ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol21, No 5, pp 781 – 793, 2000

Securitydilemmas o f nuclear-armedPakistan

SAMINAAHMED

ABSTRACT Pakistan’s security environmenthas deteriorated throughits adop- tion of adeclarednuclear weapons posture in May1998. Internal Žssures have widenedalong regional and sectarian lines as the Pakistani economyfalters, unableto sustain evenlimited external sanctions followingdecades of internal mismanagement.Tensions with Indiahave also increased asPakistan’s security managersadopt interventionist policies, basedon a misplacedbelief in the deterrent valueof nuclearweapons. The international community,in particular, the USA’sfailure to reverse SouthAsian nuclear proliferation, hasemboldened Indianadvocates of nuclear deployment. If Indiadeploys nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, Pakistanwill follow suit. Operation-readynuclear weaponswill increase the prospects ofan India – Pakistancon ict that could assumea nucleardimension. Pakistan’ s nuclearweapons capability will not prevent anIndianconventional attack norwill the presence of nuclearweapons deter anIndian accidental, unauthorised or preventive nuclearattack. Changed domestic andexternal priorities alonecan buttress Pakistani security.

Twoyears after Pakistan helda series ofnuclear tests on28 and 30 May 1998, the decision to abandonnuclear ambiguity for a declarednuclear weapons posturehas dramatically changedits security environmentin waysthat werenot foreseenby its ofŽcials. Tensionsbetween India and Pakistan havereached new heights,providing an alarming impetus to their long-standingrivalry, conducted throughmilitary andother means. In a regionalenvironment of mutual suspicion anddistrust, the risk ofwar between Pakistan andIndia has increased consider- ably.Should such a conict occur,it couldescalate tothe nuclearlevel. Pakistan’s nuclearweapons capability is unlikelyto prevent armed conf rontation with its conventionallysuperior foe nor will it act as adeterrent against an accidental, unauthorisedor pre-emptive nuclear attack byIndia. 1 Pakistan’s security environmentfaces additional challenges since it adopteda declarednuclear weapons posture in May 1998. From its inceptionin the 1970s, Pakistan’s nuclearweapons programme had been shrouded in the grabof ambiguity,neither adoptingnor rejecting anuclearweapons capability. This ambiguityhelped Pakistan to withstand international non-proliferation pressures evenas it expandedits nuclearweapons infrastructure. Thereplacement of ambiguityby an overt nuclear weapons posture has exposedPakistan to international pressure at atime whenthe state is internally weakand divided, the result ofmisplaced domestic priorities andpolicies. Theattention ofPakistan’ s

SaminaAhmed is attheKennedy School of Government, Harward University, Cambridge,MA, USA.

ISSN0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/ 00/050781-13 Ó 2000 ThirdWorld Quarterly 781 SAMINA AHMED security managersfocuses onways to offset India’s regionalin uence and to undermineIndian security, ignoringinternal demandsfor socioeconomic and political redistributive justice. Misperceptions aboutthe roles andutility of nuclearweapons, moreover, result in high-riskexternal policies that reboundon Pakistani security itself.Since Pakistan’s policydirections increase the risk of warand undermine regional stability, it faces enhancedexternal pressure and international isolation. Theattention ofPakistani policymakers notsurprisingly focuses onthe removalof these extra-regionalpressures. Importantinternational actors, partic- ularly the USAare warnedabout the dangersof destabilising ageostrategically important state, situated ina volatile neighborhood. 2 Pakistan’s bidto regain the goodwillof the international community,on which it is dependentfor its economicsurvival, also includes pledgesof nuclear restraint. 3 Pakistan’s nuclear policyis, however,reactive innature, responding to India’ s nuclearambitions. HenceIndia’ s declaredintention todeploy nuclear weapons could force Pakistan to followsuit, resulting ina destabilising nucleararms race. International pressure couldplay a positive role in preventingsuch an arms race.The USA andthe otherpermanent members ofthe UNSecurity Council are awareof the needto containPakistan andIndia’ s nuclearcompetition. The international communityalso realises the importanceof reducing the risk of conict in SouthAsia that couldassume anucleardimension. The international responseto SouthAsian nuclearproliferation will, toa considerableextent, determine whetherPakistan andIndia curb their nuclearrivalry orembark on a full-edged nuclear arms race with major implications fortheir bilateral relation- ship,for regional stability andfor global peace.

Pakistan’s nuclear options Pakistan’s nuclearweapons programme is closely related toits troubledrelation- ship withIndia. The two countries havegone to waron three different occasions, in 1948,1965 and 1971. Although the last armedcon ict betweenPakistan and Indiatook place three decadesago, their bilateral relationship is markedby acrimonyand includes proxywars conductedin eachother’ s territory as well as several nearwar situations. 4 Theinception of Pakistan’ s nuclearprogramme can betraced backto the 1960swhenIndia’ s nuclearinf rastructure beganto expand. Theactual decision to optfor nuclear weapons came after Pakistan’s defeat and dismemberment in the 1971India –Pakistan war.The next crucial turningpoint forPakistan’ s nuclearweapons programme was India’s nucleartest of197 4. 5 Duringthe 1980s, whenPakistan adopteda policyof nuclear ambiguity, it attempted to justify its nuclearweapons programme on the basis ofthe Indian threat andas aresponseto India’s nuclearweapons capabilities. Similar justiŽcations weremade after Pakistan’s May1998 nuclear tests. TheShari f governmentemphasised that Pakistan’s failure to respondin kindwould have madeit vulnerableto its aggressive,hegemonist neighbour. Tensions between the twostates hadindeed risen in the 1980sfora numberor reasons, including Pakistani accusations ofIndian support for insurgents in Sindhand the escalation ofKashmiri militancy whichIndia blamed on Pakistani intervention.When the 782 SECURITY DILEMMAS OF NUCLEAR-ARMED PAKISTAN

Bharatiya Janata Party ( BJP),an ultra-nationalist, right-wingparty that had adoptedan aggressive stance onthe Kashmir issue came topower and opted for aseries ofnuclear tests inMay 1998, Pakistan’ s decision makers,deeply distrustful ofIndian intentions, optedf ora retaliatory response. Extra-regionaland domestic determinants playedan equally important role in the Pakistani decision to test. Pakistan was consciousthat the international community,particularly the declarednuclear weapons powers, the permanent Žve(P-5), treated the twoSouth Asian states differently fromother aspiring proliferators suchas Iraqor North Korea. Since the 1950sthe international communityhad deliberately ignoredIndia’ s nuclearambitions becauseof India’ s geostrategic importance,its democratic credentials andits economicpotential. In the Pakistani context,close ties with the USAin the 1980sresulted in US administrations deliberately overlookingits fast-expandingnuclear weapons infrastructure duringthe veryperiod when Pakistan acquireda nuclearweapons capability. Immediately followingthe Indiannuclear tests ofMay 1998, Pakistani ofŽcials closely assessed the international responseto judgewhether in uential external actors wouldcontinue to accept yet anotherSouth Asian deŽance of international non-proliferation norms.The international community,especially the P-5and the G-8,appeared divided in their reaction tothe Indiantests, failing to adopta commonapproach. 6 Pakistan’s security managerswere therefore encouragedto respond to the Indiantests inkind, convinced that international condemnationwould be symbolic at best andshort-lived at worst. While security andexternal imperatives inuenced the Pakistani response,the decision toabandon nuclear ambiguity for a declarednuclear weapons posture was ultimately determinedby domestic factors, particularly the natureof Pakistan’s decision-makingapparatus. Policy makingin the realm ofsecurity, includingthe nuclearŽ eld,has beenthe preserveof the Pakistani military with the assistance andwilling collaborationof the civil bureaucracy,including the nuclearscientiŽ c estate. Havingexperienced and in fact contributedto the outbreakof war with Indiaon three separate occasions,the military – bureaucratic apparatusis deeplyhostile to Indiaand suspicious ofIndian intentions. Forthe politically dominantPakistani military, India’s larger size andresources must be counterbalancedby external alliances, the acquisition ofa countervailingmili- tary capability, conventionalas well asnuclear,and the adoptionof an assertive regionalrole. ForPakistani decision makers,the acquisition ofa nuclearweapons capability is moreoverseen as ameans ofstrengthening the country’s bargainingposition within regionaland international arenas vis-a`-vis India.Issues ofprestige also comeinto playin the formulationof security policy.In the internal context, successive regimes havedepicted Pakistan’ s acquisition ofnuclear weapons as asourceof pride and national accomplishment. 7 This emphasis onmilitary, particularly nuclear,prowess is partly usedto divert domestic attention from issues ofmisgovernance and partly toprovide a sense ofa national identity to acountrythat is dividedalong regional, ethnic andsectarian lines. Inthe speciŽc contextof the Pakistani nuclearweapons tests ofMay 1998, the BJP government’s decision toadopt an overt nuclear weapons policy came at a 783 SAMINA AHMED time whenPakistan hadan elected government,headed by Prime Minister NawazSharif. The military had,however, retained controlover sensitive areas ofpolicy making, including the nucleardomain, after it transfered powerto civilian handsin 1988.With its inherentdistrust ofIndia reinforced by the Indiannuclear tests, andconcerned about enhanced Indian prestige as the BJP governmenttried to gatecrash its wayinto the nuclearweapons club, the civil–military bureaucracypressured the Sharifgovernmentto opt for a retalia- toryresponse. 8 TheSharif governmentat Žrst adopteda cautious posture,concerned about the external andinternal consequencesof testing. Thegovernment was urgedto test in the majority provinceof the Punjab,the recruiting groundof the military and central bureaucracy.In the NorthWest Frontier Provinceand Baluchistan, however,public opinion was divided,with opponentsof testing insisting that pressing developmentalneeds should take priority overa potentially costly nucleararms race. 9 Thegovernment was also concernedabout the external costs oftesting. Thedecision to test was Žnally takenafter the mutedinternational responseto the Indiannuclear tests indicated that SouthAsia would,as in the past, manageto violate non-proliferationnorms without incurring international wrath.

NuclearPakistan’ s security dilemma Pakistan’s security, in bothits internal andexternal dimensions,has been seriously underminedby its decision to adoptan overt nuclear weapons policy. By1998 Pakistan’ s relations withIndia were already under considerable strain as bothsides failed to demonstrate aresolve to negotiate their differences peacefully.After the tests, adialogueprocess initiated bythe Sharifgovernment was subsequentlyderailed thanksto anumberof developments, including the military takeoverin Pakistan. Asbilateral tensions reachnew heights, Pakistani ofŽcials attempt to justify andto legitimise Pakistan’s declarednuclear posture as anecessary measure tocounter an enhanced Indian nuclear threat. Pakistan’s demonstrationof its nuclearweapons capability has,however, strengthenedthe positionof Indian advocates of overt weaponisation. If India opts todeploy its nuclearweapons and their deliverysystems, Pakistan will once againbe underpressure to respondin kindsince its nuclearweapons policy and rhetoric is reactive in nature.Should both states decideto incorporatenuclear weaponswithin their military arsenals, the regionalasymmetry will continueto workto Pakistan’s disadvantagebecause of India’ s advancednuclear infrastruc- ture. ShouldPakistan andIndia decide to assemble andto deploy nuclear weapons, there are also increased chancesof accidental orinadvertentnuclear war. Neither side possesses reliable command,control and communication systems andthe fact ofimmediate proximitydangerously reduces warning times. 10 The dangers ofan intentional, pre-emptivestrike also increase becauseof poor intelligence andthe lack ofbilateral transparency. 11 Inan atmosphereof heightened bilateral tensions, there are,moreover, increased chancesof armed con ict. Eveni fsuch aconict is restricted to the conventionalrealm, Pakistan’s conventionalinferi- 784 SECURITY DILEMMAS OF NUCLEAR-ARMED PAKISTAN ority places it at adistinct disadvantage. 12 Shoulda conict escalate to the nuclearlevel, Pakistan couldbe annihilated, given India’ s conventionaland nuclearsuperiority. If armedhostilities occuragain, Pakistan canno longer rely onits traditional regionalally, China,to cometo its aid.Since the 1960sChinahas beena major supplier ofconventional armament to Pakistan. Motivated bya commonantipa- thytowards India and by India’s close ties with the USSR,China also provided technologicaland material assistance toPakistan’ s nuclearweapons pro- gramme.13 Pakistan’s relations with Chinahave, however, undergone a change inthe past decadef ora numberof reasons, including Chinese antipathyto the involvementof Pakistani sub-state actors in ethnic unrest inits Muslim-majority borderprovince of Xinjiang. The end of the ColdWar and the subsequent dissolution ofthe USSRhave also broughtabout a rethinkin Chinese policies towardsIndia and Pakistan. Since the 1990sChinahas enteredinto a dialogue to normalise its relations with India.Thus, China’ s policytowards its twoSouth Asian neighbourshas becomemore even-handed, calling onboth states to resolve their differences in the interests ofregional peace. AlthoughChina’ s immediate responseto the Maynuclear tests was more critical ofIndia, reacting to the BJP’sjustiŽcation ofIndia’ s tests onthe grounds ofa perceivedChinese threat andChinese – Pakistani nuclearcollaboration, China’s post-test policyis primarily dictated byits concernabout a potential nucleararms race betweentwo of its conict-prone neighbours. In its bilateral dealings andat multilateral forums,China therefore calls uponboth Pakistan andIndia to abandon their nuclearweapons programmes and to signthe Non- Proliferation Treaty( NPT)as non-nuclearweapons states. Chinais also far more responsiveto USdemandsf oran end to its nuclear-related material and technologicalassistance andto the supplyof nuclear-capable ballistic missiles to Pakistan. Thechanged Chinese stand,if translated intopolicy, will havean adverseeffect onPakistan’ s nuclearweapons capabilities, particularly inthe developmentof ballistic missile deliverysystems, increasing Pakistan’s nuclear asymmetry vis-a`-vis India. Givenan adverse international climate, Pakistan is unlikelyto narrowthis technologicaland resource gap by diversifying its sources ofexternal supply.In the wakeof the Indiantests, the Pakistan governmentwas pressuredby the international communityto refrain froma retaliatory response.Pakistani ofŽcials claim that the decision totest was reluctantly taken,since external actors includingthe USAfailed toprovide adequate security assurances against an enhancedIndian nuclear threat. Since Pakistan tested only17 days after India anda minimum ofseven to eight dayswas neededto preparefor the tests, 14 it is clear that noserious attempts weremade to bargainfor such external assurances ofsupport— moral ormaterial. 15 HadPakistan refrainedf romtesting, it couldhave bargained for military andeconomic incentives fromthe inter- national community. Almost completely dependenton external lendingand Ž nanceto sustain its faltering economy,Pakistan also underminedits internal security byopting for adeclarednuclear posture. Its nucleartests led to the imposition ofmultilateral sanctions onsoft grants andloans andimportant donorssuch as Japanimposed 785 SAMINA AHMED sanctions onbilateral aid.Although Pakistan’ s economywas onthe vergeof collapse as aresult ofinternal mismanagement,the sanctions regime resulted in asharpdecline inexternal andinternal investor conŽdence. A numberof post-test sanctions havesince beenwaived to preventa Pakistani economic breakdown.The Pakistani economyhas, however, failed to reviveand as the economyfalters, internal Žssures alongalong ethnic, regional and sectarian lines grow. Ethnictensions haveincreased evenfurther after the military coupof 1 2 October1999. Centralised authoritarian controldeprives a multi-ethnic popu- lation ofparticipatory andrepresentative avenues,and the predominantly Punjabimilitary is seen as apartisan ethnic actor.Rejecting minoritydemands forchanged internal policies, includingpolitical andsocioeconomic autonomy, the central governmentattempts to use internal tensions as abargainingchip inits dealings withthe international community.Appealing for an end to sanctions andfor international assistance, Pakistani ofŽcials implythat an externally engineereddefault wouldencourage the growthof Islamic militancy, threateningthe stability ofa moderateMuslim state situated within avolatile region.

TheUS role: past andpresent TheUS governmentis the main target ofthese appeals,since Pakistani ofŽcials quite correctly assess that the USAinuences the responseof other important external players towardsSouth Asian nuclearproliferation. US policydirections havealso hada considerableimpact onPakistani andIndian nuclear decision making.In the Pakistani context,formally allied tothe USAinthe 1950sand thus amajor beneŽciary ofUS economicand military assistance andhardware, Pakistan felt little needfor a nuclearweapons capability. After the 1965US arms embargo,as the Žrst differences developedin the relationship, Pakistan turned toChina for conventional arms. Bythe late 1960sPakistan showedan interest in acquiringa nuclearweapons capability byref usingto sign the NPT. In the 1970sadismemberedPakistan optedto match India’s nuclearweapons capa- bility, drivenas muchby considerations ofprestige andstatus as bysecurity concerns. Havingoverlooked India’ s nuclearweapons programme since the 1950s, the USAsuddenlybecame aware of the dangersof South Asian nuclearproli feration after the 1974Indiannuclear test, pressuringPakistan to abandonits nuclear weaponsprogramme. Less thana decadelater, the USresolve faltered as it forgedan inf ormal alliance relationship with Pakistan against the Soviets in Afghanistan.During this periodPakistan becamenuclear-capable with the knowledgeand tacit acceptanceof US administrations. 16 Underpressure from Congress,an embargo was imposedon economic assistance andarms sales to Pakistan in 1990.USsanctions were,however, limited in scopeand were not sustained. Mixedsignals werealso givenby successive USadministrations to Pakistani andIndian nuclear decision makers.The Clinton administration’ s ofŽcial goals, forinstance, wereto freeze, back roll andultimately eliminate weaponsof mass 786 SECURITY DILEMMAS OF NUCLEAR-ARMED PAKISTAN destruction inSouth Asia. Thesedeclared goals didnot, however, shape its SouthAsian non-proliferationpolicy. Pakistan andIndia posed no threat to US national security. Hencethe USAwas disinclined to subject either state to punitivemeasures. Since numerouspolitical, economicand strategic interests wereas important as its nuclearnon-proli feration objectives, the Clintonadmin- istration favoureda policyof engagement that includedunconditional induce- ments to inuence Pakistan’ s andIndia’ s nuclearbehaviour. Inthe Pakistani case, whenthe USAprovidedincentives suchas the waivers containedin the Brownamendment, 1996 and the Harkin – Warneramendment, 1997without any reciprocal non-proliferation concessions,Pakistani decision makers wereconvinced that the region’s geostrategic importancefar outweighed USnon-proliferationconcerns. 17 USattempts to dissuade Chinaf romabandon- ingits nuclearcollaboration with Pakistan werealso half-hearted,since the importanceof trade with Chinaoutweighed US nuclearproliferation concerns. Norcould Pakistan orits Chinese ally havetaken the UScommitment toreverse SouthAsian nuclearnon-proli feration seriously, since the USAhaddone little morethan impose restrictions ondual-use technology on India, an avowed proliferator.These vacillations andcontradictions in USpolicycontributed to India’s decision toabandon nuclear ambiguity for a declarednuclear weapons posturein May 1998. Soonafter the Indiantests the Clintonadministration launcheda diplomatic campaignto dissuade Pakistan fromtesting. TheUSA reportedlyoffered incentives suchas the removalof the Pakistan-speciŽc Pressler amendmentand additional economicand military aid. 18 At the same time, Pakistan was warned that the USAwas legally obligedto oppose multilateral lendingto Pakistan in the eventof a nucleartest. Pakistani policymakers believedthat sanctions would beshort-lived andthat their costs couldbe bornewith the helpof allies suchas China,Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates. TheUSA, however,obtained international, includingChinese, support f orsanctions onmultilateral lending frominternational Žnancial institutions toPakistan andIndia, a consensusthat Pakistan’s Middle Eastern allies wereunwilling to challenge.US punitive policies towardsPakistan andIndia were accompanied by offers ofincentives, contingenton progress towards non-proliferation. Pakistan andIndia were informedthat sanctions wouldbe eased in the eventof their commitment to: sign the ComprehensiveTest BanTreaty ( CTBT); participate meaningfullyin f orth- comingdiscussions ona Fissile Material Cut-OffTreaty; refrain fromassem- blingand deploying nuclear-capable delivery systems; impose restraints onthe transfer ofnuclear technology and supplies; andto enter into adialoguefor the normalisation ofrelations. Facingeconomic collapse andrising internal unrest,the Pakistan government deviseddomestic legislation formore stringent restraints onthe transfer of nucleartechnology and supplies. 19 Pakistan also committed itselfto signingthe CTBT,albeit conditionalon the removalof economic sanctions; agreedto participate infuture negotiations ona Žssile cut-off; andinitiated adialogueon normalisation ofrelations with the BJP government.In response to these commitments, the Clintonadministration provideda one-offwaiver on multilat- eral sanctions, fearinga Pakistani economicmeltdown. With USsupport,the 787 SAMINA AHMED international Žnancial institutions, includingthe WorldBank and the IMF, agreed to reschedule$3 .3billion ofPakistan’ s external debtand to providePakistan with anadditional $4billion inloans. 20 Inits ofŽcial rhetoric the USAhas madea futurerelaxation ofrestraints on multilateral lendingto either Pakistan orIndia contingent on progress towards nuclearnon-proliferation. In practice, however,the Clintonadministration’ s nuclearpolicy, particularly towardsIndia, is diluted byan emphasis onother economic,political andstrategic goals.In its negotiations with Pakistan and India,moreover, the USemphasis onSouth Asian non-proliferation has been replacedby demandsfor nuclear restraint andrisk avoidance.Mixed signals are thereforeonce again being given to Pakistan andIndia, where policy-makers perceivethat the USAwill tacitly accept their nuclearweapons status in return fora reductionof regional tensions andreciprocal undertakingsof nuclear restraint. Pakistan andIndia’ s nuclearbehaviour, however, provides little evi- denceof either cautionin their bilateral dealings orofa willingness to exercise nuclearrestraint.

Nuclearweapons and regional instability Therelationship betweennuclear weapons and regional instability inSouth Asia is evidentin the developmentsthat havefollowed the May1998 tests. Ayear after the tests Pakistan andIndia fought an undeclared war in the Kargil and Drass sectors ofthe disputedterritory ofKashmir, the Žrst direct military confrontationbetween two nuclear-capable states. Anescalation ofhostilities into anall-out warwith anucleardimension was narrowlyaverted only at the last momentthrough US intercession. Since the late 1980sPakistan had increased its supportfor anti-Indian insurgents inthe disputedterritory of Kashmir.As tensions heightened,sporadic armed clashes occurredalong the Lineof Control ( LOC)dividingthe twosides. This warby proxy was to take on amoreominous dimension in May1999. India’s decision to demonstrate its nuclearweapons capability andPakistan’ s retaliatory responseincreased bilateral suspicions andhostility. Tomolli fy international, particularly US,pressure andto ease the US-ledmultilateral sanctions regime,Pakistani andIndian Prime Ministers, NawazSharif andAtal Bihari Vajpayee,met in the Pakistani city ofLahore in February1999. This formal bidto normalise relations provedshortlived whenPakistan’ s politically dominantmilitary, withthe acquiescenceof its political leadership,opted for a military confrontationwith India. Since 1989Pakistan’ s security managershave intensiŽ ed their proxywar in Kashmir in the belief that Pakistan’s nuclearweapons capability effectively counteredIndia’ s conventionalsuperiority. According to formerPakistani Army Chief,Aslam Beg,‘ Despite havinga massive strength in conventionalarms, Indiadare not attack Pakistan becauseof the fear ofa nuclearstrike that will renderthe vast portionof [its] conventionalarmy ineffective’ . 21 Havingdemon- strated Pakistan’s nuclearweapons capability in1998, the security managers wereeven more convinced that Indiawould be deterredfrom using conventional forceagainst nuclear-capablePakistan. 788 SECURITY DILEMMAS OF NUCLEAR-ARMED PAKISTAN

InMay 1999 the Pakistani military intervenedacross the LOC intoIndian- administered Kashmir.During the Žghting,a senior Pakistan ofŽcial stated, ‘The Indianscannot afford to extend the warto other areas inKashmir, leave aside launchingan attack across the international boundaries’because of the ‘risk of nuclearcon agration’ . 22 InIndian perceptions, however, India’ s conventional superiority was sufŽcient tocounter Pakistan’ s nuclearweapons capability. Thesedivergent perceptions brought both sides tothe brinkof all-out war. AlthoughIndia did not intervene across the LOC, the BJP governmentlaunched amajor military offensiveagainst the Pakistani intruders,signalling its intention toescalate the Žghtingthrough a massive buildupof troops along the LOC and the international border.Both sides also resorted to coercivenuclear diplomacy, issuing implicit andexplicit nuclearthreats. 23 Asthe Žghtingthreatened to spiral outof control, the USAinterceded.Pakistan was told to withdrawits personnel andsupporters from Indian-administered Kashmir. When it was approachedby ahard-pressedPakistani government,the Clinton administration also actively mediated tobring the Žghtingto a close, narrowlyaverting the outbreakof an all-out warthat couldhave assumed anucleardimension.

Pakistan’s nuclear directions TheKargil conict andthe resultant increase in bilateral tensions havestrength- enedthe bargainingposition of hardliners within India’s nucleardecision- makingapparatus. US policydirections havealso tilted India’s cost – beneŽ t analysis in favourof nuclear deployment. In its negotiations with the BJP government,the USAcalls fornuclear restraint in the hopeof preventing an open-endednuclear and missile arms race inSouth Asia. Toappease Indian hardliners,the USAdoesnot demand either aroll-backor the elimination of India’s nuclearweapons capability. 24 Since the conciliatory USstance is inter- pretedas atacit acceptanceof India’ s nuclearweapons status, it strengthens the BJP government’s resolve todeploy nuclear weapons. 25 Indiais well awarethat achievingthis posturewithout incurring unbearable economicand military costs requires aninternational, particularly aUS,accept- anceof the deploymentof nuclear weapons in SouthAsia. Totest the inter- national responseto apotential Indiandeployment a draft nucleardoctrine was issued on19 August 1999, on governmental directives, byan advisory body to India’s National Security Council.Recommending the assembly anddeployment ofnuclear weapons and their deliverysystems, the draftnucleardoctrine envisages anucleartriad in whichnuclear weapons would be delivered by aircraft, bysubmarines andby land-basedmobile missiles. 26 The BJP government emphasises that the proposeddoctrine has yet to becomeofŽ cial policy.Indian policymakers hopeto persuade the USAtoaccept the deploymentof nuclear weaponsin South Asia as inevitable. LikeIndia, Pakistan also refuses to abandonits nuclearweapons capability. Pakistan has,however, yet to declare its intention to deploynuclear weapons andtheir deliverysystems. Pakistan has anumberof nuclear options to choose from.It couldopt f oran ambitious programmeof full-scale weaponisation anddeployment; it couldadopt a morecautious approach,developing and 789 SAMINA AHMED assembling nuclearweapons and their deliverysystems butrefraining from deployment;or it couldopt for the nuclearstatus quo,ie the developmentof nuclearweapons and their deliverysystems, withoutproceeding further down the roadto assembly anddeployment. Given its present constraints, political, economicand technological, the most desirable posturefor Pakistan is the continueddevelopment of nuclear weapons and their deliverysystems underthe garbof ambiguity. Steps towardsassembly couldthen be taken over time with the developmentor acquisition ofthe necessary technologicaltools andcom- mandand control mechanisms. Giventhe reactive natureof its nuclearweapons programme, Pakistan’ s nucleardirections will bedetermined by India’ s nuclearchoices. According to asenior Pakistani ofŽcial, Pakistan wouldbe ‘ satisŽed with non-weaponizedor non-operationaldeterrence, if Indiawere to agree to this. But if India“ escalates” the nuclearladder, Pakistan will becompelled to take the necessary steps to preservethe credibility ofits nucleardeterrence’ . 27 ThePakistani military regime is closely followingthe ongoingUS – Indianuclear dialogue to assess the US responseto India’s declaredintention to deploynuclear weapons and their deliverysystems. Shouldthe USAtacitly accept the presenceof operation-ready nuclearweapons in India,Islamabad will inevitably optfor nuclear deployment. Animpending nuclear arms race in SouthAsia will thenbecome a reality, withgrave implications forregional stability andsecurity. Operation-ready nuclearweapons and hair-trigger postures wouldlower the thresholdfor nuclear use in SouthAsia. Theattention ofthe international community,particularly the USA,should,theref ore,focus on strategies to dissuade the tworivals from deployingnuclear weapons. However, US warningsagainst anuclearand missile race will notaffect SouthAsian nucleardecision-making unless theyare accompaniedby a demonstratedUS resolve to act decisively, bothunilaterally andthrough an international consensusagainst SouthAsian nuclearproliferation. Thereis at present little evidenceof such a resolve.

Pakistanisecurity in anuclear SouthAsia Ultimately Pakistan’s nuclearchoices andhence its security environmentwill be determinedby internal andregional factors, includingits defencedecision-mak- ingprocesses, Pakistan’s relations with Indiaand India’ s nucleardirections. In the internal context,the military highcommand continues to dominatePakistan’ s nucleardecision-making. It is unlikelythat the military’s controlover defence decision-makingwill bechallenged in the foreseeable future.Recent reverses, suchas the Kargil episode,have, in fact, reinforcedthe military’s political dominance.Indeed, representative governmenthas becomethe casualty ofthe Kargil crisis, althoughthe military leadership was primarily responsible forthe ill-judged operation. Pakistan’s failure to sustain its military operationsin Kargil andits uncon- ditional military withdrawalhad resulted inan unprecedentedquestioning of the notionof nuclear deterrence within andwithout parliament. Heavycasualties and misplaced expectations ofvictory also fuelled unrest within the ranksof the military whenPakistan optedunilaterally andunconditionally to withdrawits 790 SECURITY DILEMMAS OF NUCLEAR-ARMED PAKISTAN forces fromacross the LOC.Tocounter internal unrest,Prime Minister Sharif attempted to shift the blame forthe Kargil operationon Army Chief ofStaff GeneralPervez Musharraf . 28 Its corporateinterests threatened,the military high commandclosed ranksbehind Musharraf, ousting the civilian governmentand imposingindeŽ nite military rule. Undermilitary rule,Pakistan’ s nuclearpolicy will beprimarily determinedby the highcommand’ s mistrust ofIndia and the military’s propensityto react to India’s nuclearambitions. Pakistan’s relations with Indiahave seriously deterio- rated after the military takeover,since Musharrafand his fellow commandersare seen as the main instigators ofthe Kargil conict. As aresult, there is no diplomatic communicationbetween the twonuclear-capable states. Giventhe presenceof hard-line regimes inboth states, bilateral tensions couldquite conceivablyresult in anoutbreak of con ict. Shoulda conventionalwar occur, aninadvertent,accidental orevenpre-emptive use ofnuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. Eachstep alongthe nuclearladder in SouthAsia, suchas anIndian decision tooperationalise its nucleararsenal anda retaliatory Pakistani responsewill furtherfuel bilateral suspicions, while divergentIndian and Pakistani views on the utility androles ofnuclear weapons will lowerthe thresholdfor nuclear use betweenthe twogeographically contiguous and con ict-prone states. Indian policymakers, for instance, express the belief that alimited conventionalcon ict in SouthAsia is possible despite the presenceof nuclear weapons. 29 For their part,Pakistani policymakers express awillingness to use nuclearweapons i f Pakistan’s territorial integrity is at stake, aŽrst-strike posturethat could encourageIndia to pre-emptthe pre-empter. 30 Inthe nearf uture,Pakistani andIndian perceptions of the utility ofnuclear weaponsas sources ofsecurity andprestige will affect howtheir policymakers shapetheir nuclearpolicies. Inthe Pakistani context,it is, however,increasingly evidentthat abelief in the deterrent valueof nuclear weapons has little basis in reality. TheKargil episodeof May – July 1999conclusively proved that the presenceof nuclear weapons is noguarantee against anIndian conventional attack. Giventhe existing nuclearasymmetry in SouthAsia, acontinued dependenceon nuclear weapons as alast resort against external aggressioncould result in the annihilation ofthe Pakistani state. Since this asymmetry is likely to growin the future,Pakistan has also rendereditsel fvulnerableto potential Indianblackmail at atime whenit is externally isolated as aresult of interventionist policies in Kashmir whichare againbased on a misplaced belief in the deterrent valueof nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s security managershave also underminedPakistan’ s internal secur- ity bytheir nuclearchoices. The decision to optf ora declarednuclear weapons policyin May 1998 resulted in sanctions, weakeningthe Pakistani economyand in turnheightening internal tensions. Since democratic governancehas also becomethe casualty ofinterventionist policies basedon the nuclearmispercep- tions ofPakistan’ s security managers,these internal schisms are likely to grow, threateningthe stability ofa weakstate. Pakistan will remain hostageto its nuclearweapons policy until suchtime asits policymakers realise that the best wayto ensurenational security is to abandonan untenable nuclear competition 791 SAMINA AHMED with India.Pakistan couldthen bargain with the international communityfor the kindsof assistance— economic and technological— that wouldbe best suited to advancethe security ofthe state andits citizens.

Notes 1 MECarranza, ‘Animpossible game: stable nucleardeterrence after theIndian and Pakistani tests’ , The NonproliferationReview ,6(3),1999, p 12. 2 Rejectinginternal criticism thatPakistan is internationallyisolated as aresultof its regional policies, Pakistan’s militaryruler, General Pervez Musharrafsays: ‘Nobodycan ignorea nuclearstate witha populationof 140 million. We [need]to play our cards right’. MZiauddin,‘ CEhintsat meetingpoliticians soon:but corrupt to be kept away’ , Dawn,26May 2000. 3 ForeignMinister Abdul Sattar, for instance, calls uponthe international community to appreciate and supportPakistan’ s proposalsfor a SouthAsian ‘strategic nuclearrestraint regime’ . Hasan Akhtar,‘ Discrimi- nationopposed: Pakistan to retain nuclear deterrence’ , Dawn,24May 2000. 4 Pakistanand India were onthe brink of war in1986 – 87,1990 and 1999. 5 See SAhmed,‘ Pakistan’s nuclearweapons program: turning point and nuclear choices’ , International Security,26(4),1999, pp 183 –184. 6 TheUSA failedto persuade France andthe UK toimpose sanctions, which were alsoopposed by Russia. 7 Followingthe May tests, thehead of Pakistan’ s uraniumenrichment laboratories, Dr AbdulQadeer Khan, notedthat Pakistan could now be ‘ countedamong the only seven countries of the globe having a nuclear capability’. ‘Nuclear blastshave added to country’ s pride:Qadeer’ , Dawn 1January1999. 8 Aformer militaryofŽ cial disclosesthat the high command put ‘ pressure onthe government to let India know,in no uncertain terms, thatPakistan also possessed weapons of mass destruction’. LtGen (retd)K Matinuddin,‘ Nuclearizationof South Asia: implicationsand prospects’ , Spotlighton Regional Issues , 17 (7– 8),1998, pp 33 –34. 9 SAhmed,‘ Thenuclear debate’ , Newsline,June1998, pp 191 –192. 10 MECarranza, ‘RethinkingIndo-Pakistani nuclear relations: condemned to nuclear confrontation?’ Asian Survey,26(6), 1996, p 572. 11 TGraham, Jr,‘ Sanctions:hang tough’ , Bulletinof the Atomic Scientists 54(5),1998, pp 24 – 25. 12 Carranza, ‘RethinkingIndo-Pakistani nuclear relations’ , p567. 13 USintelligencesources disclosethat Chinese nuclear assistance toPakistan included nuclear materials, reactor andenrichment technology and nuclear-capable ballisticmissiles. DAlbright,F Berkhout& W Walker, Plutoniumand Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies , New York: SIPRI/OxfordUniversity Press, 1997,pp 166 – 167. 14 Thetest site hadalready been prepared in 1996 after reportsthat India intended to conduct tests in1995. ZahidHussain, ‘ Layingthe groundwork’ , Newsline,June1998 p 24.See alsoD Albright,‘ Pakistan:the othershoe drops’ , Bulletinof the Atomic Scientists ,54(4),1998, p 24. 15 Dr AQKhanstates thata decisionwas takento detonate ‘ ourown nuclear devise the very day India staged itssecond nuclear test’ , butdelayed until the government Ž rst ascertained theinternational reaction to the Indianexplosion. ‘ PMhaddecided to detonate nuclear devise on May 9, Dr Khan’, Dawn,16February 1999. 16 Inthe 1980s the USA waivedits Pakistan-speciŽ c non-proliferationlegislation on Ž veconsecutive occasions,despite its knowledge that Pakistan was aviolator.M Reiss, ‘Safeguardingthe nuclear peace in SouthAsia’ , AsianSurvey ,38(12), 1993, p 1110. 17 TheBrown amendment allowedthe delivery of a packageof weapons and military hardware toPakistanand the Harkin– Warner amendment restoredsupport for US companiesoperating in Pakistan under the Overseas PrivateInvestment Corporation. 18 InformationMinister Mushahid Hussain claimed thatUS incentivesincluded $3 billion in economic assistance. 19 AStatutoryRegulatory Order was issuedto control the export of nuclear technology or nuclearsubstances. Ansar Abbasi,‘ Pakistanputs curbs on export of nuclear material’ , Dawn,11March 1999. 20 Pakistan’s debtwas rescheduleduntil January 2001 but the disbursement of additional funding from internationalŽ nancialinstitutions ( IFIs) suchas the IMF andthe Asian DevelopmentBank is stillbeing negotiated. 21 Quotedin P Hoodbhoy,‘ Pakistan’s nuclearfuture’ , inS Ahmed& Cortright(eds), Pakistanand the Bomb: PublicOpinon and Nuclear Options ,NotreDame, IN: Universityof Notre Dame Press, 1998,p 78. 22 Quotedin Z Hussain,‘ Onthe brink’ , Newsline,June1999, pp 24 – 25. 792 SECURITY DILEMMAS OF NUCLEAR-ARMED PAKISTAN

23 PakistaniForeign Secretary ShamshadAhmad warned India, ‘ We willnot hesitate touse anyweapons in ourarsenal todefend our territorial integrity’ . Quotedin News Desk,‘ Pakistanmay use anyweapon’ , The News,31May, 1999. 24 USnegotiator,Deputy Secretary ofState StrobeTalbott states: ‘HavingIndia and Pakistan stabilize their nuclearcompetition at thelowest level is boththe starting point and the near term objectiveof US diplomaticefforts’ . STalbott,‘ Dealingwith the bomb in South Asia’ , ForeignPolicy ,78,1999, pp 111, 119. 25 As aresultof his discussions with Talbott, claims IndianForeign Minister Jaswant Singh,the USA recognises‘ thatIndia shall maintain a minimumnuclear deterrent as determinedby us. There is nolonger anytalk of a “rollback”’. InterviewWith Jaswant Singh, The Hindu,29November 1999. 26 Statesman News Service,‘ N-buttonin PM’ shands’, Statesman,18August 1999. 27 ‘USurgedto set uprational security architecture,’ Dawn,1June2000. 28 ZHussain,‘ Beatinga hastyretreat’ , Newsline,July1999, p 23. 29 In the India–Pakistancontext, states IndianArmy Chief,V PMalik,‘ Havingcrossed thenuclear threshold doesnot mean thata conventionalwar is out… nucleardeterrence onlyrestricts all outwar’ . Quotedin ‘Army chief fears risingtension on China’ s borders’, Asian Age,11February 1999. 30 Accordingto Pakistan’ s militaryruler, General Musharraf,Pakistan would ‘ never’use nuclearweapons unlessit was attacked,adding that: ‘ We are notIraq … Nothreat can gounanswered’ . ShaheenSehbai, ‘Musharrafmay visitKabul for talks on Osama’ , Dawn,5February2000.

Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations

EDITORS John L. Esposito, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA David Thomas, University of Birmingham, UK

Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations (ICMR) is edited jointly by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian Muslim Relations (CSIC), Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, UK, now part of the University of Birmingham, and the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA ICMR provides a forum for all those who wish to enhance their critical appreciation of the two religious traditions on historical empirical, and on ideological theoretical levels. The Editors welcome scholarly contributions concerning Islam in its relations with other groups and ideologies, past and present, as well as on Christian-Muslim relations worldwide. Articles are also welcomed which deal with the role of Islam and the nature of Christian-Muslim relations and analysis of theological, social, political and cultural responses to Muslim interaction with Christian and other societies and cultures, both as minorities and as majorities. This journal is also available online. Please connect to http://www.tandf.co.uk/online.html for further information. SUBSCRIPTION RATES 2000 – Volume 11 (3 issues) Print ISSN 0959-6410 Online ISSN 1469-9311 Institutional rate: US$280; £170 (includes free online access) Personal rate: US$106; £58 (print only)

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