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Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia

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Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider, editors Copyright © 2004 The Henry L. Stimson Center All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior permission in writing from the Henry L. Stimson Center. Cover design by Design Army. ISBN 0-9747255-8-7 The Henry L. Stimson Center 1111 19th Street NW Twelfth Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone 202.223.5956 fax 202.238.9604 www.stimson.org Table of Contents Preface ................................................................................................................. v Abbreviations..................................................................................................... vii Introduction......................................................................................................... ix 1. The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia Michael Krepon ............................................................................................ 1 2. Nuclear Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia: Structural Factors Rodney W. Jones......................................................................................... 25 3. India’s Escalation-Resistant Nuclear Posture Rajesh M. Basrur ........................................................................................ 56 4. Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in South Asia Feroz Hassan Khan .................................................................................... 75 5. Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory Policy, and Escalation Control Rahul Roy-Chaudhury .............................................................................. 101 6. Are Tactical Nuclear Weapons Needed in South Asia? Michael Krepon, Ziad Haider, and Charles Thornton.............................. 119 7. Limited War, Escalation Control, and the Nuclear Option in South Asia Michael Krepon ........................................................................................ 148 About the Authors........................................................................................... 168 Preface t is with great pleasure that I present the latest publication of the Stimson I Center’s South Asia program, Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia. We believe this book of essays by prominent American, Pakistani, and Indian authorities will advance our understanding of this poorly explored topic. India and Pakistan have been beset by several serious crises since the advent of offsetting nuclear capabilities. To date both countries have sought to manage nuclear dangers primarily by unilateral means. Bilateral negotiations seeking cooperative approaches have so far produced disappointing results. The international community and policy makers around the globe also seek to ensure that India and Pakistan manage this potentially destructive capability responsibly, particularly since the two programs are not bound by international conventions or treaties. The Stimson Center’s Michael Krepon has been engaged in serious discourse with all concerned to illuminate the best paths to responsible stewardship, and this new volume represents the fruits of two years of programming to identify concepts and concrete ideas for escalation control on the subcontinent. This critical subject warrants far greater attention. These essays refer to the literature of the Cold War period, but are mindful of the differences between the Cold War and South Asia cases. To this day, wise and learned people can disagree about whether deterrence was proven right, was dangerously close to failure, or was irrelevant to the outcome of the superpower competition. We are all grateful that our data set does not include the consequences of a nuclear exchange between the rival powers. This volume represents the beginning of a new literature that pays homage when due to the intellectual legacy of the Cold War, but also recognizes the need for fresh thinking that is grounded in South Asian realities. We hope that this book will stimulate further thinking about escalation control, nuclear doctrine and policy, and conflict avoidance in South Asia. It ends with an essay by Michael Krepon that begins to identify a new theoretical construct that takes into account the particular dynamics of the region, including the possible sparks to conflict that could escalate, and the way the region’s leaders think about limited war and its consequences. I will welcome your reactions to this latest publication of our South Asia program, and hope you will find it a useful contribution to the shared goals of a peaceful and safe region. VI PREFACE My colleagues and I at the Stimson Center wish to thank Senator Sam Nunn, Charles Curtis, and Joan Rohlfing at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, as well as Vartan Gregorian and Stephen Del Rosso at the Carnegie Corporation for their generous support for our South Asia programming. Thanks are also due to Toby Berkman, Jane Dorsey, Ziad Haider, Lisa Herskowitz, Jake Lefebure, Moira Shanahan, Meghan Smith, Luis Vertiz, and Elizabeth Wallish for their help in shepherding this publication to print. Ellen Laipson President and CEO The Henry L. Stimson Center Abbreviations ABM Treaty Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty AWACS Airborne Early Warning and Control System BJP Bharatiya Janata Party BVR Beyond Visual Range CBM Confidence-Building Measure CCS Cabinet Committee on Security CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures CII Confederation of Indian Industries CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty DefCon Defense Condition DGMO Director-General of Military Operations DRDO Defense Research and Development Organization EMP Electromagnetic Pulse INF Treaty Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles IGMP Integrated Guided Missile Development Program JeM Jaish-e-Muhammad LeT Lashkar-e-Toiba LoC Line of Control MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime MEA Ministry of External Affairs MoD Ministry of Defense NCA National Command Authority NDA National Democratic Alliance NPT Nonproliferation Treaty NSAB National Security Advisory Board NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group NRRM Nuclear Risk-Reduction Measure PAL Permissive Action Link PSI Proliferation Security Initiative RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UPA United Progressive Alliance Introduction hen nations with deep grievances acquire nuclear weapons, tensions Wincrease and their crises become more nerve wracking. It is therefore not surprising that India and Pakistan are traversing a very dangerous passage marked by periods of intense confrontation. Offsetting nuclear capabilities on the subcontinent have made crisis avoidance and conflict resolution more imperative, but also more difficult to achieve. One reason why crises have become more prevalent under the nuclear shadow is that some in Pakistan have sought to use unconventional warfare, backed by nuclear weapons, to leverage a more favorable outcome of the Kashmir dispute. A second reason is that India’s ill-advised policies have given ample opportunities for mischief making in Kashmir. Decades of Pakistani diplomacy, two conventional wars, and unconventional means have failed to wrest territorial gains from New Delhi. Pakistan’s failed Kashmir policies have instead worsened social, economic, and political conditions at home, while penalizing those living across the Kashmir divide. It has also pinned down and punished large numbers of Indian security forces. Perhaps India’s grief is viewed as a sufficient reward by those in Pakistan who continue to support the “freedom struggle” in Kashmir. Continued support for militancy, however, means that a single catalytic event by jihadis, whether operating independently or under guidance, can spark the next severe crisis on the subcontinent. The outcome of a nuclear-tinged crisis is rarely decisive, since all parties as well as outsiders will seek to prevent a crossing of the nuclear threshold. Indeterminate outcomes have not, however, prevented adversaries from declaring victory once the crisis has passed. These assertions are then belied by subsequent actions taken on the presumption that scores still need to be settled. When unsettled accounts produce yet another crisis, the outcome cannot be confidently predicted. While efforts will again be made to keep the crisis from reaching a boiling point, or to prevent unintended escalation, these plans might fail since the unexpected becomes commonplace during crises and military campaigns. Despite – or perhaps because of – the inconclusive resolution of crises, some in Pakistan and India continue to believe that gains can be secured below the nuclear threshold. How might advantage be gained when the presence of nuclear weapons militates against decisive end games? Pakistan has answered this question by resorting to unconventional methods. If Indian press reports are to be believed, New Delhi is now contemplating the answer of limited war. Each X INTRODUCTION answer reinforces the other, and both lead to dead ends. If the means chosen to pursue advantage in the next Indo-Pakistan crisis show signs of success, they are likely to prompt escalation, and escalation might not be easily controlled. If the primary alternative to an ambiguous outcome
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