international markets runs through Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, but Uzbekistan is not an exception.

Tashkent has introduced gradual but strictly controlled market reforms. There is little encouragement for the private investors and the least is done to make new and vibrant economic policies. Average economic growth of Uzbekistan according to the IMF during the last five years has remained 8.5% which was highest in the region. 39According to the Tashkent Center for Economic Research (CER), water crises in near future will create huge problem for Uzbekistan for which government is not making any serious efforts. The other dangers which the CER reported are food insecurity and unemployment. No room for political opponents (at least liberal democrats) will eventually lead to the fragmentation of the Uzbek society on different lines whenever Karimov seizes the power. This closed political system has led to the popularity of underground Islam, especially the Hizbut Tahrir al-Islami (HTI).40

Despite a large scale production of natural gas, winters in Uzbekistan are marked by a cut in gas supply especially to the countryside. For example in the winter of 2011,

38 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.135. 39 Robert M. Cutler, “Dark Clouds on the Horizon”, Asia Times, 2nd August 2012, URL:www.atimes.com/atimes/central_Asia/ML.htm. Access date 22nd February 2013. 40 Robert M. Cutler, “Dark Clouds over the Uzbek Horizon.” Asia Times, 2/11/2012. URL: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/ML02Ag02.html. Access date 22nd February 2013.

87 many areas of Uzbekistan like; Pakhtakor, Karakalpakstan, Jizzak, Andijon, Samarkand, Tashkent, Khorezm and Bukhara were badly hit by the electricity and gas shortages.41Situation remained the same during the winter of 2012. An old lady from Andijon region stated that ‘we face five to six hours power shortage daily which, sometimes go up to ten hours.42The gas shortage also contributes to the miseries of the people. Most of the Uzbeks face low gas pressure during the winters. People use sucking pumps to increase the gas pressure which obviously deprives their neighbors of gas.

This problem of power shortage is also witnessed at filling stations where long queues of vehicles waiting to get fuel can be seen. One of the attendants at a filling station says that “many times, we face electricity load shedding which hampers our business as machinery of our filling stations runs on electricity. People have to wait for hours in long lines.” 43 The Uzbek government exports much of its gas to neighboring states to maximize its foreign exchange reserves at the cost of its own population. Similarly, the poor old Soviet constructed infrastructure is unable to fulfill the growing energy demands of the Uzbek population especially in the remote areas. Massive migration from the rural areas to cities and towns in search of jobs and better life is on rise that has further exacerbated problems in urban centers.

3.4. Tajikistan and its Political System

Tajikistan is the only Central Asian country which has legalized the existence of a political party based on religion. This recognition, however, is not the result of pluralism in Tajik politics but the five years bloody civil war which killed almost fifty thousand people besides injuring hundreds of thousands and costing the Tajik economy loss of billions of dollars. The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) fought against the regimes from 1992 to 1997 along with other secular opposition political parties. Although, Islamic party led this fight against the regimes

41 Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, “Why Does Gas-exporting Uzbekistan have People Protesting About Gas Shut Offs”, URL:www.eurasianet.org/node/65547. Access date 21st November 2011. 42 Deirdre Tynan, “Uzbek Gas Bypasses Populations”, Asia Times, URL: www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/NAzAg01.htm. Access date 22nd February 2013. 43 Ibid.

88 in Dushanbe, nevertheless, it was purely ethnic and regional issues which led to the outbreak of civil war.44

Tajikistan’s almost 70% of area is comprised of mountains which have divided the Tajik territory into different and isolated geographic zones. Separated and isolated ethnicities living in specific areas have peculiar values and social set ups. Another interesting feature of Tajik population is that most of it lives in rural areas. It has one of the most difficult terrains in the region which are a major hindrance in the development of Tajikistan. More importantly Tajikistan could not experience that level of development which was experienced by its neighboring countries during the Soviet times. It was the poorest of all the Soviet states. Since Tajikistan had no substantial resources to generate its revenues; it was heavily dependent of Moscow for the economic aid and assistance. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Tajik economy collapsed completely. Unemployment, inflation, in and out migration and poverty escalated. The Soviet dismemberment led to a large scale intra and inter-state ethnic migration within the former Soviet Union. This led to the clash of interests among the settled and newly migrated ethnicities.

Tajikistan was also hit by that ethnic disturbance. Dushanbe was already witnessing the housing shortage when the ethnic Armenians were given apartments in Dushanbe. This unjust move hyped the local people who demanded that the unjust practices must be abandoned by the authorities.

3.4.1. Political Set Up in Tajikistan

Tajikistan is a secular state according to its constitution. Article 8 and 100 of the Tajik constitution ensure the secular nature of Tajik political system. Since the creation of Tajikistan in 1929, the Khojantis remained into power till the disintegration of Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Gharamis, Pamiris, and the people from other surrounding regions remained poor, underrepresented, 45 and deprived from the power sharing in Tajikistan. Current president Emamoli Rehmanov

44 Details of the Tajik Civil War will be discussed in the “Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan” chapter. 45 Stuart Horsman, Op. Cit., p.37.

89 has consolidated powers into his hands through a gradual process. When Rehmanov was made the president, powerful figures from Khujant did not like that. They even resisted the move to make Rehmanov as the president. They accepted him as the head of the state on temporary basis. When consolidated powers and got support from Moscow, Rehmanov sidelined Khujantis from the Tajik political power apparatus. As a result Khujantis created a new “National Revival Movement” which emerged as the third force in Tajik politics46 after PDPT and IRPT.

Once consolidated powers, Rehmanov started getting rid of his old Kulyabi aides as well which include Safarov and Salimov. Both of them were trustworthy friends of Rehmanov during initial years of his rule. They even fought against the UTO for Rehmanov during the Civil War. Salimov even saved the life of Rehmanov in an assassination attempt in 1999. Rehmanov had to get rid of them because they were the potential successors of him in Tajikistan. Moreover, as they were the powerful regional warlords, they could have challenged the writ of Dushanbe in their respective areas. By sidelining them, Rehmanov also tried to lessen the influence of Tashkent in its domestic issues.

Responding to Rehmanov actions Salimov stated that “a man (Rehmanov) who came to power is eliminating his comrades. He needs only those who know him as the president. He destroys those who remember him as a shop assistance…he began with Sangak Safarov and now it’s my turn”.47

The two important opposition political parties established during Glasnot and Perestroika period in Tajikistan were Rostokhez and Democratic Party of Tajikistan. Both of these parties hold demonstrations against the political malpractices in Dushanbe in 1990. Rostokhez declared its manifesto in January 1991. It said that the Party will “ensure socio-economic and cultural development of the Republic; improve material well-being and spiritual culture of the population; socio-economic justice…eradication of oppression and exploitation; social inequality and injustice;

46 Randa M. Slim, Op. Cit., p.173. 47 Kirill Nourzhanov, “Saviors of the Nation or Robbers Born? Warlord Politics in Tajikistan”, Central Asian Survey, vol. 24. No.2. 2005, p.120.

90 corruption and build a true democracy based on the rule of law”.48 Rostokhez also demanded that political affairs be based on political balance which favored Leninabad (Dushanbe). The Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT) was abolished after independence and replaced by the Socialist Democratic Party of Tajikistan (SDPT). The People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) was established under the leadership of KhudaeNazarov. Various smaller groups also emerged in Tajikistan during 1992. These included; Oskkoro (publicity), Aftob-e-Sugdian (Sun of Sughd), Ehya-i-Khojand (Revival of Khojant), Wahdat (Unity), Society Maihan (Homeland), and the Socio-Cultural Association of Samarqand.49However, currently Tajikistan has only four legal political parties which are PDPT, IRPT, CPT and the SDP.

PDPT is Rehmanov’s party and has been winning all the presidential and parliamentary elections since Tajik independence. Tajik constitution ensures the multiparty system in Tajikistan, opposition has nominal representation in the legislature. IRP and CPT have two seats each in the legislature. The elections of 2010 has been declared as fraudulent and rigged by the international community. The presidential term was increased from five to seven years during a 1999 referendum when 93% of the voters allowed this change. The 2003 referendum brought a new era of Rehmanov’s regime into power. One of the amendments done in the constitution through this referendum stated that the president cannot serve for more than two consecutive terms in the office.50 The first term of any president, however, had to start after the 2006 presidential elections which were won by Rehmanov, thus ensuring Rehmanov’s presidency up to 2020.

A former legal advisor of Rehmanov, Rakhmatullah Zairov stated that technically Rehmanov has completed his “two consecutive terms” and according to the law, he cannot contest for the third term.51Zairov is missing since 15th March 2013 and there

48 Mavlon Makhamov, “Islam and the Political Development of Tajikistan After 1985”, Hafeez Malik, Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994,) Pp.198-99. 49 Mavlon Makhamov, Op. Cit., p.199. 50 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p.167. 51 Konstantin Pershin, “Tajikistan: Can Rehmanov Keep Running, Eurasianet, 23rd April 2013, URL: www.eurasianet.org/66869. Access date 12th November 2013.

91 is no clue about him. Another political analyst in Central Asia, Pervaiz Mullajanov says that 2013 presidential elections (In Tajikistan) would witness multiple candidates but these candidates would be a show off to international community. 52 While Rehmanov regime claims and assures that the 2013 presidential elections were free and fair.

Rahmanov has the similar views about western democracy which Karimov expressed many times. Answering a question about democracy on the occasion of Noroz, he stated that it is impossible to bring the American or western democracy in any of the former Soviet republic including Russia in near future.53According to the Chairman of the DPT Rahmatullah Valiev, the forthcoming presidential elections of 2013 would be just a show if the proposed reforms by opposition political parties are not considered54and as per expectations, Rehmanov won.

Tajik government is a “Super Government” since most of the political powers have been vested into the presidential office. 55This has happened particularly after the Peace Accord of 1997. The presidential office is so powerful that all the financial powers are controlled by it. Judges in Tajikistan are appointed by the “Council of Justice” which also falls directly under the control of the president; thus not independent. The trials of the political opponents are manipulated by the presidential office. The judiciary is not only under strict state control but is highly corrupt as well. There is ban on all kinds of demonstrations and all the demonstrations need to get a prior approval by the authorities even if it is by a single person (just like Uzbekistan).

52 Ibid. 53 “President Emamoli Rahmanov: “There is no Shortcut to Democracy”, Euronews, URL: news.tj/en/news/president-emomali-rahmanov-there-is-no-shortcut-to-democrapresident-emomali- rahmanov-there-is-no-shortcut-to-democry. Access date 12th November 2013. 54 “State Politics in Tajikistan”, institute of War and Peace Reporting, URL: https://iwpr.net/global/tajikistan. Access date 11th September 2010. 55 Abdullaev Komoluddin, ““Current Local Government Policy in Tajikistan”, in Luigi De Martino, ed. Tajikistan at the Crosssroad: The Politics of Decentralization, Geneva: Cimera, 2004, p.12. URL:info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/.../tajikRegion(eng).pdf. Access date 20th April 2009.

92 3.4.2. Human Rights and Civil Liberties Concerns in Tajikistan

Like Uzbekistan, Tajik regime has also controlled most of the groups and individuals who are critical to it. Media is under strict control and is frequently banned. The detainees are tortured and are not given access to justice. Human rights are widely violated. Massive corruption exists in the state. One region has dominance in all the political and economic matters of state. Children under the age of eighteen are restricted from the religious education.56The government does not give free access to the International Committee on Red Cross (ICRC) to visit the detainees in prison.57 Many of the websites have also been blocked by the authorities.

Some of the human rights abuses by the Tajik regime are highlighted here. Dushanbe has sent an official request to Moscow to extradite two political opponents to the regime, Dodo Jon Atovilloyev (editor-in-chief of Choraghi Rouz newspaper) on the charges of president’s defamation and Nizam Khan, ex legislator from Sughd under the charges of issuing murder orders of Talib Baba, the ex-deputy Prosecutor General in 1999.58 Mahmudi Iskandarov of the Progressive Party was arrested in Moscow by the Russian authorities in April 2005 on behalf of the Tajik government. He was brought back to Tajikistan and was sentenced to twenty three years in prison on terrorism charges. Other political opponents detained, tortured and sentenced to various years in prison during 2005 and 2006 include; Rustam Faizov (Progress Party), Nizamuddin Begmatov and Nasim Jan Shukarov (Social Democratic Party) and Tajuddin Abdur Rahmanov (IRPT) on different charges.59

During 2004, Rajab Mirzaev, editor of the Roz-e-Nao (A New Day) was beaten twice by the “unknown” assailants. Besides Roz-e-Nao, “Nerui Sukhan(Power of the Word) and Nejot (Salvation)” also came under state’s repressive measures against

56 For details see US State Department, 2011 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, URL: www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/sca/186477.htm. Access date 12th November 2013. 57 Human Rights Watch, “Tajikistan”, in Central Asia: Overview of Key Human Rights Concerns and Recommendations, 20th June 2012, URL:www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/20/Centralasia-overview-key- humanrights-concernsand-recomendations. Access date 12th November 2013. 58 Nargis Hamroboyeva, “Tajikistan Seeks Arrest and Extradition of Charoghi Rouz Editor”, Asia Plus, 12th April 2011. URL: news.tj/en/news/Tajikistan-seeks-arrest-and-extradition-of-Charoghi-rouz- editor. Access date 8th October 2011. 59 Lawrence P. Markowitz, “The Sources of staying in Power in Central Asia”, Foreign Affairs, p.110.

93 independent media.60 The political opponents of the regime who were potential rivals to Rehmanov in 2013 presidential elections were under state attack. Salimboy Shamsiddin, for example, disappeared on 15th March 2013. Another political opponent, Umar Ali Quvatov, a businessman by profession who also created an opposition group in Tajikistan was arrested from Dubai by Interpol on behalf of the Tajik government.

Criminal charges were put against two opposition leaders; Sultan Quvvatov of Progress Party and Muhammad Ruzi Iskandarov of Democratic Party of Tajikistan. Both of them were disqualified to contest the 2003 presidential elections 61. The opposition members in detention are treated in a very harsh manner. They are electrified frequently and sometimes boiling water is poured onto them. Ilham Usmanov, an alleged member of the IMU from Khujant claimed that he and other people in police custody were given electric shocks along with boiling water poured on their bodies in late 2010.62 During March 2011, Safar Ali Sangov was tortured to death in Sino police station of Dushanbe district.63Other human rights violations include deportation of two BBC journalists in March 2012. Natalia Antelava and Nouaya Gazeta were the victims. A Russian newspaper Viktoriya Ivleva was banned by the authorities64. Gulshan Karaeva, another human rights activist was attacked in May 2012 by unknown people.

Qasim Rahimov, a senior member of the IRPT was arrested on rape charges in July 2003 while Shamsiddin was imprisoned for sixteen years on murder charges.65 On 24th October 2012, Ampro, a human rights group based in Khujant was shut down by

60 Micheal Hall, “Tajikistan at the Crossroad of Democracy and Authoritarianism”, in Birgit N. Schlyter, Prospects for Democracy in Central Asia, (Sweden: Alfa Print, 2006,) p. 33. 61 Lawrence P. Op. Cit., p.110. 62 Human Rights Watch, “Tajikistan”, in Central Asia: Overview of Key Human Rights Concerns and Recommendations, 20th June 2012, URL:www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/20/Centralasia-overview-key- humanrights-concernsand-recomendations. 63 “Two Police Officers Charged over Detainee’s Death Amnestied”, Asia Plus, URL: tj.news/en/news/two-police-officers-charged-over-detainee’s-death-amnestied. 64 Human Rights Watch, “Central Asia: Overview of Key Human Rights Concerns and Recommendations”, 20th June 2012. URL: www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/20/central-asia-overview-of- key-human-rights-concerns-recommendations. 65 Emmanuel, Karagiannis, Political Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, (London: Routledge, 2010,) p.104.

94 a local court. The court accused the group that it did not provide the new official address to the ministry of Justice. Moreover, the court stated that it has a lot of foreign influence which is against the Tajik national interests.66 “We intend to lodge an appeal against this decision”67 says Junaid, a young lawyer from Ampro. Formed by the young lawyers; Ampro has been advocating the human rights in Khujant area. The chairperson of the group, Didora Samadova says that the move against Ampro is politically motivated but such illegal steps cannot stop their struggle.

The Tajik government wants to keep its youth out of the western, especially US, influence in order to retain its power. One of the channels to restrict this limit is the frequent blockage of the internet sites which provide news services. The government has banned all kinds of “conferences, seminars, academic gatherings and meetings of the Tajik students with international organizations” stating them as “against international law”.68 Strict laws and rules have been implemented for the NGOs. Law of Public Association was implemented in March 2006 which imposed strict conditions for the NGOs registration. All the NGOs working in Tajikistan had to re- register under the new law. According to Lawrence P. Markowitz, out of 3500 NGOs registered in 2006, only 1040 were able to get registered in 2007.69It is interesting to note here that only those organizations which had human rights protection and civil liberties orientations were declined re-registration while rest of organizations, working for economic development and in food, education and health sectors were encouraged to continue their activities.

Similar kinds of laws have been made for the private independent media. Some of the media houses were shut down under the new media laws in 2005 including the only private TV channel “Somonian.”70 Newspapers like “Nerui Bakhan, Ruzi Nav and Odamn Olan were denied accreditation for failure to pay taxes or on technical

66 Eurasisnet, “Tajikistan: NGOs Feeling Heat in the Winter”, 14th November 2102, URL: www.eurasianet.org/66177. 67 Mavlouda Rafiyeva, “Khujant Court Shuts Down Human Rights Group”, 25th October 2012. URL: http://mail.google.com/mail?shva=1#inbox/13a963cc5f2cf370. 68 Eurasisnet, “Tajikistan: NGOs Feeling Heat in the Winter”, Op. Cit. 69 Lawrence P. Markenwitz, Op. Cit., p. 110. 70 “Government Controls on News Compromise Vote in Tajikistan”, New York: Committee to Protect Journalists, 2006, URL: www.cpj/org/news/2006/europe/tajik03nov06na.html.

95 violations. 71 However, many of these restrictions including ban on independent newspapers websites were lifted after the presidential elections in 2006. The ban on the media before the presidential elections illustrates the fact that the regime, besides rigging the elections, want to keep its citizens politically uneducated.

One of the strongest critiques of the Rehmanov regime, Dodojon Atovilloyev, a journalist by profession severely criticizes the judicial system of Tajikistan. He frequently questions the independence of judiciary. He says that “the judicial system (in Tajikistan) is tool of execution in the hands of Rehmanov”.72Another political opponent and the critique of Tajik regime, Abdul Malik Abdualljanov was arrested from Kiev’s airport on 5th February 2013. This was done by the Ukranian government on the request of Interpol. Abdullajanov was accused of the assassination attempt on Rehmanov in 1997 and his alleged support to the 1997 Peace Accord field commander Muhammad Khudaebardaev. 73 Independent analysts say that as Abdullajanov was a potential competitor of Rehmanov during 2013 presidential elections. His arrest by the Ukrainian government is nothing but to keep him out of that electoral race.

Tajik regime says that the human rights conditions are stable in the country. Talking to the Euro news in March 2012, Rehmanov described human rights situation as satisfied in Tajikistan. He stated that in 1991 Tajikistan had only one TV channel along with four private newspapers and only one news agency that too was state controlled but “today there are forty four TV stations and almost 500 newspapers and magazines out of which 60% are privately owned”.74 He stated drugs trafficking as the only major issue in Tajikistan. He says that the security is under control at all the

71 “Government Controls on News Compromise Vote in Tajikistan”, New York: Committee to Protect Journalists, 2006, URL: www.cpj/org/news/2006/europe/tajik03nov06na.html. 72 Konstantin Parshin, “Tajikistan: Dushanbe Targets the Old Presidential Candidate for Extradition”, Eurasianet, 11th February 2013, URL: http://www.eurasianet.org/66947. 73 It is interesting to note here that when Abduallajanov was released on the orders of the Ukranian court, young people in Dushanbe staged protests in front of the UN office and the US embassy for the alleged involvent of the US in the release of Abdulaajanov. According to the neutral researchers, these demonstartions were planted by the Rehmanov regime. For details see Konstantin Parshin, “Tajikistan: Unusual Protests Helped by Authorities’ Invisible Hand”, URL: http://www.eurasianet.org/66947. 74 “Emamoli Rehmanov: There is No Shortcut to Democracy”, Euronews, 30/3/2012. URL: http://www.euronews.com/2012/03/30/president-emomali-rahmon-there-is-no-short-cut-to-democracy/

96 borders of Tajikistan, especially with Afghan border. “Drug trafficking is the only issue of concern not only for Tajikistan but also for international community,”75 stated Rehmanov. All these freedoms are at the presidential discretion and whenever he desires to curtail or curb these, no one can challenge him.

3.4.3. Religious Policies of the State

The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) led the Tajik civil war which forced the Rehmanov regime to bring religion under tight control. The growing number of IMU membership as well as Tajik men and women joining the Islamic State (IS) has brought further concerns regarding religious freedoms among Tajik policy makers. New and strict laws have been imposed recently in order to save the society from radicalization. For example, the state in Tajikistan has put a ban on headscarves in educational institutions in 2005. There is also a ban on less than eighteen years of age boys to attend mosques. This ban was implemented in 2011.

Ten Imams from Israfa region were banned in 2002 to perform their duties on the allegations that they had contacts with IRPT.76 The government also tried to cut down the number of mosques through a proposed legislation in 2006. The proposed law also intended to bring the religious education and pilgrimage to Macca under state control. However, this move of the authorities could not be fulfilled due to the severe criticism from all walks of life including opposition political parties in the legislature.77Although, religion is not under control like it is in Uzbekistan, Tajik government time and again amend the religious laws in order to keep a strict check on political Islam.

3.5. Economic Conditions in Tajikistan

Tajikistan is the poorest of all the former Soviet states. The GDP of Central Asia declined on an average to 37% between 1992 to1997, with Tajikistan hit worst where

75 Ibid 76 Emmanuel, Op. Cit., p.99. 77 Lawrence P. Markenwitz, Op. Cit., p. 110.

97 the economic decline touched to 60%.78The civil war crashed the Tajik economy where about 7 billion US Dollars were lost. Besides capital lost, human losses were unmatchable. Due to the civil war, least foreign direct investment (FDI) poured into Tajik economy. This situation forced Dushanbe to look towards the alternative means to increase the volume of national exchequer. It asked the International Financial institutions to help it out in this regard. But the IFIs were least interested in a war ridden state. Tension with Uzbekistan, which had been a major market for Tajik products traditionally, forced Tashkent to close down its borders with Tajikistan in order to stop the infiltration of democratic and religious figures and ideas.

The poor economic conditions where many of the people are unemployed, force Tajik population to become immigrant laborers, notably in Russian Federation. Those who are unable to go to Russia prefer to be involved in lucrative drugs trafficking. Almost ninety percent of international drugs generate from Afghanistan and about 70% of them are transited through Tajikistan. Tajik authorities, despite their concern on this trafficking have been unable to control this menace. The major reason in this regard is high level corruption. Majority of people in Tajikistan are related to agriculture. Today many of the important productions are controlled by the local elites and warlords. Postwar decentralized administration is in the hands of the elites at local level. Some of the key Tajik productions like “cotton, energy and administration” went out of the control of state into the hands of these local elites and warlords.79

Major export companies in Tajikistan belong to the president’s family. There is no checks and balances in Tajik economy. Tajikistan is heavily dependent upon the foreign assistance. It receives large sums of foreign aid each year. The foreign aid which comes for the social and physical infrastructure development is controlled and distributed by the regime. This aid is controlled by a department known as “Aid

78 Ajay Parthaik, “Central Asia Since Soviet Disintegration”, World Focus, August 2000, p.4. 79 Lawrence P. Markenwitz, Op. Cit., p. 101.

Coordination Unit” which falls directly under the presidential apparatus. 80 People wonder and ask question about the fair use of that aid.

3.6. Kyrgyzstan: A Real Democracy?

Kyrgyz nationalism emerged due to the Perestroika and Glasnot policies of the Gorbachev regime. This growing ethnic nationalism in Kygyzstan forced majority of the ethnic Slavs to leave the country. Kyrgyz was given the status of national language in 1989. The Democratic Kyrgyz Movement (DKM) was established by the teachers, students, writers and the journalists in Bishkek in May 1990 with ethnic Kyrgyz as the majority members.81The groups which constituted the DKM include; Ashar, struggling for land reforms Asaba and Erkin, which had democratic orientation. 82 The major objective of this DKM was the revivalism of Kyrgyz nationalism. Migration of ethnic Russians 83 from Kyrgyzstan started due to this movement which left a huge technical, administrative and political vacuum in the country.

Despite the early problems of transition from authoritarianism and closed economy towards democracy and lassies faire, Kyrgyzstan showed a substantial progress. This was mainly due to the Askar Akaev’s background who was an academician by profession contrary to his counterparts who were the hardline communists of their native states. Another reason for the introduction of liberal system in Kyrgyzstan was the rivalry between Akaev and Musadieyv, head of the Kyrgyz Communist Party. Musadieyv was a strong contender for the presidency in Kyrgyzstan during the Gorbachev era but Akaev was appointed as the Kyrgyz president by Gorbachev.

Gorbachev offered Akaev to become the vice president of the USSR which was turned down by the latter. He portrayed himself as the democratic leader of Kyrgyzstan. After the independence, Akaev was elected as the president of Kyrgyz

80 Sabrina Margarita Dzalaeva, “Foreign Aid Management and the State Budget Cycle in Tajikistan”, NISPAcee News, 2007, p.3. 81 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p. 287. 82 Mehrdad Haghayaghi, “Islamic Revivalism in Central Asian Republics,” Central Asia Survey, vol. 13, no. 2, 1994, p.256. 83 An estimated 920,000 ethnic Russians left Kyrgyzstan only during 1991. For details see Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.289.

99 republic in October, 1991. Akaev got 98.3% of the votes.84 These elections were relatively free and fair. During the initial years, despite the economic hardships85, Akaev showed progress towards development in almost all the fields of life. Kyrgyzstan was the first country to join WTO and to get advice from the IMF and the World Bank.

Kyrgyzstan remained highly motivational for the political and economic development at least for the first few years of independence. Political institutions were given a prescribed role, press was free, market oriented economic reforms were introduced, with highest rate of private investment across the whole Central Asia, different groups had representation in legislature and their say was heard. However, when consolidated powers like other counterparts in the region, Akaev gradually changed his policies of democratic reforms, political pluralism and economic transparency. This is more evident after the 1995 presidential elections when presidential apparatus got involved in corruption and consolidation of power by all the means. In order to grab more powers, he announced a referendum in 1996 which provided him more powers than the legislature. More restrictions were imposed on the opposition during the late 1990s.86 The 2000 presidential elections were highly criticized by all the independent observers and democratic states. The US and the OSCE objected the elections as well.

Surrounded by all the non-democratic states, Kyrgyzstan tilted towards authoritarianism during the latter half of 1990s. Establishment of Shanghai-5 brought Bishkek closer to Moscow and Beijing. China started investing substantial sums of money in the Kyrgyz economy. The civil society which had backing from the west especially from the US started criticizing the policies of Akaev. Washington also showed concern over the human rights and democracy’s condition in Kyrgyz republic. However, 9/11 provided Akaev regime with new opportunities to control its political opponents. In the name of containing terrorism, Kyrgyz regime approved

84 Dilip Hiro, Op.Cit., p. 139. 85 Almost 75% subsidies for the Kyrgyz budget were provided by Moscow before the Soviet disintegration which were stopped by the Russian Federation after Kyrgyz independence, pushing the country into deep economic and social crises. 86 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p.6.

100 new harsh laws to control the potential political opponents. It also used other means to control the opponents. For example, appointment of Felix Kulov as Bishkek’s mayor was a political move as he was a potential political competitor for Akaev in the parliament.

Nevertheless, Kulov joined his hands with the opposition political groups, notably of Kurmanbeg Bakaev who led the uprising against Akayev during late 2004 and 2005. The Colored Revolutions in Georgia in November 2003 and Ukraine in 2004 alarmed Akaev of the potential revolution against him. The parliamentary elections of 2005 sparked widespread protest across the whole country. Akaev’s son (Haider) and daughter (Bermet) also won these elections despite the hatred of general public towards the regime. This posed serious reservations about the credibility of the elections. People suspected that Akaev will bring one of his children as the next president of the country if he does not get extension for the third term.

Widespread protests erupted under the leadership of Bakaev and under the banner of Peoples Movement. This movement controlled most of Kyrgyzstan and ultimately the protestors got control of presidential palace. The president fled to Moscow via Kazakhstan. Bakaev was made the president of Kyrgyzstan. He assured Moscow, Beijing and Washington that his regime will continue the policies of the previous regime towards them. Before being elected as the president, Bakaev promised to bring constitutional reforms in order to devolve powers to the grass root level and bring greater transparency in economic and political matters. However, after being elected as the president, he did not execute the promised constitutional reforms which forced the prime minister Flex Kulov to resign.

The Bakaev regime became corrupt after a couple of years of time. Most of the influential and lucrative institutions and post like banks, electric companies, and fuel supplying companies went under the control of the president, his family members, and the cronies.87In order to grab more money either from Russia or the US, Bakaev announced in 2009 that Kyrgyzstan is going to shut down the Manas base. It was

87 Alexander Cooley, “Kyrgyzstan at the Brink”, Current History, Vol. 109, Issue, 729, October, 2010, p.301.

101 expected that Russia is going to give $2 billion to Bishkek if the later announces so. When they got only $ 300 million, Bakaev administration stuck a new deal with Washington on Manas base which raised its annual earnings from $ 17 million to $ 63 million. 88 The Obama administration overlooked the democratic conditions and human rights concerns in Kyrgyzstan in return to this deal.

The 2005 Tulip Revolution brought a new regime which proved failed to bring cohesion and integration in Kyrgyzstan. This failure discomforted the population and further shattered their confidence in secular regime.89It led to a new era of violence in Kyrgyzstan especially in the south during 2010. The Osh and Jalalabad cities in southern Kyrgyzstan has substantial majority of ethnic Uzbeks who were divided off their relatives in Uzbekistan after the independence. The ethnic Uzbeks feel dissatisfied as they are underrepresented in the local as well as national administration.

The ethnic riots, which broke out in Osh and Jalalabad in 2010 killing hundreds of people spread across the whole country. The situation went out of regime’s control when many regions demanded Bakaev to resign. This opposition movement was led by Rosa Otambaeva, the head of the Kyrgyz parliament. The movement was successful in ousting Bakev from power. Fresh elections were held and Almazbeg Atanbaev was elected as the new president of Kyrgyzstan. The positive story of these elections was that Rosa Otanbaeva who led the opposition movement during 2010 did not contest the presidential elections. Thus setting a new precedence in the Central Asian politics in general and Kyrgyz politics in particular. Despite these political practices, international parameters declare Kyrgyzstan as undemocratic. According to OSCE and Transparency International, Kyrgyz politics is dominated by clientalism and favoritism90while Freedom House declares Kyrgyzstan as not free.

88 Ibid, p.302. 89 K. Warikoo, Op. Cit., p.144 90 Richard Rose, “How Muslims View Democracy: Evidence from Central Asia”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 4, 2002, p.104.

102 3.7. Market Economy of Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan commenced its economic journey with a market oriented economy. It wanted to become the Switzerland of Central Asia due to its geography as well as scenic mountains. Although, it joined WTO right after its independence, it became an economic disaster during late 1990s and early 2000s due to the bad economic policies, patrimonilaism, clientalism, corruption and nepotism. One third of the Kyrgyz population says their economy is very bad while majority is dissatisfied with it.91Kyrgyzstan is highly dependent on the foreign investment and loans from the IMF.

Aid dependency is one of the major sources of Kyrgyz GNP. However, most of the aid coming to Kyrgyzstan “benefits the presidential family and closest allies during

the Akaev’s period”, reported Moya Stolitsa-Novosti, an independent Kyrgyz newspaper. 92 Like other regional states, Kyrgyzstan is marked by high level of corruption. Uneven distribution of wealth, poverty, unemployment and ethnic issues have a deep impact on the social thinking of Kyrgyz society. These divisions and injustices have increased the popularity of alternative political and economic models, notably provided by the Islamists.

3.8. Ethnic Division and Kyrgyz Politics.

The Kyrgyz flag has forty sunrays which represent the forty major tribes in Kyrgyzstan. However, the power remained in the hands of northern region throughout the Soviet rule and in the form of Askar Akaev. The ethnic division is so much embedded in the Kyrgyz society that people cast their votes according to tribal, clan and regional affiliations than the national priorities. Kyrgyzstan is divided into two parts, northern and southern Kyrgyzstan, mainly on ethnic basis. Northern Kyrgyzstan comprises of mainly ethnic Kyrgyz and Russians while southern Kyrgyzstan constitutes mainly of the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz population. Ethnicity is very important for the identity in Kyrgyzstan. It is also evident in the politics as well. Akaev had support from the north while Bakaev had it from the south.

91 Richard Rose, Op. Cit., p.109. 92 Sultan Jumagulov, “Kyrgyzstan: International Aid Concerns”, IWPR Reporting on Central Asia, No. 154. 18th October, 2002. URL: http://eng.gateway.kg/news/cacis/1688

103 The major ethnic tensions in Kyrgyzstan are in the Osh and Jalalabad regions where ethnic Uzbeks almost equals the ethnic Kyrgyz in numbers. The ethnic Uzbeks have their own separate Mohallahs in these regions where they have their own schools, markets and even mosques.93 Akaev, having support from north always preferred ethnic Kyrgyz’s over the ethnic Uzbeks for key appointments in the regional administrations of these two areas. These policies had always been a source of tension between these two ethnicities in southern Kyrgyzstan. When Bakaev became president, it was expected that the Uzbeks would get their due share in the regional as well as central administration but their expectations met with disappointment like other expectations when Bakaev followed Akaev’s regime policies in these regions. The tension mounted to such a level during 2010 that an armed group of ethnic Kyrgyz attacked the ethnic Uzbeks in Osh which resulted in the outburst of violent ethnic clashes in Osh and Jalalabad regions claiming several lives besides leaving thousands as injured and displacing many hundreds of thousands to neighboring Uzbekistan. It is suspected that the Kyrgyz security forces actually supported these armed groups for their attacks against the ethnic Uzbeks.94Izzatillah Rakhmatillaev95 endorses these allegations.

3.9. Human Rights conditions in “Democratic” Kyrgyzstan

The constitutions of all the Central Asian states ensure the protection of human rights and civil liberties. The actual practice is not different from those of authoritative states. Although Kyrgyzstan is the most democratic of all the Central Asian states, it does not follow the principles of human rights and civil liberties in true sense. Harassment to the political and religious opponents is normal in Kyrgyzstan. Those political parties or groups which are potential threat to the regimes are either banned or under strict state control. No political party on religious basis can be registered; therefore, HTI is also banned in Kyrgyzstan.

93 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002,) p.70. 94 Alexander Cooley, Op. Cit., p.305. 95 A human rights activist from Osh, Kyrgyzstan. In an interview to the author through skype, he said that police that is dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz not only supported the ethnic Kyrgyz against ethnic Uzbeks in 2010 but it also provided them with weapons to be used against ethnic Uzbeks.

104

Qari Rafique Kamaluddin, a prominent imam of the Kara-Suu area of south Kyrgyzstan was killed during a counter-terror operation in July 2006.96As mentioned earlier, Kyrgyzstan had been an open society relatively but when media highlighted the presidential corruption, restrictions were imposed on it. For example, Zamira Sadiqova was detained for twelve years for her stories on presidential corruption in 1997. 97 Felix Kulov was sentenced to seven years in January 2001 on multiple criminal charges. The fact about the case is that Kulov was a potential threat to the political power of the president as he became a popular leader in Kyrgyzstan. He was punished by the regime for the creation of an opposition political party Ar-Namys (Dignity). His property was also confiscated by the state.98However, he was given amnesty by a military court later on.

Aksu demonstrations by peaceful people on 17th and 18th March 2002 were heavy handedly responded by the Kyrgyz forces killing six people. Opposition forces joined their hands against the Akaev regime after this incident.99Such harsh policies have been blessings for the popularity of underground Islamists especially the HTI which propagates an ideal Islamic state where there would be social and economic justice.

3.10. Nursultan Nazarbaev and Centralized Political Setup in Kazakhstan

In an interview to the Japanese newspaper in October 1991, Nazarbaev stated that “I see Kazakhstan as a democratic, presidential republic with a professional parliament, elected on a multiparty system and a strong executive power in the center and in the region.”100 The first constitution was perfectly democratic in nature. It restricted the president for two consecutive terms with clear separation of powers syndrome. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan was abolished in October 1991 and was replaced by Socialist Party of Kazakhstan.

96 Emmanuel, Op. Cit., p.69. 97 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p.43. 98 Ibid, p.44. 99 Pinar Akcali, “Democracy and Political De-stability in Kyrgyzstan”, in Birgit N. Schlyter, Prospects for Democracy in Central Asia, (Sweden: Alfa Print, 2006,) p.43. 100 Sally N. Cummings, Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005,) p.24.

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Jeltoqsan 101 (December) and Alsh Orda are the strong nationalist movements in Kazakhstan. Alash Orda consists of young, mostly unemployed people of Kazakhstan’s rural areas. It is not a recognized political party in Kazakhstan.102 It was established in April 1990 by Aron Atabek. The party was popular among intelligentsia. Objectives of the Party were ‘the achievement by Kazakhstan of the real status of independent ethnic state, the integration and propagation of the ideas of Turkic unity and Muslim solidarity, and the national rebirth of Kazakhstan as the historical nucleus of the future unified Islamic Turkic state, great Turkestan”.103When the Party raised voice against the irregularities and corruption in the Kazakh administration, its leadership was forced into exile and its newspaper, Khaq (the Truth) was banned.104

Chairman of the Kazakh National Security Committee, Alnur Musaev declared in the parliament in 1999 that radicalism is on the rise in Kazakhstan and it has been witnessed that radical elements are penetrating Kazakhstan through south. 105 No political party is given legal status if it is based on regionalism, ethnicity, race or religion. Heavy repression on political opponents is witnessed in Kazakhstan. During the early years of independence, Alash Orda and Jeltoqsan came under heavy state assault.106

The 1996 demonstrations led by the trade unions named Azamat (citizens) demanded political and economic reforms which were perceived as a threat to the Nazarbaev’s rule and the regime further tightened control over political and economic matters of Kazakhstan.107 Before the 1991 presidential elections, major opposition leader like Hassan Hamedov, head of Jeltoqsan Party was attacked, beaten and deprived of the

101 This was amovement which encouraged the ethnic Russians to migrate from Kazakhstan. 102 Both Jeltoqsan and Alsh were not given recognition by the Kazakh authorities despite having more than 3000 registered members, a pre-requisite for the recognition of political parties in Kazakhstan. 103 Ludmila, Op. Cit., p.36. 104 Emmanuel. Op. Cit., P.30. 105 Mahavir Singh, Op. Cit., p.214. 106 Paul Kubecik, “Authoritarianism in Central Asia: Curse or Cure”, Third World Quarterly, No. 63, Winter, 2008, p.35. 107 Paul Kubecik, Op. Cit., p.35.

106 list of signatures from his supporters which was the pre-requisite to contest elections.108

Alash Orda started its campaign with the objective to extradite ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan and to establish a political system with a mixture of Islamic and Turkic models. 109 Turkestan Party wanted to establish a unified Islamic state throughout Central Asia.110 Not only political parties but also the media came under attack from the regime. During 1997, strict laws were introduced which banned almost all the independent TV channels and newspapers. Close relatives of regime including daughters and sons-in-law were appointed against lucrative and powerful positions in different important organizations.

A law in 1998 provided lifetime immunity to the president for prosecution.111 The June 2002 law about Political parties put strict conditions for their recognition. The political parties must have a minimum of 7000 members in each oblast (region) while it must have at least 50,000 of members across the whole country, 112a move which is almost impossible for the opposition political parties which are already short of funds to recruit such a big number of members. But on the other hand, those political parties which are pro-regime and favor “evolutionary democracy” in Kazakhstan are given recognition even if they do not fulfill the criteria for the recognition under the 2002 law about political parties. One such example is the establishment of Democratic Party of Kazakhstan in 2004. It had openly declared to back the Nazarbaev regime.

Nazarbaev even created problems for his daughter Dariga Nazarbaeva’s political party Asar, which was critical to several governmental policies and officials. 113 According to the electoral laws, presidential candidate must have to submit the signatures of 100,000 supporters within a month but the election commission of Kazakhstan gave only nine days to the contesting candidates to fulfill

108 John Glenn, The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999,) p.108. 109 Ibid, p.109. 110 Ibid. 111 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p.34. 112 Emmanuel. Op. Cit., P.80. 113 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.275.

107 the task which was, obviously, impossible for them to accomplish. One of the candidates, Hasan Kojahmadov, managed to get the required signatures. When got information, secret agencies of Kazakhstan attacked him two days before the elections and snatched the list of signature.114Since he could not submit the required list of signature, the presidential elections were a one man show.

During the 2004 parliamentary elections, many of the political parties failed to get registration. Those parties, without regime’s blessing, which were able to get registered, could not perform well during the elections. Even AK Zhol, the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan a newly established and well popular party, got only one seat after the elections, which it did not own. However, the 2004 parliamentary elections were declared as not up to the mark by independent international observers. Freedom House declared Kazakhstan as not free, OSCE stated that elections were not fair, Transparency International says that Kazakhstan is one of the most corrupt states in the world.115

State takes actions against those who are critical to the governmental policies. For example, Irina Petrushova, the editor of Republican newspaper, when published the story of $ 1 billion corruption in oil contracts by the president was threatened by the state agencies by “displaying a decapitated clog outside the newspaper’s office.”116 Akezhan Kazhegeldin, a former prime minister was charged under criminal record by the regime in 1998. The independent analysts accuse the regime that was fearful of him as he wanted to contest the 1999 presidential elections. He was barred to contest the 1999 presidential elections by Supreme Court. He fled Kazakhstan to Europe and eventually to the US.117

3.11. Ethnic Division

Elder, middle and younger hordes are found in Kazakhstan. Elder hordes are at key positions. Younger hordes, ethnic Uzbeks and other ethnic minorities feel deprived of

114 Ibid, p.247. 115 Richard Rose, Op. Cit., p.104. 116 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p.36. 117 Ibid, p.35.

108 their rights and chances to get into political power. They feel dissatisfied, hence, are more vulnerable to the opposition forces. Middle hordes are educated and more Russified.118 Therefore, they have a sort of influence in political process. Hence, they are more or less satisfied. While people living in southern Kazakhstan comprising mostly of the younger hordes and other ethnic minorities are living relatively less satisfied lives. They compete for small posts in their respective areas119and are least included in the national administrative and political affairs.

The Zhuz tribe is very important in the Kazkah power structure. Most of the key administrative positions are held by the Zhuz people. Even getting a job for Zhuz in Kazakhstan is much easier than other ethnic groups.120Kazakhstan is much stronger economically than rest of the Central Asian states due to its oil wealth and low population. People are more or less satisfied with the basic necessities of life. However, ethnic divisions and disparity has a deep influence on the minds of people.

3.12. Economic Conditions in Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan was deeply connected with mainland Russia and had largest international population in Central Asia which included the ethnic Russians (the largest), Uzbeks, Germans, Tartars and Ukrainians etc.121 The ethnic Russians even outnumbered the Kazakhs during 1960s and 1970s. Soviet disintegration brought difficulties for Kazakhstan as most of the northern Kazakhstan was connected to Russia, the electricity supply and other means of communication ran from Russia to Kazakhstan. Most of the Kazakhstan, indirectly, was dependent on Russian supplies and demands which were also halted.

Increase in oil prices during late 1990s, gave boost to Kazakh economy which was gradually transformed on modern international lines. It opened up its economy for the private businesses. Kazakhstan followed the path of Kyrgyzstan to get the

118 Emmanuel. Op. Cit., P.86. 119 E. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics: The Power of Blood in Kazakhstan and Beyond, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004,) p.106. 120 Anatoly Kahzanov, Op. Cit., p.30. 121 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p.30.

109 membership of WTO in 1998. Kazakhstan expected a steady increase in the development due to this privatization and FDI. But the privatization process in Kazakhstan has been corrupt which resulted in the increase of president and his family’s personal income and bank accounts. Corruption is massive in the oil and gas contracts. One of the mega scandals of corruption in Kazakhstan which revealed $ 1 billion were deposited in the secret Swiss banks was admitted by Iman Galiev Tasmagambetov, the then Kazakh Prime Minister.122 The Kazakh government stated that this $ 1 billion secret fund which was established by the commission in oil contracts helped Astana to pay the pension arrears besides pooling substantial money to the annual budget.123

Estimated oil in Kazakhstan is between 5.4 billion to 17.6 billion barrels, 124while estimated potential worth of Kazakh natural resources by its government stands at $ 8.7 trillion.125Billions of dollars have been invested by international companies in oil sector of Kazakhstan. The contracts are given to those companies which pay bribery and commission to the presidential family. For example, James Giffon who heads Mercator Corporation blamed the president and his family for kickbacks in these contracts. 126 Similarly, the construction of Astana as a new capital to move the economic activities near to Russian border also cost a huge sum of money to the Kazakh national exchequer. Almost $850 million were spent on the construction of Astana while only $ 85 million were spent on the agriculture sector during 2003127 to which most of the rural population is dependent for its survival.

The only success in Central Asia is Kazakhstan which has highest level of per capita income that is 13,000 US dollars in 2013,128production and human resource. It has very strong banking sector which fulfills international banking requirements. But despite these successes, there are problems of unemployment especially in southern

122 www.eurasianet.org/policy-forum/CRW-news-archiveaprisl/html 123 “Top Kazakh Banker Defends Secret Oil Fund”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Library, 18th April 2002. URL: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1142658.html 124 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p.32. 125 Ibid, p.32. 126 Ibid, p.34. 127 Anatoly Khazanov, Op. Cit., pp.22-23. 128 World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kazakhstan/overview.

110 regions and inflation. International companies which work in the Kazakh energy sector prefer to hire ethnic Russians than the Kazakhs. These companies include Chevron and Hurricane Hydrocarbons etc. 129 One of the major reasons for this discrimination is that the local Kazakhs are inexperienced in the field of petro- industry. But the local population considers it as injustice to them. By 2020, it is expected that Kazakhstan will produce 8 million barrels of oil per day. 130Astana expects about $ 52 billion as FDI in its energy sector by 2015.131New contracts with foreign oil and gas companies in order to increase the state control, shares and profits of energy exports.

3.13. State Responses to Political Islam in Kazakhstan

During the initial years of independence, Kazakhstan needed national integration and cohesion for which Islam was perceived as the best way to achieve it. Therefore, Nazarbaev let the Islamic revivalism continue but under the state supervision. A League of the Muslims was established in 1990.132But the regional developments in the form of Tajik Civil war and emergence of Islamists in Namangan, Uzbekistan forced Nazarbaev to rethink his religious policies.

Islamic extremism is making its roots in Kazakhstan. The late infiltration of Islamists in Kazakhstan is a result of relatively less Muslim population and the social structure of Kazakhstan which is nomadic in nature. The current trends of Islamism in Kazakhstan are the result of closed political system. The high per capita income and economic affluence in Kazakhstan are the major reasons for its less vulnerability in terms of political instability. Nevertheless, a sharp increase in the number of Islamists in Kazakhstan especially in southern areas indicate that political ban and international political issues also impact and shape the minds of people.

129 Sheel K. Asopa, “Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Central Asia in the Aftermath of 11th September”, in Mahavir Singh, ed. International |Terrorism and Religious Extremism: Challenges to Central and South Asia, (Kolkatta: Anamika Publishers, 2004,) p.170. 130 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p.88. 131 Interfax, “Central Asia and Caucasus Business Report”, 9th December 2002. 132 Emmanuel, Op. Cit., p.30.

111 3.14. Turkmenistan and the Personality Cult of Niyazov

Turkmenistan has five major tribes and five major regions. The power politics in Turkmenistan revolves around this division. Tekke tribe is the most powerful to which Niyazov belonged to. It is followed by Akhal, a sub-tribe. Like its counterparts, Turkmenistan also adopted a presidential form of government after independence. Supramurad Niyazov became the first president after independence (he had been the president of Turkmenistan under Soviet rule as well). Niyazov remained in power till 2005 till his death. He was replaced by Kurbanbeg Berdemukhamadov who is still in power.

3.15. Socio-economic and Political Conditions

Despite having large number of hydrocarbons, almost 90% of Turkmen lived under the poverty line.133Niyazov was elected as the president in 1990 by securing over 98% of votes. New constitution was promulgated on 18th May, 1992 which declared Turkmenistan as a secular state having the presidential form of government. Niyazov grew up in an orphanage. After assuming powers of independent Turkmenistan, he consolidated all powers in his hands. He created his personality cult in all the spheres of Turkmen life. Niyazov wrote a ‘sacred’ book Ruhnama which provided the guidelines to Turkmen society to lead its life. This book was given the status equal to the Quran and the Bible and was obligatory to be present in every mosque and church. To get a degree in medicine, to become a teacher or civil servant and even to get a driving license, a compulsory test of Ruhnama had to be taken.134The students in Turkmenistan could not get their degrees until and unless they passed a ‘tough’ exam of Ruhnama.

When several imams rejected the equal status of Ruhnama with Quran, courts sentenced them to several years of imprisonment on Niyazov’s orders. One such example is of the former head imam of Turkmenistan, Nasrullah Ibn Abdullah, who was sentenced to 22 years in prison for his alleged connection to the assassination

133 Dilip Hiro, Between Marx And Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia, (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1994,) p.145. 134 Ibid, pp.216-17.

112 attempt on Niyazov.135However, it is stated that he was extremely critical to Ruhnama and Niyazov’s social and religious policies. Not only did he write Ruhnama, he also got lifetime immunity from the prosecution in Turkmenistan by the rubber stamp parliament.

Opposition political parties in Turkmenistan have literally been banned. Article 28 of the Turkmen constitution declares that political parties cannot be established if they want to change the Turkmen political system by force, against the constitutional rights of the citizens, preach hate, on the basis of ethnicity, race, religion or region, sand those who try to topple the elected political government through establishment of a military rule.136Ironically, it is the regime which will decide about the fate of political parties.

Niyazov had all plans to rule the country till his death as all the ‘so called’ presidential elections were won by him unopposed. In December, 1999, Niyazov was declared lifetime president of Turkmenistan by the legislature comprised of a 100% membership to Democratic Party of Turkmenistan which was headed by none other than Niyazov, leaving no choice for democratic transition in the country in future. Later on, he announced that he would step down as the president in 2010, which would lead to a multi candidate presidential election in Turkmenistan. Niyazov banned all kinds of opposition groups. He banned all the religious-political activities as well. Even most of the Christian and Hindu political leaders were forced to leave the country.137

Powers to amend the constitution, dissolution of legislature, and the appointment of the judges of Supreme Court were given to Turkmenbashi in 2003.138 Niyazov even changed the names of the days and weeks. He renamed them to his relatives. He renamed bread with his mother’s name “Gurbon-Sulton”. 139 Loyal opposition political parties like Young League of Turkmenistan and Peasants’ Justice Party were

135 Eric McGlinchy, “Autocrats, Islamists, and the Rise of Radicalism in Central Asia”, Current History, October 2005, p.342. 136 Ashqabat Vecherni (Ashgabat Evening), 19th May 1992. 137 Ahmad Rashid, Op. Cit., p.73. 138 Dilip Hiro, p.223. 139 For details see Eric McGlinchy, Op. Cit., p.345.

113 created by Niyazov in order to deceive his own people as well as international community regarding democracy. He got prepared a golden statue of himself which was installed right in the center of the Capital. The interesting fact about the statue was that it always faced the sun by rotating- a symbol of eternity.

Not only the political scenario but the economic sphere had been under the tight control of Niyazov. Even the international trade agreements and FDI had to be approved by the president.140 Instead of investing in development and social sectors, the hydrocarbon wealth had been invested in the construction of new buildings, luxury hotels and palaces for the president and his family members.

3.16. Human Rights Violations and the Rise of Political Islam in Turkmenistan

Niyazov dismissed the chief met officer once his prediction went wrong. Long hair and beard were banned for the students and young men. In 2006, he ordered the pensioners to repay the last two years of pension for illogical reasons. He also banned dogs in the capital. He banned smoking throughout the country as well.141He did all this because of his personal likings and disliking.

During August 2004, Turkmenistan government did an agreement with the Turkish government to shut down the Turkish-Turkmen colleges and universities in order to de-Islamize the education system. “Subjects related to religious studies have been removed from school curricula, the prayers hours (which were obligatory in these institutions) have been abolished” and the teachings of Fathullah Gulen are banned.142 In order to keep the Turkmen youth away from international influences, Niyazov banned all the foreign languages especially English.143

Boris Sheikhmuradov, the former foreign minister of Turkmenistan tried to stage a coup against Niyazov in 2000 which could not succeed. He was sentenced to 25 years after an alleged assassination attempt on Niyazov. Under the ‘Betrayers of the

140 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p.99. 141 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.227-28. 142 Stanislov Ivanov, “Will Turkmen Become a Shield in Jihad’s Way?”, URL; http://journal- neo.org/2015/01/10/rus-stanet-li-turkmenistan-zaslonom-na-puti-azhihadistov/ 143 Ahmad Rashid, Op. Cit., p.74.

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Motherland’ decree, two other people, Khudaiberdy Orazov, ex-Central Bank’s head and Mukhammad Khanamov, ex-Ambassador of Turkmenistan to Turkey were also given 25 years imprisonment in the same case.144 9/11 provided Niyazov with a new zeal and zest to suppress his political opponents. He used to rotate top brass government officials in order to keep them politically weak. Other prominent potential political opponents like Mukhammad Nazarov, former security chief, Kurbandury Begendajev, former defense minister, and Batyr Berdyev, successor of Sheikhmuradov were arrested under different charges.145

Turkmenistan has huge hydrocarbon wealth. The crude oil reserves according to British Petroleum in Turkmenistan are estimated 600 million barrels in January, 2014146 while its proven gas reserves are estimated at 17.3 trillion cubic meters147. Despite such a tremendous natural reserves, majority of Turkmen population lives in extreme poverty. The widespread corruption in the country has halted the economic development. The regimes and their relatives/cronies are involved in corruption. Niyazov was known as Mr. 33% in Turkmenistan.148People living in countryside face severe problems in the form of non-availability of standard schooling and health facilities, infrastructure development and job opportunities. Instead of improving their conditions, Niyazov ordered to shut down most of the rural health centers in order to save the money.149 He converted all cinemas into puppet houses- avoiding external impacts. New and strict laws were introduced for NGOs.

Worst treatment is done to the ethnic Uzbeks in Turkmenistan, especially after the failed coup attempt against Niazov which was supported by Tashkent. According to Olcott, Niyazov regime introduced harsh policies towards the ethnic Uzbeks by putting visa restrictions on the cross-border movement. The state controlled religious authority which had been under the authority of ethnic Uzbek clerics, was also taken

144 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p.159. 145 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p.161. 146 “Turkmenistan”, US Energy Information Administration, URL: http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=tx 147Abdelghani Henni, “Gas for Cash: Future of Turkmenistan”, Society of Petroleum Engineers, 11 November 2014. URL: http://www.spe.org/news/article/Turkmenistan-Gas-for-Cash 148 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p.101. 149 Philip Shishkin, “Central Asia’s Crisis of the Governance”, Asia Society, January 2012, p.17. URL: asiasociety.org/files/pdf/120215_central_asia_crisis_governance.pdf, p.26.

115 back from them and Nasrullah ibn Abdullah, former mufti of Turkmenistan, an ethnic Uzbek criticized the status of Ruhnama, was charged for the failed coup.150The other major ethnic minority in Turkmenistan is Russian. They had been treated even in worst manner by the Niyazov regime. They were given a deadline to decide about their dual citizenship 151, which had to be converted in a single one. Strict legal obstacles were put in the way of those who wanted to go back to Russia. Due to these complexities along with unfriendly flight schedule, many of the ethnic Russians could not flee back to Russian Federation. They were deprived of their properties and were ‘thrown on the streets’ by the state authorities.152

In a letter to OSCE in January 2002, Sheikhmuradov stated that “a new wave of terror and cruelty against its citizens (has started)…it is impossible to hide anymore of Niyazov’s hypocrisy, the absence of elementary norms of political and diplomatic behavior, the insidiousness and cruelty in relations to the people, and the speeding of an atmosphere of fear.”153Durdimurad Khojamukhammad stated that “wiretapping, provocating, dismissal from jobs, all kinds of intrigues and telephone threats” is a routine in Turkmenistan.154To justify his aging rule, he stated in Ruhnama that the age of wisdom starts at 73 years,155thus planned to govern the state for many more years. Such circumstances supported the anti-regime sentiments. When people did not find any democratic way to express their discontent, they turned towards political Islam.

Although, a very limited number of Turkmen are vulnerable to extremist ideology, says Aiden Azarbaev, a Turkmen political scientist,156the regime’s repression and its hard policies towards religion will give birth to Islamic regimes in Central Asian

150 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p. 162. 151 The dual citizenship was given to the ethnic Russians living in Turkmenistan aft er the independence. The state wanted them to retain as they were highly skilled people and had vast experience in the administrative matters. However, when Turkmen nationalism was enforced in its letter and spirit in Turkmenistan, they under the state fire. 152 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p.163. 153 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.218. 154 “Interview with Durdimuad Khojamukhammad”, Central Asia Monitor, No.4, 1992, p.16. 155 Martha Brill Olcott, Op. Cit., p.164. 156 Dzhummogul Annayev, “ISIL Raises Flag in Turkmenistan-Afghanistan Border”, 5th February 2015. URL: www.centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2/5/15/06/feature-01.

116 states, said the imam of Ashgabat’s largest mosque.157 Besides Iraq, Turkmenistan which has proven 24.3 trillion cubic meter of natural gas and unproven 80.6 billion barrels of crude oil158 is an attractive place for the Islamists. Similarly, Turkmenistan has the weakest security apparatus in the region with around 30,000 security personnel that is a soft target for groups like IMU.

Many of the Turkmen have joined IMU, ETIM and HTI. In order to pacify the security threats, Ashgabat has contacted the tribal elders in Northern Afghanistan to control the infiltration of militants from Afghan territory. Although exaggerated, it is said that the militants have occupied major parts of the proposed TAPI pipeline routes in Afghanistan. Cattle breeders frequently cross Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border for cattle grazing.159 The militants taking cover of the cattle breeders can penetrate into the Turkmen territories. The Turkmen border security forces have taken important steps to ensure the security of the borders.

The threat of the possible spillover of militancy from Afghanistan to Turkmenistan and Central Asia in general is not exaggerated. Many Uzbeks and Turkmen are the members of global political Islamist groups based in Afghanistan which are active in the Northern Afghanistan bordering Central Asia, says Gulmuhammad Rasuli, an Afghan senator.160 16 militants who belonged to Turkmenistan were killed in North Waziristan on 16th February 2012 by Pakistani forces. “Yes, Turkmen also fight in Pakistan-Afghanistan region. They are here because they cannot operate in Turkmenistan…they have joined their hands with IMU in a hope that they will bring down the autocratic regime at home and will replace that with an Islamic one”161 says Rahimullah Yousafzai.

Berdemukhammadov is less autocratic than Niyazov but he is an authoritative ruler. He has loosened the control over economy and has given room to some sort of private

157 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.205. 158 Michael Tanchum, “Will Islamic State tip the Balance in Turkmenistan?”, 11/5/2014. URL: www.jpost.com/opinion/will-islamic-state-tip-to-balance-in-turkmenistan-380913. 159 Stanislov Ivanov, “Will Turkmen Become a Shield in Jihad’s Way?”, URL; http://journal- neo.org/2015/01/10/rus-stanet-li-turkmenistan-zaslonom-na-puti-azhihadistov/ 160 Dzhummogul Annayev, Op. Cit., 161 Author’s interview with the respondent.

117 businesses but the political sphere is still under tight control. Under such circumstances where real democratic opposition is banned, people have no other option but to join political Islam. The Turkmen have not only joined HTI and IMU but also the other political Islamists. If the political and socio-economic policies continued in Turkmenistan, the future of political Islam is brighter there.

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Chapter Four

ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN (IMU)

4.1. Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapters, Islam remained deeply embedded in the social life of ethnic Uzbeks of Central Asia. Uzbeks were the major ethnic group which remained in the urban centers and their lives were organized than rest of the ethnicities and regions of Central Asia. Ethnic Uzbeks were and are the most practicing Muslims in the region. People of this region always resisted anti- Islamic moves. Basmachi Movement at the time of Soviet occupation and subsequent underground religious activities in the region kept Islamic values and traditions alive in one or the other form. The most important era of Islamic renaissance during the Soviet era started from late 1970s and early 1980s mainly due to the Afghan War, Iranian Revolution and Perestroika and Glasnost policies introduced by Gorbachev regime.

The last decade of Soviet occupation in Central Asia witnessed manifold increase in Islamization. Many men with beard and many women wearing headscarves and veil could have been seen in streets. During 1987, a survey revealed that more than sixty percent of the Tashkent Muslims declared themselves as “Muslims” and only seven percent as atheist.1

The imposed independence on Uzbekistan, like the independence of other Central Asian states, generated new hopes for economic and political opportunities among the general public. That was the era which also brought ideological vacuum by the demise of Soviet Union. The policy makers in the region were directionless in their planning and future discourse. The deteriorated socio-economic conditions2 forced the regimes to consolidate all powers in their hands in order to maintain the stability. The Uzbek government under Islam Karimov mixed Soviet styled administration with few modern institutions like establishing democratic parties

1 Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia, (London; Harper Collins publishers, 1994,) p.163. 2 Discussed in details in chapter 3.

119 and institutions as well as Islamic symbols3 but most of the powers remained in the hands of the president.

On the other hand, opposition forces that included both secular and religious, demanded a new set up based on democratic and Islamic values. The major opposition forces which emerged during that period were Erk, Birlik, Islamic renaissance party of Uzbekistan and Adolat. Instead of complying with the demands of the opposition, the Uzbek government resorted to oppressive measures. It started massive crackdown on all kinds of opposition forces followed by a ban on most of them. Karimov says that “fundamentalism falsely presents the Islamic religion to the masses as a universal mean to solve all social, economic, political, and international problems”.4 The opposition forces “both Islamists and anti-state actors” are not sincere with the state and people of Uzbekistan but their “every slogan and action is backed by a political motivation”.5 Since Karimov was a part of old Soviet administration, he thought it better not to start an open democratic and market oriented transition.

4.2. Historical Background

During the 1960s and 1970s, unofficial Islam rose to a great extent. The young people, especially from Fergana valley started secret Islamic activities. The start of 1980s decade brought further support and popularity to these underground Islamic activities. People were keen to know about their religion which had been under strict control by Moscow for many decades. The clandestine or parallel Islam led by Sufis and some of the Mullahs, got a golden opportunity to propagate their ideology and expand their influence while Gorbachev in power. Muslims of Soviet Union in general and Central Asia in particular were under extreme religious control. They not only wanted to revive their Islamic values but also wanted to bring an Islamic revivalism in Central Asia.

The popularity of underground Islam during the Soviet era was also admitted by the Communist Party’s officials. One of the party’s official, L. Klimovich stated

3 These symbols did not mean the official recognition of Islam as an ideology but it was an effort to satisfy the demands of Islamists in the republic. 4 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan at The Threshold of Twenty First Century, (Massachusetts: N.K., 1998,) p.27. 5 Ibid., p.32.

120 in 1966 that unofficial Islam in Soviet Union is stronger than official Islam.6 When the Afghan war started in 1979, many of the Central Asians especially Uzbeks were recruited by the Red Army to fight in Afghanistan. Tashkent remained the major hub of Soviet military activities in Afghanistan. An estimated 15000 to 20000 Central Asian troops, mainly Tajiks and Uzbeks were dispatched to Afghanistan.7 Most of these Central Asians got inspired by the mujahidin in Afghanistan. Some of them ran and joined mujahidin during the war while others including Juma Namangani8, came back under the Islamists influence.

The Uzbek KGB conducted raids in 1982 and found four underground Islamic groups.9 The leadership of these groups was imprisoned but towards the end of the 1980s, people of Uzbekistan demanded that all anti-Islamic laws and practices be abolished and moral values be implemented. These demands included ban on alcohol, gambling and pork, control over massive corruption and provision of socio-economic needs to the people, check on inflation and improving law and order situations. They also wanted to implement Islamic code in the educational institutions which meant segregation of male and female students, and promotion of Islamic culture, handing over of government buildings to Islamists so that they can implement Shariah as the constitution of the state especially in Fergana valley. Major center for these demands was Namangan in the Fergana valley. Soviet laws prohibited fulfilling such demands, nevertheless, the Uzbek government showed a relative openness towards these demands at the time of independence. The regime showed flexibility towards Islamic renaissance. New Islamic groups like Adolat, Barka, Tauba and IRP were established in Fergana valley.

During 1989, protests started in Uzbekistan to replace the mufti Shamsuddin Babakhanov from the position of head of the Board of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. He was accused of alcohol addiction and not following the other Islamic practices. Protestors also criticized him for not being sincere for the

6 Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problems in the USSR, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990,) p.159. 7 Alexandre Benningsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet States, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983,) p.113. 8 A paratrooper in the Soviet Military who later joined Tauba group and then established IMU. He was a born fighter and not an Islamic scholar. However, he had a huge impression on his followers. For more details see Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Lahore: Vaguard, 2002, pp.137-138 and 143. 9 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.130.

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Islamic revivalism in Central Asia.10 Those protests resulted in the appointment of mufti Muhammad Sadiq Yousaf as the new head of Board.

Namangan is most densely populated region of Uzbekistan and had the largest number of mosques during the Soviet era. It remained the bastion of Islam during the Soviet rule in Central Asia. The Islamists of the region started a campaign during 1991 and 1992 which was at the forefront of Islamic renaissance in the region. Although, Adolat was headed by Hakim Jan Satimov,11 it was Tahir Yaldashev12 and Jumma Hajiov Namangani who were soul of this movement. Two of Mullah Hindustani’s students Abdulvali and Rakhmatilla were deeply influenced by the ideologies of Banna, Qutb and Maududi. Namangani and Yuldashev were the students of Abdulvali.13Many of the new mosques were being constructed in Namangan and “long live the Islamic state” was written outside of those newly constructed mosques.14 The movement occupied all the important buildings of the city when the authorities did not comply with their demands. Despite several efforts, the local authorities could not free the government buildings. The Islamists demanded that Karimov should personally come and negotiate with them.

Sensing the gravity of situation, Karimov fled to Namangan in March 1992 where negotiations started between Islamists and the Karimov but could not achieved desired results from both the sides. Karimov wanted to take the issue in the parliament for discussion15 which was not acceptable to Islamists. They wanted to resolve the issue at the spot. The failure of negotiations led to a massive crackdown on the Islamists in which many of the Islamists’ leaders were captured by the authorities. The crackdown was the outcome of newly introduced Law on Public Association in Uzbekistan which denied registration of political groups on

10 Abdumannob Polat, “The Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan: A Threat to Stability”, in Roald Sagdaev and Susan Eisenhower, eds. Islam and Central Asia: An Enduring Legacy or An Evolving Threat? (Washington D. C.: Washington Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2000,) p.41. 11 Vitally V. Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005,) p.58. 12 Yaldashev was a local imam of an underground mosque. He was a brilliant speaker as well. 13 Anna Munsteer, Op. Cit., p.18. 14 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: Op. Cit, p.138. 15 Abdumannob Polat, Op. Cit., pp.45-46.

122 religious basis. Thus all the Islamic groups including Tauba, Adolat16 and IRP were banned. This crackdown sparked the situation which led to more demonstrations and violence in the area. The foreign aides of Islamists provided them with all kind of material aid. The common people in Fergana also severely criticized that crackdown. One of the local mullahs from Namangan, Haji Bilal Khan stated that “religion cannot be separated from life and government is a part of the religious life”.17

The Islamists declared Central Asia as a Muslim land, where only Islam has the right to govern all the spheres of Central Asian society. Since all the people of the region believe in one God, therefore clergy has the right to govern here.18 This declaration clearly illustrates that these people wanted to establish an Islamic state which is preached by Maududi and Qutb. In an interview to Vitaly Naumkin in 1992, a local resident of Namangan Muhammad Jan stated that “since the local official authorities have failed to bring peace and law and order in the city, Islamists were the people who restored it. They controlled robberies, car theft and other street crimes. They are pure and non-corrupt people. He said that he will vote for the Islamists and not the ‘corrupt regime of former atheists’”.19

The official Mufti of Uzbekistan, Muhammad Sadiq Yousaf was very critical to these Islamists. He declared these Islamists as foreign intruders. He said that these people do not know our traditions and are misguiding the local Muslims. He further said that since local people do not know much about their religion, the extremists pose that they know everything about Islam. He also criticized the religious leaders coming from Russia which, according to mufti Sadiq, are not more than mediocre scholars there but have become outstanding scholars in our

16 Adolat is an offshoot of Uzbek IRP. It got split from IRP due to their differences on the strategy to establish an Islamic state. Abdul Ahd, one of the leaders of Adolat and a local imam in Namangan told Ahmad Rashid that we have differences with IRP. Since their struggle is for political power within the existing set up, we do not want to be a part of this un-Islamic political structure. Our ultimate goal is Islamic revolution which is impossible through constitutional impossible. He further stated that Islamization of society will be a gradual process, “We will ensure that first Fergana, then Uzbekistan and then the whole Central Asia will become an Islamic state.” Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: Op. Cit, p.139. 17 Dilip Hiro, Between…, Op. Cit., p.184. 18 Abdul Jabbar Abduvakhitov, “The Jaded Movement and Its impacts on contemporary Central Asia”, in Hafeez Malik, ed. Central Asia: Its Strategic importance and Future Prospects, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994,) p.73. 19 Vitally V. Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.60.

123 region.20The Islamists constructed many mosques in the Fergana region each having its own distinct ideology and objectives in the region.

4.3. Tauba and Hostage Taking of 1992

In fact, Islamists thought Islam Karimov as a soft target who had diverse ethnic identity.21 They thought that he would not be able to derive support from major ethnic groups of Uzbekistan and Islamists would be able to install their own government in Uzbekistan. But their assumptions met with failure when the government started a severe kind of operation against Islamists of Fergana. Tahir Yaldashev, leader of Tauba managed to escape to Tajikistan while many of Tauba leaders and supporters were imprisoned by Uzbek authorities. Tauba operated on the pattern of Hizb-ut-Tahrir with small cells. However, the number of members of a cell differs from HT. It had almost 60 cells with as estimated membership ranging from 20 to 50.22

Islamists declared Karimov as an enemy of Islam and even declared him a Jew. Article 31 of the Uzbek constitution declares all the political parties and groups illegal which are based on religion. Government resorted not only to repressive measures, which included imprisonment of many Islamist leaders, banning of their groups, expulsion of foreign emissionaries and closure of many unofficial mosques, to counter opposition but also started building friendly opposition for this purpose. For example, National Progress Party under the leadership of Muhammad Azimov was established23to support the government’s religious, social and economic policies.

Yaldashev travelled to many Muslim states in order to seek their support. Many hundreds of Uzbek students went to Afghanistan and Pakistan to seek religious education in Islamic madrasahs.24 These students joined Taliban movement in Afghanistan later and eventually Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). On the other hand those Uzbek Islamists who fled to Tajikistan joined Islamic

20 Ibid., p.64. 21 Karimov was considered as half Tajik and half Uzbek, while his wife is a Slav. 22 Ashirbek Muminov, “Traditional and Modern Religious Theological Schools in Central Asia”, in Lena Jonson and Murad Esenov, eds. Political Islam and Conflict in Russia and Central Asia, (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1999,) p.110. 23 Dilip Hiro, Op. Cit., p.180. 24 Vitally V. Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.71, see also Ahmad Rashid, Op. Cit.,140-41.

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Renaissance party of Tajikistan (IRPT) in its struggle against the secular regime, comprised mainly of ex-Communist officials. However, when General Agreement of Peace was signed in 1997 in Tajikistan, Juma Namangani, along with his hundreds of fighters fled to Afghanistan where Tahir Yaldashev was already present.

Yaldashev fled from Uzbekistan in 1992 and since then had been on a fund raising mission for Uzbek Islamists from one Muslim state to another. Ultimately he settled down in Peshawar, Pakistan from 1994 to 1998. There he established close contacts with different factions of Mujahidin. Ultimately he came closer to Osama bin Laden, who helped him to establish IMU. On the other hand, Namangani established his base in Tavildra valley of Tajikistan from where he used to attack the Tajik forces during the civil war. IRP had a great advantage in the form of Namangani because he not only provided them with fighters in the civil war but also the military tactics which were used by the Tajik military.25When the Afghan civil war started during early 1990s, many of the Arab fighters also joined the Islamists in Tajikistan in order to establish the Islamic state across the whole region.

4.4. Establishment of IMU

The IMU was established in 1998 in northern Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden financed its establishment. Major bases of IMU before the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) were in Tavildra valley and Karategin region of Tajikistan and kunduz, Mizar-e-Shareef and Taloqan in Afghanistan.26 However, after the defeat of Taliban at the hands of the ISAF forces, the IMU remnants have taken sanctuary in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and those parts of Afghanistan which are controlled by Taliban.

4.5. Aims and Objectives of the IMU

Tahir Yaldashev stated that “The goal of IMU is to establish an Islamic state under sharia.”27 A document of IMU released by its leadership narrates the

25 As stated earlier, Namangani was an ex paratrooper in the Soviet military, he knew very well about the military tactics of the Tajik army which was also a remnant of the Soviet forces. 26 Ahmad Rashid, Op. Cit., pp.148-149. 27 www.youtube.com/watch?v=2dpiD=cQe-m. Access date 10th August 2011.

125 situation in Uzbekistan and the demands which were raised by it. The document says that Shariah is the true law and Islamic ways must be implemented in all the fields of social life of Uzbekistan. Every problem has its solution in the teachings of Allah and the Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW). Islamic norms, laws and rights must be respected. Uzbek people are Muslim people, they have long relationship with Islam but the tyrant leaders have possessed power which is being used against Islam. Mosques have been closed down and friendly relations with Jews28 and America have been fostered by the oppressive regime. President and his cabinet must resign immediately which should be followed by “a council of top- level ulema to draft and pass laws in conformity to Shariah and also select people who will perform the political and executive function”. The foreign policy of international relations of Uzbekistan will be based upon fair play, justice and equality. “All the existing treaties with enemies of Islam will be broken” and a jihad will be launched against all those states which persecute Muslims.29

Yaldashev declared that they want to establish a political system based on Shariah in Uzbekistan. He further said that their type of Islamic system will not have anything common to other Islamic systems prevailing in the Muslim states. Even he declared the Islamic systems of Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as un-Islamic. He said that the IMU want to establish the Islamic system which was given by the Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW) in the city state of Madina. Other important issues to be addressed by the IMU, according to Yaldashev are; bribery, injustice, oppression and inequalities.30 The IMU leadership tried to justify their violent acts by declaring that they want to attract international community towards injustices done by the Uzbek government.31The IMU leadership pledged to carry on its activities till their death.

In a video Yaldashev declared that “we are with Shiekh Osama bin Laden and al- Qaeda…after taking over Afghanistan and Pakistan (with the help of international

28 During 1998, Karimov visited Israel and gave the MFN status to Jerusalem. It was widely disliked by the Uzbek society. 29 Vitally V. Naumkin, Op. Cit., pp.74-76. For more details see Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: Op. Cit., p. 148. 30 Poonam Mann, “Role of Central Asian republics in the US-Led War on Terrorism” in Mahavir Singh, International Terrorism and Religious Extremism: Challenges to South and Central Asia, Kolkata: (Anamika Publishers and Distribution (Pvt) Ltd., 2004,) p. 176. 31 Mouzaffar A. Olimov and Saodat K. Olimova, “Religious Roots of Terrorism in Central Asia”, in Mahavir Singh, ed. Op. Cit., p.51.

126 jihadis based in these states), one part of us will go to India and the other will go to the Central Asian states.”32Islam Karimov responded to these demands as dangerous. According to him Uzbek state cannot allow Islamists to use religion for their political struggle. Such an effort would bring “serious danger to the stability and security of our state.”33

4.6. Membership

IMU is no more an ethnic Uzbek organization. It’s a multi-ethnic group which includes Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Uighurs, Afghans, Pakistani, Chechens, Arabs and even some of the Europeans. According to Ismatillah Faizullah, the deputy head of Uzbek mission to Pakistan, ethnic Uzbeks constitute only 35% of the IMU membership, rest is mixed breed.

4.7. Sources of Finances

According to Poonam Mann, IMU’s sources of finances include “drugs trafficking, al-Qaeda and Uzbeks living in Saudi Arabia”.34 Others say IMU generates finances through drugs trafficking, armed robberies, target killings, hostage taking and Uzbek diaspora living abroad.35 It is also involved in the kidnapping for ransom activities now. Other sources of finances include charity money collected from Europe especially France, Germany and the Netherlands where police had foiled a terror plot plan by the IMU member as well. Police of these states also arrested some of the suspected IMU members during 2008 who were busy in collecting the money for IMU operations.36 Some of the finances for IMU come from the Uzbek diaspora who lives in Saudi Arabia.

Wealthy members also contribute for the finances as membership fee. However, after living in exile for more than a decade, this membership fee contribution

32 Abu Bkr Siddique, “IMU Takes Roots in Increasingly Insecure Northern Afghan Provinces”, Radio Free Europe/RL. 8/12/10.URL: www.rferl.org/content/imu-takes-roots-insecure-northern- afghan-provinces/2242579. Access date 24th March 2011. 33 Islam Karimov, Op. Cit., p.26. 34 Poonam Mann, “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Will It strike back?”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2002, p.295. 35 Stephen R. Bowers, Bakhodir Musayev, and Steven A. Samson, “The Islamic Threat to Eastern Central Asia: The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, Winter 2006, p385. 36 “10 Arrested in France, Germany and the Netherlands in Terror Probe”, Associated Press, 16th May 2008.

127 seems to be fake. One of the major financiers to IMU is al-Qaeda with which the former has affiliated itself. IMU, under the banner of al-Qaeda, takes part in militant activities against ISAF forces, Afghan and Pakistani security forces and civilian installations. Close relationship between the IMU and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is another source for IMU to collect money for its operations. Pakistani officials time and again have stated that Baitullah Mehsood and Hakeemullah Mehsood, leaders of TTP, had connections with India and Afghanistan which pay them money in order to carry out terrorist activities against the Pakistani military apparatus as well on the civilian set ups in order to terrorize the Pakistani society. Therefore, money from these states indirectly reaches to IMU.

Besides these financial sources, the major source of IMU finances is drugs trafficking. Most of the drugs are smuggled from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe through Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Osh, the second largest city of Kyrgyzstan, is deemed as the main junction for this trafficking. All the Central Asian states and Russia accuse IMU for the drugs trafficking in the region. One of the Kyrgyz officials stated in 2000 that almost seventy percent of drugs trafficking to Kyrgyzstan are controlled by the IMU.37According to Ahmad Rashid, after the conclusion of the Tajik Civil war, Namangani was involved in the drugs trafficking besides farming and transport business.38 This claim seems to be partially correct in the current scenario. It is said that since the routes used for drugs trafficking in Central Asia pass through those areas which had been controlled by the Namangani forces during and after the Tajik civil war, IMU still has a substantial support in these areas.

One of the ex-Tajik security officials who had served in the Rasht area said that “IMU still has support base in those Tajik areas where it had been based during the 1990s. The people, who were supported by Namangani financially during his stay there, are the major supporters of IMU. They provide them with intelligence,

37 “Narcotics Flood Threatens to Wash Away Central Asian Stability”, New Eurasia, 30th December 2000, URL: www.neweurasia.info/archives/2000/press_en/12_29_Narcoticflood.eng.htm. Access date 31st August 2009. 38 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: Op. Cit., p.144.

128 refuge, food and safe routes for drugs trafficking”.39 In return, they get their share as well. But these statements cannot be declared as correct. There are other people who say that it is the local powerful elite of the Central Asian state who are involved in the drugs trafficking rather than the IMU. In fact, these local elites want to hide themselves behind the IMU’s shield. Besides, warlords and local elites, criminal groups are also involved in the drugs trafficking in the region.40 Nevertheless, IMU’s involvement in drugs trafficking cannot be ignored.

4.8. Social Support to IMU

For the reasons of Islamic revivalism, Islam Karimov says that three reasons have contributed for this resurgence; ideological vacuum, Islam as a self-identification force, and changes in socio-economic and political structure.41 Major sources of support to the IMU are; state repression, lack of institutional facilities, bad economic conditions, social injustices and corruption and patrimonialism. These conditions have generated frustration among the Uzbek youth which is likely to join the Islamic movements. Furthermore, ban on real opposition in Uzbekistan is the major reason for extremism.42 Moreover, humiliation of relatives of the accused terrorists is so severe that it is another cause of radicalism in Central Asia. Derogation of these relatives at the hands of the security agencies bring nothing but more hatred towards the regimes. It is more prominent in the case of Uzbek regime where state carries out severe punitive actions against the alleged terrorists.

According to Andrew Tesoriere, member of the Organization of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) the bad policies of the regimes is the major cause of discontent in Central Asia which is one the causes for the rise of political Islam in Central Asia. He says “I think there is a direct relationship between failures in the governments, failure by authority and the way in which people feel which kind

39 Author’s interview with Jahanshah, an ex-Tajik security official in Tashkent on 17th August 2013. 40 Thomas S. Sanderson, Daniel Kimmag, and David A. Gordon, “From the Fergana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadis”, CSIS Transnational Threat Project, March, 2010, p.15. 41 Ibid., p.24. 42 Ye. Zhacheva, M. Laumvliss, L. Muzaparova and D. Kaliyeva, New Challenges and new Geopolitics in Central Asia: After September 9/11, (Almaty: Kazakh institute for Strategic Studies, 2003,) p.39.

129 of system…even if someone is suspected of terrorism, must be observed…human rights even in the detention and during a trial must be respected. If you dent to that you are multiplying the problem.”43There are almost ten thousand plus members of the Islamists groups in Uzbek prisons,44 says Abdujalil Boymatov, chairman of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU).

Immediately after independence, people of Central Asia in general and Uzbekistan in particular thought that with the advent of Islam their problems are going to be solved and they would be able to live their lives freely and in a better way but everything went wrong. Neither Islam was implemented in these states nor did the living conditions of common people got better. “There is no rule of law in Uzbekistan. There is high level of corruption. Even people have to pay bribes to go on Hajj. When I ask such people who you bribe for such a pious ritual, they reply that they do not consider Karimov regime as Islamic one,”45 says Boymatov. He further says that “authorities in Uzbekistan do not respect constitution and the law of the land. Breach of the law and constitution by the authorities is a common practice. When they themselves do not respect law and constitution how do they expect it from the Islamists?”46

Borders conflicts and little attention to the weak border security especially in the mountainous regions of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan besides small but guard-less gorges at the border regions are another reason for the militants to penetrate in across the Central Asian territories. According to S. Khotib, a Kyrgyz analyst, IMU has expanded its areas of operation. It has, even, declared so called jihad against the Kyrgyz regime.47In fact, the 2010 rigged elections which triggered ethnic violence and economic unrest in the Kyrgyz republic were the basic reasons for this call to jihad by the IMU. All the accused during those ethnic clashes by the Kyrgyz government were ethnic Uzbeks. Independent analysts like Lilit Gevorgyan disagree with the official stance. Gevorgyan stated that “whereas the Uzbek community members are maintaining that it is again a pretext to go after

43 www.youtube.com+n31Uw2TSISE, Access date 20th June 2013. 44 Author’s interview with the respondent on 26th August 2013. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Shakar Saadi, “Weakend IMU Searches for Support”, 6th September 2012, URL: www.cewntralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/newsbrief/2012/09/06/newsbrief-5. Access date 12th August 2013.

130 and persecute the Uzbek minority that is already beleaguered after the ethnic clashes in 2010.”48 However, it is suspected that it is not IMU but Hizb-ut-Tahrir which is against the Kyrgyz regime.

IMU also exploits the international political issues on the pattern of HTI. IMU believes strongly in the traditional Islamic theory of Sayyar which calls for a jihad against the enemies of Islam. Yaldashev says “O you kuffar (non-believers): we are not looking for dollars or rubles on this path. We are not looking to acquiring governing power, ministry or respect of kuffar. But we sacrifice ourselves just like our Messenger (SAW), Khulfa-i-Rashedin and His companions.”49”Dear brethren, be ready for a great battle with the party of Satan that spreads around the globe…we migrated just like your forefathers did for their religion. Your ancestors migrated 70 years ago to save their religion (he pointed towards the people who migrated from Central Asia at the time of Soviet occupation) and we have done the same.”50 Injustice in international politics is a strong weapon for IMU to recruit new members.

4.9. Activities of the IMU

When 1999 Tashkent bombings occurred, the regime not only accused the secular opposition group Erk but also the HTI and IMU. Rustam Inayatov, head of the Uzbek National Security Service blamed the foreign hand involved in those attacks.51 Islam Karimov stated that “such people must be shot in the head. If necessary, I will shoot them myself”.52 On another occasion he stated that “if my child chooses such path, I myself would rip off his head.”53 The regime again started a crackdown on the Islamists. Government accused twenty two people for the bombings (all of them were Islamists).

48 Bruce Pannier, “The Growing Threat of Militants in A Corner of Central Asia”, Radio Free Europe, 23rd April 2011. URL:http://www.refrl.org/content/militants_growing_threat_is_corner_of_central_asia/9503283.ht mi. Access date 23rd March 2012. 49 www.youtube.com/watch?v=2dpiD=cQe-m. Access date 10th August 2011. 50 Ibid. 51 Alexender Knyazev, “Afghanistan: Source of Religious Extremism and Terrorism for Central Asia” in K. Warikoo, The Afghanistan Crisis: Issues and Perspectives, (New Delhi: Bhavana Books, 2002,) p.170. For more details, see Ahmad Rashid, Op. Cit., pp. 149-150. 52 Ahmad Rashid, Op. Cit., p.146. 53 Ibid, p.150.

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In a trial against those twenty two people, the Uzbek Supreme Court declared Z. Hassanov as the main culprit who wanted to blow the Uzbek parliament with an explosive laden truck. According to the Uzbek interior ministry official, the militants wanted to explode the presidential palace and then to kidnap the president’s daughter along with foreign diplomats in Tashkent.54 The Court also declared that those involved in Tashkent bombing are also involved in robbery, dacoity, looting and kidnapping in the Fergana valley. Out of the accused twenty two, six were hanged; eight got twenty years of imprisonment while rest of them got mild penalties. It is very important to note that it was proved later on that the accused had nothing to do with those bombings and were the members of HTI.55 Besides putting many people behind the bars and hanging six people, Uzbek regime accused transnational Islamic groups which include Chechens, Afghans, UAE, Pakistani, Turkish and many others for their support to the IMU. In protest to these allegations, Ankara shut down its embassy in Tashkent.

Abid Khan Qari Nazarov, a Salafi imam from Fergana was one amongst many who were thought as the persons behind extremism in the region. Authorities arrested him from his residence but did not keep any record of his ‘abduction’. Instead, the authorities claimed that he fled to an unknown place before the authorities could have reached his residence. Nazarov’s wife and his associate were abducted by the authorities for ten days. According to human rights section of the US State Department, Nazarov’s brother Omar Khan, uncle Ahmad Ali Salam and brother-in-law Abdur Rashid Nasaruddin were captured by the Uzbek agencies and accused them for planning a coup against Karimov regime. After an in camera trial, they were sentenced between four to ten years imprisonment.56

Most of independent analysts did not agree with official statement that the explosions were carried out by the IMU. They accuse the authorities themselves for the explosions. They say that authorities needed justification to imprison and harass the Islamists. One of such Munich based analysts; Anwar Osman says that ‘the IMU was undoubtedly preparing an attempt on the life of president Karimov. But there were SNB agents within that organization, who preempted it and

54 Tajik Ministry of Interior statement in Vitally V. Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.77. 55 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: Op. Cit., p.152. 56 “Uzbekistan: Country Report on Human Rights Practices”, US Department of State, URL: www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/369.htm. Access date 10th August, 2009.

132 provoked the notorious explosions.”57 Another dimension of this bombing is that it was done by the political opponents of Karimov who had close relationship with some of the criminal groups.58These opponents wanted to get rid of Karimov in order to reach to the power.

One of those political opponents was Ismael Jurabekov. Jurabekov was a close aide of Karimov. He remained vice premier for many years in Karimov’s administration. But in 1998 he resigned on the charges of drugs trafficking. Although, he belonged to Samarqandi clan, which Karimov belongs to, analysts say that he did so to get more concessions from the Karimov administration.59 Interestingly, after just 45 days of those explosions Jurabekov was made chief of the state inspection on Control and Supervision of Irrigation Facilities.60

Besides Namangani and Yaldashev, other prominent leaders of IMU at the time of its inception were; Abdul Wali Yaldashev, Zahid Dekhan, Kazim Bek Zakir, Bahram Abdullah and Muhammad Sabir etc. Bahram Abdullah was appointed as IMU’s Uzbek branch Amir in September 1999.61 Responding to February 99 bombing, IMU issued a statement which declared that the IMU had nothing to do with these explosions. Not a single member of IMU is involved in these explosions. These acts manifest the dissatisfaction among the Uzbek youth. They want change and the change will come through an Islamic government in power. The statement also declares that Islamic government is the only key to control such nefarious acts.62

Later on, the Uzbek authorities accused both IMU and Erk for the incident. The Uzbek authorities said that Saleh, leader of Erk met Namangani and Yaldashev in Istanbul in 1997 and later in Kabul in 1998 to discuss the future common strategy against Karimov regime. They discussed in details how to create a wide range chaos and anarchy in Uzbekistan through explosions, shootings, and killings.

57 Vitally V. Naumkin, Op. Cit., pp.78-79. 58 Tamara Makarenko, “The Changing Dynamics of Central Asian Terrorism”, James Intelligence review, 2002, pp.1-2. URL: www.cornellcaspian.com/briefs/020201_CentralAsian_Terrorism.html. Access date 10th August 2009. 59 Vitally V. Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.86. 60 Interfax. 4th February, 1999. 61 Oleg Yakubov, A Pack of Wolves, (Moscow: Veche, 1999,) p.224. 62 Vitally V. Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.82.

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When chaos prevails in Uzbek society then Yaldashev and Namangani will enter Uzbekistan with their fighters and seize Tashkent. This seizer will led Salah as the president and Yaldashev as the war minister. The political system of Uzbekistan will be based on Islamic political principles.63

4.9.1. Incursion into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan during 1999 and 2000

Alleged IMU members crossed Kyrgyz border in Batkan region from Tajikistan where they attacked a border post killing several personnel and seized their weapons.64 These incursions of 1999 and 2000 left 25 people dead besides making 8500 as refugees. 65 During an August 1999 expedition, mayor and three employees of a small town in Osh region of Kyrgyzstan were taken as hostages by the IMU. They demanded $50,000 as ransom money and a helicopter for the save passage to Afghanistan.66 Both the demands of IMU were fulfilled.67 The interior minister of Kyrgyzstan at that time stated that the IMU militants captured four villages on 25th August 1999. They also took control of Darley village of the same area where they blew two schools up.68

The Uzbek Air force bombed the area on 15th August which was followed by a military operation by the Kyrgyz Army. Three Japanese geologists and one Kyrgyz general Shamkeev were taken as hostage on 22nd August 1999. This situation pushed the Kyrgyz government in the midst of crises. Kyrgyz government decided a military operation which was started on the night of 23rd and 24th August from village named Kan. The militants went deep into gorges along with the hostages. All efforts to free the hostages from the militants failed. The joint operation by Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Kazakh and Tajik forces started to set the

63 Ibid. pp.84-85. For more details see Richard Weitz, “Storm Clouds Over Central Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, No. 27, 2004. pp.472- 473. 64 K. Warikoo, ed. Religion and Security in South and Central Asia, (New York: Routledge, 2011,) p.145. see also M. Ashimbaev, ed. New Challenges and new Geo-Politics in Central Asia: After September 11, (Almaty: Kazakh Institute of Strategic Studies, 2003,) p.47. 65 M. Ashimbaev, ed. Op. Cit., p.48. 66 Josie Le Blond, “Analysis: Radical Uzbek Groups Recruiting in Europe”, Washington Times, 20th January 2012, URL: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/20/analys-radical- uzbek-groups-recruiting-in-europe. Access date 10th August 2013. 67 Vitally V. Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.91. See more in Svante E. Cornell, “Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 17, No.4, 2005. pp.627-28. 68 Interfax, Moscow, 28th August 1999. SWB/SU/3626/G/3, in Jatin Kumar Mohanty, Terrorism and Militancy in Central Asia, (New Delhi: Kalpaz Publishing, 2006.)

134 hostages free and capture or kill the militants on 28th August 1999. Before the meeting in which it was decided to start a joint operation, a meeting of the officials of these four states held in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) which declared that the militants have foreign connections.69

The next incursion happened in August 2000 in Surkhan Darya area of Uzbekistan and in the areas of southern Kyrgyzstan. At the end of July 2000, some of the IMU members in the form of smaller groups entered into the most difficult area of Batkan region in Kyrgyzstan. On a tip off, Abdur Rehman Mamataliev, who was heading the regional administration approached the IMU group and negotiated with them to end their incursion. But he along with his three subordinates was made hostages by the IMU members. After having almost two weeks long negotiations with the IMU militants, government was successful to get the hostages released.70 During these incursions, a group of US climbers present in that area was made hostage too but they managed to escape from the custody of the militants.

Although, the IMU militants reached as near as 60 miles away from Tashkent,71 this time the security forces were alert and well prepared to counter the incursions. Heavy fighting started between the Islamists and the security forces. The retaliation from the Kyrgyz security forces was swift and well organized. The Islamists had to retreat back with heavy causalities. According to the commander of southern command of Kyrgyz security forces, Colonel Ormakoyev, Arabs, Tajiks, Taliban, Chechens, Afghan and Uzbeks were among those who were killed in an ambush with the security forces.72

One of the Kazakh soldiers, Dawuren Akhmetov, who was deployed at the Tajik- Afghan border under the CIS forces, described the Islamists as the fearless people. “They are crazy and show no mercy. They never surrender and if caught explode

69 Jatin Kumar Mohanty, Op. Cit., p.70. 70 Alexender Knyazev, “Afghanistan: Source of Religious Extremism and Terrorism for Central Asia” in K. Warikoo, The Afghanistan Crisis: Issues and Perspectives, (New Delhi: Bhavana Books, 2002,) pp. 164-165. 71 Richards Weitz, Op. Cit., p.471. 72 Jatin Kumar Mohanty, Op. Cit., p.71.

135 grenade which they always carry with them”.73These incursions at the time when Taliban regime was fighting with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan might be an effort to detract the Central Asian support to the Northern Alliance against Taliban regime. Similarly, it might have wanted to smuggle a large quantity of drugs into the Kyrgyz city of Osh while engaging the security officials with them.

4.9.2. 2004 Bombings

About fifty people were killed in the late March 2004 violence in Tashkent. Government was quick to blame the IMU for those violent activities. Then in July 2004, US and Israeli embassies along with the office of the Prosecutor General came under attack from the terrorists. Although, Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) claimed the responsibility of those attacks, regime again blamed the IMU for those attacks.74 The government also accused the international terrorist networks for their role in that terror activity. However, opposition groups in Uzbekistan as well as many of the independent observers rejected this claim and declared these incidents as the internal one having no connection with foreign militants.

Some of the scholars say that since Pakistani security forces started an operation against the foreign militants in its border area with Afghanistan, most of them fled back to Afghanistan and Central Asia where they did those explosions. Islam Karimov directly accused IMU along with foreign involvement in those incidents. He stated that “the evidence from the people arrested in connection with attack particularly maps allegedly in their possession-showed they came from Pakistan”.75 The Charsu market suicide explosions which claimed the lives of six people in 2004 are suspected by many people as mere ‘drama’. Murray says that police on that day mustered in the green belt instead in the office. Secondly no such damage was seen on the sight which is caused by a suicide bombing.76 He further says that the evidences from the scene showed that explosion was not more

73 Eduard Poletaev, “Islamic Rebels Threaten New Mountain Offensive”, Institute of War and Peace Reporting, URL: www.iwpr.net/index.pr?arcmve/rca/rca_200103_51_1_eng.txt. Access date 12th October 2012. 74 Richards Weitz, Op. Cit., p.481. 75 Bruice Pannier, “Uzbekistan: Karimov Elaborates on Recent Attacks, Criticizes West:, Radio Free Europe/Radio Library, 30th April 2004. URL: www.rferl.org/featuresartocleprint/2004/04/f9c2f480-2764-4463-ae16-0d3c7b99. 76 Craig Murray, Murder in Samarkand: A British Ambassador’s Controversial Defiance of Tyranny in the War on Terror, (London: Mainstream Publishing, 2006,) p.331.

136 than that of a hand grenade. Few people interviewed by Murray confirmed that all it was planted as police fired and killed different people due to different issues. To hide these killings, police planted all this show.77

Many of the independent analysts say that socio-economic hardships and political repression are the major reasons for militancy in Uzbekistan. The Uzbek officials, on the other hand deny these allegations. They relate militancy in Uzbekistan with foreign elements. The former Uzbek foreign minister Sadiq Safaev stated that socio-economic hardships are not the reason for terrorism in Uzbekistan instead it is international conspiracy against Uzbekistan. “To think that what has happened was caused solely by the socio-economic reasons, would mean to oversimplify matters a great deal…Poverty is not the reason for terrorism for extremism and terrorism, just as wealth does not offer immunity from the phenomena”.78

Murray took an interview from the parents of one of the alleged female suicide bombers; they revealed that they had two daughters who were very happy and satisfied university students. One day both of them disappeared. When they did not come back, we registered a report with police the next morning. After a couple of weeks, some SNB personnel came to our house and took away the possessions of the girls. Then after six weeks of their disappearance, an unknown call came and the caller told us that our daughters are unharmed and are currently in the ‘north’. Then after another couple of weeks, another unknown caller told us to reach at a location in Tashkent and onboard a vehicle standing there. That vehicle took us near to presidential palace where we met Dildora, our elder daughter for a brief time.

The only conversation between us was that our daughters are alive and are well cared. Then she fled back in a convoy of five vehicles. Then on the day of bombing, SNB (Uzbek secret service) men came at our residence by 2:30 am, took us to a lockup and put us behind the bars without telling us anything. Then by 11:30 am, one of the SNB men told us that our daughters are dead and released us. After three days, Dildora’s body was handed over to us which had one hand burnt and a burnt mark at her stomach ‘as small as a walnut’. There was no other

77 Ibid. p.332-33. 78 Interfax, Moscow, 4th April 2004.

137 mark on her body while the body of younger daughter was never returned back.79If they did suicide bombing, how was Didora’s body intact? A question everybody can ask.

4.10. Beyond Andijon: An Uzbek Group?

IMU reappeared with full blow during 2006 in the border zone of Afghanistan and Pakistan, where most of the international militant networks went into hiding after the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). They lived in peace with the local population till they joined their hands with the anti-Pakistan militant outfits, notably, Baitullah Mehsood and TTP. Although, the local tribesmen allowed IMU’s militants to live in their areas along with their families, nevertheless, they ambushed and killed many of the militants when they started their activities against the Pakistani interests. Besides having confrontation with the local tribesmen, IMU faced wrath of the Pakistani military which took several operations against the foreign militants on its land, including the IMU militants.

IMU joined Baitullah Mehsud in April 2007. Its major areas of activities in Afghanistan are Zabul and Ghazni. Recently IMU is more active in Pakistan than Uzbekistan or Afghanistan. It’s carrying many terrorist activities against Pakistani security installations. IMU claimed the responsibility of a suicide blast in Miran Shah Town of North Waziristan on 4th April 2009. This attack killed eight people including a soldier. IMU’s terrorists were killed in a Mehran Base attack in Karachi. IMU is involved in airports attacks in Pakistan as well. It has attacked Peshawar airport in 2012, Karachi Airport in June 2014 and Quetta airport in August 2014.

Sixteen militants of IMU who belonged to Turkmenistan were killed in North Waziristan on 16th February 2012. “Yes, Turkmen also fight in Pakistan- Afghanistan border region. They are here because they cannot operate in Turkmenistan…they have joined their hands with IMU in a hope that they will bring down the autocratic regime at home and will replace that with an Islamic one” says Yousafzai.80

79 Craig Murray, Op. Cit., pp.334-37. 80 Author’s interview with the respondent in Peshawar.

138

The first important operation against the Uzbek militants in Pakistani tribal areas was started during 2004 but most of the Uzbeks including Yuldashev narrowly escaped. “Pakistan Army intercepted radio signals in Uzbek and Chechen languages”, said the Lt. General Safdar Hussain,81 who was in command of that operation. One important ambush of IMU with the local tribesmen was witnessed during March 2007 when IMU fighters had a face to face fight with the locals in South Waziristan Agency of the Pakistani FATA region. This ambush killed almost 130 militants, mostly Uzbeks. Sixty of them were also captured by the locals.82After this ambush, Yaldashev asked his militants to start activities against the Pakistani security apparatus. IMU also took part in the Swat saga when militants occupied the Swat and Buner districts of the North West Frontier (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) Province and run an administration of their own style in these two districts. However, Pakistan military started an operation against these anti-state elements with its full force. This operation drove those militants out of Pakistan towards the neighboring provinces of Afghanistan.

According to the Pakistani officials many of the IMU members were also killed and captured during that operation. The militants went back to their save heavens in Waziristan. When the activities of IMU against the Pakistani security apparatus increased, the Pakistani authorities decided to start the operation Rahe Nijat (path to salvation). This operation broke the backbone of foreign militants residing in Pakistan’s tribal belt along the Afghan border. This operation forced IMU to take refuge in Deh Chopan area of Zhabul district in Afghanistan.83 There are certain reports that Pakistani military delayed the Operation which gave IMU militants enough time to leave the area along with their families,84 most probably to Afghanistan.

81 Mike Redman, “Central Asian Militant Groups Remain Active in Pakistan”, EurasiaNet: Eurasia Insight, 24th March 2004, www.eurasianet.org/department/insight/articles/eav032404_Pr.shtm. Access date 12th October 2012. 82 Hans-Inge Longo, “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Crackdowns (2005-2010)”, 10th March 2011, URL: http://hegemonicobsessions.com/?p=281. Access date 12th October 2012. 83 Andrew R. Feitt, “Countering the IMU in Afghanistan”, Small Wars Journal, 11th March 2010, URL: www.smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/countering-the-imu-in-afghanistan. Access date 12th October 2012. 84 “Uzbek Fighters Flee South Waziristan”, The Daily Times, Islamabad, URL: www.dailytimes.com.pk/default/asp?page=2009%5c11%5C02%Cstory_2-11-2009_pg7_15. Access date 12th October 2012.

139

Both Tahir Yuldashev85 and Usman Adil86were killed in drone attacks carried by the US army. In order to keep the momentum of IMU, Yaldashev stated before his death that “this movement does not stop with someone’s death or martyrdom. This caravan will continue…this caravan shed a lot of blood…has suffered a lot.” “This (Islamic) knowledge and jihad are amanat (trust) of Allah for you and Allah will ask about the amanat. This jihad should be purely for Allah’s will and not for the kingdom, for nation or tribe.” “We have this goal that we will establish the army of Ummah and they will only serve the Ummah. This special army will only be in the service of Islamic Khilafah. And this will be the army which will liberate Palestine.”87 This statement also depicts that IMU is carrying an international agenda. This international agenda is in line with that of al-Qaeda.

On 12th May 2013 a powerful suicide blast killed six people in the south western town of Quetta in Pakistan. IMU claimed the responsibility of that attack.88 The recent Operation Zarb-e-Azb by Pakistani military against the militants in FATA region has forced many of the IMU members to flee to Syria and Iraq. Nevertheless, it has substantial presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Besides its increased activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan, IMU has restarted its activities in Central Asia, especially in Tajikistan. There are evidences that IMU is based mainly in north Afghanistan and southern Tajikistan while it has a negligible presence in the Osh area of Kyrgyzstan. It attacked a jail in Tajikistan during February 200689 in order to free its members.90 Before this incident, it is said that IMU was involved in a bomb attack on a Tajik minister, Mirzo Ziyoyov in Dushanbe on 13th June 2005 in which he remained unhurt.91 During May 2006, suspected IMU militants attacked the border posts of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.92 The IMU has focused on Pakistan and Afghanistan from 2006 to 2010. Little

85 Killed in 2009. 86 Killed in June 2012. 87 www.youtube.com/watch?v=2dpiD=cQe-m. Access date 10th August 2010. 88 “IMU Claims Responsibility for Quetta Bombings”, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Library, URL: www.rferl.org/contents/imu-claims-responsibilkity-for-quetta-bombings/24985792.html. Access date 3rd September 2011. 89 Hans-Inge Longo, Op. Cit. 90 These kinds of attacks have been carried out by many of the militant organizations in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 91 “Tajik Police Chief: Militant Islamic Groups Behinds two explosions last year”, Associated Press, 17th April 2006. 92 “6 Alleged Islamic Radicals go on Trial in Kyrgyzstan for Involvement in Armed Incursions”, Associated Press, 30th August 2006.

140 activities of IMU were noticed in Central Asia during this period. Only certain suspected IMU members were arrested by the authorities on different charges.

IMU has a significant presence in Rasht and Tavildra valleys of Tajikistan as well. Eighty six members of the IMU were arrested in connection to the September 2010 car bombing which was carried out in the northern part of Tajikistan. Out of 86, fifty three were sentenced to different years of imprisonment.93 IMU ambushed with Tajik police in Tavildra on 8th July 2008. Similarly, on 18th July 2009, three IMU members were arrested in Gorno-Badakhshan area who, according to Tajik security forces, were on an explosion mission to Dushanbe.94 In October 2010, 28 Tajik soldiers died in an ambush with the IMU in Rasht valley. Some people say that the militants were members of al-Qaeda while others say that it was an activity conducted by both al-Qaeda and the IMU.95

During March 2010 another deadliest attack on the Tajik security forces by IMU was witnessed. On 19th March 2010, IMU attacked and killed 25 Tajik security personnel in an ambush in the Tajik-Afghan border region.96 Currently, IMU is not only engaged to new recruits from the region but also from Europe. Omid H. an Afghan national was arrested by the German police in July 2011 on charges of recruitment for the IMU.97

Although, very limited in number, most of the IMU’s activities are witnessed in Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan today. For example, during March to June 2013, almost 10 suspected IMU members were arrested by the Tajik security forces. On 9th and 10th January 2013, six IMU members were captured by the Tajik security forces in Sughd. One IMU member Fakhruddin Bozorov was

93 Christian Bmeuer, “Instability in Tajikistan: IMU and the Afghan Factor”, OSCE Academy, Central Asian Security Brief no. 7, February 2012, p.8. 94 Jim Nichol, “Tajikistan: Recent Development and the US Interests”, Congressional Research Service, Washington, 29th July 2009, p.3. 95 Lola Olimova, “Few Tears Shed for Tajik bin Laden”, IWPR, RCA issue No. 647. 5th May 2011. URL: iwpr.net/report-news/few-tears-shed-for-tajik-bin-laden. Access date 12th October 2012. 96 “Islamic Group Claims Responsibility for the Attack on Tajik Servicemen-Website”, BBCWM, 23rd March 2010. See also, “Al-Qaeda Linked Terrorist Group Claims Deadly Ambush on Tajik Troops”, Long War Journal, URL: www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/09/al_qaedalink_imu_cla.php. Access date 12th October 2012. 97 Josie Le Blond, “Analysis: Radical Uzbek Group Recruiting in Europe”, Washington Times, 20th January 2012, URL: http://washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/20/analysts-radical-uzbek- group-recruiting-in-europe. Access date 16th October 2012.

141 sentenced to ten years in prison by the Khujant court on 17th February 2013.98As many as 34 IMU members were also arrested from Israfa region in 2011.99 Similarly, the suicide attack in Panjsher Afghanistan on 29th May 2013 was also claimed by the IMU.100 .

IMU now talks about the global jihad. Tahir Yuldashev once stated that “we must rid the world of infidels. There are no limits for us. Our goal is to take over not only Afghanistan and Pakistan, but the whole world and to re-establish a caliphate as Allah commanded”.101 Similarly, another member of the IMU, Abu Zar says that the goal of IMU and other mujahedeen is to establish the Islamic state in the areas of the sub-continent which was once part of the Muslim (Mughal) rule. He says that the expeditions to retake all these areas will be known as “Ghazwat-ul- Hind”.102 But the most important statement regarding international jihad was given by the Mufti of IMU Abu Zar al-Burmi. He said “in Mali, Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria and Somalia, there is a jihad going on, dear brothers. This is the victory of us-the mujahedin.”103

As Pakistan Army has started military operation “Zarb-e-Azb” many of the Central Asian militants have gone to including Usman Ghazi, the head of IMU.104 Several border guards of Turkmenistan have been killed in recent past by Afghan militants. They want to extend their influence into Turkmenistan as well because it has a lot of energy reserves. Lt. Col. Soltan of the Turkmen military says that

98 “Tajik IMU Member Sentenced to 10 Years”, Central Asia online, 19th February 2013, URL: www.cewntralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/newsbrief/2013/02/19/newsbrief-5. Access date 9th May 2013. 99 “Trial of 34 IMU Suspects in Khujand”, 30th January 2012, Central Asia online, URL: www.cewntralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/newsbrief/2012/01/30/newsbrief-5. Access date 16th October 2012. 100 “IMU Takes Responsibility for Panjsher Attacks”, 3rd June 2013, Central Asia online, URL: www.cewntralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/newsbrief/2013/06/03/newsbrief-17. Access date 14th August 2013. 101 Jeffery Thomas, “Transnational Terrorist Networks: The Afghanistan-Pakistan Connection”, Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, 18th August 2011, p.8. 102 Christopher Anzalone, Op. Cit., 103 Jacob Zenn, “After Afghanistan, Central Asian jihadis look to New Theatres”, Central Asia Caucasus |Analyst, 31st October 2012. URL: www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5868. Access date 23rd December 2012. 104 Shakir Saadi, “ISIL Propaganda Suffers Fiasco in Central Asia”, 20th April 2011, URL: www.cewntralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/20/04/11/06/feature-01. Access date 23rd December 2012.

142 the militants will “bite off more than they can chew” if they try to enter into Turkmenistan.105

4.11. State Responses

Islam Karimov says that “we will never allow religious slogans to be exploited in the struggle for power…in this we see a serious danger to the stability and security of our state.”106 Therefore, in the name of national security and stability, Uzbek regime is very critical to the Islamists. It takes every measure to bring the “stability” of the state under control. The political opponents are harassed and kidnapped by the security agencies. Abdullah Utaev, the Uzbek IRP leader disappeared in 1993. Another prominent Uzbek cleric, Abdul Wali Qari alongwith his two students disappeared in August 1995 when he flew from Tashkent to Moscow. Similarly, Abid khan Nazarov, an imam of a Tashkent mosque also disappeared in March 1998. It is widely believed that Uzbek secret services are involved in their disappearance. In 2001, Amnesty International reported that Abdullah Qari had been kept in an underground prison in Tashkent where he is constantly tortured.107Almost fifty two members of the IMU were captured from Khujant area of Tajikistan.108

Unfair and biased trials of political opponents and alleged Islamists are forced to confess those crimes which they have not done. Momina Whitlock, BBC correspondent in Uzbekistan witnessed the trial of those accused of Tashkent bombing in 1999. She says that “a long confession could lull the listener into a sort of mesmerized acceptance; a sudden job of the unbelievable jolted are awake. Sometimes, it seemed as though at least some of the young men in the cages might be guilty and at the same time their confessions seemed to be pure fabricated.109

105 Ibid. 106 Islam Karimov, Op. Cit., p.26. 107 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: The…, Op. Cit., p.146. 108 “Tajikistan: Overview of Key Human Rights Concerns” URL: www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/15/tajikistan-overview-of-key-human-rights-concern. Access date 23rd December 2012. 109 Dilip Hiro, Inside Central Asia: A political and cultural History of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Iran, (New York: Overlook Duckworth, 2009,) p.171.

143

2004 Tashkent bombing was blamed to IMU and IJU. The Uzbek security forces arrested 85 alleged terrorists including 17 women belonging to these two organizations.110 Karimov regime has also given amnesty to some of the IMU members in order to pursue the other members to give up their armed struggle against the regime. For example, during 2002, around hundred members of the organization were granted amnesty by the Karimov regime. They came back to their homes in Uzbekistan and criticized and denounced IMU in a press conference.111

Relatives of the militants as well as suspected militants continuously come under state repression. Tahir Yaldeshev’s mother was forced to denounce her son in 1999. Karamat Asqarova, mother of Yaldeshev (was forced to) declared that “May Tohir be swallowed up by the earth, may he and his accomplices rot in their graves.”112 Namangani’s family also met with the similar fate when his brother was sentenced to fourteen years in prision in 2000 and his mother was publicly defamed in Namanagan. Families of deceased soldiers killed in 1999 and 2000 terrorist attacks blackened her (Namangani’s mother) face with paint and cursed her for bringing Namanagani in the world.113Despite all these sufferings, IMU struggles for its survival. In order to keep its fighters engaged, Yaldashev stated that “After 9/11, all kuffar (pointed towards OEF) are bombarding us. Children and women are getting martyred. But we will not leave Islam…Islam is a religion of sacrifice and not a religion of cowards…fighting is nothing for us. Either we become martyred or become ghazi but we will not fight according to plans of kuffar… They (enemies of Islam) could cut the branches of this movement, could cut big branches of this movement, but will never be able to uproot it…because most of those who put the foundation for this have long been martyred and we joined the IMU after them.”114

The authorities are also critical to the probable programs of the IMU. Islam Karimov says that s“ the entirely hollow and baseless slogans of the fundamentalists about justice will turn out to be hostages to the will of others…the

110 Murat Laumulin, “Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia”, in K. Warikoo, ed. Religion and Security in South and Central Asia, (New York: Routledge, 2011,) p.143. 111 Richards Weitz, Op. Cit., p.471. 112 Jatin Kumar Mohanty, Op. Cit, p.130. 113 Ibid. 114 www.youtube.com/watch?v=2dpiD=cQe-m. Access date 10th August 2011.

144 subordination to such authority can result in personal and public tragedy…rendering national progress impossible.”115 Government blames IMU for attacking a border post at Uzbek-Kyrgyz border and the buildings of security service and internal affairs administration in Khanabad and a suicide bombing in Andijon on the eve of 26th May 2009. The locals, however, say that the attackers were speaking a foreign language and had a translator.116The multi-ethnic and multi-national IMU might have been involved in those attacks.

4.12. Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)

Islamic Jihad Union is a splinter group of IMU which emerged during 2002 when Najmuddin Jalalov got ideological differences with Tahir Yaldashev. Yaldashev wanted to expand the activities to all Central Asian states alongwith Xinjiang province of China and wanted to rename IMU as Islamic Movement of Turkestan (IMT). On the other hand, Jalalov wanted to confine their activities to Uzbekistan only. One of the arrested members of IMU, during an interview with Moskovskiye Novosti on 25th November 2005, stated that IMU changed its name to IMT but very shortly reverted the decision.117It is thought that the IJU is involved in the 2004 Tashkent bombing. It was also involved in bomb blast plot in Germany in 2005. IJU had close relationship with Haqqani network in Pakistan and Afghanistan.118IJU has a website in Turkish for propaganda purposes. It has contacts with Turk Jihadis as well.

Jihadis from different origins especially Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia as well as Russia are the members of this organization. One of the leaders of Turkish “Victorious Group”119AbuZar says that before moving to Afghanistan in earlier 2008, the group has been active in North Caucasus for 15 years. The group has been provided with the local supporters in Afghanistan.120IJU is more concerned about Uzbekistan than Afghanistan. Taking the responsibility of suicide bomber’s

115 Islam Karimov, Op. Cit., p.26. 116 Erkin Akhmatov, “Attackers in Kahanabad and Andijon: What is True? Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 3rd June 2009. URL: www.caclanalyst.org/?q=node/5123. 117 Jermy Benny and Juana Wright, “Uzbek Qiyadat me Jangjuon ka Afghanistan aur Pakistan me Bharta Hua Kirdar” translation in English “The Growing Influence of Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan under Uzbek Leadership”, Monthly Tajziat, Islamabad, No. 11, November 2009, p.122. 118 Ibid., p.123. 119 Turk cyber jihadis who have supported IJU for its on-line propaganda. 120 www.elifinedyaworld-press.com/2009/05/29/17.

145 blowing up himself on 26th may 2009 and early dawn’s attack on border security forces in Khanabad near the border of Kyrgyzstan show that the IMU’s ultimate destination is Uzbekistan.121IJU is not familiar in Central Asia so much.

Analysis

One of the major reasons for Karimov’s hatred towards Islamists was his experience and the humiliation he faced at the hands of Islamists during Namangan negotiations in 1992.122 Karimov while recalling his memories stated that “I went to Namangan and met face to face with those who had lost their minds…they insisted on proclaiming the Islamic state. I still remember those bearded persons, attracting people by raising these matters. I still remember their (insulting) voices.”123 He says that “no religious system by itself can solve all social and economic problems”124. He says that a religion can never play a constructive role in the development. “No religious system contains the concrete means to control the progress of world development.”125 On the other hand, basic agenda of Islamists is that Islam as a religion is a complete code of life and it has solution to all the current day socio-economic and political ills. These opposite views easily illustrate that the regime and Islamists are going into different directions. Until and unless, the regime does not show flexibility regarding its policies towards religion and religious practices, Islamists will continue to carry out their violent activities.

The other important issue is that IMU has very strong connections with al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It has, therefore, become an international organization. In order to get finances from external sources, IMU has willingly aligned itself with international Islamists network. It is under a great influence of these international Islamists. According to Bahtier Uzakov, an ex- commander of the IMU in Afghanistan, “even though officially we were independent of the Talibs, in reality we maintained quite close contacts and

121 Jermy Benny and Juana Wright, Op. Cit., p.126. 122 Emmanuel, Op. Cit., p.24. 123 Islam Karimov, Speech to the Uzbek legislature on 1st May 1998. “Freedom to Profess Faith must be on Lawful Guards”, URL: www.president.uz 124 Islam Karimov, Op. Cit., pp.21-22. 125 Ibid.

146 always took their opinion into account. Juma Namangani was elected the leader of the IMU on Mullah Muhammad Umar’s recommendation.”126

People like Sanderson, Kimmage and Gordon are of the view that the most lethal and fearless Islamic movement of Central Asia is IMU127 and most of the violent activities in Central Asia are linked to this movement. It had training camps in Tajikistan. They included; “Karategin region, Pakshif and Demnora, Romit and Sangore, Jirgital and Iskandarkul, Komsomolabad and Gharam.”128 It is important to note that after operations against IMU by the Uzbek, Afghan, NATO and Pakistani forces, the members of the organization have dispersed themselves into different region and they operate in a decentralized way now.

General Tommy Franks, Commander in Chief of the CENTCOM stated in February 2002 that “still it (IMU) can cause tension and danger” in Uzbekistan.129 However, according to Nasrullah Qayyamov, an Uzbek political scientist, “it (IMU) has no strong leaders, none of its previous financial infrastructure, and no foundation as such for mobilizing capital…to carry out a really serious act; you need a lot of money. Also, the entire preceding generation of IMU fighters is being wiped out, and the terrorists need new forces but have no money to train them. Its arsenal is also disappearing, since government troops conducting raids have often captured their arms caches. To restore itself, the IMU needs a major influx of money that is nowhere on the horizon”.130

126 Igor Rotar, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: A Resurgent IMU?”, Terrorism monitor, Vol. 1, Issue. 8, 18th December 2013. URL: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5D=26187... Access date 30th December, 2013. 127 Thomas M. Sanderson, Daniel Kimmage and David A. Gordon, “From the Ferghana to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists,” Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2010, URL: csis.org/files/publications/100324_Sanderson_FerghanaValley_WEE_0.pdf. 128 ,Alexender Knyazev, “Afghanistan : Source of Religious Extremism and Terrorism for Central Asia” in K. Warikoo, The Afghanistan Crisis: Issues and Perspectives, New Delhi: Bhavana Books, 2002, p.175. 129 Nagendra Rao, “Religious Extremism in Central Asia: Towards a Conceptualization”, in Nagendra Rao and M. Munir Alam, central Asia: present Challenges and Future Prospects, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2005, p.107. 130 Shakir Saadi, “Terrorist Group’s Weakened Saps its Budget”, 23rd September 2011, Central Asia online, URL: www.cewntralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/newsbrief/2011/09/23/newsbrief-16.

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Another Uzbek political scientist, Allakhverdiyev says that “if Ghazi is leading the movement (IMU), it means simple nobody is left”.131 The identity and ideology of the IMU does not suit to the socio-economic and political interests of Uzbek citizens,132 says Kamaluddin Rabimov, a political analyst. To gain the confidence of al-Qaeda and TTP, IMU carried out its activities against the Pakistani security forces. Besides, kidnapping for ransom, IMU is also involved in the bank robberies in Pakistan and Afghanistan to carry out its activities.

Left with very small numbers of fighter ranging from 1500 to 2500, IMU is trying hard for new recruits from other central Asian states and Afghanistan and Pakistan. One of the arrested members of IMU, Alisher stated that “the groups of new comers include not only Afghans and Pakistani but also quite a few Tajiks, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Chechens”.133 The regrouping of IMU in northern Afghanistan and Tajikistan may hamper the supply of NATO through Northern Distribution Network (NDN). Moreover, resolution of issues with Afghanistan in Afghanistan may also give boost to IMU in Central Asia. However, due to their past experiences, this time Taliban of Afghanistan would be more cautious about their support to transnational Islamic networks.

It will keep itself alive through propaganda and some practical actions to keep getting financing. It would remain a ‘disruptive but a manageable force’ in Central Asia.134 However, majority of the Uzbek people do not endorse the idea of creating a caliphate instead they are happy with the secular regimes. Therefore, public support to the militants in Uzbekistan is impossible.135 But prospects for the IMU’s resurgence will remain intact until and unless situation across the whole region does not improve. Terrorists will be getting support, at least moral, if regimes do not change their attitude and policies. Mayor of Osh stated that almost 500 suspected members of IMU live in Osh. They may become lethal if the IMU

131 Shakir Saadi, “IMU Leader Osmon Odil Killed”, Central Asia online, 6th August 2012. URL: www.cewntralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/newsbrief/2012/08/06/newsbrief-5. 132 Maksim Yeniseyev, “IMU Doctrine Alien to Uzbekistan”, 25th August 2011. URL: www.cewntralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/newsbrief/2011/08/25/newsbrief-13. 133 Shakir Saadi, “Weakened IMU Searches for Support”, Centralasiaonline, 6th September 2012. URL: www.cewntralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/newsbrief/2012/09/06/newsbrief-5. 134 Richards Weitz, “Terrorism in Uzbekistan: The IMU Remains Alive but not Well”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 5th may 2004. URL: www.cacianalyst.org/.../8975-analytical-articles-cacianalyst-2004-5-5-ar. 135 Shakir Saadi, 11th March 2013, URL: www.cewntralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/newsbrief/2013/03/11/newsbrief-17.

148 members in Afghanistan join them at home136 because the Central Asian Islamists especially the IMU members are now well trained in any kind of planning and operations.

136 Igor Rotar, Op. Cit.,

149

Chapter Five

ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN (IRPT)

5.1. Introduction

The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was established by the Tartar intellectuals of Russia in the Russian city of Astrakhan in June 1990. The sub branches of IRP were also established in all the Central Asian states but only Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) could survive. It has been engaged in the politics of Tajikistan since its creation in 1990.1 It is deemed as the major opposition political party in Tajik politics. It also fought the civil war in Tajikistan which lasted between 1992 and 1997 from the platform of United Tajik Opposition (UTO). IRPT experienced different phases of development from extremism to moderation and from violence to peace.2 Currently IRPT is the essence of Tajik politics.

Said Ibrahim Hadov and Daulat Usman were the representatives from Tajikistan who attended the Conference in Astrakhan which established IRP in 1990. When they came back to Tajikistan, they applied for the creation of Tajik IRP but the appeal was rejected by the Supreme Soviet on the grounds that religious organizations were banned in the Soviet Republic.3 However, the Islamists in Tajikistan managed to hold the conference in the outskirts of Dushanbe in October 1990. IRPT was established on 6th October of the same year in a small village of Chortut in the suburb of Dushanbe. Abdus Samad Himmatov was elected as the chairman while Daulat Usman and Said Ibrahim were elected as the deputy chairmen. Other people who were elected for the Party numbered twenty four.4 The government did not recognize IRPT

1 Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Political Islam in Central Asia, (Beirut: Garnet Publishing, 1994,) p.125. However, the IRPT was formally recognized by the Tajik government as a legal political party on 26th October 1991. 2 For details see Adam Saud, “Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan: From Militancy to Moderation”, Regional Studies, vol. XXVIII, No. 2. 2010. 3 Vitally Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005,) p.208. 4 Mavlon Makhamov, “Islam and Political Development in Tajikistan After 1985” in Hafeez Malik, ed. Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994,) p.202. See also Shirin T. Hunter, “Religion, Politics and Security in Central Asia”, SAIS Review, vol. 21, no. 2, 2001, p.74.

150 as the laws of the land prohibited any political party based on religion. Under a newly enacted law in 1990, all the religious parties were banned in Tajikistan.5 This law was brought into action in order to combat the popularity of IRPT. Therefore, its newspaper Nejot (salvation) and IRPT were banned by the Tajik Supreme Court in January 1992 and June 1993 respectively.6

5.2. IRPT and the Ideology of Maududi, Banna and Qutb

Said Abdullah Noori, who was the student of Mullah Hindustani7, established a clandestine educational organization named ‘Nazhar-i-Islami’8 (Islamic Knowledge) in 1974. The Organization declared that it worked for educational purposes as well as working secretly for the Islamic revivalism in Tajikistan. Later, he established his own underground madrasah in 1980s where the teachings of Hassan al-Banna, Syed Qutb and Maududi were taught. Said Abdullah Noori demonstrated against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during 1987 and for this he was sent to jail for two years.9 In a couple of years after his release, Noori demanded Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) to declare Tajikistan an Islamic state.10 Another underground Islamic study circle, Ihvon-us-Safo (1989-1995) was established by Domulo Hakhazar Sobir in a school to teach the young boys and girls Islamic lessons.11

Another of Hindustani’s student, Mullah Hakimjon was very active in Tajikistan for Islamic revivalism. His most active and important students during the late 1970s and

5 The Economist, 21st September, 1991. 6 Saodot Olimova, “Islam and the Tajik Conflict”, in Roald Sagdaev and Susan Eisenhower, eds. Islam and Central Asia: An Enduring Legacy or An Evolving Threat? (Washington D. C.: Washington Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2000,) p.67. 7 Mullah Hindustani got his education from a deobandi madrasah in India during early 1970s. When he went back to Tajikistan, he opened up a clandestine madrasah in Dushanbe where he taught religion to many of his students. One of them was Said Abdullah Noori who became the chairman of IRPT later on till his death. 8 Jatin Kumar Mohanty, Terrorism and Militancy in Central Asia, (New Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2006,) p.104. 9 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Political Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, (London: Routledge, 2010,) p.16. 10 Dilip Hiro, Islamic Fundamentalism/Holy Wars: The Rise of Islamic fundamentalism, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1989,) p.256. 11 Muzaffar Olimov, “Islam in the Contemporary Tajikistan: The Role of Muslim Leaders”, in K. Warikoo, ed. Religion and Security in South and Central Asia, (New York: Routledge, 2011,) p.157.

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1980s were Qari Rakhmatulla and Abdul Wali Mirzaev.12 Both of them started their underground activities which mainly focused to purify Islam from the un-Islamic rituals in Tajik daily life. They also preached the radical ideology and teachings of Syed Qutb and Maududi to achieve their objectives.13 Mirzaev disappeared in 1995 allegedly due to Tajik secret services. These teachings had a great impact on the IRPT’s demands in Tajik political system right after the independence.

5.3. Aims and Objectives of IRPT

The IRPT wanted to carry out its political agenda through peaceful and constitutional means. The Party declared that it wanted to establish a “democratic state based on the rule of law” and stated that it would not represent only a few factions of the society but all the peoples of Tajikistan14 including secular Muslims and the non-Muslim communities. For example, Abdullah DadKhuda, the then secretary of education and propaganda of IRPT declared that ‘forceful acceptance of our path by the people is not our strategy. We want to achieve our objectives through democratic means’.15 Muhammad Shareef Himmatzode stated that ‘we want to establish a democratic state and not an Islamic state’.16

The official website of the IRPT17 declares the aims and objectives of the party as “with the grace of Allah Almighty, the party wants to establish free, stable and modern society (in Tajikistan) where the human dignity is preserved and the priority will be to achieve social justice, democracy, and meritocracy as well as human, religious and national rights.”18 Mohiyyudin Kabiri, current head of the IRPT says “our goal is to create a society that lies with Islamic values.”19 While the deputy chairman Hussaini says that “our party operates with what we see as true Islamic

12 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Op Cit., p.12. 13 Ibid. 14 Saodat Olimova,“Islam and the Tajik Conflict”, in Roald Sagdaev and Susan Eisenhower, eds. Op. Cit., p.66. 15 Jatin Kumar Mohanty, Op. Cit., p.106. 16 Ibid. 17 www.nazhat.info/about-us. 18 www.nazhat.info/about-us. Access date 14th October 2013. 19 Farangis Najibullah, “Tajik Islamic Party Puts Face-lift to A test”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Library, 22nd February 2010, URL: http://www.rferl.org/content/tajik-islamic-party-puts-face-lift-to- atest/1965070.html. Access date 24th October 2012.

152 principles which uphold moderation, tolerance, and being able to adopt to realities of the time…we do not want to be a backward force. That is why we promote development of the society, education, science and technology.”20

Vitaly Naumkin describes the following objectives of IRPT; “the spiritual revivalism of the Tajik citizens, economic and political sovereignty of the Republic, political and legal rights with a view to realizing Islamic norms in the life of the Muslims of the Republic.”21 However, IRPT’s agenda right from the beginning has remained to establish a modern democratic state. Shareef Himmatzode explained the objectives of IRPT in October 1991 in a press conference which included “spread of Islam, promoting spiritual revivalism and political and economic restructuring of Tajik society’ besides establishing a democratic state which will ensure the promulgation of the rule of law.22

5.4. Membership and Finances of the IRPT

IRPT is very keen to induct new highly educated members from all walks of life including students, lawyers, businessmen and teachers and so on. Promotion of the women into the party affairs has led to the growth of the female membership. One of its female election candidates for 2013 elections, Zufaro Rehmani points to the increased role of Tajik women into the politics. She says “Party (IRPT) aims to promote women’s role in society, including in the political arena.”23

Among the main sources of the party’s revenue are the members who have businesses and the Tajik immigrants and workers abroad, says Khikmatillah Saifullah,24 senior leader of the party. The party’s newspaper, Nijot (salvation) has a circulation of around 1500 copies daily25 and is also a source of income.

20 Ibid. 21 Vitally Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.209. 22 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, (Lahore: Vanguard, 2001,) p.99. 23 Farangis Najibullah, Op. Cit. 24 Author’s interview with the respondent through Skype on 10th December 2013. 25 Gulchehra Mansoora, “The Absence of Debate on Islam in the Tajik Media”, Media Insight Control, No.22, January, 2002, p.2.

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5.5. Strategy of IRPT

At the time of its creation, IRPT negotiated with other opposition groups to achieve its objectives especially, Rostokhez headed by Abdul Jabbar and comprised of mainly young and educated Tajiks which included journalists, intelligentsia, writers, teachers, students and lawyers etc. The major objective of the Rostokhez was the revivalism of Tajik culture. Rostokhez was a modern secular political party but the interests of both the parties coincided, and this led them to cooperate and later carry out a joint strategy to oust the Tajik regime.

The Party went through a reformation process which shifted from violence to peaceful means. Muhayyudin Kabiri, the current leader of IRPT and the then vice chairperson stated in 2001 that “jihad (Asghar26) cannot be the only criterion as advocated by the IMU. What is needed is a political structure that can further the cause of Islam.”27He also said that IRPT wants a democratic Tajikistan. Since Tajikistan is a predominantly Muslim state, democracy and Islam should be in harmony. For this purpose, he says that there should be a “democratic Islamic project with a progressive Islamic movement where not only the IRPT will participate but other Islamic groups as well…the IRPT thinks that democracy may be linked to Islam and Islam itself contributes to the achievement of free democracy from the point of view of its ideology and practical experience.”28

IRPT is not only against the strategy of IMU but is also against Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HTI). Akbar Turajonzode, former Tajik grand mufti who joined IRPT later on, stated that HTI is playing a very negative role in Tajikistan as itt wants to further divide the Tajik society.29 He even accused anti-Islamic forces (international) as the creators of HTI. IRPT is also critical to those members who are involved in extremist activities,

26 Discussed in details in chapter one. 27 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad, Op. Cit., p.109. 28 Muhiuddin Kabiri, “Hizbut-Tahrir and the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan”, in Zeyno Baran, ed. The Challenge of Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamic Ideology, (Washington D. C.: The Nixon Center, 2004,) pp78-79. 29 Tim Epkenhans, “Defining Normative Islam: Some remarks on Contemporary Islamic Thought in Tajikistan-Hoji Akbur Turajonzoda’s Sharia and Society”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2011, p.90.

154 for example, during 2002, the state authorities did a crackdown in Israfa area where an imam of masjid was suspected to have links with the extremists. Noori stated that the participation of the “imams” in political matters is a mistake”30 and “urged them to strictly honor the state laws”31. It is also critical towards al-Qaeda and Noori supported the US operation against al-Qaeda after 9/11. He stated that “US has the right to respond to 9/11 attacks in any way. But…retaliatory operation should not harm innocent people”.32

IRPT has changed its objectives from the establishment of an Islamic state to the establishment of a democratic state compatible with Islamic principles. According to IRPT, introduction of Islamic values in Tajikistan will not only bring peace, stability and unity in the society but economic and political order as well.33 Kabiri says that one of the objectives of current IRPT is to bring justice and equality in the Tajik society.34 He also says that IRPT has changed its stance from creating a state on the principles of Islam. It now projects the creation of a modern and liberal democratic state in Tajikistan. He says that IRPT is a religious party but works like the European Christian Democratic Parties.35 Establishment of a caliphate and radical tendencies, especially things like the civil war, are the past stories of IRPT and do not reflect upon the party’s current agendas.

Post Peace Accord IRPT is not interested in any conflict rather it wants to participate in Tajikistan’s development under a real democratic and constitutional set up. Kabiri says “We are trying to combine between religious values, national values and

30 Immanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit., p.99. 31 A. Blua, “Tajikistan: Government to Vet Islamic Clerics”, Radio Free Europe, 7th August 2002, URL: www.refrl.org/content/article1100477.html. Access date 22nd October 2012. 32 U. Babakhanov and M. Mamadshoyev, “Tajik Islamic Party Leader Vigorously Denies Bin Laden Link”, Eurasia Insight, 13th February 2002, URL: eurasianet.org/departments/recaps/articles/av021302.shtml. Access date 04th July 2011. 33 Immanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit., p.12. 34 Ibid. 35 Cathelin Collins, “Ideas, Networks, and Islamic Movements: Evidence From Central Asia and Caucasus,” World Politics, Vol. 60, No. 1, October 2007, p.87.

155 democratic values. So, this new program, new approach of our party made us more popular among people.”36

5.6. Transnational Linkages: Religious or Secular?

Tajik Civil war brought many transnational actors in Tajikistan which mainly included Uzbeks and Russians. The Russian and Uzbek forces supported the Tajik regimes throughout the civil war while Uzbek Islamists37 joined the IRPT in its struggle against the so called un-Islamic regime in Dushanbe. In fact, Uzbek Islamists were forced to leave Uzbekistan after a severe crackdown by the Uzbek authorities in Namangan during 1992. The best place for the Uzbek Islamists was Tajikistan where IRPT was fighting with the regime. Namangani, along with his troops moved to Tavildra and Gharam valley of Tajikistan where he joined the IRPT troops and started his fight against the Tajik regime. He married a local woman in Tavildra valley which strengthened his bond to Tajikistan.38

Karimov called Russia to play its role in Central Asia, especially in Tajik security which the later had been playing actively for the last one hundred years. He also asserted that Russia must protect the southern border (Afghan-Tajik) from the infiltration of terrorists from Afghanistan. He further said that terrorism is not the problem of Tajikistan or Central Asia only; it will eventually reach Russia if it is not stopped in time. He also declared Russia as the guarantor of stability in Central Asia.39Nevertheless, nobody could avoid the outbreak of Tajik civil war.

Karimov stated that these kinds of conflicts only bring destruction; not only in the economic sphere of life but also in the social and political spheres as well. They bring hatred in the society besides creating refugee problems and criminalization of the society. They also cause damage to health and education activities in a state as well.40Experts opined that Russia could have resolved the civil war issue in a very

36 www.youtube.com/watch?8KtItGh1tHw. Access date 14th August 2013. 37 For details see chapter four “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan” from the same thesis. 38 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: Op. Cit., p.158. 39 Stovo Kyrgyzstan, (Word of Kyrgyzstan), 10th October 1992. 40 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan at the Threshold of Twenty First Century, (Massachusetts: N.K., 1998,) p.12.

156 short span of time but it feared Tajikistan as another Afghanistan. Some people also blame foreign involvement as being the catalyst to turn the civic strife into a full- fledged civil war.41Anyhow, Karimov anticipated the spillover of Tajik conflict into Uzbekistan if not catered within Tajikistan and therefore, he strongly criticized the opposition political parties in Tajikistan regardless of their ideology.

The situation alarmed the neighboring states, in particular, Russia and Uzbekistan. Other regional states in general supported Nabeiv regime while Islamists were supported by Afghanistan. Not only the Islamists but the secular opposition groups also sought help from all available sources. The Democratic Party’s leader Shadman Yousaf stated that “help may be sought from the neighboring countries for the opposition.”42 He was pointing towards Afghanistan because Afghanistan was the only neighboring state which had an Islamic government that too of former Mujahidin.

Karimov’s regime provided weapons to pro-Nabeiv forces in Tajikistan through a border town of Temrez.43These forces were led by Safar Ali Sangaev44, an ethnic Uzbek in Tajikistan. The CIS forces landed in Tajikistan and provided the Kulyabi (pro-regime) forces with tanks and APCs. When CIS forces were criticized by Iskandarov for allegedly providing weapons to Kulyabis, the CIS command stated that these weapons were stolen by the militants.45The areas from north like Leningrad and from south like Kurgan-Tyube attacked Dushanbe on 24th October, 1992 with the help of Russia and Uzbekistan in order to oust the Islamists from the capital.

However, the situation after the General Agreement on Peace in 1997 changed the whole strategy of IRPT. Instead of seeking help from the Islamists, non-state actors or Islamic regimes, IRPT asked IMU to leave Tajikistan and since then is actively involved in Tajik political life. It relies on local and regional political forces now, notably the secular ones. IRPT is also critical to the west’s approach towards Tajik

41 Randa M. slim and Faredun Hodizoda, Op. Cit., p.170. 42 Dilip Hiro, Between Marx and Muhammad, Op. Cit., pp.207. 43 Central Asia Monitor, No. 5, 1992, p.9. 44 Stuart Horseman, “Uzbek Involvement in the Tajik Civil War 1992-97: Domestic Considerations”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1999, p.38. 45 Central Asia Monitor, No. 5, 1992, p.6.

157 politics. It says the west especially US must understand the realities of Tajik society. It also criticizes the west’s polarized concept of Islamism and secularism. “The west doesn’t see the ‘third group’, normal people, moderate Islam…who want an Islamic society and not an Islamic state. We want a democratic society, democratic country. Radical ideas in central Asia are the outcome of wrong policies of totalitarian regimes…it is very difficult for an Islamic party to fight against the Islamic radicals and also against the secular but authoritative regimes. We are under pressure from both the sides. People want us to be more radical but we are not only responsible for the Islamic values, we are responsible for peace in our country” Says Kabiri.46This statement illustrates that IRPT is fighting at a dual front; a secular but authoritative regime and Islamists who are not in line with the IRPT’s policies notably, HTI.

IRPT backed the Tajik-Russian military deal in October 2012 which gave the basing rights to Russia in Tajikistan by the year 2042. Kabiri stated that “the benefits offered by the deals outweighed the disadvantages of hosting a foreign military base in the country.”47IRPT is playing its political cards very wisely because it knows that Russia and China are the big regional powers and both are against HTI and other Islamist groups. So, it’s the strategy of IRPT to strengthen its relations with these powers along with other Muslim regimes because the latter have also banned HTI in their respective states. IRPT has closer relations with secular groups than the religious ones.

5.7. Social Support Bases

The parities in terms of ethnicity, region, language, social status and economy mark the Tajik society as a deeply diverse one. These differences are so complex and overlapping that Vitaly Naumkin declares this situation as the “mosaic of the Tajik society.”48 This complex social structure is one of the greatest hurdles to construct a single Tajik nationalism. Since Tajikistan is a multi-ethnic society divided into

46 www.youtube.com/watch?y3djkyBMBm8. Access date 14th August 2013. 47 Alexander Sadiqov, “Russia Keeps Military base in Tajikistan till 2042”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 17 October 2012. URL: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5857. Access date 10th January 2013. 48 Vitaly Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.202.

158 different regions on the basis of ethnicity and clans, Islamic revivalism was seen as a vital force for the unity of Tajik people and to generate the sense of nationhood it lacked. It is assumed that since IRPT has a pro-government policy, HTI has gained more popularity in Tajikistan. In fact, the Tajik government has failed to provide clean drinking water, employment, electricity and other basic necessities of life to its population. It has also failed to resolve the water crises, ethnic rifts, environmental problems, and rural overpopulation problems. These problems have escalated the popularity of the Islamists. Impact of Basmachi Movement on the rise of Islamic revivalism in Tajikistan is also evident in the regions like Tavilderah, Gharam, Khait and Kala-i-Khum which had been the bases for the Basmachi during their struggle against the Soviets in the late 1910s and 1920s.

The oppressive policies of the Tajik government also contribute for the rise of Islamism in the state. Tajik government through the Tajik Security Council prepared main guidelines to combat terrorism in the form of Counter-Terrorism Laws and a National Programme for Combating Terrorism. This programme is used against the potential political opponents by the regimes. The deteriorating socio-economic and political conditions have damaged the social relationships of the multi-ethnic societies of Central Asia in general and Tajikistan in particular. Corruption, nepotism and other ill practices on the part of regimes have aggrieved the marginalized ethnicities which try to overcome these injustices through violent means. The call from Osama bin Laden to fight against the US and its allies who have done injustices at international and domestic levels have also provided the Islamists with some sort of zeal because OBL had been a major financer to these Islamists. Following are the major reasons for the IRPT’s support in Tajikistan.

5.7.1. Economic Conditions

Tajikistan emerged as one of the poorest countries in the world after independence. All the subsidies, food supplies, and other necessities to run the Tajik administration were halted by the Russian government after the Soviet disintegration. The government failed badly to fulfill the popular expectations due to a variety of reasons. Under such uncertain economic conditions, the local business communities have

159 joined their hands with the religious segments of society in order to establish their own solidarity networks. As the government has failed largely to provide the basic necessities of life to its citizens, these new solidarity groups became active to establish the Islamic social order in their respective communities/regions.49 Juma Namangani, when joined the Tajik civil war provided economic services to the people where he had his bases.50

The people of Gharam Valley grow opium as they have no other means of production due to physical terrain of the region. The physical geography makes it very difficult to access the area easily. Sometimes, helicopters are used to carry the eatables and other necessary items needed for life to the top of mountains. This expensive practice is done with the help of a drug mafia in the region which also supports the locals in their times of need.51 According to Ahmad Rashid, IRPT had strong support (during the civil war) in the regions of Karategin, Vaksh valley and Kurgan Tyube52 because all were economically and politically perished regions. Besides these far flung and impoverished regions, urban educated but unemployed youth also supported the IRPT against the regime.

The unofficial data reveals that about one million Tajiks work in Russia and other CIS states as second workers.53Unemployment and poverty has forced many of the Tajik youth to join the criminal groups especially the drugs mafia. Drug trade is a very lucrative business in Tajikistan. On the other hand, “many of such unemployed youth themselves and their parents prefer their sons/daughter to be part of IRPT because it offers them a positive platform” says Khikmatullah Saifullah.54 One of the reasons for IRPT’s opposition to IMU is that the latter is involved in drugs trafficking in the region. However, IRPT does not offer any of the social services on such a scale which other Islamic political parties provide in the Muslim states like Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) founded by Maududi in Pakistan and HTI in many Muslim states including

49 Tim Epkenhans, Op. Cit., p.84. 50 For details see Ahmad Rashid, Jihad…Op. Cit., 51 Mahavir Singh, Op. Cit., p.227. 52 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad, Op. Cit., p99. 53 Mahavir Singh, Op. Cit., p.228. 54 Author’s interview with the respondent through Skype on 10th December 2013.

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Central Asia. But the slogan of economic justice by IRPT is more than enough for the unemployed youth.

5.7.2. Social and Political Insecurity

Tajik people are not free to express their political will in real sense. Elections and referendums are highly rigged and president and his party gets maximum majority. It is interesting to note that under extreme poverty, social inequality and region/clan politics, Tajik people elect Rehmanov all the times by percentage not less than 90. Even his constitutional amendments which further consolidate his powers get more than 95% of popular consent and this sheds light on the election’s lack of authenticity.55 After coming into power, Emomali Rehmanov gradually marginalized not only his rival clans and regions including “Hissar, Gharam, Pamir, Lakhai, and ethnic Uzbeks” but “Khojantis” as well.56After the Peace Accord with the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in 1997, many of the important UTO commanders57were assassinated by “unknown people”. The Human Rights activists say that those people were killed due to their opposition or threat to Romanov’s regime.

The then editor of Nijot newspaper, Khikmatillah Saifullah was beaten by unidentified people in Dushanbe when he came out of his home.58 Kabiri is of the view that since both, secular repressive regimes and the extremist Islamists are a curse for the state, a new, modern and moderate Islamic state is the need of the time for Tajikistan.59The situation and policies of the regime have not changed even during the contemporary era. “People who are dissatisfied with the Rehmanov regime

55 For example, during 1999 presidential elections in Tajikistan the voters’ turnout remained above 96% and Rehmanov got more than 96% of votes. It was the time when the Tajik civil war nearly ended and a substantial majority of population was fighting against Rehmanov regime. But interestingly almost all of them who fought against Rehmanov regime voted him to retain the presidency. Similarly, in June 2003 referendum which president to hold two further terms of seven years, 96% of the people participated in the referendum and 93% of people voted for the proposed change in the constitution. 56 Kathleens Collins, Op. Cit., p.256. 57 Those who were killed by the ‘unknown assassins” included Khabib Sarginov, deputy interior minister, Sobirjon Bagjanov, UTO supporter, Karim Yaldashev, president’s advisor on foreign affairs and Abdurakhim Rakhimov, culture minister of Tajikistan. For details see Mathew Crosston, “Compromising Coalitions and Duplicitous Diplomacy: US Support for Tajikistan after 9/11 and its Security Implication”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2008, p. 160. 58 “Central Asia: Overview of Key Human Rights Concerns”, 59 Ivan Watson, “Islamist Political Party Faces Conflict in Tajikistan”, 21st February 2008. URL: http://www.npr.org/templates/stray/story.php?storyId=19214821. Access date 22nd December 2012.

161 support IRPT” said Kabiri in Washington. He further stated that “ban on media and women and children attending the mosques have increased the popularity of the IRPT.’60Similarly, in an address at the Washington State University, Kabiri stated that “the government operation in the Gorno Badakhshan area during the summer of 2012 escalated anti-regime sentiments. They look towards IRPT as an alternative”61 According to Medicines Sans Frontiers, Karategin Valley of Gorno Badakhshan area receives the least medical attention by the government.62Other non-traditional security threats have also provided the Islamists with popularity. One such threat in Tajikistan is the increase in drugs trafficking.

Tajikistan has its own peculiar social values which are different from the rest of Central Asia. Tajik people are more traditional and conservative and this is elucidated by the fact that most people in Tajikistan prefer their daughters to seek religious education along with training in the household work. They obey and train them according to traditional Tajik values and customs, which were either banned or wiped out during the soviet era. These values and traditions many a times coincide with the Islamic traditions and teachings. Boys are also groomed according to future needs and local values of respect and care. Therefore, parents prefer their children to get religious education in order to live their lives according to both Islamic and local traditions.

These lessons (private) not only enable the young children to learn the proper Islamic rituals like prayers but also the Islamic social principles and manners to enable them to move within society. An imam masjid in Dushanbe says that prayer is the best way to keep one away from bad deeds. Prayers make man perfect and clean, not only physically but mentally as well.63The government has banned children who are less than 18 years of age from attending mosques and it is also very critical to these private lessons. According to Tajik authorities these private lessons are one of the

60 Dilfaraz Khan, “IRP Leader Speaks in Washington, Unsure of Parety Goals and Wary of Tajikistan’s Future”, Asia-Plus, 19th October, 2012, URL: http://news.tj. Access date 22nd December 2013. 61 “IRP Claims Groqing Support After Gorno Badakhshan Operations”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Library, 17th October 2012, URL: news.tj. Access date 22nd December 2013. 62 Mahavir Singh, Op. Cit., p.228. 63 Manja Stephen, “Education, Youth and Islam: The Growing popularity of private Religious Lessons in Dushanbe, Tajikistan”, Central Asian survey, Vol.29 No.4, December 2010, p.472.

162 reasons for the growth of extremist tendencies in Tajik society. However, the authorities do not crackdown on these private lessons due to their utility. These lessons keep the children away from bad social habits like alcohol, drugs and many other things.64

Answering the question of radicalism in Central Asian societies, Kabiri stated that the repression and human rights violation are the major reasons for militancy in Central Asia.65 “We should not expect free and fair elections in Central Asia in the foreseeable future” 66 says Kabiri. According to Suchanda Chatterjee, “social inequalities have often molded the psychology of the terrorists and these unequal relationships are seldom taken (to combat terrorism) into consideration.67 Muslim states, sometimes, do not pay attention to resolve the social problems of their societies. This leads to the unity of opposition groups which use Islam as a catalyst for their cause. However, in Tajik’s case the opposition political parties do not share common agendas.

5.7.3. Religious Policies of the Government:

Islam is gaining importance in the daily life of Tajikistan. People want to learn Islamic practices and beliefs. Although people in Tajikistan are traditional and are more inclined towards religion, the Tajik government has put strict restrictions on religious practices and institutions. In 2007, Laws on Freedom of conscious and religious organizations brought new and tough restrictions on the religious organizations. This new law also set a number of prayers attenders for each mosque i.e. 12,000 for rural areas and 30,000 for the urban areas.68 It means that if the prayer attenders are less than this number, mosque cannot be constructed which is totally against fundamental freedom. Such policies along with globalization and internet access have forced many of the Tajik citizens especially form Dushanbe to send their

64 Manja Stephen, Op. Cit., p. 475. 65 Ihsan Yalmiz, Op. Cit., p.144. 66 Farangis Najibullah, Op. Cit. 67 Mahavir Singh, Op. Cit., p.219. 68 Matthew Crosston, “Compromising coalitions and Duplicitous Diplomacy: US Support for Tajikistan after 9/11 and its security Implications”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2008, p. 161.

163 children between ages 5-16 to private religious lessons commonly known as Dars/Sabaq for basic religious knowledge.69

There have been many other ways with which the religious leaders and their followers have been harassed in Tajikistan. In 2004, almost 250 imams and 20 heads of religious madrasahs (majority of them were IRPT’s sympathizers) were interviewed by the Tajik authorities to test their knowledge about Tajik secular laws which was followed by a forced oath of allegiance to the Rehmanov regime.70 Although, IRPT has repeatedly announced that it does not believe in any armed struggle to grab political power, Tajik regime suspects the IRPT leadership and members having connections with the extremists and terrorists. IRPT had a close relationship with IMU’s71 leadership during the Tajik Civil war and therefore Tajik authorities time and again allege IRPT for extremist activities.

In the name of controlling terrorism, Tajik security agencies harass, detain and punish the citizens. The authorities also deal with HTI and IMU heavy handedly. Deputy interior minister of Tajikistan, Abdurahim Kaharov, declared in 2006 that IMU and HTI have similar kinds of goals to establish Khilafah in Central Asia; therefore, they have joined their hands in order to achieve their “shared” objective.72It is very easy for the Tajik security agencies to declare anyone member of these two banned organizations. This heavy handed repression has placed the IRPT in a very positive light as the only legal option for these people who have religious inclinations and who want to establish a just political order in Tajikistan.

Tajikistan has an official religious affairs department which works directly under the president but most of the official religious institutions have failed to attract the Tajik popular support. Tajik people expected that the religious affairs department would take necessary steps to promote Islamic teachings and learning but their expectations

69 Manja Stephen, Op. Cit., p.469. 70 Crosston, Matthew, Op. Cit., p. 161. 71 IMU was established in 1998 in Afghanistan by Tahoir Yuldashev with the help of Osama bin Laden. However, Juma Namanagani had remained in Tajikistan during the whole of Tajik Civil War and left for Afghanistan in 1998. He had very cordial relationship with the UTO and IRPT. Namangani left Tajikistan after Said Abdulla Noori, chairman of the IRPT convinced him to do so. 72 Matthew Crosston, Op. Cit., p.166.

164 were met with disappointment. Haji Akbar Turajonzode, the chairman of Tajik religious department demanded that the Tajik government must declare important Islamic days like Eid etc. as public holidays73but his demands were not given due importance. Such harsh and old soviet styled religious policies by the regimes have escalated the membership of IRPT.

5.7.4. Ethnicity

Soviet policy of collectivization dismantled many ethnic groups from their areas. It brought many grievances against the state as well as against the other ethnic groups living at the sites of collective farms. These grievances were the major ingredients for Islamic revivalism in Tajikistan.74 According to the socio-economic and political structure, Tajikistan is mainly divided into two parts; north and south. Most of the socio-economic and political developments took place in northern part not only during the Soviet era but after independence as well. North was the part of Russian empire from late 19th century till the Bolshevik revolution while south remained under the Bukhara Emirate. The Russian dominance in the northern Tajikistan brought concrete and fundamental changes in the social and political set up on modern lines while south remained mostly traditional.

Northern Tajiks were closer to Russian and the Soviet authorities and most of the key portfolios in the Communist Party of Tajikistan and administration were occupied by the people of Khojant which is part of Northern Tajikistan. People from Southern Tajikistan were pushed towards the wall and had almost no participation in the political, economic and administrative affairs. Once Tajikistan was given the status of an independent state, the old grievances of south surfaced due to the continuation of administrative, political and economic policies of former Soviet Union in the independent state of Tajikistan. People from the regions of Gharam, Kurgan-Tyube, Gorno-Badakhshan, and Hissar felt dissatisfied and different groups from different regions started demanding their rights.

73 Tim Epkenhans, Op. Cit., p.85. 74 Vitaly Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.203.

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These ethnic, regional and clan differences are among the major reasons of the IRPT’s popularity in Tajikistan. The party is more popular in those regions which had been marginalized during the soviet and the current era and where the modern reforms were introduced too late. But it does not mean that IRPT is not popular in urban centers like Dushanbe and even Khujant. It has substantial support in these regions as well.

During late 1980s, Islamism rapidly increased in Tajikistan. The then first secretary of Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT), Kahar Makhanov stated in 1987 that “Islam is still (after 70 years of Soviet repression) a great power in Tajikistan and the number of believers has even increased.”75 During 1990s the Muslims of Tajikistan demanded the Soviet authorities to replace Saturday and Sunday with Tuesday and Friday as off days. They also demanded slaughtering of animals according to Islamic rituals.76 One of the prominent international scholars on Central Asia, Oliver Roy stated that “Islamic revivalism in Central Asia is not an alien step. It is the reemergence of Central Asian culture which did not disappear completely during the Soviet era.”77 Similarly, during December 1991, Shareef Himmatzode told Ahmad Rashid in an interview that “for seventy five years the Communists’ tried to wipe out the memory of Allah, but every Tajik today still remembers Allah and prays for the success of the party of Allah.”78 Even the official Qazi of Tajikistan Akbar Turajunzode stated that Islam covers all the aspects of human life; therefore, its implementation in socio- economic and political spheres will surely bring positive results.79 One of the major purposes to establish IRPT in the Soviet Union was to counter the official Islam which was a mere tool in the hands of the Soviet regime.

75 Volksstimme, (Voice of the People), Vienna: 9th May 1987. 76 Mavlom Makhamov, Op. Cit., p.201. 77 Oliver Roy, The New Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Birth of Nations, London: I. B. Taurus, 2007, p.144. 78 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad, Op. Cit., p.98. 79 Roald Sagdaev, “Central Asia and Islam: An Overview”, in Roald Sagdaev and Susan Eisenhower, eds. Islam and Central Asia: An Enduring Legacy or an Evolving Threat? (Washington: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2000,) p.14.

166 5.8. Weaknesses/Problems/Failures

“IRPT rightly calculated its strength and went for a compromise in 1997. It was a realistic step taken by the IRPT, otherwise it could have become involved in Afghanistan like the IMU,” says Rahimullah Yousafzai80, a renowned analyst and expert on terrorism. Peace Accord of 1997 paved the way for demilitarization of private fighters, restructuring the Tajik police and military and security forces, besides giving one third portfolios in the government to the UTO. A process of refugees’ repatriation also started.81 The former Prime Minister Abdul Malik Abdullah Janov (who was left out of power, under the Peace Accord) and an ethnic Uzbek group led by Colonel Mahmood Khudaeberdaev defied the Peace Accord and carried on their militant activities. However, IRPT’s accomodationist policies have forced many of its members to join HTI82, for the creation of an Islamic state. Takfeer Group severely criticized IRPT for the signing of Peace Accord and accused it of betraying Islam. However, they were forced by Tajik authorities to leave for Afghanistan.

The parliamentary elections were held in February 2000, which resulted in the success of the Peoples’ Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) led by the president Rehmanov who got 64.5% votes followed by Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT) and then IRPT which got only 7.5% votes. IRPT accepted the results of these elections while declaring them as rigged. The years 2000 and 2001 witnessed different incidents of terrorism which aimed at destabilizing Tajikistan. IRPT has a weak organizational structure beside sharp ethnic division within the Party. It did not start its struggle with a coherent and organized ideology and program; rather it was its random response to governmental policies which increased its popularity. This popularity got a huge setback when it joined the government in 1997 and did nothing to bring a real change in Tajikistan for which they and other groups fought the Civil War. There are several other issues which are a hindrance in the success of IRPT. These include; election rules and regulations, free access to media and specific ideology of IRPT.

80 Author’s interview with the respondent in Peshawar on 09/01/2010. 81 Jatin Kumar Mohanty, Op. Cit., p.67. 82 Immanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit., p.17.

167 According to IRPT’s official election rules and regulations the difficulty to access media for the promotion of the party’s objectives and the economic difficulties it faces are the main hurdles in the way of the party’s success in the elections. The newly enacted law on elections demands 7000 Somonis83 as the election fee84 which is impossible for many parties including IRPT to pay for each constituency. Therefore, parties do not contest elections from each and every constituency. Specific ideology is another hindrance for IRPT’s popularity throughout the country.

Despite being a part of the Tajik parliament (Majlis), IRPT faces a lot of harassment at the hands of Tajik secret forces. One of the Tajik MPs, Nasiruddin Saidov, a member of IRPT stated that authorities, despite giving prior permission, do not let us hold scheduled conferences on Islam.85The authorities may be afraid that IRPT’s old field commanders who do not like the pro-government stance of the Party may create anti-state environment through these demonstrations. Another reason for the ban on such activities is the emergence of new militant groups in Tajikistan which have resorted to violent activities. One such group is Jamat al-Ansarullah (Group of God’s Helpers) which emerged during early 2009. The group was banned by the Tajik authorities in May 2012 on the charges of several anti-state and terrorist activities including suicide bombing and killing of Tajik police and security officials. The group has declared jihad against the Central Asian governments. It wants the common people to join their hands for their ‘just’ cause.86

Disaster to Tajik economy due to the civil war has spread fear among the common population that Islamic Tajikistan can push the country back towards a new era of destruction. The civil war brought about the loss of $7 billion to Tajik economy.87

83 Tajik currency’s name. 84 “State Policies in Tajikistan”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 15th August 2009, URL: www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,IWPR,TJK,4a8a57fcc,0.html. Access date 7th December 2013. 85 Gulchehra Mansoora, , “The Absence of Debate on Islam in the Tajik Media”, Media Insight Control, No.22, January, 2002, p.2.

86 “Tajikistan Bans new Islamist Group”, URL: http://www.thesundaytimes.uk/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=18796;tajikistan- bans-new-islamist-group&cated=&1:news&Itemid=625. Access date 7th December 2013. 87 M. Ashimbaev, New Challenges and New Geopolitics in Central Asia: After September 11, (Almaty: Kazakh Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003,) p.50.

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Tajikistan still needs to go a long way towards development in terms of politics, economics and social aspects. Some of the senior and old members of the Party are not happy with the policies of the party and the way they are dealt with by the leadership. Mirza Muhammad Naveed, a prominent leader of the IRPT resigned from the office of the ‘Chairman’s Counselor for Cultural Affairs’ in protest to Kabiri’s benign negligence to his opinion and position.88 Khitmatillah Saifullah, an official of the IRPT says that he got a job with the Tajik National Library Center that is why he left the party. He says “it’s only allegations against Master Kabiri. He is a democratic man and listens to his subordinates. What can the party do when someone wants to join another job and wants to leave the Party?”89

Islamists, especially IMU and HTI are also highly critical to IRPT’s policies. “Kabiri is a shadow of Rehmanov. He is also the part of Taghoot (false deities90) who wants to crush Islam. He is against the creation of an Islamic state. How can he lead an Islamic state when he does not want to implement Islamic laws in Tajikistan”91 says Akhmadov a resident of Namangan. HTI says that IRPT is not following the real path of salvation and development. The real path to salvation and development is the following of the Islamic path which has been prescribed by the Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW). IRPT is very critical to HTI not only for its extreme ideology but due to the fear of Pan-Turkism which HTI propagates to achieve its objectives. Obviously, pan-Turkism does not suit the interests of Tajikistan which has Iranian background.

Another reason for the failure of IRPT is the lack of coordination among the Tajik opposition political parties. According to Saimiddin Dustov “the real Tajik opposition

88 Ayaz Yuyldoshev, “Member of IRPT Political Council Withdraws from the Party in Protest”, Asiaplus, 17th August 2011. URL: http://news.tj/en/news/member-irpt-pol-ca...... Access date 24th March 2012. 89 Author’s Interview with the respondent through skype on 5th September 2013. 90 These false deities according to the Islamists are all those people who are part of injustice in the world whether Muslims or non-Muslims. They claim that these false deities are the major source of Muslims sufferings whether at local, regional or global level. The Muslims must fight taghoot in order to get out of these sufferings. 91 Authors Interview with the respondent on 20th August 2013.

169 is disorganized and thus ineffective”.92Although, there are no bright chances that the Tajik opposition will join hands for a combined struggle against the current authoritative regime, prospects for their cooperation can still be expected.

Analysis

IRP was established with objectives to revive and reform the Muslim societies of Soviet Union. It aimed to reform the socio-economic and political lives of the Muslims on the basis of Shariah laws. It also wanted to bring unity among the Muslims of the Union. One of the objectives of the IRP, according to Immanuel Karagiannis, was the constitutional struggle for the Soviet Muslims to live their lives according to their faith.93 Another important objective was to reform the economic system so that accumulation of wealth in few hands would be replaced94 with a system where fair distribution of wealth and resources can be done to bring economic justice in the society which is the basic feature of an Islamic state.

Kabiri wants to establish a free, democratic and secular state rather than an Islamic state based on strict principles of Sharia laws.95 He says that “the main freedoms that are acknowledged today by the international community are in accordance with the ideas and norms of Islam and have no serious contradictions”.96 The IRPT declared that once in power, the Islamic government will be based on the principles of Islam where parliament would have a vital role to play as Islam has highlighted the importance of consultation in every matter of life. The elected leadership will have both secular and religious expertise in order to counter the modern day complex problems in the light of religious and contemporary needs. One of its aims was the

92 Rukhsana Ibragimova, “It’s Tough for |Opposition Parties to break into Parliament”, Central Asia Online, 4th January 2010. URL: http://Centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2010/01/04/feature- 01?change_locale=true. Access date 24th February 2012. 93 Immanuel Karagiannis, “The Challenge of Radical Islam in Tajikistan: Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami”, Nationalities Paper, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2006, p.1. 94 Mehrdad Haghayagi, “Islamic Revival in the Central Asian Republics”, Central Asian Survey, vol. 13, no. 2, 1994, p.254. See also “ustav I programma organizatsii ‘Rostokhez’ tadzhiskoi SSR” (Rostokhez Organization’s Program in Soviet Socialist Republic), Rostokhez, No. 5, 1990, p.2. 95 Cathelin Collins, Op. Cit., p.88. 96 Muhiuddin Kabiri, Op. Cit., p.80.

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“regulation of the excessive accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few on the basis of Sharia.97

The growing role of political Islam in Tajikistan is due to weak institutional set up and strong tribalism, ethnicity, and regionalism where central government writ has been challenged time and again. Intensified and increased interaction with outside world has also brought new ideas, values and discomforts in Tajikistan. These linkages have generated the process of strengthening the hands of Islamists against the incapable secular regime. Deputy Chairman of the IRPT Said Umar Hussani says that “if the population was provided with the electricity, if the people were provided with clean drinking water since some regions face acute lack of water, and if we had natural gas…but we don’t. Roads are in extremely poor condition we have mass labor migration and other problems. That is why people set their hopes on IRPT.”98All these facts support the central argument that the state policies are the major reason for the revivalism of political Islam in Central Asia.

Kabiri is very optimistic about the party’s democratic success in Tajikistan. He says that “this uprising in the Arab world is a beginning of a new era in Islamic world. I hope that, after these events, there would be democracy and freedom not only in the Arab world but also in the whole Islamic world. We are expecting, especially that the Turkish world will play a more active role in Islamic countries, especially in our region, in Central Asia.”99 “First of all we should change our mentality ourselves. The second step is to change our life, our societies. And the final step is that it should be the changing of Islamic world (he pointed towards the modernization). I think, if Islamic world will be changed, it will impact the whole world and it will benefit all humanity.”100 This statement combines both Islamic and modern secular instincts as the IRPT policy.

97 Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, Op. Cit., p.124. 98 Ivan Watson, Op. Cit., 99 www.youtube.com/watch?v=a5p7plBtMvg. Access date 14th August 2013. 100 Ibid.

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Chapter Six

HIZB-UT-TAHRIR AL-ISLAMI (HTI)

6.1. Introduction

The largest Islamic movement of Central Asia is Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HTI). HTI was founded in 1952 by Sheikh Takiuddin Nabhiani a Palestinian; it penetrated Central Asia during early 1990s. The Party was created with an aim to re-establish the Caliphate which was created by the Holy Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) and subsequently run by the first four Pious Caliphs of Islam.1 The most important and interesting fact about HTI and its struggle is that it wants to establish this Caliphate through peaceful and constitutional means however, it does not take part in the political processes of any state. Nabhiani stated that the members of HTI will contest elections when it thinks that it has enough membership to elect those candidates. Once into power through legal and peaceful means, the HTI would implement its agenda in the society from top to bottom.

Most information about its organizational structure is still a myth. However, the organization functions into highly secretive cells known as Halqas (circles) of five to seven persons. Many researchers say that it has an organized hierarchy which starts from a cell to the top most level known as Amir. Only the cell leaders know each other2 and the next hierarchy while cell members know only about their own colleagues. They have no idea about other cells or members of the Organization. The organization works in a modern environment where members are allowed to watch TV, films, shaving beard and all other modern practices except those which are strictly forbidden by Islam. The Organization is banned throughout the Muslim states.

1 The initial 30 years era of the Islamic state after the death of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW) is deemed as the best era of Islamic polity. Not only HTI in contemporary world but most of the Islamic movements and scholars have projected, supported and struggled to establish such kind of Islamic state throughout the Islamic history. Basic features of that state have been discussed during the first chapter of Islamic Theory of State and Its External Relations. 2 This does not mean that each cell leader knows every other cell leaders. He/she knows only those cell leaders which are close to their area or work place.

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It has its headquarters in Beirut3says Khamzin Elder, HTI spokesperson for Central Asia.

To become a full-fledged member of the Organization, a person has to go through a two-year rigorous training by the cell leader. This training is to ensure that the member has completely understood the HTI’s ideology and purpose and is ready to dedicate his life for the purpose of establishing an Islamic state.4 According to Vitaly Naumkin, members are directed to confess their membership if arrested and if any member denies it on arrest; he is expelled from the Organization.5 The Organization is most popular in highly authoritative and restricted Muslim societies including Central Asia, especially among the ethnic Uzbeks.

HTI has its internal as well as external political agenda. Internally it wants to establish an Islamic caliphate on the pattern of early Islamic state of Madina while externally it wants to replace the existing international political system with a new one based on justice and fair play. It is highly critical to the superpowers’ imperialistic policies. HTI severely condemns and criticizes the US led War on Terrorism. It issued a statement which requested all the Muslim states not to join their hands with the US in its war against terror. The Organization is so critical to US policies that it declares it will abolish all the existing treaties with the US if it comes into power in any of the Muslim states in the world.6 It is against the US’s invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and has declared these invasions as attacks on Muslim lands. U.S., Russia, UK, and India are considered as the “invaders into Dar-ul-Islam” because they have occupied Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Palestine and Kashmir.

HTI is critical to the western concept of democracy on account that it is a man-made system while Islamic concept of Khilafah has been bestowed upon by the Almighty Allah.7It, nevertheless, intends to participate in the politics in order to get into power.

3 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 10th September 2014. 4 Ariel Cohan, “Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. in Central Asia.” URL: http://www.heritage.org/research/russsiaandeurasia/BG1656.cfm. Accessed on 24th December 2009. 5 Vitally Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2005,) p.143. 6 Ariel Cohan, Op. Cit., 7 Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Political Thoughts, (London: Al-Khalifa Publications, 1999,) p.117.

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HTI uses a three staged strategy to pursue its agenda. It claims that this strategy was used by the Holy Prophet (S.A.W.) to achieve political objectives. The strategy is; to recruit members as the first step, preaching the message of Islam to the whole community so that society as a whole embraces the Islamic system of government; and when majority embraces the “Islamic way of life”, the Islamic state is established through constitutional, legal and non-violent means.8 Once into power, the HTI will implement Islamic socio-economic and political system where social justice reigns.

6.2. Historical Background

Although, no exact date is known for the HTI’s penetration in Central Asia but it dates back to the Soviet Central Asia. Different people give different dates for the arrival of HTI in Central Asia but most of them agree that it penetrated Central Asian society during 1990s. However, HTI pamphlets were found in Fergana valley (Uzbek part) even during the 1980s.9 The leader during Soviet era in Central Asia was Abdul Qadim Zallum.10According to Ahmad Rashid, it was established in 1995 by a Jordanian named Salahuddin in Uzbekistan11while Vitaly says that Nasirov and Said Amirov established Uzbek cell of HTI in 1995.12 HTI members do not reveal this myth to outsiders.

6.3. Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the Islamic State

The major objective of the HTI is to establish an Islamic state on the pattern of early Islamic state of Madina established by the Holy Prophet (S.A.W), Nabhiani has given a draft constitution for that state where the head of the HTI Central Asia, Sheikh Abdul Qadeem Zaloom says that “the issue of transforming the lands (un-Islamic) into the Islamic homelands and unite them with the rest of Islamic lands is an

8 Hizb-ut-Tahrir, The Methodology of Hizb-ut-Tahrir for Change, (London: Al-Khalifa Publications, 1999,) p.32. 9 Vitaly Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.140. 10 Ranjan, p.132. 11 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002,) p.120. 12 Vitaly Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.141.

174 objective which the Muslims aim to achieve and the method which ought to be taken to achieve this objective is that of re-establishing Khilafah”.13

The fundamental purpose of the Islamic state would be a good life and that is possible in an Islamic welfare state only. Article 149 and 160 of the draft constitution prepared by Nabhiani declares that the Islamic State will guarantee employment and free healthcare to its citizens.14The constitution also says that the ultimate solution to internal and external security of Islamic State lies in the establishment of Caliphate. The creation of Caliphate will also guarantee international stability.15 The organization is critically against the personal designs of the Muslim regimes. They say that with the establishment of Caliphate, social justice which is the key to the Islamic Theory of state will prevail in the society where everybody would be treated equally. The natural resources of common interest would be state owned and it will provide equal opportunities to all of its citizens to get benefit from them.

One of the members of HTI from Central Asia who is an engineer by profession says that “the Prophet (SAW) said three things are common commodity for all the Muslims; water, pastures and fire (referring to energy reserves). Therefore, according to this saying of the Holy Prophet (SAW), no imperialist or MNC can claim the ownership of these public properties.”16This statement is not only critical towards the regimes but also to the international political and economic system where the west has manipulated all the spheres of life.

HTI says that Khalifah (Islamic State’s ruler) will be elected by a Shura (Consultative body). The Khalifah will be the commander of the Armed forces and all the foreign relations will be controlled by him.17 The HTI’s website describes it as a political

13 Nagendra Rao, “Religious Extremism in Central Asia: Towards a Conceptualization”, in Nagendra Rao and M. Monir Alam, eds. Central Asia: Current Challenges and Future Prospects, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2005,) p.108. 14 K. Warikoo, ed. Religion and Security in South and Central Asia, (New York: Routledge, 2011,) p,126. 15 Ibid. 16 www.youtube.com+v=d06wXDfdvfy. Accessed on 20th June 2013. 17 Jatin Kumar Mohanty, Terrorism and Militancy in Central Asia, (New Delhi: Kalpaz Publishing, 2006,) p. 115.

175 movement which aims to replace existing “un-Islamic”18 regimes with Islamic ones across the whole Muslim world through “constitutional and legal” means and that it has nothing to do with violent activities to pursue its agenda. This change will come with the help of common people when they would be in a position to win the general elections in their respective states. According to a spokesman of HTI Central Asia Khamzin Eldar, “The method to get power is according to the Prophet’s (SAW) method i.e. to seek assistance from the people in power to replace the un-Islamic systems with Islamic ones. The Prophet (SAW) went to different tribal leaders and demanded of them that they accept Islam and apply Sharia in their lives and those whom they govern. In Central Asia we present and educate the Ummah about our program, our state and how Islam will solve different problems in the state. We also call the people in power to give the Nussrah (assistance and power) to Hizb to implement the Islamic Sharia in the state.19.

Article 186 of the proposed constitution of the Islamic state given by Al- Nabhiani declares that the Islamic state will not make any treaty or join any international organization which is not based on the principles of justice and fair play, HTI in Central Asia and other states of the world does support the peaceful processes in international arenas. The foreign policy of the Islamic state will be formulated according to the principles given by Islam. There would be friendly relations with all the states in the world. However, if a (non-Muslim) state does aggression against a Muslim state, it is the duty of all the HTI members of the ‘Islamic state’20 to wage Jihad against that aggressor.21 This illustrates the HTI’s adherence to the classical theory of Sayyar in Islam. According to Khamzin Elder “The existing treaties that are within the bounds and limits of the Sharia will remain in place. However, if these treaties violate the Quran and Sunnah then they will be considered null and Void within the

18 Here un-Islamic regimes or state means those having Muslim majority population and/or Muslim rulers but do not follow Islamic laws to govern those states. 19 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 10th September 2014. 20 This Islamic state does not mean the current Muslim majority states of the world but that Islamic state which is ruled by HTI and where Islamic laws are implemented in letter and spirit. 21 Members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Britain, The Method to Reestablish Khilafah, (London: Al-Khilafah Publications, 2000,) p.126.

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Islamic state. We can have trade and economic relations with countries that are not fighting Muslims. There can be visitors from these countries to our land and vice versa e.g. businessman from those countries can visit and sell their products in our markets. The Islamic state will have new treaties with non-combatant countries and the treaties will define clearly the extent and nature, according to the sharia, of relationship between the Khilafah state and the non-Islamic states.”22 But it is important to note here that this Jihad would be defensive and not an offensive; one of the fundamentals of an Islamic state.

6.4. Organizational Structure

The Organization works in high secretive environment and no one knows the complete details about its hierarchy except the heads of the organization in the respective states. Even the common members do not know the organizational structure in details because they are not given information in this regard. When asked the same question, Khamzin Elder stated that “Hizb ut Tahrir has a policy of not revealing its administrative structure and policies to anyone outside the party. We follow the method of Prophet Muhammad (SAW).”23 According to S. Taji-Farouki, following is the organizational structure of HTI, a. Halqa or Cell comprising of five to seven members headed by Mushrif or Cell leader, b. Mushrif or Cell leaders are headed by the Naqib or district leader, c. Naqib or district leaders are headed by Mustamad, who is the provincial leader and d. Amir is the head of that particular country.24 There is strict discipline in the Organization and all the members have to obey the rules and regulations prescribed by the leadership. They cannot follow their own ambitions and cannot follow their own desires. They have to follow the

22 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 10th September 2014. 23 Ibid. 24 S. Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb-ut-Tahrir and The Search for the Islamic Caliphate, (London: Grey Seal, 1996,) p.116. See also K. Warikoo, Religion and Security in South and Central Asia, Op. Cit., p. 125.

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Organization’s ideology and principles. Members of the HTI, according to Mahesh Ranjan, cannot act independently.25 To make them conform to HTI ideology, they are taught several subjects during their initial training which not only include religious subjects but modern courses on science and technology, economics, sociology and politics etc. Most of its membership is youth which include both men and women. The membership is usually from educated and urban strata of society which include doctors, engineers, teachers, lawyers, students and even politicians and military officers.

6.5. Islamic State in Central Asia

HTI is most popular among ethnic Uzbeks throughout the region. It is estimated that HTI has more than 100,000 memberships in Central Asia.26 “We have about 30000 members in Osh and Kara-Suu regions of Kyrgyzstan only”27 says Akhmad (name changed on respondent’s request). It is not only active in Fergana valley but in the other regions of Kyrgyzstan as well. After the 2010 ethnic clashes in southern Kyrgyzstan, membership has increased in Bishkek and the regions bordering with Kazakhstan. “We have connections not only with the Kyrgyz HTI members but also with the neighboring segments of HTI”28 says Ali Yaldashev (name changed on request), a ring leader. Although, the organization operates in a very secretive cells structure, the leadership nevertheless, has connections with each other.

HTI has a three way strategy to pursue its objectives; increasing membership, Islamic teachings to the members so that they are able to resolve the problems, and reaching to top most state positions through peaceful constitutional means.29 The Organization holds secret meetings where not only local and domestic issues are also discussed but international issues directly or indirectly related to the Muslims are discussed and analyzed. HTI wants to create a caliphate comprising of Central Asia, Xinjiang, and South Caucasus. To carry out its agenda, HTI uses modern means of propaganda in

25 K. Warikoo, Op. Cit., p. 125. 26 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Political Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, (London: Routledge, 2010,) P.58. 27 Interview with a HTI member in Osh on 19th August 2013. 28 Ibid. 29 K. Warikoo, Op. Cit., p.126.

178 the form of CDs, cassettes, DVDs, and electronic mail etc. Other ways to spread its message is distribution of leaflets at public places as well as pushing them under the doors of houses at night.

There is an ever increasing women membership of HTI in Central Asia. Khamzin Elder speaks about women membership in these words; “The percentage is as much as men. We do not differentiate between men and women; Islam is for all human beings, both men and women.”30 The most prominent reason for this increase has been the persecution of their male family members which include their fathers, husbands, sons, brothers and other near relatives. These women have their own halqas which are headed by a close male relative and in some cases by an elderly woman.31 These women are used for the demonstrations because they are not (often) physically abused by the security forces. There are evidences that Tajik women in rural and poor areas are provided with money and material support by the HTI. Leader of the Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Dilbar Samadova thinks the same.32 The women members, if not active in the Organization’s political activities, “must at least understand what Shariah laws tell”33, Rano, a HTI women member says.

HTI has proved itself as the major opposition (illegal) political group as no real opposition exists in Central Asia. It is deemed as the major opposition group in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan especially. However, it has a competition with the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT) in Tajikistan. The latter is the only legal Islamic political party in the whole of Central Asia. There is a rivalry between IRPT and HTI in Tajikistan. The IRPT leadership has declared HTI as illegal and its ideology as alien to Central Asian society. Major hub of its activities is the Fergana Valley while in Kazakhstan it operates mainly in the southern cities like Shymkent, Turkestan and Kentan. It also has strong presence

30 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 12th September 2014. 31 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit., p.51. 32 K. Warikoo, Op. Cit., p.129. 33 Vitaly Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.171.

179 in KarateginSkaya zone and Badakhshan area of Tajikistan.34 Khamzin Elder, however, does not agree with this saturation of membership in specific areas. He says “Hizb ut Tahrir has a strong membership in the entire Central Asia. It does not matter which country one travels to in the region, one will hear about the members of Hizb ut Tahrir. Only a mere twenty years ago people used to say mockingly that ‘look here come the people calling for Khilafah’ but today everyone talks about Khilafah and everyone knows the ideas that the Hizb carries and only Hizb is giving Islamic ideas to the masses.”35 Major stress of the HTI (at least for the time being) is on inner jihad or Jihad-e- Akbar that stresses to purify oneself before fighting against the enemies of Islam. Jihad-e-Akbar, as described in chapter one in detail, focuses on the fight against inner evil. It tries to make a person good and cooperative. It also generates tolerance in the society which is the fundamental necessity to construct a welfare state. HTI claims that the imposition of Shariah will resolve all the ethnic, social and economic problems of the people.”36 One of the major objectives and functions of the Islamic state is to project and create an environment of tolerance in the society. For this purpose, the Islamic state establishes a portfolio of Ammr bil Ma’roof wa Ani Anil Munkir (convinces towards good and forbids from evil). “It is well known that Hizb ut Tahrir has a program from the day it started carrying out dawah almost 60 years ago and has been following that program ever since. We want to return to the Islamic way of life by establishing the Islamic Khilafah. Uzbekistan shall be a part of the Islamic state that would stretch from Morocco to Indonesia and from Bosnia to Nigeria. HT(I) has presented complete details of the Khilafah system mandated by Islam. The Khilafah system rests upon the notion that the divine guidance is supreme and not human desires and selfish power-lobbies-interests. Under Khilafah both the

34 M. Ashimbaev, New Challenges and New Geopolitics in Central Asia: After September 11, (Almaty: Kazakh Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003,) p.56. 35 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 10th September 2014. 36 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad, Op. Cit., p.121.

180 ruler and the masses cooperate in implementing the Islamic way of life- the Shariah”37 says Khamzin Elder.

6.6. Strategy in Central Asia: Peaceful or Violent?

The Organization is against the use of violence to achieve its objectives. It believes in employing peaceful means to gain success which include demonstrations, sit-in protests, civil disobedience and the like. “If we do the same (resort to violence) as what regimes do with the people then there is no difference between us and them. We want to create a true Islamic state in the region which will dispense social justice”38 says Akhmad. Violence is disliked by many of the Central Asians who have witnessed it during the Tajik civil war. They know the repercussions of violence very well.

Like their counterparts at global level, HTI does not want to create democratic state(s) in Central Asia. Ali Yaldashev criticizes democracy on the basis that “how is it possible that a highly qualified person and an illiterate are equal in terms of political thinking. The major flaw of democracy is that the powerful use propaganda to achieve their personal interests in the name of national interests. On the other hand in an Islamic system, the leader is appointed through different ways39and is not only responsible to the public but also to the Almighty Allah. Therefore, he has dual accountability which makes him more efficient and keeps him away from corruption, which is the fundamental evil of our society.”40

Another member of the HTI from Osh says “we are a political party but we work differently…look what democracy has to offer; Aids, homosexual crimes, and social problems. All of these are consequences of democracy.”41 “We are against armed struggle. It brings violence and destruction. We only follow the peaceful way for our

37 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 10th September 2014. 38 Author’s Interview with a HTI member in Osh on 19th August 2013. 39 When asked about those ways, he referred me the books of Khilafat Publications London to read. 40 Author’s sInterview with a HTI ring leader in Osh on 19th August 2013. 41 www.youtube.com+n31Uw2TSISE. Accesse date 20th June 2013.

181 struggle, the path which the Holy Prophet (SAW) followed for the spread of Islam”42 says Muhammad (name changed) an HTI member from Andijon. Therefore, establishment of Caliphate is the need of time as “today collective responsibilities of the Muslims are not fulfilled because of the lack of Caliphate. It is the responsibility of the ruler to fulfill the needs of common man in Islam. From liberating the occupied Muslims to feeding the hungry as well as steady and cheaper justice to the people are suspended due to the absence of Caliphate.”43

HTI knows the importance of the military in Central Asia. It has never criticized the armed forces in the region. The Organization assumes that it will influence some of the key security personnel who will throw the existing un-Islamic regimes and replace them with the pure Islamic state(s).44Khamzin Elder says “There are already policemen and men in the armed forces in different countries who support HT(I). They quit their jobs as policemen and army men and then they learn the culture of HT(I) and start working with the Hizb in its political work. Thus HTI does not form a military and a political wing as Hamas, Hizbullah, and Fatah. We follow the method of Prophet Muhammad (SAW). The only benefit that we get is that the common people see former police and army men working among them for Islam and thus they do not lose hope in their brothers and sisters. So people see that the people in army and police are not dead and still have heart that beats for Islam and one day they will help their fellow Muslims in need. ”45

HTI is very much active in Central Asia and the reasons for this activism range from oppression to poverty and from ideological vacuum in Central Asia to international issues of the Muslim world. Since HTI has a single global strategy to carry out its objectives, it does the same kinds of operations in Central Asia. Most of the books and literature is brought from the Arab world and other parts of the Muslim world to be distributed in the region. As a major portion of the Central Asian population in general is ignorant about Arabic language and most of other international languages

42 Authors interview with the respondent in Andijon on 21st August 2013. 43 www.youtube.com+v=d06wXDfdvfy.Access date 20th June 2013. 44 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit., p.115. 45 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 12th September 2014.

182 including English, this literature is translated into the local languages by clandestine printing houses. “These Wakhobis46 push leaflets under the doors and in the mailboxes during the night”47 Says Odil a taxi driver in Tashkent.

Another problem of Central Asian society is the ethnic division which has engulfed the rifts between regional states due to their historical ethnic conflicts. The artificial boundaries drawn by Stalin during the 1920s will wither away when the Islamic state under the caliphate is established in Central Asia, aims HTI. It says that the creation of caliphate across the whole of Central Asia will not only resolve the border issues because that caliphate will be a borderless state, but also resolve the ethnic tensions in the region as well. The powers would be shared by the people on a strict merit system rather than on other flawed procedures and thus ethnic discriminations and grudges will automatically vanish as happened during the creation of early Islamic state of Madina, claims HTI.

There are people who say that HTI does not follow a non-violent strategy to achieve its objectives but also uses violent means or at least it does not criticize the use of violent means to achieve its objectives. A few articles by the HTI in Central Asia illustrate this story. But, there are analysts who differ from this connotation. They say that the articles written in al-wa’y are fabricated by those who want to defame the organization. One of such articles published in al-Wa’y calls for the Muslims to wage jihad against the infidels. These articles justify the use of all means (legal or illegal and violent or peaceful) to achieve the organization’s objectives.

Some people say that HTI even justifies suicide bombing declaring that if someone blows himself only for the cause of Islam and for Allah, he is a martyr.48 For example, the ex-Director of Kyrgyz State Agency on Religious Affairs, Toigonbek Kalmatov, is highly critical towards HTI. He claimed in 2007 that HTI does not follow a peaceful strategy to change the regimes rather it is involved in armed and

46 Wakhobi is a term in Uzbekistan which is used commonly for the terrorists. 47 Authors interview with the respondent in Tashkent on 17th August 2013. 48 Vitaly Naumkin, Op. Cit., pp.154-155.

183 violent strategy for change.49 It is also said that the March 2004 women suicide bombing in Tashkent was the result of HTI’s support to the February 2004 women suicide bombing is Israel.50 As these people are not neutral, therefore, one cannot rely solely on these sources.

In a meeting with Craig Murray, the then Uzbek Foreign Minister Kamilov told the former that HTI is resorting to violent means in Central Asia. Ho told him that some arms have been confiscated by Kyrgyz and Kazakh authorities from HTI members. He further says that the Kyrgyz and Kazakh authorities showed them HTI’s leaflets which called for a “jihad against the Uzbek regime.” He further stated that most of the HTI members in Uzbek jails are charged due to their criminal activities and not due to their religious affiliations.51

On the other hand, members of HTI deny these allegations and accuse authorities for these false allegations to justify oppression against HTI members. In an interview with Ahmad Rashid, one of the HTI members Ali, (name changed on his request) told him that although, we do appreciate and support IMU’s aim to establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan and we support Taliban for their efforts to purify Islam, we differ from them both in their strategies to achieve this objective and their use of violence which is against the methodology of HTI. Moreover, Taliban’s major focus is the world to come after the death and they are not interested in the economic uplift of the people. HTI wants to make human life better not only in the life after death but in this world as well. We want to use modern means and technology to enhance the standard of life for people which is least attractive for Taliban and IMU.52

Nevertheless, according to reports, underground groups in Central Asia especially HTI and the IMU negotiated for several times to adopt a joint strategy to establish an Islamic state at least in Uzbekistan. For example, during 1997, Tablighi Jama’t, Tahir Yaldashev (leader of IMU) and some of the HTI members met in Islamabad for the

49 K. Warikoo, Op. Cit., p.126. 50 Ranjan p.128. 51 Craig Murrey, Murder in Samarkand: A British Ambassador’s Controversial Defiance of Tyranny in the War on Terror, (London: Mainstream Publishing, 2006,) p.122. 52 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad, Op. Cit., pp.132-33.

184 same purpose.53 There have been incidents when the security personnel clashed with the militants and found each other’s (HTI and IMU) leaflets from their possession. Some of the cells of HTI have cooperated with IMU, at least, in drug trade, says Tamara Maskarenko.54

Khamzin Elder also endorses the strategic differences between HTI and IMU. He says “IMU is a jihadist group who wants to establish Khilafah. However we in Hizb ut Tahrir believe that the Khilafah can only be established by the method of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) and this method is not Jihad (by sword). The state wants to give a black face to all Islamic groups whether political or militant, whether Hizb or IMU and therefore we hear about reports regarding meetings between IMU and Hizb and charting out common plans and strategies. All of which has no basis whatsoever in reality. If IMU comes to power then Hizb will seek nusrah (help) from them and will advise them to implement Islam just as it does with the current rulers.”55

Major stress of HTI is on the social justice, human equality and assistance to the poor, fundamental pillars of the Islamic state. It works for different projects of social welfare. HTI members in Central Asia publicly claim that soon they will be able to establish caliphate in the region where all the people live a happy and improved life with fundamental human freedoms.56One of the HTI members in Kyrgyzstan told Kathelin Collins in 2004 that “we want justice…all that government does is against religion and justice”.57 HTI says that once the caliphate is established, chronic social diseases like corruption, poverty, unemployment, inflation and other socio-economic ills will be eliminated from the society.

53 Vitaly Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.176. 54 Tamara Maskareno, “The Changing Dynamics of Central Asian Terrorism”, James Intelligence Review, February 2004, p.4. 55 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 12th September 2014. 56 Ranjan p.129. 57 Kathleens Collins, “Ideas, Networks, and Islamic Movements: Evidence From Central Asia and Caucasus,” World Politics, Vol. 60, No. 1, October 2007. p.79.

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6.7. Membership

As discussed earlier, HTI has a lot of membership in Central Asia. The most successful way to recruit new members is the conduct of seminars/conferences at halkas and personal contacts. Another successful way to make new members is in the prison.58 As most of the political prisoners in Central Asia have HTI membership, it is very easy for them to influence the fellow prisoners. Khamzin Elder says “Hizb ut Tahrir has the support of people from all walks of life in society. Both rich and poor help the members of Hizb even those who work in police help us. It often happens that the policemen quit their jobs and start carrying the dawah (call to religion) with us. Even though that these policemen have a great risk of ending up in prison. Hizb’s message is that of Islam, which is the deen (religious way to lead the life) of the people, therefore any and every Muslim, male and female, can support the Hizb, and this is what has happened in reality across Central Asia and the Muslim world form Indonesia to Morocco.”59 Members of the HTI do not conceal their identity on arrest; instead they proudly announce that they want to change the existing exploitative system with that of the Islamic one which is the real system providing social justice to the citizens of an Islamic state. Most political prisoners in Central Asia belong to HTI. For example, only in 2001 out of the total 7600 political prisoners, 5150 belonged to HTI.60This number continued to grow in the coming years as war on terrorism and later the 2004 terrorist activities in Tashkent and 2005 Andijon crisis escalated the state’s oppression against HTI members. Many of the important figures of Uzbek HTI have been imprisoned for different periods. They include Abdur Rashid Qasimov, Abdur Rahim Abdur Rafiq, Said Amirov, Istam Khudabardiyev, and Hafizullah Nasirov etc.

Khamzin Elder explains the reasons for increasing membership of HTI in these words, “there exist many problems in society and people are looking frantically towards solutions. And these solutions are not only about economy but also about morals, humanity and religious things. People say that the members differentiate

58 Ranjan, p.134. 59 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 12th September 2014. 60 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad, Op. Cit., p.126.

186 themselves from other people such that when they say that we need to help each other so they really do it without demanding something in exchange or e.g. when our members pray and fast so they do it even if they are in danger of their lives or in danger of ending up in prisons e.g. one cannot pray and fast in the prisons as you will be punished and beaten up to death if found praying and fasting in prisons. Yet the members continue to do this. Our members are like the stars in the sky that guide people both within prisons and outside in the society. Therefore people trust in the Hizb and assist and follow it. Many young people join the Hizb despite the dangers to their lives and the ideas of the Hizb remove the dangers that these people have.” 61

6.8. Foreign Policy of Islamic State

Article 186 of the proposed constitution of the Islamic state given by Al- Nabhiani declares that the Islamic state will not make any treaty or join any international organization which is not based on the principles of justice and fair play, HTI in Central Asia and other states of the world does support the peaceful processes in international political arenas. The foreign policy of the Islamic state will be formulated according to the principles given by Islam. There would be friendly relations with all the states in the world. However, if a (non-Muslim) state does aggression against a Muslim state, it is the duty of all the HTI members of the ‘Islamic state’62 to wage Jihad against that aggressor.63 This illustrates the HTI’s adherence to the classical theory of Sayyar in Islam. According to Khamzin Elder “The existing treaties that are within the bounds and limits of the Sharia will remain in place. However, if these treaties violate the Quran and Sunnah then they will be considered null and Void within the Islamic state. We can have trade and economic relations with countries that are not fighting Muslims. There can be visitors from these countries to our land and vice versa e.g. businessman from those countries can visit and sell their products in our markets. The Islamic state will have new treaties with non-combatant

61 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 12th September 2014. 62 This Islamic state does not mean the current Muslim majority states of the world but that Islamic state which is ruled by HTI and where Islamic laws are implemented in letter and spirit. 63 Members of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Britain, Op. Cit, p.126.

187 countries and the treaties will define clearly the extent and nature, according to the sharia, of relationship between the Khilafah state and the non-Islamic states.”64But it is important to note here that this Jihad would be defensive and not an offensive; one of the fundamentals of an Islamic state. 6.9. Basis of Support

The proposed constitution of the Islamic state given by Nabhiani says that Islamic state guarantees free education, healthcare and employment opportunities for its people. HTI projects such provisions of the proposed constitution which are very attractive to the people of Central Asia in general and Fergana valley in particular. As discussed in chapter three, people of this region face a lot of hardships ranging from economy and politics to the social. People of the region are quickly adopting HTI’s ideas and extending their support to the Organization. Following are the major basis for HTI’s support in Central Asia;

6.9.1. States’ Policies

Freedom of expression, criticism and even removal of the rulers is allowed in the Islamic state but Central Asian constitutions are hyper presidential and criticism on the regimes is not acceptable. Therefore, the regimes are considered evil. The Organization “forms its political struggle as part of the struggle between evil and the good”65a manifestation of the concept of Amr bil Ma’roof wa ani anil Munkir (call to good and forbid from evil), which is central to the Islamic state. Although, HTI claims to be a non-violent organization, authorities in the region do not agree with this claim. Authorities are quick to blame HTI for many of the violent activities happening in Central Asia. And as a consequence most political prisoners in Central Asian jails are people belonging to HTI. “Authorities are so afraid of our (HTI) popularity that they blame us for every wrong in the society. HTI members and supporters are always under strict surveillance here but Inshallah (if God wills it) we

64 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 10th September 2014. 65 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit., p.90.

188 will succeed in our mission to establish an Islamic state in the region”66 Says Abu Muhammad (named changed), a member of HTI from Osh.

Pervez Mullajanov, a political scientist from Tashkent has reservations about the way authorities treat political Islam. According to his opinion, undue suppression of the political opponents has created a soft corner for political Islam in Central Asia. He says “they (officials) do not understand Islam. They are afraid of Islam. The majority of advisors to the presidents are teaching historical merchandism, for example, Marxism. They are unable to define what the (political) Islamists are…In many cases they suppress everybody. When you put pressure on moderate Islam, you would get something opposite to that, support to those radical organizations which are working underground.”67He says “if you put pressure on them (political Islamists)…you would see new leaders coming up. New leaders of a more radical character…you would see a rise of confrontation (due to repression) between this party and the government.”68

Economic hardships and political oppression have provided a lot of support for the rise of religious extremism in Central Asia. Gulnara, a school teacher accuses poverty and unemployment as the major causes for the rise of crimes and militancy in Central Asia. As all the political Islamic groups claim to establish an Islamic state where social justice prevails and where “there will be no corruption, unemployment or other negative aspects in the society”, they are highly attractive to the young and educated but unemployed people, says Gulnara.69 Pervez Mullajanov says “we (Uzbekistan) have underground circles of radical terrorists. They are becoming stronger because of the failure of the economic and social strategies reforming the local governments.”70 This statement also illustrates the ethnic and regional divisions in Central Asia which are one of the causes for the rise of radical opposition notably political Islam in the region. According to Bakhtiar Babajanov, most of the HTI members are young and

66 Interview with the respondent in Osh on 19th August 2013. 67 www.youtube.com+n31Uw2TSISE.Access date 20th June 2013. 68 Ian Watson, “Islamist Political Party Faces Conflict in Tajikistan,” 21 February 2010. URL: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=19214821. Access date 17th March 2010. 69 Nagendra Rao, “Religious Extremism in Central Asia: Towards a Conceptualization”, in Nagendra Rao and M. Monir Alam, Op. Cit., p.109. 70 www.youtube.com+n31Uw2TSISE.Access dtae 20th June 2013.

189 under the age of 25. They are unemployed and “had not found a legal way to express their ambitions of opposition.”71

Most of the HTI members in Kyrgyzstan belong to lower strata of society, says Sadiq Khan Kamalov, former Mufti of Kyrgyzstan.72The security officials of Kyrgyzstan claim that twenty percent of support to HTI comes from Fergana region of the state.73 Abdul Salim Ergashev, a human rights activist from Kyrgyzstan says that people were reluctant to join or support the HTI initially but later on the common people started helping them to carry out their activities,74 primarily due to their social services networks.

IRPT, the only legal political party of Central Asia is highly critical towards HTI and vice versa. HTI thinks that the later has joined the fraudulent political system of Tajikistan. HTI is against the western concept of democracy and other political systems. On the other hand IRPT is also against the HTI. In 2002, Noori in an interview stated that HTI is an illegal Organization. The former members of IRPT who did not endorse the Peace Accord of 1997 and have distanced themselves from the Party due to its pro-government policies, have been recruited by the HTI. Moscow returned Tajik immigrants who were deported or forced to leave Russia under the new immigration laws are also a soft target for the HTI.

6.9.2. Corruption

Corruption is one of the major reasons for the discontent against the regimes. Besides economic and political matters, corruption also prevails in religious sectors as well. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, Hajj quotas are selling on higher prices. “In 2013, Emilbek Kaptagayev the grand mufti of Kyrgyzstan sold them for $4.5 million that is much higher than the original price”75 says Chairman of the Congress of Muslims Bakit Nurdinov. According to him, the police are aware of fraud during the Hajj. "But

71 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit., p.81. 72 Vitaly Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.192. 73 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit p.66. 74 Kathelin Collins, Op. Cit., p.77. 75 Interview with Izzatellah Rakhmatellaev, a human rights activist from Osh, Kyrgyzstan on 24th September 2013.

190 they do not respond, because there is a payoff. Authorities also are silent because they themselves ask for a quota for their relatives. In particular, the deputies asked for the relatives of the order.”76 Activities of this nature which are carried out by the official authorities have created hatred among the general public for them. This is enough for those who are bribed to tilt or at least have a soft corner towards HTI. “Corruption (in Kyrgyzstan) is so much rampant that the most wanted extremist of the Osh region Islam Isakov fled to Russia through the fragile Kyrgyz-Kazakh border when he got information about his arrest and who leaked the information is a joke in Osh” Izattellah narrates further.77

This rampant corruption is one of the major reasons for the increase of unemployment in the region. To overcome the economic hardships of the people, modern style of Islamic charities has been very popular throughout the Muslim world including Central Asia. The Islamists, with the help of some wealthy businessmen, have established such charity organizations. Chairman of the Human Rights Association of Uzbekistan (HRSU), AbduJalil Boymatov says that “during the twenty two years of independence, socio-economic and political conditions have worsened. People had pensions, child protection, every house had electricity and gas and people were more or less satisfied with their living standard. But after the independence the living standard of the people has declined steadily…these conditions have forced the common man to look towards the opposition forces, which obviously are largely banned, to resolve their issues. (Political) Islamic forces have gained social support during the last decade especially. Not only the rural population, that is more inclined towards religion, but the people from urban centers also support Islamization of the system. People in villages even demand implementation of Shariah in Uzbekistan.”78Interestingly people in Uzbekistan in general and villages in particular do not know much about shariah. “I don’t know what shariah means but I think it’s

76 Ibid. 77 Author’s interview with the respondent on 26th September 2013 via Skype. 78 Author’s interview with the respondent on 26th August 2013 via Skype.

191 good for us and it will end up our miseries” said Olimjon (named changed) a resident of Chust town near Namangan.79

HTI is also critical to the secular opposition of Uzbekistan which, according to the Organization is a mere tool in the hands of the Karimov regime. This allegation seems true because “in Uzbekistan today, there are four secular opposition political parties which are only shadow political parties of the president and get a share from the regime’s corruption”80 says Boymatov. General perception about the political parties in Uzbekistan is that they do nothing for the public welfare. In fact they are engaged in their own agenda, which is to be in power at any cost. Madina(named changed), a female member of the HTI from Namangan says “during Soviet times Uzbekistan had strong science, industry, sport and educational activities but after independence, all is in shit. Bribery and corruption prevails. From school to colleges, technical colleges to universities, majority of students have to pay bribes to complete degrees.”81However, these allegations are not totally true because female teachers form a maktab school of Kuva village near Ferghana city in Uzbekistan deny such allegations. Norgis, a teacher of that school says “education is free in the governmental schools and students get their degrees according to their caliber and hard work.”82 Boymatov, however, endorses Madina’s stance.

There has been a long, slow and gradual process of reforms in Tajikistan. It is very important to know that almost 70% of the Tajiks are engaged in agriculture while less than 10% of its land is arable. The land reforms have engulfed the gap between rich (landowners) and poor (peasants) in Tajikistan. This gap has forced the poor people to retaliate and think about alternatives. One of the attractive alternatives given by Nabhiani’s Islamic state is the abolition of feudalism and landlordism through a

79 Author’s interview with the respondent in Chust on 22nd August 2013. 80 Author’s interview with the respondent via skype on 26th August 2013. 81 Author’s interview with the respondent on in Namangan on 22nd August 2013. 82 Author’s interview with the respondent in Tashkent on 17th August 2013.

192 process in which lands extra to the needs of the landlords are given to the landless people.83

Sukhrob (named changed) a Tajik migrant worker in Tashkent is critical to Rehmanov regime. He says that “before judging, you should understand the politics that surrounds Tajikistan. First we don’t have democracy and we cannot change the government. Second, our government is being controlled by Russia. Third, in order to grow crops you need money. Fourth, government does not allow you to sell your crop openly in the market. Most farmers are forced to sell their crops below production cost and that forces them to stop farming and leave the country for other jobs…I am here for the fourth time. Nobody leaves the good life, no body leaves their families, (but) there is no choice for us.”84Abdujalil Boymatov tells similar kinds of stories about Karimov regime.

6.9.3. International Political Issues

The Organization is also against the biased and exploitative international economic and political structure where the weak suffer and the powerful enjoys life. One of the HTI members from Namangan region Basheer (name changed upon request) is highly critical to the international political system. He opines “today’s international political system is based on exploitation where the powerful subjugates the poor. The weak is fragile and forced to obey the orders of the stronger. The same criterion is followed in the domestic politics of Central Asian states. We don’t have freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Islam is the only religion which can save humanity from brutalities of the powerful. HTI also propagates anti-Westernization as well as anti- Americanism. The Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and 2003 attack on Iraq intensified this propaganda at domestic level and international level.”85

Khamzin Elder says that “the Islamic state is empowered and expected to unite the whole Muslim world under its wings, and to spread Islam across the globe

83 For details see Taki an Nabhinai, The Economic System in Islam, (London: Khilafah Publications, 1997,) pp.118-131. 84 Author’s interview with the respondent in Tashkent on 17th August 2013. 85 Author’s interview with the respondent in Tashkent on 20thth August 2013.

193 based upon introducing Islam to the world population in a convincing manner, which is based upon the famous verse: there is no compulsion in deen. Everybody will be invited to study Islam as a way of life, while maintaining his right to embrace it or reject it. When it comes to state-to-state relationships, these are governed by the prevailing international politics and the other state policies toward the Khilafah.”86 Khamzin says “The leaders in our countries are like the leaders in all the Muslim countries. They have nothing in common with Islam; they do not implement the Islamic systems and thereby do not rule by Islam. They work for their masters in the West. Hizb ut Tahrir is an Islamic political party and carries Islamic ideas. We want to establish an Islamic life in an Islamic state. Of course these leaders in our countries are against Islam and Muslims; they think only about themselves and protect Western interests in our countries. When one observes ones countries so one notices that they are rich with resources but people are poor.”87 6.9.4. Ethnicity

Ethnic, clan, sub-clan and regional affiliations are extremely strong in Central Asia. These identities, most of the times, decide the political decision making in the region. Uzbeks constitute the largest ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These minorities feel marginalized in these states. Since ethnic Uzbeks constitute the largest minorities in other Central Asian state except Kazakhstan; i.e. 20% in Kazakhstan, 15% in Tajikistan and 14% in Kyrgyzstan, they have a substantial role in socio- economic and political setups of these states. The ethnic Uzbeks are not dispersed in these states and rather live in regional clusters. For example, they live in southern Kazakhstan, Sothern Kyrgyzstan and northern Tajikistan which are parts of Fergana valley. This Uzbek concentration in specific regions has given them a sense of strong identity and strength in these states.

Uzbeks feel that they are under-represented in these states. For example, the population of Osh constitutes almost 50% of ethnic Uzbeks but they have only 8% of

86 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 10th September 2014. 87 ibid.

194 representation in the local administration.88 This unjust distribution of power is more than enough for the ethnic Uzbeks to support the anti-system forces and one of the best choices is HTI. As HTI claims to establish a borderless caliphate, at least in Fergana Valley, the idea is charming for the ethnic Uzbeks who could have free access to their counterparts at least in the entire Fergana valley. The creation of the caliphate will also bring Uzbek dominance in the Central Asian affairs.

Ethnic Uzbeks constitute the largest membership of HTI in Kyrgyzstan. “In Kara-Suu district of Osh, Umarov and Akramitov are very strong Uzbek clans which have close contacts with the HTI. These clans have good foreign relations (with political Islamists) and import a lot of extremist material to distribute in Osh and Kara-Suu” Says Izzatillah Rakhmatellaev a human rights activist from Osh.89

According to Kyrgyz security officials, almost 90% of HTI members in Kyrgyzstan are ethnic Uzbeks.90 However, Abu Muhammad differs with the authorities when he says that “both Uzbeks and Kyrgyz are the members of HTI in Kyrgyzstan. However, ethnic Uzbeks constitute major portion of the membership that is around 65- 70%.”91Izzatillah Rakhmatellaev also endorses that ethnic problem is one of the major reasons for the rise of HTI in Kyrgyzstan. He says “authorities in Osh are doing very wrong to the ethnic Uzbeks. The new roads and development projects are designed in such a way that they damage the Uzbek properties. By doing so what the Kyrgyz authorities expect from young ethnic Uzbeks? They will surely be drawn towards HTI because it has something attractive for them in the form of social justice and a chance for them to reintegrate with their Uzbek brethren across the border.”92

The Organization claims to overcome the problems of ethnic differences and divisions across Central Asia and Fergana valley especially. It claims that the establishment of Islamic state in the region will eventually eliminate the strong

88 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit., p.78. 89 Author’s interview with the respondent via Skype on 4th September 2014. 90 “Third Kyrgyz Presidential Candidate Fails Mandatory Language Test”, Radio Free Europe/Free Library, 24th August 2000. URL: www.refrl.org/content/article/1142224.html. Access date 19th January 2009. 91 Author’s Interview with a HTI member in Osh on 19th August 2013. 92 Author’s interview with the respondent via Skype on 20th March 2014.

195 identity of ethnicity and clans which is also a source of getting into power because the Islamic state has other parameters of governance and not ethnicity and clans. Islamic state, rather, discourages such kinds of identities and only merit is considered while appointing the officials. “Muslims across the whole world have been divided on the basis of modern nation-state system. They are further divided on ethnic, regional, linguistic and clan basis. This division is deliberately done by the enemies of Islam in order to weaken them so that they (enemies of Islam) can dictate us in all spheres of life”93 says Madina. She further continues, “Muslims of Central Asia have been divided into the artificial boundaries created by the Soviets. When the Islamic state would be established in the region, all the Muslim brethren will easily move in it and it is the demand of the people at least in Fergana (valley).”94

6.9.5. Religious Policies of the States

According to Khamzin Elder “You must understand the situation in the Central Asian countries; it is not one where people are free to do as they will. Praying and fasting are forbidden in schools. People younger than 18 years of age are not allowed to go to the mosques and if they do, their parents get fines or punishment in prisons. Women who work in the markets are not allowed to wear the veil. If they do so the police close down their shops and stalls and confiscates their products. In workplaces the employers keep a check upon people who are fasting and are fined or fired if they are found fasting. Young people are not allowed to have beards and schools forbid the wearing of the veil.”95

One of the HTI members from Osh, Abu Muhammad is very critical towards the Tajik regimes decision to ban the women and teenagers from attending mosques. He says “Government has banned women from wearing the Islamic dress in public. It has also banned women and children under the age of 18 from visiting mosques. Even the non-Muslim states do not forbid the children and women attendance to mosques. Isn’t it ironic that women and teenagers can go to the bars and clubs and not to a mosque?

93 Author’s interview with the respondent in Namangan on 22nd August 2013. 94 Author’s interview with the respondent in Namangan on 22nd August 2013. 95 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 10th September 2014.

196

What message the Tajik authorities want to give to the Muslims of Central Asia in general and Tajikistan in particular. If they think by doing so they will eliminate Islam from the region, they are fools. In fact, repression is one of the major reasons for people to join HTI.”96

There are many silent supporters of HTI in Kyrgyzstan. For example, in November 2004, 20,000 signatures petition was filed in Jalalabad for the introduction of more Islamic values and laws in the society including ban on alcohol, segregation of sexes, and ban on pornography etc.97This illustrates the popularity of HTI’s manifesto which might not have been attractive to the common people if it did not match the popular demands.

6.10. Finances

Most of the finances of the Organization come from the membership fee and donations from rich members. However, monitory support by the Central Asians especially Uzbek Diaspora living in the Middle East and other parts of the world is also evident. Another major source of finance is the establishment of small and medium businesses whose profits are used for the Organizational activities. Some people claim that it receives money from the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. For example, one of the security officials of Kyrgyzstan stated during May 2004 that the Organization used to get financial support from Taliban regime in Kabul during 1990s.98

“We have our own system of income generation. The income which is needed to run the organizational affairs, does not come from foreign aides but is generated through internal means”99says Ali Yaldashev (named changed).

96 Author’s interview with the respondent in Osh on 19th August 2013. 97 Kath Gannon, “Islamists See Opening in Central Asian Chaos”, Associated Press, 24th March 2005, URL: http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?4579-Islamists-See-Opening-in-Central- Asia-Chaos. Access date 19th January 2009. 98 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit., p.108. 99 Author’s interview with the respondent in Osh on 19th August 2013.

197 6.11. State Responses to HTI HTI is banned across the whole region. Regimes are highly critical and in some cases brutal towards HTI. “In our countries the rulers do not follow any principles or laws and they also lack an ideology. They rule upon the people with violence and threats. Every group/organization that has its own ideas and solutions, especially an ideological group as HT(I) is difficult for them to stand against and offer alternatives to the masses against the solutions of HT(I). Therefore they resort to arresting, harassing and banning HT(I)”100 says Khamzin Elder.

Unfair trials of the HTI members have given birth to a new creed of membership; especially women and teenage boys. The Women, whose near male relatives have been the victims of state atrocities, have joined the HTI ranks. Not only these women but the teenage boys as young as fourteen101distribute HTI leaflets. This is done in order to avoid police detention. The laws of the states declare that young people who are underage cannot be brought into a court for trial and law cannot be applied on them. In response to Karimov’s oppression, HTI declared him a Jew on 30th May 2003. Not only had the members of HTI made demonstrations in Uzbekistan but also in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in response to Karimov oppression against the HTI members in Uzbekistan in 2003.102

A new wave of recruitment began in 2005 when security forces opened fire on the peaceful demonstrators in the border city of Andijon in Uzbekistan killing hundreds of non-combatants including women and children. Karimov administration was quick to accuse the HTI for the incident. The regime accused HTI and members of Akramia as the masterminds of that uprising. Independent analysts and many international human rights watchdogs have negated this claim and declared Karimov regime responsible for that incident. Even, some of the independent analysts have declared the incident as the Karimov administration’s planted act to get a clean chit to persecute HTI membership. According to Emmanuel Karagiannis a leaflet distributed

100 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 10th September 2014. 101 Vitaly Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.150. 102 N. Zokinora, “Uzbek Policies Under Attack”, Institute for Peace and War Reporting, Central Asia, 9 November 2003.

198 by the HTI in Andijon on 21st May 2005 also accused the Karimov administration for the uprisings.103

In a TV interview, Islam Karimov stated that “the terrorist base their ideas on HTI’s teachings…HTI made the biggest contributions to terror (in Uzbekistan)”.104 Kyrgyzstan is relatively democratic in Central Asia but as the constitution does not allow any political party to be created on religious basis, HTI was banned in Kyrgyzstan in April 2004.105 All the religious material published in Kyrgyzstan must be approved from the Muslim Spiritual Board of Kyrgyzstan. Similarly, all the preachers have to take a prior no objection certificate from the authorities. “HTI has information and knowledge” said an Osh resident. “They can debate on any social, economic and political issue with comfort and it means they are capable enough to run the administration in a very smooth way”106 says Abu Muhammad. He further says that “when state cannot protect our lives and property, it’s better that someone else (pointing towards HTI) comes forward and saves people from state brutalities.”107

HTI’s popularity is not only increasing in those areas which have traditionally been more Islamic but also in those northern and western areas which are more secular. The Organization is gaining so much popularity in the region that the deputy Prime Minister of Tajikistan, Said Amin Zahoorov has declared it a greater threat at the Tajik-Afghan border than the IMU.108The Organization was banned immediately after it surfaced in Tajik society in 2001. Almost one thousand members of HTI have been captured in Tajikistan and many of them are serving different terms in the prisons. Almost two hundred and fifty HTI members in Tajikistan have been convicted under Article 187 and 307 of the Tajik constitution.109

103 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit., p.65. 104 “Uzbek President Blames Islamist Groups for Deadly Suicide Blasts”, Agence France-Presse, 31st July 2004, URL: www.afp.com. Access date 21st October 2011. 105 Mariya Y. Omelicheva, “Combatting Terrorism in Central Asia; Explaining Differences in States’ Responses to Terror”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2007, pp. 372-374. 106 Interview with the respondent in Osh on 19th August 2013. 107 Interview with a HTI member in Osh on 19th August 2013. 108 Vitaly Naumkin, Op. Cit., p.163. 109 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit., p.62.

199

One of the HTI members in Kyrgyzstan, Dilyar Jumabaev established a TV station and a Radio station in 2005 to project and promotes the Islamic values and teachings in Kyrgyzstan. Although, he was given license to broadcast with a partner company Keremet, he had to stop the broadcast just after three days because the National Security Service of Kyrgyzstan forced Keremet to cancel the agreement.110

“People just see corruption and collapse. They are looking for alternatives”111 says an HTI member. An Imam masjid, Abdullah from Osh is highly critical to the official ban on mosques to participate in the political affairs of the state. He says “in Kyrgyzstan the official position is there should be no politics in mosques. The whole point of Islam is that it is only religion that offers guidelines to the life. Islam answers every question regarding life”112, therefore, we must be given permission to counter the HTI propaganda.

6.12. Charity Work

The failure of governments in Central Asia has created many problems for the common people including economic hardships in the form of unemployment, poverty, inflation and overgrowing taxes. People have no choice regarding the change in rulers in order to bring a change in the state policies. The concept or practice of welfare state in Central Asia is only a dream: the welfare state which does care about its population. HTI, on the other hand, is very busy in cashing this situation and has started plenty of charity projects at local levels.

Ercan Murat, the UN head in Kyrgyzstan stated in 2001 that “human trafficking is the second biggest problem in Kyrgyzstan after drug trafficking and it is mainly due to poverty and the falling economic conditions in this part of Central Asia.”113 HTI distributes free meals and toys during Islamic holidays on account of Eid festival in Kyrgyzstan.114It does charity works in Andijon and surrounding areas. The

110 “Kyrgyz Member of Banned Group Comment on Suspension of OWN TV Programme”, BBC Monitoring Service, 10th March 2006. 111 www.youtube.com+n31Uw2TSISE. Access date 20th June 2013. 112 Ibid. 113 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad, Op. Cit., p.129. 114 Wrikoo, Op. Cit., p.147.

200 businessmen suspected of being HTI members in Andijon were engaged in social welfare activities. They were supporting the poor families.

6.13. The Splinter: Akromiya

Akrom Yaldashev, one of the HTI leaders declared that since HTI’s agenda is to create an Islamic Caliphate through peaceful means, it seems to be impossible in the near future. He said that HTI’s objective to create the caliphate through peaceful means does not fit to the Central Asian conditions. The concept of non-violent strategy to create the caliphate was given for the Arab world.115Therefore, he split away from HTI and created Akromiya group in 1996 which started an armed struggle to create the alleged Islamic state. Another splinter group from HTI in Central Asia is Hizb-un-Nusra.

Akromiya differs with HTI on the creation of a single caliphate throughout Central Asia. It says that a single caliphate is almost impossible to be created here; therefore, it is more appropriate to create more than one caliphate in Central Asia. Akromiya wants to establish a state where Islam’s role must be accepted in the society.116 Akromiya does support the poor people economically by employing educated but poor youth in small businesses like shoes factories, bakeries and cafeterias etc. which have been set up by the wealthy members of the Organization. Moreover, the owners of big businesses contribute a handsome amount for charity purposes besides contributing on the earnings of every member.117 It is estimated that the organization has provided jobs to almost 5000 people.118 One of the disciples of Akrom Yaldashev, Behram Shakirov who is a wealthy businessman is said to have allocated a huge piece of land in 1993 near Andijon to construct a business center for the members of the organization.119By 2005 almost forty different kinds of businesses had been established in this business center. One fifth of the profit from this business

115 Ibid, p,127. 116 Alisher Ikhlamov, “The Phenomenology of Akromiya: Separating Facts from Fictions”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, 2006, p. 41. 117 K. Warikoo, Op. Cit., p.142. 118 Alisher Ikhlamov, Op. Cit., p. 39. 119 Ibid, p.42.

201 center had to be deposited in the self-created ‘Bait-ul-Maal’120 Akrom Yaldashev was involved in private religious teachings which were banned as they were unacceptable to the authorities, therefore, he was forced into the limelight in the government’s anti- religious policies. He was sentenced to seventeen years in prison in connection to the Tashkent bombings of 1999.

Yuldashev has written a book as well. This handwritten book declares that “truth and kindness to each other” must rein in the society. He also talks about human psychology and even science. In his book, he time and again stresses on the Qur’anic verses as reference/support to his arguments. Yaldashev has explained a five staged strategy to achieve his groups’ objectives. This strategy includes recruitment, financial strength to the organization, moral and spiritual training of the members, penetration of members into the state’s institutions, and establishment of an Islamic state.121According to the independent analysts, this five staged strategy document is planted by Karimov regime itself because nobody ever got this document from any of the Akromiya members.

Analysis

Most of the political prisoners in Central Asia belong to HTI. During 1999 only, after the Tashkent bombing around six thousand HTI activists were jailed while fifty five were executed.122 The US State Department estimates around 4500 HTI members in Uzbek jails only.123 The Organization does not openly support its imprisoned members because they follow the early period of Islam when the Muslims were persecuted by the Pagans of Makkah but the Holy Prophet (S.A.W) and fellow Muslims did not openly confront the pagans.124 “Our organization is against any kind of violence to reach into political power. Despite the peaceful struggle to achieve our

120 An institution in an Islamic state which collects taxes and charities etc. from the wealthy citizens in order to serve and take care of the needy. 121 Alisher Ikhlamov, Op. Cit., p.45. 122 Mahavir Singh, International Terrorism and Religious Extremism: Challenges to South and Central Asia, (Kolkata: Anamika Publishers and Distribution (Pvt) Ltd., 2004,) p.167. 123 Bureau of Democracy and Human Rights and Labor, Uzbekistan: International Religious Freedom Report, Washington D.C.: US State Department, 2007. URL: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper. Access date 25th march 2012. 124 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit., p.48.

202 target i.e. to create an Islamic state, the regimes fear us. They know that they have failed to deliver and the HTI is capable of diverting the attention of general public towards them if given (any) chance to come into mainstream politics. That’s why HTI is banned throughout the region and is under strict observance of the authorities. Our members are detained for nothing and trialed in-camera that is against human rights” says Abu Muhammad.125

The purpose of HTI is to establish a Caliphate. It strongly believes in the traditional theory of Sayyar.126 According to Khamzin Elder “The terms of darulharb and darul Islam are Islamic and have evidences for them in the Quran and Sunnah. We use the terms that are allowed by the Sharia and the terms that are not allowed by the Sharia are rejected by us.”127 But at the same time it wants to establish a caliphate through peaceful and constitutional means. It claims that their non-violent struggle is to follow the footprints of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW) who established the Islamic state of Madina through non- violent means.128 It also criticized 9/11 and 7/7 incidents by declaring that proclamation of jihad can only be done by the Islamic state and not by the individuals.129 Membership contributions and overseas donations to the Organization help it to continue its printing activities in Central Asia. Michael Hall, the Director of International Crisis Group Central Asia project says that socio-economic situation has brought popularity to HTI in Central Asia.130According to international Crisis Group, one of the local imams of an official mosque from Tashkent is not happy with the regime. He blames the regime for the rise of religious extremism and militancy in Uzbekistan. He says that the regime does not allow them to interpret Qur’anic verses and the sayings of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (SAW)

125 Interview with a HTI member in Osh on 19th August 2013. 126 The concept has been discussed in details in Chapter one. 127 Author’s interview with the respondent through face book on 12th September, 2014. 128 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit., p.112. 129 For details see the statement of Jalaluddin Patel in M. Abedin, “Inside Hizb-ut-Tahrir: An Interview with Jalal Patel, Leader of the HTI in the UK”, Jamestown |Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 2, 2004. 130 K. Warikoo, Op. Cit., p,137.

203 and the radical groups like the HTI gain advantage from the situation and interpret and explain the verses according to their agenda.131

The regimes of Central Asia in general and Karimov in particular are so critical towards Islamists that they want to uproot them at any cost. They also fear that if provided a fair opportunity to the Islamists to contest elections, they may pose a serious threat to their (maybe) lifelong rules. They also question the peaceful struggle of the Islamists to get into power. For example, when the US and Israeli embassies were hit by the terrorists in 2004, Islam Karimov stated that “if the religious movements intend to set up caliphate…overthrow the current system, give up the modern style of life and create a state based on Sharia laws then how will they be able to do this in a peaceful way”. 132

HTI is considered lethal to the Central Asian regimes since it projects a non-violent strategy to achieve its goals. This fear is evident from the large number of HTI prisoners in Central Asia. There has been a game of hide and seek between the regimes and the members of HTI. Sometimes they intensify their activities while on many occasions they slow down their activities. Harsh policies of the regimes and the fear of persecution have led the members in many areas to go underground.

Although, it is a general perception that the HTI is an anti-Shia Organization, but its leaflets in Iraq declared Shias as the integral part of the Muslim Ummah and declared Shias and Sunnis as brethren (this might have been done in order to gain more support from the moderate Muslims at international level). Omar Barki, the person who founded HTI in Great Britain, even stated that their Organization contacted Khomeini and offered him the caliphate of the whole Islamic world after the Iranian Revolution.133 HTI has successfully created a rift among the regional states which blame each other for the militants’ escalation in numbers and activities.

131 ICG, “Central Asia: Islam and the State”, Osh: ICG Asia Report No.59, 2003, p.7, URL: http://crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1442&1=1. Access date 25th march 2012 132 URL: www.eurasianet.org/depatments/insight/articles/eva070504.shtml. Access date 25th march 2012 133 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Op. Cit., p.58.

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The Organization wants to bring change in the Kyrgyz society, however, it was least interested in the two Revolutions; 2005and 2010 which brought down the regimes of Askar Akaev and Kurban Bakaev because it was just the change of faces rather than the system for the Organization. It even opposed the 2005 parliamentary elections declaring them a mere drama.134 HTI declared Akaev a corrupt leader, stating that it wasuseless and un-Islamic to vote for a corrupt person. Members of the HTI also protested against the 2005 presidential elections in the southern Kyrgyz cities.135 These political developments in Kyrgyzstan and its aloofness from the political process brought down its popularity. However, it started to support limited political activities later on. It even supported the ex-Kyrgyz ombudsman, Tursunbai Bakir as the presidential candidate of July 2005 elections since he declared to implement Shariah laws in the country.136

“To implement Islam in the society, we don’t need to observe the wishes of the majority or the wishes of minority. We have to implement God’s orders without any reformation…democracy is the will of the corrupt politicians in the legislatures. How can the will of people be superior to Allah’s will? Therefore, it is very necessary to establish the system of Khilafah in the Muslim states, the system which was established by the Holy Prophet (SAW) and his four pious Caliphs”137says a telecom engineer and an HTI member from Central Asia.

134 Ibid, p.69. 135 Gulnoza Saidzaimova, “Kyrgyzstan: Hizb-ut-Tahrir Rallies in South, Urges Elections Boycott”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Library, URL: www.rferl.org/featuresarticles/2005/2/2FF7FDEF-DAE8- 4323-BF61-346A404F3EE9.html. Access date 25th march 2012 136 E. Zuusupaliev, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Kyrgyzstan: We Are Being Harrassed for Active Participation in the Presidential Elections”, Ferghana.Ru, 10th August 2005. 137 www.youtube.com+v=d06wXDfdvfy. Access date 20th June 2013.

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Chapter Seven

THE NEW GREAT GAME AND POLITICAL ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA

7.1. Introduction

Herald Mackinder in his famous ‘Heartland Theory’ declared Central Asia to be at the heart of international political structure. “Whoever controlled Central Asia would wield enormous power” said Mackinder.1 This assumption led to the emergence of “The Great Game” between Czar Russia and the British India. Later on Soviet occupation of the region gave it great influence not only in regional but international politics as well. However, it was the post-independence period which gave Central Asia immense importance at international level. All the important regional and international powers swiftly engaged themselves with the regional states. These powers have multiple interests in the region which include; political, economic, energy, security, promotion of human rights and democracy, drugs and arms trafficking, and above all terrorism and extremism. This competition of interests by the actors involved in the region has been described as “The New Great Game.”

The ‘Great Game’ between Czar Russia and British India had geo-political orientation but the ‘New Great Game’ in the Central Asian region has ideological orientation as well. Different ideologies better known as the world orders compete in the region. The rise of political Islam in the region has brought these competing international orders to a single table because of their mutual interest to combat this menace. The World Orders have been well explained by Tahir Amin. He says “World boundaries do not have to be absolute and mutually exclusive, so, we expect to find overlapping and even interpenetrating orders, and smaller, possibly regional orders within more encompassing, truly global world orders.”2 The competing world orders in Central Asia are; Islamic, Chinese Sinic, Western liberal, Russian Slavic, and Residual Socialist.

1 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: the Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002,) p.187. 2 Tahir Amin, “World Orders in Central Asia”, in Renee Marlin-Bennett, ed. Alker and IR: Global Studies in an Interconnected World, (London; Routledge, 2012,) p.71.

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Despite having different and even contradictory interests in the region, Chinese Sinic, Western Liberal, Residual Socialist and Russian Slavic world orders are on a single page against political Islam in the region. Both Russia and China are trying to pressurize USA through the forum of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is deemed as a future anti-NATO block by some of the western think tanks, to vacate its military bases but at the same time they cooperate with the later against political Islam in Central Asia. Similarly, USA is highly critical of Beijing and Moscow’s human rights violations and weak democracy but supports them both on their actions against Chechen and Uighur separatist movements which have been blended with political Islam in the recent years. The competition to extract and export the hydrocarbon wealth of the region is the most important interest of these powers in Central Asia and to achieve this objective they have charted out long term strategies as well. However, their cooperation against political Islam is much stronger than their competition for hydrocarbons.

Central Asia has become a sandwich between the competing world orders. Not only the big powers but the regional states have also tried to exert their influence in the region. During the initial years of independence, Turkey, Iran, India and Pakistan tried to exert their influence in the region. However, none of them could have substantial impact due to Central Asian Republics (CARs) reluctance to embrace traditionally different types of political and economic models. Another reason for this failure is the Russian influence which they were never able to come out of. They tried to adopt the Turkish model but were not willing to adopt economic liberalism. They never looked towards Iran due to its radical Islamic ideology and Pakistan for its support to Afghan Mujahedeen and later on Taliban regime in Kabul. They had good relations with India and even during the Soviet era, India had a consulate in Tashkent as well. CARs really wanted to have good relations with India but could not develop them due to geographical non-proximity. They had to go through China and Pakistan which are unfriendly towards India and vice versa. This situation limited the foreign policy choices of the CARs. They had to rely on Russia for their economic development and security measures. Nevertheless, China was also successful in making its way into the region. 9/11 provided USA with the golden opportunity to

207 penetrate into the region. Let us discuss the individual policy of these three states (Russia, China and the USA) towards political Islam in Central Asia.

7.2. Russia and Its Backyard?

To continue their personal authoritative rules, all the Central Asian states except Kyrgyzstan which is democratic to some extent, always look towards Moscow. Russia has always been supportive of the regional leadership not only to continue their authoritative regimes but also to contain the western, especially the US influence in the region. Moscow thinks that if democracy comes in this region, it will seriously jeopardize Russian interest in the region, so it is better to have oppressive regimes which are ready to serve the Russian interest. This Russian fear proved correct after the Colored Revolutions in the former Soviet Union which along with the Andijon incident of 2005, forced Central Asian leadership to get closer to Moscow and Beijing. These incidents have led to the strengthening of regional security measures especially under the umbrella of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and to some extent under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). CARs know that without Russian support, they cannot handle the security issues but at the same time they don’t want Moscow’s influence in the internal political affairs of the region.

The other major concern of Russia in the region is the rise of political Islam. Having issues of political Islam in Volga, Crimea and most importantly North Caucasus regions, Moscow cannot afford the revival of political Islam in Central Asia. The Russian Slavic order tries its best to support every step which can ensure the containment of political Islam’s spillover from Afghanistan and Central Asia into Russian Federation. As political Islam in Russia has its roots in Central Asia, Moscow is really worried about the situation in its backyard. Moscow’s concerns about the region have been described by one of the Russian analysts who stated that “preservation of Russia’s wholeness begins in the Fergana valley.”3 It is really concerned about the recent accumulation of Islamists in Northern Afghanistan and their possible spillover into Central Asia especially in Turkmenistan.

3 Nicklas Norling, “Is Russia Stirring Unrest in Central Asia?” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 1st July 2009, p.3.

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The strengthening of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Northern Afghanistan is a real threat to the region’s stability. Putin has urged the regional states for “the coordinated actions to address the Islamic State (IS) threat to the region.”4 This statement shows the concern of the Russian Federation after the reports confirmed that hundreds of Central Asians especially members of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and other militant organizations have joined the IS. However, it’s the Chechen issue and the rise of political Islam in broader North Caucasus region which has forced Russian Slavic order to cooperate with Western Liberal, Chinese Sinic, and the Residual Socialist World Orders to combat the Islamic World Order in the region. This nexus against political Islam has been described as - what Qutb stated - the nexus of Dar-ul-Harb and Modern Jahilliyah against Islam by the Islamists of the region.

7.3. Central Asia-Russia Cooperation Against Political Islam

Many security agreements have been signed between Moscow and the CARs. The most significant of them is the creation of CSTO. Since CARs do not have state of the art security forces and equipment, they have to rely on external powers for the said purpose. Russia is the best option as old Residual Socialist order still rules the CARs who have historical ties with Russian Slavic order. This relationship has been described by Karimov as “We have centuries old relationship of friendship, brotherhood, and mutual assistance with that (Russia) country and its great people.”5 Uzbek President Islam Karimov said during a visit to Moscow in April 2013 that “next year's planned exit of NATO troops from Afghanistan will create dangerous conditions in Central Asia, and Russia's presence will help maintain peace in the

4 “Re-examining the Threat of Central Asian Militancy”, 21st January, 2015. URL: www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/re-examining-threat-central-asian-militancy. Access date 22nd January, 2015. 5 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan at the Threshold of Twenty First Century, (Massachusetts: NY, 1998,) p.38.

209 region.”6 Russian role in maintaining so called peace during the Tajik Civil War is another example of CARs dependence on Russia for their security.

Russia has a military base in Tajikistan and one in Kyrgyzstan. It has to pay nothing for the use of these bases. On 5 October 2012 military base lease deal between Russia and Tajikistan not only give further 29 years to Moscow to station its 7000 troops in Tajikistan up to 2043 but also exempted these personnel and their families from any possible legal prosecution7, an area of concern not only for the Tajik human rights activists and civil society but also for the common citizens who are persecuted for minor crimes. Russian-Kyrgyz deal regarding the basing rights to Russia in Kant was finalized in September 2012 which extended the Russian stay there for further 20 years.8

The most important security measure of the CSTO is the creation of Collective Rapid Reaction Force which was established in June 2009. The major purpose of this Reaction force is to counter any internal threat to the stability of any member state, if requested by the concerned state. It is feared that this Force will be used against any possible political or religious opposition or insurgency. According to AbduJalil Boymatov, chairman of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU), “most of the security measures taken by the Central Asian governments in general and Uzbekistan in particular to deal with the internal “crisis” are fake and are to counter the opposition, both religious and secular”.9

7.4 Chechen Issue and Political Islam

Like their counterparts in Central Asia, Caucasus Muslims were banned from practicing their religion and had been under a tight state control during the Soviet era. The policies of Glasnost and Perestroika had similar kind of impacts on this region

6 Grigory Dukor, “Karimov Says Russia Provides Stabilizing Force in Central Asia”, The Moscow Times, 15th April 2013, URL: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/karimov-says-russia- provides-stabilizing-presence-in-central-asia/478670.html. Access date 16th October 2013. 7 Alexander Sadiqov, “Russia Keeps Military base in Tajikistan till 2042”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 17 October 2012. URL: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5857. Access date 10th January 2013. 8 Scott Moore, Op. Cit., p.282. 9 Author’s interview with the respondent via Skype, 9th September, 2013.

210 like Central Asia. In the absence of educated and moderate religious figures who could have led the society in a better way, the Mullahs who were influenced by the Afghan war of 1980s took the religious charge in the region. Some of the Chechens, who had joined the ‘so called’ mujahidin in Afghan war, also returned to their homeland and influenced these mullahs. The result was radicalization of, at least, this religious community. In order to keep the people away from militant political Islam, Moscow introduced Shariah Courts in Dagestan and Ingushetia.10 But at the same time the state banned all kinds of religious materials in the Muslim majority regions11 negating the fundamental right of the society. Therefore, the desired results by establishing Shariah courts could not be achieved.

Not only the extremists political Islam but non-violent political Islam in the form of Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HTI) has also penetrated into the North Caucasus region. The State keeps an eye on the potential Islamists which, many times, has provoked them to violent activities. When the first Chechen War of 1994-96 started, almost 4000 Russian troops were killed which was a test for Moscow to combat political Islam within its territory. The ruthless handling of Chechen political Islam by the Russian authorities has encouraged Central Asian rulers, especially Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to handle political Islamists in their respective states in a similar fashion. After the second Chechen war of 1999-2001, Russia declared all the political Islamists groups whether peaceful or violent as ‘terrorists’. It linked Chechen political Islam with that of Taliban regime in Afghanistan, IMU and al-Qaeda, 12thus tried to pose this issue as an international issue.

Caucasus faces complex socio-economic and political issues. These issues are enough for the rise of political Islam. The current leader of political Islam in Caucasus, Dokka Umarov has created a self-proclaimed Islamic Emirate of Caucasus with a

10 E. M. Polyakov, “Islam and Islamism in Contemporary Russia: The Lack of State Power or Factor of Stabilization?” World Applied Sciences Journal, Vol. 30, No.4, 2014, p.430. 11 Ibid, p. 431. 12Ahmad Rashid, Op. Cit., p.196.

211 website Kavakazcenter.com for propaganda purposes.13 The increased activities of the Islamists in Caucasus region have forced Moscow to declare this region as “new heaven for separatism.”14To combat this menace, besides countering the Chinese Sinic and Western Liberal Orders in the region, Russia Slavic order created CSTO in 2002 and a Rapid Reaction Force in 2009. It has established its military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and is negotiating with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for the establishment of its military bases to assist the regional states in improving their security measures as well as to counter the US influence. Russia is operating Kant base in Kyrgyzstan which is only 30 miles away from the US base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan.

7.5. Transnational Linkages of Chechen Political Islam

The Russian and especially North Caucasus political Islam not only has connections with the global political Islamist groups like al-Qaeda, but with their counterparts in Central Asia and Afghanistan as well. This connection dates back to the Central Asian khanates. The Soviet invasion of these territories disrupted these connections but when Soviet Union disintegrated and Central Asia got independence, these connections were revived. Tahir Yaldashev had close connections with Ibn-al-Khatab and Shamil Basaev, the founding pillars of modern political Islam in Caucasus. Al- Qaeda had been the major financer of the Chechen separatists from 1995 to 2005.15 Not only militant political Islam but the moderate political Islam in the form of HTI and Tableghi Jamaat (TJ) has substantial grounds and support in this region as well as Volga.

Daku Umarov’s Caucasus Islamic Emirate has connections with broader political Islamist groups like al-Qaeda. It attacks on Russian military and civil targets. The inclusion of Chechen Islamists in IMU is another example of the transnational

13 Anna Munster, “Growing Islamic Extremism in central Asia and the Caucasus-Situation and Outlook”, 6th June 2013. URL: https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2013/06/2515987/ Access date 25 November, 2013. 14 E. M. Polyakov, Op. Cit., p.434. 15 Surgery Markedonov, “Radical Islam in North Caucasus: Evolving Threats, Challenges and Prospects”, CSIS, November 2010, p.10.

212 linkages of Caucasus political Islam with its counterpart in Central Asia. When Chechen Islamists and their aides around the world used Turkmenistan’s territory as their corridor to reach North Caucasus from Afghanistan,16 Russia reacted swiftly and deployed its troops at the Afghan-Turkmen border under the umbrella of CSTO. Russian troops also guard the Tajik-Afghan border under the same CSTO in order to halt the inflow of Islamists from Afghanistan.

When IRP was established in Astarakhan in 1990, one of its leaders Bagautdin Kebedov (a Caucasian) tilted towards radicalism17 which got external support after the disintegration of USSR. Kebedov’s relations with the transnational Islamists raised concerns in Moscow regarding the possible revivalism of political Islam in the region. Having its branches established in CARs, Russia suspected the aims and objectives of IRP and showed concerns about the possible linkages of Russian IRP with those of its counterparts in CARs and other Islamists of the broader Muslim world. After the initial years of Soviet disintegration, IRP was banned throughout the former Soviet Union.

7.6. Reasons for the Rise of Political Islam in Caucasus and Russia

According to Sergy Markedonov, there are four major reasons for the rise of political Islam in Caucasus; political Islamists offered ‘aid’ to the local imams in return of their support to political Islam; official clergy at the time of independence was least practicing Islam and was less equipped with religious knowledge; social discomfort increased due to corruption, nepotism, social injustice and economic decline; there was a strict ban on religious-political activities.18

Reasons for the rise of political Islam in Russia are authoritarianism, economic hardships, and gap between rich and poor, and disliking of the official religious figures by the general public.19 These conditions are nonetheless similar to those of the Central Asian Republics (CARs) conditions which have led to the rise of political

16 Ahmad Rashid, Op. Cit., P.200. 17 E. M. Polyakov, Op. Cit., p.434. 18 Sergery Markedonov, “The Rise of Radical and Non-Official Islamic Groups in Russia’s Volga Region”, CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program, January 2013, pp.16-18. 19 E. M. Polyakov, Op. Cit., p.431.

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Islam in the later. Just like Central Asia, North Caucasus region faces ethnic and sub- national tensions. Creation of an Islamic state in the region endures the solution of these ethnic issues. The Islamists preaches social justice and ensures a corruption free society.

As discussed in chapter three, CARs’ heavy economic and political dependence on Soviet Union brought disaster to the region after independence as Moscow cut down most of its economic relations with the region. CARs could not find alternative economic partners due to being landlocked. However, after a brief interval, the economic relations between the CARs and Russia revived which brought a kind stability in the region. The negative impact of this economic relationship is that if economic crises occur in Russia, it has direct impact on Central Asian region. Many of the Central Asians, especially Tajiks, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, work as migrant workers in Russia. Russia uses these migrant workers as a political tool to force the CARs to comply with Moscow’s instructions. Russia’s economic decline might force these migrant workers to come back to their respective states. In that case, these migrant workers who become jobless are the soft target of political Islam which may offer them lucrative deals.

These migrant workers are a source of providing religious information to their religious brethren in Russia especially in the Muslim majority regions. Political Islamist groups like HTI are extensively engaged with these migrant workers in order to influence them by their ideology. About 100,000 Muslims, including migrant workers from Central Asia and North Caucasus gather in the Central Mosque of Moscow for Friday and Eid prayers where HTI distributes its leaflets.20 These leaflets discuss the social injustices, economic hardships, political repression, human rights violations, corruption and bribery and convince the people to support the creation of Islamic caliphate(s) in the region including Russian Muslim majority areas.

20 Alexi Malashanko. “Islam in Russia”, Global Affairs, 23rd September 2014. URL: eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/islam-in-russia-17002. Date of access 21st December 2014.

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7.8. China and Rise of Political Islam on its Western Borders

Gen. Liv Yazhou of the Peoples’ Liberation Army of china expressed the importance of Central Asia for China by calling it “the thickest piece of cake given to the modern Chinese by the heavens.”21 China has two key objectives in Central Asia; securing energy interests and the containment of political Islam in Xinjiang. For the sake of energy security, Beijing has been very successful to strike deals with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to ship oil and gas from the Caspian region and Daulatabad fields to China. Two parallel pipelines (with the third under construction and to be operational in 2016) have been constructed from Gedaim (Turkmenistan) to Horgos (China) through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.22 While China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline has been operational since 2006,23 there are prospects for further cooperation in this field between Central Asian states and China. To counter political Islam in Xinjiang, Beijing is actively engaged with the CARs on bilateral as well as on multilateral levels. SCO reflects the multilateral strategy of China to counter the threat of political Islam.

7.9. Xinjiang and the Chinese Strategy to Counter Political Islam

Xinjiang has long been dominated by the Chinese rulers. This extended period of over 2000 years of Chinese dominance and influence in Xinjiang is considered as colonialism by the ethnic Uighurs.24 China has been facing resistance from the Uighur Muslims of Xinjiang region from the early twentieth century. The Uighurs are ethnic Turks who have closer historical links with Central Asia and broader Turkic and Islamic world, than they have with China. Beijing has introduced unfriendly policies towards Xinxiang. Han migration to this region has created a huge

21 Edwards Wong, “China Quietly Extends Footprints in Central Asia”, New York Times, 2nd January 2011. URL: www.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/world/asia/03china.html?pagewanted=all. Access date 25/11/2013. 22 “Flow of Gas From Central Asia”, URL: http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/FlowofnaturalgasfromCentralAsia/FlowofnaturalgasfromCentralAsia2.sht ml. Accessed on 23rd February 2015. 23 Fakhmidin Fazilov and Xiangming Chen, “China’s Energy Security Strategy in Central Asia”, China in Central Asia, 27th November 2014, URL: http://chinaincentralasia.com/2014/11/27/chinas-energy- security-strategy-in-central-asia/ accessed on 23rd February 2015. 24 Garam F. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, “Islam in Xinjiang”, in Fredrick Starr, ed. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, (London: M. E. Sharp, 2004,) p.323.

215 demographic imbalance which has resulted in the Uighurs’ discontent. When failed to achieve their objectives politically, Uighurs blended their struggle with ethnicity and later on with Islam. They created East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). This struggle got violent when it joined Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Two independent East Turkestan Republics (ETRs) in 1933 and 1944 were established by the indigenous Uighurs which were recaptured by the Chinese regimes. Although, these Republics could not exist for long, their political impacts on the ethnic Uighurs were immense. Shariah laws were promulgated in the first ETR as state laws which depict the Uighur adherence to their religion. It gave them the sense of political independence as well. Political developments in Central Asia had deep impacts on the creation of these Republics. The Basmachi movement and the creation of five Central Asian States by Stalin during the late 1920s and early 1930s resulted in the creation of first ETR in 1933 while broader religious and political liberalism given by Moscow to CARs during the World War II in order to win the support of Central Asian population resulted in the creation of second ETR.

After 1969, once the region was fully under control, the Chinese regime started ethnic cleansing of Uighurs from Xinjiang. Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing declared the non-Hans as alien in the Chinese lands. A systematic campaign against the Uighurs was started by the Chinese authorities with incidents like defaming religious leadership, parading them in the streets and in extreme cases, burning the Quran.25 It resulted in the strengthening of hatred towards Hans rule in Xinjiang. The Uighurs uprising had mostly been of political nature but Beijing’s religious policies forced the struggle to blend itself with religion in order to gain more support from broader Muslim communities especially from the political Islamists. The Afghan jihad of 1980s and the Islamic revivalism in CARs after their independence (have profound impacts that resulted in turning a political struggle into a religious one) turned the struggle on the religious blending of the struggle of the Uighurs, which was initially political.

25 Dru. C. Gladvey, “The Chinese Program of Development and Control: 1978-2001”, in Fredrick Starr, ed. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, (London: M. E. Sharp, 2004,) p.97.

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To counter political Islam on its western borders, Beijing has charted out a clear cut policy of non-tolerance. Besides introducing harsh and strict policies towards (political) Islam in Xinjinag Autonomous Region, China has done treaties with the CARs to control and extradite wanted Uighurs’ living or taking refuge in Central Asia. Most of the Uighurs live in Kazakhstan where they are under constant and tight control. Although, most of these Uighurs are secular political opponents of the Chinese regimes, they are labeled as political Islamists.

Chinese request to Central Asian states to extradite the wanted and suspected Uighur leaders is a routine. One such example is the handing over of a Uighur school teacher who fled to Kazakhstan from Xinjiang in 2009.26 Almost 300,000 ethnic Uighurs live in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.27 Only those Uighurs who have close relatives in Xinjiang live there. Beijing fears that the substantial freedoms in Kyrgyzstan and relative religious and social freedoms given to ethnic Uighurs by the Kazakh regime may influence their relatives and ethnic communities in Xinjiang and they may demand similar freedoms which are unacceptable to Beijing.

Religion is under tight control in Xinjiang. State policies towards religion are polarizing young Uighurs; either modernizing them or pushing them towards extremism. Dress code in educational institutions and work places has been introduced by Chinese government. This dress code bans the local traditional Uighur dress in work places. Dress code in educational institutions forces the female students to wear short skirts, which is totally against the social and religious norms of the Uighurs. Male students cannot wear their traditional caps and overcoats. Moreover, Fasting and offering prayers at workplaces and educational institutions is also banned. The authorities claim that it’s an unhealthy practice which makes human beings physically weak and mentally dull.

On the other hand, Muslims across the whole world have strict adherence to these practices. Children under 18 years of age are prohibited to attend the mosques or to

26Philip Shishkin, “Central Asia’s Crisis of the Governance”, Asia Society, January 2012, p.17. asiasociety.org/files/pdf/120215_central_asia_crisis_governance.pdf, p.26. 27 Niklas Swanstron, “China in Central Asia: A New Great game or Traditional Vassal Relations?” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 14, No. 45, p.575.

217 get religious education, a practice which has been adopted by Tajikistan as well. There are many hurdles in the way of Uighurs if they want to undertake international travel. The term Wahabi28 is frequently used for practicing Muslims who have no links with Islamists. Detention of Mullahs and closure of Mosques is a routine practice in Xinjiang. There is a complete ban on religious material and only state approved religious material is allowed to be distributed. However, so-called illegal religious material is also circulated clandestinely mostly by the Islamists.

A systematic vast migration of Hans to Xinjiang has been carried out by Beijing.29 The Han population in Xinjiang has reached to 40% which had been only 6% in 1953.30 Not only Han migration is carried out by the authorities, Huis (ethnic Chinese Muslims) migration has also been encouraged in order to counter the Uighur majority in the region. The Hui Muslims are not considered a threat to the Chinese interests as they are the indigenous Chinese people. Majority of the administrative and other key positions including those of doctors and teachers are being allotted to the Hans. This policy has further intensified the tension between the authorities and the ethnic Uighurs besides creating complex socio-cultural and economic problems for the Uighurs.

In reaction to Chinese policies towards Uighurs, riots exploded in Urumqi in 2009 killing hundreds of people both Hans and Uighurs. A jeep explosion was witnessed in Urumqi in October 2013 which killed 5 people in Tiananmen Square. In 2013, Kunming faced terrorist attacks. All these incidents were blamed on the Uighurs by authorities for two reasons; escalating anti-Uighur sentiments within China and CARs and the world to believe that China faces security threats from political Islam.

28 It is used for the militant political Islamists in derogatory sense. 29 For details see Fredrick Starr, ed. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, (London: M. E. Sharp, 2004.) 30 Shirley A. Kan, “US-China Counter Terrorism Cooperation: Issues for the US Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 15th July 2010, p.5, URL: www.crs.gov.

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7.10. Central Asia-Xinjiang Connection of Political Islam

Islam in Xinjiang has arrived from Central Asia and it is said that ‘Kashgar is closer to Baghdad than to Beijing.’31Most of the rebellious movements against the Qing dynasty and subsequent Chinese rules in Xinjiang, were led by the religious figures who also used the concept of ‘jihad’ in its letter and spirit to challenge the Chinese authority over their region. Beijing fears that the ethnic and religious revivalism in Central Asia has profound effects on Xinxiang. China has charted out bilateral as well as multilateral strategies with the CARs to combat political Islam in the region.

Relations between Taliban regime and the ETIM forced Beijing to chart out a comprehensive policy towards political Islam. The creation of Islamic movement of Turkestan (IMT) which was abolished later on was a cooperation agreement between the political Islamists of Xinjiang region and from CARs. IMU, ETIM, Islamic Jihad union (IJU) and other shadow groups from the region joined their hands in order to carry out a coordinated and joint strategy to fulfill their objectives. The Chinese authorities claim that In 2000, Chinese forces confiscated ‘4100 KGs of dynamite, 2723 kg of other explosives, 604 illegal small arms and 31000 rounds of ammunition from Xinjiang.’32 When 50 Uighur separatists were intercepted and captured by the Chinese authorities in 2002, it was discovered that they were trained in Afghanistan and were transported through Central Asian region into Xinjiang. This incident forced Beijing to take further strict measures to combat inflow of Islamists from its South- Western borders. 33 China has charted out bilateral as well as multilateral strategies with the CARs to combat political Islam in the region.

After the resolution of border disputes with its western neighbors, China substantially reduced its military from these borders but surprisingly it has increased its troops’ deployment in Xinjiang by 200,000.34 Chinese government has warned the Central Asian leaders not to harbor or give sanctuary to any of the ETIM’s dissidents;

31 Garam F. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, Op. Cit., p.327. 32 Niklas Swanstron, Op. Cit., p.572. 33 Guangcheng Xing, “The SCO in its Fight against Terrorism, Extremism and separatism”, Central Asia and Caucasus, No.2, 2002. 34 Niklas Swanstron, Op. Cit., p.572.

219 otherwise, Chinese investments will be in jeopardy. The three bordering Central Asian states i.e. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have deep cooperation with China in combating political Islam that proves the cooperation between Residual Socialist and Chinese Sinic World Orders against Islamic World Order.

Upon Beijing’s request, Central Asian states have closed down ‘Uighurs publications and Offices’ besides arresting those ethnic Uighurs who used to criticize the Chinese government.35 When Arshidin Israil, a Uighur journalist reported the brutalities of authorities during and after the 2009 Urumqi riots, he fled to Kazakhstan from possible persecution. The UNHCR accepted him as a refugee and decided to repatriate him to Sweden in 2010 but before it could happen; Kazakh authorities extradited him back to China under the SCO umbrella.36

China surely wants that political Islam be eliminated from Afghanistan and Central Asia and for that it supports international efforts, especially by the US However China also feels that its interests may be threatened with the prolonged stay of the US forces in the region. Mohiyyidin Kabiri, Chairman of the Tajik Islamic Renaissance party (IRPT) stated that “the Uighurs in Xinjiang are waging their own jihad against Beijing and Chinese sees that there is a transnational threat that cannot be stopped just from Xinjiang. The Chinese understand that if the IMU is successful, more Uighurs will find support and sanctuary with Namangani.”37 The statement proved correct when the Uighurs joined IMU and IMT. Current Uighur membership of the IMU is also substantial. It means there are still connections between the Uighur and Central Asian political Islam.

Nevertheless, the increased transportation and communication linkages between Central Asia and Xinjiang has created further security threats across the borders, as the Islamists both from Central Asia and Xinjiang may float to each other’s regions under a cover of bilateral trade. This trade may be used for the finances of the Islamists as well. Beijing is also concerned with the drugs trafficking because a

35 Ahmad Rashid, Op. Cit., p.202. 36 Maxim Marmur, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Vehicle for Human Rights Violations”, August 2012, p.16. URL: https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/sco_report.pdf 37 Jihad, Op. Cit., p.204.

220 substantial percentage of this trafficking is carried out by political Islamist groups especially IMU. To combat drugs smuggling, regional cooperation is of immense importance.

7.11. Reaction to the State policies

The large state sponsored Han migration to Xinjiang has forced the ethnic Uighurs to strengthen their culture, language, values and even religious practices. “Islam and Islamism in Xinjiang has become a means for resisting state powers and are likely to grow in that role.”38 The 2009 Urumqi violent clashes claiming almost 200 lives, mostly of the Hans was a reaction to the killings of Uighur migrant workers in Guandong province. The authorities stated that the violence had been “instigated and directed from abroad, and carried out by outlaws in the country.”39 The outlaws had been the members of World Uighur Congress, a secular political group.

Language and religion is a key to Uighur nationalism’s success. Just like the Chechen separatists who blended religion in their purely political struggle, the Uighurs, when failed to achieve their objectives through peaceful political means, resorted to violence and ultimately joined hands with broader political Islamic organizations especially with al-Qaeda, Taliban and later on with IMU. The strict religious policies and the oppressive policies towards Uighurs along with massive Han migration in Xinjiang have led to the rise of underground militant political Islam like in Central Asia. However, there are least evidences of the rise of peaceful political Islam in the form of HTI in Xinjiang.

7.12. World Orders against Xinjiang (Political) Islam

Uighurs relations with al-Qaeda and other transnational political Islamist groups have brought Western liberal and Chinese Sinic World Orders to a single table against this ‘menace.’ In the wake of 9/11, Chinese foreign ministry stated that “(Uighurs) have been trained by the international terrorists, so, the fight against separatists in Xinjiang

38 Garam F. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, Op. Cit., p.336. 39 Nick Holdstock, “Islam and Instability in China’s Xinjiang”, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource center report, March 2014, p.3.

221 is part of the fight of the world against terrorism.”40 SCO adopted a provision into its charter in 2012 that declared the events “threatening the peace, stability and security of the member states of the SCO or the entire” world be dealt jointly,41thus, inviting other world orders to cooperate with Sinic order against Islamic order.

Uighurs’ political Islam is a least threat to the Chinese authority due to its insufficient operational capabilities. As stated by Roberts, “the facts do not support the idea that there is, or has been in recent history, a substantial and sophisticated Uighur terrorist threat” to the Chinese authorities in Xinjiang and China in general. The evidence of actual terrorist act perpetrated by the Uighurs is largely inconclusive as is the information about the capacity and reach of the ETIM…as a terrorist group.”42 Despite its incapability to pose a serious threat to security in Xinjiang, Beijing has adopted certain strict regional and international measures to keep ETIM activities under tight control.

Joint Counter-Terrorism Center in Bishkek was established under Shanghai-5. $ 1.3 million aid to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had been given by China to combat terrorism. SCO charter states that “perceived a potential danger of Islamist militants is the main threat that binds regional security strategies of the SCO countries together.”43 Not only the joint military exercises held by SCO member states during 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006-7 against terrorism manifest the regional states quest against political Islam but the establishment of Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) initially in Bishkek and then in Tashkent in 2004, depicts the intentions of the regional states against political Islam. Under the charter of SCO, none of the member states can harbor/give asylum to any of the suspected militant of any of the SCO member state.

Regional Anti-terror Structure (RATS) with its headquarters in Tashkent works under the umbrella of SCO. RATS was established in June 2004 to ensure the exchange of all kinds of information by the member states to combat the three menaces which

40 Garam F. Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, “Islam in Xinjiang”, Op. Cit., p.342. 41 Nick Holdstock, Op. Cit., p.4. 42 Ibid, p.6. 43 Ishtiaq Ahmad, “SCO: China, Russia and the Regionalism in Central Asia”, SSRC, Feb 2008, p.3.

222 were declared as the primary duty of SCO. It works as the advisory body to ensure the regional security. RATS is concerned mainly with the correspondence among the member states besides advisory role. It does not participate in any kind of operational activism. As an advisory unit, it is involved in the conduct of different seminars and workshops etc. for the exchange of ideas and experiences.

RATS is run by the member states contributions. Most of these contributions come from Moscow and Beijing. However, during the recent years, Astana has also contributed a major portion of SCO finances.44 Combating drugs trafficking is also on the high agendas of RATS. “Drug trafficking is always a matter of concern for the SCO. It has not only plagued the Central Asian states but Russia and Europe as well and SCO want to play its role to control this menace.”45 During June 2009 SCO summit, China announced to create a fund of worth $10 billion for the SCO members.46

Despite its successes in different fields, SCO still faces divergent interests and stance on many core issues like “the nature of terrorist threats and their causes, diverging national definitions of terrorism, and national governments eager to maintain freedom of action in this sphere and limit encroachment on their national sovereignty.”47

In August 2002, ETIM was declared as a terrorist organization by the US State Department. It (US State Department) stated that it (ETIM) was planning to attack US embassy in Bishkek. In fact, this ban came right after the 9/11 which brought US and coalition forces in the Chinese neighborhood to carry out Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for which Washington needed Beijing’s support. There are reports that intelligence sharing between Washington and Beijing has been done regarding terrorism.48

44 Interview with Mr. Mirzosharif Jalolov, the deputy Secretary General of SCO in Islamabad on 28th August 2013. 45 Ibid. 46 Alexander Cooley, “Behind the Central Asian Curtain: The Limits of Russia Resurgence”, Current History, vol. 108, no 720, October, 2009, p.32. 47 Richards Weitz, “SCO Struggles to meet Renewed Terrorism Challenges”, Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 10th April 2012. URL: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5848. Access date25th May 2012. 48 Ahmad Rashid, Op. Cit., p.206.

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On 14th November 2014, the Chinese Foreign minister stated that Uighur Islamists, who had been trained in Afghanistan, funded by al-Qaeda and were members of the ETIM, entered China in order to overthrow Chinese rule in Xinjiang and to create an Islamic theocratic state there.49 China conducted military exercises with CARs and Russia in Xinjiang under the umbrella of SCO.50 Political Islam in the entire region including Russia, China and Central Asia perceives these exercises as cooperation of modern Jahiliyah (CARs) with that of Dar-ul-Harb (Russia and China).

7.13. USA, War on Terrorism and Political Islam in Central Asia

Since USA does not have geographical proximity with the Central Asian region, it has to rely on the CARs’ neighbors in order to achieve its interests. Washington faces tough resistance from Chinese Sinic and the Russian Slavic orders in the region. However, the Residual Socialist order has shown mixed responses to the US. CARs know that USA would not try to dominate the region as it is not a regional power like Russia and China trying to exert their influence in Central Asia. Therefore, they would surely wish that Washington must continue to play its role in the region.

US perception about CARs is that they are weak states in terms of security, politics and economics. CARs continuously face the threats like drugs trafficking, Arms smuggling and above all terrorism and extremism. The Assistant Secretary of States for Central Asia, Elizabeth Jones told the Senate sub-committee on Central Asia on 13th December 2001 that US wants to see prosperous, stable and peaceful region which has accelerated in economic and democratic reforms, a vibrant civil society and human rights respect. We want to see the region integrated to global markets and society as well.51 USA wants to have a balanced relationship with CARs where no single state is given priority. But doing so, it not only wants to have good relations with the regional states but also to contain the Slavic and Sinic world orders in Central Asia. Currently, US security cooperation is mainly focused on counter-

49 Nick Holdstock, Op. Cit., p.5. 50 Shirley A. Kan, “Op. Cit., p.5. 51 Mahavir Singh, International Terrorism and Religious Extremism: Challenges to South and Central Asia, (Kolkata: Anamika Publishers and Distribution (Pvt) Ltd., 2004,) p.215.

224 terrorism, counter-narcotics and border security areas especially of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan with Afghanistan.

Since USA is engaged in OEF against political Islam in Afghanistan, importance of CARs does not recede in the eyes of Washington. The connections between the political Islam in Afghanistan and its counterparts in Central Asia and Xinjiang region has bound USA to get support from CARs, China and most importantly from Russia. USA is also interested in the region’s hydrocarbons. The west had been critical of the human rights violations by the Central Asian regimes and controlled democracy but war on terrorism and later on creation of Northern Distribution Network (NDN) has forced them to keep silent on human rights violations and political oppression. Benefiting from this situation, CARs regimes exaggerate the threats of extremism and terrorism in their states in order to draw more attention and concessions from the west and international community.

7.14. US Strategy to Counter Islamic World Order in Central Asia

Although “the US does not face a direct terrorist threat from central Asia but has interest in maintaining the security of the US logistics infrastructure supporting operation in Afghanistan, key strategic facilities and in preventing the emergence of Al-Qaeda’s safe heavens in Central Asia. We remain vigilant to warning signs in the region and continue to support local efforts to ensure that the threat against US and allied interest from terrorist groups in Central Asia remain low.”52

During March 2014, the US CENTCOM commander General Lloyd Austin stated to the Congressional Committee of Armed Services that “Central Asia’s position bordering Russia, China, Afghanistan and Iran assures its long term importance to the US. By improving upon our military to military relationships we will be better able to maintain influence and access, counter malign activities, protect lines of

52 “National Strategy for Counter Terrorism”, June 2011. URL: whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrosim_startaegy.pdf.

225 communication and deny (violent extremist organizations) access to ungoverned spaces and restrict their freedom of movement (in Central Asia).”53

US was offered basing rights by all the CARs except Turkmenistan which allowed the coalition forces to use its airspace that too for the humanitarian assistance flights. Interestingly, not only the CARs but Russia and China also supported the OEF in Afghanistan. Currently a German contingent is based in Termez, Uzbekistan and French forces use Dushanbe base, Tajikistan while Shymkent base, Kazakhstan is used by ISAF forces for their operations in Afghanistan. However, it is the Manas airbase that is the main hub of NATO/US forces transit activities in the war against militant political Islam in Afghanistan. In 2010, it was told to Secretary of States Ms. Clinton that “up to 3500 troops daily, over 13 million pounds of cargo each month and 117 million gallons of fuel each year were handled by the airbase.”54 Karimov stated in May 2009 that the coalition forces including the US can use Navoi airport for the shipments of non-lethal weapons to Afghanistan.55 This statement was followed by mutual visits of the officials of the two states which resulted in the creation of Annual Bilateral Consultation to discuss the issues like border security, counter terrorism and counter-narcotics, trade and development and so on.

NDN has been created for the NATO supply through Russia and Central Asia. NDN is a blessing for the authoritative Residual Socialist Order whose interests to contain political opposition in the form of political Islam can be best served in response to this cooperation. Western Liberal order has closed its eyes regarding the human rights violations and oppressive political conditions in the region. Betterment in the relations between Washington and CARs especially Uzbekistan after the Andijon incident has disappointed the human rights activists and supporters of democracy. The rent which is being drawn from the NDN supplies has increased the bank accounts of Central Asian presidents and their cronies. It has opened a new chapter of corruption in Central Asia.

53 Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests”, URL: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33458.pdf. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid.

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Although US has to pay $ 17,500 to CARs as compared to $7,200 to Pakistan for its per supply56, Washington prefers NDN as security, political and weather conditions are harsh in Pakistan for the NATO supplies to Afghanistan. Another deal has been done between the USA and CARs for the provision of reverse transit facility to NATO and ISAF forces from Afghanistan to Europe. This agreement not only brings further monetary benefits to the regional states but also makes US more dependent on CARs. Besides receiving $500 per year from the US in the wake of NDN supplies, CARs are blatantly committing human rights violations in their authoritarian regimes.

The west especially the US, which criticized Karimov regime for civilian killings including children and women by security forces in Andijon in 2005, are least critical of Central Asian regimes now.57 Pentagon says that “Andijon massacre was passé. It’s gone, got over it.”58 US, under the umbrella of the Central Asian Counter- narcotics Initiatives (CACI) a plan with a sum of $ 4.1 million to combat drugs trafficking in the region, wants to establish its centers in all the Central Asian states. However, both Russia and China suspect this move as the deployment of semi- military forces of the US in this region.59 This agency may be used for spying as well on the pattern of Black Water in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Besides rent for NDN supplies, US have given millions of dollars assistance to the CARs to train their militaries and security forces to combat terrorism and drugs trafficking. For example, during 2002, this amount was US Dollars 188 million which reached to US Dollars 247 million in 2010.60 US have also proposed to establish military training centers in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan that have estimated costs of $ 17.5 million.61 The US sponsored military exercise ‘Exercise Regional Cooperation

56 Deirdre Tynan, “Central Asia: Who’s the Big Winner in the NDN Sweepstates?” Eurasisnet, 7th February 2012. URL: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64969. 57Jeffery Mankoff, “The US and Central Asia After 2014”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2013, p.4. 58 Paul Quinn-Judge, Op. Cit., p.62. 59 Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse, Op. Cit., p.40. 60 Jim Nichol, Op. Cit., 61 Deirdre Tynam, “Kyrgyzstan: US Intends to Construct Military Training Center in Batkan”, Eurasisnet, 3rd march 2010. URL: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav062309b.sthml.

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10’ was conducted in Tajikistan where other CARs also participated. Major focus of these exercises was the collective regional responses to terrorism.

The US military and economic aid was extended to CARs especially Uzbekistan in order to contain the Russian influences and for the improvement of common man’s life. It nevertheless proved a source of wealth for the president and his cronies, and thus, provided valid grounds to political Islam to declare US as the enemy of Islam and people of Central Asia. They propagate that this (US) aid is to further strengthen the ‘un-Islamic’ regime of Uzbekistan. They claim that the US support to CARs to counter-terrorism is nothing but a cooperation of Dar-ul-Kufr and modern Jahiliya against Islam.

7.15. Challenges and Cooperation from Competing World Orders

As discussed earlier, the world orders engaged in Central Asia have convergence as well divergence of interests. The New Great Game being played in the region is generally attributed to the competition between great powers to secure their energy interests in the region. This competition had led to rivalries among these states and all these great powers try to influence the CARs through different means. However, their interests always converge when it comes to the matter of Islamic order in Central Asia. These powers support the initiatives taken by any of the regional or global state to combat Islamism in the region.

CARs want that US must stay in Afghanistan for a longer period of time because their security is better served due to US military presence in the region. They fear that once US forces leave Afghanistan and Central Asia, militants from Afghanistan and even within Central Asia would re-surface and may create a security dilemma for CARs like 1999 and 2000 incursions by the IMU. The US stay in Afghanistan has engaged the Central Asian militants beyond the region in Afghanistan and Pakistan and now in Iraq. CARs think that if the US forces leave Afghanistan, the militants would use it as base for their actions in Central Asia. Moscow, however, does not want a prolonged stay of US forces in the region especially in Central Asia. The Russian Slavic and the

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Chinese Sinic Orders have asked the Western liberal order to vacate the Manas base in Kyrgyzstan.

From the forum of SCO in 2005, these orders along with the Residual Socialist order asked US to give a timeframe to vacate the Manas base. However, the matter was resolved between Kyrgyzstan and the USA. Again in 2009, Kyrgyz president Bakaev asked USA to vacate the Manas base as Russia pledged to give $ 2 billion in aid and grants to Bishkek. A substantial portion of that proposed aid had to be invested in the completion of Kambarate-1 Dam. Washington reacted swiftly and announced to triple the rent of Manas base which reached up to $60 million per annum. Besides, increasing the rent of Manas base, the USA extended $170 million in aid to Bishkek as well.62

Russia wants to establish NATO/CSTO connections but USA is reluctant in doing so. It thinks that CSTO is a weak organization which is not capable to resolve the regional issues and its desire to become a regional hegemon is not acceptable to the USA. USA supports anti-narcotics initiatives through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) which falls in the highest security assistance category to Central Asia. Through OCO, the US wants to curtail the narcotics trafficking in the region which is believed to be carried out by militant organizations especially IMU besides criminal groups. Through counter-narcotics initiatives, the US and the regional governments including Russia and China want to curb the finances of militant political Islamic organizations.

General Lloyd Austin stated that “initiatives will be tailored to transform our current limited transnational-based relationships into more constructive cooperative exchanges based on common interests and focused on training and equipping them (CARs) to conduct more effective (counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation and counter narcotics) operations.”63 For this purpose, Washington also coordinates with Beijing and Moscow besides CARs. There are reports that there has been an

62 Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: US Armed Forces to Remain at Airbase for Afghan Resupply Operations”,Eurasianet, 22nd June 2009. URL: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav062309b.sthml. 63 Jim Nichol, Op. Cit.,

229 intelligence sharing between China and the US regarding militant Islamists. Although, Western liberal Order has competition with Slavic and Sinic orders in Central Asia, it has to cooperate with the two in order to integrate CARs politically and economically at international level. The US interests cannot be pursued in Central Asia without the help of Beijing and Moscow, who have a lot of influence on CARs.

Analysis

The possible US drawdown from Afghanistan may trigger internal rivalries among the Central Asian states which are on the same page on the subject of terrorism.64 The Central Asian states are ‘confused’ regarding the US withdrawal from Afghanistan after 2014. They want the US forces to remain in Afghanistan for a longer period, as the continued deployment of the US forces in Afghanistan will provide security assurance to the Central Asia regimes against terrorists’ infiltration from the former, especially into Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. However, the regional security apparatus has failed so far to bring stability in the region.

The international cooperation against the Islamic order in Central Asia along with the international issue of the broader Muslim world, are the key tools of political Islam to propagate anti-regime sentiments. Close relations of the CARs with those states which are involved in the killing of Muslims is projected as “grand International Conspiracy” against Islam by political Islam. Close relations of CARs and Israel are also projected as evil by the Islamists. They claim that all these (anti-Islam) powers are engaged to eliminate Islam from the region. The human rights abuse by the CARs regimes and the criminal neglect by the western powers is also criticized by the Islamists. David Lewis’s statement that “the calculations of Uzbekistan leaders that the US would overlook abuses in exchange for military cooperation proved to be correct”65 proved correct when Secretary of States Ms. Clinton visited Tashkent and lowered her tone regarding human rights violations in Uzbekistan.

64Jeffery Mankoff, Op. Cit., p.2. 65 David Lewis, The Temptation of Tyranny in Central Asia, (London: Hurst, 2008,) p.16.

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In the wake of Andijon massacre, the SCO summit of July 2005 declared that every region and every state has its own parameters of human rights and civil liberties which are different from other societies; therefore, others must respect the social values and sovereign equality of all the other nations.66 This was a clear message to international community as well as to those states which were critical of human rights violations not only by Uzbek regime but also the CIS and SCO states. Political Islam considers Residual Socialist, Sinic, Slavic and Liberal world orders to be on the same page as far as human rights violations, political oppression and religious persecution are concerned.

The New Great Game has strengthened the autocratic and authoritative Central Asian regimes. The ‘national interest’ of the powers involved in the region has forced the western regimes to close their eyes to human rights conditions. According to Stephen Blank, ‘Central Asia has become a cockpit not only of terrorism and of a renewed great game, but also of ideological contestations’.67 Frederick Starr describes the New Great Game in these words, “as US and European pressure increased in the area of democratization and human rights, both Russia and china were able to dangle before Tashkent alliances based on a less rigorous standard in these areas, yet promising greater rewards than were forthcoming from Washington. Both were pursuing long- term strategic objectives, which they could present a less threatening to Tashkent than the US preoccupations.”68

Political Islamist groups, especially IMU, IJU and Jandul Ansarullah etc. “will keep NATO/US forces engaged in Afghanistan for a longer period of time in order to legitimize their activities not only in Afghanistan but in Central Asia as well”69 says Rahimullah Yousafzai, a renowned analyst and expert on terrorism. However, US withdrawal from Afghanistan and possibly from Central Asia without a triumph in the

66 Sergei Blagov, “The Geopolitical Balance in Central Asia Tilts towards Russia”, Eurasia Insight, 6th July 2005. URL: www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp070905.shtml. Accessed on 24 March 2010. 67 John Heathershaw, “World Apart: the making and Remaking of Geopolitical Space in the US- Uzbekistani Strategic Partnership”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2007, p.126. 68 Frederick S. Starr, “Introduction” in John C. K. Daly, Kurt H. Meppen, Vladimir Socor, and S. Frederick Starr, eds. Anatomy of a crisis: US-Uzbekistan Relations, 2001-2005, Cambridge: Silk Road paper, Central Asia-Cacasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, February 2006, pp. 11-12. 69 Author’s interview with the respondent in Peshawar on 09/01/2010.

231 war on terrorism will strengthen the hands of violent groups propagating political Islam in Central Asia.

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CONCLUSION

There exists an intellectual vacuum throughout the Muslim World due to which the issues of different yet competing versions of political Islam remain unaddressed. Not even a single variant of Islam has been developed to date by the Muslim World which is wholly acceptable to the international community. Majority of the Muslim states face severe socio-economic and political issues in the form of social and economic inequalities and authoritarian regimes. The local and societal issues together with international political issues have given rise to terrorism which seems to be one variant of transnational political Islam. Today’s political Islam can be divided into static Islam and transnational Islam. At times both of them compete with each other but they also tend to cooperate at the other time. A similar pattern can be observed in Central Asia where HTI, IMU, IRPT, IJU and ETIM in Xinxiang and Chechens in Russia compete and cooperate with each other to achieve their vested interests.

Central Asian region is a mixture of different civilizations and cultures of the world. Although, Islam remained an integral part of Central Asian political and social life, people of modern Central Asia do not want to establish states based on Sharia. However, they really want a change in their life style where they can have easy access to the basic necessities of life. They want a corruption free society where social justice prevails. All the people regardless of their ethnic, regional, religious and clan affiliation must be provided with the equal opportunities. The case in Central Asia is different where except Kyrgyzstan, which has a democratic set up, all the other regional states are authoritative. A major factor for the support to political Islam’s appeal is the negation of justice in Muslim societies1. Therefore, what Fuller says about the authoritative regimes in the Muslim world seems accurate. He says the most powerful alternative to many of the autocratic Muslim regimes is Islamization.2 As real secular opposition ceases to exist in the region, the underground opposition in the form of political Islam has continued to attract the mass support.

1 Jason Burke, “Al-Qaeda Today and the Real Roots of Terrorism”, Terrorism Monitor, 12/2/04, p.2. 2 Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003,) p.15.

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The destruction of Soviet socialist system brought massive economic disasters to the Central Asian region. During the Soviet era, all the Central Asian states had high literacy rate but when they got independence, many of these literate people lost their jobs which brought acute economic hardships for them. Hyperinflation and corruption reached at the peak but the regimes were busy in consolidation of powers. This led to the dissatisfaction among the common people and some of them especially the youth tilted towards political Islam. Islam Karimov declares three major reasons for the rise of political Islam in the region; Soviet policies towards religion, national and ethnic identities and the changed socio-economic and political conditions after independence.3

Many of the young men who joined political Islam earn a handsome salary from their groups. More than half of the Uzbek population is less than 25 years of age.4 Most of them are unemployed male who are a natural force for regime’s criticism. One report by the Radio Free Europe suggests that at least one of the Islamists groups operating in Tajikistan illegally offers almost fifteen hundred US Dollars to the new recruits;5that is very attractive for the unemployed and poor youth. Similar stories are heard about other states of Central Asia.

Islamists across the entire region as well as stationed in Pak-Afghan borders region have no nationality. They cooperate with each other for a broader agenda which is not confined to a state, region or locality. Tajik National Security Council’s head Amirkul Azimov stated that “they (Islamists) are stateless people who are out to destabilize the situation”.6

3 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan at the Threshold of Twenty First Century, (Massachusetts: N.K., 1998,) pp.23-24. 4 United Nations, Uzbekistan: Common Country Assessment, Tashkent: UN Office Uzbekistan, 2003, p.9. 5 Bruce Pannier, “The Growing Threat of Militants in A Corner of Central Asia”, Radio Free Europe, 23rd April 2011. URL:http://www.refrl.org/content/militants_growing_threat_is_corner_of_central_asia/9503283.htmi. Access date 23rd March 2012. 6 Ibid.

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IMU claims that repressive policies of the Uzbek regime “give people the right to replace this evil by force”.7 This is not the case of Uzbekistan only. The Tajik regime has banned all the people less than 18 years of age to attend the worship places. Similarly, the Kazakh regime has banned offering of prayers in the governmental offices. It has issued a notification to re-register the religious organizations in Kazakhstan. These acts of the Central Asian regimes are considered as inhuman and against the religious freedoms by human rights organizations. Being the Muslim majority region, majority of the common people is also critical to such policies. The so called ‘secular’ policies of the states have not only been challenged by the unofficial Islamic groups but also by some of the official religious figures. For example the central mosque of Almaty declared New Year’s Eve celebration contradictory to Kazakh traditions. Similarly Tajik state mufti declared these (celebrations) as “contradictory to the laws of Islam.”8

The institutionalized corruption in Uzbekistan may help the IMU to bribe the border security officials in order to penetrate into the Uzbek territories. It can go for suicide bombing which it has learned as a tactic from the international militant organizations especially al-Qaeda. The fragile borders of Central Asia, especially Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan may be used for this purpose. For example as stated by the interim government of Otanbayeva and Russian analysts that the Islamists from IMU and the ex-militants of IRPT were involved in the ethnic violence of 2010 in Osh and Jalalabad regions in Kyrgyzstan.9 These incursions from Tajik-Kyrgyz territory will definitely trigger animosity among the regional states as it did during the 1999 and 2000 incursions of the IMU.

7 “Militant Islamic Group Serves Ultimatum on Uzbekistan from Iran”, Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor, 1999, vol. 5. 26th March 1999. URL: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=12817&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=2 13&no_cache=1#.VJ4xpYLaA. Access date 25th March 2009. 8 Anna Nemtsova, “Islamists Crack Down on New Year’s eve in Central Asia Caucasus”, The Daily Best, 8 January 2010. URL: http://www.thedailybest.com/articles/2012/01/08/islamists-crack-down- on-new-years-eve-in-central-asia-cacasus.html. Access date 23rd March 2012. 9 “Dr Heathershaw on Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan”, 10th May 2011, URL: http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/115016/-jtw-interview-dr-heathershaw-on-central-asia-and- kyrgyzstan.html. Access date 24th March 2012.

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Almost all the undemocratic and authoritarian states of the Muslim world declare their political opponents as extremists and even terrorists.10 In the opinion of Oliver Roy, the female suicide bombing (of 2004 in Tashkent) is the direct result of harsh treatment to their close relatives who are charged with terrorism. Most of these suicide bombers are the close relatives of the deceased family members at the hands of the security forces. Therefore, to claim foreign hand in these bombings in not fair.11 Similarly, the US Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, analyzed that two things contribute towards terrorism and extremism in Central Asia. First is poverty while the second is the state repression.12 The authorities, on the other hand claim that state is not against Islam but it is against those people who want to spread chaos and anarchy in the society. The head of the Uzbek Religious Affairs Committee, Shazim Munawarov told Vitaly Naumkin in an interview that we do not hate clergy. We accommodate even those mullahs who return from the Middle East and Near East in mosques and help them to find jobs.

Radical Islam in Central Asia manifests a society’s response to the accumulated injustices of severely authoritarian rule.”13 “Good governance is perceived as a challenge to the existing political order in Central Asia.”14 In an interview to Ahmad Rashid, a couple of locals from Hoit, a small village in Garam valley in Tajikistan where Namangani was settled said that they witnessed many Uzbeks visiting Namangani and urging him to fight against the Karimov regime because they are fed

10 Graham Fuller and Jonathan N. Lipman, “Islam in Xinjiang”, in Frederick Starr, ed. Xinjiang: The China’s Muslim Borderland, (New York: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004) p. 340. 11 Bruice Pannier, “Uzbekistan: Karimov Elaborates on Recent Attacks, Criticizes West: Radio Free Europe/Radio Library, 30th April 2004. URL: www.rferl.org/featuresartocleprint/2004/04/f9c2f480- 2764-4463-ae16-0d3c7b99. 12 Jacquelyn K. Davis and Michael J. Sweeney, Central Asia in U.S Strategy and Operational Planning: Where Do We Go From Here? (Washington D.C.: Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis, 2004,) p. ii. 13 Eric McGlinchy, “Autocrats, Islamists, and the Rise of Radicalism in Central Asia”, Current History, October 2005, p.342. 14 Alison Roy, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structure and Regimes’ Security in Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 2, p.189.

236 up of Karimov’s repression and atrocities.15 And now many nationals have joined the IMU to create Islamic state(s) in the region including Pakistan and Afghanistan.

In Tajikistan opposition is ineffective due to its disorganization. Saimiddin Dustov has rightly analyzed the Tajik opposition by stating that ‘the real Tajik opposition is disorganized, and thus ineffective.’16 So far elections in Tajikistan are concerned, opposition political parties like Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan (SDPT) are critical to the election results and the findings given by certain governmental sponsored observers especially from CIS and SCO. According to SDPT leader, Rakhmatillo Zoyirov ‘they (CIS and SCO observers) do not observe the elections, but spend their time being wined and dined by the representatives of governmental structure.’17 And he is right because most of the members of these two powerful regional organizations do not or have controlled democracy.

In Kazakhstan two important Islamic groups operate. These include Nurcu and Fetullah Gulen. Both of these groups focus mainly on individual ‘journey of rediscovery of Islam’.18 Major focus of these groups is modernization through education. A close study of these groups reveals that they are closer to the Jadid movement during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, despite the efforts of these groups to modernize the Kazakh society, there are strong evidences that HTI is gaining strength in Kazakhstan especially in the south. The number of the unofficial or unregistered mosques in Southern Kazakhstan especially in the villages has increased substantially.

Not only HTI but other shadow groups like Jandul Khilafah (soldiers of khilafah) and Ansar Din operate in Kazakhstan. The later issued a Fatwa on the internet that Kazakhstan is Dar-ul-Harb and the Kazakh people must migrate to Caucasus and

15 Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002,) pp. 143-44. 16 Rukhsona Ibraghimova, “It’s Tough for the Opposition Parties to break into Parliament”, Central ASIA ONLINE, 4TH JANUARY 2010. URL: CENTRALASIAONLINE.COM/EN_GB/ARTICLES/CAII/FEATURES/MAIN/2010/01/04/FEATUR ES-01? CHANGE_LOCALE=TRUE. 17 Ibid. 18 Mariya Y. Omelicheva, “Islam in Kazakhstan: A survey of contemporary trends and sources of securitization”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 30, No. 2. 2011. P. 247.

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Afghanistan in order to strengthen their brethren especially in Afghanistan who will introduce Islamic laws in Afghanistan and later in Central Asia.19

During his address to the nation in 2005, Nazarbaev stated that “terrorism, political instability and religious extremism are the gravest threats of the twentieth century and serious obstacles to the economic, social and political modernization of the country. Nursultan Nazarbaev has stated time and again that ‘evolution not the revolution’20 is the key to success for CARs.

Although the activities of IMU have mainly been controlled by the regimes, shadow groups are still operating in Central Asia. One such group is the Jandul Khilafah, (soldiers of Khilafah). This group wants to introduce Khilafah in the region. During 2011 and 2012, minor scaled terror acts have been carried out by this group in southern Kyrgyzstan as well as Kazakhstan including Atyrau, Taraz, and Almaty.21 This group has issued statements regarding the ban on prayers in governmental offices and headscarves. The group has stated that the Kazakh authorities are following the footprints of North African dictators like Zain-ul-Abidin of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. The results of such policies may be the same like in North Africa.22

According to Abdul Karim Abib Kazimov, the deputy chairman of the National Security Committee, the group is based in Pak-Afghan border region. The group has issued a statement in December 2011 which says “it (Jandul Khilafah) reminds Muslims of their duty to revive the Islamic Caliphate system in future…we believe that the region of Central Asia, in addition to the Islamic Maghrab (North Africa) and Yemen, are candidates to be nucleus for the return of the Caliphate system in future.”

19 Jacob Zenn, “Kazakh Jihadists Intensify Internet Propaganda”, Central Asia Caucasus |Analyst, 22nd August 2012. URL: www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5793. Access date 23rd December 2012. 20 Georgiy Voloshin, “Kazakhstan Economic Proposals reveal fear About Political Instability”, Central Asia Caucuses Analyst, 13th June 2012. URL: www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5793. Access date 28th June 2012. 21 Jacob Zenn, Ibid. 22 Ibid.

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It also stated to “overthrow the tyrant”23 pointing towards Nazarbayev’s regime. The first ever suicide attacks in Kazakhstan has been carried out by this group.

Kazakh government is facing a new kind of threat from the Islamists. Some of the Kazakhs have gone to Syria to fight against Bashar al-Assad regime. There are reports that some of them have returned to Kazakhstan and are carrying out their underground activities. They are recruiting new fighters for Syria. On their return to home after Syrian conflict is over, there are chances that these militants may start insurgency in Kazakhstan. Moreover, as Kazakhstan has abundance of hydrocarbons, IS and other political Islamists (maybe) in the form of coalition between IS and IMU+ETM may try to occupy or at least disrupt the supply to China and Russia and then to international markets. Rakhat Sulemanov, spokesperson of the Kyrgyz interior ministry admits that growing phenomenon of IS in Kyrgyzstan and says that government is taking serious measures in this regard. Igor Shestakov, a political analyst from Bishkek says that “ISIL aims to destabilize Central Asia and is trying to build a Caliphate in the region.”24

The rise of political Islam in Central Asia has emerged not only due to the socio- economic, political and regional and international issues but also due to the “local grievances, challenges and conflicts.”25 Ethnic and inter-ethnic relationship play very important role in the political matters of Central Asia. The ethnic division and inter- ethnic rivalries also count for the rise of Political Islam in Central Asia. These ethnic groups try to get support not only from their own communities but from those communities which have the similar problems with the dominating ethnicities. This situation has even been realized by Islam Karimov himself. He says that ethnic groups appeal to the emotions of the society. The dangerous phenomenon about these groups is that they ‘exclude political wisdom and common sense’26 from those who

23 Ibid. 24 Askar Sultanov, “Kyrgyzstan Crackdowns on ISIL, Central Asia online, 20th November 2014. URL: www.cewntralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/chronicles/2014/11/20/feature-01 25 Anna Munster, “Transnational Islam in Russia and Crimea”, Russia and Eurasia Program, November 2014, p.18. 26 Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan at The Threshold of Twenty First Century, (Massachusetts: N.K., 1998,) p.15.

239 support them. In a multiethnic society where state should follow a balanced policy, the Central Asian regimes, however, follow an exactly opposite policy; where rival ethnic and regional groups have been marginalized.

Karimov says that uneven socio-economic and political development in different states and regions of Central Asia has put a negative impact on the interethnic relationship in the region.27 This uneven development is being exploited by the terrorists who want to divide the Uzbek society on ethnic lines. One of the basic reasons for the political Islam’s popularity in southern Kyrgyzstan is the ethnic division between Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz. Ethnic Uzbeks, although constitute a substantial portion of Kyrgyz population, they have to face an indifferent attitude by the government. The ethnic clashes of 2010 in Osh and Jalalabad were the outcome of such indifferent attitude.

Izzatillah Rakhmatillaev, a human rights activist from Osh says “they (Kyrgyz) have very rude attitude towards ethnic Uzbeks. They consider us a second grade citizen. This indifferent attitude does not prevail only in the political sphere but everywhere. The social life of Kyrgyz is different from Uzbeks. Uzbeks face severe hardships in finding jobs or starting a new business. We have our own Mohallahs (neighborhood) and they have their own. There is very limited interaction between the two ethnicities.”28 Ethnic Uzbeks feel insecurity because they compose a very limited proportion of the Kyrgyz governmental services. “Ethnic Uzbeks are underrepresented in the government jobs. Most of the security officials in south Kyrgyzstan are ethnic Kyrgyz. This situation has given room to political Islam especially HTI and to a lesser extent Jandul Khilafah to penetrate the Kyrgyz society.”29

It has been reported that majority of the members of these organizations are ethnic Uzbeks. These allegations seem to be true as Melsi Myrzakmatov, Osh mayor stated after the 2010 violence that ethnic Uzbeks must realize their sub-ordinate position.

27 Ibid. p.47. 28 Authors interview with the respondent on 21st January 2013. 29 Authors interview with the respondent on 21st January 2013.

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They must accept it and should live with the reality.30 Durdona, another resident of Osh says that “we have no security in Osh. State does not protect our interests. Young Uzbeks are really disenchanted with the official policies. It may lead us to any of the alternatives”31 and one of the alternatives may be an Islamic state.

The Kyrgyz interior ministry spokesman, Joldoshbek Busurmankulov, stated about HTI that “I do not think that we will live 20 years without any HTI, if we give them 30-40 years of imprisonment or arrest all of them. It will not work. I think we may have fight through the alternative ways, different methods. We should prove them destructiveness. We should fight for the hearts and minds of the people.”32 This approach sounds good because according to Anatoli Vasilyevich Lunacharski the religion is like a nail; the more you hit it the more it goes deeper.33 Same phenomenon fits on Central Asian situation. Martha Brill Olcott in a testimony to the US Congress declared that regimes in Central Asia are highly repressive and intolerant towards religion. There is no distinction between “religious activists, religious extremists, and Islamic terrorists.” Having a beard or wearing an Islamic dress code is enough for the security personnel to put a person behind the bars.34

Despite the growing threats of political Islam in the region, prospects for its success in the near future seem to be not encouraging. The internal rivalries and differences among the political Islam in the region have brought it at the back foot. The differences between HTI and IMU are prominent. IRPT is also very critical towards both of them. The formers accuse IRPT as being pro-regime and not sincere to the cause of Islam. Said Abdullah Noori, IRPT leader stated that “HTI does not have a right to operate in Tajikistan, from the point of view of Sharia as well as laws. There is already a religious party in Tajikistan and thus, there is no need for the establishment of another similar party. From the legal point of view, this group is not

30 International Crises Group, “Kyrgyzstan: Widening Ethnic Division in the Street: Executive Summery and Recommendation”, Asia Report No. 222. 29th March 2012, p. i. 31 Authors interview with the respondent on 24th August 2013. 32 Maria Omelicheva, “Combatting Terrorism in Central Asia; Explaining Differences in States’ Responses to Terror”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2007, pp.374-75. 33 Pervez Iqbal Khan, “Central Asia: Turmoil in Transition”, Central Asian Journal, No. 4, Summer 1997, p.119. 34 www.house.gov/international_relations/108/90361/pdf, pp.55-56.

241 registered and does not have a right to operate in Tajikistan. We treat it as an illegal party.”35 Despite this criticism, HTI’s popularity is on increase because “Central Asian population has no option but to join HTI” in order to express their opposition to the regimes, says Rahimullah Yousafzai36, renowned analyst.

Ban on independent religious education has forced many of the independent religious schools to go underground. Same happened during the Soviet era. These underground religious schools are a kind of breeding grounds for the Islamic extremism and terrorism in the region. In an interview to International Crisis Group (ICG), a religious leader from Uzbekistan stated that “if the negative tendencies in our society do not stop, and corruption, unemployment continue to grow, and the police continue to terrorize people, then in the place of state organs, underground anti-state structures will begin to emerge. This will happen not today, but when young people, who have passed through underground education in the humiliating conditions of suppression of Islam, and children, whose fathers sit in prison, mature politically. Then an explosive situation will arise.”37 The situation which exploded right after the independence when young men who got education in underground religious schools during the Soviet times clashed with state in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Role of external powers which are involved in the region for the rise of political Islam cannot be negated. Support of big powers to the autocratic and repressive regimes of the region have provided political Islam with a legacy to declare that Dar-ul-Harb is planning to destabilize and imperialize Dar-ul-Islam. Political Islam exploits the negative role of big powers towards broader international issues of the Muslim world. It claims that although US is champion of democracy, it supports non-democratic regimes in Central Asia. US-Uzbek close relations are considered as an alliance against religion and religious communities in Uzbekistan. Russia’s support to authoritarianism in Central Asia and its repressive policies towards the Muslims of

35 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Political Islam in Central Asia: The Challenge of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, (London: Routledge,) 2010, p.99. 36 Author’s interview with the respondent in Peshawar on 09/01/2010. 37 International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: Islam and the State”, ICG Asia Report Number 59, 2003, p.12. URL; http://crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1442&1=1. Access date 13th April 2009.

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Chechnya and other Muslim regions have also created discomfort among the common Muslims of Central Asian region.

Cooperation among different world orders against Islamic world order in Central Asia has its own positive as well as negative impacts. Russia’s support to the regional governments in order to combat political Islam has sowed the seeds of hatred towards Russia. Ban on HTI and IMU by Moscow demonstrates that Russia would not let political Islam to penetrate its territory from the Central Asian region as it already faces secessionist movements in some of its Muslim majority regions. China follows the similar footprints of Russia in pursuance of its policy towards political Islam not only in Central Asia but in the broader neighboring region. Having roots of political Islam in Xinjiang in the form of East Turkestan Movement (ETIM), Beijing cannot afford support to ETIM from its neighboring states including Central Asia. Central Asia has immense importance in combating ETIM because Uighurs have historical ties with their ethnic and religious brethren in Central Asia. Any social, political and religious development in Central Asia affects Uighurs of Xinjiang. Hence, rise of political Islam in Central Asia is considered as a considerable threat to Xinjiang by Beijing.

The regional as well as global powers have taken certain measures in order to combat political Islam in the region. These measures include bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements in this regard. Most important of them are; combating ‘separatism, extremism and terrorism’ under the umbrella of SCO and regional security measures taken by CIS. Two counter-terror measures in the form of RATS and CSTO under these two regional organizations have been established. US has used Central Asian air and military bases in OEF against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and still operates Manas base in Kyrgyzstan for its operations in Afghanistan. Recent use of the Central Asian routes under Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to transport NATO/ISAF military equipment to Afghanistan has provided political Islam another ground to oppose the regimes.

These agreements by the regional states with regional and super powers are projected as a ‘conspiracy against the Muslims and Islam’ by political Islamists. Rahimullah

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Yousafzai says that “all the stake holders involved in Afghanistan and Central Asia must agree upon a sort of terms and conditions”38 not only to bring peace and stability in the region but for reconstruction of Afghanistan as well. States, which are unofficial champions of political Islam, are also very much active there. Their support to political Islamist groups through intermediaries has facilitated and strengthened political Islam in Central Asia. All these elements have sowed the seeds of hatred towards regimes and many of the people look towards religion as a salvation force.

Nexus between IMU and other jihadis may bring hazard to Central Asian social, cultural and political lives. Strong and stable Central Asia is not only a key to success for the region but for the whole world as instability in Central Asia especially in Afghanistan has hindered the broad cooperation between half of the world’s population. Islam Karimov has rightly pointed that ‘peace, tranquility and wellbeing” are the keys to economic and political stability of the region “and we should not forget our responsibility to future generation.”39 Regimes must support and reinitiate Sufism and Jadedism in the region. These two Islamic ideologies can surely bring tolerance and pluralism in Central Asia. However, until and unless states do not focus on provision of social justice, political Islamism will continue to operate in Central Asia.

38 Author’s interview with the respondent in Peshawar on 09/01/2010. 39 Islam Karimov, Op. Cit., p.3.

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