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Ground: Its History, Complexities, Threats and Implementation

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Ground: Its History, Complexities, Threats and Implementation PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS FOR THE PEACEKEEPER ON THE GROUND: ITS HISTORY, COMPLEXITIES, THREATS AND IMPLEMENTATION BY Eric Rudberg A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL COMPLETION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF The Certificate of Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations Peace Operations Training Institute® Index Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………1 Background to Protection of Civilians (PoC) in Armed Conflict…………………………2 Why Protect Civilians?........................................................................................................5 Right to Self-Defense…………………………………………………………………….10 Defining a “Civilian”…………………………………………………………………….12 Common Threats to Civilians……………………………………………………………16 o Torture or Other Prohibited Treatment……………………………………..……17 o Gender Based and Sexual Violence……...……………………………………....18 o Violence Against Children (Six Grave Violation Against Children)………………………..…..…….....21 . Killing & Maiming……………………………………………………....21 . Recruitment and/or Use of Child Soldiers…………………………….....22 . Sexual Violence………………………………………………………….24 . Attacks Against Schools & Hospitals…………………………………....25 . Denial of Humanitarian Access………………………………………….26 . Abduction…………………………………………………………….......27 o Human Trafficking…………………………………………………………….....28 o Forced Displacement………………………………………………………..…...29 o Denial of Humanitarian Assistance……………………………………………...30 o Explosive Weapons………………………………………………………….…...31 o Peacekeepers………………………………………………………………..…....32 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) for Reducing Threats to Civilians…………………………………………………....34 o Torture or Other Prohibited Treatment………………………………..……..…..36 o Gender Based and Sexual Violence……...…………………………..……..……37 o Violence Against Children………………………………………..…………..….39 o Human Trafficking……………………………………………………...…..……41 o Forced Displacement………………………………………………..…………...42 o Denial of Humanitarian Assistance…………………………………….………..44 o Explosive Weapons……………………………………………………………....45 o Peacekeepers………………………………………………………………..……45 Training Peacekeepers for Protection of Civilians…………………………...……….…49 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….…52 References……………………………...…………………………………………...……54 Abstract As we move into this new millennium the idea of Protection of Civilians continues to gain ever more importance in peacekeeping operations. Civilians are now increasingly becoming the targets of armed operations instead of regrettable and often, unavoidable collateral damage. There are many different threats faced by civilians on today’s battlefields. However, there are unique ways that each of these threats can either be reduced or eliminated completely. In this thesis I hope to accomplish three objectives. First, and most importantly, I hope to explain the concept of “Protection of Civilians” to the actual peacekeeper on the ground, the one walking on patrol or standing guard at the check point. Instead of an idea discussed in theory, in some college classroom, I want to illustrate to the soldier why he should care about it and why it is worth risking his life for. Second, I hope this thesis can be a guide and a frame of reference for those who are out in the field conducting pre-deployment training before a unit is dispatched on a peacekeeping operation. Hopefully, this thesis will help instructors and trainers to better prepare those peacekeepers who are about ready to put this concept into practice. Third, I hope that after reading this thesis, those who are skeptical of the importance of the “Protection of Civilians” task come to understand why it is now viewed, by many, as the priority task in most peacekeeping operations. On a personal note, by writing this thesis I learned just how truly rich and important this subject matter is. There is a wide array of material on each of the different threats discussed, more than enough to write an entire thesis on just one of the threats. It was a challenge deciding what information to include, but I always asked myself, “does the peacekeeper on the street corner care about it?” If he does, then I included it. This thesis addresses just the highlights of each threat and offers suggestions on how to reduce that threat. 1 Background to Protection of Civilians (POC) in Armed Conflict Throughout the history of warfare the issue/problem of dealing with civilians in an area of an armed conflict has been problematic. Traditionally the purpose and goal of the military force in an armed conflict has been to defeat the opposing military force whereupon one’s political goal or will could be imposed on the defeated enemy. On relatively rare occasions a civilian population may have been targeted by the military, but this was not the primary military effort and was generally looked down upon. One well known example of a military campaign that specifically targeted civilians occurred during the American Civil War. In 1864 Union General William Tecumseh Sherman launched his “March to the Sea,” driving through the rebelling South’s heartland, burning and destroying crops, killing livestock, razing food storages, and destroying factories. While this was successful in hindering the South’s war efforts and contributed to the collapse of the South’s war efforts and the eventual surrender of the Confederate States of America, it is still generally viewed negatively because of the deliberate targeting of non-combatants. The same is often said of the World War II “Strategic Bombing Campaigns” conducted by the Allies against Germany and Japan. In that effort thousands of tons of explosives were dropped on military related targets located in cities resulting in countless innocent civilian lives being lost. The overall impact on the war’s outcome of this massive aerial bombardment campaign, however, is still questioned and debated by historians. Generally, throughout the long history of warfare in the West up through the recent Cold War, civilian injuries and deaths caused in military operations were viewed as regrettable but often unavoidable “collateral damage” to military operations.1 Civilians were not to be directly 1 Wikipedia, Collateral damage, (Last modified February 1, 2017), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collateral_damage (accessed: February 18, 2017). 2 targeted by the belligerents. Since the end of the Cold War, however, there has been a change. This is largely the result of the predominance of intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War world over the previous dominance of inter-state conflicts. In intra-state conflicts the fighting is most often between non-state groups and their armed factions. Civilians supporting these armed groups have increasingly become the intended targets of the opposing faction. A century ago, 90% of those who lost their lives in armed conflicts were military personnel. By the mid-1990’s this was reversed. Now up to 90% of casualties in intra-state conflicts are civilians, and the majority of these are women and children.2 Because of this the international community, especially the United Nations, is seen as needing to address this issue. In particularly two post-Cold War intra-state conflicts shocked the world to such a degree that a response by the international community was deemed necessary. The first was the genocide that occurred in Rwanda from April 7th to mid-July 1994. During a period lasting 100 days somewhere between 500,000 to over 1 million Rwandan ethnic Tutsis and a small number of moderate majority ethnic Hutus were slaughtered. Urged on by the Rwandan Hutu government a large part of the majority Hutu population took part in this slaughter. United Nations “blue helmeted” peacekeepers based in Rwanda stood idly by as this occurred because their mandate did not give them authorization to intervene. Lt Gen Romeo Dallaire, the Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) then deployed in Rwanda, stated that if he would have had available a brigade size force of around 5,000 troops when the killings began, “I could have done a lot.” Unfortunately, he did not at the time have, 2 American Red Cross, Geneva Convention (IV) on Civilians, 1949. http://www.redcross.org/humanityinwar/geneva- convention-iv-on-civilians-1949 (accessed: February 25, 2017). 3 nor did he ever get, a brigade of peacekeepers.3 The second case occurred in the area of the former Yugoslavia; specifically, in the area of Srebrenica, Bosnia. Upon the conclusion of a short period of fighting in the area, from July 11-22, 1995, elements of the victorious Bosnian Serb army summarily executed more than 8,000 captured Bosnian Muslim men and boys. UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, described this atrocity as being the worst crime on European soil since the end of World War II.4 This all happened despite the presence of a deployed UN peacekeeping mission and the fact that Srebrenica had been declared a “safe area” under UN protection. Once again, the UN peacekeepers stationed in the area of Srebrenica felt they had neither the authorization under their mandate nor the strength to intervene. A review of UN policies and actions in these two highly publicized failures of UN peacekeeping, as well as problematic UN interventions in other failed states and areas such as Somalia and in West Africa, led to a consensus that the United Nations could not allow such violence, especially to civilians, occur without a response. By 1998, the UN Security Council was struggling to address this recurring problem of needing to provide protection for civilians “caught” in a conflict. “Protection of Civilians” was given the moniker for the
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