IFS Info 6/1997

Robert G .. Patman

Securing Somalia

A Comparisollil of US am!! AWistll'aHcm IPeacekeepillilg oclmillilg the UIMITAf Operatiollil Note on the author ...... 4 Introduction ...... 5 The Disintegration of the Somali State ...... 5 International Intervention: A Mandate to Disarm or Not to Disarm? ...... 7 Cosmetic Disarmament in Mogadishu ...... 9 Active Disarmament in Baidoa ...... 14 A Comparative Assessment ...... 18 I. Mission definition ...... 18 2. Style of Peace Operations ...... 19 3. Cultural compatibility ...... 20 Conclusion ...... 21 Notes ...... 23

IFS Info 6/97 3 Note on the author

Or Robert G. Patman is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Otago in New Zealand. He is the author of The Soviet Union in the Horn of Adrica: the Diplomacy of lnten•emion and Disengagement (Cambridge University Press 1990) and has contributed with a number of book chapters, journal articles and media commentaries on internaional affairs.

The author gratefully acknowledges that the research undertaken for this study in Australia was supported by a public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC) Fellowship.

4 IFS lnfo 6/97 Introduction

The UN intervention in Somalia between 1992 and comparative analysis. The argument that emerges 1995 was one of the first substantial efforts to is that the absence of a consistent disarmament respond to a disturbing new trend in the current strategy in Somalia, not peace enforcement per se, era - the challenge of intra-state conflict. In 1992, condemned the UN operation to failure. If the US constant civil war and drought in Somalia had had positioned itself, like the Australians in Baidoa, combined to produce a catastrophic famine killing above the warlords instead of between them, the an estimated 300,000 people. 1 Unable to ameliorate picture for UN intervention in Somalia may have these conditions through UNOSOM I, a looked quite different. humanitarian assistance mission, the UN opted for drastic action. This consisted of two phases: The Disintegration of the Somali State UNITAF a US-led humanitarian intervention with limited enforcement powers; and UNOSOM II, a Somalia was a spectacular example of state UN-led humanitarian operation with extensive disintegration during the post-Cold War era. By the enforcement functions. While the existence of vast beginning of 1992, Somalia had dissolved into a amounts of weaponry in Somalia was closely Hobbesian "state of nature". A many-sided civil linked with the disorder and violence in the war had destroyed any vestiges of central authority country, US strategic planners focused on short­ in the country, and turned a severe drought into a term humanitarian need rather than the catastrophic famine. Moreover, around 70 percent prerequisites for long-term stability. Disarmament, of the country's livestock was lost and much of which is understood here as a process involving Somalia's farmland belt in the south was the reduction, removal or elimination of the means devastated. 3 of violence, 2 was not specifically written into The reasons for the failure of the Somali state UNITAF's mandate. The effects of this omission are complex ami widely misunderstood. On the one became clear in Mogadishu when UNOSOM II's hand, a number of commentators have attributed belated program of disarmament encountered the the demise of the Somali state to the overwhelming armed resistance of General Aideed's faction in impact of a "natural" disaster, the Somali famine of June !993. This confrontation eventually ended the 1991-92. On the other hand, some analysts who UN's experiment in peace-enforcement and led to saw politics rather than nature at the heart of the the humiliating withdrawal of UN troops and Somali crisis focused either on the divisive legacy personnel from Somalia on 2 March 1995. But the of the Si ad Barre dictatorship or on the destructive demise of the UN's first peace enforcement effects of abundant superpower weapons provided operation in a failed state was by no means during the Cold War. In reality, the Somali inevitable. In Baidoa, the Australian contingent in convulsion was not only shaped by both local and the international coalition achieved a remarkable international politics, but also by what one observer transformation in the security environment. It has called "structural impediments"~ to the involved, amongst other things, a policy of active formation of a centralised Somali state. disarmament. Historically, the notion of Somali statehood is The purpose of this article is to explore the relatively new. Prior to independence in July 1960, dynamics and linkages between "micro the Somalis did not have a cohesive state. As a disarmament" and the process of political nation of mainly pastoral nomads, the Somalis reconciliation in Somalia. To do this, we will traditionally had a de-centralised political consider the disintegration of the Somali state, the community based on an extensive clan structure. contested nature of the UNITAF mandate, the Here political identity and loyalty was largely experiences of disarmament in Mogadishu and determined by clan affiliation or descent. By eking Baidoa and the lessons that may be learned from a out an existence in the arid planes of the Horn of

IFS lnfo 6/97 5 Africa, the Somali lifestyle was marked hy Congress, citing human rights violations by Siad's independence, assertive self-reliance and a general regime against rebels in northern Somalia, forced distrust of central government. the Bush government to suspend its military and From the time of Somalia's independence, the economic aid programme in Somalia. 9 Other clan­ persistence of clan politics frustrated the efforts of based opposition groups took up arms in southern central government in Mogadishu to build an and central Somalia. By I 990, the Si ad regime, enduring sense of Somali nationalism based on bereft of virtually all foreign aid, exercised only allegiance to the state. The task was complicated limited control over the regions surrounding by the fact that the boundaries of independent Mogadishu. Because of the civil war, the Somali Somalia did not fully correspond to the aspirations state had, in political and institutional terms, already of Somali nationalism. Over a million Somalis, collapsed before the final ousting of Si ad in living in French Somali land (later to become January 1991 by the United Somali Congress Djibouti), the Northern Frontier District of Kenya (USC). 111 Instead of heralding stability, the and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, were left overthrow of Si ad accelerated the process of outside the borders of the new state. Thus, from disintegration. The leaders of the USC, which drew the very beginning of its existence, Somalia sought its support from the Hawiye clans became to expand its boundaries so that they coincided absorbed in a bloody power struggle almost as with those of the "nation"-' This goal quickly soon as they had driven Siad from Mogadishu. The brought Mogadishu into conflict with all its USC military commander General Mohamed Farah neighbours. But if Pan Soma! ism encouraged Aideed, who played a key role in defeating Siad, 11 solidarity against external threats, it failed to erase refused to accept Ali Mahdi Mohamed as interim antagonism among Somalia's clans. In 1969, President of a new USC government. The struggle President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was also had a tribal dimension. Ali Mahdi's support assassinated in an apparent tribal dispute. Shortly base was in the Hawiye subclan, Ab gal, while afterwards, the military led by General Mohamed Aideed's backing derived from another Hawiye Si ad Barre seized power. Siad promised to unite the subclan, Habar Gidir. country through the doctrine of "scientific Fighting was not limited to Mogadishu but socialism". 0 spread chaos and starvation throughout southem Using Somalia's strategic location as a pawn in Somalia. As well as the confrontation between the the Cold War, Siad exploited superpower rivalry to heavily armed factions of Aideed and Ali Mahdi, maximise aid for his dictatorship. Alliances were there was fierce fighting involving these groups formed tlrst with the former Soviet Union and then and forces loyal to the Si ad regime led by Siad's with the US. Altogether, after 22 years in power, son-in-law General Siad Hersi Morgan. The the Siad regime had received more than US$1 intensity of the fighting was fuelled both by the billion worth of military aid and around $300 vast arms stockpile accumulated during the Cold million in economic assistance.7 Among the War and also a thriving local arms trade, partly armaments that went to the Siad government stimulated by the disbanding of the huge army of (along with training in how to use them) were the former Ethiopian dictator, Mengistu Haile recoilless rifles, armoured personnel carriers, Mariam, in 1991. 12 tanks, anti-aircraft guns, racket launchers and Alongside these relatively organised factional surface-to-air missiles-' In this way, Siad wars, looting, random killing and banditry was established the basis for a centralised state carried by gangs of Qat-chewing, armed teenagers, apparatus. The centrifugal tendencies of clan known as mOOI}'OOll. At the same time, drought, a politics were curbed through a combination of cyclical problem in Somalia, magnified the impact foreign aid-funded patronage and military coercion. of the man-made damage to the country. By 1992, Siad's dominance, however, diminished with the UN estimated a death toll of 300,000 from the decline of East-West rivalry. In I 989, the US starvation, while 400,000 Somalis sought refuge in

6 IFS In fa 6/97 Kenya and another 300,000 did the same in improve the security situation. Restrained by very Ethiopia." limited rules of engagement, the lightly-armed Meanwhile in northwest Somalia, the victorious Pakistanis were powerless to stop the looting or Somali National Movement (SNM) insurgents, secure the peace. confronted with virtual anarchy in the south, By late 1992, the collapse of central declared unilateral independence from Somalia in government authority was total. But the country's May !991. While the "Republic of Somali land" traditional clan structures, backed by a surfeit of failed to achieve any international recognition, it did modern weapons, had reasserted themselves with a attain a measure of stability and embarked upon a vengeance, dividing the capital, fragmenting the 1 process of political reconciliation. ' country and condemning thousands of Somalis to Despite the prolonged dissolution of the Somali death through starvation. While gun-ridden, state, the international response to the suffering it stateless Somalia represented a challenge for the occasioned was initially slow and ineffective. With UN, the organisation's traditional peace-keeping the heroic exception of the Red Cross and a response proved totally inadequate to the task. number of non-government relief organisations, Somalia was virtually abandoned in 1991 by the International Intervention: A Mandate international community. Citing security concerns, to Disarm or Not to Disarm? the foreign diplomatic community in Mogadishu led by the US embassy evacuated their entire Unable to reverse the trend of starvation and personnel. The UN and its specialised agencies disorder in Somalia, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the (UNICEF, UNHCR and WHO) followed suit. This new UN Secretary General, concluded that the withdrawal rellected the UN Security Council's UN's policy in Somalia had become "untenable". 17 preoccupation with the Persian Gulf conllict, the He believed there was little alternative but to adopt disintegration of the USSR and the unravelling of more forceful measures to protect humanitarian Yugoslavia. As an upshot, the UN provided no operations. This view had been floated by the UN assistance in 1991. According to Mohamed Secretary General's former Special Envoy to Sahnoun, the UN's Special Envoy to Somalia Somalia, Mohamed Sahnoun, and publicly (April-October 1992) the UN missed clear advocated by a number of aid agencies operating in 1 opportunities to prevent the catastrophic collapse Somalia. " On 24 November 1992, the Bush of the Somali state. 15 administration informed Boutros-Ghali that the US Moreover, when the UN Security Council was prepared to lead a multilateral enforcement finally addressed the Somali conllict in early 1992, operation in Somalia. During subsequent the organisation made only slow progress. Having negotiations it became plain that the US was not brokered a shaky cease-fire in March, the Security proposing to establish a UN protectorate in Somalia Council passed Resolution 751 on 14 Aprill992. and that any American troops deployed there The resolution approved the deployment of 500 would remain under US command. While voicing Pakistani UN troops to provide security for relief some reservations about these conditions, Boutros­ operations in Mogadishu and 50 military observers Ghali accepted the US offer. to oversee it. But the mission, designated On 3 December, the Security Council UNOSOM I, was subject to the agreement of the unanimously endorsed the US initiative. Resolution parties to the conllict. That consent took four 794 recognised that the "human tragedy caused by months to negotiate. Hi In the meantime, an the conflict" in Somalia constituted "a threat to increased flow of food aid to Mogadishu, partly international peace" and resolved "to restore peace, prompted by growing media interest in the Somali stability and law and order with a view to famine, produced an upsurge in looting, extortion facilitating the process of a political settlement ... in and assaults on relief workers. But the belated Somalia".19 As a consequence, Resolution 794 arrival of the Pakistani peacekeepers did nothing to authorised the US-led Unified Task Force

IFS lnfo 6/97 7 (UNITAF) to use "all necessary means to establish armed groups in Somalia posing a direct threat to as soon as possible a secure environment for the security of famine relief operations. humanitarian relief operations". 20 This landmark The UN, however, took a much broader decision was the first time that the Security interpretation of the mandate. In the view of the Council sanctioned an enforcement action under UN Secretary-General and other senior officials "a chapter VII of the UN Charter in a theoretically secure environment" was inconceivable without sovereign state. Unrestrained by the need for disarmament."'lndeed, Boutros-Ghali believed he consent from the parties to the Somali conflict, had a private understanding on this matter with the UNITAF troops were permitted under common Bush administration. In a letter to President Bush rules of engagement the possible use of deadly after the Security Council resolution of 3 force, including "pre-emptive action", beyond December, Boutros-Ghali set out what he saw as simple self-defence to accomplish the humanitarian the aims of the US-led operation. These included mission. But this was unchartered territory for the removing mines, disarming the militias and seeking UN. The UN Charter made no provision how to to pacify the country, as well as the purely deal with "failed states"." And in the Somali case, humanitarian tasks."But the Bush administration the mandate to establish a secure environment for denied this. Undeterred, Boutros-Ghali said humanitarian relief operations was not sufficiently UNITAF troops should fan out from its designated precise to withstand the stresses of sectors in Somalia to neutralise heavy weapons implementation. belonging to the warlords." From the outset, Washington saw UNITAF as a The dispute between the US and the UN over limited enforcement operation. Its humanitarian disarmament seemed to centre on different mission was simply "to open the supply routes, to interpretations of what constituted a secure get the food moving and to prepare the way for a environment in Somalia. The UN wanted UNITAF UN peacekeeping force to keep it moving"." Bush to use its overwhelming military advantage to spoke about getting out of Somalia by 20 January create an environment that would be both 1993. While President-elect Bill Clinton expressed conducive to humanitarian operations and the scepticism on this withdrawal timetable, he shared process of national reconciliation before it handed Bush's view that the US should not stay any longer over the operation to the UN. Without substantial than was absolutely necessary. disarmament, the UN leadership believed that Nevertheless, within a week of launching inherent financial and logistical constraints would Operation Restore Hope, the US and the UN make the organisation acutely vulnerable to the publicly clashed over whether "straightening things armed menace of the bandits and organised out" included the disarming of Somali militias. factions in the follow-up peacekeeping Presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said operation.'" In other words, Boutros-Ghali feared "disarmament was not a stated part of our mission that if the gangs and factions were not disarmed, and that has not changed"-'' According to US much of the humanitarian work during Operation special envoy to Somalia, Robert Oakley, Security Restore Hope would be wasted in what would Council Resolution 794 was "a clearly defined basically become a band-aid exercise. But the US mission, which is to establish security conditions in did not consider forcible disarmament an essential Somalia to provide for the uninterrupted flow of element in establishing a secure environment. relief supplies. It does not include Political rather than strictly security considerations disarmament"." He was supported by US prevailed here. A number of factors were involved. commander of UNITAF, Lieutenant General Robert First, Washington made a firm distinction between Johnston who said "People will need to change the humanitarian and strategic intervention. 30 Because terms of my mission before I get into a wholesale Somalia was deemed to belong to the former disarmament"." As a result, Washington maintained category, the Bush administration seemed anxious that US troops would only be used to disarm to adhere to the norm of non-interference in

8 IFS lnfo 6/97 domestic affairs. In this vein, the Bush Cosmetic Disarmament in Mogadishu administration pledged respect for Somalia's "sovereignty and independence"." Underlying this Guided by a narrow interpretation of the UN was a tacit recognition that ultimately civil wars are mandate UNITAF adopted a consensual approach about the distribution of power and that disarming to security in Mogadishu. Although operating under would by definition affect the position of key Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNITAF relied on competitors for political power. Should voluntary and co-operative methods to advance the disarmament be pursued, the US would have to get political reconciliation portion of Security Council involved in putting some sort of governing Resolution 794. structure in place in Somalia. That entailed be a Two days after the launch of the US-led long term commitment. intervention on 11 December 1992, Robert Oakley, Second, the US feared that systematic US Special Envoy to Somalia, secured a fresh disarmament in Somalia could involve significant ceasefire agreement between the two main casualties. As one senior US officer put it: "If we protagonists in Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi and General go out and try to physically disarm people who Aideed. Under the terms of the seven point don't want to be disarmed, we're talking about agreement, the two faction leaders agreed inter-alia going to war against all the factions in Somalia"." to end hostilities, abolish the "green line" (a free­ And that was something Lieutenant General Robert fire zone dividing Mogadishu) and move their Johnston was determined to avoid: "We want to "technical" battlewagons, mounted with machine minimise absolutely the risk to our own forces"Y guns and rocket launchers, to designated areas Third, the Americans were wary of the complexity outside the city." The two warlords re-affirmed of the security environment in stateless Somalia. A the agreement at another meeting in the presence large part of the population was armed. Guns were of Oakley on 16 December. Two days later, Ali an ever-present feature of Somali life and carrying Mahdi and General Aideed publicly embraced in a them in public was commonplace. In these ceremony marking the end of the "green line"." circumstances, according to Lawrence Despite the veneer of agreement, the ceasefire Eagleburger, the US Secretary of State, it was brokered by Oakley represented little substantive "impossible to imagine" that US-led forces could progress. Many of the points had in fact been ever totally disarm Somalia." There was another agreed at various times during the previous nine problem. How could UNITAF troops distinguish months. The major novel element, the removal of between Somali gun-holders who were militia technicals from Mogadishu to designated areas members, outlaws or those who simply had outside the city, was essentially a concession to the weapons for self-defence? Such difficulties, in the new military realities of the US presence in the city. words of Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, Moreover, Oakley's immediate dialogue with two made the task of disarming Somalia "an enormous of the key warlords shocked and dismayed many challenge"." Fourth, a policy of active Somalis and foreign aid workers. The warlords disarmament would have been potentially were widely seen as war criminals who had expensive. The US was probably keen to keep its plunged Somalia into chaos and famine. But instead phase of the UN operation limited because it was of arresting the warlords, the US treated them as paying the cost of about $30 million a day to keep legitimate political players at a time when they were 3 the troops in Somalia. t' If disarmament was on the backfoot and their authority was ebbing'" pursued in a purposeful fashion, that figure would Thereafter, the UN's freedom of action in have risen sharply. Seen from the White House, searching for a political solution was severely these factors indicated that the political consensus circumscribed by the involvement of the faction supporting Operation Restore Hope could collapse leaders. if active disarmament became a major goal in On 4 January 1993, the UN Secretary General, Somalia. 37 Dr Boutros Boutros Ghali, opened a peace

IFS lnfo 6/97 9 conference of 14 Somali faction leaders in Addis remained armed. There was very little voluntary Ababa. The talks tloundered almost immediately. disarmament. General Aideed and three allied factions, incensed After an initial lull in hostilities, the large but by Boutros Ghali's failure to include three other transitory US military presence failed to stop the pro-Aideed groups, disrupted the talks until the UN erosion of Mogadishu 's security. From mid­ chief left Mogadishu on 6 January." Eventually, December I 992, fighting between rival militias formal cease-fire and disarmament agreements escalated. The visit of President Bush to the city were signed on 8 and 15 January respectively. over the New Year was marked by sustained Under the accords, the factions agreed to draw up artillery, mortar and machine-gun exchanges just a national charter and discuss forming a new three miles north east of the American embassy." interim government at a reconciliation conference By I 0 January, Mogadishu was gripped by the in Addis Ababa on I 5 March. It was also agreed worst violence since the March I 992 ceasefire. that UNITAF/UNOSOM I immediately establish a Inter-clan fighting centred on the residential district cease-fire monitoring group comprising of Wardiigley. Some estimates put the death toll as representatives from the Somali factions. The high as 300." However, UNITAF did not monitoring group would take possession of heavy intervene. US military spokesmen dismissed such weapons under the control of these movements fighting as "internal" Somali incidents outside the until "a legitimate Somali government can take scope of the UN mandate.49 UNITAF's seeming them over":" Other points in the agreement neutrality on intra-Somali violence was perceived included the encampment of militias, the as weakness by the armed factions. In early registration of all weapons belonging to civilians January I 993, 200 supporters of General Aideed and the return of all property unlawfully taken stoned the UN headquarters in Mogadishu, during previous hostilities.·0 attacked a car containing James Jonah, UN under­ Notwithstanding these solemn agreements, very secretary for African and Middle-Eastern affairs little progress was made in implementing them. and forced the UN Secretary-General Bourros­ True, the ceasefire monitoring group identified a Boutros Ghali to cut short his visit to the Somali number of Authorized Weapons Storage Areas capital."' Armed clashes between UNITAF and (AWSSs) where the factions agreed to deposit Somali gunmen increased. Between 25 and 27 some of their heavy weapons such as tanks, February, US troops shot dead at least three armoured personnel carriers and technical Somalis and fought running battles with thousands vehicles." But many of the heavy weapons were of rioters after General Aideed publicly accused the moved out of Mogadishu into areas beyond US of favouring a rival warlord, Si ad Hersi UNITAF's control even before the international Morgan, in Kisrnayo. 51 force arrived in Somalia. The AWSSs in The growing confidence of the gunmen found Mogadishu were subject to a number of routine expression in a soaring crime rate. Once it became inspections by UNITAF troops although there were clear to bandits they could keep their guns if they no formal modalities with the factions, a situation did not directly threaten UNITAF's operations, inherited by UNOSOM II." At the same time, the armed robbery and extortion in Mogadishu took warlords were unwilling or unable to comply with off." Relief aid workers and foreign journalists the agreement that their armed followers register became favourite targets as the gunmen resumed their weapons with the UNITAF authorities for control of large areas of the city. While UNITAF eventual disarmament. Because the warlords initially tried to curb the protection rackets benefited financially from the criminal activities of surrounding relief work, the subsequent upsurge of their supporters, they had little incentive to order attacks against relief vehicles and workers the registration of machine-guns, especially as it persuaded prominent organisations like the Save might involve a test of their leadership control." the Children Fund to continue spending nearly Consequently, many Somalis in Mogadishu $10,000 per week hiring local gunmen to provide

1 0 IFS lnfo 6/97 "security". 53 Such decisions, no doubt influenced further confusion. He strongly hinted that the US by the still serious humanitarian situation at that military was considering actually disarming the time, also reflected what was seen as an gunmen, even if they did not show any threatening ambiguous UNITAF commitment to relief agency intentions. 62 security. In early March, when a group of Aideed's The absence of a clear US vision on followers attempted extortion operations against disarmament and contradictory pronouncements the Mogadishu officer of CARE and the World from the UN predictably muddled policy in Food Programme, no attempt was made to arrest Mogadishu. Three episodes highlighted this within the culprits." The point was not lost on the the first week of Operation Restore Hope. First, gunmen themselves. Commenting on the US US marines discovered a large arms cache in a marine presence in Mogadishu one gunman building owned by Os man Ato, General Aideed's observed: "They're not troubling us. We do what then financier and close aide, but were instructed we like"." Certainly, Robert Oakley, the US Special not to remove the guns or their owners.h'3 Second~ Envoy, readily conceded that UNITAF had failed to US marines confiscated weapons from gunmen control the "big problem" of Somali crime." only to discover that a batch of 20 AK-47 The deteriorating security situation eventually machine-guns were subsequently returned to jolted the UNITAF forces in January 1993 into faction leader, General Aideed.'" Third, when periodic weapon searches and confiscations that French legionnaires seized weapons from some were independent of the disarmament agreements Somalis at road checkpoints they were rebuked by signed by the warring factions-" But these did not the Americans for exceeding the UN mandate and form part of a comprehensive disarmament plan obliged to give them back to their owners." Yet, nor were they considered by the US as a central US Cobra helicopters took pre-emptive action to feature of the UN mandate. The aforementioned destroy a number of "technicals" apparently split between the US and UN over the role of threatening UNITAF. The discrepancy between the disarmament in the mission was compounded by wide latitude given to UNITAF troops in the rules divisions within the US political and military of engagement and the US refusal to embark on establishment. Amid some disquiet in the Pentagon "house-to-house searches or searching of cars" for about participating in an operation defined in weapons left some senior US marines struggling to humanitarian terms by the White House," senior make sense of the weapons policy." US officials in the first week of the intervention The initial American focus on voluntary issued conflicting statements about whether their disarmament in Mogadishu brought several small­ troops would be used to disarm gunmen. On the scale weapons incentive programmes to the fore. one hand, Laurence Eagleburger said that an Variations of the "food for guns" and "cash for agreement had been reached with the UN that US guns" concepts were considered. In January 1993, soldiers, along with contingents from other UNITAF Marine Forces (MARFOR) began giving a countries, would be used to "pacify" Somalia while receipt for weapons surrendered or for information distributing food aid" On the other hand, on where to find weapons."' These receipts could Lieutenant General Robert Johnston, the Marines then be exchanged for food provided by the commander of Operation Restore Hope, insisted humanitarian relief organisations. This scheme was that disarmament of the Somali gunmen was not largely concentrated in a sector of northern part of his mission.") While President Bush Mogadishu under the sway of Ali Mahdi. Italian intervened and seemed to come down on troops organised a similar programme in the same 1 Johnston's side by stressing he would not order area in March 1993. " In both instances, however, American forces to mount a potentially explosive the impact was very limited. Not only was the effort to disarm Somalia,") General Joseph Hoar, general food situation beginning to improve in early chief of US Central Command with overall 1993, but many Somalis believed they would risk responsibility for the Somali operation, added their lives surrendering their weapons in what was

IFS lnfo 6/97 1 1 a worsening security environment. Consequently, Tanks, guns, and battle wagons were confiscated the number of weapons surrendered was modest in what was the first UNITAF operation of this and invariably consisted of poor quality or aging kind against a major Somali faction. 74 A similar arms. The proposal to pay for weapons turned in assault on another weapons compound belonging was also reviewed. Citing the Panama example of to General Aideed occurred the next day. It was 1989 where 4,000 weapons were recovered at a reported that heavy weaponry seized included anti­ cost of about $800,000, Dick Cheney, the US aircraft guns, mortars and more than 15 field Secretary of Defence, expressed early optimism artillery guns." UNITAF forces then turned their that such a scheme could be just as effective in attention to the so called Argentine arms market Mogadishu.w But this view soon gave way to a located in Ali Mahdi's domain in north Mogadishu. recognition that the Somali arms problem did not This raid led to the confiscation of a small tank, bear any meaningful comparison. At the beginning two armoured personnel carriers, "technical" battle of US/UN intervention, something like one in ten wagons, 250 rifles and machine guns, as well as Somalis in Mogadishu carried arms. One estimate mortars, rockets and shells76 Perhaps the most put the total number of small arms in Mogadishu spectacular arms seizure occurred on 11 January above I 00,00070 Given the large quantity of 1993 when 900 US marines occupied Mogadishu's weapons, any "weapons for cash" plan in main arms market at Bakara and confiscated five Mogadishu faced enormous difficulties. For one truckloads of arms and ammunition77 thing, it would have been prohibitively expensive. If anxiety about security prompted ad Jzoc Although the price of AK-47s plunged at the disarmament, it also led to a belated UNITAF beginning of the international intervention, prices concern with Jaw and order. Until mid-January soon recovered and rose in line with increased 1993 the US Special Envoy to Somalia, Robert demand in January 1993. 71 So unless UNITAF was Oakley, said that the creation of local police forces prepared to pay the market price, there was little was not on UNITAF's agenda. This task, it was incentive for gunmen to give up their quality arms. noted, was the responsibility of the UN. However, A weapons for cash programme also ran the risk increasing attacks against US marines in of boosting the already thriving arms trade in East Mogadishu galvanised UNITAF into supporting Africa. By late January 1993, the US finally efforts by a joint committee, established after the abandoned the idea of weapons incentive ceasefire of 11 December 1992, to form a police programmes in Mogadishu. 72 constabulary in Mogadishu. On 6 February, a Still the US retained what might be loosely Somali police force consisted of more than 2,000 termed an "arms control" approach to security in members began operations in the Somali capital for 7 Mogadishu. That is, individual disarmament was the first time in two years " A judicial committee seen as unfeasible as it was dangerous. After aJJ, was also formed, with an equal number of the city was awash with weapons. Nevertheless, magistrates and judges named by the Aideed and UNITAF was under pressure to respond to the Ali Mahdi factions. But these efforts did little to continuing security problems of Mogadishu. In late restore the rule of Jaw. The legal process was December 1992, on the eve of a visit by President fundamentally compromised by the involvement of Bush, US forces seized arms, missiles and battle appointees from the two warring factions. Neither \vagons in north-west Mogadishu and the contents group would permit the arrest of its own of a smaller arsenal from a building opposite the members. 7 ~ US embassy compound in south Mogadishu.71 The penchant for quick-fix solutions to Local residents were wamed that machine-guns, Somalia's security problems reflected UNITAF's mortars, recoilless rifles and "technical" battle determination to withdraw from Somalia and hand \vagons would nol be tolerated on the streets. On 7 over responsibility to the United Nations. In early January 1993, US marines stormed a large arms January 1993 US Marine Colonel Mike Hagee dump belonging to warlord, General Aideed. announced that the US troop contribution would be

1 2 IFS lnfo 6/97 cut by 4,000 while warning the warring factions in 3,000 civilian personnel. It was expected to do Mogadishu in the next breath against the further what UNITAF had been unable to do with 17,000 use of heavy weaponry in the city!"' Other US troops more: disarm the warlord militias and take officials indicated that most of UNITAF's duties charge of the 60 percent of Somali territory could be transferred to UN peacekeeping troops by previously outside international control. the end of January although there was clearly no With the expansion of the UN mandate, political prospect of a replacement UN force being ready pressure on the Somali factions increased. A UN within that time. Then, despite four days of riots sponsored Conference of National Reconciliation and gun battles in Mogadishu in late February, the was held in March I 993. After I 3 days of US military announced it was pressing ahead with bargaining, the 15 faction leaders signed a peace plans to withdraw 3,000 troops from Somalia." accord on 27 March which committed the parties According to General Robert Johnston, UNJTAF to "complete" disarmament within 90 days." The had accomplished its mission: "We reversed a agreement called on the multi-national forces to devastating famine and now it is safe to walk the apply "strong and effective sanctions" against streets. We have given Mogadishu and the towns violators of the cease-fire. The Conference also back to the Somalis." agreed to set up a Transitional National Council Certainly, UNJTAF's intervention had saved (TNC) as the country's supreme authority during something like 250,000 Somalis from starvation,83 what was seen as a two-year transition to but senior UN officials denied American claims that democratic government. But the warlords had little the US-led force had created a secure environment intention of implementing the Addis Ababa for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Indeed, accords. After the adjournment of the ON­ Boutros-Ghali said in early March that the sponsored conference, the warlords signed a deteriorating security situation in Somalia required second document in Addis Ababa which went the successor UN force to take "forceful action" to against the letter and spirit of the agreements of 27 protect the facilities of international aid agencies March." The warring factions inter-alia re-asserted and take control of all heavy weapons and small their political right to shape the composition of the arms belonging to the organised factions." TNC. Suffice it to say, UNOSOM I! never It was in this context the United Nations recognised the 30 March agreement'' Security Council adopted resolution 814 on 26 From the outset, the hastily-assembled March 1993, expanding the size and mandate of UNOSOM I! force was over-stretched. First, the UNOSOM to include not only the protection of initial complement of 16,000 UN troops, drawn humanitarian relief supplies and personnel but also from a large number of countries, struggled to fill to compel the Somali militias to disarm. It was the the vacuum left by the 37,000 strong UNITAF most far-reaching operation in the UN's history force." Second, the UNOSOM Il mission was ill­ and placed the organisation in virtual charge of the equipped with operational material. Some country for the next two years. Thus unlike contingents lacked appropriate hardware such as UNITAF, whose involvement in the disarmament armoured personnel carriers (APCs) to protect process was secondary ami derived from the their troops from small arms fire.'"' Third, the new ceasefire and disarmament agreements of January multi-national force was required to impose law I 993, the new UNOSOM - UNOSOM I!- was and order in a civil war environment in which mandated to disarm Somali militias under Chapter militia leaders, despite a pledge to disarm, showed VII of the United Nations Charter to create no signs of doing so. Not surprisingly, the resolve conditions for a political settlement." of the new UN force was soon put to the test. On On 4 May 1993, UNOSOM Il formally took 5 June 1993, 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were over from UNITAF. The multi-national force was brutally killed during pre-arranged weapons supposed to consist of 20,000 peacekeeping verification inspection visits to some of Aideed's troops, 8,000 logistical support staff and some authorised weapon storage sites (AWSS) in south

IFS Into 6/97 1 3 Mogadishu. Under its mandate to disarm the 20,000 refugees. The Australian deployment, factions and enforce a ceasefire, UNOSOM li was known as Operation Solace, lasted for just 17 perfectly entitled to carry routine inspections of weeks but managed to create a stable situation in this nature." Besides UNITAF, although interpreting Baidoa where relief agencies could freely operate its own mandate more narrowly in Mogadishu, had and fulfil their work. established the practice of conducting such While Australia did not have a history of close inspections. ties with Somalia, several factors prompted a In many ways, the attack on the Pakistani positive response in mid-December I 992 to a US peacekeepers was a "shoot-out waiting to request for assistance there. First, the Keating happen".'" Because UNITAF left the Somali government believed it was important to reinforce gunmen with weapons to use, it was almost old ties with the US during the uncertainties of the inevitable that a well-armed faction like Aideed's post-Cold War era. Linked by the ANZUS Treaty would take on a visibly weakened UN presence. As and the ABCA (America-Britain-Canada-Australia) the most formidable warlord, General Aideed cross servicing arrangements, Canberra perceived understood that UNOSOM II's programme of that the interoperability of Australian and US forces disarmament and political reconstruction was a would minimise the operational risks of deployment direct challenge to a power base built on the arms under the leadership of the US Commander, of his followers. The 5 June incident exposed the Lieutenant General Robert Johnston.'" Second, the danger of relying on the hope that international Somali situation seemed almost an ideal testing intervention would somehow convert warlords like ground for part of Australia's Operational Aideed into consensus oriented politicians. The Deployment Force (ODF). For five months prior rest, as they say, is history. The UN launched a to the Somali deployment, I RAR underwent manhunt for Aideed and tried to forcibly disarm his intensive training in services protected evacuation militia. But the window of opportunity for exercises in northern Australia. These involved a disarmament had long since closed. Instead, the strong emphasis on civil-military relations in UN became locked into a bloody confrontation in conditions which bore a certain resemblence to the Mogadishu which eventually scuppered the peace­ terrain in Somalia. 1J7Third, there was a moral enforcement mission. imperative to assist the UN-sanctioned operation in Somalia. Like other peoples, Australians were Active Disarmament in Baidoa deeply moved by the haunting TV images of famine and death in that country. In one weekend In contrast to the American predicament in alone in early December 1992, the Australian public Mogadishu, the Australian contribution to the donated over A$500,000 to an ABC Radio UNITAF operation was widely seen as a UN National-Community Aid Abroad fund raiser for success story." On I 7 January 1993, the I" Africa." Such generosity probably persuaded the Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment (I RAR) Keating government that sending troops to Somalia took control of the Baidoa Humanitarian Relief would demonstrate good international citizenship Sector (HRS) from 700 US Marines and 142 without risking votes ut home. French Legionnaires.'" Until the arrival of these Whatever the calculations, the immediate troops on 16 December 1992, Baidoa was known security challenge facing the Australians in Baidoa as the "City of Death" because after Mogadishu it was formidable. In many ways, the situation there was the area worst affected by civil war and followed the Mogadishu pattern. The arrival of US famine. Geographically, Baidoa HRS covered an and French troops in Baidoa at the outset of area of nearly 17,000 square kilometres in central UNITAF initially had a calming effect. Quite a few Somalia and comprised a total population of about heavy weapons, including "technicals" were 180,000.05 Baidoa was the major population centre neutralised and many gunmen either buried their in the HRS with 50-60,000 inhabitants, including weapons or simply moved out. But by mid-January

1 4 IFS lnfo 6/97 1993. the gunmen began to re-assert themselves donned the mantle of "military governor" of the again. The US Marines became the target of Somali Baidoa HRS and positioned the Australians above ambushes and hit-and-run shootings in Baidoa. On the armed clansmen in a counter-insurgency style 12 January, one US Marine was killed and another operation. It involved the "aggressive" protection seriously wounded in separate incidentsY9 fn of humanitarian work and the "domination" of the retaliation for casualties taken, the Marines HRS through the use of static security positions, assaulted several towns and villages in the Baidoa patrolling and on-caJI quick reaction forces.""In HRS. This heavy-handed response served only to part, this approach reflected a range of combat increase tensions. On 14 January, a Marine patrol capabilities and integral administrative support that was stoned by a group of Somali youths. A day allowed the Australian contingent to operate in a later, the first contingent of Australian troops to virtually autonomous role within the UNITAF arrive at Baidoa was fired on at the airport.wo framework. But it was also grounded in a hard­ At the same time, humanitarian non-government headed assessment of the major Somali players on organisations (NGOs) were subjected to criminal the ground. According to Australian military harassment. Food and equipment were frequently oftlcials, Somali warlords and gunmen "only stolen from NGO compounds. Relations between respected the realities of power""" and were quick the aid agencies and the US military became very to exploit perceived weakness. In such a "dog-eat­ strained. The NGOs, which paid enormous dog" environment, it was deemed psychologically amounts to hired gunmen for "protection" against important for Australian troops to "call the bluff' looters, were told they would not get US security of Somali gunmen in any challenge to ensure local for their compounds or staff unless they requested respect for the Australian presence. Failure to do it."" From the NGOs standpoint, "the interest so, it was believed, would produce an irreparable which the US Marines and the French troops "loss of confidence" in the operation.'"" In an early displayed in their own security ... often "show of strength", the Australians engaged in a compromised the protection provided to the NGOs number of fire-fights with Somali gunmen. Overall. in Baidoa".'"'On 15 January, a Swiss NGO the Australians faced I I major contacts. Five employee of the International Committee of the Somalis were killed and at least six were wounded. Red Cross was murdered and robbed. Three of the One Australian was killed."" six gunmen involved in the attack were Red Cross Disarmament was in effect part and parcel of employees. This incident and the looting of a the Australian strategy. Unlike the US, Canberra Medicines San Frontiers compound convinced adopted a broad interpretation of Security Council many in the NGO community that it was Resolution 794 mandating the creation of a secure impossible for US marines to stop such activity by environment for the provision of humanitarian "hiding behind sandbags at a heavily protected assistance. It was recognised that under US airport" or "riding around in a jeep". Hn For aid military leadership there was no requirement to workers like Lockton Morrissey of CARE Australia take guns and weapons from the Somali it was clear what needed to be done. "There is no population. But while the Australian government way that the [Baidoa) operation could be openly acknowledged the potential risks to troops successful in the long term unless the guns are involved in active disarmament, it clearly indicated taken out of circulation"."" And the NGOs made it that it supported the UN's stand on the issue. "We clear to Australian military officials that if there believe that for there to be an effective long-term was not an improvement in Baidoa's security solution to Somalia we will have to disarm the situation they would all pack up and leave town."" people" said a spokesman for Australian Defence Conscious that Operation Solace would fail Minister, Senator Robert Ray. "And if we go ahead unless a more secure environment was created, with disarmament ... the risk factor will be high to Colonel David Hurley, Commander of I RAR, very high"."" But, as Australia saw it, the worst developed a robust but clear-cut strategy. He risk at this time was not to take any risk at all.

IFS lnfo 6/97 1 5 Certainly, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) protection, Australian troops occupied the under which UNITAF troops operated in Somalia compounds and other facilities of these were considered sufficient in scope to permit the humanitarian organisations. 116 Third, relentless application of force in certain situations beyond patrolling was sustained throughout Operation simple self-defence. Devised by the Americans and Solace. Conducted by foot and Armoured accepted by all coalition participants, following Personnel Carriers (APC), these around-the-clock some minor, mainly grammatical changes, the ROE patrols concentrated on the Baidoa township but authorised UNITAF troops to use "all necessary also covered adjacent rural areas. This presence on force" against hostile acts or hostile intent the ground was seen by the Australians as the involving "crew served weapons or "armed "bread and butter"'" of the peace operation. It kept individuals".'" In this context, UNITAF armed factions and bandits off-balance and Commander Lieutenant General Robert Johnston facilitated the enforcement of weapons reduction on 8 January 1993 issued a policy directive on whether through house-to-house searches, weapons confiscation.'" The directive allowed counter-ambush actions, pursuit after contact, and UNITAF Commanders in each HRS to confiscate cordon and search activities. Altogether, the weapons as and when the need arose. So Colonel Australians confiscated over I ,000 weapons during David Hurley felt free to undertake "offensive" i their stay in Baidoa. That constituted a sizeable measures including forcible disarmament to protect proportion of the 2,250 small arms and heavy humanitarian relief work in Baidoa. 113 weapons seized by UNITAF forces as a whole From an early stage in Operation Solace the during the first 90 days of the multi-lateral Australians served notice that arms could not be intervention. 118 tolerated on the streets. Much of the heavy Another important aspect of operations in the weaponry such as "technicals" had been previously Baidoa HRS concerned civil-military relations. The eliminated by the US Marines and French civil military operations team (CMOT) was, Legionnaires. However, the Australians introduced according to Colonel David Hurley, "one of the a system of weapons registration. Under this keys to the success of Operations Solace"' "Its scheme, Somalis working for the NGOs and role was to provide an interface between the performing other essential tasks in the HRS could Australian military and the civilians with whom retain their registered weapons. But all other they needed to deal with on a daily basis. As a unauthorised weapons in the township were starting point, the Australian army cultivated the confiscated on sight and destroyed. The purpose NGO community in Baidoa. The relationship began of the registration was to strengthen NGO before the arrival of Australian troops. protection by differentiating between those Somalis Organisations such as CARE Australia and World supporting humanitarian activities and those Vision were consulted in December 1992 about engaged in faction fighting or banditry.'" local personalities and conditions in Disarmament, though, was linked and indeed Baidoa. 120 These consultations, along with a reinforced by a multifaceted peace-enforcement demonstrated willingness to address the security operation. Four tactical aspects stood out. First, concerns of the NGOs after deployment, forged a the Australians guaranteed the distribution of close bond between the Australian forces and aid humanitarian relief in the Baidoa HRS through workers. This relationship, as Colonel Hurley escorting food convoys. By the end of Operation acknowledged, had wider implications for the Solace, the battalion group had escorted a total of Australians in Baidoa: over 400 convoys carrying more than 8000 tonnes of grain to more than 130 locations.'"Second, the By \Vinning the cm~fidence and the trust of the Australians provided security in the Baidoa NGOs, that then percolated down to the people. township by maintaining a constant and visible The NGOs who were feeding them, looking presence. In response to the NGOs' dire need for ajier them, educating them and so forth were

1 6 IFS lnfo 6/97 giving them the message that the Australians Rather the strategy adopted to tackle this were a competellf and even-handed lot who problem was to build up the law and order could be dealt with. They could take their structure in Baidoa. It was a joint UNITAF­ problems to us. 121 Australian initiative with considerable input from local clan elders. When the US indicated it was Having eased itself into the community through the prepared to set up an auxiliary security force in NGOs, the Australians embarked on a process of Mogadishu in early February 1993, the Australian "bottom up" political reconstruction. This effort "leapt on to that pretty quickly".""In Baidoa, centered on frequent meetings with the clan elders, Australian military police and a CMOT legal officer, the semblance of civil authority left in Baidoa. "By Major Michael Kelly, as well as troops, were used establishing a good working relationship with to train the Somalis as police. By May 1993, a them", noted Colonel Hurley, "we could also get police force of over 200 had been recruited and our message down to the people about what we deployed in Baidoa and outlying areas. Similarily were trying to achieve". m In March 1993, with the judiciary, Australia went further than any following two UN-sponsored peace conferences in other UNITAF partner in restoring a fully Addis Ababa, arrangements were made to convene functioning legal system based on the 1962 Somali a National Congress at Baidoa. Several factions penal code. 127 competed for power. The Somali Liberation Army Taken together, these measures helped to (SLA) which was pro-Aideed, two wings of the rebuild local confidence in the rule of law and also Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and a new, encouraged surviving victims of the SLA's criminal third wing of the SDM, the SDM Baidoa. The organisation to provide detailed information on its Australians saw the latter as an authentic "grass­ activities. As a consequence, the notorious and roots movement" which it "really wanted to much feared commander of the bandit empire foster". Such a stance "caused some difficulty in known as Gutaale was arrested and brought to trial Mogadishu between the Australians and the UN. in Baidoa.'" After appearances before the Regional The UN had a top-down approach to peace­ Court and Court of Appeal, Gutaale was convicted building; they focused on the 14 faction leaders, of the murders of 32 people as well as related which meant the grass-roots movements did not robbery charges and sentenced to death in get much attention". 123 accordance with the Somali penal code. According The political emergence of SDM Baidoa was in to Major Kelly, the execution of this "strong man" no small way due to CMOT's determination to re­ had dramatic results in Baidoa. The remnants of establish a local justice administration system. the SLA organisation packed up and left town Upon arrival in Baidoa, the Australians discovered within days. Meanwhile the "atmosphere and that the SLA ran a Mafia style revenue gathering security in the town improved dramatically"."" empire based on terror, intimidation, planned Something like 70 lesser known figures were also killings, and massacres. 12 ~ The prime function of arrested or fled Baidoa. this external element was to raise funds to support Against this background, the Australian troops Aideed's broader ambitions in Somalia. While the were able to ensure "there was no outside Australian army quickly faced down early interference"'"' at the National Congress and SDM challenges from SLA gunmen and bandits in a Baidoa emerged as the major political force in the number of armed confrontations, the SLA soon township. This outcome was a triumph for the realised they could covertly maintain their bandit "bottom up" approach to reconstruction. By empire without openly challenging the Australian responding energetically to the elders' requests to troops. Indeed, the SLA tried to present itself as a re-establish a police force and judicial system the legitimate political authority in Baidoa with whom Australians not only provided a model f(lr the rest the Australians should work in tandem.'" But the of the UN operation, but also consolidated local "Mogadishu option" was resisted. support for disarmament in the Baidoa HRS. In this

IFS lnfo 6/97 1 7 connection, Colonel Hurley said "elders would UNOSOM !I in May 1993, the security situation in sometimes walk as far as 90 kilometres to report the two locations had markedly diverged. weapons !dumps] which they felt the Aussies Mogadishu saw a somewhat marginal improvement would have to deal with".'ll Nor did the elders try while Baidoa underwent a positive transformation. to conceal their contempt for the Somali warlords. The difference in outcome was related to three "What we don't understand is how you could have factors. all I 4 faction leaders in one room (at the UN­ backed peace conference in Addis Ababa in March I. Mission definition I 993) and then Jet them go! We do not understand that".n:: US forces in Mogadishu constantly ran into When the Australians left in May I 993, the difficulty over both the conception and duration of situation in Baidoa was stable. Warlords and their commitment. From the outset, Washington bandits no longer ruled the day. Armed militiamen stressed that UNITAF was a strictly humanitarian and their barricades had disappeared while the mission. That meant, in the words of President surrounding villages were free of the terror once Bush, the US did not intend to "dictate political 13 inflicted by armed gangs.m Such progress was outcomes" . h Furthermore, the US government possible because the Australians focused both on qualified its support for securing the environment the humanitarian and socio-political symptoms of for humanitarian relief. In this regard, Colin Somalia's civil conflict and on the material vehicles Powell, the US Military Chief of Staff said: "It is for perpetuating violence (like weapons and not a question on our part or on the subsequent UN munitions). Operation Solace demonstrated that part that we will guarantee a weapon-free and systematic weapons reduction can be a tool for violence-free environment. But I think it will be an promoting stability in conditions of little or no civil environment that is manageable ... to ensure the authority. Quite understandably, the Australians continual delivery of humanitarian supplies to save became very popular in Baidoa. And when the end lives". m of their operation approached, Canberra had to Such ambivalence reflected the conflicting resist tremendous local and international pressure goals of doing something "about the starving to extend the stay of the battalion group.'" It is people that we're seeing on our television significant that the positive transformation of screens""' and an official determination to pull out Baidoa's security environment was sustained by US troops from Somalia almost as soon as they the I, I 00 French UN troops - that replaced the had arrived. As a consequence, the US operation in Australians - and their successors, the Indians, Mogadishu did not look to establish a new both of whom also practiced "total immersion".m transitional political authority, but adapted itself to Baidoa remained a UN success until I 994 when it "working with the major faction leaders." It too succumbed to the violent turmoil that had manoeuvred in lhe direction of maximum consent reappeared in the rest of southern Somalia. and tacitly accepted that active disarmament of the warring parties constituted an infringement of A Comparative Assessment Somali sovereignty. As events transpired, US troops were drawn Even aliowing for differences in development, into limited disarmament when humanitarian work population size and clan composition between was impeded by general lawlessness and the level Mogadishu and Baidoa, a comparison of the of arms in circulation. But this belated response disarmament efforts in the two cities is was too ad hoc and unsystematic to have any illuminating. At the beginning of the UN's significant impact. Constant changes in the humanitarian intervention, both places were full of weapons policyD 9 served to strengtl1en the resolve the sights and sounds of death and destruction. of the main warlords and diminished hopes that the However, by the time UNITAF was replaced by NGOs and peaceful Somalis entertained about a

1 8 IFS lnfo 6/97 concerted US disarmament policy. The very slow expel Aideed's foreign militia from snuth efforts to re-establish a law and order system in Mogadishu was soon lost when the Americans the Somali capital also compounded that sense of belatedly sought to restore law and order through disillusionment. the warlords in the Somali capital.'" On the other hand, the Australians arrived in Baidoa with a well-defined game plan. The fact the 2. Style of Peace Operations Australians were deployed for a specified period of time was a distinct advantage. It facilitated a longer The United States and Australia demonstrated term perspective on the UN mission and the contrasting styles of peacekeeping in Somalia. problems it faced. The Australians saw Viewed in terms of a continuum, the US pursued disarmament as a crucial but by no means what might be called the "sheriff's posse" model exclusive element in creating a secure environment. of peacekeeping.'" In the words of Colin Powell, Because Somalia was a heavily armed "failed state" the US Commander-in-Chief, UNITAF was "like with no effective civil authority, the Australians the cavalry coming to the rescue, straightening took the view there was no sovereignty to things out for a while, and then letting the marshals offend-'"' In placing themselves above the come back in to keep things under control"-'" The belligerents, the Australians not only sought to US approach was short-term, reactive, high-tech, maintain a ceasefire in Baidoa through forcible crisis-oriented and compartmentalised. At the other disarmament, but also re-establish a law and order end of the spectrum, Australia exhibited a structure as part of a wider social reconstruction community-oriented style of peacekeeping. This effort. was specific in time, purposeful, low-tech, Unlike the Americans, the Australian battalion integrated and participatory. Overall, it was a subscribed to an "arms spillover" security "tough but tender" approach to peacekeeping. philosophy.'" The belief was that if low-level In relation to disarmament, these differences in armed crime or factional lighting was ignored or style added up to differences in substance. First, tolerated, similar copy-cat incidents would surely there was the question of intelligence. To create a follow, leading to a cycle of escalating violence and secure environment, UNITAF commanders needed banditry. To counter this possibility, it was deemed to be able to detect the movement of opposing necessary to take the initiative, intervene in such forces, to determine the location of hidden arms incidents and confiscate weapons on a "street by caches and to anticipate the plans of those who street, block by block" basis until an environment might attack their forces or commit crimes. That of sustainable security was gradually created. But required a sound information gathering system. But if these gains in security were to be preserved, it this proved elusive for the US forces in "was critical in Somalia to re-establish the law and Mogadishu."''To be sure, the intricacies of clan order system quite quickly" because a large and factional loyalties in the Somali capital always number of clans were moved by famine and civil complicated the intelligence process. Nevertheless, war into areas traditionally held by other clans.'" the uncertainties associated with the length of the In Baidoa. the restoration of the 1962 Somali Penal US deployment and the extensive u,se of advanced Code effectively paved the way for the removal of technology in an marginally developed country the pro-Aideed SLA organisation from the town. served to limit contacts with the local population. Similar possibilities existed also in south The story in Baidoa, however, was quite different. Mogadishu. In 1991, General Aideed's HabarGidir Here, the Australians succeeded in establishing an clan fought Ali Mahdi Mohamed's Abgal followers intimate community intelligence base. As il was and took control of much of the south side of the clear armed gunmen and bandits were blending into city, including Abgal homes and properties as well the community, the Australian troops which lacked as the lucrative seaport and airport. However, the helicopter support, fostered the community as a opportunity to use the Somali judiciary system to source of human intelligence. Regular contacls

IFS lnfo 6/97 1 9 with the clan elders and the revival of a Jaw and to direct security challenges through rapid, "in-out" order system were "critical" in providing manoeuvres (ie airlifting or transporting troops to a "intelligence as to what was going on" in Baidoa. 147 troublespot on a temporary basis). The Second, relations between US and Australian conspicuous absence of regular patrolling in peacekeepers and NGOs diverged considerably. It Mogadishu undermined the US's authority through should be emphasised that humanitarian Somali eyes and certainly compromised any organisations such as Save the Children and CARE disarmament efforts made there. By way of were confronting on a daily basis armed bandits comparison, patrolling was the backbone of and the "armies" of warlords to ensure that food Australia's community-oriented peacekeeping in the reached the starving long before the UNITAF Baidoa HRS. From the Australian perspective, a operation was launched. They did this without troop presence on the ground amongst the people military training, the security of APCs, flak jackets was both a symbol of resolve and a prerequisite for or back-up force to call on if arrangements went achieving other humanitarian and security wrong.'"With one or two notable exceptions, the objectives, including disarmament. It gave, in the "sheriff's posse" style of US peacekeeping words of one senior Australian official, "a better alienated a significant number of NGOs in outcome than having troops working remotely Mogadishu. The US military were criticised for a from the population"."' tendency to treat aid workers as "bleeding hearts", largely ignoring their knowledge of local security 3. Cultural compatibility problems in Mogadishu and putting the lives of NGO personnel at risk by constantly changing their Despite a Cold War connection with Somalia, the 1 policy toward the possession of arms in the city "' Americans evidently found it difficult to adjust to Against this, Australia's community-oriented the political culture of the country. Historically, the peacekeeping nurtured a very good relationship Somalis have been a fierce, nomadic and proud with the various NGOs in Baidoa. Convinced they people who eked out an existence from the land. In were engaged in a process of nation-building, the a harsh environment, social co-operation was often Australians stressed teamwork with the NGOs and tempered by a willingness to fight for access to 15 the clan-elders. "What can we do for you?" and pasture and water. ::. Moreover, since the late "How can we make your job easier?" were among 1980s, civil war and the proliferation of modern the questions framing I RAR's dialogue with these arms eroded the traditional authority of clan elders groups. As an upshot, the Australians developed a in moderating centrifugal tendencies within Somali "product mix" that addressed local security society. concerns and provided a range of civilian Faced with this situation, the US, either because assistance that went far beyond the US of cultural insularity 153 or inexperience in preoccupation with convoy escorts for the delivery international peace operations, 15 ~ seemed unable to of relief aid."" recognise that an unwillingness to disarm gunmen Third, the issue of patrolling was not given in Mogadishu when the opportunity existed would equal weight in the UNITAF operation. Because the serve to boost the warlords' standing and quickly US commitment to a secure environment in demoralise Somali supporters of the intervention. Somalia was limited, the "sheriff's posse" mode of Puzzled and distressed by the gap between the peacekeeping involved relatively few foot and US's awesome military capabilities and limited mobile patrols in Mogadishu. Except for US political will, many Somalis resigned themselves to strongholds such as the UN compound and the the power of the warlords and came to question international airport, most of the streets in south the motives for the US presence: "Without Mogadishu remained in the hands of armed disarmament, the Americans have missed the factions and bandits. The US occasionally whole point. Unless they are going to disarm on a contested this control but generally only responded nation-wide basis, they might as well pack their

20 IFS lnfo 6/97 bags and go home" .155 recognisable authority existed, the quest for But the Australians had comparatively few disarmament by consensus proved elusive. It was problems in relating to the population of Baidoa not uncommon for warlords like General Aideed to region. The key to this cultural "fit" appears to co-operate with UNITAF forces one week and have been a flexible approach to peacekeeping then to refuse co-operation the following week."" which combined a top-down military stance As an upshot, the US's "arms control" approach, towards faction fighters or bandits with a bottom­ predicated on the centralized political management up socio-political strategy towards ordinary structures of a state-oriented system, proved Somalis. On the one hand, the Australians assened unworkable in the chaos of Mogadishu and set the themselves as a local Leviathan. A concerted effort scene for the tragic events of 5 June !993 when at weapons control early in the mission was pan of UNITAF's much weaker successor, UNOSOM II, a broader Australian effort to signal determination tried to enforce disarmament. It was a case of too to subdue any armed challengers. Interestingly, little too late. Australian military ortlcials believed that such Some observers, however, would dispute this firmness impressed both Somali gunmen and non­ interpretation. According to one school of thought, combatants alike. 156 On the other hand, the disarmament in Somalia never had a chance Australians adopted a low-key culturally supportive because the UN made a fundamental error when it approach towards ordinary Somalis and respected abandoned diplomacy and the consensual principles community figures such as clan elders. 157 of traditional peacekeeping to intervene unilaterally According to several accounts, Australian troops in Somalia's civil war. By seeking to impose peace showed they "did not feel superior" to the locals upon the warring factions, the UN compromised and were prepared "to do anything in their power one of its main assets, namely political 1 162 to assist people ... worse off than themselves" '" impartiality. In the process, the UN became Pieced together, this combination of determination simply another party to Somalia's civil war and and compassion helped to forge a bond between thus become part of the problem rather than the the Australians and many Somalis in BaiLlua. By solution to the country's crisis. On this view, curbing the power of the gunmen through active Somalia demonstrated that the international urge to disarmament, the Australians pumped new life into "do something" in troubled regions should be the traditional leadership of the clan elders and, in resisted unless the measures taken stood a doing so, facilitated the restoration of some of the reasonable chance of success on the ground. vestiges of civil society. While Australian military Of course, it has to be conceded that the UN officials had few illusions about the Somali faced a formidable task in Somalia. It was no easy capacity for violence, they were clearly not thing to foster national reconciliation when both the prepared to accept Col in Powell's view that machinery of government and the traditional Somalia would always be a lawless society."" hierarchies of clan had been all but completely destroyed by civil war. Moreover, a bloated, and Conclusion somewhat antiquated UN organisation had little precedent for such a role. Beyond that, however, There was a relationship between the the "fundamentalist" school of thought remains "disappointing" 1Wrecord on disarmament and the unconvincing. First, in the age of CNN and the absence of progress toward national reconciliation global communications revolution, it was in Somalia. As far as the US was concerned, a unrealistic to expect the UN to ignore the plight of programme of active disarmament was not a Somalia, especially as a traditional peacekeeping priority during the UNITAF operation. Indeed, the operation (UNOSOM I), had not proven to be up first really serious attempt to implement a plan of to the challenge. Second, peace enforcement in voluntary disarmament only began in January Mogadishu initially floundered not because the US 1993. But in a failed state like Somalia where no used too much force, but because the Americans

IFS lnfo 6/97 2 1 adopted a cap-in-hand approach towards the conflicts may not be amenable to traditional Somali warlords and were unwilling to enforce peacekeeping remedies, the Australian experience disarmament. By courting the warlords, the in Baidoa revealed the international community may Americans sought to base a solution to Somalia's yet have a wider choice of impotence or simply troubles on the very forces bearing considerable engaging in some half-baked peace enforcement responsibility for tearing the country apart. action. But if that choice is to be realised, the UN Third, the Australians demonstrated in Baidoa will have to obtain some sort of autonomous that in a Chapter VII operation there is a range of military capability that facilitates rapid action and options available, including coercive disarmament, minimises the inherent tendency of states to micro­ to help bring bandits and warlords to the sober manage their UN peacekeeping units from distant realisation that resistance to peace is futile. In capitals. Failing that, and thus far there has been striking a balance between cultural relativism and a little enthusiasm among most sovereign states for measured willingness to use force to secure an arrangement which puts certain national forces compliance with UN demands, the Australians unconditionally at the disposal of the UN, the indicaled that successful peace-enforcement was international community will have to reconsider a possible in a failed state situation. And while protectorate solution for a failed state like forcible disarmament is not itself automatically Somalia.'" According to this option, the UN could tension-reducing, its application within the context assume a temporary trusteeship over the country in of multifaceted peacekeeping can enhance rather question and authorise one of its member-states to than diminish the impartiality of the UN in a lawless exercise sovereignty in the area for a specified 11 3 environment. ' That much was made clear by the period to permit internal reconciliation and the Australians. restoration of legitimate government. That may be More generally, Baidoa suggested that the an imperfect option, but given the realities of state debacle in Somalia was not due to peace­ disintegration and its terrible potential for human enforcement per se, but the way that peace suffering it could yet be the most realistic response enforcement was implemented. What was missing available in what is likely to be a prolonged and in Somalia was a long-term vision that turbulent international transition. synchronised political reconciliation with a coherent programme of disarmament. As Henry Kissinger pointed out, the UNITAF and UNOSOM 11 phases of the international intervention should have been merged from the beginning-"" But for that to happen, disarmament needed to be specilied in the original UN mandate authorising UNITAF. That proved to be a crucial omission. In the event, the initial political scope for peaceful leadership created by the surprise impact of UNITAF was soon nullirietl by th~; resurgence of the warlords in Mogadishu. Disarmament could have made a difference by checking this development. One further point warrants consideration. The conditions that led to humanitarian intervention in Somalia- civil war in a failed state- are widespread and resurfacing elsewhere. There are many more Somali as in the world, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, where debt, drought, disease and civil strife are common. While many of these

22 IFS Info 6/97 Notes difficult to stick to rules which certainly are obsolete in the post cold war period," The Guardian, 14 1"Editorial: No Time for Celebration" Somalia News November 1992. However, Sahnoun subsequently Update (SNU) [Electronic mail], Vol3, No 22,27 claimed he opposed the UN's unilateral interaction in December 1992. See Sahnoun "Preventing August 1994; Lewis 1993, Making History in Conflict". Somalia: Humanitarianlmem•t•ntion in a Sta!ele.n Sodety, Discussion Paper 6, Centre for the Study of 14UN Security Council Resolution794, dated 3 Global Governance, London, September 1993, p. 6. December 1992. 2Disarmamenl is often defined as both a process and 10Ibid. an end state. See Graham Evans & Jcffrcy 21 lsmat Kittani, "UN Peace Effons in Somalia" in Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics Revised Kevin Clcmcnts and Christinc Wilson (cds.), UN edition (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatshcaf, Peacekeeping at the Crossroads (Peace Research 1992), pp. 73-74. Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 'Mohamcd Sahnoun, Somalia: the Missed 1994),p.135. Opportunities (Washington DC, United States z~us Ocrensc Secretary Dick Cheney and General Institute of Peace Press, 1994) pp. 15-16; Jonathan Colin Powcll, "US Mission to Somalia is Necessary Ste\·enson ''Hope Restored in Somalia?'', Foreign and Clear", United States lnformution Agency Policy, No 91 (Summer 1993), p. 143. (USIA),East Asia/Pacific Wireless Fih~. 4 December 4 Ken Menkhaus and John Prcndergast, "Political 1992, p. 2. 3 Economy of Post-Intervention Somalia", Somalia " Reuters, 14 December 1992. Task Force Issue Paper no 3, April 1995, p. 3 v.The Independent, 15 December 1992. !electronic mail]. 15 Tiu.> Age (!vtclbourne), 15 December !992. 5Robert G. Patman, The Soviet Union in the Horn of 21;Reuters News Sen'ice, 12 December 1992 and 15 Africa: 1/te diplomaC}' ofinten•entiotl and December 1992. disengagement (Cambridge, Cambridge University 17 Press, 1990), p. 46. Tlte Age, (Melbourne) 15 December 1992. h!bid. ~HThe Evtming Standard (London), 22 December 1992. 1Tlw Guardian, 5 September 1992. 2 ~Rmters News Ser,.ice, 15 December !992; The RNell' York Times, 10 October 1993. Evening Standard (London) 22 December 1992; The 9 Theodore Dagne, "The Horn of Africa: A Trip Guardian, 24 December 1992. Report", CRS Report for Congress, 9I-823F, 15 YiTJJe Guardian, 16 December 1992. November 1991, p. 15. ~ 1 President George Bush cited in "'Substantial 10Lewis 1993, p. 5. American Force Ordered to Somalia", USIA,Easr 11 John Drysdalc, Whate\•er Happened to Somalia? Asia/Pacific Wireless File, 4 December I 992, p. 2. (London, Haan Associates, 1994) pp. 27-28. 3 ~The El'ening Post, (\Vellington) 30 December !992. ~~loan Lewis, ''Misunderstanding the Somalia Crisis", ''The lrulependem, 15 Decem her 1992, Anthropology Today, No. 9, August 1993, p. I. ~~Reuters, 17 December 1992. 13 Lewis 1993, p. 3; Ken Menkhaus and Tcrencc 5 Lyons, ''What are the Lessons to be Learned from ' The Times, 15 December 1992. Somalia'!", CS IS Africa Notes No. 144, January Jt;The Age (Melbourne), 15 December 1992.

1993, p. 3. ~7 Clcment Adibe,Afanagrllg Anns in Peace Processes," l4Rakiya Omaar, "Somaliland: One Thorn Bush at a Somalia, (New York and Geneva, United Nations Time" Current History, No 93, May 1994, p. 232. Institute for Disannament Research, 1995), p. 60.

8 L5Mohamed Sahnoun, "Preventing Conflict: The ' The Guardian, 12 December 1992; Africa Case of Somalia" Secrewry S Open Fontm, Research Bulletin (ARB), December 1-31, 1992, p. (Washington DC, 12 January 1994) pp. 6-1!. 10834. lODrysdale 1994, pp. 47-52. '"ARB, December 1-13, 1992, p. 10834. 17 Boutros-Ghali cited in Menkhaus and Lyons, ·!ODanicl Campagnon, .... I11e Lack oi"Consider.nion for "Le.ssom; to be Learned from Somalia", p. 4. lntemal Political Dynumics in the lntemational 1llJn November 1992, Sahnoun said: "In view of the Intervention in Somalia," Paper prescmed at Intcmational human tragedy which Somalia is facing, it's very

IFS lnfo 6/97 23 Colloquim on Integration and Regionalism, Talence, bSReuter Nmvs Sl~n•ice, 30 rvtarch 1993. Bourdeaux, 17-30 Aprill994, p. 19. tf)The Daily Telegraph, 21 December 1992. "ARIJ, December 1-31,1992, p. 10834. 70"The United Nations Operation in Somalia", "I bid, p. I 0869. Insight, New Zealand National Radio, 10 July 1994. 43Repor1 qfthe Commi\·sion qfInquiry Established 71 7'lw Sunday Times, 3 January 1993; Lieutenant Pursmrt to Secun'ty Council Reso/ution885 (1993) to Colonel Brian Mill an, Queensc1iff Military Training lnw~stigate Anned Attack\' on UNOSOM 11 Persomu:l college, intcrvie\'.' with author, 23 January 1995. Which Led to CtLI'Iwlries Among Tlu.•m, Security Council "Lorenz 1994, p. 415. Document S/19941653, p. I3;ARII, December 1-31, 1992 10 The Guardian, 30 December 1992. p 10834; ARIJ, JanuUI)' 1-31, 1993, p. 10869. 1JReuters News Se11'ice, 7 January 1993. ~~Rqwrt of the Commission ofinquiry, p. 21; ARB, 15 January 1-31, 1993, p. 10869. The EFening Standard (London), 8January 1993. 7 ~ 5 Report of the Commission of inquiry, p. 13. ('The Guardian. 9 January 1993. 17 4f1Thc Obs1•n•cr (London), !?January 1993. The Guardian. 12January 1993. HThe Times (London), I January 1993. "ARIJ, February 1-28, 1993, p. 10904. 7 4RRakiya Omaar and A lex de Waal. Somalia QCJarkc "Testing the World's Resolve in Somalia", p. Operation Restore Hope: A PreliminalJ' Assessmellt 49. (London, African Rights, May 1993), p. 29. ~ 0 The Guardian, 2January 1993.

49 1 Tiu• Sunday Times (London), !January 1993. H The Sunt!ay-Star1ime.r(Wellington), 28 February 1993. 51 lTJw Guardian, 4January 1993. "ARB,May 1-31, 1993,p. 11018.

51 The Dominion (Wellington), 25 February 1993; ~ 3 Ambassador David Shinn, Director for East The Guardian, 25 February 1993. African Affairs, Department of State, interview with "Lewis 1993, p 9; ARIJ, February 1-28, 1993, p. author, Washington DC, 24 January 1994. 10904. 'MThe Times, 5 March 1993; According to Terencc 5lT!Je Sunday Times, 3 January 1993. O'Brien, New Zcakmd's fonncr Pennanent Representative to the UN and President of the Security 5JWaller S. Clarke, "Testing the World's Resolve in Council in March 1993 when resolution 814 wa~ Somalia". Parameters, Vol XXI 11, No 4, Winter fonnulated, "no-one on the Council believed UNITAF 1993-94, p. 49. had discharged iL-; mandate''. But ''theAmcricans sugared 55 The Sunday Times, 3 January 1993. the piU [f()r the Security Council] by tmnouncing they 51'The Guardian, 3 March 1993. would be prepared to leave behind in Somalia sizeable 57Rcport of the Commission of Inquiry, p. 13. uniL~, to participate in UNOSOM 11; and to place them under the (non US) command. This \Va~ the first, and -:1l1Confidential source, State Department's Bureau of indeed only occasion the US had ever volunteered w do Intelligence, 25 January 1994. this in peacekeeping history''. Tercnce O'Brien, Director 51 T/w Times, 15 December 1992. of the Centre for Strategic Studies, Wellington, private 6IJTfu' Age (Melbourne). 15 December 1992. correspondence wilh the author, 24 July 1996.

1 h 71w Times, 15 December 1992. ~5 Report of the Commission of Inquiry, p. 14; Brucc

~ 2 Tite Sunday Obstm•a, 20 December 1992. Lcndon, "Somalia: International Intervention in a Failed State", in Kevin Clcments and Robin Ward 1' 3Tiw Otago Dail)' Times (New Zealand), 12 (ecb.), Building llllt!mational ComnJWJity (Canberra, December 1992. Alien and Umvin in association with the Peace (o~Tiw Guardian, 15 December 1992. Research Centre, 1994), pp. 131-132. 11'i'Colonel M. Couton, Department of Peacekeeping Ht.Tiu~ ~Vashington Post, 28 March 1993. Operations (DPKO), interview with author. New 7 H Report of the Commision of Inquiry, p. 17. York, 28 January 1994; Ewning Post (Wellington), 26 December I 992. ~~Ibid., p. 17. 66The Guardian, 15 December 1992. ~''Mrs Elisabcth Lindenmayer, UN DPKO, interview with author, New York, 27 January 1994. ~>7 F.M. Lorcnz, "Weapons Confiscaton Policy During the First Phases of Operation "Restore 'fl'~Coloncl M. Couton, interview with author, 28 Hope"', Small Hhrs and lnsurgmicies, VolS. No 3 January 1994. (Winter 1994), pp. 414-415. 91 Report of the Commission of Inquiry, p. 22.

24 IFS Into 6/97 92 Rclief aid worker cited in The Times, 7 June 1993. 110 The Age (Melbourne), 29 December 1992. 93The Australian forces were the only army in the 111 Clemenl Adibe, Afanaging Arms in Peace UN operation to receive a letter of commendation Processes: Somalia, p. 74; Colonel Bill Melior, from !he NGO community in Baidoa. See Peter ''Somalia- A Catalyst for Change in the Comm:md and Kieseker, "Relationships between Non-Government Control of Un Opcrmions" in Hugh Smith (ed.) and Multinational Forces in the Field" in Hugh Smith /1/lematlonal Peacekeeping: Building 011 the Cambodian (ed.), Peacekeeping: Cha/lengesfor the Future Erpen·ence(Canberm. AustrJlian Defence Force (Canberra, Australian Defence Force Academy, 1993). Academy 1994), p. 162. There was also great national and international 112Lorenz 1994, p. 415. pressure for the Australians to extend their stay in 113Colonel David Hurley, "An Application of the Baidoa beyond May 1993. This point was made by Laws of Armed ConOict: Operation Solace", p. 185. Rear Admiral A. M. (Gerry) Carwardine, Australian Defence Force Academy, interview with author, 20 11 ~Colonel David Hurley, Headquarters 1st Division, Janum}' 1995, and Colonel Bill Melior, "The Australian Army, Enoggcra, telephone interview Australian Experience in Somalia" in Smith 1994, p. with author, 25 January 1995. 64. nscolonel Bill Melior, "The Australian Experience '14Robert Breen, Through Aussies Eyes: Photographs in Somalia", pp. 62-63. ofthe Australian Defence Force in Somalia 1993, mpetcr Kicseker, "Relationships between Non­ (Canberra. Department of Defence, 1994), p. 13. Government Organisations and Multinational Ft)rces

~ 5Tcstimony of Colonel David Hurley to Joint in the Field", p, 72. Standing Commiltee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and 117Colonel David Hurley, "An Application of the Trade, Defence Subcommittee, 8 April 1994, Laws of Armed Conflict: Operation Solace", p. 185. Canberra, Hansard Report, pp. 530-531. 11 HBreen 1993, p. 79; Lorenz 1994, p. 424.

<)(\Colonel Bill Melior, "The Australian Experience in 11 '-~Colonel David Hurley, "An Application of the Somalia", p. 66; Testimony of Colonel Bill Mellor to Laws of Armed Conflict: Operation Solace", p. 18 I. Joint Standing Commiltec on Foreign Affairs, 1u1Colonel Bill Melior, "The Australian Experience Defence and Trade, Defence Subcommittee, 12 in Somalia", p. 60; Peter Kieseker, "Relationships October 1994, Canberra, Hansard Report, p. 51. between Non-Government Organisations and 11 ' Culoncl David Hurley, "An Application of the Multinational Forces in the Field", p. 67. Laws of Armed Conllict: Operation Solace" in Hugh 1 1 " Testimony of Colonel David Hurley to Joint Smith (cd,), The Force ofLaw: International Law Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 536. and th£• Land Commander, (Canberra, Australian Defence Fnrce Academy, 1994), p. 180. '"Ibid., p. 536. 123 '!1\Brccn 1993, p. 12. Colonel Bill tv1ellor. interview with Pacific Research, Yol 6, No 4, November 1993. "''!bid, p. 14. 1Z-1Major Michael Kelly, "Legal Regimes and Law H~ 1 Jbid, p. 15. Enforcement on Peace Operations", pp. 199-200. 101 The Guardian, 17 December 1992. 125 Major Michael Kelly, Australian Participaiion in ur..reter Kiesckcr, "Relationships between Non­ UN Peace Opermions, Submission to Australian Government Organisations and Multinational forces Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Foreign in the Field", p. 71. Affairs, Defence and Trade, Defence Sub­ IIHJbid. Committee, Canberra, Vol4, 1993, p. 17. HJ.JThe Ttme.r, 15 December 1992. 1 ~Yfestimony of Lieutenant Colonel David Hurley to ""Brcen 1993, p. 15, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, p. 546. 127 lrx;Colonel David Hurley, "An Application of the Laws Colonel Robert Shoebridge, Department of of Anned Conflict: Operation Solace", p. 180. Defence, interview '"'ith author, 27 January !994. 1 107 Brigadicr Phi lip McNarnara, QuecnscliffMilitary :!J!Major Michael Kelly, "Legal Regimes and Law Training College, interview wilh author, 23 J:muary 1995. Enforcement on Peace Opcralions", p. 20 I. 129 10RMajor Michael Kelly, "Legal Regimes and L1w Submission of Major Michael Kelly, A11stralian Enlbrcement on Peace Operations" in Smith 1994, p. 202. Participalion in UN Peace Operations, p. 18. 1mColonel Bill Mellor, interview with Pacffic Research, nncolonel Bill Melior, interview with Paqfic Vol6, No4, November 1993; Brccn 1993, p. 53. Research, Vol 6, No 4, November 1993. mcoloncl David Hurley, telephone interview, 25

IFS Into 6/97 2 5 January 1994. "Relationships between Non-Government mClan elders cited by Colonel Bill Melior, interview Organisations", pp. 71~73. with Pacific Research, Vol6, No 4, November 1993. 151 Teslimony of Lieutenant General John Baker, Vice "'Brcen !993, p. 110. Chief of the Australi

~~ 1 Thc phrase is the author's but it is derived from 15"Colonel David Hurley, telephone interview with views expressed by Colonel David Hurley, author, 25 January 1995: Brigadier Phi lip telephone interview with author, 25 January 1995. McNamara, interview with author, 23 January 1995;

~~~c."ltimony of Colonel David Hurley to Austr.:tlian Lieutenant Colonel Brian Millan, interview with Parliament's Joinl Standing Committee on Foreign author, 23 Janu<"try 1995. AfTairs, p. 546; The a!JShington Posr, 21 November 157 Murray Domney, interview with author, 27 1993; loan Lcwis's letter to The Times, 4 December 1992. January 1995. 14 3Thomas J. Callahan, "Some Observations on 15ilJbid; Testimony of Colonel David Hurley to Somalia's Past and Future" CS IS AFRICA NOTES, Australian Parliament's Joint Standing Committee No !58 (March !994), p. 6; Clarke 1993-94, p. 49. on Foreign Affairs, p. 531.

1 ~Brian Urquhart "Beyond the ''Sheriff's Posse'"', 15YGeneral Colin Powcll cited in "US Mission to Sun'ival Vol 32, No 3, 1990. Somalia Necessary and Clear", p. 21.

~~~General Colin Powcll cited in "US Mission to lf~1 Mike McCurry, press spokesman for Presid~nt Somalia Necessary and Clear", p. 17. Bill Clinton, cited in Reuters, 3 November 1993.

uliCon!idential source, State Departmcm's Bureau H• 1''Prnctitioners' Questionnaire on: Weapons oflntclligcncc, 25 January, 1994. Control, Disarmanent, and Demobilization during 1J'Testimony of Colonel David Hurley to Australian Peacekeeping Operations" in Clement Adibc, Parliament's Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Managing Anm in Peace Processt•,c Sonwlia, p. Affairs, p. 546; Major Michael Kelly Australian 225. Participation in UN Peace Operations, p. 3. lu:Ramesh Thakur, ''From Peacekeeping to Peace

l~kPeter Kieseker, "Relationships between Non­ Enforcement: the UN Operation in Somalia" Journal Government Organisations and Multinational Forces of Modem African Studies, Vol 32, No. 3, in the Field", p. 68. September 1994. 11 149Jbid .• p. 68; Ian Wishart, tvlanagcr of World Vision r3MiJes Armitage, UN Political Section, Australia's Relief Project Unit, cited in World Vision Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, Australia's Submission, p. 15. interview with author, 14 December 1994. 1 ~~oMurray Domney, International Policy Division, MThe Guardian, 16 December 1992. Department of Defence, Australia, interview with 1 r"~Thc Bush Administration abandoned plans in late author, 27 January 1994; Peter Kiescker,

26 IFS Into 6/97 November 1992 to establish a UN protectorate in Somalia. Sec The Guardian, I December 1992; I am also indebted to Professor John Omer-Coopcr, formerly of the Department of History, University of Otago, for emphasising in our discussions the need for new multi-lateral approaches to the current problem or failed states.

IFS lnfo 6/97 27 IFS Info 6/1997

Robert G. Patntan

Seculiing Somalia

A Comparison ot US and Australian Peacekeeping during the UNiii"AF Operation

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