Notes INTRODUCTION 1. The differing images of Japan's foreign policy are, obviously, partly a matter of reference points. The majority of commentators on Japanese affairs outside Japan have been Americans (Stockwin, 1985, p. 159). This is particularly true of studies of Japan's foreign and security policies. The comparatively intensive US scholarly and general interest in Japan, with its clearly recognizable great­ power bias, has led to a situation where '[mJost commentaries about Japanese security policy tend to look either at military or economic issues and few seek to tackle these together in a more comprehensive fashion. Those that examine military security are very much influenced by the Japan-US Security Treaty arrangements and the perspectives of both US and Japanese observers are inevitably bound to be affected by national bias' (Chapman et al., 1983, p. xvii). 2. The many faces of foreign policy show up in language itself. In Japanese documents a number of different concepts are used for foreign policy. Such concepts are gaiko, diplomacy, gaikO seisaku, foreign policy, taigai seisaku, external policy, and taigai kankei, external relations. For scholarly discussions of these concepts, see Sata, 1989, pp. 5-7; Aruga, 1989, pp. 1-3; Eta et al., 1982, pp. 94-8. In official documents, gaiko and gaiko seisaku are used interchange­ ably. Seiji gaiko, political diplomacy, is sometimes seen in the literature parallel to keizai gaiko, economic diplomacy. The former is hard to distinguish from gaiko - seiji can probably best be described as a kind of embellishment. 3. This definition follows closely the one presented by Nygren in his study of the Soviet foreign-policy doctrine (Nygren, 1984, p. 13). 4. For a comprehensive treatment of the prime minister's role in foreign-policy decision-making, see Edstrom (1996). 5. The necessity of avoiding the construction of analytical categories from the empirical material which is later to be analysed is discussed in Bryder (1985, p.81). 6. As the author himself was the coder, reliability refers to intracoder reliability. 7. In the initial postwar period, prime ministers Yoshida Shigeru and Hatoyama Ichira presented speeches in the parliament which were not policy speeches, but of the same character. These speeches, three in all, have been taken into account in the analysis, although data from them are not included in the tables. 8. For the method of focused comparison, see George and Smoke (1974). 1 TO RESTORE AND RECONSTRUCT 1. On secrecy as an element of traditional Japanese diplomacy, see Blaker (1977, pp. 17f). 2. Later, Yoshida reiterated this view (see Yoshida, 1963, p. 159). According to a key figure in the negotiations, Nishimura Kumao, Yoshida did not ask the other Japanese delegates to sign, knowing that 'the security treaty was not popular in Japan'. See Finn (1992, p. 305). 180 Notes 181 3. In an intelView with the author, Mr Aso Taro, Yoshida's grandson and a member of parliament, rejected this description as incorrect. According to Mr Aso, Yoshida was quite at ease when he had stepped down and intended to have a leisured time in retirement (intelView, 27 October 1993). 4. One should not, however, overlook the fact that one reason behind this attitude was also personal: the Japanese leaders knew that if they did not act in a way that was satisfactory to the Americans, they could be dismissed with no further ado. 5. Figures within parentheses refer to pages in Naikaku seido hyakunenshi hensan iinkai, ed., Rekidai naikaku soridaijin enzetsu sha (Collection of prime-minister­ ial policy speeches) and the date of the speech. For speeches after 1985, the figures refer to edition and pages of Gaimusho, Waga gaiko no kinkyo (Diplo­ matic bluebook), and the date of the speech. 6. For a discussion of this aspect of Yoshida's policies, see Edstrom (1994). 7. For a description of how traditional Japanese diplomatic thinking was per­ meated by a 'we have no choice' mentality, see Blaker (1977, pp. 24ft). 8. For a general discussion, see, for instance, Farrell (1966, pp. 183t). 9. In a famous passage in his memoirs, Yoshida writes: 'Japan is an island-nation in which a population in excess of ninety-one million must be provided with a civilized standard of life. This can only be accomplished through an expanding volume of overseas trade' (Yoshida, 1961, p. 8). 10. Kokusai shakai refers either to 'international society' or 'international commun­ ity'. In official translations into English, both renderings are found. In the texts studied here, kokusai shakai no iehUn refers almost without exception to Japan as a state among other states, that is, kokusai shakai refers to a society of sovereign and independent states. 11. It should be noted that sUlVival figured as a national goal in Yoshida's speech in the parliament on 25 June 1946 (412, 25.6.1946). 12. Japan applied for admission to the UN in June 1952 (Japan and the United Nations, 1958, p. 94). 13. In a statement in the parliament on 28 January 1950 (quoted in Dower, 1993, p.7). 14. In his speech in the parliament on 25 June 1946, Yoshida referred to three roles: Japan was (not) a war-instigator but a contributor to peace and a leader. These cases are not included in Table 1.2 since it was not a policy speech. 15. The term 'economism' denotes an attitude that prioritizes economic considera­ tions. 16. In an exchange of notes between Yoshida and US Secretary of State Dean Acheson after the signing of the security treaty, Yoshida pledged continued support for US military operations in Korea (Welfield, 1988, p. 25). 17. An influential case is Kawai (1960). 18. While ambassador to Great Britain, Yoshida developed an admiration for the British political system with its parliamentary politics and combination of aristocratic and democratic traditions (Finn, 1992, p. 21). 19. The letter is reprinted in Asahi shimbunsha (1972, pp. 140f). In a book published after his retirement, Yoshida foresaw that Japan would recognize the People's Republic of China in the future (Yoshida, 1963, p. 139). 20. Tanaka (1991, pp. 35-40) gives an account of how Yoshida tried to keep Japan's options open and go against the United States in his China policy after 'the Yoshida letter'. 21. Hellman (1977, p. 326) claims that the concept of 'economic diplomacy' was first developed publicly by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru in setting 182 Notes forth the broad goals of the foreign policy of the first Hatoyama government. This is refuted by Yoshida's speeches in 1952-53. 22. This idea resurfaced later, leading to the establishment of the Asian Develop­ ment Bank in 1965 (Pharr, 1993, p. 259). 2 THE PREWAR LEFTOVER WITH A POSTWAR MISSION 1. Hatoyama was purged because of his prewar activities. As education minister in the 1930s, he suppressed progressive student movements and hounded profes­ sors for their 'dangerous thoughts' (Lauterbach, 1947, p. 98). 2. For their opposing views of the promise, see Hatoyama (1957, pp. 55f) and Yoshida (1961, p. 75). According to a well-placed observer, Yoshida's former private secretary Matsuno Raiza, there is no doubt that Yoshida's initial inten­ tion was to step down when Hatoyama returned to politics (Matsuno, 1985, p. 17). 3. Some researchers go so far as to claim that Hatoyama was Yoshida's opposite on all counts. See Tsutsui (1992, p. 123) and Kitaoka (1995, pp. 62,69). 4. This idea was launched by Kase Toshikazu, later Japan's first ambassador to the United Nations (Inoue, 1994, pp. 206f)' 5. In a book published before he became premier, Hatoyama indicated that Japan could not depend entirely on the credibility of US forces if a war between the great powers broke out, since these troops might retreat if it was necessary for strategic reasons (Hatoyama, 1952, p. 288). 6. In his memoirs, Hatoyama (1957, p. 198) argues that Japan should try to reduce tensions between East and West, preventing an escalation of the cold war, and suggests that Japan should act as a bridge between East and West. Although this role-conception did not surface in his policy speeches, he referred to it on other occasions. Before he went to Moscow to try to reach a final agreement over the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, he indicated that he was convinced 'that Japan, by restoring normal relations with the Soviet Union and by becoming a bridge between the two opposing camps, can play an important role in achieving peace and averting war' (quoted in Jain, 1981, p. 234). 7. Cf. Richard Nixon's argument when he reversed the China policy of the United States: 'We have to live with Communist powers and we have no illusions about Communism but we must accept the realities' (quoted in Welfield, 1988, p.278). 8. According to Hatoyama Iichira (Ichira's son, foreign minister 1976--77), the release of POWs was the main reason (Yomiuri shimbun seijibu, 1985, p. 25). In Hatoyama's memoirs, another reason for normalization is presented: if a war between the United States and the Soviet Union occurred, the latter would attack Japan. Such an attack could be avoided by normalizing relations (Hatoyama, 1957, p. 117). 3 THE FAILURE OF BRILLIANCE 1. Ishibashi had been active as an ef'.QJJ./l1llic journalist for several decades and served as finance minister in Yoshida's first government but was purged and Notes 183 barred from office in the years 1947-51. His purge seems to have had more to do with his unpopularity among SCAP than his prewar activities. To the Japanese, he was known as an outspoken critic of the militarists during the 1930s and no objections were raised when he was appointed finance minister, but 'when he began making disdainful remarks about the professional compet­ ence of the Occupation's economic planners, SCAP suddenly ordered that he be purged' (Kawai, 1960, p.