How Ex-Ante Expectations Determine Asymmetric Conflict Outcomes
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CHOOSING TO LOSE: HOW EX-ANTE EXPECTATIONS DETERMINE ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT OUTCOMES MELANIE W. SISSON B.A., Tufts University, l999 M.I.A., Columbia University, 2003 M.A., University of Colorado, 2009 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science 2012 This thesis entitled: Choosing to Lose: How Ex-Ante Expectations Determine Asymmetric Conflict Outcomes written by Melanie W. Sisson has been approved for the Department of Political Science (Dr. Steve Chan, Committee Chair) (Dr. David Bearce, Committee Member) (Dr. Jaroslav Tir, Committee Member) (Dr. Anand Sokhey, Committee Member) (Dr. Thomas Zeiler, Committee Member) Date 11/29/2012 The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we Find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards Of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline. IRB protocol # 11-0584 Sisson, Melanie W. (Ph.D., Political Science) Choosing to Lose: How Ex-Ante Expectations Determine Asymmetric Conflict Outcomes Thesis directed by Professor Steve Chan This dissertation develops a theory that is explicitly cognitive in nature to explain why and when strong states retrench from ongoing conflicts with weaker opponents. The theory's fundamental premise is that states take seriously not only what they are fighting for, but also who they are fighting against. Specifically, the theory proposes that prior to militarized engagements states evaluate their power, measured primarily in terms of the number, sophistication, skill, and resilience of military assets, in relation to that of a prospective opponent and, on this basis, establish an expectation of the losses it likely will incur in a fight. The theory’s central contentions are that this expectation operates as a reference point, and that states therefore will make the choice to decrease their level of commitment by scaling back objectives, circumscribing operational activity, reducing troop levels, or even effecting a full and rapid withdrawal when this reference point is violated. That is, strong-states will choose to lose asymmetric conflicts when the level of cost realized exceeds the level of cost anticipated ex-ante. These dynamics explain not only individual cases of strong-state loss, but also the upward trend in a particular type of strong-state loss -- great power loss -- over time. Specifically, the theory suggests, rather counterintuitively, that great power loss should be both more frequent and more likely under low-polarity structures -- that is, during periods of bipolarity and unipolarity. This proposition is tested using quantitative analysis, while the theory's hypotheses about the formation of the reference point and the salience of its violation are tested directly through the use of a survey-based experiment fielded to a sample population of roughly 400 U.S. elites. These methods, coupled with illustrative studies of three post-Cold War U.S. interventions, produce results that are largely supportive of the theory's central argument: that the fact and the timing of strong-state decisions to retrench are determined by the violation of ex-ante expectations of the costs of conflict. [iii] ACKNOLWEDGEMENTS I extend my sincere gratitude to Dr. Steve Chan for his invaluable feedback, given early, often, and always with goodwill. My thanks also to: Dr. David Bearce; Dr. Curtis Bell; Dr. Duncan Lawrence; and Jim Pripusich. [iv] CONTENTS CHAPTER I THE RESEARCH QUESTION 1 Why do the Strong Sometimes Lose to the Weak? CHAPTER II THE LITERATURE 11 Explaining Strong-State Asymmetric Conflict Loss: Miscalculation, Democracy, and Strategy Miscalculation 14 Domestic Constraints 17 Strategic Error 20 Problems with the Expected Utility Proposition 23 CHAPTER III THE THEORY 26 Power, Cost-Expectations, and Asymmetric Conflict Loss The Bilateral Hypotheses 27 The Structural Hypothesis 30 The Reference Point Proposition vs. Bargaining Theory 35 The Reference Point Proposition vs. Gambling for Resurrection 37 What about the Weak? 39 Summary 41 CHAPTER IV TESTING THE BILATERAL HYPOTHESES 43 Experimental Test of the Effects of Power and Cost-Expectations on the Decision to Retrench Selecting an Appropriate Test 45 Experimentation in International Relations Research 47 The Experiment 49 Results and Interpretation: Hypothesis 1 52 Results and Interpretation: Hypothesis 2 53 Summary 58 CHAPTER V TESTING THE STRUCTURAL HYPOTHESIS 60 Large-N Analysis of the Relationship between Great Power Status, Polarity, and Asymmetric Conflict Loss The Systemic Distribution of Power and Great Power Loss 61 The Data 65 Testing Hypothesis 3 67 Data Limitations 72 The Models 73 [v] Results 75 Interpretation 78 Summary 81 CHAPTER VI ILLUSTRATING THE DYNAMICS: 82 U.S. Interventions in Panama, the Former Yugoslavia, and Somalia The Successful U.S. Intervention in Panama (1989) 84 Assessing the Power Differential 85 Establishing Ex-Ante Cost-Expectations 87 Casualties and Decision Points 88 Summary 90 The Ongoing U.S. Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia (1995- 90 Present) Assessing the Power Differential 94 Establishing Ex-ante Cost-Expectations 96 Casualties and Decision Points 99 Summary 102 The Failed U.S. Intervention in Somalia (1992-1993) 104 Assessing the Power Differential 106 Establishing Ex-ante Cost-Expectations 108 Casualties and Decision Points 110 Alternative Explanations 112 Summary 115 Conclusions 116 CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION 118 Findings, Extensions , and Implications Findings 118 Extension: Other U.S. Conflicts 122 Extension: Other Great Powers 124 Extension: Public Opinion 125 Implications 126 REFERENCES 128 APPENDIX A EXPERIMENTAL DATA 140 APPENDIX B SURVEY-BASED EXPERIMENT 147 APPENDIX C THE DATA SETS Full Set of Conflict Participants 153 Great Power Set of Conflict Participants 165 [vi] TABLES Table 1: Experimental Conditions in Brief 52 Table 2: Mean Likelihood of Retrenchment Across Strong/Weak Treatment 53 Groups Table 3: Logit Regression Results 54 Table 4: Mean Likelihood of Retrenching Nuclear Scenarios vs. Humanitarian 56 Scenarios Table 5: Illustration of Observations 65 Table 6: Predicted Signs of Coefficients for Theoretically Substantive Variables 75 in Full Models Table 7: Logit Analysis: All Asymmetric Conflict Participants 76 Table 8: Logit Analysis: Great Power Asymmetric Conflict Participants 77 Table 9: Data Gathered through Process Tracing 117 [vii] FIGURES Figure 1: Relation of Physical Defeat to the Reference Point 41 Figure 2: Regressing Power Differential on Casualties 46 Figure 3: The Experiment 51 Figure 4: Great Power Loss as % of Total Conflicts 68 Figure 5: Predicted Probability of Loss for States that are Great Powers by 78 System type Figure 6: Great Power Loss as % of Total Conflicts Disaggregating Bipolarity 80 and Unipolarity [viii] CHAPTER I: THE RESEARCH QUESTION Why do the Strong Sometimes Lose to the Weak? *************** One of the most accepted truisms of the last twenty years is the notion that the United States is the center of world power. In 1991 columnist Charles Krauthammer first proclaimed the beginning of a “unipolar moment,” anointing the United States an “unrivaled superpower…at the apex of the industrial West." A veritable cottage industry of work emerged soon thereafter, with pundits and professors alike concerned with understanding whether, and/or when and how the United States might come to be removed from -- or simply to fall off of -- this elevated perch, all with an eye toward avoiding, preventing, or otherwise delaying that eventuality’s arrival (Mastanduno 1997; Kupchan 1998; Copeland 2000; Brooks and Wohlforth 2002, 2005, 2008; Wohlforth 2009; Krauthammer 2002/2003; Ferguson 2005; Walt 2005). Although some, most notably prominent historian Samuel Huntington (1999), quibbled with Krauthammer’s depiction of a unipolar world, even he acknowledged “The United States, of course, is the sole state with preeminence in every domain of power – economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, technological, and cultural--with the reach and capabilities to promote its interests in virtually every part of the world.” Huntington’s characterization of the United States provides perhaps the most concise rendering of the foundations for this seeming consensus about America’s uberpower status: an [1] understanding of power as control over resources, defined by both material and ideational endowment. With its “hard” variant captured in measurements of military expenditures, the size of armed forces, gross domestic product, geography and population1, and its “soft” component -- human capital, technological achievement, and cultural appeal -- left more ephemeral but not omitted, this elements-of-power approach led inexorably to the identification of America as the elephant in the room.2 Whether such an accounting continues to lead to this conclusion is the subject of rather heated debate, with a spirited back-and-forth about the rise of China3; the effects of the 2008 financial crisis (Layne 2012; Wohlforth 2012); and the United States' most recent military outings in Iraq and in Afghanistan, which for many call to mind Paul Kennedy's well-known argument about imperial overstretch -- including for Paul Kennedy himself4 -- and, some argue, may long tarnish the United States' soft power.5 Not surprisingly given their courses, conduct, and outcomes, these engagements often are offered both as cause and as consequence of the waning