Peace in Puntland: Mapping the Progress Democratization, Decentralization, and Security and Rule of Law

Home , Abdiweli Gaas, Bargal, Battle of El Adde, Bayla, Bosaso, Burtinle

Pillars of Peace Somali Programme

Garowe, November 2015

Acknowledgment This Report was prepared by the Puntland Development Re- search Center (PDRC) and the Interpeace Regional Office for Eastern and Central Africa.

Lead Researchers Research Coordinator: Ali Farah Ali Security and Rule of Law Pillar: Ahmed Osman Adan Democratization Pillar: Mohamoud Ali Said, Hassan Aden Mo- hamed Decentralization Pillar: Amina Mohamed Abdulkadir Audio and Video Unit: Muctar Mohamed Hersi

Research Advisor Abdirahman Osman Raghe

Editorial Support Peter W. Mackenzie, Peter Nordstrom, Jessamy Garver- Affeldt, Jesse Kariuki and Claire Elder

Design and Layout David Müller

Printer Kul Graphics Ltd

Front cover photo: Swearing-in of Galkayo Local Council. Back cover photo: Mother of slain victim reaffirms her com- mittment to peace and rejection of revenge killings at MAVU film forum in Herojalle.

ISBN: 978-9966-1665-7-9

Published: November 2015

This report was produced by the Puntland Development Re- search Center (PDRC) with the support of Interpeace and represents exclusively their own views. These views have not been adopted or in any way approved by the contributing donors and should not be relied upon as a statement of the contributing donors or their services. The contributing donors do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this report, nor do they accept responsibility for any use made thereof. Content Acronyms 6 Foreword 7

1 Background 8 1.1 Brief Project Context 10 1.2 Pillars of Peace: Phase II 12

2 Security and Rule of Law 14 2.1 Introduction 14 2.2 Challenges to Security Sector 15 2.2.1 Low Institutional Capacities 15 2.2.2 Proliferation of Arms 16 2.2.3 Public and Police Relations 18 2.2.4 Religious Extremism 18 2.2.5 Regional / Intra-Regional Border Issues 19 2.2.6 Illegal Fishing and Possible Implications 20 2.3 Challenges to Puntland Judicial and Legal Sector 21 2.3.1 Key Institutional Deficiencies 21 2.3.2 Formal versus Traditional Justice 22 2.4 Challenges to Social Reconciliation 22 2.4.1 Recurrence of Resource-Based Conflicts 22 2.4.2 Loose Communal Cohesion 23 2.5 Exploring Social Reconciliation Prospects in Puntland 24 2.5.1 Prospects for Security 24

3 Democratization 32 3.1 Introduction 32 3.2 Challenges to the Democratization Process 33 3.2.1 Transitioning from the Clan System to Multi-Party Politics 33 3.2.2 Frail Commitments and Capacity 34 3.2.3 Widespread and Easy Public Access to Weapons 37 3.3 Obstacles for Elections 38 3.3.1 Low Public Awareness 38 3.3.2 Lack of a Constitutional Court 38 3.3.3 Lack of Regional and District Boundary Demarcation 39 3.3.4 Lack of Voter Registration and Voter ID Cards 39 3.3.5 Limited Financial Resources 39 3.3.6 Nascent Political Parties 39 3.4 Exploring Democratization Prospects in Puntland 40 3.4.1 Popular Support 40 3.4.2 General Government Commitment 40 3.4.3 Public Expectations on the Benefits of Democracy 41 3.4.4 Sufficient Time 41 3.5 Key Entry Points for Democracy Promotion 42 3.5.1 Reinvigorating Community Cohesion 43 3.5.2 Intensifying Civic and Voter Education 43 3.5.3 Demarcating Districts in Puntland 44 3.5.4 Identifying and Registering Voters 45 3.5.5 Providing Security 45 3.5.6 Instituting the Constitutional Court 46

4 Decentralization 48 4.1 Introduction 48 4.2 Decentralization Milestones 49 4.3 Challenges to Decentralization in Puntland 50 4.3.1 Lack of Institutional Capacity (administrative, fiscal and human) 51 4.3.2 Low Citizen Participation 52 4.3.3 Limited Financial Resources 54 4.3.4 Revenue Generation Capacities 55 4.3.5 Transparency and Accountability 55 4.3.6 Public Service Delivery 56 4.3.7 Multiplication of Districts: Implications and Possible Consequences 56 4.3.8 Central and Local Authorities Relations 57 4.4 Exploring Decentralization Prospects in Puntland 58 4.5 Key Entry Points for Decentralization in Puntland 59 4.5.1 Building Local Government Capacities 59 4.5.2 Fostering Public Participation in Local Affairs 60 4.5.3 Addressing Proliferation of Districts 60 4.5.4 Enhancing Local Revenue Generating Capacities 61 4.5.5 Reinforcing Inter-Governmental Linkages 61

5 Conclusion 63

6 Bibliography 65 Acronyms ALGAPL Association of Local Government Authorities of Puntland State CRRC Conflict Resolution and Ratification Committee CSO Civil Society Organization DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration DfP Dialogue for Peace FGD Focus Group Discussion FGS Federal Government of Somalia HoR House of Representatives IDP Internally Displaced Person KII Key Informant Interviews MAVU Mobile Audio-Visual Unit MOCFAD Ministry of Constitution, Federal Affairs and Democratization MOI Ministry of Interior MOS Ministry of Security PAR Participatory Action Research PDRC Puntland Development Research Center PMPF Puntland Marine Police Force PoP Pillars of Peace PSM Puntland Stakeholders Meeting SC Steering Committee SfP Search for Peace SRoL Security and Rule of Law SSC Sool, Sanaag and Cayn SSF Somalia Stability Fund TPEC Transitional Puntland Electoral Commission UNSOM United Nations Office for Somalia WSPI War-Torn Societies Project International

6 Foreword This report is the product of a yearlong research on the challenges, opportunities and prospects of democratization, decentralization and security and rule of law in Puntland. It was implemented under the Pillars of Peace (PoP II) programme through the joint efforts of PDRC and Interpeace, who have been partners in supporting peace-and-statebuilding processes in the Somali region over the years.

The research engaged 389 people through key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FDGs) in eleven districts from nine locations within Puntland. An additional 140 people were also engaged in the Punt- land Stakeholders’ Meeting (PSM) held in Garowe on 3-5 February 2015 to validate the research findings. PDRC and Interpeace are thankful to all the people that took part in the research and for their invaluable and meaningful contributions.

7 1 Background

The Puntland Development Research Center participatory approach has been to work with (PDRC) is a non-governmental organization all segments of Puntland society, placing a par- based in Garowe, with a satellite office in ticular emphasis on including groups that are Galkayo. PDRC was established in November often overlooked or under-represented in de- 1999 by the War-Torn Societies Project Inter- cision-making processes, namely women, youth, national (WSPI), which operated in Puntland and socially-segregated communities. By engag- from 1997-99. PDRC remains a partner in ing these groups in important conversations, peacebuilding of WSPI’s successor organization, PDRC seeks to ensure that the processes and Interpeace. institutions necessary for a strong society and well-functioning government are truly reflec- tive of Puntland’s popular, cross-clan interests. The mission of the organization is to participate, as actor and beneficiary, in PDRC fosters community dialogue and stake- peacebuilding and the reconstruction of holder engagement in a variety of ways, from Somalia; and to contribute to the crea- individual interactions to convening large public tion of a democratic system of govern- forums and conferences, as well as carrying out ment, economic and social development, a number of training programs, awareness-rais- and respect of human rights for all, ing activities and civic education for the public, based on equality of citizens. in partnership with government authorities, other local actors, and international organizations. It utilizes audio-visual tools as a core ap- PDRC has become a prominent and esteemed proach to sharing information and broadening peacebuilding institution in Puntland, an area in debate within the community. northeastern Somalia that continues to recov- er from the aftermath of the Somali civil war PDRC employs participatory action research (which erupted in 1991), as well as the subse- (PAR), a methodology that embodies the quent sectarian and criminal violence. principles of strengthening local capacities, promoting genuine inclusivity, and pursuing Over the past 16 years PDRC has become a consensus-based decision-making at all levels. neutral space for dialogue and reconciliation, The essence of PAR is to reach consensual primarily through ambitious core programs solutions to key challenges faced by society carried out in cooperation with Interpeace. as identified by concerned stakeholders. Such A characteristic feature of PDRC’s broad-based solutions are based on the inclusion and gen-

8 uine participation of all sectors of society (i.e. Puntland democratization process. engaging both horizontally with a cross-section of the community and vertically from the grass- The Search for Peace (SfP) study was a result of roots to the political elite). This approach fos- the DfP program, and comprised a comprehen- ters community-based ownership of research sive mapping of conflicts and their respective and decision-making in both its design and mediation processes, highlighting priority areas management. With adaptations over the years, and possible solutions from past experiences this methodology has been a key foundation of and practices. The output of this study was The the peacebuilding work pursued by Interpeace Puntland Experience: A Bottom Up Approach and PDRC. to Peace and Statebuilding1. The SfP study not only researched local issues, but also thorough- PDRC has undertaken a series of dia- ly examined Somalia-wide issues, such as ap- logue-based research projects to shed light on praising the successive national reconciliation pressing issues facing Puntland society and to efforts and their outcomes. develop action and policy-oriented recommendations to address these issues. The vision of the Pillars of Peace is to build upon more than a decade’s experi- The vision of the “Dialogue for Peace” ence of peacebuilding and support for project is to advance and underpin pro- institution building in order to continue cesses of peace and state building in So- to advance and underpin the consoli- malia through inclusive, research-based, dation of peace throughout the Somali consensus-oriented consultations and region through consensus-oriented, actions. integrated approaches to state building and peacebuilding.

The Dialogue for Peace (DfP) program, implemented between 2004 and 2008, laid the foun- The Pillars of Peace program build on more dation for a viable space for dialogues in So- than 15 years’ experience of PDRC and In- malia, which had been devastated by prolonged terpeace, its long-time partner in peace- and civil strife. By gathering stakeholders around statebuilding. PDRC, through successive peace- tables and under trees, the objective of these building programs, has fostered a culture of di- dialogues was to discuss issues of common in- alogue, inclusiveness, and consultation across a terest and to solve pressing conflicts, in part wide spectrum of communities and authorities. by enabling stakeholders to identify the root These programs have been built upon consen- causes of their problems. Such forums creat- sus-seeking, integration, representation, and ed much-needed opportunities to rebuild trust ample local ownership. and confidence and to establish a basis for sustainable statehood and governance. Publications The first phase of the Pillars of Peace program resulting from this research included Funding commenced in early 2009 and concluded at the Future, a study on how public funds could the end of 2012. The second phase began with be better utilized for greater social service de- comprehensive research process mapping the livery, as well as key policy documents including The 1993 Mudug Region Peace Agreement: 1 Puntland Development and Research Center (PDRC). Peacebuilding at the Crossroads and Roots for “The Puntland Experience: A Bottom-up Approach to Peace and State Building.” The Search for Peace: Somalia Good Governance, a roadmap for the evolving Program, in collaboration with Interpeace, 26 July 2011.

9 challenges, opportunities, and prospects for the A comprehensive consultative pillars mapping security and rule of law, democratization, and exercise underlined the relevance of these decentralization pillars. The outcome of this challenges, and validated the selection of these exercise was presented to a Puntland Stake- priority issues with key stakeholders, gathering holders Meeting held in February 2015. The preliminary input as to how these issues may following notes embody and capture the out- be addressed. Further validation came during comes of the mapping exercise as well as addi- the first Puntland Stakeholders Meeting (PSM)2 tional information gathered after the Puntland in 2010. Findings were published in a note en- Stakeholders Meeting. titled Mapping the Foundations of Peace. Fol- lowing the first PSM, PDRC entered into an Following the adoption of mapping tools and implementation phase, seeking to put the rec- strategies, the three pillar teams visited 11 dis- ommendations of the research and validation tricts carefully selected by size, location, and into action. social, economic, and political relevance. Dur- ing the mapping the teams reached out to lead- The first phase of Pillars of Peace program, de- ing community elders, religious leaders, civil tailed above, provided the basis for a second society organizations, representatives of mar- round of research that forms the foundation ginalized communities, internally displaced peo- for this report and for the second phase of the ple, prominent politicians and intellectuals, and program. representatives of the international community. In each of the visited locations the teams not only carried out interviews and FGDs, but also 2 Puntland Development and Research Center (PDRC). screened documentary films highlighting the “Puntland Note: Mapping the Foundations of Peace Chal- achievements of the first phase of the PoP pro- lenges to Security and Rule of Law, Democratisation Process and Devolution of Power to Local Authorities.” gram and delivering traditional peace and civic Pillars of Peace: Somalia Program, in collaboration with education messages. Interpeace, 27 May 2014.

1.1 Brief Project Context

Since the first phase of the PoP program, the lection rather than popular election. This was Puntland context has seen significant evolution, the fourth time the hybrid system was used particularly in the political arena. since Puntland was established in 1998.

On 8 January 2014, Puntland emerged from In November 2013, traditional elders began a major political, social, and security impasse, the selection of new members of the House of caused by the stalling of the democratization Representatives (HoR), which was officially dis- process. This occurred on 14 July 2013, when solved on 31 October. The process plunged into President Abdurahman Sheikh Mohamed (Fa- crisis, resulting from divergent political visions roole) suspended the scheduled local council and interests between the then-administration elections (due to occur the next day) because and the highly disenfranchised opposition. The of violent flare-ups in several parts of Puntland. incumbent president, Faroole, had nominated a This prompted a return to the “hybrid” system Conflict Resolution and Ratification Commit- of political transition, a mixed traditional and tee (CRRC) to resolve disputes over the selec- democratic approach based in large part on se- tion of the new HoR members. Soon after its

10 nomination, the majority of other presidential dangerous mass migration (tahriib) of youth to contenders rejected the committee, noting ir- Europe and to the Gulf States, across the Libyan regularities in the appointment process and se- and Sudanese deserts and the Gulf of Aden, still lection of commissioners. Intense political and continues due to severe unemployment. Dis- security consultations involving traditional and cordance between revenue collection targets religious leaders, politicians, civil society organ- and actual public expenditure has strained the izations (CSOs) and the international commu- government’s ability to cope with Puntland’s nity began in all major towns and at all levels. overall economic burden. Despite the fact that Most of these consultations were interactive the government has launched important finan- and intended to defuse the prevailing political cial reforms, such as the introduction of inland disputes and deteriorating security conditions. revenue collection, there are acute shortcom- ings in the payment of salaries to the security On 31 December 2013, the fourth Puntland forces and civil servants. Even when salaries are HoR was inaugurated. The new House included paid, they are often inadequate to cover the more incoming Members of Parliament (MPs) living expenses of government employees and than veterans from the previous parliament, their families. although only two female members were selected. All stakeholders, including the then High public expectations for the new admin- presidential candidates, accepted the new HoR. istration to resume the stalled democratiza- On 8 January 2014, the MPs cast their votes tion process, the undertaking of a meaningful to elect a new president for the coming five decentralization of authority to the local lev- years. Despite being the fiercest political con- el, and the holding of a reconciliation confer- test Puntland has seen, the process was peace- ence for Puntland communities still remain the ful, and Abdiweli Mohamed Ali (Gaas), who won top agenda items in any political debate. With by only a narrow margin, was inaugurated. The the assistance of PDRC, the government has, international community and Puntland diaspora however, re-instated a number of previously hailed the peaceful nature of the transition. dissolved local councils. Councils were also established in a number of newly-designated Under the new administration, security has districts, including Harfo, Uffain, Ballidhidin, and generally improved, although notable attacks Baargal. PDRC conducted induction trainings have taken place in the Golis Mountain region for several local councils following direct re- and Garowe. Stability still faces challenges from quests from the government and local councils. an unfolding federal system and border dis- Both the newly-established and re-instated lo- putes over North Mudug. Major development cal councils suffer from issues of inclusivity. Al- projects have commenced, but the provision though young mayors were elected in Jarriban, of basic services has only marginally improved. Harfo, Badhan, Uffain, and Ballidhidin, the rep- The construction of the Midigar Bridge3 has resentation of youth, women, and marginalized been implemented, the construction of Bossa- groups remains low. so International Airport is underway, and many other projects are in the pipeline. However, the In March 2014, PDRC and Interpeace conducted a participatory poll to examine prospects 3 Midigar is a bridge on the tarmac road, about 45 km for the democratization process. The main north of the capital Garowe, connecting to the northern objective of this poll was to gauge public per- towns of Gardo and Bossaso. The bridge was destroyed ceptions on and support for the resumption of by a cyclone in late 2013. The project cost over $1 million, the halted democratization process, and what and was funded through a self-help scheme with locally generated resources. this would entail from the government as well

11 as civil society. An overwhelming majority of ratization process. The polling also highlighted respondents, about 86 percent, urged the gov- popular perceptions about key issues facing the ernment to establish the second Transitional democratization process and provided quanti- Puntland Electoral Commission (TPEC II) as tative, verifiable, and immediate public opinion soon as possible to prepare for the upcoming information to facilitate communication be- elections and confirm the leadership’s commit- tween the public and decision-makers, as well ment towards the continuation of the democ- as public awareness-raising.

1.2 Pillars of Peace: Phase II

PDRC initiated the PoP Phase II mapping ex- thoroughly elaborated in the following chap- ercise from May to June 2014. This consisted ters. In brief, the findings indicated considerable of preliminary focus group discussions (FGDs) programmatic successes in local peacebuilding with a wide spectrum of experts to fine-tune but continued challenges relating to capacity. the questionnaire and interview material. This The main challenges to democratization were was followed, in September and October, by a deemed to be the chronic difficulty of tran- more comprehensive mapping exercise cover- sitioning from a clan-based to a democratic ing eleven districts in all nine regions of Punt- system, the lack of expertise and profession- land. Eleven districts from these nine regions alism among political parties, misperceptions were selected according to their category (A, regarding the composition and role of politi- B or C, in accordance with Law # 7 of 2005), cal parties, and the lack of political or social geographical distance, and region. An overall reconciliation. With respect to the decentrali- number of 389 people took part in key inform- zation of power to local authorities, the main ant interviews (KIIs) and FGDs. challenges identified included the chronic low participation of the public, the multiplication of The main purpose of the mapping was to estab- districts and un-demarcated district borders, lish the challenges, opportunities and possible limited local government revenues, and low in- focus areas for the democratization, decentral- stitutional capacities. In terms of security and ization, and security and rule of law pillars. This social reconciliation, the challenges identified provided an opportunity for PDRC to recon- included low institutional capacity (especially nect with communities across Puntland, explain for the judiciary and security sectors), the flow what PDRC is currently working on, and find of illegal weapons, poor public/police relations, out how their perceptions and situations have persistent religious extremism, and protracted changed since the previous mapping exercise in sub-clan conflicts. 2009. This also allowed PDRC to report back on the accomplishments of Pillars of Peace I. Many challenges are “cross-cutting” for all The research teams met with stakeholders three pillars, including district border disputes, such as community elders, youth, women, civil religious extremism, insufficient political recon- society organizations, and socially segregated ciliation among communities, and low capaci- and disadvantaged groups, conducting inter- ties of government institutions. views, FGDs, and specialized panel discussions on specific topics. The mapping exercise culminated in a second PSM that gathered more than 140 participants The detailed findings of the mapping will be representing local communities, authorities,

12 and members of the international community with the facilitation of PDRC and Interpeace to discuss the key findings, analyze the implica- research teams, thereby transferring own- tions of the research, validate identified chal- ership of the process to the stakeholders. In lenges and opportunities by prioritizing and conjunction with PDRC, the steering commit- ranking them, and agree on recommendations tees would agree on “entry points” – specific for programming. challenges and proposed approaches to solve them – which they would pursue during the At the PSM, PDRC research teams present- implementation phase. ed their community-based research, and also screened documentary films related to each In order to further highlight the process and pillar in order to authenticate the findings of findings, PDRC has developed this pillar note, the mapping exercise. Following three days of which highlights the challenges and opportuni- discussions on the presented challenges and ties identified in the mapping exercise, priorities prospects, key challenges to be addressed for as identified by the PSM, prospects for address- each thematic area were validated and prior- ing these priority issues, and key questions that itized. The PSM also adopted selection crite- need to be answered by the government, civil ria for three steering committees that would society, and the wider Puntland community in oversee the implementation of pillar activities order to reach solutions.

13 2 Security and Rule of Law

2.1 Introduction

Over the past sixteen years, Puntland has en- the main impediments to sustainable peace and joyed relative peace and stability despite on-go- rule of law in Puntland. ing insecurity and political transition in central and southern Somalia. This can be attributed, at Despite these challenges, Puntland has made least in part, to the relatively homogenic clan significant headway in countering the Al composition of the Puntland population, the Shabaab insurgency in the Galgala Mountains, dedication of its public and traditional elders with considerable progress made towards up- to peace, and the relentless efforts of succes- rooting piracy (through joint community and sive governments to sustain peace and securi- government efforts). The establishment of the ty across the state. Yet, despite these efforts, Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF) and the Puntland has experienced fragmenting politics enactment of anti-piracy and anti-terror laws and security, which has adversely affected its during President Faroole’s tenure were impor- political and social cohesion in various ways. tant milestones. Police stations and posts were Security threats – including, among others, un- built in Garowe, Bossaso, Eyl and Bayla – an in- precedented sea piracy off its coast, persistent itiative that is on-going. Contemporary prisons inter-clan conflicts and violent religious- ex were also built in Garowe and Gardo. The cen- tremism (Al Shabaab) – all pose an acute men- tral investigation department offices in Garowe ace to Puntland’s stability. were reconstructed and capacity-building programs targeted the police and other security As noted during the second pillar mapping ex- forces, with hundreds sent to Ethiopia and Dji- ercise, there are other critical challenges that bouti for further training. Various clan conflicts also hamper the Puntland security sector which have also been brought to an end. Unlike his include an ineffective police force, low capaci- predecessors, Faroole’s era was also character- ty for intelligence-gathering and investigation, ized by limited, but vicious confrontations with public possession of weapons, loose social co- Somaliland, despite the on-going dispute over hesion, inadequate rule of law and a weak jus- control of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) regions. tice system. These factors are considered to be

14 Within the PoP program, the purpose of the cess between Osman Mohamud (Majeerteen) security and rule of law pillar is to strategical- and Dubeys (Warsengeli); the Igdhays recon- ly contribute to the reduction of conflict and ciliation process between Ali Saleban and Ali consolidation of peace in Puntland. It does so Jibrahil (both Majeertein sub-clans); and the through provision of policy and programmatic Rako reconciliation process between Ugaar support to the relevant government institu- Saleban and Ali Saleban. Most recently, in con- tions as well as through technical hands-on and junction with the PDRC Mobile Audio-Visual logistical facilitation of peacebuilding efforts Unit (MAVU), the security pillar successfully throughout Puntland. facilitated the settlement of a long-standing feud between two brotherly communities in As a result, during the first phase of the PoP Xero-Jaale village, 51 km west of Galkayo. With program (2009-2012), modest progress was the exception of the Rako conflict, which flared made in addressing key concerns of the securi- up again in 2014, the majority of these peace ty pillar, in conjunction with the pillar steering processes have endured. committee and other key stakeholders, including the Ministry of Security and Disarmament, Expanding on these achievements, and in Demobilization and Reintegration. The holding preparation for the implementation phase of of numerous policy dialogues and consultation PoP II, this note chronicles the challenges to workshops in Puntland’s main towns contrib- the Puntland security and judicial sectors and uted to the development of clear policy guide- outlines opportunities for improvement. Finally, lines for the security sector. it also includes analysis on the prospects and key questions to prompt the much-needed dis- The pillar also facilitated several reconcilia- course on countering the immediate challenges tion and peace-making processes in 2011 and to Puntland security and stability. 2012, including: the Armo reconciliation pro-

2.2 Challenges to Security Sector

2.2.1 Low Institutional Capacities ping had neither an adequate number of police nor the necessary security infrastructure and Chronic institutional capacity deficiencies and the amenities, and the police that are stationed in absence of clear policy the visited districts operate either in run-down premises or co-locate with other government Since the establishment of Puntland in 1998, institutions. The matter is further exacerbated institutional challenges have beleaguered the by the lack of clear-cut regulations or proce- security sector, affecting the entire security ap- dures to govern the security sector. paratus and other law enforcement institutions. This sector is characterized by a work force “There are no clear-cut policies and proce- that is poorly trained, disciplined, equipped and dures that regulate our security sector; we remunerated; worn-out or non-existent infra- usually resort to ad hoc means, let’s finish structure; and the absence of a vision, mission the ‘jabhad/faction style’ way of governance.” and program of action. - Muse Ali Jama, politician in Gardo

Most of the districts visited during the map- According to government records, around 30

15 percent of the government budget is spent curity maintenance efforts. This is seen particu- on security4. Yet, the perception is that little larly with the prioritisation of pay to members of this actually trickles down to the security of armed clan militia who provide protection personnel on the ground, and that security is and security to the senior government officials proving to be less effective in tackling the mul- including the members of parliament. This was tiplicity of security concerns. The police force best depicted by a prominent elder in Bossaso, receives neither fair and timely remuneration Mursal Mohamoud Abdi, who ironically stated: nor healthcare and other benefits. The conditions are extremely bad in remote and hard- “Fifty ministers and over 60 MPs are escort- to-access areas. Inadequate or infrequent pay ed by their tribal militiamen at the expense for policemen cause demoralisation and leads of public security.” to a troubled relationship between the security apparatus and local communities. A particularly interesting, but discouraging, finding was the sense of vulnerability these soldiers “A soldier who receives seventy dollars a felt in the absence of government oversight or month – and sometimes doesn’t receive accountability. It was clear that the individual (any salary at all) – cannot fully commit to soldier still relies on clan protection and fears uphold peace and security.” - Gen. Mohiya- incidents of retaliation. din Ahmed Muse, Deputy Chief of Police “We refrain from taking action against cul- Part of the security officials interviewed men- prits because the government is reluctant to tioned that following enlistment, they were not accept liability for our actions while on duty provided with any firearms or ammunition, but and I don’t want to engage my family/clan in were instead asked to bring their own guns and war. We need protection in the first place.” - arrange for their own ammunition. Lack of such Ahmed Osman, Deputy Division Command- provisions, as well as training, prevents the for- er of Mudug mation of a strong sense of allegiance to the rule of law or government authority. Another overarching challenge elucidated by this research was the weakness of the com- “Our region consists of four districts/towns mand structure and intelligence gathering – and over sixty rural villages – and only 36 that are both major contributors to prevailing policemen are assigned to maintain securi- police ineffectiveness. ty in this vast area. Sometimes I am stuck when a security incident happens and I cannot find any fuel. We buy shackles out of our 2.2.2 Proliferation of Arms pocket, use our own computers to write cor- respondence and plead with Golis to print Divided society and easily accessible arms make for us.” - Col. Jama Mohamed Gabaydhe, local conflicts more lethal Divisional Commander of Haylaan Since the breakdown of Siyad Barre’s regime in Some of the mapping participants felt that in- 1991 and the subsequent collapse of the Somali appropriate use of security funds and absence army, the possession of arms and heavy weap- of accountability measures also undermines se- ons among civilians has increased. Arms have proliferated across Puntland and have fuelled violent conflict between Somali communities, 4 See “2013 Budget,” Ministry of Finance Report, January 2013. as well as sea piracy, destruction of property,

16 terrorist activities, kidnapping, and rape. Easy low table5 indicates the reported criminal inci- access to weapons has been fundamental to dents by category from 2011 to 2014: the on-going insecurity and political instability in the Somali region, including Puntland. The be- 5 PDRC Interview, Office of the Attorney General of Puntland

Incident 2011 2012 2013 2014 Rape 174 32 131 157 Murder 257 301 176 124 Drug related crimes 58 57 323 347 Robbery and theft 1745 409 1052 1902 Death toll of clan conflicts 163 100 454 643 Total 2397 899 2136 3173

Table 1: Reported criminal incidents

There is continued smuggling of firearms and ment and demobilization programs. This would ammunition into Somalia/Puntland, where they provide the foundation for a more effective are sold on the open market. The estimated to- voluntary disarmament exercise. tal number of guns (both licit and illicit) held by civilians in Somalia is between 550,0006 and “We are all at risk and due to the absence 750,000 7, with only 14,000 of these guns duly of political and social commitment to un- registered. dertake disarmament, demobilization and

rehabilitation programs, and illegal arms will

Despite efforts of Puntland’s government to always pose a significant threat to our se- shoulder the overall responsibility of security curity.” – Abdirashid Ali Sajin, Deputy Mayor and engender a safe environment for its citi- of Bocame zens, overall lack of confidence in the security sector motivates people to retain arms for Initial studies8 reveal that the number of civilian self-defence or clan interests. The majority of arms in Puntland exceeds the number of arms the security mapping participants believe that held by the government. In the border areas the government should first provide protec- of Mudug and Cayn, communities possess large tion to all citizens and then pursue disarma- numbers of weapons in order to repel possible

threats from southern Mudug and Somaliland

respectively. This security dilemma prohibits 6 Lynge, Karina (2009), “High Presence of and Easy Ac- the disarmament of one group without that of cess to Small Arms,” Community Safety and Small Arms in Somaliland: Analysis and Recommendations. Somaliland: the other. Danish Demining Group, 1 September. (Q2099). “No one can overrule an armed society; Karp, Aaron (2007), “Completing the Count: Civilian 7 firearms.” Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 27 August. 8 World Bank, in collaboration with PDRC. “Conflict in (Q5). Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics.” January, 2005.

even the policeman cannot dare to confront arrested a suspect and handed him over to an armed militiaman who counts on impu- the police, then the investigating police of- nity from his clan.” – Ahmed Hassan Jama, ficers took a bribe and freed the suspect. Bocame Police Commissioner I saw the freed suspect days later and he shouted that I will pay a high price (for my While dependence on weapons by the civilian action) – that is why I hold a pistol.” – Dhudi population remains strong, there is mounting Yusuf, Chairlady of Mudug Women’s Associ- aversion to weapons throughout Puntland, with ation clan elders playing a pivotal role in controlling the nature of conflicts by keeping clan arms in The majority of security officials interviewed stockpiles, although these tend not to be se- during the study mentioned that police face dif- cured or well-guarded. ficulties in detaining culprits due to poor public awareness and understanding of the rule of law. The perpetrators are often supported by their 2.2.3 Public and Police Relations parents, close kin and clan elders, who, in some cases, will resort to violent means to set them Prevailing distance between police and community free. members In the visited districts, elders and business- The security service is not widely decentral- people often provide backstopping support to ized across Puntland, and police personnel are police in maintaining peace and order. The po- mostly centred in main towns. This allows peo- lice fully rely on local communities to enforce ple to seek refuge among their clans in areas the law in remote localities. This also applies where the police has no presence. Even in large at the state level, where the Puntland govern- towns, participants reported police ineffective- ment often depends on the traditional elders, ness – for instance, that police often take bribes religious leaders and business community in and release criminals in the town of Galkayo. resolving social conflicts. Despite being formal Another practice alienating the public is the allies in maintaining security, however, the role lack of professionalism or privacy that often of elders, sheikhs and the business community leads to the exposure of citizens who cooper- is not fully institutionalized and integrated into ate with the security agencies. The combination the prevailing security and peace-making struc- of these factors has resulted in widespread dis- tures. Some critics say that successive Puntland trust between the police and the public, further governments were unwilling to empower the compounded by the lack of adequate informa- traditional elders, fearing that they would chal- tion sharing between the public and police. lenge the government.

The study revealed limited cooperation and “Our role – as elders – is to sustain peace, suspicion between the public and security or- we get nothing in return and yet we are gans throughout the visited districts. Partici- committed to fulfil what seems to be a life- pants indicated that most people refrain from time job for all of us.” – Adan Warsame Os- cooperating with the police and other security man, traditional elder in Galdogob agencies due to the perception that police will be unresponsive, or fearing retaliation from perpetrators in the event of police leaks. 2.2.4 Religious Extremism

“One day, I and a group of women citizens Poverty, high unemployment and lack of youth

18 development programs alienate young Somalis group’s capacity. The biggest security hazard is posed by the continued resilience of the Al-Qaida-affiliated Public perception of Al Shabaab was adversely group, Al Shabaab. Their ideological dedication affected by the assassination of the two most to universal jihad and ability to indoctrinate prominent religious leaders in Puntland, Dr. young Somalis and engage them in terrorist ac- Ahmed Haji Abdirahman and Sheikh Abdikadir tions suggest that they will continue to pose a Nur Farah, in 2012 and 2013 respectively. This threat to the security and stability of Puntland contributed to a widespread public awakening and the region for the foreseeable future. and backlash against Al Shabaab. Coupled with government offensives against the group, the According to the FGD participants, poverty environment in Puntland has not been condu- and lack of employment were the main drivers cive to its presence. Nevertheless, increasing of insecurity, alienating youth and raising dis- pressure on Al Shabaab from the African Union content in Puntland. As the UNDP Somalia Hu- Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somalia man Development Report 2012 indicates, 82 National Army (SNA) – and their loss of con- percent of Somalis are considered to be poor, trol over major urban strongholds in southern with 73 percent living on less than two dollars, and central Somalia – has pushed the group while the youth unemployment rate exceeds further northward, with terrorist operatives 67 percent. For unoccupied young people in establishing an increasing presence in Punt- search of a living and avenues for influence in land’s main towns. Thus, while it is estimated society, joining an extremist group or criminal that Al Shabaab has been weakened, it cannot network can be rewarding. be discounted and remains a formidable threat.

Apart from government troops killed in battle, Al Shabaab has assassinated dozens of promi- 2.2.5 Regional / Intra-Regional Border nent personalities including sheikhs, business- Issues people, legal professionals, media persons and government officials in the towns of Bossaso, Uncontrolled borders facilitate infiltration of exter- Garowe and Galkayo since 2009. The Puntland nal threats into Puntland Defence Forces (PDF) have been engaging in sporadic battles with Al Shabaab militants Puntland shares a long border with the central in Galgala, making significant headway and regions of Somalia, the eastern part of Ethiopia, squeezing extremists into difficult terrain along and Somaliland. Due to weak border security, il- the Golis Mountains. Parallel to this, there have legal arms flow freely, terrorist elements sneak been regular security sweeps in Puntland’s ma- into Puntland, and drug and human smugglers jor towns, successful in detaining Al Shabaab operate largely unnoticed. The issue of porous operatives and sentencing through the Punt- borders was raised and heatedly debated in land Martial Court. FGDs held in Galkayo, Buhodle and Badhan.

The assassination of Al Shabaab leader Ahmed As a divided city at the crossroads between Abdi Godane on 1 September 2014 in a coor- Puntland and southern and central Somalia, dinated U.S. drone attack near Baraawe town Galkayo remains a particularly conflict-prone and the surrender of Mohamed Said Atom, the town, characterized by clan fighting and fre- leader of Al Shabaab in the Galgala Mountains, quent security lapses (including the infiltration to the Somali Federal Government on 7 June of piracy networks). During the civil war, the 2014, also struck an important blow against the city experienced bloody confrontations be-

19 tween north and south Mudug communities ty criteria or regulations. This has resulted in that claimed hundreds of lives. This long-stand- fierce contention between the old and new dis- ing feud can easily escalate into fierce blood- tricts over jurisdiction. For instance, Gumbah, a shed due to the absence of effective security new district situated in the recently established cooperation between Puntland and Galmudug region of Gardafu, conflicts with its mother dis- and the lack of genuine reconciliation between trict, Bargaal, over the control of Binna, a small these communities. Current disputes over the seaport that lies eight kilometres south of Bar- border demarcation in relation to the forma- gaal. tion of Galmudug interim administration will certainly bring these latent tensions to the fore. “The lack of district demarcations and the resultant conflict between new and old dis- “Unlike other regions of Puntland, Mudug tricts is truly a social time bomb, and only requires special attention from the govern- the Puntland government shall be exclusive- ment and possibly ‘a special status’ of secu- ly responsible for any conflict that erupts be- rity arrangements.” – Osman Barre Khalaf, tween Bargaal and Gumbah.” – Omar Said businessman in Galkayo Sharmake, traditional elder in Bargaal

The dispute between Puntland and Somaliland over the control of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn re- 2.2.6 Illegal Fishing and Possible gions has become increasingly tense since the Implications election of President Abdiweli Gaas and continues to threaten the already fragile peace and At the roots of piracy security in these areas. Heightened mobilization and military posturing by Puntland and So- The Puntland districts along the coast are cur- maliland, with both seeking to strengthen their rently experiencing an upsurge in illegal fishing respective control over the areas, continues to off their shoreline. Residents in Bosaso, Bargaal exacerbate tensions. Communities in Buhodle and Eyl stress that foreign companies – namely, and Badhan feel that the Somaliland incursion Iranian and Korean trawlers – are illegally plun- into the disputed regions has expansionist dering Puntland’s fishing stocks, while severely motives. The emergence of the self-declared devastating the marine environment and over- Khatumo State in August 2012 also prompt- fishing certain species that are now vulnerable ed another layer of dispute over statebuilding to extinction. agendas in these regions with the three administrations (Puntland, Somaliland and Khatumo) “They trespass and fish in our territori- vying for control. al waters, threatening the lives of the few fishermen who risk going fishing by shoot- Equally problematic is the lack of clearly de- ing them and crashing into their boats. They marcated boundaries between Puntland dis- also destroy the marine ecosystem by using tricts and regions. Their number has drasti- internationally banned drag nets and so- cally increased – up from 20 districts in 1991 nar systems. Since they swiftly deliver their to the current total of 43 districts, which are catches to the global and regional markets, dispersed over nine regions in Puntland. FGD they paralyze our fishing industry.” – Abdi- participants argued that successive Puntland rizak Osman Ali, fishery expert in Bossaso administrations redrew district boundaries and regions to buy support, without pursuing Many of the FGD participants indicate a lack of a clear strategy or following defined eligibili- trust in the foreign naval forces patrolling the

20 Somali waters (particularly along the north- “The Puntland Marine Police Force is sta- eastern borders). The perception is that they tioned here (in Eyl) and they are not fulfill- operate under the pretext of counter-piracy, ing their task. We got fed up with the illegal but are not taking concrete actions to crack fishing vessels, they are terminating our lives down on illegal fishing, instead covering up ille- and we have nowhere to go. If the govern- gal trawling. According to the perception of the ment and the intentional community do not coastal communities, both international and take immediate action against illegal fishers Somali actors are involved in the ongoing illegal we shall be compelled to take our arms and fishing, whereby a number of these vessels are fight back.” – Abdikhadar Ahmed Mohamed, escorted by Somali brokers. fisherman in Eyl

2.3 Challenges to Puntland Judicial and Legal Sector

2.3.1 Key Institutional Deficiencies overall job dissatisfaction contribute to high turnover that, in turn, affects capacity-building Under-resourced and -skilled sector serving an un- of the sector.10 aware society “Only injustice causes insecurity; we stand The Puntland justice system faces serious op- for justice and yet we lack protection and erational incapacity, which adversely affects do not receive enough salary; we also lack its performance and credibility. The Puntland office equipment and furniture and since we legal sector is characterized by ineffective operate in single-roomed, rented offices with policies, legal and operational frameworks; no security guard we usually carry the court poorly trained and remunerated personnel; stamp with us.” – Abdelkadir Ahmed Ismail, inadequate facilities with deficient infrastruc- Judge in Badhan ture; and an absence of genuine reform initiatives. There are only 23 first instance district Under-equipped and demoralized police – not courts operating in the 43 districts of Puntland, to mention inadequate local jail and transport with 8 appeal courts in each of the provincial infrastructure – inhibit the effective delivery capitals except Alula, the provincial city of the of justice to citizens. There are only four pris- recently established region of Gardafui. Of the ons in Puntland, which are located in Garowe, 23 district courts, only five9 operate in court Galkayo, Gardo and Bosaso. Due to prison owned buildings. The majority of courts in the shortages, many convicts are kept in police visited districts operate in run-down or rented stations under unclear custody arrangements. premises whilst local judges often receive insuf- Poor investigation and forensic capacities and ficient remuneration and live under constant clan influence also lead to biased court deci- fear of reprisals from those they have sen- sions. FGD and KII participants expressed per- tenced who are unwilling to accept judgment. ceptions of unethical practices such as bribes, Eight high-ranking judicial officers, five prose- clan bias and impunity of officials, calling into cutors and three judges have been assassinat- question the autonomy and integrity of the for- ed in the past five years, mainly in Galkayo and mal justice system. Bossaso. The resulting sense of insecurity and

9 Garowe, Gardo, Galkayo, Bossaso and Burtinle. 10 PDRC Interview, Office of the Chief Justice, Puntland.

21 2.3.2 Formal versus Traditional Justice dicial system lacks credibility and is inefficient – seen as foreign, excessively bureaucratic, and Traditional justice: efficient and accessible, though unable to effectively enforce the law. Thus, by formally under-recognized default, the majority of participants indicated they would resort to the traditional or sharia One overarching structural problem centers system of justice. Inadequate awareness or sen- on the coexistence of three legal systems; sec- sitization on national justice systems and rule ular, Islamic Sharia and Somali traditional Xeer of law has left the majority of people in Punt- and the absence of harmonized laws and clearly land unequipped to make an informed decision defined working relations between the three. about how justice would be best served. This gives rise to inconsistency and uncertain- ty regarding access to formal legal system — Some participants of the FGDs said they have especially for rural and nomadic people, who faith only in customary and sharia law and see only have access to sharia and customary laws. courts as outlandish entities that pursue Italian A majority of security mapping participants, in- coded laws. This is due to the perception that cluding the judicial staff, suggest that the two the current Somali/Puntland penal code was later systems fill a void by the secular justice adopted during the colonial era, despite the system that is not fully decentralized or accept- amendments made by former Somali govern- ed by most people. ments, and hence does not easily apply to the Puntland context or Islamic religion. “Sharia and customary law are even accessible to the poor and they deliver justice “People go to court only when there is a promptly and efficiently.” – Abdirashid Salad, ‘gar cadaawo’, or prolonged enmity between lawyer, Galkayo disputing groups, even though they have no faith in it.” – Buraale Mahad Magan, tradi- Many FGD participants felt that the formal ju- tional elder, Buhodle

2.4 Challenges to Social Reconciliation

2.4.1 Recurrence of Resource-Based conflicts, there are still multiple longstanding, Conflicts unresolved conflicts that persist within - Punt land – that often have a root in resource-based Scarce resources, armed communities and lack of conflict and perceptions of injustice. These in- vibrant policies for peacebuilding clude:

Recurrent clan conflict constitutes a major • The “Adaadda conflict” between two neigh- threat to Puntland security and stability. It im- bouring communities in western Burtinle pedes the present and future security of the district over the sharing of resources (wa- state and undermines the prevailing, but fragile, ter and pasture) and the establishment of peace. The large human and material costs of new settlements (berkeds); recurrent conflicts have led to increased social • The conflict between the Rako and- Xum disintegration and displacement. Despite gov- bays communities, which has claimed more ernment and NGO/CSO efforts to explore than 60 lives thus far, with multiple reconcil- durable solutions for the recurrence of clan iation attempts proving ineffective;

22 • The Taleex conflict between two sub-line- and Cayn are divided along political allegianc- ages of the Nur Ahmed sub-clan of Dhulba- es to Puntland, Khaatumo and Somaliland. The hante (based on recurrent revenge killings); tripartite conflict between the administrations • The Xero-Jaale conflict driven by revenge sometimes escalates into violent confron- killings (with the two poor minority clans tations, disrupting the peaceful cohabitation often unable to muster the prescribed com- between neighbouring communities and also pensation required by xeer, Somali custom- exacerbating social divisions. In addition, com- ary law); munities in peripheral districts have substantial • The Isku-shuban district in Bari region has grievances and discontentment resulting from also undergone communal clashes between the government’s poor delivery of services. charcoal traders and opposing local pasto- They feel that the government has left them in ralists. limbo, deliberately ignoring their development priorities. Pastoral communities frequently compete over the sharing of natural resources. Tensions are An increasingly underestimated link is the role particularly high during dry seasons (summer of traditional elders – the last resort in resolv- and winter) at which point many nomadic coming fatal communal conflicts and political stand- munities move in search of water and pasture. offs. Throughout Somali history, elders have While many existing clan disputes result from played a pivotal role in upholding social cohe- such resource-based movement, others are sion, mitigating clan conflicts and transforming clearly politically or economically driven. The violence into harmony. Despite this, the role of establishment of new settlements, excavation the traditional authority – though declining in of reservoirs on grazing land, land grabbing in recent years – still remains under-recognized. urban centers and the charcoal trade cause According to the viewpoints of study partic- violent conflicts among communities. The- ab ipants, elders are considered to be forces for sence of clear resource and land management peace and yet their involvement in peace and policies and regulatory frameworks, as well as reconciliation processes is not fully institution- the weak capacity of law enforcement institu- alized, or supported by national political elites. tions, also contribute to the perpetuation of Unlike in Somaliland, where the elders are disputes over natural resources. formally institutionalized within the government’s bicameral system, in Puntland, the role of elders is informal, and often bypassed by the 2.4.2 Loose Communal Cohesion government. Yet, as the participants confirmed, the role of the elders is critical to the peaceful Lack of government outreach and alienation of resolution of clan conflict. many peripheral communities “Personally, I don’t receive (any money) and The absence of effective government outreach we aren’t in need of the 30 USD that the and development plans to engage marginalized Ministry of Interior provides to the elders, it and peripheral communities has substantially is humiliating. We need more strategic sup- contributed to the deterioration of Puntland’s port from the government.” – Mursal Mo- social cohesion. Communities in Sool, Sanaag, hamoud Abdi, traditional elder, Bossaso

23 2.5 Exploring Social Reconciliation Prospects in Puntland

Critical progress has been made in statebuild- The Puntland Grand Reconciliation Confer- ing – including decentralised governance – ence, whose initial phase was held in August since the inception of Puntland in 1998. Yet, 2015 and subsequent three phases upcoming, Puntland faces on-going, destabilizing security is expected to address the long-standing re- threats (including religious insurgency, wide- sentments of discontented communities, as spread possession of arms, persistent clan con- well as to reinforce Puntland communities’ flicts, loose social cohesion and deteriorating cohesion and unity. Restoration of full-fledged tensions with Galmudug, as well as strained re- relations with the FGS and fortification of the lations with FGS and Somaliland). Issues of in- existing security cooperation with Galmudug stitutional incapacity – ranging from an ineffec- and Somaliland would underpin the Puntland tive police force and a defunct judicial system, government’s efforts to mend peace and secu- to the lack of adequate support provided to rity as well as contribute to regional security the elders (in local dispute resolution) – leaves and stability. Puntland vulnerable to the destabilizing effects of conflict. 2.5.1 Prospects for Security Successive Puntland administrations have made multiple promises to undertake genu- PDRC’s security and rule of law pillar mapping ine security and political reforms in order to conducted in late 2014 was not an end to itself, address the aforesaid challenges. However, rather it was the beginning of a long process these pledges have resulted in little state se- meant to examine the drivers of insecurity in curity reform. Nevertheless, there are consid- Puntland and to outline the ways to address erable opportunities that could contribute to them in coordination with key stakeholders. the improvement of the security conditions if To this end, PDRC conducted a three-day the current government seeks to harness them stakeholder meeting in early February 2015 consciously. These include, among others, the with the participation of 150 delegates rep- on-going security and judicial reform process- resenting the government, civil society, inter- es, the mounting public vigilance and aversion national community and prominent figures of towards weapons; growing public demand for the Puntland public. The findings of the second democratic rule of law; public awareness about mapping of the PoP program were presented the negative effects of religious militancy and to the participants of the second PSM with the sea piracy; and the international community’s objective of allowing them to discuss these is- willingness to support the government’s secu- sues extensively and validate the outcomes of rity efforts and its overall reform agenda. the study.

While religious leaders can play an effective Another primary objective of the PSM was to role in combating piracy and terrorism, per- prioritize the challenges to security, decentral- haps more important is capitalizing on the role ization and democratization in Puntland with played by traditional elders in maintaining peace the aim of identifying actionable solutions that and security by incorporating elders in national are adapted to the current context. Following processes. Participants also recommended that interactive and vigorous deliberations on the the government employ Puntland’s state tele- identified challenges to Puntland security, rule vision as a tool for public outreach, awareness of law and social reconciliation on the third raising and engagement. day of the PSM, the participants unanimously

24 authenticated the outcomes of the security pillar of PDRC. While it may not prove pos- study, and made the following ranking of the sible to take up efforts in every single area, challenges: the security pillar will be guided in selecting their focus areas based on prioritization from 1. Weak capacity of security and judicial or- the PSM (and ongoing engagement with these gans actors); guidance from a “security and rule of 2. Uncontrolled borders and disputed territo- law steering committee” made up of influen- ries tial individuals and experts on these issues; and 3. Poor public and police relations further analysis from PDRC about where its 4. Terrorism (primarily Al Shabaab in the Gal- expertise can be most useful and add the most gala mountains) value. 5. Illegal fishing (particularly emphasized by coastal stakeholders) 6. Resource-based clan conflicts Strengthening Puntland’s security and judicial systems The above list ranks all security challenges, identified during the pillar mapping study, by Puntland has invested heavily in its military and importance (to the key stakeholders). Partici- security apparatus. In 2013, the security sector pants left out “public possession of arms” from received 31 percent of the state budget, while the list as they believed it requires first signif- the social and economic sectors received 10% icant strides in the above areas – for instance, or less. Yet, enormous challenges still threat- free flow of arms is a by-product of lax securi- en the peace and stability of Puntland. The ab- ty (lack of popular confidence in security) and sence of conscious security policies and reg- porous borders. The successful completion of ulatory frameworks, weak security structures the PSM was followed by a rapid context scan- and preparedness, and low capacity of security ning aimed at exploring the prospects for the forces remain major obstacles in this regard. A prioritized challenges, and possible avenues for burning issue that demands the government’s change. The motive behind this exercise was to immediate attention is the extremely low and identify the government’s short and long-term frequently delayed payment of salaries for the plans for addressing the aforesaid security chal- security forces. lenges as well as possible synergies and overlaps between international and local partners’ work Notwithstanding the above, there are ongoing and the government’s interventions. Thus, this endeavours led by the government with the process aimed to outline the current programs support of international partners to further of key actors in order to better highlight gaps strengthen the capacity of police and other and opportunities. security forces. Under the leadership of Presi- dent Gaas, the current government of Puntland With respect to this, PDRC’s security pillar has embarked on multi-sector reform process- research team conducted a series of inter- es meant to enhance institutional performance views with officials from various government and the integrity of security and judicial sec- institutions and their partner agencies to study tors, as well as improve fiscal and civil service on-going and planned efforts to address the sectors of government. challenges prioritized during the second PSM. The outcomes of this exercise are elaborated With support from UNSOM, the the Ministry in the following section, which envisages pos- of Security, Demobilisation, Disarmament and sible areas of work and focus for the security Reintegration in conjunction with the presi-

25 dency, has commissioned a thorough security With the support of UNSOM, the Ministry of reform beginning with the vetting and re-en- Security, Demobilisation, Disarmament and rolment of all Puntland forces. This exercise is Reintegration has recently initiated a strategic meant to ensure eligibility of all security forces planning process, the aim of which is to define and to eliminate hundreds, if not thousands, priority areas for the security sector and then of ghost soldiers from the government’s se- to devise an intervention strategy for the next curity payroll. Through the use of a biometric few years. Further capacity support from UN- system, the majority of the police force and a SOM could include the establishment of a stra- considerable number of the paramilitary forces tegic planning unit within the Ministry. With (Darvish) and custodial corps were vetted and the advent of the New Deal, there are also re-registered to serve in their respective in- prospects for earmarking significant funds to stitutions. In line with the reform process, the respond to security needs and capacity-build- government plans to revisit the remuneration ing at federal and state levels. policies of government forces and to introduce a welfare scheme for security forces to boost In terms of the judiciary, proposed initiatives morale. Government security officials envisage are fewer. The current government has initiat- drastic improvements in the working condi- ed a reform process meant to reinforce the ef- tions once the reform process is fully realized. fectiveness of the judicial system, but the pace However, the current reform initiative is not of reform is slow. UNDP is backing a “mobile the first of its kind and its success will largely courts” project and providing some capacity depend on commitment and continued sup- support to the Puntland judiciary and Ministry port from the sitting government. of Justice.

The 2015 plans of the Ministry of Security, Key questions must be considered when eval- Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegra- uating the institutional challenges facing the tion also indicate that 11 model police stations Puntland security and judicial sectors: should be built by UNDP and the Somalia Sta- bility Fund (SSF) in the districts of Harfo, Jarrib- • Is there a need for a security policy to com- an, Dangorayo, Iskushuban, Qandala, Lasqoray, plement the strategy currently under devel- Gardo, Eyl, Galkayo, Bayla and Godob. Fur- opment? If so, what is the best approach to thermore, 16 police posts are to be erected develop such a policy to ensure it is effec- in Garowe, Galkayo, Bossaso, Badhan, Eyl and tive and broadly supported? Gardo to expand the coverage and accessibility • What is the best way to help the security of security services in Puntland’s major towns. sector take a more forward looking, holis- With the financial help of UNDP, the Minis- tic, strategic approach to security? try of Security, Demobilisation, Disarmament • How can a common vision for security – and Reintegration is currently sponsoring 25 shared by government, security sector undergraduates to study law at Puntland State personnel, and citizens – be fostered in University in Garowe. The Ministry of Security, Puntland? What monitoring and evaluation Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegra- systems are needed to ensure the efficiency tion will also be sending 50 officers to partic- of Puntland’s security and judicial sectors? Is ipate in training on coast guarding in Djibouti there a need to review current government and another 85 officers to receive training on spending on security? How can the availa- intelligence and investigation procedures in ble resources be strategically optimized and Ethiopia. accounted for? How can effective civic and parliamentary oversight of the security sec-

26 tor be achieved? be further improved and supported? • How can border demarcation mitigate politically motivated land-based conflicts -be Defining district borders tween communities and districts?

The participants of the security study pointed to two major issues relating to borders: un- Enhancing public and police cooperation controlled, insecure and disputed state borders, and an ever-growing number of districts Hostile and ineffective practices on the part and regions within Puntland that are not clear- of the security forces and the low public un- ly demarcated. Given the shortage of financial derstanding of the law has resulted in prevail- resources and security personnel, Puntland ing mistrust and weak cooperation between struggles to secure its vast borders with So- Puntland police and the general public. Several maliland and southern Somalia. Internally, the attempts have been made by the government, lack of district demarcation poses critical chal- local and international NGOs in the past dec- lenges for Puntland security, decentralization ade to bridge this divide, but progress has been and democratization processes, as identified slow. This is attributed, in large part, to ineffi- by mapping and PSM participants, amplifying cient strategies and the government’s inability inter-district conflicts and conflict between to adequately channel international assistance communities. towards security. However, there are ongoing efforts supported by UNSOM, UNDP and The Puntland constitution neither clearly out- Danish Demining Group (DDG) in Garowe, lines the necessity for delimiting district and Gardo, Bossaso and Eyl to institute sustainable regional boundaries, nor does it envisage the cooperation mechanisms and linkages of mu- establishment of a boundaries commission. It tual trust between communities and the police only implies that a special law shall determine forces. the number, name and boundaries of the dis- tricts11. DDG in cooperation with the Ministry of Se- curity, Demobilisation, Disarmament and Re- Regardless of constitutional ambiguity, the integration and local authorities in selected yet-to-be-approved decentralization policy districts (namely Garowe, Eyl and Gardo) is of Puntland envisioned the formation of the currently spearheading a community-to-police boundaries demarcation commission in 2014, dialogue and trust-building program that aims though this is still to be established. Despite to lay the foundations for durable and viable the delay, the Puntland Ministry of Interior says structures that uphold peace and security in it plans to fast-track the establishment of the the target districts, and are supported fully first boundaries commission, pending availabili- by the community. The initiative also involves ty of funding from Somalia Stability Fund (SSF). establishment of community safety commit- In regard to district proliferation and border tees at district and village levels whose role is issues, the following questions need to be crit- to facilitate dialogue between the public and ically reflected on: police and create avenues for better understanding and cooperation between them. The • How can cross-border security coopera- committees are also entrusted to facilitate the tion between Puntland and its neighbours development of security action plans that reflect local community priorities at the national 11 Article 123 of the Puntland Constitution. level. Results include the implementation of

27 street lighting projects in Garowe and Gardo continue to report successes. to improve security and public safety, and the construction of police posts in Eyl and Garowe The Puntland government states that it regards to increase accessibility to security services. combating terrorism as a top priority that requires both top-down and bottom-up pro- The following questions should be addressed grams. The Ministry of Security, Demobilisa- to ensure trust and enhanced cooperation be- tion, Disarmament and Reintegration plans to tween the Puntland police and general public: intensify its offensive against AS and undertake awareness-raising and mobilization campaigns • What policies, structures and avenues are to sensitize the general public on the dangers needed to facilitate communication, build of AS. With UNSOM support, the Ministry confidence and reinforce the cooperation also plans to build rehabilitation and correc- between public and security forces? tion facilities for terror convicts. In a good faith • What privacy and disciplinary measures measure to joint counter-terror efforts, Punt- need to be put in place to ensure proper land has offered 3000 soldiers to building the police conduct? Somali National Army (SNA) as a step towards • How can public understanding of the rule the formation of an inclusive and competent of law and participation in security be fighting force against the AS insurgency and achieved? What mechanisms are needed to other security threats12. further involve women and youth in building peace and maintaining security? The Ministry of Security, Demobilisation, Dis- armament and Reintegration also intends to co- operate with the Ministry of Education on the Combating religious militancy integration of peace education into all curricula to instil a culture of non-violence. In 2012, the The presence of Al Shabaab in the mountain- PDRC research team composed a civic educa- ous hideouts of Galgala has been a source of tion guide for secondary school students. The real threatto Puntland security and stability toolkit was intended to help secondary school over the past eight years. Security gains have teachers facilitate discussions on issues of civic been documented since October 2014, after importance e.g. security and rule of law, peace, Puntland waged the largest offensive against and democratization. Helping youth to think AS strongholds in the region. This offensive critically about the many cultural and religious continued until early 2015 with Puntland forc- synergies with peace and good governance – es making significant advances, liberating large and their own role as a citizen – can be a useful areas held by Al Shabaab and subsequently technique towards fostering positive citizen- establishing permanent garrisons. Notable de- ship and countering extremist influence. The fections of Al Shabaab insurgents, taking ad- civic education guide can provide a valuable vantage of the extended amnesty offered by resource in this regard. the Puntland president, were also documented. Though grave losses were inflicted on Al Serious questions remain about how to com- Shabaab, the offensive was halted indefinite- bat Al Shabaab and how to prevent Puntland ly for unknown reasons. It is possible that Al citizens, particularly youth, from becoming in- Shabaab fighters will take advantage of this volved in religious extremism: policy gap to regroup (as southern precedent indicates). Security sweeps and mass detention 12 See “Joint communiqué,” Puntland and Federal Gov- of terror suspects in Puntland’s major towns ernment of Somalia, April 2015.

28 • How has the current government strategy In addition to improving legal frameworks for to defeat Al Shabaab changed in light of the regulating activity, the government pledges to influx of Al Shabaab fighters in the Galgala fully operationalize the PMPF to counter ille- Mountains? Is it sufficient, and does it in- gal trawlers, but will require surveillance sup- clude adequate community-based mobiliza- port in this regard. According to the Ministry tion against Al Shabaab? What role can the of Ports and Marine Resources, financial pres- public, particularly religious groups, play in sures and the UN imposed arms embargo on combating Al Shabaab and other forms of Somalia are disadvantaging its efforts to equip terror? coast guards. Nonetheless, it also intends to • Will the planned integration of Puntland launch a large-scale awareness-raising cam- forces into the SNA bring about greater paign to demobilize fishermen who have taken cooperation and intelligence sharing or pri- up arms to protect their interests, and work oritise security-first approaches at the ex- with coastal communities to counter illegal pense of grassroots engagement? fishing and crack down on the Puntland nation- • Is lack of economic opportunity really the als who help facilitate the practice. main driver for youth to become involved in extremist activities? Are there other fac- Given that on-going illegal fishing could fuel the tors as well? How can youth be positively resurgence of piracy if the adequate security engaged to reduce the risk of radicalization? measures are not taken, the following questions are to be raised:

Countering illegal fishing • How does the current review of the Punt- land Fishing Law of 2006 plan to counter Despite noted downturns in pirate activities, the depletion of Puntland marine resourc- illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing re- es? Is it sufficient? Will the government be mains a key concern that continues to pose a able to enforce the key tenets proposed in great threat to Puntland’s marine resources, as the review of the 2006 fishing law? well as crippling the nascent fishery industry of • What is the scale and scope of the current the state. In June 2014, President Gaas called illegal fishing problem? How has it changed? upon the international community to help What measures are in place to ensure pira- eradicate this practice, pledging all Puntland cy does not resurface? Is the government forces to unite to combat this crime. In a par- ready to address the concerns of communi- allel effort to secure Somalia’s territorial sea ties affected by illegal fishing? limit, exclusive economic zone and continen- • What role does the international navy pa- tal shelf, President Hassan Sheikh of the FGS trolling off the Puntland cost play in coun- sent a Puntland-supported proclamation to tering illegal fishing, and cooperating with the International Commission on the Limits of domestic judicial systems? Can the role of the Continental Shelf in July 2014. This was in- international patrollers be better aligned tended to dispel controversies over Somalia’s with protecting Puntland’s interests? What territorial waters and pave the way for a later steps will be necessary to raise community review of Somalia’s Law No. 37 on the Terri- awareness and involvement in such efforts? torial Sea and Ports of 10 September 1972. In a related effort, the Puntland Ministry of Ports and Marine Resources is currently reviewing Addressing communal conflicts the state’s fishing law of 2006 to include stiff measures against illegal fishers. As emphasized during the security pillar map-

29 ping exercise, the recurrence of intra- and to prevent the recurrence of clan and re- inter-clan conflicts poses a significant threat sourced-based conflicts? to Puntland security and stability. There are • What enforcement mechanisms are need- numerous unresolved communal conflicts in ed to sustain peace processes that are fre- and around Puntland – mainly in Bari and Sool quently broken? How can the role of elders regions, as well as cross-border conflicts be- and sheikhs be further strengthened and in- tween the south and north Mudug communities stitutionalized to help prevent and resolve and between Cayn community and Somaliland. clan-based conflicts? In order to address these issues, the Puntland • How can a culture of non-violence, peace- MOI, which is mandated to address clan con- ful coexistence and constructive dialogue flicts, plans to commission a conflict mapping be instilled in the communities of Puntland study throughout Puntland and envisages the and its neighbouring Somali communities? institutionalization of the role of elders in rec- What role can women and youth play in onciliation and peace-building. The initiative preventing and resolving conflict? would involve establishment of an autonomous structure for select elders to support mitiga- tion of clan conflicts and maintenance of peace. Controlling arms in public hands Scarce pastoral and water resources in rural areas and the absence of resource-sharing Possession of firearms is common in Puntland, mechanisms often lead to communal clashes. with a substantial proportion of the public However, the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF), a possessing weapons. Many communities re- subsidiary body of the New Deal, is funding tain large stockpiles for defence against pos- the drilling of water boreholes in areas13 prone sible threats, although they are not always to resource-based conflict. Additionally, SSF well-guarded or maintained. The proliferation soon plans to undertake a mapping study on of arms in the region costs the nation dear- resource-based conflicts in Puntland and states ly, as they are increasingly used in inter-clan that it is willing to invest in livelihood and eco- conflicts, as well as criminal activities. Accord- nomic development projects to address pov- ing to information obtained from the Puntland erty and unemployment, perceived as major Attorney General’s Office, 767 persons were drivers of insecurity. SSF has also expressed killed in 2014 either in clan conflict or targeted openness to supporting the government’s sta- shootings. bilization and peacebuilding initiatives in years to come. Despite people’s growing aversion towards the possession of weapons, widespread public While exploring the conflict cycles in Puntland, disarmament does not seem feasible, at least it is important to seek answers to the following in the near future. Over the past decade, the questions: MOS & DDR implemented a pilot project to register firearms owned by the public, which • What legal and regulatory frameworks would legalize their possession and also estab- are needed for managing natural resourc- lish a system to track them. Yet, this initiative es, particularly land, pasture and water? has not been successful, and the public contin- What proactive strategies can be taken by ues to circumvent (for reasons that requires the government and international actors further research).

In 2014, the Ministry of Security, Demobilisa- 13 Rako, Xariiro, Dhudhub, Ceelbuh of Nugaal, and Towfiiq. tion, Disarmament and Reintegration, in con-

30 junction with DDG, launched a new undertak- Key questions remain: ing aimed primarily at controlling small arms and light weapons (SALW). A joint technical • In cases where disarmament is not possible, committee – comprising officials from MOS & what other measures can be taken to limit DDR, the Puntland police and civil society – the use of firearms? What incentives might was tasked to lead the process. This started persuade people to give up their weapons? with the review and expansion of Puntland’s • Keeping in mind the links between clan con- Public Order Law No. 1 of 5 January 2000 to flict and gun violence, would better mech- establish legal foundations for the process, anisms for preventing and addressing clan which should also include elaboration of cer- conflict lead to a reduction in arms stock- tain provisions criminalizing the trade and ille- piling by clans? gal possession of firearms. The amended law • How can the rule of law be further strength- is expected to be tabled at the parliamentary ened and the culture of impunity minimized? session scheduled in June 2015 for further review and approval.

Description of Participants Quantity Percentage Regional & District Admins 10 8.5 Security Institutions 15 12.7 Judiciary 12 10.2 Elders 16 13.6 Youth Groups 15 12.7 Women Groups 15 12.7 Businesspeople 6 5.1 Socially Segregated/Minority 7 5.9 Professionals 22 18.6 Total 118 100.0

Table 2: Participants disaggregated by group

Participants by Gender Quantity Percentage

Male 86 72.9

Female 32 27.1 Total 118 100.0

Table 3: Participants disaggregated by gender

3 Democratization

3.1 Introduction

Upon its establishment in 1998, the founders mittee for the PoP democratization pillar pro- of Puntland State pledged to carry out a tran- gramled these campaigns by organizing public sition from a clan-based political system to a forums, disseminating messages, and screening democratic multiparty system through free and documentary films. Other key developments fair elections. However, promises of democ- included Parliament’s approval of the Elector- ratization and multiparty politics still remain al Commission Law, Political Parties Law, and largely unfulfilled due to multiple political and Election Law, the establishment of the Transi- social challenges that have forced successive tional Puntland Electoral Commission (TPEC) administrations to fall back upon old systems of in July 2011, the adoption of the Puntland State clan-based politics and clan rotation schemes. Constitution in April 2012, and the emergence These challenges have been varied in nature of a number of (still largely nascent) political and substance. The first PoP mapping exercise, associations in late 2012. carried out in 2009, revealed little knowledge of, and thus confidence in, democracy among The establishment of TPEC was a major step the population. The survey identified four main forward for Puntland’s democratization pro- challenges facing the democratization process cess. It marked a new era for the institutionali- in Puntland: zation of the process after almost a decade and a half of an ad hoc approach. Soon after its es- • Diverging public perceptions and under- tablishment, TPEC managed to hastily register standing of democracy a number of political associations, announce • Ongoing political reliance on the clan the date of the Puntland local council elections • Political uncertainties in the greater Somali on 15 July 2013, and facilitate an intensive civ- context ic education campaign. PDRC and other local • Lack of commitment to reforming institu- and international NGOs substantially support- tions. ed TPEC in this endeavour. However, the local council elections were suspended on 14 July Despite these overarching challenges Puntland 2013 after an outbreak of violence in sever- has made some progress towards democrati- al locations – a major setback to Puntland’s zation in recent years. It has carried out in- democratization. tensive public awareness-raising campaigns through civic education. The steering com- Resuming the democratization process will

32 require serious commitment, proficient prepa- advance Puntland’s political development. ration, and clear cooperation by all actors involved, including the authorities, the electoral Following the postponement of local council commission, the political associations, civil so- elections, PDRC and Interpeace undertook a ciety, and the public at large. In the meantime, number of activities toward the resumption of the government has returned to the old clan- elections. They conducted a comprehensive based scheme of selection for members of the participatory polling exercise that confirmed House of Representatives, who in turn elect that the majority of citizens want to see a the top leadership of the government. resumption of the democratization process, and would like elections to be held as early as On 8 January 2014, the current administration possible. The second PoP mapping exercise, came to power through this process, follow- conducted from August to November 2014, ing tough competition between the incumbent indicated some positive improvements, but (Faroole) and other prominent politicians. also identified a number of obstacles to the One of the main campaign promises made by full realisation of the democratization process. now-President Gaas was to fulfil the promise These included difficulties in transitioning from of a “one-person-one vote” election during a clan-based system to a democratic system, his term in office. Initial attempts have been weak government commitments and capaci- made to meet this pledge, including the estab- ties, and above all challenges to overall security lishment of a new Ministry for Constitution, and stability. Federalism, and Democratization intended to

3.2 Challenges to the Democratization Process

3.2.1 Transitioning from the Clan System edly discussed the issue of clan dominance and to Multi-Party Politics its influence on Puntland’s society and political landscape. Speaking on the importance of The clan system is peculiar to Somali society clans, one participant compared clan loyalty to and politics. Clan loyalty supersedes formal life insurance. Given its central role in Somali loyalties to government and to other institu- life, it is clear that it will not be easy to move tions. The centrality of clan is reflected in all away from the clan system. aspects of life and deeply permeates the political sphere. The political influence of this age- “Miracles are needed to uproot clannism old system constitutes a significant handicap to from the soul and the mind of the Somali moving ahead with democratization in Punt- people.” - Ali Abdi Jibriil, Baran land and in Somalia as a whole. Some interviewees and participants in the map- “The clan system is, so far, fully intermingled ping exercise believed that clannism sparked into the politics of Puntland. The question the civil war that disintegrated the Somali is how to disentangle its influence from the state, while others indicated that it was actually democratization process.”- Muktar Ahmed the war that “unchained the demons of clann- Farah, Buhodle ism.” Many participants, however, viewed the struggle for clan supremacy as both the reason Stakeholders involved in the mapping repeat- for the state’s collapse and for the increasing

33 President Abdiweli kicks off a peace match for youth at Goldogob.

Bargaal local council members elect the town’s mayor.

Security official elaborates on the need for additional support during the Goldogob mapping exercise. 34 Participants of the Puntland Stakeholders Meeting follow a presentation by the Audio-Visual Unit.

A young student smiles in Galkayo. Brother of slain victim of revenge killing at Herojalle.

Elders mediate Rako conflict in presence of government security forces. 35 fragmentation of the state during its recon- member, Galdogob struction. Some interviewees believed that only a Many stakeholders agreed that clannism and long-lasting campaign of civic education and the corrosive effects of clan politics will con- socioeconomic development could overpow- tinue to pose considerable obstacles to the er the dominance of the clan system. Reduced advancement of the democratization process. clan dominance, particularly in affairs of state, They pointed out the extent to which clan and the emergence of political parties as the interests exert an influence on critical areas, primary form of political organization, are including voter registration, district demarca- both essential to the transition from clan pow- tion, elections, allocation of seats, nominations er-sharing to elective democratic governance. for leading positions in political parties, and distribution of positions within important government institutions. 3.2.2 Frail Commitments and Capacity

Stakeholders engaged in the mapping provided Institutional challenges are tangible and sub- a clear picture of how clan influence is deeply stantial. Some are inherited from previous ad- intertwined with the structure and conduct of ministrations while others have become more public affairs in Puntland. The organization of apparent of late – weak governmental com- the Puntland state is based on the clan system. mitment, poor planning and inexperience, and Seats in Parliament, ministerial portfolios, and attachment of political power to clan patron- positions in public administration as well as lo- age. According to the stakeholders, inherited cal district councils are all allocated according challenges include a lack of civil service reform to clan patronage. and poor social service delivery, which hinder public administration and the implementation Participants both within and outside the gov- of government policies. ernment agreed that the clan system would not easily disappear from the social and political Some of these challenges are facets of Punt- fabric, even with the introduction of a multi- land’s political environment, which is charac- party system and elections. The conditions for terised by a lack of organized pressure on the its existence and the forces that keep it alive government and an absence of credible leader- are still strong enough to challenge the emer- ship and political maturity. gence of a view of the individual as a citizen rather than a clansperson, which is crucial to “Broadly speaking, the leaders of Punt- the democratic mindset. The clan system also land are responsible for the impasse in the largely marginalizes and excludes women and democratization process due to one of the youth from political discourse, at odds with following reasons: they benefit from the ex- democratic ideals. Throughout the duration istence of the clan system or they are inca- of this exercise, women, youth, and minorities pable of or lack the needed leadership qual- repeatedly voiced their dissatisfaction with the ities to tackle the problem. Some sectors of clan system. the public (traditional, religious, etc.) carry part of that responsibility as well.” – Elmi Ali “We don’t know what we did wrong to Guled, politician, Galkayo be discriminated against. If democracy will bring justice we will be ready to support it.” Those consulted in the mapping exercise want- - Keyf Ali Ismail, councillor and minority clan ed to give the new administration the benefit of

36 the doubt regarding its capacity and willingness extent, clan representation. to discharge its promise of bringing democracy to Puntland. The stakeholders were in a mode The urgency of dealing with challenges hin- of “wait and see.” dering the resumption of the democratization process was suggested by the majority of Government institutions are tasked with tack- stakeholders contacted in the mapping exer- ling many challenges facing the resumption of cise. They called upon institutional leaders to the democratization process – public disarma- shoulder the great responsibility of removing, ment, border demarcation, voter registration, without further delay, these challenges. voter education/information, and political reconciliation are just a few. 3.2.3 Widespread and Easy Public Access The issue of Puntland’s borders with its neigh- to Weapons bours, Somaliland and Galmudug, has become a particularly thorny matter for the new ad- Participants in the democratization mapping ministration – not least with the emergence of exercise were troubled by the fact that clans federal member states. In reference to this is- are armed, and concerned that violent con- sue, women’s group leader Hawo Mohammed frontations and anti-election protests could of Galkayo said that erupt in the lead-up to elections. The people interviewed believe that one of the main rea- “All of Puntland’s borders are not under sons behind the suspension of the 2013 local Puntland State control. How is it possible elections was the fear of an outbreak of vio- to have elections in border areas which are lence due to widespread public possession of out of the control of Puntland authorities?” weapons.

Ali Egal of Galkayo spoke out on the people’s “A major challenge to the democratization trust in the leadership: of Puntland, and particularly to free and fair elections, is the lack of disarmament of the “Even though the people are prepared for public.”– Abdinassir Serar, businessman, democracy, they suspect that the leaders Bossaso are not committed at all to the democratization process, because they fear losing They were also concerned that discontented their grip on power.” communities and disengaged political and traditional leaders might mobilize their constituen- Traditional elder Yassin Abdisamad of Galkayo cies to take up arms and confront the electoral criticised the lack of institutionalisation of clan process. The easy accessibility of arms is exac- elders in Puntland State: “As a clan elder, I erbated by the poor capacity of security forces don’t have a defined role in Puntland’s- con to curb potential threats. stitutional institutions, so I have the right to exercise the traditional rights bestowed upon Another source of potential danger is the lack me by my clan to select representatives to the of clearly marked district boundaries. Without Parliament.” By referring to the absence of an demarcation, communities might fight over the upper house for traditional elders in Puntland, delineation of constituencies and polling sta- as there is in Somaliland, he indicates that such tions to secure political power. an institution could provide a greater check on the executive and ensure, at least to a certain Grievances resulting from the stalled elector-

37 al process of 2013 might also arouse unfore- that the government could secure the elector- seen opposition to the process. Interviewees al process only by introducing robust securi- also viewed the Al Shabaab insurgency as a ty arrangements while pursuing inclusive and significant threat to democratization and the credible approaches throughout the electoral participation of citizens in electoral and vot- process. ing processes. Respondents clearly believed

3.3 Obstacles for Elections

3.3.1 Low Public Awareness ence. The majority of the population, especially the youth, needs to be educated on how The participants in the mapping exercise, while to take part in electoral processes. There is a discussing challenges and opportunities for need for wide-reaching voter education/infor- promoting democratization, recognised the mation processes. need for a full-fledged awareness-raising campaign on the principles and practices of democ- “The majority of the public, except for a few racy, which is largely unfamiliar to the broader old people, have no familiarity with elec- public. There exist some misconceptions, as tions.” – Nuro Mohamed Ahmed, female well as hostility from some religious interest youth activist, Galdogob groups that need to be mediated. Stakehold- ers are conscious of the fact that the transition from a clan system to a democratic one 3.3.2 Lack of a Constitutional Court requires concerted efforts towards mitigating the influence of clannism over politics. The absence of a constitutional court from the election process raised serious disputes be- Due to widespread illiteracy resulting from the tween the former TPEC and the political asso- prevalent nomadic lifestyle in Puntland, there is ciations over how electoral controversies or little knowledge of the notions and principles procedural issues would be settled during the of democracy, political parties, elections, or election process. Former political association good governance. Participants in the mapping leaders Said Farah Mohamed (UDAD) and Lul referred to this unfamiliarity with political par- Jama (WADAJIR) stressed the importance of ties and elections as a hindrance to the demo- the Constitutional Court in conducting free cratic process. and fair elections.

“I welcome the democratization of Punt- “The Constitutional Court should be in place land, but I want to know more about it.” to perform the role of arbitrator among the - Kadijo Abdi Mohamed, Bossaso three branches of the state when they are in conflict, and to resolve electoral disputes.” - “I know what the clan system can do for me, Ali Haji Abdulle, politician but I do not understand about democracy. I cannot compare them.” – Said Mohamed Her- si, Dhahar

Few Puntlanders have any electoral experi-

38 3.3.3 Lack of Regional and District 3.3.5 Limited Financial Resources Boundary Demarcation Electoral processes are costly, especially when Boundary demarcation is a critical issue for starting from scratch. Activities like district elections because they, in theory, take place demarcation, voter registration, production of at the district level. It is impossible to allo- voting materials, and ensuring a safe environ- cate seats and polling stations, in accordance ment for the process and the voters all require with the constitution, when districts are not considerable financial resources and technical marked with clear and distinct borders. When know-how. These, however, are limited in the Puntland was established in 1998, there were case of Puntland. only 20 recognised districts with clearly defined boundaries; now the number of districts “The two most critical issues in successful- stands at 43. In stakeholders’ estimation, unde- ly carrying out the democratization process fined regional and district boundaries – as well are the commitment of the government as the lack of a population census – are serious and the availability of financial resources.” problems that can prompt territorial disputes - Asha Gelle, Galkayo between clans.

“The proliferation of districts is very confus- 3.3.6 Nascent Political Parties ing and dangerous. For example, a district like Iskushuban has been divided into 5 Mapping participants were aware of how crit- other districts.” – Ali Haji Abdulle, politician, ical the formation of genuine political parties Garowe is in a society dominated by clan allegiance, and voiced their concerns about the current state of political parties. Asho Abdikarim Hirsi 3.3.4 Lack of Voter Registration and Voter of Eyl indicated his preference for “a political ID Cards party that is inclusive, and promotes peace and progress with a vision of equality and jus- The number of potential voters should be pub- tice.” Ahmed Jama Abdille of Galkayo approves licly estimated (in the event that a census is of “a party with a good political program and not possible) to avoid electoral fraud and mal- good leaders,” while Samiira Jama Mohamed of practice and to allocate seats fairly according Bossaso favours “a party that combats clann- to districts. Voter ID cards are also important ism and corruption.” to know who is eligible to vote, as required by the constitution. Interviewees endorsed similar criteria for the existence of political parties in Puntland and be- “Before elections, there must be clear distinc- lieved that none of the six political associations tions between citizens, IDPs, and foreigners. that were registered to compete in Puntland’s That is possible only with voter registration July 2013 local elections satisfied the criteria and ID cards.” – Saynab Sheikh Osman, wom- given above. They said that those political asso- en’s group leader, Galkayo ciations had limited connections with Puntland constituencies. “Without voter registration and voter ID the election is unconstitutional.” – Abdiweli M “The political parties were not based on Ali (Gaas), KAALO, youth-peer organization constituencies or membership; they also leader had no discernible programs from each oth-

39 er, and the leaders seemed to have sprung The mapping exercise identified a number of from a vacuum.” - Hirsi Musse Hirsi, dias- opportunities that could contribute to the re- pora, Gardo sumption and evolution of the democratization process in Puntland.

3.4 Exploring Democratization Prospects in Puntland

3.4.1 Popular Support blocks of democracy. Genuine political parties integrate different segments of the pub- There is widespread public support for democ- lic among their supporters, particularly those ratization among stakeholders and the general excluded from the political process. They also public, who have embraced the ideas and prin- serve as a check on power, and exercise con- ciples of democracy on the condition that basic trol over the government’s activities in order Islamic and Somali values are respected. to ensure good governance, transparency, and Over the past few years, there has been sig- accountability in the conduct of public affairs. nificant improvement in public awareness on However, establishing viable political parties democracy. People are now more receptive that are able to accomplish these objectives is to the democratization process and the ideals not easy, as proven by Somalia’s past experi- and principles of democracy. ences and recent events in Puntland.

“A short time ago the word democracy used to be associated with blasphemy or an of- 3.4.2 General Government Commitment fence to religion. Today it is the political system we are striving for.” – Omar Aden The stakeholders interviewed in the mapping Abdulle, Councillor of Galdogob exercise were aware of how critical the formation of genuine political parties with clear A part of these attitudinal changes is attributed ideological platforms is in a society dominated to various actors’ involvement in public aware- by clan allegiances. ness-raising campaigns in the lead-up to the attempted elections: civil society organizations, Interviewees were asked, “What opportuni- government, and domestic and international ties are available to successfully resume the NGOs. democratization process?” Overall, with the new government in place, respondents showed During the most recent electoral process in confidence regarding the resumption of the January 2014, the people of Puntland had a democratization process. short-lived glimpse of a democratic, multiparty system of governance. Puntlanders were ex- “The current government has only to cor- posed to the concepts of democratization, po- rect the mistakes made by the previous ad- litical associations, and different levels of elec- ministration and take advantage of the time tions, which will make it considerably more available.” – Hawo Abdi Jama, Diaspora, difficult for the government not to address Galkayo some of these key popular concerns. “The new government has useful lessons to Political parties are indispensable building learn from the past experience, sufficient

40 time, and a public ready to resume the 3.4.3 Public Expectations on the Benefits democratization process.” – Ahmed Kalif of Democracy Abdulle (Galdogob) Following government pledges to resume Mapping participants felt that the new admin- the democratization process, public expec- istration promised a better chance for expe- tations were high. Puntlanders are weary of diting and accomplishing the democratization mistrust-fuelled clan politics and see popular process. In their estimation, a great deal of elections as a way to curtail political margin- insight and practical experience was gleaned alisation, particularly for women, youth, and from the stalled electoral process of 2013 and minorities. These groups see democratization would inform government decision-making in and elections as avenues for increasing active the next round. participation in the political process and influence the decision-making process. The stake- A good indication of the government’s com- holders consulted in the mapping reiterated mitment to the resumption of the democrati- time and again that women, youth, and minori- zation process was the creation of the Ministry ties will benefit from democratization. for Constitution, Federal Affairs, and Democ- ratization. The fact that the appointed Minister Though significant institutional and political re- was a woman, according to some stakeholders, forms are still needed before citizens, through was an even better indication of renewed com- political parties, are able to openly criticize the mitment. government and freely express their concerns and opinions on matters of public interest, The Ministry’s mandate was to oversee and some mapping exercise participants seemed coordinate, with other relevant institutions, to take pleasure in imagining the freedom activities designed to move forward and bring they would enjoy after the advent of democ- about the democratization process. The Minis- racy. During elections it is possible for such try would also lead the drive for democratiza- high expectations to conflict with reality on tion in Puntland by initiating the development of the ground, which could jeopardize Puntland’s the necessary legal framework, enhancing pub- peace and political stability. lic awareness, ensuring democratic processes, engaging and supporting local and international Despite still-optimistic public expectations, at institutions, and building public confidence. the time of publication and contrary to the government’s promises, the democratization “The new president is a knowledgeable per- process had not yet resumed. The Ministry son and has a good record of leadership. I of Constitution, Federal Affairs, and Democ- have no doubt that he will succeed.”- Mo- ratization has focused mainly on establishing hamed Abdullahi Farah, Galkayo itself rather than on pursuing concrete steps towards the resumption of the democratiza- “A woman Minister for the democratization tion process. process will help persuade more women to become involved in the process.” - Nuro Mohamed Ahmed, Female youth activist, 3.4.4 Sufficient Time Galdogob The interviewees were convinced that limited time for preparations (in part a result of political turmoil) was one of the critical factors

41 that contributed to the failure of the previously siderable time, and requires adequate prepara- attempted electoral process. According to the tion. This means that the necessary laws need findings of a poll PDRC conducted in March to be passed, and contracts signed in good 2014, 91% of respondents were in favor of the time. These activities were highlighted by par- resumption of the democratization process ticipants as the most necessary, although diffi- within the first six months of the current gov- cult, priorities for moving ahead with democ- ernment’s term.14 ratization.

“The time factor is favourable to the re- At the time of the mapping in late 2014, par- sumption of the democratization process ticipants felt that the current administration if the process restarts early and without had at its disposal sufficient time for there further delays.” - Eid Mohamed Mohamud, sumption of the democratization process and student, Bossaso to focus on crucial issues, including the early nomination of an electoral commission, tack- Pushing ahead with voter registration, district ling challenges facing the democratization pro- demarcation, civic and voter education, and cess, and defining the roles and responsibilities the establishment of political parties takes con- of the government, civil society, and political associations in the resumption of the democratization process. However, the resumption of 14 Puntland Development and Research Center (PDRC), the democratization process has been slower “Participatory Poll on Prospects of Democratization in Puntland,” Garowe, 10 September 2014. than anticipated.

3.5 Key Entry Points for Democracy Promotion

Following the conduct of the second mapping 4. Absence of voter identification and regis- exercise, PDRC convened a three-day stake- tration mechanisms holders meeting from 3-5 February 2015 to 5. The flow of arms and security threats present the findings of the mapping study. The 6. Absence of a functioning Constitutional meeting brought together 150 participants Court. representing the government, civil society, and local and international NGOs. Alleviating these challenges will require concrete and timely actions before the current Participants vigorously discussed challenges to government’s term of office expires in 2019. democratization in Puntland and agreed upon Nonetheless, the PDRC democratization pillar a list of priority challenges. Based on the views team, in search of possible entry points and of the participants, the following are key chal- prospects for engagement with the challenges lenges that could derail Puntland’s forthcoming prioritized at the PSM, has conducted further democratization process: consultations with relevant government authorities and other stakeholders. The object 1. Prevalent social and political divides be- of this exercise was to address the challenges tween communities in Puntland prioritized at the PSM and also to look into ar- 2. Low public awareness and understanding of eas where the democratization pillar can build democratization and electoral processes upon the planned efforts of the government 3. Lack of clearly demarcated boundaries be- and other stakeholders. tween Puntland’s districts and regions

42 The subsequent section of this report chron- leaders and their communities, to lay the foun- icles the outcomes of the consultations along dation for inclusive democratization processes. with the anticipated entry points for the Preparations for a “Puntland Grand Consulta- democratization pillar and implementing part- tion Conference” are currently underway, led ners. The final choice of entry points will be by President Gaas, with the technical facilita- determined by a “democratization pillar steer- tion of government-appointed oversight and ing committee” made up of influential individ- steering committees and secretariats. More uals, decision-makers, opinion-shapers, change than 250 participants from different constitu- agents, and experts, in conjunction with PDRC. encies and regions of Puntland are expected to The steering committee selection of pillar fo- come together almost 17 years after the for- cus themes will be guided by the PSM’s pri- mation of Puntland State to hold consultations. oritization and PDRC’s analysis of where its The following questions are expected to arise: expertise can add the most value. • What has changed of the fundamental objectives and principles upon which Puntland 3.5.1 Reinvigorating Community Cohesion was based at its formation in 1998? • Do the elders still enjoy the same influence Puntland has faced adverse social and political and power they had at Puntland’s forma- changes in the past few years. The formation tion? of anti-government secessionist movements • Assuming the conference comes up with (including the self-proclaimed state of Kha- recommendations, what guarantees are tumo) and a rapid degradation of the role of there for effective implementation of its an- traditional elders have indicated a loosening of ticipated outcomes? communal cohesion. These are all attributed • What are the prospects for the conference to the recurrence of resource-based conflicts, to deliver recommendations on the re- marginalization of peripheral communities, and sumption of the democratization process in political controversies provoked by the 2013 Puntland? electoral process and subsequent presidential elections of 2014. 3.5.2 Intensifying Civic and Voter According to the views of participants in the Education democratization pillar mapping, before Punt- land’s environment becomes conducive to According to an opinion poll conducted by rigorous democratization, genuine social PDRC in March 2014, which surveyed 1,525 and political reconciliation processes must respondents across Puntland, low public be spearheaded, including the participation of awareness and understanding of electoral pro- political elites and traditional elders as well as cesses emerged as the second most threaten- other interest groups. Such reconciliation pro- ing challenge to the forthcoming democratiza- cesses will inevitably lessen the prevalent social tion process. Most Puntlanders lack electoral and political divides, which in turn will pave the experience and have little understanding of way for democratization. their basic rights and responsibilities, especially those that live in rural and hard-to-reach areas President Gaas has repeatedly vowed to con- with little access to information. However, civ- duct a national dialogue process to reinforce ic and voter education are believed to be the Puntland’s social and political unity, and address best approaches to galvanizing political partici- the discontentment of political and traditional pation while also increasing voter participation.

43 In the 2013 electoral process, significant broader contribution and participation in strides were made to educate the general implementing the democratization process, public on their civic rights and responsibilities including outreach campaigns on civic and and electoral processes. However, voter edu- voter education throughout Puntland? cation and information activities were mostly • What is the role of civil society organiza- centered in the major towns. Poor outreach tions in this regard? and loose cooperation and coordination mech- • What is the best approach for better coor- anisms on the part of civil society organizations dination and cooperation among the actors also weakened their role in awareness-raising in the democratization process? efforts and the overall electoral process.

Notwithstanding the above, the Ministry of 3.5.3 Demarcating Districts in Puntland Constitution, Federal Affairs and Democra- tization envisions expanding outreach to 21 The increase in the number of Puntland dis- districts throughout 2015, to ensure that civic tricts and regions in the past decade has cre- education messages get to the grass-roots lev- ated multi-dimensional challenges to security, el. According to ministry officials, their efforts decentralization, and democratization process- are usually impaired by the lack of adequate fi- es. At the time of writing in early 2015, there nancial resources. Nonetheless, there is strong were 43 districts forming the nine regions of interest on the part of the international com- Puntland, most of which have no demarcated munity in supporting active approaches to civic boundaries. As a matter of fact, the absence and voter education. of distinct constituencies threw the 2013 electoral process into a dilemma over which of the PDRC has ample experience and expertise in then 37 districts would be qualified to become spearheading civic and voter education pro- electoral districts and how many seats each grams and can add substantial value in this would have in parliament. area. PDRC’s democratization pillar, in conjunction with PDRC’s Mobile Audio-Visual The severity of this challenge still persists Unit (MAVU), envisages substantively contrib- despite the Ministry of Interior’s efforts to uting to the programming and implementation establish a boundaries and demarcation com- of civic and voter education and information mission.15There is little hope of carrying out a endeavors once the transitional electoral com- nationwide boundary demarcation in the near mission is re-instituted. The pillar also seeks future, due to lack of government resources to prompt better approaches to coordination and an absence of the expertise, know-how, and cooperation among key stakeholders in and awareness needed to implement such the process. a vast exercise. Future government efforts should include a consensus-based formula to The following questions should be explored identify polling stations in districts, to legit- regarding civic and voter education: imize the electoral process at the local level until legal steps can be taken. • To what extent did previous public awareness efforts raise the level of civic and voter The following questions need to be explored education in Puntland? • The democratization process is a very expensive exercise that Puntland cannot 15 According to the Puntland Decentralization Roadmap, the boundaries commission was supposed to be estab- implement alone. Is there an appetite for lished in March 2014.

44 with regard to district demarcation: stopping support to the future electoral commission in addressing issues of paramount im- • What challenges could hinder the resump- portance for elections. tion of the democratization process in the absence of a demarcation of regional and The lack of voter registration was one of the district boundaries in Puntland? critical issues that hindered the democratiza- • How can the Puntland government limit the tion process in 2013. To avoid repeating the number of electoral districts? same mistakes, Puntland must conduct voter registration well before the next elections.

3.5.4 Identifying and Registering Voters The following questions will need to be explored regarding voter registration: In its 17 years of existence, Puntland has never undertaken any census or population estima- • Bearing in mind that it is a costly process, tion, nor has it registered its citizens of voting can Puntland afford to conduct voter regis- age. The absence of citizen identification mech- tration? anisms and voter registration has always been • What strategies can be employed to ensure a contentious issue, resulting in a longstanding a credible voter registration process? stalemate, which led some associations to boy- • Should voter registration be prioritized cott the 2013 election process. ahead of civic registration?

Their concerns arose around possibilities of multiple voting and potential fraud and ma- 3.5.5 Providing Security nipulation of the election results by the then administration. Another concern was, and still According to international standards, the suc- is, that Puntland hosts a large number of in- cess of an election is measured by certain internally displaced people (IDPs) and migrants dicators, including how peacefully it was con- from southern Somalia and Ethiopia who could ducted. Ensuring security during an electoral be exploited to vote in favor of certain political process is critical to guaranteeing citizens’ par- associations. Globally, voter registration is be- ticipation and buy-in to the electoral process. lieved to be an important safeguard for legiti- The violent anti-election uprisings that erupted mate elections. It facilitates the identification of on the eve of the planned 2013 local elections eligible voters and curbs instances of multiple led to the suspension of the election process. voting. Puntland’s security institutions are weak, while security conditions remain volatile. Commu- According to the Ministry of Interior, the nities across Puntland are heavily armed and government will soon initiate a civil registra- grievances about poor government outreach tion process, the aim of which is to document and the delivery of social services fuel further Puntland citizens and grant them citizen ID insecurity in the border regions. cards. The decision of whether to roll out voter registration will rest with the forthcoming However, the biggest threats to the democ- electoral commission, subject to the approval ratization process emanate from Al Shabaab, of Parliament. It is envisaged that future polit- and from communities who might feel margin- ical associations will have a say over whether alized from the political process and vulnerable voter registration is to be conducted or not. to more radical ideals. Disengaged political and The democratization pillar will provide back- traditional leaders might also seek shortcom-

45 ings within the electoral process to justify their program that will involve a review of the state opposition and thus mobilize their constituen- constitution to address possible contradictions cies against the process. and imprecisions. According to these respondents, the establishment of the Constitutional Poorly delineated electoral districts and poll- Court will be a key aspect of this reform pro- ing stations pose considerable dangers to the cess. advancement of the democratization process, and may lead to inter-communal conflicts. The In a related issue, officials from the Ministry of capacity of security forces in policing elections Constitution, Federal Affairs and Democratiza- and providing security to all communities is tion met during the prospects mapping stated perceived to be extremely low. that they worked with the Ministry of Justice to draft a special law that sets out the struc- Ahead of the resumption of the democrati- ture and powers of the Constitutional Court. zation process, the Government of Puntland This law was planned to be tabled at the parlia- should come up with a clear-cut strategy for mentary session scheduled for June 2015. sustaining peace and security that does not result in any further election delays. The current constitution does not clearly define which of the constitutionally recognized The following questions should be explored courts is responsible for adjudicating elector- regarding electoral security: al disputes. It only recognizes the Supreme Court as the highest tribunal of the state and • Can the Puntland government take action vests it with substantial powers including the to regulate arms in the hands of the public? announcement of election results. Due to this • How can Puntland set up and implement an loophole, some government officials downplay electoral security plan? the importance of this court in the election • Does Puntland have enough trained police process. However, the formation of the Con- to secure regional and district election of- stitutional Court is believed to be a govern- fices and polling stations? ment prerogative and key tenet of the democratization pillar.

3.5.6 Instituting the Constitutional Court The following questions arise in relation to the Constitutional Court: The Puntland Constitution mandates the establishment of a constitutional court whose re- • How can it be ensured that a constitutional sponsibilities include preserving public liberties court is in place, with a mandate that is sup- and personal rights stipulated in the constitu- ported by all actors? tion. According to the deputies16 of the speak- • Will the powers of the constitutional court er of the Puntland parliament, President Gaas regarding electoral disputes be clarified? has commissioned an evolving judicial reform • What is the appropriate role for the constitutional court with regard to elections?

16 Cabdihamid Sh. Cabdisalaam and Hussein Yasin Dirie.

46 Category Quantity Percentage Business 12 9.24 Councillors 8 6.15 Elders/Religious Leaders 16 12.3 Media 1 0.8 Professional 22 16.9 Women Groups 16 12.3 Youth 18 13.85 CSOs 4 3.07 Minority 10 7.7 District Authority 8 6.15 Diaspora 2 1.54 Intellectuals/Politicians 13 10 Total 130 100

Table 4: Participants disaggregated by group

4 Decentralization

4.1 Introduction

Puntland’s decentralization process is more headed efforts to establish local councils and than a decade old and has a vision of “… estab- implement key laws and policies such as the Lo- lishing the local government level for improved cal Council Law and an official decentralization good governance and service delivery through policy. However, much remains to be done to participatory, accountable, and transparent empower local governments to assume greater local government and to effectively utilize the responsibility in implementing the decentraliza- limited resources available at the central and tion process. Greater commitment from the local government levels” (Puntland Decen- state government, especially in strengthening tralization Policy). The decentralized system the capacity of local governments and promot- of governance, while still nascent, provides a ing public participation, is needed. valuable alternative to the highly centralized rule that contributed to state collapse and on- Decentralization remains a critical component going political instability. Following independ- of peace and statebuilding in Puntland because: ence in 1960, a brief period of democracy was followed by a military dictatorship that lasted • It will bring governance closer to the peo- until the outbreak of the civil war in 1991. As ple, and promote increased public partici- a result, Somali people have little experience pation in decision-making processes. It is, with public ownership and local participation therefore, imperative to ensure that the in governance affairs. public is involved in the process from the start, so that the results reflect and address In recent years, progress has been made to- the needs of the people. wards establishing a federal system of govern- • Decentralization promotes democracy and ance that includes devolved local governments. participation at the local level, enabling Devolved power to local governments is a crit- more people to engage. Decentralization is ical component of decentralization – the focus also beneficial for rural development as it must be placed on improving administrative brings decision-makers closer to the people structures with the potential to mobilize local who best know what challenges they are actors for community-based initiatives. facing and what is needed to address them. • It will enhance development efforts by im- The Puntland Minister of Interior, Local Gov- proving the opportunities for the public to ernment and Rural Development has spear- influence priorities at the local level to ad-

48 dress the most pertinent needs of commu- ability and transparency of local revenue nities. spending and limited local governments’ in- • Bringing decision-making closer to local frastructure); communities could strengthen the influence • Poor relationship between the state and lo- of women, youth and other marginalized cal governments. groups whose voices are often absent from political processes. To assess the current status of the decentralization process in Puntland, PDRC conducted PDRC, together with its partner Interpeace, a mapping exercise for the second phase of supports peace and statebuilding in Puntland the PoP program with the objective of high- through promoting local ownership and broad- lighting the major challenges, opportunities based participation. Decentralization has been and focus themes for future interventions in part of the work in the PoP program since support of decentralization. From May to June 2008. of 2014, the mapping exercise consisted of an in-depth desk review followed by FGDs with During the first comprehensive mapping exer- decentralization experts and representatives cise in 2010 the following key challenges, to from the different regions of Puntland. This the decentralization process in Puntland, were was followed by a more comprehensive qual- identified: itative research exercise covering 11 out of 43 districts in Puntland conducted throughout • Inappropriate and undemocratic local coun- September and November 2014. The districts cil selection processes; were selected according to the categories A, B • Insignificant public participation; and C, and geographical and regional balance: • Institutional limitations (internal disputes 51 individual interviews were held along with within local governments, lack of account- 13 FGDs gathering a total of 90 people.

4.2 Decentralization Milestones

Transfer of power from the central authority The Government of Puntland has mandated to local administrations through the establish- the Ministry of Interior, Local Government ment of local councils is enshrined in the 1998 and Rural Development to support decentral- Constitution of Puntland and other legal and ization and local governance in Puntland. The policy frameworks, such as the Local Council key decentralization priorities for the current Law and the recently adopted Puntland Decen- Puntland administration (2014-2016) include tralization Policy. In spite of these positive de- governance, security, justice, and economic velopments, including the formation of district foundations, including improved revenue col- councils, the process is still impeded by signif- lection and public financial management. - Ac icant difficulties. The challenges facing district cording to the document outlining the Gov- councils are similar regardless of the district’s ernment of Puntland’s priorities for the period category. Smaller districts in categories B and 2014-2016, the priority in decentralization is C are at a disadvantage compared to larger dis- to “… strengthen local authority and deliv- tricts in category A due to their comparatively er decentralized services by promoting good lower capacity to overcome these challenges. governance principles and empowering local communities to constructively monitor deci-

49 sion-making at the local level.” which have local councils. Meanwhile, 20 out of the 43 districts have executive com- When assessing the progress of decentrali- mittees proposed by the Ministry of Inte- zation in Puntland, and planning how to best rior and nominated by the president. The support this process, it is important to under- executive committee comprises a mayor, a stand why decentralization has not yet been deputy mayor and a district secretary. fully implemented and why the fiscal, admin- • Despite the public’s dissatisfaction with the istrative and political powers have not yet de- aborted local council elections in 2013, it volved effectively to the local governments. was a lesson learned in terms of how and The following are some of the most important what was needed before the next attempt achievements and setbacks in the decentraliza- at holding local elections. The new Punt- tion process: land government led by President Gaas, has promised to accelerate the democratiza- • Local Council Law No. 7 was passed by Par- tion process in Puntland, this includes push- liament and endorsed by the President of ing forward with local council elections. Puntland on 23 September 2003. The law • A champion’s office under the leadership of activates the constitutional provisions and the Vice-President of Puntland was estab- provides the primary framework guiding lished in 2013 to lead the decentralization the work of local governments in Puntland. process. The office coordinates efforts of The two main challenges that the law faces the Inter-Ministerial Committee of Local are its implementation and legal interpre- Government and plays an active role in sup- tation among local governments and the port of decentralization in Puntland. public. There is also a need to harmonize • The decentralization policy for Puntland existing laws on local governance and de- was approved on 10 July 2014. It is now be- centralized service delivery in order to fill ing disseminated to stakeholders before the gaps and address challenges. implementation starts. • Two years after the Local Council Law was • Some ministries, with support of the UN passed, the process of establishing local Joint Programme on Local Governance councils started. At that time, Puntland had (JPLG), had piloted the decentralization of 37 official districts. The Ministry of Interi- service delivery including health, education, or established 25 district councils while 12 environment and water in several districts districts had only executive committees. In belonging to categories A and B. Given the 2010, of the 25 established district councils, low capacity of local governments, service only one district council remained function- delivery and most local government real, while 24 had been dissolved or were sponsibilities remain the responsibility of deemed non-functional. the central government of Puntland with • Currently, Puntland has 43 districts, 23 of support from the private sector, NGOs and

4.3 Challenges to Decentralization in Puntland

the international community. the Government of Puntland does not have the The majority of districts in Puntland are not yet capacity to provide the support necessary to equipped with the necessary human or financial speed up the process. Development partners resources to assume greater responsibility; and such as JPLG are providing support to the de-

50 centralization process – particularly for grade insufficient to fulfill these tasks at the local gov- A and B districts in Puntland, strengthening the ernment level. capacity of those districts to assume greater In spite of the institutional challenges outlined responsibilities. Yet, the targeted support by above, the districts supported by JPLG have JPLG to certain districts has also contributed acquired the capacity to assume many of the towards creating a gap between JPLG-districts responsibilities assigned to them by the appli- and non-JPLG districts – a gap which needs to cable legal frameworks, but there are concerns be bridged to reduce tensions and improve that certain ministries at the state level are re- service delivery equitably across all districts. luctant to transfer their responsibilities to the Below are the challenges that need to be ad- district level. dressed in order for local governments to assume greater responsibilities as part of the “You find that the services that used to be decentralization process. delivered by the district administration are instead being delivered by the state government. In most districts, and in particular the 4.3.1 Lack of Institutional Capacity JPLG supported districts, the legal frame- (administrative, fiscal and human) works, local councils with committees, the structures, and the district plans are func- The core challenges identified in the local gov- tional, I agree that the district’s capacity ernment institutions include lack of adminis- depends on its category and the available trative and fiscal transfer capacity, incomplete infrastructures but I do believe that grade A local government departments without the and B districts have the capacity to perform necessary legal provisions, offices and equip- their duties.” – Awil Mohamoud, consultant, ment, or experienced staff. Gardo District

Restructuring local government departments for better efficiency, establishing administrative Fiscal Capacity legal procedures at district level and developing district authorities fiscally and administra- Most districts have not been allocated the tively are all required to improve the capacity needed financial resources to provide the of local governments. Technical assistance in necessary basic services, or attract sufficient the form of advice, training, supervision and and competent staff. The systems for inter- apprenticeship will help improve efficiency and governmental transfers from the state level effectiveness, as well as strengthen local gov- to the local level lack efficiency, and consist of ernments’ capacity to assume their legally-con- monthly fiscal transfers towards development stituted responsibilities of delivering services and security to the four major districts Bossa- to the community. so, Galkayo, Gardo and Garowe. While local governments can rely on this initial transfer, Administrative Capacity many smaller districts see little of this revenue. With little revenue generating capacity, these Puntland has transferred responsibilities for districts face severe challenges when trying to services, planning, management, and allocation meet their responsibilities or when responding of resources to municipalities that elect their to emergencies. Their informal tax and other own mayor and councils. While some powers revenue collection systems remain inadequate, have been devolved, the capacity to success- partly because the public is generally averse to fully administer these responsibilities remains contributing to taxes while not receiving the

51 expected level of service. The recently adopted decentralization policy of Puntland stipulates: “When we employ people with capability “Fiscal decentralization provides the frame- and knowledge we can expect good work, work for the allocation of financial resources but now look at the human resource we to local government and includes the fiscal re- have!”- Ahmed Deeq, journalist, Dhahar lationship between the central and local governments” (Decentralization policy, p. 23). The difficulty of finding qualified individuals to work for local governments is a key challenge It is clear that the fiscal relationship between to the emergence of an effective decentralized the state and local levels of government needs system of governance in Puntland. Providing to be improved and that the local governments capacity strengthening trainings for existing need to improve their independent, local rev- district councils and induction trainings for enue collection capacity. This will, in turn, newly-established ones, combined with more positively impact public recognition for the le- in-depth follow-up trainings for councilors, is gitimacy of the local government and tax com- of key importance to the implementation of pliance among them. the decentralization policy in Puntland.

“The challenge in Puntland is that the Human Resource Capacity councils do not have the capacity to make enforceable decisions. If for example, the Articles 19 to 27 of the Local Council Law and council finds me incapable of fulfilling my articles 125 to 127 of the Puntland Constitu- leadership responsibilities in the district, tion define the roles and responsibilities of lo- then, the councils should be able to im- cal government, as well as local councils. Due peach me without fear of repercussions.”- to a generally low level of public understanding Yacquub Mahamed, Deputy Mayor of of the regulations that guide the appointment Galkayo of local councils, the process is often influ- enced by clan power-sharing agreements that contradict and violate local council selection 4.3.2 Low Citizen Participation processes articulated in the local council law. Local council and municipality staff need capac- “We the mayors should start transferring ity-building to successfully carry out their du- responsibilities to other members of the dis- ties and responsibilities in accordance with the trict administration including the secretary, legal framework. district council departments, village committees and so on, but if we adopt everything Another challenge is that clan representatives like the central government does, good gov- and elders are not inclined to select candidates ernance may become impossible to achieve based on their knowledge and experience of in Puntland. In Galkayo the current council’s local governance, but rather on their clan af- strategy of participation is to accept that the filiation or personal connections. In the local community has the ownership of clarifying councils, it is therefore possible to find uni- what is to be done, and the administration versity graduates, as well as people with only facilitates this.” - Yacquub Mahamed, Dep- primary school education and people who are uty Mayor of Galkayo illiterate. It is difficult, in turn, to facilitate cooperation among people from such diverse ed- Citizen empowerment and participation are ucational and professional backgrounds. key elements of decentralization and local gov-

52 ernance. Decentralization brings the govern- need to equip local officials with the tools ment closer to the people by transferring pow- for delivering the required public services. If er to local authorities that are better placed to a governance structure is established lack- address the challenges faced by local commu- ing a police component, logistics, and the nities. In most regions and districts of Puntland limited capacities and collaboration of the covered in the mapping exercise, the commu- available government institutions, in a situ- nity is not able to effectively influence the de- ation where wrongdoers cannot be referred cisions of their government which undermines to court, or to custodial facilities, I do not the effectiveness and legitimacy of the local think there can be any governance without governments. It is important to include the the complete and collaborative functioning empowerment of all citizens in efforts to build of all governmental institutions. That is the and strengthen local governments. This could only viable path for decentralization.” – bring forth democratic institutions and devel- Hassan Farah, Mayor of Galdogob opment. With focus on how public participation in local To gauge citizen participation, the mapping decision-making processes can be improved, exercise asked respondents representing the the mapping provided the following insights: public, “Do you participate in local council decisions in your district? How? If not, why • Clan-based selection of local council mem- not?” Most of the responses suggested that bers contributes to less citizen participa- participation existed largely in informal ways, tion and lack of accountability in Puntland. for instance in emergencies, influential community people – including elders, businesses and “A person selected on a clan basis (into village committees – convened to address the public office) cannot be fair because of al- situation. Although structured participation legiance to the elder and his/her clan.” – is largely absent, districts with local councils Hawo Yusuf, Women’s Activist, Galkayo manage to organize the district into villages and established village committees in both ur- • Limited availability of public spaces has had a ban and rural settings. negative effect on public participation in decision-making processes. The availability of The interaction between local governments such public space is important for encour- and civil society is key to pressuring the gov- aging cooperation between the local coun- ernment to support the decentralization pro- cils and the public, and strengthening the cess. Civil society plays an important role in influence of locally-owned decision-making the community and has provided essential con- processes. The principle of public participa- tributions to development in Puntland. Despite tion in local governance is emphasized in the these contributions, there is still a lack of un- Puntland Decentralization Policy: “Ensuring derstanding among local governments and civil that village councils are engaged in prioritiza- society actors on their specific roles, respon- tion and planning of development activities sibilities and how they could complement each in their own area, and these are forwarded other. to the council for possible inclusion in the overall district plan and publishing district “For effective decentralization to take place, council plans and presenting these to the there is a need for mass education and sen- citizens through a public hearing process.” sitization that could enable people to grasp the meaning of governance. Next there is a • The influence of clan in politics means that

53 men tend to be over-represented in politi- also mandated to collect revenue from several cal offices. Despite marginal improvements other sources, including taxes (property tax, in youth representation in local govern- sales and gross receipt tax, individual income ment, women and minority groups remain tax, etc.), and other revenues such as public significantly under-represented. Women, contribution, contributions from Diaspora youth and marginalized groups in Somali communities and support from the interna- community have limited opportunities to tional community. serve their communities in public life. Their political participation is hindered by cultural The objective of the decentralization process and institutional barriers, presenting them is to transfer functions and resources to lo- with few opportunities to serve in political cal governance. Yet, in Puntland, the revenue positions at the local, state and national lev- base at the central level is low to begin with els in Puntland. Addressing this imbalance – limited to custom duties from Bossaso port remains pivotal to the legitimacy of govern- and Galkayo airport, which cannot cover the ance on the local level. basic ordinary expenditure of administration. At the local level, most governments still face “Until we determine democratic elec- significant challenges related to revenue gener- tions, women and minority groups ation. Thus, it goes without saying that there is cannot obtain their political rights” – a need for budgetary reform to increase reve- Hawo Yusuf, women activist, Galkayo. nue generating power at both central and local levels. • As a consequence of the legacy of the uni- tary system of governance in Somalia and The current administration emphasizes reve- the ensuing civil war, there is a lack of un- nue and public financial management reforms derstanding of democratic principles and as indicated in the 2014-2016 priorities: the concept of decentralization. Broad civic education campaigns will be necessary to “The ability to raise, prioritize, and manage address this need to improve public under- resources and deliver services is critical in standing. Puntland. Therefore, the state will lead the setting of frameworks that coordinate equi- “Other than starting a new system with table service delivery and resource manage- a policy, the public should receive strong ment such as building a transparent system awareness campaigns. We heard that the of public financial management” (Puntland decentralization policy was adopted but we priorities 2014 – 2016). observed that public understanding of what this means is missing.” – Mohamed Mahad, The government is committed to identifying Rector of Bossaso University challenges faced by local governments in collecting revenues. As part of the mapping exercise, respondents were asked how local 4.3.3 Limited Financial Resources governments’ resources could be increased through tax collection. The following are the “Labo qaawani isma qaado - Two destitute identified areas where revenue collection can persons do not help each other” be improved.

In addition to receiving internal transfers from the central government, local governments are

54 Natural resource utilization and financial infrastructure. The low -admin istrative capacity of most local governments “We are an impoverished people living in a in Puntland is a serious impediment to their rich country, we need resources and educat- capacity to collect revenues from accessible ed people to help us benefit from our nat- sources. In addition to the institutional chal- ural resources.” – President Abdiweli Gaas lenges, there is also a gap between local governments and the public based on mistrust. Most of the districts in Puntland are rich in natural resources. The main sources of livelihood “Revenues are collected through govern- are currently pastoralism and fisheries – the ment power… it can be a challenge if the latter which is potentially very lucrative, but taxpayers have not received local govern- not adequately supported due to the limited ment budgets. Accountability and transpar- capacity of coastal districts in Puntland. Of all ency is important for revenue but still there the coastal districts, only Bossaso district has should be government power for those who a small commercial port, which remains the refuse to pay taxes.” – Hassan Farah, May- biggest source of government revenue in Punt- or of Galdogob land. Developing the fishing capacity of Punt- land holds great potential for increased income In most districts, the district council lacks the generation. Although the presence of maritime tools and knowledge to properly fulfill its re- pirates in Puntland territory have decreased, sponsibilities – feeding popular mistrust that as mentioned previously, illegal fishing in Punt- negatively affects the public’s willingness to land’s waters remains a key challenge. contribute to taxes, further widening the gap between local governments and their constit- “There would be no begging, and we would uents. A two-pronged approach focusing on not have had to stretch out our palms to building the capability of local governments beg, had we managed to exploit our vast to collect taxes and deliver services, as well natural resources. The coastline has been as improving the relationship between local abandoned; everyone is in the mainland governments and the public would contribute pursuing the little left in towns by the tar- towards improved revenue collection. mac highways. If we only could rear our livestock and practice our fisheries, we would “When revenue is something in a person’s become a destination for global economic pocket, you need wisdom, cunning, and migration, but now the world is tired of force to collect it. The fining of tax default- our begging and so are our stretched out ers and collection of other fines, for instance palms.” – Yasin Abdi Samed, Elder, Galkayo littering is vital source of revenue. To generate it, you need force not persuasion; people The mapping also established that the two should fear the laws, policies and the con- other key resources of Puntland, livestock and sequence of not paying tax; however, there agriculture also remain underdeveloped, and has to be a symbol of fear.” – Mohamed would benefit from income generation in Punt- Said Issa, Mayor of Gardo land both at the national and local levels.

4.3.5 Transparency and Accountability 4.3.4 Revenue Generation Capacities Local government’s lack of accountability is a Collecting revenues requires human resources key factor that affects the public’s willingness

55 to pay taxes to the local government. The map- cannot afford it and also to build roads; only ping exercise asked respondents, “How can then will the public be motivated to partici- we increase accountability of local councils to pate and contribute to the national revenue. the people?” Most responses indicated that the This will generate extra revenue leading to key solution would be improving citizen access better service delivery thus improving the to information, which would, in turn, amelio- standards of” – Hawo Yusuf, women activ- rate council-constituent relations – increasing ist, Galkayo confidence in and public pressure on ensuring the accountability of local governments. Tar- 4.3.7 Multiplication of Districts: Implica- geted interventions are necessary to increase tions and Possible Consequences the public’s understanding of their rights and responsibilities, as well as local governments’ When Puntland was established, it consisted responsibilities towards the communities. of 21 administrative districts in five regions. Today that number has risen to 43 districts in Transparency in local government budgeting nine regions. This increase in the number of would certainly contribute to enhanced trust, district has had a significant impact on commu- and indicate the local governments’ efficient nities, district development, and economy and management of resources and revenues, and has led to questions of efficiency. to increase the opportunities for public participation in decision-making at the local level. “This place was allocated the status of a region before it even attained the status of district in Puntland. The place does not even 4.3.6 Public Service Delivery have a jail or prison for holding criminals but Puntland went ahead and named dis- When the public pays taxes and other fees, trict. Now they are giving us directives for they expect the government to provide servic- establishing council and elect mayor, how es. Taxpaying citizens want to see something in should we do it?” – Jasin Jama, Business- return for their money, like clean streets, sup- man, Dhahar port in establishing businesses, healthcare, education and clean water. Most of these services The boundaries of Puntland’s new districts are currently provided by the private sector or have not been properly demarcated. The new non-governmental organizations in Puntland, districts have been established mainly based on not by the government. As a result, there is clan distribution, driven by the government to little motivation for constituents to pay taxes. carve out local pockets of support. The com- Major services provided by local governments petition for jurisdiction between neighboring are mainly sanitation, security, and in some authorities has fuelled clan-based disputes in districts land management. Many respondents some districts. The government has not been indicated that if their local governments pro- able to manage this new development effec- vided more services, their willingness to pay tively although there have been attempts to taxes would increase. curtail the proliferation of districts by establishing eligibility criteria that focuses on the vi- “The government has to initiate necessary ability of the proposed entity. steps for public indoctrination along with a tangible display of service delivery to “Due to the growing progress towards dem- the public. The government needs to visit ocratic elections in Puntland, clans are rush- schools, provide education to those who ing to establish their own constituencies. If

56 they do not do so, they believe they will miss out on political representation.” – Bile Qa- Bina claimed two lives, and multiple bowsade, politician, Bossaso casualties. In addition to causing the suspension of tax collection in the Instead of encouraging the proliferation of area, the clashes have divided the once clan-based districts, the government of Punt- unified clans and have initiated a cycle land and other relevant stakeholders should of revenge killings. focus on developing already existing districts to support the cultivation of local democracy. been divided into six districts (Bargal, Gumbah, The mapping exercise indicated that it was Ufayn, Armo, Rako and Iskushuban). None of crucial for the government to establish clear these districts have an officially known area of criteria for district formation; and that districts jurisdiction, thus undermining their viability as should be given different reform agendas de- functioning authorities, as well as increasing pendent on the political, social and economic the risk for conflict between neighboring com- profile of the district. For instance, Iskushuban munities over borders. district of Bari region was one of the largest districts in Somalia. Nowadays, Iskushuban has 4.3.8 Central and Local Authorities The implications of ambiguous district Relations boundaries in Puntland Although the current government has started (A Case study of Bargaal and Gumbah outreach visits, many people in the more re- districts) mote parts of Puntland still criticize what they perceive as the government’s indifferent ap- Bargal and Gumbah districts are both proach to supporting local governance in the under the jurisdiction of Guardafui peripheral regions. Public knowledge about the region – the ninth newly formed region respective roles of the state and local govern- in Puntland State. Guardafui is a former ments is limited. Similarly, the capacity of local constituency of Bari region. Both Presi- councils to represent and build the community dent Adde Muse and President Faroole capacity remains insufficient. The active - sup granted administrative autonomy to the port of the state government to the district new districts. Yet, the ambiguous dis- level is fundamental in order to better define trict boundaries resulted in heightened the roles of central versus local governments competition between the two districts and to enable local governments to assume authorities, particularly in Ras Bina – a their legally-stipulated responsibilities. viable tax-base area for revenue from fisheries, located 7 km from Bargal and For instance, the Ministry of Interior should 52 km from Gumbah. While Ras Bina support budgetary planning and allocation, is geographically closer to Bargaal, the the drafting and implementation of local reg- clans that inhabit Ras Bina are closer to ulations, and general development of districts. those in Gumbah district. This present- The Ministry of Interior is also expected to ed a jurisdictional dilemma resulting guide and support local councils, to oversee in clan skirmishes over tax collection. and coach them in their new roles in order to The competition for control of Ras build their capacity. However, the government

57 has proven unable to provide such support. For The district authorities are not informed by example, during the mapping exercise, PDRC aid coordination in Puntland. According to the met with a local council (which was established stakeholders, international and local organiza- four months ahead of the PoP II mapping) that tions collaborate only with the line ministries, was yet to receive vital information such as the who coordinate interventions, and not directly Local Council Law and the Puntland Decentral- with the districts which can identify the basic ization Policy. needs of their respective districts and villages. A recommendation suggests that coordination “Why is it that they established us and should begin from local to the central levels of abandoned us? The councils were expecting government. intergovernmental transfer, capacity building, coaching, and so on from the Ministry of The Ministry of Interior is responsible for Interior.” – Hasan Farah, councilor, Badhan harmonizing the decentralization system and enforcing policy at state and local levels, in The uncoordinated manner in which decentral- coordination with the Vice President (as the ization is pursued in Puntland is a major chal- champion of decentralization). However, the lenge affecting the relationship between the limited coordination between these two, as state and local governments. Efforts by differ- well as with local government, has caused pro- ent stakeholders, such as the central govern- grampoor development, duplication of efforts, ment, international agencies and non-govern- inequity of resource allocation and the lack of mental organizations, need to be coordinated better implementation strategies and owner- to enhance sustainability and impact. ship.

4.4 Exploring Decentralization Prospects in Puntland

During PoP Phase II, progress was noted, and Renewed government commitment to dual-track key opportunities were highlighted by partici- democratization and decentralization process- pants that demonstrate good foundations for es: The current Puntland administration has moving ahead with implementing decentraliza- pledged to reform and accelerate the decen- tion: tralization process. This has been demon- strated, at least in part, by appointing the Vice Improved popular understanding: The public’s un- President as the champion of decentralization. derstanding of decentralization has improved Promoting both democratization and decen- since the creation of Puntland State in 1998. tralization processes in a comprehensive and While the local council selection processes interlinked manner will be key to improving were among one of the major challenges iden- effectiveness and efficiency of democratical- tified during the first phase of PoP, the most ly-elected local governments. recent mapping exercise saw positive changes in terms of local ownership of the process. Adopted legal frameworks: Following the adop- Yet, participants still noted continued frustra- tion of essential laws and policies, such as the tion with inadequate resource allocation or Local Council Law and the Puntland Decentral- service delivery. ization Policy, there is a need to shift the focus toward implementation and harmonization. An

58 important element of the implementation is to experiences from over the world. We need to raise awareness among stakeholders and mem- utilize the human capital they present us. They bers of the public, especially on the benefits of are the biggest hope we have.” – Bile Qabows- implementing decentralization. ade, politician, Bossaso Establishment of the Association of Local Govern- Increasingly qualified human resource capacity: ment Authorities of Puntland State (ALGAPL): AL- The number of qualified candidates for -posi GAPL was established in 2012 and reviewed in tions within the local government is promising 2013. It provides a platform for local govern- given the increase in university graduates, with ments to interact with each other, coordinate universities providing an important institution- efforts and to speak with one voice. While its al platform for launching civic education. These membership only consists of the districts in efforts could be streamlined with the media which JPLG is currently working, the member- for mass outreach. “Remember a time when ship base is expected to widen to also include literate were every few, today we have thou- other districts. sands of young educated people returning with

4.5 Key Entry Points for Decentralization in Puntland

On 4 February 2015, the decentralization pillar centralization process in Puntland. The findings of PDRC presented the findings of the - map are below, and expand upon results from the ping exercise at the second PSM in Garowe. mapping exercise. The meeting aimed to discuss, validate and prioritize the outcomes of the mapping exercise. Below is the list of the primary challenges, 4.5.1 Building Local Government identified by participants and validated at the Capacities PSM meeting, as hindering Puntland’s decentralization process: Despite the multi-dimensional challenges that local governments face in Puntland, there are 1. Poor local government institutional capac- numerous initiatives currently underway to ity (including administrative, fiscal and hu- strengthen local governments to fulfill their man resource); mandates. The Ministry of Interior is in the 2. Low public participation; process of bolstering the internal and regula- 3. Limited financial resources; tory systems of local governments (including 4. Proliferation of districts and lack of clear for local government employment). A fiscal border demarcation; decentralization strategy and municipal finance 5. Loose intergovernmental relations between policy are also currently being drafted. Further central and local government. discussions are underway on forming a local government training institute, harmonizing ex- Following the PSM, PDRC carried out consul- isting legal and policy frameworks and rolling tations with relevant government institutions out JPLG interventions in three more districts and other decentralization actors to prioritize namely Burtinle, Galdogob and Qandala, thus these challenges. This exercise was intended to raising the number of participating districts to guide further intervention to support the de- ten.

59 According to officials, the Ministry of Interior ry out the recently approved decentralization – in conjunction with the Vice-President’s of- policy. The Ministry of Interior plans to solidi- fice (as the champion of decentralization) – will fy public participation in local decision-making carry out grassroots level awareness-raising to and development by adopting the existing pub- disseminate the decentralization policy, to en- lic engagement guideline and pertinent tools sure the optimal and timely implementation of to ensure that communities are involved in the decentralization reform agenda. Accord- planning, budgeting and prioritization process- ing to the roadmap, Ministry of Interior and es at local level. With the support of UNICEF, sector ministries will also advise the prevailing the Ministry of Interior has introduced a new local development fund and service delivery model “community score cards” as part of an models to enable JPLG participating districts overall local government barometer meant to to deliver basic services to their communities. gauge public perception and satisfaction to- MOI will also pursue a comprehensive capac- wards local government performance and de- ity enhancement strategy to address capacity livery in Puntland. The model will be tested in a gaps within local governments with a special number of JPLG participating districts. focus on those districts with established local councils. PDRC, through the decentralization pillar and the the Mobile Audio Visual Unit is contrib- PDRC has provided capacity-building pro- uting to promoting community participation grams by delivery training on good governance, through forums, debates and film screenings public participation, and education on laws to foster good relations between community and policies to district council and municipal and councils mainly in the non-JPLG districts, staff in Puntland. In 2014 alone, PDRC trained bringing some fruits of decentralization to seven of the newly-established local councils those districts currently not benefitting from with plans to expand similar trainings in other larger-scale capacity building programs. districts. Key questions going forward regard what needs to be done to practically imple- A key aspect to be addressed, in conjunction ment the decentralization policy within the with promoting public participation, is what existing legal framework to achieve Puntland’s mechanisms should be adopted to enable vision towards more effective decentralized women, youth and marginalized groups to ac- governance? Furthermore, how can the gov- tively participate in decision-making processes ernment along with civil society actors such as at local government level. PDRC support the capacity-building efforts of local councils, and what level of coordination should occur? 4.5.3 Addressing Proliferation of Districts

The Puntland government commissioned a 4.5.2 Fostering Public Participation in baseline survey in 2013 to assess viability of Local Affairs districts, as well as more generally, population density and revenue potential. Despite the ev- Efforts are currently underway to increase er-growing concern of the population towards public participation in issue of local importance. the multiplication of districts, progress towards According to plans, the Ministry of Interior will addressing these issues has been slow. Neither undertake community engagement and con- the assessment nor the decentralization policy sultation processes in Burtinle, Galdogob and roadmap (that clearly stipulates the formation Qandala and will also launch a campaign to car- of boundary demarcation commission by March

60 2014), were acted upon due to the absence of districts. The following are some key questions expertise and funding. The Ministry of Interior that must be considered when addressing lim- has recently submitted a proposal to the Soma- ited financial resources: lia Stability Fund (SSF) to help support Puntland government in border demarcation. Yet, with • What revenue frameworks are required to the advent of a federal electoral and boundary strengthen local government income gener- commission in Mogadishu (which Puntland de- ation capacities to insure better utilization nounced as unconstitutional), it is unlikely that of the local resources while securing inter- the international community will back such a governmental transfer? proposal. To find solutions to district demarca- • How can the various revenue activities be tion challenges, the below questions must be better regulated at local, state and federal carefully considered: levels?

• What rules and regulations does the government need to abide by in the nomination 4.5.5 Reinforcing Inter-Governmental of a new district or region? Linkages • Is it too late for the government to review the criteria on which current districts are The establishment of the Inter-Ministerial based, with the aim of addressing the neg- Committee on Decentralization in 2009 and ative implications of undefined/disputed the nomination of the Vice President as the district borders and of the proliferation of champion for all decentralization reforms and districts? processes in 2012 were meant to strengthen the cooperation, coordination and information-sharing between central and local govern- 4.5.4 Enhancing Local Revenue Generating ments. The formation of ALGAPL in 2013 was Capacities intended to further strengthen the relationship, cooperation and exchange between local The Ministry of Interior, in conjunction with governments, as well as to play a key role in the United Nations Capital Development advocacy and oversight on local government Fund (UNCDF), has recently embraced a lo- issues. In addition, the Ministry of Interior in- cal revenue mobilization initiative to support tends to follow up with the outcomes of the two districts in Puntland with the aim to build recently-held decentralization forum – where district capacities in revenue generation and all governors, mayors and municipal secretar- administration. With the support of JPLG, the ies participated – and will convene periodic fo- Ministry of Interior is also formulating a mu- rums for decentralization actors to ensure ef- nicipal finance policy meant to improve public fective linkage of cooperation, knowledge and finance management at district level. -The es information sharing. This key question must be tablishment of Geographic Information System considered when addressing intergovernmen- (GIS) and Billing Information System (BIM) and tal relations: the introduction of business licensing process in various districts of Puntland have also yield- • In addition to the existing efforts undertak- ed fruit with districts generating more reve- en by the different stakeholders for local nues. Equally, the Ministry of Finance is using and central government coordination, what its intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems other efforts can contribute to more effec- to boost poorly-performing districts and to tive cooperation? invest in community priorities in a number of

Category Quantity Percentage Business 18 12.76 Councillors 22 15.6 Elders 12 8.5 Mayor 11 8 Media 3 2.12 Professional 8 5.6 V. Committees 7 5 Women 17 12 Youth 12 8.5 NGO 1 0.7 Minority 3 2.12 District Authority 15 10.6 Intellectuals 12 8.5 Total 141 100

Table 5: Participants disaggregated by group

62 5 Conclusion

PDRC’s activities related to the thematic areas dicial organs, uncontrolled borders and disput- of the Pillars of Peace program have informed ed territories, poor public and police relations, trainings for local councils, community-based terrorism, illegal fishing, and resource-based reconciliation initiatives, and town-hall style clan conflicts as particularly pressing issues meetings, providing key platforms for dialogue that require immediate attention from inter- and necessary capacity-building support. How- national and domestic actors. However, the ever, following the completion of the mapping mapping exercise also found cause for opti- and validation phase of PoP II, as elaborated mism – including ongoing government securi- in the preceding note, PDRC will enter a new ty and judicial reform processes, commitment phase of implementation dedicated to address- from the international community to support ing specific challenges identified. these endeavors, mounting public vigilance and opposition against extremism and sea piracy, PDRC will draw on the inputs of stakeholders and an increasing aversion towards weapons – both the problems they perceived and the stockpiles. Additionally, it is apparent that tra- solutions they proposed – to arrive at “entry ditional and religious leaders play an important points” for action. In doing so, it will work in- role in combating piracy and terrorism and in tegrally with steering committees comprised of maintaining peace, and there is a potential to influential individuals with particular expertise build on this. related to the three pillar themes. These decision-makers, opinion-shapers, change agents, PDRC’s research found that the majority of and experts in their fields will help guide imple- participants see security and rule of law as the mentation and ensure buy-in for the solutions key sectors for bringing greater stabilization pursued. and progress. The participants in the mapping exercise repeatedly emphasized the need for The mapping exercise and the subsequent val- a secure and conducive environment as the idation of research carried out at the PSM in- foundation for social, economic and political dicate that there are serious and unrelenting development. Therefore, improving securi- challenges to peace and stability in Puntland. ty and stability and ensuring the prevalence These problems vary in nature, extent, and of rule of law are of utmost importance for substance and will require careful attention democratization and decentralization process- when searching for lasting solutions. In relation es as a whole. to security and rule of law, participants of the PSM found the weak capacity of security and ju- The mapping exercise also revealed a number

63 of overlapping challenges to Puntland’s politi- districts and lack of border demarcation; and cal transformation at the local and state levels. insufficient coordination between central and Inadequate institutional capacity and continued local authorities. At the same time, there are reliance on clan politics hamper decentraliza- many trends that bode well for increased in- tion efforts and the institutionalization of a fully stitutionalization and capacity of decentral- democratic system of governance in Puntland. ized governance structures. As in the case of In addition, low public awareness and under- democratization at the state level, one very standing of democratization and electoral pro- crucial trend is ever-greater public ownership cesses, the lack of clear boundaries between of, and confidence in, the decentralization pro- Puntland’s districts and regions, the absence cess. Others include the establishment of the of voter identification and registration mech- office of the Vice-President (as the champi- anisms, and the absence of a Constitutional on of decentralization), the adoption of legal Court provide further obstacles to the full re- frameworks for decentralization, and a rise in alization of the democratic process. Yet, such the number of qualified candidates to take on slow progress has further accelerated public local government positions. demand for pushing ahead with the democratization process. Finally, the new administration It is clear that there must be concerted efforts has expressed support for a resumption of at all levels to overcome the many challenges the democratization process, and should it re- that Puntland still faces in advancing security launch this process in earnest very soon, there and social reconciliation, decentralization, and is still sufficient time to make strides before democratization in Puntland, as well as to build President Gaas’ term in office ends. Lessons on positive trends that are also apparent. It learned from the suspension of the 2013 local will be crucial for communities, civil society, council elections should be applied to future government at all levels, and the international democratization efforts. community to work together to achieve this. While much work remains, PDRC’s research Key challenges related to decentralization in- reveals progress and ongoing commitment clude: poor institutional capacities (related to (from government as well as local communi- the administrative, fiscal, and human capacity ties) to achieving these goals – positive indica- of local government); low public participation; tions that leave Puntland in good stead to push limited financial resources; multiplication of ahead with these reforms.

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Puntland Development Research Center Interpeace +252 5 844480 / 907 794161 (Garowe) Eastern and Central Africa +252 5 844480 / 907 794161 (Galkayo) +254 (20) 265 52 28 [email protected] [email protected] In partnership with the United Nations www.pdrcsomalia.org www.interpeace.org

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