PIRACY AS A MANIFESTATION OF STATE FAILURE: A historical context for Somali piracy and its suppression Sarah-Letetia Craze ORC ID: 0000-0002-4424-7000 This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Arts at the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne. 20 December 2018 FINAL 1 School of Historical and Philosophical Studies THESIS DECLARATION I declare that: 1 The thesis comprises only my own work. 2 Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used. 3 The length of the thesis is 86,503 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, graphs, bibliographies, and appendices. Sarah-Letetia Craze ii ABSTRACT This thesis establishes the Somali piracy epidemic of 2008-12 as a conflict between how Somalis perceived their own sovereign authority and the rules of centralised state norms established by the international community. I argue that as the dominant force in the conflict, the international community’s efforts to apply these rules was complicated by the re-emergence of historic contradictions between the need for immediate deterrence of pirates and the long-term objectives for piracy suppression. The criminalised war economy that grew out of the Somali state’s collapse in 1991 strengthened the Somalis’ historic cultural tradition of equating wealth with respect, a prime motivator for piracy. However, while ‘state failure’ provided a convenient explanation for the harsh reality of life in Somalia, it ignored the Somalis agency in their post-state collapse state-building efforts. The international community’s ignorance of the state-like authoritative constructs Somalis had built for themselves, especially in Puntland, meant the incomplete ‘state failure’ narrative fed the UN’s decision to suppress Somali piracy. Historically, ship-owners and merchants always want states to protect their trade from pirates without controlling it, but states were disinclined to sponsor any large-scale naval intervention against pirates unless faced with considerable economic or national security threats. This created a divergence of interests in the piracy’s suppression that had the effect of dispersing the power to stop it. This situation occurred again in response to Somali piracy. Merchants and ship-owners took the path of deterrence: using self-protective measures to avoid pirates, such as arming ships or resolving hijack iii situations as quickly as possible, by paying ransoms. The UN took the suppression path of naval intervention, prosecution, and land-based initiatives. For all stakeholders, this proved a highly complicated, expensive, and problematic task. Somali piracy suppression became more an expression of state prestige than an effective suppression of piracy. For the UN though, Somali piracy exposed an entrenched, mutual distrust between the Somalis and the international community that had fed their neglect of Somalis since the mid-1980s. The demise of the Somali piracy epidemic is commonly attributed to the international community’s naval patrols and the use of armed guards. Eventually, the efforts by successive presidents in Puntland to stop young men from turning to piracy gained the UN’s attention. Today, Somalia is moving from failed state to fragile nation. With international assistance, Somalis endeavour to exert sufficient sovereign authority over individuals and protect their own fishing waters for foreign interlopers despite a cultural ambivalence to the criminality of piracy. The question still remains whether the pirates are gone for good. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my supervisor A/Prof Richard Pennell for his invaluable assistance, support and comments on this thesis since my commencement in 2012. This topic is rather alien to the University of Melbourne and Australia in general, so I recognise the rarity of the opportunity to pursue an African-oriented project that ties in so many fascinating aspects of history, international relations, law, and criminality. Richard has proved a steadfast advocate for my academic career and I appreciate this immensely. I also appreciate the support of my co-supervisor A/Prof Kate McGregor, particularly in undertaking a full thesis review while on her holiday. I will stop feeling bad about that sometime in the next decade. I also must acknowledge Cyrus Mody of the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre and Richard Searle of the University of Melbourne’s Bailleau Library for assisting in the acquisition of piracy reports. The staff at the Law Library also provided helpful assistance navigating online databases for old treaties and laws, reaffirming my belief that everything is on the internet somewhere if you look hard enough. The kindness of Mohammed Haji Ingiriis, PhD Candidate at Oxford University in assisting me with the Somali-oriented aspects of my research has grown into a mutually beneficial academic relationship that I hope to continue. I also appreciate the assistance of Leith Campbell, Shannon Gune and Aroha Greenwood in reviewing v chapters in various incarnations. A big thank you to Roland Burke is due for providing a copy of his thesis to me. This thesis was supported by the Australian Government’s Research Training Program Scholarship (formerly the Australian Postgraduate Award). I also acknowledge the financial assistance of the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies in funding my 2013 conference trip the UK and my 2016 trip to Perth. The completion of six years of research, writing, and angst would not have been possible without the support of my partner Toby. I know my completion process brought back many unpleasant and long-suppressed memories of his own PhD completion and I greatly appreciate the years of patience and understanding he invested in me. Occasionally, our sons, Griffin and August ask how my ‘pirate book’ is going. Despite having a pirate expert for a mother, they remain resolutely disinterested in pirates. Don’t ever change boys. My sister Liz and my father David have proven steadfast in their support despite not really having any idea what I’m doing or complaining about. I also thank my friends, Tanya Forsyth, Ngaire Greenwood, Zoe Kristall, Melanie Ottens, Tash Schryvers, Corrie van Raaphorst and Danielle Young for their enthusiasm for my efforts over the years. Finally, I wish to dedicate this thesis to the memory of my mother, Elinor. Her presence in my life is missed every day. She was always the family’s historian and how I wish she could see how my love of history has blossomed through this process. vi ACRONYMS AMISOM African Union Mission to Somalia ARS Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia BMPs Best Management Practices CGPCS Contact Group for Piracy of the Coast of Somalia CJTF-HOA Combined Joint Taskforce – Horn of Africa DSA Danish Ship-owners Association EU European Union GFC Global Financial Crisis (2008) ICGS International Contact Group for Somalia ICU Islamic Courts Union (Somalia) IGAD Inter-governmental Authority on Development IMB-PRC International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre IMO International Maritime Organisation IUU Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (Fishing) JWC Joint War Committee (insurance) K&R Kidnap and Ransom (insurance) MIG Merchant International Group MSA Merchant Shipping Act (Kenya) SEMG Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia (UN) PACER Public Access to Court Electronic Records (USA) PCASP Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel PMPF Puntland Maritime Police Force RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade (weapon system) SCG Somaliland Coast Guard SHADE Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (naval group) SRSG Special Representative to the Secretary-General (UN) SSDF Somali Salvation Democratic Front (political group) TFG Transitional Federal Government (Somalia) TNI Indonesian National Armed Forces (Indonesian abbreviation) UAE United Arab Emirates UN United Nations UNCLOS United Nations Convention for the Law on the Sea UNOSOM I United Nations Operation in Somalia (1992) UNOSOM II United Nations Operation in Somalia (1993-5) USC United Somali Congress USA United States of America vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Declaration i Abstract ii Acknowledgements v Acronyms vii Maps, Tables, Graphs, Images and Charts xiii List of Appendices xvi INTRODUCTION 1 State failure as the ‘cause’ of Somali piracy: an incomplete explanation 7 Background to Somali piracy 12 The Somali piracy epidemic: 2008-12 16 The international community’s response 20 Chapter summary 23 Sources and methodology 25 PART I CHAPTER 1 39 Pirates and the history of sovereign authority The 1693 trial of the King James privateers 42 The historical basis of Oldish’s argument 44 Sovereign authority in the Caribbean 44 The power of sovereign allegiance: The Dunkirkers 47 Sovereign allegiance as a choice: the aftermath of the trial 49 Exerting sovereign authority over pirates: the problem of piracy suppression 52 viii Non-European sovereign authority 56 The expression of sovereign authority through the state 59 Piracy suppression as a tool of colonial expansion 61 The effect of the abolition of privateering on state development 62 Piracy and state sovereign authority: Maritime crime and piracy in the Malacca Strait 64 CHAPTER 2 69 The sovereign authority of Somali clans: (1840s – 2007) Pre-colonial Somali sovereign authority 72 The first Somali state-like entity: establishing British Somaliland by treaty 75 Italian treaties with the Somali clans 78 Mohammed Abdullah Hassan: The beginning of a nationalised Somali identity 80 Somali independence