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Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, Edited by Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson

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Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, Edited by Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson DETERRENCE STABILITY AND ESCALATION CONTROL IN SOUTH ASIA Edited by Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson © 2013 The Stimson Center All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent from the Stimson Center. ISBN: 978-1-939240-06-4 Stimson 1111 19th Street, NW, 12th Floor Washington, DC 20036 Tel: 202.223.5956 | Fax: 202.238.9604 www.stimson.org Contents Preface 5 Key Terms and Acronyms 7 Introduction 9 Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, Stimson Center The Non-unitary Model and Deterrence Stability in South Asia 21 George Perkovich, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability 41 Michael Krepon, Stimson Center The US Experience With Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia 65 David O. Smith, independent consultant Doctrine, Capabilities, and (In)Stability in South Asia 93 Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Prospects for Limited War and Nuclear Use in South Asia 107 Neil Joeck, University of California, Berkeley Missile Proliferation and Deterrence Stability in South Asia 123 Dinshaw Mistry, University of Cincinnati, Ohio Deterrence Stability and the Conventional Balance of Forces in South Asia 135 Christopher Clary, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Strategic Restraint Regime 2.0 161 Feroz Hassan Khan, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey The Yin and Yang of Strategic Transparency: Tools to Improve Nuclear Stability and Deterrence in South Asia 175 Zachary S. Davis, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Beyond Incrementalism: Rethinking Approaches to CBMs and Stability in South Asia 187 Toby Dalton, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Contributors 209 Preface | 5 Preface I am pleased to present the latest publication of the Stimson Center’s South Asia pro- gram: Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia, edited by Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson. Since 1991, the Stimson Center has examined the threat of conflict in South Asia, ways to seek normal relations between India and Pakistan, and means to reduce nuclear risks. Stimson’s South Asia program includes prescriptive analysis, fieldwork, outreach to decision-makers and civil society, Washington meet- ings, workshops within the region cosponsored by local partners, Visiting Fellowships, and initiatives geared to a rising generation of strategic analysts in India and Pakistan. This fall, Stimson launched a new website — South Asian Voices: Generation Why (www.southasianvoices.org) to empower a rising generation of strategic analysts and to facilitate cross-border dialogue, which has been hindered by the denial of visas. During the past year, Stimson has convened workshops where the authors in this volume have presented their work in progress. Feedback from these workshops and from project advisors is reflected in this collection. Stimson plans an additional vol- ume with essays from new workshops and authors a year from now. I wish to express gratitude to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the National Nuclear Security Administration for their support of Stimson’s programming on nuclear issues in South Asia. The editors also wish to thank Stimson’s Communications team — David Egner, Rich Robinson and Lita Ledesma — copy editor Karla Daly, and intern Dylan Rebstock for their production support. Sincerely, Ellen Laipson President and CEO, Stimson Center Key Terms and Acronyms | 7 Key Terms and Acronyms ATGM Anti-tank guided missile CBM Confidence-Building Measure CENTCOM Central Command CIA Central Intelligence Agency DCM Deputy Chief of Mission DGMO Director General of Military Operations DOD Department of Defense DRDO Defense Research and Development Organization FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas IM Indian Mujahideen ISI Inter-Services Intelligence JeM Jaish-e-Mohammad JTEs Joint transparency exercises LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba LoC Line of Control MAD Mutually Assured Destruction MoU Memorandum of Understanding NCTC National Center for Counterterrorism NGO Non-governmental organization NPT Nonproliferation Treaty NRRM Nuclear Risk Reduction Measure NSC National Security Council RSO Regional Security Office SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SPD Strategic Plans Division (Pakistan) SRBM Short-range ballistic missile TTP Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UNSC United Nations Security Council Introduction | 9 Introduction Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson When India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998, their governments offered as- surances that they would seek minimum, credible nuclear deterrents. With the passage of time, their definitions of “minimum” have evolved. Powerful domestic constituen- cies and institutions in Pakistan and India have developed, tested and inducted more types of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles than are now possessed by the United States. There is no evidence, as yet, that this competition is slackening. Even though the nuclear competition on the Subcontinent pales by comparison to the superpower competition, it is nonetheless dangerous. The primary dangers do not relate to a lack of professionalism on the part of those responsible for nuclear steward- ship. Instead, escalatory dangers are rooted in the absence of normal relations between nuclear-armed neighbors, the presence of spoilers who seek to disrupt more normal relations, and the potential for incidents that could lead to renewed conflict. The United States and the Soviet Union did not have to concern themselves with domestic and cross-border threats to deterrence stability. Pakistan and India do. New challenges to stability are rising. Governance in Pakistan continues to be in decline. Water is becoming an increasingly scarce, and perhaps contested, commodity. Crises may be prompted by disaffected Indian Muslims who seek to settle domestic scores by violent means, actions that may be hard to distinguish from Pakistan-based spoilers. The introduction of short-range delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, the utility of which depends on their proximity to battlefields, leaves much to chance. Some pathways to conflict, such as premeditated, large-scale conventional warfare, as might have been contemplated in 1987, and as was the case in 1965 and 1971, now seem unlikely because of offsetting nuclear capabilities. Fears of preemptive nuclear strikes, like those plaguing Washington and Moscow during the Cold War, seem even more improbable on the Subcontinent. Instead, the most likely scenario for conflict in this region continues to arise from escalation sparked by spectacular acts of violence on Indian soil by individuals trained and based in Pakistan. This scenario has confronted decision-makers on two prior occasions — the “Twin Peaks” crisis sparked by an attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 followed by an at- tack on the dependents of troops deployed on the front lines in 2002, and after multi- ple attacks on iconic targets in Mumbai in 2008. On these occasions, spectacular acts of terrorism did not lead inexorably to war. Neither did a limited war, fought in the heights above Kargil in 1999, lead to uncontrolled escalation. In these three instanc- es, national leaders acted responsibly, outsiders played constructive roles to defuse tensions, and escalatory pressures were deflated. This may hold true in the future, as well. But there can be no assurance of the absence of another triggering event. Nor can there be assurance that Indian and Pakistani leaders will react in the same way in the future as in the past. Indeed, there is good reason to assume that there will be another crisis-triggering event, whether relations between Pakistan and India remain poor or, perhaps more likely, if national leaders seek improved ties. 10 | Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia A great many in Pakistan see the wisdom of avoiding a repeat of the Twin Peaks crisis and the Mumbai attacks. After these crises subsided, India rebounded, while Pakistan’s image and economy suffered deeply, and foreign direct investment dried up. It is, nonetheless, hard to translate this recognition into concerted actions against extremist groups. Pakistan’s army is heavily engaged in fighting some of these groups along the Afghan border. Pakistan already suffers more internal violence than any other state not in the throes of a civil war, with the sole exception of Iraq. To take on extremist groups that carry out attacks against India would entail even tougher challenges for Pakistan’s security forces and much higher potential casualties — not on the periphery of the state, but in its heartland. Pakistan’s national leaders hope that extremist groups will turn away from violence and be reintegrated within their society. But hope is not a game plan for dealing with the perpetrators of violence directed against India — or, indeed, against Pakistan itself. As long as Pakistan’s decision-mak- ers are unable or unwilling to move against extremist groups, the potential for another crisis remains, along with the potential for uncontrolled escalation. To complicate matters further, India’s national leaders do not appear to have a game plan for trying to improve relations with Pakistan. If they do, very little effort is being expended toward this goal. Ambition has been displaced by ennui. Indian leaders have had good reason to conclude that Pakistan’s political leaders do not have the power or inclination
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