Protection of Civilians for the Peacekeeper on the Ground: Its History, Complexities, Threats and Implementation

BY Eric Rudberg

A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL COMPLETION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF The Certificate of Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations

Peace Operations Training Institute® Index

 Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………1

 Background to Protection of Civilians (PoC) in Armed Conflict…………………………2

 Why Protect Civilians?...... 5

 Right to Self-Defense…………………………………………………………………….10

 Defining a “Civilian”…………………………………………………………………….12

 Common Threats to Civilians……………………………………………………………16 o Torture or Other Prohibited Treatment……………………………………..……17 o Gender Based and Sexual Violence……...……………………………………....18 o Violence Against Children (Six Grave Violation Against Children)………………………..…..…….....21 . Killing & Maiming……………………………………………………....21 . Recruitment and/or Use of Child Soldiers…………………………….....22 . Sexual Violence………………………………………………………….24 . Attacks Against Schools & Hospitals…………………………………....25 . Denial of Humanitarian Access………………………………………….26 . Abduction……………………………………………………………...... 27 o Human Trafficking…………………………………………………………….....28 o Forced Displacement………………………………………………………..…...29 o Denial of Humanitarian Assistance……………………………………………...30 o Explosive Weapons………………………………………………………….…...31 o Peacekeepers………………………………………………………………..…....32

 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) for Reducing Threats to Civilians…………………………………………………....34 o Torture or Other Prohibited Treatment………………………………..……..…..36 o Gender Based and Sexual Violence……...…………………………..……..……37 o Violence Against Children………………………………………..…………..….39 o Human Trafficking……………………………………………………...…..……41 o Forced Displacement………………………………………………..…………...42 o Denial of Humanitarian Assistance…………………………………….………..44 o Explosive Weapons……………………………………………………………....45 o Peacekeepers………………………………………………………………..……45

 Training Peacekeepers for Protection of Civilians…………………………...……….…49

 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….…52

 References……………………………...…………………………………………...……54 Abstract

As we move into this new millennium the idea of Protection of Civilians continues to gain ever more importance in peacekeeping operations. Civilians are now increasingly becoming the targets of armed operations instead of regrettable and often, unavoidable collateral damage. There are many different threats faced by civilians on today’s battlefields. However, there are unique ways that each of these threats can either be reduced or eliminated completely.

In this thesis I hope to accomplish three objectives. First, and most importantly, I hope to explain the concept of “Protection of Civilians” to the actual peacekeeper on the ground, the one walking on patrol or standing guard at the check point. Instead of an idea discussed in theory, in some college classroom, I want to illustrate to the soldier why he should care about it and why it is worth risking his life for. Second, I hope this thesis can be a guide and a frame of reference for those who are out in the field conducting pre-deployment training before a unit is dispatched on a peacekeeping operation. Hopefully, this thesis will help instructors and trainers to better prepare those peacekeepers who are about ready to put this concept into practice. Third, I hope that after reading this thesis, those who are skeptical of the importance of the “Protection of

Civilians” task come to understand why it is now viewed, by many, as the priority task in most peacekeeping operations.

On a personal note, by writing this thesis I learned just how truly rich and important this subject matter is. There is a wide array of material on each of the different threats discussed, more than enough to write an entire thesis on just one of the threats. It was a challenge deciding what information to include, but I always asked myself, “does the peacekeeper on the street corner care about it?” If he does, then I included it. This thesis addresses just the highlights of each threat and offers suggestions on how to reduce that threat.

1

Background to Protection of Civilians (POC) in Armed Conflict

Throughout the history of warfare the issue/problem of dealing with civilians in an area of an armed conflict has been problematic. Traditionally the purpose and goal of the military force in an armed conflict has been to defeat the opposing military force whereupon one’s political goal or will could be imposed on the defeated enemy. On relatively rare occasions a civilian population may have been targeted by the military, but this was not the primary military effort and was generally looked down upon. One well known example of a military campaign that specifically targeted civilians occurred during the American Civil War. In 1864 Union

General William Tecumseh Sherman launched his “March to the Sea,” driving through the rebelling South’s heartland, burning and destroying crops, killing livestock, razing food storages, and destroying factories. While this was successful in hindering the South’s war efforts and contributed to the collapse of the South’s war efforts and the eventual surrender of the

Confederate States of America, it is still generally viewed negatively because of the deliberate targeting of non-combatants. The same is often said of the World War II “Strategic Bombing

Campaigns” conducted by the Allies against Germany and Japan. In that effort thousands of tons of explosives were dropped on military related targets located in cities resulting in countless innocent civilian lives being lost. The overall impact on the war’s outcome of this massive aerial bombardment campaign, however, is still questioned and debated by historians.

Generally, throughout the long history of warfare in the West up through the recent Cold

War, civilian injuries and deaths caused in military operations were viewed as regrettable but often unavoidable “collateral damage” to military operations.1 Civilians were not to be directly

1 Wikipedia, Collateral damage, (Last modified February 1, 2017), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collateral_damage (accessed: February 18, 2017). 2 targeted by the belligerents. Since the end of the Cold War, however, there has been a change.

This is largely the result of the predominance of intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War world over the previous dominance of inter-state conflicts. In intra-state conflicts the fighting is most often between non-state groups and their armed factions. Civilians supporting these armed groups have increasingly become the intended targets of the opposing faction.

A century ago, 90% of those who lost their lives in armed conflicts were military personnel. By the mid-1990’s this was reversed. Now up to 90% of casualties in intra-state conflicts are civilians, and the majority of these are women and children.2 Because of this the international community, especially the United Nations, is seen as needing to address this issue.

In particularly two post-Cold War intra-state conflicts shocked the world to such a degree that a response by the international community was deemed necessary. The first was the genocide that occurred in Rwanda from April 7th to mid-July 1994. During a period lasting 100 days somewhere between 500,000 to over 1 million Rwandan ethnic Tutsis and a small number of moderate majority ethnic Hutus were slaughtered. Urged on by the Rwandan Hutu government a large part of the majority Hutu population took part in this slaughter. United

Nations “blue helmeted” peacekeepers based in Rwanda stood idly by as this occurred because their mandate did not give them authorization to intervene. Lt Gen Romeo Dallaire, the Force

Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) then deployed in

Rwanda, stated that if he would have had available a brigade size force of around 5,000 troops when the killings began, “I could have done a lot.” Unfortunately, he did not at the time have,

2 American Red Cross, Geneva Convention (IV) on Civilians, 1949. http://www.redcross.org/humanityinwar/geneva- convention-iv-on-civilians-1949 (accessed: February 25, 2017). 3 nor did he ever get, a brigade of peacekeepers.3 The second case occurred in the area of the former Yugoslavia; specifically, in the area of Srebrenica, Bosnia. Upon the conclusion of a short period of fighting in the area, from July 11-22, 1995, elements of the victorious Bosnian

Serb army summarily executed more than 8,000 captured Bosnian Muslim men and boys. UN

Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, described this atrocity as being the worst crime on European soil since the end of World War II.4 This all happened despite the presence of a deployed UN peacekeeping mission and the fact that Srebrenica had been declared a “safe area” under UN protection. Once again, the UN peacekeepers stationed in the area of Srebrenica felt they had neither the authorization under their mandate nor the strength to intervene.

A review of UN policies and actions in these two highly publicized failures of UN peacekeeping, as well as problematic UN interventions in other failed states and areas such as

Somalia and in West Africa, led to a consensus that the United Nations could not allow such violence, especially to civilians, occur without a response. By 1998, the UN Security Council was struggling to address this recurring problem of needing to provide protection for civilians

“caught” in a conflict. “Protection of Civilians” was given the moniker for the broad thematic concept that began to address the complex requirements and responsibilities for dealing with security for the civilians whose lives were found to be in imminent danger in those conflict zones.5 A UN Security Council “Presidential Statement” adopted 12 February 1999 “expressed the Council’s future willingness to respond to situations in which civilians had been targeted” by

3 Ken Shiffman, As genocide raged, general's pleas for help ignored, Central News Network, (December 10, 2008), http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/11/13/sbm.dallaire.profile/ (accessed: February 18, 2017). 4 Wikipedia, Srebrenica massacre, (Last modified February 16, 2017), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Srebrenica_massacre (accessed: February 18, 2017). 5 European Security and Defense College, AKU16: An Introduction To The Protection of Civilians (PoC), https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters- homepage_en/4369/European%20Security%20and%20Defence%20College%20(ESDC) (accessed: January 6, 2017). 4 combatants.6 Subsequently the UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, which was established on 22 October 1999 was the first mission “to afford protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” in its mandate.7 Since then, more than 90% of all UN peacekeepers have been deployed with a mandated task to protect civilians.8

Why Protect Civilians?

The term “Protection of Civilians” has been both narrowly and broadly defined. Its

“narrow” definition deals with the “use of force to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence.” In its “broad” definition the term has been expanded and includes such things as securing civilians’ rights and access to essential services, resources, and to a secure, stable, and just environment for all civilians over the long term.9 Obviously, most of the latter must necessarily be the primary responsibility of a host nation’s government. A UN peacekeeping mission deployed in a conflict area or in the immediate aftermath of a conflict will deal with

“Protection of Civilian” issues principally in the narrow sense, that of protecting civilians under imminent threat of violence. As noted earlier, “Protection of Civilians” in imminent danger of violence has now become a mandated task in most UN Security Council peacekeeping missions authorized since 1999.

6 United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, (S/PRST/1999/6; February 12, 1999), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Civilians%20SPRST19996.pdf (accessed: February 21, 2017). 7 United Nations, Resolution 1270, (S/RES/1270; October 22, 1999), https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/315/02/PDF/N9931502.pdf?OpenElement (accessed: February 18, 2017). 8 European Security and Defense College. 9 Julian Bower, Introduction to the Concept of Protection of Civilians (PoC), Class lecture, The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict from Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Stadtschaining, Austria, January 30, 2017. 5

There are many reasons why “Protection of Civilians” has become an assigned task for

United Nations peacekeeping missions. First, the many non-military “Peacebuilding” or “Nation- building” efforts that begin in these post conflict environments become difficult if not impossible if there is not a secure public environment. There are also operational and tactical benefits that accrue to those peacekeepers who daily patrol in villages and troublesome areas if their operations are viewed as contributing to an environment of public security.

As a start, having the task to protect civilians in imminent danger explicitly stated in the peacekeeping mission mandate adds legitimacy, credibility and purpose to a deploying peacekeeping mission. Once operational, it obviates the question, asked time and again of the peacekeepers: “if you are not going to help protect civilians, why are you even here?” This gets to the very essence or purpose of a peacekeeping mission, which is to help establish a safe and secure environment in which a wide array of developmental and democratization programs can begin to take root and the foundations of a lasting peace are in place.

Second, having a mission mandated task to protect civilians provides a measurable mission goal to be achieved. The peacekeeping mission must be organized, structured, equipped and trained so that it has the resources and capabilities for the “Protection of Civilians” mission.

Then once deployed to the area of operations, the peacekeepers should conduct all operations in light of their “protect” mission. It must be something that the peacekeeping force strives to achieve. It also provides a key indicator with which to measure mission progress as well as success and can be used as one yardstick in measuring if the peacekeeping mission can be terminated. Stated simply, it provides one of the key measurings of mission success.

Third, the stated task of protecting civilians adds institutional legitimacy to the United

Nations in its peace and security role. Some member states, especially after the tragedies in

6

Rwanda and Srebrenica, began to question why the United Nations even existed. When the

United Nations deploys a peacekeeping force and that force is unable or unwilling to protect civilians, why should member states invest their time, money, and resources in support of such missions?

Fourth, there is the moral perspective as to why a concerted effort should be made for the protection of civilians. As stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”10 These include the civilians’ right not to be killed or abused during conflict. Peacekeepers are morally obligated to protect these rights. This idea is not a new concept. Throughout history efforts have always been made to protect the weak and the innocent in conflict areas. This was considered the “right thing to do.” The protection of civilians is no different.

Fifth, is the legal perspective of the protection of civilians. This is the legal obligation that peacekeepers have when they are on a mission. International Humanitarian Law, also known as the Law of War or the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), “seeks to protect the lives and dignity of people by limiting the suffering caused by war. It restricts the means and methods of warfare and protects those who are not, or who no longer are, taking part in hostilities.”11 The

1977 Additional Protocols I and II to the Law of War discuss the protection civilians have against the dangers caused by military operations. These state that civilians shall not be the object of an armed attack and that civilians are protected unless they are directly participating in

10 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (A/RES/3/217 A; December 10, 1948), http://www.un- documents.net/a3r217a.htm (accessed: February 18, 2017), Article 1. 11 Hong Kong Red Cross, What International Humanitarian Law (IHL)? https://www.redcross.org.hk/rcmovement/ihl.html (accessed: February 18, 2017). 7 hostilities.12 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court also addresses intentional attacks against the civilian population and the willful killing, torture, or inhumane treatment of civilians.13 In addition, for those peacekeeping missions who are “expected” to protect civilians, this must be explicitly stated in the UN Security Council mandate authorizing the mission. Such a mandate gives the peacekeeping force the legal authorization to use up to, and including, deadly force to protect civilians.

Sixth, is the idea that when it is known that peacekeepers have the authority and will use up to, and including, deadly force in order to protect civilians, this will reduce the direct impact the conflict has on the civilian population as armed groups will be less inclined to target and abuse civilians to achieve their objectives.

Finally, including protection of civilians in the peacekeeping mission’s mandate can help peacekeepers to become more effective and efficient in executing all their tasks. As the local population realizes the peacekeepers are there to assist in their protection, they will be more willing to “work” with the peacekeepers. This is colloquially known as “winning the hearts and minds” of the local population. The local population will, hopefully, no longer be a potentially

“safe haven” for fighters. The population will also be more likely to work with the peacekeeping force and provide them with actionable intelligence. Such intelligence might include the “bed down” locations of fighters, where IED’s or weapons caches are hidden, or if an attack is planned against the peacekeepers or their bases. This was a painful lesson the Kenyan Defense

Force (KDF) serving in the African Union’s Peacekeeping Mission in Sudan (AMISOM) learned

12 Gerhard Weitzer, International Legal Framework for Protection, Class lecture, The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict from Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Stadtschaining, Austria, January 30, 2017. 13 Ibid. 8 at their forward operating base in El Adde, Somalia in January 2016. The KDF had a poor relationship with the local population, particularly with the influential local Somali Elders, since

Kenyans were unwilling to proactively engage with them. Many Somali’s viewed the KDF as a force that was not there to protect them. They also felt that the KDF did not want to interact with them. Furthermore, they accused the KDF of indiscriminately firing into rural communities when they suspected the presence of renegade al-Shabaab forces. Eventually the KDF compound came under a surprise attack during which they sustained a large number of casualties. The local

Somali population was probably aware of the preparations for, and timing of, this violent attack on the KDF peacekeeper compound, yet they did not share any of this information with

AMISOM.14

Without a positive relationship with local communities a peacekeeping force cannot earn the trust and support of the local population and will struggle to acquire the information needed for conducting everyday operations as well as maintaining an appropriate base security posture.

A good working relationship with the local population can also help to keep the peacekeeping force from “wandering” around the area of operations, often subject to random and unanticipated attacks. They can be more effective and employ their resources on “fruitful” offensive operations while at the same time proactively securing the local population against those that wish to do the population harm.

There are many consequences if the protection of civilians is not addressed or accomplished. First and most obvious is the potential for increased human suffering by the local population. Not only will this result from the inaction of the peacekeepers, but a lack of security

14 International Peace Institute, The Battle of El Adde: The Kenya Defence Forces, al-Shabaab, and Unanswered Questions, (July 2016), by Paul D Williams, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/1607_Battle-at-El- Adde.pdf (accessed: February 18, 2017). 9 will also hinder the work of other national and international “humanitarian” assistance providers who are deployed in the area of peacekeeping operations.

Finally, not proactively addressing the protection of civilians can have a negative impact on the overall morale of the peacekeepers. Seeing innocent civilians suffer and not being able to assist can be demoralizing. Lt Gen Romeo Dallaire often discusses his post-traumatic stress

(PTSD) and the sense of guilt with which he is plagued resulting from him not being able to intervene as the genocide in Rwanda was occurring.

Right to Self-Defense and Use of Force

Peacekeepers always have the inherent right to self-defense. According to Article 51 of the UN Charter “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an attack occurs against a member of the United Nations…”15

Nevertheless, one must always consider and weigh the amount of force that is needed and then use only the level of force that is proportional to the threat. The use of force in a peacekeeping operation requires a careful balance between self-defense and the potential harm to the civilian population by the amount of force used. The on-scene commander has the authority to use any means necessary to defend himself, those he is in charge of, and the mandate to protect civilians.

He only needs a reasonable threat of hostile intent before he can act. The commander’s assessment of “hostile intent” can be based on only one or a combination of factors. Such factors include the capacity and preparedness of the threat, the available evidence which indicates an

15 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statues of the International Court System, (June 26, 1945), https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf (accessed: February 18, 2017), Chapter VII, Article 51, pg 10. 10 intention to attack, and the historical precedent of attacks against the peacekeepers within the mission’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). Actions to protect civilians can be preemptive as well as reactive. These actions are not limited to taking forceful actions only when specified individual civilians are about to be attacked. Imminent threats to civilians may be persistent and generalized, as in the case of an armed actor that engages in an ongoing pattern of attack against the populace. In resorting to use of force the commander does not need a “stroke-for-stroke” response to a hostile act and also does not need to cede the initiative to the attackers. A peacekeeper must consider the necessity and proportionality of his actions when deciding on his response. He should only use the minimum force necessary to eliminate the threat and stop whenever the hostile act has ceased. Whenever possible he should use the escalation of force measures and resort to deadly force only as a measure of last resort. Using the escalation of force criteria helps ensure that those engaged clearly pose a threat. Deadly force should only be used when all other methods of persuasion have been exhausted and must be used with restraint.

However, one must remember that one can immediately resort to deadly force if the situation warrants such action. Moreover, as soon as the situation allows, the peacekeepers must de- escalate the violence of the situation and return to a non-violent means of persuasion. During an attack on a legitimate target the commander or leader must be conscious of his actions and try to minimize collateral damage or damage to non-combatant property. One way to do this is to always have positive identification of target(s) and, once again, by using only the appropriate and proportional amount of force necessary to neutralize the threat. There can be serious, unintended consequences associated with collateral damage. There are often secondary and tertiary effects that result in one making more enemies and belligerents. That is why, in some cases, the most appropriate response may be to do nothing at all. The use of force in peacekeeping is very

11 challenging, especially for young soldiers, nevertheless it is the reality of the complex nature of peacekeeping and requires training of soldiers and leaders at all levels.

Defining a “Civilian”

Another challenging aspect of the protection of civilian mandate is defining who is and who is not considered a “civilian.” It is not a “black or white” issue but rather a very gray area when it comes to this distinction. Within a peacekeeping area of operations an indigenous individual can easily and momentarily shift from being a civilian…to not being one…and then back to appearing to be a civilian again. One definition of a civilian is:

Any person who is not or is no longer directly participating in hostilities or other acts of violence shall be considered a civilian, unless he or she is a member of armed forces or groups. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered a civilian.16

Some classify a civilian as a member of one of the following groups: the local population, internally displaced persons, refugees, NGOs and other humanitarians, and media personnel, but this over simplifies a very complex and multifaceted categorization!

The concept many peacekeepers find the most challenging to understand are the circumstances under which civilians can lose their protection from an armed response by the peacekeepers. Chapter 1, Rule 6 of Customary International Humanitarian Law states that,

“Civilians are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in

16 Stefan Schwarz, Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping, Class lecture, The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict from Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Stadtschaining, Austria, January 31, 2017. 12 hostilities.”17 Unfortunately, the phrase “direct part” has not been clarified yet, and there is no precise definition of what exactly it means. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has stated that it is generally understood to mean “acts which, by their nature or purpose, are intended to cause actual harm to enemy personnel and material.”18 It is clear and uncontested that a civilian loses his protection from attack when he uses weapons or other means to commit violence against human or material enemy forces. An example of this occurred on 29 January

2017 during a US naval special operations raid of a compound in Yakla, Yemem. During the ensuing firefight “women in the compound who may have started out as bystanders, became combatants when they took up weapons from dead men, thus they would have posed a threat to the special operations raiders.”19 Once the women picked up the weapons and attempted to use them, thus posing a threat, they lost their protected status as civilians. However, not everyone who has a weapon on the battlefield is considered to be a combatant nor is everyone without a weapon considered to be a civilian. This was brought to light during the trial of several US

Army snipers who were accused of “baiting” their victims in Iraq. The snipers had placed weapons and IED making material on the ground, over-watched these items, and then engaged anyone picking the items up. They justified their actions by saying that anyone who picked up what they planted must be a combatant. However, as James Ross of Human Rights Watch explained, “it seems to me that there are all sorts of reasons that civilians would want to pick up ammunition that is sitting on the ground.”20 On the other hand, if an armed individual engages

17 International Committee of the Red Cross., Rule 6. Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack, https://ihl- databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule6 (accessed: February 18, 2017). 18 Ibid. 19 Alice Fordham and Tom Bowman, Yemem Aftermath: Trump’s First Military Raid Continues to Raise Questions, National Public Radio (February 2, 2017), www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/02/02/512490365/yemem- aftermath-trumps-firs-military-raid-continues-to-raise-questions (accessed: February 18, 2017). 20 Paul Von Zielbauer, Snipers Baited and Killed Iraqis, Soldiers Testify, New York Times (September 25, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/25/world/middleeast/25abuse.html (accessed: February 18, 2017). 13 peacekeepers with a rifle and then runs behind a building only to reappear moments later unarmed, and if the peacekeepers can positively identify him as the one who shot at them, even though he is currently unarmed, he is still a combatant. He is not protected just because he suddenly re-appears unarmed.

Also, there is a challenge in defining what “direct” means. It is generally accepted that this is decided on a case-by-case basis. Some argue that engaging in such activities as serving as guards, intelligence agents, spies, couriers, or lookouts constitutes direct participation, whereby such “civilians” lose their protected status. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights attempted to distinguish between “direct” and “indirect” participation by stating:

Civilians whose activities merely support the adverse party’s war or military effort or otherwise only indirectly participate in hostilities cannot on these grounds alone be considered combatants. This is because indirect participation, such as selling goods to one or more of the armed parties, expressing sympathy for the cause of one of the parties or, even more clearly, failing to act to prevent an incursion by one of the armed parties, does not involve acts of violence which pose an immediate threat of actual harm to the adverse party.21

There are numerous examples of an armed force using this “gray area” between protected civilian status and combatant to their tactical advantage. Two recent reported cases were: use of unarmed women to resupply fighting positions with ammunition and unarmed women allowing gunmen to shoot between their legs and acting, in a sense, as a consenting human shield for the gunmen. By doing such acts, though, these women are considered to be direct participants and therefore forfeit their protected status.

The “Report on the Practice of Rwanda” tries to flush out this idea of “direct participation” when it comes to logistical support by differentiating between an international and

21 International Committee of the Red Cross, Rule 6. 14 non-international armed conflict. It was decided that although unarmed, any civilians that follow their armed forces in order to supply them with logistical support in an international armed conflict lose their status as a civilian. On the other hand, unarmed civilians who collaborate with one side in a non-international armed conflict (e.g. a peacekeeping operation) still retain their status as civilian. The rationale behind this is that civilians in an internal conflict are forced to cooperate with the party that holds power over them. An interesting case in this regard is that of civilians working in legitimate military target areas such as a munitions factories. Even though these civilians do not participate directly in hostilities, they nevertheless assume risk by working in what is a legitimate military target. Their injury or death during an attack on that legitimate target is considered to be regrettably incidental. If possible, though, precautions should be taken by the attacker to minimize the likelihood of their injury or death, such as bombing at night when it may be unoccupied. Such civilians are considered quasi-combatants, an ill-defined and ambiguous category. 22

Clearly there is often a case of doubt on whether to classify someone as a combatant or a non-combatant. Additional Protocol I attempted to resolve this by stating “in case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.”23 Yet, some

States have reservations about this idea. France and the United Kingdom “expressed their understanding that this presumption does not override commanders’ duty to protect the safety of troops under their command.”24 In other words, their inherent right to self-defense. The US

Naval Handbook states that:

Direct participation in hostilities must be judged on a case-by-case basis. Combatants in the field must make an honest determination as to whether a particular civilian is or is not

22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 15

subject to deliberate attack based on the person’s behavior, location and attire, and other information available at the time.25

This ambiguity of who is a civilian and who is not makes it ever more important to do an extremely careful assessment of the situation in the operational environment under current conditions. For example, if one is engaged by an unseen sniper in a wood line and a few moments after the firing ceased someone walks out, is that individual a combatant? Perhaps but it is impossible to be certain. What if someone walks out from that location an hour later? This is when one can use the escalation of force criteria. The suspect can be detained, and the situation investigated. A good concept to address in this situation is to remember the inherent right to self-defense, consider what force is necessary to deal effectively with the threat present, and then use what force is proportional to that threat.

Common “Threats to Civilians” in Peacekeeping Operations

There are many threats to civilians in today’s conflict and immediate post-conflict peacekeeping mission areas. These threats can come from various and diverse groups, such as: government forces, various factional armed forces, armed “spoiler” groups, transnational and national criminal organizations, local armed criminal gangs, and, regrettably, it may even come from the peacekeepers in their use of force in operations and, at times, how they conduct themselves individually.

Before discussing the major common “Threats” or “Challenges” faced by peacekeepers, many of which will require a response under Protection of Civilian mandate, there should be a

25 Ibid. 16 clear understanding of the key principles of neutrality and impartiality which underlie all actions taken by the peacekeeping force. One must remember, unlike Nongovernment Organizations

(NGOs), peacekeepers are impartial, but they are not neutral. NGOs will not take sides and have a policy of non-interference, thus they are neutral. Peacekeepers, on the other hand, will interfere if their mission is mandated to take action. They will act with up to and including deadly force in order to protect civilians. Peacekeepers are impartial in that they will protect civilians, without favor or prejudice in terms of race, sex, religion, tribe, etc., from anyone who wishes the civilians harm. They are not neutral because they will take sides, siding with the weak, and they are expected to act if civilians are threatened, no matter by whom.26

Common Threat: Torture or Other Prohibited Treatment

One threat is the use of torture or other prohibited treatment. The Convention against

Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment defines torture as:

Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.27

26 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, (January 18, 2008), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf (accessed: February 18, 2017), Part 1, Chapter 3.1, page 33. 27 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (39/46; December 10, 1984), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cat.pdf (accessed: February 18, 2017), Part 1, Article 1, Par. 1, pg 1. 17

The freedom from torture is an absolute and a non-derogable Human Right. There is “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever” to justify it.28 This includes the state or threat of war, internal political instability, any other public emergency, acts of terrorism, violent crime, or any other type of armed conflict.29 One can never justify torture because an order was received from superior or public authority.30

Common Threat: Gender Based and Sexual Violence

Gender based and sexual violence can be divided into two categories: Conflict Related

Sexual Violence (CRSV) and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA). CRSV is generally committed by armed groups, government security agencies, and others while SEA is often committed by UN Mission personnel (civilian, police, or military force).31 SEA will be discussed later. The Rome Statute of ICC states:

Sexual violence can take many forms, including rape; sexual slavery; forced prostitution; forced pregnancy; forced sterilization; or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, which may include indecent assault; trafficking; inappropriate medical examinations; and strip searches.32

The most at risk victims of sexual violence are women and children. This is especially true for women who are unaccompanied or the single heads of households. For children, the most at risk

28 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Advanced Unedited Version: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/REV.4; November 23, 2007), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/CAT.C.GC.2.CRP.1.Rev.4_en.pdf (accessed: February 18, 2017), Part II, Article 5, pg 2. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., Part VII, Article 26, pg 7. 31 Julian Bower, Conflict Related Sexual Violence. Class lecture, The Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict from Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Stadtschaining, Austria, February 1, 2017. 32 Ibid. 18 are generally those who are unaccompanied, are in some sort of foster care, or are in a detention arrangement. Even though women and children are traditionally most at risk, it is not uncommon for men to be victims as well. Such occurrences are rarely talked about, and there is little formal research on this. Numerous instances of “castration, beating and mutilation of the genitals, undressing men and making them remain naked while in prison and even forcing men to rape their own family members” have occurred during times of armed conflict.33 It is reported that in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 23.6% of men had experienced sexual violence and 32.6% of the males surveyed had been victims of sexual violence during the conflict in Liberia.34

The UN Security Council considers that “sexual violence is conflict related when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations.”35 Most victims of CRSV will be physically and/or emotionally affected in some manner. Physically they might suffer from one or a combination of the following conditions: physical trauma, skeletal muscle tension, gastrointestinal issues, or genitourinary issues. Emotionally they might feel anxiety, powerlessness, disorganization, have self-blame, have a distorted self-image, depression, or withdrawal.

There are many different reasons why CRSV is used as a strategy in a conflict.

Combatants may use CRSV against the local population in order to help achieve a military

33 The Borgen Project, Male Victims of Sexual Violence During Conflict, (January 31, 2014), by Elizabeth Brown, http://borgenproject.org/male-victims-sexual-violence-conflict/ (accessed: February 18, 2017). 34 Ibid. 35 United Nations, Resolution 1820, (S/RES/1820; June 19, 2008), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CAC%20S%20RES%201820.pdf (accessed: February 18, 2017), Par.1, pg 2. 19 objective. They might use it to intimidate, punish, or scare the local population into submission.

It can also be used to interfere with the “reproductive cycle” of a certain ethnic group, thus it can be a way of ethnic cleansing. The physical and emotional after-effects of CRSV can cause long lasting damage to the targeted population. It may also be used to destroy families and destabilize communities. Finally, combatants can use CRSV as a form of torture. They use it to obtain a confession, gain information, as a means of punishment, or to coerce the population, often forcing them to either leave an area or, the opposite, restrain them from moving. On March 21,

2016 the International Criminal Court found Jean-Pierre Bemba, once the Vice-President of the

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) guilty of “command responsibility” for the rapes and murders of civilians committed by military forces he led while fighting in the Central African

Republic (CAR). This was not only the first war-crimes conviction for the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, but the “first time that the court has convicted a commander for having criminal responsibility for the acts committed by his troops.”36 At the beginning of the trial the ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo said, “Women were raped systematically to assert dominance and to shatter resistance. Men were raped in public to destroy their authority and their capacity to lead.”37 Within armed groups, CRSV is a strategy used by superiors for differing purposes. It might be a rite of passage or considered as one means of bonding for new recruits. It is also used to create cohesion between combatants and to increase their tolerance for other forms of violence. Finally, superiors have been thought to use it to test a combatant’s will to obey commands or allow it as an award.38

36 Geoffrey York, Ex-Congolese vice-president convicted of war crimes, including rape, The Globe And Mail (March 21, 2016), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/icc-finds-ex-congolese-vice-president-guilty-of- war-crimes-including-rape/article29309990/ (accessed: February 18, 2017). 37 Ibid. 38 Bower, Conflict. 20

Common Threat: Violence Against Children

Children are particularly threatened during the time of armed conflict. According to the

United Nations “a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years.”39 It does not matter what the local law states. When on a UN mandated mission, any person younger than eighteen years old is considered a child. There are many reasons why children have become more vulnerable during recent armed conflicts. This is due to “new tactics of warfare, the absence of a clearly delineated battlefield, the increasing number and diversification of parties to conflict that add to the complexity of conflicts and the deliberate targeting of traditional safe havens.”40 Also, the line between what is a legitimate target compared to what is not has become increasingly blurred. The UN Security Council has identified and condemned six grave violations against children which must be reported if witnessed. These violations form the basis of the Security Council’s architecture to monitor, report and respond to abuses suffered by children in times of conflict and war.41

Grave Violation: Killing and Maiming of Children

The first of the grave violations is the killing and maiming of children. This can result from different things such as from shelling, crossfire, cluster bombs, landmines, unexploded ordinances, or suicide bombing. Children are particularly vulnerable to landmines and

39 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Convention on the Rights of the Child, (44/25; November 20, 1989), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx (accessed: February 18, 2017), Part 1, Article I. 40 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Changing Nature of Conflicts, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/the-changing-nature-of-conflict/ (accessed: February 18, 2017). 41 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, The Six Grave Violations, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/six-grave-violations/ (accessed: February 18, 2017). 21 unexploded ordinances (UXO). Landmines and UXO represent an especially "insidious and persistent danger" to children affected by conflict.42 Curious by nature, children often pick them up because they are strange or unusual. Children in these areas are often illiterate or too young to read. Signs posted to warn about the presence of mines may be of little use. Finally, children have been found to be much more likely to die from mine related injuries than adults.43

Grave Violation: Recruitment and/or Use of Child Soldiers

The next grave violation is the recruitment and/or use of child soldiers. The Paris

Commitments and the Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated With Armed Forces or

Armed Groups define a child soldier as:

A child associated with an armed force or armed group refers to any person below 18 years of age who is, or who has been, recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, spies or for sexual purposes.44

There are many reasons why armed groups recruit and use child soldiers. First, children are naïve and might not understand an inherent difference between “right and wrong.” They willingly follow orders, not understanding the severe consequences of their actions and see

“playing soldier” as a game, ignoring the life and death implications. Because of the fact that children are often physically vulnerable, easily intimidated, and susceptible to psychological

42 United Nations Children’s Fund, Impact of armed conflict on children, (A/51/303; August 26, 1996), by Grac'a Machel, https://www.unicef.org/graca/a51-306_en.pdf (accessed: February 18, 2017), Section II, Chapter D, Paragraph 111, page 26. 43 Ibid., Section II, Chapter D, Paragraph 113-116, page 27. 44 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Child Recruitment and Use, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/six-grave-violations/child-soldiers/ (accessed: February 18, 2017). 22 manipulation, they typically make exceedingly obedient soldiers.45 Also, they are easily blackmailed or manipulated into service. Their commanders might threaten the child’s family, and the child feels like there is no choice. Also, children are often physically forced into service.

Leila Zerrougui, UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed

Conflict, describes how child soldiers, once forced into service, are often made to cut any linkage with their community. Commanders first have them go back to their own communities and do something that will end the sympathy their community has for them such as having to kill or rape even members of their own families. This ensures that the children will not or cannot flee back to their community.46 Still, this is not the only extreme violence children are often exposed to during their time as child soldiers. They are often forced to severely punish or kill fellow child soldiers for such crimes as desertion. This instills fear and guilt in them and foreshadows what punishment they would suffer if they attempt to leave.47 Children are also lured to becoming soldiers and retained by promises of money, guns, sex, drugs and alcohol. For example, child soldiers in Sierra Leone were addicted to a concoction called brown-brown, which was cocaine mixed with gun powder. Finally, to insurgent groups, children are low cost soldiers. They are cheap to maintain, do not eat much, are seen as expendable, and can be “worked to death” or put on suicide missions such as clearing a path through a mine field by forcing them to walk through it.

Child soldiers can also be used in a variety of non-combatant roles. As previously mentioned, not all child soldiers carry weapons. They could loiter unobtrusively outside a base or

45 Human Rights Watch, Coercion and Intimidation of Child Soldiers to Participate in Violence (April 16, 2008), https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/04/16/coercion-and-intimidation-child-soldiers-participate-violence (accessed: February 19, 2017). 46 Leila Zerrougui, A Child’s Fate, YouTube, directed by Ron Tippe and Dana Kaproff, United Nations, (April 8, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gNFnRlGPzSM&t=17s, (accessed: February 19, 2017). 47 Human Rights Watch. 23 along a road, acting as informants by warning their superiors of the peacekeepers’ movements.

They can also participate in delinquent activities like throwing rocks. These activities usually result in distractions of the peacekeepers from the real threat and present an operational dilemma for the peacekeeping force. Sometimes they pose as sex workers to gather information. It is also not uncommon for child soldiers to man check points or road blocks in conflict areas. Finally, child soldiers may be deliberately used in engaging peacekeepers in a firefight. Seeing children among the fighters may make the peacekeepers more hesitant in responding with deadly force under the inherent right of self-defence when needed.

Peacekeepers must be prepared for child soldiers to suddenly attempt to self-demobilize.

Unfortunately, the difficulties faced by child soldiers do not end once they demobilize. Not only do many suffer serious long-term psychological consequences resulting from being forced to perpetrate atrocities, most are stigmatized as a former child soldier. They are often rejected by family members and communities for acts that they have committed as a fighter, and in some instances they are subjected to reprisals for their past actions or group affiliation. Child soldiers usually do not have any marketable job skills, thus they may be vulnerable to re-recruitment as a child soldier, or they may turn to a life of crime. For these reasons rehabilitation and reintegration into their home communities can be extremely difficult.48

Grave Violation: Sexual Violence

Sexual violence against children during armed conflict is not uncommon, and it is identified as a grave violation. Children who experience this are not only susceptible to

48 Ibid. 24 dangerous health consequences like HIV/AIDS and other STDs but also suffer long term psychological trauma. This sexual violence includes, but is not limited to rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced abortion. Girls are more at risk of becoming victims of sexual violence than boys. It is usually a greater challenge to reintegrate these female victims back into society since they are stigmatized for being associated with armed groups and are suspected of having been raped. Boys may not just be the victims of sexual violence but can also be traumatized from witnessing it or having been forced to be the perpetrators themselves.49

Grave Violation: Attacks Against Schools and Hospitals

Attacks against schools and hospitals or medical clinics is another grave violations.

Though this is a threat to all civilians, it predominantly and most severely affects children. Each of these are protected civilian sites according to International Humanitarian Law, but unfortunately, such designation does not necessarily protect them during armed conflict. They are threatened by direct physical attacks where buildings are damaged or destroyed by explosives and gunfire. They are also looted by armed groups and may be used as military bases. This violation also includes attacks or threats to kill, maim, harass, coerce, or abduct personnel who operate these schools and hospitals or clinics. For example, there have been multiple cases of

Taliban militants in Pakistan killing health workers who were attempting to immunize children for polio.50 Finally, it includes the attacks or threats against the children in hospitals/clinics or

49 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Sexual Violence, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/six-grave-violations/sexual-violence/ (accessed: February 19, 2017). 50 Tim McGirk, “Taliban Assassins Target Pakistan's Polio Vaccinators,” National Geographic (March 3, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/03/150303-polio-pakistan-islamic-state-refugees-vaccination-health/ (accessed: February 19, 2017). 25 attending school. Once again, girls are usually the victims or the reasons behind these incidences. Sometimes armed groups are opposed to girls being educated or do not want them to be treated by male doctors. Parents might find it too risky to send their children to schools or clinics because of the security situation. Children and workers can be denied access to schools or clinics by randomly placed road blocks or checkpoints.51

Grave Violation: Denial of Humanitarian Access

The denial of humanitarian access to children is considered a grave violation. It consists of “blocking the free passage or timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to persons in need as well as the deliberate attacks against humanitarian workers.”52 This blocking of free passage can be the result of illegal roadblocks or checkpoints. It can also be the theft of humanitarian assets.

This can be actual aid (food, water, medicine, etc.) being stolen or the means of delivering the aid being stolen. For example, there have been instances where the UN’s World Food Program had its trucks stolen which then prevented it from delivering food to those in need. Violence against humanitarian workers can consist of murder, kidnapping/abduction, or extortion. In sum, it is estimated that there are 80 million children around the world who are denied humanitarian access because of the many and various impediments to humanitarian relief efforts brought on by conflict.53

51 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Attacks on Schools and Hospitals, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/six-grave-violations/attacks- against-schools/ (accessed: February 19, 2017). 52 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Denial of Humanitarian Access, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/six-grave-violations/denial-of- humanitarian-access/ (accessed: February 19, 2017). 53 Ibid. 26

Grave Violation: Abduction

The act of abduction is the sixth grave violation against children. It is not uncommon for children to be abducted during conflict and subjected to brutal treatment. This is often a precursor to one of the other grave violations against children discussed above and identified by the Security Council. They can be maimed or killed, subjected to sexual violence, or recruited as child soldiers. Children are often abducted “in systematic campaigns of violence and reprisal against civilian populations.”54 These abductions are used as “a tactic to terrorize or target particular ethnic groups or religious communities.”55 A well-publicized recent example of children being abducted are those children that were kidnapped by Boko Haram in Nigeria.

These children are being indoctrinated into violent fundamentalism and used as fighters, suicide bombers and spies.56 Girls are being raped and held in sexual slavery. Another example is the

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) which has kidnapped hundreds of children in Iraq and

Syria and used them to carry out suicide attacks, to fill in gaps in sentry positions, as well for sexual purposes.57

54 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Abductions, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/six-grave-violations/abduction-of-children/ (accessed: February 19, 2017). 55 Ibid. 56 Kevin Sieff, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls two years ago. What happened to them? The Washington Post (April 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/04/14/boko-haram-kidnapped-276- girls-two-years-ago-what-happened-to-them/ (accessed: February 19, 2017). 57 Caroline Mortimer, Isis has abducted up to 400 Yazidi children and could be using them as suicide bombers, Independent (January 14, 2016), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-has-abducted-up-to- 400-yazidi-children-and-could-be-using-them-as-suicide-bombers-a6811876.html (accessed: February 19, 2017). 27

Common Threat: Human Trafficking

Another threat faced by civilians during conflict is human trafficking. The Protocol to

Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children states:

"Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”58

Human trafficking is a very complex problem. The difference between human trafficking and migration comes down to consent. With migration, one voluntarily chooses to move from one place to another, of their own free will, and generally in search of work or in hopes of a better life. The UNHCR defines a migrant as “any person who moves, usually across an international border, to join family members already abroad, to search for a livelihood, to escape a natural disaster, or for a range of other purposes.”59 Trafficked people do not move voluntarily but, rather, are forced to move. This can happen internally or across international borders. Because of the fact that they might be forced to illegally cross borders, trafficked people should be seen as victims of a crime, not as illegal immigrants. This is a distinction that many laws fail to recognize. If caught, they should not be charged with illegal entry and subject to fine and imprisonment before being deported. Victims often have the intention of migrating but end up

58 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, (55/25; November 15, 2000), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolTraffickingInPersons.aspx (accessed: February 19, 2017), Article 3 (a). 59 United Nations High Commission for Refugees Handbook, Migrant Definition, https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/44938/migrant-definition (accessed: February 19, 2017). 28 being trafficked because of the lack of access to information and opportunities, as well as the lack of legal channels for migration. Women and girls are especially vulnerable to being trafficked. They are often less educated than their male counterpart, thus having less opportunity to work in skilled professions. Also, frequently they are socially valued less than men. These women and girls end up being trafficked in order to be exploited in a variety of different kinds of work which includes domestic work, factory work, sex work, entertainment, and as marriage partners or beggars. In the United States “any minor under the age of 18 engaging in commercial sex is a victim of sex trafficking, regardless of the presence of force, fraud, or coercion.”60

Common Threat: Forced Displacement

Forced displacement of the civilian population often occurs during armed conflict. This is caused by violence or the threat of violence, natural disasters, famine, or development and economic changes leading to the feeling of isolation.61 Displaced people can be categorized into two groups. One is “Refugee” while the other is “Internally Displaced Person (IDP).” The

International Committee of the Red Cross states that:

Refugees are people who have crossed an international frontier and are at risk or have been victims of persecution in their country of origin. Internally displaced persons (IDPs), on the other hand, have not crossed an international frontier, but have, for whatever reason, also fled their homes.62

60 National Human Trafficking Hotline, Recognizing the signs, https://humantraffickinghotline.org/what-human- trafficking/recognizing-signs (accessed: February 19, 2017). 61 United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Displace Persons / Displacement, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/displaced- person-displacement/ (accessed: February 19, 2017). 62 International Committee of the Red Cross, Refugees and displaced persons protected under international humanitarian law, (October 29, 2010), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/protected-persons/refugees-displaced- persons (accessed: February 19, 2017). 29

According to the UN Development Program, “Of the 59.9 million people who are currently forcibly displaced worldwide, 38.2 million are internally displaced persons (IDPs), 19.5 million are refugees and 1.8 million are asylum seekers.”63

Common Threat: Denial of Humanitarian Assistance

Such denial can take many different forms during a conflict. It can vary from inadequate security for humanitarian relief agencies and workers, challenging terrain locations, inadequate infrastructure to constraints established by the local government or controlling authorities. The three types of challenges that currently pose the greatest difficulty are: “bureaucratic constraints imposed by Governments and other authorities, the intensity of hostilities, and attacks on humanitarian personnel and assets.”64 These attacks may constitute a crime under International

Criminal Law. The UN Secretary-General has identified:

Violence against humanitarian personnel as among the most severe and prevalent constraints to humanitarian access. Intentionally attacking persons or objects involved in the provision of humanitarian assistance is a war crime according to the Rome Statute of the ICC, if such attacks take place during, and in connection with, an [International Armed Conflict] or [Non-International Armed Conflict].65

Some armed groups use starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare. The

Rome Statue prohibits the “deprivation of objects indispensable to their survival, including

63 United Nations Development Programme, Migration, refugees and displacement, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/sustainable-development/development-planning-and- inclusive-sustainable-growth/migration-refugees-and-displacement.html (accessed: February 19, 2017). 64 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, (S/2009/277; May 29, 2009), http://www.poa-iss.org/CASAUpload/ELibrary/S-2009-277en.pdf (accessed: February 19, 2017), Annex II, pg 18. 65 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Humanitarian Access in Situation of Armed Conflict Handbook Version 2, (December 2014), http://www.cdint.org/documents/Humanitarian_Access_Handbook-v2.pdf (accessed: February 19, 2017), Chapter 5.2.1, pg 52. 30 willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions.”66 When committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, the denial of humanitarian assistance and access could constitute crimes against humanity. For example, “if civilians die as a clear result of the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance and access, then it is arguable that the denial constitutes murder.”67 Such denial could constitute genocide if the perpetrator has “the intent to destroy the group in whole or in part,” which admittedly only happens in extreme cases.68

Common Threat: Explosive Weapons

Because of the changing nature of warfare and that fighting is occurring to a greater extent within urban areas, explosive weapons are becoming increasingly more of a threat to the civilian population. These weapons include everything from hand grenades, mines, and IEDs, to mortars, RPGs, artillery, and bombs dropped from aircraft. The threat from these weapons are two-fold. There is the obvious first order threat of civilians being hurt or killed from exploding munitions or being crushed by buildings collapsing from explosions. There is also the secondary threat of these explosive weapons destroying key infrastructure that is critical for sustaining life.

It is common to mine agricultural land, which has led to malnutrition, even to famine and starvation. Also, “roads and footpaths strewn with landmines impede the safe repatriation and return of refugee and displaced children and their families.”69 Explosive weapons can even

66 Ibid., Chapter 5.2.2, pg 53. 67 Ibid., Chapter 5.3, pg 54. 68 Ibid., Chapter 5.4, pg 55 69 United Nations Children’s Fund. 31 destroy such things as key bridges that isolate communities or water mains and power lines that can negatively affect larger communities and thousands of people.

Common Threat: Peacekeepers

The final threat to civilians in a peacekeeping area of operations can come, unfortunately, from peacekeepers themselves and their operations. Questionable or poor peacekeeper performance is most often traced back to inadequate peacekeeping training of military units and/or peacekeeper police from a sending State and secondarily to poor leadership.

UN Peacekeeping is guided by three basic principles: consent of the parties to the presence and operations of the peacekeepers; impartiality of the peacekeepers in all their operations; and in non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

The normal training programs for military units stress operations that use maximum and overwhelming combat power to achieve an objective as quickly as possible. Peacekeeping operations, on the other hand, are grounded not in force but in mediation and negotiation.

Military units in peacekeeping must use force only as a last resort, when all other options have been exhausted. An inappropriate resort to force or the resort to force by poorly trained soldiers, units and leaders can initiate a cycle of violence which can threaten large parts of a civilian population for a long period of time.

In the war-ravaged environments to which peacekeepers are deployed, there is a significant power differential that exist between the peacekeepers and the local population. In some instances individual peacekeepers have exploited these unequal power dynamics in order to commit rape and participate in activities such as prostitution, human trafficking, corruption, and

32 torture against the very population they are mandated to protect.70 As previously discussed,

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) has also been, unfortunately, committed by some UN

Mission personnel (civilian, police, or military force).71 The UN defines sexual exploitation and sexual abuse as two separate violations. Sexual exploitation means:

Any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.72

Sexual abuse, on the other hand, means “the actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.”73 The idea that peacekeepers participate in abuses of power is “profoundly disturbing to many because the United Nations has been mandated to enter into a broken society to help it, not to breach the trust placed in it by the local population.”74 It is self-evident that the peacekeepers should not increase the suffering of the vulnerable sectors of the population.

Closely related to this abuse of power is the lack of disciple sometimes evident when peacekeepers are conducting operations as well as in their personal conduct and behavior while off-duty. The UN has written a set of rules called the Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for

Blue Helmets. These outline the basics of what is expected in terms of personal conduct and

70 Civilians In Conflict, Reducing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping: Ten Years After the Zeid Report, (Policy Brief no. 1; February 2015), by Jenna Stern, https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file- attachments/Policy-Brief-Sexual-Abuse-Feb-2015-WEB_0.pdf (accessed: February 19, 2017), pg 8. 71 Bower, Conflict. 72 Stern, pg 7. 73 Ibid. 74 United Nations, Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspect, (A/59/710; March 24, 2005), https://cdu.unlb.org/Portals/0/Documents/KeyDoc5.pdf (accessed: February 19, 2017), Chapter I, Paragraph 6, pg 8. 33 deportment of a peacekeeper.75 The UN has a zero tolerance policy with respect to sexual exploitation and abuse, and forbids sexual relations with prostitutes and with any persons under eighteen, and strongly discourages relations with beneficiaries of UN assistance. Regrettably there are still far too many recorded instances of peacekeepers failing to abide by these rules.76

Problems of indiscipline are still too often encountered during military operations. This is in areas such as fire control and direction of fires as well as indiscriminate and often unnecessary shooting. Poorly trained and ill-disciplined peacekeepers “damage the image and credibility of a peacekeeping operation and bring into question the mission’s impartiality in the eyes of the local population.”77 This has the potential of impeding the implementation of the peacekeeping mission’s mandate.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) for Reducing Threats to Civilians

Even though the protection of civilians is primarily the responsibility of the host government, the peacekeeping force must strive to help reduce those threats to civilians within its capabilities to do so and within the provisions of the mandate. The peacekeepers active acceptance of this responsibility can make a tremendous positive difference in the lives of the local population. Nevertheless, they must remember that they cannot help everyone, everywhere since this is physically impossible. The protection of civilians is not simply a task alone for the military element of a multi-component peacekeeping operation. It is a mission wide

75 United Nations Conduct and Discipline Unit, Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets, (1998), https://cdu.unlb.org/UNStandardsofConduct/TenRulesCodeofPersonalConductForBlueHelmets.aspx (accessed: February 19, 2017). 76 United Nations, Conduct and discipline, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/cdu.shtml (accessed February 19, 2017). 77 United Nations, Comprehensive, Chapter I, Paragraph 10, pg 9. 34 responsibility. All components of a mission can and must contribute to helping protect civilians.

Each brings their own skill set and expertise “to the table” to help accomplish this goal. It is essential to know what each component specializes in so that resources and manpower can best be used. The exclusive capacity that the military component possesses is the fact that it is armed.

This capacity leads to the unique role of being able to contribute to providing physical protection or security to the civilians and humanitarians. If necessary, the military component can provide it with deadly force. The military component of the peacekeeping force should reach out and work with the other components whenever their expertise is needed to best help the local civilians.

The simplest action a peacekeeping military force can take in order to reduce the threat of violence to civilians is to “get off their bases” and pro-actively conduct aggressive presence patrols in their Area of Responsibility (AOR). Their routine presence in the community shows that they are there to protect the local population and can be trusted. A robust operational presence by the peacekeepers also allows them to gain situational awareness and detailed knowledge of their area. They become the experts on the area, knowing such things as the physical locations of key infrastructures like schools and hospitals as well local atmospherics such as if children are being kidnapped in order to become child soldiers. Being consistently present in the operational sector allows the peacekeepers to be accessible to the local population.

The peacekeepers can talk to the local population, interact with them, and listen and learn from them. Peacekeepers presence “on the ground,” walking on patrols and manning check points, are the sensors that can detect threats the local population may be facing. They can help monitor and report on developing situations or violations as well as take action if needed. They are the “face” to the peacekeeping operation. Their mere presence in sector can be a deterrent, by exhibiting

35 the fact that they are armed and have the capability to use force, including deadly force, to stop abuses in accordance with their mandate.

By identifying the most common threats to civilians in an area, the peacekeepers can undertake focused operations to reduce them. There are some basics that peacekeepers should be trained to take in this regard: for each event they must take note of the facts, prepare a report, and submit this report up (immediately if deemed critical information) through the proper channels.

When gathering information from victims, witnesses, or sources it is important to be sensitive to their personal information in order not to endanger their safety. If using a local translator, one must be certain of their integrity, again for the reasons of safety of the witnesses. Also, it is important not to raise false expectations of the victims and witnesses. One must be frank when explaining the limits of the mandate and what can be done by the peacekeepers. If armed intervention is necessary to defend the mandate and to protect civilians, the peacekeepers should continue to monitor the situation to ensure that the threat is obviated.

TTPs for Reducing the Threat: Torture or Other Prohibited Treatment

If local authorities are using torture or other prohibited treatment, then the peacekeepers must step in and stop it since they are required to protect civilians no matter who presents the threat. The most common methods of “physical torture include beating, electric shocks, stretching, submersion, suffocation, burns, rape and sexual assault.”78 In some cases, one can visually see the results of those who were physically tortured. Psychological torture, on the other

78 International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, Torture Rehabilitation, http://irct.org/what-we- do/torture-rehabilitation (accessed: February 19, 2017). 36 hand, is much more difficult to detect and observe. This torture may be inflicted through a

“variety of methods such as threats of violence, sensory overload and deprivation or mock executions.”79 Many torture survivors, from both physical and psychological abuse, suffer from symptoms such as “anxiety, depression, withdrawal and self-isolation.”80 Peacekeepers must be aware of these symptoms and be actively looking for them, especially if they work in any type of detention center. If observed or if there is a suspicion that it has occurred, this must be reported to the proper authorities.

TTPs for Reducing the Threat: Gender Based and Sexual Violence

As mentioned before, the most at risk victims of sexual violence are women and children.

The use of Female Engagement Teams (FET) is a technique to better interact with this marginalized part of society. A FET is usually a two to three woman team whose job is to interact with the females and children in the area of operations. If available, a FET should be augmented with female medical personnel and female linguists/translators. FET teams should be an augmentation to a military unit, usually placed in direct support at battalion level. They should not be drawn from a unit on an ad hoc basis. This avoids FET members from having to perform several duty functions.

FETs deployed with U.S. military units in Afghanistan have proven to be highly effective in “opening doors” to a major part of the local population, since females are usually ignored.

FETs are able to immediately relate with the females in the area of operations since they have

79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 37 shared concerns of family, security, health, and development. They are able to address the needs and concerns of the female part of the population who would otherwise not be included.

Through these engagements the FETs are able to passively collect information since the females are often the “eyes and ears” among the local population. The FETs are also able to help disseminate information and participate in shaping operations. Women often directly influence the men in their lives, thus by working through them one can again help to shape the operational environment. FET members are also viewed as mothers, daughters, or sisters by the males in the local society. Sometimes FET members are more readily trusted than their male military counterparts. Finally, FETs can help during security operations. They can reduce the cultural friction of male soldiers conducting searches on local females or children. This also increases security by not allowing females or children a ‘free pass’ due to cultural taboos or fears of being accused of sexual assault.

In the same line of thought as a FET, Nigeria deployed one hundred female police officers to protect women in IDP camps in the state of Borno after it was reported that security guards had raped and sexually exploited dozens of women. The Borno State Police

Commissioner, Mr. Damian Chukwu, placed the female officers in charge of "day-to-day interaction in the camps," while "the male officers were limited to handling area coverage and patrol [within] the camps."81 Commissioner Chukwu also stated, "We feel that the victims might not want to talk freely to men about abuse, but they would be encouraged to open up to women policemen."82

81 Merrit Kennedy, After Scathing Report, Nigeria Deploys Female Police To Protect Displaced Women, National Public Radio (November 8, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/11/08/501162268/after-scathing- report-nigeria-deploys-female-police-to-protect-displaced-women (accessed: February 19, 2017). 82 Ibid. 38

TTPs for Reducing the Threat: Violence Against Children

Out of the Six Grave Violations identified and condemned by the UN Security Council, only the recruitment and/or use of child soldiers is exclusive to just children. There are many different tactics and procedures that peacekeepers can use when dealing with children who are potentially child soldiers. First, they can stop encouraging children from loitering near their base camps or along the roads begging for inducements like candy or pencils. Peacekeepers should be prohibited from giving out such items. Instead they should report the children’s needs to the relevant organizations who have the capacity to truly help them.

It is a challenge to determine if a child sitting along a road or at a check point is acting as a spy. One indication might be is if certain children loiter in one particular area but disappear if attempts are made to approach them. One should also pay close attention to children with mobile phones and cameras. Finally, observe and take note if groups of children appear to have a leader who sends runners out to report on activities.

Commanders should not lose sight of the mission’s real threats when confronted by delinquent actions of children. A vast majority of this type of behavior is not intentionally harmful or politically motivated, rather it is just “kids being kids.” Often times the best response to this behavior is doing nothing at all. If the problem persists, Civil Affairs and/or PSYOPS can be enlisted to assist. Using force in such instances is usually not appropriate. Another action, if possible, is for the peacekeepers to work with village elders and leaders to stop such potentially dangerous behavior.

If sexual bartering involving children occurs one must always remember that the UN has a zero tolerance policy with respect to forbidding sexual relations with any person under

39 eighteen. Not knowing a person’s age and just assuming he or she is over eighteen is not an excuse. Having sexual relations with someone under the age of eighteen is one of the quickest ways for a peacekeeping force to lose all credibility and become completely ineffective.

Once again commanders must remember their mission when they encounter children manning a check point or road block. If crossing the road block is not mission essential, one option would be to withdraw and attempt another route. This action, though, might encourage more check points and roadblocks to be established since their adversaries then realize they can influence the movement of the peacekeepers. If negotiating a safe passage is the course of action chosen, offering a trade-off for passage should be the last resort. Once offered it will probably be expected every time. Weapons and ammunition should never be offered as a trade-off.

If engaged by a child soldier in a firefight peacekeepers cannot be expected to forget their military training and not respond to a life threatening situation. When invoking their inherent right to self-defense they must adhere to the Rules of Engagement. If possible, peacekeepers should attempt to target the adult leaders of the child soldiers. With them neutralized, child soldiers may be more inclined to surrender. If, however, the peacekeepers are forced to engage child soldiers, one must be aware that PTSD is very common for those peacekeepers.

It is also not unheard of for child soldiers to spontaneously self-demobilize.

Peacekeepers must be prepared for such an event. If a child soldier does try to demobilize, they must always be accommodated. As soon as possible they should be turned over to a Child

Protection Agency or a similar organization. Child soldiers who have been detained or have self- demobilized should not be kepted in the same area as adults or with children from rival groups.

They should also not be interrogated by the peacekeeping force. This should be left to specialists.

40

The threats for girls and boys can differ thus the approach to reduce these threats must vary as well. One must be careful not to “pigeon hole” a certain threat exclusively for one sex or the other. For example, boys are most vulnerable to be recruited as child soldiers while girls are more likely to be victims of sexual violence. Yet, as previous mentioned, in Nigeria many girls have been abducted and forced to carry out suicide bombing attacks.83 On the other hand, in

Afghanistan the tradition of “bachabaze” or “dancing boys” is not uncommon. This is the tradition of young boys dressing as women and dancing for not only powerful and wealthy men but even men with moderate means. It is not unusual for them to be raped as well.84

TTPs for Reducing the Threat: Human Trafficking

In their role as “sensors to threats against civilians” in the local community, peacekeepers should be trained to be alert to signs of human trafficking. Research and studies of human trafficking has identified certain “red flags” that indicate further investigation may be necessary to see if human trafficking is occurring. Some of these are:

-In Common Work Areas and Living Conditions: --Individual is not free to leave or come as he or she wishes --He or she is unpaid, paid very little, or paid only through tips --He or she works excessively long and/or unusual hours --High security measures exist in the work and/or living locations -Exhibits Poor Mental Health or Abnormal Behavior --He or she is fearful, anxious, depressed, submissive, tense or nervous/paranoid --Exhibits fearful or anxious behavior after bringing up law enforcement --Avoids eye contact

83 Sieff. 84 Rustam Qobil, The sexually abused dancing boys of Afghanistan, British Broadcasting Company, (September 8, 2010), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11217772 (accessed: February 22, 2017). 41

-Exhibits Poor Physical Health --Lacking in medical care and/or denied medical services by employer --Appears malnourished or signs of exposure to harmful chemicals --Shows signs of physical and/or sexual abuse, confinement or torture -Lacks any Control --Has few or no possessions --Is not in control of his/her own money and has no financial records --Is not in control of own identification documents --Is not permitted to speak for themselves (a third party insists on being presence) -Other Signs --Lack of knowledge of whereabouts and/or of what city they are in --Loss of sense of time --Has numerous inconsistencies in his/her personal story 85

Establishing check points along selected routes may make it more difficult for human traffickers to transport their victims. Peacekeepers at these check points should be cognizant of the potential of human trafficking if the passengers riding in a vehicle do not know the driver and vice versa.

TTPs for Reducing the Threat: Force Displacement

Peacekeeping forces do not have the primary responsibility to assist those who are forced to displace but nonetheless support the activities of their civilian partners. Humanitarian agencies, like UNHCR, have the flexibility to respond to the needs of both refugees and IDPs.

Refugee and IDP movement can be divided into five stages: 1) Preflight/Flight; 2) Arrival at temporary Refugee/IDP camps or areas; 3) Asylum; 4) Return and Repatriation to locations from which they had fled, and finally; 5) Reintegration into that social and economic structure.

85 National Human Trafficking Hotline. 42

During any stage of this process, if involved, the primary responsibility of the peacekeeping force will be to assist in providing for the safety and security of the effected population.

The Preflight/Flight stage is when the civilian population is preparing to leave an area and then begins their movement. In addition to providing security, the peacekeeping force can provide intelligence support to determine the actual timing, magnitude, and direction of the population’s movement. They can also help control the movement once it actually begins by selecting the best routes to be used. This must be done in coordination with other humanitarian agencies. The military may also be required to provide security along said routes.

The next stage is Arrival at temporary refugees and IDP camps or areas. At these locations the peacekeeping force can assist with the camp construction, but as in the

Preflight/Flight stage, their primary concern will be the physical security of the displaced population.

Following this is the Asylum stage. This is when the displaced population is settled in more long-term locations where facilities required for normalizing daily existence are more readily available. The peacekeeping force could be asked to continue providing security but very often this is assumed by local authorities in the area or contracted to an outside security force.

Once conditions in the displaced population’s area of origin improve, and it is deemed safe for them to return, the repatriation stage begins. This stage involves the displaced people moving back to their area of origin. Before this can happen, it must be confirmed that whatever caused the displacement in the first place is now no longer an issue. Displaced populations cannot be expected to, or be forced to return to areas from which they fled if the situation that caused them to flee has not improved. Along with security, there must be adequate shelter and

43 local infrastructure, as well as functioning institutions, in their area of origin. Finally, there should be economic potential so that those returning can provide for themselves. Once again, a peacekeeping force can help control the movement with route selection and providing security.

The final stage is reintegration, which is when the displaced population is re-absorbed into their local communities. The peacekeeping force may be required to help provide security, especially if there is an absence of capable local national forces or if there is an active resistance to the resettlement. This was the case in refugee/IDP return and resettlements to areas in the former Yugoslavia following the end of fighting. In some areas there was resistance by the local population to the return of those that had fled.

Whenever possible, though, if the peacekeepers are tasked to provide security for displaced populations, the peacekeepers should consider the feasibility of utilizing local and national forces and be ready to augment and back-up these forces whenever necessary. First, by doing this the peacekeepers conserve their own resources and can use them in a different capacity. Next, these local authorities normally have legal status and are best equipped to handle their own people. Finally, the use of local personnel reduces the need for interpreters or translators.

TTPs for Reducing Threats: Denial of Humanitarian Assistance

Nongovernmental and other humanitarian agencies highly value their own impartiality and neutrality. Because of this they rarely want to be seen associating with any type of peacekeeping force, thus they seldom ask for assistance, even when humanitarian assistance and access is being denied. If the humanitarians do ask and the peacekeeping force can support it,

44 they should assist however they can. This usually involves providing security or logistical aid.

Peacekeepers must remember that even though they are impartial, they are not neutral. They should not undertake a mission that compromises this position.

TTPs for Reducing the Threat: Explosive Weapons

The peacekeeping force potentially has the capability to help reduce the amount of explosives left in areas that were once battlefields. Peacekeeping missions routinely deploy with small Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) specialists and teams. They may also have a limited operational demining capability. These specialized unexploded ordinance (UXO) and demining personnel are usually limited to removing unexploded ordinance and mines from structures/facilities and roadways used in carrying out the operational tasks of the peacekeepers.

Clearance of UXO and mines is only meant to render these safe for the peacekeepers, not necessarily for the local population. Any large scale demining effort (known as “humanitarian demining”) must generally be undertaken by civilian experts contracted and paid by the peacekeeping mission. These will be employed until an indigenous mine clearing force can be trained and deployed. A close working relationship should be established with the peacekeeping mission’s military UXO experts and deminers and the much larger humanitarian demining efforts.

TTPs for Reducing the Threat: Peacekeepers

Finally, though not in the same category nor on the same scale as the “threats” to civilians that may require their “protection,” it would be disingenuous not to recognize that the

45 very presence of peacekeepers and their operations can also cause problems and difficulties for civilians in the mission area.

First and easiest to address is the problem of misconduct by peacekeepers. Simply, this is almost always attributable to poor unit leadership and an unwillingness to openly address this in a timely manner by the senior mission leadership. Leaders must hold themselves and those they are leading to the highest of standards. Anything less would be a disservice to those that they are there to protect. All peacekeepers must follow the Rules of Engagement (ROE) set forth for the mission. The ROE are a set of written instructions of when and how force can be used in the mission. Peacekeepers should use force only when necessary, and when necessary, to use only the minimum amount required to accomplish the objective. This force should be proportionate to the level of the threat and minimize collateral damage. Direct fire weapons systems should be utilized whenever possible when deployed for supporting fires because of the increased likelihood of collateral damage caused by indirect fire weapons (e.g., mortars/artillery). For indirect fire weapons, the proper shell-fuse combination must be utilized. If possible, the target should be under observation before using indirect fire. If initial fires are insufficient the peacekeepers can always escalate the level and type of supporting fires used. An easy way to remember the steps in the escalation of force is to use the Five S’s: Shout, Show, Shove, Shoot a warning shot, and finally, Shoot to kill. “Shove” means to use a less than lethal means like tear gas or “charging” one’s weapon. When shooting a warning shot, it must be remembered that what goes up must come down. Thus, one must be aware of the surrounding environment to preclude accidently injuring a civilian. A peacekeeper’s best option might be to shoot a warning shot into the ground. Some ROEs advise a first “single shot should be aimed at non-vital parts of

46 the body in order not to kill.”86 Realize, though, when engaging someone with potentially deadly force, there is a strong possibility that the victim will be killed. If such an outcome is not acceptable, then the shot should not be taken. Peacekeepers also must be conscious of innocent bystanders and fire aimed shots only after positively identifying their target(s). They should use deadly force only as a last resort and stop firing when the threat is eliminated. The acronym

RAMP can be used as a quick mental reference for the Rules of Engagement (ROE). RAMP encompasses the basics of the ROE principles. The letters stand for the following:

R – Return fire with aimed fire A – Anticipate the attack (look for hostile act/intent) M – Measure response (use the minimum of force need and escalate if needed) P – Protect with deadly force yourself, your buddy, those in your charge, and the UN Mandate

Peacekeepers must also follow International Humanitarian Law and other internationally recognized legal documents. Abusing one’s position of power and acts of indiscipline when functioning as a peacekeeper must never be tolerated. Offenders must be brought to justice.

This sets an example and eliminates the idea of impunity for peacekeepers or that peacekeepers are above the law. One example is the use of torture or other prohibited treatment. One might believe that this is the only way to get information out of a suspect. As documented in many reports including the US Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on the Central Intelligence

Agency’s detention and interrogation program, torture does not work. Philippe Sands, a law professor at University College, London comments, “This is an authoritative conclusion, it confirmed what I was always told by US military psychologists, that torture produces

86 Peace Support Operation Division, AMISOM – ROE. (April 2012). 47 information, but it does not produce reliable information.”87 Besides not getting reliable information, there are other reasons why torture is counterproductive. One reason is that many fighters use this prohibited treatment as a reason for them to take up arms. Also, by treating captured enemies well, hopefully, they in return will act in a similar manner with their prisoners.

Finally, if enemies or insurgents know that they will be treated well and not abused if captured, they are more likely to surrender. During the Gulf war in 1991 thousands of Iraqis decided they would rather surrender than fight the Allies. They knew that after surrendering they were going to be treated well: given food, water, and not beaten. In fact, in one case, ten Iraqis were so intent on surrendering that they tried to surrender to two journalists.88 It is far better to have an enemy surrender rather than having to engage them in a firefight.

Finally, peacekeepers must always remember that they, in the eyes of the world, they not only represent their own country but the larger international community, the United Nations, and all UN peacekeeping troop contributing nations. Acts of indiscipline in one peacekeeping operation can threaten the success of other peacekeeping operations. One individual peacekeeper’s misconduct, perhaps raping a child, can doom that entire mission to failure. For example, the actions of a few American soldier guards at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq, who abused and humiliated Iraqi prisoners, had a very negative ripple effect on operations in Iraq for years to come. Following this tragic event, Iraqis’ opinion on why America was there significantly dropped with many believing that the Americans were simply an occupying force, and it

87 Julian Borger, US report on 'enhanced interrogation' concludes: torture doesn't work, The Guardian (December 9, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/09/senate-committee-cia-torture-does-not-work (accessed: February 19, 2017). 88 Dan Fesperman, 10 Tired Iraqis Surrender To Reporters War In The Gulf, The Baltimore Sun (February 27, 1991), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-02-27/news/1991058040_1_kuwait-iraqi-army-surrender (accessed: February 19, 2017). 48 immediately caused an increase in the number of attacks per day conducted by the insurgents.89

With today’s news cycle and the popularity of social media, one seemingly little and mundane incident can quickly go viral and become a mission’s defining moment.

Peacekeepers must set the example in both their words and deeds. Something as simple as taking a piece of fruit from a stand without paying for it while on patrol can undermine the entire mission. Peacekeepers must treat the local population the same way they would want someone to treat their own family.

Training Peacekeepers for Protection of Civilians

Training in Protection of Civilians should form a part of the training program for individuals and military units scheduled for deployment to a peacekeeping operation. Soldiers and military units become proficient in the performance of tasks expected to be accomplished in a mission by practicing these tasks during training exercises. It is necessary to have classes on the protection of civilians. It is basically unavoidable since there really is no other way to disseminate the many nuances of this subject matter. One must remember, though, that soldiers learn best in “hands-on” training. Leaders are responsible to plan training exercises that are performance oriented and reinforce the information taught in the initial classes. This means that individual soldiers and units must physically perform and demonstrate competence in a specific mission task. Proficiency is measured based on performance results, not merely by participating

89 Jamie Tarabay, Abu Ghraib closes, bitter memories of torture remain, America Al Jazeera (April 16, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/4/15/abu-ghraib-s-infamousend.html (accessed: February 23, 2017).

49 in the process. This training is only limited by time, resources, and the creativity of the leaders planning the training.

A proven methodology for conducting performance oriented training is using “Situational

Training Exercises (STX).” These are scenario-driven training events structured to replicate operational challenges faced by the peacekeepers to which they must respond using appropriate and proven tactics, techniques and procedures discussed above. STX are characterized as “free- play” events since for each STX there is an “opposing force” that will respond to the specific actions taken by the peacekeepers. It is imperative for the opposing force to understand what the learning objective is for said STX so that they can act accordingly.

An STX usually requires a unit to perform multiple collective tasks linked into a realistic exercise scenario. An example of such a training event for protection of civilian would be having peacekeepers man a vehicle check point. In this training event, peacekeepers can be exposed to a majority of the common threats to civilians. It is also possible to increase the stress and challenge for the trainees depending on how well they are performing. For example, initially they can encounter just one unarmed cooperative pedestrian attempting to walk by. By the end of the training iteration they might encounter an uncooperative angry mob which has a few armed members. Such training must be structured to be challenging and realistic. As General

George S. Patton once said, “The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war.”90 They should not be afraid to “fail” since this usually results in flushing out more lessons to be learned.

Ideally the trainees will not experience anything as stressful or complicated during their deployment compared to what they faced while in training.

90 George S. Patton, The Quotation Page, http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/35511.html (accessed: February 22, 2017). 50

Protection of civilians training should be incorporated in all pre-deployment training since it plays a central role in everything peacekeepers do while on mission. It should not be limited to just a few STX lanes and then forgotten. This incorporation can be as simple as ensuring peacekeepers continue to follow the principles of the ROE, especially in regards to firing well aimed shots, target discrimination, and ceasing fire once the threat is eliminated.

Incorporating vignettes highlighting specific protection of civilian scenarios into pre-deployment training is another simple way to remind soldiers to always be thinking about their duty to protect civilians. Ideally these vignettes would be real life situations experienced in the peacekeeping mission area to which they are deploying.

A key element in performance oriented training is the “After Action Review (AAR).”

The AAR is recognized as one of the most successful organizational learning tools used by the military. The process revolves around an active discussion by all members who have participated in the training exercise. The discussion centers around four key questions relating to the training event:

-What did we intend to accomplish? (What was our strategy?) -What did we do? (How did we execute our strategy?) -What happened and why? (How did we execute relative to our strategy?) -Why did it happen that way? (Why was there a difference between our strategy and how we executed?)

From this discussion the members of the unit individually and collectively come to understand what needs to be done for a better outcome the next time or, how to repeat success. The AAR must be conducted in a climate of transparency, selflessness, and candor. Unit members must be able to challenge current ways of thinking and performing. Those leading the training can help

51 steer the direction of the AAR discussion, but it is best when the soldiers who participated in the training themselves are involved. By doing so, the soldiers are more likely to understand and internalize both the good and bad points that came to light during the AAR. AAR’s have proven to build strong cohesive units and improve performance

Conclusion

The need to spare and protect civilians in armed conflict has been acknowledged for millennia. Yet, it was not until the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century that the protection of civilians became firmly universalized and codified in international law. This came about in the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in

Time of War.91

However, it was not until the peacekeeping mission authorized by the UN Security

Council to deal with the internal conflict in Sierra Leone in 1999 that protecting civilians was explicitly stated in a peacekeeping mandate. Since then, it has been argued by some, protection of civilians has become the heart of peacekeeping mission mandates and that this task is the most important factor which peacekeepers must take into account when deploying into a mission area.

Furthermore, accomplishing this task is central to the success of both current as well as future peacekeeping operations.

What still needs to be done, however, is to translate Protection of Civilians from what is often viewed as merely a thematic policy level pronouncement into concrete results at the

91 American Red Cross, Summary of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocol, (January 2013), http://www.redcross.org/images/MEDIA_CustomProductCatalog/m22130477_summary-of-geneva- convention.pdf (accessed: February 25, 2017), pg 2. 52 country specific level. There remain a variety of diverging views among UN Security Council members, as well as the major troop and police contributing countries, regarding such key issues as the use of force in executing the Protection of Civilians mandate.

At the strategic level, the parameters of Protection of Civilians in peacekeeping operations should be clarified. At the Operational and Tactical levels, the level of execution, peacekeeping doctrine as well as Tactics – Techniques – and Procedures for training peacekeepers in Protection of Civilians must be developed and adjusted periodically based on feedback from experience.

Stated simply, a concerted effort is needed to translate the rhetoric of Protection of

Civilians into reality “on the ground” in peacekeeping operations. Wars cannot be won, and military interventions cannot be successful based solely on sophisticated weapons or superior firepower. Though not often considered “sexy” and would not make a good Hollywood blockbuster movie compared to kinetic engagements, Protection of Civilians is what will ultimately ensure an enduring peace. Wars and military interventions are won by the dedication and competence of individual soldiers and peacekeepers who, operating in units under professional and competent leadership, carry out all assignments with confident professionalism.

Successful protection of civilians from violence and the establishment of a dependable public security environment is a necessary condition for a stable and lasting peace. Protection of

Civilians must be seen as a vital task in peacekeeping!

53

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