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Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 MASTERS THESIS M-5505 SPEAR, Joseph Carroll THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRESS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARD THE NEWS MEDIA. The American University, M.A., 1973 Journalism

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company , Ann Arbor, Michigan

0 1974

JOSEPH CARROLL SPEAR

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRESS : A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION * S POLICY TOWARD THE NEWS MEDIA

by

Joseph C. Spear

Submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

in

Communication

Signatures of C

theDean of theDean the College

Date ; iQj I ÿ Date :

1973 The American University Washington, D. C.

THE AWiER:c;.:i ü ;;:'.':"ôîty library y/7? PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the Nixon

Administration's policy toward the news media. The heart of the study is a presentation of what is alleged to be a dis­ cernible pattern, or "grand strategy," which apparently has been adopted by President Nixon and his top advisors for handling the press. As a prologue to this main portion of the thesis, the writer has included a brief review of the history of the relationships between the Presidents and the press from Washington to Johnson, and a short history of

Mr. Nixon's relationship with the press from his first term as a young Congressman to his election as President.

It should be noted that unless otherwise designated, the words "press" and "newsmen" are used interchangeably to mean those men and women of the network news shows, the wire services, magazines, and the major newspapers, who devote most of their time to covering the President and the Admin­ istration. Depending on the context, the word "press" can also refer to television and radio networks and stations, and the larger publications, which transmit and print con­ siderable news about the President and the Administration.

ii 1X1

In this sense, the term "news media" is often used inter­ changeably with "press."

The writer is deeply indebted to Dr, Robert O.

Blanchard, Chairman of the Department of Communication and chairman of the writer’s thesis committee, for his guidance, assistance, and extraordinary patience- Thanks also go to

Jack Anderson, another thesis committee member and the writer's employer, for his invaluable advice and for grant­

ing time off to complete the study. Most of all, the writer would like to thank his wife, Linda Mahaffey Spear, who

financed the project. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE ...... ii

Chapter

1. THE PRESIDENTS AND THE PRESS: AN INTRODUCTION...... 1

A BRIEF REVIEW ...... 2

RICHARD N I X O N ...... 32

THE GRAND STRATEGY ...... 42

2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NIXON PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRESS ...... 46

HISS, "CHECKERS," AND OTHER HISTORY .... 46

THE 1968 CAMPAIGN ...... 69

3. THE NONESSENTIAL PRESS ...... 87

A VERY PRIVATE PRESIDENT ...... 90

THE PRESS "SPOKESMEN" ...... 104

THE MORIBUND PRESS CONFERENCE ...... 126

4. TAKING IT TO THE P E O P L E ...... 140

THE END RUN; T E L E V I S I O N ...... 140

THE END RUN: TO THE H I N T E R L A N D S ...... 187

OTHER END RUNNERS ...... 221

iv V chapter Page

5. THREATS AND COMPLIMENTS: KEEPING THE PRESS OFF BALANCE...... 233

THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE PRESS ...... 234

OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AND THE PRESS...... 265

THE RESULTS OF INTIMIDATION...... 347

"THANK YOU FOR THE NICE COVERAGE" ...... 360

6. THE 1972 CAMPAIGN; THE GRAND STRATEGY AT WORK...... 370

THE NONESSENTIAL PRESS ...... 371

THE END RUN...... 383

THREATS AND COMPLIMENTS ...... 406

THE RESULTS OF INTIMIDATION ...... 412

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 422

APPENDIXES

A. A Sample "Mailing from Herbert G. Klein to Newspaper Editors ...... 450

B. A "Mailing" from Barbara Hackman Franklin, Staff Assistant to the president, to Interested Persons ...... 458

C. "Secret" Excerpt from the "Treleaven Report"...... 461

D. Documents Dealing with the Operation of the Inter-Departmental Group on Foreign Policy ...... 464

E. Presidential Directive Ordering a Cutback of Governmental Public Relations A c t i v i t i e s ...... 475 VI

Chapter page

F. Statement Issued by Congressman William Morehead, Democrat of Pennsylvania, Concerning Public Relations Spending During the Nixon Administration...... 478

G. Teletype Message from Patrick Buchanan to "Governor" Agnew, October 29, 1968 . . . 481 chapter 1

THE PRESIDENTS AND THE PRESS; AN INTRODUCTION

On the principle that a free people cannot long enjoy such a condition without a free flow of information, the Pounding Fathers adopted the First Amendment to the Con­ stitution, which strictly forbade Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . .

From the beginning, the First Amendment has been steeped in controversy, but it has stood the test of time and has been generally hailed through the ages as the salvation of our democracy.

But some, especially Presidents, have not been so williig to concede the Founders' wisdom. For in adopting the First Amendment, they created, perhaps deliberately, an "adversary relationship" between the nation's leaders and its press. Every Chief Executive, from George Washing­ ton to Richard Nixon, has been plagued with journalistic a-seaults. Most have survived their "bad press" to be remembered in history as effective leaders with good inten­ tions . Is the relationship between president Richard Nixon and the press different from that of other presidents and the newsmen who covered them? Has the press dealt more harshly with Nixon? Is this President's well-known antip­ athy for reporters unique among Chief Executives? To find the answers, it is necessary to review the history of the

President-press relationship.

A BRIEF REVIEW

Although the record of George Washington's relations with the press is far from complete, it suggests the Father of our country had little use for the "gazettes" of his day. He first began to express his displeasure while engi­ neering the fight with the British. The papers, he wrote to the president of Congress in May, 1777, were revealing too much military information to the English:

It is much to be wished that our printers were more discreet in many of their Publications. We see almost in every Paper, Proclamations or accounts transmitted by the Enemy, of an injurious nature. If some hint or caution could be given them on the Subject, it might be of material Service.1

Writings of George Washington. Bicentennial Edition, Vol. XXX, pp. 319-21, cited by James E, Pollard, The Presi­ dents and the Press (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 1. After Washington won the nation's first election without opposition, he became the target of partisan barbs.

Most of the criticism centered around his aristocratic demeanor, which led detractors to believe he had designs on becoming America's first monarch. When everyone stood at

Washington's reception, for example, he was accused of want­

ing to be a king. Such affairs, wrote some, were "court- 2 like levees" held in "queenly drawing rooms."

He was charged with treason, with theft of the pub­

lic treasury, with living the secluded life of a monk, and 3 with keeping the distance of a tyrant. Benjamin Bache,

editor of the Philadelphia Aurora. was a particularly vicious critic who spared the President few insults. To

this newsman, Washington was "treacherous" and "inefficient he suffered from "insignificance" and "ingratitude"; he was

guilty of "ostentatious professions of piety" and of

"stately journeying through the American continent in search 4 of personal incense."

An aloof and reserved man, Washington rarely

2 Stephen Decatur, Jr., The Private Affairs of George Washington. pp. 45-46, cited by Pollard, p. 20.

?P. L. Ford, The True George Washington, p. 241, cited by Pollard, p. 20. 4 Ford, p. 264, cited by Pollard, p. 19. deigned to deal with the press personally or to air his displeasure publicly. Instead, he vented his anger in his 5 conversations and correspondence. At a Cabinet meeting, one of his officers mentioned a satirical article he had recently read, and Washington erupted in a furious tirade.

Thomas Jefferson, displaying the talents of a natural reporter, captured the moment in writing:

The Presidt was much inflamed, got into one of those passions when he cannot command himself, ran on much on the personal abuse which had been bestowed on him, defied any man on earth to produce one single act of his since he had been in the govmt which was not done on the purest motives, that he had never repented but once the having slipped the moment of resigning his office, & that was every moment since, that by god he had rather be in his grave than in his present situ­ ation. That he had rather be on his farm than to be made emperor of the world and yet they were charging him with wanting to be king. That that rascal Freneau sent him 3 of his papers every day, as if he thought he would become the distributor of his papers, that he could see in this nothing but an impudent design to insult him. He ended in this high tone. . .

For all his disdain of journalists, Washington saw the need for a free press and occasionally spoke up for it.

In his fourth annual message to Congress, for example, he

5 James Keogh, President Nixon and the Press (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1972), p. 17.

^P. L, Ford (ed. ) , Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. VI, p. 2 54, cited by Pollard, p. 15. Spelling and italics as in the original. argued for more favorable postage rates for newspapers.^

But he retired to his beloved M t . Vernon glad to be free, at last, of the burdens of public office. Bache bade the President farewell with a vitriolic flourish :

. . . If ever there was a period for rejoicing, this is the moment. Every heart in unison with the freedom and happiness of the people ought to beat high with exultation that the name of Washington ceases from this day to give currency to political insults, and to legalize corruption. A new era is now opening upon us, an era which promises much to the people, for public measures must now stand upon their own merits, and nefarious projects can no longer be supported by a name. When a retrospect has been taken of the Washing­ ton administration for eight years, it is a subject of the greatest astonishment that a single individual should have cankered the principles of republicanism in an enlightened people just emerged from the gulf of despotism, and should have carried his designs against the public liberty so far as to have put in jeopardy its very existence. Such, however, are the facts, and with these staring us in the face, the day ought to be a JUBILEE in the United States.^

John Adams, consigned by fate to govern in the shadow of George Washington, came in for his share of crit­ icism. In 1800, he dismissed his Secretary of State, Timothy

Pickering, but refused to outline his reasoning. When asked for a public explanation, he replied that ;

. . . If a President of the United States has not

^Writings of George Washington. Vol. XXXII, p. 210, cited by Pollard, p. 9. 0 [Philadelphia] Aurora, March 5, 1779, cited by Pollard, p. 25. authority enough to change his own secretaries, he is no longer fit for office. If he must enter into a con­ troversy in pamphlets and newspapers in vindication of his measures, he would have employment enough for his whole life, and must neglect the duties and business of his station.9

"If I am to judge by the newspapers and pamphlets

that have been printed in America for twenty years past," he

once wrote to Benjamin Rush, "I should think that both parties believed me the meanest villain in the world. . . ."

George Washington and Benjamin Franklin, he complained in

the same letter, "could never do any thing but what was

imputed to pure, disinterested patriotism; I never could do

anything but what was ascribed to sinister motives.

Adams was frequently accused of being the moving

force behind the insidious Alien and Sedition Acts, which were designed to muzzle government critics. It is likely,

however, that the laws would have been passed even if Adams

were not in office.H But he signed them with no overt sign

of regret and on occasion urged they be used to prosecute

his detractors.12

9 Charles Francis Adams (ed.). Works of John Adams. Vol. IX, p. 79, cited by Pollard, p. 44.

^^Adams, Vol. IX, pp. 619-20, cited by Pollard, p. 47,

^^Pollard, p. 43.

^^Pollard, pp. 41-42. Modem Journalism is deeply indebted to the third

President of the United States. As Pollard puts it, "Free­ dom of the press in America owes as much, if not more, to

Thomas Jefferson than to any other public man. Certainly it owes more to him than to any other President.

In a public life that spanned four decades, Thomas

Jefferson championed the free press as no man of his station has done, before or since. During the formative years of the young nation, he was instrumental in getting a freedom of the press clause placed in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.

He defended the cause during his terms as Secretary of State,

Vice-President, and President.

Jefferson was not opposed to prosecution for libel, but he felt that it was the prerogative of the states and not of the federal government. In 1803, he wrote to Thomas

MeKean, saying:

The restraints provided by the laws of the States are sufficient . . . if applied. And I have, therefore, long thought that a few prosecutions of the most prom­ inent offenders would have a wholesome effect in restor­ ing the integrity of the presses. Not a general prose­ cution, for that would look like a persecution . . ,

^^Pollard, p. 52. 14 P. L. Ford (ed.), writings of Thomas Jefferson. Vol. VIII, p. 218, cited by John P. Foley, The Jefferson Cyclopedia (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967), p. 638. 8

Most of the time, however, Jefferson would leave libelous journalists "to the reproof of their own consciences.

If these do not condemn them, there will yet come a day when the false witness will meet a Judge who has not slept over 15 his slanders."

One of Jefferson's most famous statements concern­ ing freedom of the press appeared in a letter to Edward

Carrington in 1787 :

. . . The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left for me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.

Ironically, Jefferson suffered considerable abuse at the hands of the press. Few public men, if any, have been subjected to more intense, bitter, and scurrilous newspaper attacks. No aspect of his life was immune. He was accused of being an atheist, of cowardice, of having a mulatto house servant as his mistress, of having sired children by his slave women and sold them, and of having attempted to seduce the wife, of a friend. It was also said, on one occasion, that he

^^Foley, p. 498.

^^Ford, Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Vol. IV, p. 359, cited by Foley, p. 637. was mortally ill and given up by the doctors, and that he was 17 not the author of the Declaration of Independence.

Despite the strident personal and political attacks,

Jefferson adamantly held to his conviction that democratic government could not exist without freedom of opinion. His attitude is epitomized ny the story of the Prussian minister who picked up a libelous paper from a White House table and asked Jefferson why such matter was allowed to be published.

Jefferson replied;

Put that paper in your pocket, Baron, and should you ever hear the reality of our liberty, the freedom of the press questioned, show them this paper— and tell them where you found it.18

Jefferson regretted the press* abuse of its freedom.

"Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper," he once wrote. "Truth itself becomes suspicious by being put 19 into that polluted vehicle." In another letter, he deplored

"the putrid state into which our newspapers have passed, and the malignity, the vulgarity, and mendacious spirit of those

^^Pollard, pp. 73-83. 18 Claude G. Bowers, Jefferson in Power (Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1936), pp. 50-51. Italics in the original. 19 Ford, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. IX, p. 73, cited by Foley, p. 636. 10 who write for them.

Yet he retained, until the end of his days, the belief that a free press was the single, most important bul­ wark against tyranny. "The only security of all is a free press," he wrote at the age of eighty. He continued:

. . . The force of public opinion cannot be resisted, when permitted freely to be expressed. The agitation it produces must be submitted to. It is necessary to keep the waters pure.21

Andrew Jackson was wise in ways of using the press, but he, too, often fell prey to strident critics. While campaigning for office, he was accused of having executed militiamen and of living with Mrs. Jackson before she had obtained a final divorce from her previous husband. Screamed one pamphlet; "Ought a convicted adulteress and her paramour husband to be placed in the highest office of this free and

Christian land?"^^

Jackson saw the public relations value in a good press, however, and his journalistic friends were often

20 Ford, Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. IX, p. 446, cited by Foley, p. 63 9. 21 Ford, Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Vol. X, p. 280, cited by Foley, p. 637. 22 Charles Hammond, Truth's Advocate [a campaign sheet], cited by Pollard, p. 150. 11 rewarded with the fruits of the "spoils system." His early nominations included a "batch of editors," and the Richmond

Enquirer, a Jackson supporter, was constrained to comment :

We wish the Executive would let the Press alone. We cannot . . . approve of the appointment of so many of its conductors to office .... We know that Gen­ eral Jackson solemnly disclaims all intentions to reward his supporters or to bribe the Press to support his measures. And we believe him— we know also, the reasons by which he justifies these appointments. . . . But we are better satisfied with his motives than his reasons— with the integrity than with the expediency of the appointment.23

William Henry Harrison, the elderly Indian-fighter,

found himself continually defending charges of being decrepit,

of being "a superannuated and pitiable dotard," and of being

dishonest. A Philadelphia paper declared it didn't know

"whether to scorn his imbecility, to hate his principles, or 24 wonder at his impudent effrontery." A Wisconsin journal

preserved for posterity the rumor he had sired three children 25 by a Winnebago squaw. When Harrison died after one month

in office, his successor, John Tyler, was immediately dubbed

23 National Journal, August 18, 1829, cited by Pollard, p. 161. Italics in the original.

James A. Green, William Henry Harrison, His Life and Times, p. 314, cited by Pollard, p. 204. 25 Green, p. 346, cited by Pollard, p. 204. 12

"His Accidency.

James K. Polk, unknown when he became a dark horse

Democratic candidate, remained virtually unknown through four years of seclusion in the White House, But he exhausted him­ self at the job, and fifteen weeks after leaving the Execu­ tive Mansion, he was in his grave. His diligence, however, met with small reward. To the Knoxville Register, he was a 27 "pliant tool, traitor, apostate and tory." To the Memphis 28 Scimitar, he was "a crouching sycophant."

Abraham Lincoln, for all his vaunted simplicity, had a natural talent for publicity. He knew how to cultivate reporters and editors and how to manipulate them into telling a story as he saw it.

All newspapers were not friendly, however. To some, he was "a third-rate country lawyer" who told "coarse and clumsy jokes" and was a blood relative of "an African 29 gorilla." One New York newspaper charged him with drawing

Oliver P. Chitwood, John Tyler, Champion of the Old South, p. 317, cited by Pollard, p. 215. 27 E. I. McCormac, James K. Polk, p. 141, cited by Pollard, p. 230. 2 8 McCormac, p. 141, cited by Pollard, p. 230. 29 Pollard, p. 337. 13 his salary in gold while Jeff Davis was satisfied with depre­ ciated confederate currency. "See to what depths of infamy a Northern Copperhead can descend," the President lamented.

"If the scoundrel who wrote that don't boil hereafter, it will be because the devil hasn't got iron enough to make „30 gridirons."

Lincoln's most persistent gadfly was Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune, who evidently felt the Civil

War would soon be over if only the President would take his advice. On one occasion, after Greeley had suggested a settlement might be negotiated, Lincoln invited the journal­ ist to proceed. Greeley traveled to the Canadian side of

Niagara Falls, where he met four confederate "commissioners."

But he soon discovered they had no authority and demanded harsh terms. He returned home empty-handed and acutely embarassed.

He demanded the President's permission to publish their cor­ respondence, so that the whole story might be known. Lincoln refused on the grounds that Greeley's letters were too "gloomy."

Greeley printed the correspondence anyway, prompting one of

Lincoln's Cabinet secretaries to note in his diary that the

^^Don C. Seitz, Lincoln, the Politician, p. 374, cited by Pollard, p. 350. 14

President "permits himself . . . to be induced to engage in correspondence with . . . scheming busybodies like

Greeley.

On the whole, however, Lincoln's relations with the press were successful. "In his dealings with the press," as

Pollard aptly puts it, "he knew how to be wise as a serpent 32 and as gentle as a dove . . . . "

But for two circumstances, Andrew Johnson may never have survived the protracted and calumnious assaults that were leveled upon himself and his Administration. First, he was weaned in the rough and tumble world of Tennessee poli­ tics. Second, he was blessed with a thick skin.

Early in his career, for example, Johnson traded insults with "Parson" Brownlow, a feisty Methodist preacher and editor of the Knoxville Whig. One of Brownlow's articles gave "Ten Reasons for Believing Andrew Johnson To Be an

Atheist." Johnson came back with the charge that Brownlow was a "devil," a "hyena," and a "coward. " The fighting

Parson, not to be outdone, declared Johnson to be a "vile calumniator, an infamous demagogue, a common and public liar.

31 Pollard, pp. 356-58 32 Pollard, p. 390. 15 33 and impious infidel, and an unmitigated villain."

Johnson's press image was little better when he stepped forward to face the impossible task of filling

Lincoln's shoes. He was popularly seen as a drunk, a Cath- 34 olic, an atheist, and an illegitimate child. The New York

World characterized him as "an insolent drunken brute in comparison with whom Caligula's horse was respectable" and'hn 35 insolent, vulgar, low-bred brute."

When Johnson's lenient reconstruction policy met with Radical Republican opposition in Congress, the President devised a strategy that, in later years, would become a stan­ dard tool in a President's fight with the press: he took his case directly to the people, asking them to elect a congress which would see things his way. He stumped through nine

states and unleashed a torrent of abuse in the Republican

press. One observer summed it up this way:

The type of thing that the Radical press had to say about this President of the United States shows to what low estate journalism had fallen. Editorially and in

33 G. F. Milton, The Age of Hate, pp. 79-80, cited by Pollard, p. 3 98. 34 Pollard, p. 397. 35 New York World. March 7, 1865, cited by Pollard, p. 399. 16

their news columns, such papers as Joseph Medill's Chicago Tribune and Horace Greeley's New York Tribune gave vent to vituperation which a decent man would be ashamed to apply to a convict. The Independent was quite as bad. In this religious journal for religious folk, Johnson's eyes were called "deep set, lascivious," and he was further described as having "the face of a demagogue, the heart of a traitor.

Johnson's ploy failed. An even more obstreperous congress was elected. Johnson was impeached and came within a single vote of being convicted.

President-press relations remained uneasy for dec­ ades. Ulysses S. Grant's Administration was rife with scan­ dals , and he was among the three or four Presidents most reviled by the journalists of their day. Rutherford B.

Hayes assumed office after a hotly disputed election and never received much press support; he managed to restrain his criticism but wrote it all down in his diary. James Garfield was shot before he could make any serious mistakes. Chester

Arthur steadfastly refused to have anything to do with the 37 press.

Grover Cleveland was unique in a number of ways.

The first Democrat to reach the White House in twenty-eight years, he was also the first president to openly and publicly

^^Milton, p. 367, cited by Pollard, p. 403. 3 7 Pollard, pp. 434-97. 17 trade insults with his tormentors in the Fourth Estate. The

1884 campaign for the presidency has gone down in history as one of unparalleled bitterness and scurrility. Cleveland, the rumor went, kept the company of low women. The Buffalo

Telegraph exploded a bombshell when it revealed Cleveland had fathered a son by a woman he didn't marry. The story gave birth to a campaign chant that is remembered still :

Mai Mai Where's my pa? Gone to the White House, Hal Hal Ha 138

As President-elect, Cleveland established the pat­ tern he would continue to adhere to in his relations with the press; he kept reporters at arms ' s length. Once an eager young journalist needled him with a question he didn't like, and he cut the reporter off by saying, "Young man, that is an issue too big to be brought up in a brief interview that 39 is rapidly drawing to a close."

Cleveland did not trust the press and was convinced the papers were deliberately trying to misrepresent him. His distaste intensified when reporters learned through backdoor

3 8 Pollard, pp. 500-501. 39 Henry L. Stoddard, It Costs To Be President, p. 211, cited by Pollard, p. 501. 18

sources that the President would marry the young daughter of

his late law partner. Cleveland refused to announce his

marital plans publicly but wrote his sister that his fian­

cee's family had better avoid his wedding. Otherwise^ he wrote :

. . . they will be subjected from the time of their arrival to the impudent inquisition of newspaper cor­ respondents j and if this latter dirty gang were not entirely satisfied^ our friends would probably be dished up in a very mean way.40

Reporters were not permitted to witness the wedding,

but they worked their own form of revenge; they followed the

couple to their honeymoon cabin in Deer Park, Maryland, and

watched it around the clock. When there was little to report, 41 the newsmen used their imagination and filed stories anyway.

At the 250th anniversary of Harvard College, Cleve­

land traveled to Cambridge to deliver an address denouncing

the pencil-pushing hawks who watched him so closely. He said,

in part :

The close view afforded our citizens of the acts and conduct of those to whom they have entrusted their interests, serves as a regulator and check upon tempta­ tion and pressure in office, and is a constant reminder

40 Allan Nevins, Letters of Grover Cleveland, pp. 106- 7, cited by Pollard, pp. 503-4.

"^^Pollard, pp. 506-9. 19

that diligence and faithfulness are the measure of public duty. And such a relation between President and people ought to leave but little room in popular judgment and conscience for unjust and false accusations, and for malicious slanders invented for the purpose of under­ mining the people's trust and confidence in the adminis­ tration of their government. No public officer should desire to check the utmost freedom of criticism as to all official acts; but every right-thinking man must concede that the President of the United States should not be put beyond the protection which American love of fair play and decency accords to every American citizen. This trait of our national character would not encourage, if their extent were fully appreciated, the silly mean and cowardly lies that every day are found in the columns of certain newspapers, which violate every instinct of American manliness, and in the ghoulish glee desecrate every sacred relation of private life. . . .42

Cleveland's criticism of the Fourth Estate was expressed even stronger in his private correspondence. To one friend, he wrote:

I don't think there ever was a time when newspaper lying was so general and so mean as at present, and there never was a country under the sun where it flour­ ished as it does in this. The falsehoods daily spread before the people in our newspapers , . . are insults to the American love of decency and fair play of which we boast.43

While Cleveland had ample grounds to censure the press, the journalists, in turn, had good reason to take him to task. He rarely talked with reporters; and when he wanted

42 Harvard College. 250th Anniversary, pp. 268-69 ited by Pollard, p. 512.c 43 Nevins, pp. 94-95, cited by Pollard, p. 517 20 to say something to the public, he often put it in writing and instructed his personal secretary to hand it out to 44 reporters. He was often evasive, he actively suppressed coverage of legitimate news events, and he frequently lied to reporters. When, for example, he was secretly operated on for cancer of the mouth, his policy was, in his own words, 45 "to deny and discredit" the story.

Gifted with personal magnetism, an impulsive nature, and an acute sense of drama, Theodore Roosevelt was a favor­ ite of newsmen. They sometimes wrote stories the President didn't like, and he returned the favor by bullying them. He filed libel suits against some editors and publishers, and he used his influence to get reporters fired. But the jour­ nalists liked Roosevelt, and the feeling generally was returned in kind.^^

One of Roosevelt's first acts as President was to call reporters together to establish the ground rules by which he would deal with the press. He would cooperate by

44 David Barry, "News Gathering at the Capital," Chautauquan. Vol. XXVI (December, 1897), pp. 282-86, cited by Pollard, p. 517. 45 Nevins, pp. 333-34, cited by Pollard, p. 524. 46 Keogh, president Nixon and the Press, p. 25. 21 providing stories, he said. But he was not to be quoted directly, and reporters were not to publish news he didn't want published. Offenders would be ostracized. "All right,

gentlemen," he said, closing the meeting, "now we understand 47 each other."

Teddy Roosevelt actively cultivated reporters and gave them their first press room in the White House. Occa­

sionally, he held group sessions with the press, often in the

form of "audiences" which were granted when he sat down for his late afternoon shave. He formalized the official "leak" 48 and the "trial balloon."

Woodrow Wilson was a shy and somewhat aloof man who

claimed he believed in "pitiless publicity" for his public

activities but who detested and resisted all attempts to 49 probe his personal life. As President-elect, for example, he was vacationing in Bermuda when a news photographer

snapped a picture of his daughter, Jessie, against Wilson's

explicit instructions. "I want to give you the worst

47 David S. Barry, Forty Years in Washington, pp. 2 67- 69, cited by pollard, pp. 571-72. 48 Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1965), pp. 17-18. 49 Pollard, p. 630. 22 thrashing of your life," the enraged Wilson, his fists clenched, told the photographer. "And what's more. I'm per­ fectly able to do it."^^

He subsequently returned to the subject time and again. On one occasion, he stood before reporters, in his daughter's words, "with fire in his eyes," and upbraided them:

. . . I am a public character for the time being, but the ladies of my household are not servants of the government and they are not public characters. I deeply resent the treatment they are receiving at the hands of the newspapers at this time. . . . It is a violation of my own impulses even to speak of these things, but my oldest daughter is constantly represented as being engaged to this, that or the other man in different parts of the country, in some instances, to men she has never met in her life. . . . These things are printed without any attempt to verify them by communication to the White House and when explicit denials are received . . . those denials are not respected in the least. . . .51

Wilson is credited with initiating regular press conferences as they are known today. He held his first just eleven days after his inauguration. He said, in part:

I feel that a large part of the success of public affairs depends on the newspaper men— not so much on the editorial writers, because we can live down what they

^^Charles Willis Thompson, President's I've Known. p. 295, cited by Pollard, p. 534.

^^Ray Stannard Baker, Life and Letters of Woodrow Wilson. Vol. IV, p. 230, cited by Pollard, p. 637. 23

say, as upon the news writers, because the news is the atmosphere of public affairs. Unless you get the right setting to affairs— disperse the right impression— things go wrong. . . .

If you play up every morning, differences of opinion and predict difficulties, . . . you are not so much doing an injury to an individual or to any one of the groups of individuals you are talking about, as impeding the public business. Our present business is to get together, not to get divided. . . .

I sent for you, therefore, to ask that you go into partnership with me, that you lend me your assistance as nobody else can, and then after you have brought this precious freight of opinion into Washington, let us try and make true gold here that will go out from Washington. 52

Wilson was not fond of facing the press. He had to spend too much time in preparation, he said. The questions, moreover, were too "trivial and personal." He looked for an excuse to terminate the press conferences and found it in

World War I .

The twenty-eighth President was an innovator in yet another respect. When the U.S. entered the war, he felt a need for some instrument which could be used to shape the national opinion. He formed the famous "Committee on public

Information" and placed it in the hands of George Creel, a 54 former editor of the Rocky Mountain News. The "Creel

52 Baker, Vol. IV, p. 230, cited by Pollard, p. 636. 53 Cornwell, p. 41.

^^Pollard, p. 659. 24

Committee," as it soon came to be called, supervised the war­ time censorship, which was theoretically "voluntary," and performed an immense "selling" job by taking the President's 55 policies straight to the people.

Warren G. Harding, himself a newspaperman, was blessed with a good press. He knew how reporters worked and what they needed, and he gave it to them as best he could.

He is most fondly remembered by journalists for rejuvenating the regular press conference.Harding's successor, Calvin

Coolidge, was, by nature, a taciturn man, and he could see no reason why he should change just to satisfy the press.

He made little news, but was not treated particularly harshly by newsmen. Herbert Hoover began his relations with the press on a promising basis, with regular news conferences and hon­ est, forthright answers. But events and a talent for inanity soon combined to drag him into a journalistic inferno where 57 he was daily roasted.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt, it is safe to say, "used" the press like no President before him. With a few excep­ tions, he liked reporters, enjoyed parrying with them, and went out of his way to satisfy their eternal thirst for news.

^^Cornwell, p. 49, ^^Pollard, p. 712. ^^Pollard, pp. 740-41. 25

He held 998 press conferences in his four terms— an all-time record, "My hope," he said in his first news conference, four days after he took the oath, "is that these conferences are going to be merely enlarged editions of the kind of very delightful family conferences I have been holding in Albany 5S for the last four years." They proved to be everything he had hoped they would.

F.D.R. established strict rules for reporters cover­ ing the White House. He banned direct quotation of his remarks, except when authorized. He established "background" sessions in which everything said was totally "off the rec- 59 ord" and could be cited only on a reporter's own authority.

Radio provided Roosevelt with direct access to the people, and he used it masterfully. Whenever he wanted to say something without filtering it through the Washington press corps, he went on the air with the "fireside chats" that have become legendary.

Journalists, on the average, were fond of Roosevelt.

But they were well aware they were being manipulated, and

charges were often heard that freedom of the press was being

58 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Public Papers and Addresses. Vol. II, p. 30, cited by Pollard, p. 775. 59 Roosevelt, Vol. II, p. 30, cited by Pollard, p. 775. 2 6

"destroyed" or "assailed." A Roosevelt speech at the Uni­ versity of Missouri in 1934 typified his attitude;

Freedom of the press means freedom of expression, both in news columns and editorial columns. Judging by both these columns in papers in every part of the country, this freedom is freer than it ever has been before in our history.

There has been no attempt in Washington to "gag" newspapermen or stifle editorial comment. There will be no such a t t e m p t . ^0

Editorially, newspapers were often critical of

Roosevelt, and he was wont to use them as whipping boys.

But he was careful to segregate the "owners" as the villains, as opposed to reporters. He frequently decried what he called "colored news stories." But, he said, "It is not the man at the desk in most cases. It is not the reporter. It goes back to the owner of the paper."61

Harry Truman entered the White House with a promise to continue Roosevelt's policies towards the news media. He met reporters fairly regularly, but held only half as many press conferences as his predecessor.^2 jje was humble with

^^Roosevelt, Vol. Ill, p. 228, cited by Pollard, pp. 781-82. 61 Roosevelt, Vol. Ill, p. 512, cited by Pollard, p. 784. 62 James E. Pollard, The Presidents and the Press. Truman to Johnson (Washington, D.G.: Public Affairs press, 1964), p. 27. 27 the press at first, but after upsetting Thomas Dewey in the

1948 election, he became more self-assured. As one corres­ pondent put it :

. . . Practically everyone has a personal liking for Mr. Truman. This applies to newspapermen as well as to everyone else. They disapprove of him or criti­ cize him with their intellectual faculties, but on the human front they feel warm toward him. I do not know anyone, either pressman or other, who feels anything except personal warmth for Truman the man.

After the 1948 elections . . . Mr. Truman became obviously cocky in his dealings with the newsmen, and with practically all others. Mind you, this isn't arro­ gance. It's just cockiness. It arises out of his feel­ ing that he won the election. He did— not his party— he did. This is pretty much true. The reporters recognize the fact, and they don't rough him much on account of his self-assurance. . . .53

Truman was caustic with reporters and appeared to care little aboüt what they thought of him. New York Herald

Tribune reporter Bert Andrews once began a query by saying,

"One thing that puzzled reporters," but Truman interrupted him. "You're easily puzzled," he said. "You’re always speculating about something you don't know anything about. 64 But go ahead."

On the whole, Truman's relations with the press were decent. He quarreled with reporters, editors, and publishers.

^^Pollard, Truman to Johnson, p. 39. 64 Pollard, Truman to Johnson, p. 48. 28 as have all Chief Executives. But in his last press confer­ ence, on January 15, 1953, he summed it up in a way most

Presidents would have :

I want to urge all of you to continue to do your best to dig out the facts and to put them before the people. Naturally, not all of the newspapers agree with me and I do not agree with all of them. But in spite of these differences, i want to make it plain that I think it is important for our democratic system of government that every medium of communication between the citizens and their government, particularly the President, be kept open as far as possible.55

Dwight D. Eisenhower’s relationship with the press was highlighted by a new development: he was the first Presi­ dent to have his press conferences filmed and broadcast on television. The President, possessed of the famous, infec­ tious "Eisenhower smile," went over well in the new medium.

As Arthur Krock, chief of the New York Times Washington bureau, put it after the new President's first press confer­ ence :

No President . . . since the beginning of White House press conferences in Woodrow Wilson's time has given a stronger impression of sincerity, mental integ­ rity, devotion to the basic constitutional system and amiability that Dwight D. Eisenhower conveyed today. . . .56

The love affair soon leveled off, and reporters

Pollard,.Truman to Johnson, pp. 57-58.

6 6 Pollard, Truman to Johnson, p. 63. 29 learned that Ike possessed a ferocious temper. On one occa­ sion, an embarrassing question left him, in the words of one reporter, "nearly speechless with emotion," and he stalked 67 from the room. He soon began referring to reporters as

"you people," and the news conferences tapered off.^^ The antagonistic relationship between Eisenhower and the press, however, never went beyond the healthy stage and has generally been judged as good.

John F. Kennedy, handsome, articulate, witty, always ready with a quip, was a "natural" for television, and fit­ tingly, he was the first President to permit live telecast­ ing of his press conferences. The broadcast press loved it, but print reporters soon came forth with charges that tele­ vised conferences made them feel like props in a staged . 70 show.

An ardent student of the press, and a former reporter himself, Kennedy was liked and respected by the White House press corps. But charges soon arose that the Administration was "managing" the news. Kennedy's press secretary.

^^Pollard, Truman to Johnson. P* 72.

^^Pollard, Truman to Johnson, PP- 87-89. 69 Pollard, Truman to Johnson, P* 93. 70_ _ _ _ Pollard, Truman to Johnson, P- 101- 30

Pierre Salinger, it was learned, "coordinated" the news policies of other executive departments.^^ There was evi­ dence, also, that the Kennedy Administration leaked selected 72 information to favored reporters. The controversy boiled over when Pentagon press spokesman Arthur Sylvester defended the government's "inherent right to lie" in certain situa- 73 trons,

Kennedy himself asked newsmen to be selective with

their stories. "Every newspaper now asks itself," he said,

"with respect to every story: 'Is it news?' All I suggest

is that you add the question: 'Is it in the interest of the 74 national security?'" Later, Kennedy learned the New York

Times had killed a story exposing preparations for the Bay

of Pigs invasion. After it turned into a complete fiasco,

the President told Orvil Dryfoos, late publisher of the 7 5 Times , "I wish you had run everything on Cuba."

When Lyndon Johnson assumed office, reporters were

^^Pollard, Truman to Johnson, p. 104. 72 Pollard, Truman to Johnson, p. 105. 73 Pollard, Truman to Johnson, p. 100. 74 Harrison Salisbury, "Print Journalism," Playboy. XIX (January, 1972), 122. 75 Salisbury, p. 122. 31 certain he was going to he an "electronic" President,

Throughout his career, especially as Majority Leader of the

U.S. Senate, he had dealt almost exclusively with the spoken word rather than the printed one. He habitually insisted, for example, on receiving his staff briefings orally rather than by memoranda. Yet, as President, he shunned television and was much more at ease chatting with reporters in small groups around his desk.^^ Indeed, he was in office over two months before he held his first televised news conference.

Network officials were so distressed they flew to Washington 77 to press their case to Johnson.

Initially, L.B.J. tried to cultivate reporters with a soft touch. He visited Walter Lippmann. He flew New York

Times Washington chief James Reston to the Johnson ranch for the Christmas holidays. He met with executives of the major 78 news services.

The tactics did not work. Johnson soon became entangled in the Vietnam War, and newsmen did not always report it the way L.B.J. saw it. He was accused of lying to

^^Ben H. Bagdikian, "JFK to LBJ: Paradoxes of Change," Columbia Journalism Review, Vol. II (Winter, 1964), pp. 32-34. 77 Bagdikian, p. 34. 78 Bagdikian, p. 35. 32 reporters and, in the end, tried to bully them. By the time he left the White House, it was said that he had cut himself off from everyone in journalism except columnist William S, 79 White, an old and dear friend and fellow-Texan.

RICHARD NIXON

When Richard Nixon reached the White House, eight years after being defeated in his first attempt, there was speculation that mutual hostility would be the hallmark of the President-press relationship. In his twenty-two years

On the national scene, he had seldom hesitated to let the public know of his deep-rooted antipathy for the press.

The speculation appears to have been prophecy. Most of the conflict with the press has come, not from Nixon him­ self, but from other Administration figures, but James Keogh, the President's former chief speechwriter and now the direc­

tor of the United States Information Agency, has said that the "chain of command" for press policy runs "ultimately to 80 the President himself." At the same time, he personally remains isolated and above the battle. He told Associated

Press reporter Saul Pett that he does not even permit the

^^Salisbury, p. 122. 80 Keogh, President Nixon and the Press, p. 43. 33 press to intrude on his solitude. Said the President;

I could go up the wall watching TV commentators. I don't. I get my news from the news summary the staff prepares every day and it's great; it gives all sides.

I never watch TV commentators or the news shows when they are about me. That's because I don't want decisions influenced by personal emotional reactions.81

Nixon impresses the same philosophy upon his family, according to Julie Nixon Eisenhower. Her father, she says, is "always telling us not to worry, to turn off the tele­ vision, don't read the newspapers and don't get upset by what people say about him, because that's all part of the 82 game.

The "news summary" the President spoke of is a spe­ cial digest prepared daily under the direction of aide 83 Patrick Buchanan, Even this summary sometimes gets mini­ mum attention; the President, wrote Keogh, does "not read it 84 word-for-word everyday."

Except for a news sheet that has been filtered through

81 Associated Press dispatch. The Washington Post. January 14, 1973. 82 Allen Drury, Courage and Hesitation (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1971), p. 223.

^^Jack Anderson, "Press Corps Smooths Way for Nixon," The Washington Post, June 3, 1970, Sec. B, p. 11. 84 Keogh, p. 70. 34

the White House staff, therefore, the press is effectively

locked out of the President's life. In addition, H. R.

Haldeman, the President's former "chief of staff," who

resigned in the wake of the "Watergate affair," had the

responsibility of deciding who saw Nixon, and Haldeman was

known to have been discriminating. He once explained to

author Allen Drury why he and other aides protected their boss and other Administration officials so diligently:

. . . We . . . act as a screen, because there is a real danger of some advocate of an idea rushing in to the President or some other decision-maker, if the per­ son is allowed to do so, and actually managing to con­ vince them in a burst of emotion or argument.°5

Thus the President sits in apparent seclusion in his

"castle," protected by his staff while his representatives

criticize the journalists who write and talk about him. But

there remains a suspicion that he does not really feel as

strongly as his spokesmen, that they perhaps exaggerate his

concern with his coverage. Indeed, Nixon often claims to be

unconcerned with what he calls the "intellectuals and the

liberal press." As he once told reporter Jules Witcover:

I'm not one of those guys who reads his press clip­ pings. I believe in never being affected by reports about me. I may read some selected clippings a week or later, when somebody sends them to me, but never the

^^Drury, p. 128. 35

next morning. I never look at myself on TV, either. I don't want to develop those phony, self-conscious, con­ trived things. One thing I have to be is always be myself.55

In Six Crises. Nixon wrote that "unwarranted attacks,

particularly those involving personal integrity . . . take

their toll , . . [and] there are times when you wonder if 87 you shouldn't chuck the whole business."

Witcover, in his interviews with Nixon, observed that

he seemed to regard the news conference as a battlefield.

"The number of times he referred to the press conference as

a standard of performance was noteworthy," the reporter

wrote.

Mr. Nixon has had difficult experiences with the

press. In the heat of the 1952 campaign, for example, when

Senator Richard Nixon was running as Dwight Eisenhower's

vice-presidential candidate, the story broke that Nixon was

the beneficiary of a "secret fund" raised by some of his

wealthy California constituents. Nixon's immediate response

was to attack :

86 Jules Witcover, The Resurrection of Richard Nixon (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), p. 151. 87 Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962), p. 128. 88 witcover, p. 150. 36

You folks know the work that I did investigating Communists in the United States. Ever since I have done that work the Communists and left-wingers have been fight­ ing me with every possible smear. When I received the nomination for the vice-presidency, I was warned that if I continued to attack the Communists in this government they would continue to smear me. And believe me, you can expect that they will continue to do so. They started it yesterday. They have tried to say that I had taken $16,000 for my personal use.89

"The man in political life must come to expect the smear," Nixon has also written, "and to know that generally, the best thing to do about it is to ignore it— and hope that 90 it will fade away."

President Nixon has frequently expressed the belief that the press has been unfair to him. "You won't have Nixon to kick around anymore," he told newsmen in his famous "last press conference" after he lost the 1962 California guberna- 91 torial election. ". . . Of all the Presidents in this century, " he once told ABC newsman Howard K. Smith, "it is probably true, that I have less . . . supporters in the press 92 than any President."

89 Nixon, p. 83. 90 Nixon, p. 129. 91 Witcover, p. 22. 92 TRB from Washington, "Evading the Press," The New Republic, April 24, 1971, p. 4. 37

Today's newsmen, Nixon feels, have forgotten the old traditions and rules of journalism. "Nowadays," he told

Allen Drury, reporters "don't care about fairness, it's the

in thing to forget objectivity, and let your prejudices 93 show." The President continued:

. . . You can see it in my press conferences all the time. You read the Kennedy press conference and see how soft and gentle they were with him, and then you read mine. I never get any easy questions— and I don't want any. I am quite aware that ideologically the Washington press corps doesn't agree with me. I expect it. I think people can judge for themselves when they watch one of my press conferences. It's all there.84

Drury, although sympathetic with the President's

arguments, noted that when Nixon talked about the press, "his

eyes narrowed, he swung his chair around and stared out across 95 the distant gray Pacific. . . .

Other newsmen claim to have noticed in Richard Nixon

an uncompromising abomination of the press. Jack Anderson

told this investigator that ;

Nixon is mean about the press. He's nasty about it; he's ugly about it. And he's dangerous. The "last press conference" in '62— that was the real Nixon coming out. It's important to remember there's another Nixon lurking behind that smiling, public face. This Nixon is saying

93 Drury, p. 395. 94 Drury, p. 395. 95 Drury, p. 395. 38 96 to the press, "You sons of bitches, you."

"Other Administrations have had a love-hate relation­ ship with the press," says NBC newsman John Chancellor, "The 97 Nixon Administration has a hate-hate relationship." Former president of CBS Fred Friendly has charged Nixon with exe­ cuting a "plot against free speech." Nixon, Friendly says, 98 "really doesn't believe in a free and open society."

The President's family reflects his attitude toward the press. Pat Nixon once said that her husband's "marvel­ ous sense of humor" and penchant for "situational jokes" were not reported because "some people just don't want to write about it because they think it makes him seem more 99 human and likeable."

When Allen Drury asked Tricia Nixon how she regarded the press, she said she thought "they're a necessary evil."

But then she caught herself and continued;

. . . No, I won't say that, because they aren't really evil. They have their job to do and i suppose that without them the public would not be informed, and

96 Statement by Jack Anderson, personal interview, December 26, 1972. 97 "Nixon and the Media," Newsweek, January 15, 1973, p. 42. 98 "Nixon and the Media," p. 42. 99 Drury, p. 235, 39

in a way a President could not really do what he wants to do because he couldn't get public opinion behind him. However, I do think that sometimes the questions in the press conferences are not so much questions as they are an indictment. I don't think that is so good. . . .100

The President's aides and colleagues apparently share the First Family's view. On Monday, January 4, 1971,

President Nixon held a televised "conversation" with three network commentators. The President handled himself well with the respectful but inquisitive newsmen. The next morn­ ing he walked into a Cabinet meeting and was greeted with a standing ovation. Reporters asked the President's press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, if Nixon had received similar congratulations before. Ziegler was prepared with the facts :

The president has received standing ovations in Cabinet meetings following addresses that he has given on television. I have recalled the Cambodian speech and also others that he has given on family assistance, when he introduced the family assistance plan and other speeches that he has given on nationwide television explaining United States policy in South Vietnam. . . .101

"The conviction that President Nixon could expect more twisted stories than straight reporting in the major 102 media ran strong in his Administration," James Keogh wrote.

^^^Drury, p. 241.

^^^Drury, pp. 165-66. 102 Keogh, President Nixon and the Press, p. 39. 40

He described how a group of twenty-five correspondents met in a Washington hotel, prior to a presidential press con­ ference, in an effort to plan a more effective method of questioning Nixon. "... The vultures were circling omi­ nously," he wrote.The reporters, Keogh continued, were demonstrating a "'let's get him for sure this time'" atti­ tude.

Reporter Stuart Loory, formerly of the Los Angeles

Times, is, in Keogh's words, "well up in the ranks of the

Nixon-haters. Nicholas von Hoffman, caustic columnist for the Washington Post, writes "the most vicious anti-Nixon rhetoric, Herb Block, the Post's eminent cartoonist, 107 has "for two decades" been "ogerizing Richard Nixon." The 108 New Republic is a "Nixon-hating magazine," Sander Vanocur's

"emotional approach to issues on NBC news made him the elec­ tronic Tom Wicker"; on one show, Vanocur asked a series of questions "with an attitude of barely controlled out- ..109 rage.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the colorful Harvard

^*^^Keogh, p. 45. ^^^Keogh, p. 45. ^^^Keogh, p. 46.

^^^Keogh, p. 68. ^^^Keogh, p. 68. ^^^Keogh, p. 71. 109 Keogh, p. 120. 41 professor who served Nixon as a domestic affairs advisor, and is now ambassador to India, once said that Nixon "has had the least generous press of anyone I have ever known in the White House. It has been one long presumption of mal­ feasance, sinister intent, trickery, and double-dealing.

In H. R. Haldeman ' s opinion. President Nixon has "a more hostile press corps" than other Presidents had. Nixon, he said, "may have a greater number of the press interested in his unsuccess. Haldeman alleged that "the great bulk of the working press are [sic] Democrats, so there's a party difference to begin with." Reporters, he said, "have 112 a liberal-versus-conservative approach to things,"

Haldeman's criticisms, however valid or invalid, were not always so properly expressed. New Republic colum­ nist John Osborne once wrote an article describing President

Nixon's 1970 trip to Europe as "a power kick." Haldeman

passed the word to Ron Ziegler that Osborne ' s column was 113 "the shittiest piece of journalism I ever saw. "

^^^Drury, Courage and Hesitation, p. 68.

^^^Associated Press dispatch. The Washington post. August 10, 1971. 112 Associated press dispatch. The Washington Post, August 10, 1971. 113 John Osborne, The Second Year of the Nixon Watch (New York: Liveright, 1971), p. 157. 42

THE GRAND STRATEGY

Like other Presidents, Richard Nixon is trying to communicate with the people and he resents those who would presume to interpret, explain, or condemn his policies.

Consequently, like those before him, he has taken it upon himself the task of neutralizing the press.

Yet, it is the hypothesis of this analysis that

President Nixon, unlike his predecessors, has adopted a deliberate, well thought-out, and systematic approach to the problem.

The pattern, or "grand strategy," which apparently has been adopted by the Nixon Administration for handling the news media consists of two elements. First, the Nixon associates have institutionalized the tactic of "evading" the press to take their message straight to the people through modern communications techniques. Second, they have attempted to dilute the credibility and effectiveness of journalists.

The "evasion" of the news media is carried out pri­ marily through the use of television. Nixon is the first

President to effectively and fully use the medium. As Wall

Street Journal columnist Alan L. Otten has expressed it; 43

The Democrats have just begun awakening to a crucial fact of political life: In Richard Nixon they face a President who^ thus far at least, has proven remarkably adroit and effective in using the mighty medium of tele­ vision. , . .

Might not a President use the medium to manipulate the nation in dark and devious ways?

There's really been no President yet with the chance or talent. Television hadn't arrived under Truman. Ike was a television natural, but rarely tried to use it as a political weapon. Kennedy wasn't around long enough, and Johnson came across as a television heavy.

The use of television to evade the press is supple­ mented by the application of propaganda techniques to deal with editors, publishers, and prominent citizens all across the country. This operation was directed by Herbert Klein, a former newspaper editor and longtime friend of the Presi­ dent who was "Director of communications" for the Executive

Branch.■ U 115

President Nixon's effective use of the electronic media is made possible because of the continued improvement of the technology of communication. When he traveled to

Europe and Asia in 1969, for example, the trip was beamed live into the nation's living rooms via satellite— the first

114 Marvin Barrett (ed.). The Alfred I . duPont- Columbia University Survey of Broadcast Journalism 1969-1970 (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 1970), p. 47.

^^^See Chapter 4, pp.187-221. 44 such transmission from Eastern Europe.The heralded trip to China also became a prime-time spectacle because of dra­ matic, live satellite transmission.

Mr. Nixon's emphasis in hiring aides has been on those who are expert in the advertising and public relations professions. They plan campaigns to sell his programs. They bring in Congressmen for breakfast meetings, coordinate with business leaders and special groups. They arrange briefings for community leaders.

At the top of his staff was the President's "chief of staff," H. R. Haldeman. CBS's Dan Rather has said about

Haldeman;

[He] thinks he knows more about my business than I do, and I'm inclined to think he's correct. . . . He came out of an advertising agency [J. Walter Thompson] in Los Angeles. He's made a lifetime study of the techniques of manipulating my business.

Rather went on to say that John Kennedy had the knowledge but not the will to manipulate the media. Lyndon

Johnson and his advisors had the will but not the knowledge.

But the Nixon men. Rather said, "have both the will and the determination to try to manipulate the media, and the

^^^Barrett, p. 9 .

1 1 7 James R. Dickenson, "Nixon and the Press," The National Observer. October 2 8 , 1 9 7 2 , p. 2 4 . 45 know-how. . . . All politicians in my experience want to do in one degree or another what M r . Nixon and his people are doing.

In sum, it is the thesis of this study that the Nixon

Administration pursued a two-fold plan to influence the news received by the American public: (1) used advanced communi­ cations techniques to circumvent the press, and (2) encour­ aged public criticism of the news media in an attempt to affect the reportage of newsmen.

118 Dickenson, p. 24. chapter 2

THE EVOLUTION OP THE NIXON PHILOSOPHY

OF THE PRESS

Richard Nixon did not bring his views on the function of a free press with him when he first assumed national office. The nuts and bolts and girders of his philosophy were tempered in the fires of bitter experience.

HISS, "CHECKERS," AND OTHER HISTORY

Nixon's conflicts with the press, he has often said, began in the late 1940's when, as a member of the House

Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), he became a central figure in the investigation of Alger Hiss for alleged Com­ munist ties. A Harvard Law School graduate and former clerk to Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Hiss had been an important State Department official. When his name was first mentioned before the HUAC, he was president of the Car­ negie Foundation for International Peace.

Hiss came to the committee's attention through the testimony of Whittaker Chambers, a confessed ex-Communist and

46 47 senior editor of Time magazine. Chambers testified, in

Nixon's words, that Hiss had been one of "four members of his underground Communist group whose purpose . . . was not espionage but rather 'Communist infiltration of the American government.'

An indignant Hiss denied everything Chambers had said and demanded a hearing before the committee. He appeared before the HUAC on August 5, 1948, and, as Richard

Nixon put it. Hiss staged "a virtuoso performance":

. . . Without actually saying it, he left the clear impression that he was the innocent victim of a terrible case of mistaken identity, or that a fantastic vendetta had been launched against him for some reason he could not fathom.2

"I was a lawyer," Nixon said, "and . . . I felt that 3 his testimony was just too slick. ..." Having been appointed to head a special subcommittee to continue the investigation, Nixon queried several people about Hiss. He cross-examined the two antagonists again. Finally, he arranged a face-to-face confrontation between them in the

Commodore Hotel in New York City. Chambers repeated all his

^Richard Nixon, Six crises (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & company. Inc., 1962), p. 3. 2 Nixon, pp. 7-8.

^William Costello, The Facts About Nixon, an Unauthor­ ized Biography (New York: The Viking press, 1960), p. 192. 48 charges; Hiss continued to deny them and challenged Chambers to repeat his accusations in public. Chambers accepted the challenge and reiterated his charges on a radio program. 4 Three weeks later. Hiss filed a libel suit.

Whittaker Chambers then dropped a bombshell by pro­ ducing an envelope of documents which, he said, had been passed along to him by Hiss. Some were in Hiss's handwriting.

Still, the Justice Department demanded additional evidence and threatened to drop its investigation if none were pro­ duced. Nixon subpoenaed Chambers for other papers, and this move resulted in a scene that might well have come straight out of a spy thriller : Chambers took a HUAC agent to a pump­ kin patch on his Maryland farm, reached into a hollowed-out pumpkin, and withdrew five rolls of microfilm containing pho­ tos of secrete State Department documents given to him, he said, by H i s s .^

A New York grand jury, after hearing Nixon testify, returned an indictment for perjury against Hiss. After two trials, he went to prison.

In his first real "test," Nixon, with an amazing dis­ play of tenacity and energy, had triumphed. But he paid a

^Costello, pp. 193-94. ^Costello, pp. 194-95. 49 stiff price in the loss of support in the press. As James

Keogh put it.

There could be no doubt that the press corps cover­ ing the Hiss case— with The Washington Post setting the tone— was overwhelmingly in favor of Hiss and against the Un-American Activities Committee, which was widely denounced in print and on radio as an instrument of repression. This placed young Congressman Nixon . . . directly at target center.5

Nixon himself has said much the same thing. His relentless pursuit of Hiss, he said, "left a residue of hatred and hostility toward me , . . among substantial seg- 7 ments of the press and the intellectual community. ..."

He was still brooding about it on November 7, 1962, when, in his "last press conference," he gave vent to his innermost feelings :

And as I leave the press, all I can say is this: For sixteen years, ever since the Hiss case, you've had a lot of fun— a lot of fun— that you've had an opportunity to attack me and I think I 've given as good as I've taken. . . .8

Thus evolved the first principle in the Nixon credo of the press : Richard Nixon is convinced that the press dis­ likes him.

James Keogh, President Nixon and the Press (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1972), p. 4. 7 Nixon, Six Crises, p. 69.

g Jules Witcover, The Resurrection of Richard Nixon (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), pp. 20-21. 50

Nixon's next great battle with the press occurred during the 1952 presidential campaign when he was running as General Dwight Eisenhower's vice—presidential candidate.

Several reporters heard about a "fund" that had been col­ lected for Nixon by a group of wealthy Californians. When he was asked about the fund, Nixon played it down, claiming the money was used to offset legitimate expenses he incurred in his official job as a Senator. In fact, he even told reporters they could get the details from the fund's trea­ surer, Dana Smith, and he gave newsmen Smith's telephone number.^

On September 18, 1952, Nixon was whistle-stopping on the West Coast when the story broke in the New York Post.

His first thought, he later wrote, was that:

The Post story did not worry me. It was to be expected. The Post was and still is the most partisan Democratic paper in the country. It had done an unusually neat smear job. . . .

That was the message he began preaching to the crowds as he traveled about. The "smear job" tactic, how­ ever, was not sufficient to bail him out this time. Even

9 Stewart Alsop, "The Mystery of Richard Nixon," The Saturday Evening Post, July 12, 1958, pp. 60-62.

^^Nixon, Six Crises, p. 81. 51 the New York Herald Tribune, a Republican paper and tradi­ tional Nixon supporter, called on him to withdraw from the ticket.Eisenhower's advisors began giving him the same advice, but Nixon refused to make any move until he had

talked to Ike himself. The old general finally called and told Nixon it was up to him. Nixon replied that he wanted a chance to tell his side of the story.

Nixon turned to Murray Chotiner who had previously managed campaigns for California Governor Earl Warren and

Senator William Knowland, Republican of California.

Chotiner had joined forces with Nixon for his first Con­ gressional contest\against Jerry Voorhis in 1945 and had

counseled his young protege to challenge the incumbant's

patriotism. In what Nixon called a "rocking, socking" cam­

paign, he pulled off the upset and went to Washington. Then,

in 1950, Chotiner managed Nixon's race for the Senate seat held by Helen Gahagan Douglas. Chotiner conceived the idea

of printing the lady's liberal voting on pink paper, sug­

gesting that this was the color of her political philosophy. 12 Again Nixon won. Said Chotiner, who seems to be quite

Alsop, p. 60. 12 Elizabeth Drew, "The White House Hard Hats," The Atlantic Monthly. CCXXVI (October, 1970), 52-53, 52 fond of his hardnose image: "I don't know why the lady should have thought that we meant to imply she was pink.

In the fund crisis, Chotiner provided Nixon with another lesson in how to deal with the press. Said

Chotiner:

Everytime you get before an audience, you win them. What we have to do is get you before the biggest pos­ sible audience so that you can talk over the heads of the press to the people. The people, I am convinced, are for you but the press is killing you.

Principle Number Two: A skillful politician can use television to "end run" the press.

Nixon conferred with his other advisors; they all told him the same thing :

Everyone . , . agreed that somehow I had to get an opportunity to tell my story to millions rather than to the thousands who were coming out to hear me at the whistle-stops. There was only one way to do this— through a national television broadcast.^5

They considered the possibility of going on a net­ work public affairs panel show such as "Meet the Press."

But Chotiner advised against the idea, Nixon has written, because such a show "would be a bad format because . . .

13 "Chotiner's Comeback," Newsweek, June 22, 1970, p. 21. 14 Nixon, Six Crises, p. 95. 15 Nixon, p. 95. 53 the program should give me an opportunity to state my side alone, without interruption by possibly unfriendly press questioners.

When he announced his intentions, reporters clam­ ored for some hint of what Nixon would say. But he was adamant :

This time I was determined to tell my ^tory directly to the people rather than to funnel it to them through a press account. Consequently, Bassett [Jim Bassett, a press aide] made arrangements for the reporters to see my speech at television monitors in a separate room, with no advance text and with no notice of what I would say.

Principle Number Three: When you take your message directly to the people, control it as tightly as possible; keep the press comfortable, but don't give it any news.

As he prepared his television talk, Nixon resolved

to do more than relate the "complicated and dull facts about

the fund to the people." He wanted "a smash hit," something

that "would inspire" his viewers "to enthusiastic, positive

support.^ ..18 ’

In other words, it had to be emotional. It was.

^^Nixon, p. 96. 17 Nixon, pp. 107-8. 18 Nixon, p. 102. 54

The now famous "Checkers speech"— so named because Nixon stoutly defended having received as a gift a small Cocker

Spaniel named "Checkers"— has come to be regarded as a clas­ sic. It was an evasive, folksy, appeal to the emotions, as well as a materful display of practical politics. In the end, Nixon threw the ball back to Eisenhower by calling on other candidates in the race to join him in revealing their

finances. This, because of some questionaible financial arrangements of his own, Eisenhower would never do, and 19 Nixon knew it.

Nixon left the studio with mixed feelings about his

performance. But aide Jim Bassett reassured him:

What the reporters think about the content of the speech is not important now. That's an old story any­ way. The big story now is not the speech itself but the public reaction to it and on that one we can't help but win.20

Bassett had gauged the situation expertly. Millions

of telephone calls, telegrams, and letters poured into the

Republican National Committee headquarters and other Repub­

lican offices around the country. After momentary hesita­

tion, Ike met Nixon in Wheeling, West Virginia, and told him.

19 Garry Wills, Nixon Agon is tes (New York : Signet Books, 1971), p. 109. 20 Nixon, p. 119. 55

"Dick, y o u ’re my boy." Nixon wept on Senator Knowland's shoulders.

In later years, Nixon has often spoken of his battle over the fund and of how he faced "the overwhelming hostile 22 reaction of the press."

The original story, reported Jean Begeman in the New

Republic magazine, was obtained through a joint effort of the New York Post and the Los Angeles Daily News. The News refused to publish the story. Begeman's survey showed that of seventy daily newspapers polled in forty-eight states, 23 only seven went with the story the first day they had it.

A number of the papers that did carry it buried the story in the back pages. The Associated Press waited seven hours after getting the story before putting it on the wires. Other papers mentioned the story only in connection with Nixon's subsequent charge that it was a Communist plot. Overall, the story was handled cautiously by many of the nation's largest and most respected newspapers, the vast majority of which had endorsed Eisenhower. Reporter Begeman concluded that the

21 Alsop, "The Mystery of Richard Nixon," p. 66. 22 Nixon,„. p. 5. 23 Jean Begeman, "Nixon: How the Press Suppressed the News," The New Republic, October 6, 1962, p. 11. 56 free press had never "carried its prejudices over into its news columns with such ruthless suppression of unwelcome facts.

In his years as Ike's vice-president, Nixon took increasing notice of image-making techniques. The New

Yorker's astute political columnist, Richard Rovere, observed that Nixon "more than anyone else . . . has set the political style of the Eisenhower Administration, with its heavy bor­ rowings from the techniques of modern advertising and public 25 relations. ..." Rovere also commented that:

. . . What stands out in any consideration of the whole record is the flexibility that suggests an almost total indifference to policy. Nixon appears to be a politician with an advertising man's approach to his work. Policies are products to be sold the public— this one today, that one tomorrow, depending on the discounts and the state of the market. He moves from intervention [in Indochina] to anti-intervention with the seune ease and lack of anguish with which a copy writer might trans­ fer his loyalties from Camels to Chesterfields.26

Nixon himself denied he was leaning on image-makers.

"You've got to be what you are," he told Steward Alsop in 27 1958. The Vice-President continued:

24 Begeman, pp. 11-13. 25 Richard H. Rovere, The Eisenhower Years (New York : Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956), p. 295.

Rovere, p. 302. 27 Alsop, "The Mystery," p. 27. 57

. . . You know, I suppose I'm about the only major public figure who's never had a public-relations man. I write all my own speeches. I make up my own mind what to say. A lot of people have told me that what i need is a public-relations expert to "humanize" me, and so on. But I'm not going to do it. I'm not going to have a lot of public-relations people working on me, with pictures of me doing silly things I wouldn't do naturally, and so on. 28

In 1960, Nixon ran for the presidency against young

Senator John Kennedy of Massachusetts. The race proved to be one of the closest in the nation’s history, and Kennedy's edge has often been attributed to his superior performance

in the "Great Debates" of 1960. Television politics had

truly come of age; and that, Nixon would later realize, called for some expert help in the use of the medium.

The Great Debates were supposed to end, once and for all, the "old fashioned" way of politicking— the hand-shaking, back-slapping, and arm-twisting; the dodging and ducking; the

seamy business of saying one thing in one part of the country and something else in another. From now on, the intellectuals reasoned, campaigners would have to deal with issues. What­

ever a candidate said, he would be saying it before the 29 entire electorate.

28 Alsop, p. 27. 29 Stephen Hess, "Only the Style Was Important," The Washington Post. September 1, 1972, Sec. A, p. 24. 58

Just the opposite proved to be true. The pre­ eminent chronicler of presidential campaigns, Theodore H.

White, summed it up aptly when he said that "issues . . . all but ceased to matter; only 'style' was important,

With only a few minutes to state their positions on extremely complex issues, the content of Kennedy's and

Nixon's answers meant little. What mattered was how they

looked to the seventy million Americans looking on. And on this count, Nixon wasn't even close.

He campaigned hard right up until the first debate

in Chicago, September 26, I960, grabbing his free moments to cram for the big occasion. His television advisors were excommunicated and had to make their arrangements with little consultation with their candidate. They did what they could,

arranging lights and tables. They asked that Nixon's left

profile not be photographed. When the candidate finally

arrived at the studio, he made only one request— that the

cameraman not focus on him when he was wiping sweat from his

face. He refused makeup, permitting only a light coating of 31 "Lazy Shave" to hide his heavy beard.

^^Hess, Sec. A, p. 24. 31 Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (New York; Atheneum Publishers, 1961), pp. 313-14. 59

When the red light went on, Nixon appeared nervous, taut, and hollow-eyed. The heavy campaign schedule, and an eleven-day stay in the hospital with a bad knee some weeks before, had combined to cause a weight loss. His suit looked baggy and tended to blend with the background. His shirt collar hung loose. As the newsmen began asking questions,

Nixon tended to go on the defensive, answering Kennedy point- 32 by-point and ignoring his huge audience beyond the camera.

Kennedy, by contrast, appeared rested, calm, informed, cocksure. Whatever the question, he aimed his answer at the millions of Americans viewing the program in their living rooms.

It was an unmitigated disaster for Nixon. He seemed to realize it as he weighed the results in his mind:

. . . While the press was calling it a draw, I knew they were basing their conclusions primarily on what had been said, not on how the candidates had looked. I knew, too, that how the candidates looked, to many viewers, was going to be a great deal more important than what they said.33

John Kennedy later related the story of how, during one debate, Nixon saw a still photographer preparing to take a picture. He angrily stuck his finger under Kennedy's nose.

^^White, pp. 313-18. 33 Nixon, Six Crises, p. 342 60 as he had done with Russian Premier Khrushchev, and said 34 softly, "And how is Jackie?"

As he prepared for the second debate, Nixon was still resolving to "be myself." Writing of the occasion two years later, he said:

I have seen so-called public relations experts ruin many a candidate by trying to make him over into an "image" of something he can never be. I went into the second debate determined to do my best to convey three basic impressions to the television audience--knowledge in depth of the subjects discussed, sincerity, and con­ fidence. If I succeeded in this I felt my "image" would take care of itself,^5

But he did pay some attention to the technical experts, and, afterwards, he felt it had helped him.

I was back up to my normal weight and collar-size. . . , This time we gave the technical factors the atten­ tion they deserved but had not received first time out. The lighting was better. The set was less bleak. I had yielded to , . , advice that I use makeup to cover my five o'clock shadow, instead of the powder which had made me appear pale during the first debate.36

In the Second, third, and fourth debates, Nixon man­ aged to recover somewhat from his initial poor performance.

But it was too late. Surveys showed that an overwhelming

34 Gore Vidal, An Evening with Richard Nixon (New York: (Vintage Books, 1972), p. 56. 3 5 Nixon, p. 344. ^ A Nixon, p. 345. 61 percentage of the audience had judged Kennedy the victor.

Whereas, before the debates, Nixon had been the expected 3 7 winner in November, now Kennedy became the favorite.

Nixon later admitted the folly of his concentration on the issues, in a remarkably frank self-appraisal in his book. Six Crises, he "regretfully" reached the conclusion that :

. , . I spent too much time . . . on substance and too little time on appearance; i paid too much attention to what I was going to say and too little on how I would look. Again, what must be recognized is that television has increasingly become the medium through which the great majority of the voters get their news and develop their impressions of the candidates. There are, of course, millions of people who still rely pri­ marily on newspapers and magazines in making up their minds on how they will vote. But the fact remains, one bad camera angle on television can have far more effect on the election outcome than a major mistake in writing a speech which is then picked up and criticized by col­ umnists and editorial writers. I do not mean to suggest that what a candidate says is not important; in a presi­ dential election, in particular, it should be all- important. What I do mean to say is that where votes are concerned, a paraphrase of what Mr. Khrushchev claims is an "ancient Russian proverb" could not be more controlling: "one TV picture is worth ten thousand words."38

Principle Number Four: When addressing the elector­ ate directly via television, image is more important than

37 White, The Making of the President 1960, pp. 318- 23. 3 8 Nixon, pp. 422-23. 62

substance.

Despite his own mistakes in the 1960 campaign, Nixon

still felt the press had much to do with the outcome. "I have always felt," he later said, "that a reporter has a

right to any political bias whatever, provided that he keeps 3 9 it out of what are supposed to be straight news stories."

This, he felt, they didn't do in I960: "During the campaign

. . . they quite naturally— and often as not, perhaps, quite

unconsciously— favored the candidate of the party of their . . „40 choice."

Writing about his press coverage, Nixon sounded

almost sorry he hadn't complained about it at the time. He

doubted, he said, "if any official in Washington had greater,

more sincere respect for the press corps than I, or had tried 41 to be more fair in his treatment of them." His opponent, however, had done just the opposite, and had gotten away with

it;

. . . Kennedy, Salinger, and several top members of the Kennedy staff followed the practice during the campaign of complaining to individual reporters about the fairness of their stories. In several instances.

39 Keogh, President Nixon and the press, p. 5. 40 Keogh, pp. 5-6. 41 Nixon, p. 396. 63

Kennedy himself and members of his staff went over the heads of the reporters to their publishers and to the top officials of the radio and television networks, when they felt they were getting less than fair treat­ ment in news stories or on TV and radio reports. Never once during the course of the campaign did I resort to such tactics, regardless of what opinion I had of the coverage of my activities.42

Principle Number Five: it pays to complain about your press coverage.

Following his narrow defeat, by some 112,000 popular votes,in the 1960 race, Nixon moved to his native state of California, and, in 1962, ran for Governor against Demo­ cratic incumbent, Edmund G, "Pat" Brown. It was unquestion­ ably one of the roughest and dirtiest political battles in

California history. The two candidates freely traded insults, all of which were fully reported by the California press. The former Vice-President and his campaign manager—

H . R. Haldeman— organized and financed a dummy organization called "Committee for the preservation of the Democratic

Party in California" and passed it off as a legitimate Dem- 44 ocratic organ. A few days before the election, Nixon

42 Nixon, p. 396. 43 White, p. 382. 44 The Washington Post. October 27, 1972, Sec. A, p. 1. 64 publicly predicted bis opponent would launch a "massive cam- 45 paign of fear and smear," On election eve, Nixon went on television with his family, and, as Time magazine reported it, "claimed in persecuted tones that he had been the victim 46 of the worst smear campaign in California history. "

He lost. With the election returns in, Nixon's top press aide. Herb Klein, approached Nixon in his room. Suite

724 of the Beverly Hilton Hotel in Los Angeles, to urge his concession. Klein had just come from the Cadoro Room below, where reporters were waiting for Nixon's appearance.

"They're all waiting," Klein told Nixon, "You've got to go down."

"Screw them," Nixon said.

His aides and advisors discussed the situation for a few minutes. "Screw them," the former Vice-President kept repeating. Klein finally went down to give a statement on 47 Nixon's behalf. While he was bantering with reporters,

Nixon suddenly appeared, took the microphone, and launched into what has become known as his "last press conference,"

45 Walter Gieber, "California Campaign Reporting," Columbia Journalism Review. I (Winter, 1963), 19. 46 "California; Career's End," Time, November 16, 1962, p. 28. 47 Witcover, The Resurrection of Richard Nixon, p. 14. 65

He said, in part:

Good morning, gentlemen. Now that Mr. Klein has made his statement, and now that all the members of the press are so delighted that I have lost. I'd like to make a statement of my own. . . .

I appreciate the press coverage of this campaign. I think each of you covered it the way you saw it. You had to write it in the way according to your belief on how it would go. I don't believe publishers should tell reporters to write one way or another. I want them all to be free. . . .

I am proud of the fact that I defended my opponent's patriotism. You gentlemen didn't report it, but I am proud I did that. I am proud also that I defended the fact that he was a man of good motives, a man that I disagreed with very strongly, but a man of good motives. I want that— for once, gentlemen— I would appreciate if you would write what I say, in that respect. I think it's very important that you write it. _In the lead. In the lead.

I say these things about the press because I under­ stand that that was one of the things you were particu­ larly interested in. There'11 be no questions at this point on that score. I'll be glad to answer other ques­ tions .

One last thing. . . . I said a couple of things with regard to the press that I noticed some of you looked a little irritated about. And my philosophy with regard to the press has never really gotten through. And I want it to get through. This cannot be said for any other American political figure today, I guess. Never in my sixteen years of campaigning have I complained to a pub­ lisher, to an editor, about the coverage of a reporter. I believe a reporter has got a right to write it as he feels it, I believe if a reporter believes that one man ought to win rather than the other, whether it's on tele­ vision or radio or the like, he ought to say so. I will say to that reporter sometimes that i think, "Well, look, I wish you'd give my opponent the same going over that 6 6

you give me,"

And as I leave the press, all I can say is this : for sixteen years, ever since the Hiss case, you've had a lot of fun— a lot of fun— that you've had an opportunity to attack me and I think I've given as good as I've taken. . . . I think that it's time that our great news­ papers have at least the same objectivity, the same fullness of coverage, that television has. And I can only say thank God for television and radio for keeping the newspapers a little more honest.

. . . I leave you gentlemen now, and you will now write it. You will interpret it. That's your right. But as I leave you l want you to know— just think how much you're going to be missing. You won't have Nixon to kick around anymore, because, gentlemen, this is my last press conference, and it will be one in which I have welcomed the opportunity to test wits with you. I have always respected you. I have sometimes disagreed with you. But unlike some people. I've never canceled a subscription to a paper, and also I never will.

I believe in reading what my opponents say, and I hope that what I have said today will at least make television, radio and the press, first, recognize the great responsibility they have to report all the news and, second, recognize that they have a right and a responsibility, if they're against a candidate, give him the shaft, but also recognize if they give him the shaft, put one lonely reporter on the campaign who will report what the candidate says now and then. Thank you, gentlemen, and good day.48

As he finished, he turned and strode from the room.

Behind him stood Herb Klein.

"I know you don't agree," Nixon said to Klein as he passed. "I gave it to them right in the behind. It had to

48 Witcover, pp. 16-22, Italics in the original 67 49 be said, goddammit. It had to be said."

Principle Number Six: If you feel so strongly about your press coverage that you cannot complain about it with eloquence and dignity, then let someone else do your com­ plaining for you.

Much of what Nixon said in his attack on the press, in the opinion of some, wasn't true. There were the little things, such as his claim never to have canceled a newspaper subscription. This was an obvious reference to the occasion when John Kennedy banned the now defunct New York Herald

Tribune from the White House. Muckraking columnist Jack

Anderson, however, told this investigator that Nixon, in fits of pique over Herblock cartoons, had twice cancelled his subscriptions to The Washington Post. Nixon also said that he had never complained to an editor or publisher about a reporter's coverage. Yet San Francisco State College pro­ fessor Walter Gieber, writing in the Columbia Journalism

Review, stated that a tenacious reporter for the Los Angeles

Times, Richard Bergholz, drew Nixon's complaint during the

49 "California: Career's End," Time, November 16, 1962, p. 28.

^^Statement by Jack Anderson, personal interview, December 26, 1972. 68

1962 campaign:

According to other newsmen, [Bergholz] asked per­ sistently about the alleged involvement of Nixon in a loan from the Hughes Tool Company to Nixon's brother because Brown kept bringing it up. Nixon went to [Otis] Chandler [publisher of the Times] and demanded that the publisher remove Bergholz. Bergholz, shifted to the Brown Gcimpaign, was replaced by [Carl] Greenberg, who was equally tough-minded.51

Gieber also cast doubt on Nixon's contention that the press had treated him unfairly. seventy percent of the

California papers endorsed the former Vice-president. Their coverage of the campaign was, moreover, a model of objec­ tivity— perhaps too much so. They simply permitted the can­ didates to speak and then faithfully recorded their comments.

Much was said that needed interpretation and background, but this was not provided. "The effect on the reader," wrote

Gieber, "was apparently the effect gained from watching two 52 wrestlers work out in the mud." From this account, there­ fore, it is possible to conclude that if the press helped to defeat Nixon, it did so only by quoting his own words. As one reporter told Gieber: "If there's anything dirtier than libel, it's telling the facts.

^^Gieber, "California Campaign Reporting," p. 18, 52 Gieber, p. 19. ^^Gieber, p. 19. 69

THE 1968 CAMPAIGN

After his defeat in California, most political

experts gave Nixon up for dead. He had other ideas. He moved to New York City to accept a well-paying partnership

in a law firm. He also traveled to many foreign nations where he talked with heads of state. He campaigned, albeit

reluctantly, for Goldwater in 1964; and in 1966, he stumped

the country for Republican candidates. in retrospect, it

appears to have been one big build-up for his next run at

the presidency. He began working actively toward that goal

in early 1967.

In dealing with the press in his 1968 campaign, Nixon

put to use all the lessons he had learned over the years.

He hired expert public relations help, and, for most of the

race, left his media campaign in their competent hands. As

for the press, he pampered them and showered them with paper,

but he cut them off almost completely from his other activi­

ties .

Jules Witcover, then with the Newhouse newspaper

chain, followed Nixon on the hustings and observed that his

campaign was conducted on "two tracks." One track was the

standard campaign of hoopla : rallies and speeches, comple­

mented with bands, parades, and cheerleaders. In contrast 70 to his frenetic 1960 effort, however, Nixon in 1968 care­ fully paced himself, making only one or two major stops a day. Most of the candidate's energy was preserved for the second track. This was the "media caunpaign"— the low-keyed, tightly controlled television and radio commercials and shows in which the candidate discussed the issues in his charac- 54 teristically bland style.

There is considerable evidence that Nixon did not like to rely so heavily on television. Joe McGinniss— the enterprising reporter who infiltrated the Nixon campaign and wrote The Selling of the president 1968. said: "He half sus­ pected it was an eastern liberal trick, one more way to make 55 him look silly. " As late as November, 1967, Nixon was quoted as saying, "I'm not going to take any speech lessons.

I'm not hiring any high-powered public relations firms.

When a man is constrained or artificial, he doesn't get through.

About the time Nixon was saying this, his lawpctrtner.

54 Witcover, The Resurrection of Richard Nixon, pp. 238-39. 55 Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Trident press, 1969), p. 33.

^^Vidal, An Evening with Richard Nixon, p. 79. 71

Leonard Garment, was hiring two advertising experts. One was Harry Treleaven, formerly a vice-president with the

J. Walter Thompson advertising agency. While with the

Thompson firm, Treleaven had produced commercials for Lark cigarettes. Ford, Pan American Airlines, RCA, and others.

He had also worked part-time on the political campaign that put Representative George Bush, Republican of Texas, in 57 office. One of the things he learned from the Bush cam­ paign, he once wrote, was that "most national issues today are so complicated, so difficult to understand, and have opinions on that they either intimidate or, more often, bore the average voter. . .

The second expert Garment hired was Frank Shakespeare, a former CBS official and ardent conservative. It was this trio— Garment, Treleaven, and Shakespeare— who put together the media campaign. Wrote Witcover:

. , . The three of them, with later recruits, master­ minded a revolutionary second track over which Richard Nixon could be presented directly to the electorate with­ out the risks entailed in exposing him on the first, traditional track. That track was too hazardous, mined as it always was with the unexpected and patrolled so diligently by those shabby reporters who always were watching and then scribbling things, harmful things.

57 McGinniss, p. 42.

^^McGinniss, p. 44. 72 59 in their little notebooks.

AS the Nixon team began preparing for their first primary in New Hampshire, they consulted with and passed memoranda to each other. Harry Treleaven advised that Nixon had actually gained in popularity during his long layoff, and this, the media expert wrote, was not due to any change

in Nixon, but to a change in the voters. "Add a little warmth," said Treleaven, "a touch of humor, an aura of con­

fidence- -then publicize poll results, favorable articles,

friendly quotes, and anything else that says 'winner.

William Gavin, a former high school teacher who had

impressed the Nixon team with his knowledge of the media, counseled avoidance of issues :

. . . reason pushes the viewer back, it assaults him, it demands that he agree or disagree; impression can envelop him, invite him in, without making an intellectual demand, or a demand on his intellectual energies, he can receive the impression without having to think about it in a linear, structured way. when we argue with him we demand that he make the effort of replying. we seek to engage his intellect, and for most people this is the most difficult work of all. the emotions are more eas­ ily roused, closer to the surface, more malleable.

59 Witcover, p. 238.

^^McGinniss, p. 177.

^^McGinniss, pp. 187-88. Punctuated as in the original, 73 Raymond K. Price, formerly an editorial writer for the New York Herald Tribune and presently Nixon's chief speechwriter, agreed with Treleaven that Nixon the man was in fine shape, but his image needed restructuring:

. . . have to be very clear on this point : that the response is to the image. not to the man, since 99 percent of the voters have no contact with the man. It's not what's there that counts, it's what's projected — and, carrying it one step further, it's not what projects but rather what the voter receives. It's not the man we have to change, but rather the received impres­ sion. And this impression often depends more on the medium and its use than it does on the candidate him­ self . 62

"It was as if they were building not a President but an Astrodome," wrote McGinniss, "where the wind would never blow, the temperature never rise or fall, and the ball never 63 bounce erratically on the artificial grass."

On his very first day of campaigning in New Hampshire,

Nixon slipped out of his hotel unnoticed and went to the town of Hillsboro, where he met with a panel of ten citizens and ten college students— all handpicked— for an "entirely unre­ hearsed" discussion. It was filmed and selected excerpts were subsequently used in television commercials throughout ,, . . 64 the state.

^^McGinniss, pp. 192-93. Italics in the original. ^^McGinniss, p. 39. 64 Witcover, p. 237. 74

Reporters traveling with Nixon were upset. Patrick

Buchanan— the aide who would later become one of the chief architects of the Agnew attack on the media— explained that newsmen might "inhibit those people" on the panel. Reporters were not invited along, he said, "so that people would feel at ease.

So it went. Nixon's face and his commercials became standard fare for TV viewers; to the press, however, he was a virtual stranger. He stormed through the primaries and arrived at the Republican Convention in Miami Beach with the nomination wrapped up. His plane landed at the Miami Inter­ national Airport, where a crowd of two thousand awaited him, at 6;25 p.m. At precisely 6:38 p.m., he stepped from the aircraft for a pre-arranged live appearance on the network 66 news shows.

Nixon's well-oiled machine maneuvered him through the convention in fine style. They even went so far as to attempt

to censor a seconding speech by Senator Mark 0. Hatfield. The

Nixon image team apparently felt it was too dovish on the

^^Witcover, p. 237.

^^Paul Hoffman, The New Nixon (New York : Tower Pub­ lications, Inc., 1970), pp. 27-28. 75 67 Vietnam War. Shortly after his nomination, Nixon appeared

at a press conference and proclaimed: "I am not going to barricade myself into a television studio and make this an

, , . . ,,68 antiseptic campaign.

The fall campaign was a repeat of the primaries. As

reporter Paul Hoffman put it ;

There was a Nixon to suit every taste— a hard-hitting Nixon on the stump, a soft-sell Nixon in the TV ads, a thoughtful Nixon in the radio speeches, a celebrity Nixon in the slick brochures issued from his campaign head­ quarters at 450 Park Avenue, New Y o r k . 69

On the road, Nixon's advance men filled the halls to

capacity, busing people in from miles away. Suspected heck­

lers were usually turned away; males with long hair or a

beard were automatically rejected.

Every event, no matter how disastrous to others, was

viewed in terms of how it would affect Richard Nixon and his

image. When the Russian army invaded Czechoslovakia in

August, for example, Frank Shakespeare was ecstatic. "What

a break!" he exclaimed, "This Czech thing is just perfect.

It puts the soft-liners in a hell of a box!Nixon leaped

67 witcover, p. 345.

^^Witcover, p. 3 74. 69 Hoffman, p. 31.

^^McGinnis, p. 49. 76 at every advantage to get his face before the public, going so far as to appear on NBC's "Laugh In," where he joined in the fun by asking, "Sock it to me?"^^

A staple of the TV campaign was the one-hour "panel show" in which Nixon appeared before a group of local citi­ zens in various cities to answer "unrehearsed" questions.

The queries were usually softballs for the experienced candi­ date; tossed up by a group of hand-picked and nervous ama­ teurs, he invariably knocked them out of the park.

In the staged shows, panelists were always carefully chosen to get the "correct" ethnic balance— a black, a Jew, a housewife, an ethnic or two. Studios were packed with

Republican spectators whose enthusiastic and cued applause gave the impression that Nixon would be joyously mobbed if 72 the crowd could but get to him.

In Philadelphia, the Nixon team was faced with a prob­ lem. The studio was smaller than usual; it would seat only

240, whereas the other studios they had used had seated around three hundred.

This was of no concern to Roger Ailes, a young tele­ vision producer hired by the Nixon men- "That's all right,"

^^Witcover, p. 3 75. Italics in the original. 72 McGinniss, pp. 64-66. 77 he said. "I can get as much applause out of two hundred

and forty as three hundred, if it's done right, and that's

all they are— an applause machine. That and a couple of 73 reaction shots. "

Ailes was especially anxious to get a Negro on the

show in Philadelphia, according to Joe McGinniss, who over­ heard the following conversation between Ailes and a local

Republican. Said Ailes :

". . . 1 don't think it's necessary to have one in every group of six people, no matter what our ethnic experts say, but in Philadelphia it is. U.S. News and World Report this week says that one of every three votes cast in Philadelphia will be a Negro. And god­ dammit, we're locked into this thing, anyway. Once you start it's hard as hell to stop, because the press will pick it up and make a big deal out of why no Negro all of a sudden."

"I know one in Philadelphia," the local man, whose name was Dan Buser, said. "He's a dynamic type, the head of a self-help organization, that kind of thing. And he is black."

"What do you mean, he's black?"

"I mean he's dark. It will be obvious on television that he's not white."

"You mean we won't have to put a sign around him that says, 'This is our Negro'?"

"Absolutely not."

"Fine. Call him. Let's get this thing going.

73 McGinniss, p. 98. 74 McGinniss, pp. 98-99 78

While the panel shows were convincing the country

that Nixon had an encyclopedic grasp of the issues, other

television advertising campaigns were buttressing his image

in other ways. The candidate himself made different commer­

cials for different parts of the country to demonstrate he

understood local problems. While filming these, he was care­

ful to keep people out of his line of vision. His reason- 75 ing; "So I don't go shifting my eyes."

To demonstrate he was well thought of by the famous,

Nixon also used television "spots" containing the endorse­ ments of such celebrities as Art Linkletter, Connie Francis,

Pat Boone, and John Wayne.

Kevin Phillips, Nixon's "ethnic specialist," now a

syndicated columnist, explained to Joe McGinniss why people

like John Wayne were so important;

Wayne might sound bad to people in New York, but he sounds great to the schmucks we're trying to reach through John Wayne. The people down there along the Yahoo Belt. If I had the time. I'd check to see in what areas The Green Berets [a movie in which Wayne starred] was held over and I'd play a special series of John Wayne spots wherever it w a s .

The campaign finished with an election-eve telethon.

75 McGinniss, p. 10.

^^McGinniss, p. 124. 79 in which Nixon answered questions called in from all over the country. Actually, the questions were written in advance to conform with the pat answers Nixon had been rehearsing for nearly two years. When a question was called in that fit a general area, the prepared question was passed on to 77 Nixon.

This tremendous effort to blanket the country with

Nixon's smiling, "Presidential" image had one overriding pur­ pose. Frank Shakespeare summed it up for Joe McGinniss:

Without television, Richard Nixon would not have a chance. He would not have a prayer of getting elected because the press would not let him get through to the people. But because he is so good on television, he will get through despite the press. The press doesn't matter anymore. . . . Television reaches so many more people. You can see it in our attitude toward print advertising. It's used only as a supplement. TV is carrying our campaign. And Nixon loves it. He's over­ joyed that he no longer has to depend upon the press. . . . He has a great hostility toward the press and as President he should be shielded.

Reporters covering the Nixon campaign didn't need

Frank Shakespeare to tell them the Nixon camp was hostile.

It was evident from the very beginning. Not that the press wasn't treated royally, for they were. They just couldn't get any news. Wrote reporter Paul Hoffman :

^^Witcover, pp. 445-47. 78 McGinnissj p. 58. 80

In 1960, the official attitude was "fuck the press"; in 1968, Nixon's entourage of reporters was coddled as never before— wined, dined, entertained, provided with just about everything except hard news. ^9

Jules Witcover began noticing the new Nixon attitude while accompanying the former Vice-President on his 1966 tour on behalf of Republican candidates. Two of Nixon's rules, observed Witcover, were "don't offend the press" and 80 "make it easy for the press." However, he hadn't changed his attitude— just his approach. Said Nixon ;

The press are good guys, but they haven't basically changed. They're oriented against my views. But I like the battle. . . . I used to be serious about it. Now I treat it as a game.®!

Whenever he criticized the press, he always took pains to exclude those to whom he was talking. Wrote

Witcover: "This I ' m-not-talking-about-you— fellows-but-about-

some-of—the-others approach always amused those reporters 82 who had heard it more than once."

As the campaign gained momentum, the "tread softly"

approach was supplemented by another tactic: don't tell the

79 Hoffman, The New Nixon, p. 32. 80 witcover, p. 134. 81 witcover, p. 152. 82 witcover, p. 128. 81 press anything. Patrick Buchanan, before the New Hampshire primary, wrote that "rather than political reporters walking through the office, I would like to see an AP feature writer 83 maybe and some (friendly only) magazine writers." He called for "controlled ads, RN smiling when campaigning, RN the statesman when speaking," and above all:

We don't need any press conference type stuff where RN is being baited by reporters and saying why he would oppose the rat control bill or something. We just don't need that; and it should be considered a necessary evil when we have to have it.84

At the convention in Miami Beach, Nixon continued to play the isolation game. He remained in his suite at the

Hilton Plaza Hotel and let his aides fend off the press. It was only after David Broder, political reporter for The

Washington Post. formally demanded that Nixon meet the press that the candidate relented. He held a standard press con­ ference, easily fending off the questions which, by this 8 5 time, had become routine.

Nixon's only adverse encounter with the press at the convention came when the Miami Herald obtained a tape

83 McGinniss, p. 225. 84 McGinniss, p. 222.

^^witcover, pp. 342-44. 82 recording of a Nixon meeting with Southern politicos. It caused some embarrassment; but, in time, that, too evap-

^ ^ 86 orated.

During his fall campaign, Nixon remained aloof from the reporters on his trail. A small press "pool" flew on his plane, but they rarely saw the candidate. Ronald Ziegler, now the president's press secretary, was designated to stand guard over reporters and preserve their ignorance. He pur­

sued his job with zeal. Jules Witcover was a pool reporter only once, and on that occasion, Ziegler talked him out of the "pool report"— ostensibly to duplicate it for other reporters. Instead, Ziegler ran with the report to Nixon's

compartment, where he showed the boss what the newspapers would be printing the next day. Witcover was understandably

distressed, but Ziegler could not seem to comprehend the 87 reason.

There were press conferences, or "press availabil­

ities, " as Nixon's Madison Avenue team preferred to call

them. But they were usually short sessions, held as the

candidate stepped off his plane to give his stock answers

86 Witcoverj pp. 342-44, 8 7 witcover^ pp. 375-79. 83 to local newsmen who crowded around and thrust microphones in his face. When a reporter of the regular entourage wanted answers, he had to deal with Ron Ziegler. Nixon was 88 rarely available.

Newsmen were smothered, on the other hand, with spoon­ fed position papers and handouts. There was always something for both morning and afternoon papers. Nor were the Sunday feature writers ever ignored. When Nixon taped a television show, however, or submitted to a local interview, the trans­ cripts were never available until the next day, when reporters were safely out of the area and in a different 89 city which called for a fresh dateline.

After a period of time, wrote Jules Witcover, report­ ers began to grow numb :

The whole experience tended to have a lulling, even hypnotic effect. . . . For veterans of Presidential elections, it was Valhalla— up at a reasonable hour, late morning departure, perhaps one noontime appearance and another in the late afternoon, with the nights blocked out for TV tapings or study and rest. The Nixon campaign came to be called "The Country Club," and for good reason.®®

At one point, Joe McGinniss overheard Roger Ailes

88 Witcover, pp. 37 5-79. 89 Witcover, p. 3 79. 90 witcover, p. 379. 84 explain why reporters were never allowed into the studio when Nixon was taping a panel show:

. . , Reporters get pissed and go out of their way to rap anything they consider staged for TV. And . . . that's what they'd do if they saw this from the studio. You let them in with the regular audience and they see the warmup. They see Jack Rourke [an assistant to Ailes] out there telling the audience to applaud and to mob Nixon at the end, and that's all they'd write about.®i

The selection of Spiro Agnew as a running mate was, in the eyes of the Nixon team, the only major mistake their boss had made. After Agnew referred to a Japanese-American reporter as a "fat Jap, claimed one slum was representative of all, and called Hubert Humphrey "soft" on Communism, he was limited to one campaign appearance a day in a "safe" area. The rest of the time, he was shut up in his hotel 92 room. Visitors were barred; press conferences were banned.

When challenged by the press to reply to Humphrey’s call for a debate, Nixon refused on the grounds it would have to include George Wallace— the third candidate in the race— and therefore would "fragment" the two-party system.

Another idea was put to Nixon : Would he consent to an

91 McGinniss, p. 66. 92 Hoffman, The New Nixon, p. 132. 85 untelevised debate with the full transcripts carried in all the major newspapers? Nixon responded by saying that;

I don't mean to downgrade the writing press, but television changed campaigning, and I believe that a debate in which we are on national television, fully covered, where the people themselves can judge rather than having it judged by the press, and I don't mean by that I think the press would be unfair, I mean that every individual now likes to be his own judge. I think where the people themselves can judge, that's the kind, if it is arranged, I will participate in, provided it's two m e n . 93

After refusing interviews all during the campaign,

Nixon— ten days before the election— agreed to appear on

"Face the Nation." In this, the first occasion as a candi­

date that he faced an aggressive, professional team of

reporters before the entire nation, his performance was far

from perfect. The newsmen bore in relentlessly, and Nixon

appeared harassed and nervous and, in the end, a little

irritable. One of Nixon's advisors, however, attributed the

candidate's poor showing to other factors. "The camera

height was wrong," he said, "I didn't like the chair, and

there was a bad shot of the back of his head which made it 94 look like he had a point there."

The "grand strategy" worked. Richard Nixon finally

93 Witcover, p. 416. 94 McGinniss, p. 137. 86

reached the White House in 1968, and a good portion of his

success undoubtedly could be attributed to the manner in which he applied the lessons he had learned about how to

cope with the news media. He had successfully "endrun" the

press, taking his tightly controlled message directly to the

people. The reporters who had bothered him in the past had been courteously dealt with but, as far as hard news was con­

cerned, they had been kept in the dark.

But would the grand strategy work once Nixon was in

office? Would he still be able to control the flow of infor­

mation to the public? All he had to do, really, was find

some means of keeping the press in its place. With the

mighty weight of the entire federal government behind him,

that should prove an easy task.

A small hint of what lay in store for the news media

came in the aftermath of Nixon's victory speech. The Nixon

team of advance men gathered around to congratulate each

other. Roy Goodearle, an Agnew aide, turned to his comrades

and said: "Why don't we all get a member of the press and 95 beat them up? I'm tired of being nice to them."

95 Witcover, p. 456. chapter 3

THE NONESSENTIAL PRESS

As they prepared to move onto the White House in the early winter of 1968, Nixon and his team solemnly promised that the new Administration would be an "open" one. They would strive, they said, for "a spirit of openness, honesty, and mutual respect." One Nixon aide even vowed to the U.S.

News & World Report that "cabinet officers and other top officials will be more accessible to the press than ever before.

For the newsmen who devoted most of their time to covering the President and his Administration, this was heartening news indeed. Later they would discover that when

Nixon spoke of the "press" and of being "open," he was not speaking of them.

By "open," Nixon meant he would go before the public more often than any President before him. The problem for newsmen is that he would do it via television.

^"Will the Press Be Out To 'Get' Nixon?" U.S. News & World Report. December 2, 1968, p. 40.

87 88

By "press," the President meant the "hinterlands" press— the smaller dailies and weeklies across the country which were not represented in Washington by their own cor­ respondents. This "press" he would indeed cater to, as will be shown later. Again, the "regulars" were left in the dark.

In short, Nixon came into office with a scheme to by-pass the national press. In such a plan, he would no

longer need the news media to communicate with the people.

The national press was nonessential.

Nixon realized, however, that something had to be done to keep the press diverted while he executed his end runs. The answer to this problem evolved out of his cam­ paign. The idea was simply to placate the press— give news­ men harmless information, and keep them comfortable and

secure. Then he could by-pass them, just as he had done in his campaign. Judging from that experience, it wouldn't be

especially difficult to go around newspapermen. And the broadcast press was licensed by the government and was tra­

ditionally timid, anyway.

Nixon saw the possibilities of such a maneuver as

early as 1962, when he observed that "television has increas­

ingly become the medium through which the great majority of

the voters get their news and develop their 89 impressions. , . .

During the 1968 campaign, one of Nixon's media advisors, Frank Shakespeare, indicated that this was indeed the line of thinking in the Republican camp. "The press," said Shakespeare, "doesn't matter anymore, . . . Television reaches so many more people. . . . And Nixon loves it. He's 3 overjoyed that he no longer has to depend on the press."

Thus, it appears, Nixon wrote off the press. He was well aware he would never gain the favor of the "eastern establishment" newsmen. With television available to broad­ cast his message, in whatever form and whenever he wished, why try? There would be little to gain, of course, by delib­ erately antagonizing the press, so he would not do that unless it became absolutely necessary. As he had done in the campaign, he would be as amenable to newsmen as his prej­ udices would permit him to be. He would see they always had something to write about. It would be nothing controversial or unfavorable, but it would be something. And while newsmen were feeding from their bottles, he would go around them so

2 Richard Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 19.62), p. 422.

^Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Trident Press, 1969), p. 59. 90 artfully that many of them would not even realize it.

This phase of his "grand strategy" began on election day, 1968, when Nixon flew from Los Angeles to New York with but one "pool" reporter, Anthony Day of the Philadelphia

Evening and Sunday Bulletin, aboard his plane. It was not the fault of the journalists who had been following Nixon since the New Hampshire primary. Day was the only reporter permitted on the aircraft. He repeatedly tried to obtain an interview with the President-to-be, but was refused. Once 4 Nixon walked by the reporter but said nothing to him.

Just months after taking the oath, Nixon refurbished

Air Force One, the presidential Boeing 707 jet, and had it divided into four compartments. The President's new quar­ ters were now the farthest forward in the plane; the press was shoved all the way to the rear. Mr. Nixon, it seems, did not approve of Lyndon Johnson's arrangement, in which 5 the press was berthed next to the President.

A VERY PRIVATE PRESIDENT

Such moves are not out of keeping with Nixon's

4 Jules Witcover, "Washington; Focusing on Nixon," Columbia Journalism Review, VII (Winter, 1968-1969), 11.

^ "The President's Airborne Privacy," Newsweek. June 16, 1969, p. 20. 91 concept of the presidency. Like Woodrow Wilson, a prede­ cessor he deeply admires, Nixon zealously guards his pri­ vacy. Indeed he seems to thrive on isolation. He dislikes

"the laying on of the tongues," as his aides put it, much preferring to have his information and "options" put in memorandum form rather than getting it orally.^ Frequently, his aides segregate all the paperwork dealing with a par­ ticular issue and bind it in large black notebooks. Nixon then takes these home in the evening, or with him to Camp

David, Maryland or Key Biscayne, Florida, for study. The

President's men always leave an "order blank" in the back 7 of the book for the President's thoughts and instructions.

Nixon sees few people, compared to past Presidents, and that applies even to the Cabinet. When he calls a meet­ ing, it is usually only for the purpose of "educating" the Q Cabinet about his plans.

Senators, Congressmen, newsmen, prominent citizens, special interest groups--all are regularly turned away from

^"How Nixon's White House Works," Time, June 8, 1970, pp. 15-17.

^Associated Press dispatch. The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News, November 13, 1972. Q The Washington Post, May 17, 1970, Sec. f , pp. 1, 3. 92

the White House door. The situation became so bad at one

point, reported Time magazine, that Senators found themselves

"ludicrously blurting ideas to Nixon during 15-second encoun- 9 ters in a White House reception line."

Nixon's isolation is so perfect that even newspapers

do not penetrate it. He gets the bulk of his news from the

summary that is prepared daily by a staff directed by speech­ wr iter Patrick Buchanan. Following a practice that was begun

during Nixon's campaign, Buchanan's assistants put together

summaries of articles, editorials, and news broadcasts and

insert them into a blue, loose-leaf notebook. It averages

about twenty-five pages a day. The front of the notebook is

emblazoned with the title, "The President's Daily News Brief­

ing," embossed in gold.

Edited by Lyndon (Mort) Allin, a former high school

teacher from Wisconsin, the news in the digest is culled from

some forty newspapers, twenty-five magazines, network news

shows, and other public affairs programs. Originally, items were classified according to the type of publication they were drawn from. Now they are arranged according to subject.

9 "How Nixon's White House Works," p. 15.

^^Jack Anderson, "Press Corps Smooths Way for Nixon," The Washington Post. June 3, 1970, Sec. B, p. 11. 93

News stories are reduced to a few paragraphs which are writ-ten in a breezy, clipped style. Names are reduced to initials* acronyms abound. The emphasis is almost always on the Administration and how it is being viewed by the press.

A typical item, drawn from a daily digest in the spring of 1971, stated: "NRA turns down EMK bid to address its convention. " Translated, this means that the National

Rifle Association would not permit Senator Edward Kennedy of

Massachusetts to speak at its convention.

Another item: "Media criticism by VP Agnew and Dole

[then Republican National Committee Chairman Senator Robert

Dole of Kansas] is being well covered with veep apparently 12 causing CBS to at least temporarily hold its fire."

"Storin of Globe impressed with EMK's staying power, his Gridiron appearance is treated well," states another item. The reference is to White House correspondent Matthew

Storin of the Boston Globe. who wrote that Senator Kennedy was doing well politically and his appearance at the annual

Gridiron dinner in Washington, where the famous spoof one

^^Jack Anderson, "President Gets News in Capsule Form," The Washington Post. April 7, 1971, Sec. B, p. 15. 12 Anderson, "President Gets News in Capsule Form," Sec. Bj p. 15. 94 13 another, had been favorably reviewed.

A longer item, which appeared in the digest on Novem­ ber 28, 1972, concerned a story written by John Osborne in the New Republic magazine :

New Republic's Osborne w/another critical piece on RN's [Richard Nixon's] "charade" and the CD [Camp David] meetings— only for public effect, Osborne says reorg. plans are the only way RN could find to create impression that 2nd term is going to be, on the domestic front, more than a mere and sterile extension. But the reporter acknowledges that restructuring is serious business in RN's view. Still he wonders why and how RN let [White House] become biggest in history. . . .14

A typical campaign story by United Press Interna­ tional was summarized on November 2, 1972, as follows;

UPI says Dole [Senator Robert Dole] appeared to bridle, but remained calm when asked about mud-slinging allega­ tions in McG's campaign and whether it would be naive of MeG forces "to stand aside and let the GOP have a one­ sided smear." Dole said MeG supporters "have admitted it. It's all right to throw 4-letter words at Tricia and Julie because they're Nixons and they're not sophisti­ cated. They don't appeal to this elitist group around McG and some of the people who write news stories." Dole said some writers from the Times and CBS think they are too perfect.15

The news items that appear in the President's daily summary seem to be written in a relatively objective fashion.

13 Anderson, "President Gets News in Capsule Form," Sec. B., p. 15. 14 The Washington Post. January 7, 1973, Sec. A, p. 3.

^^The Washington Post. January 7, 1973, Sec. A, p. 3. 95

It is difficult to imagine, however, how Nixon can grasp the subtleties of prevailing attitudes from such bland and unemotional summaries. Nevertheless, he apparently feels the news digest is sufficient to keep him current with events.

He refers to it as his after-breakfast "mint"; and shortly after his re-election, he ordered it be continued. "I am constantly amazed at the brilliant work done in the news summary," he wrote to Buchanan in a marginal note. "It is invaluable to all of us.

No where is the President's desire for seclusion more evident than at camp David, his official "retreat" in

Maryland's Catoctin Mountains. The complex is surrounded by two rows of seven-foot high, electrically charged fence, topped off with coiled barbed wire known as "concertina wire." Between the fences runs another wire which is attached to an alarm system. Marines, sometimes accompanied 17 by dogs, guard the fences.

Par more frequently than his predecessors, Nixon retires here to read his memos and write his speeches, "I find that up here on top of a mountain," he once said, "it is

^^The Washington Post, January 7, 1973, Sec.A, p. 3. 17 The Washington Post. December 8, 1972, Sec.A, p. 2 96 18 easier for me to get on top of the job. ri

It is also easier for him to get away from report­ ers, The White House staff doesn't appreciate it when news­ men follow Nixon to his mountain, and they have made it plain. Ronald Ziegler has consistently refused to permit the press to tour the facility. Originally, an area was walled off with saplings for reporters to stand behind and observe the helicopter landings. Even this has been declared off limits. Now reporters are confined to a ten-foot by fifty-foot trailer containing ten telephones. Ten more phones have been installed outside; in inclement weather, reporters have to cover themselves with plastic sheeting.

The facilities are hardly sufficient for the seventy-plus newsmen who follow the President. Briefings are held in the helicopter hanger. But most reporters have taken the hint and now remain behind at the White House. The President's men encourage this by piping the daily briefings from Camp 19 David into the White House press room.

Similar constraints restrict coverage of the Presi­ dent's activities at his winter home in Key Biscayne,

18 The Washington Post. December 8, 1972, Sec. A, p. 2. 19 The Washington Post. December 8, 1972, Sec. A, p. 2. 97

Florida. His neighbors must adorn their cars with special stickers and identify themselves to guards who barricade the street entrance. Even when Nixon is not there, the

Coast Guard patrols the bay to keep boats at least a half mile from the compound. Members of the Key Biscayne Yacht

Club have been warned not to bring photographers or newsmen to the club. "Bebe" Rebozo, close friend of the President, docks his houseboat there and is apparently afraid someone will snap a picture while Nixon is aboard. One club member allowed photographers on his vessel and "heard from Bebe on that faster than it could make your head swim," Neighbors have also been cautioned to avoid the press. One man who let photographers in his backyard to take pictures of the

Nixon homestead also heard from Rebozo

The man who kept the people and paper moving in and out of Nixon's office was his "chief of staff," H. R. Halde- man, a former executive with the J. Walter Thompson adver­ tising agency. Haldeman first became interested in working for Nixon when the latter was investigating Alger Hiss,

Haldeman didn't like Communists any more than Nixon, and the ad man soon joined Nixon's campaign staff, working in

20 The Washington Post. March 6, 1969, Sec. C, pp. 1, 3. 98 the elections of the fifties and sixties.

Haldeman was recognized as the man who oversaw, con­ trolled, and directly coordinated the Administration's press policy. Few doubt that Nixon himself decides the policy; but

it was Haldeman, apparently, who saw the policy was carried out and who supervised the day-to-day handling of the press. The most important admission of this fact came from insider James

Keogh who, in writing about the Administration's "communica­ tions effort," stated that "the chain of command ran directly 21 to Haldeman and ultimately to the President himself."

It was Haldeman, for example, who selected Ronald

Ziegler, a colleague at the Los Angeles office of J. Walter

Thompson, to be the president’s press secretary. Haldeman

also hired Constance Stuart, press secretary to the First 22 Lady. He also brought along from the Thompson firm the

President's appointments secretary, Dwight Chapin, who 23 recently resigned to take a job in business.

During the 1972 campaign, Haldeman was named as "the

21 James Keogh, President Nixon and the Press (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1972), p. 43. 22 The Washington Post. October 27, 1972, Sec. B, p. 1. 23 Jack Anderson, "Haldeman Calls Shots for Nixon," The Washington Post. August 22, 1972, Sec. B, p. 13. 99 man who calls the political shots for President N i x o n . " ^ 4

Columnist Jack Anderson wrote that Haldeman "issues polit­ ical directives, approves campaign contracts, receives polit- 25 ical reports and coordinates campaign activities." It was

Haldeman, said Anderson, who dreamed up the idea of creating an advertising agency, the "November Group," specifically to 2 6 handle the President's campaign promotion.

One of Haldeman's main jobs was to deny the press any access to or information about Nixon, But he was not beyond promoting stories, if he could perceive any benefits to the Administration. Such was the case, wrote Anderson, when Senator Edward Kennedy became involved in the Chappa- quiddick affair :

Haldeman likes to operate behind a screen. But on occasion, he has ventured forth into political combat. In the turbulent days following the death of Mary Jo Kopechne in Senator Ted Kennedy's automobile, Haldeman was on the telephone to key reporters, urging them to keep the pressure on Kennedy.

Haldeman's major task, however, was to guard the presidential castle, and this he did with relish. His

24 ^ Anderson, "Haldeman," Sec. B, p. 13 .

25^ ^ Anderson, "Haldeman," Sec. B, p. 13 .

26^ ^ Anderson, "Haldeman," Sec. B, p. 13 .

^^Anderson. "Haldeman," Sec. B, p. 13. 100 concern for the President's privacy reached its zenith when he tried to move Nixon's personal secretary. Rose Mary Woods

— one of few persons who has immediate access to the Oval

Office— from the White House to the crowded, roccoco Execu­ tive Office Building next door. Miss Woods is Nixon's senior aide, in length of service, and is as close to him as anyone outside the family. Haldeman's effort to oust her was dis­ creetly described by a former White House aide as a "tac- 28 tical error."

Aiding Haldeman in seeing that Nixon always has memoranda to read was John Ehrlichman, a former real estate lawyer from Seattle, Washington. Haldeman and Ehrlichman

(who, until his recent departure, was Nixon's chief domestic affairs advisor) were commonly referred to--because of their power and Teutonic ancestry— as the "Berlin Wall" or "The

Germans." Haldeman was sometimes called "Hans" and Ehrlich- 29 man was often referred to as "Fritz."

By his second year in office, Nixon had walled him­ self off from the outside world so efficiently that he apparently became concerned he was neglecting his friends.

So he hired "an old friend," Roger E. Johnson, as a special

2 g The Washington Post. October 27, 1972, Sec. B, p. 1. 29 The Washington Post, October 27, 1972, Sec. B, p . 1. 101 assistant and charged him with keeping the President's

"friends friendly." Johnson, an oil company executive for twenty-seven years, said his job was "to keep in personal contact with the good friends of the President he would like to see but doesn't have time to." But even Johnson wasn't going to be bothered with just casual acquaintances of the

President. Any callers, he said, would "have to be fairly close friends or they're not referred to me."^^

The hue and cry over Nixon's isolation has occa­ sionally moved the White House to deny that any such situa­ tion exists. Press secretary Ziegler once took pains to cite the many occasions Nixon had met with outsiders. In the first sixteen months of the President's first term, he said, there had been all of eighteen Cabinet meetings and many other meetings with sub-Cabinet groups, including the National

Security Council. White House reporters respectfully pointed out that such affairs could hardly be considered effective 31 means of keeping their fingers on the public pulse.

Not only has Nixon shut himself off from the press, but his staff is almost as isolated. Reporters are people

^^The Washington Post. February 2, 1971, Sec. B, p. 2.

^^The Washington Post. May 17, 1970, Sec. F, pp. 1, 3. 102 to steer clear of; when contact is unavoidable, the aides and advisors are about as communicative as CIA agents. James

Keogh has written frankly of the Nixon men's evasive tactics ;

. . . One experienced hand [in the White House] said he had found the perfect way to deal with newsmen : have your secretary take their calls and promise that you would call later. Call early the next morning, before the reporter would be expected to be in the office and leave word. In this way the calls were always returned but it was never necessary to talk.^^

Even when they deign to talk, Nixon's aides are cautious to an absurd degree. Washington Post society reporter Sally Quinn once had the difficult assignment of writing a profile on Fred Malek, the presidential assistant in charge of personnel until he was promoted to be the deputy director of the powerful Office of Management and

Budget. When Quinn asked for an interview, Malek was extremely reluctant to cooperate;

. . . "Can't you reconsider?" he asked over the phone. "The last thing I need at this point in my career is an article in the society section. " He sub­ sequently refused to speak on the record. He even refused to let a newspaper photographer take his picture, insisting that he pose instead for a White House photog­ rapher .33

Reporter Quinn also attempted to do a story on

32 Keogh, President Nixon and the Press, p. 126. 3 3 The Washington Post. December 17, 1972, Sec. K, p. 1. 103

H. R. Haldeman and encountered even more roadblocks, Halde­ man would not talk to her at all, nor would most of his friends and associates. Wrote Quinn:

Several of Haldeman's friends first assured a reporter they would be happy to talk about him but they were busy just then and would call back. An hour later they somehow found they "really don't know much about the guy at all."34

In the wake of the "ITT affair"— the furor that erupted when columnist Jack Anderson published a confidential memorandum written by International Telephone and Telegraph lobbyist Dita Beard which suggested the firm was planning to underwrite the 1972 Republic convention— the President's staff was instructed to avoid writing memos when a phone call would do the job. The concern, of course, was that reporters would obtain the documents and publish them. In a discussion with a junior aide, reported Time magazine, a Nixon assistant

"produced a presidential directive cautioning against treat­ ing mere memo writing as a sign of productivity. " The orders, said Time. "were, of course, delivered orally.^

The official silence around the White House some­ times is interpreted broadly by the staff. Nixon aides, for

34 The Washington Post, October 27, 1972, Sec. B, p. 3. 3 5 "Writing Block," Time, March 27, 1972, p. 20. 104 example, will not disclose what books the President r e a d s . 36

Associated Press reporter Saul Pett heard that Nixon had broken a tooth. He found several persons who would confirm the innocuous story, but each of them cautioned, "don’t quote m e . "37 pett also tried to nail down the story that Nixon suffers from hay fever. The president had once, in fact, dashed home by helicopter from Camp David because his hay fever was acting up— a story White House spokesmen denied.

Nixon's physician also denied his patient suffered from the malady, but Pett found a White House source who swore— anonymously— that Nixon lied to the doctor about it. The persistent Pett finally reread Nixon's book. Six Crises, and found an admission that the President was, indeed, sus- 38 ceptible to hay fever.

THE PRESS "SPOKESMEN"

The responsibility for executing the Administration's policy of keeping the press "comfortable but ignorant" has

^^The Washington Post. August 22, 1972, Sec. A, p. 13. 37 Associated Press dispatch. The Washington Post, January 14, 1973. 3 8 Associated Press dispatch. The Washington Post, January 14, 1973. 105

fallen to the President's press secretary. A native of Ken­ tucky, Ziegler went to Xavier University in Cincinnatti on a football scholarship. His parents moved west, and he

transferred to the University of Southern California. While

in college, he worked part-time at Disneyland, where he was 3 9 a tour guide on a boat cruise through a papier-mache jungle.

It was on this job that he learned a litany which he can

still remember and in which White House correspondents jok­

ingly claim they can find deep meaning;

My name is Ron and I'll be your guide down the rivers of adventure. As we pull away from the dock, please turn around and take a good look. You may never see it again. . . . Note the alligators, please keep your hands inside the boat. They're always looking for a handout. . . . On your left, the natives on the bank, please be quiet. The natives have only one aim in life— and that is to get ahead. . . .40

It was also while he was at U.S.C. that Ziegler began doing volunteer work for the Republican party. He made the press arrangements for a campus visit by Richard

Nixon in 1960. He continued working for the party after

graduation and joined the Nixon-for-governor team in 1962.

His basic job during the campaign was handling the physical

arrangements for the press entourage accompanying Nixon.

39 Martin Nolan, "Ron Among the Plastic Alligators," (More), A Journalism Review, II (September, 1972), 11-13. 40 Nolan, p. 12. 106

After his candidate's defeat, Ziegler took a job with the

J. Walter Thompson advertising agency in Los Angeles— the same office where Nixon's campaign manager, H. R. Haldeman, worked. Ziegler became an account executive, handling such advertising accounts as French's Mustard, Disneyland, and

7-Up. He left to join Nixon's 1968 campaign team as a 41 "press spokesman."

Reporters soon realized, however, that Ziegler had been fitted out with a tight leash. He "served chiefly as a transmission belt for the approved word," wrote Jules

Witcover, "and as a buffer whenever possible between the 42 press and the candidate." Witcover continued:

The routine procedure was for Ziegler to field ques­ tions, taking them directly to the candidate only when pressured by nagging newsmen and hardly ever clearing the way for them to confront Nixon himself.43

Newsmen began to get an idea of their low place in the new scheme of things when the Nixon White House staff was taking shape and it was announced that the President would have no press secretary; Ziegler, it was said, would be a "press assistant." It was "only when it became

41 Nolan, p. 12. 42 Witcover, "Washington: Focusing on Nixon," p. 16. 43 Witcover, p. 16. 107

embarrassing to Mr. Ziegler," reported John Pierson of the

Wall Street Journal, "did the President confer full honors" 44 and annoint Ziegler a full-fledged "press secretary."

Ziegler's approach to his job frequently has given

White House newsmen the impression that he still believes he is fending off plastic alligators. He is an affable,

usually friendly man with an innocent-looking face that fre­

quently breaks into a puckish grin. ". . .To bait him," 45 wrote one columnist, "would be like kicking a puppy." But

he absolutely refuses to be pinned down to specifics. His

information often has been erroneous and incomplete. He

regularly refuses to answer the most innocuous questions

except in the most general terms. He is a master of Madison

Avenue prattle, speaking an impenetrable language peculiar

to the advertising trade. He leans to such terms, for

example, as "time frame," "input," "output," and "I am com­

pleted on what I had to say," or, "This is getting to a

point which I am not going to discuss beyond what I have 46 said." He might accuse a reporter of "trying to complexify

44 The Wall Street Journal. December 29, 1969, p. 14. 45 Nolan, "Ron," p. 11, 46 The Wall Street Journal, December 29, 1969, pp. 1, 14. 108 the situation," or firmly disallow a query with, "I won't be responsive to your follow-up question on the original ques- 47 tion to which I told you I wouldn't be responsive."

Reporter John Pierson recorded this typical Ziegler statement ;

I have noted these reports where on occasion it is suggested that the President is angered on one occasion or frustrated or upset. And I have noted the reactions on the part of the President in my conversation and discussions with him at the time I have been with him that he has not been angered on the subjects that these particular references have been made about him having reacted that way.48

The White House press corps appears to be about evenly divided on the question of whether Ziegler and his staff are exceedingly clever or exceedingly ignorant.

Reporter Pierson surveyed his colleagues and found that while a few newsmen considered Ziegler to be "forthcoming," most felt otherwise. "Ron is programmed to do nothing," one reporter told Pierson. Ziegler fails to give "the remotest clue to the direction of the President's thinking," said 49 another newsman.

'^^The Wall Street Journal, December 29, 1969, pp. 1, 14.

^^The Wall Street Journal, December 29, 1969, P* 14.

Wall Street Journal, December 29, 1969, p. 1. 109

This investigator also interviewed a number of White

House reporters on the subject of Ronald Ziegler and obtained similar responses. Most newsmen surveyed said they liked

Ziegler and that he continues to improve in the areas of language and information. Their personal feelings about him, however, were mixed. One newsman summed it up in a manner that seemed typical ; "Ziegler is charming, but he's arrogant and cocky. At times I want to punch him.

When author Allen Drury was researching his book.

Courage and Hesitation, he undertook to interview Ziegler.

Drury is sympathetic to Richard Nixon and has criticized the news media for their treatment of the President. It is a measure of Ziegler's capacity to irritate newsmen, therefore, that he managed to infuriate Drury. Wrote the author, with obvious resentment;

. . . I had an appointment with him one dark after­ noon and waited for fifty-five minutes without even the courtesy of a secretary's hello, after which I picked up my marbles and went home and did not try to see him again. Next morning, after I had mentioned to others on the premises that I now thought I had found out all I needed to know about the character of Ron Ziegler, he called with loud apologies and a long tale beginning, "Jesus, I just didn't know you were out there, Al." I told him not to worry, these things will happen. I was told by his colleagues later that indeed they do, and

^^Statement by a White House correspondent, personal interview, March 23, 1971. 110

often to people who come to him in good faith for the help he is theoretically supposed to provide on projects basically friendly to the President.

But— those magic words in this or any other White House— "the President likes him." So he stays. . . .51

If Ziegler is unawed by the newsmen he matches wits with every day of the week, the same cannot be said for the

men from whom he must get his information. "I can walk into

the President's office any time I like without going through

any secretary or any other individual," he has said, as if 52 he cannot really believe it. New York Times reporter

James M, Naughton visited Ziegler for an interview and was

treated to a display of the press secretary's powers :

He reached behind him, to a gadget on a credenza that looked like a sleeping electronic crane. It had a series of buttons and said WESTERN ELECTRIC VIDEO­ PHONE on it. Ziegler pressed three buttons and the gadget went eep, pop, pp and suddenly a stomach clad in a white shirt came onto a small videoscreen. The stomach descended and it turned out to have above it the bespectacled face of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, assistant to the President for national security affairs. He looked slightly nonplussed as he fiddled with his gadget in an office about 20 yards distant. The following conversation ensued.

Mr, Ziegler: Henry, can you see me?

51 Allen Drury, Courage and Hesitation (Garden city. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1971), p. 165. 52 James M. Naughton, "How the 2d Best-Informed Man in the White House Briefs the 2d Worst-Informed Group in Wash­ ington, " The New York Times Magazine. May 30, 1971, p. 25. Ill

Dr. Kissinger; Hi, Ron, yeah. Let me get the stupid thing—

Mr. Ziegler: He has trouble working it.

Dr. Kissinger; O.K.

Mr. Ziegler: You know Jim Naughton.

Mr. Naughton: Hello, Henry.

Dr. Kissinger: Hi.

Mr. Ziegler: I don't mean to break in and bother you, but I was—

Dr. Kissinger: You are breaking in.

Mr. Ziegler: — but I was making a point to Jim on how well you looked on the picture screen here and how you are really more accessible for information than some may believe. Just proving my point,

Mr. Naughton; We saw your stomach first.

Dr. Kissinger: I see.

Before anybody could say anything more, Ziegler, declaring, "I talk to him that way all the time," reached back and pressed three more buttons— urp. eep, urp— and onto the screen came a side view of a leather reclining office chair, the back slowly rising to its normal perpendicular and a head peeping slowly around the edge. It was John D. Ehrlichman, assistant to the President for domestic affairs.

Mr. Ziegler: John?

Mr. Ehrlichman: Yes?

Mr. Ziegler: You know Jim Naughton?

Mr. Ehrlichman: Hello, Jim.

Mr. Naughton: How are you, John? 112

Mr. Ehrlichman; Fine. I'm down here in a hole.

Mr. Ziegler: Uh, John, I was just making a point to Jim Naughton that you're really easier to get to than many may believe.

Mr. Ehrlichman: There you are. See?

Mr. Ziegler: So you've just proved my point.

Mr. Ehrlichman: How 'bout that?

A secretary stepped in front of Ziegler's videophone and the press secretary broke off the conversation.

"I do that all the time," said Ziegler.

An average day in Ron Ziegler's life begins at 6:30

a.m. when he leaves his white brick home in Alexandria,

Virginia and climbs into a chauffeur-driven Chrysler New

Yorker dispatched from the white House motor pool. As he is being driven to work, he reads four newspapers and whisks

through Patrick Buchanan's news digest— all of which were waiting for him in the car. In the office, he goes through

stacks of intelligence reports. Meanwhile, he notes on a

yellow legal pad all the subjects that may be brought up in

his press briefings at 11 a.m. and 4 p.m. Sensitive subjects he researches himself by calling Cabinet officials or White

House aides. Other potential questions are researched by

his staff. At 8:15 each morning, he meets with senior aides

53 Naughton, pp. 26-27. 113 and outlines precisely what information he can give the press on important subjects. With especially sensitive information, he will write down exactly what he expects to say; and frequently, he will hold in reserve a few bits of information that he will allow to be drawn from him as ques­ tions proceed. No matter how many times a question is asked, or in how many different forms, he will never go beyond what he has prepared. Some newsmen have said Ziegler uses inflection, mannerisms, and phrases to signal hidden meanings in his otherwise uninformative statements and answers— a charge which Ziegler has indirectly admitted is 54 true.

The press secretary's mechanical approach to his job, his reluctance to say anything he has not been specif­ ically instructed to say, and his stubborn insistence on conversing in the patois of the advertising world have com­ pelled newsmen, more than once, to compare him to a computer.

Nicholas von Hoffman, irreverent columnist for the Washington post, has called Ziegler an "automatic man" who speaks only when "the disks of magnetic tape behind his eyes" begin to whir, and who can switch subjects only when his "reel" is

54 Naughton, pp. 24, 25. 114 ^ 55 changed.

Ziegler's main chore is performed twice a day when he mounts a podium in the White House briefing room and parries the questions of the newsmen whose unenviable task it is to draw something from him. Briefings usually begin with a prepared statement and announcement of the President's schedule. The fun starts when Ziegler begins taking ques­ tions, usually with a cup of coffee in one hand and a cig­ arette in the other.

On a typical day in January, 1973, Ziegler began the briefing by outlining the president's schedule. Then he went over a list of resignations the President was accepting with

"deep regret.") Then he discussed a fishing rights treaty that was being arranged with Colombia. The newsmen were becoming restless with such trivia, and their complaints elicited from Ziegler the admonition that, "In all due respect gentlemen, these announcements must be made some­ where!" The tittering reporters were brought up short with a Ziegler command: "Write it down! These are government actions !" Ziegler then noted that Nixon would be celebrat­ ing his birthday with a dinner "at the appropriate time."

55 The Washington Post, January 12,1973, Sec. B, p. 1. 115

Then followed a discussion of the President's neckties.56

Nicholas von Hoffman witnessed the briefing and commented that ;

Just before the press corps dashed to the phones to inform a waiting world, the automatic man said, "This has been an uninhibited briefing," and then rocked off on his track and disappeared through the door to his office like a bird in a Schwarzwald clock.57

Ziegler is not always so solemn. Occasionally he will banter with newsmen in a humorous manner. In a 1969 briefing, for example, reporters inquired about the Presi­ dent's mood. Reporter John Pierson recorded the dialogue:

QUESTION: Does he smile, does he crack jokes? Really, when you talk to him, you know, sort of anec­ dotally describe a sort of conversation.

Mr. Z; I wouldn't do that.

Q : You brought up the subject.

Mr. Z: I didn't, and I am completed on what I had to say.

Q : Are you saying he hasn't been angered or upset in recent weeks?

M r . Z : Yes -

Q: Nothing has angered or upset him?

Mr. Z : I haven't seen him angered or upset at all.

^^The Washington Post, January 12, 1973, Sec. B, p. 1.

^^The Washington Post. January 12, 1973, Sec. B, p. 1. 116 Q; For how long a time?

Mr. 3; For quite a while, since January 20.

Q: Is he well pleased, has he been the last few weeks?

Mr. Z: This, I think, is getting to a point which I am not going to discuss beyond what I have said.

Q: You have drawn for us the picture of a President who is smiling and completely content through eight months of turmoil, crises and so forth.

Q: You have said that he had been concerned about several matters.

Mr. Z: Let me say he has approached the Presidency in the posture of. . .of. . . of. . . of. . . no, I w o n ' t say it. (Laughter)

That is all I have for today. There will be a tra­ ditional briefing at 11 o'clock tomorrow.58

Ziegler's relish in attacking his job of keeping information out of the hands of the press is manifested in many ways. Once, for example, reporters asked Ziegler for a list of White House staff members. After a few weeks,

Ziegler produced a list that was far from complete. It showed, for example, that Henry Kissinger was the only White

House staff member working on national security. Ziegler's reasoning: Dr. Kissinger's assistants are on the National 59 Security Council staff and not on the White House staff.

58 The Wall Street Journal, December 29, 1969, p. 14. 59 Stuart H. Loory, "The Nixon White House : 117

On another occasion, Ziegler was asked to confirm a report that President Nixon had been seen, at Camp David, wearing purple flared trousers. "Flared is a bit of an exaggeration," retorted Ziegler, adding that Nixon does own pants without cuffs. "He's a regular guy," said Ziegler.

"He wears sports clothes.

John Osborne of the New Republic related the story of how a reporter— presumably himself--was chatting with

Henry Kissinger on a patio outside his office, when Ziegler appeared. The press secretary "stared for a moment at the visitor and then, with a look of consternation so extreme that the reporter thought he must be kidding, whirled and dashed back into the office from which he had come," slam­ ming the door behind him. The problem, it later turned out, was that Ziegler, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman had been discuss­ ing the President's budget, and Ziegler was certain the reporter had overheard the figures, "Mr Nixon is no man to tolerate leaks of that magnitude, accidental or not," wrote

Osborne, "and his prospective wrath was too awful for

Herrlichman and Co. Look Ahead to 1972," The Washingtonian Magazine, V (February, 1970), 32.

^^Associated Press dispatch. The Washington Post, January 14, 1973. 118 contemplation.

The corps of White House press photographers, known as the "animals," get their share of the Ziegler treatment.

When the President travels, Ziegler stands watch, making sure they don't catch the President in an awkward situation and preserve it for posterity. On election day, 1972, when

Nixon dropped his ballot and bent down to pick it up, the photographers had to fight off Ziegler as they snapped the picture.• ^ 62

At the White House, the photographers pass their long days with conversation and gin games, waiting for the voice on the intercom system to announce "a photographic opportunity" in the Oval Office. When the word comes, the cameramen are herded to the President's office, where they wait outside for their cue. When they get it, they rush inside, pushing and shoving, jockeying for position. Thirty seconds later, the lights go out and the photographers return to their card games.

^^John Osborne, The Second Year of the Nixon Watch (New York: Liveright, 1971), p. 15.

^^Associated Press dispatch. The Washington Post, January 14, 1973.

Steve Kline, "Mugging the President," Saturday Review of the Society. I (February, 1973), 5, 7. 119

Ziegler’s staff of press aides are even less inform­

ative than their leader. Most were young and inexperienced when they were hired. In 1970, only one of Ziegler's assist­

ants was a veteran newsman. Three of the remaining four were

in their mid-twenties. Today, Ziegler is assisted by deputy

press secretaries Gerald L. Warren and Neil Ball, and press

aides Timothy Elbourne, J. Bruce Whelihan, Andrew Falkiewicz, 64 and Agnes Waldron.

Wherever the President goes, the press aides precede him. Their primary job apparently is to protect Nixon from

unfavorable publicity.

In February, 1970, for example, press assistant

Timothy Elbourne flew to Chicago to make plans for Nixon's

arrival in the city. Columnist Jack Anderson outlined what

occurred at a briefing for press photographers;

. . . Tim Elbourne outlined to news photographers the "do's" and "don'ts"— almost all "don't's."

"What can we do?" growled a veteran photographer.

"Well," replied Elbourne brightly, "all of you who want to can go with Mrs. Nixon to Goose Lake Prairie. And we have planned a nice picture of Mr. and Mrs. Nixon stepping off an elevator just before the reception. " Having offered the cameramen these historic events to photograph, the businesslike young Mr. Elbourne

64 Naughton, "How the 2d Best-Informed Man," p. 25. 120

departed.a. ^ 6 5

While the newsmen who cover the President are pain­ fully aware of Ronald Ziegler's proficiency in keeping them ignorant of the real news, many seem to be oblivious to

Ziegler's second, far more subtle task of diverting them with creature comforts.

Wall Street Journal reporter Jonathan Spivak ruminated on this subject while with the President in San Clemente,

California ;

. , . Working with the White House press corps is a heady business. There is the charter flight westward where the booze flows freely— Bloody Marys for breakfast — the service is sublime, the stewardesses are stunning. There is the "VIP" treatment for accompanying families, the Army helicopters, the special buses, the waiting press rooms and the hovering Western Union operators. All feed the ego and indulge the sense of self- importance . 66

One of Ron Ziegler's strong points is his ability to

enhance the natural euphoria of White House reporters by

seeing they are well provided for— with everything, of

course, but news. He gained his reputation as a superb

"technician" while working on the President's 1968 campaign.

While keeping the traveling newsmen from the candidate's

^^Jack Anderson, "Press Corps Smooths Way for Nixon," The Washington Post, June 3, 1970, Sec. B, p. 11.

^^The Wall Street Journal. December 24, 1970, p. 27. 121 door, he literally swamped them with prepared statements, position papers, and similar handouts. There was always something to write about, however innocuous it was.

Once in the White House, Ziegler put together a pro- 68 posai for a new press room. At a cost of over half a million dollars, the Nixon men boarded over the old White

House swimming pool and topped it with the "West Terrace

Press Center," In one room are the working quarters con­ taining forty desks— some enclosed in glass booths— twelve broadcast booths, telephones, typewriters, and piped-in music. Just off this room is the "briefing room" where

Ziegler or his aides hold forth at least twice a day. A built-in stage can be swathed in spotlights at the flip of a switch; the floor is covered with cinnamon-colored pile carpeting; Elizabethan chairs and tufted suede Chesterfield 69 sofas are scattered about.

There is also a "snack area" replete with vending machines filled with sandwiches, cakes, sweets, and soft

^^Witcover, "Washington; Focusing on Nixon," pp. 11-17. 68 Nolan, "Ron," p. 11. 69 Luther A. Huston, "Nixon Puts Newsmen in Lap of Luxury," Editor & Publisher, April 18, 1970, pp. 18, 44. 122 drinks. Several glass coffee pots are always hot and full.70

The maneuver appears to have worked its charm on some of the newsmen, accustomed as they are of being deprived of space rather than the opposite. Wrote one reporter;

. , . If the history books record that the press in time came to no longer want to "kick Richard Nixon around" (in his phrase) , [the press room] may be one small, unworthy reason.71

As much as the President apparently dislikes being followed by the press to his Camp David retreat, he neverthe­ less, in the words of a UP I newsman, "noticed reporters shivering in the cold while covering his arrival by heli- 72 copter" and ordered a press trailer be installed. Although cramped, it is equipped with wall-to-wall carpeting, black leather armchairs and sofa, other chairs, and a television set specially equipped to show Washington Redskins football 73 games even when they have been "blacked out" in the area.

The President, of course, is not the only person

70 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star, April 3, 1970, Sec. C, p. 1. 71 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star, April 3, 1970, Sec. C, p. 1. 72 United Press International dispatch. The Washington Post, November 18, 1972. 73 United press International dispatch. The Washington Post. November 18, 1972, 123 around the Wliite House to be blessed with a personal secre­ tary whose major role is to deny reporters meaningful news.

The First Lady has her own press secretary, as does the Vice-

President .

Pat Nixon's affairs are watched over by public rela­ tions expert Constance Cornell Stuart, Mrs. Stuart earns over thirty thousand dollars a year for her twelve-hour days and the twice weekly briefings she holds for the First Lady's 74 press entourage.

Although she is somewhat more communicative than her counterpart in the West Wing, Ron Ziegler, Connie Stuart constantly strives to put the First Lady's best foot forward.

This is understandable, of course, but sometimes it causes the truth to be stretched, Pat Nixon, Connie claims, is

"the most accessible First Lady since Eleanor Roosevelt.

She is straightforward and honest. She is out to promote volunteerism. She saw everybody lifting themselves up on 75 her ghetto tour of Watts." Reporters who were in Watts with her, however, were quick to note that Mrs. Nixon never

74 "First Lady's Lady," Time, January 4, 1971, p. 43. 75 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star, February 26, 1971, Sec. C, p. 2. 124

7 6 actually entered the Los Angeles ghetto.

Mrs. Stuart doesn't particularly like the reporters she has to deal with. In what she later said was her "same old speech," she traveled to Ridgewood, New Jersey, in 1971, where she told a women's club that the female wire service reporters were "leeches" who "stay glued to Mrs. Nixon."

One magazine reporter, she said, was "hysterical." And the female reporters who traveled with Pat Nixon were a "massive conglomeration of human beings somewhat like a huge Rube 77 Goldberg contraption."

The tart-tongued Mrs. Stuart also has taken it upon herself to lecture reporters on how to do their jobs. The ladies of the press, it seems, were getting too many solid details at various receptions, so Connie took them aside for a scolding;

If I think some of you have gotten exceedingly busty because you are carrying tape recorders, I might question how you gained weight. You are here as guests, and guests do not wander around taking notes. Please introduce yourself to the guests just as any nice, well- brought-up lady would do. Circulate, and take mental impressions.78

The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star, February 26, 1971, Sec. C, p. 2. 77 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star, February 26, 1971, Sec. C, p. 2. "First Lady's Lady," p. 43. 125

Agnew's press secretary, until he resigned after the

1972 election to write a book on the news media, was one

Victor Gold, a devoted disciple of his employer and venomous critic of the press. "We're the amateurs in this media busi­ ness," he told this investigator while scoffing at the alle­ gation that the Vice-President was deliberately intimidating the press, "The networks have the experts. Compared to 79 them, we're a 1942 Fred Waring operation."

Gold claims to be an erstwhile liberal who saw the 80 error of his ways and became a "visceral conservative."

Veteran New York Times political reporter James T. Wooden followed the Agnew party on the hustings in 1972 and filed this report on Gold;

. . . The 44-year-old press secretary to Vice President Agnew must surely have come to know himself this year as a tense, touchy fellow given to tirades, temper tantrums, and an occasional impersonation of Genghis Khan with a toothache.

In six weeks of travel, from New England . . . to the West Coast, he has by rough count shouted insults at 11 bus drivers and one pilot, berated 44 cameramen and reporters, thrown things at his assistant once, excoriated his secretary twice, and managed to offend an assorted gathering of Secret Service agents, local

79 Statement by Victor Gold, personal interview. March 23, 1971. 80 The New York Times, November 3, 1972, p. 21. 126

policemen and potential Republican voters,81

A veteran of the 1964 Goldwater campaign. Gold worked in public relations until he joined forces with Agnew in

1969. He was given generally high marks by the press for being honest and straightforward. He was hardly loquacious, however, and never on a subject unflattering to the Vice-

President. In other words, he was, like Ziegler, helpful with everything but the kind of news that reporters most need.

When the going got rough in press conferences, Gold was known to impersonate a reporter and close the proceedings with the traditional, "Thank you, Mr. Vice-President." He also denied recalcitrant reporters berths on Agnew's press plane, despite 82 the fact there were seats available.

THE MORIBUND PRESS CONFERENCE

Nowhere has the Nixon Administration's policy of deliberately shunning the press been more overtly evidenced than in the manner in which the Nixon men have abandoned the institution of the formal press conference.

In his first four years, Nixon submitted to

^^The New York Times, November 3, 1972, p. 21. 82 The New York Times. November 3, 1972, p. 21. 127 twenty-eight such affairs— little more than two a month.83

Franklin Roosevelt, by contrast, averaged almost two press 84 conferences a week. Even since F.D.R.'s time, Chief Execu­ tives have met the press on the average of twenty-four to thirty-six times a year— as many conferences, in most cases, as Nixon held during his entire first term in office.The situation had deteriorated so badly by 1972 that the Washing­ ton News Committee of the Associated Press Managing Editors

Association was constrained to report that "President Nixon has come close to killing off the presidential press confer- 8 6 ence as a public institution during his term in office."

The APME report continued;

As of Jan. 31 [1972], the most recent presidential press conference was on Nov. 12.

In the interim, full-scale fighting broke out between India and Pakistan; James Hoffa was sprung from federal prison by presidential order; the President held

83 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin Delano Roosevelt," rev. of Jonathan Daniels (intro.). The Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Da Capo Press), Book World, January 28, 1973, p. 3. 84 Schlesinger, p. 1. 8 5 Associated Press dispatch. The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star, February 4, 1972.

^^Associated Press dispatch. The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star. February 4, 1972. 128

pre-summit meetings with Canada, Great Britain, France, West Germany and Japan; Congress adjourned and then reconvened; the Anderson papers exploded on the Washing­ ton scene; the President issued his State of the Union and budget pronouncements; the President said he had been conducting secret negotiations with the North Viet­ namese, just to name a few controversial happenings.

Why the reluctance of Mr. Nixon to step forward even once in 2*$ months to answer the questions on the public mind?87

The question of "why?" is indeed a good one. Appar­ ently, most newsmen feel that when President Nixon does con­ sent to face the press in a formal situation, he performs exceedingly well. He is always fully prepared; he is a master debater who organizes his talking points with great facility; he habitually foils reporters by couching his answers in cleverly constructed generalities which resist follow-up questions. Why, then, does he not meet the press more often? Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., former John Kennedy aide, has written that :

. . . He [Nixon] evidently finds scrutiny and chal­ lenge intolerable. The whole idea of accountability exacts a heavy psychic toll on him. And, to be real­ istic, his refusal to meet the press regularly spares him the necessity of answering uncomfortable questions — about such matters, for example, as his knowledge of the Watergate affair. . . .88

8 7 Associated Press dispatch. The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star. February 4, 1972.

8 8 Schlesinger, p. 3. 129

Jules Witcover noticed, while traveling with Nixon

in 1965, that he seemed to think of the press conference as

the ultimate battlefield, the supreme test of a public man.

While discussing politics with Witcover, Nixon commented that

"intellectuals" have a double standard. "If you happen to

support their point of view, you can be a drunk, a stupe,

fall on your face in a press conference, and they will still . , „89 back you.

As President, Nixon complained to Allen Drury that

John Kennedy was asked "soft and gentle" questions in his

press conferences. It was different with Nixon. "I never 90 get any easy questions," he said.

But the most likely reason Nixon shuns press con­

ferences is that they simply do not fit into his "game plan."

He wants to end run the press, not face them. He wants to

address the people on his own terms, in situations he can

control. He wants to convey the message h^ wants to convey,

and he wants it delivered undiluted and unsullied by the per­

sistent critics of the press.

89 Jules Witcover, The Resurrection of Richard Nixon (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), p. 150. Italics in the original. 90 Drury, Courage and Hesitation, p. 395. 130

His communications director. Herb Klein, has said as much. Referring to the writing press as "the Gutenberg set," he wrote:

Let's face it ; A Presidential news conference with 300 reporters clamoring for their moment on camera and with 50 million viewers watching— is not the ideal format to reveal policy to world powers or to explain it in depth to the nation.81

Ronald Ziegler has taken it a step further:

. . . I believe the press conference is one way to communicate. It is a very effective way but not the only way to communicate, and I think President Nixon . . . has used a variety of ways— through direct tele­ vision speeches, through radio addresses, of course through the daily briefings we have in the White House. .82

Lest there be any auestion from whom the President's men are taking their cues^^'bhis is how the President himself put it in December, 197 0;

My job is, among other things, to inform the American people. One of the ways to inform them is through a press conference. . . . Another way is through making reports to the nation, as I did on several occa­ sions about the war in Southeast Asia. Another is an interview, an hour ' s interview with the three anchormen of the three networks, which mainly dealt . . . on Southeast A s i a . 83

91 "'Presidential News Conference Not the Ideal Format— Klein,'" The Quill. LVIII (February, 1971), 11. 92 "Covering the White House in Particular," The Quill, LX (January, 1972), 13. 93 "More Presidential News Conferences? SDX Pursues 131

The President, in other words, prefers other forms of communication— forms in which the potential for any kind of mistake is reduced to the absolute minimum.

When Nixon does agree to a news conference, all the vast resources of the federal bureaucracy are cranked up to make the confrontation as controllable as possible. The

President and the bureaucrats do their job well; the final performance is usually as well staged as a Broadway show.

As much as a week before a press conference is scheduled, the White House staff is organized to gather information. A domestic affairs team under the direction of

Patrick Buchanan collects data from every Executive Depart­ ment and agency, including any policy statements the bureau­ crats want publicized. Another team supervised by Dr. Henry

Kissinger gathers information on foreign affairs. Meanwhile,

Ron Ziegler and Herb Klein put together scores of questions that they, based on their daily contact with newsmen, think might be asked. The material is then arranged in question and answer form, placed in two, loose-leaf notebooks, and forwarded to the President. Updated information is con­ stantly fed to Nixon. The system has worked so well, say

White House insiders, that they have pinpointed as many as

the Issue," The Quill. LVIII (February, 1971), 10. 132 94 ninety percent of reporters' questions in advance.

The President then secludes himself and crams. He underlines key words and catchy phrases, memorizing some of them. He may rewrite a few of the answers. Usually, he tries to arrange two or three study sessions before going on 95 stage.

The night before his press conference, the President gets at least seven hours sleep. Before facing the reporters, he shaves with a safety razor, submits to a light application of makeup, and often runs in place two hundred times to bring 96 color to his cheeks.

Meanwhile, Ronald Ziegler has made arrangements for the White House "regulars" to be seated in the center section directly in front of the President. Nixon knows which of these reporters will treat him with deference, and it is to them he will turn if he feels the need for a "safe" question. 97 A seating chart is made available to Nixon before he begins.

94 "How the President Gets Ready for a News Confer­ ence," U.S. News & World Report, December 22, 1969, p. 47. 95 "How the President Gets Ready for a News Confer­ ence," p. 47. 96 "The Making of the Newest Nixon," Time. January 18, 1971, p. 12. 97 The [Washington, D.C.] Sunday Star, November 29, 1970, Sec. A, p. 6. 13 3

As he moves into the East Room of the White House, where most of his formal press conferences have been held, he mounts a spare, square stage and faces a single micro­ phone. He usually foregoes even a lectern, but this is not by happenstance. The purpose of the bare setting is to create, as much as possible, an aura of direct contact with the television audience. When he answers a question, he will be talking to the viewer, not to the correspondent who asked it.®®

In contrast to the extensive preparations the Presi­ dent has made, some of the reporters sitting out front more than likely will have composed their questions on the way to the White House. Others have put more thought into what they will ask if called upon; but in rare cases have they the time or the resources to prepare for the task ahead of them as has the President. When they assemble, moreover, they face almost insurmountable problems.

First of all, the East Room is usually crowded to the breaking point, rendering it almost impossible to string together a series of challenging follow-up questions. Rela­ tively few reporters are called upon in the half hour

98 Julius Duscha, "The President and the Press," The Progressive, XXXIII (May, 1969), 26. 134 allotted— because of television— and if they do manage to ask some reasonably tough questions, the President has the option of filibustering or moving on quickly to someone else, perhaps a "safe" reporter.

More often, however, the questions in a televised conference are not tough. This is due partly to the extended lapses between Nixon's press conferences; issues and events pile up and questions tend to be too general. Also, reporters, as much as anyone, want to appear professional before the vast audience of peers and viewers. So they might read a question they have prepared in advance; it will, in most instances, have little to do with what has gone on before. Other report­ ers, disdaining written questions, drone on endlessly, often taking more time to pose the query than the President will take to answer it.

The television cameras present still another problem.

The Wall Street Journal's political columnist, Allan L.

Otten, expressed it this way:

. , . Most reporters are loath to appear loathsome to a nationwide audience, and so serve up puff-balls— would the President please "comment on" such and such a subject? — instead of asking the hard, searching ques­ tions they should be asking and so often used to ask.88

99 The Wall Street Journal, August 5, 1970, p. 23. 135

On May 8, 1970, for example. President Nixon held a press conference in a time of unusual turmoil. Since he had last faced the press, there had been an invasion of Cam­ bodia, students had been shot down on the campus of Kent

State University, demonstrators were even then on their way to Washington, the stock market was plummeting, and Interior

Secretary Walter Hickel's letter in defense of the young had been leaked.-, 1 100

The President strode into the East Room, and, in the words of New York Times reporter Hedrick Smith, "held the assembled reporters at bay as easily as Cassius Clay dab­ bling with a clutch of welterweights. These, in Smith's words, are some examples of what occurred:

. . . One reporter noted that some young people were saying the United States was headed for revolution or repression and asked the President's view: true or false? Another invited Mr. Nixon to tell the public about the isolation of the presidency. A third inquired whether the President thought the Vietnam War worthwhile. A fourth wanted to know if the President was prepared to pursue a political settlement in Paris with fervor. A fifth asked for "comment" on the Hickel letter.102

^^^Hedrick Smith, "When the president Meets the Press," The Atlantic Monthly, CCXXVIII (August, 1970), 65,

l O l eSmith, p. cc:65.

^^^Smith, p. 66. 13 6

In sum, the advent of television has robbed the press of their own conference and given it to the President. It is his show, and it is surprising that Nixon doesn't use the format more frequently than he does. The problem, of course, is that despite all his preparation, the President cannot exert absolute control over reporters and the questions they ask. Occasionally, newsmen do get tough, and this distorts the message that Nixon wants to get across to the public. At his June, 1971, press conference, for example, several reporters set aside their prepared queries to bore in on the president with a set of follow-up questions. The experience proved to be an uncomfortable one for Nixon.

It began when Herbert Kaplow, then White House cor­ respondent for NBC news, asked Nixon for his thoughts on how the Washington, D.C., police force had handled the "Mayday" demonstrations the previous month. The police had literally

swept thousands of people off the streets, making wholesale

arrests with little regard for civil liberties. Did the

President think, asked Kaplow, "the police handled it prop­

erly"? Had he thought about "the broader constitutional

question involved of protecting individual rights in a diffi­

cult situation to control

"Reporters Bore in on President with Tough Follow- Up Questions," National Journal. June 5, 1971, p. 1194. 137

Nixon, in his debater's style, separated his answer into two parts. First there were such things as demonstra­ tors who had legal right to peacefully protest. Then there were "vandals and hoodlums and lawbreakers" who "should be treated as lawbreakers." These were the types the police had 104 arrested, he said, and he approved.

He had not, of course, addressed the question of whether the civil liberties of innocent bystanders had been violated. Indeed, the cases of some two thousand of those arrested had already been dropped by the courts.

Two questions on different subjects were answered, then Forrest J. Boyd of the Mutual Broadcasting System stood up and asked if preventing the "closing down [of] the govern­ ment . . . was so important that some method of suspending constitutional rights was justified.Nixon replied that

Boyd was exaggerating things. J. F. terHorst of the Detroit

News rose to ask if that was so, then why were the courts releasing so many of the arrested? Arrest, said Nixon, "does not mean that an individual is guilty. This completely

104 "Reporters Bore in," p. 1194. "Reporters Bore in," p. 1194.

"Reporters Bore in," p. 1194, 107 "Reporters Bore in," p. 1194. 138 evaded the point that numerous illegal arrests had been made, James Deakin, veteran reporter for the St. Louis

Post-Dispatch was recognized and, to Nixon's obvious chagrin,

the reporter wanted to know if people were "being released 108 on the grounds that they weren't properly arrested." The response was a curt defense of the policemen's tactics, deliv­

ered while Nixon looked around desperately for a safe face.

He found it in Sarah McClendon, a correspondent who repre­

sents a group of newspapers in Texas, Wisconsin, and Cali­

fornia, and who has a reputation for asking kooky, irrelevant

questions. She came through in characteristic style, and 109 Nixon was off the hook.

It was a magnificent display of how a press confer­

ence is supposed to work. It was also Richard Nixon's last

press conference for exactly one year and twenty-eight 110 days .

In the interim, John Ehrlichman visited Los Angeles

and was asked, in a television interview, why the President

didn't meet the press more frequently. His response;

108 "Reporters Bore in," p. 1194. 109 "Reporters Bore in," p. 1194.

^^*^The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star, June 29, 1972, Sec. A, p. 1. 139

Well, he doesn't get very good questions at press conferences, frankly. He goes in there for half an hour; he gets a lot of flabby and fairly dumb questions, and it doesn't really elucidate very much. I've seen him many times come off one of those things and go back in and say, "Isn't it extraordinary how poor the quality of the questions are."Ill

^Newsmakers, Newsweek, June 26, 1972, p. 49. chapter 4

TAKING IT TO THE PEOPLE

Shortly after Richard Nixon's election in 1968, reporter Jules Witcover wrote that :

Prom all indications, what has been "media campaign­ ing" under Nixon may approach "media governing," with the same panoply of communications innovation used by the new President to get his message to the public— undiluted, whenever possible, by press interpretation, analysis, or expemsion.l

This is precisely what occurred : Richard Nixon took to the airways like no President before him.

THE END RUN: TELEVISION

Given Nixon's distaste for the press— his conviction that any criticism reporters made of him was the result of personal hatred, his reluctance to face them, his deep- rooted belief that he would never be treated fairly by them— it is not surprising that he decided, apparently during his long "exile," that he would devise an arrangement wherein he

^Jules Witcover, "Washington: Focusing on Nixon," Columbia Journalism Review. VII (Winter, 1968-1969), 13.

140 141 would never have to deal with newsmen again except on his own terms. What made it possible, of course, was tele­ vision— and the know-how to use it. And Richard Nixon knew how to use it. Insider James Keogh has written of the Presi­ dent's attitude toward evading the press with television:

Richard Nixon believed— and more than once advised his associates— that the best way to communicate with the people was to appear on live television and speak directly to them. This was, in effect, going over the heads of newsmen so that what was said would not be strained through their political b i a s . 2

If, during the 1968 campaign, many newsmen didn't realize, as Jules Witcover did, that Richard Nixon had tamed

the electronic beast to serve him, they received another les­

son during the "transition period" before Nixon took office.

One of the President-elect's associates hinted at what was

coming in an interview with the U.S. News & World Report.

"... Mr. Nixon is good on television," he said, "and may 3 use it a lot to get his views across to the public."

The first television extravaganza of the Nixon Admin­

istration came on December 11, 1968, when the President-elect

went before the cameras to announce all twelve of his Cabinet

2 James Keogh, President Nixon and the Press (New York; Funk & Wagnalls, 1972), p. 39. 3 "Will the Press Be Out To 'Get' Nixon?" U.S. News & World Report, December 2, 1968, p. 40. 142 appointments en bloc, This, in itself, was a slap in the

face to the press. Cabinet officers were traditionally named one or two at a time to permit newsmen time to criti­ cize, analyze, and, in effect, pick the new men apart. This was beneficial to the President as well as to the press. If

any of his appointees had shortcomings, he would discover 4 them before it was too late.

But Richard Nixon wanted the public to make up its

mind about his new Cabinet without help from the press. So,

from the Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C., he presented his

new men. First he announced the re-appointment of Washing­

ton's Negro mayor, Walter Washington.^ This "impressed

many," wrote reporter Paul Hoffman, "as a cynical ploy to get

a black face on the TV tube."^ Nixon then named his "team" 7 of "new men with new ideas." It readily became apparent to

most experienced newsmen why Nixon had chosen to end run 8 them. For the new Cabinet officers numbered among them not

4 Witcover, p. 14.

^Paul Hoffman, The New Nixon (New York: Tower Publica­ tions, 1970), p. 42.

^Hoffman, p. 42. 7 Hoffman, p. 42. g Despite his elaborate attempts to keep his new Cab­ inet secret until air-time, Nixon got what Witcover called "a 143 a single blackj Jew or Democrat. Furthermore^ as reporter

Hoffman put it;

It was a group of middle-aged men without ideas. With the exception of Mitchell [John Mitchell, Attorney General] and Finch [Robert Finch^ Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare] , they were not meant to be idea men; they were meant to be administrators, running their departments with as little to-do as possible; they were picked not to make waves. Under the new Nixon, policy would be made at the White House. . . .9

But the press analysis came later. Nixon achieved what he sought ; he let the people get a look before reporters began their criticism. It was, in James Keogh's words, a

"striking indication of how he preferred to communicate with the people.

In the next four years, the viewing public was treated to "The Richard Nixon Show" as often, in some periods, as every three days. In his first seventeen months, Nixon starred in a dozen of his own productions and ten additional

sound lesson in journalistic enterprise" with this episode. Newsmen ferreted out the name of every man on the new Cab­ inet in advance and the New York Times published the complete list the morning of the day Nixon went on television. The President-elect took it well, however; he told reporters he would go on television to "confirm" the Times list. See Witcover, "Washington," pp. 14-15. 9 Hoffman, p. 42.

^^Keogh, President Nixon and the Press, p. 38. 144 11 televised news conferences. At mid-term, an awestruck broadcasting executive, CBS President Frank Stanton, was moved to remark that the President had "appeared on network prime-time television as many times as Presidents Eisenhower, 12 Kennedy and Johnson combined . . . ." Within a nine-day period in 1970, Nixon pre-empted three times ; on January 22 for his State of the Union message, on January 26 to veto an

HEW appropriation bill, and on January 30 for a press confer- 13 ence,

By May, 1972, Nixon had commandeered television time 14 twenty-nine times for his own "major" announcements. Ten of these appearances were devoted to a defense of his plans 15 to end the Vietnam War. While discussing the Vietnam con­ flict with some of his aides, wrote James Keogh, Nixon said that "without television it might have been difficult for me

"A Fair Share of Air," Newsweek, July 6, 1970, p. 59. 12 Herbert Block, Herblock's State of the Union (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. 66. 13 Marvin Barrett, ed., The Alfred I. duPont-Golumbia University Survey of Broadcast Journalism 1969-1970 (New York : Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 1970), pp. 47-48. 14 Block, p. 66.

"And the War Goes on," Newsweek, May 8, 1972, p. 19. 145 to get people to understand a thing.

Nixon proved to be remarkably sensitive to the tele­ vision audience. On May 8, 1970, for example, he delayed a live press conference for an hour— from 9:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.— so his show wouldn't conflict with a basketball game on ABC. The network volunteered to squeeze the President in 17 at half-time, but he refused.

Both the president and the Vice-President, further­ more, moved into the world of television entertainment. Nixon accepted an invitation to appear with Art Linkletter and later went on the NBC "Today" show. Agnew starred in the Bob Hope

Palm Springs golf classic, twice went on the Johnny Carson show, and spent ninety minutes as the sole guest of talk-show 18 host David Frost.

The medium of radio may seem outdated in this tele­ vision age, but it was not neglected by the White House. It has long been a favorite of Nixon's. He made heavy use of radio in his campaigns of 1968 and 1972; it proved to be an

ideal means of discussing issues without having to submit to

^^Keogh, p. 39.

^^Barrett, p. 49. 18 Barrett, pp. 53-54. 146 the troublesome questions of well-informed reporters. Nixon occasionally used radio during his first term, and recent reports predict he will make more frequent use of the medium in the next four years. Both he and his media men believe he has a good radio voice and comes across the airwaves as con­ cerned and cerebral. The myriad problems associated with television, moreover, do not exist with radio productions.

There is no need for makeup. There are no hot lights to make

Nixon's lip sweat, and nobody can see him if it does. There

is no need to worry about his heavy beard. He can read from his text and use his reading glasses, which he never does on television. The average audience of several million, further­ more, is often enhanced with a new twist: Nixon's media men have begun permitting television cameras to record selected portions of the President's presentations. In addition to the radio audience, therefore, he gets exposure on nationwide

television news shows.

But television has commanded most of the President's

attention, and he has used it in many formats. Perhaps the

low point of his television campaign to win the public's sup­

port came on January 26, 1970, when he requested time and

19 The Washington Post, February 12, 1973, Sec. A, pp. 1, 16. 147 went on the air at 9:00 p.m. For ten minutes, he talked about the inflationary aspects of a $19.7 million appropria­ tions bill which congress had passed for the Labor and Health,

Education, and Welfare Departments. The president objected to provisions for increased aid to college students and to public health service grants. As he finished his defense of what he was about to do, the President picked up his pen and, with a tight little smile, vetoed the bill before millions of 20 viewers. It was, commented a Life magazine reporter, "a slanted, self-serving and utterly unnecessary use of the public „21 airways. "

Richard Nixon knew what he was doing. Before his broadcast, the mail on Capitol Hill had been running ten to one in favor of the HEW appropriation and against the presi­ dent. The day after he vetoed the legislation in front of the nation. Congress was inundated with fifty-five thousand tele­ grams supporting Nixon's action. The mail, in the days that 22 followed, ran five to one in favor of the President.

As time passed, Nixon continued to vary the format

20 Barrett, p. 46. 21 "TV Politics : Too High a Price," Life, October 11, 1970, p. 2. 22 Barrett, p. 46. 148 for'bommunicating with the American people." In January,

1971, he sat beside the fireplace in the White House library and engaged in a "conversation" with four television newsmen—

Eric Sevareid of CBS, John Chancellor of NBC, Howard K. Smith of ABC, and Nancy Dickerson of the Public Broadcasting System.

It was another public relations triumph for Nixon. He was serene, cerebral, "presidential," He remembered, when answer­ ing questions, to address the audience rather than his inter­ viewers. For their part, the interrogators avoided discomfit­ ing questions. Not wanting to dominate the show, they failed to ask searching follow-up questions. In all, it was a polite, chatty hour that revealed little information but a lot of 23 "warm" Richard Nixon.

A few weeks later, Howard K. Smith of ABC spent an hour on the air with the president. The respectful Smith drew little more from Nixon than a warmed over defense of his actions in Southeast Asia, South Vietnamese units had only weeks before executed an "incursion" into Laos, with U.S. help. Many of the Vietnamese soldiers had retreated in a panic, some of them hanging onto the skids of helicopters.

Press coverage of the "withdrawal," Nixon told Smith, was a

23 "Advantage: Mr. President," Time, January 18, 1971, p. 36. 149 good example of how the news media distort the facts. Pho­ tographers and reporters, the president said, had paid too much attention to isolated incidents. He neglected to mention that most of the press had been barred from covering the "incursion" and could hardly be held accountable if they didn't cover the entire campaign. Just fourteen percent of the prime-time television audience bothered to watch the 24 interview.

One of the most perfect examples of how Nixon likes to use television to evade the press and sell his programs came with the announcement of his turnabout on economic policy

in August, 1971. Until the day he went on nationwide tele­ vision to announce wage and price controls, among other

changes, he gave little hint that any such precipitate move would take place. Indeed, he had adamantly and publicly

resisted any suggestion of economic controls. Thus, when he went on television, Sunday evening, August 15, 1971, most

reporters were caught completely off guard. National Journal

reporters surveyed their colleagues and found that :

Only one of the three economics writers in The New York Times Washington bureau was in the city; Murray A.

2 4 "Again the Credibility Gap?" Time, April 5, 1971, p. 13. 150

Seeger, economics writer for The Los Angeles Times, was on vacation, as were columnist Joseph R. Slevin of the Knight newspapers and Norman Kempster, Treasury Depart­ ment correspondent for United Press international.25

Radio and television reporters were given a one and a half hour headstart to prepare for their "instant analysis."

An hour before the President went on the air, print reporters were called in, some in blue jeans and golfing slacks, for a briefing. Since many eastern newspapers have a 9;00 p.m. deadline, this gave them but a few precious minutes to write a major story. Time and Newsweek. both of which go to press

Sunday evening, were not alerted.

In March, 1971, Nixon accepted an invitation prof­

fered by NBC's Barbara Walters to appear on the network's

early morning "Today" show. The story behind the President's

appearance began when Walters visited the White House to film

an interview with Tricia Nixon. The President walked in to

exchange a few pleasantries. Before he left, he promised

Walters he would see what he could do about arranging an

interview for her with England's Prince Philip, who was then

in the country. The next morning, the royal visitor went

25 "Media Report/Nixon’s Surprise Freeze Announcement Leaves Washington Press Ruffled, Not Furious," National Jour­ nal , October 30, 1971, p. 2164. 26 "Media Report," pp. 2166-68. 151 before the NBC cameras. When Walters next saw Nixon, she

thanked him, and he asked, "Whom would you like me to get 27 next?" Walters said she would like to interview him.

Months later, as she was preparing to leave for a

vacation, Walters received a call from the White House. It

was Ronald Ziegler. Would she like to come to the White

House to interview the President? A week later, on the 28 First Lady's birthday, Nixon went on the air.

It turned out to be a chatty two hours, with Nixon

devoting much comment to his image. He didn't wear sports

shirts, he said, because he felt better in business suits.

At the same time, he disavowed all attempts to alter his

image. "The president, with the enormous responsibilities

that he has," Nixon told Walters, "must not be constantly

preening in front of a mirror, wondering whether or not

he is getting across as this kind of individual or 29 that. ..." The image-makers, he went on, were strug­

gling in vain when they tried to work their humbuggery on

27 "Not for Women Only," Time, February 21, 1972,p. 66. 28 The Washington Post. March 18, 1971, Sec. A, p. 21. 29 James R. Dickenson, "Nixon: He Denies He's 'Preen­ ing, ' Wants U.S. To Look Again," The National Observer. March 22, 1971, p. 14. 152 him:

These public-relations experts always come in and are constantly riding me, or they used to in the cam­ paign, and they do now. "You have got to do this, that, and the other thing to change your image." I am not going to change my image. I am just going to do a good job for this country. I really wonder, you know . . . what Lincoln, T.R., Wilson, F.D.R. . . . if they had been constantly worrying about their image what kind of lead­ ers they would have been. I don't think nearly as good.30

Pretending disdain for television politics and the

practice of image-making, some writers argue, is part of the

image game. As Joe McGinniss observed in The Selling of the

President 1968:

It would be extremely unwise for the TV politician to admit . . . knowledge of his medium. The necessary nonchalance should carry beyond his appearance while on the show; it should rule his attitude toward it. He should express distaste for television; suspicion that there is something "phony" about it. This guarantees him good press, because newspaper reporters, bitter over their loss of prestige to the television men, are cer­ tain to stress anti-television remarks. Thus, the sophisticated candidate, while analyzing his own on-the- air technique as carefully as a golf pro studies his swing, will state frequently there is no place for "pub­ lic relations gimmicks" or "those show business guys" in his campaign . . . .31

Richard Nixon, in short, was fully aware that if his

^*^Dickenson, p. 14. 31 Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Trident Press, 1969), pp. 30-31. Italics in the original. 153 campaign to end run the press was to succeed, he had to pro­ ject the proper image. The record shows, furthermore, that he has pursued a "Presidential" image with gusto.

First, Richard Nixon is careful about his physical appearance. He eats cautiously in order to hold his weight at a steady one hundred and seventy pounds. For exercise, he runs in place every morning and bowls occasionally (his average score is a state secret). However tense a situation, he manages to get to bed by 11:30 or midnight and arises around 7:00, He shaves as many as three times a day and maintains a healthy tan with trips to Key Biscayne and San

Clemente.^ 32

In 1970, Nixon changed barbers and his hair style.

The new tonsorial artist, Milton Pitts, bills himself as

"Washington's leading men's hair stylist." He washed the

"greasy kid stuff" out of Nixon's hair, lowered his side­ burns a half-inch, his neckline by an inch, and gave the

President what Pitts calls "the natural sculptured look."

Nixon's hair "used to stick out in back, " said Pitts. The old cut, he continued, was "too thin on the sides and . . .

too full just above the ear. Now, with a balanced sculpture

32 "The Making of the Newest Nixon," Time, January 18, 1971, p. 12. 154 33 cut, he has a more oval look." At least one reporter, John 34 Osborne, claims Nixon colors his hair to hide the gray.

Nixon buys many of his clothes off the rack at Brooks

Brothers or Bonwit Teller. But he also uses a tailor, H. Free- 35 man & Son of Philadelphia. Since Nixon assumed the presi­ dency, the tailor has talked him into wearing wider lapels and has even persuaded him to purchase more modern, double- breasted suits. Having gone that far, Nixon went overboard and ordered a batch of semi-wide (three-inch) ties from F. R.

Tripler and A. Sulka in New York.^^

Next, efforts are made to project the President as a wholesome and moral person. The Nixon men have let it be known that only "family type" movies are shown in the White

House. John Wayne films, for example, are popular with the

Nixons. The President himself became enamored with George C.

Scott's portrayal of General George Patton and watched the movie several-, times.37

33 "The Making of the Newest Nixon," p. 12. 34 "The Nixon Watcher," Newsweek, June 22, 1970, p. 60. 35 The Washington Post. December 1, 1969, Sec. B, p. 2.

^^"The Making of the Newest Nixon," p. 12. 37 "Patton's Defection," Time, August 24, 1970, p. 8. 155

The image of the asexual man who watches only the

"clean" movies, however, was tainted somewhat in August,

1972, when director peter Bogdanovich was invited to a party at the Western White House and took actress Cybill Shepherd with him. Shepherd, a comely young blond, had starred in the Bogdanovich-directed movie, "The Last Picture Show." In one scene, she had stripped to the skin atop a diving board.

Although the movie had been rated "R" (restricted) because of the nude scenes, Nixon told Bogdavonich he had 38 seen the "remarkable" movie at Camp David. Describing the encounter with the President in an article in Esquire maga­ zine, Bogdanovich wrote :

. . . To my amazement, he launched into a very flattering paragraph about the movie. Then he turned to Cybill, putting a hand on her arm. "And what part did you play?"

"Jacy," she said.

I said, "She was the one who stripped on the diving board."

The President paused. He looked at me, but kept his hand on Cybill's arm. "Well, everyone gave a remarkable performance in that film, " he said, and then, still not looking at Cybill, but patting her arm as he spoke and with the barest flicker of a smile,"And, of course, I

38 Peter Bogdanovich, "Hollywood," Esquire, LXXVIII (December, 1972), 52-64. 156 39 remember you very well now, my dear."

Such an admission of libidinous thoughts is rare with

Nixon. He customarily goes out of his way to preserve the

image of the straitlaced moralist. When, for example, the

Commission on Obscenity and Pornography issued its 1970 report, which concluded there was little correlation between

dirty movies and sexual depravation, Nixon dispatched his

lieutenants to let the country know he felt differently.

Robert Finch, then a counselor to the President, claimed

the report "reduces morality to the lowest common denomina- 40 tor of a passing fad." Republican Senator Edward Gurney of

Florida, a Nixon spokesman on Capitol Hill, asserted that the

commission's recommendations would "open the flood gates to 41 quickening decay of morals undermining the country today."

As usual, however, no one could out-metaphor Vice-President

Spiro Agnew. He traveled to the heart of Mormon country.

Salt Lake City, Utah, to promise that "as long as Richard

Nixon is President, Main Street is not going to turn into 42 Smut Alley." _

39 Bogdanovich, p. 64. Italics in the original. 40 The Washington Post. October 3, 1970, Sec.A, p. 3. 41 The Washington Post, October 3, 1970, Sec. A, p. 3. '^^The Washington Post, October 3, 1970, Sec. A, p. 3. 157

Nixon also rejected outright the report of the Com­ mission on Population Growth and the American Future because it recommended such population controls as abortion, family planning services, and distribution of birth control devices to minors. "Such measures," the President said, "would do nothing to preserve and strengthen close family relation­ ships .

The President's wholesome image is bolstered by his close friendships with men of the cloth. He counts evange­ list Billy Graham and positive thinker Norman Vincent Peale among his closest associates. Shortly after moving into the

White House, Nixon began holding Sunday services in the East

Room. Both Graham and Peale have preached there, the latter taking care to dub Nixon (on Father's Day) as "the first 44 father of the nation." Few ministers, however, have heaped such fulsome praise on the President as Dr. Paul S. Smith— president of Nixon's alma mater, Whittier College— who exclaimed that the "hope for mankind is strengthened in the knowledge that our intrepid President himself will soon go 45 into orbit, reaching boldly for the moon of peace." On

^^The Washington Post, May 6, 1972, Sec,A, p. 1. 44 "White House Sermons," Time. May 22, 1972, p. 60. 45 "Sermons," p. 60. 158 the whole, commented a religion reporter for Time magazine, the White House sermons "are bland, riddled with cliches 46 and pockmarked with tumorous metaphors." The sermons, the critic continued, "reveal a Billy Graham who quotes himself as often as he quotes Scripture and a bubbly Peale who dis- 47 solves Christianity into verbal Alka-Seltzer,"

The President is also very conscious of his image as a sports fan. His associates have told newsmen that Nixon has often said he would like to have been a sports writer or 48 "sportscaster." He frequently calls coaches and players

after a big victory or loss, and sports celebrities are 49 regular visitors to the White House. For the 1971 football

"Super Bowl," Nixon sent Miami Dolphin coach Don Shula a sug­

gestion for a pass play. It didn't work, and Miami lost to

the Dallas Cowboys, 24-3. The next year, Nixon telegraphed

Shula that the President would henceforth keep his strategy 50 to himself. His failure in football, however, did not

46 "Sermons," p. 60. 47 "Sermons," p. 60. 48 United Press Internai:ional dispatch, The Washington Post, January 26, 1970. 49 Newsmakers, Newsweek, February 14, 1972, p. 48,

^^The New York Times. November 14, 1972, p. 30. 159 prevent Nixon from choosing a few all-time "All-Star" base­ ball teams for the Associated Press. His choices, however, were carefully selected to avoid offending anyone. One columnist noted that Nixon "saluted young and old, white and black, Latin and Nordic, lefthanders and righthanders, Catho­ lic and WASP, Jew and American Indian.

Nixon is also given to uttering athletic metaphors, speaking of his "team" and his "game plan." The habit appears to be catching on among his subordinates. As Com­ mander James Cannon, skipper of the U.S. destroyer "Mullinix," guided his vessel into the waters off Vietnam for his third tour in Southeast Asia, he offertîd these inspired words for his "team": "We are ready to step in the batter's box and belt a few pitches with hard stuff now that the contract is 52 signed for our third season with the big leagues." Commented

Time magazine ; "Anyone looking for the roots of the current military infatuation with athletic metaphor might possibly start with the playing fields of Whittier, Calif.

The President's concern with image is nowhere more

51 "White House All-Stars," Time. July 17, 1972, p. 10. 52 "Blockade That Metaphor," Time, May 29, 1972, p. 12. 53 "Blockade That Metaphor," p. 12. 160 evident that in his persistent habit of claiming "historic firsts." In 1970, for example, he sent to Congress a message on foreign policy. It was, he told reporters, "the first of 54 its kind ever sent to Congress." In England, in 1969, he claimed that "for the first time in history, a man occupying the office of President of the United States visited a ses- 55 sion of the House of Commons." In Djakarta, on July 27,

1969, he told a gathering, "Now, as I stand here today, I realize for the first time in history a president of the

United States of America is visiting Indonesia. When he left Djakarta, the following day, he said, "This is the first time that I have ever said goodbye to the people of this country.To the first astronauts on the moon, he said;

". . . This certainly has to be the most historic telephone 5 8 call ever made from the White House." In February, 1970,

Nixon toured a sewage treatment plant near Chicago. "This

54 Reports: Washington, The Atlantic Monthly, CGXXVIII (May, 1970), 4.

^^Jeff Greenfield, "Mr. Nixon's Sense of History," Harper's Magazine, CCXLIII (November, 1970) , 66.

^^Greenfield, p. 66. 57 Greenfield, p. 66. eg Greenfield, p. 66. 161 will be my first tour of this kind of facility," he said on 59 that historic occasion. A Harper's Magazine writer com­ mented that "the President has heard the voices of too many baseball announcers imparting historic significance to every fly ball.

Nixon has long harbored a fondness for spectacular entrances. At the 1964 Republican convention in San Fran­ cisco, where he was not even in the running as a candidate, he and pat descended on the city in a helicopter that landed at Fisherman's Wharf.On his return from his 1972 trip to

Moscow, Nixon landed by helicopter on the parking lot in front of the Capitol Building, as spotlights flooded the area for television viewers. One reporter, catching on to the president's game of "firsts," noted solemnly that "it was the first time any President has flown directly to Capitol Hill by helicopter.

A keen awareness of image also shows in Nixon's

^^Greenfield, p. 67.

^^Greenfield, p. 66.

^^Jules Witcover, The Resurrection of Richard Nixon (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1970), p. 96.

^^The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star, June 2, 1972, Sec. A, p. 7. 162 abiding love for royalty and the regal. On his European tour in 1969, for example, he was impressed with the braided ceremonial guards he saw in almost every country he visited.

Upon his return, he ordered the Secret Service to spruce up

the uniforms worn by the White House Police. A few months

later, Britain’s Prime Minister Harold Wilson arrived at the

White House to be greeted by a cadre of policemen resembling

toy soldiers . They were decked out in dazzling white tunics

trimmed in gold braid and buttons. Atop their heads were

perched high-crowned, drum major hats. Around their waists were strung black leather gun belts. The military tailor who had been hired by the Secret Service explained that he was seeking "a nice police image.

Critics, however were unimpressed. The uniforms,

commented Time magazine, suggested "by turns, a Ruritanian

palace guard, a Belgian customs inspector, and Prince Danilo 64 in The Merry Widow. " Veteran President-watcher Hugh Sidey

of Life magazine wrote that Richard Nixon "has hired more

bands and had more ceremonies and designed more funny police

uniforms and worn more white ties than any recent

^^The Washington Post, February 4, 1970, Sec. B, p. 3. 64 "The Palace Guard," Time. February 9, 1970, p. 7. 163

President ....

Of course, not all efforts at image-making are suc­

cessful, and Nixon is not infallable. On Veteran's Day in

1969, for example, he was quoted as telling a one-eyed Viet­

nam veteran, "All you need is one. You see too much, any- „66 way. "

To avoid such embarrassments and to create a more

positive image of himself, he has depended upon expert help.

Chapter 2 describes his reliance on experts during the 1968

campaign. Chapter 3 describes how they followed him as he moved into the White House, and how they became the most

important men in his Administration. They are the "media men" who have spent their lives in advertising, broadcasting,

newspaper work, and public relations. Some of them have made

careers out of manipulating the media, and they know their

jobs well. They are exquisitely suited for the task of end

running the press with television. They know that when Nixon

takes his message to the people, he will appear warm and

human and strong and decisive. They know because they have

^^Hugh Sidey, "A Lingering Love of the Royal," Life, July 31, 1970, p. 4.

^^Hoffman, The New Nixon, p. 77 164 constructed that image, have taught Nixon to appear that way, have sold the "new" Nixon to the public the same way they sold bug killer, floor wax, and the "un-cola."

By the end of his first term, according to one Con­ gressional report, Nixon had the largest presidential staff in history. Some fifty-five persons were listed as "advis­ ors," six hundred were carried as "White House staff," and

5,395 worked for the "Executive Office.Somewhere in these statistics are buried the media men— over fifty of them at last count, although an accurate tally is impossible because they continually come and go.

Foremost among these image-makers was the President's chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, formerly of the J. Walter

Thompson advertising agency. At least three more Thompson alumni have used their experience to help shape the Nixon image ; press secretary Ronald Ziegler, appointments secre­ tary Dwight Chapin (who recently resigned in wake of the

"Watergate affair," in which, allegedly, he had a hand), and

Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., who was an assistant to former aide

^^Thomas E . Cronin, "The Swelling of the Presidency," The Saturday Review of Society, I (February, 1973), 30, 68 The Washington Post. June 1, 1971, Sec. A, p. 1 165 69 John Ehrlichman. Communications Director Herb Klein was editor of the San Diego Union before leaving to work in the

Nixon campaign.Helping Klein was Kenneth Clawson, form- 71 erly a reporter for the Washington Post. A Ziegler aide, deputy press secretary Gerald Warren, also worked for the 72 San Diego Union. Advising Henry Kissinger on his press relations was John Scali, the former diplomatic reporter for

ABC who was recently named ambassador to the United 73 Nations. A former ABC producer, Mark Goode, handles rela- 74 tions with the television networks. The President's speechwriting staff was initially supervised by James Keogh, a Time magazine editor; he was succeeded by Raymond K. Price, former editorial page editor for the New York Herald Trib- 75 une. Another speechwriter, recently promoted to a higher position, is Patrick Buchanan, who used to write editorials

Dom Bonafede, "White House Report/Ehr1ichman Acts as Policy Broker in Nixon's Formalized Domestic Council," National Journal, June 12, 1971, p. 1243.

^^Dom Bonafede, "Commissar of Credibility," The Nation, April 6, 1970, p. 392. 71 Martin F. Nolan, "The Re-Selling of the president," The Atlantic Monthly, CCXXX (November, 1972), 80. 72 73 Nolan, p. 80. Nolan, p. 80. 74 75 Nolan, p. 80. Nolan, p. 80. 166 7 6 for the St. Louis Globe-Democrat. Still another speech- writer, William Safire, was a reporter for the New York

Herald Tribune before moving into public relations; he

recently left the White House to become a columnist for the 77 New York Times. Still around on a consultant basis is

Roger Ailes, the colorful and candid media expert who kept 7 8 tight rein over Nixon's image in the 1968 campaign. An

NBC makeup man, Ray Voege, is always on call for a presi- 79 dential television appearance. Even the First Lady has

her own "radio-TV coordinator." She is Penelope Martin Adams, 80 who joined the White House staff in 1969.

Thus Richard Nixon was and, to a degree, still is

surrounded by advertising, public relations, and media

experts. They work their magic on the President's image by

watching over his every action and weighing his every word.

7 6 Nolan, p. 80. 77 "The Times's Right Hand," Newsweek, February 12, 1973, pp. 46, 51. 78 "The Selling of the Candidates 1970," Newsweek, October 19, 1970, pp. 36-37. 79 The Washington Post, February 8, 1973, Sec. C, p. 3. 80 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. November 29, 1972, Sec. C, p. 8. 167

The picture that emerges, as a result of their efforts, is one of a wise President who is never discouraged or troubled, who knows he has his people, the "silent majority," behind him, who is in complete control of all situations and is never, but never, wrong about anything. In the midst of the turmoil at colleges and universities, the public was told 81 the campuses were seas of tranquility. As the South Viet­ namese retreated in haste from Laos, the nation heard the 82 "incursion" pronounced a success. in response to a Gallup

Poll that showed sixty-nine percent of the American people felt they were not getting the truth about the war, the

White House image-makers ceune forth to declare they were, 83 indeed, telling the truth. When Richard Nixon slipped up and referred to some types of college students as "bums,"

Herb Klein told the country the president had been misinter- 84 preted. When Nixon, with his attorney general at his side.

81 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star, March 14, 1971, Sec. A, p. 18. 82 The Washington Post, March 22, 1971, Sec. A, p. 1. 83 The Washington Post, March 9, 1971, Sec. A, p. 11. 84 Richard Gorman, "Cambodia Move 'Major Success,' Klein Tells New Jersey Chapter," The Quill. LVII (July, 1970), 39. 168 declared that Charles Manson "was guilty^ directly or indirectly, of eight murders without reason"— even as the hippy cult leader was standing trial— there was no admission of error, no immediate correction. There was, instead, a ham-handed attempt by Ronald Ziegler to change the record 8 5 about what the President had said.

The image-makers not only defend the President against what they feel is unfair criticism, they also attack.

They plan briefings for Congressmen and other prominent people; they conduct "sales" campaigns for Administration programs; they carefully analyze every request for a meeting, an interview, or information.

The major planning is done each Saturday morning when the "Plans Committee" meets in the Executive Office

Building suite once occupied by Herb Klein, Here top aides discuss how best to present a favorable image. Indeed, appointments secretary Dwight Chapin told author Allen Drury the committee is sometimes referred to as "the image fac­ tory.

85. ^Hugh Sidey, "Loose Talk from an Old Lawyer," Life, August 14, 1970, p. 4.

^^Allen Drury, Courage and Hesitation (Garden City, New York; Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1971), p. 210. 169

Drury was permitted to sit in on a meeting, a cour­ tesy extended to few outsiders, but he was forbidden to 87 report what went on except in "limited paraphrase." Among those attending this day were Klein, speechwriter William

Safire, and Dwight Chapin, Drury's report is presented, in part, as follows;

On this day the first item on the agenda was a memo from Bob Hal deman— signed with a large and imperial "H"— requesting the consensus on "possible Presidential participation in a satellite conversation with Prime Minister Heath. " The consensus was that this would be great if it could be tied to a major event, otherwise it would look contrived and phony.

Second item was a request by the Canadian photogra­ pher Karsh to take pictures of the President. Decision was deferred.

Third item was requests from various magazines for information on the President's reading habits. It was agreed that this must be handled with great care, because if the president were disclosed to read anything even remotely frivolous somebody would be sure to pick it up and make it the basis for snide criticism that would be used against him forever after.

Fourth item was the possibility of the President appearing on various types of informal television shows other than straight press conferences or talks. This too was considered a matter for further study.

Next came a discussion of the proper time for airing the president's State of the Union message to Congress in January. Should it be at noon, Washington time, the traditional hour? Or should it be in the evening when

87 Drury, p. 210. 170

it would reach the widest possible television audience, a practice increasingly followed by occupants of the White House? The discussion grew heated as the tradi­ tionalists battled the let's-make-the-most-of-it group. Finally someone remarked with some disgust that he thought the idea was to strengthen the President’s image and help him get reelected, and he didn’t see why in hell it was so important what Congress said about his timing. It was the President's right to go up there when he pleased and talk when he wanted to. It was finally decided to place all the options before the President. . . .

sixth item on the agenda was "how to counter the theme that the President is heartless and cold," and the discussion very quickly got down to a specific : the recent episode in which a little black poster girl had been turned away without having her picture taken with the president, an incident that had brought in its wake great and probably abiding rancor in the Negro commun­ ity. Those who deplored the incident's effect on the President's image were explosive and blasphemous in their criticism of the way it had been handled. Those who were responsible said crisply that the President was working on a speech and it was decided it was best not to bother him: "It was a judgment." (It was admitted, however, that it was a judgment the President had known nothing at all about until the media went into full cry that night. It had not even been brought to his atten­ tion at the time.) Those who were responsible said defensively that the President can't see everybody who comes in. Those who objected said he had damned well better take half an hour, if necessary, to be photo­ graphed with a little black poster girl— especially since just a few days later he had been photographed with a little white poster boy. Those who were responsible said well, anyway, the little girl and her parents were going to be invited to a Sunday worship service in a couple of weeks, and maybe he could be photographed with her then. Those who criticized said that of course an apology could be made after an incident like that, but if it were made weeks after the event, "Nobody will hear, nobody will know and nobody will give a damn." Those who were responsible reiterated in a tone that showed they were 171

not to be budged: "It was a judgment." And that ended that.88

The image-makers have been trying to convince the nation that Nixon is a "warm" and "human" man since the 1968 campaign. In his first year in office, the president's closest aides and advisors kept passing the word about how

"warm" and "happy" the private Nixon was. "I've never seen him more relaxed," a Cabinet member told reporters after

Nixon had been in office a little more than one month, "He doesn't get upset about the things that used to bother him.

He doesn't get mad when news leaks out. Herblock's cartoons 89 don't irritate him. Neither does Walter Lippmann."

But the campaign Drury heard about, the one "to coun­ ter the theme that the President is heartless and cold," was a special effort. It came at the height of Senator Edmund

Muskie's popularity— when the Maine Democrat was being hailed 90 as a "warm" figure— and the blitz lasted for months. In a span of thirty or forty days in early 1971, Nixon held two press conferences, met with a selected group of women

88 Drury, pp. 210-11, 214. 89 Hugh Sidey, "It Was Good To Be Home," Life. February 7, 1969, p. 2. 90 Nolan, "The Re-Selling," p. 80. 172 reporters to talk about his family, gave two exclusive inter­ views (to Peregrine Worsthorne of the London Sunday Telegraph and C. L. Sulzberger of the New York Times) , went on the NBC 91 "Today" show, and was interviewed by ABC's Howard K. Smith.

The image-makers, meanwhile, passed the word to reporters that their man was in fine shape, confident, optimistic, and 92 "tracking well."

Late in 1972, Nixon's image-makers began dropping hints that the President was cast in the mold of the Nine­ teenth Century British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli.

Nixon himself picked up the theme; just before his re- election he told an interviewer ;

I would say that my views, my approach, is probably that of a Disraeli conservative— a strong foreign policy, strong adherence to basic virtues that the nation believes in and the people believe in, and to conserv­ ing these values, and not being destructive of them, but combined with reform, reform that will work, not reform that destroys.83

No detail is too small to be considered by Nixon's

Madison Avenue team. At his very first press conference, a

91 James R. Dickenson, "Nixon: He Denies He's 'Preen­ ing , ' " p. 1. 92 The New York Times, March 22, 1971, p. 24. 93 James M. Perry, "Disraeli and Nixon: Wooing the Yeomen," The National Observer, December 2, 1972, p. 5. 173 black White House waiter carrying a glass of water on a tray stood close to the President. A picture of the scene appeared in Jet magazine; at the next news conference the 94 water sat on a nearby table.

The image-makers also worked their magic to get the

President in the picture when the first American astronauts walked on the moon. They suggested to Nixon that he place a telephone call to them, that he sign a plaque to be left on the moon, and that he arrange a pending, around-the-world trip to include a visit to the astronauts' mid-Pacific land­

ing site. Officials at the National Aeronautics and Space

Administration were not infatuated with the ideas, reported

columnist Jack Anderson, but H. R. Haldeman impressed upon 95 them the urgency of the President's requests.

Anderson also alleged that the Nixon team revised an

official picture history of the White House to make it look

as though Nixon was its most important resident in two hun­

dred years. Under Lyndon Johnson, the book had included

thirty-two pictures of L.B.J. and the First Family. When the

94 "The Waiter with the Water," Newsweek, February 17, 1969, p. 24. 95 Jack Anderson, "Nixon Gambled on Moon Publicity," The Washington Post, July 29, 1969, Sec. B, p. 11. 174

Nixon men finished with the book, Johnson appeared but six times; Nixon and his family turned up in twenty-eight pic- 96 tures. George Washington rated but two photographs.

In the aftermath of the Kent State tragedy, as stu­ dent demonstrations broke out across the country, a group of several hundred hard-hatted construction workers decided to turn the tables. They waded into a crowd of student protest­ ers on New York’s Wall Street, and, as policemen stood aside, lashed into students with pipes and wrenches, charging "Lind­ say 's a commie," and "Lindsay's a fag," the "hard-hats" then marched to City Hall where they forced city employees to raise the flag that the mayor had ordered be flown at half-staff in memory of the dead students. From there, the hard-hats went across the street to Pace College where they thrashed the 97 students they found in the lobby of the main building.

The White House image men were impressed; they sent out an invitation to the hard-hat leaders to visit the White

House. At the Executive Mansion, the construction men gave the president an honorary hard-hat inscribed "Commander in

96 Jack Anderson, "Recasting History," The Washington Post, February 9, 1972, Sec. C, p. 15. 97 Hoffman, The New Nixon, pp. 183-84. 175 98 Chief." Later, a reporter asked Ronald Ziegler how the hard-hats could get in to see the president so easily, when not even Congressmen could get past the East Gate. Ziegler 99 replied that it was "kind of a loaded question."

Since they usually operate by committee and have so many years of experience among them, Nixon's image-makers rarely make a mistake. They slipped up seriously, however, in one episode during the 1970 campaign. While stumping in

San Jose, California, the presidential limousine allegedly was stoned, and Nixon leaped on the opportunity, two days

later, to deliver a fiery speech in Phoenix, Arizona, He called on "the silent majority to stand up and be counted

against the rock throwers, The Nixon men taped the

event, but the film turned out to be fuzzy and of generally

poor quality. Yet, on election eve, the Madison Avenue team beamed it across the nation on all three networks. The same

evening, Edmund Muskie delivered a calm appeal to voters on

nationwide television. The contrast with the president's

98 Hoffman, p. 184. 99 The Word from Washington, The Progressive. XXXIV (July, 1970), 13.

"Selling the President, 1970," Newsweek. November 16, 1970, p. 77. 176 shrill performance was striking; the whole affair was uni­ versally adjudged a disastrous setback for Nixon.

Nixon's television appearances are usually handled with the utmost care. Although many of the image-makers around the White House are considered experts in the use of the medium, they frequently call on outside help when Nixon wants to execute an electronic end run. One of the experts they often turn to is the colorful Roger Ailes.

During the 1968 campaign. Ailes explained to reporter

Joe McGinniss why Nixon's televised panel shows were so important ;

Now you put him on television, you've got a problem right away. He's a funny-looking guy. He looks like somebody hung him in a closet overnight and he jumps out in the morning with his suit all bunched up and starts running around saying, "I want to be President." I mean this is how he strikes some people. That's why these shows are important. To make them forget all that.102

When Nixon moved to the White House and continued his

"media campaigning," Ailes was often called upon to help.

When Nixon went on the air to announce the "intervention" in

Cambodia, for example. Ailes offered advice on how to set up

"Selling the President, 1970," pp. 77-78. 102 Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President 1968, p. 103. 177 the broadcastin 1969, Nixon delivered a speech before the United Nations; Ailes inspected the lighting and advised the President to look into the lights and to back off six 104 inches from the podium. Ailes also had a hand in the

telecast of the President's telephone call to the astronauts

on the moon, and also in the show Nixon staged to introduce 105 his new Chief Justice, Warren Burger. Ailes' role is not

confined to giving technical suggestions about lighting; he

also advises the President on how to handle himself. Here

is how Ailes himself has explained this job:

I brief M r . Nixon on the procedures that have been agreed upon. Working from a diagram, I explain the setup to him, so that he knows where the cameras are. He is very aware of the technicalities of television. You can talk to him in technical terms. Essentially, the briefing is just to make sure that no mistakes are made, that the telecast runs smoothly and looks good.106

The staff also assists Vice-president Spiro Agnew.

During the farewell ceremonies, at San Clemente, for Agnew's

1970 trip to Asia, wrote John Osborne, "The President appeared

103 "^e Selling of the Candidates 1970," Newsweek, October 19, 1970, pp. 36-37.

"How To Get That Good 'Media Image,*" Newsweek, September 29, 1969, p. 69.

"How Nixon Changed His TV Image," U.S. News & World Report. February 2, 1970, p. 68.

^^^"How Nixon Changed His TV Image," p. 68. 178 with him on the photogenic knoll that lies between the Nixon 107 office and the pacific Ocean. . . . " Upon the Vice-

President's return, Nixon gave Agnew a golf ball adorned with the presidential seal. Then the party moved outside where microphones and television cameras had been set up, "angled so that the cameras commanded a clear view of the path to a 108 Marine chopper in the background, some 200 feet away, "

Then, wrote Osborne, the following scene occurred:

. . . Newspaper cameramen and reporters were ordered to stay where they were confined in a roped area when the Vice President finished speaking his piece. It was essential, a White House staff man said, that the tele­ vision cameras have an unobstructed shot of the Vice President's receding back as he walked across an inter­ vening expanse of grass and pavement to his helicopter. Mr. Agnew with his trim and erect figure, the noble head slightly marred by squinted eyes, in a dark suit and grey tie, his hands primly fixed at the hem of his jacket, was appropriately impressive when he said into the microphones that his trip had been worthwhile for him, the President, and the countries he visited, I don't know how the concluding walk came over the home screen, but to the watching press it was extremely funny, a welcomed and heartily ridiculed break in the solemnity that usually shrouds the Nixon White House. It was a farce of a sort that had to be seen on the spot to be appreciated: the confessed contrivance, the cadenced pace of the Vice President, the pause at the foot of the chopper steps, and then the takeoff for a nearby hotel, where Mr. Agnew spent the afternoon and night isolated

107 John Osborne, The Second Year of the Nixon Watch (New York : Liveright, 1971), p. 139. X08 Osborne, p. 139. 179

from the press and in no further communication with Mr. Nixon.109

The television end run was executed for President

Nixon's 1972 trip to Peking: The traveling press was not informed of important news; key events were timed to coin­ cide with prime-time viewing hours back in the United States;

Nixon was kept cloistered from the press while the staged events were beamed back home via a satellite orbited for that purpose. The print reporters began to get an idea of the secondary role they would play when Ronald Ziegler released the list of correspondents who would be permitted to make the trip. Only eighty-seven slots were available; of these, the print media were awarded but forty-four, including photogra­ phers. Twenty-two correspondents represented all of the nation's daily newspapers; six were from the wire services; six were from national magazines. Three slots went to columnists (Joseph Kraft, a moderate, and William P. Buckley and Richard Wilson, both conservatives); and one magazine slot was assigned to the Reader's Digest, which does not cover the White House.

109 Osborne, pp. 139-40.

^^^"Made For Television," Newsweek. February 21, 1972, p. 100 "Peking Protest," Time, February 21, 1972, p. 64. 180

The forty-three remaining press slots were assigned to the broadcast media. Eighteen were correspondents, the 112 remainder technicians and cameramen. Since large tele­ vision advance crews were already in Peking, the broadcast 113 press outnumbered the print press by about three to one.

The China trip indeed promised to be a television spectacular; as Ronald Ziegler told a UPI correspondent ; 114 "After all, it is a picture story." Commented New York

Times satirist Russell Baker;

We already knew that a President could make it very difficult for anyone else to get attention on television, but until the Peking trip we did not realize that he had the power to pack the entire television industry into an airplane and transport it lock, stock and Sevareid out of the country, 13.5

The presidential jet departed Washington the morning of February 17. After a two-night layover in Hawaii and one in Guam, the party landed in Peking at 11:30 a.m., or 10:30 p.m.. Eastern Standard Time, in the united States, It was, a Time magazine writer commented, "an excellent hour for a presidential candidate seeking re-election to make a

112 "Made For Television," p. 100, 113 "Made For Television," p. 100. 114 "Peking Protest," p. 64,

"Made For Television," p. 100. 181 television appearance. The entire world, if it cared to watch, was then treated to a sight many had thought impossible— the old Red-baiter, Richard Nixon, alighting from a plane in Peking to be greeted by Chinese Premier Chou

En-lai. The television commentators, however, were stunned.

There was no hoopla, no bands, no pomp, no pageantry. With nothing else to cover, they mused over the question of whether there was "an air of excitement" in Peking. Back in

New York, NEC's Edwin Newman analyzed the President's recep­ tion and Chou En-lai's greeting. "It did seem to be a cor- 117 dial handshake," he said.

As soon as Nixon had settled in his quarters, he received an invitation to meet with Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

They met that afternoon, and following this momentous occa­ sion, press secretary Ronald Ziegler was asked by reporters about the tone of the meeting. No comment. How was Mao's health? No comment. How long did Nixon and Mao shake hands? 118 No comment. Where is Mao's home? No comment. Did the

"A Guide to Nixon's China Journey," Time, February 21, 1972, p. 28. 117 "TV: An Eyeful of China, a Thimbleful of Insight," Newsweek, March 6, 1972, p. 27. 118 "The President's Odyssey Day by Day," Time. March 6, 1972, p. 13, 182 two leaders partake of any refreshments? It would be "fair 119 to assume that tea was served."

Deprived of any hard news for seven days, reporters

developed feature stories, Correspondents were not even

given menus at the first banquet and so they discoursed on whether the little orange balls in the center of the table were oranges, Jell-O, or pomegranates. Dan Rather of CBS

reported on a visit to a small Chinese eatery; he also put 120 together an imaginative report on Chinese women. Barbara

Walters of NBC followed Pat Nixon everywhere she went and

finally sat down to interview her interpreter. It proved

surprisingly insightful. Others toured Peking University,

Jerry terHorst of the Detroit News merited a banner headline 121 when he reported on a tour to an auto assembly plant.

Accommodations, on the other hand, were good. The

Chinese had constructed a press center containing all the

needed supplies and facilities except sufficient copy paper

and wastebaskets. The center came complete with a bowling

119 "China Coverage: Sweet and Sour," Time, March 6, 1972, p. 50. 120 "TV; An Eyeful of China, a Thimbleful of Insight," p. 27. 121 "China Coverage; Sweet and Sour," pp. 48, 50. 183

alley, a basketball court, and waitresses to serve t e a . 3-22

Time magazine summed up the press coverage by report­ ing that;

Inevitably, the readers tended to get stories about the low rents in Peking, the prevalence of bicycles, or the fact that stores were peddling pastel-colored Ping Pong balls. There was also copy about the comfortable press quarters at the Hotel of Nationalities where guests were supplied with pots of glue— because Chinese stamps, though colorful, are stickless. . . .3-23

Reporters may have had little to say of substance, but the cameras rarely ceased clicking and rolling, and the picture story unfolded for the home viewers according to plan. UPI reporter Helen Thomas explained that;

We were most times the props. At least when the President was playing the big scene. As the Chinese say, a picture is worth a thousand words. And none had to tell that to the White House. The times we saw Nixon and Chou were for picture sessions— starting meetings or marching around their mammoth banquet table, bowing, clinking their glasses. Chou thoroughly enjoyed the attention and began to ham it up more and more. Once Chou told a cam­ eraman to get more pictures of the president. And Nixon shot back, "They'll only burn them." On another occasion when Chou asked reporters if they were having a good time, Nixon in an off-stage whisper said, "More than they deserve."124

122 "China Meets the Press," Newsweek, March 5, 1972, p. 26. 123 "China Coverage; Sweet and Sour," p. 50.

3-24 „The china Trip and How It Was Covered, " The Quill, LX (April, 1972), p. 11. 184

Meanwhile, Ronald Ziegler handed out copies of

Mr. and Mrs. Nixon’s observations as they moved about the countryside. Stanley Karnow, veteran China-watcher for the

Washington Post, kept a record of the President's "Chinese sayings." At the ancient Ming tombs, Karnow reported, Nixon was moved to note that the emperors had "spoons as well as chopsticks." Pat gazed at ancient headdresses of gold and jewels and observed, "Isn't that something." During a snow­ fall as they Were touring Peking’s Forbidden City, Nixon turned to a Chinese official and informed him, "It snows like this in Chicago." At Hangchow, Nixon informed Chou En- lai that the scenery "looks like a postcard." At the Peking zoo, Pat conversed with the pandas. "Hi there," she said.

On the airplane trip back to Washington, she commented, "We had some fun moments." Most of these observations were recorded, reproduced, and distributed to newsmen by Ziegler's 125 "press office."

It was at the Great Wall of China, however, that

Ziegler put on the most awesome display of his talent. Helen

Thomas, the capable and irreverent White House correspondent

125 Stanley Karnow, "The Chinese Sayings of President Nixon," The Washington Post. February 29, 1972, Sec. A, p. 18. 185 for UPI, described the moment as follows:

. . . The President and Mrs. Nixon walked a few steps in each direction, looked up at the mountains, admiring the winding snake that was a wall, and appeased the pre­ positioned photographers with smiles, gestures and ban­ ter. It occurred to Ziegler that reporters might also record this moment for history's sake. While the presi­ dential party was having a tea break, Ziegler singled out what he thought was a safe reporter and said, "If you ask the President how he likes the Great Wall, he will be prepared to answer." Sure enough, when the President emerged, he was asked on cue, "Sir, how do you like the Great Wall?" "I must conclude that the Great Wall is a great wall," he said,3-26

While the newsmen carefully recorded Nixon's observa­

tions on the Great Wall, reported Stanley Karnow, the presi­

dent remarked that, indeed, it had been worth the entire

sixteen-thousand mile trip. He turned to Secretary of State 127 william Rogers and asked, "Do you agree, Mr. Secretary?"

According to Stanley Karnow ;

The Secretary had a ready answer. "I certainly do, Mr. President," he replied. "It is really a tremendous privilege we have had."

As if he did not quite trust Rogers, the president wheeled around to the reporters on hand for further con­ firmation of his opinion: "Let me ask the members of the press, do you think it was worth coming? "

The newsmen, like Chinese schoolchildren reciting a lesson, responded in unison; "Yes, Mr. President."128

3-26',The china Trip and How It Was Covered," p. 11. 127 Karnow, Sec. A, p. 18. 128 Karnow, Sec. A, p. 18. 186

The stage-managing for television did not cease when the presidential party left China, White House television

specialist Mark Goode scheduled a long layover in Anchorage,

Alaska, to permit the plane to land in Washington at the

peak of prime time. Goode then set up a podium, used "The

Spirit of '76" airplane as a backdrop, and gave the presi­

dential party a welcome-home celebration the nation's tele- 129 vision viewers would not soon forget.

The Nixon Administration has proved remarkably adept

at using television to end run the press. With some notable

exceptions, they have been able to keep the news media busy

with harmless reports while they delivered their own, closely

controlled message to the public. Yet the Nixon men may well

be unsatisfied with their performance, for they have con­

ceived a system that, if it were ever put into effect, would

enable them to establish immediate voice contact with virtu­

ally every American citizen.

The proposal, exposed last November by Democratic

Congressman William Moorhead of Pennsylvania, was one of many

contained in a three-hundred page study, assembled by the

White House Office of Science and Technology, entitled

129 Nolan, "The Re-Selling," p. 80. 187

"Communications for Social Needs.It called for a spe­ cially designed FM radio receiver to be placed in every

American home, car, and boat, ostensibly for communications in time of disaster. The radios would be turned on and off automatically. White House spokesmen declared the study had been "rejected," but later reports disclosed that the Defense

Department is presently testing the proposed system.

Although the White House has tried to downplay it, a perusal of the study— which this investigator made— shows it to be a weighty, technical document which was obviously assembled with great care and much thought beforehand.

Such a system would, without doubt, enable the Nixon men to execute the ultimate end run.

THE END RUN: TO THE HINTERLANDS

The Nixon Administration's campaign to take its message directly to the electorate via the electronic media is but one phase of its total effort to end run the national press corps. The second phase consists of the use of

^^^The Washington Post, November 1, 1972, Sec. A, p. 2,

^^^The Washington Post. November 3, 1972, Sec. A, p. 10. 188 propaganda and public relations techniques to reach "the silent majority" through local leaders and hometown press.

Administration spokesmen travel around the country, speaking before varied audiences; special interest groups receive

literature and appeals for support; editors, reporters, and broadcast journalists are mailed pro-Nixon material; these

same journalists are frequently addressed by Administration

"briefing teams."

The program was directed by Herbert George Klein, who recently resigned. He first worked for Nixon as an

unpaid aide in the young Congressman's 1948 campaign for

re-election. Then a reporter for the Alhambra [California]

Post-Advocate, Klein climbed the ranks in the politically

conservative Copely newspaper chain, eventually (in 1959) 132 becoming editor of its flagship paper, the San Diego Union.

At the same time, he took five leaves of absence to help in 133 Nixon's campaigns.

Klein has been through it all with his friend. The

newsman was there during the rough and tuitble 1950 Senatorial

132 Bonafede, "Commissar of Credibility," p. 392. 133 Bob Wilson, Klein and Ziegler: Nixon's PR M e n , Freedom of Information Center Report No. 244 (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri School of Journalism, June, 1970), p. 2. 189 campaign, the vice-presidential campaigns, the heartbreaking defeat in 1960, the devastating 1962 loss in California and the "last press conference." Finally, he joined the Nixon 134 for President campaign on June 1, 1968. While Ronald

Ziegler traveled with the candidate, Klein remained in New 135 York and handled the overall publicity effort.

An examination of Klein's personality and background demonstrates why Nixon increasingly depended upon him through the years. Klein is quiet of temperament, low-keyed, un- excitable. His eyes are perpetually squinted, which gives him an Oriental appearance of deep and mysterious profundity.

Over the years, he managed to juggle his two, antithetical responsibilities— simultaneously pleasing Nixon and the press— with remarkable dexterity. He did so well, in fact, that he shared the President's trust as well as his colleagues' ^ 136 respect.

Klein recently left Nixon's employ. Newsweek maga­ zine attributed Klein's departure to the allegation that he

134 Wilson, p. 2. 135 Bonafede, "Commissar of Credibility," p. 3 93.

^^^Jules Witcover, "The Two Hats of Herbert Klein," Columbia Journalism Review. IX (Spring, 1970), 26-28. 190 was "not rated expert enough" in the Administration's fav- 137 orite medium, television. Washington Post White House

correspondent Carroll Kilpatrick reported that Klein's

responsibilities will be assumed by press secretary Ronald 138 Ziegler. The office of Director of Communications would

continue to exist, according to this report, but overall

supervision would shift to the White House, and Ronald Ziegler would become the information chief for the entire Executive . 139 Branch.

It would be a mistake, in this investigator's opinion,

to assume the President was in any way dissatisfied with his

old friend. Indeed, any such postulation on the part of the

press could be viewed as evidence that newsmen generally

underrated the effectiveness and finesse with which Klein

managed to end run them. The "Klein shop" is by far the most

sophisticated public relations operation any President has

ever assembled. It could very well provide a model for many

presidents to come.

137 "TV— Love It or Leave," Newsweek, February 21, 1972, p. 17. 138 The Washington Post, January 9, 1973, Sec. A, pp. 1, 7. 139 The Washington Post. January 9, 1973, Sec. A, pp. 1, 7. 191

Klein's job appeared to break down into three parts ;

(1) he was a press "pacifier" and "door opener" for reporters in search of information, (2) he "coordinated" the activities of public information offices throughout the Executive

Branch, and (3) he was the chief public relations officer 140 for the Administration. He also acted as a liaison man between the Administration and the Republican National Com­ mittee, but this seemed to be more a part of his job as a 141 "PR" man than a separate function.

Klein's appointment as a "Communications Director" elicited editorial comment that he would be a "minister of 142 information" and a communications "czar." He would, he declared, prove his critics wrong, "Truth," he proclaimed in a burst of euphoria, "will be the hallmark of the Nixon 143 Administration. " His job, he said, would be that of 144 "extending the flow of news."

140 Erwin Knoll, "The president and the Press ; Elim­ inating the Middlemen," The Progressive. XXXIV (March, 1970), 15 141 Witcover, "Two Hats," p. 29. 142 Wilson, "Klein and Ziegler," p. 2. 143 Wilson, p. 2. 144 Wilson, p. 2, 192

Klein proved true to his word. Anytime a reporter had difficulty getting information from some publicity offi­

cer, a call to Klein usually opened the door. Newsmen were

surprised with Klein's performance, especially when his repu­

tation reached the point that a mere threat to "call Herb" proved sufficient, in many cases, to convince a stubborn

information officer to cooperate. "In the early stage we had

to convince people we meant it for real," Klein said after a

few months in office. "Now I have few phone calls because

the press can say, 'If you can't do this. I'll go see Herb 145 Klein about it.'"

Klein also received high marks for making officials

available to newsmen. He constantly urged Administration

figures to cooperate with the press; according to one report, he arranged one hundred television and newspaper interviews 146 for Cabinet-level officials in his first two months. On

a typical day in 1969, reported the Washington Post. Klein handled requests from the president of El Salvador, the head

of the British Conservative Party, the Washington post. the

Los Angeles Times, the U.S. News & World Report, NBC, and the

145 Witcover, "Two Hats," p. 27. 146 The Wall Street Journal. March 29, 1971, p. 1. 193

British Broadcasting Corporation. This was in addition to the many meetings he attended and the miscellaneous telephone calls he handled^ as well as having a "background lunch" with ^ 147 Canadian newsmen. It should be noted^ however, that the information

Klein made available to newsmen was rarely uncomplimentary

to the Administration. It was usually positive or, at best,

neutral. Even his "backgrounders" produced mixed results.

Wall Street Journal correspondent John Pierson wrote that ;

. . . Reporters profess disappointment over the backgrounding they've been getting from Mr. Klein. Some find him well-informed on political matters, only mod­ erately knowledgeable on domestic affairs and hopeless on foreign policy. Mutters one veteran; "All I ever get from Herb is a propagandistic pitch."148

In his role as Nixon's press "pacifier," Klein

attempted to convince his former colleagues that the Admin­

istration's anti-press image was not nearly as bad as it

appears. He was, for example, forever promising that Nixon

will pay more attention to press conferences. In late Janu­

ary, 1969, Klein predicted the president would hold televised 149 press conferences every week or ten days. It soon became

147 The Washington Post, June 8, 1969, Sec. A, p. 11. 148 The Wall Street Journal, December 29, 1969, p. 14. 149 The Washington Post, January 30, 1969, Sec. A, p. 6. 194 apparent that newsmen would be fortunate to see the President once every few months, but the undaunted Klein continued to hold out hope. As Nixon began his second term, the communi­ cations director predicted that now they were "past a lot of these negotiations" with the Chinese and Vietnamese, Nixon 150 would be meeting the press more frequently.

When Vice-president Agnew began his attacks on the press, Klein marched forth to try to appease newsmen, Samuel

Archibald, director of the Washington office of the University of Missouri’s Freedom of Information Center, reported in July,

1970, that:

Herb Klein . . , has used his contacts with the edi­ tors, publishers and broadcast station owners to play Tweedledee to . , , Agnew ' s Tweedledum. After Agnew's second blast at the information industry, Klein called a number of his former colleagues together for a White House dinner and told them he deplored Agnew's excesses and assured them the attacks were only political sound and fury. The friendly meeting may or may not have deflected the editorial return fire to Agnew’s attacks, but it was a clever public relations ploy.^^^

When Clay T, Whitehead, director of Nixon's Office of Telecommunications Policy, called on local stations, in

^^^The Washington Post, January 18, 1973, Sec. A, p. 24. ^Samuel J, Archibald, "Who's Running Government PR?" Public Relations Journal. XXVI (July, 1970), 8. 195 effect, to censor network news, Klein was quick to let news­ men know that there was someone in the Administration who was not in complete agreement. Whitehead, Klein said, had used "a number of phrases I don't want to associate myself with."^^^

In his efforts to pacify the press, Klein spoke at so many Sigma Delta Chi meetings that his picture became a

fixture in the society's magazine. The Quill. In Los Angeles, he declared that "truth, one of the ideals of the journalism 153 society, is not corny." In Washington, D.C., he told the

SDX chapter that former Assistant Defense Secretary Arthur

Sylvester was wrong when he said, in 1962, that the govern­ ment had a "right to lie" in certain situations; the Nixon men, he predicted, would render "obsolete" the term "credi- 154 bility gap." He traveled to Dekalb, Illinois, to tell

SDX members that "the president has issued a directive to his

staff that the executive order requiring secrecy be used only

152 The Washington Post, January 18, 1973, Sec. A, p. 24. 153 "Klein Addresses L.A. Chapter," The Quill. LVII (August, 1969), 23. 154 "Government Has Right To Lie? No, Says Klein at Record D.C. Turnout," The Quill, LVII (April, 1969), 39. 196

155 in extreme cases of national security."

Klein's second role, that of "coordinating" the information that flows out of the Executive Departments, was undoubtedly his most difficult assignment. It was also the job that is the least understood, simply because it was per­ formed behind the scenes.

The job of overseeing the information functions of the entire Executive Branch is a difficult one for many rea­ sons, the chief of which is the fact that most of the federal government ' s six thousand plus information officers are civil service employees.Since their jobs are, theoret­ ically at least, nonpolitical, it is not easy to make them adhere to the Administration line. They are only partly responsive, at best. Some two hundred top information jobs are filled with political appointees, however, and these men 157 jump when the Klein shop calls.

The task became a bit easier after Klein saw to it that former colleagues or friends were appointed to the top

^Stephen Newton, "'Now' Journalism Discussed at Region 5 Meeting," The Quill. LVII (June, 1969), 50.

^^^Wilson, "Klein and Ziegler," p. 3. 157 Archibald, "Who's Running Government PR?" p. 6. 197 information jobs at the Departments of Health, Education, and Welfare, Interior, Commerce, and Agriculture. He also 158 had a hand in the selection of others,

Klein organized for the job of coordinating informa­ tion by assigning different departments and agencies to each of the members of his staff (which seems to average around eighteen to twenty persons, including secretaries) and instructing them to keep in contact with their charges. Each day, information men from the various agencies call the appointed Klein aide and report the news releases they 159 expect to circulate that day and in the near future. Occa­ sionally, the procedure will result in a change of plans for the lower echelon information men. In 1969, for example, then Labor Secretary George Shultz was prepared to release information about manpower programs. When Klein's shop heard about it, arrangements were made for Shultz to announce his 160 plans at the White House. At times, according to one report, Klein's aides went so far as to prepare press releases for departmental information men; this was done.

158 The Wall Street Journal. March 21, 1969, p. 23. 159 The Wall Street Journal. March 21, 1969, p. 1.

^^^The Wall Street Journal, March 21, 1969, p. 1. 198 apparently, only when a project was deemed potentially harm- 161 ful to the Administration if not handled properly.

In addition to the daily reports to Klein's office, the departmental information chiefs were required to submit weekly reports outlining the events they expect to develop in the days ahead. Klein also tried to meet with his information men at least once a month for general discussion of their problems and publicity efforts

"My office," Klein once explained, "is like a public relations firm which is the consultant to a number of cor­ porations with their own public relations departments. The internal departments solve a lot of their own problems, but they turn to the consultant firm for help when they need it." 1=4

Now that Klein has departed, the White House in all likelihood will assume the role of "coordinating" the infor­ mation flow from the various Executive Departments. The

^Luther A. Huston, "How Herb Klein Assists the President," Editor & Publisher. February 15, 1969, p. 10.

^^^Witcover, "Two Hats," p. 27.

^^^Witcover, p. 27. 164 The Washington Post. June 8, 1969, Sec. A, p. 11. 199 media men around Nixon apparently feel much more could be

done to make the entire Executive Branch speak with one voice. Shortly after Nixon's re-election, in fact, Ronald

Ziegler announced that he had been reviewing the public

information situation at the department level and was even

then actively assisting the Cabinet officers in finding "good

people for those jobs."^^^ What this meant, commented a

Washington Post reporter, was that "the White House intends

to exercise stricter control over public relations appoint- ,,166 ees. "

By far the most important of Klein's three tasks was

his role as the chief public relations officer for the Admin­

istration. It was in this aspect of his job that Klein was

most innovative. Strangely, however, the apparatus he set

publicize the Administration— particularly the manner

in which the operation is financed— was largely ignored by

the press. Indeed, Nixon had been in office for months

before newsmen began to understand what Klein was doing; it

took them over a year to fathom the extent to which he was

^^^The Washington Post, January 4, 1973, Sec. A, p. 2.

^^^The Washington Post. Januairy 4, 1973, Sec. A, p. 2. 200 doing it. While reporters were marveling over how nice it was of "old Herb" to "open doors" for them, old Herb was finessing them out of their pads and pencils.

It was unlikely that Klein's job as a publicist evolved after he became communications director. The evi­ dence suggests he and the President planned the PR operation well in advance of Nixon's election. Before Nixon was sworn in, Klein discussed the job he was to assume and commented that:

. . . It's one that we [Nixon and Klein] discussed for a considerable time and we had it under consideration as we worked in the 1968 campaign. . . . We worked in this manner in the campaign. . . . We felt it was success­ ful there, and we feel that as a result of the discussions we've had since, we have been able to fully structure this in a way which will be highly applicable to modern government,167

What was this new job to be? Was Klein, as he fre­ quently expressed it, simply going to expedite the flow of information? Would he be a mere "door opener" for newsmen?

Hardly. Insider James Keogh has explained it quite bluntly:

He [Klein] became, among other roles, the booking agent of the operation, placing Cabinet members and others on television shows and lecture platforms, while at the same time dispensing reams of copy to editors, commentators and anyone else who might pass on the

1 67 Wilson, "Klein and Ziegler," p. 2. 201 , 168 word.

The "editors" and "commentators" Keogh referred to were not simply the men who normally cover the President.

They were also the men in newsrooms west of the Appalachians,

the "hinterlands" press, the newsmen who were not on the

scene in Washington, men who were less informed about issues

and events than their colleagues in the Capital, newsmen who were, therefore, much more susceptible to persuasion by the

Nixon men telling their one-sided story. Klein's job, in

Keogh's words, "was a clearly visible end run around the „1G9 national news corps , . . . "

It was not as "clearly visible" as Keogh would have

his readers believe. When Klein assumed the role of "Direc­

tor of Communications for the Executive Branch, " many of his

old friends in the press publicly pondered his misfortune at

not being named the President's press secretary. Julius

Duscha, veteran newsman and director of the Washington Jour­

nalism Center, summed it up in an article in The Progressive;

There are some Washington correspondents who feel that Mr. Nixon blames Klein for many of his past diffi­ culties with the press and that the president did not

^^^Keogh, president Nixon and the press. p. 39.

^^^Keogh, p. 60. 202

want Klein, who is a mumbler, as his press secretary, but because of Klein's past loyalties Mr. Nixon created for him the new but perhaps not terribly important job of director of communications, Others believe that advertising executive Haldeman and others convinced him that for public relations and image reasons the press secretary, who is frequently seen on television, should be young, handsome, and personable, all qualities pos­ sessed by Ziegler but not by Klein.

If Klein hasn't enjoyed a hearty laugh over such comments, he should have. Ronald Ziegler's role was an entirely negative one; Klein's was positive. Whereas Zeigler proved to be, at least in his first four years, little more than a transmission belt and gatekeeper, Klein had a hand in making policy and developing one of the most extensive public relations operations ever to exist.

Klein had been on the job less than two months when he began sending materials to the hinterlands press. Some four hundred editorial writers, for example, received infor­ mation on postal reform. A short while later, hundreds of editors received a packet of material concerning the anti- 171 ballistic missile system.

With the help of the previously discussed White

170 Julius Duscha, "The President and the Press," The Progressive, XXXIII (May, 1969), 28. 171 The Wall Street Journal. March 21, 1969, p. 23. 203

House "Plans Committee," Klein soon developed additional methods of reaching beyond the Washington press corps. How­ ever, the "mailings," as Klein and his aides soon came to call the information kits, remained a primary weapon in the

PR arsenal. Hundreds, occasionally thousands, of the kits went out in each mailing; and the mailings were made, Klein aide Kenneth Clawson told this investigator, on the average 172 of once a week. In some instances, the editors of all eight thousand of the nation's weekly newspapers received a particular kit.^^^ Some mailings were addressed to writers in special fields and to specialized publications such as 174 women's magazines and the black press.

A typical mailing contained press releases, selected excerpts from news conferences, presidential statements and messages, poll results, magazine or newspaper articles, and columns. They were always chosen, of course, to cast the

Administration in a favorable light. The "fact kits," as they were sometimes called, were usually accompanied by a

172 Statement by Kenneth Clawson, personal interview, August 8, 1972. 173 Knoll, "The President and the Press ; Eliminating the Middlemen," p. 16. 174 The Wall Street Journal. February 9, 1971, p. 16. 204 175 cover letter signed by Klein.

In 1969, for example, kits containing Nixon speeches

on "neo-isolationists" and campus protesters were sent out.

"Because of the importance of these speeches, which discuss

freedom and the nation's responsibilities in today's world," wrote Klein in his cover letter, "I am sending the complete

texts for your analysis." The kits went to eight thousand 176 weekly newspapers.

On June 16, 1971, Klein mailed to selected editors

a "summary" of the Administration's attempts to curb the

traffic in illegal narcotics. "To help you in studying the

impact of this all-out effort, " Klein wrote, "i have sum­

marized for you the background of events which led to the 177 current proposals. "

On another occasion, some two thousand editors and

broadcasters received a pamphlet entitled, "A Generation of

Peace— An Address to the United Nations, Oct. 23, 1970."^^^

When, in the winter of 1971, Nixon began pushing for Cabinet

175 Bonafede, "Commissar of Credibility," p. 394. 176 The Washington Post. June 8, 1969, Sec. A, p. 11. 177 See Appendix A, pp. 451-57. 178 The Washington Post. June 1, 1971, Sec. A, p. 8. 205 reorganization, Klein mailed informational packets to 3,827 publishers, editors, and broadcast officials, in this case,

the material was prepared in question and answer form. "Can

these 'super departments' be made manageable?" asked one

question. The answer was yes, and General Motors and the

American Telegraph and Telephone companies were pointed to as

"large but manageable organizations" that "handle complex and

complicated tasks in an efficient and effective manner."

Other packages have gone out on such topics as revenue shar- 179 ing, the economy, the budget, and so on.

Early in 1971, Klein was favorably impressed by a

Joseph Alsop column which defended the "incursion" in Laos

and charged that Arkansas Senator J. William Pulbright and

others were "eager to be proved right by an American defeat

in war, and will loath being proved wrong by U.S. success in

Southeast Asia." Klein included the column in a mailing; in 180 his cover letter he held it to be "timely and interesting."

Another Klein innovation has been the creation of

Administration "briefing teams" which tour the country

179 The Wall Street Journal. February 9, 1971, p. 16. 180 Hugh Sidey, "Kingdom Come on Pennsylvania Avenue," Life. February 26, 1971, p. 2B. 206 extolling the Nixon programs. The same type of briefings, of course, are held in Washington as well. So many groups have been brought to the White House for briefings, in fact, that at one time insiders were quipping that the Roosevelt

Room, where most briefings are held, ought to be renamed the 181 "NAR Room," standing for Nixon's "New American Revolution."

But Klein put the Nixon show on the road. In the summer of

1969, for example, he organized a group of Budget Bureau and

White House staff members to explain Nixon's welfare pro­ posals, or the "family assistance plan," as the president preferred to call it. John Ehrlichman explained the Adminis­

tration's policy to Allan Drury:

If we are going to leave a mark on the tree to show we were here, we are going to have to go to the country and try to get active support from the citizens. We did this in the case of the family assistance plan when a team from my office traveled around the country. They visited as many influential people as they could in each city, talking to editorial boards of newspapers, to ser­ vice clubs and chambers of commerce, appearing on radio and television, trying to saturate a city so that it would have a basic understanding of the program.

Similar teams toured the nation to explain postal 183 reform and proposals to eliminate the draft. Klein often

181 The Wall Street Journal. February 9, 1971, p. 16. 182 Drury, Courage and Hesitation, p. 71. 183 The New York Times. August 24, 1970, p. 18. 207 made use of the weekly projection reports sent to him by his departmental information chiefs to book appearances for prom­ inent Administration officials. James Hagerty, former press secretary to President Eisenhower and now an ABC network executive, told a New York Times reporter that anytime a

Cabinet officer travels to Seattle, the local ABC television station gets a call from Klein's office "two weeks before 184 the trip . . . offering an interview. "

A new twist was added to the end run in 1970 when

Klein began organizing "regional briefings"— featuring top-

level policy men such as Henry Kissinger and occasionally the

President himself— for newsmen around the country. In June,

1970, after Nixon withdrew American troops from Cambodia,

Klein arranged a private briefing at the Western White House

for thirty-eight editors and other news executives. Nixon began the affair with a brief speech; he was followed by

Henry Kissinger, Lieutenant General John W. Vogt, Jr., then

operations director for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and

William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

East Asian and Pacific Affairs— all of whom defended the

184 James M. Naughton, "How the 2d Best-Informed Man in the White House Briefs the 2d Worst-Informed Group in Washington," The New York Times Magazine. May 30, 1971, p. 27 208 ^ 185 Cambodian maneuvers.

A second regional briefing was held in New Orleans in August, 1970, to discuss Middle East policy. A similar session was staged in San Clemente again a few days later, X86 and another one was held in Chicago.

The "regional briefings"— so named because they were held to be consistent with Nixon’s effort to "regionalize" and decentralize the functions of the federal government— produced mixed results. An editor with the Arizona Star.

David Brinegar, said he still favored the withdrawal from

Vietnam but "in the future, l probably will not attack Nixon for the nation's policy— I'll view it historically as part X87 of the American scene." After the New Orleans briefing.

New York Times reporter Richard Ha11oran quoted a "southern editor" who said the briefing was "useful to people out here X88 in the boondocks." An "eastern editor," however, felt a

San Clemente briefing "wasn't worth the money to go out there

just to hear the Administration say the same old thing." He

^^^The New York Times. August 24, 1970, p. 18.

^^^The New York Times. August 24, 1970, p. 18. X87 "Direct Communications," Newsweek, September 7, 1970, p. 57. 188 The New York Times, August 24, 1970, p. 18. 209 added; "We're trying to make [it] evident to Mr. Klein that 189 we're not in his pocket."

Although the mailing campaign, the touring sales teams, and the regional briefings constituted the three major public relations techniques devised by Klein, they were not the only ones. He inaugurated "chain call" campaigns in which businessmen and special interest groups were alerted to posi­

tive poll results and asked to pass the message on to their 190 friends and colleagues. He sent his "fact kits" to spe­

cial groups, such as blue-collar workers and black, Jewish, 191 and ethnic organizations. He encouraged prominent Adminis­

tration officials to write by-lined articles in major publi­

cations. Elliot Richardson, then Secretary of Health, Edu­

cation, and Welfare, penned a reply to a Newsweek article on 192 Nixon. George Romney, then Secretary of Housing and Urban 193 Development, replied to a Life editorial on the President.

189 The New York Times, August 24, 1970, p. 18. 190 The Wall Street Journal. February 9, 1971, p. 16. 191 The Wall Street Journal. February 9, 1971, p. 16. 192 Elliot Richardson, "Nixon Behind the Scenes," News­ week. February 1, 1971, pp. 16-17. 193 George Romney, "A Reply to Life's Editorial on Nixon," Life, February 5, 1971, p. 62A. 210

The Reader's Digest has published a number of articles by men associated with Nixon. Associate Justice of the Supreme

Court Lewis F. Powell, Jr., permitted the magazine to reprint 194 an address to the American Bar Association. Shortly after his resignation as Treasury Secretary, John Connally wrote a piece for the Digest in which he called for "toughness in ,,195 America."

The entire Klein operation, in the view of many

Washington reporters, was little more than blatant propa­ gandizing. "It's propaganda," one correspondent told this

investigator. "That's a dirty word, but that's exactly what

it is."^^^

Klein himself, as could be expected, hotly denies any

suggestion he was a minister of propaganda. The material he

sent out, he steadfastly insists, is "fact," not opinion.

"If I just gave my opinions," he told this investigator with

a hint of irritation in his voice, "it would be a selling

194 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., "What Has Happened to the Old American Values?" The Reader's Digest, Cl (November, 1972), pp. 170-72. 195 John B. Connally, "A Time for Toughness, " The Reader's Digest, Cl (October, 1972), pp. 85-88. 196 Statement by a Washington correspondent, personal interview, March 23, 1971, 211 job. But we deal in statements of fact, and that's a dif- _ ^ ,,197 ferent case."

The truth, however, is that the White House briefing teams organized by Klein offered their opinions and cited only those "facts" which were favorable to the Administration.

The mailings sent out by Klein contained many articles and editorials which are far from established fact. The material, moreover, was carefully selected to make Nixon look good.

The curious manner in which Klein financed his tours

and mailings, furthermore, suggested that the Nixon men

themselves believed their public relations effort was not

entirely free of political propagandizing. For many of the

tours and most of the mailings were underwritten by the

Republican National Committee. Reports differ on the ques­

tion of whether this was true from the beginning.

Wall Street Journal reporter John Pierson claimed

that at least sixteen "fact kits" containing Nixon speeches

and statements were printed during the President's first two

years at taxpayers' expense. But they were mailed, Pierson 198 reported, by the party. At some point, the Republican

197 Statement by Herbert Klein, personal interview, March 16, 1971. X 98 The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 1971, p. 16. 212

Party also began bearing the expenses for stationery as well.

When Kenneth Clawson was asked how this came about, this investigator was told; "Herb made the policy at the very . . . ,,199 beginning."

The details of these curious financial arrangements, of course, were not volunteered by Klein's office. Reporter

Dorn Bonafede has described how one newsman discovered the

"fact kits" were being distributed by the party;

When the kits were first introduced, a reporter interviewing Klein asked to see one of them. Klein obligingly buzzed for a secretary. She had no kits handy, but added, "There are some at the Republican National Committee." Until then, the reporter had not known of the tie-in. After the reporter left, Klein instructed the secretary in a basic rule of government public relations: "Never volunteer anything."200

When White House briefing teams departed for the hinterlands to inform the nation about the Nixon welfare reform proposals, the Republican Party again bore some of the expenses. Reporter Jules Witcover wrote that :

Klein's office enlisted the help of private public relations offices in some cities; breakfast and lunch meetings with news executives in leading hotels were arranged, with the Republican National Committee picking up the tab. The briefers were explaining government

199 Statement by Kenneth Clawson, personal interview, August 8, 1972.

^^*^Bonafede, "Commissar of Credibility," p. 394. 213

policy. But the fact that the Party was paying the bills — including, according to Klein, the travel expenses of the briefers— amounted to an acknowledgement that these government employees were embarked on Party business.201

Klein maintained that he was simply trying to lighten the taxpayers' burden and, at the same time, avoid any hint of propagandizing. But such tactics were essentially devious ; the briefing teams did not advertise the fact that they were financed by the party; nor did the White House stationery purchased by the Republicans for the distribution of Klein's

"fact kits" carry any hint that the mailings were political in nature. As far as the recipients know, it was all offi- 202 cial White House business.

Private financing was also arranged for other Klein activities. Some special interest groups were encouraged to 203 place newspaper ads extolling Nixon programs. In another case, tax-exempt foundations financed a White House "confer­ ence" for government, business, labor, and educational leaders.1 J 204

201 witcover, "Two Hats," p. 29. 202 See Appendix A, pp. 451-57. 203 The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 1971, p. 16. 204 The Washington [D.C.] Daily News, February 10, 1972, p. 9. 214

While on the public payroll, Klein also campaigned actively for Republican candidates. In an October, 1972, interview, he admitted that;

Just in recent days . . . I've been in Texas and I've campaigned for Sen. [John] Tower, I've been in Kentucky where I campaigned for Gov. [Louie B . ] Nunn, and I hope before the election is over that I'll be able to do some­ thing additional for Mr. [Winton M.] Blount [1972 Repub­ lican Senatorial candidate in Alabama].205

Herbert George Klein was a public servant, paid by the taxpayers. His aides enjoyed high salaries, courtesy of the American citizen. Yet he openly engaged in partisan affairs; he, by tacit admission, actively disseminated polit­ ical propaganda. Indeed, Lyn Nofziger, when he was Deputy

Chairman of the Republican National Committee for Communica­ tions, admitted to a "working relationship" with Klein's office. Nofziger, an uncompromising party stalwart who once worked for California Governor Ronald Regan and who managed

Nixon's California campaign machine in 1972, told this investi­ gator ; "They [Klein and his aides] know policy and I have to know policy. So I'm in contact with them frequently.

The fact that the President and Klein "discussed"

205 Human Events, October 28, 1972, p. 19. 206 statement by Lyn Nofziger, personal interview. March 19, 1971. 215 the latter's role "for a considerable time" in 1968, and the admission by James Keogh that the operation was specifically and carefully designed as an "end run around the national news corps" leads one to wonder where the idea for a public relations "shop" came from. How did Richard Nixon think of it? Is there a precedent for the Klein operation?

Indeed there is, and its history makes it exceedingly pertinent. One of Nixon's idols is the twenty-eighth Presi- 207 dent of the United States, Woodrow Wilson. Nixon is so familiar with the Wilson Administration, in fact, that he can 208 quote some of Wilson's statements from memory. Interest­ ingly, it was Wilson who devised the first, large-scale pub­ lic relations effort which was clearly designed as a means of by-passing the press to deliver a message directly to the electorate. This was the famous "Committee on Public Infor­ mation," or the "Creel committee." Its structure and methods of operation strongly suggest that someone in the present

Administration, if not the President himself, made an inten- 209 sive study of the Wilson era.

207 Hugh Sidey, "Looking Forward to the Harvest," Life, June 25, 1971, p. 7. 2 08 Keogh, President Nixon and the Press. p. 53. 209 Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., Presidential Leadership of 216

As explained in Chapter 1, Woodrow Wilson was not

fond of the press. He felt correspondents dwelt too much on his private life, and he searched for a way to end the press

conferences he had begun when he entered the White House, He met with newsmen with less and less frequency, and then, with

the outbreak of World War I, he stopped his press conferences

altogether.

Eight days after the United States declared war,

Wilson placed veteran newsman George Creel in charge of the

Committee on public Information. Throughout the rest of the war, this was the vehicle for most of the information Wilson

transmitted to the public. Even his "secretary" (there were

no press secretaries at the time), stopped the daily press

conferences he had been holding for reporters, In his

history of the Creel operation, Elmer Cornwell wrote that :

. . . The idea seems to have been Wilson's own. It may well have been foreshadowed by his desire for direct access to the public through visits to Congress, and by a proposal he had once made for a "national publicity bureau."211

Public Opinion (Bloomington, Indiana; Indiana University Press, 1965), pp. 48-57. 210 Cornwell, pp. 44-45. 211 Cornwell, p. 48. 217

Ostensibly, the purpose of the creel committee was to get the country behind the war effort. But Creel delib­ erately chose to associate his "information" with the Presi­ dent and the committee quickly turned into what Cornwell termed "a kind of embryonic 'propaganda ministry' for the 212 National Executive . . , ."

Radio and television, of course, did not exist dur­ ing Wilson's terms in office, but the array of devices creel invented to get the Wilson message to the public was prodi­ gious indeed. There was, for example, the "official bulletin," which contained information about government actions and pro­ ceedings, It was posted in military camps and in fifty-four thousand post offices and was sent to government officials, publicity agents, and editors. Here again, wrote Cornwell,

"the President was seeking a means of bypassing the press and 213 getting verbatim information into the public's hands."

Other publications put out by creel included posters and pam­ phlets. Some seventy-five million pieces of literature, it has been estimated, were disseminated— a large portion of which were the president's statements and speeches. A

212 Cornwell, p. 49. 213 Cornwell, p. 48. 218 handbook was prepared for Boy Scouts instructing them to become "a dispatch bearer from the Government at Washington 214 to the American people all over the country." The Scouts then attempted to "dispatch" messages to every home in the country. In just one campaign, over five million copies of 215 a Flag Day speech by Wilson were delivered by the Scouts.

Creel also inaugurated the "Pour-Minute Men" speaking program. Every week, state and local "chairmen" were provided with a topic and a bulletin of information, including appro­ priate quotations and suggestions for phrasing. The chair­ men, in turn, distributed the information to their respective speakers, who then put together a four-minute speech. Then they ventured forth into motion picture houses, theaters, and anywhere else they could find an audience and delivered their messages. Speakers of different nationalities were picked to speak before ethnic audiences. Some seventy-five thousand speakers were eventually used. They delivered over one million speeches, reaching an estimated audience of four hundred mil- 216 lion.

214 Cornwell, p. 51. 215_ Cornwell, p. 51.

2 1 6 Cornwell, pp. 51-52. 219

In some ninety percent of the speeches, the President was mentioned or quoted. Citizens were reminded of the need to back Wilson's moral leadership. In at least one instance, 217 the Four-Minute Men read a Wilson speech verbatim. In other cases, Wilson was quoted extensively.

On Lincoln's Birthday, 1918, for example, the Four-

Minute Men were asked to recite the Gettysburg address. They were to preface it with this short speech;

Ever since the Liberty Bell at Philadelphia tolled its message to the world in 1776 this country has lived for liberty and right "as God gives us to see the right." The language of our Presidents from the time of George Washington to this day breathes these highest ideals.

So in this greatest of all wars, the President again expresses the noblest of sentiments, emphasizing again and again "that this is a war of high principles, debased by no selfish ambitions of conquest or spoilation," and "the cause being just and holy, the settlement must be of like motive and quality."218

Creel also devised a brochure called the "National

School Service" which was mailed twice monthly to school

teachers across the country. Each issue was crammed full of war news, quotations, articles, and suggestions for the

teacher to use to get a war message across to the students.

217 Cornwell, p. 52. 218 Cornwell,„ p. 53. 220

Some six hundred thousand teachers received the National

School Service free of charge; the "message" in each issue, 219 it has been estimated, reached into twenty million homes.

Throughout the war. Congress had been critical of the

Committee on Public Information but had tolerated it on patri­ otic grounds. With the war over, therefore, Wilson disbanded the committee. Creel reluctantly ceased his efforts, but not before getting in a few subtle plugs for the League of _ 220 Nations.

The similarities between the Creel committee and the

"Klein shop" are obvious. Many of the public relations devices used by Creel were duplicated by Klein— the speakers, the presidential speeches mailed to editors, and so on.

Indeed, many of Nixon's speeches on the Vietnam war are remarkably similar to the appeals Wilson made during World

War I. The major difference between the Creel operation and

Klein's was the fact that the former's propaganda could be excused as patriotic excess in time of declared war. Klein had no such "cover, " but he managed to put together a public relations campaign that was at least as imaginative as the

219 Cornwell, p. 54. 220 Cornwell, p. 57. 221 one created by the Committee on Public Information. The parallels between the Wilson Administration and that of his admirer Richard Nixon, it appears, are far greater than have been previously suspected.

OTHER END RUNNERS

Other Administration officials appear to be following the path cleared by Nixon's media men. Image-making and the use of television and propaganda techniques to end run the press have been adopted throughout the Executive Branch.

Soon after assuming office, for example, Nixon appointed a staff assistant to recruit women for Administra­ tion jobs. The press generally has treated the effort as an application of cosmetics— an attempt to plaster a pretty face over the ugly fact that women play a minor role in the Nixon

Administration. The staff assistant, Barbara Franklin, is a former executive with the First National City Bank of New

York. Although she has gamely attempted to recruit tal­ ented women for top jobs, many observers, including the lead­ ers of some women's organizations, believe she has failed to make much of a dent in what one feminist called the "affluent 221 white male club." Apparently taking her cue from Herb

221 Jack Anderson, "President Nixon and the Women," 222

Klein, Ms. Franklin eventually began mailing "information" to concerned individuals and groups. In the heat of the

1972 election campaign, for example, she dispatched a letter summarizing a few Nixon "firsts" for women. She wrote, in part:

We have now more than tripled the number of women in top-level, policy positions since April of 1971 when President Nixon asked an intensification of efforts to bring about equal employment opportunity for women.

Even though it's summer, things are moving along for women here in Washington. I hope this summer is an equally successful one for you, and I'll be in touch again soon with some more exciting news!222

This investigator traced the postage meter number on the envelopes and discovered the letters had been mailed from

Republican National Committee headquarters in Washington. A spokeswoman for Ms. Franklin, Judy Kaufman, explained that the party had paid for all costs of distribution, including stationery. The White House letterheads, she said, were off­ set duplicates of official White House stationery. Ms. Frank­ lin didn't want the taxpayers to pay for the operation, said

Ms. Kaufman, because they were just "informational mailings."

If the letters were, as she seemed to be admitting, political

Parade, October 31, 1971, p. 5. 222 See Appendix B, p. 459. 223 in nature, why didn ' t the stationery indicate this fact?

"Because Barbara Franklin is an official White House person," said Ms. Kaufman, The investigator asked how they thought of the idea of mailing "official information" with Republican

Party funds. "Well," said Ms. Kaufman, "Herb Klein works ,,223 the same way. "

Cabinet Secretaries, especially, seem to have adopted the end run tactic. In 1971, Rogers c. B. Morton,

the tall, white-haired Secretary of the Interior, hired

Harry Treleaven— the former J. Walter Thompson vice president who helped mastermind Nixon's 1968 media blitz— "to improve

the image " of the department. "Morton wants to know what ' s going on throughout the department, " said Treleaven as he began the job. "He wants to make sure it is spending its

dollars wisely in the way it will do the most good for the

public.

At a fee of $121 a day, Treleaven worked for several

months to produce an eighty-five page study, which was

promptly dubbed the "Treleaven Report." Among other things.

223 Statement by Judy Kaufman, personal interview, August 4, 1972. 224 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star, March 10, 1971, Sec. A, p. 1. 224 he criticized the department's information experts for being

"too passive, reacting to events rather than looking for 225 opportunities." A "top priority," wrote Treleaven, "must be to develop ways of getting Interior's story on tele- vision• • . . . . ,,226"

For some time, the interior Department refused to make public the Treleaven Report; when it was finally released, eighteen pages had been deleted. Some resource­ ful digging by newsmen produced the censored portion, and it turned out to be devoted to a discussion of Secretary Morton's image. The secret part reads, in part, as follows;

*A part of greater use of television should be a continuing effort to get the Secretary visually involved in newsworthy events (which will provide good picture material for the print media, too), Secretary Morton is not only the most photogenic member of the Administration — but he's also able to participate physically in all kinds of outdoor situations and look natural. It’s important that the communications program make full use of this, because it's a way of making sure that the Sec­ retary's statements get maximum exposure, as well as building valuable goodwill for the Department and the Administration. Information officers in each of the Bureaus should be required to submit, on a regular basis, ideas for this kind of involvement, (Every time this was suggested in an interview it immediately sparked ideas.) And arrangements for motion picture and still photography

225 See Appendix C, pp. 462-63. 226 See Appendix C, pp. 462-63. 225

should be built into all personal appearance plans.

•It is recommended that a nationwide "network" of specially trained and briefed information personnel be established to handle all television, radio and press arrangements for the Secretary and others when they travel. As soon as travel plans are finalized the net­ work should be alerted; it will then be their respons­ ibility to arrange for film and press coverage, tele­ vision and radio interviews on local stations, visits to places pertinent to Interior's operations, and contribute any ideas that will make the trip more productive. This network can be set up using existing regional offices and personnel . . . .227

Morton appears to have taken Treleaven's advice to heart. Wherever he travels now, he makes an extra effort to appear photogenic. In January, 1972, he traveled with Julie

Nixon Eisenhower to Florida's Big Cypress Swamp for an inspection of a 547,000-acre parcel which may soon become a federal water preserve. Julie climbed into a $75 pair of hip boots to make the trek through the muck. But not Rogers. As

Newsweek reported it, "Rugged outdoorsman Morton shunned slush-puppies and emerged from the swamp with soaking trou­ sers." Sure enough, an Associated press photographer was on 228 hand to capture the "rugged outdoorsman" on film.

Shortly after Treleaven recommended Morton enhance

227 See Appendix C, p. 463. 228 Newsmakers, Newsweek, January 17, 1972, p. 49. 225 his image, the Interior Secretary hired an expert to help him. She is Pamela Coe, a pretty, young media expert who worked for the ubiquitous J. Walter Thompson advertising 229 agency in New York, Ms. Coe told Morton he had to watch his weight, and she has been seen in public snatching candy 23 0 out of his hands. On one occasion, Coe and Morton were lunching in an exclusive Washington restaurant when they were approached by one of the restaurant owners. The man wanted Morton to autograph a caricature of the Secretary that was hanging on the wall. Ms. Coe advised against it. Rogers

Morton, she said, "is the handsomest man in the Cabinet. This doesn't look anything at all like him." Morton agreed and 231 refused to autograph the drawing.

During his four years as Nixon's Attorney General,

John Mitchell displayed an increasing awareness of the value

of a good image. In the 1968 campaign, he had been one of

the old school pols who exchewed the television men and

advised Nixon to get into the ring with his opponent.

229 Jack Anderson, "White House Tie Booms Ad Agency, " The Washington Post. November 30, 1972, sec. F, p. 9. 230 The Washington Post, October 24, 1972, Sec. B, p. 6. 231 The Washington Post. December 14, 1972, Sec. C, p. 4. 227

As time wore on, however, the image-makers converted

Mitchell, In 1970, he hired an old friend, Richard Moore, as a "confidential assistant." Moore, a West Coast lawyer and broadcast executive, was instructed, according to News­ week , "to improve the department's— and the Attorney General’s ,,232 — image."

During the previously described "make Nixon warm" campaign in early 1971, Mitchell attended a dinner party, and he stood up and told some ribald jokes to a mixed audience.

He was trying, he said, to show the "Nixon men are not all 233 squares." Later he explained what he meant ; "We have got to change the Nixon image. People do not see the President 234 for what he is or what he is doing." Treasury Secretary

John Connally agreed with him, said the Attorney General.

"Connally called together a lot of Republican Senators the other day," Mitchell said, "and told them that they are not 235 selling the President to the country."

232 The Periscope, "Mitchell's Confidential Assist­ ant," Newsweek. June 6, 1970, p. 15. 233 The Washington Post, March 8, 1971, Sec. B, p. 1. 234 The Washington Post, March 8, 1971, Sec. B, p. 1. 23 5 The Washington Post. March 8, 1971, Sec. B, p. 1. 228

At the State Department, an end run was organized to sell the country on the Vietnam war. One vehicle created to spread the approved word was an organization called the

"Inter-Departmental Group on Foreign Policy Information," which consisted of representatives from other executive agen­ cies, regardless of whether they had a foreign policy respons­ ibility. At the group meetings. State Department personnel distributed "talking points on Vietnam." The various repre­ sentatives were then expected to disseminate the information to their principal officers, who in turn would use it in speeches and interviews. "We should ensure that every employee of all our agencies fully understands the facts" about Vietnam,

Secretary of State William Rogers told the group at one meet­

ing, "and that your principal and senior officers, whenever appropriate and feasible in their public statements, should

take the opportunity to stress these essential facts.The

representative for the Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Robert O.

Beatty, distributed the material to his colleagues and stressed

the need for "support for the President's current strategy in

Vietnam at this very critical time in our involvement there."

236 See Appendix D, pp. 465-73. 229

Subordinates were "urged to speak out as you deem appro­ priate. "237

Under Herb Klein's guidance, most Executive Depart­ ments installed machines that would play a tape-recorded message over the telephone when the proper number was 233 dialed. These "actualities," as they are called, are widely used by radio newsmen over the country to make it appear as if they have conducted an actual interview with the government official involved. When the President's revenue sharing proposals were a hot item, for example, radio newsmen could dial a number at the Department of Housing and Urban

Development and record Secretary George Roraney's viewpoint on the subject. The Air Force had a tape set up to deliver a message on the tenth anniversary of the first firing of a minuteman• u. missile.• 239

A great deal of public relations work is carried on at the department and agency level by the federal government's estimated six thousand plus "public information officers."

Indeed, the public information operations of the Executive

237 See Appendix D, p. 465. 238 The Wall Street Journal. February 9, 1971, p. 16. 239 The Wall Street Journal. February 9, 1971, p. 16. 230

Branch have been estimated to cost $400 million annually-- over twice the amount spent for newsgathering by the ten largest U.S. newspapers, three major networks, and two major 240 wire services combined. The President has bemoaned what he claimed was unfair coverage of the Vietnam war, but he has never mentioned the fact that the Pentagon's information machine— solidly in his corner on this subject— works with an annual budget conservatively estimated at $3 0 m i l l i o n .

On November 6, 1970, Nixon issued a directive to all departments and agencies "to curtail sharply . . . plans for promoting the agency's programs and attempting to obtain sup- 242 port of special interest groups." The directive continued:

I want to make it clear that this is not an attempt to single out those who serve the Government well by informing the public and preserving the principle of freedom of information. Rather, it is directed at those who are, quite understandably, program advocates, and who, perhaps unknowingly, affront many of our citizens with public relations promotions, fancy publications and exhibits aimed at a limited audience, and similar extrav­ agances that are not in keeping with this Administration's often stated policy of frugal management of the public's resources.243

240 Barrett, The Alfred I. duPont-Columbia University Survey of Broadcast Journalism 1969-1970. p. 54. 241 Barrett, p. 54. 242 See Appendix E, pp. 476-77.

Appendix E, pp. 476-77. 231

There is considerable evidence that this directive and the drive to reduce public relations efforts were little more than a sleight of hand exercise. Over a year after

Nixon's directive was issued, for example, the National Jour­ nal conducted an in-depth investigation to determine the success of the cutback effort. The Journal's conclusions :

•The amount of funds and the number of personnel affected by the reduction are slight in relation to the government's total public-relations outlay— and smaller than the White House anticipated.

•The directive has had no impact on several agencies, which say that their public-relations activities do not fall within the White House definition of "self-serving."

•There is no real budgetary saving because, accord­ ing to 0MB [Office of Management and Budget] officials, the funds have been reprogrammed within each agency.

.in many instances, useful and worthwhile public- service programs have been eliminated or drastically trimmed.

•Since each agency is left to its own devices in interpreting the White House order and in specifying the means of implementing it, the 0MB is hard put to judge the credibility of the cutback claims.

•Even as Mr. Nixon was ordering a reduction in depart­ mental public relations, the White House was boosting its staff and efforts in the area.244

244 Dom Bonafede, "White House Report/Agencies Resist Nixon Directive To Cut Back Spending on Public Relations," National Journal. July 24, 1971, p. 1551. 232

Still, in 1972, the Office of Management and Budget reported to the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and

Government Information that the Nixon directive had resulted

in the elimination of 1,771 public information jobs and a

"savings" of $3 3 million. The chairman of the subcommittee,

William Moorhead of Pennsylvania, decided to probe deeper.

He reported: "It appears from our study that while claiming

'savings' of some $33 million over a period of 2^ years, the

Nixon Administration has contracted out {over a 3-year period) more than $77 million in such public relations activities to . ^ . ,,245 private companies.

245 See Appendix F, pp. 479-80. Among the firms that most benefited from the largess was none other than the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency (former employer of Nixon men Haldeman, Ziegler, Chapin, and at least half a dozen other high-level Administration officials) whose federal business increased from $160,000 in 1969 to $3.5 million in 1972. This writer personally determined these figures in an investigation, the results of which were published in a column by Jack Anderson, See The Washington Post, November 30, 1972, Sec. F, p. 9. Chapter 5

THREATS AND COMPLIMENTS: KEEPING THE PRESS GPP BALANCE

For the first few months of Nixon's first term, his plan to end run the press worked exceedingly well. The Pres­ ident maintained his personal peace of mind by avoiding reporters and reading only what his staff deemed worthy of his time. He took his message to the people while his aides fed newsmen a diet of harmless information.

During this relatively peaceful period, however,

Nixon and his advisors learned a lesson about the men who report news for a living: when they are consistently turned away and are denied reasonable requests for information, they generally tend to arch their backs and attack, digging out their stories despite the roadblocks. So, as the months passed, and the president's traditional "honeymoon" ended, the criticism about Nixon's isolation and his policies, especially his Vietnam strategy, began to intensify.

In the eyes of the Nixon men, no doubt, it was to be expected. In early December, 1968, well before Nixon took office, the conservative U.S. News & World Report published

233 234 an article entitled, "Will the press Be Out To 'Get' Nixon?"

The writer came to the conclusion that the "future relation­ ship" between Nixon and the news media "already is a worry to some of the President's staff, weeks in advance of the

White House changeover."^

This suggests the third major element of Nixon's

"grand strategy" for handling the press : publicly criticize the press to diminish its credibility.

THE VICE-PRESIDENT AND THE PRESS

The uneasy truce between the President and the press ended in the aftermath of a Nixon telecast on November 3,

1969. The President had requested air time to defend his actions in Southeast Asia, and he delivered an address that network newsmen, in their usual post-speech analysis, char­ acterized as "nothing really new" and "nothing of a substantial 2 nature." ABC, much to the chagrin of the White House men, brought out former ambassador and Democrat Averell Harriman, who rather gently asserted his opposition to the President's

^"Will the press Be Out To 'Get' Nixon?" U.S. News & World Report. December 2, 1968, p. 39. 2 James Keogh, President Nixon and the Press (New York; Funk & Wagnalls, 1972), pp. 171-85. 235

"Vietnamization" plan.^

The Nixon men were furious. When several of the

President's aides suggested retaliation, Nixon readily 4 acceded and called on Spiro Agnew.

Agnew, by this time, had gained a reputation for being the point man of the Administration's assault team. He had displayed a lust for battle and a talent for shrill rhetoric only a month before, on October 19, 1969, when he traveled to

New Orleans to attack anti-war demonstrators. "A spirit of masochism prevails," he said on that occasion, "encouraged by an effete corps of impudent snobs who characterized them- 5 selves as intellectuals."

According to at least one reporter who has excellent sources inside the White House, syndicated columnist Jack

Anderson, Agnew did not relish the thought of attacking the news media.^ Indeed, less than a year before, in January,

3Keogh, pp. 171-76. 4 The suggestion that the Vice-President's attack on the news media was premeditated and accomplished with the full knowledge and support of the President is not an idle charge. For supporting evidence, see 5 Keogh, p. 136.

^Statement by Jack Anderson, personal interview, February 19, 1973. 236

1969, Agnew had been warned by outgoing President Lyndon

Johnson to lay off the press. "Remeinber, " Johnson had cau- 7 tioned Agnew, "they come out everyday; you don't." The

Vice-President was wary of the press also because newsmen had only recently begun to treat him kindly. Having survived a campaign in which he was portrayed— certainly unfairly, in light of his abilities and intelligence— as a bumbling neo­ phyte, Agnew, in the early spring of 1969, had been praised by Newsweek, Time, Life, and the New York Times for the mod­ esty and tact with which he was handling the job of Vice- g President. So, when Nixon assigned him the task of leading the charge against the news media, Agnew gave his perfunctory assent but privately balked. He felt Nixon wanted to play the good Dr, Jekyll, Agnew told friends, and was setting him 9 up as the evil Mr. Hyde. But Agnew is a fierce loyalist over everything else, and he marched dutifully and stridently forth to carry out his mission.

With the national networks somewhat masochistically providing full prime-time coverage, Agnew mounted a podium

7Keogh, p. 133. g Keogh, pp. 135-3 6. 9 Statement by Jack Anderson, personal interview. February 19, 1973. 237 at Des Moines, Iowa, November 13, 1969, and lashed out fero­ ciously at television newsmen. President Nixon's November 3 speech, he charged, had been subjected to "instant analysis and querulous criticism,The reporters, he asserted, had

"made clear their sharp disapproval” of Nixon's address "by the expressions of their faces, the tone of their questions, and the sarcasm of their responses .... In the after- math of a presidential speech, he seemed to be arguing, the right of criticism and analysis ought perhaps be curtailed.

Every American has a right to disagree with the Pres­ ident of the United States, and to express publicly that disagreement.

But the President of the United States has a right to communicate directly with the people who elected him, and the people of this country have the right to make up their own minds and form their own opinions about a Presidential address without having the President's words and thoughts characterized through the prejudices of hostile critics before they can even be digested.12

This, it appears, was the nub of the issue. News commentators were interfering with Nixon's control over his message— explaining it to people, putting it in context, comparing it to what had gone before.

^^Keogh, p. 191.

^^Keogh, p. 192.

^^Keogh, p. 192. 238

Agnew ridiculed the "gaggle of commentators" and

"tiny and closed fraternity of privileged" newsmen who worked in New York City and Washington, D.C, and who were talking

"constantly to one another, thereby providing artificial 13 reinforcement to their shared viewpoints." He disavowed any notion that he was calling for government censorship of network news shows. But he pointedly noted that television stations enjoyed "a monopoly sanctioned and licensed by gov­ ernment" and in the very next sentence suggested that "per­ haps it is time that the networks were made more responsive to the views of the nation and more responsible to the people „14 they serve."

Agnew went to Montgomery, Alabama, where, one week after his Des Moines appearance, he assured newspapers they were not forgotten. The American people "should be made aware," he said, "of the trend toward the monopolization of the great public information vehicles and the concen­ tration of more and more power in fewer and fewer hands."

There was one such conglomerate, Agnew allowed, right in

33Keogh, pp. 192-95.

^^Keogh, p. 195.

^^Keogh, p. 200. 239

Washington ;

. . . A single company, in the Nation's Capital holds control of the largest newspaper in Washington, D.C., and one of the four major television stations, and an all-news radio station, and one of the three major national news magazines— all grinding out the same edi­ torial line— and this is not a subject that you have seen debated on the editorial pages of the Washington Post or the New York T i m e s . i 8

Agnew moved on to the New York Times, citing instances 17 of what he felt were poor editorial judgment. He finished with a thundering quote from William Lloyd Garrison; "I am

in earnest. I will not equivocate. I will not excuse. I 18 will not retreat a single inch. And I will be heard." The

Alabama audience rose and lustily cheered the words, appar­

ently unaware that the Vice-president was quoting perhaps 19 the most eloquent abolitionist of the Civil War era.

, Following the Montgomery speech, Agnew let it be

known that he was done with press criticism. Wrote Luther

Huston in Editor & Publisher ;

According to Herb Thompson, the Vice President's

^^Keogh, pp. 200-201. italics in the original. 17 Keogh, p. 201. 18 Keogh, p. 204. 19 Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism (3d ed.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 206. 240

press secretary, Agnew feels that his speeches in Des Moines and Montgomery adequately called to public attention the practices and policies of newspapers and television which he regarded as failing to live up to the responsibilities of a free press.20

"The Vice president, according to Thompson," contin­ ued Huston's report, "does not regard his speeches as launch­ ing a crusade against the press, and he has no intention of 21 starting one." The press was therefore relegated to a back burner while Agnew moved on to "ideological eunuchs"

(politicians who supported demonstrators) and "tomentose exhibitionists" (long-haired demonstrators). He accused Sen­ ators who opposed Nixon's Supreme Court nominees as practic­

ing "learned idiocycampus demonstrators, he said, were 22 afflicted with "totalitarian ptomaine."

As the 1970 Congressional elections approached, Agnew was designated the Republican parade master. He stocked his wardrobe with two-vent, three-button Mark Sloman suits and wide ties. He was equipped with an Eastern Air Lines Boeing

727, which was dubbed "Executive II." A special White House

20 Luther A. Huston, "No More Press criticism Unless He Is provoked," Editor & publisher. November 29, 1969, p. 10. 21 Huston, p. 10. 22 Jules Witcover, "Spiro Agnew; The Word's the Thing," The progressive. XXIV (July, 1970), 14. 241 strategy teaiin was assigned, presidential counselor Bryce

Harlow was put in charge of the roadshow. White House researcher Martin Anderson was picked to provide much of the raw material for speeches; presidential speechwriters William

Satire and Patrick Buchanan were assigned to provide many of

the words.33

The Agnew roadshow took off to tour the nation, but not before the Vice-President sat down for a U.S. News &

World Report interview, in which he violated his promise to

stop kicking around the press. Columnists and commentators, he said, "won't tolerate a different point of view. . . .

One of their favorite tactics is ridicule. They try to cast

their antagonist as a stupid buffoon, and they never stop try- 24 ing." The "great majority" of people, Agnew said, "want a

conservative and responsible government"; but, he continued;

. . . I pick up the Eastern "liberal" newspapers, and it's like going to a Greek tragedy— there's some­ thing wrong with the country on every page, and the United States isn't worth a damn, and the people in it are "insensitive" and all that. You get a completely distorted view.25

23 Hugh Sidey, "Here Comes the 'Aggernaut,'" Life, August 28, 1970, p. 2. 24 "Agnew Talks About 'Those Agnew Speeches,'" u.s. News & World Report, August 24, 1970, p. 34. 25 "Agnew Talks," p. 36. 242

For the most part, however, Agnew reserved what he

calls his "pithies and pungents" for demonstrators and

"intellectuals" and avoided direct confrontation with the 2 6 news media. On February 23, 1971, however, the CBS network b oadcast a documentary called "The Selling of the pentagon," which revealed the enormity of the Defense Department's

effort, in the words of one critic, to "glamorize combat and

maintain among the civiliam population a pervasive sense of 27 danger that can find relief only in a military solution. "

The documentary disclosed, among other things, that the Pen­

tagon's annual public relations budget was probably close to

$200 million, that it still used outdated propaganda films

of the Cold War, that millions are spent to stage tours and

"firepower demonstration" for "VIP's," that a team of lectur­

ing Colonels traveled around the nation delving into the for­

bidden foreign affairs aspects of the Vietnam war, and much 28 more. CBS made some relatively minor but lamentable errors

in editing, and this provided critics with ammunition for a

3^"Agnew's pungent Quotient," Time, January 29, 1970, p. 12. 27 Robert Lewis Shayon, "Propaganda Deflation," Satur­ day Review. March 20, 1971, p. 40. 28 "TV V. the Pentagon," Time, April 5, 1971, p. 46. 243 29 sustained attack on the program and the network.

Agnew's contribution to the assault on CBS came in

Boston, on March 18, in a speech before the Republican

Middlesex Club. While several thousand anti-war demonstra­ tors hooted in the streets outside the Sheraton-Boston Hotel, where he spoke, Agnew tore into "The Selling of the Penta­ gon" with the charge that it was "a subtle but vicious broadside against the nation's defense establishment."^^ It was, Agnew fumed, a perfect example of "the widening credi­ bility gap which has simply been reported, not created, by 31 this . . . Vice president."

Agnew avoided any specific criticism of "The Selling of the Pentagon," but instead launched into an attack on previous documentaries aired by CBS :

Considering the serious charges leveled recently by the CBS television news organization against the public affairs activities of the Department of Defense, the matter of the network's own record in the field of documentary-making can no longer be brushed under the rug of national media indifference.32

29 "TV V . the Pentagon," p . 46.

^^The Washington Post. March 19, 1971, Sec. A, p. 2. 31 The Washington Post, March 19, 1971, Sec. A, p. 2. 32 Associated Press dispatch. The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star, March 19, 1971. 244

He then criticized "Project Nassau," a documentary of an aborted Haitian invasion which was never aired, Agnew also claimed CBS had engaged in deceptive practices in the filming of a 1968 documentary, "Hunger in America." The net­ work, said the Vice-President, had shown a baby to be dying of malnutrition when in fact it was actually expiring from meningitis. He quoted from an FCC report which allegedly 33 chastized CBS for its duplicity.

But Agnew failed to mention other parts of the FCC order. "Hunger in America," the FCC had reported, was a laudable performance. The report, published in October, 1969, stated in part ;

We commend CBS for undertaking this documentary on one of the tragic problems of today . . . . I n this democracy, no government agency can authenticate the news or should try to do so. We will therefore eschew the censor's role, including efforts to establish news distortion in situations where government intervention would constitute a worse danger than the possible rig­ ging itself. . . . We believe that no further action is warranted.34

Furthermore, Agnew had not bothered to obtain CBS's

side of the story. "When we filmed the baby, " said peter

Davis, a producer-writer, "hospital authorities told us it

33 The Washington Post, March 28, 1971, Sec. B, p. 4. 34 The Washington Post, March 28, 1971, Sec. B, p. 4. 245 35 was dying of pre- and post-natal malnutrition." Then CBS president Prank Stanton pointedly noted that President Nixon himself had praised "Hunger in America" when it was aired.

The CBS network answered the chorus of criticism with a re-broadcast of "The Selling of the Pentagon." This time, the network also aired a series of "rebuttals" by its critics, including Agnew. The Vice-President, however, demanded the privilege of editing his remarks. CBS refused, and Agnew told a "regional" press conference in St. Louis that he was

"totally dissatisfied" with the network's latest performance.

"It's rather unusual to give you the right of rebuttal," he said, "and not allow you to decide what you’re going to say 37 in rebuttal." He also had some censorious words for News­ week . which had published a report that Agnew was seeking "a new image." That, said the Vice-president, was "a sloppy piece 38 of Journalism."

with his momentum back, Agnew moved on to Phoenix where, before the National Young Republican Federation on

3 5 "An Arrow in the Air," Newsweek, March 29, 1971, p. 111. ^^"An Arrow in the Air," p. 111. 37 The Washington Post, March 25, 1971, Sec. A, p. 3. 38 The Washington Post, March 25, 1971, Sec. A, p. 3. 246

June 26, he lambasted the publication of the "Pentagon

Papers." This act, he said, was "a cheap, common fencing 39 operation" perpetrated by biased newsmen. He doubted,

Agnew said, that the American people believed the publication of the classified history of the Vietnam war deserved First

Amendment protection :

The same people who are putting this most distorted viewpoint of American participation in the South Viet­ namese war before the American people, the same people who rush to expose those portions of secret documents that support their point of view— even though they may just be contingency plans that were drawn up to take care of events that never happen— these are the same people who are firmly controlling American opinion through a biased and slanted and an oversighted view­ point of what is taking place around the world.

I believe the papers that made those exposes and the commentary of some of the networks in support of these revelations, you'll get the opinion right off the bat that the American people are solidly behind this thing they call freedom of the press.

The Agnew barrage continued until the final months of the 1972 campaign. His own speeches were hardly inflam­ matory, he told the International Platform Association on

August 1, 1972, when compared to the heated words he read in newspapers. "The worst rhetoric I've read," he said.

39 The Washington Post, June 27, 1971, Sec. A, p. 14. 40 The Washington Post. June 27, 1971, Sec. A, p. 14. 247

"has been in some of the editorials I've read. They were 41 not exactly placid." He went on to give his own analysis of why newspapers are biased; they get their reporters and editors from the large universities, he said, which are 42 overwhelmingly liberal.

The arsenal of weapons used by the Vice-President to cow the press includes more than simple bombast, in some instances, he flatly bars newsmen from covering his appear­ ances; in other cases, he dictates who may cover him and who may not. In June, 1970, he visited Miami and granted an exclusive interview to reporters and editors of the Miami

Herald. He was asked if he planned to make himself available to other publications. His reply;

. . . I'm going to select a few newspapers where I think we are not so far apart in viewpoint as it seems we've become through a lack of communication, and try to do this kind of interview.^3

When Agnew went to St, Louis in March, 1971, to cen­ sure CBS for airing "The Selling of the pentagon," he pulled a few tricks from the Nixon bag to control the format of his

41 The Washington Post. August 8, 1972, Sec. A, p. 8. 42 The Washington Post. August 8, 1972, Sec. A, p. 8. 43 "Agnew Tries Direct Talks with Editors," Editor & Publisher, June 13, 1970, p. 14. 248 appearance. press credentials to cover the "regional" press conference were handed out by the publisher of the conserva­ tive St. Louis Globe-Democrat. As a result, reporters from the liberal St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Globe-Democrat * s chief rival, were denied seats at the televised affair. After

a heated debate, newsmen who had been ostracized were allowed

to sit around the walls of the room, while the annointed sat

at a table with the Vice-President. Questions were permitted

only from the eleven reporters around the table. Agnew's

press secretary, Victor Gold, instructed the outcasts along

the wall that they could only report on the event, not partic­

ipate in it. The next day, the approved Globe-Democrat

reported that "it was a no-holds barred meeting with newsmen.

No restrictions were imposed by Agnew on what type of questions 44 could be asked." There was no mention of the restrictions

on who could ask the questions. The ultimate irony was the

fact that Agnew spent half the press conference condemning the 45 news media— at the same time he was managing the news.

On one occasion in May, 1972, Agnew took his hatred

44 "Agnew; Managing the News," Columbia Journalism Review, X (March-April, 1972), 38. 45 "Agnew; Managing the News," p. 38. 249

for the news media abroad with him. The incident was reported by Newsweek as follows;

. . . When the U.S. ambassador to Tokyo stages embassy receptions for distinguished visitors from state­ side, representatives of the major American news media are almost always invited. But that definitely was not the case at the function held last week for Vice Presi­ dent Agnew. According to one high-ranking embassy source, Agnew steadfastly turned aside all official attempts to intercede for American journalists, insisting that he did not care to meet a single one. Consequently, none was invited.46

In December, 1972, Agnew went to Arizona to speak to

Republican governors gathered at a resort hotel in Scotts­

dale. He dined with the governors on Sunday night at the

house of Republican Senator Barry Goldwater, and breakfasted

with the state officials the following morning. Newsmen were

explicitly barred from both events, nor would Agnew deign to

answer any questions, despite the fact that he had discussed 47 government business with the state leaders.

Agnew's efforts to manipulate his press coverage

reached an all-time low when he consented to an interview

with a reporter for The Eagle, student newspaper of the

46 The periscope, "Spiro vs. the Media in Japan," Newsweek, May 29, 1972, p. 15. 47 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. December 5, 1972, Sec. A, p. 9. 250

American University in Washington, D.G. Two years after the

initial request, Agnew finally agreed to be interviewed in

September, 1972. Among the restrictions imposed by press

secretary Gold was that someone with a viewpoint similar to

the Vice-President's be present. Gold's reasoning: "We don't 48 want any confrontations." Two members of the Washington

College News Service were, therefore, invited to sit in; the

Washington College News Service, according to the Eagle

reporter, is the "youth division of the Republican National 49 Committee." Gold enjoined the national press corps from

attending, but he did allow the presence of a reporter from

the government's propaganda arm, the United States Information

Agency. When the wire services carried notice of the impend­

ing interview. Gold heatedly accused the college journalists

of leaking the information; later, it was discovered that a

member of Gold’s own staff gave out the information. The irre­

pressible Gold then charged that the press was "unreasonable

and irrational" for printing it. When the interview finally

got under way, wrote the Eagle reporter, "the representatives

48 The Eagle [Student newspaper of the American Uni­ versity, Washington, D.C.], September 15, 1972, p. 6. 49 The Eagle, p. 6. 50 The Eagle, p. 6. 251 of the WCNS largely ignored the major issues in the United

States today to ask time consuming questions dealing from permisiveness in today’s society to quotas.Agnew, of course, swung from the heels at the softballs tossed up by 52 his young party workers and knocked them out of the park.

If, as has often been said, Spiro Agnew is "Nixon's

Nixon," then it can also be said that Victor Gold was

"Agnew's Agnew." Indeed, when Mr. Gold offered his per­ sonal opinions, his criticism of the news media was often more harshly expressed than the Vice-President's, In April,

1972, for example, Agnew made a speech about academic free­ dom in which he charged that reference works were being politicized. A weekly trade publication in the communica­ tions industry interviewed a number of publishers and his­ torians and published their comments, most of which refuted

Agnew's allegations. When Gold heard what the historians had said, he fumed, "Who the hell are they? And who the hell are 53 they to criticize the Vice President?"

^^The Eagle, p. 6. 52 The Eagle, p. 6. 53 Passing Comment, "Extra Effort," Columbia Journal­ ism Review. X (July-August, 1972), 3. 252

Agnew has been criticized for his intimate asso­ ciation with Prank Sinatra, the singer who, allegedly, is

friendly with underworld figures. On one occasion, when

Sinatra flew to Washington to emcee a State Department dinner hosted by Agnew, Gold was asked about the potential embar­ rassment to the Vice-President. The press secretary bristled.

"If it was the Berrigans, it would be all right, wouldn't it?" he growled. "If this were a benefit in Southampton for the

Berrigans, with Ethel tossing it, that would be just fine, wouldn't it?" Sinatra, he said, was innocent until proven

guilty. "Show me a court record, show me an indictment, a

conviction, " Gold demanded, "anything but a lot of crap in ,.54 the papers."

Gold resigned his job after the 1972 election to write

a book about the Washington press corps. "When reporters

wrote critically about the Vice President," said Gold, "they

always said they were calling it as they saw it. I hope 55 they'll extend the same privilege to me."

The avowed aim of the Agnew onslaught was to let the

press know what the "silent majority" thought about the news

54 Newsmakers, Newsweek, March 6, 1972, p. 54. 55 The Washington Post, January 9, 1973, Sec. A, p. 4. 253 they were getting. And it is apparently true that the Vice- president struck a vein of antipathy for the news media among reasonable, middle class Americans. An ABC poll conducted shortly after the Des Moines speech showed that of 559 adults interviewed, fifty-one percent were substantially in agree­ ment with Agnew, thirty-three percent disagreed, and sixteen percent didn't know or had no opinion.

However, the Alfred I. duPont-Columbia University

Survey of Broadcast Journalism for 1969-1970 reported that :

. . . Despite this weight in favor of Agnew [in the ABC poll]j only one quarter felt that the news media had been unfair to the administration, while three-fifths felt they had not been unfair and should not ease up. Sixty-seven percent felt they wanted commentators to continue their prompt analysis and comment after presi­ dential speeches.57

The poll results seem to reflect, therefore, a general dissatisfaction with the news media but refute Agnew's alle­ gation that the "silent majority" feels the press is biased against Nixon. The question that begs answering, then, is from what element of the population did the tremendous support for Agnew's arguments come? Who wrote the thousands of

Marvin Barrett, ed., The Alfred I. duPont-Columbia University Survey of Broadcast Journalism 1969-1970 (New York; Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 1970), p. 33. 57 Barrett, p. 33. Italics in the original. 254 supporting letters which the White House claims to have received?

Much of the correspondence sent to newsmen was clearly

"hate mail." The Columbia University School of Journalism analyzed some of the letters received by one network and found that a full quarter of the mail accused the broadcasters of communist affiliation or sympathy. Other letters were racist and anti-semitic in tone; reported the Survey of Broad­ cast Journalism:

. . . Eleven per cent were anti-Semitic (". . .he [Agnew] got his pound of flesh off you Jew boy," "V.P, Agnew expressed my views 100 per cent. We are tired of the news being presented to us from a Jewish point of view. Replace some of the Jewish reporters with good Americans.") Ten per cent were anti-black ("We are tired of the Niggers having all the time they want. I under­ stand you have a Nigger newsman. You liberals in the East just can't be trusted with the news." "You damn Jews have been getting away with a lot of crap, and it took the Vice President to stop it. . . . All we see are Niggers and Jews.")

Of the mail analyzed, 15 per cent contained some sort of threat, ranging from writing to the FCC (the FCC's mail doubled in November) to phrases like "come down here and I'll blow your guts out," or "maybe you need a bomb­ ing . "58

Norman Isaacs, then executive editor of the Louis­ ville [Kentucky] Courier-Journal and the Louisville Times.

58 Barrett, p. 33. Italics in the original. 255 publicly accused the Nixon Administration of intimidation of the press and was inundated, he said, with "vicious" and

"venomous" letters about the "Jew-owned and Jew-dominated news media.'..59

John Osborne of the New Republic magazine wrote that

Agnew's criticisms resulted in an "extraordinary volume" of

"expressions of hates and antipathies . . , . The reporter told of one Washington, D.C., station "that had dared to interview a militant black professor in California [and] was denounced for 'throwing shit in the face of us Caucasians’ by a letter writer who cited Agnew in support of his view.

CBS newsman Mike Wallace learned what sort of insen­ sitive audience Agnew was playing to when he conducted a grim interview with one of the soldiers who had taken part in the

My Lai massacre. Here is how he explained it in a November,

1969, broadcast of the CBS show "60 Minutes":

Last night on the "CBS Evening News" I interviewed a young man who fought in Vietnam. He told me he had taken part in the alleged slaughter at Song My. He said

59 "Isaacs : Defense of Press Brings Sack of 'Sick Mail,'" Editor & Publisher. November 29, 1969, p. 9.

^^John Osborne, The Second Year of the Nixon Watch (New York : Liveright, 1971), pp. 28-29.

^^Osborne, p. 29, 256

he had shot old men, women, children, and babies in cold blood. Since that broadcast we've received hun­ dreds of messages about it. The overwhelming majority condemn CBS News for putting the interview on the air.

Let me read from a telegram, typical of many that we received today; "Mike Wallace's performance this evening with the soldier who killed Vietnamese civilians on orders, polarized me to Agnew's position almost instantaneously.

"Either Wallace is a massively unsophisticated reporter or is simply pimping for our anti-war feelings to his own purposes. Perhaps what Agnew means by 'effete Eastern snobs' is the contempt Wallace shows for the public and its sensitivities."52

It is the opinion of many spokesmen for liberal views that Vice-President Agnew deliberately set about to agitate that element of American society which is predisposed to

antipathy for the press. It has long been known, these spokes­ men feel, that a reservoir of resentment against the press was waiting to be tapped by someone of sufficient stature.

"For many years," Fred Fowledge, investigator for the American

Civil Liberties Union, has written, "the press has been serv­

ing at home and abroad as the messenger who delivers the bad news, and all that was needed was a public figure such as

Agnew to cultivate and organize the public around a movement

to slay the messenger. Powledge continued:

^^Barrett, "Survey," p. 38. 63 Fred Powledge, The Engineering of Restraint, The 257

Political figures have known all this for years. They knew, as did the vice president, that the press (both broadcast and printed media) is not the strong monolith that it might appear, but rather a delicate and vulnerable institution, and that a little attack can go a long way, especially in times of civil chaos and national guilt over foreign affairs.54

Still the question remains: Did Agnew purposefully seek to agitate the lunatic fringe against the news media?

In his book. President Nixon and the press. James Keogh related a well-known incident that occurred at the 1964 Repub­ lican convention in San Francisco's Cow Palace. Former Pres­ ident Eisenhower read a prepared speech, including a thought he had penned in at the last moment. "Let us particularly scorn the devisive efforts of those outside the family, " said

Ike, "including sensation-seeking columnists and commenta­ tors . . . . " The Cow Palace crowd, most of them Goldwater delegates and supporters, gave a rear and rose in unison to shake their fists and scream obscenities at the television cameras and press booths.- u ^ 1 - 55

Thus, wrote Keogh, "Vice President Agnew did not invent or discover an issue; he simply articulated what a

Administration and the press (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1971), p. 9, 64 Powledge, p. 9.

^^Keogh, president Nixon and the Press, p. 138. 258 great many people felt. That was to a very great degree what the Administration wanted done.

The President and his team, perhaps, did not care who they stirred up; indeed, they were aware that many of those who would respond to Agnew's assault on the press would be those who had clustered around Goldwater in 1954— the same people who castigated reporters for "writing down what

Mr. Goldwater was saying,

There is evidence, then, to suggest that the campaign of public criticism of the press was planned and undertaken with at least the tacit approval of the President and his

closest advisors. In the months following Agnew's broadsides, this was not known to be the case. Newsmen, communications executives, and media experts in general debated the possi­ bility that Agnew was speaking for himself and not for the

Administration. Indeed, the possibility remains even today

that while Nixon may have supported Agnew, the President did not specificially instruct the Vice-President to attack the

press nor give him enthusiastic encouragement.

The evidence suggests, however, that this was not

^^Keogh, pp. 138-39. Italics not in the original.

Harrison Salisbury, "Print Journalism," Playboy. XIX (January, 1972), 255. 259 the case. In all likelihood, intimidation was long con­ sidered a major element of the grand strategy to manipulate the news media— an element that would be used at the most propitious moment.

In fact, Nixon's closest associates were toying with the idea of intimidation during the 1968 campaign, Frank

Shakespeare— the former CBS executive who was one of Nixon's

"big three" media advisors and later became the director of the United States Information Agency— ruminated about how he would like to confront the NBC network. Joe McGinniss quoted

Shakespeare as saying that;

"... Here's what I thought I'd do. I thought I 'd go to Walter Scott, the NBC board chairman— this would be in private, of course, just the two of us in his office— and say, 'Here are the instances. Here are the instances where we feel you've been guilty of bias in your coverage of Nixon. We are going to monitor every minute of your broadcast news, and if this kind of bias continues, and if we are elected, then you just might find yourself in Washington next year answering a few questions. And you just might find yourself having a little trouble getting some of your licenses renewed.'"

During the last week of the 1968 campaign, the New

York Times accused candidate Agnew of benefitting from land

deals with wealthy speculators while he was Governor of

^^Joe McGinniss, The Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Trident press, 1969), p. 60. 260

Maryland. The Times also said Agnew had not told the truth about the inheritance of some bank stock.

Agnew was furious, and, in retrospect, it does appear the Times did not get all its facts straight. The "Governor," as he was then called by the Nixon men, was wondering what to do about the editorial attack when a teletype message was delivered to Agnew's campaign manager, George White. It was from the presidential campaign party, and it was signed by

Patrick Buchanan. It read:

You might score some real yardage down in the South with a good blast at the New York Times. Down there they are the essence of the New York, ultra-liberal, left-wing establishment press that has beaten on the South for years. Suggestions.

1) The Governor tear hell out of them for deliberate and vicious libel, demand an apology, ask if they are "man enough to give it."

2) The Governor then say that the Times is squealing because RN tore hell out of them. That the Times is will­ ing to play low-level dirty politics; but they belly-ache when they have to pay the price. Then use Truman 's quote. "If the editorial board of the New York Times can't stand the heat, maybe they ought to get out of the kitchen." They can dish it out; but they can't take it.

3 ) The Governor could needle hell out of them by say­ ing after his blast and demand for apology that "Actually those fellows who write editorials for the Times aren't so bad. They just put their foot in their mouth a little too often."59

^^See Appendix G, pp. 482. 261

Agnew did strike back, with vengeance. He issued a statement, citing the errors made by the Times. Nixon backed him up in a heated statement on "Face the Nation." The

Nixon-Agnew campaign Committee printed a full-page ad in the

New York Times refuting the newspaper's charges. But Nixon and Agnew were elected a few days later, and the issue was rendered meaningless— except for two things. First, Spiro

Agnew was convinced the press was inherently unfair; the

Times affair was, in the words of one campaign aide, "the 70 straw that broke Agnew’s patience." Second, the man who

first advised him to "tear hell" out of the Times so that he

"might score some real yardage down in the South" was Patrick

Buchanan— the presidential speechwriter who penned Agnew's

infamous Des Moines speech, the address that kicked off the 71 Vice-president's anti-press campaign.

In September, 1969, two months before Agnew's Des

Moines appearance, Frank Shakespeare stood before the annual convention of the Radio Television News Directors Association

in Detroit and told the broadcasters they ought to be adding

70 Jack Anderson, "Did Times Editorial Light Spiro's Fire?" The Miami Herald, September 14, 1972, p. 23. 71 Julius Duscha, "The White House Watch Over TV and the Press," The New York Times Magazine, August 20, 1972, p. 9 262 a little right-wing ballast to their liberal ship. ABC News president Elmer Lower was there, and he filed this report :

He [Shakespeare] told us that in his view "tele­ vision news, as it exists in this country today, is rather clearly liberally oriented," Next he told us that it was impossible for these "liberals" to be fair to the conservative point of view.

Then he said ; "If out of 50 or 100 men you hire— purely on the basis of ability— you're going to end up with a tremendous number on one side of the ideological fence rather than the other, then . . , you're going to end up in the box." Frank Shakespeare then suggested we might consider hiring men for their ideology.

I assumed then [after Agnew's November 13 speech] that, although Frank Shakespeare said he had been speak­ ing in Detroit as a private citizen, he had been express­ ing Administration f e e l i n g s .72

Thus it is clear that the Nixon men had long con­ sidered bullying the news media to be a legitimate weapon in their battle to obtain more favorable coverage. The first

Agnew assault, moreover, was no sudden thunderbolt to the

Nixon men; it was a well-planned and well-considered attack involving many Administration figures.

Reporter Dom Bonafede, for example, interviewed Herb

Klein and reported that;

72 Elmer C. Lower, "Fairness and Balance in Television Reporting," The Quill. LVIII (February, 1970), 12. Italics in the original. 263

On the morning of the day Agnew criticized the networks, Klein in an interview with me voiced resentments extraordinarily similar to those expressed by the Vice President. He took a crack at the commen­ tators who resort to "unfair comments," maintaining that "they use their commentary like a rebuttal." As an example, he, like Agnew, cited the televised commen­ tary after Nixon's November 3 speech on Vietnam, add­ ing, "I don't feel this fulfills the primary purpose of providing background."

. . . Klein [also] singled out The New York Times and The Washington Post for what he described as their "usually negative" attitude toward the President. These were the same two newspapers mentioned by Agnew in his second attack on the media. Such consistency does not happen by chance in Washington ; it indicates a coordi­ nated assault.73

But Klein hinted at what was coming even earlier than his interview with Bonafede. On a National Education Tele­ vision show, taped two days before Agnew's Des Moines attack,

Klein expressed the same thoughts Agnew would later claim to be his own. Said Klein;

One of the things that I think is an interesting point right now is that after his [Nixon's] broadcast on Vietnam, three networks came on and made comment immediately thereafter. The public response to this was very negative, and the interesting thing has been to look through the wires which have come in from the silent Americans expressing this overwhelming wave of support which has come forth for the President— to find intermixed in those, criticisms of some of the commentary

73 Dom Bonafede, "Commissar of Credibility," The Nation, April 6, 1970, p. 395. 264

which perhaps came on too quickly. . . . Credibility isn't just the problem of the government. I think it is a problem with the media as well.74

After Agnew's first speech, the outline of a care­ fully orchestrated scheme of manipulation began to take shape. It was soon learned that Klein's aides had called local broadcasters around the country the day of the Presi­ dent ' s Vietnam speech and asked what editorial comment was planned.FCC chairman Dean Burch, appointed just two weeks before Agnew's virtuoso performance at Des Moines, also called the networks and demanded transcripts of the commen­ taries that had followed Nixon's November 3 speech. Such a move was unprecedented, and the network executives were understandably upset. Then Dan Rather of CBS reported other calls; Herb Klein and Ronald Ziegler had asked broadcasters to supply them with details of commentaries they made after future presidential speeches. And Paul O'Neil, a member of the Subversive Activities Control Board, made inquiries about plans for editorial responses to the Administration's

74 Statement by Herbert Klein on National Education Television Network program, "The President's Men," November 13, 1969. The program was taped on November 11, 1969. 75 Jules Witcover, "The Two Hats of Herb Klein," Colum­ bia Journalism Review, IX (Spring, 1970), 30. 265

activities. O'Neil's wife made calls as well.75 Three days

after Agnew's initial speech, furthermore, Herb Klein went on

the CBS program "Face the Nation" and told an astonished

panel of reporters that if the news media did not take steps

to correct its shortcomings "you do invite the government to 77 come i n ."

Said Dr. Frank Stanton, then president of CBS;

Because a federally licensed medium is involved no more serious episode has occurred in government-press relationships since the dark days in the fumbling infancy of this Republic when the ill-fated Alien and Sedition Acts forbade criticism of the government and its poli­ cies on pain of exile or imprisonment.78

Early in 1970, Democratic Senator Harold Hughes of

Iowa offered his own description of what was occurring between

Nixon and the press. "First you pistol-whip the mass media," he said, "and then you commandeer it for political pur- 79 poses."

OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AND THE PRESS

The final three years of Nixon's first term and the

Barrett, "Survey," pp. 36-37. 77 Bonafede, "Commissar of Credibility," p. 3 95. 78 Barrett, p. 37. 79 Barrett, p. 45. 266

first months of his second saw the unwritten rules of the government-versus-media game change with an unprecedented

attack on the news media.

The Columbia Journalism Review commented editorially

that "the observer draws back from the notion of a press-

suppression plan in view of the sheer lack of pattern, the 80 clumsiness and pettiness" of the various incidents.

Such an interpretation, however, overlooks the point

that a broad attack on the news media does not have to be

patterned. However haphazard the intimidation campaign may

appear to be, it fits very well into the larger scheme: keep

the press ignorant of meaningful information, take the mes­

sage directly to the people, reduce press interference with

that message through relentless intimidation. The apparent

purpose of attacking the news media, therefore, is to keep

them out of the way. A secondary goal would be to get news­

men to tell the Nixon story the way Nixon wants it told. A

campaign of intimidation, however amorphous it is or may

appear to be, creates a general "chill" in the press. It

keeps the press off balance and skittish; newsmen have to

spend much of their time watching for the next ambush.

80 Passing Comment, "Are the Rules Changing?" Colum­ bia Journalism Review. X (January-February, 1972), 2. 267

Indeed, if there is a plan of press suppression, it appears to be this : grasp every opportunity to confront and harrass the news media. It makes little difference, the

Nixon men seem to be reasoning, whether their battles with the press result in any tangible achievement other than keep­

ing newsmen off balance; the Administration's purposes are

served by the confrontation act itself. Thus the cardinal rule ; Attack, keep up the pressure, never relent. The Nixon men apparently feel that newsmen have never been seriously

challenged before, and they can be worn down drip by drip.

The man most responsible for maintaining the hectic

tempo of the Administration ' s scattershot attacks on the press appears to be Patrick J. Buchanan, the presidential

speechwriter who put together the words Spiro Agnew uttered on that memorable November night in 1969. Buchanan, of

course, does not make the press policy. This, as previously

shown, comes from the president himself, and it is enthusi­

astically implemented by the chief of staff, H. R. Hal deman.

But of all the president's close advisors, it is Buchanan,

apparently, who is most deeply committed to reducing the

press to a transmission belt for presidential messages.

Indeed, Julius Duscha has flatly charged the thirty-three-

year-old aide with "orchestrating the Administration's 268 81 unprecedented attack on the press."

Duscha has quoted Buchanan as saying that ;

My primary concern is that the President have the right of untrammeled communications with the American people. When that communication is completed^ what he has had to say should not be immediately torn apart or broken down even before the American people have had a chance to make their own judgment about what he said.82

If the networks continue what Buchanan sees as their biased reporting^ he once said on a public television inter­ view, "you're going to find something done in the area of 83 antitrust action. ..." He disdains the concept of the press as an adversary of public officials. "The people have a right to be informed," he told Duscha, "and the President has a duty to inform them, but the idea of the press playing 84 the role of the loyal opposition is a lot of malarky."

The idea that the network news departments should hire reporters for their political views appears to be one that had been discussed at some length in the Nixon circle of

advisors. For, like Frank Shakespeare, Buchanan wants more

81 Duscha, "The White House Watch," p. 9. 82 Duscha, p. 9. 8 3 Duscha, p. 92. 84 Duscha, p. 92. 269 right-wing television newsmen :

Just as the networks have made a fairly successful effort in promoting blacks into positions of reporting news to give that particular understanding, and just as they are beginning to promote women to positions of influence, so perhaps it is time that they find some people who have a conservative or Republican orientation and promote them.85

Buchanan oversees the preparation of the President's daily news summary and has hired five assistants to put it together. The continual monitoring which the job requires enables Buchanan to keep a close watch over what the press is

doing. He has even purchased an expensive machine to record television news shows for later playback.

The press is also monitored by the "Klein Shop."

Klein himself used to watch the three networks simultaneously

on a remote control, three-set console he kept in his office.

During the Johnson years, it adorned the Oval Office. Klein

fell heir to it when Nixon had it moved out of his office on 87 Inauguration Day, 1969. Klein's aides also monitor wire ser- vice 4tickers..- 1 8 8

8 5 Duscha, p. 93. 86 Duschaj p. 96. 87 The Washington Post, June 8, 1969, Sec. A, p. 11. 88 The Washington Post, June 8, 1969, Sec. A, p. 11. 270

The constant White House watch over the news media often results in immediate demands for changes or corrections.

In 1971, a Klein aide who specialized in television, Al

Snyder, monitored Dick Cavett's late night talk show on ABC and saw three guests speak in opposition to the Super Sonic

Transport. Two days before the SST vote in the Senate,

Snyder called Cavett's executive producer, John Gilroy, and

"suggested" they air the other side of the controversy by allowing the appearance of William Magruder, the Administra­ tion's "program manager" for the SST. Gilroy asked if he could put SST opponent Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin on the same show to add a little balance, Snyder thought "it would be fairer" if Magruder went on alone. ABC relented, and Cavett sat tight-lipped throughout the Administration's

SST propaganda pitch. "Hi," said Cavett as he greeted his audience the following evening. "My name is Dick Cavett— but we will make equal time available to those who think it is not.

Later Snyder denied he had put the squeeze on the network. There was "never any intention to pressure anyone,"

89 "Cavett's complaint," Newsweek, April 5, 1971, p. 59. 271 he said. "As far as I know, no one else from the White 90 House and no one from the PCC" had contacted ABC.

Until the Cavett episode, Snyder maintained he was the Administration's television "ombudsman"— the public relations liaison with the networks. He did not "advise" the president on the use of television, he told this investi­ gator in an interview. He did not maintain a "watch" over the networks. He was involved in "setting up interviews" and "coordinating" newsmens' requests, he said. "Broad­ casters have never had this kind of service before," Snyder said. "They need help in order to do a better job of tell- 91 ing the story of this Administration."

"A better job," it appears, is an euphemism for "a favorable job"; any other treatment means a newsman is biased.

To "help" reporters do a better job, the Nixon men engage in a wide range of activities, ranging from outright censorship, to "gag rules" for executive employees.

In 1971, for example. Attorney General John Mitchell tightened his department's guidelines on contacts with the

90 United Press International dispatch. The Washing­ ton Post. March 23, 1971. 91 Statement by Al Snyder, personal interview, March 9, 1971. 272 press by forbidding his subordinates from discussing with reporters "most aspects" of civil cases. He also published an order in the Federal Register revising the guidelines on discussion of criminal cases. The news ban, Mitchell wrote, begins "from the time a person is the subject of a criminal investigation." Justice Department personnel were pre­ viously forbidden to talk about criminal cases only from the 92 time a person was indicted or arrested.

A number of federal agencies, including the U.S.

Postal Service, National Science Foundation, and Public

Health Service, warned their employees in 1971 not to asso­ ciate with newsmen. At a public Health Service hospital in

Baltimore, the director warned his underlings in writing to avoid "press contacts" and even "casual social contacts with the press." The penalty for violating his edict was severe :

"You are reminded that failure to obey this directive can lead to court-martial for commissioned officers and discharge 93 for Civil Service employees." The reason for the order, it was learned, was to prevent the public and Congress from

92 The Record, "Mitchell Tightens Press Guidelines," The Quill, LX (January, 1972), 6. 93 Mike Causey, "Clam-Up Order Affects Some 800,000," The Washington Post. March 20, 1971, Sec. B, p. 5. 273

learning anything about the Administration's plans to close

a number of Public Health Service hospitals across the coun-

At the same time, in early 1971, that federal employ­

ees were being instructed to shun the press, the Bureau of

Labor Statistics of the Labor Department was ordered to cease

providing its customary interpretive briefings for reporters.

For twenty years, the ELS statisticians held the briefings to

analyze for newsmen their complicated price and employment

figures. During the first few months of 1971, however, the

statisticians' opinions differed with the White House's. So

Labor Secretary James Hodgson solved the public relations

problem by summarily eliminating the briefings. A spokesman

stated that "no other department holds briefings like the

BLS has. This was a decision to put Labor parallel with 95 government practice generally." The Washington Evening

Star commented editorially that "the discontinuance of press 96 briefings" was "a silly exercise of news suppression. ..."

94 Causey, Sec. B, p. 5. 95 The Washington Post. March 20, 1971, Sec. A, p. 8. 96 Editorial, The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star, March 23, 1971, Sec. A, p. 16. 274

Despite the restrictions on the flow of information from the Administration to the press, insiders found ways of

"leaking" news out of their departments. To plug the "leaks," the White House installed several "plumbers"— men whose sole job was to track down those who fed stories to newsmen. The existence of the team of plumbers came to light during the

Washington Post's investigation of the "Watergate affair."

Two of the men involved in the "bugging" of the Democratic

National Committee headquarters at Washington's Watergate complex, E. Howard Hunt, Jr., and G. Gordon Liddy, were,

Ronald Ziegler finally admitted, members of the plumbing team, along with Egil (Bud) Krogh, who was an assistant to

John Ehrlichman, and David Young, a member of the National 97 Security Council staff. The men, said Ziegler, were assigned to investigate "serious leaks relating to national security affairs." One of the "leaks" they tried to plug were the secret papers, passed to columnist Jack Anderson, which dealt 98 with the 1972 Indo-Pakistan war.

Another tactic used by the Administration is the open

97 The Washington Post, December 13, 1972, Sec. A, p. 10. 98 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. December 23, 1972, Sec. A, p. 6. 275 attack. In the Spring of 1970, for example, H. R. Haldeman became tired of the charges that Nixon was isolated. At his old alma mater, the University of California at Los Angeles, he told a gathering of alumni that he was "completely con­ vinced that President Nixon is the most 'unisolated' Presi- 99 dent in recent times." News commentators who said other­ wise, proclaimed Haldeman, were indulging in an "orgy of doom crying.

Haldeman continued :

Cambodia and related events are on everyone's mind tonight, including those men who are hidden away some­ where in an elusive command headquarters that, search though we may, we haven't been able to find.

Yes, somewhere in the jungle labyrinth of Manhattan Island there is a secret nerve center where, every Sunday afternoon, an enormously powerful group of men gather to decide what the Eastern Establishment media line for the coming week will be. Most importantly, they decide on the password of the week.

A week or so ago it was "desperate gamble"— then last week, it was "crisis of leadership." Now they've discovered that the leadership's gamble was not so desperate and in fact it has already paid off hand­ somely by all criteria.

On another occasion, Haldeman expressed his expert

99 The Washington Post. May 2 5, 1970, Sec. A, p. 1.

^^^The Washington post. May 25, 1970, Sec, A, p. 1.

^^^The Washington Post. May 25, 1970, Sec. A, p. 1. 276 opinion that President Nixon has "a more hostile press corps" than any Chief Executive before him and "may have a greater 102 number of the press interested in his unsuccess." He also went on the NBC "Today" show and accused the press and other critics of Nixon's Vietnam policy of "consciously aid­

ing and abetting the enemy.

Until his recent retirement to go into private law practice, special counsel Charles W. Colson was another

Administration spokesman who regularly attacked the press.

Colson— who once wrote in a memorandum that reports that he would "walk over my grandmother " to get what he wanted were 104 "absolutely accurate" — was particularly upset by news­ paper and television reports that tied the White House

directly into the "Watergate affair. " The news media involved,

Colson said in November 1972, before the New England Society

of Newspaper Editors in Kennebunkport, Maine, were guilty of 105 "McCarthyism." He was especially critical of the

102 Associated Press dispatch, The Washington Post. August 10, 1971. "Not for Women Only," Time. February 21, 1972, p . 6 6 . 104 The Washington Post. August 30, 1972, Sec. A, p. 22.

^*^^The New York Times. November 13, 1972, p. 24. 277

Washington Post and described Benjamin Bradlee, executive editor of the Post, as the "self-appointed leader of a tiny

fringe of arrogant elitists" in journalism.Colson con­ tinued ;

If Bradlee ever left the Georgetown cocktail set where he and his elitist buddies dine on third-hand information, gossip and rumor, he would discover the real America. He might learn that all truth and knowl­ edge does not emanate exclusively from the Post, the [New York] Times, and the networks; and that all of the rest of the country isn't just sitting around waiting to be told by those select few what they are supposed to think.107

Another top Republican who is skilled at attacking

the press is Kansas Senator Robert Dole, who recently

resigned as Chairman of the Republican National Committee.

When newsmen reported that the South Vietnamese "incursion"

into Laos was in shambles. Dole labeled them "doom merchants" who were "doing their best to discourage a war-weary American

people and obscure the tremendous progress that President

Nixon has made towards an honorable settlement in Southeast X08 Asia." At a 1972 luncheon with the California Republican

^^^The New York Times, November 13, 1972, p. 24. 107 The New York Times, November 13, 1972, p. 24. 108 United Press International dispatch. The [Washing­ ton, D.C.] Evening Star, April 4, 1971. 278

State Convention, Dole prefaced his address by saying, "I'm not here to broadly attack the media." He then accused the

press of having a "vested interest in our defeat," Press reports of the Vietnam war and its effects on the nation, 109 said Dole were "viewed through the prisms of prejudice."

He went on to charge that :

. . . The news media is [sic] presenting a false picture of a deeply divided America in a nervous crisis — rather than the true picture of a largely united America standing firmly behind the resolute but care­ fully planned and calmly decided actions of its Presi­ dent . HO

Lesser figures in the Nixon Administration have also

taken to assaulting and threatening the press with alarming

regularity. At the 1972 convention of the American Society

of Newspaper Editors, Justice Department official Kevin T.

Maroney told the gathering of newsmen that if they were left

"entirely free to determine for themselves what was proper 111 to publish" they would encounter "interminable mischief."

In case the editors missed his point, Maroney reminded them

109 Associated Press dispatch. The [Washington, D.C.] Sunday Star. May 14, 1972.

^^^Associated Press dispatch. The [Washington, D.C.] Sunday Star. May 14, 1972.

^^^The Washington Post. April 20, 1972, Sec. B, p. 1 279

of the Espionage Act and cited state and federal laws that 112 forbade the receipt of "stolen property." Columnist Jack

Anderson followed Maroney to the podium and charged that the

Justice Department official was trying to exert "the kind 113 of authority that is exercised in the Kremlin."

Kenneth Clawson, assistant to Herb Klein, took

umbrage at a story, reported by the New York Times. which

quoted a North Vietnamese spokesman to the effect that the

American mines dropped in Haiphong Harbor were being dis­

armed. The Times. said Clawson, was "a conduit of enemy

propaganda to the American people,After the Super Sonic

Transport was voted down in the Senate, "program director"

William Magruder visited a Dallas convention to warn against

"journalistic jingoism, The press, he lamented, would

never "automatically" rally behind any cause, even if "expert

opinion" determined it to be "good for an industry or even

the nation.

112 The Washington Post. April 20, 1972. Sec. B, p. 1. 113 The Washington Post, April 20, 1972, Sec. B, p. 1. 114 United press International dispatch. The [Washing­ ton, D.G.] Evening Star. May 19, 1972. 115 The Wall Street Journal, August 13, 1971, p. 1.

^^^The Wall Street Journal, August 13, 1971, p. 1. 280

The sustained assaults moved Richard Salant, head of CBS News, to comment that "the White House must be

aware of the impact of their attacks on us. One thing our government has learned from Hanoi is how to fight a war of 117 attrition."

Occasionally, one of Nixon's assistants takes it

upon himself to advise a newsman's employer of the reporter's

shortcomings. NBC correspondent Catherine Mackin once

reported that "the president accuses McGovern of wanting to

give those on welfare more than those who work, which is not

true." She went on: "The President says McGovern is call­

ing for a quote confiscation of wealth unquote, which is not 118 true." The telephones at NBC headquarters started ring­

ing before the program was over; White House callers even

complained to NBC president Julian Goodman. Said Kenneth 119 Clawson: "She, in effect, called the President a liar."

He then simmered down and said that :

We didn't ask that she be fired or removed from covering [Nixon] or reprimanded. We didn't ask

117 "Nixon vs. the Media," Newsweek, April 5, 1971, p. 54. 118 Newsmakers, Newsweek, October 16, 1972, pp. 58-59. 119 Newsmakers, p. 59. 281

anything. We just wanted to register our protest that she was inaccurate.120

The Associated Press's prize-winning investigative reporter, H. L. Schwartz III, once reported that then Com­ merce Secretary Maurice Stans was associated with a foun­ dation that had an interest in a U.S. subsidized company in

Thailand. Stans fired off a furious letter to AP general manager Wes Gallagher and complained that Schwartz was

"irresponsible" and "without respect for the truth." Stans hoped, he wrote, that Schwartz could "be properly reminded 121 of his responsibilities to the facts."

The White House media men have often attempted to punish newspapers which print disagreeable reports about the

President. When news organizations were being selected for representation in the presidential party that traveled to

Peking, for example, the Boston Globe and Newsday were omitted. Significantly, the Globe has been a frequent critic of the Administration; Newsdav published a series of investi­ gative reports on Nixon's business investments and those of

120 Newsmakers, p. 59. 121 Jack Anderson, "Stans, Navy Join in Press Bait­ ing," The Washington Post. December 25, 1971, Sec. C, p. 7. 282 122 his close friend, C. G. "Bebe" Rebozo.

Occupying the number one spot on the White House list, however, is the Washington Post, the paper most influ­ ential in exposing the "Watergate affair." When the Post linked H. R. Haldeman to the affair, presidential press sec­ retary Ronald Ziegler began to routinely deny the stories as they appeared. On Friday, December 18, 1972, Ziegler took direct action.

Post society reporter Dorothy McCardle, a grand­ mother who had covered the social life of five First Fam­ ilies, arrived at the White House to attend a reception. She was informed that a "pool" of five reporters had been chosen to cover the event, and she was not among them. It has long been customary to permit the local papers in Washington to cover all White House social functions, but Mrs. McCardle faithfully accepted the "pool" report and returned Saturday night to cover a black-tie dinner. Again she was excluded.

On Sunday, she was barred from the White House worship ser­ vice. On Monday, she was forbidden from covering a Christ­ mas party for children of foreign diplomats .123

122 Don Oberdorfer, "The China Press Scenario," The Nation, March 27, 1972, p. 397. 123 The Washington Post. December 18, 1972, Sec. B, pp. 1, 2. 283

pressed for an explanation, Ronald Ziegler said the

White House was concerned about other publications which had not had the "opportunity" to cover the social scene at the

Executive Mansion. "We intend to spread it around more," he said.This prompted Post executive editor Benjamin Bradlee to issue a statement. With tongue tucked firmly in cheek,

Bradlee said:

We are delighted to hear from Mr. Ziegler that no newspapers are being excluded from the pools which cover White House social events.

The Washington Post has been excluded from the last four social events, including the party Monday afternoon for diplomats’ children.

That seems to defy the odds, but we hope we will have the chance to bring firsthand reports to our read­ ers again soon.125

At the Christmas party, Pat Nixon was asked why the

Post was being banned from White House social events. "I'm not an ugly person," she said, defensively. "I don't dis­ criminate against anyone; there is nobody in the world I dislike; I did not have anything to do with the pool.

124 The Washington Post, December 19, 1972, Sec. B, p. 1. 125 The Washington Post, December 19, 1972, Sec. B, p. 1. The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News, December 19, 1972, Sec. C, p. 1. 284

She added that she had known Mrs. McCardle since 1952. "I like her very much," the First Lady said, "and I'm sure 127 she'll be coming here again."

But Ziegler was determined to make his new "pool policy" work. On January 5, 1973, he summoned thirteen male reporters in to form a pool to cover a White House reception for new members of Congress, The men had never covered such events before, and most of them did not plan to start at that late point in their careers. Many of those who chose to report the affair went scampering after female reporters to 128 pick up pointers on how it was done.

Washington Star News reporter Isabelle Shelton was constrained to comment that:

It is obvious that the present controversy is being orchestrated for the White House by Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler, with the First Lady's staff carrying out orders. It is not clear where Ziegler's orders are coming from, although the prime suspects are the President him­ self or his top assistant, Robert H a l d e m a n . 129

The "pool" controversy lasted until Nixon's second

127 The Washington Post. December 19, 1972, Sec. B, p . 2. 128 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily N e w s . January 5, 1973, Sec. A, p. 1. 129 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. December 19, 1972, Sec. C, p. 6. 285 inauguration, but the Washington Post Company soon dis­ covered that its troubles were far from over. In Jackson­ ville, Florida, three groups filed petitions with the FCC challenging the license renewal of television station WJXT, which is owned by the Post company. One of the groups was led by George champion, Jr., Chairman of Nixon's campaign in Florida in 1972. At the same time, challenges were filed against the licenses of Post-owned WPLG-TV in Miami. The principals of the challenging party included two law partners of former Senator George Smathers of Florida, a close friend of Nixon, The Miami station also had been challenged in 1970 by a group including former business partners of Nixon's friend, Bebe Rebozo. That episode had cost the Post company 130 $67,000 in legal fees.

Reporters asked Ronald Ziegler if the Administration's vendetta against the Washington Post was in any way related to the challenges of the parent company's broadcast licenses. 131 Ziegler's reply: "No, absolutely not."

While the Administration's punitive measures against the Post are substantial, they do not measure up to the

^^^The Washington Post, January 9, 1973, Sec. A, p. 6. 131 The Washington Post, January 4, 1973, Sec. A, p. 4, 286 intense and coordinated attack the Nixon men executed against the CBS network. Their displeasure with the network's news­ casts began shortly after Nixon assumed office; during the

1968 campaign, according to Frank Shakespeare, it was NBC 132 that Nixon was "way down" on.

After Vice-president Agnew excoriated network news operations at Des Moines, however, it was CBS which most vigorously defended the media. Agnew's assault, said then

CBS president Frank Stanton, was "an unprecedented attempt 133 . . . to intimidate a news medium. " Richard Salant, president of CBS News, called Agnew's speech "terribly dis­ heartening" and predicted it was only the beginning of a general assault.

Ten days before Agnew's first speech, CBS had broad­ cast a film, narrated by Vietnam correspondent Don Webster, showing a South Vietnamese soldier, without provocation, stabbing to death a North Vietnamese prisoner. The atrocity, the film showed, had been witnessed by unmoving American

132 McGinnis, The Selling of the President 1968, p. 60. 133 Erwin Knoll, "Shaping Up CBS: A Case Study in Intimidation," The progressive, XXIV (July, 1970), 18. 134 Knoll, p. 18. 287 135 military advisors. Eleven days later, the Pentagon requested the network's "out-takes," Richard Salant, claim­ ing the unused film was as "sacrosanct" as "a reporter's 136 notebook," refused to comply.

On April 12, 1970, the Des Moines Register ran an exclusive story on its front page under the banner headline,

"PROBE TV'S ATROCITY." The story related the details of a

Pentagon investigation of the CBS story and the military's feeling that the network's film was phony. On May 11, syn­ dicated columnist Richard Wilson, who also headed the Regis­ ter 's Washington bureau, published a column citing CBS's failure to cooperate with the Pentagon as evidence the film was faked. The feeling inside the Nixon Administration,

Wilson wrote, was that CBS had perpetrated "a bald fraud" on ,,. 137 the public.

At this point, CBS began to suspect a campaign of intimidation was afoot. A few months earlier, Nixon had appointed the Des Moines Register's highly regarded investi­ gative reporter, Clark Mollenhoff, as a "deputy counsel" to

135 Knoll, p. 18.

^^^Knoll, p. 18. 137 Knoll, pp. 18-19. 288 the President. Mollenhoff would serve, it was announced, as a "presidential ombudsman" to "direct and conduct continuing investigations to assure follow-through action on corruption and mismanagement and apprise the President of any question- 138 able operations within his own administration." White

House reporters had heard, however, that one of Mollenhoff's jobs would be to investigate newsmen who were unfriendly to 139 Nixon. Significantly, it was the Register which broke the news that the CBS atrocity story was being investigated by the Pentagon; Richard Wilson, moreover, was Mollenhoff's former boss. CBS sensed that Mollenhoff was the moving force 139 behind the unfriendly reports.

The network's White House correspondent, Dan Rather, then interviewed Mollenhoff and obtained the admission that he had talked about the situation with "several reporters."

Mollenhoff hotly denied he was conducting an investigation.

"Let's just say I'm interested," he told Rather. "The PCC is interested, a House Committee is interested. I'm inter­ ested. . . .

138 "Clark Mollenhoff Named Nixon Aide," The Quill, LVII (October, 1969), 43. 1 39 -^^''Knoll, pp. 18-20. 140 Knoll, p. 20. 289

The network then learned that syndicated columnist

Jack Anderson had obtained a White House memo accusing CBS of "irresponsibility." He was going to publish it on Friday,

May 22. So on Thursday night. May 21, CBS once again aired the atrocity story. "What follows is unusual for CBS Even­ ing news," said Walter Cronkite, and in the next seven min­ utes the story was outlined in great detail, It was appar­ ent, at the end, that CBS had filmed an authentic event. The next day, Ronald Ziegler refused to comment on the affair, except to deny an investigation of CBS had taken place. One week later, Mollenhoff resigned, and CBS heard no more about 141 its "irresponsibility" for a while.

Anchorman Cronkite, however, was not prepared to dismiss the affair as an aberration. "If it had just been a single episode, " he said, "I think it might have been for­ gotten. But it represents a continuing attitude and a threat 142 to all of us in the media."

Throughout 1971, the network's troubles seemed to multiply with every story it broadcast. Following "The Sell­ ing of the Pentagon," CBS officials were dragged before the

141 Knoll, pp. 20-21. 142 "Atrocity Story," Newsweek, June 1, 1970, p. 67. 290

House Investigations Subcommittee by West Virginia Congress­ man Harley O. Staggers, who demanded the network's "out- takes" be turned over for review. CBS refused, and Staggers attempted to cite the network for contempt. The measure was 143 defeated in the full House, 226 votes to 181.

There is no evidence that the President's aides attempted to intercede in any direct fashion. At the FCC, however. Chairman Dean Burch— the former Republican National

Chairman— was furious. He drafted a letter for Staggers and spoke of the press's "sheer hubris— overweening pride . . . that leads to the knee-jerk response of closing ranks against 144 the critics." He also included, according to reports, a threat of government interference if broadcasters didn't put 145 their house in order. The full FCC, however, vetoed

Burch's letter and in its place sent word to Staggers that the procedures used by CBS were matters of judgment and therefore out of its purview.

At about the time the controversy over "The Selling

143 Charles Long, "The CBS Summer of '71," The Quill, LX (August, 1971), 14-16. 144 Long, p. 15.

145^ Long, p. 15. 146 Long, p. 15. 291 of the Pentagon" reached its peak, CBS reporter Morley Safer went to Vietnam to do a story on Nixon's Vietnamization pro­ gram. U.S. military information officers in Saigon for­ warded a memo to their colleagues in the field to warn them that "the word is to be cautious and that Safer is not merely covering the war but has an ulterior motive.Safer was denied military transportation and had to return without his 148 story.

Other CBS newsmen also found themselves the target of the White House hit men. Investigative reporter Daniel

Schorr became the subject of an FBI investigation, allegedly because he was being considered for a "position of trust and confidence" in the Administration. Strangely, however, Schorr himself was never asked if he wanted to work for Nixon; he learned of the FBI's interest in him from his colleagues and 149 friends. The network's aggressive White House correspon­ dent, Dan Rather, became the subject of a breakfast meeting between John Ehrlichman and CBS News president Richard Salant.

147 Associated Press dispatch. The Washington Post. April 8, 1971. 148 Powledge, The Engineering of Restraint, p. 19. 149 The Washington Post. November 11, 1971, Sec. A, p. 1. A discussion of the Schorr incident in greater detail 292

Initially, it was reported that Ehrlichman had "demanded"

Rather’s dismissal, hut this, said Salant, was untrue.

The actual story, however, is almost as alarming. As Salant has explained it :

In the middle of nice, small-talk conversation, he [Ehrlichman] suddenly lit into Dan Rather and called him a hatchet man and told me how unhappy they were with him.

There were only two things I felt I ought to do, aside from telling him I thought Dan Rather was great. One was to make it public, and the other was to let Dan Rather know that he was now assured of being the White House correspondent as long as he ever wants to. But I can't guarantee that if the White House or somebody like Ehrlichman pulled the same stunt with some other broad­ caster, the other broadcaster would react the way I did. 151

The Administration ' s displeasure with CBS surfaced

again during the 1972 election. The network performed in its

usually diligent fashion in reporting details of the "Water­

gate affair" and the windfall profits that fell to giant grain

dealers when the U.S. government arranged the sale of wheat

to the Soviet Union. As a result of this reporting, wrote

columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Sentiment is build­

ing within the White House staff for a partial resumption of

the . . . anti-media campaign, with CBS News as a special

begins on p. 320. 150 Powledge, p. 25.

^^^Powledge, pp. 25-26. 293 152 target." The Nixon men were bitter, said Evans and Novak^ who reputedly have excellent high-level sources within the

Executive Mansion, and they wanted revenge:

These same aides are not nearly so exercised over Washington Post's much more exhaustive investigative reporting of Watergate. The reason: TV-wismen believe the prime-time CBS programs had far more national impact.

Hence they want the anti-media campaign resumed with the sights on CBS— perhaps not with a resumption of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew's rhetoric but with the far more menacing threat of government action against news program content.153

On December 18j 1972, the director of the White House

Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTp), Dr. Clay T. White­ head, told the Indianapolis chapter of Sigma Delta Chi, in effect, that the White House was going to see to it that local television stations around the country began vetoing the biased news they were being fed by the networks; if they didn't, he said, they could very well be left out in the cold come license renewal time.^^^ It was, in the opinion of many broadcast journalists, the most insidious assault upon their

152 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "The White House vs. CBS," The Washington Post, November 26, 1972, Sec. B, p. 7. 153 Evans and Novak, Sec. B, p. 7. 154 "Restrained 'Freedom,'" Time. January 1, 1973, p. 53 294 much abused First Amendment rights since Agnew's speech in

Des Moines.

Whitehead, a thirty-four-year-old former systems ana­ lyst for the Rand Corporation, roundly denounced television newsmen who peddle "ideological plugola" and the "so-called professionals who confuse sensation with sense and who dis- 155 pense elitist gossip in the guise of news analysis,"

The remedy proposed by Whitehead consisted of a bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934. It would have broad­ casters show they were "substantially attuned to the needs of the community , . . irrespective of where the programs were obtained. The meaning of these vaguely worded phrases was perhaps lost on most observers, but it was very plain to young Dr. Whitehead. He interpreted it to mean that:

Station managers and network officials who fail to act to correct imbalance or consistent bias from the net­ works— or who acquiesce by silence— can only be consid­ ered willing participants to be held fully accountable by the broadcaster's community at license-renewal time.157

In other words, the Administration was prepared to

155 "Restrained 'Freedom,'" p. 63. 156 The Washington Post, December 22, 1972, Sec. A, p. 22. 157 "Restrained 'Freedom,'" p. 63, 295 force the local affiliates around the nation to censor the networks for Nixon, on pain of losing their licenses if they failed to comply. As an inducement to the local broadcast­ ers, the Administration, according to Whitehead, was prepared to meet their frequently expressed desire for a lengthier licensing period; the present three-year term of a broadcast­ ing permit would be extended to five years.

The broadcasting community was deeply disturbed. The

OTP had been established by Nixon in 1970 to act as a policy­ making instrument in the increasingly complex field of com­ munications. By 1973, the DTP had a staff of sixty-five and 159 a budget of $3 million. Broadcasters had been a little skeptical about the new agency's vaguely defined role; with

Whitehead's Indianapolis speech, their suspicions proved well- founded. Commented Reuven Frank, president of NBC News ;

On the face of it, he's saying the stations should monitor what comes to them from the networks, They already do that and network affiliates also meet regu­ larly with network officials to ask why we've said and done certain things. In other words, they have been holding us accountable all along. Now, what Whitehead

"Mr. Nixon Jawbones the Media," Newsweek. January 1, 1973, p. 13. 159 The Presidency, "Nixon's Proposed 1973 Budget Reflects Record Growth of Executive Office," National Jour­ nal , February 26, 1972, p. 370. 296

is saying is: "We're holding the station accountable for what we don't like to see on each station and the station's license is involved." That's quite a threat.160

"It appears that young Clay Whitehead is to provide

us with 'four more years' of Nixon's war on the networks,"

said FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, himself a frequent

and caustic critic of the broadcasting industry.Former

president of CBS Fred Friendly called the Whitehead proposal

"the most dangerous thing to come along in fifty years of

broadcasting.Even syndicated columnist James J. Kil­

patrick, an ardent and articulate conservative who backs

Nixon on most occasions, joined in the chorus of criticism.

"If the Nixon administration will yak a little less," wrote

Kilpatrick, "perhaps the station managers and viewers, having won some improvement [from the networks], will strive for a

little more. The Washington Post commented editorially

^^*^The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News, December 20, 1972, Sec. A, p. 11.

^^^The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. December 20, 1972, Sec. A, p. 11.

^^^The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. December 20, 1972, Sec. A, p. 11.

^^^James J. Kilpatrick, "Whitehead Off Base in Attack on TV Industry," The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily N ews. December 26, 1972, Sec. A, p. 11. 297 that :

. . . It [the Whitehead proposal] is a move that strikes at the very heart of the First Amendment's notion that a people, in order to retain their freedom, must know as much as possible about what their government is doing for or to them and that any interference in this process by the government, however finely motivated towards the elimination of "bias," opens the way for an intolerable suppression of free speech and expression.

Whitehead pretended to be surprised at the storm of protest he had stirred up. The bill he had proposed, he said, will mean "more freedom for the broadcaster."

Despite persistent questioning by reporters, however, he refused to cite a single example of the "bias" or "ideo­ logical plugola" he was so concerned about."I think anyone who watches television would have his own example of that kind of thing," he said. When asked how he felt about the criticism, Whitehead said: "Well, I suppose everyone would like to have everyone love them but you just can't make effective change in something as important and controversial as communications without making some people unhappy."

164 Editorial, The Washington Post. December 22, 1972, Sec. A, p. 22. "Restrained ' Freedom, ' " Time, January 1, 1973, p. 63.

"Restrained 'Freedom,'" p. 63.

^^^The [Washington, D.G.] Evening Star and Daily News, December 20, 1972, Sec. A, p. 10. 298

Well over a year before the Whitehead performance

CBS News president Richard Salant told ACLU investigator

Fred Powledge that :

After Agnew, we had much more concerted criticism from the affiliates. I've always been convinced— although Herb Klein denies it— that there has been a deliberate effort on the part of the administration to exploit the natural abrasions between the affiliates in the first place. Their notion of news, you know, is different from our notion of news.

They're part of the local establishment. The news to them, is saying what the mayor said, and so on. And we have distinct signs of the administration's wooing the stations and encouraging them to stand up and fight u s .168

Salant went on to relate that the network's affiliate advisory board had considered sending a delegation to New

York to tell the CBS brass that they were unhappy with net­ work coverage of the war; from New York, they were thinking of going to Saigon to protest the war coverage to CBS report­ ers in the field. Commented Salant;

It was an atrocious idea, and we finally persuaded them not to do it. The fellow who was presenting this idea finally told somebody that it wasn't his idea; that it was an idea that was proposed by another affiliate to him after he ' d been to a meeting at the White House. Somebody— we don't know who— at the White House had said, "Aren't you unhappy with the way they're covering Viet­ nam?" He said, "Yes, I am."

168 powledge, The Engineering of Restraint, p. 34. 299

"Well, why don't you do something about it? Why don't you go out to Saigon and tell them so?"169

There is one broadcasting "network" that Richard

Nixon can officially influence; it is the public television system.

Before 1967, public TV existed in the form of "edu­ cational television" or ETV, which was funded completely through private means. The 1967 Public Broadcasting Act replaced the old ETV with the federally funded Corporation for Public Broadcasting, This private, non-profit corporation was designed to distribute the federal funds to the pro­ duction center and local stations, and was specifically meant to act as a buffer between the government and the broadcast­ ers and thereby remove the politics from programming. To further reduce governmental influence, the CPB was to be

financed on a long-term basis. A financing system was never

set up before president Johnson left office, however. Presi­ dent Nixon is not happy with public television and has not hesitated to use his power, including the veto of funds, to keep the Corporation for Public Broadcasting on a short

leash.■u 1 7 0

169 powledge, p. 35. 170 The Washington Post, July 18, 1972, Sec. B, p. 2. 300

Mr. Nixon's distaste for public TV appears to be the result of its emphasis on public affairs. Until recently, some thirty percent of public television's prime-time was being devoted to public affairs programming, as contrasted to two percent for the commercial networks.Many of the documentaries and news programs are produced at the public

TV production center in New York city and at the National

Public Affairs Center for Television (NPACT), located in 172 Washington, D.G. This, in Nixon's eyes, gives public television an "eastern liberal" slant.

Innovative programs such as "Sesame Street" are apparently fine as far as Nixon is concerned. But he does not approve of "The Great American Dream Machine," an equally innovative program which was presented in an unconventional

"magazine"format and frequently touched upon public affairs.

He doesn't like documentaries such as "The Banks and the

Poor," which vividly portrayed the tricks used by money lend­ ers to bilk an unsuspecting public. And he undoubtedly does not approve when public television airs the views of those who disagree with his Vietnam policies, as was done at a

171 The Washington Post. July 18, 1972, Sec. B, p. 2 172 The Washington Post. December 27, 1972, Sec. E, p . 1. 301 public station, in New York on the day Nixon announced the 173 mining of Haiphong Harbor.

If the president needed any further convincing that public TV was peddling "ideological plugola," it came when the NPACT hired former NBC reporters Robert MacNeil and

Sander Vanocur— at salaries of $65,000 and $85,000 per year, 174 respectively— to act as Washington correspondents. Vanocur, after all, is known to have liberal tendencies. He is also the reporter, as Nixon pointedly recalled in Six Crises, who embarrassed him in the first "Great Debate" of the 1960 pres­ idential campaign. At that time, Vanocur had recalled the press conference in which President Eisenhower had been asked what "major decisions" Nixon had participated in, and

Ike had answered, "If you give me a week, I might think of

one." Did Nixon, Vanocur had asked before millions of view- 175 ers in 1960, have any comment on Ike's statement? It is conceivable that vanocur's mortifying question cost him his

public television job over a decade later. For, amidst con­

troversy over his "exorbitant" salary and political views.

173 The Washington Post, July 18, 1972, Sec. B, p. 2. 174 The Washington post, June 2, 1972, Sec, B, p. 1. 175 Richard Nixon, Six Crises (Garden City, New York; Doubleday & Company, inc., 1962), p. 339. 302 he quit public TV in January, 1973.

In the first years of its existence, public tele­ vision has been funded on an annual basis and has therefore always been subject to political pressures. One former pro­ ducer for public TV told ACLU investigator Fred powledge that public television executives "tend to be concerned with programs that will be of interest to Congress, so that mem­ bers of Congress can literally see your cameras at a hearing and know that the money they were appropriating was being used 'wisely.' Since the Nixon Administration moved in, however, the "chill" has intensified. As another former pub­ lic television employee told Powledge:

Public television is, if anything, even more craven than commercial TV now. There is direct censorship; word coming from Washington to the production center, directly, saying "You can't do this; it'll jeopardize our appropriation. " The producers are told not to come up with any controversial ideas; it'll "get us into trouble." The era of strong documentaries is dead. The people in Washington are saying "Later on we ' 11 get independence; don't rock the boat now. "177

Bill Greeley, a reporter for Variety magazine who specializes in covering television, told Powledge that the

CPB waer now doing only that which is "especially pleasing to

X 7 6 Powledge, The Engineering of Restraint, p. 37. 177 Powledge, p. 37, 303 the Nixon Administration." In 1937, Greeley noted, "the hard-hitting documentaries and the muckraking are gone, . . . 178 They're clearly shying away from controversy."

Indeed they were. The effects of a hostile Adminis­ tration in Washington could be seen not only in the bland diet of programs that began to come over the public tele­ vision "network" in the months after Nixon became President; it could also be seen in the day to day changes that were made in programming and scheduling. A humorous skit in which comedian Woody Allen would appear as a bumbling Henry

Kissinger was pulled off the schedule a day before it was 179 to be aired. A segment of "The Great American Dream

Machine" was dropped because it dealt with the politically 180 sensitive issue of FBI informers.

Try as they might to placate the President, however, public television executives were unable to meet Mr. Nixon's standards. At a convention of the National Association of

Educational Broadcasters in Miami on October 20, 1971,

Dr. Clay Whitehead suggested that the broadcasters would

173 Powledge, p. 38. 179 Newsmakers, Newsweek, February 2, 1972, p. 46. 180 passing Comment, "Hanging by the Thumbs," Colum­ bia Journalism Review, X {January-February, 1972), 3. 304 never obtain ample financing from the Nixon Administration under present circumstances. "To us," said Whitehead, "there is evidence that you are becoming affiliates of a centralized, 181 national network." Programming, he went on, should be a local matter, but it was being dominated by the CPB and its distribution arm, the public Broadcasting System (PBS). They were, said Whitehead, trying to win ratings contests with commercial broadcasters ;

Once you're in the rating game, you want to win. You become a supplement to the commercial networks and do their things a bit better in order to attract the audience that wants more quality in program content.182

If the public broadcasters could not "fulfill the promise" intended for it— as defined by the Nixon Adminis­ tration, of course— "then permanent financing will always be 183 somewhere off in the distant future."

In subsequent appearances, Whitehead became increas­ ingly specific. On January 12, 1972, he was interviewed on

National Public Radio. Said Whitehead;

181 Bruce E. Thorp, "Media Report/White House Static Over Structure, Funds Keeps Public Broadcasting Picture Fuzzy," National Journal, April 29, 1972, p. 735. 1 82 Thorp, p. 735. 1 R3 Thorp, p. 736. 305

There is a real question as to whether public tele­ vision, particularly I guess really the national fed­ erally funded part of public television, should be carrying public affairs and news commentary, and that sort of thing. . . .184

On Wednesday, February 2, 1972, Whitehead testified before the Senate subcommittee on Constitutional Rights and declared that national news programs on public television were "contrary to the spirit" of the 1967 law. He continued;

No citizen who feels strongly about one or another side of a matter of current public controversy enjoys watching the other side presented, but he enjoys it a good deal less when it is presented at his expense. His outrage— quite properly— is expressed to, and then through, his elected representatives who have voted his money for that p u r p o s e . 185

The Administration submitted its own bill for financ­ ing public television. It called for a one-year budget of

$45 million, most of which would be channeled, not through the CPB, but through the Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare directly to local public TV stations.congress balked, however, and passed a bill allocating the CPB a two- year allotment of $155 million. At the White House, Patrick

184 Thorp, p. 736.

^^^The Washington Post, February 3, 1972, Sec. B, p. 12. 186 The Washington Post. February 3, 1972, Sec. B, p. 1. 306

Buchanan organized a protest by Administration officials and advised Nixon to veto the bill, which he did. The CPB

is now struggling along on its previous budget of $3 5 187 million.

Reaction among concerned public television execu­

tives to the Nixon campaign against public TV was swift in

coming. CPB official John p. Wither spoon circulated a memo

declaring that "until public broadcasting shows signs of becoming what this administration wants it to be, this admin- 188 istration will oppose permanent financing. . . ." Hartford

Gunn, president of PBS, lamented that "public broadcasting might have to make a compromise in its news coverage in order

to get stable financing. The question is: Is there a price 189 here for survival? And can we afford to pay that price?"

Said James Day, chief of the New York production center : "If

you want to weaken public television, the fastest way to do it would be to put more money into local broadcasting and less 190 into national. Whitehead’s position gives me nausea."

187 Duscha, "The White House Watch," pp. 9, 96. Tflfi Thorp, "Media Report," p. 736. 189 "The Czar of the Airwaves," Newsweek, February 7, 1972, p. 44. 190 "The Czar," p. 44, 307

And public TV newsman Robert MacNeil offered the harshest criticism to date; when public television newscasts were accused of being "biased" by Republicans, he said, it meant

"any attitude which does not indicate permanent genuflection 191 before the wisdom and purity of Richard Milhous Nixon."

When the President engaged in a nationally televised

"conversation" with network newsmen in January, 1971, public television reporter Nancy Dickerson participated without 192 objection from Nixon. Before the political conventions in 1972, PBS officials decided to spend $2.75 million to provide "gavel-to-gavel" coverage of both affairs, but the

CPB overruled them on grounds of expense. During the Demo­ cratic convention, therefore, public television broadcast only a ninety-minute "preview" and a thirty-minute wrap-up each evening. Just before the Republican convention, however, the CPB decided to broadcast the entire show. public tele­ vision cameras were then "fixed on the podium" and the Repub­ lican affair was given, in the words of the PBS, "live uninterrupted, television-of-record coverage."193 commented

1 Q 1 The Washington Post, January 27, 1972, Sec. E, p. 4. 192 "Talk Show," Newsweek, January 18, 1971, p. 16. 193 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News, August 24, 1972, Sec. A, p. 18. 308

Washington S tar-News reporter Robert Walters :

. . . No mention was made of how happy President Nixon and his White House associates might be about the prospect of having their convention— a legitimate exer­ cise in partisan political propaganda— transmitted directly to the electorate without the meddling of any newsmen who might question the value of what was being presented.194

By October, 1972, CPB president John Macy had resigned and Nixon had appointed enough members to the cor­ poration's fifteen-member governing board to gain a majority.

To replace Macy, Nixon reached into the United States infor­ mation Agency and plucked out one Henry Loomis, a fifty- three-year-old bureaucrat who had spent seven years as direc­ tor of the "Voice of America." When asked if he would accept the appointment at the CPB, reported T i m e . Loomis 195 asked, "What the hell is it?" He said he had never watched public TV, but he was soon offering criticism. This drew from public television newsman Robert MacNeil the acid comment that "if you heard someone say he disapproved of pro­ grams he never had seen, you might reasonably conclude that

194 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News, August 24, 1972, Sec, A, p. 18. 195 "A Novice for Public TV," Time, October 16, 1972, p. 94. 309 someone else has told him to dislike them. I conclude that.

Loomis said he particularly disliked "instant anal­ ysis." "Frankly," he said, "I think 'instant analysis' is lousy because the commentator who is sitting there hasn't 197 had a chance to think." Actually, he didn't think too much of any public affairs programming on public television.

Instead, he averred, the industry should take aim at "minor­ ities" whom he defined as "people who love ballet, people interested in adult education, children. Orientals, blacks 198 and chess players,"

Within three months of Loomis's appointment, the board of CPB had totally stripped the PBS of all power to determine programming. The shows that went over the air henceforth would be determined by the CPB itself. Pre­ dictably, the announced schedule for 1973-74 is almost devoid of public affairs programming. Conservative William F.

Buckley's program, "Firing Line," will be off the air. Bill

Moyers, former press secretary to President Lyndon Johnson,

196 The Washington Post, January 27, 1973, Sec. E, p. 94. 197 "A Novice for Public TV," p. 94. 198 The Washington post, November 2, 1972, Sec. C, p. 1. 310 had been anchoring a program called "Bill Moyers Journal"; it will no longer be seen. Gone will be the popular news show, "Washington Week in Review." In doubtful status is

"The Advocates," a program which aired opposing views on 199 controversial issues.

When Loomis took control of the CPB, critics charged that it would become a domestic "Voice of America" and a

"Nixon network.A public TV veteran told a Time reporter, 201 "I think public television is washed up."

The Justice Department under Nixon also became

involved in press policy, on May 31, 1972, for example, an

anti-war group called the "National Committee for Impeach­ ment" ran an advertisement in the New York Times calling for

Nixon's impeachment. Notified by the newly formed Office of

Federal Elections that an "apparent violation" of the 1971

Federal Election Campaign Act had been perpetrated, the

Justice Department went to court. Federal Judge Sylvester

Ryan agreed with the Justice lawyers that the ad was illegal;

199 The Washington Post, December 15, 1972, Sec. E, pp. 1, 12.

200"Thg Nixon Network," Newsweek. January 1, 1973, p. 59. 2 0 1 "The Nixon Network," p. 59, 311 overlooking the delicate First Amendment questions. Judge

Ryan enjoined the group from further political activity. The

Justice Department later filed suit against the Committee for

^ 202 Impeachment.

For several months, consideration was given to a

suit against the Times because the newspaper had inadver­ tently omitted a disclaimer, as required by the 1971 law,

that no candidates for federal office had authorized funds 203 for the ad. The idea was dropped. Earlier, however.

Times pressmen had walked off the job for several minutes in

protest to the ad. Attorney General John Mitchell thought

the move so patriotic that he publicly praised the press­ men. The president himself was so moved that he dis­

patched a White House aide to New York to thank the labor- 205 ers.

In April, 1972, the Justice Department filed anti­

trust suits against the three major networks on the grounds

202 "Stop the Impeachers, " Time, September 18, 1972, p. 101. 203 The New York Times, September 14, 1972, p. 26. 204 "Stop the Presses," Newsweek. June 12, 1972, p. 35 205 "Stop the Impeachers,"p. 101. 312 that they monopolized the production of prime-time tele­ vision programs and thus denied the TV audience "the bene­

fits of free and open competition. Network critics generally hailed the move as laudatory and indeed it might have been had the suits been filed under different circum­

stances .

First, the Administration was under fire at the time

for its decidedly benign treatment of the International

Telephone and Telegraph Company in the settlement of three

antitrust suits; the theory was thus tendered that the Nixon men were seeking to allay the implication that they were 207 mollycoddling big business.

Second, the networks were sued just as the 1972 J presidential campaign was gearing up. This curious timing

could well have served to put the networks on notice that

the Nixon men would be watching their newscasts in the weeks

ahead and that the enthusiasm with which the antitrust suits were pursued would be commensurate with the type of treat­

ment the Administration was given. Such a theory is rend­

ered more plausible by the fact that the suits had been

"Justice vs. the Networks," Newsweek, April 24, 1972, p. 55. 207 "Justice vs. the Networks," p. 55. 313 under consideration by the Justice Department for years.

One suit, in fact, had been prepared under now Secretary of

State William Rogers when he was President Eisenhower's

Attorney General; another had been worked up for the Johnson

Administration by Attorney General Nicholas Katzenback, In both instances, the prospective suits were shelved. Indeed, the antitrust suit that was eventually filed against the networks was first prepared, according to some reports, in

1970, but it, too, had been postponed by Attorney General

John Mitchell until April, 1972— seven months before Nixon had to face the voters. If, as some believe, the Adminis­ tration was treated kindly by the networks during the cam- 208 paign, it was not without good reason.

The Attorney General displayed his awesome talent for suppression in much more direct fashion in June, 1971, when he and his fellow lawyers in the Justice Department moved to restrain publication of the "Pentagon Papers," and, with the cooperation of the courts, managed to stop the presses for the first time in American history.

208 "Justice vs. the Networks," p. 55, 209 Jules Witcover, "Two Weeks That Shook the Press, " Columbia Journalism Review. X (September-October, 1971), pp. 7-15. 314

The great Pentagon Papers affair began, for most people, on Sunday, June 13, 1971, when the New York Times published the first in a series of articles based on a forty- seven volume, classified history of the Vietnam war which had been assembled under the auspices of the Department of

Defense. The series promised to reveal how the United States, through several Administrations, deliberately became involved in and escalated the conflict in Southeast Asia.^^*^

For the Times newsmen involved, the story began months before publication, when seven thousand pages of the study was obtained by investigative reporter Neil Sheehan.

As the series began to take shape, reporters and editors were closeted in the Hilton Hotel in New York City, where they worked twelve to fifteen hours a day. A special composing room was set up in the Times office building, where production men assembled the final pages of the stories in secrecy. When the Times hit the sidewalks on June 13, it contained one of 211 the biggest journalistic scoops of all time.

A second installment appeared, with accompanying documents, on Monday. That evening, the Times was asked by

210 Witcover, p. 8.

211 Witcover, pp. 8-9. 315

the Justice Department to cease publication of the stories

on the grounds they revealed "information relating to the national defense of the United States." The newspaper's

top officers "respectfully declined," and a third install­ ment was published Tuesday. That night, the Justice Depart­ ment obtained a court order enjoining the Times from further 212 publication, pending a court hearing.

On Friday morning, June 18, the Washington Post was

on the streets with stories based on the pentagon papers.

Again the Justice Department sought a restraining order, but

this time it was refused. The post * s second installment ran

on Saturday. The government appealed and eventually obtained 213 an injunction. Again the presses were silenced.

Meanwhile, the Boston Globe was out with a Pentagon

Papers story. The newspaper was swiftly enjoined from fur­

ther publication. In subsequent days, the Chicago Sun-Times,

Knight Newspapers, Los Angeles Times. St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

Christian Science Monitor, and the Long Island-based Newsdav.

in John Mitchell's words, got "in the act." of these, only

the Post-Dispatch was enjoined.

212 213 Witcover, p. 10. Witcover, p. 12, 214 Witcover, pp. 12-15. 316

On Saturday, June 19, meanwhile, the U.S. District

Court in New York City ruled in favor of further publication by the New York Times, but the restraining order was con­ tinued to permit the U.S. Court of Appeals to review the government's case; it was then bounced back to the District

Court. In Washington, both the District Court and Appellate

Court ruled in favor of the Post. Subsequent appeals by both newspapers and the government took the cases to the Supreme

Court, which voted to consolidate them, continue the ban on publication, and hear evidence. On Saturday, June 26, the court heard the arguments. On Wednesday, June 30, the ver­ dict was announced— six to three in favor of the newspapers. 215 The presses rolled once again.

The heady celebrations in newsrooms across the country, however, were short-lived, for the victory had been a Pyrrhic one. The Nixon Administration, after all, had succeeded in persuading the courts to restrain publication for a total of fifteen days— an event which had never happened before and which, therefore, could only be considered a step backwards.

The opinions of several of the Supreme Court Justices, fur­ thermore, left the press in a much less secure position than

215 Witcover, pp. 12-15. 317 it had been in before the Pentagon Papers case. Justices

Black and Douglas ruled, as they usually do, that freedom of the press was an absolute right; and, newsmen found little to contest in the opinions of Justices Brennan and Stewart.

But Justice Byron White, while concurring in the decision to allow publication, openly admitted that he would, if the occasion presented itself, vote to convict the newspapers on charges of violating the espionage statutes. Justice Marshall largely avoided a discussion of the First Amendment question and instead concentrated on the powers of Congress versus the powers of the President. Justice Harlan dissented on the grounds that the President's right to conduct foreign affairs gave him the right to classify documents, which, once classi­ fied, were immune to public disclosure; the Court should accept, Harlan argued, the government's word that publi­ cation would bring harm to the national security. Chief Jus­ tice Burger and Justice Blackmun, the Nixon appointees, were disturbed at the "haste" with which the cases made their way to the court; neither displayed a sophisticated understanding 216 of the First Amendment or concern for freedom of the press.

216 Don R. Pember, "The 'Pentagon Papers' Decision: More Questions Than Answers," Journalism Quarterly, XLVIII (Autumn, 1971), pp. 403-11. 318

The Pentagon papers case was marred in other ways.

Lawyers for the newspapers^ forced to prepare their cases quicklyj made several errors, even conceding at one point that in some circumstances prior restraint may be acceptable.

Retorted Justice Douglas: "This is a strange argument for the 217 Times to be making. "

The best that can be said about the Pentagon Papers case is that once again the press withstood an all-out effort on the part of the government to establish some limits on the First Amendment. in no way, however, can the news media claim a total victory. For, in the end, the Nixon Adminis­ tration did succeed in stopping the presses, and it did succeed in establishing a subtle form of prior restraint in that it evoked some encouragement from the court for pur­ suing criminal prosecutions for violation of the espionage laws. Such a prospect will surely exert some restraining effect on subsequent publication of similar material. The press was, therefore, in a weaker position after the pentagon

Papers affair than before it. Thus, Richard Nixon did, after all, register another small victory in his continuing war

217 pemtoer, p. 406; see also Charles Rembar, "Paper Victory," The Atlantic Monthly. CCXXVIII (November, 1971), 61-66. 319 with the news media.

It was possible, moreover, that the victory could have become a greater one. For the Justice Department attempted to prosecute the sources who "leaked" the docu­ ments— the first trial of its kind in American history. The case was dismissed, however, when it was revealed that the government had used illegal methods to obtain evidence. Had these men, Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, been convicted, it could very well have inhibited other potential sources from revealing information which the public ought to know.

In the Ellsberg case, the government was seeking, in effect, to establish the principle that it owns the information it gathers, or information which is gathered under its auspices.

Had such a view been recognized by the courts, then anyone who possessed unauthorized "government" information could 218 have been prosecuted as a common thief.

While the Justice Department has not sought, thus far, to prosecute the newspapers involved in the Pentagon

Papers affair, it has harrassed Beacon Press, the liberally oriented Boston publishing house which printed a four-volume

218 "Nixon and the Media," Newsweek, January 15, 1973, p. 47. 320 set of "Pentagon Papers" which were obtained by Democratic

Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska. So far, the Justice Depart­ ment investigation of Beacon has been little more than a

"fishing expedition." Assistant prosecutor Warren Reese tacitly admitted as much when he attempted to justify the investigation in a memo filed in the Boston District Court:

. . . Beacon Press and some of its agents and employees are logically suspect as participants in crim­ inal activity relating to the documents. . . . Identifi­ cation of the participants in the transaction whereby the Pentagon Papers were obtained and published by Beacon press is sought, along with the details of such transactions. The public interest in investigation to identify and prosecute those responsible for criminal offenses overrides any protection afforded by the First Amendment. . . ,219

The FBI has examined the bank accounts of Beacon

Press and its parent body, the Unitarian Universalist Asso­ ciation, many officers and employees have been interrogated, and Beacon has spent $50,000 for legal advice, but so far the government hasn't filed charges. No one seems to know, fur­ thermore, what charges could be filed. Nevertheless, the 220 investigation continues.

The investigation, of newsmen, often under some false #

219 Trudy Rubin, "Stalking Beacon Press, " (More), A Journalism Review, II (September, 1972), 5. 220 Rubin, pp. 5-7. 321 pretext, has become a standard tactic of intimidation in

Mr. Nixon's Justice Department. On August 20, 1971, for example, CBS investigative reporter Daniel Schorr learned he was under investigation by the FBI, He was later informed

that it was a "routine" probe for "possible federal employ­ ment." It was anything but "routine" for him, Schorr has written; August 20, 1971, he said, was "a day of disruption

and puzzlement, the FBI at the door and the telephone inces­

santly jingling with breathless bulletins from superiors,

associates, family, and friends touched by the widening web 221 of interviews."

Strangely, the possibility of a job with the Nixon

Administration came at a time when the President's men were

at odds with Schorr over the stories he was reporting. Just

six months before, he had quoted Dr. James Fletcher, director

of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, as say­

ing President Nixon harbored reservations about the Safeguard

ABM System. Nixon himself publicly labeled the story as 222 "totally without foundation and fact." The day before the

221 Daniel Schorr, "A Chilling Experience," Harper ' s Magazine, CCXLVI (March, 1973), 92.

222 Schorr, p. 94. 322

FBI probe began, Schorr had been summoned to the White House to hear complaints about his report that Nixon had no plans to give aid to parochial schools, as he had promised catho- 223 lies. Several months after the investigation. Special Coun­ sel to the president Charles Colson personally telephoned

Frank Stanton, then vice-chairman of CBS, to complain that

Schorr's stories concerning conflicts on Nixon's Pay Board 224 threatened to shatter the organization. In view of the

Administration's distaste for Schorr's reporting, the idea that he was being considered for a "position of trust and 225 confidence" seemed ludicrous, indeed.

The fact that the FBI had investigated Schorr went unreported for three months; in the meantime, Schorr ran into

Frederick V. Malek, Nixon's personnel recruiter, at a dinner party. When Schorr asked him what job he was being considered for, Malek, in Schorr's words, "expressed complete surprise and ignorance, even to inquiring when the investigation had occurred." Malek promised to check on the job offer and call

223 Schorr, p. 93. 224 Schorr, p. 94. 225 The Washington Post, November 11, 1971, Sec. A, p. 1. 323 226 Schorr; the call never came.

When the story was finally broken— ironically by

Washington Post reporter Kenneth Clawson, who would soon become a deputy to Herb Klein— Ronald Ziegler allowed that

Schorr had been considered for a job "in the environment 227 area." Malek, who six weeks earlier had never heard of the job offer, backed Ziegler up. The FBI report, Malek

said, had never been forwarded to the White House. Yet FBI

Director J. Edgar Hoover had reported that "the incomplete

investigation of Mr. Schorr was entirely favorable to him, 228 and the results were furnished to the White House." Sud­

denly, the report which had never been received became a

"preliminary report, which . . . has subsequently been 229 destroyed."

After a complete investigation of his own, Daniel

Schorr "reluctantly" became "finally convinced" that he was

subjected to deliberate harassment. "I should like to think

that it has not affected me," he wrote. "But the insidious 230 thing is that I can never be sure."

226 227 Schorr, p. 94. Schorr, p. 95. 228 229 Schorr, p. 95. Schorr, p. 96.

^Schorr, p. 97. 324

The "chill" that settles over newsmen who become the targets of government investigation is so subtle, in other words, that the reporter himself may not realize he is tread­

ing softer. As Schorr explained it;

I am left now to ponder, when a producer rejects a controversial story I have offered, whether it is because of the normal winnowing process or because of my trouble- making potential. Even more am I left to wonder, when I myself discard a line of investigation, whether I am applying professional criteria or whether I am subcon­ sciously affected by a reluctance to embroil my superiors in new troubles with the Nixon Administration. I should like to think that the government cannot directly intimi­ date me. But my employer, with millions at stake in an industry subject to regulation and pressure, is sensitive to the government, and I am sensitive to my employer's problems. So, one never quite gets over an FBI investi­ gation— not, at least, for four more years.231

The Justice Department again moved against an indi­ vidual reporter when it arrested and incarcerated Leslie H.

Whitten, Jr., veteran muckraker and chief legman for syndi­

cated columnist Jack Anderson, on charges of illegal pos­

session of stolen documents. It was, in Anderson's words, 232 "an outrageous violation of the First Amendment."

The chain of events which led to Whitten * s arrest

began during the first week of November, 1972, when a group

231 Schorr, p. 97. 232 "The Indian Connection," Newsweek, February 12, 1973, p. 45. 325 of militant Indians occupied the Bureau of Indian Affairs building in Washington and made off with seven thousand cubic feet of documents. Toward the end of November, according to

Whitten, he was contacted by sources who were interested in making some of the stolen papers available for publication.

After a series of meetings with the sources, during which

Whitten had to convince them he was knowledgeable about the plight of American Indians, the documents were made available.•I V.-. 233

Stories based on the papers soon began appearing in the Anderson column— much to the chagrin of the FBI, which had mounted a massive search to locate the documents. After a number of the stories were published, Whitten learned from

Hank Adams— a Washington-based Assiniboine-Sioux who had been acting as an intermediary between the militant Indians and the government— that three cartons of the documents were going to be returned. This event promised to make a good story, so Whitten asked to go along. Adams agreed. On the morning of January 31, 1973, they boxed the documents, marked them with the name of the FBI agent Dennis Hyten, and walked out to load them into Whitten's automobile. At that point.

233 Statement by Leslie Whitten, personal interview, March 2, 1973. 326

FBI agents stepped forward, snatched Whitten's notebook out of his hand, and marched the men off to jail in handcuffs. 234 Other Indians were later arrested.

Columnist Anderson was furious. "The White House is behind this, we're certain of that," he told this investigator

"It is an attempt, as in the Ellsberg case, to establish that the government owns the information. And they are trying to shut us up. Well, they'll see. We are going to be raising 235 holy hell about it."

Slowly the story began to fall together. The Indians around Adeims had been infiltrated by an undercover agent who apparently had informed the FBI that the documents were to be returned and that Whitten would be there. After eight hours in custody— five behind bars— Whitten himself emerged to relate the circumstance of his arrest. He had asked FBI pho­ tographers to take pictures of the cartons marked with the agent's name. "This camera don't work for photographs like that," Whitten was told.^^^

Whitten interview. 235 Statement by Jack Anderson, personal interview. February 1, 1973. 236 Whitten interview. 327

Two weeks after the arrests, Whitten, Adams, and

Anderson appeared before a federal grand jury to tell their story. The jury refused to return an indictment, and the 237 government dropped its charges.

About a week later, Anderson discovered what he thinks to be the reason Whitten was arrested in the first place. In connection with the "investigation" of Whitten, the FBI had subpoenaed Anderson's telephone records, for office and home, from the early summer of 1972. This seemed a bit strange, since the occupation of the Bureau of Indian Affairs hadn't taken place until November. Then Anderson learned that FBI agents had been calling the numbers, some of them unlisted, on his telephone records, apparently in an attempt to track down his sources of information. 238 wrote the columnist;

The G-Men traced phone calls in an effort to locate the sources of our information about the Watergate scan­ dal, secret drug-smuggling reports and other stories. Most of all, the agents seemed eager to find out who has been slipping us confidential excerpts from the FBI's own files.

All of this had nothing to do, of course, with the Indian documents, which the FBI used as an excuse for

237 The Washington Post, February 16, 1973, Sec. C, pp. 1, 10. 238 Jack Anderson, "FBI Used Arrest To Probe Anderson, " The Washington p o s t , February 23, 1973, Sec. D, p. 17. 328

getting our telephone records. This was a flagrant vio­ lation of our rights under the First Amendment. Obvi­ ously, freedom of the press is a mockery if the FBI can block our access to the news by investigating and harass­ ing our news s o u r c e s .239

It was not an idle charge. Federal authorities later acknowledged to a Washington Star-News reporter. Barry Kalb, that the telephone records for both Anderson's home and office had indeed been subpoenaed, dating from the early 240 summer.

According to recent reports, other newsmen have had

their telephones wiretapped by the FBI. The taps were

installed at the request of the White House three years ago,

according to Time magazine, when the Nixon men became upset

over a series of "leaks" and determined they were a threat to

the "domestic security." Director J. Edgar Hoover, said

Time. balked at the order but finally acceded at the request

of Attorney General John Mitchell. The wiretapping operation

continued after Hoover ' s death and was suspended, reported

Time, only after the Supreme court declared Mitchell's lax 241 surveillance policies illegal in June, 1972.

239 Anderson, Sec. D, p. 17-

^^^The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News, February 27, 1973, Sec. A, p. 4.

"Questions About Gray," Time. March 5, 1973, p. 14. 329

What may well prove to be the most effective weapon yet in Nixon's war with the news media was also developed with the approval, and in some cases active cooperation, of the Justice Department. This is the use of the general,

"fishing expedition" subpoena to force newsmen to testify before courts and grand juries and to confiscate their notes, film, photographs, "out-takes," travel vouchers, and expense accounts— regardless of whatever guarantees of confidential­ ity the reporters may have given their sources.

Before the 1968 riots in Chicago at the Democratic convention, newsmen like other citizens, often testified in open court and frequently cooperated with policement to help them solve crimes. On most occasions, however, a reporter testified simply to verify the authenticity of what had been printed or broadcast. Any help given policemen was usually in criminal cases, not the "political" cases which have become so prevalent in the past five years.

In the aftermath of the Chicago riots, however, things changed. A presidential commission, prosecutors, defendants, and grand juries began to subpoena unprecedented quantities

242 Alfred Balk and James Boylan, eds., Our Troubled Press. Ten Years of the Columbia Journalism Review (Boston: Little, Brown and company, 1971), p. 185. 330 of film, notes, and photographs. Again newsmen went out of their way to cooperate, largely because the confidentiality of news sources was not compromised. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were spent to duplicate film and photographs; none of^0.1. the costs ^ were repaid. • J 243

The wave of subpoenas continued to grow. Life. Time. and the Chicago newspapers were told to produce their unpub­ lished materials dealing with the radical group known as the

"Weathermen." New York Times reporter Earl Caldwell was ordered to produce his notes on his dealings with the Black

Panthers. Fortune magazine was subpoenaed to produce the material it had collected while preparing an investigative article on businessman James Long, who was being prosecuted in an antitrust. . ^ J. action. J. • 244

As reporters began complaining that their First

Amendment rights were being violated. Attorney General John

Mitchell came out with a promise "to insure that, in the future, no subpoenas will be issued to the press without a good-faith attempt by the Department of Justice to reach a compromise acceptable to both parties prior to the issuance

243 Balk and Boylan, p. 185.

^^^Balk and Boylan, pp. 185-86. 331

245 of a subpoena."

Shortly after Mitchell's "promise," CBS newsman Mike

Wallace and his producer Paul Loewenwater were subpoenaed to

produce the "out-takes" of a filmed interview with Black

panther Leader Eldridge Cleaver. Times reporter Earl Caldwell was also served with another subpoena. Two networks, CBS

and NBC revealed that they had been served with 122 sub­

poenas in the thirty months between January, 1969, and July, 247 1971; fifty-two of these were government subpoenas.

The use of subpoenas to demand information of news­ men, and thus threaten and possibly cut off their sources,

could not succeed, of course, without the concurrence of the

nation’s courts. The tactic, once thought illegal, was legit­

imatized on June 29, 1972, when the Supreme Court, with four

Nixon appointees concurring, ruled that reporters had no First

Amendment right to withhold information they had obtained in

confidence from grand juries.

245 Balk and Boylan, p. 186. 246 Balk and Boylan, p. 186. 247 Powledge. The Engineering of Restraint, p. 45. 248 Norman E. Isaacs, "Beyond ’Caldwell'— 1: 'There May Be Worse To Come from This Court, ' " Columbia Journalism Review, XI (September-October, 1972), 18. 332

The landmark case, which has become known as the

"Caldwell decision," had its beginnings in 1968, when a thirty-four-year-old black reporter for the New York Times,

Earl Caldwell, gained the confidence of the Black Panther party and began to report their story from the inside. When he wrote of the guns the Panthers were collecting, he was subpoenaed by a federal grand jury in San Francisco that was investigating the black militants. He was advised by legal experts and colleagues to comply; he refused and was cited ^ 249 for contempt.

Caldwell's reasoning was based on his experiences in the civil rights movement. He had been on the Memphis motel balcony with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., when the civil rights leader was shot. He had reported the riots in Dayton and Cincinnati, Ohio, in Los Angeles, Sacramento, Chicago,

Detroit, and Newark. He had followed militant leader Rap

Brown across the country. He was friendly with Panther leader

Eldridge Cleaver and his wife, Kathleen. He knew the Panthers, he said, to be something more than their popular image of black police killers. "The party trusted me so much," Cald­ well wrote, that when he met with them, he "did not have to

249 Earl Caldwell, "’Ask Me. I Know. I Was the Test Case,*" Saturday Review. August 5, 1972, pp. 4-6. 333 250 ask permission to bring along a tape recorder." He simply could not bring himself, he reasoned, to testify against those who had trusted him and to whom he had promised his confidence. Indeed, even to appear before a secret grand jury would ruin his relationship with his sources from that moment

forth.

Moreover, Caldwell has written, the federal govern­

ment used the subpoena as a technique of harassment. He was

first interrogated by the FBI when he reported the fact that

the Panthers were hoarding guns. He refused to cooperate,

and, for a while was left alone. Then, in late 1969, he was

again approached by the FBI ;

. . . They wanted to pick my brain. They wanted me to slip behind my news sources, to act like the double agents I saw on old movie reruns on TV.

This is not my fantasy. The Times knew what was happening. They knew the FBI was calling me every day. Finally, Wallace Turner, chief of the Times bureau in San Francisco, arranged for an assistant, Alma Brackett, to take all my calls. The FBI even had women call. It went on like that for months, until one day an agent told Mrs. Brackett that, if I didn't come in and talk to them. I'd be telling what I knew in court. That's when they subpoenaed me. They asked for all of my tape recordings, notebooks, and other documents covering a

250 Caldwell, p. 5. 251 Caldwell, pp. 4-6. 334

period of more than fourteen months— and let me know that if I did not come in with everything, I would go to jail. . . .252

Caldwell appealed his contempt citation and received

a favorable decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit. The decision said, in part;

If the grand jury may require appellant to make available to it information obtained by him in his capac­ ity as a news gatherer, then the grand jury and the Department of Justice have the power to appropriate appellant's investigative efforts to their own behalf— to convert him after the fact into an investigative agent of the government.

The very concept of a free press requires that the news media be accorded a measure of autonomy; that they should be free to pursue their own investigations to their own ends without fear of governmental interference, and that they should be able to protect their investiga­ tive processes.

To convert news gatherers into Department of Justice investigators is to invade the autonomy of the press by imposing a governmental function upon them. To do so where the result is to diminish their future capacity as news gatherers is destructive of their public function. To accomplish this where it has not been shown to be essential to the grand jury inquiry simply cannot be justified in the public interest. Further, it is not unreasonable to expect journalists everywhere to temper their reporting so as to reduce the probability that they will be required to submit to interrogation. 253

The government appealed to the Supreme Court, which

252 Caldwell, p. 5. 253 Powledge, The Engineering of Restraint, p. 45. 335

accepted the case and consolidated it with two others. One was that of Louisville Courier-Journal reporter Paul Branz- burg, a Harvard Law School graduate who, in 1969, had been permitted to witness drug dealers manufacturing hashish and

report on it; he had written another story concerning drug

use in Frankfort, Kentucky. A grand jury had demanded the

identity of the central characters in his stories and he had 254 refused to divulge the information. The third case

involved Paul Pappas, a television reporter-photographer in

New Bedford, Massachusetts. Pappas had been given a con­

ditional invitation to visit Black Panther headquarters in

New Bedford, and he refused to tell a grand jury what he had - 255 Witnessed.

On June 29, 1972, the Supreme Court returned its

decision: the reporters did not have a First Amendment right

to refuse to cooperate with the grand juries. Writing for the

majority. Justice Byron R. White stated that "fair and effec­

tive law enforcement aimed at providing security for the per­

son and property of the individual is a fundamental function

of government, and the grand jury plays an important.

254 The New York Times, June 30, 1972, p. 15. 255 The New York Times. June 30, 1972, p. 15. 336 constitutionally mandated role in this process.Thus,

White concluded:

On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncer­ tain, burden on news gathering which is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial.257

In what some observers believed to be an incredible display of twisted logic, the majority— including Chief Jus­ tice Burger and Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist— declared that consideration for the problems that a pro-press ruling would create for the courts somehow overrode the sig­ nificance of the First Amendment;

The administration of a constitutional newsman's privilege would present practical and conceptual diffi­ culties of a high order. Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods. . . .258

In his dissenting opinion. Justice Potter Stewart

2 c 0 The New York Times, June 30, 1972, p. 15. 257 The New York Times. June 30, 1972, p. 15. 258 Isaacs, "Beyond 'Caldwell,'" p. 20. 337 accused the court of harboring a "crabbed view" of the First

Amendment; in its ruling, he wrote, the court was inviting government authorities at all levels "to undermine the his­ toric independence of the press by attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of govern- 259 ment." Characteristically, Justice William O. Douglas held to his view that freedom of the press is an absolute right :

Those in power, whatever their politics, want only to perpetuate it. Now that the fences of the law and the tradition that has protected the press are broken down, the people are the victims. The First Amend­ ment, as I read it, was designed precisely to prevent that tragedy,260

Although most newsmen were shocked at the ruling, many had anticipated it. Justice William Rehnquist, in fact, had argued against a First Amendment "privilege" for newsmen months before when he was an Assistant Attorney Gen­ eral. He also helped prepare the department's "guidelines" 2 8 X on the issuance of subpoenas to newsmen in 1970. Yet he did not disqualify himself. Indeed, he cast the deciding

259 The New York Times, June 30, 1972, p. 15. 2 cm The New York Times. June 30, 1972, p. 15.

^^^The New York Times, June 30, 1972, p. 15. 338 vote, an act which Earl Caldwell said "makes me sick-"262

Both Burger and Powell, furthermore, had been involved in the preparation of the famous "Reardon Report"— the document, published under the auspices of the American

Bar Association, which created a fair trial-free press furor between the bar and the press in the late I960's.Burger had also clashed with the press on several occasions after assuming his Supreme Court seat. He occasionally banned broadcast coverage of his public speeches; he once attempted to control rights to his "state of the judiciary" speech to the ABA. He has taken into his confidence two wire service reporters and supplied them with "background" material which was made available to no other newsmen.

In Atlanta, Burger once barred radio-television coverage of a speech to the ABA and actually turned away a

CBS reporter who showed up with a tape recorder and camera crew. When asked why he proscribed coverage of his address.

Burger said, "If you have a couple of hours sometime, come

^^^Caldwell, "'Ask Me,'" p. 5. 2 CO Isaacs, "Beyond 'Caldwell,'" p. 21. 264 "When Officials Shackle the News," Saturday Review. December 12, 1970, p. 49. 339 by my office and I'll explain it to you." The next day.

Burger allowed that television lights hurt his eyes. The

Chief Justice also went out of his way to telephone the CBS reporter's superiors to complain about the newsman's "dis- 265 respectful and outrageous" behavior.

In the eight months that followed the Caldwell decision, judges, attorneys, and grand juries across the country unleashed an unprecedented barrage of subpoenas on newsmen. More than thirty-five refused to comply and were cited for contempt. The first to actually go to jail was a thirty-six-year-old investigative reporter for the now defunct Newark Evening News. Peter Bridge.

In May, 1972, Bridge reported that a member of the

Newark Housing Authority Commission, Pearl Beatty, had been offered a $10,000 bribe to influence her vote on a particular issue. An ambitious public prosecutor, Joseph Lordi, decided he wanted to know the name of the unidentified per­ son who had made the bribe; he summoned Bridge before a grand jury. The newsman refused— on the grounds that it would threaten confidential sources who had verified the story— to reveal more information than had been published. He was

2 c c will Muller, "Chief Justice's Words Not Writ on Stone," The Quill. LVIII (April, 1970), 29. 340 cited for contempt. The case wound its way to the Supreme

Court, which, in October, refused to delay Bridge's imprison­ ment while he prepared a petition for a full-dress review of his case. He was manacled and led off to jail, where he

stayed for twenty-one days until the grand jury which had 267 issued the subpoena disbanded.

From his jail cell. Bridge castigated his own col­

leagues whom, he said, had ignored the story until he was behind bars :

I was bleeding to death for four months and it wasn ' t a story until l went to jail. The issue was not whether I was going to jail but the harassment the authorities were putting me through.

If I could be put in jail for doing my job, then they could fill up the jails with reporters. If the newspapers don't realize that, you wonder if they deserve the freedom they h a v e . 268

Curtis Meaner, the judge who sentenced Bridge to jail,

told the reporter that his appeal for a stay was "a charade."

Said Bridge: "I thought that was rather injudicious coming

^^^The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily N ew s. October 9, 1972, Sec. A, p. 3. 267 Associated Press dispatch. The Washington Post. October 25, 1972. 268 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. October 9, 1972, Sec. A, p. 3, 341

from a judge. I didn't hire him for his legal advice."269

Shortly after Bridge was released, another reporter,

William T. Farr of the Los Angeles Times, was jailed for contempt— months after he had originally refused to reveal

confidential sources to a judge. During the murder trial of

Charles Manson— the "hippie" cult leader who was convicted

of killing actress Sharon Tate and four other persons— Farr

obtained the confidential statement of a potential witness who had related the details of future murders the clan had

planned to execute. California Superior court Judge Charles

H. Older learned of Farr's pending story and called him in

to talk about it. The judge informed Farr, however, that he

did not have to answer any questions because of a California

law which extended newsmen the "privilege" of keeping their

sources confidential. Farr refused to reveal the information,

and he published the story despite Cider's stern warning not 270 to. The sequestered jury never saw it.

Later, Farr left the Los Angeles Herald Examiner. where he was working at the time, and took a job in the

269 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. October 9, 1972, Sec. A, p. 3. 270 The Washington Post. November 17, 1972, Sec. A, p. 5. 342 office of the Los Angeles County District Attorney. Judge

Older then called Farr in, informed him he was no longer pro­ tected by the California "shield" law, and demanded to know the identity of his sources. Again Parr refused to comply.

This time he was cited for contempt— even though he was once again a working reporter, this time for the Los Angeles Times. 271 Farr was, said Older, "a martyr without a cause." The

State Court of Appeals and the California Supreme Court sus­ tained the lower court ruling; the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case. On November 15, 1972, Farr was ordered to 272 jail until he revealed his sources. Judge Older issued an order that Farr was to receive no special privileges, and the newsman was confined in a windowless, eight-by-twelve foot cell in the jail's hospital ward. He was denied television and a watch. He was allowed to have paper and a pencil, but 273 visitors were permitted to bring him nothing but underwear.

Farr remained behind bars for forty-five days until he was finally released to pursue a bid for a writ of habeas

271 The Washington Post, February 5, 1973, Sec. A, p. 4. 272 The New York Times, November 17, 1972, p. 24. 273 The Washington Post. December 14, 1972, Sec. A, p. 30 343 274 corpus,

During the trial of the seven men eventually con­ victed in the break-in and "bugging" of Democratic National

Committee headquarters at Washington's Watergate complex^ the

Los Angeles Times published an interview with a prosecution witnessj Alfred c. Baldwigi III, an ex-FBI agent who told of being hired to monitor wiretaps at the Watergate. One of the defense attorneys asked U.S. District Judge John Sirica for permission to subpoena the tape-recordings of the inter- 275 view; the judge promptly agreed.

However, the reporters who conducted the interview.

Jack Nelson and Ronald Ostrow, had turned the tapes over to their editors in Los Angeles. Sirica then ordered the Times

Washington bureau chief, John Lawrence, to produce the tapes.

Lawrence refused and was jailed for two hours until released on appeal. Finally, Baldwin himself released the Times from its pledge of confidence, and the tapes were released to the ^ 276 — court.

274 The Washington Post, February 5, 1973, Sec. A, p. 4. 275 The Washington Post, October 26, 1972, Sec. A, . p. 8.

^^^The Washington Post, October 26, 1972, Sec. A, p. 8. 344

Later reporter Nelson accused the federal government of deliberate harassment. The authorities, he said, "upon learning of the interview, tried to block publication first by prior restraint, threatening to withdraw Baldwin’s immu­ nity from prosecution if the story appeared." They then beseeched Sirica to issue a "gag rule, " which he did. "The prosecutors," said Nelson, "told Baldwin he faced possible prosecution and a contempt of court proceeding if the story appeared, " The Times printed the interview. "Six days after the Baldwin story appeared," said Nelson, "Earl J. Silbert, the chief prosecutor, told me I would have to produce the tapes. He said, 'If we don’t subpoena you, the defense will,’" The defense did subpoena the recordings, and the 277 federal prosecutors stipulated they had no objection.

The Caldwell, Bridge, Parr, and Lawrence cases, along with several others, have prompted a movement in Congress to write a law granting newsmen the "privilege" of withholding confidential information. As of the beginning of February,

1973, ninety-one members of congress and seventeen Senators had either submitted such a bill or co-sponsored one. Several

277 The Washington Post. February 6, 1973, Sec. A, p. 5. 345 major problems have emerged, however, one of which is whe­ ther to grant an "absolute" privilege or a "qualified" one.

Most newsmen who have testified before the Senate and House committee considering the bills have favored either an abso­

lute privilege bill or none at all, on the theory that any qualified privilege would limit the absolute rights they now

feel they have in the First Amendment. Another major stum­ bling block in assembling a newsman's privilege bill concerns the definition of a "newsman." Who among the thousands of people involved in disseminating information is to be given

the "privilege" of withholding confidential sources? Campus reporters? The "underground" press? And how should quali­

fication be determined? Are newsmen going to have to be 278 certified in some way?

The problems will be resolved in some manner, for it

is almost certain that Congress will pass some bill to pro­ vide the "newsman's privilege" which the Supreme Court has held the press doesn't inherently possess by virtue of the

First Amendment. Sam Ervin of North Carolina, the Senate's

foremost Constitutional lawyer and chairman of the sub­ committee considering the Senate privilege bills, is

278 The Washington Post. February 5, 1973, Sec. A, p. 4. 346 convinced the Supreme Court erred in the Caldwell case. The

Congress, he feels, must fill the gap:

Congress must attempt to be as wise as the drafters of the First Amendment two hundred years ago. A press which is not free to gather news without threat of ulti­ mate incarceration cannot play its role meaningfully. The people as a whole must suffer, For to make thought­ ful and efficacious decisions— whether it be at the local school-board meeting or in the voting booth— the people need information. If the sources of that information are limited to official spokesmen, the people have no means of evaluating the worth of their promises and assur­ ances .279

The Nixon Administration, as might be expected, has little sympathy for congressional efforts to write a law granting "privilege" to newsmen. In a letter to Robert G.

Fichenberg, chairman of the freedom of information committee of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, President Nixon himself declared there was no need for privilege legislation

"at this time." The "guidelines" on subpoenas composed by former Attorney General John Mitchell were sufficient, the

President said. Besides, the states could do the job; Con­ gress should exercise caution because the "merits of enact­ ing such laws must be carefully weighed against the dangers inherent in the administration and exercise of such a

279 "Fight Over Freedom and privilege," Time, March 5, 1973, p. 64. 347 privilege.

Herb Klein has simplified the Nixon position by stat­ ing that the Administration "does not oppose" granting pro­ tection to newsmen. "We just think, "he said, "it's a mistake to rush in with a federal shield law" before the situation has been carefully examined. Klein also argued that relief for newsmen ought to be sought "where the problems arise— 281 in the states."

Such an approach, however, completely ignores the fact that it is state laws which have created many of the problems for the press. Reporters in New Jersey and Calif­ ornia were jailed despite the fact that these states had

"shield laws" on the books. The Nixon men well know, say some critics, that relegating the problem to the states is a foolproof method of insuring that it will not be solved for ^ ^ 282 a long time to come.

THE RESULTS OF INTIMIDATION

Newsmen generally abhor the suggestion that they may

260 Associated Press dispatch. The Washington Post. November 10, 1972. 281 Mark R. Arnold, "pressure on the Press Alarms Newsmen, " The National Observer, December 30, 1972, p. 20.

^^^Arnold, p. 20. 348 be responding to the Administration's intimidation campaign in the manner the Nixon men want them to. Evidence is accumulating, however, which suggests this is precisely the case. There can be no question that the news media are in a far more vulnerable position today than they were when

Richard Nixon assumed office in 1969. And, when an insti­ tution begins to realize its vulnerability, it tends to take steps to protect itself. The simplest precaution is to avoid reporting stories which may cause trouble.

One man who has made the charge that the press is knuckling under to Nixon is Ralph Nader, one of the nation's premier muckrakers, in the best sense of the word. The White

House press corps, Nader publicly charged, is "a mimeograph 283 machine" for the Administration's pronouncements. What the President declares, said Nader, "the press reports. 284 There is absolutely no news judgment." As a remedy, Nader suggested assigning investigative reporters to the White 285 House and rotating the assignments.

283 United press International dispatch. The [Washing­ ton, D.C.] Eveninc Star and Daily News. December 15, 1972. 284 United Press International dispatch. The [Washing­ ton, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News, December 15, 1972. 285 United Press International dispatch. The [Washing­ ton, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. December 15, 1972. 349

Another who has made similar charges is Fred

Friendly, former CBS president. Attacks on the press, he charged on May 22, 1970, have caused newsmen to shun probing reports and to concentrate instead on the trivial. He con­ tinued ;

The journalist fails when he allows himself to be diverted by the tactics of a skilled sleight-of-hand artist, like the Vice President.

Mr. Agnew is so good at it that Wednesday's [May 20, 1970] New York Times felt it necessary to devote four front-page columns, including a picture, to the Vice President beaning the director of the Peace Corps with a tennis ball, while burying on Page 29 a major report on sulfur dioxide which affects us all.286

The Nixon men, as Nader charged, especially approve of those news organizations which objectively transmit the

President's words. "This is pretty much what the wire ser­ vices do and do well," press critic Ben Bagdikian has writ­ ten, "which is why they are always pointed to by the White 287 House media watchers as the perfect model of journalism."

The wire services, of course, do not look upon them­ selves as transmission belts. In their view, they "search" facts while striving for the elusive goal of "objectivity."

286 The Washington Post, May 23^ 1970^ Sec. Aj p, 2. 287 Ben H. Bagdikian, "The Fruits of Agnewism," Colum­ bia Journalism Review. XI (January-February, 1973), 10. 3 50

The professional journalist. Associated Press president Wes

Gallagher has said, is one who is "impartial" and "objec­ tive"; he continued;

It is the journalist's task to be a clear, cool objective voice bringing reason to an inflamed and con­ fused world. The strident, partisan voices in today's society contribute heat but no light to a society drown­ ing in problems. They are not in short supply. Someone must make sense out of the heated rhetoric. Someone must search for the facts— all the facts— not just those that fit his point of view, and present them to the public.288

It sounds impressive and laudable. But the Asso­ ciated Press has been known to suppress well-documented stories which were uncomplimentary to the Administration.

This investigator was a personal witness to one incident in which an AP reporter brought a story to syndicated columnist

Jack Anderson because his editors felt it treated Nixon too harshly. Anderson rechecked the facts, then rewrote and published the story.

The Administration-led attempt to swamp newsmen with subpoenas, however, is the tactic which most threatens to sink the ship of press freedom, A reporter's sources are his lifeblood, the one treasure he cannot live without, and

238 Wes Gallagher, "'Someone Must Search for the Facts,' " Columbia Journalism Review. XI (January-February, 1973), 70. 351 they threaten to "dry up" when they feel their identities may be exposed. Reporters themselves begin to avoid stories which they think might cause them grief.

After newsman Peter Bridge was jailed, for example, two high-level municipal employees in Newark were fired.

"They were suspected— that's right suspected." wrote Bridge, 289 "of being sources of information to me, as a reporter."

What disturbed Bridge even more, however, was the reaction of some of his peers to his jailing. Wrote Bridge:

. . . Some of my colleagues, while supporting my own action, have told me that they have pulled their own punches on some stories because of what was happen­ ing to me. They have not told the whole truth because they do not want to go to jail. They would, they said, if faced with the same situation as mine, go to jail. But why create the same situation?

So the public is already suffering from the current anti-press trend by government agencies. It is being robbed of the full truth because of the intimidation of the press by government officials who are supposed to be representing that same public.

A California reporter heard of some possible cor­ ruption in his state legislature and called a lobbyist to confirm the story. Asked the lobbyist: "If I answer that

289 peter Bridge, "Is the Press 'All Too Willing To Be Neutralized'?" The National Observer, December 9, 1972, p. 15. Italics in the original. 290 Bridge, p. 15. 352

291 question, will you go to jail to protect me?" A radio

operator in California obtained a promise of help on a bail- bond scandal story from a government employee; when the reporter called for the information, however, he found the man had heard of the Caldwell decision. "As far as I'm con­

cerned," the erstwhile source said, "I haven't even spoken 292 to you." The Boston Globe's assistant managing editor,

Timothy Leland, anticipated grand jury subpoenas from a

planned investigative series. "We spelled this out to one

or two reporters whom we wanted to work on the story," he 293 said. "They considered it combat duty and backed out."

This investigator was told by a Spanish-American taxi driver

in Washington, D.C., that a certain Congressman, whom he knew

on sight, had become upset at the driver's complaints about

inflation and, as a result, had huffily refused to tip him

a single penny. The driver was asked to identify the big-

hearted public servant. His reply: "You kidding? Look what

they are doing to Ellsberg. What do you think they could do

291 "Nixon and the Media," Newsweek, January 15, 1973, p. 47, 292 "Nixon and the Media," p. 47. 293 "Fight Over Freedom and privilege," Time, March 15, 1973, p. 65. 353 to me, an ordinary hack, if I told you who the guy was?"

Reporter Les Whitten was asked if his being jailed for

"possession" of the "Indian papers" had affected his relationship with his sources. "The Indians won't talk to me anymore," he said. "They're afraid the FBI will be lis- tenrng."^ . ,.294

One of the most disturbing results of the Nixon assault on the press has been its effect on broadcast jour­ nalism— the medium which has been the special target of the

Nixon men. Broadcast journalists are a nervous breed to begin with— and understandably so, since their right to use the public airways is dependent upon a government-is sued license.

Just two days after Vice-President Agnew's Des Moines speech, the city of Washington, B.C., was the scene of one of the largest anti-war demonstrations in history. Some half million citizens marched peacefully by the White House. The networks, however, gave the event scant notice. Eight months later, comedian Bob Hope came to town to lead the celebration of an "Honor America Day. " This time, the networks were out in force, devoting hours of coverage to what FCC Commissioner

294 Statement by Leslie Whitten, personal interview, March 2, 1973. 354

Nicholas Johnson called "the apple pie view of America."295

Johnson also noticed other discrepancies which hailed, he said, "the beginning of the Age of Agnew in journalism":

. , . Picking up the spirit of the times, ABC Sports banned halftime coverage of the Buffalo-Holy Cross foot­ ball game because it had to do with the "controversial" subject of peace but provided a nationwide audience for the chairman of the Joint chiefs of Staff to say a few words on behalf of war at the halftime of the Army-Navy game.296

At CBS, the network had purchased a fifteen-minute special entitled "The Sixties," for use on its "60 Minutes" public affairs program. It was cancelled shortly before air­ time. NBC picked it up and eventually ran it in edited form.

The producer. Chuck Braverman, charged the networks thought 297 it too offensive in the wake of Agnew's criticism. At

NBC, network news officials began flashing the word "commen­ tary" across the screen whenever anything was broadcast which 298 could possibly be construed as opinion.

Affiliate stations across the country underwent an

even greater retrenchment than the networks. According to

295 The Washington Post. March 28, 1971, Sec. B, p. 4. 296 The Washington Post, March 28, 1971, Sec. B, p. 4. 297 Barrett, The Alfred I. duPont-Columbia University Survey of Broadcast Journalism 1969-1970, p. 41. 298 Barrett, p. 41. 355

CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite, his network's affiliates began demanding less analysis and criticism. Some of the local stations began overlaying a slide on the screen stat­ ing that what the viewer was witnessing was "CBS News Net­ work Analysis," or "This does not represent the views of this ^ . . ,,299 station."

At Dallas-Pt. Worth, station WFAA announced it would use "Support Your President" station breaks. The WFAA anchor­ men also began wearing flag lapel pins.^^^ In Seattle, KIRO-

TV labeled itself the "good news" station and began promoting its "fairness." KIRO, stated the station's ads, "tells your side of the story.

"The original rash of viewer criticism stimulated station managers to take various significant actions," reported the Alfred I. dupont-columbia University Survey of 302 Broadcast Journalism. In one case, the survey reported:

. . . KHVH Honolulu instituted a Citizens Editorial Board to 'discuss and evaluate the handling of the news. The station did not, it was quick to explain, "intend to accept policy from the board, but merely criticism. Hope­ fully this criticism will bridge the gap of understanding between us." Eight months later, the board had yet to meet. According to DuPont's Honolulu correspondent.

299 300 Barrett, pp. 41-42 Barrett, p. 42.

^^^Barrett, p. 43 ^^^Barrett, p. 43. 356

"Lawrence S. Berger, president of KHVH, was unable to find the right kind of balance of people to serve on this board. Only right-wing activists were eager to serve. Left-wing activists would have nothing to do with it. And, as for the middle-of-the roaders— they didn't even want to be heard from."303

In Detroit, NBC affiliate WWJ-TV has long been fol­ lowing the nightly news show with a program of its own featur­ ing Fred E. Dohrs, a conservative professor from Wayne State

University who presumably slices through the liberal "plug- ola" espoused by John Chancellor, David Brinkley, and com­ pany, to inform a waiting city of the real truth. In Denver, listeners to radio station KHOW, an ABC affiliate, haven't 304 heard a network news broadcast for three years.

The campaign of intimidation, however, has produced results which are far less visible and infinitely more danger­ ous than these. The assaults have wrought a "chilling effect" on journalists, especially broadcast newsmen. Stories that might have been reported in 1968 are not reported now, simply because avoiding a controversial story is the easiest way to avoid trouble. In other words, the use of intimidation tech­ niques is just another way of effecting prior restraint.

303 Barrett, pp. 43-44. 304 "Mr. Nixon Jawbones the Media," Newsweek, January 1, 1973, p. 14. 357 censorship in advance. Bill Monroe, the Washington editor of NBC's "Today" show has explained the subtleness of the chilling effect like this:

I have no atrocity story to tell about outright government censorship. I have never seen it happen, perhaps it never has. But I know that what might be called indirect, or unintended government censorship has happened. . . .

We do know there are stations that don't do investi­ gative reporting. There are stations that confine their documentaries to safe subjects. There are stations that do editorialize, but don’t say anything. There are sta­ tions that do outspoken editorials, but are scared to endorse candidates. My opinion is that much of this kind of caution, probably most of it, is due to a deep feeling that boldness equals trouble with government, blandness equals peace.305

Monroe failed to mention that the networks, as well as individual stations, have turned down major stories out of fear for the consequences. All three major networks, for example, were offered huge chunks of the Pentagon Papers, and all three turned the offers d o w n . 305

At CBS, reporters actively pursued Daniel Ellsberg, the man with the papers. They finally caught up with him in

Boston, and Walter cronkite personally flew up for an

^Quotable . . . , "Newspapers Should Help in Broad­ casters* Fight," The Quill. LX (May, 1972), 22.

^^^Steve Knoll, "When TV Was Offered the Pentagon Papers," Columbia Journalism Review. X (March-April), 1972), 46-48. 358 exclusive interview. The questions, however, focused on

"Ellsberg the man" and rarely touched upon the great issues involved. Ellsberg offered CBS a two-foot high stack of the

Pentagon Papers, but the network refused to broadcast the contents. CBS officials denied their decision was rooted in their concern for their government-licensed radio and television stations,

NBC officials displayed a remarkable lack of sophis­ tication when they refused the papers. They didn't air them, they said, because Ellsberg insisted they do it immediately upon receiving the papers. Had they accepted Ellsberg's terms, one NBC representative said, it would have been tanta­ mount to "press agentry for Ellsberg, " When Ellsberg offered to appear on NBC, following his CBS interview, he was turned down. The reason: "Ellsberg had answered almost all the questions we would have asked." The network finally ran

stories based on the papers— after the Supreme Court had 3 08 ruled in favor of the newspapers.

ABC refused a thousand pages of the Pentagon Papers because "it's not a very good television story." The network

307 Knoll, p. 46.

^°®Knoll, p. 47. 359 was also advised by its lawyers that it may have been held in contempt if it "published" the papers in cities where news- papers ■uhad X.been enjoined. . . 309

The Nixon men are apparently pleased with the results of their press policy. In April, 1970— just five months after

Agnew's Des Moines speech. Herb Klein addressed the convention of the National Association of Broadcasters and claimed that television coverage of the Administration was "more fair" in the post-Agnew months. He cited the practice of labeling com­ mentary as evidenceJournalist Julius Duscha interviewed

Nixon's chief media watcher, Patrick Buchanan, and recorded this account of Buchanan's comments :

"We of course don't take credit for the CBS Spectrum commentators or the wide range of opinion on the New York Times op-ed page . . . but consider CBS's Spectrum. They've got Jeffrey St. John and Stan Evans on the right, Stu Alsop in the middle, and Murray Kempton and Nick von Hoffman on the left. This is a balanced run of commentary which is a by-product of the Vice President’s criticism of the networks.311

But the essence of the White House attitude has been

summed up best by none other than the President's daughter,

Tricia. On the occasion of her twenty-fourth birthday in

309 Knoll, p. 47.

^^^Barrett, "Survey," p. 42. 311 Duscha, "The White House," p. 9. 360

1970, she was quoted as saying:

The Vice President is incredible. I feel I should write him a letter. He's amazing what he has done to the media . . . helping to reform itself [sic]. I'm a close watcher of newspapers and TV and I think they've taken a second look. You can't underestimate the power of fear. They're afraid if they don't shape up . . . .312

"THANK YOU FOR THE NICE COVERAGE"

The Nixon Administration's approach to the news media is not entirely negative. Often newsmen publish reports which the President or his associates feel are worthy of reward or praise. On occasion. Administration officials go out of their way to be complimentary to individual newsmen and the press in general. The combination of rewards and compliments generally serve to keep the press off balance and unsure of what to expect next.

At the Pentagon, for example, former Defense Secretary

Laird set up a "Correspondents Corridor" to honor those news­ men who cover the Department of Defense. At one end of the one-fifth mile corridor, he established a memorial to the thirty-six reporters who were killed in battle since World War

II. At the dedication ceremony, Laird had nothing but praise for the "adversary relationship" between politicians and

312 Barrett, p. 42. 361 press. He said:

We need not apologize for the adversary relationship of the government and press. Instead we should praise it and preserve it. And as we go about our constitu­ tional business of being adversaries, we should avoid becoming antagonists.313

Nixon himself has occasionally engaged in the prac­ tice of honoring his "friends" in the press. On September 4,

1972, he threw a Labor Day party for one hundred newsmen at his San Clemente villa. He promised to give his golf clubs to any reporter who could stroke a hole-in-one on his private golf course. When, after several tries, no one was success­ ful, he increased the prize by throwing in his golf cart.

No winner emerged, and Nixon declared the prize would be awarded to any of the reporters who scored an ace between 314 then and the election.

Inclusion in the press party which traveled with the

President to China in February, 1972, as previously explained, was based largely on a system of rewards and punishments. A number of newspapers which cover the White House on a daily basis were not permitted to send representatives because they

313 United Press International dispatch. The Washing­ ton Post, November 22, 1972. 314 United Press International dispatch, The [Washing­ ton, B.C.] Evening Star and Daily News, September 5, 1972. 362 were considered too critical of the president. Other reporters were chosen, however, because they were close to the Administration. One surprise choice for the honor was columnist John Osborne of the liberal New Republic magazine, whose selection at first seemed to violate the "rewards and punishment" theory. Former presidential aide Richard J.

Whalen, however, solved the mystery when he revealed that

Nixon was pleased when Osborne published a column in which he adjudged the President's first year in office a good one.

Wrote Whalen:

. . . When he [Osborne] ventured mild praise ("a better President than I thought the candidate of 1968 capable of being"), he was shocked by the vehemently critical mail he received. To be sure, Nixon himself was pleased and thereafter came to regard him as one of the "good liberals," a factor in such bestowals of favor as Osborne's inclusion in the press contingent taken along on the Peking trip.315

One of the prized rewards Nixon holds out for those reporters who treat him kindly is the exclusive interview.

Very few newsmen, for example, have ever managed to get inside the presidential "hideaway" office— where Nixon goes to do his thinking— in the old Executive Office Building across the

315 Richard J. Whalen, "See Dick, See Dick Run. See John Osborne Watch Dick Run," Esquire, LXXVIII (October, 1972), 196. 363

Street from the White House. Yet reporter and columnist

Frank van der Linden, a Nixon favorite, was invited in for a solo interview during which he noticed such things as the

"deeply etched" lines in Nixon's face, his reading glasses, 316 briar pipes, and presidential "demeanor."

One of Nixon's favorite newspapers, because of the relatively kind manner in which it usually treats him, is the

Washington Evening Star and Daily News. The newspaper's

White House correspondent for eighteen years, Garnett D. 317 Horner, ranks high on the president's preferred List. For, in addition to working for an approved newspaper, Horner has a professional philosophy which endears him to a President who likes reporters to impersonate transmission belts. As

Horner explains it ;

My function is to report the President's actions and as far as possible to interpret his actions— to make clear what they mean without advocating one point of view or another. So many of our colleagues give the impression that they know more about running the country than the people they're covering. But they weren't elected to run the country, and as a newspaper reader, I would not be interested in reading what some reporter thinks.318

316 The Miami Herald, September 14, 1972, Sec. A, p. 14. 317 "Horner's Corner," Newsweek. December 25, 1972, pp. 51-52. 318 "Horner's Corner," p. 52. 364

Horner has often demonstrated why he is so well liked by the Administration, Just prior to the July, 1970, press conference in Los Angeles, for example, he approached press secretary Ziegler and inquired, "Is there any fertile ground we should plow tonight?" Well, Ziegler ventured, the

President might have something to say about his efforts to take the government to the people, such as this "historic first" press conference in California— if he were asked, that 319 is. Whereupon, during the press conference, Horner stood up and confronted the President with this challenging inquiry:

Mr. President, this press conference in Los Angeles is sort of a climax to a series of activities that you have described as bringing the government to the people, such as your recent meetings in Louisville, Fargo, Salt Lake City, and your work at the Western White House in San Clemente. What benefits do you see to you and to the country from such activities?320

"Nixon must have felt like [baseball slugger] Frank 321 Howard at batting practice," wrote one reporter. "When last seen," wrote another, "that softball had cleared the 322 Coliseum and was heading out into the Pacific."

319 " Martin Nolan, "Ron Among the Plastic Alligators," (More). A Journalism Review. II (September, 1972), 12. 320 321 Nolan, p. 12. Nolan, p. 12. 322 The Washington Post. December 10, 1970, Sec. A, p. 18. 365

As a result of his willingness to play the game by the Administration's rules, Horner has been blessed with a number of "scoops" and "exclusives." He scored his "biggest beat, the high point of forty-five years in the newspaper world" in November, 1972, when he was granted an exclusive interview with the President, one which, by all accounts, provided penetrating insight into the Nixon mind and his plans 323 for his second term. It was both a reward for Horner and punishment for his newspaper's chief competitor, the Washing­ ton Post, which had embarrassed the Administration during the election campaign with its devastating exposes on the "Water­ gate affair." As one White House aide told a Time magazine reporter :

The whole idea was to screw the Washington Post. The thinking was, "How can we hurt the post the most?" They seem to relish the frontal attacks. The answer is to get people thinking, "I wonder what's in the Star-News today?"324

The Administration official charged with keeping the news media happy, as explained in Chapter 4, was the "Direc­ tor of Communications," Herb Klein. He mastered the art of

323 "White House Scoop," Time, November 27, 1972, p. 62. The interview was published in The [Washington, D.C.Î Evening Star and Daily News. November 9, 1972, Sec. A, pp. 1, 6, 324 "White House Scoop," p. 62, 366 complimenting the press, and he traveled widely about the

Western Hemisphere to do it. In an interview on public tele­ vision in March, 1971, Klein consistently refused to "join my friends" in a "blanket indictment of any one of the net- 325 works." Indeed, he could not see what all the fuss over the CBS documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon, " was all about. It was not a "fully balanced" program, he would admit, but there was good reason to criticize government information operations in "not only the pentagon, but in other depart­ ments" as well. One week later, Klein flew to Chicago to address the annual convention of the National Association of

Broadcasters. Broadcast journalism in America, he said, was

"the greatest in the world in professionalism and objectiv- 3 27 ity. " He admitted there were "some exceptions" but applauded the "adversary relationship" as "a healthy 328 thing." A year later, he returned to the same convention and read a letter from the President praising the broadcast­

ing industry and promising a limited regulatory role for the

32 5 The Washington Post, March 24, 1971, Sec. A, p. 1.

^^^The Washington Post. March 24, 1971, Sec. A, p. 1. 327 The Washington Post, March 24, 1971, Sec. A, p. 1. 3 28 The Washington Post. March 24, 1971, Sec. A, p. 1. 367 329 federal government.

A rare turnabout came on September 27, 1972, when

Klein went on the NBC "Today" show and declared he had "not met an intimidated reporter yet and I don't think I will."

There was simply nothing to the "feeling that the press thinks it has been bullied," he said. "I have serious doubts," he 330 concluded, "for the need of a federal shield law. "

When speaking to an audience of newsmen a few weeks later, however, Klein told the Radio-TV News Directors Asso­ ciation that he abhorred the jailing of reporters who refuse to reveal their confidential sources. The "courts have done a disservice," he said, "to . . . basic issues concerning the 331 rights of newsmen and the judiciary process," In both the Bridge and Parr cases, Klein said, "the jury and the

judge had other witnesses who could provide information if they would. It is unfair and clouds the real issues to take 332 such arbitrary stands."

329 "Broadcasters plan Intensified Lobbying in Move To Protect Licenses, Revenues," National Journal. May 6, 1972, p. 786. ^United Press International dispatch. The Washing­ ton Post, November 20, 1972, 331 Associated Press dispatch. The [Washington, B.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. December 4, 1972. 332 Associated Press dispatch. The [Washington, D.C.] 368

No one is more adept at making an annointed newsman feel special, however, than the master himself. Nixon has frequently placed personal calls to reporters to thank them for coverage which particularly pleased him. Both as a can­ didate and as president, Nixon has written and called his favorite anchorman, ABC's Howard K. Smith, to praise his per- 333 N. formances. When CBS broadcast a White House dinner for^

Italian Prime Minister Emilio Colombo on its "60 Minutes" program, Nixon tracked down the producer, Don Hewitt, in a

New York restaurant to tell him how much the First Family enjoyed the show.^^^

On another occasion, he telephoned labor columnist

Victor Riesel, who was sick with a cold at the time.

"Victor, how are you?" Nixon asked.

"Well, Mr. President," said Riesel, "I'm fighting a bug, but I'm not going to let it get me down."

Said Nixon: "I don't have anything on my mind, I just called to talk about what you've been writing about the

Evening Star and Daily News, December 4, 1972. 333 Jules Witcover, The Resurrection of Richard Nixon (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), p. 39. 334 Hugh Sidey, "'This Is the White House calling,'" Life. April 2, 1971, p. 2B. 369 335 construction trades."

In Davenport, Iowa, one day in 1971, television announcer Bill Gress of station WOC was in a meeting with his manager when a call came through from the White House.

He picked up the phone, and the familiar voice on the other end said: "Bill, I just wanted to thank you for the nice coverage your station did on my visit to Iowa.

335 Sidey, p. 2B.

^^^Sidey, p. 2B. chapter 6

THE 1972 CAMPAIGN: THE GRAND STRATEGY AT WORK

The previous chapters have attempted to establish that Richard Nixon and his cadre of close advisors have con­ ceived and executed a plan to: (1) evade the national press corps while they directly address the people with their own view of reality, and (2) render ineffectual those in the news media who refuse to cooperate. The 1972 campaign pro­ vides a case study of this plan. Indeed, a review of the record, even such a superficial review as shall be presented here, demonstrates that the three major elements of the grand strategy which have been used over the past five years (includ­ ing the 1958 campaign) were followed to the letter in the 1972 campaign. The national press was isolated and denied meaning­ ful information while the President and his re-election team went to the people with their own message. A campaign of

intimidation was begun, but, as shall be shown, it was soon aborted, largely because the previous four years of assault and battery had already worked their magic to create a tim­ orous press.

370 371

THE NONESSENTIAL PRESS

In the midst of the 1972 campaign, reporter Richard

Reeves wrote this about the Nixon press strategy:

With four years of experience behind them, the • Republicans or, in this case, the Nixon Administration and its re-election apparatus, have learned an essential lesson about the press: If you keep your mouth shut, there's not much they can do to you.l

Newsmen began to get an idea of what was to come dur­

ing the convention in Miami Beach. They were unwelcome at

most events, especially "social" affairs attended by the par- 2 ty's wealthy contributors. At the convention headquarters

in the Fontainebleau Hotel, Nixon's public relations team

routinely handed out "news releases," but the "information"

they passed on rarely resulted in an article or broadcast

item. On a typical day, reported David Broder of the Wash­

ington Post, the "propaganda team" arranged four events, only

one of which received any coverage.^

At the "presidential" headquarters in the Doral

^Richard Reeves, "How Nixon Outwits the press," New York, October 9, 1972, p. 51. 2 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News, August 22, 1972, Sec. A, p. 11. 3 The Washington Post. August 19, 1972, Sec. A, p. 15. 372

Hotel, security was extremely tight. Beginning August 18, the hotel was "totally secured" and no one was permitted to enter without credentials. Fear of unauthorized disclosure of documents prompted the Nixon men to publish a memorandum outlining "security precautions," It stated, in part:

While at the Hotel you are requested to put all sensitive papers in the "Confidential Burn" bags found in every office. These are not general trash bags but for sensitive memos, papers, etc., only. At approx­ imately 9 p.m. each day, a security officer will pick up these bags. A paper shredder is available in the Security Office.4

On one occasion, a group of reporters were called to the Doral Hotel for a "press opportunity." As David Broder reported the action;

The Doral is under a security guard rivaling that of the control room of the Strategic Air Command. Approaching the room where Secretary of interior Rogers C. B. Morton would meet the press was like ascending into heaven.

Those few newsmen who survived the successive screen­ ings were privileged to hear Morton express his confi­ dence that Mr, Nixon would carry Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, Minnesota and other states that had eluded his grasp in 1968.5

Between August and November, Nixon pursued what was

4 The Washington Post. August 22, 1972, Sec. A, p. 18, Italics in the original. 5 The Washington Post. August 19, 1972, Sec. A, p. 15 373 described as a "limited campaign." He was, after all, the

President, spokesmen kept informing the nation. He had the affairs of state to attend to. When he did hit the campaign trail, in the words of one reporter, he was "like a touring emperor. His appearances were carefully selected, as were his audiences, to ensure friendly receptions. The traveling press rarely got near him and usually had to be satisfied 7 with a view of the President over closed-circuit television.

Not even Republican candidates for Congress were permitted to get close to Nixon. They rode in separate cars and joined the President only upon receiving a signal from the Secret g Service.

In September, for example, Nixon traveled to New York to address a $1000 per plate fund-raising dinner. The event, which was telecast via closed-circuit television to dinner guests in twenty-eight other cities, earned the Republicans an estimated $7 million. Reporters covered the event, but their stories were based on what they saw on television from a room adjacent to the ballroom where Nixon spoke.

^The New York Times. October 16, 1972, p. 39. 7 The New York Times, October 16, 1972, p. 39.

g The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. November 1, 1972, Sec. A, p. 18. 374

While in New York, Nixon engaged in one "visual media event" when he went to what used to be Ellis Island, now Liberty

Island, to dedicate an "immigration museum." His attentive audience consisted primarily of school children and teachers 9 brought in by his campaign team.

In October, one of his Ccimpaign trips took him to

Atlanta, deep in the sympathetic South. After a victorious ride, through a cloud of confetti, down Peachtree Street, he informed his audience that the fact they were against the

"busing" of school children didn't mean they were racists^ they were just "parents" who wanted "better education" for their children, education which "is going to come in the schools that are closer to home and not those clear across town. He later met Republican leaders from the southern states in Atlanta's swank Hyatt Regency Hotel. A small "pool" of reporters witnessed the proceedings, but most had to be content with hearing the President's words piped in over loudspeakers.

9 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. September 27, 1972, Sec. A, pp. 1, 6.

^^The [Washington, B.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. October 13, 1972, Sec. A, pp. 1, 6.

^^The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. October 13, 1972, Sec. A, pp. 1, 6. 375

By late October, Nixon had visited just nine statesj his longest campaign swing had lasted three days, and even this trip spanned the continent from New York to Califor- 12 nia. His seclusion and his refusal to meet the press eventually elicited from a frustrated George McGovern the charge that Nixon was "hiding" in the White House. The Nixon team's response was quick and remarkably monolithic. "He is attending to the matters of the Presidency," said press sec- 13 retary Ronald Ziegler. "How can you expect a man to be

President and candidate at the same time?" said Vice- 14 President Agnew. "Richard Nixon has the responsibility of carrying on the duties of chief executive each day, and he can hardly go out campaigning across the country to the extent some critics think he should," wrote conservative columnist 15 David Lawrence.

As during "normal" times, the press was forced to turn to "spokesmen" for information. At the "Committee for

12 James R. Dickenson, "Nixon end the Press," The National Observer. October 28, 1972, p. 24. 13 The New York Times. October 3, 1972, p. 32, 14 The New York Times. October 3, 1972, p. 32.

^^The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily N ews. October 4, 1972, Sec. A, p. 27. 376

the Re-election of the President"— delightfully reduced to

the acronym "CREEP" by Democrats— the information officers were frequently used as monitors. When a newsman proved suf­

ficiently tenacious to obtain an interview, a public relations

man sat in on the discussion and took copious notes. "I sus­

pect," commented Richaird Reeves, "the flack taking notes is

there to intimidate the source rather than the reporter—

Little Brother is always watching to make sure . . . [the]

'surrogate candidates' stick right to the company line.

The chief "spokesman" at the White House, Ronald

Ziegler, spent a good portion of the campaign issuing denials.

He denied that thousands of dollars in contributions from the

dairy lobby had influenced the Administration's sudden 17 decision to increase government price supports for milk.

He denied reporters' contentions that "dissenters" were being

excluded from Nixon's public appearances. The President, he

said, was particularly "pleased by the enthusiasm . . . shown

by the young people. " The lack of the usual anti-Nixon plac­

ards on one campaign swing, he said, "was because there were

not a lot of people motivated to participate in that type of

^^Reeves, "How Nixon Outwits the Press," p. 51. 17 The Washington Post. August 26, 1972, Sec. A, p. 4. 377 18 activity." At one briefing alone, Ziegler was asked twenty-nine questions about alleged White House involvement in the "Watergate affair," and he answered each one with some variation of "no comment." When he admonished report­ ers for having the audacity to ask such questions, CBS news­ man Robert Pierpoint lost his temper. "I’m , , . not about to drop my questions simply because you don't want to answer 19 them," he told Ziegler.

During a typical Ziegler "briefing," the press sec­ retary was asked whether Nixon supported Defense Secretary

Laird's charge that Democratic candidate George McGovern was

"acting as an agent of Hsmoi." Said Ziegler: "I don't have a comment on that subject." Well, said a reporter, Laird was speaking as a "surrogate" for the President, wasn't he?

Ziegler: "No comment." The next day, the same question was put to the press secretary. Said Ziegler : "I was asked that same question yesterday and confined my remarks then, so I won't make one adding to what I've already said on the sub­ ject.

18 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. August 26, 1972, Sec. A, p. 2. 19 Dickenson, "Nixon and the Press," p. 24. 20 Reeves, "How Nixon Outwits the press," p. 57. 378

Ziegler's role aboard the President's plane was to act as a buffer between Nixon and the press. The large major­ ity of the traveling newsmen, understandably, had to ride in a separate "press plane." On the presidential jet, the seven- or eight-man "pool" was relegated to a rear compart­ ment and instructed to remain there unless invited forward.

Such overtures were rare and were usually extended only for a "photo opportunity, " perhaps pictures of Nixon conferring 21 with his advisors. The newsmen were then required to assemble a "pool report" for their colleagues. Part of a typical report, dated September 26, said:

WASHINGTON, D.C. TO NEW YORK, NEW YORK— Ziegler came back at 2:15 to give us the following statement : "Dr. Kissinger and the North Vietnamese representatives, Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy, have decided to extend their talks another day .... He is staying in close touch with the President concerning the current talks . . . ." Rest of flight uneventful. President off at 1:48 and landed at 2;25. president also declared major disaster for Iowa. You will get separate state­ ments on that.22

Even when following Nixon on the ground, reporters saw little of him. From the plane, he hopped into his auto­ mobile and was off again. The newsmen climbed into "press

21 "Travels with Nixon and McGovern," Time, October 9, 1972, p. 21.

2 2 Reeves, p. 57. 379 buses" and joined the motorcade much too far behind the lead car to see what was going on. Right behind the President's

limousine, typically, was a Secret Service car; then came

limousines carrying political dignitaries, a number of "pool cars" GEurrying White House aides and pool reporters, several

small trucks bearing television cameramen, and, finally, the press buses. Since the men who have to tell the country what

is going on couldn't see what is going on, a White House aide

described the action via a radio hookup. On one trip, reporter and columnist Bruce Biossat made a verbatim record

of the action as described by the White House play-by-play

announcer :

"The President is waving to people along the street. . . . A few are holding signs giving a message (White House lingo for a pro-McGovern or anti-war sign) ....

"He’s still standing in the car with Mrs. Nixon and waving. Now he * s getting out of the car to shake hands a while. "

(Writer's note; During this running account, we in bus No. 3 are spotting many knots of young folk bearing small forests of anti-war and other hostile placards. Examples: "Deliver us from Nixon," "Robots for Nixon, people for McGovern," "Re-elect the dike bomber?")

But our friendly disembodied voice carries on:

"There's some contradictory cheering here. But, of course, the favorable ones are outshouting the unfav­ orable .... 380

"The president has left the car again, people are saying various things to him. I CEin't hear, but I imagine they're saying: 'Good luck, we're for you, we support you.'

"He's being overwhelmed by people. He's talking to a drum majorette now. i can't hear him, but he seems to be saying: 'You're doing a good job here.'

Mixed in with this steady play-by-play, we get official "state trooper" crowd estimates, drawn from police chiefs along the way.

"Up to that last town, the estimate is that 312,000 people have seen the President today. Hold it. We just got a new figure on one city. The chief there says it was 80,000, not 50,000. Make the cumulative total 342,000.

"We're now an hour and fifteen minutes behind sched­ ule. The most we’ve ever been behind before was 45 min­ utes, so this may be an historic first. We're trying to make up time, but it's impossible. The crowds have just been too big, bigger than expected, Ron Ziegler (Nixon's press secretary) is very apologetic."23

A typical Nixon excursion on the hustings began in

Washington, September 22. The press plane took off while

Nixon was still in the White House, and, after breakfast and drinks were distributed, a ten-page mimeographed statement was handed out. The day would be spent in Texas, and, even though Nixon was still on the ground, the statement quoted him as saying the "U.S. Customs Agents whom I met today at the

23 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. November 4, 1972, Sec, A, p, 5. 381 international Bridge between Texas and Mexico are represent­ atives of the many thousands of dedicated Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials engaged in our total war against drug abuse. ..." The president went on to

"say" that he had been informed of "shocking instances of convicted heroin pushers who have been released onto the streets rather than sentenced to the long prison terms they deserve . . . .

At Laredo Air Force Base, Texas, the newsmen were herded into a pen of oil drums strung together with rope where they began typing their stories. The next day, the

Baltimore Sun, for example, would declare that "Nixon says 25 judges hinder drug war."

Minutes later, Nixon landed. After greeting a crowd of airmen and their families, he climbed into his car and motored through large crowds gathered on the streets of

Laredo. At the border, he addressed an assembly of customs officers and vowed to do something about "lenient judges and lenient probation officers.

From there, the entourage boarded six helicopters and

^'^Reeves, p. 49. ^^Reeves, p. 49. 26 Reeves, p. 49. 382 descended on the Rio Grande City high school. As the school band played "Hail to the Chief," the reporters were led to a stage while the President— accompanied by press photographers and television cameramen— traipsed to the rear of the hall where he sat down at a piano and played and sang "Happy Birth­ day" to the local Democratic Congressman, Eligio de la Garza, forty-five years old that day. He then instructed his young audience to "be for your school, be for your team, be for 27 your state, but above all, be for your country. "

Later, the newsmen were bused to the ranch of former

Treasury Secretary John Connally where Nixon mingled with several hundred wealthy "Democrats for Nixon." Two hours later, the reporters were bused back to their hotel in San

Antonio. The next morning, they boarded their chartered plane and departed, many wondering if they had really seen 28 the President during the entire trip.

Press conferences for the national press, as could be expected from Nixon's record, were practically nonexistent during the campaign. He finally assented to meeting the press in early October, an event which prompted Washington Star-News

27 Reeves, p. 49. 28 Reeves, p. 50. 383

columnist Mary McGrory to remark that the President was

"getting awfully bored" and "resorted to having a press con- 29 ference, just so he would have someone to talk to." Report­

ers in attendance suspected that such was indeed the case

since Nixon said very little worth writing down. He would

not reply to charges of corruption in his Administration, he

said. He would not comment on the "Watergate affair," or on

the Vietnam peace negotiations. No, he wouldn't campaign a

great deal, Nixon said— he had to be around to veto legis­

lation that would otherwise result in a tax increase.

THE END RUN

In the panic that gripped the Republican establish­

ment in 1964, when it became apparent that Barry Goldwater was going to get the presidential nomination, Richard Nixon

urged Michigan Governor George Romney to make a run for it.

At one point, according to Pennsylvania Governor William

Scranton, Nixon told Romney he "owed it" to the television

audience "to provide some kind of contest at the conventionj

29 The [Washington, D.G.] Evening Star and Daily N e w s . October 6, 1972, Sec. A, p. 2.

^^The Washington Post. October 14, 1972, Sec, A, p. 14. 384

31 otherwise they'll be bored and turn it off."

Nixon faced a similar problem in his own convention of 1972. Since he and Spiro Agnew had the nominations wrapped up, it promised to be the most boring show of the year. So the Nixon men went to work to make it interesting. They suc­ ceeded, and therein lies the story of the most spectacular end run Nixon ever executed on the news media. He converted the convention hall, and in some respects the city of Miami

Beach, into one gigantic television studio. Newsmen, like millions of viewers across the country, were little more than

spectators.

Planning for the convention began months in advance

and was conducted primarily by Nixon's White House team. Bryce

Harlow, then an assistant to the President, wrote much of the

Republican platform. John Erhlichman went to Miami Beach to

see that it was adopted without controversy. William Timmons,

chief White House liaison man with Congress, supervised secur­

ity arrangements. Herb Klein organized news conferences and 3 2 interviews. New York Times newsman Robert Sample reported

31 Jules Witcover, The Resurrection of Richard Nixon (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), p. 93. 32 The New York Times, August 24, 1972, p. 46. 385

that Klein's deputy, Kenneth Clawson, even wrote a pro-Nixon 33 statement for Teamsters Union president Frank Fitzsimmons.

At the convention hall, an $80,000 podium— designed by George Smith, art director for a television show called

"The Dating Game"— was constructed to resemble a Greek col­

umn. The floor in front of the microphones was built to be

raised or lowered so that all speakers would stand the exact height of president Nixon. Above the podium, three twenty-

seven- foot screens were installed for film and slide pre­

sentations. For the benefit of those in the front few rows

of the audience, four television sets were set up to rise 34 hydraulic ally from the first tier of the podium. A stair­

case was strategically positioned to permit the speakers to make their entrances on camera. And— the final touch— an air

conditioning unit was installed in the podium to relieve the

President and his supporting cast of the embarrassment of

33 The New York Times. August 24, 1972, p. 46. Clawson initially denied Semple ' s report in an interview with this investigator on August 24. Semple saw him speaking with Fitz­ simmons, he said, and "just assumed" he was coaching the labor leader. When pressed, Clawson said he didn't want to call Semple a liar. He had, in fact, Clawson said, offered Fitz­ simmons "some suggestions" about what he might say in support of the President. 34 Associated Press dispatch. The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. August 21, 1972. 386 perspiring before the entire nation.

The convention unfolded with the precision of a drill team exhibition. The galleries were packed with over a thousand earnera-attracting "Young Voters for the president" who were recruited to come to Miami Beach, largely at their own expense, to provide cheers for the president— which they did, lustily and on cueThroughout the proceedings, the delegates were kept attentive for the nationwide television audience with slide shows and films about Nixon, Pat, and other Republican heroes. A continuous stream of movie stars and other prominent figures marched forth to pay homage to 37 their man in the White House. All events were performed so perfectly that newsmen began to suspect there was a script somewhere; and, indeed, one did turn up. Delivered by mis­ take to a few newsmen by the Nixon propaganda team, it out­ lined each event down to the minute eind allowed for

"spontaneous" demonstrations— all perfectly timed to last a prescribed number of minutes, when enough ballots were cast to give Nixon the nomination, the script called for

35 The [Washington, D.G.] Evening Star and Daily News, August 22, 1972, Sec. A, p. 7. 3 6 "The Cheerleaders," Time, September 4, 1972, p. 16. 37 The New York Times. August 24, 1972, p. 46. 387 convention chairman Gerald Ford, Congressman from Michigan, to say, "I am informed that . . . ." Then came the "Demon- 3 8 stration— Nixon Now."

All went as planned, and thousands of baloons— which had been blown up before hand and trucked in— floated to the floor. Minutes later, the delegates looked up in surprise to see their man appearing live on the gigantic screens above 39 them. For as he was being nominated in one part of the city, Richard Nixon was being driven to Miami Beach's Marine

Stadium where a youth rally, emceed by black entertainer

Sammy Davis, Jr., was in progress. From a command trailer at convention hall, Nixon was cued when to make his entrance at the rally, and he jumped out to tumultous applause for a live television appearance just a few minutes before the late 40 evening news shows.

It may have been disheartening for the reporters who were outflanked by the Nixon men. But as far as the star of the show was concerned, it was a smash hit. "It's just been wonderful, " Nixon told the man who directed the perfectly

38 The New York Times, August 23, 1972, p. 26. 39 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. August 23, 1972, Sec. A, p. 1. 40 The New York Times, August 24, 1972, p. 46. 388 timed affair. "It's like no convention has ever been in the world.

For official purposes, the Nixon campaign was managed by the Committee for the Re-election of the president (CREEP) , which was housed in a well-secured building near the White

House. Here the men representing the man who pledged an

"open government" worked behind closed doors, surrounded by plainclothes security guards, protected by a sophisticated alarm system. Their visitors were monitored by television cameras and the "sensitive" memos were ground to confetti in paper shredders.T. 42

In truth, however, the campaign was run from the White

House, and it was dominated by the Nixon media men. At the top of the pyramid, as previously explained, was H. R. Halde- man. His assistant, in immediate charge of the White House 43 campaign team, was the former lobbyist, Charles Colson.

Colson headed what has become known as the "Attack

Group"— a cadre of Nixon's advisors which included

"The Clockwork Convention," Newsweek, September 4, 1972, p. 36. 42 David Maxey, "Confidence, With a Little Paranoia," Life, September 15, 1972, p. 29. 43 Martin P. Nolan, "The Re-Selling of the President," The Atlantic Monthly, CGXXX (November, 1972), 81. 389

Patrick Buchanan, Kenneth Clawson, and Wallace Johnson, an assistant to congressional liaison officer William Timmons.

Also sitting in at the group's meetings were officials from

CREEP, including the director of communications, Albert

Abrahams, and a "McGovern specialist," Edward Pailer. Meet­ ing in a secret office each morning, the "attack group" orchestrated the counterattack on McGovern. Using infor­ mation gleaned from press accounts and the reports of their own spies in the Democratic camp, they devised ways to keep the heat on McGovern. They answered the Democrat ' s every statement and issued orders to Nixon's "surrogate" candi- 44 dates to carry out the group ' s schemes.

Thus, while the men at CREEP handled the mechanics of the campaign, the brain work was done at the White House.

But even the CREEP operation was placed in the hands of the media-oriented men Nixon trusted most. In charge of adver­ tising, planning, and public relations, for example, was

Jeb Magruder, a young executive who was once an aide to Herb

Klein. Acting as deputy campaign director was Pred Malek, the secretive young millionaire who normally spends his time

44 The Washington Post. November 11, 1972, Sec. A, p. 18, 3 90 recruiting talent for the Administration.45

To handle the routine advertising campaign, the Nixon image-makers created their own advertising agency, the "Novem­ ber Group." The "president" of the "firm" was one Peter

Dailey, head of an advertising agency in Los Angeles, who was recruited by CREEP. The November Group began operating in

January, 1972, and dissolved after the campaign. It was staffed, according to Dailey, with admen from agencies all over the country who were "loaned" under a program sanctioned by the American Association of Advertising Agencies called

"Anchor and Loan." Admen, in short, were "borrowed" from their parent agencies (the "anchor"), which were reimbursed 46 for the time their employees spent with the CREEP.

Although the Nixon advertising campaign was origi­ nally supposed to begin in early September, it was delayed over a month, largely because the polls showed Nixon to be well ahead of his opponent. When the films and "spots" eventually began appearing on television, they were clearly divided into two distinct categories. One group of com­ mercials extolled Nixon's accomplishments during his first

45 Maxey, "Confidence," p. 30. 46 Statement by Peter Dailey, personal interview, August 17, 1972. 391

four years. His trips to Russia and China were given special

emphasis. "There is only one candidate in this election, not

two," Peter Dailey explained. "There is the incumbent. The

President. Mr. Nixon. And then there is the only candidate, 47 McGovern." The second group of ads consisted of those made

and distributed under the auspices of "Democrats for Nixon."

They featured speeches and comments by former Treasury Sec­ retary John Connally in which he bitterly criticized

McGovern's defense proposals. One ad showed a hand sweeping

toy soldiers and weapons off a table while the narrator

droned on about the hcirm McGovern's proposals would bring to 48 the "national security." The November Group produced these

advertisements, as well as the others, despite the fact that

"Democrats for Nixon" was described as a totally independent . ^ . 49 organization.

Overall, the Nixon re-election team spent only about

$5 million for television advertising, and far less for pro­

motion in all forms of the media than had been anticipated.

47 The Miami Herald. September 14, 1972, Sec. A, p. 9. 48 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News, October 4, 1972, Sec. B, p. 1. 49 The Washington Post. October 9, 1972, Sec. A, p. 2. 50 The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. November 3, 1972, Sec. A, p. 4. 392

Much of the money earmarked for the broadcast media was used to finance a series of radio and television speeches by

Nixon in the closing weeks of the campaign.

One of the major reasons the CREEP could spend less on a paid advertising campaign was because Nixon and most of his "surrogates" were public officials in the first place and their activities were routinely covered by the networks. And the Nixon men, as has been shown, are experts at manipulating cameras to get their stories told the way they prefer,

When Nixon visited the San Antonio high school, for example, reporters were ordered to stay at one end of the hall while the President went to the rear and, as cameras clicked and whirred, sat down at a piano to play and sing

"Happy Birthday" to a Mexican-American Congressman. "I wish we could have seen it, " said Robert Walters of the Washington

Star-News. "I don't think one reporter got close enough to 52 see him play."

Vice President Agnew went to Anaheim, California, in

October, A cheering band of "Youth for Nixon" was rounded up, and Agnew ' s advance men arranged the television camera

^^The New York Times, November 1, 1972, pp. 1, 26 52 Reeves, "How Nixon Outwits the Press," p. 49. 393 platforms so that the cameramen couldn't film Agnew without

also capturing the hordes of cheinting kids in the background.

Said one NBC reporter : "It worked out so that your best cut- 53 away shot showed a screenful of happily screaming kids."

During his early October press conference in the

Oval Officej Nixon banned all cameras and tape recorders.

Laterj the President's aides took the unprecedented step of

releasing the tape-recording made by the Signal Corps unit

at the White House. A portion was used on the CBS evening

news show as well as on radio news programs around the coun- 54 try.

After his Labor Day break at the Western White House^

Nixon stopped in San Francisco for what was billed as a

"nonpolitical" appearance. While there, he took a forty-

five minute ride on a Golden Gate ferry, where he conferred

with his Citizens Advisory Council for Environmental Quality.

Prior to the president's arrival, the White House advance men

contacted the transit manager and requested that certain

portions of the ferryboat be repainted. The reason: to

53 "The Hard-1o-Cover Campaign," Newsweek. October 23, 1972, p. 118. 54 Dickenson, "Nixon and the Press," p. 24. 394 provide a good backdrop for visual coverage of the Presi- dent.^ 4-55

As the Nixon men continued to demonstrate their talent for obtaining the type of coverage they desired, reporters began to catch on, but could do little about it.

"We're being finessed out of our boots," said Chicago Daily

News reporter Peter Lisagor. "We're just sitting on the bench while the Administration dribbles the ball past us."^^

Few opportunities for publicity were passed up. Chi­ cago insurance executive W. Clement Stone contributed enough money to finance a campaign book about Nixon, although it wasn't identified as such. Entitled "Eye on Nixon," it was largely a collection of "warm" photographs accompanied by a text written by White House speechwriter William Safire.

Edited by Julie Nixon Eisenhower, the book offered such rev- 57 elations as the fact that Nixon is a "clean desk executive" who suffers from the malady of "wakening with a feeling that there was something important he had to tell the President,

^^The Washington Post, November 11, 1972, Sec. A, p. 2 . ^^Dickenson, p. 24. 57 Julie Nixon Eisenhower, ed.. Eye on Nixon. A Photo­ graphic Study of the President and the Man (New York; Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1972), p. 12. 395

an instant before remembering that he was the P r e s i d e n t . "58

On one occasion, the Republicans saw a Western Union magazine advertisement featuring Democratic National Chair­ man Lawrence F. O'Brien and insisted they be given equal treatment, despite the millions of dollEurs the GOP had col­ lected to purchase such advertising. Western Union conceded and in a subsequent ad Republican Chairman Robert Dole was shown, posed on a desk in front of President Nixon's picture, 59 endorsing the western Union "Mailgram."

The Nixon campaign team also used the government's public relations machinery. An illustrated booklet entitled

"For Purple Mountain Majesties Above the Fruited Plain" was twenty-four pages long and mentioned the President seventy- eight times. Over seven million pamphlets were printed by the various executive departments and distributed, using mailing lists supplied by the White House, to the elderly, farmers. Social Security recipients, veterans, union members, and other special groups. In each pamphlet, Nixon was repeatedly and prominently mentioned; one pamphlet spoke of

58 Eisenhower, p. 67, 59 The Washington Post. September 29, 1972, Sec. A, p. 7. 396

President Nixon's special concern" for the elderly.

Each stop on Nixon's caunpaign schedule appeared to be designed to bolster his image in some specific manner and

to generate as much free press coverage as possible. He

twice flew into the flood-devastated town of Wilkes-Barre,

Pennsylvania, to tell the citizens, many of them homeless, what he was doing to bring them relief.Yet the entire federal effort, according to columnist Jack Anderson, amounted to "a high-powered public relations operation.The Presi­ dent's personal representative in the area, Frank Garlucci,

"rounded up ten government press agents," Anderson reported,

and "newspapers and radio-TV stations were bombarded with press notices, carefully prepared to cover up mistakes and minimize problems.When Anderson himself went to Wilkes-

Barre for a personal inspection, he was followed every step

of the way. "Trailing my car," he wrote, were "two of

^^The Washington Post. October 26, 1972, Sec. G, p. 2.

^^United press international dispatch. The Washing­ ton Post, September 10, 1972.

^^Jack Anderson, "Bureaucratic Havoc in Agnes' Wake," The Washington Post. December 20, 1972, Sec. D, p. 19.

^^Anderson, Sec. D, p. 19. 397

Carlucei's agents.The columnist dispatched a three-man reporting team to the city and they returned with "evidence

of [federal] mismanagement, miscalculations and possible malfeasance." To the millions of television viewers who

saw Nixon's visits on the evening news, however, the Presi­

dent was a concerned leader willing to give up his time and

spend federal money for people in need.

In September, Nixon dropped in on a festival of

11alian-Americans in Mitchellville, Maryland. One of Nixon's

advisors, Mike Balzano, was in Detroit when, a few hours

after the President's appearance, a few ethnics ran up to

tell him Nixon was "at an Italian picnic." Balzano was not

surprised, however, that he got the word so fast, "Why, I

can contact five Poles and in seventy-two hours twelve

million people have the message," he said.^^

Nixon's trip to Atlanta was specifically designed to

reassure southerners their President hadn't forgotten them

or their concern for such issues as the "busing" of school

64 Anderson, Sec. D, p. 19.

^^Anderson. Sec. D, p. 19.

^^Hugh Sidey, "Tying Up the Lasagna Network," Life. September 29, 1972, p. 12, 398 children. Here again, he turned the television cameras to his advantage. As his motorcade moved down Peachtree Street, the cheering crowds and falling confetti were captured on film. What television viewers saw, however, was not just ordinary confetti. As columnist James Reston explained:

It came from giant machines with spouts like sewer pipes that blew literally tons of shredded paper off the tops of the buildings in Peachtree Street and almost drowned the candidate and his lady when they stopped at the prearranged spot between the Lane Bryant Building and the Regency Hyatt H o u s e . 67

Television newscasts and newspapers passed on the word that Nixon had drawn a crowd of half a million people— the figures given them by Ronald Ziegler after he revised it down from his original estimate of up to a million. But

National Observer columnist James M. Perry researched the question in depth and arrived at a crowd figure of 75,000. 68 Ziegler's figures, he wrote, were "absolute nonsense."

Nixon's campaign team was not worried solely about the President's image; many others also received instructions concerning their deportment. Vice-President Agnew, for

67 James Reston, "How the President Won Over Atlanta," Chicago Today. October 19, 1972, p. 23. 68 James M. Perry, "The Numbers Game," The National Observer, October 21, 1972, p. 4. 399 example, was told to tone down his rhetoric and act more like a statesman. Accordingly, he announced at the Repub­ lican convention that he had enjoyed being "the cutting edge" but from that point on, he was going to become a "team player,Delegates at the convention were given a guide­ book which cautioned them to "be very thoughtful and careful when talking to anyone representing the press, When two members of the Nixon "youth team" advised college students to ignore the president's "colorless and unexciting" person­ ality, they were admonished in a series of memos written by 71 a campaign official.

Nixon's image with younger voters was considered so important that the Republican National Committee sent out a memo instructing all "young Republican" groups at colleges to hold and win mock elections. The reason for the mock elections, advised the national committee, was "to obtain 72 favorable publicity for our candidate." The memo

69 The New York Times, August 25, 1972, pp. 1, 38. 70 The New York Times, August 22, 1972, p. 36. 71 The Washington Post. September 9, 1972, Sec. A, p. 1 72 Tidbits and Outrages, "Nixons of the Future," The Washington Monthly. IV (December, 1972), 6. 400 continued:

Early preparations— . . . No attempt should be made, even among our club general membership, to let out early how important holding a mock election is to us. The top club leadership should privately make all plans for the poll.

No one outside the club leadership should be given any idea of the state-wide program, or that any techniques used in winning the election came from outside the campus.

Winning the Election— . . . The morning of the election, have pretty girls in short skirts in the parking lot to hand copies [of a letter] to every commuter and solicit his vote, . . . Not the least benefit [of an election victory] can be the demoralization of the oppo­ sition. They thought they had the youth vote. . . .73

As a final hint, the Republicans suggested to their young stalwarts that "if it is clear we are winning, " they should "call several media outlets and ask about the results of the mock election. (Posing, of course as an impartial citizen.) This will give the impression the results are 74 indeed newsworthy, . "

The person whose image most worried the President's men, however, was George McGovern, and they went out of their way to distort it. Sabotage schemes turned up in abundance in the wake of the "Watergate affair." Vice-President Agnew,

73 Tidbits and Outrages, p. 6. Italics in the orig­ inal . 74 Tidbits and Outrages, p. 6. 401 for example, was confronted with hecklers and was prepanred with written remarks for the occasion. After one such dis­ play, McGovern charged that "the old Nixon sabotage squad 75 was at work." McGovern aide Frank Mankiewicz agreed. The hecklers, he noted, were "properly scruffy, with hair just the length the Nixon publicists think identifies a hippy, and they shake their fists for the cameras right on cue."^^ When

McGovern appeared on the ABC show, "Issues and Answers," he found himself answering questions sent over by Al Snyder, 77 aide to Herb Klein. On another occasion, someone called the CBS network and attempted to cancel a McGovern broadcast about Vietnam; Mankiewicz claimed he had no evidence but sus- 78 pected it was a Republican trick. Early in November, another phantom concocted a concession speech for McGovern and mailed it to newspapers in Detroit. Local CREEP officials claimed it was "a joke" perpetrated by a young aide who was

75 United Press International dispatch. The [Washing­ ton, B.C.] Evening Star and Daily News, November 3, 1972.

^^United Press International dispatch. The [Washing­ ton, B.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. November 3, 1972. 77 The Washington Post. October 23, 1972, Sec. A, p. 7. 78 The [Washington, B.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. October 11, 1972, Sec. B, p. 3. 402 79 subsequently fired. in late October, union members across

the country received a booklet bearing the title, "Why Labor

Can't Support George McGovern." Ostensibly, it was published

by a "Labor For America Committee"; it was later discovered 80 that it was paid for and distributed by the CREEP.

While the major end run effort during the campaign was devoted to the manipulation of television, the President's

chief public relations man. Herb Klein, continued his job of

selling the President to the public. His normal duties—

keeping the hinterlands press "informed" with "fact kits" and

briefing teams— were left to others as he hit the hustings

and campaigned actively for Republican candidates, His

office, however, kept things running smoothly. Shortly after

McGovern's running mate, Sargent Shriver, made the charge that

Nixon "blew" a chance in 1969 to disengage from the Vietnam

war, the Klein shop was out with a thirteen-page document

outlining the Administration's defense to the charge.

Described as an "evaluation paper" on the issue, it was dis- 81 tributed to editors all across the country.

79 The Washington Post, November 5, 1972, Sec. A, p. 2. 80 The Washington Post, October 29^ 1972^ Sec. Aj pp. 1, 8. 81 The Washington Post, August 19, 1972, Sec. A, p. 11. 403

A slightly new form of the end run was created when

Nixon appointed thirty-five "surrogate candidates" to "stand in" for him. Taking their orders from the White House "attack group" headed by Charles Colson, the surrogates ripped into every utterance made by George McGovern and topped them with 82 claims and charges of their own. While presidential aide

Henry Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers were 83 predicting peace at every turn. Agriculture Secretary Earl

Butz was accusing McGovern of "witch-hunting" and "making 84 smear charges." Attorney General Richard Kleindienst criss­ crossed the country speaking about "the accomplishments of the Justice Department" while insisting his speeches were

"nonpolitical but partisan. Treasury Secretary George

Schultz criticized McGovern's tax reform proposals^^; Labor

Secretary James Hodgson abandoned his field of expertise

82 The Washington Post. September 9, 1972, Sec. A, p. 1. 83 The Washington Post. August 21, 1972, Sec. A, p. 1; see also The New York Times. November 5, 1972, pp. 1, 11; see also, "'Peace Is at Hand,'" Newsweek. November 6, 1972, pp. 33-39. 84 The Washington Post. September 14, 1972, Sec, A, p. 2. 8 5 The Washington Post, October 16, 1972, Sec. A, p. 6.

^^The Washington Post. September 1, 1972, Sec. A, p. 1. 404 altogether to accuse McGovern of perpetrating a "cruel hoax" on the American people by making "rash promises" to "bring our 07 prisoners home." The entire First Family joined in, with

Julie Nixon Eisenhower leading the way and chalking up 38,234 miles in behalf of her father before the first of N o v e m b e r .

Presidential son-in-law Edward Cox proved to be an unexpected hit, especially with elderly women, some of whom were over­ heard to remark "ooooh, isn't he nice" and "he should run for 89 public office, he's got so much going for him."

The surrogate campaign drew the attention of consumer activist Ralph Nader who filed a suit to recover, on behalf of the public the "salaries unlawfully paid" to public officials who stumped for Nixon. "Never before, " Nader said in a statement, "has there been such an open, flagrant and large conversion of taxpayer revenues and government facil- 90 ities for a re-election campaign."

The press, as the Nixon men planned, fell before the

87 The Washington Post, August 27, 1972, Sec. A, p. 17 88 The New York Times. November 3, 1972, p. 22. 89 United Press International dispatch. The Washing­ ton Post. November 2, 1972. 90 The Washington Post. November 17, 1972, Sec. A, p. 4. 405 surrogate end runs like tenpins before a bowling ball. In their effort to be "objective" and "balanced," newsmen gave the surrogates coverage equal to that accorded McGovern.

"I'm running against Nixon," the frustrated Democrat com- 91 plained, "not Melvin Laird or Earl Butz." He continued;

. . . I think when a Presidential csmdidate is given a minute and a half on network television that it's unfair to put some second-stringer on for a minute and a half on the Republican side. Let the president come out and talk for himself.

The details of what may be the most sophisticated end

runs executed by the Nixon men have yet to be revealed. For most of the Republican energy was aimed at a grass roots

effort to "get out the vote." When, for example, it became

apparent that too much money had been budgeted for advertis­

ing, the surplus was diverted to what was called a "voter

identification" program. Using computerized mailing tech­

niques and personal visits by Republican volunteers, the GOP

succeeded in canvassing an unprecedented number of citizens.

Indeed, Frank Mankiewicz has claimed that this is why McGov^n

was defeated so badly;

When we talk about the McGovern campaign, we ought to

91 "The Hard-to-Cover Campaign," Newsweek, October 23, 1972, p. 118. 92 "The Hard-to-Cover Campaign," p. 118. 406

look at the Nixon campaign, which was a model. It spent an inordinate amount of time and money . . . in one of the best get-out-the-vote operations in terms of direct mail and telephoning that many of us have ever seen. . . .

I would think the figures will show that the Nixon campaign beat us at what we do best— getting out the vote. It's probably the first time a Republican cam­ paign has ever done that so successfully. It was a remarkable job.93

THREATS AND COMPLIMENTS

In June, 1972, one major magazine reported that Nixon's campaign strategists were planning to make the "liberal press an issue in their drive for the re-election of the President.

Nixon's top-level advisors, it was said, had already held 94 "strategy meetings" to plan their assault on the news media,

A salvo of attacks early in the election year tended to substantiate the report. Kenneth Clawson, aide to Herb

Klein, went out of his way to accuse the New York Times of being "a conduit of enemy propaganda to the American 95 people," Vice-President Agnew declared that "a bit of

93 The National Observer, November 18, 1972, p. 4. 94 The Periscope, "The White House vs. the Media," Newsweek. June 5, 1972, p. 23. 95 The Record, "Administration Expands Public Attacks on Press," The Quill, LX (July, 1972), 30. 407 96 opinion [is] creeping in" news accounts. Before a Palo

Alto, California, audience, he castigated "the pundits of the networks and national publications" who "pander to the worst 97 instincts of the leftist radical mob." L. Patrick Gray III, then an assistant attorney general, traveled to Santa Ana,

California, to tell the Orange County Bar Association that the press "is often inaccurate, biased, and grossly unfair"; the New York Times. Washington Post, NBC, and CBS, he observed, often sacrificed "accuracy and objectivity to partisan bias 98 and prejudice." It was during the first few months of 1972, also, that Patrick Buchanan suggested networks might be exor­ cized of their bias with "antitrust type action" and the Jus­ tice Department ruled antitrust suits against the television networks for having "monopolized and restrained trade in 99 prime-time entertainment programming." After interviewing the intense fusilade of criticism, the Associated Press

Managing Editors' Washington News committee reported that

96 The Record, p. 30. 97 The Word From Washington, The Progressive, XXXVI (July, 1972), 10. 98 The Washington Post, April 29, 1972, Sec. A, p. 3. 99 The Word From Washington, The Progressive. XXXVI (July, 1972), 10. 408

"the chorus is so well harmonized there almost has to be a choir director somewhere.

In late July, however, things abruptly changed. Dur­ ing the California primary, Democratic candidate Hubert

Humphrey openly attacked a number of the radical programs proposed by George McGovern, and the press, belatedly con­ vinced of McGovern's strength among the electorate, joined in. This confused the Nixon men, who had expected the "lib­ eral" press to be kind to the liberal McGovern. The Presi­ dent’s advisors, including former newsmen Kenneth Clawson and

John Scali, began to argue that as long as the press was spot­ lighting McGovern's shortcomings, the Nixon camp should call a moratorium on its war with the news media.The advice was taken and the truce announced by Vice-President Agnew in

Portland, Oregon, on July 22, in a speech before a joint con­ vention of the National Newspaper Association and the Oregon

Newspaper Publishers Association. In a carefully worded statement, Agnew declared:

The substance of my remarks is that we all, whether

^^^Passing Comment, "A Choir Director Somewhere," Columbia Journalism Review, XI (July-August, 1972), 2.

"Nixon and the Media," Newsweek, January 15, 1973 p. 44. 409

government official or editor, might do well to forego harangue and cliche in favor of discussion based on rea­ son and public interest. There is a place for the press and the government to coexist with respect to each other and yet to maintain that vital and delicate adversary relationship that is so vital to the maintenance and preservation of a free society. I think that we can bring that about with mutual cooperation.

The time is long overdue . . . for government officials and newspapermen alike to begin thinking in terms of 20th Century realities rather than bygone conflicts between state and press. . . . Unfortunately, efforts to discuss issues involved in this relation­ ship too often tend toward cliche and reflex response rather than reason and thoughtful communication. In this regard, the record shows that hyper-sensitivity to criticism is in abundant supply on both sides.102

The decision by the Nixon men to call off their war on the press appeared even more justified when McGovern dropped his first running mate. Senator Thomas Eagleton of

Missouri, because of the letter's admission of prior mental problems. For McGovern's decision was met with criticism in the press, and the president's men were delighted. "I don't anticipate any concerted effort to get on the press in a gen­ eral way, " said Herb Klein."The President feels, and I

think everyone here feels, that the free press should not be

102 "The Agnew Peace Offering," The Quill, LX (Sep­ tember, 1972), 8.

"Plague on Both Houses," Time, September 18, 1972, p. 47. 410 an issue in this campaign," said Ronald Ziegler.

As in most wars in which neither side emerges the vic­ tor, the cease-fire was interrupted with occasional bursts of fire. When, for example, the Washington Post published its brilliant series of exposes on the "Watergate affair," Repub­ lican "spokesmen" attempted to put the newspaper in its place.

At first the Post stories on Watergate failed to elicit any comment— not even a denial— from the Nixon men. Then Republi­ can Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona took to the Senate floor to castigate the "liberal newspapers" which "consist­ ently bemoaned the fact that the Watergate affair has not con­ vinced the American people that they should dump President 105 Nixon . . . ." Nixon's campaign director, Clark MacGregor, hotly accused the Post of "maliciously" using "innuendo, third- person hearsay, unsubstantiated charges, anonymous sources, and huge scare headlines. . . . Ronald Ziegler added his observation, remarkably similar to MacGregor's, that the post 107 employed "hearsay, innuendo and guilt by association."

104 The Washington Post, August 8, 1972, Sec. A, p. 3,

^^^The National Observer. October 28, 1972, p. 2.

^^^The Washington Post, October 18, 1972, Sec. A, p. 16. ^^^James R. Dickenson, "Nixon and the Press," The National Observer. October 28, 1972, p. 24. 411

Despite his earlier promise to soften his thrusts at the news media, Vice-President Agnew also lambasted the Post for publishing an article which suggested some drugs may be less harmful than alcohol.L. Patrick Gray III, by this time the Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investi­ gation, took note of the imprisonment of reporter Peter 109 Bridge and pronounced the punishment "justly deserved."

By and large, however, the Administration's truce with the press remained in effect until well after the elec­ tion. But a few insiders were careful to warn that it could only be considered temporary. As one White House aide told reporter Don Bacon of the Newhouse News Service:

Whatever good resulted from it [the campaign against the press] over the past three years, the time is now past when there can be any more gains. It's passe around here to go after the press, although that is not to say someone won't do it tomorrow.HO

And Patrick Buchanan, the Nixon advisor who most savors the battle with the news media, commented that the

108 The Washington Post, October 20, 1972, Sec. A, p. 10. 109 United Press International dispatch. The [Washing­ ton, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News, October 10, 1972.

^^^The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News, August 7, 1972, Sec. A, p. 3. 412 moratorium "doesn't mean that some of us have abandoned or will abandon some of our cherished assumptions about the ,,111 press. ..."

THE RESULTS OF INTIMIDATION

One reason the Nixon men eased their harassment of the press during the campaign may well have been the fact that they had little to complain about. For in the opinion of many media watchers, the press generally gave Nixon a free ride during his run for re-election. There were, no doubt, many reasons. For one thing, Nixon stayed out of the line of fire by secluding himself in the White House. For another,

McGovern kept newsmen diverted with what seemed to be an unending string of blunders. One certain factor was the fear and exhaustion newsmen experienced after three years of doing battle with the Nixon Administration. Media critic Ben H.

Bagdikian studied the election-year coverage and concluded;

A sample study of leading papers and network specials during the presidential campaign makes it clear that the Nixon Administration's three-year war against the news media has succeeded. There has been a retrogression in printing newsworthy information that is critical of the Administration and a notable decline in investigation of

^^^Julius Duscha, "The White House Watch Over TV and the Press," The New York Times Magazine. August 20, 1972, p. 93. 413

apparent wrongdoing when it is likely to anger or embarrass the White House. This, coupled with the shrewd manipulation of the media by Nixon officials, has moved the American news system closer to becom­ ing a propaganda arm of the Administration in power.

Bagdikian reviewed the attention newspapers paid to the "Watergate affair" and found that an appalling number of the nation's most respected journals gave it scant, or biased— in favor of Nixon— treatment. When, for example, the

Washington Post published a story linking H- R. Haldeman with the incident, the Chicago Tribune ignored the event until the following day when it reported White House denials. The same treatment was accorded the Haldeman story by the Minneapolis

Tribune and the Philadelphia Inquirer. Herb Klein's old paper, the San Diego Union also ignored the most important developments in the Watergate affair, but carried the denials

and played publisher James S. Copley's endorsement of Nixon on the front page. When the Washington Post printed charges

that Watergate was but one incident in a series of sabotage

and espionage activities, the New York Daily News oyerlooked

the story but printed an editorial asserting that the McGovern 113 campaign had "spiraled downward into the gutter. ..."

112 Ben H, Bagdikian, "The Fruits of Agnewism, " Colum­ bia Journalism Review, XI (November-December, 1972), 9. 113 Bagdikian, pp. 15-18. 414

Bagdikian examined newspaper coverage of several other major stories which broke during the campaign and found the performance to be consistently poor.

It was not, however, as poor as that of the tele­ vision networks. Traditionally during presidential elections, the networks run several documentaries designed to examine the issues. The President's favorite network, ABC, ran no specials at all during the campaign. CBS, which had aver­ aged seven political specials in campaigns since 1960, aired but two in 1972. "The answer," wrote Bagdikian, "appears to be the Nixon-Agnew attack on the networks.

Bagdikian's analysis merely confirmed what many observers had suspected all along. Even a casual student of the press could see that precious little was written, for example, about the ITT scandal, or the deception practiced by the Administration during the Indo-Pakistan conflict in

1971. Most could see that the President was succeeding in hiding out in the Executive Mansion with a minimum of con­ cern on the part of the news media. On the few occasions he ventured out, he astutely avoided situations in which he might be questioned about issues and events. When he did

114 Bagdikian, p. 20. 415 consent to answer queries, reporters treated him with the deference usually accorded royalty. On August 29, for example, he held a "political" news conference and received not a single question about the Watergate affair, which was 115 then commanding the headlines— in Washington at least.

George McGovern, on the other hand, received a drub­ bing at the hands of the press. His proposals concerning

defense spending and welfare programs were scrutinized and criticized with abandon. His dismissal of Senator Eagleton

as his vice-presidential running mate was viewed as an exe­

cution. McGovern, wrote one "liberal" columnist, has "mis­

judged the problem of picking a Vice President, overrated the efficiency of his new young staff, trifled with the

idealism of his main supporters and mishandled the conse­

quences of his own and Senator Eagleton's blunders.

Another "liberal" wrote that McGovern "has not shown the

one thing a Presidential candidate must show— the capacity ,,117 to govern."

One commentator for the Washington Post made the

115 Passing Comment, "Unilateral Cease-Fire," Colum­ bia Journalism Review. XI (November-December, 1972), 3.

H6„Feet to the Fire," Newsweek. August 14, 1972, p. 42 117 "Feet to the Fire," p. 42. 416 observation that McGovern was responsible for his own poor coverage because he was too candid. Wrote Stephen Isaacs:

. . . George McGovern may complain about it [his coverage] , but he is the principal cause for it. For the past 22 months that he has been an announced candi­ date for the presidency, he has always insisted on an "open" campaign. Even now a reporter can walk up to him and ask him almost any and every question, and he will try to answer it. He insists that his staff do the same, no trickery, no appearance of guile. This is one of the things that attracted many of his young staffers in the first place. It is, in fact, a basic tenet of his cam­ paign strategy.118

Instead of being commended for his honesty and open­ ness, in other words, McGovern was faulted for it. The implied suggestion was that he should have been more secretive— the very sin which, in the case of other poli­ ticians, upsets reporters.

Isaacs also made the tacit admission that McGovern's poor treatment was a direct result of the three-year campaign of harassment by the Nixon men. Newsmen were not necessarily afraid of Nixon, Isaacs seemed to be saying, but they felt they had something to prove :

. . . One suspects . . . that the reporters— or at least many of them— are over-compensating for their own biases. Many of them, particularly in the writing press, resent the cold treatment they have received from the White House over the last four years, they have been

1X8 The Washington Post, October 12, 1972, Sec. A, p . 18 • 417

stung by Mr. Nixon's going to the public over their heads—-directly via the tube, from the TV theater in the White House. They like McGovern's openness.

But they remember Mr. Agnew's attacks on the press in 1969. They don't want to go "in the tank" for George McGovern, just because they happen to like the guy. Even more, they seem often to go out of their way to show they are fair, u n b i a s e d . H 9

If the Nixon attacks on the press did not create a fearful press, in other words, it at least created one with a massive guilt complex, and that was more than sufficient to ensure McGovern would receive stern treatment. Isaac's observation was a keen one, and nowhere was such an effect more evident than in the manner in which the news media sought the elusive goal of "objectivity."

No matter what McGovern said or did, he could not force Nixon to actively campaign. Instead, the President dis­ patched his "stand-ins " or "surrogates," to counter McGovern ' s

offensive thrusts. The newspapers and the networks, seek­

ing "balance," frequently gave the surrogates as much "play"

as the Democratic candidate, thus creating the impression

that what Nixon's underlings said was of equal import to

McGovern's comments. Indeed, many important newspapers,

including the New York Times, engaged in the practice of

119 The Washington Post. October 12, 1972, Sec. A, p. 18 418

"twinning"— running side-by-side stories of equal size, one

concerning Democratic activities, the other about the Repub-

-licans. often, one story dealt with a McGovern speech while 120 its twin concerned the utterances of a surrogate. The

network news programs were even more scrupulous about giving

Republican surrogates equal time with the Democratic candi­

date. William Small, chief of the CBS Washington bureau,

dismissed complaints with the excuse that "the surrogates are 121 part of the campaign story." An NBC official was more

apologetic about the inherently unfair means used to achieve

"balance," but he felt little could be done. "When no one

speaks or acts in response to anything, that's a pretty 122 effective way to shut things off," he said.

McGovern himself attempted to persuade the press of

its responsibility to strive for something beyond objectiv­

ity. Speaking before a conference of United Press Inter­

national editors in October, he said:

The work of the press is hardest when it is most important. When a candidate issues press releases but

^^^The Washington Post, October 12, 1972, Sec. A, p. 18. 121 Dickenson, "Nixon and the press," p. 24.

1 2 2 ^ . . Dickenson, p. 24. 4 1 9

holds no press conferences, it is up to the reporters to inform the country that he is hiding. When a candi­ date tells a lie to a handpicked crowd, it is up to reporters to tell the country the truth. And when a candidate will not give answers, it is up to the reporters to keep asking questions— or to keep remind­ ing the people of what they would ask if the candidate would come within shouting distance.^^3

But Richard Nixon did not come within shouting dis­ tance. He stayed in the White House and let his surrogates do his talking. Even when he did venture forth, he succeeded in keeping the press on a string which he handled with the skill of a puppeteer who has been manipulating marionettes for a long time.

Perhaps no incident was more exemplary of his talent than the manner in which he handled the press during his visit to Liberty Island to dedicate the new American Museum of Immi­ gration. His audience was largely a crowd of school children who had been bused and boated in by his cohorts. Reporter

Richard Reeves witnessed the event and reported that :

. , . There were even real live protesters there, about six of them, shouting, "Stop the bombing, " while most of the crowd chanted, "Pour more years!" When the dissonant shouts began, the president stopped speaking for a moment, then said: "Ladies and gentlemen, I would only suggest that on your television screens tonight, in addition to showing the six there, let's show the

123 Jules Witcover, "The Trials of a One-Candidate Campaign," Columbia Journalism Review, XI (January-Pebruary, 420

thousands that are over here. '*

The television cameras swung dutifully away from the demonstrators, police removed the six protesters, and the reporting of the 1972 campaign of Richard

Nixon moved smoothly a l o n g . 124

The only problem that remained was to ensure the networks received the film in time to make the evening news

shows. The Nixon men had a solution for this, too. They

produced helicopters, and the film was flown to the mainland.

Commented one television executive :

When the Administration doesn't want us to film something, we deimn well can't. But if they want, they can be marvelous at helping with the logistics of film. They've got almost unlimited facilities, of course.12 5

1973), 24. 124 Reeves, "How Nixon Outwits the press," p. 57. 125 Dickenson, "Nixon and the Press," p. 24. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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"A Novice For Public TV," Time. October 16, 1972, p. 94.

"Now, In Living Color From china," Time. February 28, 1972, pp. 11-12.

"'Now' Journalism Discussed at Region 5 Meeting," The Quill. LVII (June, 1969), 50. 437

Oberdorfer, Don. "The china Press Scenario," The Nation. March 27, 1972, pp. 394-397.

"The Oliphant perspective," Newsweek. June 12, 1972, p. 78.

"On the Road with RMN," Newsweek. August 11, 1969, p. 60.

"On the Spot," Newsweek. October 2, 1972, pp. 20-21.

Osborne, John. "Toilet Training," The New Republic. Janu­ ary 1 & 8, 1972, pp. 16-17.

O'Toole, John E. "Let's Abolish TV Political Spots," Colum­ bia Journalism Review. X (January-Pebruary, 1972), 56-58.

"The Palace Guard," Time. February 9, 1970, p. 7.

Passing comment. "Are the Rules Changing?" Columbia Jour­ nalism Review. X (January-February, 1972), 2.

Passing comment. "Blowing Kissinger's Covers," Columbia Journalism Review. X (March-April, 1972), 2-3.

Passing Comment. "A Choir Director Somewhere," Columbia Journalism Review. XI (July-August, 1972), 2.

Passing Comment. "Covering the 'Smears,'" Columbia Journal­ ism Review. IX (Winter, 1970-71), 2-3.

Passing Comment. "Ending an Acceptable Myth," Columbia Jour­ nalism Review. X (May-June 1971), 3.

Passing Comment. "Extra Effort," Columbia Journalism Review. X (July-August, 1972), 3.

Passing Comment. "Hanging By the Thumbs," Columbia Journal­ ism Review. X (January-February, 1972), 3.

Passing comment. "The Heat Goes On," Columbia Journalism Review. X (July-August, 1971), 2.

Passing Comment. "Unilateral Cease-Fire," Columbia Journal­ ism Review. XI (November-December, 1972), 2-3. 438

Passing Comment. "The White House Springs the Trap," Colum­ bia Journalism Review, XI (September-October, 1972), 4-5.

"Pat Nixon on Her Own Home Ground," Life, August 25, 1972, pp. 29-34.

"Patton's Defection," Time, August 24, 1970, p. 8.

"'Peace Is at Hand,'" Newsweek. November 6, 1972, pp. 33-35.

"The Peking pool," Time, January 24, 1972, p. 42.

"Peking Protest, " Time, February 21, 1972, p. 64.

Pember, Don R. "The 'Pentagon Papers' Decision: More Questions Than Answers, " Journalism Quarterly. XLVIII (Autumn, 1971), 403-11.

The Periscope. "Cooling It with the Press," Newsweek, August 7, 1972, p. 9.

The Periscope. "Mitchell's Confidential Assistant," News­ week . June 6, 1970, p. 15.

The Periscope. "Spiro vs. the Media in Japan," Newsweek, May 29, 1972, p. 15.

The Periscope. "Tuning Out Mr. Nixon's Jesuit," Newsweek, October 2, 1972, p. 13.

The Periscope. "The White House vs, the Media," Newsweek, June 5, 1972, p. 23.

"Plague on Both Houses," Time, September 18, 1972, pp. 47-50.

Powell, Lewis F., Jr. "What Has Happened to the Old Ameri­ can Values?" The Reader's Digest, Cl (November, 1972), 170-72.

"The Power of the Purse," Newsweek, July 10, 1972, p. 64.

The Presidency. "Nixon's Proposed 1973 Budget Reflects Record Growth of Executive Office," National Journal, February 26, 1972, p. 3 70.

"President and Press: A Debate, " Time, April 12,1971, p. 53. 439

"A Presidential Ghost Story," Newsweek. January 11, 1971, pp. 21-22.

'"Presidential News Conference Not the Ideal Format'— Klein," The Quill. LVIII (February, 1971), 11.

"President Nixon's FOI Record Good So Par, Clark Mollenhoff Tells Region 7 Conference," The Quill, LVII (June, 1969), 51.

"The President's Airborne Privacy," Newsweek, June 16, 1969, p. 20.

"The President's Man," Time, March 1, 1971, p. 14.

"The President's odyssey Day by Day," Time, March 6, 1972, pp. 13-16.

"Press Secretaries," Time, October 10, 1969, p. 77.

"Public Relations," National Journal, April 10, 1971, p. 809.

"Quadrennial Overkill," Newsweek, July 24, 1972, pp. 85-86.

"Questions About Gray," Time. March 5, 1973, pp. 14-15.

Quotable .... "Determinations," The Quill, LX (August, 1972), 11.

Quotable .... "Flabby and Dumb," Ihe Quill. LX (August, 1972), 11.

Quotable .... "Newspapers Should Help in Broadcasters' Fight," The Quill. LX (May, 1972), 22.

Quotable .... "On Nation's Mood," The Quill, LVIII (April, 1970), 3.

The Record. "Administration Expands Public Attacks on Press, " The Quill. LX (July, 1972), 30.

The Record. "Agnew's Views on Press coverage Praised, Con­ demned in Statements," The Quill. LVIII (January, 1970), 10. 440

The Record. "Ervin Committee Hears Schorr," The Quill. LX (March, 1972), 28.

The Record. "Klein Named Director of Communications," The Quill. LVII (January, 1969), 42,

The Record. "Mitchell Tightens Press Guidelines," The Quill, LX (January, 1972), 6.

The Record. "Newsmen's Privilege Remains an Issue," The Quill. LX (August, 1972), 30-31.

The Record. "Newsmen Still Waiting for Nixon press Confer­ ences," The Quill. LIX (March, 1971), 38.

The Record. "Nixon press Conferences at Low point," The Quill, LX (March, 1972), 28.

The Record. "No More Leaks Ziegler Says," The Quill. LX (March, 1972), 28.

The Record. "President's TV Sessions Win Approval," The Quill. LVII (April, 1969), 30.

Reedy, George E. "Moynihan's Scholarly Tantrum," (More), A Journalism Review, I (June, 1971), pp. 5-7.

Reeves, Richard. "How Nixon Outwits the Press," New York. October 9, 1972, pp. 49-67.

Relia, Nancyann. "Nixon's Record Alters Image— McGinniss," The Quill. LX (June, 1972), 45.

Rembar, Charles. "Paper Victory," The Atlantic Monthly. CCXXVIII (November, 1971), 61-66.

"Reporters Bore in on the President with Tough Follow-Up Questions," National Journal. June 5, 1971, pp. 1190-94.

Reports: Washington. The Atlantic Monthly. CCXXVIII (May, 1970), 4-22.

"Restrained 'Freedom,'" Time. January 1, 1973, p. 63. 441

"Richard Nixon: An American Disraeli?" Time, November 27, 1972, pp. 18-19.

"Richard Nixon's Long March to Shanghai," Time, March 6, 1972, pp. 11-12.

Richardson, Elliot. "Nixon Behind the Scenes," Newsweek, February 1, 1971, pp. 16-17.

Roberts, Wallace. "The White House and Free Speech," Satur­ day Review. May 2, 1970, p. 26.

Romney, George. "A Reply to Life's Editorial on Nixon," Life, February 5, 1971, p. 62a .

Royster, Vermont. "presidential Press Conferences?" The Quill. LVIII (February, 1971), 9-11.

Rubin, Trudy. "Stalking Beacon press," (More) . A Journalism Review, II (September, 1972), pp. 5-7.

Salisbury, Harrison. "print Journalism," playboy. XIX (January, 1972), 121-22, 254-55.

Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. "The complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin Delano Roosevelt." Review of Jonathan Daniels (intro.), The Complete Presidential Press Conferences of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Da Capo Press) . Book World. January 28, 1973, pp. 1, 3.

Schorr, Daniel. "A Chilling Experience," Harper's Magazine. CCXLVI (March, 1973), pp. 92-97.

"The Selling of the Candidates 1970," Newsweek. October 19, 1970, pp. 34-43.

"Selling the president, 1970," Newsweek. November 16, 1970, pp. 77-78.

"Selling the President '72," Newsweek, July 31, 1972, p. 55B.

Semple, Robert B ., Jr. "Nixon's Inner Circle Meets," The New York Times Magazine. August 3, 1969, pp. 6-9, 45, 50, 54, 58-59, 62-64. 442

"Sevareid Replies to Agnew Proposal," The Quill. LVIII (Decem­ ber, 1970), 20.

Shayon, Robert Lewis. "Future Schlock," Saturday Review. May 27, 1972, p. 23.

______. "Propaganda Deflation," Saturday Review. March 20, 1971, p. 40.

"The Right To Be Wrong," Saturday Review, Mcirch 18, 1972, pp. 8-9.

Sheldon, Courtney R. "Nixon and the Press; a Campaign Broad­ side." Review of James Keogh, President Nixon and the Press (Funk and Wagnalls). Columbia Journalism Review. X (July-August, 1972), 53-55.

Shogan, Robert. "The Once and Future Agnew," Newsweek. August 28, 1972, pp. 21-22.

Sidey, Hugh. "'Anybody See Patton?'" Life, June 19, 1970, p. 2B.

______. "Bad News From the Pollsters," Life. March 19, 1971, p. 2b .

"Castle on the Catoctin," Life. December 1, 1972, p. 12.

"Here Comes the 'Aggernaut,'" Life, August 28, 1970, p. 2.

"It Was Good To Be Home," Life, February 7, 1959, p. 2.

. "John Connally: 'There Are No Leaders in My Own Party. Nixon Is a Man of Courage,'" Life, pp. 39-41.

. "Kingdom Come on Pennsylvania Avenue," Life, February 26, 1971, p. 2B.

"'Let's Be the Movers This Time,'" Life, Feb­ ruary 5, 1971, p. 2B.

. "A Lingering Love of the Royal," Life, July 31, 1970, p. 4. 443

"Looking Forward to the Harvest^" Life, June 25, 1971, p. 7.

"Loose Talk from an Old Lawyer," Life, August 14, 1970, p. 4.

"Marshaling the Good Guys," Life, August 21, 1970, p. 2b .

"Once Again, Witless ViolenceLife, May 14, 1971, p. 4.

"'This Is the White House Calling,'" Life, April 2, 1971, p. 2B.

"Tying Up the Lasagna Network," Life, September 29, 1972, p. 12.

Smith, Hedrick. "When the President Meets the Press," The Atlantic Monthly, GCXXVIII (August, 1970), 65-67.

"The South Rises Again— For Nixon," Newsweek, October 23, 1972, pp. 37-38.

"Staggers' Revenge," Time, February 14, 1972, p. 76.

Starr, Louis M. "When Government Stopped the presses." Review of Sanford J. Ungar, The Papers & The Papers (E. P. Dutton). Columbia Journalism Review. XI (July- August, 1972), 55.

"Stop the Impeachers," Time. September 18, 1972, p. 101.

"Stop the Presses," Newsweek. June 12, 1972, p. 35.

"Stop the War," Time, September 4, 1972, pp. 38-39.

"Sulzberger Notes Agnew Inaccuracy," Editor & Publisher, November 29, 1969, p. 11.

"Talk Show," Newsweek, January 18, 1971, p. 16.

"Thank You, Mr. President," Newsweek, December 21, 1970, pp. 22-23, 444

Thorp, Bruce E. "Communications Report/Broadcasters Charge PCC and Courts Erode Media Freedom," National Journal, November 13, 1971, pp. 2260-66.

______. "Media Report/White House Static Over Structure, Funds Keeps Public Broadcasting Picture Fuzzy," National Journal, April 29, 1972, pp. 734-45.

"Threatened Reporters," Time, October 16, 1972, p. 44.

"Thunder All Around," T i m e , May 22, 1972, p. 39.

Tidbits cind Outrages. "Nixons of the Future," The Washington Monthly. IV (December, 1972), 6.

"The Times's Right Hand," Newsweek. February 12, 1973, pp. 46-47, 51.

"Travels with Nixon and McGovern," Time, October 9, 1972, p. 21.

TRB from Washington. "Evading the Press," The New Republic. April 24, 1971, p. 4.

Truscott, Lucian K. IV. "The Coronation of Richard Nixon," Saturday Review. September 16, 1972, pp. 7-26.

"TV: An Eyeful of China, a Thimbleful of Insight," Newsweek. March 6, 1972, p. 27.

"TV— Love It or Leave," Newsweek, February 21, 1972, p. 17.

"TV Politics: Too High a price, " Life, October 11, 1970, p. 2.

"TV V . the Pentagon," Time , April 5, 1971, p. 46.

"Violent End to a Vitriolic Campaign," Time, November 9, 1970, pp. 14-15.

"The Waiter with the Water," Newsweek. February 17, 1969, p. 24,

Warner, Edwin. "The Nixon Vacuum." Review of Richard Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag (Houghton Mifflin) . Time. June 5, 1972, p. 94. 445

"Watergate, Contd.," Time, August 14, 1972, pp. 21-22.

"Watergate: Very Offensive Security," Newsweek. October 23, 1972, pp. 35-36.

Wax, Mel. "Incident at San Jose," Columbia Journalism Review. IX (Winter, 1970-1971), 47-52.

Whalen, Richard J. "See Dick. See Dick Run. See John Osborne Watch Dick Run," Esquire, LXXVIII (October, 1972), 142, 196.

"When Officials Shackle the News," Saturday Review, Decem­ ber 12, 1970, pp. 49-50.

"White House All-Stars," Time. July 17, 1972, p. 10.

"White House Scoop," Time. November 27, 1972, pp. 62-63.

"White House Sermons," Time, May 22, 1972, p. 60.

"Who's for Whom," Time, October 30, 1972, p. 85.

"Who Speaks for the Press?" Newsweek. July 31, 1972, p. 41.

"Why Hiss?" The Columbia Journalism Review. I (Winter, 1963), 2.

"Will the Press Be Out To 'Get' Nixon?" U.S. News & World Report. December 2, 1968, pp. 39-40.

Wilson, Bob. Klein and Ziegler: Nixon's PR M e n . Freedom of Information center Report No. 244. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri School of Journalism, June, 1970.

Witcover, Jules, "The Presidential Press Conference; Status Report," Columbia Journalism Review, IX (May-June, 1971), 52-54.

"Salvaging the Presidential Press Conference," Columbia Journalism Review. IX (Fall, 1970), 27-34.

"Spiro Agnew: The Word's the Thing," The Pro­ gressive . XXXIV (July, 1970), 14-17 446

"The Trials of a One-Candidate Campaign," Colum­ bia Journalism Review, XI (January-Pebruary, 1973), 24-28.

"The Two Hats of Herb Klein," Columbia Journalism Review. IX (Spring, 1970), 26-30

"Two Weeks That Shook the Press^" Columbia Jour­ nalism Review, X (September-October, 1971), 7-15.

______. "Washington: Focusing on Nixon," Columbia Jour­ nalism Review. VII (Winter, 1968-1969), 11-17.

The Word From Washington. The Progressive. XXXIV (July, 1970), 11-13.

The Word From Washington. The Progressive, XXXVI (July, 1972), 10.

"Writing Block," Time, March 27, 1972, p. 20.

C. NEWSPAPERS

Anderson, Jack, "Bureaucratic Havoc in Agnes' Wake," The Washington Post. December 20, 1972, Sec. D, p. 19.

______. "Did Times Editorial Light Spiro's Fire?" The Miami Herald. September 14, 1972, p. .23.

. "FBI Used Arrest To Probe Anderson," The Washing­ ton Post, February 23, 1973, Sec, D, p. 17.

. "Haldeman Calls Shots for Nixon," The Washington Post, August 22, 1972, Sec. B, p. 13.

. "Nixon Gambled on Moon Publicity," The Washington Post, July 29, 1969, Sec. B, p. 11.

. "President Gets News in Capsule Form," The Wash­ ington Post. April 7, 1971, Sec. B, p. 15. 447

. "Press Corps Smooths Way for Nixon," The Washing­ ton post, June 3, 1970, Sec. B, p. 11.

. "Recasting History," The Washington Post, Febru­ ary 9, 1972, Sec. C, p. 15.

. "Stans, Navy Join in Press Baiting," The Washing­ ton Post. December 26, 1971, Sec. C, p. 7.

. "White House Tie Booms Ad Agency, " The Washington Post, November 30, 1972, Sec. F, p. 9.

Arnold, Mark R. "Pressure on the Press Alarms Newsmen," The National Observer, December 30, 1972, p. 20.

Bridge, peter. "Is the Press 'All Too Willing To Be Neutral­ ized'?" The National observer, December 9, 1972, p. 15.

Causey, Mike, "Clam-Up Order Affects Some 800,000," The Washington Post, March 20, 1971, Sec. B, p. 5.

Dickenson, James R. "Nixon and the Press," The National Observer, October 28, 1972, p. 24.

______. "Nixon: He Denies He's 'Preening,' Wants U.S. To Look Again," The National Observer, March 22, 1971, p. 14.

The Eagle [Student newspaper of The American University], September 15, 1972, p. 6.

Editorial. The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star, March 23, 1971, Sec. A, p. 15.

Editorial. The Washington Post, December 22, 1972, Sec. A, p. 22.

Evans, Rowland, and Robert Novak. "The White House vs. CBS," The Washington Post, November 26, 1972, Sec. B, p. 7.

Hess, Stephen. "Only the Style Was Important," The Washing­ ton Post, September 1, 1972, Sec. A, p. 24.

Human Events. October 28, 1972.

Karnow, Stanley. "The Chinese Sayings of President Nixon, " The Washington Post. February 29, 1972, Sec. A, p. 18. 448

Kilpatrick, James J, "Whitehead Off Base in Attack on TV Industry," The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News, December 26, 1972, Sec. A, p. 11.

The Miami Herald. September 14, 1972.

The National Observer, March, 1971-Pebruary, 1973.

The New York Times. January, 1969-February, 1973.

Perry, James M, "Disraeli and Nixon: Wooing the Yoemen," The National Observer. December 2, 1972, p. 5.

______. "The Numbers Game," The National Observer, October 21, 1972, p. 4.

Reston, James. "How the President Won Over Atlanta," Chicago Today, October 19, 1972, p. 23.

The Wall Street Journal, January, 1969-February, 1973.

The Washington [D.C.] Daily News. February 10, 1972.

The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star. January, 1969-July, 1972

The [Washington, D.C.] Evening Star and Daily News. July, 1972-February, 1973 .

The Washington Post, January, 1969-February, 1973. APPENDIXES

449 A. A Sample "Mailing" from

Herbert G. Klein to

Newspaper Editors

450 451

THE WHITE HOUSE

W A 5 M ■ N 3 T O N ^

J une 16, 1971

Dear Editor:

News dispatches this week called attention to the m ajor new P res id e n tial c o m m itm en t to the battle against the spreading epidemic of Drug Abuse. The program centers on negotiation with foreign countries, corrective measures within the Armed Forces, education and enforcement. The new acceleration is part of a long range development which began shortly after P resid en t Nixon nook office.

To help you in studying the impact of this all-out effort, I have had summarized for you the background of events which led to the current proposals.

Sincerely, ^

Herbert G. Klein Director of Communications for the E xecu tive B ra n c h 452 SYNOPSIS OF NIXON ADMINISTRATION ACCELERATED PROGRAM IN THE DRUG ABUSE FIELD I

I. Presidential Messages and Addresses

July 14, 1969 - President Nixon sent to Congress a message proposing the Comprehensive Drug Abuse P re­ vention and Control Act of 1970. In the same message the President recommended and proposed parallel model state narcotics legislation.

The President signed the Comprehensive act into law on October 27, 1970, and thus far 18 states have passed and 25 states have under consideration the model state narcotics legislation.

In the July 14 m essage to C ongress, the P resid en t also took the following actions:

- Directed the Secretary of State and Attorney General to explore international narcotics control.

- Directed the Bureau of Customs to tighten our nation's borders against narcotics.

- Directed the Attorney General to create special narcotics investigative units.

- Directed the Secretary of HEW and the Attorney General to initiate an authoritative anti-drug education program.

- Directed the Secretary of HEW to expand research into the cause and effects of drug addiction.

March 1 1, 1970 - Statement by the President which announced:

- A $3.5 million Office of Education National Drug Education Training Program {by June 1, 197 1, 150,000 teachers and 75,000 students and community leaders trained). 453 - 2 -

t - The creation of a clearinghouse on drug abuse in­ form ation.

- The publication of authoritative book on drugs.

- A modification in the Law Enforcement Assistance A d m in is tra tio n to allow large cities to apply for funds for drug education.

- The development by the Advertising Council of an expanded public service campaign on drug abuse.

- Intensified professional training in prevention and treatment of drug abuse.

October 23, 1970 - President addressed the 25th Anniversary Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations urging international cooperation to stop the scourge of drugs. The President recommended creation of a United Nations Fund for Drug Control (April 1, 197 1, U.S. donates $1 million to the Fund) and strengthened anti-narcotics treaties.

F e b ru a ry 25, 1971 - In his U .S. F o reig n P o licy for the 1970's document, the President stated that the "control of illegal narcotics . . . requires an integrated attack on the demand for them, the supply of them, and their movement across international b o r d e r s ."

II. Legislation

October 27, 1970 - Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 was signed by President Nixon. This law consolidates and revises all of the various federal narcotic, marihuana and dangerous drug laws. The law contains a sched­ uling system whereby alT controlled substances are classified. Streamlined procedures are established to enable the Attorney General to alter the degree of regulatory control imposed over a drug and in some instances, to alter the severity of a penalty imposed for an offense involving a particular drug. 454 — 3 -

III. National Drug Program Study Papers

June 25, 1970 - The Ash Council on Executive Organization recommended a separate drug organization to coordinate ail federal education, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, training and research programs. The President announced legislation on June 17, 1971, to establish such an office in the Executive Office of the President.

November, 1970 - The President requested an intergovern­ mental report to recommend nev/ drug prevention and treatment program s.

December, 1970 - The President requested a committee of nongovernmental drug experts to recommend new drug pre­ vention and treatment programs. The President announced the new programs on June 17, 1971.

IV . White House Conferences on Drug Abuse

A number of White House Conferences on Drug Abuse have been held in order to educate various professions on the full scope of America's drug abuse problems and in order to relate Administration actions designed to cope with those actions. The following groups have been briefed:

- December 3, 1969 - Governors.

- A p r i l 9, 1970 - T V P ro d u c e rs .

- October 14, 1970 - Radio Executives.

- M a rc h 26, 1971 - R eligious Leaders.

V. International Agreements & Discussions

August, 1969 - U. S, - Turkey Agricultural Development and Control Loan Agreement. This agreement provides $3 million to Turkey to allow it to buy up Turkish poppy crops. The monies would also be used to fund a 700-man enforcement force in Turkey. . 4 -

% September, 1969 - Operation Intercept at Mexican border was designed to stop the flow of marihuana and dangerous drugs into the United States from Mexico. This action evolved into Operation Cooperation, inhibiting the drug traffic while continuing friendly Mexican-A meric an relations.

October 1 1, 1969 and October 10, 1970 - M r. John Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, delivered Presidential letters to President Pompidou of France and Prime Minister Demirel of Turkey, respectively. The Presidential letters expressed personal Presidential concern over the need to curtail international trafficking in drugs.

March 9 and August 20, 1 970 and March 29, 1971 - Attorney General Mitchell met with the Attorney General of Mexico, The Attorney General indicated his concern and the concern of the President to the Attorney General of Mexico concerning the need to curtail international trafficking of dangerous drugs, and pledges of cooperation were exchanged,

August and September, 1970, and May, 197 1 - M r, Egil Krogh, Jr. , Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, M r. John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, and M r. Ingersoll made inspection tours of Vietnam. These were fact-finding missions to determine the extent and severity of the drug problem in Vietnam. As a result of those fact-finding missions, the U. S, government is now working with the Vietnamese government in an effort to curtail drugs in that country.

October, 1970 - U.S. submitted to the United Nations amendments to Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. The amendments were designed to strengthen the treaty on international drug trafficking by permitting the International Narcotic Control Board to utilize nonofiicial sources to determine if violations are occurring. With the consent of suspected governments, the Board can conduct physical inspection of the production and distribution of dangerous drugs. The Board can impose embargoes on trade of products coming from the violating country. The amendments will make all offenses involving narcotics extraditable. - 5 - 456

February 21, 1971 - U.S. signed the Contention of Psychotropic Substances. The Convention will be submitted to the Senate for ratification. The Convention places restrictions on the pro­ duction, distribution and international commerce of hallucinogenic drugs such as LSD.

February 26, 1971 - A Protocol creating a Franco-A meric an Intergovernmental Committee on Drug Control was signed by Attorney General Mitchell and French Minister of Interior Marcellin insuring cooperative narcotic suppression efforts between France and the U.S.

April, 197 1 - The U.S. contributed $I million to United Nations Fund for Drug Control and pledges $1 million.

VI. Agency Actions and Continuing Programs

November, 1970 - The Secretary of HEW established the Federal Drug Abuse Prevention Coordinating Committee. This Committee coordinates the drug prevention programs of the National Institute of Mental Health, the Office of Education, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Law Enforce­ ment Assistance Administration, the Veterans Administration, the Department of Defense and the Office of Economic Opportunity.

November 25, 1970- The Veterans Administration announced the opening of five drug treatment centers in January. These five drug treatment centers are the first of thirty that are planned around the country. The five centers are located in Washington, D. C. ; Houston, Texas; Battle Creek, Michigan; Sepulveda, California and New York City.

May 3, 1971 - The Commissioner of Customs implemented 100% inspection of all military and civilian mail, passengers, baggage and cargo from South Vietnam and Thailand to halt the importation of drugs.

May 26, 1971 - A joint announcement was made by HEW and The Department of Justice co invoke greater restrictions on the availability of amphetamines. 457 - 6 "

4 - There are presently more than 20, 000 addicts under treatment in federally funded programs more than in any other nation.

- The Federal Government has distributed 22, 000, 000 pieces of drug abuse information literature.

- As of June 30, 1971, the number of Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and Bureau of Customs agents will have increased to 2, 134 from 1, 626 in 1970. B. A "Mailing" from Barbara Hackman Franklin,

Staff Assistant to the President,

to Interested Persons

458 ■ 459

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON » July 25, 1972

Dear Friend,

We're pleased -- and wanted to make sure you knew about the President's recent nomination of Dr. Dixy Lee Ray to serve as a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of the Pacific Science Center, she is a marine biologist frorri Seattle, Washington, who will bring a definite concern for the environment to the AEC.

Dr. Ray's nomination is another real milestone. Here are some other "firsts" for women announced in the last few weeks:

- Jean Wilkowski, nominated by the President to be our A m b assad o r to Z am b ia - Dr. Louise V/hite, appointed Director of the Teacher Corps at the Department cf Health, Education and Welfare - Rosemary Mazon, appointed Senior Vice President of Planning and Export Expansion at the Export-Import Bank » Barbara Herv/ig -- Special Assistant to the Director at the Federal Bureau of Investigation - Jeanne Pierce and Susan L. Roley -- first two women agents in the Federal Bureau of Investigation - Pamela R. Chelgren, first woman officer in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce

We have now more than tripled the number of women in top-level, policy positions since April of 1971 when President Nixon asked an intensification of efforts to bring about equal employment opportunity fo r w om en.

Even though it's summer, things are moving along for women here in Washington. I hope this summer is an equally successful one for you, and I'll be in touch again soon with some more exciting news!

Sincerely, '

Barbara Hackman Franklin Staff Assistant to the President 460

'.<1 '■^,1 CCI I:) T ill J MI ,IIS I ! J

o o CM u o z o *— o z l-t to w.

w to 3 o X w I. tz j X

U l X r c. "Secret" Excerpt from the

"Treleaven Report"

461 462 10

• Almost tho entire press operation -- in the Secretary's

office and in the Bureaus -- is too. passive, reacting to events

.rather than looking for opportunities. With only a couple of

exceptions (Frank Forrester in Geological Survey and Fd Winge in

National Park Service) the Information officers hove little enthusi­

asm for this phase of tlieir job, treating it as part of office

routine. The fact is, of course,' the work of the Department is

an almost endless source of material for news releases, feature

stories for magazines and newspapers, television documentaries,

etc. -- much of it not only interesting and ncwswortliy hut also

timely, even urgent. Tho Bureaus have the capability to got this

.out -- but they need..to be._5timulatod.by_.a.more. Gung Ho attitude

-.at_thc„top.

» . Another problem is that most of the senior people arc

„ print-oriented. They don't reject television - -but they don't

..know what to do about it,* cither. -tA— ' top A '• —'priority ' ~ ~— — - ■ — ^------must- ■ ■ be to ' develop — ' '

ways of pctt.iîu: Interior's story on television -- on news prograiMS,

interviews and panel discussions, public service announcements

..and programs, sponsored documentaries, etc. Hiis is an area that

desperately needs the kind of specialized assistance provided'for

in tho reorganization outlined earlior.

• A part of n. re a 1er use of television sliouid be a cor.tinuing

e Tfort lo got the Seeiv ; err i-i'-.n,) 11 v involved i n newsworthy*’event s 463 11

(which will provide good picture material for tlio print media, too).

Secretary Morton is not only the, most photogenic member of the

.Administration -- but h e ’s also.able to participate physically in

.all kinds of outdoor situations.and look natural. It’s important

that the communications program make full use of this, because it’s

a way of making sure that the Secretary's statements get maximum

exposure, as well as building valuable goodwill for the Department

and the Administration. Information officers in each of the Bureaus

should be required to submit, on a regular basis, ideas for this

kind of involvement. (livery time this was suggested in an interview

it immediately sparked ideas.) And arrangements for motion picture

and s.till_.photpgraphy_s}io.uld_bg..built_.intq all pcvsonni_„oppcaroncc

Tians,.

* . It is recommended that a nationwide "network" of

specially trained and briefed information personnel be established

to handle all television, radio and press arrangements for the

.Secretary and others \;hcn they travel. As soon as travel plans arc

finalized the network should be alerted; it will then be their

respensibi 1 i ty to arrange for film and press coverage, tclovisirui

and radio iinterview's on local stations, visits to places pertinent

to Interior’s operations, and contribute any ideas that will

make tlie trip more pî’oducrivo. 'Ihis nclv.'ork can be set u;i using

_.cx j st'.ing^...renJjan,U„of .C.ic.cs_.aivd_persorniel...,v--.,al;l,oup.h,. of course, a D. Documents Dealing with the Operation

of the Inter-Departmental Group

on Foreign Policy Information

464 J, 465 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ED.UCA'J'ION, AND WEI.J AUE MEMORANDUM O'nTCF^jj i bt secretary •i

TO See Below DATE: MAY 8 ,*^5 ^

FROM : Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs IS; i SUBJECT: . President's current strategy on Vietnam

At the briefing noted in the attaclicd memorandum (held Friday instead of Thursday), Secretary Rogers stressed the urgency of support for the President's current strategy in Vietnam at this very critical time in our involvement t)iere. , . ■

Attached for your information and use are:

a. Secretary Rogers' briefing notes

b. Positive talking points prepared by the State Department

c. Editorial from Friday's Christian Science Monitor

d. Suggested paragraphs for insertion in speeches as desired.

You are urged to speak out as you deem appropriate.

Robert O. lieatty

ADDRESSEES: The Secretary Under Secretary Assistant.Secretaries ^Agency Hoads Director, Office of Child Development Director, Office for Civil Rights Furgc’.c'u C’-oneral Special Assistant for Health Policy

Attachments 466

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

W tth irc to i, O.C. îûSJO

April 20, 1972

Dear Mr. Beatty:

The Secretary of State has asked me to call a meeting of the Inter-departmental Group on Foreign Policy Infom’.ation to discuss the fullest possible efforts by all foreign affairs agencies to inform the public concerning developments in Vietnam, and the President's policies relating to them. Secretary Rogers expects to participate, and wc would be most pleased if you arc able personally to attend. • ♦ The meeting will be held at 2:30 p.m. on Thursday, April 27, in the Secretary's Conference Room at his office on the 7th floor of the Department of State, We will of course be glad to have any member of your staff you v/ish to bring with you, and ask that you let the Executive Secretary of the Croup, Francis Tully (tele­ phone 632-2257), know in advance who will be attending from your agency.

Cordially,

V

John Richardson, Jr. Acting Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (Chairman, Inter-departmental Group)

The Honorable Robert O. Beatty, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, TABiaiîG FOR THE SECRETARY

1. Tho iill-out Korth V;ictnarao.v.o offensive against Honth

Vietnam, and onr necessary conntcrmetvsarca in support

of a clcterinincd South Victnamst-G defense, are being ■ used by uome in this country to revive old divisions

and to confuse tho public about our purposes.

2. Thc:rc is no solid basis in the facts for a revival of

thesedamaging divisions. Since 1969, the direction of

cur national policy has changed substantially, toward a

gradually and responsibly reduced involvement, rather

than increased involvement; and partly as a result of

this change and the manner in which wo have made it, the

situation in South Vietnam today iô far different, and

far mo'**e hopeful, rlcsnito the flagrant Worth vietnamose

invasion, than it was at that tine.

3. In these circumstances, the job of seeing tlicxt the public

fully understands the facts, and fully understands our

purposes, is of major importance to the country, and to -

the President. It requires the hind of first-priority

information effort, bv a.11 of o.ur_.ciovo-?:-nmont

which this group was formed to help plan and carry out.

4. Accordingly, I have asked John Ricliardson to bring'you

together here today to underline tho seriousness of

the problem, and to ask for your best efforts, and those 4.68

-2-"

of all your colleagues from your principal officers on

rtovjn # in ensuring tliat the essential facts arc put before

the public, . ' 5. You v;ill have to decide yourselves how best you Cc:n do

this. As a start, v:e should ensure that every employee

of all our agencies fully understands the facts, ,and that

your principal and senior officers, wherever appropritite

and feasible in their public statcmehts, should take the

opportunity to stress these esscntici.1 facts. John

Richardson and Jvrnbassador Sullivan will be discussing * them with you in more detail, and we will have mcitcrial.s

for you, and be ready to help in every way we can, 469

TALKING POINTS ON VIETNAM . ^ ' I. THE NOr.TM VXETIV'.Ml’SE INVASION

The Kort.li Vietnamese Airny Is conducting a full-scale

mass offensive against South Vietnam with Soviet-

made tanks, trucks, mobile missiles and artillery. The

offensive v/£is launched across the Demilita.rized ilono (EMZ)

and fj.'cm Laos and CanbcdJ.a. Twelve of the thirteen known

active divisions of the KVîî Army are now operating outside

of North Vietnam.

If any pretense to a "civil war" in South Vietnam remained,

it has tC'W been shattered,

.II.. U.S. .BOBBING

A, Our bombing of mii.itary targets in North and South

■ Vietnam is designed to

— protect â.mcricaiV forces (69,000 remain in SVN as

of May 1);

— help assure that our v;ithdra\;al schedule can be

maintained (20,000 more are being withdrawn by

July 1, to bring the total down to 49,000);

-- give South Vietnam a better chance to defend itself » . against an invader using copnicticated offensive

weaponry, provided by outside powers;

-- slow tlie invasion down by destroying petroleum,

r' 470

ammunition and transport needed for so large

and mechanized an offensive.

D. Under the 1968 understandings with Hanoi, we

pledged to withhold bombing of only for so long

as the otlior side respected the D.'IZ and refrained

from attacks cm major cities.

C. /iccordincjly, our air and naval bombardment will con- . tinuG until the NVN offensive is stopped.

' III, ViETWAMISATÏOi'I IS KCkKIKG

A. The South Victlnamose are now doing virtually a .13.

the ground fighting. There arc still D , 000 Kc>.vean

troDpî'i brdpina in Military Region II; but of 54 5,000

U.S. troops there in January 1969, only 69,000 remain

as of May 1, and none are engaged in ground combat.

B. No key cities have yet been won by Co:nmunists. Com­

pare this v;ith the Tct Offensive of 1968, when sub­

stantial Communist.gains were made for a time, though

at great cost, despite the su%:port of CVM by large

U.S. ground combat forces.

C. A substantial part of the air battle is now being

waged by the South Vietnamese Air Force including

much of the tactical bombing in South Vietnam. 471

. . ‘ - 3 - . ■ D. The unity and determination of the South Vietnamese

• in the face of invasion deserves respect. TJic

National Assembly, provincial and local government,

religious groups and a v/ide spectrum of political .

parties are rallying to the. country's defense .and to

the cere of the more than 240,000 refugees nlrccidy

created by the current invasion. In addition to the

regular armed forces (1,1 million men), the Thieu • I government has distributed 600,000 weapons to the

//' local People'c .Eclf-DefensG Force, in confidcnice that

the weapons will be used against the invader.

T V . PV.nCF TAT, '5

We have long been ready to negotiate a settlement on

the basis of a cease-fire, v.’ithdrawal of all foreign

forces, release of all prisoners, and a political settle­

ment through free, independently supervised elections

in v.’liicli all parties, including the National Iiibcration

Front, could play their part.

Hanoi has consistently rejected all such proposals, and

has insisted on the advance overthrow of the existing

government chosen by the people of SVN, and the sub­

stitution of a regime which Hanoi would control, as . 472

the pre-condition to any real negotiation.

We are returninr? to the ta31;n, but not to .listen to

more ppropaganda. The first order of business will be

a halt in this offensive and the return of the prisoners.

" , V. THE m'AOl'i DOCTRINE AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE,

A. Under the l;;ixon Doctrine, the U.S. has been working

hard and successfully to reduce direct U.S. involve­

ment abroad as our allies and friends increasingly

assume primary respOi.ijibillLy for their own non­

nuclear defense. Under this policy, v;e have already

withdrawn .540,000 troe.-ÿs fj oi.i Asia -- 60,00h f f them

from Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and

elsewhere and talcen stcp.s in concert with our

Atlantic partners to increase their participation

ill the rcsponsibilizzies of that alliance.

B. These changes cannot be made abruptly, without,

creating po\;er vacuums, politica]. unrest, military

insecurity and the likelihood of more, rcither than

less, armed conflict in areas where our presence

is being reduced with resultant damage to our •* \ own interests as well as to those of the countries

concerned. To bring about a gradual change as our

allies improve their capacities, v,*e must be able

to assist them tlirough the transition period. We 473

- 5 “

must be ready to extend material assistance,

— to help our friends and allies under direct

attack, lil:e £!outh Vnetnai», Laos, and Cambodia ;

-- to support strategically located and exposed

allies, notab]y in Korea, Thailand, and Turkey: and

to strengthen countries which contri);uto to imp^or-

tant regional security interests affecting the U.S.,

as in the case of Jordan, Israel, the Philippines,

and Certain Latin 7'j.:.erican countries.

C. For tliese. purposes ’./o arc currently seeking

— gj:ant Military Assiste nee funds totaling $780 million,

foreign Military Sales credits of $527 million, and

Ti • ••

— Security Supporting Assistance, $84 4 million.

This is a far smaller burden than would be the

ultimate cost of increased or new direct U.S. military

involvement resulting from a serious deterioration of

security in those regions. 474

ir;r 1 I : ' > ‘Pfpirçinp ' W.W J1 ± J Ù I.

*^F,irat the bladc^ U'u ri(fl;ry, Aprii .mrn*m % i; ii: I'.'i- I*.';I r -, A

V-f- 'ivT'' ; ■•■■i I •■•I'-;' y-'\ i^i0..-2G 'b ù ÊiT.8 €G-11F2^

\V;uifv, \V.> cl?nj’ rv-.'-!v.rov, , .• - non-Comn-'vdif.t ci'.'ilur? can Gurvivo oiiJy cvoiv m'.I- u t '/i;.',- if Iho’ATlVK (Army of South "Vietnam) n-i;v, I'.nu uvery ü)\.T, or survives the present attack by its enemies. iiiOO:i .Vnicci r.iici \v):-h pi'ùfouncùy that it It r.ceniG equally clear timt it can survive \von)a Oi.d lucky, only with every bit of Amiincart air and v.Vit I'rcoicicn'i isi;'.on ir- it r.s .U;;> sea support winch Mr. lltxon can provide. fc. I 'l. I I ■ . I i ' Considering the alternativc.\ wo.must.n.o- “7 va ■' , .7ak.a.‘c::.rnul;v,Vkx«.4‘.iA4«jkial ~în'c>v!CThi71'érfcl'L‘.7l oTrtipporiZi'ns-AJtVilL tyifh _th'i. pr a f css i on ràly_. ro ann ed „air.,..encL 'iT.n% Vv‘i,ci t’iil.i’i. otaciwisc! jaug; inco jrua.GtryiL'jR. oi-tAo -ur.iteu'Ütates. noriC.-.dy tiic* cor:tGc;ut:ne:s o.v fnc cdloiv-A- Y/n anpreve without réservation .Mr. dve ccn;:GO. A)udlki::.f:or;rLGl£uJlAk f,ixons io'ocp.i.p.ncLpro;Tor._eno:t-to-eom? r:k. RV'::! ..io_gyL.;ÀJ:7p_v:. arp.'-vaav jnid;j;j:i'GU)''PC'r.t.xor.Sait;oiX'.vith.co:jtk'iVift- A:;’,' 11- r -^t M'ci c’co VV' '<•• : ' ', V‘C'VkL_ b'Xi c'i .'.ecr: t rbulmu-'cy vUh tho )7.urv:';tG , 4 ^ . 4 ,4 m, I. 4, 4 4 4 ^ ivnj ru:;'.:'iÛG'io:i cl far mai t'tl jt_ya-

' . . ■ 4 ■ 4", • ■! . L ^ ‘ » ■ » ■ » i 4 * * 4 "I * I - M ' * I- :-'.y " ‘ ,u;?vu.'‘vl(; ijl . -:vd izlVvipx ;; v:;b k rc.-?hu.ijT,..cifJl:.y, t'i.st* j rC(i V.\*\UU 1 iO^V (I ji'ii'ifii once I ho nil I ce mi of um halllc in SctRh .•4/-/.»iv,4444 A OJ > , « i I !♦*■lii'.j , « 4^L w«ic. » . u j ^ •. tîA'U* _ t i\ wi'ii'i Ill I t. " Vi (I. ." A G.'lid U;,i'. i;r-;i:;c.; o-' /.I'n- Vi.div'v,'h/ l::' a lot of d.xmtgo control wo iiiiAA iiGVo uzon wiui.;, hi l;o mrn.-’ged widchevor ride wins, An ro;.r,on:ii-',>: prooabijilio?, r.li‘ncvK;h liic Ici.l- open ciiaunei ijclwcea f.loseaw and Wa.di- ,n/; of C'.0 '..'..u,r.ists in the con,ilo:.cvu:n- in..;iori will he useful. Vfc note with boiii iiv'i'i ii. jAîlonexia (lid run over in g liun- roil of and a;jprov,il ihr:on-.v.‘iifliiJ to iicep CzccJio.slovakia in aide its sj'dtem yAlTy:5:aCbbu_jbû_ can be iircd toiiay in r.ujjport of Mr, 'kb: .’'.v '/hg;!'..'', ÿ.!''J.x..irjin..U.a.;io*iir Ni.s'on'.s ell'ort to Iteep £loulh Vietnam out* V.'.' a nmV'Viuinm'int.'il culture sick; of llw: CommuniM s va tern. V ■ I E. Presidential Directive Ordering a

Cutback of Governmental Public

Relations Activities

475 . /»

476 f ■

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 6, 1970

MEMORANDUM TO

THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

Subject: Public' Relations Activities

During the past 18 months, I have seen a number of agency publications, exhibits, films and related public relations efforts which in m y judgment represent a questionable use of the tax­ payers* m o n e y for tire purpose of promoting and soliciting support for various agency activities. V/hile 1 believe in and fully support an open Administration that legitimately informs the public, I want to put an end to inappropriate promotional acthdties by exec­ utive branch agencies',

Therefore, I direct you to curtail snarply your agency's F Y 1971 plans for promoting the agency's programs and attempting to obtain support of special interest groups.

To bring about a curtailment of self-serving and wasteful public relations activities, I have instructed the Director of the Office of Ma n a g e m e n t and Budget to reduce the^funds available to your agency in F Y 1971 for broadcasting, advertising, exhibits, films, publications, and similar public relations efforts. Tlie Director will inform you of the specific dollar reduction I have ordered for your agency. I have directed that amounts which would have been used for this purpose be reduced and placed in reserve.

1 want to maJce it clear that this is not an attempt to single out those who serve the Government well by informing the public and preserving the principle of freedom of information. Rather, it is directed at those who are, quite understandably, program advocates, and who, perhaps unknowingly, affront many of our citizens with public relations promotions, fancy publications and exhibits aimed at a limited audience, and similar extravagances that are not in keeping with this Administration's often stated policy of frugal management of the public's resources. - 2 - 477

Please take personal action to ensure that your subordinates carry out the intent of this directive and that they do not attempt to circumvent it through changes in position titles or a realloca­ tion of resources intended for other purposes. F. Statement Issued by Congressman William Moorhead^

Democrat of Pennsylvania, Concerning

Public Relations Spending During

the Nixon Administration

478 479 il PDBUO EEIAMOtS SISIü)IHÎ IIUmG THE HEOH AEDtEISTHATlOH i!

As part of the Foreign Operations and Goveircent Information Subcommittee's

study of public infornation policies and practices of the Executive branch of

govemnent, I sent a questionnaire to soce 8o of the more important Federal, depart­

ments and agencies requesting infornation on contracts let for public relations

activities to outside, organizations during Fiscal Years 1970, 1971, and 1972.

Also requested vas infonaation on the purpose of the contract, a description

of its provisions, and the dollar cost of each' such contract.

The results of the Subcomittee ’s analysis of responses to this questionnaire

reveals the following major findings;

* During'the first 3 Fiscal Years of ths ïlixon Adrini strati on, some $77,^^,278, was reported as spent or authorized in contracts for public re]_ations activities by Federal departments and agencies •vith private public relations cenpcnies, involving sens 1120 in­ dividual contracts, and some firms.

* Abïout h/5ths of the total spending vas by the Department of Defense, or about $62 million, the largest single contract (in F7 1972), being for recruiting by the military services to 5. Ü. Ayer & Son, Philadelphia, vas for $47 million.

* In ITovember, 1970, President ITixon sent a much-advertised memorandum to all Executive departments and agencies, urging that they curtail "self-serving and vastsful public relations activities." fbe ex­ tent of such cuttaclcB of regular public information activities by government public information offices vas tabulated by the Office of lianagement and Euiget and also monitored by the Subcommittee. The 0M3 reported to the Subocmmittee that, as a result of these cutbacks, seme 1,771 jobs in public information offices had been eliminated and some $33 million had been cut by the 20 largest Federal departments and agencies.

It appears from our study that vhile claiming ‘bavlngs" of some $33 million

over a perJ.od of 2y years, ths Dixon Administration has contracted out {over a 3

year period) core than $7 ^ million in such public z'sdations activities to private

cbz^panies. "image-building," "publicity gimmicks," and "neve management" by the 480 - 2 -

Nixon Administration' b public information team iq the Bhite Houee and in other

Executive departments and agencies — paid for by American taxpayers' dollars — has been a key part of his re-election ccnçaign. Such activities carried on day-in and day-out by government bureaucrats, a vast majority of whom vere appointed or promoted by the Dixon Administration, costs many hundreds of millions of dollars each year. This is in addition to the $77 million in private ER contracts handed out during the past 3 years ITixon has been in office. Itore than 6,000 PR bureau­ crats are Involved in this massive publicity effort, coordinated by IUxon's chief

"image-maker", Mr. Herb glein, vho serves in the White house as "Director of Com- laanications. "

legitimate public information activities by the Federal government's many agencies are important in informing and advising millions of Americans on the operation and benefits they nay obtain from hundreds of Fedei’al programs enacted by CoEgress over the years: The abuse of the information function by political nanipulators in the Mixon Administration, the use of Federal employees for political campaign speech uriting, publicity campaigns, in the preparation of political pam­ phlets extolling the President, and sloilar illegal activities are p.n contrary to our democratic system of gcverment and should be condemned by the American public.

JUUULLJUL mnnminr G. Teletype Message from Patrick Buchanan

to "Governor" Agnew,

October 29, 1968

481 482 AGMEl/ FLA Rt’J SYR ..

IS JESSIE THERE?? '

PLEASE GIVE FOLLOwI.NJG 70 JESSIE... ■

MEMO 70: GEORGE WHITE

FRO] : BUCHA.\’A.\ OCTOBER 29i 1068

YOU MIGHT SCORE SC.-*E REP.L YARDAGE DO WE IE THE SOUTH WITH A GOOD BLAST AT THE HSvJ YORK TIMES. DO.vE THERE THEY ARE THE ESSE.vCE OF THE HEvJ YORK, ULTRA-LIBERAL, LEFT-VI MG ESTABLISHMENT PRESS THAT HAS BEATEN ON THE SOUTH FOR YEA.RS. SUGGESTIONS.

1) THS GOVERNOR TEAR HELL OUT OF THEi'l FOR DSLIBEiLATE AND VICIOUS LIBEL, AM APOLOGY, ASK IF THEY ARE "I'lAM E.vjOUGH TO GIVE IT." ^ /■ .£> THE GOVERNOR THEN SAY. THAT THE TIKES IS SQUEALING BECAUSE RN TORE HELL OUT OF THEM. THAT THE TILES 'IS TILLING TO PLAT LOW-..LvEu DIRTY p o l i t i c s ; BUT THEY BELLY-ACHE WHEN THEY HAVE'TO PAY THE PRICE. THEN USE TRUMAN'S OUOTZ. "IF THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE NEW YORK TIKES CAN'T STA.VD THE HEAT, KAY5E THEY OUGHT TO GET OUT OF THE KITCHEN." THEY CAN DISH IT OUT; BUT THEY CAN’T TAKE IT.

S; THE GOVERNOR COULD NEEDLE HELL OUT OF THEK BY SAVING AFTER HIS BLAST AND DEMAND FOR AN APOLOGY THAT "ACTUAL..V THOSE FELLOWS WHO WRITE EDITORI.ALS FOR THE TIKES AREN'T SO BAD. PUT THEIR FOOT IN THEIR KOUTH A LITTLEOTOO OFTEN."

END.

• DNE

.BOJ EHT OD L0CT05ER OCTOBER £5,19 68