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Managing Proliferation in South Asia: a Case for Assistance to Unsafe Nuclear Arsenals

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Managing Proliferation in South Asia: a Case for Assistance to Unsafe Nuclear Arsenals ROBERT E. REHBEIN Viewpoint Managing Proliferation in South Asia: A Case for Assistance to Unsafe Nuclear Arsenals ROBERT E. REHBEIN Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Rehbein is the Deputy Commander, 694th Intelligence Group, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Lietenant Colonel Rebhein has a B.A. from Cornell University and an M.A. from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. His publications include, “Informing the Blue Helmets: the U.S., UN Peacekeepers, and the Role of Intelligence,” (Martello Papers, No. 16), and “The Japanese-Soviet Far East Trade Relationship,” (Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 1989). The opinions expressed in this viewpoint are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. ver three years ago, the series of nuclear explo- In order to reduce the chances of an inadvertent nuclear sions in South Asia removed any hope that exchange occurring in South Asia, or of elements of the Onuclear weapons (NW) would remain “in the South Asian arsenals being used against others, U.S. closet.” Since then India and Pakistan have gradually de- policymakers should adopt a novel solution to help “man- veloped their respective nuclear systems and plans,1 and age” proliferation in this case. Given the dangers involved, little real progress has been made to reduce the dangers. the U.S. government should transfer selected U.S. nuclear The very real fears that the two newest declared nuclear weapon command and control (C2) systems to India and weapon states could unleash their arsenals over the Kash- Pakistan. The objective would be to transform inherently mir issue were recently joined by deep concerns that Pa- destabilizing nuclear arsenals into forces less likely to be kistani NW could either be seized by rogue fundamentalists fired in anger or error, or transferred to third parties. Ad- in its own military dissatisfied with President Musharraf’s equate, reliable, and time-proven nuclear C2 is required, support of the U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan, or whether the weapons remain largely unmated with deliv- even have been provided outright to the Taliban or the al- ery systems or whether they have at times been mated Qa’ida terrorist network. More plausible is the potential and operationally deployed. The world has lived precari- transfer of NW know-how and/or radioactive materials ously with the former situation for several years and just for a radiological “dirty” bomb by individual Pakistanis2 recently appears to have been faced with the latter. In to remnants of al-Qa’ida3 or others, possibly other states.4 short, the nuclear rubicon has been crossed. These dangers have suddenly transformed the U.S. na- This viewpoint attempts to address questions concern- tional interest from preventing nuclear war in South Asia ing why these countries developed NW, and why it will to halting an attack on its own shores. Given these major be hard to force them to abandon them. Paying special shifts in the strategic environment, the United States must attention to unique challenges in South Asia, it asks explore new proliferation policies that make the most of a whether NW inherently improve stability or not. The over- bad situation. riding questions to tackle are: can nuclear C2 mitigate prob- 92 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002 ROBERT E. REHBEIN lems associated with NW? Where do the shortfalls exist bilities. Still, the same long-term realpolitik factors that in the nuclear C2 arrangements of India and Pakistan? drove India to nuclearization are also relevant in the case This study will look at these issues with a view to recom- of Pakistan. Pakistan feared its larger neighbor (India) and mending where the United States should lend assistance. believed its superpower patron (the United States) to be Despite constraints on such support, the long-term neces- notoriously unreliable.12 Unlike India, however, Pakistan sity of preventing unauthorized weapons/material trans- also tied and has continued to press—however heavy- fer or a nuclear exchange via “managed” proliferation handedly—the linkage between its nuclear program and outweighs the barriers to protecting a principled “zero- the seemingly ineluctable Kashmir issue.13 For Pakistan, proliferation” stand. The United States must, in the words its NW program is also ostensibly a bargaining chip to be of one commentary, “delink issues of nuclear safety from used to resolve the Kashmir issue, a tactic that is fraught nuclear proliferation…[and] redefine the nonproliferation with danger and miscalculation. 5 regime in a more realistic manner.” In other words, the roots of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs run very deep. In the words of one ana- THE RATIONALE FOR DEVELOPING NUCLEAR lyst, “India and Pakistan…are as unlikely to give them ARSENALS [nuclear weapons] up as were Washington and Moscow As much as there have been controversy and specula- at the height of the Cold War.”14 Furthermore the same tion regarding the nuclear test results in 1998,6 so too are factors that motivated India and Pakistan to develop NW there disputes about whether the NW of South Asia are are pressuring them to expand and deploy them. As a re- normally deployed or disassembled.7 There is disagree- sult, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to force either ment as to the precise numbers and types of current/pro- country to disable or destroy its nuclear arsenal. Even if jected warheads and delivery vehicles, and what the costs the root causes for developing their NW disappear, the would be for a projected nuclear arsenal.8 It is not sur- weapon program itself continues to generate powerful prising to find that there is also disagreement as to why bureaucratic and public advocacy for its continued exist- the two countries developed NW to begin with. Yet, de- ence.15 The world is thus faced with NW in both India spite this dispute, in many respects India and Pakistan share and Pakistan for the foreseeable future, a situation that many of the same deep-seated insecurity concerns that led former U.S. President Bill Clinton to call South Asia gave birth to their nuclear weapon programs. “the most dangerous place on earth.”16 While short-term domestic factors in India, such as the weak coalition government and a desire to appease the NUCLEAR WEAPONS, GREATER STABILITY: nuclear scientific-technical cabal,9 may have forced New EXTRAPOLATING THE COLD WAR ONTO Delhi’s hand in performing the 1998 tests, these explana- SOUTH ASIA tions alone are insufficient to explain why India developed Of course, many analysts counter that such a provoca- NW in the first place. While some argue that the country’s tive claim is more hype than reality. They argue that now nuclear program served “as the vehicle of national self that both countries have come “out of the nuclear closet,” expression…[and] the goals of national identity construc- there is improved stability between India and Pakistan. tion,”10 several long-term geopolitical factors were also After all, did not the nuclear stalemate between the United at play. India has long held a genuine fear of the Chinese States and the Soviet Union produce greater stability in military threat, and Beijing’s support of Islamabad’s their relations? Does not the “long peace” of the Cold nuclear and missile programs intensified this concern. War prove that NW engender sufficient caution in what Doubts concerning the extent of its superpower patron’s would otherwise have been a hot and deadly conflict be- security guarantee during the Soviet era, and the later col- tween the superpowers? From this point of view, if nuclear lapse of the Soviet Union, exacerbated India’s unease. deterrence worked for the much more massive arsenals Finally, the leaders in New Delhi were motivated by a of the United States and Soviet Union, it might also work desire for prestige and respect in the international com- for the much smaller arsenals of India and Pakistan. 11 munity. Kenneth Waltz, the leading proponent of such think- If India’s rationale for developing a nuclear arsenal is ing, has argued that “the gradual spread of NW is more to complex, Pakistan’s impetus appears to be simple: a cost- be welcomed than feared.”17 Many observers of South effective reaction to India’s overwhelming military capa- Asia have taken up Waltz’s position, arguing that the The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2002 93 ROBERT E. REHBEIN nuclear programs force India and Pakistan to adopt a more pressures of an inadvertent launch or an overly provoca- cautious, less bellicose approach toward each other. In tive launch on warning posture.23 In contrast to the some- their view, the possibility of large-scale, deliberate con- what controlled superpower stand-off, the Indo-Pakistani ventional conflict between the two states has lessened situation is more akin to a prolonged Cuban missile crisis. considerably, and “nuclear deterrence ultimately com- In South Asia, the crisis atmosphere and risks of miscal- pelled restraint, de-escalation, and disengagement on both culation “would be permanent rather than temporary, sides.”18 Some analysts even suggest that an inadvertent would occur without adequate command, control, com- or accidental war arising over Kashmir is now highly im- munications, and intelligence (C3I) in place, and with po- probable.19 litical leaderships located less than five minutes from 24 However, such an optimistic faith in nuclear deterrence mutual Armageddon.” For India and Pakistan, NW might does not bear strong scrutiny. True, there was never any have bought strategic stability, but at the cost of crisis sta- nuclear exchange between the United States and the So- bility.
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