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Contents Introduction

I

STRATEGIC VISIONS FOR EAST ASIA Toward Greater U.S.-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue and Coordination

Mike Green

Arc of Freedom and Prosperity

Heigo Sato

India’s Strategic Vision

Suba Chandran
II

THE RISE OF CHINA Dealing with a Rising Power: India-China Relations and the Reconstruction of Strategic Partnerships

Alka Acharya

The Prospect of China Up to 2020: A View from Japan

Yasuhiro Matsuda

The United States and a Rising China

Derek Mitchell
III

NONPROLIFERATION Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime in the Era of Nuclear Renaissance: A Common Agenda for Japan, the United States, and India

Nobumasa Akiyama

Global Nonproliferation Dynamics: An Indian Perspective

Lawrence Prabhakar

Nonproliferation Players and their Policies

Jon Wolfstal
IV

ENERGY SECURITY Trends in Energy Security

Mikkal Herberg
1

Japan’s Energy Security Policy

Manabu Miyagawa

India’s Energy Security

Chietigj Bajpaee
V

ECONOMIC CONVERGENCE A U.S. Perspective of Economic Convergence in East Asia

Krishen Mehta

New Open Regionalism? Current Trends and Perspectives in the Asia-Pacific

Fukunari Kimura
VI

SOUTHEAST ASIA U.S. Perspectives on Southeast Asia: Opportunities for a Rethink

Ben Dolven

Southeast Asia: A New Regional Order

Nobuto Yamamoto

India’s Role in Southeast Asia: The Logic and Limits of Cooperation with the United States and Japan

Sadanand Dhume
VII

COUNTER-TERRORISM Japan’s Counterterrorism Policy

Naofumi Miyasaka

Counterterrorism Cooperation with the United States and Japan: An Indian Perspective

Manjeet Singh Pardesi

VIII MARITIME SECURITY
Northeast Asia Security Environment: Moving Toward a New Reality

Mike McDevitt

Trilateral Maritime Security Partnership for Broad Maritime Security Coalition

Hideaki Kaneda

The Maritime Interests of the United States, India, and Japan

Raja Menon
2
IX

HUMAN RIGHT & DEMOCRACY PROMOTION Japan’s Approach toward Value-Oriented Diplomacy

Ikuko Togo

Human Rights and Democracy in India’s Emerging Role in Asia

Maya Chadda
X

CONCLUSION The Way Forward in U.S.-Japan-India Relations

Derek Mitchell Appendix A: Conference Agendas Appendix B: Conference Summaries
Washington, DC Tokyo

Appendix C: Participants Appendix D: About the Contributors

3

Introduction

The conclusion in October 2008 of the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement and a formal security agreement between Japan and India have been touted as turning points in respective bilateral relations. When joined with the long-standing U.S.-Japan alliance, many have suggested these building blocks may form the basis for greater trilateral cooperation and interaction in coming years on a host of international issues of common interest.

Indeed, the gradual breakdown in traditional notions of “Asia” in recent years has been noticeable, as India has entered the strategic discussion in East Asia increasingly, while the United States and Japan (and China) have become factors for consideration in South Asia. It was in this spirit that the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in partnership with the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA), hosted closed conferences in Washington, DC, and Tokyo, Japan, in June 2007 and February 2008, respectively, to facilitate discussion among a younger generation of U.S., Japanese, and Indian foreign policy experts and practitioners. The idea was to bring a fresh perspective to the issues at hand, and to broaden the network of those within the U.S., Japanese, and Indian elite who may recognize the new possibilities of trilateral relations. In total, the two two-day meetings combined to address nine topics. The first meeting examined the respective strategic visions of each country, and national perspectives on the rise of China, nonproliferation, and energy security. The second meeting discussed potential economic convergence, Southeast Asia, counterterrorism, maritime security, and the role of values (human rights and democracy) in respective foreign policies.

4
The papers collected in this volume are final versions of those presented for discussion at the two conferences. Together, they provide a snapshot of thinking among leading policy practitioners and scholars in Japan, India and the United States about potential trilateral collaboration and vision for future cooperation.

----------
The volume opens with an examination of the overall strategic vision of each nation. Heigo Sato comments that as the strategic environment changes in Northeast Asia, Japan must assess its capabilities to create specific approaches and priorities in order to bolster its foreign policy. He cites the expansion of Japan’s conventional definition of defense as evidence that Japan is gradually moving in this direction.

Suba Chandran follows with a paper contending that India’s strategic objective is to join a concert of powers through a series of strategic partnerships, while maintaining a peaceful periphery. He notes India’s hesitancy to promote values, including democracy, in its foreign policy due to its need for general stability to promote economic growth. He concludes that India can take a leading role in combating transnational issues such as terrorism, nonproliferation, and environmental threats.

5
U.S. strategy, according to CSIS’s Michael Green, includes developing new concerts of power to handle global and regional problems. Green notes that the United States welcomes increased Japanese and Indian leadership in the international system, and that from the U.S. perspective, trilateral engagement can help shape a responsible China, protect sea lines of communication (SLOCs), increase economic ties, and enhance the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Chapter two addresses the three nations’ perspective on China’s emergence. Japan, according to Yasuhiro Matsuda, sees China as focusing on economic development and opportunistic to maximize openings as they come to expand its influence over time. He notes that it remains to be seen if China will sign onto existing institutions and norms or if it will pursue new avenues of cooperation.

Alka Archarya contends that India’s policy toward China remains entrenched in historical clashes between the two nations. India’s chief concern, she alleges, is China’s alleged “string of pearls” naval access strategy, which plants China’s military firmly in its neighborhood. She suggests that India’s best option to compete with China in its neighborhood is to help resolve problems in its backyard and to improve its relations with neighbors.

Derek Mitchell argues that the “containment vs engagement” debate in the United States, if it ever really existed has now settled into an essential U.S. consensus on engagement, with debates now over how to engage in ways that protect U.S. interests given the immense complexity of U.S. perspectives and policy toward China. He notes that an opportunity exists for the United States, Japan, and India to coordinate and cooperate more to ensure that China’s rise in the

6international and regional security affairs serves their common interest. He suggests the United States and others need to consider ways to ensure China further integrates itself and invests in the international system according to established -- and perhaps new -- international norms and institutions.

Chapter three discusses respective views on the issue of nonproliferation. Though it has rejected accession to international nonproliferation treaties, Lawrence Prabhakar says India has aided the nonproliferation regime by securing its nuclear materials and technology. He concludes that India is increasingly adopting international norms in handling its nuclear arsenal, but that it will maintain its assertive posture given its nuclear neighborhood.

According to Nobumasa Akiyama, energy security and environmental concerns are leading to a “nuclear [energy] renaissance” in the world, greatly increasing the risk of nuclear proliferation for non-peaceful means. He concludes that to assuage this risk, the United States, Japan, and India should strengthen current norms and mechanisms to safeguard against clandestine nuclear programs while creating new vehicles that promote global interest in nonproliferation. Jon Wolfsthal writes that while the three countries differ on nonproliferation policy, at a minimum they could cooperate on technical aspects of maintaining and securing nuclear materials. He speculates that such cooperation could aid in developing closer relationships and lead to a more coordinated approach on nonproliferation and disarmament more broadly.

Chapter four discusses energy security, an area of significant opportunity for cooperation between the three sides (among others). Manabu Miyagawa describes Japan’s energy security

7policy, and notes that stability in the Middle East and establishing an international set of norms regarding energy through the International Energy Association (IEA) remain its primary goals.

In his paper, Mikkal Herberg argues that increasing competition in global oil and gas markets must be turned into a source of cooperation. He contends that strategic dialogues, cooperation on energy efficiency, and clean coal technology transfers at the bilateral, regional, and global levels are essential while noting that ultimately each nation must make a commitment to reduce its own demand for oil.

Chietigj Bajpaee writes that India is facing enormous challenges when it comes to energy and energy security. He observes that India imports 70 percent of its oil, relies heavily on unclean technology, and routinely faces steep competition from China for energy supplies. In addition to plans to expand its nuclear capability, he recommends that India attempt to enter cooperative bids with China to develop oil fields and import clean coal technology to meet its energy needs .

Chapter five explores potential economic convergence among India, the United States, and Japan. Noting that Japan, China, and Korea have not been able to establish FTAs with each other, Fukunari Kimura suggests that the United States engage the Asia-Pacific to pursue comprehensive FTAs, which ultimately will lead to a domino effect expediting economic integration in the region. On a micro-economic level, Krishen Mehta argues that the United States, India, and Japan should seek mutually beneficial public-private partnerships that will continue to promote Asia as an engine of economic growth even in light of economic downturns in the West.

8
In chapter six, Ben Dolven counters perceptions of U.S. laxity in Southeast Asia, outlining the number and depth of U.S. bilateral relationships in the region. He urges the United States and Japan not to view China’s engagement with the region negatively and to instead use it as an opportunity for deeper cooperation.

Sadanand Dhume contends that India’s democratic, pluralistic society and booming entertainment industry has expanded its soft power in Southeast Asia, but encourages the United States and Japan to aid India in improving its infrastructure, literacy rate, and poverty alleviation in order to make it a true model for Southeast Asia.

Nobuto Yamamoto outlines the realities of regional economic engagement, with a focus on the United States, Japan, and China, and observes that a general policy of hedging and balancing by regional states would increase predictability and overall regional stability.

Chapter seven describes India and Japan’s counterterrorism strategies and potential for cooperation with the United States. Manjeet Pardesi outlines India’s history of combating terrorism within its borders and along its periphery, and of its enhanced cooperation with the United States post-9/11. He suggests technology tranfers in areas such as port security and aviation to better coordinate trilateral cooperation.

Naofumi Miyasaka describes Japan nascent domestic and international counterterrorism strategy, noting that its tight immigration policy and border security ensures that its vulnerability to

9international terrorism is low. He nonetheless recommends that Japan increase its international law enforcement assistance to help monitor developments abroad.

Chapter eight highlights the issue of maritime security. Raja Menon notes that the Indian Ocean is home to more piracy than the rest of the world combined, and suggests that since richer nations are able to unilaterally protect their interests, they should provide maritime security in the Indian Ocean as a public good. Hideaki Kaneda recommends that the U.S.-Japan alliance form the backbone of a Maritime Security Coalition with India to address rising conventional and nonconventional regional challenges. Michael McDevitt looks at the geopolitical implications of China’s growing navy and submarine fleet, and while he concludes that China’s modernizing fleet is not seeking to supplant the United States, he recommends that the U.S. and its regional partners should begin to adapt now to maintain maritime superiority.

Chapter nine discusses the role of values, particularly human rights and democracy promotion, in Japanese and Indian diplomacy. Ikuko Togo notes Japan’s interest in promoting democracy, but adds that the concept of individual human rights is still developing in Japan and that its bureaucratic system does not allow for enough flexibility to evaluate situations on a case-by-case basis.

Maya Chadda writes about India’s nascent discussion about promoting universal values, but contends that India is skeptical of international human rights regimes and remains ambivalent about the promotion of human rights and democracy in its foreign relations.

10
Finally, Derek Mitchell concludes the volume with overarching observations about trilateral relations, and urges policymakers in all three countries to consider a host of initiatives over time that may lead to deeper and broader cooperation. He notes, however, that to do so will require some changes in mind-set in each capital concerning their respective international orientations, and in their perception of potential opportunities offered by a coordinated trilateral relationship.

Like the conferences on which these papers were based, it is our hope that this volume will cross the artificial East Asian and South Asian elite divide to promote greater understanding of perspectives in, and potential cooperation between, the United States, Japan and India on key issues of mutual interest.

11
Strategic Visions for East Asia

Towards Greater U.S.-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue and Coordination

Michael J. Green Introduction The United States, Japan, and India have set robust bilateral agendas at a time when leadership is desperately needed to face numerous economic and security challenges. With common values and a shared commitment to democracy and pro-active diplomacy both in Asia and around the world, these three nations should come together to develop a trilateral policy agenda for the near and long term.
The U.S.-Japan alliance has never been stronger, and the U.S.-India relationship has been transformed with the new Strategic Partnership, whether the U.S.-India nuclear deal is approved by the Congress and the Indian government this year or not. The possibilities for greater economic and strategic cooperation between Japan and India have been highlighted by Prime Minister Kiro Mori’s visit to India in 2000 and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit in 2005, and more recently the December 2006 joint statement “Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership” issued by Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Manmohan Singh in Tokyo. The advantages of enhanced trilateral cooperation were evident in the common experience of leading on tsunami relief.
Building on this momentum, CSIS has initiated two trilateral dialogues among the United
States, Japan and India: one at the level of experts and the other among CEOs and former senior officials. This paper briefly outlines the agenda items and questions that seem most appropriate for future dialogue, as well as some of the obstacles and challenges.

12
The Agenda for Trilateral Cooperation and Dialogue There are three drivers for greater trilateral strategic dialogue and coordination:

Security

If the premise of U.S. strategy towards Japan and India is right—that increased Indian and Japanese leadership in the international system is based on common values and U.S. interests— then strategic thinkers from all three nations should consider how to shape the international system and international organizations to fit those interests and values. Key areas include assessments of the rising role of China and opportunities to collectively encourage an equally positive “stakeholder” role for Beijing; promotion of democracy and rule of law in Asia; reform of the U.N. and U.N. Security Council; the architecture of Asia and the role of the East Asia Summit and other institutions; and the prospects for further trilateral cooperation in providing “public goods” based on the precedent of the Tsunami Regional Core Group. Challenges to stability in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Afghanistan have a direct impact on India’s security, “but also have the potential to affect Japan and the United States due to the formers dependence on SLOC, and the latter’s commitment to the war on Islamic radicalism.”1
Influencing and engaging China is a particular challenge for all three governments at both the individual and collective levels. Thus, a major consideration for all three nations is how to react and engage with an increasingly active and confident Beijing. All three nations set new standards for cooperation with the Malabar Exercise on April 17, 2008 Explaining the

1 Joint Statement of the United States and Indian Government.

13 importance of the joint exercises, India’s Rear Admiral Pradeep Chauhan stated, "the growth of joint exercises has gone up in its scope and complexity… Communication, equipment and procedural inter-operability can be obtained through these exercises."2 The exercise consisted of four Japanese, two US and three Indian ships participating in search and seizure operations, wargames, and fire power maneuvers.3 The high quality of the U.S. Navy and JMSDF offered the Indian Navy opportunities for developing their own operational skills that few other navies in the Asia-Pacific region could match.
Beijing’s reaction to the exercises was mixed with skepticism and calls for further enhancement of China’s own forces. Despite Japan’s Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi insistence that "the drills are not directed at any third country…and China need not worry about the maneuvers…which are a goodwill exercise,” this unexpected show of unified force worried many policymakers in Beijing, many of who see the exercises as a provocation.4 In future, the U.S., Japanese and Indian navies can use their own high degree of transparency and cooperation to encourage the PLA Navy to join in multilateral exercises that encourage the same levels of confidence-building.
These are promising beginnings, but to advance cooperation further in the security arena,
U.S.-Japan-India dialogue must address these questions:

o How do the three nations assess the rising role of China and the proper tools for hedging, shaping and reassuring Beijing? How can trilateral cooperation be used to simultaneously remind Beijing that its military build-up is a source of concern

2 Indian Express. India, Japan Naval Exercises on April 17. March 29, 2007.

3 Ibid.

4 Agence Press France. Japan, US, India Hold Naval Drills. April 16, 2007.

14 and to encourage greater transparency and confidence-building steps by the PLA Navy?

o While all three nations have firmly established democracies and accept the principle that democratic governance reinforces stability in their regions, there are also different views of how much governments should press others to move in that direction. Can the three governments establish an agenda for promoting democracy and rule of law in Asia?

o While all three nations share a common interest in secure sea lanes and maritime security, is there political support for expanded cooperation in the Indian Ocean?

Economic

In light of the prominence ascribed to economic cooperation in the form of the U.S.-India Economic Dialogue and the Japan-India Joint Study Group, the United States, Japan and India could fruitfully develop cooperation on: investment flows; manufacturing; technology trade; infrastructure development (railways and civil aviation); energy policy; human resource development; Official Development Assistance; and Economic Partnership Agreements. It is the economic basis for engagement that will create constituencies across the three borders and a basis for sustained engagement on strategic issues. Of primary concern to all three governments is the increased economic integration provided for by a strengthened trilateral framework. Recent influxes in technology trading between India and Japan, and $21.8 billion dollars of Indian

15 textiles imported from India by the US last year, has brought India to the center of an important economic relationship.5 Moreover, increased weapons sales of F-16 and F-18 advanced fighters by the American military to India highlights the realization that continued cooperation brings with it robust economic activity and strategic opportunities to enhance regional security.
Given that economic ties are important to sustain strategic cooperation among the US,
Japan and India, the incorporation of India into APEC has become a major topic for all three governments. While Japan continues to balance its commitment to ASEAN+6, the Trans-Pacific trade agenda, and the WTO Doha round, it has been unable to come to any consensus with other APEC nations, headed by Australia, that call for India’s incorporation. The U.S. government has also remained cautious about expanding APEC. India’s initiative toward regional integration in the South Asian Free Trade Agreement and the India Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement is further shifting Asia’s sights to India as a vital economic partner. While all three countries have acknowledged the strategic importance of a fully integrated trade agreement in Asia, they remain unable to move forward with any agreement that drastically strays from the current regional economic architecture. India and Japan have decided to hold a comprehensive economic partnership agreement meeting June 25 and to launch a "strategic economic dialogue" in July in New Delhi, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said.6 This agreement, following up on the comprehensive ‘Eight-fold Initiative for Strengthening the Japan-India Partnership’, will “sharpen the focus” on specific economic projects.7
To advance trilateral cooperation in the economic field, a U.S.-Japan-India strategic dialogue must address these questions:

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    U.S.-JAPAN COUNCIL 2010 ANNUAL REPORT A YEAR IN REVIEW TABLE OF CONTENTS A Year in Review A Letter of Introduction 1 U.S.-Japan Council Mission & Vision 2 Key Topics of 2010 3 Annual Programs 2010 Inaugural Annual Conference 4 Annual Members Meeting 5 USJC - ITO EN Leadership Development Program 6 Annual Meeting of the Ambassador, Consuls General, 7 & Japanese American Leaders 2010 Japanese American Leadership Delegation 8 Policy Events Hawaii Symposium - The Road Ahead 9 Washington, DC Joint Policy Luncheon 10 Japanese Governors’ Meeting in Tokyo, Japan 11 Networking Events A Reception on Capitol Hill 12 Tsunageru Hawaii Reception 13 Japanese Heritage Night at Citi Field 14 Japanese American - JBA Softball Game 15 Additional Featured Networking Events 16 About the Organization Board of Councilors 17 Board of Directors 18 Council Membership 19 Council Staff & Management 20 2011 Planned Programs & Events 21 U.S.-Japan Council Donors & Partners 22-24 U.S.-Japan Council Members 25- 27 On behalf of the U.S.-Japan Council, we would like to thank our generous donors, partners, members, board members and staff for making 2010 such a success. This past year, the Council firmly established itself as an organization that contributes to strengthening U.S.-Japan relations by bringing together new and diverse leadership, engaging new stakeholders in the U.S.-Japan relationship, and exploring issues that can benefit community, business and government entities. The U.S.-Japan Council presented its Inaugural Annual Conference in September 2010. It was an opportunity to discuss key topics and themes that can re-define US-Japan relations in the future such as education, transportation, and clean and green technology.
  • The Limits of Forgiveness in International Relations: Groups

    The Limits of Forgiveness in International Relations: Groups

    JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations E-ISSN: 1647-7251 [email protected] Observatório de Relações Exteriores Portugal del Pilar Álvarez, María; del Mar Lunaklick, María; Muñoz, Tomás The limits of forgiveness in International Relations: Groups supporting the Yasukuni shrine in Japan and political tensions in East Asia JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations, vol. 7, núm. 2, noviembre, 2016, pp. 26- 49 Observatório de Relações Exteriores Lisboa, Portugal Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=413548516003 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative OBSERVARE Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa e-ISSN: 1647-7251 Vol. 7, Nº. 2 (November 2016-April 2017), pp. 26-49 THE LIMITS OF FORGIVENESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: GROUPS SUPPORTING THE YASUKUNI SHRINE IN JAPAN AND POLITICAL TENSIONS IN EAST ASIA María del Pilar Álvarez [email protected] Research Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Salvador (USAL, Argentina) and Visiting Professor of the Department of International Studies at the University T. Di Tella (UTDT). Coordinator of the Research Group on East Asia of the Institute of Social Science Research (IDICSO) of the USAL. Postdoctoral Fellow of the National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET) of Argentina. Doctor of Social Sciences from the University of Buenos Aires (UBA). Holder of a Master Degree on East Asia, Korea, from Yonsei University. Holder of a Degree in Political Science (UBA).
  • Civil Society and the State in Democratic East Asia

    Civil Society and the State in Democratic East Asia

    PROTEST AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS Chiavacci, (eds) Grano & Obinger Civil Society and the State in Democratic East Asia East Democratic in State the and Society Civil Edited by David Chiavacci, Simona Grano, and Julia Obinger Civil Society and the State in Democratic East Asia Between Entanglement and Contention in Post High Growth Civil Society and the State in Democratic East Asia Protest and Social Movements Recent years have seen an explosion of protest movements around the world, and academic theories are racing to catch up with them. This series aims to further our understanding of the origins, dealings, decisions, and outcomes of social movements by fostering dialogue among many traditions of thought, across European nations and across continents. All theoretical perspectives are welcome. Books in the series typically combine theory with empirical research, dealing with various types of mobilization, from neighborhood groups to revolutions. We especially welcome work that synthesizes or compares different approaches to social movements, such as cultural and structural traditions, micro- and macro-social, economic and ideal, or qualitative and quantitative. Books in the series will be published in English. One goal is to encourage non- native speakers to introduce their work to Anglophone audiences. Another is to maximize accessibility: all books will be available in open access within a year after printed publication. Series Editors Jan Willem Duyvendak is professor of Sociology at the University of Amsterdam. James M. Jasper teaches at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. Civil Society and the State in Democratic East Asia Between Entanglement and Contention in Post High Growth Edited by David Chiavacci, Simona Grano, and Julia Obinger Amsterdam University Press Published with the support of the Swiss National Science Foundation.
  • Kobe University Repository : Kernel

    Kobe University Repository : Kernel

    Kobe University Repository : Kernel State Identity and Assistance Policy : Japan's Post- タイトル conflict Reconstruction Assistance in Afghanistan as Title 'Middle-power Diplomacy' 著者 Erkan, Kivilcim Author(s) 掲載誌・巻号・ページ Kobe University law review,47:87-107 Citation 刊行日 2013 Issue date 資源タイプ Departmental Bulletin Paper / 紀要論文 Resource Type 版区分 publisher Resource Version 権利 Rights DOI URL http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/handle_kernel/81005583 Create Date: 2017-12-17 State Identity and Assistance Policy: Japan’s Post-conflict Reconstruction Assistance in Afghanistan as ‘Middle-power Diplomacy’ Kivilcim ERKAN 2013 GRADUATE SCHOOL OF LAW, KOBE UNIVERSITY ROKKODAI, KOBE, JAPAN No.47 87 State Identity and Assistance Policy: Japan’s Post-conflict Reconstruction Assistance in Afghanistan as ‘Middle-power Diplomacy’ Kivilcim Erkan Abstract Most of the existing literature on Japan’s assistance policy1 is written from realist perspectives that emphasise interest-based and structural variables. While these approaches have provided useful insights, they remain insufficient for understanding some of the changes that have occurred in this policy sector since the 1990s. Such changes include the introduction of the human security norm, and increasing the humanitarian and post-conflict reconstruction assistance delivered by Japan. Japan’s contribution to the international efforts to eradicate terrorism in Afghanistan through post-conflict reconstruction assistance is a significant case that has received little scholarly attention in English-language literature. This paper is an attempt to fill that gap. By focusing on the policy-making process, the paper seeks to shed light on the questions of why and how Japan has become involved in the post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the United States–led coalition’s military intervention in 2001.