Summa Philosophica

SUMMA PHILOSOPHICA: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY AND LOGIC

Ephraim-Stephen Essien, Ed

With contributions from:

Chiedozie Okoro- University of Cape Coast, Ghana Raymond Osei- University of Cape Coast, Ghana Awuni Inusah- University of Cape Coast, Ghana Frank Amissah- University of Cape Coast, Ghana Christopher Etokudo- Akwa Ibom State University, Nigeria Joseph Alphonsus Okon- Akwa Ibom State University, Nigeria Hussein Inusah- University of Cape Coast, Ghana Innocent Asouzu- University of Calabar, Nigeria Andrew Efemini- University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria Inameti Lawrence Udo- Akwa Ibom State University, Nigeria Nkutobong Pius Ekpoudom- University of Uyo, Nigeria

Summa Philosophica

First Published 2011 By Lulu Press 3101 Hillsborough St. Raleigh, North Carolina, 27607-5436 United States of America

ISBN 978-0-557-97506-8

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in aretrievalsystem, or transmitted in any form or any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without a prior written permission of the copyright owner.

Summa Philosophica

DEDICATION

To The Summa Sapientia (Highest Wisdom), who makes all ensophizations naturally possible

To All my teachers through whom I got ensophised, especially Sir Stephen Jonah Essien and Madam Theresa Stephen Essien, my first teachers at home and at school

To Two most intelligent influences on my academic life: Dr. Andrew Edet Ekpenyong of the University of Cambridge and Professor Innocent Asouzu of the University of Calabar

Summa Philosophica

PREFACE: ENSOPHIZATION AS PHILOSOPHY

“Ensophization” is the process of doing philosophy with intent to infuse wisdom. To “ensophize” is to infuse wisdom, where “sophia” is wisdom. What I call “ensophism” describes the way I see philosophy. “Ensophism” is philosophy. Philosophizing is an analysis of reality (ontoanalysis). Ensophization is an analysis of reality with the aim to infuse wisdom. Ensophization, which is the act of doing philosophy with the aim of imparting wisdom, becomes a philosophical task. Ensophization is the primary role of philosophy. Ensophization is the wisdom consciousness (the consciousness of “sophia” – wisdom). If philosophy is the love of wisdom, ensophization is the pathway towards attainment of this wisdom. Ensophization captures epistemology as well as metaphysics, logic as well as ethics and aesthetics. Expressed otherwise, ensophization underlies our philosophical everydayness and our intellectual worries about being, knowledge of being and value of being. Here, we ensophize in terms of being and knowledge of being; we ensophise in metaphysics and epistemology, with logic as our tool. When I said elsewhere (2008a) that the world community needs a ‘debellifism’ to contain war and violence, I was ensophising towards being and its continuity. The key word in this analysis and throughout this work is and shall remain ‘being’ and human existence. ‘Being’ is the central problem of philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular. This problem not only goes back to Parmenides who asked the question ‘what is there?’; nor to Aristotle who asked ‘what is being?’, but to the trinity of Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes. These men were, in the first instance, bothered by the question of the constitution of things, the question of the underlying principle of being. Thus they asked the question, ‘out of what material is the world constituted?’ (Ex qua materia constituti mundi?). This question was a defining question, a definite moment, a radical point in the history of thought. This question marked the nativity of philosophy. The ‘ex qua materia constituti mundi’ question gave rise to varied answers: Water by Thales; Indeterminate boundless by Anaximander; Air by Anaximanes, Nous by Anaxagoras; Fire by Heraclitus; Number by Pythagoras, Atoms by Democritus and Leucippus. However, Parmenides stood out a more sober man to restate the question. He then asked: ‘what

Summa Philosophica is there?’ and answered: Being! For Parmenides, then, being is what there is; being is all there is. Parmenides may have gone a step beyond his folks by asking what there is and stating that Being is what there is. He, however, did not present a satisfactory analysis of Being, apart from his statement that Being is, and that Being is one. Aristotle, whom Dante described as ‘the master of those who know’, yet had to reframe the Parmenidean question from ‘what is there?’ to ‘what is being?’ (Ti to On?). Aristotle was not great by asking ‘what is being?’, for there is no essential difference between ‘what is being?’ and ‘what is there?’ His greatness can rather be located in his analysis of the question of being, especially in his metaphysics. The problem of being was taken seriously by Aristotle in his doctrine of ‘ousia’ as substance. For him, then, substance is being. Innocent Asouzu queries Aristotle’s dualistic description of substance as matter and form, accusing his dualism as the ancient root of all dualistic, polarizing, exclusive and dichotomizing existence. The way out of this ‘Aristotelian danger’ is a complementary mindset and action, says Asouzu. He argues that anything that exists serves a missing link of reality. Earlier in the 20th century, Martin Heidegger had repudiated Aristotle and all hitherto existing philosophers for not taking the question of being as the core problem of philosophy; as the core problem of metaphysics. Heidegger accused these all of what he denoted ‘seinsvergessenheit’ (forgetfulness of being). For him, all pre-existing philosophers forgot being and placed being in oblivion. Forgetfulness of being or oblivion of being was the Heideggerian verdict on his predecessors because, according to him, they forgot, avoided and shunned the being- question (seinsfrage). He then questioned: ‘why are there things instead of nothing?’ This question does not touch the core of the being-question, however. This is because it does not seek to know being, but to know the ‘why’ of being. The being-question (seinsfrage) was made more pertinent in the beginning page of his Being and Time where he asked: “Do we now have an answer to the question of the meaning of being?’ Heidegger, again, did not furnish a satisfactory answer to the question of the meaning of being. But suffice it to say that he reawakened modern consciousness towards the enduring and central problematic of metaphysics: the question of being. The question: ‘Ti to On?’; ‘Quid est esse?’; ‘Was ist Sein?’; ‘Qui est etre?’ all point, though couched in different tongues, to the question: ‘What is being?’ And even if we ask in our tongue, “Nside abot?” (Annang language), we still have not asked any different question from ‘what is being?’ The problem of being sits at the root of every metaphysical inquiry and endeavour. This central problem cuts across the width and breadth, height and depth of every metaphysical philosophy. But the problem of being is not the only problem of philosophy. The philosophical problems are many. We have the

Summa Philosophica problem of unity and diversity or monism and pluralism. The other problems are: those of substance and accidents, essence and existence, appearance and reality, universal and particular, change and permanence, mind and body, freewill and determinism, space and time, identity and difference, and the problem of causality. In one way or the other, this plethora of problems dates back to the central problem of being. In this work which we call Summa Philosophica, we shall devote three separate chapters (4,5,6) to analyse these problems of philosophy. While in this book, we analyse the nature of philosophy, and do so with a historicism and an Africanity wholly involved, we uphold the problem of being as the core problem which pervades our task. We locate metaphysics at the epicenter of philosophy. Aristotle called it First Philosophy. We name it Summa Philosophica, that is, Highest Philosophy, relying partly on Aristotle. For this reason, this book is named Summa Philosophica: An Introduction to Philosophy. In this Summa, we intend to analyse being in metaphysics, we intend to analyse knowledge of being in epistemology, we intend to analyse the value of being in aesthetics and ethics and to analyse the language of being in logic. However, we shall not finish this task in the present edition. This Summa Philosophica is divided into eight parts. Part one adumbrates on the nature of philosophy, involving the meaning of philosophy, the branches of philosophy, the theories of philosophy, and the problems of philosophy. The second part begins the ancient history of philosophy, followed by the history of medieval philosophy in part three. Histories of modern philosophy and contemporary philosophy are covered in parts four and five. African philosophy is contained in part six, while part seven treats the theme of irrelevance and relevance of philosophy. Part eight concerns logic, ancient and modern. The Summa Philosophica is an introduction to philosophy and logic which is intended for students taking courses in Philosophy and Logic. We thank all our contributors to this edition. We acknowledge with gratitude all authors of philosophical works that have shaped this edition. On behalf of our philosophy team, I thank Dr. Andrew Ekpenyong of Cambridge University, who suspended his experiment in the lab upon getting my email request signal, to write the foreword to this book. He is a philosopher-physicist, like Albert Einstein. I personally see the “Light of Being” in him. I thank the love of my life, Helen Emem Adrian, for tolerating me, especially my absence, but presence on my desk. Lawrence Obot and Ema Effiong deserve special mention for their help in this work. While we acknowledge the Summa Sapientia, the Being as Being, we take responsibility for inadequacies found in the work. Ephraim-Stephen Essien, PhD University of Cape Coast Cape Coast, Ghana; 1 June, 2011

Summa Philosophica

FOREWORD

Summa Philosophica is, to me, a conspectus of Western philosophy that is superlatively comprehensive, incisively succinct and peculiarly afro- affirmative. About Bertrand Russell’s book: A History of Western Philosophy, Albert Einstein wrote: “A precious book ... a work that is in the highest degree pedagogical …." Summa Philosophica is even more pedagogical. While Russell subdivided the aforementioned work into: Ancient Philosophy, Catholic Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, Essien has subdivided Summa Philosophica into eight parts, namely: Introduction into Philosophy, History of Ancient Philosophy, History of Medieval Philosophy, History of Modern Philosophy, History of Contemporary Philosophy, African Philosophy and Metaphysics, the Relevance of Philosophy, and Introduction to Logic. Based on its eighth and last part, Summa Philosophica is more than what the title suggests: it is also a Summa Logica.

It is my hope that every reader will go beyond the immediately evident brilliance of the leading author, editor and co-authors, beyond the radiance of the philosophers whose works have been adumbrated here, to the brilliant radiance of Being as Being. However, the brilliant radiance of Being as Being might be so high in intensity that it tends to blind. Even when blinded by this brilliant radiance, our perception of every being, every being as being that being, can thereafter be honed by the brilliant radiance of Being as Being. This honing is perhaps a path to wisdom. And Summa Philosophica is a map of this path.

Dr. Andrew Edet Ekpenyong Department of Physics Cavendish Laboratory University of Cambridge Cambridge, England

Summa Philosophica

CONTENTS

Dedication Preface Foreword PART I: INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY …13

1.MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY…13 What is Philosophy? Goal of Philosophy Methods of Philosophy

2. BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY…18 Metaphysics What is Metaphysics? Scope, Division and Subject Matter Epistemology Logic Aesthetics Ethics: Nature, Scope and Theories

3. PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES AND SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT…38 Idealism, Materialism, Realism, Monism and Pluralism, Dualism, Rationalism, Empiricism, Irrationalism, Utilitarianism, Dialectical Materialism, Phenomenology, Existentialism, Logical Positivism

4. PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY…46 Being, Being and Non-Being, Human Being, Essence and Existence, Transcendence and Immanence, Reality, Nature of Reality, Appearance and Reality, Change and Permanence, Mind and Body, Causality, Freedom and Determinism, Substance and Accident, Universals and Particulars, Unity and Diversity or One and Many

5. THE PROBLEM OF SPACE AND TIME…75

6. ON THE ONTOLOGY OF THE MIND…87

Summa Philosophica

7. MAN, NATURE AND GOD: THREE CONCEPTUAL DOMAINS OF PHILOSOPHY…109

PART II: HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY…113

OVERTURE: ON THE MYTHICAL ERA AND THE CHARACTER OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY…114

8. PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY…116 . Thales of Miletus . Anaximander of Miletus . Anaximenes of Miletus . Pythagoras of Samos . Xenophanes of Colophon . Parmenides of Elea . Heraclitus of Ephesus . Zeno of Elea . Empedocles of Agrigentum . Anaxagoras of Clazomenae . Leucippus of Abdera; Democritus of Abdera . The Sophists: Protagoras, Giorgias, Thrasymachus, Hippias

9. SOCRATES, PLATO AND ARISTOTLE…125

10. HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY…135 The Stoics: Stoicism Epicurus: Epicureanism Plotinus: Neo-Platonism

PART III: HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY…139

OVERTURE: ON THE CHARACTER OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY…140

11. MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY…141 . St. Augustine of Hippo, Boethius, John Scotus Eriugena, Avicenna, Averroes, St. Anselm of Canterbury, Roscellinus, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Nicholas of Cusa, Francis Suarez

12. THE INTELLECT IN NICHOLAS OF CUSA’S MYSTICAL THOUGHT..160

Summa Philosophica

13. THE INTELLECT AND WILL IN THOMAS AQUINAS AND FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY…167

PART IV: HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY…183

14. THE RENAISSANCE, HUMANISM AND MODERNITY…184 15. THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION…186 16. RATIONALISM – DESCARTES, SPINOZA AND LEIBNIZ…196 On Rationalism Rene Descartes Baruch Spinoza Gottfried Leibniz 17. EMPIRICISM – LOCKE, BERKELEY AND HUME…220 On Empiricism John Locke George Berkeley David Hume 18. IMMANUEL KANT AND THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY…235 19. GERMAN IDEALISM …246 Kant’s Heritage Johann Fichte Friedrich Schelling Georg Hegel 20. IRRATIONALISM …249 Arthur Schopenhauer Friedrich Nietzsche

PART V: HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY…251

21. ANGLO-AMERICAN NEO-IDEALISM …252 . Edward Caird, Thomas Green, Francis Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, John McTaggart, Josiah Royce

22. KARL MARX AND THE DIALECTICS OF HISTORY…254 . Dialectical Materialism, Historical Materialism,Communism

23. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD AND PROCESS PHILOSOPHY..259 24. EDMUND HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY…267 25. EXISTENTIALISM …270

Summa Philosophica

. Soren Kierkegaard, Don Miguel De Unamuno Y Jugo, Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus

26. POSITIVISM, LOGICAL POSITIVISM AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY…291

PART VI: AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY AND METAPHYSICS…320

27. IBUANYIDANDA PHILOSOPHY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ESSENCE …321 -Innocent Asouzu

28. ANNANG PHILOSOPHY…360 - Ephraim Stephen Essien

29. IMO ADE AGWO (THE HUMAN PERSON IS WEALTH): A PRINCIPLE OF TRANSCULTURAL NEO-HUMANIST PHILOSOPHY OF THE ANNANG PEOPLE …390 - Joseph Alphonsus Okon

30. IGBO METAPHYSICS, YORUBA METAPHYSICS, KEMETIC (EGYPTIAN) PHILOSOPHY…400 -Chiedozie Okoro

31. KWAME GYEKYE’S AKAN PHILOSOPHY…434

PART VII: THE RELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHY…440

32. PHILOSOPHY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT…441 -Andrew Efemini

PART VIII: INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC…456

33. BASIC CONCEPTS IN LOGIC…457 Meaning and Use of Logic Arguments Premise and Concluson Indicators Types of Arguments Deductive Argument or Deduction

Summa Philosophica

Inductive Argument or Induction The Three Laws of Thought

34. PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC…464 Categorical Propositions and Classes Types of Categorical Propositions Quality and Quantity of Categorical Propositions General Schema of Standard-Form Categorical Propositions The Notion of Distribution Square of Opposition

35. THE LOGIC OF SYLLOGISM…471 Standard-Form Categorical Syllogism Major Term, Minor Term, and Middle Term Mood and Figure Rules of Syllogism and Syllogistic Fallacies Sorites and Enthymemes The Dilemma

36. SYMBOLIC LOGIC…477 The Notion of Statement Variable The Notion of Truth Value Logical Operators, Logical Connectives, Logical Constants Negation Conjunction Disjunction Conditional or Material Implication Bi-Conditional or Material Equivalence Logical Equivalence distinguished from Material Equivalence Truth Value Table Tautology, Contradiction, and Contingent Propositions

37. FORMAL PROOF OF VALIDITY…489 Rules of Inference Rules of Replacement or Equivalence

38. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LOGIC…495

39. THE NOTION OF DEFINITION IN LOGIC…498

40. ON FALLACIES …505

Summa Philosophica

PART I: INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER ONE

MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY

What is Philosophy? Philosophy is commonly known as the study of wisdom. This notion directly comes from the Greek words combined to form the word ‘philosophy’. These Greek words are ‘philein’, ‘philos’ and ‘sophia’. While ‘philein’ means ‘to love’, ‘philos’ means ‘love’, and ‘sophia’ means ‘wisdom’. Encyclopaedia Britannica defines philosophy as ‘pursuit of wisdom’. A philosopher is often referred to as a wise man (‘ata ifiok’ in Annang language). The Annang people of Nigeria refer to a philosopher and a professor as ‘Ata Ifiok’, which literally means ‘knowledge expert’. This Annang understanding has so much relevance in the university academic system, especially as the highest academic qualification one can attain is the Ph.D ,which, when fully rendered in English, reads ‘Philosophy Doctor’ or ‘Philosophiae Doctor’ in Latin, meaning ‘Doctor of Philosophy’. This award means that the awardee is an expert in learning, expert in knowledge, expert in wisdom attainable from the school. It is worthy to note that when formal education began in Egypt and subsequently Greece, that every subject was studied as ‘Philosophy’, for whenever one left his or her house to go and learn in the Egyptian Schools or the Athenian ‘agora’ or Plato’s Academy or Aristotle’s Lyceum, he or she was in search of wisdom and knowledge. Going to school indicated ‘love of wisdom’. And one was always welcome to the school amidst an induction ceremony and graduated amidst a farewell ceremony, and these are the historical backgrounds to our matriculation and graduation ceremonies in our modern schools system. And even so, one would be crowned as a Philosophy Doctor (PhD) if he/she attained the highest degree of learning in school. Philosophy, as ‘love of wisdom’ or search for wisdom, suggests an irresistible drive, yearning and desire for knowledge of all things. Wisdom (sophia) in this sense is synonymous with knowledge, and Aristotle, charged with this conception, announced that ‘all men by nature desire to know’ (Metaphysics 980a). Philosophy, in this sense, is a search for knowledge; knowledge about reality, nature, knowledge about the world. However, Aristotle (Metaphysics Bk. 1 Ch. 1) contrasts knowledge with wisdom, despite their closeness in meaning. While knowledge refers to acquisition of facts and information and how those facts are used to yield

Summa Philosophica results, without knowing the reason or causes or principles behind those facts; wisdom refers to acquisition of information and facts and the principles, causes and reason behind those facts. Aristotle associated the latter with philosophy, by describing it (wisdom) as knowledge of first principles or causes of things. Philosophy as love of wisdom is the search for the universal principles of nature and reality. Philosophy is a critical study, inquiry, investigation and reflection on the fundamental problems and questions of human existence and reality. Philosophy is an inquiry and examination of reality.

Goal of Philosophy Is reality encapsulated in what our senses make available to us – appearances – or is there a hidden but ultimate reality? Our encounter with the world tends to indicate to us that there is more to reality than what appears. This reality must in itself be an ultimate reality, possibly responsible (in terms the ground) for what there is. This reality must exist causa sui generis (as cause of its kind). This reality must exist secundum esse (according to its being). It must be the First Cause, the Unmoved Mover, the Alpha and Omega point, the Being of Beings, the First Principle. This reality must be the ultimate reality. The goal of philosophy is the search for the ultimate reality. The goal of philosophy is the search for truth.

Methods of Philosophy

1. Dialectic or Socratic Method The method of philosophy which was invented by Socrates was called, known and referred to as Dialectic. It refers to a dialogue involving questions and answers by the interlocutors. Dialectical method of philosophy involves philosophical conversation among people known as interlocutors, who try to offer definitions and explanations to certain concepts or propositions. The explanations or definitions are often refuted by counter arguments with the purpose of coming up with better solutions to the issue at hand.

2. Analytic Method From the Greek “analyse”, that is, “to break down,” philosophical analysis involves the breaking down of concepts, propositions and issues. From this process comes the name “conceptual analysis”. Conceptual analysis involves breaking down of concepts into their constituent parts so as to

Summa Philosophica gain a clear or clearer understanding of any particular philosophical issue involving the concept. The analytic method of philosophy was given its full development by the logical positivists. The logical positivist suggested that the role of philosophy is to analyse language. Analysis of language was for them the essence of philosophy. For emphasizing on analysis as the role of philosophy, the philosophy of the logical positivists came to be called “analytic philosophy”. What is analytic philosophy? The answer is in this paragraph, that is, the school of philosophy which upholds that the role of philosophy is analysis of language.

3. Synthetic-Inductive Method This is a method of philosophy which proceeds from observable data to general principles about their being and function. This method can lead to increasing probability, but cannot lead to absolute necessary truth. The reason is that experience lies below this level of necessity which is the metaphysical level. Because it makes experience its starting point this method of philosophy often leads to dogmatic empiricism, which is a generalizing to all experience from some particular experience.

4. Skeptical Method or Methodic Doubt

The skeptical method of philosophy is a systematic process of being doubtful of the truth of one’s claim. This method originated from the origin of formal skepticism by Phrrho of Ellis and descended unto Rene Descartes. The methodic doubt is the modern version of skepticism associated with Rene Descartes. Descartes suggested that one must subject every knowledge claim to doubt until one is able to get justification for such a claim. From a whole-scale doubt, truth and knowledge can arise. One implication of the methodic doubt is that philosophers do not have to believe anything or any claim unless there is proof or justification for that claim.

5. Speculative Method As it were, philosophy arose out of speculation. From the Latin “speculatio”, speculation is a method of philosophy which involves the act or process of reasoning a priori from assumed or given premises. Almost the whole philosophical enterprise is about speculation. The pre-Socratic philosophers started philosophy through speculation. Plato, for example,

Summa Philosophica speculated about a world of forms. Most of the speculated realities do not exist in sense experience.

6. Phenomenological Method This method of philosophy was championed by Edmund Husserl. The phenomenological method has two wings: One is the “phenomenological epoche”, and the other is the “eidetic reduction”. Husserl’s aim in philosophy was a “return to the things-themselves”, what he called the “zu den Sachen Selbst”; a return to the foundation, a “recursus ad fonte”. To return to the things-themselves, according to Husserl, involved a return to our primitive world of nature, the life-world (lebens-welt), where things are in their natural states, untainted by science and technology. This was in a view to know things in their essences. For Husserl, then, phenomenological epoche involves our putting aside or putting in bracket our biases, prejudices, presuppositions or previous ideas we had about any particular thing or object or phenomena. With the biases put aside, we would then get to know things the way they are. “Eidetic reduction” on our object of investigation entails the following action: we strip our object of cognition of all existential and particular traits and we focus our minds on its essence. For it is the essence that we want to know, for phenomenology, according to Husserl, is an “eidetic science”, i.e, the science of essences, the science that is interested only in the essences of things. Husserl believes that since things reveal themselves (their essences) to us directly through immediate experience, error and doubt are therefore excluded. For Husserl, we realize our transcendental ego when man gets to the essences of things.

7. Transcendental Method This method of philosophy, the transcendental method of inquiry, mainly makes the mind to serve as a philosophical laboratory. The scientific method of inquiry is apt for the empirical sciences, where there is observation, experimentation and hypothesisation. Here, in philosophy, there is no physical sampling or quantification of data wholly involved. The mind does everything. The senses perceive, yet the mind carries out the rest by the process of abstraction. For example, given ten human beings, some male, some female, some tall, some short, some American, some African, the philosophical mind would not be bothered by the gender, nor height, nor racial content of these human beings, but would be mostly bothered by one common feature that cuts across all of them, which is their

Summa Philosophica humanity; nor shall the number of books in your bookshelf or study be of supreme significance to the philosophical mind than the concept of bookness, that is, that which makes a book a book; nor am I presently more bothered, as I write these words, by the whatness of the ink than by the inkness of the ink. The transcendental method of philosophy entails the logic of induction (in that observation of particular objects is involved) as well as the logic of deduction (in that generalizations are made). Thus the transcendental method of philosophy is inductive yet more deductive. As it is inductive, it remains more a priori. The transcendental method is not devoid of experience, for, by Aristotle, “there is nothing in the intellect which was not first there in the senses (Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu). Yet this method goes beyond (transcends) the senses. For Immanuel Kant, the transcendental method is man’s way of knowing objects in so far as this is possible a priori (Critique of Pure Reason A 11 – 14). The transcendental method of philosophy operates when the mind begins to entertain metaphysical questions such as: what is being? Why is being? Why is there something instead of nothing? What is the ‘terminus a quo’ (origin) and the ‘terminus ad quem’ (end) of the universe and man? Where did man come from and where shall he go? Does the universe have a designer? What is life? What is the purpose of life? Is life meaningful? Is there an ultimate reality?

8. The Critical Method The critical method of philosophy is disbelief that one’s claim is the absolute truth. It is a variant form of skepticism, but in this case, one may believe that one’s claim is partly true, but never absolutely true. The direct implication of the critical method is that there is no absolute truth. Immanuel Kant is best associated with this method when he disbelieved that rationalism and empiricism were absolute truths. He disagreed with the rationalists that they were totally right. He also disagreed with the empiricists that they were totally right. He agreed with them in parts and later came up with the mediation of the two positions. Hegel had to use the critical method, too, to reject Kant’s agnosticism about the noumena. The critical method requires that we suspect every knowledge claim of containing errors or anomalies. Criticism tends to be the most dominant method of philosophy. It renders every knowledge claim relative; if true, then a relative truth. Innocent Asouzu’s notion of “truth and authenticity criterion” in his Complementary Reflection is a perfect exercise of philosophical criticism (Asouzu, 2004:317-347).

Summa Philosophica

CHAPTER TWO

BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy has five main branches, viz: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Logic, Ethics, and Aesthetics. Sub branches of philosophy are: Philosophy of Science, Social and Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Law or Jurisprudence, Philosophy of Education, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophical Anthropology, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Technology, Philosophy of Engineering, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Medicine, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Economics, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Comparative Philosophy, Philosophy of Culture, Environmental Philosophy, Philosophy of Nature, etc. While it is observable that philosophy is ever extensive, we shall, however, have brief excursions into the five main branches below. More will be said about metaphysics as the base (itak) of philosophy.

METAPHYSICS

What is Metaphysics? First, what it is not: May we begin, instead, to state what metaphysics is not. Metaphysics is not occultism. Metaphysics is not witchcraft. Metaphysics is not sorcery. Metaphysics is not juju. Metaphysics is not parapsychology. Metaphysics is not mysticism. Metaphysics is none of these, for none of these is bothered by the question of ultimate reality. None of these is concerned with the question of being. To employ metaphysical concepts such as mind, self, ego, spirit, nature, life, force, action, soul, cosmic, etc, in one’s text, without the plan to do so in accordance with the methods of metaphysics – dialectic, analytic, transcendental – is to end up in non-metaphysics however contrived. Metaphysics is not esotericism. Again, metaphysics is not occultism. Iroegbu (1995:34) says that occultists are those who manipulate the forces of nature and the grandeur of meditative ecstasy for ulterior purposes. They mix up religion, mythology and bio-chemistry to manipulate the forces of the visible and invisible reality toward the end they set for themselves. Often they aim at the conquest or mastery of nature or immersion into its forces and the penetration into some invisible powers. They get so deeply involved in meditational aspirations, both physically and spiritually, that the uninstructed, the illiterate and the unscientific can be carried away in the

Summa Philosophica faces of claimed occultic experiences and discoveries. This type of mutilated involvement with reality, entirely aberrant of scientific or systematic study of being, is not metaphysics. Research in the secrets of Ancient India, China, Tibet and Greece (as in Anthony Norvell’s book, 1992: Metaphysics: New Dimensions of the Mind) may be a good work in ancient history, certainly not in metaphysics. Metaphysics is an academic subject studied mostly as a branch of philosophy. What then is metaphysics?

What it is: We have been told severally that the pioneer metaphysicians (like the Presocratics as well as Aristotle and Plato) did not make use of the term ‘metaphysics’. The Greek expression: “Ta meta ta physica” means “after the physics”. Andronicus of Rhodes is associated with the origin of this name. History tells us that while Andronicus was arranging the works of Aristotle in the Philosophical School of Alexandria, that he placed the work which Aristotle called First Philosophy after the ones on Physics, and named it After the Physics (Ta meta ta physica). In its title as well as its content, “ta meta ta physica” goes beyond physics, for physics or natural science does not inquire into being as being. Besides mere etymology, we can say that metaphysics is a critical investigation of reality. It is a crucial, rational and systematic study of existence. Metaphysics is a critical inquiry into the origin, nature and destiny of human existence and his place in the cosmos. When we ask our students the question of what metaphysics is, they often answer: metaphysics is the study of being! Metaphysics is the study of ultimate reality! Metaphysics is the study of existence! They are all right. Metaphysics has been described in many ways, to wit: a. Metaphysics is the study of being Being here refers to whatever exists. Does this imply that since rocks exist, that a study of rocks (petrology) refers to metaphysics? No! Not at all! Metaphysics does not study individual entities, but can study what is common in an entity. For instance, metaphysics goes to study common features of rocks which give essential definition to rocks. Thus, metaphysics would study the ‘rockness’ of rocks, but would not merely study rocks, since that is the domain of petrology. Metaphysics as a study of being does not only study the universal and substantive elements of beings or existents or essents, but digs deeper into the study of the being of being; into the study of being as being, being ‘qua’ being (Latin: ens qua ens; German: sein des seiendes). This is the study of the ground of being.

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This being of beings is not a particular being. You cannot point at it. It is the grand totality of beings put together. Here we say that it is existence. b. Metaphysics is the study of ultimate reality What is ultimately real? This is what metaphysics seeks to answer. In our everydayness, we are presented with the data of sensory experience. Are the things we see real? Are the sounds of the birds we hear real? We see as well as hear the birds. Are they real? We see the moon and experience the radiance of its light. We feel the wind blow its air upon us. Our seeds germinate, bloom and blossom. We experience generation and corruption of things. Man is born now, yet he dies. Where do things come from and to where do they go? Is there something that lies beyond appearances? Are appearances real, and if real, are they ultimately real? The quest for ultimate reality becomes the metaphysical quest. This self-same quest gave rise to philosophy in general and to metaphysics in particular. This was demonstrated when the trinity of Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes sought to know the underlying force behind reality as appearance. To the question: “out of what is the world constituted?”, Thales, Anaximander, Ananximendes answered as follows: Thales: Water! Anaximander: Not water! Not any material thing! Not any determinate! But an Indeterminate Boundless! Apeiron! Anaximenes: None of the above, but Air! The big question gave rise to various answers, yet the question remains unto this day and has remained unsatisfactorily answered in philosophy. The search for the ultimate reality continues to bother the mind. c. Metaphysics is the study of first principles Metaphysics was named first philosophy by Aristotle since it studies the first principles. The appellation of metaphysics as first philosophy is grounded on the fact that metaphysics does not only search for the causes of things, but the cause of causes, which is a first principle. The causes are principles and the cause of causes is a first principle. Metaphysics searches for the causes of things. It searches for what is common to the totality of things. Metaphysics is the quest for the ultimate cause of reality. It is not only searching for the ultimate reality, but also for the ultimate cause of reality. This quest takes our minds to the origin of the cosmos which is cosmology (a subset of metaphysics; a subset of science). Earlier than 2010, there was a quest in modern physics for a theory of everthing (by

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Stephen Hawking and other physicists) which was expected to explain all of reality. This quest was a metaphysical quest and, like metaphysical problems, could in some way remain perennial. They failed in finding such a theory and they surrendered in the quest. All in all, metaphysics is the study of the first principles.

Scope, division and subject matter of metaphysics Metaphysics is often referred to as ontology. This is the general metaphysics as the study of being. Ontology derives from the Greek terms “On”, and “logos”, the former meaning “being” and the latter “study or discourse”. In this sense ontology is the study of being. This explains why metaphysics is also called ontology and the two names are often used interchangeably. Metaphysics also branches into cosmology as a study of the universe, its origin, nature and destiny. Here, the question of the cause or origin of the universe comes into focus. In attempts to account for the origin of the universe causally, many speculators have made appeals to divine being or divine beings or spirits and this has led a lot of scholars, for example, Iroegbu (1995) and Uduma (2000), to preserve the name theodicy or natural theology as a branch of metaphysics. I strongly reject this division as a branch of metaphysics. The appeal to God or the divine is basically to account for the genesis of the universe, and this is an exercise in causality, already captured in cosmology, which again attempts to analyse the universe in terms of causation. Theodicy as a separate division is unnecessary, for entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity, according to the principle of economy. Metaphysics has two principal divisions, to wit: 1. Ontology 2. Cosmology While ontology is the study of being qua being, cosmology studies the origin, nature and destiny of the universe or cosmos. The question of the origin, nature and destiny of the universe or cosmos is also the question of the origin, nature and destiny of man. It is also the question of the origin, nature and destiny of time. We could better cognize this relationship if we ask the questions separately, viz: When did the universe begin? When did time begin? When did man begin? What is the nature and destiny of the universe? What is the nature and destiny of man? In most attempts to answer the question of the origin of the world, we most often refer to God. In most attempts to answer the the question of the origin of man, we most often refer to God. In most attempts to answer

Summa Philosophica the question of the origin of time, we most often refer toGod. Yet in our analysis to account for the position of man in the cosmos we most often refer to the human environment, spatial nature. This, has, so far, led us to the subject matter of metaphysics and the categories of being. Hence the subject matter of metaphysics is ‘being’, and the catogores of being are: 1. God 2. Human being 3. Nature Further analysis of the problem of being, human being and reality shall be carried out in a latter part of this work under the subtheme: The problems of metaphysics.

EPISTEMOLOGY Epistemology as a branch of philosophy is otherwise called theory of knowledge. Epistemology is the study of the nature, scope, sources and justification of human knowledge. It comes from two Greek words, ‘episteme’ meaning ‘knowledge’ and ‘logos’ meaning ‘reason’, ‘science’, ‘study’ or ‘word’. Etymologically, Epistemology means the science of knowledge. The Greek ‘episteme’ (knowledge) has affinity with the Latin word ‘scientia’, from where the English word ‘science’ is derived. ‘Scientia’ means ‘knowledge’. It is the etymological root of the word ‘science’. Science gives knowledge about nature. Epistemology is concerned with human knowledge and tries to answer questions such as: whether we can know, what we can know, when we know, how we know and how we know that which we know. It also concerns itself with the question of whether there is a limit to what we can know. Epistemology asks and tries to answer the question of the meaning of truth and its difference from opinion; the meaning of knowledge and its difference from belief or guess. How do we know? Do our senses give us true knowledge or do they deceive us? Does reason give true knowledge or do we know through divine revelation? Why does a stick appear bent when it is in water? Why do we seem to see a pool of water far down the road when it is sunny, but see nothing upon reaching that spot?

LOGIC Logic is the branch of philosophy which is concerned with the processes involved in reasoning. It is the study of procedures and the rules governing reasoning. Logic deals with the rules and methods of reasoning. Reasoning

Summa Philosophica here is understood as a process and act of putting ideas together for the purpose of arriving at a conclusion. Among others, there are two major types of reasoning in Logic: Inductive Reasoning and Deductive Reasoning. Inductive Argument or Reasoning involves the process of arriving at a conclusion from our experience of particular events to universal claims about them. In an inductive argument, we generalize from a sample to an entire class. We reason that, because many (or most or all or some percentage) of a sample of the members of a class or “population” have a certain property or characteristic, many (or most or all or some percentage) of the members of the class or population also have that property or characteristic. Examples always help:

Example 1 Premise: Most Republicans I know are conservative. Conclusion: Most Republicans are conservative.

Example 2 Premise: All ripe palm fruits I have seen are red in colour. Conclusion: Therefore, all ripe palm fruits are red in colour. Example 3 Premise: Every transformer we have tested from this batch of transformers has been defective. Conclusion: All the transformers in this batch of transformers are defective.

Example 4 Premise: Thirty percent of a random sample of registered voters says they would not vote for a woman president. Conclusion: Thirty percent of all registered voters say they would not vote for a woman president.

In the premise of each of these examples, the members of a sample are said to have a property. This is the property in question. In the conclusion, the property in question is attributed to many (or most or all or some percentage), of the entire class or population, called the target or target class (or population).

Deductive Argument, on the other hand, is a process of reasoning that moves from universal statements to particular statements. Below is an example: All human beings are mortal

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Essien is a human being Therefore Essien is mortal Deductive argument is rather a reversal of the inductive process. For instance, in the example of deductive argument above, particular experience of Essien’s mortality can give a clue to the inference that all beings like Essien, i.e., human beings, are mortal.

AESTHETICS Otherwise known as philosophy of art, Aesthetics is the philosophical study of art forms and natural beauty. Assessments of art forms such as painting, music, poetry, drama, prose, sculpture, carpentry, and of natural beauty, fall within the philosophical jurisdiction of aesthetics. Aesthetics concerns itself with the question of whether art forms are imitation of nature, or representation of nature, or expression of nature. Plato and Aristotle thought of art as imitation (mimesis). For Plato, mimesis (imitation) had its nuances and intricacies such as methexis (participation), homoisis (likeness) and paraplesis (resemblance). Aristotle admired and emphasized mimesis in drama, especially in Greek tragedy (see his Poetics) and identified the works of Sophocles (Antigone, Oedipus Rex, Electra) as the best representation of Greek tragedy. However, aesthetics is also concerened with assessment of natural beauty. Natural beauty refers to the nature of things in their originality: the blue sky, the surging of the sea, the serenity of the plains, and even the structure of the vulture and the bat. According to Immanuel Kant, we can only attain appreciation of natural beauty when we do not assess with pre-existing interests and presuppositions. At this point, Kant advises we should have the attitude of total disinterestedness (alle ohne interesse), otherwise we would not see the beauty of the vulture. There is natural beauty when objects are in their natural forms. Are the movies and films we watch on the television expressions or imitations of life? Do we see beauty in the work of the carpenter? Are there moments of pleasantness in the sound of the birds, the splendid and resplendent coloration of the flowers? Does the rhyme in the poem, the beats, lyrics and other accessories in the music, the spectral lines on the rainbow, make any sense to you? Have you ever been moved by the sound of the symphony? In whatever way any or all of these might affect you, you are more or less involved in aesthetic appreciation.

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ETHICS: ITS NATURE, SCOPE AND THEORIES

Nkutobong Pius Ekpoudom

INTRODUCTION Have we ever wondered how the world would have been without some principles of human conduct? Is it possible to be moral? Why has corruption eaten deep into our society? It is necessary to begin this paper with these interrogatives, perhaps to entertain our mind on why this paper is necessary. Very many philosophy students in our tertiary institutions and first year students of our universities, who offer Philosophy and Logic which has been made compulsory by the National Universities Commission (NUC), find Philosophy to be a course so scary for their liking. Perhaps, there may be something wrong with their attitude towards the course, or maybe they get scared when they hear that they must pass the course before they can graduate. That Philosophy, it should be stated, is a public and collective affair and not a private and an abstract discipline as many construe, is a fact. Added to this, philosophy described as love of wisdom (Philo Sophia), has the duty to help one think critically, constructively, coherently and rationally. Of all the core branches of philosophy, Ethics, Metaphysics, Epistemology and Logic, Ethics, seems to receive deep attention, perhaps because of its relevance to social life and national development. Omoregbe was correct when he maintained that: Ethics is concerned with the question of right and wrong in human behaviour; how men ought to behave and why it is wrong to behave in certain ways and right to behave in certain other ways (ix).

From antiquity to our present time, revered philosophers, notably among them, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Jeremy Bentham, J. S Mill, Immanuel Kant, have conducted discussions on what constitutes the Summum Bonum (the highest good), that is, the highest value that should determine or guide human actions. The study of ethics is very necessary especially in a nation like ours, which is plagued by squander mania, corruption, looting, examination malpractices, cheating, sexual scandals, electoral malpractice, and so on. The list is endless. We shall present some critical remarks as regards the pathetic nature of our nation whose greatest problem is a moral one.

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In this section, we shall make an attempt to discuss ethics, its nature, scope and some theories. It is the submission of this paper that ethics as a subject gets introduced in secondary schools too.

Definition and Nature of Ethics

Echekwube asserts that: Ethics is the branch of philosophy that studies the actions of the human person relative to right or wrong. It has to do with the reflected doings and morality of the human person. It is thus the scientific study of the behavioural patterns of the human person with special reference to his nature as a rational being. Ethics seeks to device reasons for approving or condemning human acts as right or wrong, good, or bad, and as worthy or unworthy of a rational being (29).

The foregoing glaringly points out and reveals what ethics is all about. It defines ethics as a branch of philosophy. Not very far from Echekwube, Blackburn equally offers definition of ethics as the study of the concepts involved in practical reasoning: good, right, duty, obligation, virtue, freedom, rationality, choice… (126). Ethics, Oke and Esikot maintain, is the branch of philosophy that studies the fundamental principles of morality” (2). Ethics clearly reflects on morality. Its Greek derivation Ethos and Latin Moralia means customs, habits, conduct, norms or accepted ways of behaviour. As a branch of philosophy, it studies human actions in terms of their being right or wrong, good or evil. In ethics, the good is what is to be sought and done, and evil to be avoided. Thomas Aquinas expressed this in Latin, saying: “Quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum’’. Ethics addresses the question of how men ought to behave in the society. Writing on the good life for man, Fagothey illustrates this thus:

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The good life and how to live must always have been the subject of human speculation. … it is not enough to have tools, but they must be used in the right way. There is a right way of hunting and fishing, of farming and building, of fighting and governing and there is also a wrong satisfaction and success, the wrong way to defeat and frustration. There must be a right way and a wrong way of living, just as there is of hunting, fishing, and the rest and the right way of living is the “good life” (19).

This shows that ethics is concerned with the good life. Its interest is on how man ought to live a good life. It is interested in teaching man how to live aright, for only by living aright can he achieve happiness.

Divisions of Ethics There are basically four classifications of ethical inquiry. Ethics can be said to be normative, descriptive, meta-ethical and applied. In order words, the divisions of ethical inquiry include:  Normative Ethics  Descriptive Ethics and  Meta-ethics  Applied Ethics

We shall, as much as possible, explain each of these classifications one after the other. This, I must say, is a contribution meant for further discussion.

Normative Ethics As the name implies, normative ethics is the branch of ethics that studies the norms of human conduct. Another name for normative ethics is prescriptive ethics. According to Uduigwomen, normative ethics is the branch of ethics that is concerned with principles by which human actions are to be judged good or bad, right, or wrong. It attempts to answer the

Summa Philosophica question- what kinds of actions or things are right and wrong, and why? (4). One thing normative ethics does is, that rather than describe how man acts, it prescribes how they ought to act. Its motif is not “is’ but that of the “ought”. Examples of behaviours judged as right or wrong in normative ethics are stealing, lying, honesty and so on.

Descriptive Ethics Ethics is not just seen to be prescriptive, it is equally descriptive. Call it empirical or positive ethics, what you mean is descriptive ethics. Descriptive ethics is that aspect of ethical inquiry that is actually held by various societies or people. This means descriptive ethics investigates into the people’s moral claims. It also researches into the moral question: what is right or bad? (John, 41). As the branch of ethics whose function is that of description, descriptive ethics finds out how moral terms and concepts in different societies and cultures, relate and how they also differ. In this case, another name for descriptive ethics is comparative ethics. It asks the question “what do people think is right?”

Meta-Ethics This is the branch of ethics concerned with the analysis of moral (ethical) terms and concepts. Its duty is to ensure that words which appear ambiguous are explained and understood appropriately. As Ozumba points out, meta-ethics seeks to establish the meaning of terms and by so doing, diminishes the ambiguity that would have enveloped in ethical terms (25). What do we mean by good, right, wrong, justice, conscience, free-will and so on? Meta-ethics, whose function is to clarify moral terms, concerns itself with these. Meta-ethics differs from normative and descriptive ethics in that while normative ethics asks the question “what should one do?, meta- ethics addresses question as “what is goodness”?

Applied Ethics Applied Ethics refers to the application of ethical principles in the various disciplines. This ranges from application of ethical principles to medicine, nursing, law, engineering, politics, and biology. Thus we have sub-divisions of ethics such as bio-ethics, engineering ethics, business ethics, professional ethics, medical ethics, nursing ethics, legal ethics, political ethics, and so on. In all these, the central question is always the question of what is the right thing to be done and what should be avoided.

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ETHICAL THEORIES We had pointed out in the preceding section what ethics is and its nature. This last section concerns itself with ethical theories. May it be stated quickly that this article cannot treat all the topics in ethics. As such, we cannot discuss all the ethical theories. It is a contribution meant for further discussion. Be that as it may, we proceed to discuss few of these ethical theories.

Hedonism The word hedonism is derived from the Greek word hedone which means pleasure. It is an ethical theory which maintains that only pleasure is the highest good and as such, pleasure alone ought to be pursued. It is necessary to distinguish between the two kinds of hedonism. One is psychological hedonism and the other, ethical hedonism. While psychological hedonism states that pleasure alone should be pursued and pain be avoided, the later (ethical hedonism), which is our concern in this write-up, holds that pleasure is the highest intrinsic good. Hence, man’s actions lead to an achievement of pleasure which is an end in itself (Uduigwomen, 28).

Egoism The word ego is usually associated with the self. Egoism is a theory which posits that what matters in life is the self, that is, one’s own well-being. As such, everyone should ensure the promotion of one’s self. Put simply, one should aim at his own pleasure and avoid pain rather than think of any other person. There are, in Blackburn’s understanding, two forms of egoism: psychological egoism and ethical egoism. For him: Psychological egoism is the view that people are always motivated by self-interest. Ethical egoism is the view that whether or not people like this they ought to be like this, usually this is advanced in the form that rational behaviour requires attempt to maximize self- interest (115).

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From the foregoing, it is observable that egoism seeks the value of self-interest. Hence, human life is the value to be pursued. The philosopher associated with ethical egoism is Epicurus (341 – 270 Bc).

Altruism Altruism is another version of hedonism. It is a theory whose interest is not on the self but with the other. The French philosopher, Auguste, Comte is credited to have coined the word which means other. According to the altruistic theory, man should strive for the goal which will produce the greatest good for all rather than the self as is the case with egoism. Hedonism, is, however, vulnerable to criticisms. There are compelling objections inherent in hedonism as an ethical theory. The hedonist contention that good or pleasure is desired cannot bring out an objective standard of morality. Good is an ethical concept while desire is a psychological fact… if good were that which human beings actually desire, there would not be need for moral instruction or the formulation of ethical doctrine of hedonism itself. (33).

Utilitarianism This ethical theory, associated with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, holds that the criterion by which good actions are distinguished from bad actions is via the principle of utility. They believe that an act is good if it is useful in achieving pleasure and diminishing pain. Bentham is accredited with the statement that “nature has placed mankind under the governance of two severing masters: pleasure and pain”. According to Stumpf, “what makes Bentham and Mill stand out as the most famous of the utilitarians is that they, more than the others, succeeded in connecting the principle of utility with the many problems of their age, thereby providing nineteenth century England with a philosophical basis not only for moral thought but also for practical reform (73). While his version of utilitarianism represents the political affairs of his days, that of J.S. Mill is basically social. Mill expresses his strong roots in hedonism thus: The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility, or the Greatest Happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong

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as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain, by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. (Utilitarianism, Chapter iv). The above shows Mill’s conviction that pleasure be pursued and pain should be avoided. There are two forms of utilitarianism. Act Utilitarianism and Rule Utilitarianism. According to Esikot, “Bentham viewed pleasure as the good in itself. He cautioned, however, that although pleasure is good, it does not follow that we must seek all pleasures. There is need to calculate and balance present happiness with future pains or unhappiness. For this reason, Bentham provided the hedonic calculus which is a method for determining which pleasure is more profitable among numerous pleasures that present themselves to us” (28).

Teleologism The word teleology is of the Greek word telos which means end. Teleology is the study of the ends and purpose of things. As an ethical theory, teleologism holds that the consequence or results of an action is the sole basic determinant of right or wrong. In other words, what is right or wrong is determined by the consequence that an action brings into effect. This is why the teleological theory is also known as consequentialism. The two versions of teleological theory as, discussed earlier, are egoism and utilitarianism. In the words of Echekwube, “the teleological theory bases the rightness or wrongness of a human act on the intention for which the person acts. That means the end or purpose of an action gives it justification on the standard for being right or wrong” (32). As a consequentialist ethical theory, it holds the consequences of an action that determines its rightness or wrongness.

Deontologism This is an ethical theory which states that actions are intrinsically good (right) or bad (wrong) in themselves, the consequences of such actions notwithstanding. Deontological theory is a direct contrast of teleological theory that believes that results of actions are determined by

Summa Philosophica the rightness or wrongness of such actions. Echekwube summarizes the Deontological ethical theory thus: Deontological theory, whose main proponent is Immanuel Kant, argues that the teleological theory is deficient and inadequate for determining the rightness or wrongness of human act because many would operate for selfish reasons and forget their rational and intellectual constituents. Kant, therefore, propounds the deontological theory in its place. He bases it on the Greek deon (duty), and the morally good act must therefore be duty-founded. Duty best reflects the nature of the moral agent who would task his/her rationality and intellect in order to penetrate the truth and making his choice in accordance with the truth. For Kant and other deontologists, we should act for the sake of duty, not just for the end which may be selfish (32).

Kant strongly submits that the only thing that is good without qualification is the good will. He was of the view that the goodwill is good in itself. It is absolute, unconditional and the good must, as a matter of fact, be duty- founded. Kant bases his ethical theory on the concept of the Goodwill, Duty and on the Categorical Imperative. Kant says: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing awe and admiration….: the Starry Heavens above and the Moral Law within” (Critique of Practical Reason). Kant was of the view that as soon as one understands the principles of Categorical Imperatives, one can know what we ought to do in

Summa Philosophica any circumstances. Citing Kant, Essien (2008, 47) presents the reformulation of the Categorical Imperative thus: 1) “Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that this maxim should become a universal law” 2) ‘So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only’. 3) ‘Always so act that the will could regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its own maxim.

In otherwords, Kant identifies the good life with the goodwill. The only thing which is good in the world, without qualification, according to Kant, is the goodwill. The goodwill consists in a virtuous life which in turn consists in keeping obligation and treating others as ends in themselves (Esikot, 28-29). Kant’s ethics also discusses the categorical imperative and Duty. His ethics takes up the motif, duty for the sake of Duty (Pflicht als Pflichit) and also discusses the Universalizability principle which states that we ought to “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or the other person of any other, never simply as a means, but always as an end” (Kant, 59).

Socrates’ Ethics Socrates demonstrated the need to live a good life. He showed strong interest in ethics. The sufficient condition to the good life, Socrates maintains, is self knowledge. The Socratic dictum “man know thyself (Gnothi Secauton) becomes necessary here. Socrates maintains that knowledge is virtue. In other words, one who knows is one who does good and one who does wrong, acts ignorantly.

Plato’s Ethics Plato’s Ethics is similar to that of Socrates. He agrees with his master, Socrates that no one does wrong knowingly that wrong doing is as a result of ignorance. In the words of Walsh: Plato accepted Socrates’ moral theory: Thus, all men desire only what is good. No man desires to do wrong, and if man actually does wrong then he does so unwillingly. All men desire to bring about what is good, that is, they desire virtue,

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virtue is entirely dependant on knowledge of what is good (38).

While we appreciate Plato’s moral theory, his ethical theory that no one does wrong knowing, is vulnerable to criticism. We know, we are sure and it is the case that people know what is wrong and still go ahead to do them. Who is not aware that fornication, cheating, killing, stealing, adultery are ethically wrong and religiously unwise? Plato knows these to be the case. Hence, his notion that no man desires to do wrong is highly fallacious.

Aristotle’s Ethics The locus classicus on Aristotle’s Ethics is contained in his work Nichomachean Ethics: He emphasized that since everything in nature has a purpose, then men too must have a purpose, and therefore, ethics should consist of guiding our behaviour in according with our purpose (Stumpf, 26). This certainly is true. Ethics guides our behaviour. Man then aims at the Summum Bonum (highest good). Happiness, for Aristotle is the highest good which man aims at. The Greek word for happiness is eudemonia. The summum Bonum is an end in se (in itself). Aristotle, as quoted by John, writes: For we choose happiness for itself, and never with a view to anything further, whereas we choose honour, pleasure intellect because we believe that through them we shall be made happy (88).

We can only attain happiness if we live virtuous life. This implies that we must act in accordance with right season. Aristotle is not concerned that we should aim at happiness but rather, that we do aim at is happiness. These are two distinct things. Added to this, while I agree with Aristotle that happiness is the highest good, it is equally the case that joy carries the feelings of lasting happiness, peace and contentment. As such, attention needs be paid to joy in order to attain happiness.

Ethics from our discussion so far, is supposed to guide our actions and perhaps make us moral. The relevance of ethics in the society cannot be overemphasized. Nigeria seems to be a strange land, a land in

Summa Philosophica spite of the natural and human resources, things at this age, are still in disequilibrium. There are compelling criticisms levelled against Nigeria, a country blessed with arable land and rich mineral reservoir but the lives of its inhabitants are paradoxically poor. Nigeria, a society plagued with immorality, is a sick one. As I pointed out elsewhere, the state of our notion, corruption, embezzlement of public funds, examination malpractices and so on, call for great concern and sober reflection. Only ethics can curb Nigeria of this moral malaise (Ekpoudom, 14). The problem of Nigeria I dare say, is more of moral than political. It is moral stupidity that leads to disorganizational malaise. Otakpor presents the moral problem of Nigeria pathetically thus: The moral history of Nigeria has nothing worthwhile in it. It is not a history that has something worthwhile to teach anybody, yet, it is a history that should be taught and learned because its lessons are dangerous in terms of our survival needs as a people and as a nation, that is, on the assumption that we agree that we are a nation. It is a history that is hopeless, shameful and odious, but ironically one that we do not deserve (33).

A country that is morally sick needs ethics for its growth, development and progress. That is why this study is very necessary. Students of secondary and tertiary institutions see nothing wrong with examination malpractices. It is not that Nigeria is the worst nation on earth but her behaviour is frustrating and often constitutes a nightmare. Ndiokwere laments on Nigeria’s ethical problems thus:  Only Nigeria is a rich oil-nation whose majority of citizens are among the poorest in the world. Otherwise why do her best minds, young men and women- able bodied and weaklings – flee the land in search of greener pastures. Those who settle somewhere but still feel uncomfortable and unsatisfied are ready to leave for any other place except the country called Nigeria. Elsewhere, citizens of rich oil

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nations swim in abundance of prosperity and enjoy great privileges which non-oil-producing nations do not enjoy (17).  It is only in Nigeria you find one man making a single public donation of money, which exceeds his annual income, and in some cases his whole-life income. He may be richer than the state and no one cares to know his sources of wealth (29).  It is only in Nigeria can dunces, imbeciles, and failed candidates get admission into institution of higher learning while the most intelligent and best qualified are denied admission. (30) It is my submission that parents should teach their children ethical values at tender age and ethics be taught equally in Secondary Schools. Perhaps when this is done, Nigeria, our dear country shall develop tremendously.

References

Blackburn, S. Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Echekwube, A. “What is Ethics? Definition, Principles, Theories, and Relationship to Other Disciplines” in Iroegbu, P. and Echekwube, A. (eds) in Kpim of Morality Ethics. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 2005: 32.

Ekpoudom, N. “Book Review. BioMedical Ethics: Foundations and Contemporary Ethics” Uduigwomen, A. (ed) in Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs. Calabar: Index Publishers, Vol 12, N. 2 April, 2010: 72-74

Ekpoudom, N. “Obafemi Awolowo’s “Political Philosophy”. In Essien, E. S. Political Philosophy and Practice. North Carolina: Lulu Press, 2012: 350-362.

Esikot, I. “Ethics, Morality and Responsibility” in Wilson, D. and Iferi Iferi (eds) in Citizenship Education. Uyo: MacGrace Publishers, 2007: 28-29 Essien, E.S. Philosophy of Peace and Conflict beyond the United Nations. Calabar: University of Calabar Press. 2008. Fagothey, A. Right and Reason. U.S.A. The C.V. Mosby Company, 1959.

John, E. The Substance of Ethics. Uyo: Scholars Press, 2005.

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Kant, I. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Translated by H. Paton. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964.

Ndiokwere, N. Only in Nigeria Owerri. Assumpta Press, 2006.

Oke, M. and Esikot, I. Elementary Ethics. Uyo, Minder Publishers, 1999.

Omoregbe, J. Knowing Philosophy: A General Introduction. Lagos: Joja Educational Research and Publishers, 1990.

Otakpor, N. “Politics and Morality: The Nigerian Experience” in Sylvanus Nnoruka et al in Father Thaddeus Ihejiofor Memorial Lecture Series. Enugu: Snaap Press, 2005: 32 – 33.

Ozumba, G. A Course Text on Ethics. Lagos Obaroh and Ogbinaka Publishers, 2001.

Stumpf, S. Elements of Philosophy: History and Problem: New York: MacGraw Hill, 1987.

Uduigwomen, A. Introducing Ethics: Trends, Problems and Perspectives. Calabar: Campus life Arts, 2006.

Walsh, M. A History of Philosophy. London: Cassell Publishers, 1985.

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CHAPTER THREE

PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES AND SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT*

Below we shall conduct a cursory but critical overview of some philosophical theories. Some of the philosophical theories to be analysed are: Idealism, Materialism, Realism, Monism, Dualism, and Pluralism. We shall mainly explain what these theories are and end with some notes on them. Besides core philosophical theories mentioned above, we shall also present very brief and cursory discussions on some schools of thought in philosophy.

IDEALISM Idealism is a metaphysical theory which affirms that reality consists of ideas, thoughts and minds rather than of material objects or forces. It is a direct opposite of materialism, which asserts that everything is basically material and physical. In other words, idealism seeks to argue that the fundamental constituent of the universe is composed of consciousness or spirit together with its properties and units that govern or regulate the behaviour of the universe. To be succinct, idealists believe that all that there are, are ideas and the mind that sustains these ideas. One implication of idealism is that the world has meaning apart from its surface appearance. Historically, the word ‘idealism’ made entrance into the philosophical lexicon in the eighteenth century. Leibniz criticized those who like Epicurus and Hobbes believe that, the soul is material and held that in his own system “whatever is good there is in the hypotheses of Epicurus and Plato…is combined here” (Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 3&4,111). Leibniz was not first to go idealist in philosophy. It was basically Plato who planted the seed of idealism, when he averred that the only real things that exist are the ideas or forms in a suprasensible world, that is, the world of forms. Plato maintained that the physical universe is only an imperfect reflection of the real world if ideas. Berkeley was the first idealist in modern philosophy. Physical object, according to him, are only ideas in the mind because they exist in so far as they are perceived. For him, then, ‘to exist (be) is to be perceived’-‘esse est percipi’. Other idealists were Leibniz, Kant (the father of German idealism), Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and the neo- idealists: Thomas Green, John McTaggat, Benard Bosanquet, Francis Bradley and Josiah Royce. We shall discuss their views in the chapters on metaphysics in modern and contemporaray philosophy.

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Idealism, especially the Berkeleian type leads to solipsism. Solipsism is the view that the universe as far as one can ever tell is nothing but myself, my mind and its ideas. Everything is about me and myself. Since solipsism is a theory of ‘me’ and ‘myself’ and nothing more, it could rightly be called “meism” or “myselfism”. “Meism” or “Myselfism” could be antonymns for solipsism. There are mainly three types of idealism, namely: SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM; OBJECTIVE IDEALISM; PERSONAL IDEALISM. SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM upholds the view that minds, or spirits, and their perceptions or ideas are all that exist. It is sometimes called mentalism and/or phenomenalism. Berkeley, who best represents this version of idealism, preferred to call his theory ‘immaterialism’. OBJECTIVE IDEALISM affirms that all parts of the world are included in one all-embracing order caused by the mind. Objective idealists regard the organization and form of the world, and hence knowledge, to be determined by the nature of the world itself, which they say is mental. When they say that the ultimate nature of the universe is mental, they mean that the universe is one all-embracing order, that its basic nature is mind, and that it is an organic whole. PERSONAL IDEALISM asserts that the basic reality is neither abstract thought nor a particular thought process, but a person, a self, a thinker. Reality is of nature conscious personality. The self is an irreducible living unit, which can be divided only by false abstraction. Reality is a system of personal selves; and henceit is pluralistic. Personalists emphasize the reality and worth of individual people, moral values and human freedom. Nature, for the personalists, is an objective order, but does not exist in and of itself. People transcend or rise above nature when they interpret it. Generally, idealism is less credible in connection with our common sense beliefs and assumptions and in conflict with scientific evidence. Even before reflecting on these matters, we seem to be convinced that there are physical events that influence our behaviour. Besides, scientific data concerning the influence of say, drugs and surgery on our mental life suggest that a mentalist or idealistist approach to the nature of man is difficult to accept. In other words, all scientific truths are true independently of our beliefs about them. For instance, “time travel is time travel’; all the laws that govern the behaviour of science are infinitely true whether we are conscious or not (Stroll and Avrum, 1996:111). More so, taking to its logical conclusion, idealism, especially the Berkeleian type leads to solipsism, the view that the universe as far as one can ever tell is nothing but me, my mind and its ideas. Besides, the evidence of science

Summa Philosophica has demonstrated that it is better to believe in a natural universe of material entities such as stones, animals and trees that independently exists on its own right. In view of its weaknesses, however, idealism as a metaphysical theory makes complete sense when compared to its opposite school of thought namely materialism. Personalism as a brand of idealism furnishes religion and ethics with metaphysical foundations.

MATERIALISM Materialistic metaphysics claim that both mental and physical events could be accounted for in terms of purely physical concepts and laws. In other words, materialism posits that the basic component of reality is composed of material entities together with its prosperities, units and behaviour that regulate the operation of the universe. Since the time of Thomas Hobbes, materialists maintain that what we call mental events is really, like physical events, only various combination of matter in motion. The physical movements that occur in the brain according to materialists are what we call thoughts, and these are produced by other events in the material world, either outside our bodies or inside and inturn can produce other physical motions in ourselves and outside ourselves (Stroll and Avrum, 1996:108). Every idea- of pain, of perception, of memory etcetera-is nothing other than a set of physical process in our higher nervous system and brain. What makes materialism very appealing is its simplistic solution to the problem of interaction immanent in the mind-body union. Moreover, the vast body of evidence accumulated about the physical basis of mental events by psychologists, physiologist and other related scientist also make this theory seem most plausible. Recent developments in the treatment of mental conditions, such as depression, disconnected thinking and mood changes, and by biochemical therapeutic treatment strongly suggest some connections between the biochemical condition of the nervous system and the mental condition of the individual. All these evidence make the materialist case a strong one. Just as the historical development of idealism can be traced to Plato’s idealisation of the Forms as enunciated in most of his dialogues, the father of materialism is unarguable Leucippus and Democritus and supported by Epicurus. Democritus and Leucippus assert that the basic constituents of reality are composed of micro properties called atoms. They contend that atoms conglomerate to give life and disintegrate to bring about destruction. Following the atomists, Epicurus developed his own version of materialism, which has been generally branded by anti-materialists as crude and extreme version of materialism. Epicurus denied that there is

Summa Philosophica existence beyond this physical world of ours. He even postulated that the gods do not interfere in human affairs, because they display marks of mortality since they are also composed of atoms (Reginald, 1966:33). For instance, a disciple of Epicurus, Lucretius, in an apparent attempt to support his master’s crude materialism, advanced fourteen arguments to demonstrate that the soul, like the body, is material and therefore mortal. In De Rerum Natura, translated as On the Nature of (Things ) the Universe, Lucretius portrays a universe containing nothing but variously shaped atoms moving through empty space. Lucretius observes in this book that the conception of the indivisible atom as the fundamental feature of the universe, having no purpose, no qualities, except its size, shape and weight, is sufficient in accounting for all that we know about the world. (Copleston, 1993:100) Following Epicurus, and presenting his doctoral thesis on the materialism of Epicurus, Karl Marx even extended the extreme materialism of Epicurus to politics. In both dialectical and historical materialism, Marx tries to demonstrates how every conflict is traceable to economic factors, which, in essence, is located in the material forces of nature. Marx places primacy on the material as opposed to the spirit when he remarked... “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary their social existence determines their consciousness “ (Engels, 1920:106). Though this comment seems to downplay the intelligence of man, it no doubt represents Marx’s view of life in the metaphysical discourse. Marx is therefore seen as the father of modern materialism, just as Berkeley is regarded as the founder of modern idealism. Disciples of Marx like Engels, Lenin and Ludwig Feuerbach continued with Marx’ view of materialism. Feuerbach writes: “that the material, sensuously perceptible world to which we ourselves belong is the only reality; and that our consciousness and thinking, however suprasensuous they may seem, are the product of material, bodily organand the brain. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is merely the highest product of matter” (Odajnyk, 1965:1). More will be discussed on dialectical materialism and Russell’s materialism in the chapter on contemporary metaphysics. Though materialism presents a concise and simplistic account of phenomena, and is plausible in light with scientific evidence and common sense beliefs, nevertheless, this theory is inherent with certain discrepancies. The first discrepancy, lies in the fact that there is no unanimous agreement amongst materialists as to the exact nature of matter; whilst some materialists believe that matter goes beyond observable phenomena, others construe matter as just what is empirically verifiable; yet others think matter is in a form of wave, the electron and

Summa Philosophica other micro properties of nature that do not lend themselves to observation, unless we are assisted by instruments. More so, materialism, in its simplest form, denies any distinction between our mental life and the physical development in our brain. Nevertheless, critics argue that one’s immediate experience seems to believe this claim. One is aware of all sorts of sensations, feelings etc. and not a series of physical occurrences in the brain. Even if the latter are the cause of the former, it still remains the case that they are different and hence distinguishable. Thus, critics claim, the materialists cannot successfully reduce everything to the mental world by simply asserting that all mental events are actually nothing but a series of physical occurrences (Stroll and Popkin, 1996:100). Thus it is still inadequate by simply employing the deductive method to explain the distinction between the mental and the physical. Though it is plausible to affirm that physical entities are real because they are the most obvious, it would be contrary to our common sense beliefs, where we tend to believe that human beings are not just assemblage of flesh, blood and bones; but, are composed also of a spirit which affects and in turn is affected by the body. Another criticism that can be raised against materialism is that, the materialistic solution to the mind-body problems carries serious implications for moral philosophy (ethics). If our thoughts are physical processes in the brain, they must be totally explicable in scientific terms; it might be theoretically possible to explain our thoughts in exactly the same way as we explain events in the physical world, i.e. in terms of cause and effect. This therefore leaves no room for evaluation of a situation for consideration of its implications, and for decisions reached after a careful thought. In other words, materialism must lead to an explanation of human behavior, in terms not of free choices based on careful appraisal; but, in terms of physical cause and effect stimulus (Sprague, 1978:100). Last but not the least, taking to its logical conduction, vulgar materialism leads to atheism, the view that in so far as matter is prior to consciousness, God is a form or product of matter. In other words atheism disbelieve in the existence of God. This is exactly the problem that Kwame Nkrumah confronts in his Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonisation, where he asserts his belief in philosophical materialism, which treats mind or consciousness as derived of matter (Nkrumah 1964:100). Out of the monistic approach adopted by materialism and idealism, another theory, metaphysical dualism, combines the two in accounting for phenomena in general and mind-body relationship in particular.

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REALISM A metaphysical realist subscribes to the view that there is a mind independent world that is open to human experience. It argues that whether there is a mind to sustain the existence of this world or not, there is an objective reality and it exists on its own right. Plato is recognised as the foremost metaphysical realist for believing in an objective reality called the world of forms. To Plato, this material world is a copy of the forms. For instance, particular entities such as beautiful objects, just acts and other forms of particulars can only approximate perfect objects in the worlds of forms. Plato is saying that no matter how much the physical world tries to be exactly like the world of forms, it can never be like the world of forms. This supposition has prompted some metaphysicians to accuse Plato of downplaying the importance of the physical world. Aristotle for instance, disagreed with his master about the possibility of the Forms. Even if the forms exist at all, they exist in particulars so that the particular is prior in existence. In other words, Aristotle argues that particulars must inhere in things or objects in the physical world. Realism seems to be a convincing theory given that humans do not have adequate resources or cognitive tools to grasp reality as it is. In other words, we are limited in the way we cognise phenomena in our everyday interaction with nature (Russell, 1967:102).

MONISM AND PLURALISM Whilst pluralism recognises the existence of more than two substances, monism is committed to the view that fundamentally only a single substance accounts for all other objects. In other words, the underlying stuff or the originative element of the universe according to the monists is basically one. Thales is mostly recognised as the father of not only Western philosophy but monism as well. Other Greeks who followed Thales also advocated a monistic world view in their metaphysical deliberations. Parmenides for instance posited permanence as the basic stuff, whilst Heraclitus settled on change as the only real thing. He is well remembered for his statement that nobody can step twice into the same river. The problem with monistic metaphysics is that it presents only a partial account of all other phenomena (Santas, 1982:11).

DUALISM Dualism partitions reality into two components namely matter and spirit. To be more specific, dualism is a metaphysical theory committed to the view that the basic constituent of man in particular and reality in general is composed of two entities namely the material world and the immaterial

Summa Philosophica world. That is, dualism tries to incorporate idealism and materialism into a systematic thesis. Put differently, dualism subscribe to the materialist and the immaterialist substance. It further recognises that these two distinct worlds or spheres are autonomous from each other and that they are governed by their separate laws. If matter is independent of spirit, then no law from the spiritual world can interfere in it. If it happens, then the spiritual world will compromise or undermine the autonomy of the material world. The question that arises out of this thesis is, how can a material substance interact with a totally distinct immaterial substance? At this stage it is instructive to make a distinction between Cartesian dualism (a type of dualism espoused by Rene Descartes) and property dualism. Cartesian dualism simply upholds autonomy between the material and the immaterial worlds and yet allows an interaction between them. When asked as to how and where the interaction takes place, Descartes replied that the interaction occurs at a place in the brain called the pineal gland. But critics have responded as to where this gland is matter, spirit or a third substance. To this query, Descartes became desperate arguing that the union of mind and body is a mystery that is better understood by accepting it without any comprehension (Popkin and Stroll, 1996:66). Property dualism recognises that the mind-body issue arises as a result of the interationist role assigned to them by Descartes. One way out for this dilemma according to the property dualist is to sacrifice the independence of one for the other. Simply allow one of the two substances to be the host and the other a parasite. In other words, property dualism recognises that consciousness is a higher order property that arises as a result of certain organisation of the central nervous system. Thus, the thesis of property dualism dodges the question of interaction. Generally, dualism of the Cartesian type is a metaphysical theory whose advantage constitutes its weakness as well. For recognising an interaction between the body and spirit, dualism is in tune with our common sense beliefs about the fact that the human frame is a composite of spirit and matter. At the same time, this theory is incoherent because it upholds autonomy between the two separate substances and yet allows them to interact.

RATIONALISM see chapter 16

EMPIRICISM see chapter 17

IRRATIONALISM see chapter 20

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM see chapter 22

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PHENOMENOLOGY see chapter 24

EXISTENTIALISM see chapter 25

UTILITARIANISM see chapter 2, page 30

TELEOLOGISM see chapter 2, page 31

DEONTOLOGISM see chapter 2, page 31

REFERENCES Allen, Reginald (1966), Greek Philosophy from Thales to Aristotle. New York, Free Press. Blanshard, Brand (1939) The Nature of Thought, 2 vols. London, Allen and Unwen. Collins, James (1970) History of Modern Philosophy, Milwaukee, Bruce. Copleston, Frederick (1993) A History of Philosophy, New York, Doubleday Dennet, Daniel (1991) Consciousness Explained, Boston, Little Brown. Descartes, Rene: Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. by Donald Cress. Indianapolis, Hacket, 1980. Kant, Immanuel. Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. New York: Barnes and Nobles, 1978. Popkin,R.H and Stroll, Avrum (1996) Philosophy Made Simple, California, Doubleday Russell, Betrand (1967). The problems of Philosophy, Oxford, OUP Santas, Gerasimos (1982) Socrates, London Routledge and Kegan Paul Sprague, Elmer (1978). Metaphysical Thinking, Oxford OUP

*This chapter was co-authored by Ephraim Stephen Essien and Awuni Inusah

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CHAPTER FOUR

PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY AND METAPHYSICS

Chiedozie B. Okoro

The word ‘problem’ as used in this context is a noun and it could mean difficulty, puzzle or question to which answer or solution has to be given. When we therefore speak of the problems of metaphysical philosophy, we have in mind those recurrent issues in metaphysics which border on human existence and influence our daily existence. We say these problems are recurrent in the sense that they defile any attempt to give final answer(s) to them. Life itself is one huge problem which continues to throw up puzzles, riddles and mysteries for us to ponder and wonder upon. Metaphysics is one of the ways philosophy employs in looking at the problems of existence with a view to proffering solutions to these life problems. To speak of metaphysical philosophy therefore, is simply another way of technically qualifying metaphysics as a core branch of philosophy. And because metaphysics is meant to solve certain problems that are fundamentally metaphysical, we say that metaphysics as a core branch of philosophy is an action theory intended for problem solving.

Recall that philosophy is often said to defy a univocal definition. In the first instance, it is the only discipline that begins by way of self-criticism after which it proceeds to examine the world at large. In doing this, it tries to provide comprehensive thought systems considered to be adequate in tackling existent problems. Like existence itself, to pigeonhole philosophy has become extremely difficult all because philosophy is a concrete being, a concrete reality which in turn deals with the delineation and resolution of concrete beings, concrete realities. As a concrete reality; therefore, any attempt to posit a univocal definition for philosophy or to invoke authoritarian answers to the problems of philosophy, would amount to a negation, a limitation of philosophy and its problems. This nature of philosophy robes off on metaphysics, especially as it pertains to the problems of metaphysics.

Problem of Being: Heidegger pointed out in Being and Time, that in the history of Western philosophy, that Being, the most topical issue of metaphysics had for long remained in oblivion. He felt that this all important

Summa Philosophica question about Being should be raised anew. Accordingly, he posed the question:

Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of being…. Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of being and to do so concretly (1962a: 1).

Though Heidegger did not succeed in capturing the meaning of Being in Being and Time and this is largely because the work remained unfinished. He rather succeeded in defining human being instead of Being. But in “The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics”, Heidegger refers to Being as “the light that gives sight to metaphysics or the light from which metaphysics derives its sight” (see Hartman, 1967: 433). As he states:

The truth of Being may thus be called the ground in which metaphysics, as the root of the tree of philosophy, is kept and from which it is nourished (Hartman, 433).

The Being that Heidegger speaks of is not any particular being, it is not this or that being. Unlike Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, by Being, Heidegger does not refer to God who incidentally is regarded as the being of beings. Heidegger is rather talking of a most primordial ground that sustains all other grounds, including God. Recall that Heidegger criticized Descartes for equating metaphysics with the roots of the tree, for referring to metaphysics as the science of the roots, the fall out of such criticism is to locate the ground from metaphysics takes its roots and also garners nourishment. The location of this ground from which metaphysics and every other thing derives source and garners nourishment is regarded by Heidegger to be the “overcoming of metaphysics” or in a more technical sense as Fundamental Ontology.

Problem of Being and Non-Being: Being has been identified by Heidegger as the ground of all things. Non-Being simply means nothing or nothingness. So when we talk about the problems of Being and non-Being, what we have in mind is to see whether there is a relationship between something and nothing. For instance, Leibniz, a German philosopher of the modern period asked the question: “Why is there something instead of nothing”? Of course as implied in Leibniz’s question, something is prior if

Summa Philosophica not superior to nothing. Needless to say, this Leibnizian poser re-enacts Aristotle’s old riddle: “The chicken and the egg which came first”? The tendency among Western philosophers is to apply the law of excluded middle in trying to solve these posers of Leibniz and Aristotle. Non-Being or nothingness was regard as a negation or a privation of Being. In this manner of thinking therefore, nothing was regarded as “absence of everything including life, existence, and all discernible qualities; vacuum or space without nothing in it; complete worthlessness or insignificance” (Encarta Dictionary, 2008). It is along this line of thought that Parmenides asserts that Being is, while non-Being is not.

The above was the treatment of Being and non-Being among classical Western philosophers until Heidegger and Sartre. Recall that in Being and Time Heidegger could not conclude his research into Being. The real fact about the matter is that he spent the later part of his life searching for Being to no avail. But at least he discovered something in his search (note that no genuine philosophical quest is all together a waste). So Heidegger’s search led him to discover the elusiveness or the mysterious nature of Being. Being is the most elusive and mysterious concept, yet its pursuit is highly illuminating and rewarding. The illumination and reward here lies in the discovery that any forage into Being must necessarily land us into nothing or non-Being. Hence, any attempt to unearth the nature of something in totality, will inevitably land us in the realm of nothing. It then becomes the case that Being and non-Being are equi-primordial in the sense that they are both inseparable and inter-related. Thus, if Being is that which can be thought about, nothing or non-Being is the unthought of thought. Nothing is the foundation of all things. The entire universe floats on nothing and this explains why there can be no end to life or existence. Being will always rise from nothing and collapse back into nothing. In the same vein, human thought rises from nothing, projects into nothing and relapses back into nothing. It is in this sense that Sartre says that: “emptiness lies coiled up like a worm in the heart of being” (1969: 21). By the expression emptiness Sartre means nothingness. From where does disease and the courses of disease arise and into what do they disappear upon healing if not nothingness? God came from nothing; Big Bang happened from nothing, nothing has always been there. Life rotates on nothing and so things rise from nothing and collapse back into nothing. And since nothing is coterminous with something, since non-Being and Being are equi-primordial, it follows that the watchword for us is the inexhaustibility of life. This is implied in the principle of electromagnetism, especially David Bohm’s “hollow movement theory”. Because

Summa Philosophica inexhaustibility implies uncertainty, Heisenberg warns that the position and momentum of particles is indeterminate (see the law of indeterminacy in quantum mechanics).

Problem of Human Being: Man is a problem unto himself and so is the concept man a most intricate one. If you ask man about other things in the universe, he probably will give you a straight forward answer. But if you ask him about himself and his fellow humans, he might get intimidated. When therefore, we pose the question concerning human being, our essential interest is to unravel that essence that makes man a most complex being.

Religion presents man as a finished product whose maker had already fixed his (man’s) essence. But the anthropological studies of man began to reveal the contrary. In fact, anthropological studies reveal that man has inexhaustible attributes in the sense that man is capable of so many activities. This led to the re-examination of the nature of man. In Western philosophy, the first philosopher to make the analysis of that power which endows man with inexhaustible attributes his preoccupation is no other than Immanuel Kant. His fundamental objective was to investigate in metaphysical light the question: “What is man”? To answer this question appropriately, he reframed it as follows: what must I be in order to be aman? The answer to the foregoing question is emphatic: man isfirst and foremost a metaphysical being. As a metaphysical being, man is a being of transcendence. This Kantian definition of man opened the way for the existentialist evaluation of man.

Existentialists are philosophers who make the investigation of human existence their preoccupation among whom are Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre. Heidegger for instance, explains that it is not possible to investigate Being without raising the question of human being. This is because man is the only being in the world who understands what it means to be and who also raises the question about Being. Man alone understands the relationship between Being and human being. Let’s listen to Heidegger on this matter. The very asking of this (i.e. the question about Being) is an entity’s mode of being; and as such it gets to the essential character from what is inquired about, namely, being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its being, we shall denote the term Dasein (1962a: 231).

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Since for Heidegger man is the only being with a vague average understanding of Being, it follows that man is the being that is there in the world, he is “being there, da-sein” (Schacht, 1972: 59). Sartre agrees with Heidegger that man is not a finished product fixated to furnish only stereotyped projects for a supposedly divine lord of the universe. Since for Sartre, emptiness or nothingness constitutes the essence of man, it means that man is a being who is not what he is and who is what he is not. These Heideggerian and Sartrean existential analysis of man obviously contradicts the traditional notion of man which presents man as a mere design of God and whose interest alone man must serve.

The Problem of Essence and Existence: We consider this problem to be ontological because it is linked to the question problem of human being. Elsewhere, we defined the ontology of man simply as the metaphysics of man and by this is meant the exposition of those qualities which make man a rational being. Immanuel Kant figured this out in his book entitled: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View when he wrote as follows: The fact man is aware of an ego-concept raises him infinitely above other creatures living on earth (1978: 9).

It is then of little surprise that Kant rejects the ontological arguments of St. Anselm and Rene Descartes on the ground that the ontological argument for the existence of God separated existence from essence. St. Anselm based his ontological argument on the greatness of God, while Descartes based his argument on the infinite perfection of God. The assumption then is that greatness and infinite perfection are necessary conditions for the existence of God. Kant rejects the ontological argument on the ground that existence is not an attribute to be added or separated from a being, just as it is impossible to separate the idea of three angles from a triangle or the idea of four equal angles from a square. Besides, it is possible to imagine the existence of a thing when in actual fact there is no such thing in existence. For instance, it possible to think of a golden mountain or a unicorn (an imaginary creature of half-man and half-horse) without such thing being in existence. So what then is existence and how does it defer from essence?

The essence of a thing is said to be the stuff, substance, feature, attribute, quality, or the kernel of which that thing is made of. Because of the importance of understanding the essence of which things are made, traditional Western philosophers placed emphasis on essence over existence. Existential philosophers on their part think this traditional way of

Summa Philosophica characterizing things is abnormal. They hold the contrary view that a thing must first exist before it can possess an essence. This latter assertion of the existentialist is in line with the thinking of Kant and Husserl. However, existentialists go one step further to state that the term existence can only be used for human beings. Hence by the word existence, existentialists actually mean human existence.

When existentialists speak of existence what they have in mind is – the ability for making both meaning and meaninglessness and since only man possesses this ability, they insist that man alone exists. Heidegger is very emphatic about this matter. As he declaratively states: The being that exists is man. Man alone exists. Rocks are, but they do not exist. Trees are, but they do not exist. Horses are, but they do not exist. Angels are, but they do not exist, God is, but he does not exist (1967: 438). He goes ahead to explain that: The proposition “man alone exists” does not mean that man alone is a real being while all other beings are unreal and mere appearances or human ideas. The proposition “man exists” means: man is that being whose Being is distinguished by open-standing standing-in in the unconcealedness of Being, in Being (Ibid.).

To say that man alone exists simply means that man is the only one describing his own activities and the activities of other things (including God and Satan) in the universe in relation to man. It is interesting to note that before Heidegger, Karl Jaspers (German philosopher, one of the originators of existentialism, whose work influenced modern theology and psychiatry as well as philosophy) made distinction between Existenz and Existentia. Existenz is German word for existence and it is used by Jaspers to qualify human beings as entities with the boundless potentiality for meaning making. Existentia as used by Jaspers refers to other things in the universe which though are there but lack the capacity for meaning making. Jean Paul Sartre also toes the line of Jaspers. He makes distinction between conscious being (etre pour-soi) and unconscious being (etre-on- soi). Conscious being refers to “being-for-itself” and it portrays man as a being of transcendence who possesses the metaphysical ability to institute both meaning and meaninglessness. Man is thus a transcendent being through whom nothingness becomes manifest in the world. Hence, to be a

Summa Philosophica being of transcendence, means to possess the power to bring about order as well as, to reorder the nature of things and this entails a negation. Human reality carries nothingness within itself. Man is the being through whom nothingness comes into the world. The being by whom nothingness comes into the world must be its own nothingness…. Man is always separated by nothingness from his existence. The being by whom nothingness arrives in the world is a being such that in its being the nothingness of its being is in question (1969: 21, 23, 28, 35; cited by Omoregbe, 1999: 207).

On the other hand, unconscious being refers to “being-in-itself” or “being of pure positivity”. By implication, “being-in-itself” is not a transcendent being and hence, lacks the ability for ordering and reordering things. So it is just there in its positivity, in its state of synthesis. Unconscious being is pure: “Plenitude, compact density full of itself, it does not have nothingness or negation within its being, nor can it posit itself other than it is, it is what it is and is fully identical with itself, it has no reason for its being, it is just there, it has no ‘within’ which is opposed to a ‘without’” (Omoregbe, 1999: 207 – 208).

In existentialist terms therefore, unconscious being or the existentia cannot be said to possess existence. Like Heidegger says, they (unconscious being or the existentia) are, but they do not exist. To exist is to possess the qualities for making meaning and meaninglessness and these include, temporality, facticity and existentiality. To exist is to possess the ability to perform those actions that can either be adjudged as authentic or inauthentic. To exist is to encounter the unfolding of life as dread and as anguish or anxiety (i.e. the dread of human finitude and the anguish or anxiety of the uncertainty of tomorrow). To exist is to be endowed with subjectivity (i.e. the autonomy of thought) from where derives the will power for deciding, for choice making and for commitment. To exist is to draw a plan and to work towards attaining this plan within a time frame. To exist is to perpetually strive towards freedom. It is in the bid to overcome vicissitudes that men aggregate into group existence in the form of society. This is why existentialists say that existence precedes essence, meaning that man first appears, experience the facticity of existence, and then begin to define his essence.

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The Problem of Transcendence and Immanence: Traditionally, man is thought to be finite and for this reason he is immanent, while God is thought to be infinite and so is transcendent. But traditional philosophers also agree that human being is a combination of the finite and the infinite. The finite in this instance refers to the human body which portrays finitude and immanence. The infinite part of man is of course the human soul or spirit which they say is eternal hence, infinite and transcendent. This basically was the trend until the time of Kant. Thus from Kant onwards transcendence came to mean: The beyondness of being made possible by the productive imagination. It is the act of projection beyond this being to that being in order to connect them into stable regularity or meaningful units. Transcendence is the act of forming relations or connectedness between beings to render them accessible. It is the finitude or native hunger in man which propels him to project from one state of affairs to another, from now to not now, from what is to what is not (Unah, 1997, 78).

Kant’s incursion into the question of transcendence stems from his attempt to rehabilitate metaphysics which was meant to evaluate the problems of “appearance and reality” in a new light. For him, traditional metaphysics commits the fallacy of paralogism (i.e. transcendental illusion) and the way to dissolve such a monumental problem is to show the processes by which metaphysical probes become transcendental. He understands metaphysics to be the ability of finite reason to go beyond experience (the physical) into the supervoid. Making distinction between immanence and transcendence Kant states as follows: We shall term those principles, the application of which is confined entirely within the limits of possible experience; Immanent, those on the other hand, which transgress these limits, we shall call Transcendent (1964: 209).

Thus, for Kant, that which is immanent is applicable to experience, that which is transcendent transgresses the bounds of experience. Transcendence then becomes a going beyond experience (i.e. the now or the physical) and it is through this act of beyondness that the world is always represented to us in a new light. This means that the whole of Kant’s forage into human finitude (immanence) and infinitude (transcendence) ends up in metaphysical architectonics (i.e. the

Summa Philosophica construction of a comprehensive metaphysical system). It also means that Kant’s interest in exploring human transcendence does not include the purpose and end result of such an exercise. It is Heidegger who raised the question about the objective and end product of transcendence. He stresses this point rhetorically: In this “creative” ontological knowledge is the essent “known”, i.e. created as such? Absolutely not! Not only does ontological knowledge not create the essent, it does not even relate itself directly and thematically to the essent (Heidegger, 1962b: 125).

To what then does transcendence or ontological knowledge relate? Heidegger says it is to; “A Nothing”. “That which Kant calls an X which speaks of an object” (Ibid.). By “transcendental object X” is meant the transcendental imagination which Heidegger considers to be the faculty of human transcendence. He devoted the book Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics to argue out this point.

In this sub-section we have taken time to examine what in Kantian and Heideggerian perspectives can be regarded as the ground of metaphysics. In line with Protagoras of Abdera who proclaims that – man is the measure of all things, Kant regards man as the source of metaphysics. The existentialists also think along this line, when they uphold that man alone exists. Heidegger makes a departure from this line of thinking. For him, more important than the being that does metaphysics in the ground of metaphysics which is Being. But whether we explore the ground of metaphysics which is Being or we explore the source of metaphysics which is human being, the point remains that metaphysics as ontological studies deals essentially with the ground, soil or foundation in which reality is rooted. We now turn to the treatment of the problems of metaphysical anthropology.

The Problem of Reality: This is a simple way of asking the question: “What is reality”? To which answer(s) in the form of definition(s) should be provided. In the most ordinary sense reality (i.e. with small letter ‘r’) refers to thing or phenomenon, the plural form of which will be realities or things or phenomena. In that case, Reality (i.e. with capital letter ‘R’) would refer to the ‘totality of all that there is’ or ‘the sum total of everything that there is which lies in wait for investigation, to be brought to light, or made visible to the naked eyes’. Note that is happens to be the preferential term here. When metaphysics is defined as the search for ultimate reality, isness of a

Summa Philosophica thing or things preoccupies the mind of the metaphysician. Another technical expression for isness is to be (i.e. the Greek to on), hence we also talk about to beness or simply beness. That something is, insofar as it influences human existence in whatever manner, remains prior to its attributes and functions. The nature of isness or beness therefore, is such that reality encompasses the totality of human experience be: it real or imaginary, tangible or intangible, material or immaterial, corporeal or incorporeal, visible or invisible, factual, fictional or mere illusion etc, all constitute the realm of reality. This is why the treatment of metaphysical problems touches on every aspect of human experience. It also explains why metaphysical systems offer a comprehensive account of reality. We can then say that metaphysics as a system is a holistic or totalizing appraisal of reality.

Problem of the Nature of Reality: This border on the human description of reality. It is about the human idea or notion of reality. The goal here is to describe the nature, attribute or the essential character of reality, a task that is technically referred to as “the naming of the world”. It is here that man shows his genius by merging thought and language to describe the world or give names to things in the world. In doing this some fundamental problems arise and this concerns the question whether reality is physical or non-physical. Philosophers who say that reality is material are called materialists and those philosophers who say that reality is non-physical are known as idealists. Thus, materialism and immaterialism (i.e. idealism) become ways of describing reality. Materialists belong in the school of materialism and they espouse the view that the real is the material or the physical and in this case they have in mind matter. Idealists or immaterialists are those who belong in the school of idealism and they maintain that ideal or immaterial is the real and by this they mean mind, idea, reason, spirit, soul or form. Because materialists and idealists hold opposing views about reality we say that they are rival schools of thought. And because each doggedly hold onto a one sided or a mono view of reality we say that materialism and idealism are monistic metaphysical systems.

There are also philosophers who argue that both the corporeal and the incorporeal constitute reality. This latter group of philosophers holds a dualistic view about reality so they are called dualists and their school of thought is known as dualism. There is however a main difference between dualism and duality. According to Microsoft Encarta (2008) “dualism, in philosophy, is the theory that the universe is explicable only as

Summa Philosophica a whole composed of two distinct and mutually irreducible elements”. It also defines duality as “a situation or nature that has two states or parts that are complementary or are in mutual opposition”. Whereas dualism connotes contrast, opposition, polarity, dichotomy and differentiation, duality would connote complementarity, mutuality, symbiosis and coexistence. Whereas dualism allows for the bifurcation of things into compartments, duality on the other hand abhors bifurcation and compartmentalization. Consequently, even when dualism recognizes two distinct existent things, because it always polarizes and dichotomizes things, this duality soon shrinks or reduces to become a monistic dualism. In essence, though dualism offers us the opportunity of a dual world of good and evil, heaven and hell, faith and reason etc; but, due of its tendency to polarize, conjunction is soon replaced by disjunction (i.e. the excluded middle) so that, at the end we are left to choose either good or bad, heaven or hell, faith or reason. In science this spirit of polarization rears its head up in the form of proving whether a given statement is true of false. This is exactly what we mean by the law of exclusivity or reductionism. It is clear from the foregoing that classical Western metaphysics (and by implication classical Western philosophy in general) is essentially monistic, reductionistic and exclusive in character. In classical Western epistemology, dualism further creates the problems of psychologism is rationalism and phenomenalism in empiricism. In psychologism apart from maintaining that reason is endowed with innate contents or ideas, there is the dogged insistence on the superiority of rational knowledge over sense knowledge and hence a deliberate discrimination against sense knowledge. Phenomenalism in empiricism is the exact opposite of psychologism in rationalism. Kant and Husserl battled with these problems with little success. It took the concerted efforts of existential phenomenologists and postmodernists alike to substantially combat the problems of psychologism and phenomenalism in Western epistemology and the problem of dualism in Western metaphysics.

The African thought system (be it in the area of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics or logic) operates on the law of duality, not dualism. We had earlier described the African metaphysical system as integrative on the ground that its dualistic nature allows for a plurality of views. We also said that this integrative metaphysics bears similar if not the same characteristics as Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology. What this boils down to is that integrative metaphysics and hermeneutic phenomenology offer a third option on how to apprehend reality. This third option is of course pluralism, which is distinct from monism/reductionism and dualism.

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Problem of Appearance and Reality: The common practice among the ancients was to regard that which is rational and intangible as superior to that which is sensual and tangible. In the same vein, the ancients concluded that since thought precedes action, it means that the immaterial has pre-eminence over and above the material. This gave rise to the “two realm cosmology” (i.e. monistic dualism) very much evident in the Parmenidean metaphysics. The vogue of any “two realm cosmology,” such as that of Parmenides and Plato, is to place preference upon reason above sense perception. Reason is equated with intelligibility, intangibility, indivisibility, indestructibility and originality. The perceptible world, on the other hand, is conceived as being tangible, divisible, material, destructible and illusory. The contrast between these substances with opposite attributes gave rise to the demarcation between “reality and appearance”. This was the common line of thinking among the Greeks. But the Greeks are not alone in this line of thinking. Traditional Africans also conceived phenomenon in a cosmological double of “spirit force” and a “material essence”. Kenneth C. Anyanwu makes this point clear when he states as follows: When the African looks at a tree within the assumptions of his culture, he sees and imagines a life-force interacting with another life-force. He sees the colour of the object (tree), feels its beauty, imagines the life-force in it, intuitively grasps the interrelationships between the hierarchy of life-forces. If he did not do this, he would not have concluded that spirit exists in the world. He does not see spirit with his eyes nor is it a rationally and theoretically postulated concept like atoms and electrons (Anyanwu, 1981: 95).

It is instructive from the above that it is common among traditional peoples (Greeks or Africans) to conceive of reality in terms of a cosmological double. However, contrary to the Greeks, Africans do not conceive the duality of spirit (i.e. ideas or reason) and matter as monistic or exclusive. For Africans, spirit and matter operate the law of inclusivity, of symbiosis, and of interpenetration. Within the materialist tradition of Western philosophy, phenomena are seen as the physical objects and the physical (cosmic) forces or laws that govern the universe. The enterprise of seeking for an ethereal double behind the physical universe is a craze of idealist philosophers. For all idealist philosophers, including transcendental philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, “real reality” is logos or reason. Phenomena are used to

Summa Philosophica depict mere appearances or illusions. In Parmenidean cosmology for instance, reality is Being, non-Being is appearance. In Platonism, real reality are the eidos, the physical universe is an ephemeral copy of the eidos. In that logical order Kant insists that what we are capable of knowing are appearances, we cannot apprehend noumena. Hegel reverses the order of Kant. For him (Hegel) real reality is the Absolute Spirit, the physical universe is a manifestation of the Absolute. Marx and the Marxists reject this idealist account and go ahead to insist that real reality is the physical universe. According to V.I Lenin: Phenomena are the things – in – themselves. There is no realm of the unknown or unknowable. Phenomena simply consist of the known and the yet to be known (cited by Kuznetsov, 1984: 74).

It took the intervention of Heidegger to sort out the divergence of views about reality and appearance among Western philosophers. To get to the ground of the term phenomenon Heidegger goes back to the early period of the Greeks. His discovery is amazing. For the early Greeks a- letheia is the word used in depicting phenomena and it meant “the unconcealedness of what-is-present, its being revealed, its showing itself” (Unah, 1998: 310). According to Michael Murray, “unconcealedness suggests that truth happens in a context with concealment, with hiddenness; this hiddenness of Being is something fertile and positive, as expressed in the aphorism of Heraclitus that physisloves to hide” (1988: 514). Thus, Heidegger radicalizes the meaning of phenomenon. He began by explaining the difference between themanifold andmanifestessences of a being. As unconcealedness, a being shows itself in the positive sense as manifest and as manifest,a being “shows itself as itself, it reveals itself in the light of day, but whether as semblanceor as manifest, phenomenon remains essentially manifold,that is, we grant that ‘what is’ reveals itself only in profiles or aspects, in bits and pieces” (1962a: 51). In other words, the problem with classical Western philosophers is that they had a polarized understanding of reality and since reality has been polarized the tendency is to regard an aspect of reality to be real, while the other aspect is either illusory or a mere appearance. When looked at from perspective of integrative metaphysics or hermeneutic phenomenology, we reach the understanding that there is unity in diversity (i.e. the one in the many) and vice versa. Thus as unity or one reality is manifest and as many or diverse reality is manifold, multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. However, we are only able to apprehend only aspects of reality at a time (i.e. applying

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Heisenberg’s theory of indeterminacy, we are never able to apprehend totality at once).

Problem of Change and Permanence: The problem of change and permanence is connected to the problem of Being and non-Being. It is actually by the intermingling Being and non-Being that Becoming (i.e. change) becomes manifest. The common convention is to regard Being as permanence, indivisibility, indestructibility, immortality, one, eternal and unchanging. Becoming is quite the opposite of Being. According to David Lindberg the discourse on change was the dominant issue among the Greek philosophers of the 5th century BC. By way of reiteration, George James states that the discourse on change among ancient Greek philosophers actually started with Pythagoras, not Parmenides. He explains that Pythagoras was well acquainted with the Egyptian doctrine of the generation of things through primordial principles of formation that occur in the form of opposites and contraries. As he states, “Pythagoreans expressed it (the doctrine of opposites) by the elements of number: odd and even” (1988: 74). Most probably, it is based on his knowledge of generation of things through opposites and contraries that Pythagoras himself explains that “fire underlies creation” (p. 71). James further explains that this law of generation through opposites and contraries was well known to all Greek philosophers of the 5th century BC, who had direct contact with either Pythagoras or Pythagoreans, except Parmenides. Being unfamiliar with the law of generation “Parmenides denied the existence of one opposite (not-Being), in order to affirm the existence of the other” (Being) (p. 74). We then notice that in Parmenides’ philosophy, the absence of the discourse on opposites and contraries, which is quite prominent in the philosophies of Greek philosophers of that period, is quite obvious.

Parmenides (540 - 450 BC) was born in the Greek city state of Elea in Southern Italy. He composed a poem on nature: Peri Physeos which contains his thoughts. The poem is said to consist of three parts, but it is the first two parts that deal with his view on the illusion of change. In the part one the Goddess of truth enlightens us to the fact that there are two paths to knowledge which are the paths to truth (i.e. path of reason) and the opinion of men, which Lindberg describes “the way of seeming which is associated with observation” (1992: 33). Right reason as the path of truth affirms the oneness and immutability of Being, but the senses and common opinion (doxa) are convinced that plurality and change exist. In part two we are told that truth consists in the knowledge that Being (To on)

Summa Philosophica is, while non-Being (To me on) is not. Since non-Being is not, it follows that Being is one and alone. Therefore: “Being is unproduced and unchanging. It is impossible for Being to produce Being; for under such circumstance Being must exist before it begins to exist” (James, 60).

Heraclitus (530 – 470 BC), a native of Ephesus in Asia Minor held opposing views to Parmenides. Contrary to Parmenides who doggedly refuted the existence of contraries and opposites, Heraclitus held that opposites and contraries propel and sustain the universe, that for this reason the universe is in a perpetual state of Becoming, in eternal state of flux. Hence, “There is no static Being, no unchanging element. Change is lord of the universe. The underlying element being fire, all things are changed for fire and fire for all things” (Ibid. 62). The change caused by fire is not random but uniform, orderly and cyclic because “the heavenly fires transmuted successively into vapor, water and earth; only to go through a similar process as they ascend again into fire” (pp. 62 – 63). This uniform, orderly and cyclic mutation of things is made possible by the “hidden harmony in nature which forever reproduces concord from oppositions, the divine law (dike) or universal reason (Logos) rules all things, reproduces itself in all things and restores all things according to fixed laws” (p. 63). It is then evident why Heraclitus held that no one can step into the same water twice for fresh waters are always flowing. Needless to say, the thinking of Heraclitus that the Logos substance that regulates change must be non- physical corroborates Anaximander’s earlier thinking that “change destroys matter and unless the substratum of change is limitless, change must at some point cease” (p. 56).

Between Parmenides and Heraclitus then ensued the problem of dualism in Greek philosophy.In Plato for instance, dualism consists of the divide between the world of forms (the eidos) which is assumed to be immutable and the ephemeral world of things which of course is mutable. The question then arose about which of the two; change or permanence, is the dominant feature of the universe. Democritus attempts a resolution of this puzzle when he wrote that: “Reality by the life of the atom is a movement of that which is (To on) within that which is not (To me on)” (James, 75). Democritus shows that permanence and change are both features of the world. The puzzle is however more comprehensively resolved by Aristotle.

In Plato the theory the form is other-worldly, Aristotle’s theory of form is this-worldly. Again, in Plato change occurs due to imperfection in

Summa Philosophica the materials the Demiurge uses in forging things of the world. In place of this, Aristotle developed his theory of hylomorphism (i.e. theory of matter and form) which states that material things have the potentiality to transform from one state to another. But this transformation is made possible by form (mind) which acts upon matter – hence there is a movement from potentiality to actuality. In the first place, “all change and motion in the universe can be traced back to the nature of things” (Lindberg, 52). So, by its nature, matter has the potency to undergo change at three levels of “(1) non-being (2) potential being and (3) actual being” (pp. 51 – 52).

To illustrate; hot or dry (an assumed state of privation or the beingness of hotness or dryness) can transmute into cold or wet (i.e. negation as non-being) and vice versa. At a second level, potential being can transmute into actual being. This happens when for example a seed displays its potentiality by transforming into actual tree. This implies that the seed is encoded with form (i.e. DNA) which determines its development into actual tree and is known in genetic engineering as morphogenesis. At third level and ultimately, Aristotle argued that “all change and motion in the universe can be traced back to the natures (i.e. the beings) of things” (p. 52). Lindberg however, warns that this third level of change will apply to only natural things, not things artificial. But all these dynamisms of change would remain impossible if there is no force (mind) to cause matter to transform. It is at this point that we enter into Aristotle’s four notions of cause. These include “(a) formal cause (b) material cause (c) efficient cause and (d) final cause which correspond to (a) the form received by a thing (b) the matter underlying that form which persists through change (c) the agency that brings about the change and (d) the purpose (i.e. goal or telos) served by the change” (p. 53).

All the while it is the mind that is acting on matter. Thus at the stage of formal cause, mind imposes form (idea) upon matter, at the stage of material cause matter receives definite shape, size and weight, at the stage of efficient cause the agency acting all the while (i.e. sculptor or potter) now begins to shape matter into the already conceived form or idea, and at the stage of final cause matter as a finished product now serves purposes which could be commercial, spiritual, intellectual, economic, political, ornamental, cultural and so on. We therefore notice in Aristotle the dynamisms of change and permanence. The assumption is that “motion and rest are attributes of nature” (James, 70), a doctrine that is aptly

Summa Philosophica represented in the theories of the Unmoved Mover and the Uncaused Cause.

We notice in Aristotle’s hylemorphism theory the presence of the doctrine of dualism. In dualism, opposites and contraries are seen to be in conflict or in antagonistic relationship. In other words, Aristotle’s theory of hylemorphism does not demonstrate enough that form and matter are symbiotic, mutual and complementary. It rather shows that form (mind) has features that are antithetical and superior to matter, making form to superimpose upon matter.

The discourse on permanence and change later gave rise to the principles of dialectics and hermeneutic phenomenology in the philosophies of George Hegel, Karl Marx and Martin Heidegger. Dialectics is the logic or law of change in history, while hermeneutics is the logic of discourse that leads to interpretations achieved through deconstruction. Hegel used dialectics to reflect on historical change. Marx used the same principle to discuss change in social consciousness. Whereas Hegel’s reflection on change in history follows the directives of Spirit or Reason, Marx’s discussion of change in social consciousness follows the directives of matter. Hegel’s discourse on change is therefore known as dialectical and historical idealism; Marx’s delineation of change on the other hand is called dialectical and historical materialism. The problem with dialectical treatment of change is that it gives the impression that change as becoming happens due to the antagonism of Being and non-Being. This is very clear in Hegel’s dialectics where Being is presented as position or thesis, non-Being is presented as opposition, antithesis or negation, Becoming is presented as synthesis or reconciliation. This antagonistic relationship between Being and non-Being that results into Becoming continues ad infinitum. In social relations, the danger with this manner of thinking is that it creates the impression that war (conflict) is the only factor for change, meaning that there are no disagreements in peace times so peace cannot generate change. Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology reverses this impression by opening us up to the realization that Being and non-Being, in the first place, are not in antagonistic affinity, rather, both are mutually predisposed (i.e. equi-primordial) in complementarity. What this means is that change is a natural process of the universe and the human society and it happens whether in times of war or peace. There is conflict in agreement; there is also conflict in disagreement. It is a question of the maturity and ingenuity we put into issues and situations. Hence, by the hermeneutic order, permanence and change are both features of the universe. We cannot

Summa Philosophica speak of perpetual permanence or perpetual change for that would result into a unidirectional universe. A universe system sustained by permanence and change is cyclical in orientation, meaning that permanence and change are in mutual cooperation.

Mind-Body Problem: Rene Descartes the French philosopher is the one who brought this problem into the open. The problem actually started when Descartes was trying to refute the claim that the soul died with the body. This particular exercise came as a result of the papal call which challenged Christian philosophers to reply skeptics who argued that the soul is not immortal. In Western philosophy the doctrine of the immortality of the soul dates back to Pythagoras and Plato. Descartes like Pythagoras and Plato belongs to the dualist school of thought. As it relates to the mind/body problem dualism maintains that man is a combination of mind and body. This used to be the basic assumption. But before Descartes, no one bothered to ask how two parts of the human entity that are distinct inter- relate. Descartes made it his point of duty to bring this distinction between mind and body into the open. He argues that mind is non-spatial (i.e. does not occupy space), non-extended, has no weight, shape, size, or density. The body as matter is the complete opposite of mind. How then do two things of different attributes relate? How then does that mental activities influence physical activities and vice versa? Descartes replies that they actually interact and that they do so, at the point of the pineal gland which according to him is located between the spinal cord and the brain. This Cartesian doctrine is known as interactionism. The problem with this theory is that it does not sufficiently explain how two things of different features interact (if at all they interact). Besides, the pineal gland is sandwiched between the cerebrum and cerebellum halves of the brain, it is nowhere near the atlas vertebral bone which is the point where the spinal cord joins the brain. Descartes can be pardoned for this mistake because in his time, neurology had not fully evolved as a medical science. This apart, implied in Descartes theory of interactionism is the tendency to regard the brain as the mind or at least the seat of the mind. If this is so then it contradicts Descartes’ earlier assertion that the mind is intangible and immaterial.

Geulinex and Nicholas Malebranche, Descartes’ followers, disagreed with Descartes. These two argue that mind and body do not interact; rather, God is the link between mind and body. On the occasion that I decide in my mind to stand, to eat or not to buy a car any more, God will intervene and move my body to respond to my mental activity (i.e. the decision I made), and vice versa. This doctrine of Geulinex and

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Malebranche is called the theory of occasionalism. It is a laughable doctrine in that it involves God in the intricate matters of the mind and as such denies man of his subjectivity which dowers us with the autonomy of thought. If indeed, God is the go between mind/body, it would mean that he is privy to every intention of man be such intention good or evil. Then if on the occasion of my deciding to commit acts that are heinous and criminal, God intervenes and moves my body to commit such, is he not as guilty as me in committing such obnoxious acts? The only unfortunate thing in this instance is that; should I be apprehended and executed God as spirit would be at large. And should on another occasion of someone slashing a very sharp cutlass on the neck of a neighbor, God also allows such physical act to result to the departure of the soul from the body (death), would God be said to be free of murder in this instance? Again as spirit he remains at large. Obviously, Geulinex and Malebranche did not know the full implications of their doctrine. For inasmuch as we applaud God for all acts noble and good, he cannot be extricated as well from all acts ignoble and evil.

Next is Leibniz with his theory of pre-established harmony. The theory states that like the maker of several clocks has set the clocks in such order that all of them simultaneously and harmoniously strike the same time always and with precision, so has God pre-established a harmony between mind and body such that mental acts simultaneously affect physical acts and vice versa. This means that mind and body do not interact, there only happens to be mutual agreement between them by a pre-established harmony. Kant dismissed this theory of Leibniz simply as dues ex machina, that is to say – no explanation. Just like the theory of occasionalism, this doctrine of Leibniz infringes seriously on human freedom.

Spinoza does not see the mind/body relation as a problem. He assumes that mind and body are two parallel aspects of the same substance. This theory of Spinoza is known as parallelism or double aspect theory. In reality there is only one substance but this substance has two aspects; God or Nature, mind or body, spirit or matter. Like the two sides of a coin, mind and body do not meet, they do not interact, but whatever happens to one side (i.e. of the coin) will expectedly and automatically affect the other (a bad coin is a bad coin whether it is the head or tail that is affected). So for Spinoza, God neither intervenes or interferes in the mind/body correlation nor is there a pre-established harmony responsible for such mental/physical affinity, rather, mind and body happen to be

Summa Philosophica parallel or double aspects of the same reality. There is a basic problem with this Spinozian theory and this concerns the question of the elusiveness of the substance with two parallel aspects.

Implied in the dualist account of the mind/body problem is an idealistic theory of mind which states that mind is mental and immaterial, and perhaps, its existence is superior to that of matter. The doctrine that mind is mental and immaterial is known as the substance theory of mind. Opposed to this idealist theory is David Hume’s materialist account of mind known as serial or bundle theory of mind. Hume argues that whenever he enters into what is fondly called mind he does not encounter any substance called mind except series or bundle of impressions. This position of Hume seems to have set the stage for other materialist account of mind/body problem which include identity theory and epiphenomenalism. Identity theorists such as Armstrong and Smart argue that there is no such thing as mind, if at all there is, it is not different from the brain. Mind in this wise is either a category mistake or simply a second order function of matter. Epiphenomenalists such as Gilbert Ryle then go ahead to declare that what we call mind is a secondary product of the brain, like the smoke or faggot given off by burning wood. Gilbert Ryle then concludes that looking for a mind in a body is like looking for a ghost in the machine.

From the idealist or materialist perspective, it would then seem that mind is either spiritual or physical. If this is the case then there will be no problem of correlation, since impliedly, man is either spiritual or physical. Problem however arises when the mind/body question is looked at from a dualist perspective. An adequate account of how the correlation between two dissimilar things happens has not been provided. A transcendentalist theory of mind such as that of Kant will seem to take care of this problem. Kant identified three basic faculties of the mind which are sensibility, imagination and the apperception also known as the understanding or thought. Sensibility is a function of the human body and its significance lies in gathering information about the world through the five senses. The information gathered by the senses is then stored in the memory which functions include receiving, storing, associating and recalling information. The imagination functions as the faculty of image formation and as such it is the faculty of synthesis. This makes the imagination to be the faculty of vision as well. Thought is the faculty of concept formation and the function of concepts is to provide rules (i.e. schema) for directing the entire affairs of the mind. This Kantian account of the mind/body problem seems to suggest that mind is the total functioning

Summa Philosophica of the human entity. It seems to uphold the point that mind is at once physical, mental as well as spiritual. It can also be described as a unitary concept of mind in the sense that it takes mind to be the power to form unity and as a power responsible for forming unity, mind in itself has to function as a unit.

Problem of Causality: As Russell points out; “in the Cartesian philosophy, as in the case of the Scholastics, the connection of cause and effect was supposed to be necessary, as logical connections are necessary” (1972: 664). Hume made a sharp departure from this traditional understanding of causality. He posits a new idea of causality that signaled the modern notion of causation. In actual fact, the challenge before him was to theorize about a notion of causality that would be relevant to science. Thus in Book 1, Part III, Section II of the Treatise of Human Nature, he asserts that there are four relations which are the foundation of science and these are; probability, identity, the situation in time and place, that is, contiguityand succession also known as the law of reciprocity and causation. For instance, the law of probability operates on the assumption that the future will always resemble the past, the law of identity assumes that nature is uniform, the law of contiguity or reciprocity assumes that there is a necessary connection between two events which follow each other, that is, based on (1) and (2), while by the law of causation we infer that the repeated occurrence of events is enough to justify their continued occurrence in the future. Of the four relations that form the foundation of science, it is causality that impresses on us the idea of a necessary connection of events. Hume explains: ‘Tis only causation, which produces such a connexion, as to give us assurance from the existence or action of one object, that ‘twas followed or preceded by any other existence or action (p. 121).

Hume then proceeds to examine how in the first instance we are able to reach the idea of a connection between events, that is to say, the general assumption commonly made in philosophy that “whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence” (p.127). Thus, contrary to the view of continental idealists and the scholastics, Hume’s aim on this matter is to prove: “How knowledge of real existence can be reached by pure reason alone” (Weldon, 1968: 39).

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The common assumption in traditional logic is that the causal link between an antecedent (i.e. ground for an) event and a consequent event can be rationally deduced. Hume disagreed with this notion in traditional logic. He proceeded to demonstrate that: “The power by which one object produces another is not discoverable from the ideas of the two objects; therefore, we can only know cause and effect from experience, not from reasoning or reflection” (Russell, 1972: 664). Thus for Hume, the thinking or statement that; every object which begins to exist, must owe its existence to a cause, is one that is “neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain” (Weldon, 1968: 129).

If we agree with Hume that it is neither from knowledge nor any scientific reasoning that we derive the idea of the necessity of a cause, but that such a notion arises from observation and experience, the question that follows concerns how experience gives rise to such a principle (p. 130). Hume’s answer to this question is to postulate that by observation and experience we perceive constant conjunction and that it is by this constant conjunction that we infer event (object) A from event (object) B. According to Russell, Hume’s usage of the word infer is never in the traditional sense of logic where we talk of formal or explicit inference, rather, what Hume simply meant by this word is that the perceiving of event A makes us to expect event B (Russell, 1972: 665). What Hume meant to say in effect is that our perception of causality or necessary connection is out of belief, habit or custom. He defined belief as “a lively idea related to or associated with a present event” (Weldon, 130). In other words, our idea of necessity or causality is custom determined which then creates the impression or the belief that event A caused event B. We can therefore say that for Hume, this habitual way of believing in causality derives from the power of the memory to associate impressions into ideas. We can then conclude that in the view of Hume, the idea of causality or “necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects” (Russell, 666).Because Hume relied on the method of empiricism (as opposed to rationalism), he could not see how sensibility can apprehend causality and so he logically concluded that there is no such thing as causality in experience. Based on this denial, Immanuel Kant was challenged to embark on an ontological examination of causality all with the sole aim of proving that we neither believe in causality out of habit nor out of expectation, rather, by inference, we think in terms of causal connections and by so doing instruct causality into nature. The delineation of how the human mind thinks causally (inferentially) and then proceeds to impose causality upon the world happens to be a cardinal thesis of The Critique of Pure Reason.

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Problem of Freedom and Determinism: Is man a free being or is he determined?If he is determined, can it be said that he is responsible for his actions? Again, if man is determined, how come he is rewarded or punished for his actions? And if man is free, to what extent is he responsible for his actions? These are questions central to the problem of freedom and determinism. Those philosophers who say that man is determined are called determinists and those of them who argue that man is free are referred to as libertarians.

There are several dimensions to the determinism theory. We have ethical: determinism, theological determinism, physical determinism, psychological determinism, metaphysical determinism, historical determinism, and social and economic determinism. Ethical determinism argues that man is compelled by the idea of the good to do the good. Prominent in this line of thought are Socrates and Plato who jointly espouse the view that ignorance is the reason for evil doing. Theological determinism derives from the attributes of God as the all powerful, all knowing and all present. Implied in these attributes is the issue of foreknowledge of all actions. If this is so, is it still normal to blame humans for actions that are adjudged to be evil? Physical determinism is the view that man as a member of physical nature is determined by the laws of nature and is therefore, not free. This view is largely upheld by materialists such as: Democritus and Epicurus the atomists, and Thomas Hobbes, La Mettrie and Baron Paul Von Holbach the nature philosophers. Psychological determinism is the view that human actions are determined by psychological factors such as instincts and motives. The theory of instincts is upheld by Sigmund Freud the psychoanalyst, while the doctrine of motives is propagated by Hobbes and Hume. Metaphysical determinism derives from George Hegel’s theory of the Absolute Spirit, who uses human characters such as the hero to accomplish his set objectives in history. Hence, connected to metaphysical determinism is historical determinism. Since men, whether as heroes, masters, citizens or victims are all manipulated by the Absolute Spirit, it means that human metaphysical and historical actions are determined. Social and economic determinism derive from Karl Marx’s thesis that – social consciousness determine individual consciousness. By implication, individuals are at the mercy of the social and economic policies of the leaders of the society.

The school of thought of those determinists who do not deny moral responsibility is called “soft determinism”, while the school of thought

Summa Philosophica of those determinists who completely deny moral responsibility is called “hard determinism”. Hobbes, Hume and J. S. Mill belong in the school of soft determinism. Baron Paul Von Holbach is a hard determinist.

One thinks that hard determinism is a more logical way of concluding the debate on determinism. However, soft determinism paves the way for the libertarians to argue for human freedom. Libertarians such as Nietzsche and Sartre vehemently argue that man is a free being. In order that man should be free without hindrance or external interference, Nietzsche declared the death of God. The death of God should lead man to the realization that he is beyond good and evil and that he is beyond the slave morality of religion. This realization should open man up to a new dawn, the dawn of the superman morality governed by the new principles of noble and ignoble. Sartre agrees with Nietzsche that man is a free being. In the case of Sartre however, God does not need to die for man to be free, he simply does not exist. For man to be completely free, God has to cease to be in existence. But the non-existence of God puts on man a heavy responsibility. So the prize of freedom is that man should be responsible for his actions. And if freedom goes with responsibility it means that man must be ready to bear the consequences of his actions. Sartre like other existentialists does not speak of good or bad actions, but of authentic or inauthentic actions. Authentically we seize upon our circumstance of freedom by making bold decisions and choices. Inauthentically, we forfeit our freedom to make decisions and choices. But the decision not to decide is indeed a decision and the choice not to choose is a choice. For when we refuse to decide or make a choice, we have unwittingly decided or unknowingly chosen.

The debate on freedom and determinism is unending. Like Kant said, this problem is not one that can be resolved metaphysically. It is more of a moral issue that appeals to our conscience.

The Problem of Substance and Accidents

The problem of substance and accident is connected to that of appearance and reality. The word: Substance comes from the Latin sub meaning under and stare meaning to stand. Substance literally means ‘standing under’ or ‘that which stands under’. Substance has been variously used to mean: stuff, basic stuff, essence, kernel, solidity, or in Cartesian parlance, an independent existent. This means that substance can be

Summa Philosophica material or immaterial depending on the school of thought of the philosopher. Accident is opposite of substance. Accident is that which cannot exist on its own but needs to be supported by another. In which case, accident represents qualities such as colour, shape, size etc which have to be sustained by substance.

The Problem of Universals and Particulars

Universals are about general names which Aristotle classifies as genus, while particulars are names of individual things which Aristotle classifies as species. The argument is whether general names exist independent of particulars, or whether they are abstractions from particular things, or whether they are just labels. Plato maintains that universals exist independent of particular things and his view is known as exaggerated realism. Aristotle maintains that universals are abstractions from particular things and his view is known as moderate realism. William of Ockham insists that names are mere labels and his view is known as nominalism.

The Problem of Unity and Diversity or One and Many

The problem of unity and diversity touches directly on the nature, task and function of metaphysics. Unity is about harmony, order, the oneness of things, or homogeneity. Diversity is about chaos, anarchy, heterogeneity, multiplicity and plurality. So there is the one in the many and the many in the one. We see this duality in the cosmos. But this is not all that there is about unity and diversity. The real gist about this problem is that man being a metaphysical being is able to replicate this cosmic order in his processes of universe construction and reconstruction. So the whole talk about metaphysics is that man is able to from unity amidst the diversities in the world, but as he does this he recreates further diversities. So the mystery of the one in the many and the many in the one continues. Identity is about the attribute or characteristics of a thing. As it relates to the humans, identity is about a person’s personality. Sometimes, we also speak of group identity (i.e. cultural identity). Going by the law of identity in logic, a thing is what it is and nothing else. In Parmenidean language we say Being is, non- Being is not. Alienation is opposite of identity. In existentialist term alienation means forfeiture or inauthenticity. For Ludwig Feuerbach alienation is the act of projecting human attributes into a supernatural entity; God, such that these human attributes become supersensible. This is the problem with anthropomorphism. For Karl Marx, alienation simply

Summa Philosophica means the exploitation of labour. Alienation exists at varying degrees. There is cultural alienation, religious alienation, and economic alienation and so on.

The upshot of our discourse on the problems of metaphysics in general is that metaphysics deals with the analysis of those problems that not only touch on our everyday life, but act as the ground or foundation of all human knowledge. Metaphysics; therefore, deals with the fundamental problems of life. There is no discipline that is not anchored on one metaphysical problem/principle or another, be that discipline in the humanities, the physical sciences, or the social and managerial sciences. In the first place to be educated in a discipline is to get acquainted with the metaphysical principles underlying that discipline. One who fails to acquaint self with the metaphysical principles that embellish one’s discipline has merely passed through that discipline, the discipline has not passed though such individual. Here, we see the division of metaphysics into metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis come in handy. Recall that under the former we examined problems dealing with Being and human being, while under the latter we delineated problems concerning the world in general (i.e. problem of reality). In relations to the academic disciplines, philosophy provides the general principles for every academic study. Other disciplines in the humanities deal essentially with the analysis of issues, related to human beings (i.e. as it concerns history, language and culture). To the physical sciences, belongs the task of investigating physical nature both at the organic and inorganic levels. In doing this, the physical sciences use mathematics as a tool, which in itself (i.e. mathematics) is a pure rational evaluation of realty through the use of symbols and figures and for the purpose of gathering precision. The social and managerial sciences combine the methodologies of the humanities and the physical sciences to investigate other human activities such as: political structure, personal and group psychology, social structure, economics, commerce, marketing, finance, communication and so on. All of these activities would require metaphysical principles for proper coordination, if not, it would be impossible to instruct unity into the chaos of life.

References Anyanwu, K.C. (1981), African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa. Rome: Catholic Book Agency.

Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Bk IV

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Copleston, F. (1946), A History of Philosophy vol. 1 Greece and Rome, London: Search Press.

Descartes, Rene (1960), Discourse on Method and Meditations, New York: Dutton.

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Heidegger, Martin (1959), An Introduction to Metaphysics (Translated by Ralph Manheim), London and New Haven: Yale University Press.

______(1962a), Being and Time (Translated by J. Macquarie and E. Robinson), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

______(1962b), Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, (Translated by J.S. Churchill), London: Indiana University Press.

______(1967), “The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics” in James B. Hartman (ed.), in Philosophy of Recent Times vol. II: Readings in Twentieth-Century Philosophy, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company.

Hume, David (1969), A Treatise of Human Nature (edited with introduction by Ernest C. Mossner), Great Britain: Penguin Books.

Iroegbu, Pantaleon (1995), Metaphysics: The Kpim of Philosophy, Owerri: International University Press Ltd.

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Kant, Immanuel (1964), Critique of Pure Reason (trans. J. M. D. Mecklejohn), London: Everyman’s Library.

______(1970), Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (trans. Norman Kemp Smith), London: Macmillan and Co.Ltd.

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Kuznetsov, V.N. (1987), Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Lindberg, D. C. (1992), The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 BC to 1450, Chicago: TheUniversity of Chicago Press.

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Schacht, R. (1972), “Husserlian and Heideggerian Phenomenology”, in Philosophical Studies, 23, pp.293 – 314.

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE PROBLEM OF SPACE AND TIME

The concepts of space and time cut across academic frontiers and thus become interdisciplinary. While the mathematician and the physicist would grapple with the concept of space and time within the purview of geometry, kinematics, dynamics and mechanics, the philosopher considers these concepts more in the light of ontology and theory of knowledge. This is why he makes these debative posits: What is time? What is space? What is the origin of space and time? How do space and time structure our conception of the universe? Are space and time properties of the object of our cognition, or are they independent of matter? What is the origin of the universe? What is the origin of matter? What is the cause of the universe? Is the existence of a first cause necessary? What are the ultimate material components of the universe? What is the ultimate reason for the existence of the universe? Does the cosmos have a purpose? Again the philosopher considers space and time more in the light of the theory of knowledge and ontology. This was why I said elsewhere concerning relativity that “space-time has penetrated our being and our knowledge of being” (Essien 2007). How do space and time structure our conception of the world? Is the universe limited in time and finite in space, or is it an infinite and static universe? This plethora of questions constitutes the problematic of the philosophy of space and time.

The history of philosophy brings out the philosophies on space, time, and motion, since motion is possible with space and time. Since motion involves the occupation of different places at different times, Zeno’s paradoxes strike at the heart of our concepts of space and time. Zeno, who wanted to defend his master, Parmenides, argued that motion, change and plurality were mere illusions. He came directly against the Heraclitean credo in motion, change and plurality, through his famous paradoxes.

Paradox 1: Achilles and the Tortoise

Zeno imagines that Achilles, the fleetest of Greek warriors, is to run a footrace against a tortoise. It is only fair to give the tortoise a head start. Under these circumstances, Zeno argues, Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise, no matter how fast he runs. In order to overtake the

Summa Philosophica tortoise Achilles must run from his starting point A to the tortoise’s original starting point T0 (see figure 1). While he is doing that, the tortoise will have moved ahead to T1. Now Achilles must reach the point T1. While Achilles is covering this new distance, the tortoise moves still farther to T2. Again, Achilles must reach this new position of the tortoise. And so it continues, whenever Achilles arrives at a point where the tortoise was, the tortoise has already moved a bit ahead. Achilles can narrow the gap, but he can never actually catch up with him.

A T0 T1 T2…

The Flying Arrow, Zeno argues that an arrow in flight is always at rest. At any given instant, he claims, the arrow is where it is, occupying a portion of space equal to itself. During the instant it cannot move, for that would require the instant to have parts, and an instant is, by definition, a minimal and indivisible element of time. If the arrow did move during the instant it would have to be in one place at one partof the instant, and in a different place at another part of the instant. Moreover, forthe arrow to move during the instant would require that during the instant, it must occupy a space larger than itself, for otherwise it has no room to move.

Achilles and the Tortoise is designed to refute the doctrine that space and time are continuous, while the arrow is intended to refute the view that space and time have an atomic structure (Salmon 35).

Democritus represented what would have been Leucippus’ ideas. Democritus believed that the universe consisted of atoms and void. The atoms were the smallest possible parcels of matter, entirely indivisible (Greek “atomos” means “uncuttable). Democritus inferred the existence of atoms, probably, by the simple argument that, if one keeps cutting a piece of matter in half, then after an infinite number of cuts one would end up with nothing. Because an infinite number of nothings is still nothing, there must be a smallest, indivisible particle, or else there would be no matter (Emiliani 5-6). This one smallest, indivisible particle, is the atom, according Democritus. Democritus believed that the atoms had different shapes: the atoms of air and water were very smooth and slippery; those of iron were hard and jagged (Emiliani 557). These atoms moved in space. Space, for Democritus, was the arena where motion of indivisible particles took place.

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The concepts of space and time are interwoven with motion in Aristotle’s physics. Time, according to Aristotle, is “numerus motus secundum prius et posterius”, meaning that “time is the measure of motion according to before and after” (Aristotle, Physics Book 4 ch. 11,218b, 1-2). Having thought of what time as such could be, Aristotle’s mind went straight to motion. In that things move, that events come, stay on and pass on, and that the physical universe in which we speak of time is characterized by this continuity of movements, these realities are immediately linked with time. Though not identical, time and motion are tied to each other. In Aristotle’s words, we perceive movement and time together…for the occurrence of movement is linked by the human mind with the lapse of time. Time belongs to movement (Aristotle, Physics, 4,11,219a,5-10,p.291). Where there is motion, there is time. Motion points to time, while time reveals motion (Iroegbu 28). In Aristotelian conception, space is the receptacle of things, which are in movement. Space goes with being and underlies its existence. Space holds being. Space, time and movement are existentially and inseparably linked. They are linked both in ‘se’ (in themselves) and ‘quo ad nos’ (in reference to us). Whatever moves, moves in space and time. Time is linked with motion in so far as measurement of time (speed, velocity) and position is involved in motion.

Does this mean that time stops as motion stops? Time as measurement or counting stops as motion stops. Time stops to measure the motion of that body which was in motion. In terms of motion, Aristotle argued that the natural state of a body was to be at rest, and that it moved only if driven by a force or impulse. This argument implied that a heavy body should fall faster than a light one, because it would have a greater pull towards the earth (Hawking15). The Aristotelian tradition had to be deflated by Galileo, who had to experiment on whether bodies of different weight did fall at different speeds. Aristotle believed in absolute time and that an event could be given an absolute position in space (Hawking 18).

St. Augustine addressed God with the problem of time: “You made all times and before all times you are; nor was there ever a time when there was no time (St. Augustine Book X1,ch13,p.267). What is time? St Augustine writes: “I know what it (time) is if no one asks me what it is. But if I want to explain it to someone who has asked me, I find that I do not know (Book XI ch 13,p 267). St Augustine argues that if nothing passed, there would be no past time, and if nothing were coming, there would be no future time, and if nothing were now, there would be no present time. St Augustine thus argues for the necessary relationship of time to events and

Summa Philosophica things. For time past means events past, present time means present events, and future time means events that would occur in the future (Iroegbu 23). However, he goes on to argue, that things that are past are no longer there and future events are not yet there, for both cannot in the strict existential sense be said to be there. They were. They will be. But they are not. Time related to these non-existent is also non-existent. For Augustine, we cannot truly say that time exists except in the sense that it is tending toward non-existence. Perhaps only the present exists, for to deny this would be self-contradictory and ourselves negating. Augustine uses three expressions to bring past, present and future to reality as existing: a presence of things past is couched in “memory”; a presence of things present in “sight”; and a present of things future in “expectation”. Thus, Augustine looks at time from a psychological perspective, since time is conceived and contemplated in the mind.

Every philosopher or philosophy student, who may have studied skepticism, or the body-mind problematic or elementary history of modern philosophy, must have come across the name of Rene Descartes. The same holds for mathematicians and physicists who may have learned something in (analytical) geometry, particularly, the Cartesian coordinates system. The Cartesian system of co-ordinates consists of three plane surfaces perpendicular to each other and rigidly attached to a rigid body. Referred to a system of co-ordinates, the scene of any event will be determined (for the main part) by the specification of the lengths of the three perpendiculars or co-ordinates (x,y,z) which can be dropped from the scene of the event to those three plane surfaces. The lengths of these three perpendiculars can be determined by a series of manipulations with rigid measuring-rods performed according to the rules and methods laid down by Euclidean geometry (Einstein Relativity, 7). In so far as space and time concepts are concerned, they are intricately interwoven with system of co-ordinates. Descartes was fascinated by the mathematics of geometry.

Rene Descartes ushered in the modern period of philosophy by wholesale doubt of the reliability of sense experience. He argued that we could never be absolutely sure of the verdict of the senses because we could never know for certain that we are not dreaming. Fascinated by the apparent clarity and certainty of geometry, he proposed to erect the edifice of philosophy on a sure ground. Thus, he was looking for an absolute and unshakable foundation (absolutum et fundamentum inconcussum) to establish his philosophy. This was the origin of ‘I’- viewpiont of modern times and its subjectivism (Heidegger 297). After having admitted of the

Summa Philosophica existence of the res cogitans, after his methodic doubt, he added the existence of res extensa. He argued that geometrical properties (extension) represent the essence of matter (Salmon 3). For Descartes, then, space is an essence of matter. Descartes did not admit the existence of vacuum or void (Gribanov 180). He admitted of the existence of mind and body and space and time, for whatever is extended is so extended in space and time. In this case, space is not empty.

Isaac Newton held tenaciously to absolute concepts of space and time. He distinguished absolute concepts from subjective ones thus: Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and immovable. Relative space is some movable dimension or measure of the absolute spaces; which our senses determine by its position to bodies; which are commonly taken for immovable space (Newton 6). Space was not a property of matter, but existed as some independent substance. Space, in Newtonian scheme of thought, was a kind of receptacle filled with material bodies. Newton drew the same conclusion with regard to time. He distinguished absolute from relative time. Absolute time, he represented as uniform, pure duration, existing independently of the material world and not connected with events taking place in nature (Gribanov 178). It was one-dimensional, continuous and homogenous throughout the universe. To quote him, Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external, and by another name is called duration: relative, apparent and common time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by the means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year (Newton 6). Time and space were considered independent not only of mechanical processes (independent in relation to moving matter) but also relatively to one another. Newton’s concepts of space and time are absolute and independent. Here, space and time exist independently of matter.

Leibniz rejected the Newtonian absolutism and rather approached the problem of time and space from a broader notion. First of all, Leibniz argued that Newton based himself, in his conclusions about time and space, on a limited metaphysical notion of matter, and saw that as the main reason preventing disclosure of the deeper space-time properties of nature. Leibniz stressed that the ancients’ idea of the existence only of atoms and void had impoverished our notions of the world, and reduced material reality simply to the existence of the simplest elements of matter. The

Summa Philosophica material world, he argued, was not only limited to the existence of substance-matter. Hear him: It cannot be said that, the present quantity of matter is the fittest for the present constitution of things. And supposing it was, it would follow that present constitution of things would not be the fittest absolutely, if it hinders God from using more matter. It were therefore better to choose another constitution of things, capable of something more (cited in Alexandrov 40). Leibniz also extended the concept of matter to light and magnetic phenomena. He did not admit the existence of vacuum or void, and considered that matter was present everywhere. According to him, the author objects to me (he wrote) the vacuum…which is made by pumping the air out of a receiver; and he pretends that there is a truly perfect vacuum or a space without matter (at least in part) in that receiver. The Aristotelians and Cartesians, who do not admit a true vacuum, here said…that there is no vacuum at all in the tube or in the receiver; since glass has small pores, which the beams of light, the effluvia of the load- stone and other very thin fluids may go through. I am of their opinion (quoted in Gribanov 180).

Leibniz recognized the qualitative diversity of the forms of matter, and reduced substance only to a particular case. This enabled him to reject the Newtonian idea of an absolute vacuum and consequently of absolute space as a separate self-contained principle existing alongside matter and independent of it. It was the position of Leibniz that space and time could not be considered outside things and processes, but were properties of matter. Matter played a decisive role in space-time structure.

Unlike Leibniz, matter, for Toland, was objective reality and not a spiritual substance (Toland 165-167). However, Toland came to the same conclusion with Leibniz about the limited nature of the Newtonian doctrine of time and space. Like Leibniz, Toland came to study of space and time from matter. Toland was uncomfortable with the Newtonian ideas of vacuum and also absolute time and space. Time and space, in Toland’s view, did not exist outside matter and outside its processes as an independent substance. Space and time were properties of the material world.

According to him, Yet because the mathematicians had occasion to suppose space without matter, as they did duration without things, points without quantity, and the like; the philosophers who could not otherwise account for the generation of motion in matter which they held to be inactive, imagined a real space distinct from matter, which they held to be

Summa Philosophica extended, incorporeal, immovable, homogeneal, indivisible, and infinite (Toland 181).

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant attempts, inter alia, to establish the validity of human knowledge. Human knowledge, according to Kant, arises through the joint functioning of sensibility and intellect, or understanding (Kant A51, B75). Sensibility is a passive receptivity, the power of receiving representations of the objects by which it is affected. Understanding is an active spontaneity, the power of exercising thought over the objects given us in sensible intuition (Kemp 16). Intuition is the product of sensibility and concept is the product of understanding.

Space and time are a priori forms of intuition. Kant’s first point about space is that it is not an empirical concept derived from our experience of things outside us. We discover empirically, by sensory observation, that a certain object is to the left of, or above, or further from us than, another object; but that objects in general are in spatial relations of some kind to one another is not an empirical generalization from specific spatial statements. For the very discovery that X is to the left of Y, already presupposes that we have some “idea” of space in general. If someone asks us, “What are the spatial relationship between X and Y?” We can, in principle, at least, provide an answer from the results of observation. But if someone asks us “is X in any spatial relationship to Y?” It would be absurd to try to answer this question by making this observation; for if the answer were No, this would be conclusive proof that observations made through our sense could not possibly be relevant, and that X and Y (or one of them at least) were not located in space at all (Kemp 17). Similarly, we cannot, Kant says, imagine or represent to ourselves the absence or non-existence of space, although we can think of space as being empty of objects. And since we cannot form an idea of a spaceless world, our knowledge that the world is spatial cannot have come to us through sense experience; we can only observe that S is P if we have some idea of what it would be like for S not to be P. Our apprehension of space then is not empirical (Kemp 17).

But space is not a general concept either. For when we have a general concept there are, or may be, particular objects falling under the concept (as particular houses fall under the general concept of house). There are no particular spaces falling under the general concept of space. There can only be one, all embracing space. Space, then, is nothing but form of all appearances of outer sense. Space is a necessary condition of all outer objects as they appear to us, but does not necessarily underline

Summa Philosophica things, as they are themselves. Kant argues that we cannot have formed the concept of time from our observation or experience of events happening successively or simultaneously, for the notions of succession and simultaneity themselves presuppose time (Kemp 18). Succession and simultaneity are temporal concepts and we must therefore already have the concept of time before we can talk about or grasp the existence of, successive or simultaneous events. Time, again, is not a general concept, for even though we can talk about different times, they are not different instances of one concept (as here words on page are three different instances of the concept ‘word’) but different parts of one and the same time. Time, then, is, like space, an ‘a priori’ form of intuition. Unlike space, it is a form of our intuition or perception of ourselves and of our inner state, not of our intuition of objects outside us. A further distinction follows: time is a necessary formal condition of all appearances whatsoever. All objects outside us appear to us extended in space but all representations, whatsoever; whether of inner states of outer objects, appear to us as succeeding or simultaneous with, one another in time (Kemp 18). We cannot say that things as they are in themselves exist in time, anymore than we can say that they are spatially extended. But all things as they appear to us in our human condition are in time-relation. Our capacity for receiving sensations, then, is so constructed that whatever its material, it is inevitably arranged in a temporal order and, as far as objects outside us are concerned, in a spatial order as well (Kemp 18).

Albert Einstein, like Leibniz and Toland, reacted against the absolutist conception of space and time as described in Newton’s classical mechanics, where time is independent of the position and the condition of motion of the system of coordinates. Einstein reaffirms that space is a three-dimensional continuum. By this, Einstein means that it is possible to describe the position of a point (at rest) by means of three numbers (co- ordinates) x, y, z, and that there is an indefinite number of points in the neigbourhood of this one, the position of which can be described by co- ordinates such as x, y, z, which may be as near as we choose to the respective values of the co-ordinates x, y, z of the first point (Einstein 55). According to the theory of relativity, time is robbed of its independence. As time loses its independence as a continuum and forms a unity with space, we have the space-time continuum. Relativity theory thus becomes the space-time theory. In relativistic physics, space-time is not arena where events take place, without their being affected or affecting the events. Space-time is

Summa Philosophica properties of matter such that nothing could be conceived outside of space- time continuum. Reality and knowledge of physical reality has meaning only within the context of this continuum. In the light of relativity, Hawking considers an event “as something that happens at a particular point in space and at a particular time” (Hawking 24). This is why space is inseparable from time, such that instead of the traditional, classical idea of “space and time” we have “space-time” in relativity. Metaphysically considered, space and time in Einstein’s theory of relativity are not entities themselves, but properties of matter substantially conceived. If we approximate Aristotle’s analysis of substance and accidents in terms of relativity, space-time would be only but accidents, inhering in some substantial matter in so far as such matter is measurable in terms of x, y, z, t coordinates. Space in relativity is finite and has boundary. Time also have and end. Geoff Haselhurst put forward what he called the ‘metaphysics of space and motion and the wave structure of matter (http//www.haselhurst.com). According to Heselhurst, the current science paradigm of representing matter as discrete particles that generate fields in space-time, while useful, is only an approximation of reality, and it causes numerous problems because of this. To correct these errors it is necessary, he argues, to reject the particle conception of matter (as Einstein did) and describe matter in terms of ‘spherical standing waves in space’ that cause the particle effect at their ‘wave-center’ ((http//www.haselhurst. com). The metaphysics of space and motion and the wave structure of matter is founded on one principle which describes one substance, space, and its properties as a Wave-medium. Matter exists as spherical standing waves in space. The discrete ‘particle’ effect of matter is formed by the wave-center of the spherical standing waves. Time is caused by wave motion (as spherical wave motions of spaces which causes matter’s activity and the phenomenon of time). Forces and fields result from wave interactions of the spherical in and out waves with other matter in the universe which change the location of the wave center (and which we ‘see’ as a ‘force accelerating a particle’).

Haselhurst acknowledges that he is combining the absolute space assumed by Newton with the spherically spatially extended structure of matter as assumed by Einstein in his theory of relativity and the scalar wave properties of matter discovered by Schrodinger and de Broglie. To correctly understand these central concepts of the wave structure of matter, the following points are important: Newton’s absolute space was considered a ‘background’ reference frame for motion (and acceleration) of

Summa Philosophica matter ‘particle’. Thus in Newton’s space, matter did not affect space (matter was somehow separate as ‘particles). Einstein rejected the ‘particle’ conception of matter and tried to unite matter and space (and time, gravity) as one thing, by representing matter as continuous spherical fields. So, in Einstein’s relativity, matter does not affect space, as matter and space are united (that is, matter is spherically spatially extended and represented as a spherical field). The ‘Wave structure of matter agrees here with Einstein as matter and space are one and the same thing (there are no particle), and thus matter does affect space and its properties. The central difference is that Haselhurst is describing matter in terms of ‘spherical waves in continuous space’, rather than Einstein’s field theory of matter as continuous spherical fields in space-time. The second point is that there are two different types of waves in physics, the ‘vector electromagnetic waves’ developed by Maxwell, which describe both a quantity and direction of force, and the ‘scalar waves of quantum theory’, which are described by a wave amplitude only. The wave structure of matter, which describes matter as spherical waves in a physically real space, requires the use of the scalar waves from quantum theory ((http//www.haselhurst.com).

By describing reality from one thing, space existing with the properties of the wave-medium, Haselhurst appers to have solved many problems in philosophy and physics. By realizing that matter is formed from spherical standing waves in space (rather than discrete particles and forces in space-time), many things, such as matter, time, forces, tend to be connected back to one thing, that is, space and its wave motion. It is this wave motion of space, Haselhurst argues, that causes matter’s activity and the phenomenon of time. This appears to solve the fundamental problem of the one and the many by moving from the metaphysics of space and time (founded on four separate things) to the metaphysics of space and motion (founded on one thing, space). Nevertheless, Haselhurst’s metaphysics of space and motion as founded on space has no clear-cut difference from a metaphysics of space- time. Since space-time is a unity and not separate things, Haselhurst has done nothing entirely new. The conceptual problem of space and time remained, and mathematicians as well as physicists had to lend their reflective minds to also philosophize on same concepts. Geometry relates with philosophy as both share a similar foundation, in terms of time, place and fatherhood. Thales of Miletus was the first to systematize both philosophy and geometry (Salmon 1). Pythagoras was another mathematician and

Summa Philosophica philosopher, who developed geometry, and Plato held that mathematics holds the key to philosophical truth, the key to understanding and prepared the way for Euclid. Plato believes that geometry signifies reality (Salmon 2- 3). Descartes, Leibniz, Frege, Russell were also symbols of the synergy between philosophy and mathematics. The doctrine that geometry provides useful knowledge of the physical world via pure reason was given its clearest formulation by Kant. He said that the propositions of geometry are synthetic a priori truths (Salmon 3-4). Euclid, in The Elements, reduced the whole of geometrical science to an axiomatic form in which all of the propositions (theorems) are deduced from a very small number of starting assumptions (axioms and postulates). He held the view that the postulates of geometry are self-evident truths. Below are five postulates of Euclid’s geometry: P-1 A straight line can be drawn between any two points. P-2 A finite straight line can be extended continuously in a straight line. P-3 A circle can be drawn with any center and any radius P-4 All right angles are equal to another. P-5 Given a straight line and a point not on that line, there is one and only one line through that point parallel to the given line. Euclid’s geometry is a theory of the spatial forms of matter. The first four postulates of Euclid’s geometry constitute what is today known as Euclidean geometry. The fifth postulate, after it had been criticized, gave birth to what is known as non-Euclidean geometry. The structure of space in Euclidean geometry is flat. This is attested to by Einstein when he described the flat space-time of the special relativity theory as Euclidean (Einstein, Relativity 92). The geometries of Saccheri, Lobachesky, Bolyai and Riemann regarded the fifth postulate of Euclid as less self evident. They doubted the absolute character of this postulate and thus made a turning point in the history of thought. Non-Euclidean geometry was born. In 1733, Girolamo Saccheri attempted to prove the parallel postulate by assuming it to be false, and then deducing an absurdity. In the first place, one can deny the parallel postulate by maintaining that parallel lines do not exist at all. On the basis of this assumption Saccheri did succeed in deriving a contradiction, for the first four postulates do imply that there is at least one line through the given point parallel to the given line. In the second place, one can deny the parallel postulate by asserting that there is more than one line through the given point parallel to the given line (Salmon 5). Saccheri died with the conviction that he had “cleaned Euclid of every blemish (Euclid, quoted in Salmon 6). Carl Friedrich Gauss, Johann Bolyai, and Nikolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky, working on the problem of the parallels, came to the conclusion that it is possible to assume that the parallel postulate of Euclid is false without getting into any absurdity or contradiction. They also realized that it is possible to adopt Euclid’s first

Summa Philosophica four postulates while denying the fifth one (by asserting the existence of more than one parallel), and to develop a perfect consistent non-Eulidean geometry on that basis. Bolyai and Lobachevsky denied Euclid’s fifth postulate by saying that, instead of one parallel, there are many parallel lines (Salmon 6). Lobachevsky’s success was due to his deep philosophical approach to contemplation of the essence, unity, and diversity of nature, and to hisunderstanding that our knowledge of nature was far from full, rough reflection. He was convinced that nature dictated knowledge to us, and that it was necessary to start in cognition from an analysis of reality. (Gribanov 181). Lobachevsky’s position was that several lines parallel to a given straight line can be drawn through a point. For him, space was inconceivable without physical bodies. (Gribanov 182). Bernhard Riemann discovered that it is possible, if one tinkers a bit with the first four postulates, to develop another type of non-Euclidean geometry on the basis of a postulate that denies the existence of parallels altogether. He thus worked out a “no parallels” non-Euclidean geometry (Salmon 6), while Bolyai and Lobachevesky worked out a “many parallels” non- Euclidean geometry (Salmon 6). 304 However, Riemann confirmed Lobachevsky’s idea of the possibility of there being properties of space different from Euclidean ones. He created a spherical geometry that defined the geometrical properties of a spherical surface. Like Lobachevsky, Riemann pointed to the connection of spatial characteristics with the physical properties of natural objects. He assumed that the space between bodies was filled with a substance that could be represented as ‘a physical space the points of which move in geometrical space’ (quoted in Gribanov182). The structure of space in non- Euclidean geometry is curved. This is why the space-time continuum of the general theory of relativity is not a Euclidean continuum (Einstein, Relativity 93). The connection of geometry to philosophy here centers on the concept of space, the thematic cause of our analysis here, with its kindred concept of time. The problem surrounding time are whether time is absolute or relative; whether time will end; what the origin of time is; whether two events can happen at same time or not, that is, the problems of simultaneity and succession; whether time can keep existing after motion would have ended; whether time is separate and separable from space; whether time is objective or relative, etc. With regard to space, some of the issues for reflective determination are: whether space is finite or infinite, flat or curved; whether space has content or is empty; whether space exists independently of matter or not, etc. The problem of space and time remain philosophically and scientifically thematic.

Summa Philosophica

CHAPTER SIX

ON THE ONTOLOGY OF THE MIND

Raymond N.Osei Introduction Humans are quite familiar with their experiences, their thoughts, their desires, their fears and hopes, agonies and aspirations. These are commonly referred to as mental states; and one’s possession of these states or anyone of them is evidence that one is possessed of a mind. The question, however, arises regarding the real nature of the mind, and the medium in which these mental states or processes occur. Another question relates to the possibility of post-mortem existence of the mind. Where does the mind come from, if it is not part of the body, and where does it go from here? A further complication worthy considering concerns the status of artificial intelligence. Are purely physical systems such as computers, capable of some of the experiences listed above? Can computers think? These are the questions that this chapter tries to explicate in detail. Central to the problematic of the mind is that the (concept) word ‘mind’ does not seem to have an obvious referent. As a substantive noun ‘mind’ should designate an object; it should point to an object in the world or point to a state of affairs. But when you try to point to its designatum you end up with a brain, which is not quite what we traditionally mean by ‘mind’. The difficulty has been complicated by the traditional construal of the mind as some immaterial principle in the body that is responsible for self- actuation in a living thing. Thus the mind and the soul were indistinguishable. This conflation of mind and soul goes back to the Presocratics and was officially endorsed in Plato’s works – Meno, Phaedo, Republic, etc. It is equally evident in Aristotle’s De Anima, as well as in Rene Descartes, as we shall see shortly. In contemporary Western discourse the mind has come to displace the soul since the latter’s designatum has become an empty shell (as naturalist philosophers would say). Mind now is the seat of consciousness. The word has come to designate consciousness or the power (Aristotle’s Dunamis) of consciousness (experience, intelligence, etc.). But consciousness is always a subject’s (somebody’s) consciousness. It is subjective. How does a state that is inherently subjective enjoy public criteria of reference: viz. how does the term mind become a meaningful concept for us when consciousness is inherently subjective? That is part of the problem raised by Wittgenstein (1953) in

Summa Philosophica

The Philosophical Investigations and which PF Strawson (1958) tried to resolve in ‘Persons’.

Historical background Since Plato the idea that mind and body were two distinct entities has developed firm roots in philosophy. In the Phaedo, for example, Plato canvassed the view that mind and body were separate because each had a distinct sphere of operation: the mind dealing with reasoning and understanding, the body dealing with our sensations and passions. It was central to Plato’s thought that the mind could better accomplish its proper function, i.e., the quest for knowledge of truth, without the assistance of the body (Phaedo 65-6; Republic 510-11). Indeed, for Plato, the body, far from facilitating the operations of the mind, is an obstacle frustrating the mind at every turn. It is from these considerations that Plato regarded the body as a prison of the mind from which it seeks release (Phaedo 64; Republic 611- 12). Hence his plea to philosophers (i.e. seekers of truth) to practise death; viz., to free their minds from the distractions occasioned by the needs of the body, in order to have a successful enterprise (Phaedo 65). Yet, despite the sharp distinction Plato drew between mind and body in the Phaedo, when he made a detailed analysis of the mind in Republic IV, he strongly promoted the idea that it was not only the exercise of our intellect but also the operation of our passions that belonged to the sphere of the mind. According to the tripartite conception, our desires for food and drink and cravings for glory and revulsion against disgrace, all occur in the medium of the mind. We are, none the less, reminded there that the pre- eminent faculty of the mind is reasoning. For it is in the cultivation of the faculty of reason that our soul could attain salvation and true happiness. The significance of Plato’s thesis in relation to the current debates of the mind is that, broadly speaking, he seemed to have entertained the widely held belief that our bodily desires, emotions and sense-experiences are realised in the mind; at the same time he seemed to be insisting that the proper function of the mind is the contemplation of the forms. The faculty of reason, he urged, could achieve this goal, only if it parted company with the other two faculties: the appetitive and the spirited. Clearly, for Plato, the mind is of a kind totally divorced from the nature of the body and survives the body (Phaedo 79-80), yet the mind, more often than not, carries with it to the afterlife the emotions and desires characteristic of earthly existence (Phaedrus). In a similar vein, Aristotle in De Anima espoused a broad conception of the mind that included our bodily desires and sensations together with our emotions and quest for knowledge. He thus regards

Summa Philosophica passion, gentleness, fear, pity, confidence, joy, loving and hating as affections of the soul; but these affections, he noted, also involve the body (De An. i.1). In support of this remark he observes that, whilst the natural scientist gives a material definition of anger (viz., as the boiling blood and hot stuff around the heart), the dialectician offers a formal definition (viz., as the desire for retaliation or something of the sort). It would thus be improper to say that the soul pities, learns, or thinks, but to say rightly that man does these with his soul (De An. 1.4). The moral is that man, as a composite of body and soul, who is so able to carry out these activities on account of that union of body and soul. The same applies to the faculty of sense-perception. In De Anima III.4 Aristotle tells us that the faculty of sense-perception is not independent of the body. Even so, he, at the same time, urges the view that all the other faculties of the mind perish with the body, with the notable exception of the active reasoning element because the intellect is distinct and unmixed with the body (De An. III.4-5). For Aristotle, then, that part of the soul known as the active reason, or the intellect, that alone is distinct from and operates independently of the body; and it is this part that survives the destruction of the body (De An. I.4 & III.5). There is thus clear evidence that traditionally sense-experience and emotional states have been construed as events in or states of the mind, together with the intellect. The tension that has characterised this construal of the mind is the temptation, amongst these very thinkers who espouse this broad conception of the mind, to regard the operation of the faculty of reason, to the exclusion of the senses and the passions, as the bona fide function of the mind. It is perhaps in an effort to rid the traditional view of this tension that Thomas Aquinas and other Christian thinkers drove a sharp wedge between the faculty of reason and the faculty of sense. In Summa Theologica (Ia.54, 5), Aquinas admonished us to ‘distinguish in the human soul between the powers that function in and through organs of the body, and which in fact therefore are activities of various parts of the body (sight of the eye, hearing of the ear, and so forth), and other powers that do not function in and through a bodily organ. Amongst the latter powers are intelligence and will. For Aquinas then the intellect and sense constitute the boundary between mind and body. Accordingly, judging, willing and understanding are the functions of the mind, properly so called, in contrast to feelings of pains, joys and sorrows and experiences of touch, taste, smell, and sound, which belong to the operations of the body. This cleavage that Aquinas sought to create did have its own problems: one of which was how to account for the moods of the angels and of the disembodied souls. For if the angels did not have

Summa Philosophica bodies then they could not share in those psychological states that are usually associated with the body (Sum. Theo. Ia 77 &82). Aquinas was thus forced to develop an elaborate theory in order to account for the joys of the good angels and the sufferings of the evil ones within the realm of their intellect or the will. Rene Descartes was among the later thinkers who rejected the idea of splitting the powers of our psychical endowment between the body and the mind. But he also went a step further by insisting that all so called bodily passions, insofar as they belong to the experiential, occur in the mind – in the same sense as the operations of our intellect and will are said to occur in the mind. Thus in the opening lines of Meditation III he reiterates the one proposition that survives his dubito argument: ‘I am a thing which thinks, that is to say, which doubts, affirms, denies, knows a few things, is ignorant of many, which loves, hates, wills, does not will, which also imagines, and which perceives.’ For the sceptic, who might think that the modes of thought outlined here do not include sensations of pain and pleasure, should be reminded of the reply Descartes sent to his contemporary, Mersenne, who accused him of having a narrow construal of thought. In his letter to Mersenne (cited by Anthony Kenny) Descartes explains: ‘for willing, understanding, imagining, and feeling are simply different ways of thinking, which all belong to the soul.’ There is sufficient textual evidence to the effect that Descartes consistently construed thought to embrace all forms of mental experience. This is clearly borne out in Meditation II where he first attempted to define the first person. He made clear there that thinking embraced doubting, perceiving, affirming, denying, willing, imagining, and feeling. So in Meditation VI when discussing the relationship between mind and body he reminds us once again that the faculties of feeling and perceiving are within the mind. In short, for Descartes mental experience covers both sensory experience as much as it includes reasoning, understanding and imagination. Of interest to our discussion is the nature of the relationship that Descartes sought to draw between mind and body. To be sure, Descartes inherited from his predecessors the doctrine that soul and body were two distinct entities. His aim then was not to challenge the dual nature of man but to reinforce the arguments for the dualist thesis. As a matter of fact, the notion of dualism which have been using so far, and espoused by Descartes, is known as ‘substance dualism’. This is the doctrine that the universe is composed of two distinct kinds of substances: the universe is composed of two distinct kinds of substances: the spiritual substance and the material substance. A distinguishing feature of Cartesian dualism is that ontologically both mind and matter have

Summa Philosophica equal status. Furthermore, it is part of this thesis that, as a matter of fact, spirit and matter interacts even though that interaction is not necessary and so remains a mystery.

A less radical version of dualism is dubbed ‘property dualism’. As the name suggests, this doctrine concedes that the universe is composed of one fundamental entity, and that this entity possesses two distinct kinds of properties, one being physical and the other being mental. This idea is founded on the observation that the mind has a special set of properties possessed by no other kind of physical object. Our beliefs, thoughts, sense-experiences, desires and emotions, etc, are held by this theory to constitute the special properties of the mental that are non-physical. This claim invites the questions, what constitutes a physical property? Descartes suggests that geometrical properties like: extension, volume, shape and size are the best examples of physical properties. But modern day physical theorists, while accepting that these are, indeed, physical properties, would urge that they are perhaps not the most crucial qualities of matter. The above suggests Descartes’ arguments in support of dualism, which were, in the main, three: 1) the argument from dubito, 2) the epistemological argument, and 3) the incompatibility of mental and physical properties. Descartes intended to use the dubito argument to flesh out unassailable truths that would serve as the foundation of our understanding of the universe. Thus he says in Discourse IV, ‘... as I wanted to concentrate solely on the search for truth. I thought I ought to ... reject as being absolutely false everything in which I could suppose the slightest reason for doubt, in order to see if there did not remain after that anything in my belief which was entirely indubitable. Accordingly Descartes rejects as false the ideas occasioned by sense perception, our theories of mathematics and science, and belief in god. In short, consistent with his journey on the sceptical road, he subjects to doubt all the commonly held beliefs – including the belief that he who doubts has a body. The outcome of the sceptical argument is one indubitable truth, namely, that ‘I who thought thus must be something ....’ As doubting presupposes thinking, Descartes felt that he had discovered a basic truth in the proposition, ‘I think, therefore I am.’ This proposition, he believed, could constitute the first principle of his philosophy. It is arguable whether you could truly deduce the existence of a person from an event, viz. thinking. But going along with Descartes for the present, our concern is to determine all the attributes that could be justifiably conferred on the thinking thing. It is first established that ‘I was a substance, of which the whole essence or nature

Summa Philosophica consists in thinking, and which, in order to exist, needs no place and depends on no material thing.’ As noted earlier, for Descartes, thinking embraced every kind of sensory experience as well as reasoning and imagination. Thus the essence of the person is the mind: in his own words, ‘... this “I”, that is to say, the mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, and even that it is easier to know than the body, and moreover, if the body were not, it would not cease to be all that it is. Going by the sceptical procedure, Descartes can doubt that he has a body but cannot doubt that he exists: for doubting his existence would render his doubting an impossibility. It follows that the body is not essential to his nature as a thinking thing (Osei, 2006: 10-14). The moral from the dubito argument is that ‘I’, qua thinking subject, am conceptually distinct from our construal of man as a composite of mind and body. That is to say, it is logically possible for the mind to engage in any form of mental act independently of the body. One plank of dualism then is the claim that the essence of a person is to doubt, affirm, deny, understand, will, imagine and feel, and that these mental acts and the contents of one’s consciousness would be the same whether one had a body or not. There is, however, a problem about sensory experience. Descartes elsewhere concedes that, though perceptual knowledge is a mental state, it is difficult to conceive how perception could occur without the body. A second claim of Descartes, as shown in the above quotation, is that it is easier to know one’s conscious state than to know that one has a body. It has been observed that Descartes’ crucial legacy to philosophy is the claim that knowledge of the self, as a conscious being, is epistemologically prior to knowledge of the external world. The argument underpinning this claim is that it can be more certain of my internal experiences than to suppose that these experiences are related to objects (including my body) that lie outside of these experiences. It is plain that this argument is a corollary of the skeptical argument. For it still a logical possibility that I might be under the illusion that I am seeing a wax, when in fact there is no wax. But this misperception does not vitiate the fact that I am having a mental experience. This explains why knowledge of my mental (i.e., internal) episodes is firmer than knowledge of external events and objects.

It seems to follow than that I have direct and certain knowledge about my internal experience; in contrast, I do not have such a direct epistemic access to the world external to my experience. This

Summa Philosophica epistemological divide is then used to ground the ontological ground between internal and external entities (Malcolm 1971, p.5). The third Cartesian argument crucial for the sustenance of dualism is the alleged incompatibility of mental and physical properties. Descartes thought that the fundamental difference between mind and body lay in the fact that we conceive mind as a thinking and non-external thing and body as an extended non-thinking thing. Other key properties of matter outlined in Meditation III include location, figure, and spatial movement. These properties in addition to extension are held to be exclusive to matter. One property arising from the extended nature of matter which, Descartes believed, sets mind apart most distinctly, is that matter is divisible. In contrast we are told that there is unity in consciousness. To this (divisibility of matter) might be added the age old belief that matter is inert, i.e., it is not capable of self-motion. In Meditation II Descartes observes, ‘For as to having in itself the power to move, to feel and to think, I did not believe in anyway, that these advantages might be attributed to corporeal nature’ (p.104). It may well be that matter as such is not capable of sensation or capable of thought, but we are now pretty certain that matter ii not inert. In reality each atomic unit of matter contains within it a huge reserve of quantifiable active force-as the hydrogen atom clearly demonstrates. There are, however, three properties that Descartes recognises mind shares with matter, namely: substance, duration and number. Substance, following Aristotle, means just anything that is capable of independent existence. And, if Descartes’ analysis of mind is correct then consciousness could exist independently of the body. So there is no rational ground for denying the status of substance to the mind. Again, as experiences occur in time, or subsist through time, the mental is clearly situated in time. Finally, since we have different kinds of experiences at different times, it is recognised that there are countable (i.e. numerable) mental episodes (Meditations III, 122-3).

The Mentalist (Idealist) thesis and the Mind-Body problem One line of approach that has sprung from the Cartesian tradition is the theory that there is one basic entity and that entity is wholly mental: this is the doctrine of mentalistic realism canvassed by contemporary non-materialist philosophers, such as, John Foster and TLS Sprigge.

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Berkeleyan Idealism Historically George Berkeley has been credited with the best and most consistent argument for the case of idealism. It will thus be instructive to start from him. Berkeley, in writing The Principles of Human Knowledge, it is generally recognised, was inspired by two main motives: 1) to demolish the Lockean theory of causal realism, which offered a mechanistic account for the popular belief in external physical reality, and 2) to espouse the doctrine that it is only ideas and the spirits that have these ideas, that are the true constituents of the universe. Accordingly, the first part of Principles consists of a critique of John Locke’s causal theory of matter. Thus Berkeley writes: ‘But, though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by Sense or by Reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This the Materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by Reason inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connection betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though there were no bodies existing without resembling them. Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same order we see them in at present, without their concurrence’ (Principles XVIII) That there exist only minds and their ideas has earlier been asserted emphatically in Principles III. In his words: ‘as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their esseis percipi, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.’ Clearly, for Berkeley, there is no question about the nature of the mind. Since the mind cannot be the idea it

Summa Philosophica has to be the substance in which mental events and states as well as ideas inhere. The mind is therefore pre-eminently an immaterial substance. From our discussion of Berkeley we have heard that: The world is wholly constituted of mind (a non-physical active substance, also called ‘the self’) and its ideas (commonly construed as physical objects); this mind figures in experience as perception and thought, and the ideas as the objects of perception and thought. (This is Berkeley’s thesis). In Berkeley the fundamental postulate is the self: it is the subject of sense-experience and the originator of thought and the operation of the will. Accordingly, the objects of sense-experience and thought, their qualities and relations, exists in the self. This self, as the seat of volition, has causal power. Hume, for his part, denies the notion of the self altogether and with it the concept of causal agency in Berkeley. In his view, the constraints of empiricism forbid him from entertaining such notions because they do not figure directly in sense-experience and they cannot be deduced either from it. Again, though Hume seems to recognise that the notion of mental act has some utility in his system, he did not accord it the same status as he endowed impressions and ideas. Finally, what makes these different positions all forms of idealism is their commitment to the view that what exists must either be definable by reference to what we are aware of in perception or introspection or be capable of being constructed from these by the exercise of our imagination and reason. Consequently, the physical world, for idealism, is something that exists in the mind, as objects of perception: its being is its being perceived. This contrasts with physical realism (or, in a word, physicalism) which takes the physical world to be logically independent of the human mind and metaphysically fundamental. Thus idealism, in essence, adopts a reductionist view with respect to the physical world. This is the same as saying that, though physical concepts are meaningful in their own right, what these concepts refer to exist in experience or are the logical constructions from experience. This distinction between idealism and physicalism is going to play a crucial role in our discussion of the mind- body problem.

The Mind-Body Problem The nub of the mind-body problem could be described roughly thus:We are aware of some intrinsic properties of the mental;We are not aware o the intrinsic properties of the physical;This gap in our knowledge is the cause of our bafflement in our attempts to account for the relationship between the mental and the physical;This bafflement, notwithstanding, a

Summa Philosophica common cord that runs through mainstream dualism and physicalism is a strong intuition that the mental and the physical are causally related. The question that arises is this: Given that our knowledge of reality is incomplete, for what reasons and on what evidence must we be persuaded by one theory rather than another as offering the best account of reality? It is in this perspective that I will try to show below that a version of materialism offers us perhaps the most coherent explanation of the relationship of the mental and the physical. There is the need here to clarify two terminologies, namely, ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’, vis-à-vis Feigl and Maxwell’s treatment of the physical. Historically ‘physicalism’ and materialism’ have been used indifferently to refer to a conceptual system that describes reality in terms of the principles and laws of physics (Armstrong 1968). As a metaphysical theory physicalism (materialism) assists that the fundamental stuff of nature is constituted of physical properties. Specifically, ‘physicalism’ in its classical sense is the theory that there is one fundamental reality, and that this reality is what the theory, principles and laws of physicals are all about. This reality, physicalism holds, occupies space-time and is constituted ultimately by: the properties and relations, actions and interactions of particles, fields and energies-that is, the basic entities that physics treats. Physicalism thus holds that all entities, properties, relations and facts are those which figure in the framework of theoretical physics and other related sciences. Thus given physicalism, if there are entities such as phenomenal qualities of experience then these qualities ought to be captured in terms and concepts of physics. Materialism is construed as the theory that asserts that all entities, properties, relations and events (including experience and phenomenal qualities of experience) that figure in the spatio-temporal realm are constituted of material principles and the laws that govern those principles. Thus materialism, in its broad construal, encapsulates mental and physical predicates. It asserts that all events describable in mentalistic terms as well as those describable in physicalistic terms are both material events. Materialism can be taken as a broader concept, as Lockwood explains, ‘because there may be more to matter than can be captured in the language of physics, more than any description couched purely in the language of physics is capable of conveying (Lockwood 1989.20).

Mentalism and the Mind-Body Problem To round off this discussion we should consider whether any coherent idealist theory can deliver a plausible solution to the mind/body problem. Now the version of idealism, that we have discussed at length

Summa Philosophica and, which reflects the broad views of Berkeley and Sprigge is a mentalist doctrine. Mentalism asserts that ultimate reality is wholly mental, that is, the mental is ontologically primitive and/or logically basic. That is to say, ultimate reality is confined to a framework of time, minds and mind- governing laws. Now, the possibility that the physical realm, while ontologically and factually derivate, is conceptually autonomous, so that physical statements cannot, without loss of meaning, be reformulated in non-physical terms. It leaves open the possibility that physical facts, though logically sustained by non-physical facts cannot adequately be expressed except by means of an explicitly physical vocabulary and an ‘immaterial- spirit substance’, or immaterial stuff; but the question of whether this stuff is itself intrinsically and wholly mental in nature is left obscure. In the Cartesian tradition, we have, on the one hand, non-self-subsistent ideas or experiences. These ideas are conceived of as dependent on minds, which, on the other hand, are ontically distinct from ideas, these minds can presumably continue to exist when there are no ideas or experiences occurring. But the paradigm cases of mental goings-on in the classical debate are just occurrent mentally contentful processes, a stream of ideas, of experiences: thought, willings deciding, dreaming, etc. It is our experience of these intrinsically mentally contenful things that gives positive content to our ideas of what the mental is. So if we suppose that there is any other kind of mental thing, namely, immaterial stuff, we have to grant that there is a sense in which we know nothing about its nature, apart from the fact that it is, somehow, the source or ground or basis of the familiar occurrent mental goings-on. The alternative to the classical view is to construe the mind as identical with (ontically indistinguishable from) the stream of ideas themselves. But even in the case of ‘pure process idealism’ or strict idealism, which might be associated with Hume, it is left unclear whether the stream of consciousness is itself some stuff or that it is a pure process, which by definition would be insubstantial. Besides the problem of determining what we are to take the substantiality of the mind to be in pure process idealism, that a person or a mind can exist even if there is presently no mental activity going on. And if a mind is nothing other than its ideas, then pure process idealism will have to contend with as many minds as there are ideas or for the theory. The other option open to it is to construe the mind as the unifying principle of the ideas, the bond that connects one strand of ideas to other strands and thus delivers a coherent pattern of experience. But the question that comes back to haunt the theory is whether this unifying principle is itself an idea of which we are distinctly aware, or not. And the answer would have to be in the negative because

Summa Philosophica this putatively unifying principle is not self manifest. Accordingly, pure process idealism is constrained to concede the unpalatable: that there are as many minds as there are ideas (in a manner of speaking). Suppose there is a mentalist theory that is able to give a positive account of the nature of the mind and its relationship with its ideas, and thereby able to deliver a coherent account of the concept of mental. The question arises whether such a coherent mentalist theory would be interestingly distinct from a materialist theory. For from the idealist perspective the objection is ground of experiential or conscious mental occurrences. The force of this objection is that we have no real idea of how matter, as we ordinarily conceive it in physics, can be the basis of, or realise, or be, experience. But this objection is valid only if we concede the dubious assumption that the nature of the material stuff is well known, or that current physics has been able to deliver the essential property of matter. For all we know matter may very well have properties of which we have no idea; properties that might, in truth, be the basis of, or realise, or constitute, experiential occurrences. The danger for the mentalist theory is that, short of subscribing to pure process idealism with all its attendant problems, it is itself incapable of giving any positive account of the essential property of the mind. But in postulating a mind whose essential nature is unknown the theory becomes vulnerable to the materialist challenge that it has no good reason to suppose that the essential nature of the mind might not be matter after all. Thus mentalism is either internally incoherent, if it reckons that the mind is ontically distinct from its ideas, or postulate as many minds as there are ideas. Now, we should remind ourselves that the motivation for a mentalist thesis is generally driven by the quest for a coherent account of the mind that would effectively resolve the mind/body problem. Mentalism, we would recall, is the thesis that all entities are wholly mental. There is therefore no other entity and so there is no body. But if there is no body, then, there is no mind/body problem. The conclusion is as trivially obvious as any proposition can be, granted that there is no matter. So far as our brief study of the idealist theories shows, the proposition that there exists extra-mental material thing has not been refuted. Matter is as deeply anchored in experiences as are mental properties. It will therefore be counterintuitive to reduce one to the other. In short, in an effort to reduce material properties to components of experience, and thus construe them as mental entities, idealists wish to succeed where the physicalists failed. It is our conviction that the mentalists in their effort to achieve their aim are confronted with no less difficulties as the physicalists. The mind/body

Summa Philosophica problem cannot be wished away by decreeing matter out of the universe or reducing it to a mere component, a baggage, of experience.

The Materialist theses: Behaviourism Scientific/methodological Behaviourism Behaviourism, as a philosophical theory of the mind sprang from psychology. Behaviourism in psychology is a method for studying human beings. The motivation for the postulation of a causal analysis of the mind sprang from behaviourism. For instance, B.F. Skinner, the well known American psychologist, canvassed the view that the mind is a thing, be it a material thing or a spiritual thing. It asserts that a ‘mental’ description of Socrates is not a description of what some substantive part of a Socrates- his mind-is like. Rather, such descriptions tell us of Socrates’ behaviour. Thus a behaviourist, such as Skinner, believed that they could attempt to predict and control human behaviour through the study of its environmental causes. On this view, the mind is not a thing related to the body; the relation of mind to the body is the relation of activity to agent. Mental terms get their meaning by reference to behaviour and its causes. Behaviourists thus tend to be sceptical about the reality of consciousness. This attitude shows itself in the manner they account for bodily sensations (pain, itches, etc.), visual experiences and intelligence. Pains, as for afterimages, are not regarded as mental objects in their own right. Rather, these are construed as bodily reactions (responses) to stimuli. The person is not so much in pain as that she is exhibiting typical pain-behaviour; similarly she is not so much experiencing an afterimage, as that she is behaving in a way typical of people who are experiencing an afterimage. In both cases the behaviour constitutes the occurrence of the mental event. Since mental objects have no place in behaviourism, descriptions of humans referring to pains and afterimages are not relational descriptions linking us to pains and afterimages: on the contrary, these are complex descriptions of our physical conditions- they refer to bodily events or processes, rather than relating one object to another. This account is applied to all mental states, events, including thoughts, emotions, and intellect- the class of mental entities that are commonly taken as inner, non- physical objects. Thus to say, for example, that a person is intelligent is to say, among others, that she has a higher success rate in solving abstract and practical problems and that solutions come to her quicker and with less effort than the average person. In short, what it means to possess a mind is to exhibit appropriate responses to stimuli. There is no inner state that mentalist terms refer to other than bodily events or behaviour.

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Logical Behaviourism Logical behaviourism is, in a sense, an advanced form of scientific behaviourism. For logical behaviourism as it deals with the concept of dispositional properties. But perhaps the main distinction between the two forms of behaviourism view their theory pre-eminently as a methodological thesis for understanding human behaviour, logical behaviourists are primarily concerned with determining the status of mental concepts in our public language. Thus logical behaviourism is a linguistic thesis that tries to explicate, how it is possible for sentences that contain mental terms like: ‘thought’, ‘belief’, ‘perception’, ‘image’ or ‘memory’, to be translated into sentences about publicly observable behaviour. Logical behaviourism is a reductionist thesis at the level of concept or language. This form of reductionism is stronger than ontological reductionism, because conceptual reduction implies ontological reduction but is not implied by ontological reduction. Thus logical behaviourism is not only claiming that mental events, like perceiving, thinking, believing, suffering, enjoying, etc., refer to behaving or else having a certain disposition to behave, but is further claiming that mental concepts have no distinctive meaning independently of the terms which we use in describing behaviour. Thus the question whether a person is intelligent or not can be decomposed into the question whether a person can solve differential equations with ease, or can understand a joke better than the average person, etc. on this showing ‘intelligent’ becomes a blanket term for a range of publicly observable performances that endow it with meaning. Besides, behaviourism, as remarked earlier, does not recognise an inner state that grounds the dispositions they employ to explain the triggering of human behaviour. Ryle, for instance, would say that attributing a certain conditional sentences are true of her (e.g., if you sit on a needle then youwill shout in pain). There is no reference here to the inner ground of the disposition. Thus mental descriptions derive their meaning by reference to what a person does or can do. For it is a dogma of logical behaviourism that for any term be meaningful there must be a public criterion for confirming or disconfirming its referent. Accordingly, if mental terms have meaningful content they must advert to facts or events that are publicly verifiable. Furthermore, for behaviourism, since there are no public criteria upon which the alleged inner states have no meaning. The upshot is that all meaningful mental descriptions can be reduced to descriptions of psychological behaviour, that is, publicly observable fact/event. Behaviourism has two enviable advantages over its rival theories: first, it demystifies the meaning of the term, mind; second, it dissolves ‘the

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Summa Philosophica problem of other minds’. In the first instance, the theory stipulates that mind does not lie behind behaviour, like some causal agent to an event (a ghost in the machine); rather, the mind is in the behaviour. It attacks common opinion for referring to behaviour as the manifestation of the mental state. Common option is mistaken in supposing that there are such ontically distinct ‘inner’ entities as mental events, processes, or states that play a causal role in producing behaviour. The postulation of inner states, the behaviourists contends has no basis in reality because they are not observable or verifiable: for the only observable referents of mental concepts is just the behaviour. But behaviour cannot be a cause of itself:for nothing is a cause of itself. So a mental event, qua behaviour, cannot be a cause itself. Hence a causal analysis of the mental is false. Moreover, in conformity with the conditions under which all words derive their meaning, there ought to be public criteria from which mental descriptions obtain, then, so claim the behaviourists, they do not, and cannot, refer to private events but to tendencies for there to be public and physical events. In the second instance, if mental descriptions do not advert to events that are antecedent to behaviour or descriptions to behave, but just the descriptions of the behaviour, or behavioural patterns-the kind of events or processes that occur in the public domain- then mental episodes are as publicly observable as are other physical episodes. Hence the problem of other minds vanishes once it is recognised that mental episodes belong to the public domain. Before we show what a version of materialism offers us and the physical; let us, for the moment, cast a critical glimpse at the theory of supervenience and its tendency towards physicalism.

The Theory of Supervenience

In the philosophy of mind the theory of supervenience has been involved to articulate a broadly physicalist position, or a naturalist interpretation of the mind, without the commitment to the reduction of mental phenomena to the basic entities recognizable in physics. That is, in contrast to the claim of some mainstream identify theorist that every mental state is identical with some brain state, supervenience theorists hold that mental states are, at lease, logically antonomous of brains states. There are two non-reductive materialist theories that give some recognition to the logical independence and effects: they are ‘supervenience’ and ‘epiphenomenalism’. These theories acknowledge thought, the ontological dependence of conscious states on brain states and a causal connection between brain states and mental (conscious) states. Yet, at the same time,

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Summa Philosophica they (more precisely: some supervenience theorists and the epiphenominalists) recognise that the phenomenology of the mental state is not reducible to its putative cause or effects. The theory of supervenience explicates the relationship between mind and body. The supervenience thesis in its materialist formulation was first introduced into the philosophy of mind by Donald Davidson in his articles, ‘Mental Events’ (1970). He wrote: Although the position I describe denies there are psychophysical laws, it is consistent with the view that mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events exactly alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot after in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect. Dependence or supervenience of this mind does not entail reducibility through law or definition.

Two remarks about Davidson’s thesis are in order. First, Davidson is firmly rejecting the identity or nomic equivalence of mental properties with physical properties. That is to say, a broadly materialist view of the mind should not require the ‘reducibility’ of mental properties to physical properties in order to account for the inter-level match between mental descriptions vis-à-vis physical descriptions. The notion of reducibility at play here is just as it is typically applied in explaining macro physical properties, like heat, in terms of their physical basic entities, live molecular kinetic energy. The reduction of heat to molecular kinetic energy involves outright identities between higher-order property type and lower- order property type. The inter-level dependency relations, that obtain between the macro and micro principles and laws is posited by physics. There is a purely physical explanation of how heat is generated by the micro theoretical entities posited by physics are held to be coherent within the magnitudes of physics. On this view the identity between heat and molecular kinetic energy does not only exemplify a nomic relation, because it is possible to vie a complete descriptive account of heat in micro physical seems without a remainder. This contrasts with putative inter-level relations that G.E. Moore believes to hold between moral descriptions and physical descriptions. In the latter case a purely physical descriptions is thought not to capture the relevant moral property that supervenes on it: the reason from Moore’s perspective is that moral properties and facts are not natural properties. For instance, Moore thinks that a proposition of the form “Anything that possesses the natural property N (say, the inclination to

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Summa Philosophica bring succor to one in distress) is to possess the property of intrinsic goodness’ expresses synthetic necessary truth. However, this synthetic necessary connection instantiated by the proposition is metaphysically rock bottom in that it is not explainable by any other facts. J.L. Mackie’s remarks illustrate the peculiar nature o Moorean necessitation connection between natural and moral facts. He writes:

What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty – say causing pain just for fun – and the moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot be entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’: It is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is dignified by this ‘because’? (Mackie 1977:44).

Thus the supervenience relation that is held to obtain between physical facts and moral facts is not of the order of logical entailment such that it warrants the deduction of moral facts from an account of physical facts, and vice versa. Now, if Davidson is following Moore in designating the inter-level relation between mental properties and physical properties as a relation of supervenience for the reason that the nature of the tie between the physical and metal phenomena is not susceptible to the sort of reductionist explanation that is intelligible in the framework of a physical theory, then materialists who are attracted to Davidson’s view are faced with the problem of given an account of supervenience that is intelligible in some materialist terms – in terms that does not render the connection between the two kinds of phenomena mysterious.

Second, Davidson is evidently committed to the view that a broadly respectable materialist theory need only claim that physical facts and physical properties are the ontically basic ones. We have thus a dependency relation of mental phenomena on the basic physical facts. Now if physical properties and physical facts are metaphysically all that there are, and yet mental properties and mental facts are not reducible5 to the physical basic facts, then we are faced with the problem of placing mental properties in the realm of physical things. Davidson construes mental properties as higher-order properties that supervene upon the physical properties. What we should like to determine is whether a relation

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Summa Philosophica of supervenience can offer a satisfactory explication of the tie between mind and matter.

Since Davidson’s seminal paper on supervenience, other materialistically inclined philosophers have developed the thesis further in efforts to deal with potential objections arising from the problem sketched above. Amongst those who have devoted much thought to the theory and have taken head on the difficulties associated with it are Terence Horgan and Jaegwon Kim (Horgan 1978;1984;1993; Kim 1978;1984). Of interest to our discussion is the determination of the potential contribution of supervenience toward a plausible materialist theory of the mind. To assist out assessment of the theory, let us restate the supervenience thesis in its materialist form. Supervenience proceeds from the following claims.

It is impossible for two events (objects, states) to be identical in all their physical characteristics and to differ in their mental characteristics. Two systems cannot differ in their mental characteristics without differing in their physical characteristics. As we saw from Davidson’s formulation of the thesis, supervenience is a dependency relation of mental states (event, properties) on physical states (event, properties). From the materialist point of view, the facts of physics synchronically fix, or determine, all the facts. This sentiment is neatly captured in Terence Horgan’s succinct formulation: Any two physically possible worlds that are exactly alike physically are also exactly alike in all other respects (Horgan 1994:239). The metaphysical commitment of physicalism ensures that the basic constituents of the universe are physical properties (states, events). It follows from this commitment that any other property, state or object that exists must be realised in some physical property, state or event. Accordingly, if there are mental states – states that are themselves not describable in physicalist language terms – then, these mental states will require the presence of a physical state (or a combination of some physical states) as a precondition for their existence. However, the thesis in its present form does not mirror the ontological dependency of the mental (and other nonphysical higher–order properties) on the physical presupposed in the theory of psychophysical supervenience. For it is consistent with the thesis that any two mentally possible worlds that are exactly alike mentally are also exactly alike physically. The physical can ground the mental and the mental, it would seem, can equally ground the physical (Miller 1990:696). But this is contrary to the metaphysical commitment of materialism according to which the basic constituents of the universe are

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Summa Philosophica material properties.There are thus many assumptions on which the supervenience thesis is riding. Horgan, has catalogued these assumptions as inter-level constraints required to guarantee materialist metaphysics. They are as follows.

1. Compatibility with the causal explanatory adequacy of physics. Metaphysical naturalism includes the view that physics is causally and explanatorily complete, within its own domain; i.e., every fact or phenomenon describable in the language of physics is fully explainable (to the extent that it is explainable at all) entirely on the basis of facts and laws of physics itself. 2. Physical supervenience. Metaphysical naturalism also includes the view that the facts of physics synchronically fix, or determine all the facts. 3. Existence of physical causal mechanism. This constraints concerns causal explanations that cite properties from higher- level theories or explanatory frameworks. For any casual transaction where some higher level property F is cited as casually explaining the effect, there must be an underlying mechanism in virtue of which the transaction occurs – a mechanism involving a physical property (or a complex of physical properties) which, on the given occasion, physically realizes the property F. 4. Noncoincidentality of higher-level generalizations. In order for higher-level counterfactual relation patterns to have genuine causal/explanatory relevance to phenomena that exhibit higher- level properties, the higher-level generalizations that systematize those patterns must themselves be nonaccidental (Miller 1990:238-240). The first constraint throws up one of the key planks of physicalism: namely, the causal completeness of physics. According to it their physical antecedents in accordance with physical laws fix the chances of physical consequences. This means that if two systems are alike in all their physical characteristics: viz, share the same number of elemental properties and structure, then, they must have similar physical consequences. But that is not all. For implicit in the thesis is a commitment to a physicalist ontology according to which physical categories by themselves always suffice to fix the chances of all consequences without the help of nonphysical categories. It follows that any putative event (state or property), be it physical, mental, or what have you, that is deemed to arise from a physical antecedent must be physical in the sense that it must conform to the laws

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Summa Philosophica of physics. Suppose we have two physical systems, A and B, that are alike in both physical composition and structure, and A possesses a mental property F, then of necessity B possesses mental property F. Thus on the assumption that mental events supervene upon physical events, we would not need to look beyond the realm of the physical in order to identify a set of antecedents that determines the chances of the subsequent mental events. Therefore, a commitment to physical ontology precludes a postulation of mental categories that do not conform to the laws of physics. But a property (state, event) that is constrained by the laws of physics is by definition a physical entity. Many philosophers who subscribe to psychophysical supervenience generally construe the supervenience relation as exemplifying a metaphysical necessity rather than a conceptual necessity, in the sense of these terms that Kripke has made familiar. These theorists thus hold that the psychophysical supervenience relation that obtains is sustained by the laws of nature, and that there is a metaphysical necessity about the determination relation between the mental and the physical domains. Therefore, just as there are no possible worlds in which water is not H2O, there are not possible worlds in which ‘C- fibre’ activity is not associated with the feeling of pain. However, it should be noted that some philosophers subscribe to a weaker version of the doctrine.

The True Non-Reductive Materialism: Agnostic Materialism

In rejecting ontological physicalism what materialist credentials are open to a theorist who is committed to a materialist ontology? Recall that a physicalist holds that the universe is constituted of particles, fields and force (energy) and the laws that govern their behaviour. Physicalism individuates particulars by reference to their extrinsic properties, i.e., in terms of their functional relations to other particulars. Our principal objection to physicalism is that it does not take adequate notice of the integrity of experience. Experience is dissolved into something we-know- not-what except for its relationships to stimuli and responses. Thus Armstrong stipulates, ‘The concept of a mental state is the concept of that, whatever is may turn out to be, which is brought about in a man by certain stimuli and which in turn brings about certain responses’. Physicalism holds that there is nothing to experience except for its relational properties. Contrary to the physicalist precept according to which to have (say) a headache is to be disposed to exhibit a certain pattern of relations

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Summa Philosophica between stimuli and responses, we are being urged to consider other options for individuating mental events types, such as the way the headache type is felt by the subject that has it. The brand of materialism that is being canvassed as the alternative to the physicalist relational interpretation of mental events (states, properties) disengages the felt qualitative character of a given conscious mental type from its relational properties. It upholds that a headache type presents itself to the subject that has it, with a certain felt quality. It is in terms of its felt character that the subject picks out the headache type. This mode of individuating a headache type, as with all other occurrent experiences, is independent of the relation interpretation that physicalism puts on the conscious event type. This felt quality of the conscious event type does not figure in physicalism because physics has no conceptual tool to deal with the felt qualities. However, if we cannot say what role felt qualities play in the functional network of physical systems that experience headaches and exhibit headache behaviours, that failure is not evidence for the denial of the occurrence of felt qualities. Rather it could be argued that with a certain felt qualitative content, conscious mental events ought to be individuated primarily by the felt character peculiar to its event type.

References Aristotle. De Anima Aquinas, T. Summa Theologica. 1a 77;82 Armstrong, D.M. 1968/1993.A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge. ------. 1981. The Nature of Mind. Brighton, Sussex: Harvest Press. Berkeley, G.(1710). The Principles of Human Knowledge. In G.J.Warnock ed. 1962 George Berkeley. Glasgow: Collins/Fontana Descartes, R. Meditations on First Philosophy. In F.E.Sutcliffe tr/ed.1968.Rene Descartes. London: Penguin. Davidson, D. 1980. Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press Foster, J.(1982). The Case for Idealism. London:Routledge and Kegan Paul. Horgan, T. 1978. “Supervenience Bridge Laws”.In Philosophy of Science.45,2. ------. 1993. “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience”. In Mind.102.408 Kim, J. 1978. “Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables”.In American Philosophical Quarterly.15

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Lockwood, M. 1989. Mind, Brain and the Quantum. Oxford: Blackwell Mackie, J.L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin Malcolm, N. 1968.“The Conceivability of Mechanism”.In Philosophical Review. 77 Miller, R. 1990. “Supervenience is a Two-Way Street”. In Journal of Philosophy. 87 Plato. Phaedo ------. Republic Sprigge, T.L.S.(1983). The Vindication of Absolute Idealism. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press. Wittgenstein, L.(1953). Philosophical Investigations. London: Macmillan.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

MAN, GOD AND NATURE: THE CONCEPTUAL DOMAINS OF PHILOSOPHY

In this chapter, we argue that there are three basic concepts involved in philosophizing. In other words, when we philosophize, we most often philosophize on three basic concepts. These concepts are: Man, God and Nature.

MAN According to Boethius, “man is an individual substance of a rational nature”. This definition implies that a person must be a rational being, or rather, a rational substance. Secondly, it implies that a person has to be an individual substance. This means that a person has to be an individuated centre of consciousness. By implication, two or more individuals cannot constitute a person. A person has to be only one individual substance, one individuated centre of consciousness.

Features of Man (1) Rationality: Many philosophers have debated on whether man is a rational being or not. According to Aristotle a human being is a rational animal. Rationality distinguishes man from other animals. If man is rational and so, reasonable, then he is a moral being. (2) Morality: The human being is said to be a moral being because he or she is said to be subject to the moral law. This also implies that he or she is responsible for his or her actions. This indicates that morality presupposes freedom to choose the kind of action we do. (3) Freedom: No being whatsoever could be said to be bound by the moral code if he were not a free being. Many philosophers often ask whether man is free. If man is free he should be able to choose from alternatives. Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, sees freedom as the quintessence of man. (4) Sociality: The human person, that is, man in the generic sense, is born into the society and realizes his goals through his contact and interaction with his society. This entails that he relates with his society. The implication of this is that man is a social being. Thus, sociality is one of the attributes of man. Man possesses the social instinct, but he relates freely. When isolated, man is not self-sufficing, and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature. Human actions are said to morally right or wrong only within and in the

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Summa Philosophica context of interpersonal relationship in society. A morally right action is an action that has beneficial consequences on other people in society. (5) Individuality: Individuality is a property of man and his substance is peculiar to him alone. Each person is a distinct individual, individuated and separable from another. Every person is indivisible in himself, but divisible from another person. Individuality endows uniqueness to each and every human person.

NATURE OR THE UNIVERSE Another fundamental concept which philosophy concerns itself with is the concept of nature or the universe. The existential space into which man is born or where man sees himself is designated the universe, or the world, or the cosmos, or simply nature. Many philosophers have debated on the nature of this world.

Theories of the Universe: Teleology and Materialism Many theories have also been propounded by these philosophers about the nature of the universe. Among these, there are two fundamental theories of the universe, especially from the point of view of philosophy, viz: that the universe is teleological, and that the universe is materialistic.

(1) The Universe is Teleological Teleology is a philosophical belief that everything has a purpose. Regarding the universe, the belief is that the universe has a purpose; that it was not created in vain. It means that the universe has a purpose and everything is moving according to that purpose. It therefore means that reality is ordered and arranged with an end in view. The universe, by this belief, is the product of a careful design by a divine rational being. Aristotle affirmed that “Nature does nothing in vain”; that there is a purpose for everything in the universe. Every being in the universe is intended for a specific end, and is endowed with the intrinfic capacity to develop towards that goal. This belief in teleology overrules the idea of chance.

(2). The Universe is Materialistic and Mechanical According to this view the universe is a machine. Everything in the world is composed only of material elements. There is no soul or spirit, only matter. The human body is mechanistic. The materialists opposed to the teleologists in the sense that they try to explain reality in purely materialistic, mechanistic and atomistic perspectives. All that there is is matter. Materialism holds the view that matter is the only thing that exists. It

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Summa Philosophica is the direct opposite of idealism, which maintains that only ideas, or mind, or spirit exist. There are two forms of materialism, namely: Hard Materialism and Soft Materialism. Hard Materialism denies the existence of immaterial or spiritual realities and maintains that only matter exists. Soft Materialism admits the existence of immaterial realities but maintains that such realities are products or later developments of matter which remains the ultimate reality. In other words, if there are spiritual entities they are only products of matter. It is evident that philosophy originated as materialism, when the presocratic philosophers posited the question of what the material constitution of the world is. Most answers they gave also indicated materialism, from water, air, fire, to earth, neatly summed up as the four elements. Materialism continued to flourish in the atomic philosophies of Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus. Leucippus and Democritus came out to say that all that exist are atoms in space. Thus the universe is composed of atoms that are invisible and move in empty space. Epicurus was also an atomist who adopted the atomist metaphysics of Democritus with only a slight modification. He also said that everything that happens is due to the movement of atoms. After the demonstration of these atomists we had little about materialism until Thomas Hobbes emerged and described the human person as a machine. He conceived man as totally material and human actions as determined by the physical laws of nature. The idea of the spiritual soul is totally ruled out in Hobbles conception of man. All that exists, to Hobbes, is matter in motion, and this accounts for everything including human decisions and actions. Man’s decision to act or not to act in any given situation is due to natural forces operating in him in the forms of appetites and avertions. La Mettrie published the book Man, a Machine. Here, he reduced man to pure matter, and the human soul to material substance. He saw no essential difference between man and the animals other than the difference in the size and structure of their brains. They are both products of matter like every other thing in nature. Baron Paul Holbach also presents man as completely part of nature like other things in the world. The only reality that exists is matter in motion, and man is a product of it like other things in nature. Man’s mind, thought, decisions and actions are all products of matter in motion and are

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Summa Philosophica controlled by the laws of nature.There is nothing like human freedom or free will. We also have vestiges of materialism in Baruch Spinoza’s pantheistic philosophy and in dialectical materialism, associated with Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Vladmir Lenin. We shall discuss Spinoza’s materialism in chapter fourteen and dialectical materialism in chapter nineteen.

GOD Another category involved in philosophizing is the concept of God. Philosophers often concern themselves about the question of whether God exist and how his existence could be logically proved. They also wonder about the nature or the essence of God. St. Anselm attempted to demonstrate the existence of God ontologically, that is, via pure reasoning. St. Thomas Aquinas gave a five-way proof of God’s existence, relying on design, order and harmony in the universe. Since he deployed the design observeable in the universe, Aquinas’ version of proof of God’s existence is often referred to as the cosmological proof. Details of these proofs by St. Anselm and St. Thomas Aquinas shall be presented in the chapter on medieval philosophy under “St. Thomas Aquinas”.

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PART II

HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

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OVERTURE: ON THE MYTHICAL ERA AND THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY The mythical era was wholly superstitious and the general character of ancient philosophy was cosmological. Philosophy started with Ionian speculative cosmology. Before the beginning of philosophy in Ionia, natural happenings were associated with divinities and mythology. Everything was traceable to the superstitious belief in the pantheon of Greek gods, who were believed to inhabit Mt. Olympus. Natural events, such as earthquakes, eclipse, famine, illness were interpreted as consequences of anger of the gods. In this period the interpretation of every happening was based on Homer’s or Hesiod’s mythologies. It was during this period that the Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes all of Ionia in Miletus, parted company with the quotidian mythical explanation of reality, and began to tease out scientific and rational explanation to natural events. By their questioning of the likely fundamental material constitution of the world, they set themselves aside as sober men of grand rational ability. They asked: “Ex qua materia constituti mundi?” They asked a question of a cosmological bent and gave cosmological answers to the question. Philosophy and metaphysics in particular evolved as cosmology.The word, cosmology, was coined by Christian Wolff in 1730. The word, “cosmology”, is derived from the Greek “cosmologia”, “cosmos” meaning “order” and “logos” meaning “word”, “reason”, “study”. Cosmology then is the study of the universe. Though the use of the word “cosmology” is recent, the study of the universe has a long history involving philosophy and science. We may, therefore, have metaphysical (philosophical) cosmology as well as physical (scientific) cosmology. In this Summa Philosophica, the names, ‘philosophical cosmology’, ‘metaphysical cosmology’, ’cosmology’ are used with the same sense and so, interchangeably. Philosophy retains the name ‘cosmology’, partly, due to its priority in time and level of abstraction. Cosmology thus deals with the world as the totality of space, time and all phenomena. Philosophical cosmology seeks to draw intuitive conclusions about the nature of the universe, man, god and their relationships based on the extension of some set of presumed facts borrowed from spiritual experience.

Philosophical cosmology addresses questions about the universe which are beyond the scope of science. Philosophical (metaphysical) cosmology addresses questions such as: what is the origin of the universe?

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What is its first cause? Is its existence necessary? What are the ultimate material components of the universe? Does the universe have a purpose? What is the ultimate reason for the existence of the universe?

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CHAPTER EIGHT

PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY

Ex qua materia constituti mundi (out of what material is the world constituted?), the question that was put up by the PreSocratics and which set philosophy in being, was, as it were, a cosmological question. The implication of this is that philosophy began as a cosmology. To put it straight, ancient philosophy, in particular, the PreSocratic philosophy, was characterized by cosmological reasoning. Men were asserted with a sense of wonder and curiosity about the facts of life, birth, death, growth and decay generation and corruption, coming into being and passing away. They wondered about the natural order, about the moon, the stars, and the nature of things. They wondered about the process of change in things and inquired about what is permanent. The birthplace of philosophy was the seaport town of Miletus, located across the Aegean Sea from Athens, on the western shores of Ionia in Asia Minor, and for this reason the first philosophers – Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes-are called either Milesians or Ionians (Stumpf 3). Ionian cosmology, ipso facto, refers to the cosmological reasoning of Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes.

Thales of Miletus (c. 624-547 B.C.), father of philosophy, father of theoretical geometry, first man to predict the solar eclipse of May 28,585 BC., (Emiliani 554), first man to observe electric charges and to apply the word ‘electron’ to the charges, was a philosopher. He believed that all substances originated from water and that the Earth was a disc resting on water (Emiliani 554). Thales’ irrevocable verdict that all substances derived from water indicates that he was on the same track as modern physicist, who are still trying to find the “primordial” particle out of which all matter- energy is made (Emiliani 554). Thales’ kind of theoretical thinking set western civilization on its course.

Anaximader of Miletus (c. 610-546 B.C.), pupil of Thales, rejected water as the primordial substance and chose the “apeiron” (indefinite) instead. The “Apeiron” was the “indeterminate boundless”. Anaximander believed the Earth was at rest in space, kept there by a balance of “internal forces”, and that all planets were born fluid, but had been dried up by the sun. Indeed, during the formation of the solar system the sun blew the gases away from the inner planets and infact “dried them up” (Emiliani 555). Anaximander also believed that life originated in the sea and that land

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Summa Philosophica animals derived from marine animals that had been left stranded on the beach by retreating seas and had learned to breathe air. These animals then generated all later land life (Emiliani 555).

Anaximenes of Miletus (c. 588-525 B.C.) was a pupil of Anaximander. According to him, air, wind, clouds, water, soil, and stone are progressive condensation (by decreasing temperature) of a primordial gas that must be; therefore, air (Emiliani 555). Anaximenes also held that earthquakes were due to the solidification of an originally fluid Earth (Emiliani 555).

Pythagoras of Samos (c. 580-500 B.C.) Pythagoras, Greek philosopher of Samos, reasoned that quantitative relations constitute the essence of all things. In otherwords, Pythagoras argued that number is the basic substratum underlying everything. Abstract quantity underly all things in the universe. The universe is only explicable in numerical terms. In a word, number rules the universe. Pythagoras thus made mathematics of numbers the supreme and sublime science. In music, which Pythagoras valued greatly, there exist a system of mathematics in the musical beats and the rhythm. The universe is ordered and harmonized by number. Pythagoras is mostly famous on the basis of the Pythagorean Theorem, which holds that the sum of the square of the opposite and the adjacent is equal to the square of the hypotenuse: a2 = b2 + c2. Pythagoras did more than this in the sphere of mathematics: He discovered the triangular numbers (1,3,6,10 etc), generated by a triangular array of dots; the square numbers (1,4,7,16, etc), generated by a square array of dots; and the fact that the alternate and the corresponding angles formed by a line crossing two parallel lines are equivalent. In the physical sciences (say acoustics, the physics of sounds), Pythagoras discovered that the musical intervals depend upon the arithmetic ratio of the length of different strings under the same tension. The transparent “celestial spheres”, to which he believed the celestial bodies to be attached, by turning as they did at different rates with specific ratios, would give off harmonious sounds because they turned at different rates and the rates had different ratios. Emiliani criticizes that the harmonious sounds were never heard by anybody (556). In astronomy, Pythagoras held that the Earth was in space and also orbiting. According to Pythagoras, at the center was the central fire, around which were orbiting, in succession, the Anti-earth, the Earth, the Moon, the Sun, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, and the fixed stars (Emiliani 556). The central fire and the Anti earth were introduced by

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Pythagoras to explain the difference in frequency between lunar and solar eclipses (Emiliani 556). Pythagoras also explained the retrograde motion of the outer planets by means of epicycles. Pythagorean astronomy was significant in that this was first time the Earth was considered to move in space.

Xenophanes of Colophon (6th-5th c. B.C.) The Milesians left out a problem to philosophers tried to grapple with. This problem was the problem of what is ontologically real? This problem was two-fold:

1. That of ascertaining the basic nature of substance; and 2. Whether the cosmic stuff is only one substance.

It was from this problematic that Xenophanes, the theological Eleatic, who was regarded as the father of the Eleatic school, also introduced two fundamental problems:

1. The problem of being and becoming; and 2. The problem of rest and motion

1. The Problem of Being and Becoming Regarding the question of being and becoming, Xenophanes queried whether things are permanent or they are in flux. 2. The Problem of Rest and Motion This problem queried whether objects in the universe are at rest or in motion. Xenophanes attempted to provide answers to these questions. He began by criticizing anthropomorphism and observed that there is only one God. He argued that God and the universe are one and the same reality and as such they are universal, unchanging and a single being. This being causes things to change by his mind. The questions which Xenophanes posited, the questions of being and becoming and the questions of rest and motion, by far, were more significant than the answers he proferred. It is also significant to note how these questions initiated a truly philosophical pugilism between Parmenides and Heraclitus, where each of them attempted to knock out his opponent out of the philosophical boxing ring.

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Parmenides of Elea (late 6th-5th c. B.C.) Parmenides was the second leader of the Eleatic school after Xenophanes. He argued that all thinking depends upon the things being thought about; that every idea has a corresponding object in the external world; and that the objective content of every external object which forms idea has being. In other words, no thought arises from a vacuum. All our concepts must have corresponding real objects in the external world otherwise they could not be thought and so it would be absurd to talk about non-existenct beings since that will be identical with nothingness. According to Parmenides, the ultimately real object is that which is uncreated, indestructible, unique, indivisible and a homogenous cosmic substance called being. This being is permanent and immovable. All the things that we see are actually one thing, namely being. He wrote a poem and named it On Nature. This poem contains his metaphysical thoughts. This man, a sober man, Parmenides, was the first to articulate the problem of being. According to him, reality cannot be known through the senses, for the senses mislead us. The senses make reality to appear as though things are many. The reason sees reality as one. The core concept with which Parmenides articulated was the concept of being. He posited the question: what is there? And he answered: ‘being’. For him, then, being is; non-being is not. Being is one. Being is immutable and permanent, for change is illusory and belongs to appearances, aided by the senses. Reality is one. In a locus classicus statement, Parmenides made the following irrevocable announcement: “Being is. Non-being is not.” Parmenides continues to argue that when something is, that it implies that it occupies space, for empty space does not and cannot exist just as non-being cannot exist. So, only one thing is permanent and unchanging. To say that something is in motion is to assume that there is an empty space or an unoccupied area where another object can occupy. But empty space is nothingness and an unreality. In order for a thing to move it must move to an unoccupied space, and since all spaces are already occupied, nothing can move. Therefore, motion does not exist. Since motion does not exist being is changeless. Being is permanent. The key categories in the philosophy of Parmenides are Being and Permanence. Parmenides is regarded as the first sustained metaphysician, by virtue of his poneering analysis of ‘being’, the core concept of metaphysics.

Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 544 - c.483 B.C.) shifted the arrow of philosophizing from describing what things consist of to a new problem, that of change. He held that ‘all things are in flux”, “everything flows”

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(Pantes rei). The concept of flux or change became central in the Ephesian philosophy. To describe change as one in many, Heraclitus assumed that there must be something which changes and he argued that this something is fire. He argued that fire behaves in such a way as to suggest how the process of change operates. Fire is simultaneously a deficiency and surplus. It must constantly be fed and it constantly gives off something either in the form of heat, smoke or ashes. Fire is a process of transformation, whereby what is fed into it is transformed into something else (Stumpf 13). Heraclitus fastened upon fire as the basic reality, not as something which changes, but, as he thought, the principle of change itself. Flux and change consist of the movement of fire, the “upward and downward paths” (Stumpf 13). The downward path of fire explains the coming into being of the things we experience so that when fire is condensed it becomes moist and this moisture under conditions of increased pressure becomes water and water, in turn, when “congealed” becomes earth. On the upward path this process is reversed, the earth being transformed into liquid and from this water come the various forms of life. Nothing is ever lost in this process of transformation, because according to Heraclitus, “fire lives the death of earth, and air the death of fire; water lives the death of air, earth that of water” (Stumpf 14) Heraclitus sought to make the point that nothing is really ever lost in the nature of things. This sounds like the principle of the conservation of energy, which holds that energy is never lost but transformed form one state to another. From the times of Heraclitus and Parmenides, the philosophical problems of being and becoming, rest and motion, change and permanence, one and many, appearance and reality, began to take their shapes.

Zeno of Elea (490-430 B.C.)

Zeno, who wanted to defend his master, Parmenides, invented dialectics to argue that motion, change and plurality were mere illusions. He came directly against the Heraclitean credo in motion, change and plurality, through his famous paradoxes, earlier analysed above in chapter five.

Paradox 1: Achilles and the Tortoise Zeno imagines that Achilles, the fleetest of Greek warriors, is to run a footrace against a tortoise. It is only fair to give the tortoise a head

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Summa Philosophica start. Under these circumstances, Zeno argues, Achilles can never catch up with the tortoise, no matter how fast he runs. In order to overtake the tortoise Achilles must run from his starting point A to the tortoise’s original starting point T0 (see figure 1). While he is doing that, the tortoise will have moved ahead to T1. Now Achilles must reach the point T1. While Achilles is covering this new distance, the tortoise moves still farther to T2. Again, Achilles must reach this new position of the tortoise. And so it continues, whenever Achilles arrives at a point where the tortoise was, the tortoise has already moved a bit ahead. Achilles can narrow the gap, but he can never actually catch up with him.

A T0 T1 T2…

Paradox 2: The Flying Arrow Zeno argues that an arrow in flight is always at rest. At any given instant, he claims, the arrow is where it is, occupying a portion of space equal to itself. During the instant it cannot move, for that would require the instant to have parts, and an instant is, by definition, a minimal and indivisible element of time. If the arrow did move during the instant it would have to be in one place at one part of the instant, and in a different place at another part of the instant. Moreover, forthe arrow to move during the instant would require that during the instant, it must occupy a space larger than itself, for otherwise it has no room to move.

The paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise was designed to refute the doctrine that space and time are continuous, while the paradox of the Flying Arow was intended to refute the view that space and time have an atomic structure (Salmon 35).

Empedocles of Agrigentum (c. 490-430) believed that there are four ultimate unchangeable elements: fire, air, water, and earth. These elements, Empedocles says, are joined by love into a single sphere and separated by hate (strife) into different proportions, forming the various substances (Emiliani 554). It is observable that Empedocles amalgamated the thoughts of his predecessors and introduced the concepts of love and hate to gather or scatter the elements. Empedocles attempted to reconcile the diametrically opposing views of Heraclitus and the Eleatics (Xenophanes, Parmenides and Zeno). According to him, although it is the case that the basic substances in the

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Summa Philosophica universe differ qualitatively, they are, however, eternal and unchanging. Again, the unchanging substances are quantitatively divisible by mechanical processes. He therefore proposed the four basic elements; fire, air, water and earth. These four elements are constituent elements of everything that exists. When closely examined, we can see that Empedocles combined the idea of the indestructibility of matter, as the Eleatic claim, with the idea of becoming, i.e change, motion and transition, as the Heraditean claim.

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (c. 500-428 B.C.) suggested that the material universe is composed of particles and that everything in the universe is a combination of all other things. Every thing in the universe is related to all other things, according to Anaxagoras. There is, accordingly, everything in everything. Thus, Anaxagoras observed a basic interconnectedness and interpenetration of everything in the universe. The Nous, the mind, was not part of the material universe. The nous is the governing principle in the universe. The nous is self-ruled, mixed with nothing, but is alone, itself by itself (Fragment 12). Like Empedocles, Anaxagoras also argued from the Eleatic premise that matter is indestructible. However, he postulated enumerable elements of matter each possessing its own distinctive form and qualities. Anaxagoras asserted that matter itself, whether in a state of composition or separation, is unchangeable, eternal and uncreated. So, when objects change the change is simply a mechanical process and not a qualitative one, which is the chemical property of change. Anaxagoras also proposed that the cosmic immaterial substance which is akin to the nature of the Mind is called Nous or Reason. This thought stuff is essentially teleological. Particular objects are always combinations of substances in which some particular substance dominates. He says the mind is the principle of creation and order. Anaxagoras rejected Empedocles’ account that the summation of the objects of experience is the product of Love and Hate. He asserted that each thing has a special ‘portion’ of everything in it. The process by which matter was formed into things is the process of “separation”. This separation was originally achieved through the power of the mind. Thus in place of Empedocles’ Love and Strife (Hate), Anaxagoras substitutes a single intellectual motive force of Mind. It, too, like Love and Strife, has many of the qualities of an abstract principle. It has all knowledge about everything, and the greatest strength; it controls all things that have life; and it set in order all things that were to be, including,

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Summa Philosophica of course, the comic revolution. Yet, at the same time, it is the finest of all things and the purest. The Nous! Anaxagorean metaphysics was the first sustained effort to introduce the problem of Mind and Matter duality. Dualism is the philosophical position which upholds that there are two forces operating in the universe. This is different from Monism, which upholds that there is one operative force in the universe; and from pluralism, which maintains that there are many forces operating in the universe.

Leucippus of Abdera (c. 500-440 B.C.); Democritus of Abdera (c. 460- 370 B.C.) The philosophy of atomism originated as an attempt to overcome the logical consequences of the Eleatic denial of space and motion. Parmenides and Zeno denied space and motion. Leucippus affirmed the existence of space and thereby prepared the way for a coherent theory of motion and change (Stumpf 25). Leucippus and Democritus upheld the view that the nature of things consists of an infinite number of particles or units called atoms. These atoms (from the Greek “atomos” =uncuttable) are said to be indestructible, indivisible, invisible, and eternal. They move about in space, and their motion leads them to form the objects we experience (Stumpf 25). Nature consists, therefore, of two things only: namely, space which is a vacuum, and atoms (Stumpf 25). The atomist bequeathed to posterity the mechanistic, materialistic reduction of reality. Their atomistic theory influenced modern science and held sway even unto the time of John Dalton, who still believed in the indestructibility of the atoms. This attribute had to be eliminated by the twentieth- century conception of matter, and, so, the quantum theory and Einstein denied the attribute of indestructibility to atoms. The atomistic theory did not account for the origin of the atoms. They did not account for the original motion which impelled the atoms. But they laid the foundation for the atomic theory in modern science.

The Sophists While succeeding philosophers after this Ionian trio continued to speculate on physical nature and theorized on the elements -water, air, fire, earth- a group of philosophers, the Sophists, added an ambient for philosophical inquiry: on man and the human society. The Sophists were itinerant teachers of philosophy who charged fees from their students. They focused their philosophical musings on man and the city-state. They taught only those who could afford to pay, especially the children of nobles. They

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Summa Philosophica taught philosophy, rhetoric and the art of argumentation. The Sophists contributed to the popular element in Greek democracy through the rhetorical training they offered to those who were preparing for leadership and participation in government. Oratory, rhetoric, persuasion, argumentation and dialogue were key aspects of the Sophists’ teaching. The Sophists rejected religion and took a relativist approach to ethics and social life. Some of them (such as Giorgias) arrived at skeptical conclusions regarding being and knowledge. In philosophical disputes the Sophists resorted to methods which later became known as sophistry. Sophistry refers to the deliberate application of superficially plausible specious arguments (sophisms) in disputes or arguments. Some of the Sophists were Protagoras, Giorgias, Thrasymachus, Hippias of Elis, Prodicus of Ceos, Lycophron, Antiphon of Athens, Callicles, Hippodamus, Critias, and Cratylus.

Protagoras is associated with the idea of man as the measure of all things (homo mensura). He argued for the position that everything is relative according to the measurement of man. He affirmed that “Man is the measure of all things. Of the things that are, that they are; of the things that are not, that they are not. About the gods, we know not of their nature. But two things are the worries of men: the shortness of mind and the brevity of human life”. Giorgias doubted that anything exists. For him, nothing exists. If it exists it cannot be known; and if it is known, it cannot be communicated. In Giorgias, we see one of the origins of skepticism. Thrasymachus is associated with the belief that “Might is right”. Besides the relativism of Protagoras, the idea that “might is right” indicates another version of ethical relativism of the Sophists, championed by Thrasymachus. The Sophists philosophized on the place of man in the state. They were, however, criticized by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, for charging fees from their students and for their wayward style of life. Sophist teaching and lifestyle led Socrates to start his philosophy on man as exemplified in his sayings: “Man, know yourself” and “An unexamined life is not worth living”. This was primarily meant to address the moral decadence of the Sophists. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle reacted to the banalities and exigencies of their everyday experiences within the political atmosphere in Greece.

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CHAPTER NINE

SOCRATES, PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

The philosophies of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle formed what is often referred to as the golden age of Greek philosophy. This may partly be due to the high level of sophistication and systematization of their philosophies, especially those of Plato and Aristotle. Most philosophies after Plato and Aristotle often point back to Plato and, or Aristotle, in rejection, confirmation or modification. The classical philosophies of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were also seen as the culmination of the philosophies before them, often referred to as preSocratic philosophy.

SOCRATES (c. 469 B.C. - 399 B.C.) Socrates was a Greek philosopher who lived and taught in Athens. He was said to have written nothing. Most of what we learn about his life and philosophy are derived from works by his students (such as Plato and Xenophon) and his contemporaries (such as Aristophanes). This is the Socratic problem. Plato, in Apology, says that Chaerephon, a friend of Socrates asked the oracle of Delphi if anyone was wiser than Socrates in Athens; the oracle responded that no one was wiser than Socrates.

Socratic Epistemology Socrates taught that the structure of the world and the physical nature of things are unknowable; we can only know ourselves. This is expressed in the popular Socratic imperative: “Man, know yourself!” (Gnoste te ipsum). Knowledge, for Socrates, is an idea, a concept of the universal. These concepts are revealed through definitions, which are preceded by dialogue which adopt the method of question-and-answer reasoning, called dialectic. Socratic dialectic is also called elenchus. This dialectic, Socrates argued, must start with self-claimed ignorance, whereby one knows nothing; for Socrates admitted: “I know that I know nothing.” This is the Socratic irony. The dialectic is the Socratic method. Socrates believed that the role of the philosopher was analogous to the role of the midwife, whose role is to ensure safe delivery of the baby from the mother’s womb. Through the method of quention-and-answer reasoning and dialogue, the philosopher “midwifes” the concepts from the interlocutor’s mind.

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Socratic Ethics Socrates reasoned that “an unexamined life is not worth living”. He urged introspection and the cultivation of virtue. He was of the opinion that self- development is better than the pursuit of material wealth and that virtue is the the most valuable of all possessions. Socrates believed that no one does wrong willingly or knowingly; that virtue is knowledge and evil is ignorance. Socrates was sentenced to death by the jury in Athens, and subsequently executed. He was given a glass of poison to drink and die. He was alleged to have corrupted the minds of the youths with his doctrines and for offending the gods. Socrates is reported to have embraced his death freely and happily.

PLATO (428/427 B.C. - 348/347 B.C.)

Plato’s Metaphysics Theory of Forms Plato’s metaphysical thought centres on his theory of forms. There exists above and beyond the world of sensible objects, the world of suprasensible ideas which are the ideals of sensible objects. This is the world of forms or ideas. These ideas or forms are eternal, immutable, immaterial, and perfect; while the sensible world is temporal, changeable, material and imperfect. The sensible world is a reflection, a duplicate, a shadow and a copy of the ideal world. The forms or ideals in the world of forms are also universal. There is one among the forms, which is supreme and the source of light which illuminates all other forms. It is the grand form in whose perfection and fullness all other forms share in. It is the form of the GOOD (Agathon). All good acts originate from the good. The forms are models and archetypes for sensible objects.

Appearance and Reality The forms in the world of forms are the real things, while sensible objects are mere appearances. The senses make sensible objects to appear as real; but the senses are illusory and they deceive us. The senses cannot apprehend the forms in the world of forms. It is only reason that is capable of such suprasensible apprehension of the ontologically real: the forms. The things in the sensible world are mere appearances, while the things in the suprasensible world, the forms, are ontologically real. The world of

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Universals and Particulars Since the forms are ontologically real, they have the character of the universal. They transcend space and time and not subject to temporality. Since they are the models, the archetypes, the fullness of being, the ultimate reality, they cannot be cognized as being particulars inhering on any other universal essence. They are the essences of things. But particulars are attributed to sentiate, ephermeral, temporal and phenomenal objects in the world of apperances. By postulating the ideas (eidos) as models upon which things sensible could be measured, Plato countered the relativism of the Sophists, and made the forms the standard of all things. Plato thus presented us with a universalism, an objectivism as the propadeutic for all forms of rational thinking. However, we are yet to see whether Plato’s universalism and idealism were not but a mental fantasy.

Plato’s Cosmology: On Space and Time Plato jettisoned the materialist notion that matter was the basic reality. According to Plato, matter itself must be explained in more refined terms as the composition not of some finer forms of matter but of something other than matter. Matter, whether in the form of earth or water, is a reflection of an idea or form, and these forms are expressed through a medium. Things are generated out of what Plato calls the “receptacle” which he considered the “nurse of all becoming” (Stumpf 74). The receptacle is a medium that has no structure; but, that is capable of receiving the imposition of structure by the Demiurge (the agent through which things become). Plato uses another word “space” for “receptacle”. According to Plato, space is everlasting, not admitting destruction; providing things that come into being, itself apprehended a situation for all without the senses by sort of bastard reasoning, and hardly an object of belief” (Stumpf 75). Plato offers no explanation of the origin of the receptacle, for, in Plato’s thought it is underived, as are the forms and the Demiurge. The receptacle is where things appear and perish (Stumpf 75). Time, according to Plato, comes to be after phenomena are produced. There can be time only after there are things as we know them, imperfect and unchanging (Stumpf 76). The very meaning of time is

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Summa Philosophica change. In the absence of change there could be no time. Physics, in Plato’s view could never be more than “a likely story” (Stumpf 73). Physics, nature or the cosmos as “a likely story” consisted of an account of how the Demiurge fashioned things out of the receptacle using the forms as patterns. Time is a product of imperfection and change. The forms are eternal and perfect. The cosmos, Plato would argue, is a copy of the world of forms. The world of nature is not the real world in Plato’s mode of thought. Plato’s metaphysics laid the foundation for idealism, which says that only ideas exist. This is why Plato was not in sympathy with materialism, which is the philosophical viewpoint that only matter exists. Plato rejected the materialist reduction of reality by the atomists. However, we may say here that Plato’s metaphysics is far removed from reality. If one could ask Plato the question: Professor Plato, please, where is the world of forms? There, perhaps, would be no immediate answer. With that, the darkness with which Plato left us would re-darken into midnight and Aristotle would be left as the viable, available and auxiliary option to herald us into the dawn and new day of metaphysics.

Plato’s Epistemology In the Theaetetus, Plato suggested that knowledge is justified true belief. Here, Plato argues that knowledge is different from mere true belief by the knower having an “account” of the object of her or his true belief (Theaetetus 201c-d). Plato suggested that true belief could be raised to the level of knowledge if it is supported with an account as to the question “why” the object of true belif is so (Meno 97d-98a). Plato also argues that knowledge is reminiscence, a recollection; and never acquired through learning, observation or study. Knowledge arises from one’s apprehension of the forms, says Plato. It is argued that the apprehension of the forms may be the basis of the account required for justification, in that it offers foundational knowledge which itself needs no account, thereby avoiding an infinite regress (Taylor 2011: 189).

Plato’s Political Philosophy The political thoughts of Plato are contained in The Republic, The Statesman and in The Laws. In The Republic, Plato averred that there are three classes of people in the state, namely, the Rulers, the Guardians and the Artisans. The Rulers are the leaders of government who direct and pilot the affairs of the state. The Guardians refer to the soldiers and security agents who protect the state from external aggression and from internal

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Summa Philosophica strife. The Artisans refer to business men who provide for the material needs of members of the state. Plato suggested that the rulers must be men of deep and wide knowledge and wisdom, for through their wisdom, they would have sense of virtue and morals, and lead the state wisely. They were expected to undergo a long, extensive and rigorous academic training, a time long enough to learn and be wise. They were expected to train in philosophy and mathematical disciplines. They were not to take up any official political posts until they became thirty five years of age. These men, the rulers, were to be philosophers, since philosophers were men of great learning and wisdom. For Plato, therefore, the king was to be a philosopher, and the philosopher was to be king. The ideal leader in the state was the philosopher-king. Justice and harmony, peace and stability were attainable in the state when each member of the state performed his duty. There was no need to encroach upon another’s duty. Plato had more requirements for the philosopher-king. He was not to marry any wife for himself. Every woman belonged to all in the state. Children, too, were to be separated from their parents. Both women and children were possessions of the state. The philosopher-king was expected to be a man of perfect and impeccable moral rectitude; a moral compass capable of being a moral measure for citizens in the state. These set of men were expected to be next to the gods, or, one could say, vice-gods; or in our political parlance, Special Advisers or Personal Assistants to God. Frustratingly enough for Plato, such men could not be found within the practical human society. Plato sadly suggested that the Statesman should lead the state (See The Statesman) and that the state should be organized and governed according to law (See The Laws). The statesman is the leader who sacrifices his personal interests for the interest of the state. He is he who focuses on the welfare of the people; how to better the lots of his people. He is the leader whose mantra is: the welfare of my people. He utilizes the limited resources within the state and embarks on projects that will be of benefit to the people: providing basic social amenities and infrastructure. The stateman is different from the demagogue and the rabblerouser. The demagogue cheats, deceives and oppresses his people. His interest is supreme; the people’s interests do no matter. He is the tyrant and the despot, the charlatan and the impostor. He makes promise to the people and hardly fulfils them. Plato suggested that the statesman should rule in the state by law. The political ideals devised by Plato in The Republic were unrealizable, impracticable and in a way over human. In describing the

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Summa Philosophica ideal state in The Republic, Plato omitted the role law had to play in the state. Perhaps, since the archetypal ruler, the philosopher king would know almost every thing; he would not need to be guided by law. Plato failed to consider the ideals and necessities of the city state in The Republic. His political theory in The Republic fostered elitism and class aristocracy, uncharacteristic of the city state. He abolished the family and private property in the ideal state.While serving in the government of Syracuse, he realized the limitations of the kind of state he dreamed of in The Republic, that such a state could not work and that the philosopher king could not be real. Plato went to Syracuse with the expectation of founding an ideal state ruled by a philosopher-king, but failed. He modified his views, rather suggesting a state ruled by law by the statesman, advising the followers of Dion, saying: “Let not Sicily nor any city anywhere be subject to human masters, such is my doctrine, but to laws…” (The Laws, cited in Thorson and Sabine 1973: 78). Plato did not favour democracy. He jettisoned democracy as a rule of the mob.

ARISTOTLE (384-322 B.C.)

Aristotle’s Metaphysics There are core themes in Aristotle’s metaphysics, and these are: the problem of being; which melts into the problem of substance and accidents; hylemorphism, that is, the theory of matter and form; causation: the four causes; motion and change, which gives rise to the concepts of act and potency.

Being, Substance and Accidents As earlier noted, Parmenides may have pioneered an analytic of the problem of being, it was, however, Aristotle, who first consciously worked out a metaphysical system which focuses of the problem of Being. Consequently, he defines metaphysics in terms of Being. He says: metaphysics is the study of Being qua Being. Metaphysics is that science which investigates the nature not of this or that reality but of reality as a whole. It is that supreme science which entails all sciences. All other science studies just aspects of Being, but metaphysics studies Being in its totality. What precisely is Being? Is Being a material or a supra-sensible entity? In the Categories, Aristotle named ten categories which includes: Substance, quantity, quality, relations, among others. Among these ten categories, he argues that there is one category that is fundamental to all

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Summa Philosophica and that one is substance which is the first of the categoris. He equated substance to Being and posited that the meaning of Being in its immediate and primary sense is substance and it is the most enduring of all other things. Aristotle’s working definition for substance is that which is capable of independent existence. This implies that substance can exist alone and it is prior in definition. It does not need anything for it to exist. All other properties or qualities are relative to substance. In De Anima, he again describes substance as that which is not asserted of a subject but of which everything else is asserted. This implies that substance is the essence of a thing and subsists without contingency. Whereas the qualities, that is, the accidents, depend on substance in order to exist, substance exists on its own. Aristotle distinguishes between primary substance which is an individual thing and secondary substance which belongs to a class of things.

Hylemorphism: Matter and Form What is the nature of a particular thing? Aristotle’s response is that any particular thing is a unity of form and matter. This is Aristotle’s doctrine of hylemorphism. “Hyle” is the Greek term for “matter” and “morphe” means “form”. Hylemorphism is the doctrine that everything is constituted of matter and form. Matter can take different forms. For example, the wood as matter can take the form of a table, a box, a chair, a door, and when burnt it becomes ashes. This theory of Aristotle maintains that matter and form co-exist, which implies that forms inhere in things. The particular and the universal both inhere in things. This is a critique of Plato’s idealism. For Plato, forms as universals are in the world of forms; while matter as particulars are in the world of apperances. Interestingly, Plato, for dichotomizing reality into the world of appearances and the world of forms; and Aristotle, for dichotomizing entities as being constitutive of matter and form, both end up in dualism.

Causation: The Four Causes Aristotle’s theme on four types of explanation gives us an ancient clue to the problem of causation and causal inference, that is, induction. The most important passages where Aristotle discussed his theory of ‘causation’ are to be found in his Posterior Analytics, his Physics, and his Metaphysics. The context always concerns both a certain being and the conditions of

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Summa Philosophica knowledge of that being. Thus, Aristotle said, for example, in his Posterior Analytics (I.2, 71b9-12), that knowing a thing involves knowing its aitai (cause). Aristotle stated that, with reference to any singular entity, the question ‘What is this?’ could be answered in four different ways, each of which corresponds to what he called a ‘cause’ in the sense of ‘something without which the thing would not be’ (aitai). Thus, given a marble statue, the question ‘What is this?’ could correctly be answered in one of the following ways: ‘This is marble’, ‘This is what was made by Phydias’, ‘This is something to be put in the temple of Apollo’ and ‘This is Apollo.’ These answers are the answers to four different questions, namely: ‘What is this made of’, ‘Who is this made by?’ ‘What is this made for?’ and ‘What is it that makes this what it is and not something else?’ The answers have come to be known as, the material cause, the efficient cause, the final cause and the formal cause. Though a complete answer to the original question would encompass those four different answers, and therefore the four different causes, Aristotle argued that the most important and decisive cause was the formal cause (Physics II.3,194b23-195a3). Only the efficient aitai has features we now associate with the idea of causation. Aristotle conceived efficient causes as 'things responsible' in the sense that an efficient cause is a thing that by its activity brings about an effect in another thing. Thus, the efficient cause was defined by reference to some substance performing a change: it is the "primary source of the change" (Metaphysics V.4, 1014b18-20). That which is produced is either some new substance, such as ashes from wood, or simply a change in some property of a given substance. Efficient causation involves a form being transmitted from the efficient cause to the effect. Thus, for example, the efficient cause of the statue is the form in the mind of the sculptor (Metaphysics VII.7, 1032a11-1032b23). The form of the statue (effect), which is the same qua form in his mind, comes about from him by means of the motion he originates (Generation of Animals I, 21-22). It is a matter of dispute whether Aristotle also defended the modern idea that efficient causes necessitate their effects. There is evidence that he associated explanation by efficient cause not simply with what happens always and necessarily, but with what happens for the most part. Indeed, given a certain man, he must have a father, but given a man, there is nothing that determines him to be a father. In other words, Aristotle defended the view that, given a certain effect, there must be some factors that brought about that effect. But he nowhere inferred from this that given certain conditions, some effect necessarily follows.

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However, it would appear that there is another kind of necessity involved in the efficient cause. Efficient causation presupposes that in some way a form is transmitted, and it is precisely this form which is some kind of boundary condition; it determines that a particular substance can behave in such-and-such a way, but not in another way. The form of man, for example, does not determine what a particular man will do, but it determines that he cannot, for example, fly as a bird.

Change from Potency to Act For Aristotle, potency or potentiality is what a thing may be, while act is what a thing is. Potency or potentiality is the inherent possibility of change or development, while act or actuality is what the thing eventually becomes at the end of the process of change. Aristotle reasoned that every object has an inherent potency of changing into something else, thus moving from one change to another. Change, for Aristotle, then, is a transition from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality. No being is capable of moving itself from potency to act. No being can bring itself from the state of potency or potentiality to the state of act or actuality. It requires something else in a state of act to bring it from potentiality to actuality. This, for Aristotle, means that whatever moves is moved by another (Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur). That other being is also in turn moved by yet another, which is itself also moved by another, and so on. There are series of movers, but must get to an original, prime or first mover, to avoid infinite regress. This First Mover moves other things, but remains itself unmoved. It is an Unmove Mover, which Aristotle calls God.

Aristotle’s Political Philosophy It is worthy to note, meanwhile, that Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were reacting against the excesses of the Sophists, an itinerant group of teachers who taught for money. The Sophists, especially Protagoras, had believed that man was the measure of all things, and that (especially Thrasymachus) might is right, or that justice means might. Aristotle rejected these defects, excesses and intellectual extravagance of the Sophist in his political philosophy, contained in The Politics, The Constitution, The Rhetoric and in the Nichomachean Ethics. Aristotle was more influenced by Plato’s later political thought in The Laws than in the Republic. Aristotle rejected the utopian state projected in The Republic. He took into consideration the human realities in the city state. He carried out a study of the constitutional istory of one hundred and fifty eight Greek cities and suggested a state ruled by law.

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Aristotle is regarded as the father of natural law. He posited the existence of natural justice or natural right (Latin: Jus naturale; Greek: dikaion Physikon). Aristotle noted that apart from particular laws each people sets up for itself, that there is a “common” law that is according to nature. In the Politics, he posited that “Man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all” (Politics, 1,2; 1253 a 31 ff.). Government must be a rule of law, which must be a constitutional rule. Aristotle, the father of natural law, also suggested the rule of law long before John Dicey. The family was abolished by Plato, but admitted by Aristotle. The family, according to Aristotle is the unit cell of the society. This is the origin of the society and of the state. The city state begins from the family. Man is a political animal, says Aristotle, because he is born into the society, and because he has the duty to organize his society. Man, says Aristotle, is an animal who reaches the highest stage of his development in the civilization of the city-state. However, Aristotle permitted slavery and deprived women of citizenship in the state.

Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy Aristotle’s moral thought centres on the concept of virtue, arête. The Nichomachean Ethics and The Eudaimonian Ethics are Aristotle’s major works in moral philosophy. The first, that is, Nichomachean Ethics, principally treats the theme of virtue; while the latter, that is, Eudaimonian Ethics, treats the theme of happiness. Aristotle reasoned that a life of virtue leads to happiness. Aristotle suggested a life of moderation as the pathway to virtue. According to him, given two extremes, one being excessive and the other defective, that we should opt for the middle way, for “virtue stands in the middle” (virtu in medio stat). For example, courage is in the midway between foolhardiness (which is excessive courage) and cowardice (which is lack of courage). A moderate life, according to Aristotle, is a life of virtue, and only a virtuous life can bring happiness.

References: Plato, The Republic, Desmond Lee (tran.) London, Penguin Books (1974). ____, The Phaedo in The Last Days of Socrates, Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant (trans.) London, Penguin Books (1993). Aristotle, The Metaphysics, W. D. Ross (tran.) in J. Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle, V. 1.New Jersey, Princeton University Press (1984). Sir David Ross, Aristotle, London, Methuen & Co Ltd. (1964).

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CHAPTER TEN

HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY

THE STOICS: STOICISM Stoicism was founded by Zeno of Citium (c. 336 – c. 264 B.C.) and Chrysippus. Zeno of Citium formed his own school in Athens in 308 B.C. and named it Stoic (from Stoa Poikile, portico decorated with frescoes). In Stoic metaphysics God and the universe are seen as two sides of the same thing, two dimensions of the same thing, and two dimensions of the same being. God is the soul of the universe while the universe is the body of God. As body and soul in man constitute one being so the world (body) in God (the soul) constitute one entity, one being. They both represent the two principles in reality, namely, the active principle (God) and the passive principle (the universe). God, the soul of the universe, is the Logos, that is, the Universal Reason, the Universal Consciousness, the Universal principle of Intelligence. Human souls are sparks of the Universal Soul, the Logos. Human reason, human intelligence, or human consciousness derives from the Logos as fragments and participations. The Logos itself contains “logoi spermatikoi” that is, the seeds of the things that will extentually come into being in the future. The universe is an ordered cosmos, planned from all eternity and governed by the Logos. Nothing happens in the universe by chance. Everything that happens has its own place and its own role in the universal system. Nothing in the universe is useless, for everything serves a useful purpose and contributes toward the order and harmony of the universe. The harmony in the universe is the harmony of opposites, for the universe is made up of opposites: good and evil, light and darkness, male and female, pain and pleasure, spirit and matter, etc. They are all complementary and they contribute to the harmony of the universe. Even evil is useful and complementary to good in bringing about the order and harmony in the universe. The universe is governed by inexorable laws of nature emanating from the Logos, and whatever happens is in accordance with the laws. The universe is a network of interactions, for everything is related to other things, and there is no event that is not caused by some other event in accordance with the plan of the system of the universe. We can see that this is a deterministic metaphysics. The idea of human freedom is ruled out. Evil loses its meaning in this system because it becomes something that is useful, something that has its own role and its

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Summa Philosophica own purpose, planned from all eternity to happen, to complement good. Human actions have also been planned along with other things from eternity. It follows therefore that men are not free.

The Stoic Political Philosophy The Stoics had their idea of the natural law. Stoicism conceives the world as an ordered whole where entities perdure following the principles of order. God, according to the Stoics, is the pervading rational substance which orders the whole course of events. God is in everything. God is reason and is in everything. Reason controls everything. Just as the world is a material order permeated by the fiery substance called reason or God so also man is a material being who is permeated by this very same fiery substance. When the Stoics said that man contains a spark of the divine within him, they meant that man contains part of the substance of God, which is reason. Man, a fortiori, possesses the rational substance. The Stoics believed that human rationality, besides engendering the act of ratiocination, fosters man’s participation in the rational order of nature. They emphasized a willing submission to nature as living naturally according to reason. The Stoics had spread the ideas of a world-state, of natural justice, and of universal citizenship. They believed that the world is under divine government by God, who is good and reasonable, and who acts like a father to all men. With God as their father, all men are then brothers and members of a common human family by their rationality. Human reason participates in the divine reason and makes all men equal and subject to natural law and justice.

EPICURUS (341-270 B.C.): EPICUREANISM Epicurus adopted the atomist metaphysics of Democritus with only a slight modification and presents us with a materialist and mechanistic universe. We are told that there is nothing in the universe except atoms and their movements. Everything in the universe is composed of atoms and everything that happens is due to the movements of atoms. There is no plan in the universe, no purpose in it, and no design. Everything that happens is just by mere chance. As atoms float about in empty space, they collide by chance and conglomerate. The result of this collision is that something comes into being; and when they eventually separate, also by mere chance, what came into existence by collision also goes out of existence. Thus, the birth and death of anything is by mere chance. In order to banish fear from the heart of men, Epicurus says that there is no life after death, that souls of men, like everything else in reality,

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Summa Philosophica are composed of atoms and dissolve along with the body at death. Even the gods are also composed of atoms, and they are not interested in human affairs. Because Epicurus was a moralist, preoccupied with men’s moral behaviour, he had to make room for human freedom in his atomist, deterministic metaphysics. He had to modify his theory about the movement of atoms in order to make room for the possibility of human freedom without which there could be no morality. He argued that the atoms do not always fall straight in their downward movement. Instead of coming down straight, they (the atoms) sometimes swerve inexplicably and this makes their movement unpredictable. This unpredictability was also attributed to human behavior, for the unpredictability of atoms account for the unpredictability of human behavior, which is accounted for by human freedom. However, by ruling out anything immaterial, we wonder whether Epicurus can make human freedom become material. We query Epicurus and his belief in human freedom which is not material. Epicurus contradicts himself since he posits and entirely material universe, yet upholds human freedom. His ethics contradicts his metaphysics.

PLOTINUS: NEOPLATONISM Platonism was a philosophical school pioneered by Plotinus. Plotinus studied the philosophy before him but regarded them as unsatisfactory. He rejected matter as a basic reality because it tends toward disintegration and decay. Whatever perishes, dies or decays cannot be the unltimate stuff of the universe. Plotinus thus rejected the materialist thesis. He rejected, jettisoned and discarded materialism. He did not accept Aristotle’s idea of hylemorphism, that is, that matter and mind are independment. He settled down for Plato’s idea that the real thing must be eternal. He adopted Plato’s philosophy and built his own philosophy on Plato’s. Hence the name Neoplatonism. In Plato’s system of thought, things which are in the world of appearances, that is, the world where things perish, are often said to be 'becoming' but not 'being'. Being is eternal, and things that perish are not eternal. Plotinus advocated that we should look at the world from the only possible point of its origination: the spiritual. Things originated by emanation. The original point in the universal hierarchy is spiritual, and there is one supreme and eminent spirit: The One (God). The One is eternal, uncreated, unchangeable. The world process begins with the incomprehensible divine One. The One emerges as the Universal Mind or

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Summa Philosophica the Universal Reason. The One, who is Universal Mind or Universal Reason is thereafter the World-Soul. The World-Soul later emerges as individual souls, as individual bodies, including matter, which is non-being. The purpose of human life is to ascend to the One on top of the universal hierarchy, by restraining bodily and material desires and by developing spiritual forces, including cognition. All things emanated from the One and go back to the One.

In the cosmic hierarchy, everything gives rise to that which is immediately below it. The Mind emanates from the One; the World-Soul emanates from the Mind; the human soul and matter emanate from the World-Soul. Matter is at the lowest level farthest from the One. Plotinus distinguishes two aspects of matter: the highest aspect of matter which obeys the law of cause and effect and the lowest aspect, which is gross matter. The world is a dark world of gross matter moving aimlessly and every matter is in constant collision; its destination is extinction. Plotinus sees matter as darkness. On top is light and below is darkness. This suggests that there is actually one substantial thing which is light. What we call matter is the last border between being and non-being, because light is the true being. The One is the true being. The One of Plotinus is equated with Plato’s Good.

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PART III: HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

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OVERTURE: ON THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY Meideval Philosophy was mainly theological in nature. Those who are regarded as the philosophers during this period were theologians. They comprised the Church Fathers (Patristics), the Islamic scholars (Averroes and Avicena) and the Scholastics in general, who were mostly Catholic priests of either the Franciscan order or of the Dominican order. They were called school men or the scholastics because their monasteries served as schools, where they philosophized. The great Roman Empire fell to theBarbarians in 476 A. D. This fall was also a fall in learning, for the Barbarians not only demolished the political might of Rome, but also the institutions of learning in Western Europe. Absence of institutions of learning which housed ancient Greek philosophical and literary texts (e.g. works of Plato and Aristotle) was part of the reason the age was also called the Dark Age. Nonetheless, Christian scholars sustained the heartbeat of philosophy during this epoch. They made use of philosophical arguments in their theologies. During this time, the scholastics were of the belief that philosophy had no independent status as a discipline, but it was meant to serve the purpose of theology. They believed philosophy to be the handmaid of theology (ancilla theologiae). Not even the most systematic of the medieval thinkers (St. Thomas Aquinas) called himself a philosopher. The name of a philosopher during this time was associated with pagan thoughts. Interestingly, what they referred to as “pagan thoughts” came to be their best weapon to defend their faith, because they mainly used Platonic or Aristotelian philosophies in their theological arguments. Major philosophical issues with which these thinkers concerned themselves with were:

1. The relation of faith and reason; 2. The problem of logical proofs for the existence of God; 3. The problem of universals and particulars.

St. Augustine of Hippo emphasized that he must believe first before reasoning or before seeking understanding. This opinion seemed to have encapsulated the whole gamut of medieval thinking, that is, the opinion that faith seeks understanding (fides quarens intellectum). St. Anselm of Canterbury was later to say: “I believe that I may understand” (credo ut intelligam). Islamic thinkers (Avicenna and Averroes) as well as Boethius presented the medieval age with translations of ancient philosophical texts.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY*

ST. AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO (354 – 430 AD) St. Augustine was Bishop of Hippo in North Africa. He stood out as a very prominent Father of the Church (Patristic), theologian and mystical thinker. He was a Neoplatonist in his philosophical views. Among other philosophical views, St. Augustine emphasized faith as the foundation of truth and knowledge. The City of God (De Civitas Dei), The City of Earth (De Civitas Terrena) and The Confessions are among his major works. In The City of God, Augustine laid down the Christian conception of pre-ordination of the universe and everything in it. In The City of Earth, Augustine counterposed his idea of The City of God. While The City of God portrayed the universal rule of the Church, The City of Earth portrayed the sinful secular state. The Confessions contains Augustine journey to faith, his life and conversion from paganism to Christianity. In the latter book, The Confessions, Augustine analysed the concept of time. What is time? Where does time go? (Quo vadis?) We mentioned earlier in this work that St. Augustine addressed God with the problem of time: “You made all times and before all times you are; nor was there ever a time when there was no time (The Confessions, Book X1,ch13,p.267). What is time? St Augustine writes: “I know what it (time) is if no one asks me what it is. But if I want to explain it to someone who has asked me, I find that I do not know (The Confessions, Book XI ch 13,p 267). St Augustine argues that if nothing passed, there would be no past time, and if nothing were coming, there would be no future time, and if nothing were now, there would be no present time. St Augustine thus argues for the necessary relationship of time to events and things. For time past means events past, present time means present events, and future time means events that would occur in the future (Iroegbu 23). However, he goes on to argue, that things that are past are no longer there and future events are not yet there, for both cannot in the strict existential sense be said to be there. They were. They will be. But they are not. Time related to these non-existent is also non-existent. For Augustine, we cannot truly say that time exists except in the sense that it is tending toward non-existence. Perhaps only the present exists, for to deny this would be self-contradictory and ourselves negating. Augustine uses three expressions to bring past, present and future to reality as existing: a presence of things past is couched in “memory”; a presence of things present in “sight”; and a present of things future in “expectation”. Thus, Augustine looks at time from a

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ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS (480 – 524 AD) The most significant philosophical contribution of Boethius was his translation and interpretation of Greek philosophical texts of Aristotle and Euclid to Latin. When the Age went Dark and no light was found for the mind, Boethius brought the light to the mind by making available what was not available for philosophical theorizing: the works of Aristotle and Euclid. While in prison, he wrote his major book, Consolation Philosophy (Consolatione Philosophiae), where he had conversation with an imaginary persona: philosophy. Boethius defines man as “an individual substance of a rational nature”.

JOHN SCOTUS ERIUGENA (810 – 877 AD) John Scotus Eriugena produced the first full-scale philosophical system in the Middle Ages.John Scotus Eriugena is also called Johannes Scotus Eriugena. He was an Irish philosopher, monk and theologian, poet and commentator. His name Eriugena which was later changed to Erigena is translated “a native of Ireland”. He is known to have lived between 810 and 877, and is recognized by most scholars as the first major philosopher in the medieval period. Having been invited by Charles II the Bald to chair the Paris Court School, Eriugena is known to have translated the writing of Pseudo-Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor, St. Epiphanius into Latin. These translations brought him to prominence in the philosophical world. Eruigena was mostly influenced by Dionysius the Areopagite. As a teacher in Paris, he was able to transfer most of his views, which were predominantly Neo-Platonic, to his students. In other words, he shared most of the Neo-Platonic views and this is understandable since Dionysius was a Neo-Platonist. As a theologian he mostly asserted that what is philosophically true can also be theologically acceptable. Thus he sought to reconcile his religious views with Neo-Platonism. Eruigena’s metaphysics is mostly found in his principal work: De Divisione Naturae written between 862-866 AD.

Eriugena understands “nature” to mean everything there is, that is, God and creatures. As a matter of fact, Eriugena argued that God is the only one true reality upon whom all other things depend and return to. Eriugena, then, gave a four-fold division of nature, to wit:

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1. Nature thatcreates and is not created; 2. Nature that is created and creates; 3. Nature that is created and does not create; 4. Nature that neither creates nor is created.

“Nature that creates and is not created” refers to God, who is the cause ofall things but does not himself need to be caused. Here, Eriugena perceives God as the embodiment of both the world of ideas and the work of phenomena. Thus God becomes the creator of the universe who is incomprehensible. In this way, God becomes a hypersubstantia, that is, more than a substance, which can be comprehended by the human mind. He is the first cause of all things. As a result all creation reflects the universal potency of God, who has created the universe with such order and Divine providence that human intellect cannot comprehend. God is conceived as the first cause because all things whether corporeal or incorporeal, material or immaterial find their cause of being in God. “Nature that is created and creates” refers to the divine ideas, which become the prototypes of all created things. They are the “exemplary causes” of all the created species. That they are created does not mean that they come to be at some point of time. In God there is full knowledge of everything, including the primordial causes of all things. These primordial causes are the divine ideas and prototypes of things. These prototypes perform the function of imitating the efficient causes. Even though they are created by God they are identical with God and are as a result responsible for other creations. Thus, these are primordial causes which are prior in the distance of particular sensory object. Examples of primordial causes are goodness, insight or intuition, virtue, power, wisdom, etc. It must be noted that Erigina conceives of the second conception of nature as the word or Logos.They are said to‘create’ in the sense that all creation “participate” in them. For instance, man’s wisdom participates in divine wisdom whichis “Superwisdom” (Stumpf 152). “Nature that is created and does not create” refers to the world of materialsthings, the world of phenomena. This is the appearance of reality in the form of sensory object that have passed through various stages of nature. These are ideas which are clothed in matter lowing from the first category of nature – God passing through the logos through space and time and are infima of logic to form the universal idealistic realm. Eriugena conceives of this category as composed of both idea and matter. Man is conceived as part of this category. This is because man is seen as the image of God and the Trinity. There is, however, the possibility for man to

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Summa Philosophica attain high heavenly superiority. This he can do through three means; reasons, contemplation and intuition. “Nature that neither creates nor is created” again refers to God. It here refers to God as the goal or end of the created order.By this conception, God is the teleological stop guard of all creation. He is the end, according to who all wings are created and to which all wings will return. As a matter of fact, physicists wouldopt for the third division of nature, that is “nature that is created and does notcreate” as the qualified candidate fornature. This is because this division refersto the world of bodies, the world of matter.Eriugena’s philosophy of nature is pantheistic, all very pantheistic. His philosophy, like other medieval thoughts, was anchored on God, and was thus the first sustained onto-theology of the age.He conceived of the perceptual world as God, who is its ultimate beginner and end. He also conceives of man as portraying three aspects; sense perception, intelligent awareness and reasoning. These aspects are in the likeness of the Trinity. Man is a fallen angel, who still had the capacity to regain all that he has lost like beauty and purity. However, there can only be regained in the future spiritual life.For Erigena evil is the absence of good. Man can eventually return to God but has to pass through hell which is but only a temporary spiritual experience.

AVICENNA (980 – 1037 AD) Avicenna was an Arabian philosopher who lived in Iran. Avicenna, who was known in the Islamic as Ibn Sina, propagated the Greek philosophical and scientific heritage in the Arabian world. He specifically developed Aristotle’s logic, physics and metaphysics. He upheld unto the doctrine of eternity of matter, which he regarded as the cause of diversity of individual things. He wrote the Book of Knowledge, Book of Discovery and the Canon of Medicine.

AVERROES (1126 – 1198 AD) In Islam, Averroes was known as Ibn Rushd. Like Aviccena, he was an Arabian philosopher who lived in Spain. Averroes also upheld unto the doctrine of eternity and uncreatability of matter and motion. He jettisoned the doctrine of immortality of the individual soul and the notion of after-life. He held that the world is etrnal and that the soul is mortal. He also taught the theory of twofold truth, which referred to the mutual dependence of the truths of philosophy and theology. His Commentaries on the works of Aristotle were important sources of philosophical learning in the Western world.

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ST. ANSELM OF CANTERBURY (1033 – 1109 AD) St. Anselm was an Abbot of the Monastery of Bec, Normandy and consequently became the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1093. He was a NeoPlatonist and was particularly influenced by Erigena. He professed Neo-Platonic Realism which states that the universal existed prior to the particular. Anselm therefore used this view in his ontological argument for the existence of God. Thus, the reality of an object is dependent on its degree of universality. Since God is conceived as the most universal being, he is the real being of beings and his reality is absolute. By this thought human beings are just particulars exhibiting the universal traits of mankind. There is only one God and his attributes are universal.

The Ontological Argument In his famous book, Proslogium, Anselm develops the ontological argument, which states that since we possess an idea of an infinite being that is also perfect, such a being most necessarily exist because perfect implies existence. Thus, it is impossible to conceive of a perfect being without accepting that such a perfect being exists. If there be any idea that lacks reality, then such an idea is imperfect. It is worthy to note that Anselm’s conception of God is identical with Plato and Aristotle’s conceptions. This is observed in the conception that there is a highest good, which when compared with anything, nothing will exist apart from it. His argument was however not without criticism. One potent argument was raised by Gaunilo of Marmoutier. The argument posited is that Anselm failed to prove the conclusion of his argument. He only succeeded in building of an argument without any proof of the reality of the conclusion. For instance, anyone can conceive of a perfect thing such as a perfect house, a golden hill, etc, but such a conception alone does not proof that such a conception exist. A reaction to his criticism from a different premise is also worth noting. For instance, if we can grant that an idea of God can be regarded as identical with existence of God. In one of his prominent works, Cur Deus Homo? (Why did God Become Man?), Anselm formulated what is popularly known as his Christological theory of satisfaction. The motivation behind this was to reconcile the perceived and apparent inconsistencies inherent between the ideals of divine justice and divine goodness. The argument observes that by sinning against God, man is right to be punished but tobe against such punishment is against divine justice and would become affront to the mercy of God. In other words, why should an all loving God who had infinite mercy punish man in eternal damnation? To this question, Anselm proposes for representative satisfaction, which states that the infinitely good God came

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Summa Philosophica down to represent the human race so that through him man, would be able to wash himself clean of the original sin. This is also known as sacrificial suffering. More so, Anselm’s popular saying, “credo ut intellegam”, that is, “I believe that I may understand” establishes that faith is the only proper basis for rational belief. This was an affirmation of the view expressed by St. Augustine. Thus, faith ought to be recognised as the basic standard for rational thought. It must be noted that his views strengthened the authority of the church making all Papal assertions absolute truth.

ROSCELLINUS (c. 1050 – c. 1112 AD) Roscellinus is also known Roscelin of Compiegn. He was a French philosopher and theologian who is also known to have established Nominalism. Little is known about him but he lived between c. 1050-1125. His main influences come from the works of St. Anselm, Abelard and John of Salisbury. According to the Nominalists reality consist in individual things while universals are but names existing only in the human mind. In other words, universals are mere names designating individual things. This view is the very opposite of realism which posit universalia ante rem – the universal exist before the particular thing. Nominalists however proposed for universalia post rem - universal exists after the particular thing. For the Nominalists, reality is to be observed in the sensory world for the individual things are observed through the sense organs. Roscellinus’ views were vehemently criticized by the Church. The criticism was focused on the Tritheism that he introduced. According to the tritheism, the three Divine persons also known as the Trinity were three independent beings. If it was not so, then God the father and God the Holy Spirit would have become incarnate with God the Son. However, since nothing like that has happened then it seems clear that they are distinct from each other. Again, the thesis that only particulars or individuals are real means that there can be no universal church as the Catholic Church. Thus the universal tag given the Church was a mere follower or flatus vocis. This also follows that the thought of original sin was wrong, since it was only individual sins that are real. With these views, Roscellinus was critically condemned by the Church.

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GIOVANNI DI FIDANZA BONAVENTURA, BONAVENTURE (1221– 1274) Giovanni di Fidanza Bonaventura, simply known as Bonaventure, was a Catholic scholastic philosopher and mystic, cardinal and general of the Franciscan order. He was a student of Scotus. As a Neo-Platonist, he affirmed the Platonic world of forms as prototypes of the world of our senses. This, according to him, is the pivot of metaphysics. Bonaventure recognizes that before the creation of the world, God had certain ideas in his mind upon which he created the universe. The Forms are therefore these ideas in the mind of God. Therefore, the forms are external ideas, become divine ideas and then become identical with the divine. This view establishes some similarities between God and the things he has created. Since God’s ideas are not distinct from his being, it is possible to know God and his nature through his creatures. Bonaventure further asserts that philosophy cannot be properly done without revelation aided by reason in order to guide it from error. This was exactly what Aristotle did. He relied so much on reason that he could not add revelation to his philosophical thinking. It is worth noting that St. Bonaventure was a fierce critic of Aristotle. This is, however, not surprising since he professed Neo-Platonism. He, however, agreed with Aristotle on the composition of objects into matter and form. But he expanded it to include spiritual entities like the soul. For him, the soul is immortal and it is in union with the body only dissipating at death. The soul, after this continues to live separate from the body for some time with the body at all time during resurrection. Bonaventure also asserted that certain things prove the existence of the soul and its immortality. For instance, the soul naturally decodes perfect happiness and since perfect happiness in must be unending because it is perfect, it must be attainable and the soul will contribute enjoying it. For him, God will not imbue in man what cannot be attained and since the human soul has the capacity of attaining such a perfect happiness, then the soul must exist even after the body is left alone in order to continue enjoying this pleasure which is perfect and unending.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (1225 – 1274 AD) Thomas Aquinas was born in Aquino near Naples in Italy. He was named after his birthplace. He was a Dominican monk and a student of Albertus Magnus (Albert the Great). By his depth of insight, he gave a theological interpretation to the works of Aristotle, which was, hitherto, considered as pagan. While interpreting Aristotle’s works to suit the Ctholic doctrines, Aquinas made sure that he discarded the materialist elements in

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Aristotle’s works, while he sustained the idealist elements, notably, the prime mover, the uncaused cause and the idea of pure act, among others. He also sifted elements of Neoplatonism and injected same into his philosophy. For example, regarding the disputatio about the problem of universals and particular, he held a position of moderate realism. The most important aspect of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is the harmony of faith and reason (fides et ratio). Aquinas believed that reason is capable of proving the existence of God and refuting the truths of faith. He tended to have annihilated the idea of ancilla theologiae, that is, philosophy as the handmaid of theology. By harmonizing faith with reason, Aquinas harmonized theology with philosophy, and thus gave an independent status to philosophy. Yet, in practice, he was to make use of philosophy (of Aristotle) to try to prove the existence of God. The philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas was, in 1879, declared the official philosophy of the Catholic Church. His major works were Summa contra Gentiles and Summa Theologica. Interestingly, our work here is also Summa, but Summa Philosophica.

Cosmological Arguments: The Quinquae Viae Aquinas did not believe that God's existence is self-evident. For Anselm the existence of God could be demonstrated by a priori arguments, by merely reflecting on the concept of God, prior to the testimony of experience. For Aquinas however, any rational proof of God’s existence would have to be a posteriori, a proof partially dependent on sense experience. Since his proof of God’s existence was mainly based on our experience in the universe, or say, on phenomena in the universe (in the cosmos), Aquinas’ proof was summarily named ‘cosmological’. In Summa Theologica (1a, 2, 3), St. Thomas Aquinas developed a five-way proof for the existence of God as follows:

First Proof: From CHANGE in things

There is motion (change) in the world as it is learnt from experience. But everything that moves is moved by another (omne quod movetur ab alio movetur). Again, whatever moves is moved by another (quidquid movetur ab alio movetur). It is impossible to proceed to infinity in a series of movers which are essentially and actually subordinated. Therefore, there exists a First Mover which is moved by no other. That First Mover all men call God.

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It was earlier said that whatever moves (is moved) must be moved by another. This is true, because motion or movement is a passage from potency to act. To be moved means to be in potency; and to move means to be in act (contrary to potency). Since the same cannot at the same time and in the same respect be both potency and in act, it means that everything which is moved, is in capable of moving itself, and of course must be moved by another.

In other words, it is evident in our world of senses that in the world some things are in motion. Things are in motion. Things do not move themselves, but something else moves it. It is argued that whatever moves is moved by another (Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur). It is also argued that that thing which moved another is itself moved by another thing. We seem to have a list of movers, since, for every motion, there is a mover. Aquinas argued that there is a mover who moves, but is not moved by another, since prime motion is its nature. This is the First Mover, the Prime Mover, the Unmoved Mover. Aquinas calls the Unmoved Mover, God.

Second Proof: From Efficient CAUSALITY in things

This proof observes being and permanence in creation. It notices that there are things which are causes, not merely of the production, but also of the conservation of their effects. Since they are not causes merely to explain becoming, but also in being, they must act continuously. In sensible things there is an order of efficient causes. It is not possible that something should be its own efficient cause, otherwise it would be prior to itself which world be absurd. The chain of efficient causes cannot be protracted to infinity, since in the series of efficient causes, the first is the cause of the intermediate, and the intermediate the cause of the last no matter how many form the series. And we know that there is no effect without a cause. It is therefore necessary to posit some First Cause without which there would be no intermediate causes at all. The First Cause is the cause of itself (causa sui generis). This First Cause men call God. In other words, this argument is anchored on causation observable in the world. This argument is a rephrasing of the motion argument. It posits that a careful observation in the universe portrays causation in the universe. We observe or reason that one thing causes another; that the cause of the first thing is itself caused by another; and yet, this other thing is again caused by another thing, such that we have a chain

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Summa Philosophica of causes. There is, according to Aquinas, the one caused which caused all other things, yet remains itself uncaused. It is the cause of its generation (causa sui generis), the cause of itself, the Uncaused Cause and The First Cause, which Aquinas calls God.

Third Proof: CONTINGENCY in things Some things are capable of ceasing to exist, that is, they need not exist, and are thus called contingent things. They supervene or depend on something necessary to exist. It is a fact of common experience that contingent beings exist, for example, plants and animals. They come into being and go out of being by death or corruption. These contingent beings do not contain in themselves the reason for their existence. They derive their being from something else – from a being which exists of itself (esse per ipsum subsistens), for we cannot proceed to infinity. Moreover, if all things were possible of being at one time, nothing would have been, and even now nothing would be, and this is false. So then, not all things are possible of being and there is something necessary in things. It is therefore necessary to posit something which is necessary of itself, which is the cause of necessity to all others. This all men called God. For Aquinas all beings in the universe are contingent. Beings come and pass out of existence.As a result they do not have necessary existence and they do not have the sufficient reason for their own existence. For Aquinas, the existence of being is only possible but not necessary. No being can bring itself into existence and if none of them existed at a point in the distant past, then there must have been even at that time another kind of being a non-contingent being, a necessary being, who brought the contingent beings into existence, and that being is God. A necessary being owes his existence to no other being outside itself. A contingent being need not exist since its existence is supervenient, dependent or contingent on another being superior to it. It needs not exist. It may exist. It may not exist. Its existence is not necessary. The only necessary being is God, since God is a being who subsists on its own (esse per ipsum subsistens).

Fourth Proof: From GRADATION in things We find in things something more or less good or better and true and noble. But more of less is predicated of things in so far they diversely approach or measure to something which is most, as the (more hot) hotter is that which closely approaches that which is most hot (hottest). Therefore, there is something which is truest, best, and most noble.

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But that which is said to be most in any genus is the cause of the things found in that genus; just as fire which is maximally hot is the cause of all hot things. Therefore, there is something which is cause of being, and of goodness and any other perfection whatever in all things. This men call God. Aquinas says that when we observe the universe we realize that one thing is always better than the other and later we find out that another thing is better than the one that we first thought was better. Still, we find another thing better than the second, and so on. This implies that there must be, in the degrees of perfect beings, a most perfect being. The most perfect being (ens realissimum) is God.

Fifth Proof: From ORDER or Harmony We see things which have no knowledge acting for a purpose or end, for example, natural bodies. This is substantiated from the fact that they always or more frequently operate in the same way and this achieves what is best known for them. One could say that they do not obtain their goal by chance, but intentionally. But these things which have no knowledge do not tend to their goals unless directed by some brain, that is, something having knowledge. Therefore, there is some intelligent being by whom all natural things are ordered to their end, and that we call God. The thesis of this argument is that the order, harmony, regularity, consistency or design observable in the universe has a designer. But is there order? The steady coming and going of the sun, moon and stars; the steady coming and going of the seasons, the genetic code, the symmetric designs of every physical object, the coherent activities of the ants, the weaver birds and the bees, the uniqueness of the designs on our palms, all portray order. The argument here is that this order is not a work of chance, but of intelligence. That the universe is so orederly constituted, Aquinas argues that there must be a designer behind the design, and this is God. Query: How would Aquinas explain occurrences of natural disasters: tsunamis, floods, typhoons and earthquakes? However, Immanuel Kant sees the work of wisdom or intelligence in the ordering of things in the universe. He appraises the fifth proof as “the oldest, the clearest and the most accordant to the common reason of mankind” (Critique of Pure Reason, 623).

JOHN DUNS SCOTUS (1264 - 1308) Duns Scotus was one of the famous philosophers of the Middle Age and a fierce critic of Thomism. He was considered as a master of

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Summa Philosophica dialectics and was nicknamed Doctor Subtilis. He is considered as the founder of the Scotist School and was born in 1270 but died in November 8, 1308. Scotus propagated his thoughts in the University if Paris and Oxford. His philosophy spans from Theology through to Metaphysics and Epistemology. Scotus’ metaphysics was in direct opposition to St. Thomas Aquinas’. For Scotus, metaphysics is a real enterprise and also theoretical as well. He re-echoes Aristotle’s thought that metaphysics is the science of being as being. Being itself is transcentral which is further divided into ten categories as outlined by Aristotle. The first one is substance and it has independent existence. It must however be noted that Scotus saw the church as the final authority and the highest standard of philosophical reasoning. This is understandable since his period of writing was the scholastic period where church fathers and religious philosophers reigned. He therefore believed that reason is incomplete unless it is aided by revelations As a result, philosophy must be the subordinate of theology. He was, however, a critic of St Aquinas. Scotus’ first of all accepts the Aristotelian view of matter and form; but, asserted further that existence belongs to the matter which is dependent on the form. He believed this because he reasoned that it is inconceivable to think that a being can exist outside its existence. This view is opposed to Aquinas’ view that matter takes it act of existence from the form. In other words, matter exists because its form exists. Scotus, however, says that matter can exist separately from the form. Scotus accepts that matter is but exists entirely devoid of form or ‘prime matter’. It must be noted that Aquinas even denied Aristotle intended to propose for a prime matter and that if there is a prime matter at all, it cannot exist on its own. Scotus however refutes this and claims that prime matter not only can but does exist since it is one and the same substance that underlines every substantial change (King, 2003). Scotus again refutes the widely accepted view that substance of even objects is a composite of form and matter. For him, equating matter with potentiality and form to actuality is unnecessary. This is because prime matter, though without form, is actual and a purely immaterial being is not bereft of potentiality automatically. Furthermore, the human or man has two substantial forms: the form of the body and animating form. The form of the body makes up the human body and is the physical flesh observable by the senses. The animating form, however, is the soul which is responsible for making the human akin to life. The soul ceases to give life to the body at death and

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Summa Philosophica since the forms of the body is weaker than the animating form, the body decomposes. On individualism and universal, Scotus accepted the conceptualist view which holds that the universal exist before things as forms in the mind of God and in things as essence of nature. Thus with universals, he was a realist. For him, the essence or the universal nature of an object has been displaced by the emphasis given to the idea of ‘thisness’ or individuation which is also known as haecceitas. He asserts and individual owe their existence to universal. The ‘thisness’ is nevertheless important since it distinguishes one individual object from the other. Thus, matter is the material substance of individual object. The universal however correspond to objects in the external world where objects are known by experience. As a result, through our knowledge of particular objects we get to know universal principles. The facts however, is that the universal and the particular are united. Scotus also posited the primacy of the will over the intellect, contrary to the Thomistic view. For him, the nature of man and God establishes that the will controls the intellect. What the intellect is capable of knowing is being qua being. If the will was not superior, then it should be controlled by the intellect, however it is not the case. Even God wills and his intellect obeys. Aquinas observed that the intellect conceives of objects which are universal, the particular are those objects that the senses conceived. Scotus however refutes this view and asserts that object of the intellect are not universal alone but particulars as well and they are known by intuition. However, just as Aquinas asserted, universals are known by abstraction. The will is primary over the intellect. God is not controlled by his reason but chooses freely and as such his will is free. More so, Scotus gives a conception of God who he saw as the first mover and the first cause. He accepted the view that our imperfect nature had affected over knowledge of God. He establishes that God exist as a necessary being who is responsible for the existence of contingent beings. This is the Thomistic expression of the existence of God. Scotus also asserts that any proof for God’s existence must be a posteriori. That is God’s existence must be affirmed by our experience. And so, he found St Anselm’s proof of God a bit problematic. This is because it was not enough to say that God is infinite but that he could have proven that the concept of infinite is possible. Furthermore, Scotus asserted that other things like the natural inclination of the human heart to love an infinite good also proof the existence of an infinite God. For him, all beings are related to an Uncaused Being, who is perfect and infinite therefore an infinite being is not only possible but exist as well.

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WILLIAM OF OCKHAM (1285 – 1349 AD) He was born about 1285 in the village of Ockham (Occam) in Surrey, England. He was considered as the most influential philosopher in the 14th Century and a controversial theologian. His approach to philosophy is characterized in a simplistic form which earned him a principle known as the ‘Occam Razor’. He is considered one of the greatest Nominalists. During this period there was the debate between universal essences which are metaphysical realities and that they are responsible for providing the indivisible structure of things. Nominalism however holds that universal essence is a concept in the mind. Occam’s nominalism was called conceptualization. This is because it held the view that universal essences are concepts caused in our minds, when we perceive real similarities about objects in the world. For instance, when one comes into contact with, let’s say, human beings for a long time, such a person develops an idea of humanity. Occam’s metaphysics is pivoted on the view that only the particular exist and the universal is not real. This is because the universal is mere abstraction. This view is also known as Terminism. According to Occam, to conceive of the universal is to conceive of terms, which are assigned to a sum of species. This view dealt a blow to even scientific investigation. This is because, if it is the case that scientists do not study particulars but universals and therefore scientific laws and principles are not universal principles, then by Occam’s Terminism they do not exist. This is so because Occam asserts that universals are only terms of description but not real entities existing in particular objects. Again, there is no universal outside the mind really existing in individual substances. This is because everything that is not many things is necessarily one thing in number and consequently a singular thing (Opera Philosophica II. p11-12).

Ockham’s Razor Ockham’s Razor is based on the principle of parsimony or simplicity. By this, the simpler theory has the more likelihood of being true. It must be noted that this principle has already been recognized in the thoughts of philosophers such as Aquinas and Aristotle. But it was Occam, who used it in more striking ways. For him, the principle of simplicity limits the multiplication of hypotheses. Thus it would be useless to do with more what can be done with less. Since the objectives of theories are to predict and explain fewer assumptions are enough to achieve such aims. It must be noted that Occam proposed for simplicity because he wanted a reduction in the risk of error. Error, according to him, must be avoided even

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Summa Philosophica if it meant abandoning a well- recognized and accepted traditional belief. With this approach, he was able to destroy the synthesis particularly created by Aquinas between faith and reason. As a member and a devout one of the Franciscan school, Occam had the believe that with the approach that hypothetical realities must be simple to make them more truthful and appealing than others, he was in fact supporting religion by divorcing knowledge from theology. Occam on this basis asserted that God must be accepted based on faith and not based on proofs, since theological proofs are not subject to demonstration and observation. The church however thought otherwise. This is because by basing all theological assertions on faith, he was opening up the religious arguments to a lot of problems and criticisms, especially from the empirical scientific world. As a student of Scotus, Occam showed evidence of some influence by Scotus. For instance, his idea of God is similar to that of his teacher. Occam saw God as an omnipotent being who is superior. But God’s will is superior to the intellect. Again, he agrees with Scotus that reality is known to us intuitively.

NICHOLAS OF CUSA (1401 – 1464 AD) Nicholas of Cusa was originally called Nicholas Crebs or Chrypffs. He was a German Catholic Priest who was a Cardinal and Bishop Bressanone. He was mainly influenced by the works of St. Augustine, Pseudo- Dionysius, Erigena and other Neo-Platonists. His major work of philosophy was, De Docta Ignorantia- On Learned Ignorance. In this work, he is known to have recognized that the learned man is the one who is aware of his ignorance. According to him, there are inner world of ideas which constitutes the true knowledge of science. These ideas are very different from individual objects even though they promote such objects in the external world. This view is called Idealistic Nominalism. For Cusa, these ideas only exist in the mind. And the mind knows what is in itself and not what exists outside it. Thus what the mind knows are not individual things but images of them. This view is opposed to the Nominalism proposed by Occam when he assumed that what constitutes knowledge is what is in the external world. Cusa, again, establishes that it is possible for the mind to know the real world. However, to be able to know the real world, human knowledge must conceive of ideas of things and it is only through this that we can know the real world. By means of mental representations man is

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Summa Philosophica able to mirror the world. Also, to be able to know the ultimate reality who is God, Cusa says that man must transcend from rational science. His theodicy is Pantheistic and he believed the world is a true copy of a true God even though they both have different essence. For him, God is an absolute infinite being who must be sought by everyone. He is a unique being through whom all other things actualize. Our knowledge of God cannot be based on reason but through immediate intuition and through an ecstatic vision without comprehension. This is the state of mind that Cusa referred to as learned ignorance. He is however recognized by some scholars to be the last major philosopher of the medieval period. He also asserted that God is infinite and it is through his infinity that all oppositions are identified. Thus God becomes the ‘implicatio’ of all opposites. This ‘implicatio’ results from multiplicity, distinction and opposites. And it is equivalent to Platonic emanations by which God is absolute unity.

FRANCIS SUAREZ Francis Suarez was a Spanish philosopher and theologian. He hailed from Granada and had a lot of works notable among item are the De Legibus (Law) and the Metaphysical Disputations. He re-echoes the Aristotelian view that metaphysics is the study of being as being. Being is conceived as both material and immaterial which also has transcendental attributes such as: unity, truth and goodness. He further asserts that division of objects into form and matter is actually the case. Individual objects are a union of these matter and form. This view is contrary to the Thomistic distinction that particulars make up matter. Again, he establishes that any argument which proposes to proof the existence of God must be based on certain and concrete premises. With this, Suarez saw the cosmological argument as inadequate to proof God’s existence. The motion argument, for him, is unconvincing because the argument did not recognise that there are objects that move themselves. If that is the case, then the premise that one thing is moved by another is indeed problematic. Also, the thesis that there must be a Necessary Being, who is uncaused and uncreated is also not too convincing. This is because the argument only shows an infinite regression of an uncaused caused or an unmoved mover or even an uncreated creator, without actually proving the existence of such an entity. This there is as well the possibility that this necessary being does not exist. Therefore, the argument advanced is indeed not convincing and based on probability. Suarez further posits that there is a difference between a metaphysical composition and a physical composition of an object.

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Metaphysical composition involves essence and existence as a composition of being whilst matter and form accounts for the physical composition. Thus only material beings are composed of matter and form whilst the immaterial beings have the attributes of existence and essence. For him, the matter and form distinction is real since they constitute the physical objects around us. This view has however attracted certain reactions. Some metaphysicians are of the view that the distinction between essence and existence is also real. This is because the essence of a being places a limitation on the beings existence. Thus finite beings are explained and understood in matters concerning their limitations in terms of their essence and existence. Suarez, however, does not see it necessary for such a distinction. He distinguishes between a predicamental relation and a transcendental relation to explain this. According to him, a predicamental relation is an accidental one whilst the transcendental relation is an essential one.

REFERENCES

Williams, Thomas (2003). The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Frank, William A. and Allan B. Wolter, OFM. (1995). Duns Scotus: Metaphysician. Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1995.

Armstrong, A. H., ed. [1970]. The Cambridge History of Later Greek & Early Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Copleston, Frederick Copleston [1950]. A History of Philosophy. Vol. II: Medieval Philosophy: From Augustine to Duns Scotus. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press. (Many subsequent reprintings by various presses.)

Copleston, Frederick Copleston [1953]. A History of Philosophy. Vol. III: Late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press. (Many subsequent reprintings by various presses.)

Marenbon, John, ed. [1998]. The Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. III: “The Middle Ages.” London: Routledge.

Maurer, Armand A. [1982]. Medieval Philosophy. 2nd ed. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

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McGrade, A. S., ed. [2003]. The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McInerny, Ralph [1970]. Philosophy from St. Augustine to Ockham. A History of Western Philosophy, vol. 2; Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press.

Baird, Forrest E., and Kaufmann, Walter [1997].Medieval Philosophy.2nd ed. Philosophic Classics, vol. 2. Upper Skaddle River, N. J.: Prentice-Hall.

Bosley, Richard N., and Tweedale, Martin [1997].Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy: Selected Readings Presenting the Interactive Discourses among the Major Figures. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press.

Hyman, Arthur, Walsh, James J., and Williams, Thomas, ed. [2010]. Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic and Jewish Traditions. 3rd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. (1st ed., 1978; 2nd ed., 1983.)

Kretzmann, Norman, and Stump, Eleonore, ed. & trans. [1988].The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts. Vol. 1: Logic and the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Klima, Gyula, ed. & trans., with Allhof, Fritz and Vaidya, Anand Jaiprakash [2007].Medieval Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

McGrade, Arthur Stephen, Kilcullen, John, and Kempshall, Matthew, ed. & trans. [2001].The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts. Vol. 2: Ethics and Political Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McKeon, Richard, ed. and trans. [1929]. Selections from Medieval Philosophers.2 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. (Vol. 1: Augustine to Albert the Great. Vol. 2: Roger Bacon to William of Ockham.)

Pasnau, Robert, ed. & trans. [2002]. The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts. Vol. 3: Mind and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Schoedinger, Andrew B., ed. [1996]. Readings in Medieval Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

Shapiro, Herman, ed. [1964]. Medieval Philosophy: Selected Readings from Augustine to Buridan. New York: The Modern Library.

Wippel, John F., and Wolter, Allan, ed. [1969].Medieval Philosophy: From St. Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa. New York: The Free Press.

Henry, Desmond Paul [1967]. “Medieval Philosophy.”The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. Vol. 5, pp. 253–58.

Inglis, John, ed. [2002] Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition: In Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. London-New York: Routledge.

Knowles, David [1964]. The Evolution of Medieval Thought. New York: Vintage Books.

Koterski, Joseph W., S.J. An Introduction to Medieval Philosophy: Basic Concepts. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Kretzmann, Norman, et al., ed. [1982].The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

*This chapter was co-authored by Ephraim-Stephen Essien and Frank Amissah

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CHAPTER TWELVE

THE INTELLECT IN NICHOLAS OF CUSA’S MYSTICAL THOUGHT

Christopher Etokudoh

“At the threshold of the modern age stands a towering, ambiguous figure – Nicholas of Cusa (1401 – 1464). This meteoric thinker, clearly the original mind of the fifteenth century, has been called the gate-keeper to the modern world. Yet having had no predecessors or genuine follower, he properly belongs neither to the past nor to the future” (Dupre, L. “Introduction of Nicholas of Cusa” in American Philosohical Quarterly. 64,(1990). No. 1,pp. 1-6). This is Louis Dupre’s opening remarks in his introduction of the philosopher and theologian, Nicholas of Cusa. Our task here is not that of situating the revered cardinal in a historical epoch, but his firm resolve to retain theology at the heart of philosophy and perhaps also the decidedly mystical inspiration of his thought reveal an intellectual more common in the high middle ages. In this write up we shall discuss his mystical theology and intellect. A man much concerned with ecclesiastical unity when the church was raved by division, this desire provides a background for his famous work, “De Docta Ignorantia” (1440), for Theology lies at the heart of Nicholas’s philosophy and theology points at mystical theology however much it differs from it. Let us first look at the Dionysian background and influence on his doctrine.

1. DE DOCTA IGNORANTIA AND PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS: (LEARENED IGNORANCE AND PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS)

Pseudo-Dionysius was so widely known in the Christian West that Nicholas of Cusa could unqualifiably boast of his depth of familiarity with Dionysius. In his Autor de la docta ignorantia he refers to the Greek text of the Dionysius corpus that he had possessed in Florence, and how Pope Nicholas V gave him Ambrose Traversari’s “very recent translation” of Dionysius. Above all, Nicholas’ acquaintance with the works of Dionysius is better attested to be the frequent citations in his works. Further proofs of his affinity and fervour for Dionysius are advanced from his dialogue ‘De non-aliud’, where he unambiguously presents himself as Dionysius’ spokesman, and in the “Apologia Doctae Ignorantia” where he forcefully

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Their Doctrine Because God utterly transcends all knowledge and being mystical union occurs in Agnostia or unknowing, which in turn requires a logic of negation. Dionysius takes as model Moses ascent of Mount Sinai which represents the spiritual progress that culminates in mystical theology. Moses first performs the rites of consecration, purges himself and sets himself apart, then he ascends to illumination in the place where God dwells and finally “plunges into the truly mysterious darkness of unknowing” (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology. Trans. C. Luibheid in Dionysius’s The Complete works, New York: 1987, 137 (1,3; PG 3, 1000 C – 1001 A). In this last stage, according to Dionysius, Moses achieves union with God by a completely unknowing inactivity of all knowledge, and knows beyond the mind by knowing nothing. It is obvious here that Dionysius rather presents mystical theology as an austere, intellectual ascent that progressively negates or “strips away” all positive names and attributes of God. In drawing up his program Dionysius links affirmative and negative theology with Neoplatonic schema of procession and return. Affirmation follows the causal procession from God’s unity into multiplicity and materiality, and expands its repertoire accordingly; negation “rises from what is below up to the transcendent” and contracts toward silent unknowing” (Dionysius, Mystical Theology, 137,3; 1033 C). This way of negation is thus the dialectic appropriate to mystical theology. The concluding parts of the treatise trace this negative dialectic; it begins by a denial of sensible names of God, followed by the intelligible ones including “one’, “divinity” and the Trinitarian names. Finally, Dionysius denies the adequacy of negative theology itself, because for him God transcends affirmation, negation and the contrast between them. With this final denial the treatise closes as Dionysius points towards silent union with unknowable God. In this journey of dialectical ascent of negation which leads into the cloud or darkness of unknowing we become aware that this quite positively complete unknowing is knowledge of him who is above everything that is known (Dionysius, “Letter One” in Complete Works, 263, PG3: 1065A). For Dionysius, this pattern of negation and unknowing defines mystical theology.

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2. DE DOCTA IGNORANTIA This is Nicholas’s first speculative work greatly influenced by the Dionysian pattern. Here, he develops a learned ignorance and a specifically mystical dialectic, the coincidence of opposites. Tapping heavily from the Socratic ideas, he describes “learned ignorance” as a reflective awareness, a knowing that we do not know. With this knowing ignorance, he reflects on God, the universe and Christ. Nicholas presents his discovery of “docta ignorantia” as a revelation. He narrates his experience while returning by ship from Constantinople. I was led by, as I believe, a heavenly gift from the Father of lights, from whom comes every excellent gift, to embrace incomprehensible things incomprehensibly in learned ignorance and through a transcending of incorruptible truths which are humanly knowable. Elsewhere, in the Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae (1449), Cusa says that this revelation took place before he had read Dionysius. He says that this new insight led him to a careful study of all the theologians. In the Docta Ignorantia, Cusa cites the Divine Names, Mystical Theology and Letters concerning negative theology, divine transcendence and knowing God “above every mind and intelligence” (Docta Ignorantia, trans. J. Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa on Learned ignorance, Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1980, 158 (516). Nicholas even commented that Dionysius endeavoured to show in many ways that God can be found only through learned ignorance. Furthermore, Cusa’s phrases, “learned ignorance” and “embracing incomprehensible things incomprehensibly” is an echo of Dionysius’s discussion of “Agnostia”. Suffice it then to say that for both Nicholas and Dionysius the unknowable God is approached through unknowing. Again, Agnostia and learned ignorance involve purgation or the removal from the mind of all positive images. Since this removal includes the logic of negation, dialectic comes into play. Supporting this from the mystical theology Nicholas invokes his mentor Dionysius as saying “we speak of God more truly through removal and negation” (Docta Ignoratia, 67 (242 – 244; 1, 16). It goes without saying that Cusanus followed Dionysius’s negative dialectic. But there is a slant away from Dionysius in Nicholas’s conclusion. Where Dionysius uses a higher negation to overcome the contrast between affirmation and negation, Nicholas turns to coincidence of opposites, presenting God as the Absolute Maximum. He says that “there is no

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Summa Philosophica proportion of the infinite to the finite”. The distinctive quality of the maximum is that opposites coincide within its unlimited power. Since the Absolute Maximum is all that which can be, it is altogether actual. And just as there cannot be a greater, so for this reason there cannot be a lesser, since it is all that which can be. But the maximum is that than which there cannot be a lesser. And since the maximum is also such, it is evident that the minimum coincides with the maximum (Docta Ignorantia. 53 (203, 1, 4). Mental purification is a prerequisite of this argument, stripping the superlative “maximum” and “minimum” of their association with the comparatively large and small. Only then do maximum and minimum coincide in an infinite unity that enfolds and transcends all finite contrasts. The Absolute Maximum for him is “beyond both all affirmation and negation”. In the coincidence of opposites, Cusa finds a logic appropriate to his learned ignorance. In Docta Ignorantia, this logic sustains his teaching on the universe as the contrasted maximum, and on Christ the coincidence of divine and human.

JOHANNES WENCK’S CRITICISM OF CUSA’S DOCTA IGNORANTIA In his “De Ignota Litteratura”, Wenck challenges Nicholas’s conception of learned ignorance and the coincidence of opposites. Vain curiousity leads Cusanus to “apprehend incomprehensibly the incomprehensible” during this life whereas, we can only understand, “comprehensibly and in terms of an image’. Nicholas leaves proportion and sensible things behind to ascend to the infinite, enters “intense darkness” and “vanishes amid thought”. Furthermore, the coincidence of opposites undercuts knowledge because it “destroys scientific procedure and all interference, destroying, as well, all opposition and the law of contradiction. This destruction reflects Cusa’s ignorance of logic and disregard for Aristotle” (De Ignota Litteratura. Cited in Duclow, D. “Mystical Theology and Intellect in Nicholas of Cusa, in The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. LXIV No. 1. 1990 (Pp. 111 - 129). By blurring all contrasts, coincidence also yields many other doctrinal errors: it abolishes distinctions between God and creatures and between the persons of the trinity, and destroys the individuality of Christ’s humanity. With the above changes, Wenck associates Nicholas with late medieval heretic especially Eckhart, who abolished distinctions between

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God and creatures, and concludes that Cusa, like Eckhart, deserves condemnation.

APOLOGIA DOCTAE IGNORANTIAE Even with ‘Ad Hominem’ arguments Cusa invokes Dionysius and the Mystical Theology to answer to Wenck’s criticism of the Docta Ignorantia. He affirms in no uncertain terms that Wenck’s reaction proves Dionysius right when warned against disclosing mystical teachings to the ignorant. He argues, for Wenck to be freed of his blindness he should with discernment read Dionysius’s Mystical Theology and there discover how he discusses Moses ascent, and his teaching that only when all things have been left behind can we be carried away with Moses to the place where the invisible God dwells. Hence, where Wenck sees only vanishing amid vain thoughts, Nicholas sees the Dionysian mystical ascent. This ascent occurs in learned ignorance, and Cusa cites Dionysius’s praise of one’s ignorance, especially concerning the divine. The unknowable God, he emphasized must be sought in unknowing – that is in learned ignorance. This search requires the coincidence of opposites. Although Wenck and the “Aristotelian Sect” consider coincidence heretical, its acceptance marks the beginning of the ascent to mystical Theology”. In saying this Cusa does not reject the principle of contradiction to restrict its range because reason itself is inadequate to Mystical Theology. For Cusa the principle of contradiction remains “first with respect to discursive reason but not at all with respect to the seeing intellect. Intellect is a higher power of the mind. Free of reason’s process and contrast, it sees opposites united in their principle or source. Nicholas clarifies his points with mathematical examples. As he directs our thoughts or gaze beyond otherness and opposition, coincidence marks the intellectual transition from reason’s contrasts to God’s infinite unity. And coincidence is not his last word, but begins the mystical ascent toward God. For “God is beyond the coincidence of contradictories, since he is the opposition of opposites, according to Dionysius” (Apologia 61 (576); also in Dionysius, Divine Names, (5, 10; PG 3: 825B). Coincidence itself is thus inadequate in the final analysis to divine transcendence. The logic of coincidence remains essential to learned ignorance and mystical theology because it marks the boundaries of rational knowledge and leads into an “unknowing” vision of God. It is clear from the foregoing that in replying to Wenck, Cusa emphasizes the mystical features of learned ignorance and the coincidence of opposites.

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3. GOD AND INTELLECT DE VISIONE DEI – Written at the request of the brothers in Tegernsee who had great reverence for the Docta Ignorantia, Bernard composed the famous “Laudatorium Doctae Ignorantae” to demonstrate it. It is Cusa’s richest spiritual treatise and its title suggests both God’s vision of us and our vision of God. The play between these two ways of seeing is Nicholas’s main theme which he illustrates with an experiment. He sent the treatise to Tegersee with a portrait whose face “seems to behold everything around it”. Nicholas asks the brothers to meditate on this “icon of God”. Regardless of where he stands, each brother feels that the face looks at him alone. And as they walk before it, they find that, “the face does not desert anyone who is moving – not even those who are moving in contrary direction” (C. L. Miller, “Nicholas of Cusa’s Vision of God” in An Introduction to the Medieval Mystics of Europe, ed. P. Szarmach, Albany: Sunny Press, 1984, p. 296). Cusa notes the paradoxes in this experiment. The icon’s gaze is at once inclusive and exclusive, seeing everyone present and concentrating on each as if it were concerned for no one else. Central to these paradoxes is the contrast between the all-seeing icon and the brothers’ limited, perspective vision. This contrast reveals a far more dramatic one between God’s vision and ours. Human seeing is always limited because it perceives from a point of view. But God’s view is radically without perspective, it is absolute. He affirms unambiguously that God’s vision is freed from restriction or limitation in even the most perfect vision or knowledge that we might have or conceive. Nicholas still harps on the lack of proportion between finite and infinite, human and divine. The icon also illustrates the fundamental relation between them, because absolute sight is the condition for all restricted vision. His vision contains all modes of seeing without limitation – that is all finite perspectives coincide within God’s infinite sight. Without God’s sustaining gaze there would be no human vision. Indeed, there would be nothing whatever, since, God’s seeing confers being on creatures. While absolute vision includes a creative, ontological dimension, Nicholas’s main concern here is the relation between the divine and human vision. No one can see God except in so far as God allows himself be seen. He asserts further, to see you is not other than that you see the one who sees you. In this mutual seeing God’s primacy and initiative are clear, since God reveals himself to the seeing subject. Nicholas then outlines a progress from the fracture of seeing mutuality in sin, to contracted mental sight, and finally to learned ignorance. Free will enables us to turn toward or away from God. Echoing Augustine

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CONTEMPLATION OF GOD Cusanus’s icon provides an “enigmatic” mirror that directs him towards “face to face” contemplation of God. He turns from the painted icon, ‘this image of your face’ to its divine examplar. Again he shifts perspectives, moving from bodily to mental seeing and from contraction to Absolute. As in mutual vision, the divine face is the truth and examplar of human faces. Nicholas again reaffirms reciprocity, but here with novel twist. Each face is an image of God, and when it looks toward God, it “creates nothing other than itself or different from itself, because it see its own Truth. As the icon seems to gaze exclusively at each brother, God appears to share the restriction of those who look toward him. An apparent reversal appears here suggesting that we create God, in our own image. Nicholas is however, not Feuerbach or Freud. The issue however remains one of perspective. Beside the perspectival vision of God, there remains another way of seeing – namely, learned ignorance that strips away the veils of contracted images and concepts. Here, if not seeing “face to face” we have at least moved beyond restricted mental vision. By breaking through all finite perspectives, ‘leaned ignorance’ approaches God’s perspectiveless vision. In his explanation Nicholas develops the classical Platonic analogy of the eye overwhelmed by the sun’s brilliance.

References

Cusa Nicholas, De Doctae Ignorantia (On Learned Ignorance), tr. J Hopkins, Minneapolis, MN: Banning, 1985

Cusa Nicholas, Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae in: Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia, Vol. II, edited by Raymond Klibansky. Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1932.

Dupre, L. “Introduction of Nicholas of Cusa” in American Philosohical Quarterly. 64,(1990). No. 1,pp. 1-6)

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Miller, C.L., “Nicholas of Cusa’s Vision of God” in: An Introduction to the Medieval Mystics of Europe, ed. P. Szarmach, Albany: Sunny Press, 1984)

Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology. Trans. C. Luibheid in Dionysius’s The Complete works, New York: 1987, 137 (1,3; PG 3, 1000 C – 1001 A).

Wenck, Johannes, De Ignota Litteratura. Cited in Duclow, D. “Mystical Theology and Intellect in Nicholas of Cusa, in The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. LXIV No. 1. 1990 (pp. 111 - 129).

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE INTELLECT AND WILL IN THOMAS AQUINAS AND FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Christopher Etokudoh

INTODUCTION

This paper sets, as its goal, the onerous burden of marrying two ideological opponents. It sets for its target not the task of constructing the biographical sketch of the Angelic Doctor and that of Nietzsche, but comparing their teachings on intellect and will. Examining the rival and almost diametrically opposed views of these two intellectual giants on the role played by intellect and will in human activity seems almost like putting a square peg in a round hole. Reading through their respective treatment on this subject-matter may be a Herculean task but the larger comparative project is not at all unproblematic. Despite their radical differences in their account of intellect and will Aquinas and Nietzsche purport to be offering an explanation of certain fundamental features of human experience. By this deep intention they are united. That informs our curiosity to investigate into such project. The justification of such curiosity requires an uncommon intellectual excursion. We shall herein examine the views of each of them separately and then in our comparison expound each in confrontation with its rival. We shall finally endeavour to adjudicate the conclusions of that confrontation. In fidelity to our outline, let’s first examine Aquinas’ account of intellect and will.

INTELLECT AND WILL IN AQUINAS Profound and elaborate analysis of intellect and will in Thomas Aquinas is witnessed to in his most celebrated piece Summa Theologiae. This account is given in two contexts: first in the prima pars, where he treats the creation and distinction of things, from the hierarchy of being that issues from God to arrive at human beings, discussing intellect and will as powers proper to such beings; second, in the prima secundae, where he treats acts by which human beings come to the perfection of their nature, outlining the role played by each of these powers in human action. His treatment of human psychology is placed within a larger account of human being in particular, and of created being generally. Aquinas’ explanatory account is far from being an introspective or phenomenological description. For him, description is not explanation but can provide materials for the construction

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Summa Philosophica of explanatory account. In his discussion of intellect and will, Aquinas rarely appeals to introspective evidence, because for him this has nothing to offer in the way of explanation. We shall discuss his two treatments of intellect and will: first, in themselves; and secondly, in their relation within the dynamic structure of human action. Intellect and will are powers or potencies proper to the rational soul, the substantial form of the human being. Being a finite created structure its essence is not its perfect operation. It is in potentiality to diverse operations and in diverse ways. The powers of the soul are the principles of those operations which by the soul is brought to perfection in acts (T. Aquinas., Summa Theologiae, 1948: 1.77.1, hereafter referred to as S.T ). Like all potencies the powers are diversified according to the nature of the act directed toward, and acts themselves are diversified according to the nature of the object.” Powers, then, are specified by their formal objects, or, more precisely, by the formality under which they are related to their objects” (S.T.1.77.3.).Intellect is that power of the soul which is in potency to knowing truth, or that power by which the soul is related to being under the aspect or notion of the true. Thus the proper object of the intellect is being qua intelligible. Will on the other hand, as a species of appetite, is that power of the soul which is in potency to desiring the good, the power by which the soul relates to being under the notion of the good. Thus, the proper object of the will is being qua intelligible the powers of the intellect and will are significantly distinguished under the formal aspect which they are related to their common object, being. Aquinas insists that the powers of the soul are potencies, and potency must be moved to act by something already in act. As Walter Thompson observes, This cause of motion can be either a principle, which moves a moving mover, or an object, which moves as a term or end. A power therefore can be in potency in two ways: first, with respect to its operation – whether it be exercised or on – and second, with respect to its object – whether the end of its exercise be this or that (W.J. Thompson., “Perspectivism: Aquinas and Nietzsche” in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 64.n.4, pp. 451 – 473).

Both the intellect and will are passive with respect to both their operation and object. Each of them awaits a cause for its exercise and for its determination. Aquinas argues that it is the function of the will to move to exercise. As for operation, the will as agent or efficient cause can move both itself and intellect to exercise. This is so because under the will’s

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Summa Philosophica proper object, the common notion of the good, are subsumed all the particular goods which belong to particular exercises of the powers [S.T.1.82.4]. Will, being inclined to the good in general, moves the power directed to more particular ends to their operation. It belongs to the intellect, on the other hand, to move by determination. The in intellect as end or formal cause can move both itself and will to the specification of its act by presenting a power with its object. In this regard, under the proper object of the intellect – the common notion of being and truth – are subsumed all particular truths regarding the powers and their proper acts and objects.{S.T.1-2.9.1} The relationship between intellect and will in general is that of reciprocal causality: Will as efficient cause moves both itself and intellect to exercise, intellect as formal cause moves both itself and will to determination (S. T. 1-2.9.3). The causality of the powers is not univocal, but of diverse kinds. Will causes an operation to be intellect causes it to be so and so. This formal differentiation of the powers is not a real separation, rather as Aquinas says, these powers include one another in their acts {S.T.1.82.4.1}. Certain difficulties seem to be evident in his account. How do we grapple with what appear to be vicious circularity in the causality of intellect and will? If the exercise of the particular act of the intellect depends on a prior act of the will, which in turn determination on a prior act of the act of the intellect, which again depends on a prior act of will, and so on, how do we avoid infinite regress?. Now, if we suppose that we must begin from an initial inertial state and if we think of causality solely in terms of mechanistic efficient causes then the circularity cannot be overcome. But, Aquinas himself makes neither of these suppositions. Instead, he argues for the inherent natural dynamism of the powers, the natural directedness of the powers toward their proper end (Stumpf, “Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities”, in Christian Theism and Problems of Philosophy, M. D. Beaty ed., 1990: 266). The will Aquinas argues, is by nature inclined to the good, the intellect to the universal true. He buttresses his argument by emphasising further that, God himself, as first cause of the being and final end of the operation of all natures, is the first cause of such natural movements in things (M. D. Jordan:1991). God is the ultimate source of the natural inclinations of created beings, and beings are created by God as naturally inclined, as naturally ordered to certain operations and ends. So the intellect naturally knows the first common principles in both speculative and practical matters while the will naturally wills the universal good and last end. Such universal movement to the end makes possible every particular act of the will for it is its efficient cause. Yet it remains for the intellect to

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Summa Philosophica determine a particular act of will to a particular apprehended good. The natural teleology of the powers, overcomes the problem of initial inertia, while the problem of infinite regress is overcome by the recognition of the fact that we are not dealing with a temporal series of univocal efficient causes but with the operation of necessarily concomitant forces which differ in kind. Intellect moves to determination, will to exercise; intellect as formal, will as agent or efficient cause. The operation of each is indispensable to any particular act. A second potential difficulty arises in attempting to sort out the problems of agency that arise in any so-called “faculty psychology.” Aquinas’ treatment of this problem is the reply to an objection which argues that since appetite is naturally devoid of understanding, will can in no way receive and head a command of reason. He argues that the powers of the soul operate not for themselves alone but for the whole human being. Thus any statement which attributes agency to a power can be translated into one which speaks of the human being who possesses such powers as the real agent (ST 1-2. 17.5.2). Faculties or powers though they are to be formally differentiated cannot be really separated. They are potentialities which inhere in integral human agents. At this juncture, it is expedient to briefly examine the role of intellect and will in the two kinds of human activity. Here, Aquinas distinguishes between speculative and practical activity with corresponding two kinds of intellect. While the speculative and practical intellect differ in their material object – speculative concerned with necessary intelligible and the practical with contingent operable – they still share a common formal object – being under the aspect of the true. Again they differ with respect to their end. While the speculative intellect directs apprehension to the consideration of truth alone {conformity of the intellect to object}; practical intellect directs {conformity of intellect with right appetite} which disposing to the right end disposes to the right operation. This distinction still remains accidental, not essential and so Aquinas admits only one power of the intellect. These two kinds of intellect are, however, diversely related to the will. While will does not enter into the constitution of speculative reason’s object, it enters into that of practical intellect’s object. We shall here also apply our conclusion on the relation of intellect and will generally to these two cases. First, “will can move both the speculative and the practical intellect to its operation or exercise” {S T 1-2. 17.6; 1-2. 16.1.3}, while it cannot itself apprehend a thing as such, and so it can move the intellect to the act which culminates in such an apprehension. So will can indirectly contribute to its own determination. Second, in

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Summa Philosophica speculative matters will cannot determine intellect’s object, but in practical matters will enter into the very constitution of intellect’s object. The object of practical intellect is a possible thing to be done. Possible things to be done are judge by practical intellect according to their goodness or appropriateness. Goodness is the proper object of the will, and the good is that which is desirable. The disposition of the will toward a possible thing to be done serves to mark it as a thing good and to be done or evil and to be avoided (S. MacDonald., Egoistic Rationalism: Aquinas’ Basis for Christian Morality, in Christian Theism and the Problem of Philosophy, 333). Let us now present Nietzsche’s criticism of this account before we discuss his own views on this subject.

NEITZSCHE’S CRITICISM OF AQUINAS To present Neitzsche’s interpretation and perhaps criticism of Aquinas, let us first understand what it means in Neitzsche’s views to interpret, to forward a view. According to him, views do not simply wear their meanings their sleeves, they are not transparent to their deeper significances. So confronting Aquinas Nietzsche will ask: This Latin psychologist, what dose he really want, what is it that drives him in such a direction? (F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals 1.1, 1968). All view for Nietzsche without exception are perspective views, are interpretations. All interpretations both reflect and at the same time conceal an interest. {Beyond Good and Evil, 6;32}. They are fundamentally masks worn by a will to power which engenders them. It is the Nietzschean genealogist’s task to unearth and evaluate what lies hidden behind and beneath the surface ciphers of a view, to lay bay the character of that constellation of motives which give rise to it. Thus, the interpretation of a view becomes the evaluation of one type of character and its masks by another. His interpretation of Aquinas’ views gives him a clue to what character – type Aquinas is. what Aquinas does in his work is to forward a certain kind of a philosophical account, which offers an explanation of intellect and will in the context of a broader account of nature or being. Such an account treats human nature and human psychology on the basis principles of explanation taken to hold for being generally, principles potentially accessible to those with adequate aptitude in the use of reason. Such a totalizing view Nietzsche argues, in forwarding the myth of an “order of things” accessible to the rational, denies the creative and perspectival character of interpretation. It denies differences in type subjecting all alike to the tyranny of rational order. On Nietzsche’s account, such a view masks the working of a will to power of a certain type – a type that feels the need

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Summa Philosophica to deny what differs from itself through totalizing claims. such a type is weak and base the action of this type is a reaction: too weak to affirm its difference, it denies the difference of others. The Thomist account which vindicates this type is, according to Nietzsche, But a scholarly version of the morality of the weak and base – all the more contemptible perhaps for its perverse ingenuity (F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 186). Aquinas’ treatment of human psychology and human action views human acts as those which proceed from a deliberate will, and so those which we are Master. For Nietzsche, such separation of door and deed denies the efficacy of will to power; for a reason which serves the weak. Such a view is the self – deception of impotence which masks the necessity of will to power’s causality with the illusion of free conscious agency. “The subject, “says Nietzsche, (or the soul) makes possible to the majority of mortals, the weak and oppressed of every kind, the sublime self –deception that interprets weakness as freedom, and their being thus – and as merit. {Ibid. 13} The weak and base, who are constitutionally incapable of true action – self-affirmation – interpret the necessary expression of their impotence as praise-worthy and self-restrain, and likewise condemn the strong for choosing to give vent to the seeming excess which is but the necessary expression of their type {T 16.7.}. in either case a fictitious agent is held to be responsible for what in truth cannot be other. Furthermore. Aquinas treats human powers and operations in terms of a natural teleology in which each power is ordered to some end proper to it, the realization or attainment of which constitutes that power’s proper perfection. Such perfection provides the standard for evaluating the success or failure of any particular operation of that power. For Nietzsche, such an elaborate teleogical account,

Denies the universal efficacy of will to power, substituting instead a multitude of superfluous principals. {Beyond Good and Evil. 13;36}.

It denies the multiplicity of evaluative principles which manifest in a given type. It type, difference in the interested character of evaluation and substitutes a monolithic measure of adequacy taken to be binding on all perspectives. Let us go on to advance Nietzsche’s views on intellect and will.

NIETZSCHE’S ACCOUNT OF INTELLECT AND WILL Nietzsche’ teaching emphatically that all views are perspectival interpretations. His discussion on intellect and will carries a pervasive

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Summa Philosophica duality of aspect. He examines each from the standpoint of cosmology (nature), and psychology {phenomena whatever are expressions of force, or more precisely, of a constellation of interacting forces (G. Deleuze, 1983: p.3, W P 567). What a thing is – its essence – is just this dynamic constellation of force. A thing is its expression, it is its effect. On a cosmic level, life is the play of these contending forces and such play has the character of a struggle for mastery. This play of life Nietzsche calls will to power. “A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength,” he says (BGE 13 and, GS 349). He posits will to power as a pervasive cause of all phenomena: The world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined according to its “intelligible character” – it would be “will to power” and nothing else (BGE 36). While recognizing the ubiquity of will to power’s causality, Nietzsche also affirms the radical plurality of appearances, the heterogeneity of phenomenal manifestations. it is will to power that gives rise to, that differentiates, that relates the order of forces which are the being of anything (G. Deleuze, op. cit. 85 -86). Thus, will to power, confers on anything its peculiar character and makes it to be of a certain type. On the cosmic level, Nietzsche envisages two antinomic types of force and will: an active force driven by a will that is affirmative; and a reactive force driven by a will that is negative. In their manifestation in human beings these types appear as the strong and noble as opposed to the weak and the base human type. In the psychological account, Nietzsche focuses his attention on will to power’s working on human beings. He affirms that will to power gives rise to, differentiates, and orders expressions of force into types. In the phenomena we call human beings such determinations specify distinct types of character. What differentiates one human being from another is the character of force and their directives will that the person manifests. For Nietzsche, all the manifold by a will to power. All activities are expressions of distinct human types, and such types differ radically. Still, all activities proceed toward an end which, while varying materially by type and circumstance remains formally constant – namely, the advancement of the life of an actor, the increase of his power (GM 3.7). Nietzsche envisages two formal possibilities which correspond to his basic distinction in types of force and will. Strong and noble types further their lives through action – while the weak and base further theirs through reaction – through the denial of what differs. Since all particular human acts are acts of particular human beings, and all particular human beings are of a type, all human acts must issue from a determinate type. Therefore, all

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Summa Philosophica human acts will be driven by a will to power which seeks to further a determinate mode of existence. For Nietzsche, all that live share a common end, all of a type share a common character, and all of a kind share common functions or operations. In exploring human beings we must look to them first as a kind sharing common functions, and as types possessing distinct characters. Here Nietzsche considers intellect and will among several functions common to human beings. He considers each in itself and both in relation. For him, intellect as a function is not fundamentally a cognitive or contemplative power, but an interpretive or creative one. Intellect, then, is an instrument in the hands of will to power, and its products – interpretations – are a means through which will to power works its way in human being (BGE 6). The language of instrumentality could sound misleading by reifying and separating the function and its ruling will, whereas, for Nietzsche, particular exercises of a function are not accidentally or extrinsically but essentially or intrinsically related to will to power. In Nietzsche’s view, the essence of a thing is its effect, the expression of its inherent force, and will to power both gives rise to and gives order to such an expression. In human beings, such force is expressed through the operation of those functions peculiar to their kind, which belong neither to faculties nor agents, but are the expression of that will – driven force. Turning to the use of intellect in diverse character – typ4es Nietzsche differentiates particular uses of intellect according to second – order attitude which diverse types assume toward the nature of intellect as a function. For him, “as the type is so is the act; and as the will is, so is the type”. The diverse types of will to power correspond with the types of exercise of what on the surface appear to be a common function.

Operations diverge in character as radically as the character types from which they proceed. Let us then look into these divergences. It is the mark of the weak and base in Nietzsche’s opinion, to mask the creative function of the intellect, to deny its interpretive and perspectival character, and to substitute a totalizing interpretation of its role which masquerades as the truth of things. Since they lack the nobility of spirit necessary to affirm themselves in affirming their own interpretations as interpretive, they end up deny interpretation altogether, and subjecting all to their unacknowledged creations. On the other hand, the strong and noble, because their action is an affirmation of their own difference, self – consciously affirm the creative function of the intellect. Because they glory in themselves, they glory too in their expression. They own their interpretations as interpretive, as perspectival. They know their

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Summa Philosophica knowing to be a free creation proceeding from a will to power which makes them what there are. Such types renounce the pretty comfort of subjection to any totalizing view and assume the terrible but liberating responsibility of truth – creation (W.J Thompson, 465). Turning to the will, Nietzsche maintains that as all functions acts of will are surface operations or manifestations of a deeper force – will to power. What we call willing is but a channel through which this more fundamental drive is vented. As expressions of will to power, particular will – acts receive their meaning from the character of that which they express, from the type of will to power they display. As an operation, Nietzsche sees willing as, above all, something complicated, something that is a unit only as a word. He gives a phenomenological description thus: The will is not only a complex of sensation and thinking, but it is above all, an affect, and specifically an affect of the command… A man who wills commands something within himself that renders obedience, or that he believes renders obedience (BGE 19).

In any instance of willing, there are a manifold of volitional sensations, a ruling thought, and simultaneous affects of command and obedience. These exist in an inseparable complex. Their mutual relation and not any one taken in isolation constitute the phenomenon we call willing. It is will to power and not some sovereign subject that wills in our willing. The fiction of the sovereign subject is the interpretation of the weak and base. The strong and noble recognize that behind their willing is no free and independent subject, but the necessity of will to power. The very force of their character compels them to discharge their inherent power, to express their strength. The weak while equally bound to this necessity of character, masks it by means of the fiction of moral agency, of freedom of the will. They do so because as they can’t enjoy the pleasure of commanding the subduing others through affirmation of self, feel the vicarious pleasure of mastery over self through a denial of strength and suppose their impotence an achievement.

On the relationship of intellect and will as functions, Nietzsche sees the operations of the two as inextricably intertwined. In any human act, we find an inseparable complex of thought – directed will and. Will – prompted thought. The exercise of neither, it would seem, can exist in isolation. There can be no thinking without willing, no willing without thinking. A will to power of a certain type always lies behind each thinking-willing, giving rise to it, giving meaning to it, giving value to it (G.Deleuze, 53).

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Finally, Nietzsche examines the attitudes assumed by the divergent types of human being toward the relation of intellect and will to one another and to will to power. The weak and base according to him, mask the causality of will to power through the reification of functions into independent faculties whose operation is subject to the control of a neutral subject. The strong and noble on the contrary, affirm both the inseparability of thinking – willing and their dependence on a will to power of a certain type.

COMPARISON OF AQUINAS’ AND NIETZSCHE’S VIEWS Our exposition of the two philosophers account on intellect and will shows Aquinas’ position to be dialectical while Nietzsche’s is interpretive, revolving around his teaching on perspective. Nietzsche denies the existence of a subject of activity, an agent independent of his acts, by asserting that a thing is the sum of its effects. The Thomist on the contrary cannot conceive of a sum (effects), without proposing something to which the things summed accrue (cause). For Nietzsche, “it is only granmmatical habit that compels us to speak in this way”. But the Thomist will hold that, for one who finds an essential connection between our mode of knowing and speaking and our mode of being, the mute dismissal of grammatical habit seems cavalier or casual. Nietzsche seems to blow his concept of will to power out of proportion, giving it such a pre-eminent position that it has universal efficacy; whereas the Thomist will wonder why the will to power cannot be otherwise, Why are Nietzsche’s pages filled with exhortation, with denunciation, with lament? Why quarrel with necessity? Why not rather resign oneself to the inevitable? (S. Rosen,1989: 200). Again, with regard to Nietzsche’s account of the best type of human life, the Thomist will wonder what makes such a life best. The strong and noble type we recall, is the one who creates meaning, purpose, and direction, who in Nietzsche’s term, “overcomes”. The context of his teaching on the best types of human life is a genealogical unmasking of common morality and its claim to be grounded in the nature of things. Nietzsche appears to deny the existence of any such natural order and to ground his own rival account in the impossibility of discovering any such norm. Yet here the Thomist will wonder whether, despite his intentions, Nietzsche is not himself forwarding an account of the nature of things as norm (W. J. Thompson, 468). Nietzsche replaces a purposive teleological natural order, conformity to which constitutes human perfection, with an alternative vision of a nature without purpose or direction which, he claims, can function as no norm. if purpose or value or meaning is to exist, it must

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Summa Philosophica be created by man, or more precisely by “the one who overcomes, “who must freely or self-consciously posit it from his being. But then where lies the true extent of the freedom of “the one who overcomes”? At least, he must be bound by one formal criterion, he must be the one who overcomes, who creates meaning, purpose, and value. The freedom of such a type is not absolute, but conditioned. His is an ordered freedom, a freedom to-in his case to overcome. In fact, his Freedom is form of enslavement-enslavement to the necessity of life as will to power (Thompson, 468). But why is freedom understood in such a way normative? What distinguishes it from all other norms which Nietzsche has debunked. Why then is life as will to power normative? Is Nietzsche here not doing precisely what he denounces all previous philosophers, namely, forwarding a teaching on the” nature of things” conformity to which constitutes the best form human life? Isn’t he arguing, That nature or the order of things is such – and – so, therefore human activity should be such – and – so, that is, in conformity with the “nature of things”? (G. Rosen, 200). With this approach the Thomist wonders why Nietzsche would not justify his account as an account. If he does nothing that radically departs from the way of past philosophy, why would he have the privilege of placing his account above dialectical scrutiny? Furtherstill, it seems expedient to compare Nietzsche’s enterprise in the account he gives and the content of his account. His account betrays more of the tacit Thomist in himself than he would admit. He expresses the natural desire in man to know. Given his teaching on perspective and the relation of perspectives to determinate types of will to power, why does he forward his account in opposition to rival accounts? The need to vindicate oneself through comparison is according to Nietzsche, precisely the province of the weak and base, whose impotence compels them to give an account. It is evident that Nietzsche’s activity as author contradicts his teaching. Nietzsche vindicates his view in the face of its rivals, while forwarding a view that maintains both the impossibility of meaningful vindication and the superiority of that view which recognizes the impossibility and renounces the quest for vindication. But it may be objected that Nietzsche is here offering no vindication but an interpretation, one affected in full knowledge of its perspectival character. What is at the crux of the matter is the fact of speaking at all, not what he speaks. In the words of Alasdair Maclntyre, Such speaking betrays a deep need to justify, to give an account of ones views. And this in turn manifests a still more fundamental desire, the desire to be right, to hold not just any view but a true one (A. Maclntyre, 1990:45 – 46).

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Nietzsche’s own deeds here bear witness to Aristotle’s observation that all human beings by nature desire to know. And is it perhaps a corollary of this desire that all human beings wish the object of their desire to receive its due, that truth be known for what it is and not otherwise? What then explains the natural human inclination to argue, to offer accounts which intend to be true and to resist those that appear to be false? This reaction of Nietzsche gives the lie to his own account. In fact, his account demonstrates precisely that we do pursue truth precisely as common, that the notion of the universality of truth is inherent in our desire for it. The notion of the universality of truth implies that it is apparent to all. That truth is common “in itself” does not follow that it is common “to or for us”. In Thomistic terminology, though the order of being (truth), itself is common to all, the apprehension of that being need not be. Here, the views of Aquinas and Nietzsche are radically opposed, for while Aquinas differentiates, speaking of things “in themselves” from things “to or for us”, differentiates the “order of being” from the “order of apprehension”, and relates them from measure to the potentially measured, Nietzsche seems to eliminate the distinction altogether. There is no difference he will argue, between appearance and reality, between things for us and things in themselves. The notion of a “real world”-underlying the world of appearance is a fiction-and no innocent one at that, for it is fabricated by base, reactive types too weak to assume the responsibility of perspectival truth-creation (W. J. Thompson, 471).

Putting the issue squarely and weighing their effects objectively, between Aquinas and Nietzsche, I am rather inclined to the views of Walter Thompson, that Aquinas is in fact the perspectivist, while Nietzsche, despite his wide protects, succumbs to a form of totalism. Aquinas maintains that, while the order of being is given prior to and as the condition for understanding, the process of knowing depends decisively on the disposition of the inquirer, on his perspective. Nietzsche rather holds that there is no common reality intended by inquiry, that all knowing, whatever the perspective of the knower, is truth-creation. On a Thomistic account, coming to know is a complex process into which figure the dispositions not only of will and intellect, but of the passions, the senses, the body – in short, of the whole human being. Knowing is in this sense a process in which concret human agent comes into relation to some particular intelligible object. It is perspectival then in this sense. Yet while all knowing is from a determinate perspective, still, it is directed toward a reality whose existence is given prior to its being known. The real “in itself”

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Summa Philosophica becomes the real “to or for us” in and through an act of knowing which effects a relation between a concrete human agent and some knowable object. It is only a realist position like that of Aquinas that can explain this process adequately well; any contrary position leads us into intellectual abyss. Nietzsche’s counterposition takes the form of the quite radical and totalizing claim that all knowing is not merely mediated by the perspective of the knower, but that the knower constructs an intelligible world out of the resources of, and in harmony with the needs of his own character. Such account of knowing holds for all perspectives. Types differ only in the attitudes they assume toward it, the strong affirming and the weak denying it. If this is Nietzsche’s position, it remains difficult to see how he can forward it and avoid self-refutation. Nietzsche’s claim is a universal one: that all knowing is conscious or unconscious truth-creation. As universal it must apply also and especially to itself. And when applied to itself, it explodes, the very claim it purports to make.

CONCLUDING REMARKS In this paper we have endeavoured to provide not only the common criteria on which Aquinas and Nietzsche philosophized, but also to justify their intentions in dabbling into such complicated subject-matter as intellect and will. Gleaning from the pages of their works, it stand crystal clear that these two intellectual giants accord intellect and will a central place in their respective anthropologies. Aquinas has proved himself a rare gem in the intellectual tradition he estsblished in western though which has remained till today fashionable and unshakeable. In her introduction of the the work Aquinas reader, M. Clark writes, To know Aquinas is to know the medieval mind at its finest, its most powerful, its most modern. Our excursus into Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, where he discusses intellect and will provides a recipe into the rich heritage of medieval scholarship. What makes the Summa most distinguishable is its intellectual appeal in an age when men were finding the intellect too constraining. Thinking or intellectual exercise not only in medieval times but even in today’s world has remained the most vulnerable of all human activities and people are more prone to act than to think in most circumstances (be they tyrannical or pleasure seeking). Hence Martin Luther King’s observation: “Rarely do we find men who willingly engage in hard solid thinking… for nothing pains some people more than having to think” (M. Luther King, 1975: 10).

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But Aquinas’ bold strides have proved the exception to be case. He is reversed as the patron of scholars and he deserves nothing less than this. Without mincing words, Nietzsche has also left indelible marks on the sands of modern philosophy thought. Max Weber, for instance, acaknowledged his indebtedness to Nietzsche saying, One can measure the honest of a contemporary scholar, and above all a contemporary philosophy, in his posture toward Nietzsche and … our intellectual world has to a great extent been shaped by … Nietzsche (A. Mitzmann,1969:182). Nevertheless, his exposition is still tainted with logical pitfalls which he cannot but pay the price of such inconsistencies. The genealogical method consists in external critique, in the confrontation of antinomic perspectives. He seems to be arguing simultaneously that there is no norm (truth), and that will to power is the norm (truth) about life. If this is so, then he is an ethical naturalist and if he is, then something is true no matter how it is expressed, and his philosophy is incoherent. Aquinas’ method, on the other hand is dialectical. It attempts to join an issue from within and it is in this way he has been able to describe in very clear terms the operations of the intellect and will. His work remains an epitome in the history of philosophical thought.

References Aquinas, T., Summa Theologiae, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1948. Clark, M. (ed), An Auinas Reader, New York: Garden City Image Book, 1972. Deleuze, G. Nietzsche and Philosophy, tr. H. Tomlinson, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. Jordan, M., “The Transcendentality of Godness and the Human Will” in Being and Goodness, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991. King, M., Strength to Love, London: Collins Fontana Books, 1975. Lee, P., “Aquinas on Knowledge of Truth and Exitence” in New Scholasticism 60 (1986) Maclntyre, A., Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy and Tradition, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990. Mitzmann, A., The Iron Cage, New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1969. Nietzsche, F., Beyond good and Evil, trans. W. Kaufmann, New York Random House, 1968. …………………., On the Genealogy of Morals, trans, W. Kaufmann, New York: Random House, 1968.

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………………….., The Will to power, ed. W. Kaufmann, New York: Random House, 1968. Owens, J., “Judgment and Truth in Aquinas” in Mediaeval Studies 32 (1970), Pp. 138 – 158. Rosen, S., The Ancients and the moderns, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989. Stumpf, S. E., “Intellect, Will and the principle of Alternate Possibilities” in Christian Theism and Problems of Philosophy, M. D. Beaty ed. Notre Dame Press. 1990. Thompson, W., “Perspectivism: Auinas and Nietzsche” in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 68 n.4 Pp. 451 – 473

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PART IV: HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE RENAISSANCE, HUMANISM AND MODERNITY

The Renaissance was a time of rebirth and renewal; a time of release and rediscovery. It was a rebirth of learning in the letters, humanism and philosophy. Men began, once again, to emphasise the natural abilities of the human person to reason independently of faith. Men began, once again, to believe in man. Man took the centre stage of all endeavours. Man again was acclaimed to be the measure of all things, as had been posited earlier in the Hellenic age by the Sophist called Protagoras. Man was the centre of all things. This was the age of humanism. This was the age of anthropocentricism. While the age preceding the renaissance, the age before renaissance was an age of theocentricism (where God was the centre of all things), the renaissance was an age of anthropocentricism, where man was the centre of all things.

The renaissance began in Italy in the fifteenth century and spread to other parts of the world. Italian artists and intellectuals felt that they had broken with the glory and civilization of the past, of the erstwhile Roman Empire. Motivated by this mindset, they sought for a rebirth of civilization, a renaissance of civilization. They felt that the Dark Ages, the medieval time and its concomitant theocentricism, did not bring much progress. The Italian intellectuals sought a rebirth of ideas, after the intellectual and cultural stagnation of the middle age. They looked back to ancient Greece and Rome for inspiration. Among these five Italian states – the Republic of Venice, the Duchy of Milan, the Republic of Florence, the Papal States, and the Kingdom of Naples - , the Republic of Florence was the centre of renaissance (Matthews and Platt, 2001: 291-292).

The thinkers, intellectuals and artists of the renaissance entertained such questions as, What is human nature? How are human beings related to God? and what is the best way to achieve human happiness? These men were greatly inspired by the writer Petrarch. The scholars of this age emphasized learning the humanities, which they called studia humanitatis, that is, studies of the humanities. These included moral philosophy, Latin literature, Greek literature, history, music, painting, sculpture, grammar, rhetoric, and poetry. New schools sprang up in most Italian city-states, in response to the demand for humanistic learning. These schools the renaissance ideal of an education intended to liberate the mind (liberal education) was born. To achieve this purpose, the

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Summa Philosophica curriculum was based on the recently recovered Latin and Greek works, instead of the curriculum of the scholastic education in the Middle Ages.

The Italian humanists believed that the ancients had better answers to the questions of the nature of man, of the question of how to achieve happiness, and of the question of the relationship between man and God. They thus abandoned the medieval answers and went back to ancient Greek hilosophy. They focused on the the important role played by the individual in the society. Individual happiness and fulfillment became a central renaissance theme, which spread to the West unto this day. Because of the focus on human fulfillment, there was an attendant emphasis on the optimistic assessment of human nature. Humanism and optimism in human nature were significant during this time.

The humanists went back to Plato’s philosophy. In 1462 Cosimo de Medici established the Platonic Academy in Florence. Scholars assembled here to analyse the writings of Plato and the works of the Neo- Platonists. This academy was led by Marsilio Ficini (1433-1499), whom Cosimo commissioned to translate Plato’s works into Latin (Matthews and Platt, 296). Ficino was a grand marshall of Florentine Neo-Platonism. He tried to harmonize Platonic ideas with Christian teachings. Ficino’s student, Pico della Mirandola (1463 - 1494), had as his goal, the synthesis of Platonism and Aristotelianism. He sought to do this within a Christian framework. This Christian framework encompassed Hebraic, Arabic and Persian ideas. This framework implied that al knowledge shared common truths, and that Christians could benefit from studying non-Christian writings. Pico della Mirandola’s importance for the renaissance extended from his synthesis of diverse thoughts to his accentuation of humanism in his book, Oration on the Dignity of Man. Here, in this work, Pico argued that human beings are endowed with reason and speech, created as a microcosm of the universe. Set at the midpoint in the scale of God’s creatures, they are blessed with freewill, the power to make of themselves what they wish, which enables them to raise themselves to God or to sink lower than the beasts. This liberty to determine private fate makes human beings the masters of their individual destinies and, at the same time, focuses attention on each human being as the measure of all things (Matthews and Platt, 2001: 298). Pico represented the highest stage of humanism of the renaissance.

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

As more emphasis was laid on man, matter and reason, there was less belief in Aristotle’s speculations about motion of bodies and on the universe. Between 1600 and 1715, early modern thinkers, scientists and philosophers countered faith with reason, dogma with skepticism, and divine intervention with natural law. These early modern thinkers made mathematics their beacon light in the search for truth. They accepted as true what could be proven mathematically and rejected those that could not be so proven. Mathematics was at the centre of knowing. But this “mathematicocentricism”, if we could invent such a word to mean math- centredness, went well for physics and astronomy, surely, not for philosophy. This emphasis on mathematics and the simplicity of numbers were direct influences of Plato with Neo-Platonism and of Pythagoras. We recall that Plato wrote on the entrance to his Academy: “Let none who has no sense of mathematics come in here”. Everything became mathematized and geometricized.

The most significant scientific revolution was the Copernican revolution, which replaced geocentricism with heliocentricism. But, we shall see, below, the astronomical theorists from Aristotle to the time of Copernicus, and how the latter influenced his succeeding scientists, including Tycho Brahe, Johannes Kepler, Galileo Galilei and Isaac Newton.

Ancient Astronomy before the Scientific Revolution Ancient Greeks explained the motions of the planets by making theoretical models of the geometry of the solar system. For example, by determining which of the known planets had the longest periods of retrograde motion, they were able to discover the order of distance of the planets (Pasachoff 13). Aristotle summarized the astronomical knowledge of his day into a qualitative cosmology which held sway for about 1800 years. On the basis of what seemed to be very good evidence, what he saw, Aristotle thought, and actually believed that he knew, that the Earth was at the center of the universe and that the planets, the Sun, and the Star revolved around it. The universe consisted of a set of 55 celestial spheres that fit around each other, each having rotation as its natural motion (Pasachoff 13). The motions of the spheres affected each other and combined to account for the various observed motions of the planets, including

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Summa Philosophica revolution around the Earth, retrograde motion and motion above and below the elliptic. The outermost sphere was that of the fixed stars, beyond which lay the prime mover (primum mobile), that causes the general rotation of the stars overhead (Pasachof 13). Aristotle held that below the sphere of the Moon everything was made of four basic “elements”: earth, air, fire and water (as was pointed out above when we discussed Aristotle’s physics). The fifth “essence”, the quintessence, was a perfect, unchanging, transparent element of which the celestial spheres were thought to be formed. However, most of Aristotle’s astronomical theories were far from what is now considered to be correct. Eratosthenes was a Greek mathematician, astronomer and geographer (Emiliani 78). He measured the size of the Earth. He made the measurement by looking in a deep well or by using a “gnomon”, basically an upright stick that is allowed to cast a shadow in sunlight (Pasachoff 15). Eratosthenes used observations made at two cities that were on the same line of longitude; that is, one was due north of theother. The length of the shadow cast by the gnomon (or, perhaps, the shadow inside a well) at noon varied from day to day. At one of his cities (Syene, near what is now Aswan, Egypt) on one day of the year (which is now called the summer solstice), that shadow vanished (Pasachoff 15). This vanishing indicated that the sun was directly overhead in Syene at that moment. From the length of the shadow at the same date and time at his second city, Alexandria, he concluded that Alexandria was one fiftieth (1/50) of a circle around the Earth from Syene. Further, Eratosthenes knew the distance on the Earth’s surface between Syene and Alexandria. It was 5000 stadia, where a stadium was a unit of distance equal to the size of an athletic stadium, about 160 meters. If one-fiftieth of the Earth’s circumference was 5000 stadia, Eratosthenes concluded that the Earth must be 250,000 stadia around. The value is said to be in reasonable agreement with the value we now know to be the actual size of the Earth. But even more important than the particular numbers is the idea that, with the application of logic, the size of the Earth could be measured and fathomed by mere humans (Pasachoff 15). Posedonius, a Greek philosopher and scientist, observed that the bright star, Canopus, when highest in the say, was barely visible on the horizon at Rhodes, while at the same time it was 7.50 above the horizon at Alexandria (Emiliani 79). He took the distance between Rhodes and Alexandria to be 3,000 stadia (Olympian stadia, making the distance equal to 569km) and concluded that the polar circumference was 144,000 stadia, or 27,300km. Although Poseidonius’ value of 7.50 was 2.50 longer than it should have been, he had corrected his observations for the refraction of

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Summa Philosophica light through the denser layers of the air near the horizon. That so much impressed the Greek astronomer Ptolemy that he endorsed Poseidonius’ value rather than Eratosthenes’ (Emiliani 79). Based on that endorsement, Poseidonius’ value remained unchallenged for 1,500 years. One degree on a great circle (that is, a circle of maximum size around the Earth) was thought to be 27,300/360 =75.8kmor 40.9 nautical miles. Martin Behaim’s globe of 1492, made just before Christopher Columbus discovered the Americas, showed that the distance between Tenerife in the Canary Islands and Japan to be 900 of longitude, equal to about 3,300 nautical miles at the latitude of 260N along which Columbus sailed (Emilliani 79). Hipparchos was the first to determine the distance to the Moon (Emiliani 79). He measured its parallax by observing its position with respect to the distant stars at two different times, about an hour apart. The parallax, corrected for the Moon’s own motion across the sky (0.50/hour) was 0.20. In one hour the Earth turns 150. According to Eratosthenes, 150 along the surface of the Earth are equal to 10,416 stadia (Emiliani 79). Hipparchos was living in Rhodes, which is at a latitude of 36.40N. The circumference of the parallel at the latitude is equal to cos53.60 multiplied by the Earth’s circumference. Sin 53.60 X 250,000 = 0.805 X 250,000 = 201, 250 stadia = 3600 Therefore, 150 = 8,385 stadia and ½ (150) = 7.50 = 4,193 stadia Knowing the distance to the Moon and observing that the substended diameter of the Moon is 0.50, Hipparchos could also determine the size of the Moon: Radius of Moon = sin 0.250 X 2,402, 409 = 0.00436 X 2,402,409 = 10,482 stadia = 1, 648km This compares well to the modern value of 1738.2km (Emiliani 81). Aristarchos, from the knowledge that a solar eclipse was limited to a small region of the Earth’s surface, concluded that the Sun was much larger than the Earth. He proposed that the sun, not the Earth, was at the center and that around it orbited Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn (the known planets in antiquity). The planets were ordered on the

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Summa Philosophica basis of the time it took for a planet to return to the same position in the sky (Emiliani 81). Claudius Ptolemy rejected the arguments of Aristarchos and put the Earth at the center, with the Moon, Mercury, Venus, the Sun, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn orbiting around it (Emiliani 81). Ptolemy’s model was Earth-centered, as was Aristotle’s. To account for the retrograde motion of the planets, the planets had to be moving not simply on large circles around the Earth but rather on smaller circles, called “epicycles”, whose centers moved around the Earth on larger circles, called “deferent” (Pasachoff 14). Sometimes the center of the deferent was not centered on the Earth (and thus the circle as eccentric). The epicycles moved at a constant rate of angular motion (that is, the angle through which they moved was the same, for each identical period of time). Another complication was that the point around which the epicycles angular motion moved uniformed was neither at the center of the Earth nor at the center of the different (Pasachoff 16). The epicycle moved at a uniform angular rate about still another point, the “equant” (Pasachoff 16). The equant and the Earth were equally spaced on opposite sides of the center of the deferent. Ptolemy’s views were very influential in the study of astronomy, because versions of his ideas and of the tables of planetary motions that he computed were accepted for nearly 15 centuries. His geocentricism was invalidated by Copernicus’ heliocentricism, although Aristarchos had earlier suggested heliocentricism as we mentioned above. Astronomical studies in the medieval period lay in “limbo” until, a Latin translation of Ptolemy’s great work, the Almagest, was printed in 1462. This translation was made possible per Johannes Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press (Emiliani 84). The stage was set for Nicolas Copernicus.

Astronomy and Physics: From Copernicus to Newton

Copernicus began studying the Almagest in 1500 AD at the instigation of Francisco Maria Novara, his resident astronomy teacher at the University of Bologna. Navara did not like Ptolemy very much, and thought that Aristarchos was probably right in placing the sun at the center (Emiliani 85). Copernicus, after studying the Almagest, especially the part that deals with planetary motions, concluded that indeed Aristarchos had been right. Hence the motions of the planets could move readily be

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Summa Philosophica explained by assuming that the planets moved around the sun in circular orbits (Emiliani 85). This Copernican helocentricism was contained in his great treatise De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium, which he refused to publish until a few weeks before his death in 1543. Copernicus still assumed that the orbits of celestial objects were circles. The notion that circles were perfect, and that celestial bodies had to follow such perfect orbits indicates Copernicus’ inability to break away entirely from the old ideas. Since his theory contains only circular orbits, he still involved the presence of some epicycle in order to improve agreement between theory and observation. Copernicus and the revolution he made were, thus a synthesis of Aristarchos and Ptolemy. Tycho Brahe was Danish. In 1560, a total eclipse was visible in Portugal, and young Tycho witnessed the partial phases in Denmark. At age 14, Tycho devoted his life from then on to making an accurate body of observations, having been struck by the ability of astronomers to predict the event (Pasachoff 22). Three years later, he witnessed a conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter, a time when the two planets come very close together in the sky (Pasachoff 22). In 1572, Tycho was astounded to discover a new star in the sky, so bright that it outshone Venus. It was what is called a “supernova”, indeed, “Tycho’s supernova” (pasachoff 22). It was the explosion of a star, and remained visible in the sky for 18 months. Tycho’s fame spread on the basis of the supernova. Tycho bestowed upon Johannes Kepler, his assistant, his tables of planetary positions, gathered through more than 30 years of careful observations (Emiliani 85). Kepler immediately began trying to make sense of Tycho’s data. In 1609, Kepler finally announced that the planetary orbits were not circular, as Copernicus had maintained, but elliptical, with the sun occupying one of the two foci. (This is called Kepler’s first law). Furthermore, he found that the speed of a planet along its orbit was constant, but was highest at perihelion and lowest at aphelion (“Perihelion is the point along an elliptical orbit around the sun that is closet to the sun. “Aphelion” is the opposite point, farthest from the sun. “Periastron” and “apastron” are the equivalent points of an orbit around a star (Emiliani 85). Kepler found, specifically, that “the line connecting a planet to the sun sweeps equal areas in equal times”. This is Kepler’s second law. The planets orbit the sun in such a way that the line connecting a planet with the sun sweeps equal areas in equal times (Emiliani 85). This means that the planets move slower at aphelion and faster at perihelion (Berry 186). Kepler later discovered that “the square of the sidereal period of a planet

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(the time a planet takes to return to the same position with respect to the fixed stars) increases with distance from the sun is proportion to the cube of the semimajor axis of its orbit” (Emiliani 86). This is Kepler’s third law. In summary, the three laws of Kepler are as follows:

First Law: The planets orbit the sun in ellipses, with sun at one focus. Second Law: The line joining the sun and a planet sweeps through equal areas in equal times. Third Law: The Square of the period of revolution is proportional to the cube of the semi-major axis of the ellipse.

Kepler’s third law relates the period of an orbiting body to the size of its orbit. The outer planets orbit at much slower velocities than the inner planets and also have a longer path to follows in order to complete one orbit (Pasachoff 33). The period of revolution of satellites around other bodies follows Kepler’s laws. The laws, with different constants of proportionality, apply also to artificial satellites in orbit around the Earth and to the Moons of other planets (Pasachoff 35). To this day Kepler’s laws are the basic description of the motions of solar system objects. Galileo was to usher in the modern period of astronomy. Owing to the fact that the telescope was not yet invented in the times of Tycho, the absolute distances of the planet from the sun could not be determined. Then came the telescopes and Galileo. Galileo Galilei, Italian scientist, believed in the Copernican system and later provided important observational confirmation of the theory. Galileo was the first to devise and use telescope for astronomical observation. In his book Sidereus Nuncius (the Starry Messenger), Galileo reported that with his telescope he could see many more stars than he could with the naked eye, and could see that the Milky Way and certain other hazy-appearing regions of the sky actually contained individual stars (Pasachoff 36). He described views of the Moon, including the discovery of mountains, craters and the relatively dark region called “Maria”, seas (Pasachoff 36). He discovered that the small bodies revolved around Jupiter. This discovery proved that all bodies did not revolve around the Earth. Subsequently, Galileo found that Saturn had a more complex shape than that of a sphere. He also discovered that Venus went through entire series of phases. This, according to Pasachoff, could not be explained on the basis of Ptolemaic theory, because if Venus traveled in an epicycle located between the Earth and the Sun, Venus should always appear as a crescent. Galileo’s observations showed that Venus was a

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Summa Philosophica body similar to the Earth and the Moon in that it received light from the Sun rather than generating its own (Pasachoff 36). Galileo put together his views in a book entitled “Dialogo Sopra I Due Massimi Sistemi del Mondo”, translated Dialogue on the Two Great World Systems in 1629, published in 1632. The two great systems referred to those of Ptolemy and Copernicus. The book was condemned by the Church and Galileo was summoned before the Inquisition. Eventually, the Copernican system, the cause for which Galileo died, prevails in modern cosmology. The Church upholds the freedom of scientific research (Pasachoff 39). Isaac Newton set modern science on its feet by deriving, laws showing how objects move on the Earth and in space, and by finding the law that describes gravity. Newton invented calculus in order to work out the law of gravity. His major ideas are contain in his great work, the Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy), known as The Principia. Newton’s Laws of Motion In his Principia, Newton advanced three laws of motion. These laws govern the motion of objects in the normal circumstances of our everyday world. i) First Law of Motion Newton’s first law of motion was a development of ideas that had earlier been advanced by Galileo. The law is stated as follows: “Every object continues in its state of rest or uniform motion in a straight line unless impressed forces act on it”. Thus a rocket, fixed from the earth to reach the moon, eventually reaches outer space, where the gravitational attraction ofthe earth is very small. If no other forces acts on it, the rocket then continues to move in a straight course with uniform velocity. When it comes within the gravitational field of the moon, however, its path is influenced by the gravitational attraction of the moon, and may therefore change (Nelkon, 41). This law was in direct conflict with the Aristotelian idea that forces have to be continually applied to keep a body in motion. The property of mass that resists change in its motion is called inertia. This law recognizes that objects have a reluctance to move when they are at rest, and a reluctance to stop when they are moving (Young and Freedman, 124).

ii) The second law of Motion The second law of motion states that “force is directly proportional to the rate of change of momentum produced” F = ma

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As an illustration, suppose a boy on a bicycle, total mass of 50kg, has a velocity of 1m/s and that, pedaling faster for 5s, the velocity increases to 3m/s. Then, since ‘rate of change’ means ‘change per second’, Average force = momentum change = (50x3-50x1)kgm/s = 20kg m/s2 Time 5s 1kg m/s2 is the force acting on a mass of 1kg which gives it an acceleration of 1m/s2 by definition, this force is the newton (since Newton in the s1 unit of force). Hence the force is 20 newtons.

iii) Third law of Motion Newton’s third law is usually stated as follows: “To every action there is an equal and opposite reaction F = -F In other words, to every force corresponds another force of equal magnitude but opposite direction. It is this principle that makes a jet plane go, the force expelling gas backwards from the engine is the action, and the force moving the plane forward is the reaction. It is this third law that also explains why the engines of space shuttles and other rockets can propel them even when they are in empty space. A propeller airplane also flies forward because of Newton’s third law; the force of the propeller pushing air back and that of the air pushing the propeller forward are action and reaction. Thus action and reaction are equal and opposite. From this law of action and reaction, we attract the earth with an equal and opposite force. These laws of motion are often referred to as laws of mechanics.

iv) Universal Law of Gravitation In his three laws of planetary motion, Kepler had given a description of the ways that planets orbit around the sun. Newton was to provide a fundamental theory to support Kepler’s laws (Marion and Hornyak 234). He suggested that the same law that describes how objects fall on Earth describes how objects fall far out in space. He particularly realized that the Moon revolved round the Earth because of thegravitational attraction between their masses which decreases as the square of the distance apart (Nelkon 645). In Pasachoff’s analysis, Newton realized that the Moon is always falling toward the Earth, and, at the same time, moves forward in space in its orbit (Pasachoff 41). The law of gravitation is stated as follows: “Every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with a force that is directly proportional to the product of the

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Summa Philosophica masses of the particles and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them F, = G m 1 m 2 R2 When Fg is the magnitude of the gravitational force on either particle, M1 and M2 are their masses, r is the distance between them, and G is a fundamental physical constant called the gravitational constant (Young and Freedman 437). This law of universal gravitation is so called in that it works all over the universe rather than being limited to local applicability, on Earth or even in the solar system (Pasachoff 41). The mass of a body was later to be given a more theoretical touch by Albert Einstein in his general theory of relativity, wherein the principle of equivalence, he derived the equivalence of inertial mass and gravitational mass.

Advocates of the Method of Science: Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes

The scientists of the empirical age laid greatest emphasis upon observation and the formation of temporary hypotheses. This empirical approach to knowledge made the philosophy of the time to assume that the basic processes of nature are observable and capable of mathematical calculation. It was also assumed that everything consists of bodies in motion, that everything conforms to a mechanical model. The heavens above and the smallest particle below were thought to exhibit the same laws of motion. Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes advocated for the method of science in philosophy. Bacon principally advocated for the inductive method of science, which was guaranteed by experiment and observation. Francis Bacon declared that the purpose of learning was to increase man’s power over nature, for, according to him, “knowledge is power” (Scientia est potestas). This aim could only be achieved through learning which reveals the true causes of things. Francis Bacon proposed a skeptical attitude towards dogmatic learning, as represented by scholasticism. Dogmatic presupposions and prejudices were called “Idols” by Bacon. The step towards this epistemic attitude was to cleanse the mind of the presuppositions, prejudices and bias (Idols). Thus cleansed of prejudices and false conceptions,one would then adopt the new method the true method of the new learning, which involves a rational reinterpretation of the facts of experience. Bacon introduced induction as the new method of

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Summa Philosophica learning. This involved enumeration of instances of the data of experience, observation and experiment. Induction, the predominant method of science, was advocated in philosophy. Thomas Hobbes loved geometry. He assumed that empirical facts correspond to geometric axioms, or that the axioms that the mind formulates correspond to the actual characteristics of observable moving bodies. His was of the belief that “to think in terms of geometry is to know how things actually behave” (Stumpf 219). Francis Bacon and Hobbes were the pathfinders to modern philosophy, the father of whom was Rene Descartes. Descartes shall be discussed the chapter that follows under the theme of rationalism.

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN

RATIONALISM: DESCARTES, LEIBNITZ, SPINOZA

ON RATIONALISM Fascinated by the progress and advance of science and mathematics, the continental Rationalists, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz set to provide philosophy with the exactness of mathematics: Thus: They set out to formulate clear rational principles that could be organized into a system of truths from which accurate information about the world could be deduced. Their emphasis was upon the rational capacity of the human mind, which they now considered the source of truth both about man and about the world (Stumpf 227). For emphasizing upon the rational capacity of the human mind as the source of truth, their system came to be called Rationalism. Rationalism is an epistemological doctrine which asserts that reason is the sole source of truth and knowledge. This doctrine emphasizes the role of reason in the attainment of human knowledge. The Latin word for reason is ratio. They emphasized ratio and the doctrine came to be called rationalism. Rene Descartes of France, Gottlob Leibnitz of Germany, and Baruch Benedict Spinoza of Holland, pioneered and establish this school of thought called rationalism.

RENE DESCARTES (1596-1650) Rene Descartes, latinised as Renatus Cartesius, was born in Touraine in 1596. From his eleventh to his nineteenth year, as he tells us in the Discourse on Method, he followed a course of studies in the Jesuit College of La Flech. After further studies in law at Pointiers he enrolled at the age of twenty-two in the army of prince Maurice of Nassau. In Holland he met the servant Isaac Beeckman, for whom he wrote a treatise on music and to who, in 1619, he addressed his first surviving letters. In them he wrote of music, geometry and navigation; he discussed the logical system of Raymond Lull and spoke of his own plan to publish “a new science which will provide a general method of solving all questions, concerning quantity, whether continuous or discontinuous”. It was in November of that same year, while meditating beside a stove in Bavaria, that Descartes acquired a conviction of his vocation to rebuild science and philosophy on fresh foundations. The years 1620 to 1625 were spent in travels in Germany, Holland and Italy. From 1626 to 1629 Descartes lived in Paris and met some of the friends who were to be his life long correspondences,

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Summa Philosophica especially the Franciscan, Marin Mersenne. At the same time most probably, he began work on the Rules for the direction of the mind, never completed and never published in his life time. In 1629 Descartes migrated to Holland, where he lived for all but one of his twenty-one remaining years of his life. It is reported that he always changed his address, always in pursuit of greater seclusion. In fact, it is to his passion for solitude that we owe the volume and importance of his works: most of his scientific and philosophical discussions with his contemporaries were conducted by letters. The letters which survive from 1629 concern lens-cutting, music and a number of scientific curiosities. The first letter to Mersenne, of 8 October 1629, discussed the perihelia, or the mock suns, which recently had been discovered by astronomer Scheiner, and which inspired Descartes to begin his treatise on meteors, and shortly after wards to project a complete system of physics. Descartes in his life time made major contributions to anatomy, physiology, optics, mathematics, and of course philosophy. Even in sphere of astronomy, Descartes was one of the first thinkers to consider the origin of the solar system in a scientific manner, where he (Descartes) proposed, in 1644, that the circular eddies called ‘vortices’ were formed at the beginning of the solar system in a primordial gas and eventually settled down to become the various celestial bodies (Essien, 2008b: 89-90). The vortex theory was, however, proven invalid by Newton (Essien 2008b:90). At the centre of his thought lies the view that each science is a branch of one unified science of the world, a science based on mathematics. Thus, Descartes was an early champion of Galilio’s doctrine that “the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics” (Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 7 1967). In addition to unifying other sciences through mathematics, Descartes effected a major unification within mathematics when he displayed the relation between the geometry of the ancient and the algebra he helped develop through the use of his Cartesian coordinates system.

The Methodic Doubt Descartes, the mathematician, admired mathematics for the reason that its results are clear and distinct. He sought to reconstruct philosophy by demolishing its pre-existing structure and reconstructing a new edifice with mathematics as its foundation. Since, for him, the results of mathematics are distinct, clear, indubitable, unshakeable, basing philosophy on mathematics would result in indubitable truth. Mathematics represented the absolute and unshakeable foundation, the absolutum et

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Summa Philosophica fundamentum inconcussum. Descartes, by basing his philosophy on the absolute and unshakeable foundation of mathematics, was later to realize his version of the absolutum et fundamentum inconcussum (the absolute and unshakeable foundation) in the cogito, the “I”. How can mathematics advance the study of philosophy? Descartes believed that through training in mathematics the mind becomes capable of engaging in philosophical thought. In mathematics we encounter absolute certainty, according to Descartes. We recognize that our conclusions cannot be mistaken because our starting assumptions are obviously true and each step in the chain of reasoning is correct. Descartes argues that, as with mathematics, certainty must be the touchstone of philosophical truth and the way to that truth must be through the understanding. The principle of the methodic doubt was to doubt and reject everything indubitable- doubt and reject whatever can be doubted. It was in the course of doing (doubting and rejecting everything that could be doubted) that Descartes discovered a truth that was impossible for him to doubt, and that was the fact that he was thinking. It was impossible to doubt this because even the very attempt to doubt it was itself a confirmation. Doubting that one is thinking is in fact a confirmation that one is really thinking since the very act of doubting involves thinking. And to doubt or to think means that one exists (Omorogbe, 1998: 51). The Meditations on First Philosophy is one of Descartes most important philosophical treatises. It is an unusual work; rather than lecturing his readers on the virtues of his conclusions, Descartes invites us to come along with him on the journey of discovering those conclusions. What is required of readers is that we too reflect on the issue that intrigues Descartes, that we ask ourselves such questions as, “if I am thinking, is it possible for me to doubt that I exist?” Descartes doubts everthing his senses present to him. He faults the senses because he believes that they are deceptive and illusory. He urges all to doubt everything as far and as much as possible, for the senses do deceive and cajole us. Descartes doubts that he has a body, his hands, eyes, and everything his senses purport to furnish him with. But he realizes something, that he is actually doubting. He begins to realize, again, doubting is an activity and that there is no activity without an actor. He realizes that there can be no doubting without a doubter. As doubting is a thinking he realizes that there is no thinking without a thinker. He concludes: “I think therefore I am” – Cogito ergo sum. Recalling that Descartes wished to bring to philosophy the certainty he discerned in mathematics, it is hardly surprising the First

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Meditation begins by attempting to doubt all claims. The doubting has purpose. Descartes wants to show that beliefs based on sensory data are not certain, thereby establishing the superiority of the understanding in acquiring knowledge. He also wants to discover whether any of our beliefs is in fact immune to doubt. In the Second Meditation, Descartes and his readers come to the understanding through reasoning that there is a claim that cannot be doubted: when one contemplates one’s existence, it is not possible to have slighted doubt that one does exist. This conclusion is neatly captured in the well-known phrase, cogito ergo sum, or I think therefore I am (although these words do not appear in the meditations). It is important to note that, for Descartes, the ‘I’ in this claim does not refer to a physical person, but to an immaterial mind (Steven ed.1995). ‘Cartesian dualism’ is the view that the world consist of two fundamental types of entities: physical bodies and immaterial minds. ‘Since only minds can think, the cogito can only be used to show that a mind exists.’ Later in the Meditations, Descartes attempts to restore the belief that his method of doubt had cast aside, arguing that it is also certain that physical bodies exist. In the Third Meditation, he completes the cogito argument and lays the basis for the later arguments concerning the existence of physical world, contending that any claim that cannot be doubted must actually be true because God exists and would not permit us to be deceived about anything which was completely obvious to us. At this point, it is clear that Descartes scepticism manifests itself fully in his First and Second Meditations which he restores in his Third Meditation. Following the discussions in his Meditations, one can confidently say that Descartes was not just a sceptic, but thinks that genuine instances of knowledge must be able to withstand the skeptical challenge. Descartes holds that perceptual beliefs, or beliefs we form based on our five senses, are susceptible to sceptical attack. His argument against perceptual beliefs is mostly called the dream argument. According to him there are times when our perceptual beliefs are inaccurate. Everything I have accepted up to now as being absolutely true and assured, I have learned from or through the senses. But I have sometimes found that these senses played me false, and it is prudent never to trust entirely those

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who have once deceived us…

The Dream Argument Descartes dreams and sees himself by the side of a stove, where he warms himself in the cold, with a scroll in his hand. He wakes up to ask how certain we are, that we are not also dreaming in this purported perceptual world only to wake up one day to realize a real world. He argues: If I see no certain marks to distinguish waking experience of physical objects from dream experience when, I believe, I was deceived, I have reason to believe my waking experience, too, may be deceptive. I see no such marks to distinguish waking experience from dreams. Therefore, I have reason to suppose that waking experience, too, may be deceptive (thorough delusory). But if have reason to suppose my waking experience may be deceptive (thorough delusory), I have reasons to doubt the existence of physical objects (for at present we are supposing this experience to be the best foundation for our belief in physical objects). We notice the sort of belief that Descartes want to call into question: those perceptual beliefs that are formed under ‘optimal’ conditions. Descartes clearly intends to undermine our confidence in such belief by likening them to the ‘beliefs’ we sometime have in dreams. Descartes thus wants to suggest that we have reason to doubt that perception reveals to us the way the world actually is. It seems that the real aim of the Dream Argument is to show that one cannot insist on the truthfulness of our waking or perceptual experience of physical objects. The significant aspect of this interpretation of the argument is that Descartes cannot trust his inner experience, or the contents of his beliefs, to give him a reliable indication of the actual, causal source of his perceptual beliefs. From his internal perspective, from the nature of what he experiences, Descartes cannot be assured that these experience or representations of the objects match the actual causes of his experience.

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This clearly runs counter to our normal interpretation of our perceptual beliefs. For example, we think if we have the experience of a blue book, we have that experience because the book is in fact blue. Our typical view is that our experience is a normally reliable indication or representation of the way things actually are in the world. But as Wilson suggests, Descartes is claiming that we have no certain reasons to distinguish the delusory character of dream from normal, waking perceptual experiences. These experiences may get the nature of the world wrong just as ‘dream experiences’ get things wrong. The Dream Argument can be concluded in Descartes own words that we cannot rule out the possibility that our perceptual beliefs are unreliable, just as our dream beliefs are unreliable, then perceptual beliefs are not infallible. Hence, perceptual beliefs are not genuine instances of knowledge.

The Demon Argument The Dream Argument specifically targets perceptual beliefs. Descartes had in mind, however, a far more powerful sceptical argument. Descartes recognized that he may have had beliefs that do not depend on the operation of his senses. Instead, those other beliefs might be taken to depend on his reasoning capacities. Descartes seems to have in mind mathematical propositions, such as that 2 plus 2 equals 4 and other beliefs, which we can call rational truths, such as that, bodies have shapes. Descartes recognizes both that such propositions are psychologically irresistible and that the truth of such beliefs is independent of whether he is dreaming. Nonetheless, he suggests that they might be false. For all we know, some extremely powerful being or demon might cause us to believe such ‘truth’ even though the propositions are in fact false. According to the Demon hypothesis or Demon argument, our reasoning ability alone cannot guarantee the truth of the beliefs in question. Reason alone cannot determine whether we have such beliefs because they are in fact true or because some demon has merely made it seem to us that they are true. That is we are unable to find any reason for preferring our commonsense view to the alternative demon scenario. Our inability to rule out the alternative scenario means that we must admit the possibility that beliefs come from deviant source. The Demon argument might run as follows: 1. I have some beliefs that are psychologically compelling 2. It is possible that an evil demon, intend on deceiving me, could be the causal source of these beliefs.

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3. If the origin of the beliefs is sufficiently deviant, then the beliefs are false. 4. I have insufficient evidence to rule out the evil demon scenario. 5. Hence, it is possible that the origin of the beliefs is sufficiently deviant. 6. Hence, it is possible that the beliefs are false. 7. Hence, I do not know.

Once again, the Cartesian sceptic argues that we cannot tell, merely from the content of our beliefs, whether our beliefs have the sort of origin that we normally think they do. ‘I think therefore I am’, Descartes decided to make this indubitable truth the foundation of his philosophy ‘I came to the conclusion that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of philosophy for which I was seeking’.

Substance: Mind and Body Descartes, who doubted everything but himself, presented a duality of substance, namely, mind and body, that is, thought and extension, “res cogitans” and “res extensa”. Res cogitans (literally, the thinking thing) as thought corresponds with mind, while res extensa (literally, the extended thing) corresponds with matter or the world of bodies. Res extensa refers to the world of bodies. Matter, in the Cartesian philosophy, is res extensa. But this world of bodies was not a mere extension. It was a geometric extension, which was bereft of dynamism and devoid of vitality. There was a paucity or total lack of dynamism in the Cartesian philosophy of mind and body. On this, Jeremiah Curran observed that: Descartes explained the world of bodies in terms of geometric extension. This subjection to mathematics rendered the world of material things immobile. In the sphere of Cartesian physics bodies did not impart upon one another, nor cause motion in one another. Precisely, as mathematized material bodies were isolated from one another, discontinuous with one another, Descartes overcame this isolation and discontinuity by an appeal to a mechanistic god who was “the primary cause of motion” (Curran in The Fountain, 31st ed 1996-1997, p. 32). Descartes, as a rationalist, believed more in the mind and the mind’s capacity to furnish ideas about the universe. Descartes, the doubter, the skeptic, the geometer, believed in the thinking substance, the res cogitans,

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Summa Philosophica the mind. The res cogitans, the mind, was deemed to be superior to the res extensa, the body. Res cogitans represents to our consciousness.

Space and Time After presenting us with the duality of mind and body, Descartes, in his subtlety of insight, argues that since the world is a world of bodies, res extensa, that these bodies occupy space. Space is not empty. It has contents, and its contents are bodies, matter. He extended this argument, that these bodies undergo motion, and motion involves time. Space is inseparable from the material substance that occupies it. Since the quintessence of material substance is extension, every space is occupied. In Descartes thought, there is no empty space. There is no vacuum.

Descartes Heritage Descartes dramatic resolution of the skeptical crisis generated a new era of skeptical argumentation. The sceptics sought to show that Descartes had not really conquered skepticism, while his dogmatic opponents tried to show that he was actually a sceptic in spite of himself. To refute Descartes, traditional sceptical arguments had to be refashioned and redirected. In the objections to Descartes Meditations (1641), Gassendi, Mersenne and others argued that either fundamental sceptical difficulty remained in the Cartesian system or that Descartes had not really established anything absolutely certain. During the rest of the seventeenth century, skeptical challenges were raised about what, if anything, had actually been proved by the cogito, about whether Descartes criterion was of any value, and about whether the ‘truth’ Descartes enunciated about the mathematical-physical universe were actually certain or ever true. Gassendi, and later Pierre-Daniel Huet, charged that either the cogito stated an uninteresting truism or it was fraught with problems. Huet’s Censura Philosophae Cartesiana (1689) and his unpublished defense of it raised doubts the element of the proposition ‘I think, therefore I am’ until it became ‘I may have thought, therefore perhaps I may be.’ Gassendi and Huet questioned whether Descartes’ criterion could determine what was true or false. Could we really tell that something appeared clear and distinct to us? Would we then need another criterion to tell when the first actually applied? Mersenne pointed out that even with the criterion we could not be sure that what was clear and distinct to us, and thus true, was really true for God. Hence, in the ultimate sense, even the most certain Cartesian knowledge might be false.

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BARUCH (BENEDICT) SPINOZA (1632-1677) Baruch or Benedict Spinoza was a Dutch philosopher who promoted materialism. In contrast to the dualism of mind and body of Descartes, Spinoza amalgamated thought and extension in human nature, since man is a finite version of God, a mode of God’s attribute of thought and extension (Stumpf 244). According to Spinoza, there is only one substance, nature or God. He identified God with the whole cosmos. His formula was “Deus sive natura”, God or Nature, and these words are for him, interchangeable. However, Spinoza distinguished between two aspects of nature, to wit:“natura naturans” and natura naturata”. “Natura naturans” refers to substance and its attributes, or God insofar as he is considered to act by the requirement of his own nature. “Natura naturata” refers to “everything which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or any of God’s attributes”. The world is God expressed in various modes of thought and extension. Spinoza was thus the symbol of pantheism. Nature alone exists, being the cause of itself (causa sui) and needing nothing else for its existence. Therefore, nature, which is the cause of itself, is, also, a necessary substance. Spinoza differentiates between substance and its modes. While nature is substance and one, its modes are infinitely many. It is only an infinite mind that could apprehend infinite substance in all its aspects, but finite human reason apprehends the essence of substance as infinite in two aspects alone, namely, as “thought” and as “extension”. Thought and extension are attributes of substance. In man, both thought and extension are unified. The body which is the mode of extension is coupled with the soul which is the mode of thought. In either mode, man is part of nature. In rationalism, Spinoza elevated intellectual knowledge based on reason above the lower order of knowledge derived from the senses. Experience has nothing or little to offer us in terms of cognition. Knowledge, true human knowledge can be afforded only by reason.

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ (1646-1716) Whereas Descartes assumed that extension referred to a material substance that is extended in space and is not divisible into something more primary, whereas Spinoza considered extension as an irreducible material attribute of God or Nature, Leibniz upheld that extension are aggregates or compounds, composing of simple substances. These simple substances, Leibniz called monads. Monads as simple substances are unlike the simple substances of Democritus and Epicurus, which were lifeless, inert and would derive motion from something outside themselves.

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Monads were described by Leibniz as force or energy. Monads were dynamic force, capable of action (Stumpf 247). Monads are unextended, having no shape or size. A monad is independent of other monads and does not have any causal relation to one another. It is pertinent to observe that, besides, its speculative tendency, Leibniz’s thinking resembles the twentieth-century view that physical particles are reducable to energy, or are a special form of energy.

The Nature of Monads In his book, Discourse on Metaphysics and the Monadology, Leibniz argued that monad is nothing else than a simple substance, which goes to make up composites; by simple, he meant without parts. There must be simple substances because there are composites; for a composite is nothing else than a collection or aggregatum of simple substances. According to Robert Latta, Leibniz speaks here of ‘a compound’ in general, in the other passage he uses the expression ‘compound substance’. In both cases he must be understood to mean ‘body,’ which, he elsewhere tells us, is not a substance strictly speaking. Accordingly, the expression here is more exact than that in the Principles of Nature and of Grace; but the difference illustrates the looseness of Leibniz’s in this connexion. If the ‘simple things’ are, like the monads, non-quantitative, can we attach any intelligible meaning to ‘compounds’, which are mere aggregates of them? Does not an aggregate always imply elements which are quantities, however small? Leibniz elsewhere makes it perfectly clear that nothing quantitative can ever be absolutely simple, and thus there seems a weakness in his reasoning at this point. Leibniz here illustrated that where there are no constituent parts, there is possibly neither extension, nor form, nor divisibility. These monads are the true atoms of nature, and, in fact, the elements of things. Carr raised the problem which is likely to result when we assume that monads have the above qualities. For him, our concept of the monad implies that the universe in reality has neither extension, nor shape, nor position, nor movement; for the monads have none of these characters and they are real constituents of the universe. In fact, then, there is nothing in reality which corresponds to the perceived qualities of bodies. These qualities, therefore, must be appearances and so far as they are essential to bodies, the bodies themselves are not realities but appearance, phenomena, such for example as colors and sound. Perception, then, must be an imperfect or rather an artificial way of knowing reality. It does not enable us to penetrate into the nature of things and know them as they are.

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Leibniz postulated that, the dissolution of things is therefore, not to be feared and there is no way conceivable by which a simple substance can perish through natural means. For the same reason there is no way conceivable by a simple substance might, through natural means, come into existence, since it cannot be formed by composition. Again, Latta had contended that the difficulty is fundamental and affects the whole system of Leibniz’s system: it is, indeed, the crux of every individualist or Atomist Philosophy. Leibniz’s hypothesis of a ‘living atom’, ‘a fertitle simplicity,’ a centre which expresses or represents an infinite circumference. We have still, in the spirit of much of Leibniz’s philosophizing, to ask ourselves the question-‘Are not “simple” and “compound” purely relative terms, so that to search for an absolutely simple thing is to explore blind alleys? Kant shows us the blind alleys in his second antinomy (Critique of Pure Reason: 81). Leibniz again argued that the existence of Monads can begin or end only all at once, that is to say, the Monad can begin only through creation and end only through annihilation. Composites, however, begin or end gradually. There is no way of explaining how Monad can be altered or changed in its inner being by any other created thing, since there is no possibility of transportation within it, nor can we conceive of any internal movement which can be produced, directed, increased or diminished there within the substance, such as can take place in the case of composites where a change can occur among the parts. The monads have no windows through anything may come in or go out. The attributes are not liable to detach themselves and make an excursion outside the substance, as could sensible species of the schoolmen. In the same way neither substance nor attribute can enter from without into a monad. Again, Latta had admonished that in Leibniz’s argument he asserts that a thing is produced by nature only when it comes into being gradually, bit by bit. But the monads, having no parts, cannot come into being by adding of part to part. Yet it may be pointed out that every Monad has an internal development, which is gradual. It is not born perfect, fully realized. Why, then, should it not come into being by natural means? Consider, by way of analogy and contrast, what Spinoza says regarding the eternity of the human mind, (Ethics: 23). Spinoza dispenses with the idea of creation. But according to Leibniz there are created Monads, whose creation is, nevertheless, not an event in time, for time and space have to do merely with phenomena, and the Monads are not in time and space, but condition them. The meaning is that by other things Monad can neither be altered as to its nature that is, changed into something else, nor even

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Summa Philosophica affected in those changes of state which it can undergo without a change of nature. It is implied that all changes in bodies are reducible to transportation of parts, and ultimately to changes in the amount and direction of motion. Leibniz seems here to have in view partly the doctrines of Thomas Aquinas and partly the scholastic theories, which were based on the system of Democritus. The ‘species’ are images or immaterial representations of material qualities. According to Thomas Aquinas, the accidents of things are known to us by means of sensible species, or particular images, while we know the essences of things by means of intelligible species or general images. The scholastic theory in general may be said to be that the sensible or intelligible ‘species’ in us have something in common with the accidents or essences in things, though there is a considerable variety of more or less vague opinion as to the nature of the relation. Leibniz is evidently thinking of a theory (not that of Thomas Aquinas), according to which sense-perception means that particles are detached from the body perceived and pass into the percipient, in whom they are reconstructed into images or representations of qualities in the thing perceived. For Leibniz, monads must have some qualities, otherwise they would not even be existence, and if simple substances did not differ at all in their qualities, there would be no means of perceiving any change in things. Whatever is in a composite can come into it only through its simple elements and the Monads, if they were without qualities, since they do not differ at all in quantity, would be distinguishable one from another. For instance, if we imagine a plenum or completely filled space, where each part receives only the equivalent of its own previous motion, one state of things would not be distinguishable from another. Each monad indeed, must be different from every other. For there are never in nature two beings, which are exactly alike and in, which it is not possible to find a difference, either internal or based on an intrinsic property. I assume it as admitted that every created being, and consequently the created monad, is subject to change, and indeed that this change is continuous in each. It follows from what has just been said, that the natural changes of the monad come from an internal principle, because an external cause can have no influence upon its inner being. Now besides this principle of change there must also be in the monad a manifoldness which changes. This manifoldness constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and the variety of the simple substances.

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According to him, this manifoldness must involve a multiplicity in the unity or in which is simple. For since every natural change takes place by degrees, there must be something which changes and something which remains unchanged, and consequently there must be in the simple substance a plurality of conditions and relations, even though it has no parts. The passing condition which involves and represent a multiplicity in the unity, or in the simple substance, is nothing else than what is called perception. This should be carefully distinguished from apperception or consciousness, as will appear in what follows. In this matter the Cartesians have fallen into a serious error, in that they treat as non-existent those perceptions of which we are not conscious. It is this also which has led them to believe that spirits alone are monads and that there are no souls of animals or other entelechies, and it has led them to make the common confusion between a protracted period of consciousness and actual death.

Three kinds of monad This is evident in Broad’s conception when he identified three kinds of monads which are; a bare monad, an animal soul, and a rational soul or spirit. All monads have all the properties which I have been describing. In addition, they all have the property of being ingenerable and indestructible by ordinary natural processes, because they are simple in the sense of not being composed of a plurality of coexisting parts. But Leibniz holds that they fall into three great classes, which form an ascending hierarchy. He calls these; Bare monads, Animal souls, and Rational souls or spirits. A Bare monad is unable to discriminate the various features in its total state at any moment. It has no conscious memory of its past states and no conscious anticipation of its future states. It has therefore only completely unconscious perception and completely blind appetition. Ostensibly corporeal substances are certain aggregates of bare monads. An Animal soul has some degree of discrimination. It also has some degree of what Leibniz here calls ‘memory’. But he does not man by this personal recollection of particular events in its past history. He means what psychologists call ‘retentiveness’ and ‘power of forming associations’. In consequence of this the mode of behavior of an animal soul may be modified by past experiences in the sense that it may acquire ‘conditioned responses’. Such monads are the souls of cats and dogs and oysters, and so on. A Rational soul or spirit has, in addition to the properties possessed by an animal soul and a bare monad, the following further

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Summa Philosophica properties, which put it in a unique position in the universe. It has self- consciousness, and therefore can remember past events in its life. It can also imagine possible future states of affairs and strive deliberately to bring them about or to prevent them from being actualized. It has knowledge of necessary truths, such as the laws of logic and arithmetic, and can make deductive and inductive inferences. It also has knowledge of God and of categories, like cause and substance. Lastly, it is aware of the differences between right and wrong, good and evil, and is morally responsible; and it has the special desires and emotions which are bound up with moral cognition. Such monads are human souls and the souls of angels. Within each of these classes there is a continuous series of monads differing in degree of confusion. On certain occasions and for limited periods a rational soul may become as confused as an animal soul normally is. This happens, for instance, to our souls when we faint or go to sleep. It almost certainly happens immediately after death. But that abnormal degree of confusion cannot last indefinitely, for a rational soul has to be restored to a state of comparative clearness at latest by the last judgment in order to recognize the justice of the verdict upon its past life and therefore to enjoy its reward in Heaven or suffer its punishment in Hell. No monad could pass from one of these classes to a higher one without a miracle, for they differ in kind. A bare monad lacks certain innate powers which an animal soul has, and an animal soul lacks certain innate powers which a rational soul has got. According to Leibniz, some people have adopted a scholastic error that souls can exist entirely separated from bodies, and have even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the belief that souls are mortal. The action of the internal principle which brings about the change or the passing from one perception to another may be called Appetition. It is true that the desire is not always able to attain to the whole of the perception which it strives for, but it always attains a portion of it and reaches new perceptions. We, ourselves, experience a multiplicity in a simple substance, when we find that the most trifling thought of which we are conscious, involves a variety in the object. Therefore all those who acknowledge that the soul is a simple substance ought to grant this multiplicity in the Monad, and Monsieur Bayle should have found no difficulty in it, as he has done in his Dictionary article “Roravius”. It must be confessed, however, that perception and that which depends upon it, are inexplicable by mechanical causes. That is to say by figures and motions. Supposing that there were a machine whose structure produced thought, sensation, and perception, we could conceived of it as

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Summa Philosophica increased in size with the same proportions until one was able to enter into its interior, as he would into a mill. Now, on going into it he would find only pieces working upon one another but never would he find anything to explain perception. It is accordingly in the simple substance, and not in the composite nor in a machine that the perception is to be sought. Furthermore, there is nothing besides perceptions and their changes to be found in the simple substance. And it is in these alone that all the internal activities of the simple substance can consist. All simple substances or created monads may be called entelechies, because they have in themselves certain perfection. In Carr’s book, Leibniz, he explained that the entelechy is a power mediating between the simple faculty of acting and the definite or effected act. It contains and includes effort. It is self determined to action, not requiring to be aided, but only requiring not to be inhibited. The illustration of a weight which stretches the cord it is attached to, or of a bent bow, may elucidate the notion. To him, this power of acting is in all substance, and that neither spiritual nor corporal substance ever ceases to act. It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths and through abstractions from them that we come to perform reflective acts, which cause us to think of what is called the I, and to decide that this or that is within us. It is thus; that in thinking upon ourselves we think of being of substance, of the simple and composite, of a material thing and of God himself, conceiving that what is limited in us is in him without limits. These reflective acts furnish the principal objects of our reasoning. Our reasoning is based upon two great principles. First, that of contradiction, by means of which we decide that to be false which involves contradiction and that to be true which contradicts Now with regard to the qualities of the monads, Broad has argued that simple substances at the basis of the appearance of extended objects, might be spatially punctiform entities; having spatial position, mobility, inertia, and various inherent active forces, but no spatial extension. A physical theory on those lines was worked out in detail by Boscovich and in less detail by Kant in his Metaphysical Bases of Natural Science. But it was not Leibniz’s view. He held that the simple substances are minds or soul. We must now consider this part of his doctrine.

Monads are Minds The following is a very clear statement of Leibniz’s doctrine, taken from the Letters to de Volder. He says that the simple substances which are the foundation of the phenomena of matter and motion do not differ

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Summa Philosophica essentially from our own souls, which we know from within. There is nothing in the ostensibly external world except simple substances, and nothing in any simple substances except appetition and perception. We must now consider why Leibniz ascribes these two properties to every monad, and what precisely he means by doing so.

Appetition Leibniz holds that it is of the essence of a created substance to be continually in process of change of state. There is a strong statement of this view in the letters to de Volder. Nothing else in a finite substance is permanent, on my view, except that law itself which involves continual sequence. Now changes must be caused, and there can be no transeunt causation. Therefore each total state of a monad must be completely determined by its immediate predecessor and must completely determine its immediate successor. The law or pattern of all its future changes was impressed on the monad by God at its creation. But that would not suffice. He must have endowed it with a permanent active tendency to pass from one total state to another in accordance with the innate law or pattern. Leibniz calls this active tendency, which keeps up the series of purely immanent changes, Appetition. It might be compared to what Spinoza called Conatus. We must not think that of it as a deliberate striving to bring about an imagined and desired future state of oneself. That is a very special form of appetition which can occur only in the higher kinds of monad which are capable memory and imagination.

Perception Leibniz explains in section 14 of the Monadology that he is using the word ‘perception’ in a very extended and technical sense when he ascribes perception to every simple substance. Perception, as it occurs in human beings’ normal attentive working life, is a very special form of it. He says that the essential peculiarity of perception is that ‘multiplicity is represented in unity’. This notion of representation of multiplicity in unity goes right back to the Discourse on Metaphysics and the Correspondence with Arnauld. Methinks when he ascribes perception to a monad he means that each total state of the monad has a number of different features which are not separable or independent, and that each different feature corresponds to, and so represents the contemporary state of a different one of the other monads. It seems that the auditory field of a person who is listening to an orchestra composed of many different instruments playing simultaneously illustrates Leibniz’s idea. But we must remember that normal human sense-perception is a very advanced kind of perception,

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Summa Philosophica which can happen only in the higher monads, just as deliberate conscious striving for an end is a very advanced kind of appetition. Leibniz held that the number of monads must be infinite in order to explain the apparent continuity of ostensibly material objects. Also he held that in each monad at any given moment the contemporary states of all other monads are represented. Therefore our group of n monads must include all the monads that there are, and the number will be infinite. So the total state of any monad at any moment will be infinitely complex. But the complexity does not consist of an infinite number of parts, which could conceivably be separated, like the bits in a jig-saw puzzle picture. It consists in an infinite number of inseparable superimposed features or modifications. If we want a physical analogy, the following may be useful. We can think of the total state of a monad at any moment, as like the pattern of ripples on a pond, produced by the several ripples emanating from each of a number of stones dropped simultaneously into various parts of the pond at some date in the past. I suspect that Leibniz’s real reason for holding that each monad mirrors the contemporary state of all the others in the following. Everything in the universe appears to be influenced to some extent by everything else. For example; every ostensible material particle is ostensibly attracted gravitationally by every other. Now really there is no matter and no interaction. But we have to account for the appearance of universal interaction between all the ostensible matter in the universe. Leibniz’s solution is to say that what underlies the appearance of universal and mutual interaction is the fact of universal and mutual representation. There is another complication to be considered. Leibniz held, not only that each total state of a monad mirrors the contemporary total states of all the other monads, but also that it mirrors in a very confused way every one of its own past and future states. He seems to have thought that this followed from the Predicate-in-Notion Principle and the fact that all causation is purely immanent. At every moment the monad must in some sense bear traces of all its past and traces of all its future, if it is to develop spontaneously in accordance with the plan laid down for it by God at its creation. We must therefore introduce into our formula a reflexive factor to symbolize the monad’s representation at each moment of its states at all other moments. If we think of Leibniz’s theory in terms of modern physics we find that it is oversimplified in at least two respects. (I) it presupposes that heat, light, sound, etc. take no time to travel, i.e. that all the ostensible effects which one remote ostensible body has on another follow instantaneously on their ostensible causes. If we are to allow for the facts we shall have to

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Summa Philosophica say that the state of a monad at any moment t mirrors the states of other monads at earlier instants. We shall have to add that the time-lag in each case is correlated with the ostensible distance between the place where the one ostensible body was when it ostensibly sent out the influence and the place where the other ostensible body is when it ostensibly receives the influence. (2) Leibniz’s theory also seems to ignore the existence of what appears to us as retarding and disturbing media between ostensible bodies. It is stated as if what appears to be the medium through which light, sound, etc appear to travel from one ostensible body to another were always clear and homogeneous. If it is not, something in the state of each monad must be allowed for what common sense would describe as the effects of the transmitting medium. Leibniz would no doubt say that what we take to be corporeal medium, for example; glass, water, air, etc. must in fact consist of swarms of living creatures each composed of a dominant monad and an organism of subordinate monads. But the fact would remain that they are mirrored in a very different way from other monads, and that they appear to influence in a peculiar way, the way in which other monads are mirrored.

Confusion Leibniz ascribes to every monad a certain determinable quality which he calls ‘confusion’. We have seen that the total state of any monad at any moment must in fact be infinitely differentiated, for it contains a different modification, corresponding to the contemporary state of every other monad and the number of other monads is infinite. It also contains a modification corresponding to every one of its own past and future states, and the number of these will be infinite, since time is continuous. Now a monad is confused insofar as its total state at any moment contains modifications, which it fails to recognize and distinguish. Leibniz used certain well-known psychological facts to show that the total state of any human mind, even at its most wakeful and attentive moments, contains factors which it fails to discriminate. If so, there is no difficulty in believing that monads below the level of human minds are habitually much more confused than human minds. It is not so obvious why he should have been sure that created minds above the human level, e.g. those of angels, must all have some degree of confusion. I think that he probably postulated this in order that every created mind, however exalted, should differ in kind from God’s mind. However that may be, it is certain that he held that every monad has some degree of confusion at every stage of its history. He seems to have held that no two monads can have precisely the same degree of confusion at

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Summa Philosophica the same moment. But the degree of confusion in a given monad may vary very much from time to time. This is illustrated by the difference between a human mind when fully awake and attentive, and the same kind when drowsy or drugged. Again I take it that the distribution of confusion within a monad might vary even if the total degree of it remained the same. At one moment a man is specially attending e.g. to certain items in his usual field and at another he is specially attending to others. If Leibniz is right he is in some sense aware at every moment of everything in the universe and of his whole past and his whole future. This shift of attention must mean that some parts of his total experiences which were clear have become confused, and that others which were confused have become clear. It will be remembered that Leibniz distinguishes in every monad two inseparable factors, viz. a substantial form or entelechy and stuff or materia prima. We can now identify each of these factors. The entelechy- factor is the activity which is characteristic of the monad, i.e. its activity of perceiving and striving. The stuff-factor is the internal limitation to which this inherent and incessant activity is more or less subjected at every moment in every monad. It is that which gives rise to confusion. We must remember that all the mental limitations such as drowsiness, laziness, etc, which we commonly ascribe to the body, must, if Leibniz’s denial of transeunt causation be accepted, be ascribed to something within the mind itself. It is this something within a monad, which limits and hampers its natural activities, that constitutes its stuff or materia prima.

Point of view Leibniz holds that each monad at any moment has a certain peculiar quality which he calls its point of view. No two monads at the same moment have the same point of view. But the point of view of a monad may alter in course of time, and so it may happen that a certain monad may acquire a certain point of view which formerly belonged to another monad. In a certain sense it may be said that the total external object perceived by any monad is the same as that perceived by any other monad, viz. the sum-total of all the monads. But, apart from the fact, already noted, that no two monads perceive this common object at any moment with the same total degree of confusion or any moment with the same distribution of confusion, there is the further difference that they perceive it from different points of view. This doctrine goes right back to the Discourse on Metaphysics, and Leibniz never gave it up. I think that this doctrine is designed to fit the following important facts (1) ostensible bodies appear to stand in various spatial relations to each other. These ostensible spatial relations sometimes remain constant

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Summa Philosophica for a while and sometimes change continuously. (2) The influences which ostensible bodies appear to exert on each other through: gravitation, heat, electricity, etc. vary with their ostensible spatial relations to each other. (3) If an observer views a certain set of ostensible bodies, their apparent shapes and sizes vary in a systematic way with the ostensible spatial relations between them and the observer’s ostensible body. This may be called the ‘phenomenon of perspective’. It is illustrated also when we have an optical apparatus, such as a camera or a system of screens on which shadows are cast, instead of a human observer. Leibniz had to account for these systematically coordinated phenomena in terms of his own theory, which denies the reality of bodies and of relations. His solution is to ascribe to each monad at every moment a certain determinable quality Q. This is called Point of View.

Pre-established harmony According to Leibniz the fact which underlies the appearance of universal interaction between finite substances is that the total state of each monad at each moment is infinitely complex and each different factor in it represents the contemporary total state of a different one of the remaining monads. Now, in consequence of his denial of the possibility of interaction between different substances, he has to hold that the state of each monad at each moment is completely determined by the immediately preceding state of that same monad in accordance with a purely immanent causal law. Why then should there be any correspondence at all between various monads, to say nothing of a complete one-to-one correlation between the state of each and the contemporary states of all the rest? Since they were all created simultaneously by God, it is natural to connect this constant correlation between their contemporary states at all later moments with their common origin. Leibniz rejects the crude occassionalist view that God continually interferes in the course of the B when he notices that a bstance A. This, he thinks, would be quite inconsistent with the wisdom and dignity of God. And in any case, science and philosophy ought not to postulate a special action of God at every instant to account for ordinary routine natural phenomena. Leibniz therefore puts forward the following theory. Anyone who admits the existence of a creative God must admit that he created each monad with certain dispositional properties and in a certain initial occurrent state. Suppose one accepts Leibniz’s general theories of causation and substance. Then one will also have to admit that God gave to each monad the power and the tendency to develop spontaneously all its future states in

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Summa Philosophica succession according to the initial plan, without any interaction with other things and without any further special action by God. All that we need to suppose further is that God created each monad with such dispositional properties and in such an initial occurrent state that the contemporary subsequent states of all would correspond at each instant down to the minutes detail. So we have the one miracle of a co-ordinated creation without needing any subsequent miracles of interference. This is the doctrine of the Pre-established Harmony If the denial of transeunt causation were based upon the denial of relations in general, or even on the denial of relations between different substances, it would hardly be consistent to supplement it with the Pre- established Harmony, for the latter plainly presupposes temporal relations between total states of different monads, since it talks of the correlation of their contemporary states. It also presupposes relations of point-to-point correlation between the various distinguishable factors in the contemporary total states of different monads. But as I have said, I do not believe that Leibniz’s ground for denying the possibility of transeunt causation was his general principle of denying the reality of relations.

The real foundation of the various bodily phenomena An ostensibly corporeal substance appears to have properties which fall into four classes, sensible, geometrical, kinematic, and dynamical. By ‘sensible qualities’ he meant: color, heat, cold, taste, smell, etc. by ‘geometrical qualities’ he meant: shape, size, and position. By ‘kinematic properties’ he meant motion of various kinds and rest. By ‘dynamic properties’ he meant impenetrability, inertial quiescence, inertial self propagation, and forces or energies of various kinds such as that possessed by moving bullet or a compressed spring.

Sensible qualities Leibniz, like practically all the scientists and philosophers of any importance at that time, held that, if there are bodies, they are not really colored, hot, etc., independently of human or animal percipients. And he held that, at the first move at any rate, the real independent basis of the phenomena of color, temperature, etc. is the minute structure of bodies and the motions of their minute particles. At this level Leibniz would say that, when a person perceives something as red, he perceives confusedly a very large number of similar minute motions in a very short period. The aggregate of these is perceived confusedly, because each separate motion is so small and lasts for so short a time and because they are all so much alike. Consequently, though each is perceived, one’s perception of each is

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Summa Philosophica unconscious, and so the perception of the whole aggregate of them is confused. Somehow this make one perceives the object as colored, although nothing is in fact colored. Of course this cannot be Leibniz’s ultimate view, since according to him; there are really no motions to perceive whether confusedly or distinctly. But it suffices to show that we can confine our attention to the geometrical, kinematic, and dynamical properties of ostensible bodies, that is, to those which scientists ascribe to them.

Geometrical properties The real basis of the appearance of geometrical properties is the property of monads which he calls Point of view.It seems to me that Leibniz makes statements in different parts of his writings which are difficult to reconcile with the each other. In the Letters to de Volder he says in one place that a monad has a certain ordered relation of coexistence to other things, in consequence of the machine which it dominates, that is, a certain kind of position within extension, although it is not possible to assign it to a point. In his letter of 21st July, 1707 to des Bosses, he says that a simple substance, though it has no extension, has position which is the foundation of extension. But in the later letter of 26th May, 1712 he definitely asserts that monads do not have real positions relative to each other. The ground given is that each monad is, as it were, a separate world, and that they are correlated with each other only through the Pre-established Harmony and by no other connexion. The statement in the letter to de Volder suggests that monads are spatially interrelated only indirectly through the organisms which they dominate. But, since the organism of a monad itself consists entirely of subordinate monads, this only shifts the problem from the dominant monads to subordinate monads. And in any case, in Leibniz’s complete theory, each subordinate monad is in its turn a dominant monad in respect of others which constitute its organism. I think that the remarks above may be concerned only with the rather special question. In what sense can you say that a man’s soul is located somewhere within his body? and is not intended to apply generally. The extreme negative statement in the letter of the 26th May, 1712 to des Bosses is consistent with, perhaps a necessary consequence of, Leibniz’s denial of relations between different substances. If there can be no relations, there can be no spatial relation; and, if all position is relative, it cannot be literally true that one monad has a position relatively to another. In conclusion, it must be noted from the above that our concept of the monad implies that the universe in reality has neither extension, nor

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Summa Philosophica shape, nor position, nor movement; for the monads have none of these characters and they are the real constituents of the universe. In fact, then, there is nothing in reality which corresponds to the perceived qualities of bodies. These qualities, therefore, must be appearances, and so far as they are essential to bodies, the bodies themselves are not realities but appearances, for instances; colors and sounds. Perception, then, must be an imperfect or rather an artificial way of knowing reality

REFERENCES: Jack S. Crumley II (1999), An Introduction to Epistemology, California, USA, Mountain View, Mayfield.

J. E Safra, et al. (2003) The New Encylopaedia Britanica (knowledge in depth), vol.25 15th ed., Chicago, USA. Encyclopaedia Britanica Inc. Omoregbe Joseph.(1998) Epistemology (Theory of Knowledge), Lagos. Joja Educational Research and Publishers.

Essien, Ephraim-Stephen (2008b). “Compatibility Principle as a Theoretical Framework for Combination of Einstein’s Relativistic Cosmology and Hawking Quantum Cosmology”. PhD Dissertation, Department of Philosophy, University of Calabar, Nigeria (December 2008).

Margaret Wilson, (1978). Descartes, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, reprinted in, Steven M. Cahn (1995).ed. Classics of Western Philosophy, Indiana, Hacket Publishing Company, Inc.

Paul Edwards (1967), ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol.7. U.S.A. Macmillan, Inc. Leibniz, G.W. (Trans) Garber, D. and Ariew, R. (1991), Discourse on Metaphysics, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, p.68

Kant, I. (ed) Guyer, P. and Wood A.W. (1998), Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge, University of Cambridge Press,. p.81

Spinoza (Trans) Boyle, A. (1963) Ethics and on the correction of the understanding, London, J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd. p.23

Herbert, W. C, (1960), Leibniz, London, Dover Publications, p.88

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Latta, R. (1951), Leibniz Monadology, London, Oxford University Press. p.215-232 Broad, C.D. (ed) Lewy, C. (1975), Leibniz: an introduction, Cambridge, University Press. p.27

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

EMPIRICISM: LOCKE, BERKELEY AND HUME

ON EMPRICISM Empiricism stands in opposition to rationalism. It is the epistemological doctrine which asserts that sense experience is the sole source of human knowledge. It rejects the thesis of rationalism which considers reason to be the sole source of human knowledge. Its major proponents were John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume.

JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704) How can we have ideas of qualities without supposing that there is something, some substance, in which these qualities subsist? To the question of what has shape or colour, we could answer something solid and extended. If we ask Locke what ‘solid’ and ‘extended’ subsist in, his answer would be substance. Locke was, however, unable to describe the idea of substance with clarity and precision, when he said: If any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other ideas of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us (Stumpf 260). Yet Locke explained sensation as being caused by substance. Again, substance contains the powers that ensure regularity and consistency in our ideas. Substance, Locke continues, constitutes the object of sensitive knowledge (Stumpf 260). If there is motion, Locke argued, there must be something that moves, for qualities cannot float around without something that holds them together. We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but not whether any material being thinks or not. If there is thinking, there must be something that thinks. Locke was bent on demonstrating the limits and validity of human knowledge when he affirmed substance as “something we know not what (Sahakian 156).

GEORGE BERKELEY George Berkeley, like Locke, gave us the impression that he was an empiricist. He, however, upholds an idealist position, which is a theory in metaphysics. According to Berkeley, whatever exists is either an idea in the mind or a perceiving mind. For anything to exist, it must be perceived, for

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“esse est percipi”, that is, “to be is to be perceived”. The central empiricist notion in Berkeley is ‘perception’. Berkeley, is, however, criticized for his mix-up of perception with being. His idealism does well for metaphysics, though.

DAVID HUME An avid reader of Descartes, Hume seems to have lived through his own personal sceptical crisis as he wrote his A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume sometimes held a most extreme sceptical position to the extent that, he questioned the knowledge claims of science, mathematics and logical reasoning and sometimes too, held a limited scepticism allowing for probabilistic standards for evaluating beliefs about what is beyond immediate experience. Like Descartes, the enthusiasm of Hume’s preface indicates his optimism about constructing ‘a science of man’. Hume was a philosopher, historian, economist and essayist, known especially for his philosophical scepticism and empiricism. He restricted human knowledge to the experience of ideas and impression, and denied the possibility of human access to the ultimate truth. If one were to judge a philosopher by a gauge of relevance- the quantity of issues and arguments raised by him that remain central to contemporary thought- David Hume would be rated among the most important figures in philosophy. Ironically, his philosophical writings went unnoticed during his lifetime, and the considerable fame he achieved derived from his work as an essayist and historian. Immanuel Kant’s acknowledgment that Hume roused him from his “dogmatic slumber” stimulated interest in Hume’s thought. With respect to Hume’s life there is no better source than the succinct autobiography, My Own Life, written four months before his death. He was born on April 26, 1711 on the family estate, Ninewells, near Edinburgh and died on August 25, 1776. According to Hume, the “ruling passion” of his life was literature, and he failed in two family sponsored careers in law and business because of his “unsurmountable aversion to everything but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning.” Until he was past forty, Hume was employed only twice. In 1734, he went to France, where he wrote A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740), an attempt to formulate a full fledge philosophical system that he later repudiated as juvenile. His other works includes Essay on Moral and Politics (1741-1742), An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748, revised 1758) and An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals (1751). Hume conceived philosophy as the inductive, experimental science of human nature. Taking the scientific method of Sir

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Isaac Newton as his model and building on the epistemology of John Locke, Hume tried to describe how the mind works in acquiring what is called knowledge. One of the issues surrounding David Hume’s epistemology is the debate as to whether Hume can actually be considered a sceptic. Attempts to resolve this debate will bring to the fore the difference between Cartesian and Humean scepticism. Hume tried to outline what he considered to be the difference between these two versions of scepticism in his writings. The distinction will be seen clearer after examining the Humean scepticism from his epistemology. As simple as it might seem, one cannot understand Humean scepticism without knowledge of his epistemological theory. It is therefore important to proceed to introduce us to Hume’s epistemology set out in his An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1758). To Hume, the whole process of knowing starts from perception. By the term perception, he means all the contents of our mind while we are aware of our interactions with the physical world. Perception here is the broad term for all mind’s mental activities, but this can be divided into two classes; impressions and ideas. The difference between these classes of perception lies in the degree of force and liveliness with which they strike upon our minds and consciousness. Hume says, “Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions, and under this name I comprehend all sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in our soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning.” (Treatise1). By all that has been said, the reader will easily perceive that the philosophy contained in this book is very sceptical, and tends to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding. Almost all reasoning is there reduced to experience, and the belief, which attends experience, is explained to be nothing but peculiar sentiments, or lively conception produced by habits. Nor is this all, when we believe anything of external existence, or suppose an object to exist a moment after it is no longer perceived this belief is nothing but sentiments of the same kind. Our

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author insists upon several other sceptical topics; and upon the whole concludes that we assent to our faculties and employ our reason only because we cannot help it. Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it (Abstract, 657). The above passage comes from a pamphlet written by David Hume to secure a readership for his largely unappreciated Treatise of Human Nature. Though not successful in this regard, the abstract remains a valuable guide to Hume’s Treatise for it offers his own assessment of the significance of that work. Here, at least, Hume is unequivocal in describing his philosophy as “very sceptical”. But even if Hume describes his philosophy in this way, and even if, at the time, his philosophy was almost universally taken in this light it remains unclear, first what this scepticism amounts to and, second how this scepticism is related to other aspects of his philosophical program. As part of the goal of this essay is to answer both questions, I will begin by giving a broad sketch of the role of scepticism in Hume’s philosophy and then, in succeeding sections, offer a detailed analysis of the central sceptical arguments.

One clue to the nature of Hume’s scepticism is given in the sentence that immediately follows his claim that the philosophy in the Treatise “is very sceptical, and tends to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding.” “Almost all reasoning is there reduced to experience and the belief which attends experience is explained to be nothing but a peculiar sentiment or lively conception produced by habit.” Now the reduction of all reasoning to the experience (empiricism) does not, by itself, yield sceptical consequences, at least of the strong (pyrrhonian) kind referred to at the end of the passage. Empiricism can lead to a mild version of skepticism, if we insist (perhaps incorrectly) that knowledge must involve certainty and then further insist (perhaps incorrectly) that empirical claims that go beyond reports of immediate experience always fall short of certainty. Scepticism of this kind might better be called fallibilism, not scepticism. In fact, a thorough going empiricist typically abandons claims to certainty over a wide range of cases where most people think they possess certainty, but traditional empiricist did not think that their position forced a wholesale suspension of belief. With an important exception to be noted, it is not Hume’s empiricism but

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Summa Philosophica primarily his theory of belief that pushes his philosophy in the direction of extreme (or pyrrhonian) scepticism.

The story broadly sketched is this: a central part of Hume’s project of introducing the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects involved giving a naturalistic account of how human beings come to believe certain things about the world that surrounds them. An example to illustrate this will serve our purposes. As human beings, we naturally suppose that we are directly aware of a world that is independent of us and continues to exist when we are not aware of it. What is the source of this belief? It cannot be the result of sound argument, for, the great bulk of mankind is wholly unacquainted with any arguments on these matters. They believe, but do so in a total absence of justifying arguments. Furthermore, those arguments intended to prove the existence of an enduring external world are easily shown to be irreparably no good. Thus, for Hume, the common belief in an external world is not based on any sort of reasoning to begin with and cannot be supported by sound reasoning after the fact. This is one side of Hume’s scepticism.

A Second side of Hume’s scepticism emerges when he lays bare what he takes to be mechanisms that do, in fact, govern the formation of beliefs on these matters. The wording in the passage from the abstract is revelatory:

The belief, which attends experience, is explained to be nothing but a peculiar sentiment, or lively conception produced by habit. Nor is this all when we believe anything of external existence, or suppose an object to exist a moment after it is no longer perceived, this belief is nothing but a sentiment.

In describing a belief as nothing but a peculiar sentiment produced by habit, Hume is obviously contrasting his view with that of others who hold that there must be more formation than this. That view crudely put, is that belief is the result of reasoning, and sound belief are the result of sound reasoning. Over and against this rationalist or Cartesian conception of belief formation, Hume holds that reasoning, by itself, is generally

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Summa Philosophica incapable of fixing belief and, in this particular case, incapable of establishing a belief in the existence of an external world.

These sceptical motives are further developed by the details of Hume’s explanation of how this fundamental belief is formed. Presented with Hume’s causal account of the actual mechanisms that lead us to believe that we are aware of an independent external world, we are simply appalled that our beliefs should be formed on such arbitrary basis. Furthermore, when this arbitrary basis for our fundamental beliefs is revealed to us, then, for a time at least, belief itself evaporates. In the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume describes scepticism generated in this way as follows:

There is another species of scepticism, consequent to science and enquiry, when men are supposed to have discovered, either the absolute fallaciousness o their mental faculties, or their unfitness to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation. About which they are commonly employed. Even our very senses are brought into dispute, by a certain species of philosophers; and the maxims of common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most profound principles or conclusions of metaphysic and theology (12.1, 150).

From all these, it appears that Hume’s writings contain two sceptical strategies. The first we might call the argumentative strategy; the second the genetic strategy. When using the argumentative strategy, Hume adopts the common sceptical ploy of presenting arguments intended to show that some class of beliefs is not capable of rational justification. In this class, we realized many of the enduring features of Hume’s philosophy, the most important being his scepticism concerning induction, his scepticism concerning the external world and more especially, his scepticism with regard to reason. His criticism of the argument from design found in the dialogues concerning natural religion and his examination of arguments

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Summa Philosophica involving miracles found in section ten of the Enquiry can also be placed in this category of argumentative scepticim.

The genetic strategy reflects Hume’s idea of a scepticism that is consequent upon science and enquiry. A system of beliefs can be discredited by revealing its disreputable provenance. Thus, in his discussion of “scepticism with regard to the senses”, Hume offers a detail account of the manner in which fictions are piled upon fictions in a way that lead us to adopt what he calls the “extraordinary opinion” thus the object of our awareness (which, for Hume, are perceptions) can enjoy a continued and distinct existence (T1.4.2, 195). Here, then, is a double movement in the development of Hume’s sceptical position. First, reasoning shows us that our belief in an external world is not based on sound argument, for no such sound argument on this matter exist, and, second, when empirical investigation lays bare the actual mechanisms that lead us to embrace this belief, we are immediately struck by their inadequacy.

Causality and Induction

From his lifetime down to the present, no aspect of Hume’s philosophy has attracted more attention than his conceptions of relations, causality, necessity and induction. In both the Treatise and Enquiry, Hume argues that causal connections cannot be established by any form of a priori reasoning. Nor can a causal relationship be ascertained through immediate experience, for inspection of the cause reveals no connecting link between it and its effect. It is only our experience of a constant conjunction between two sorts of events that lead us to suppose that one is the cause of the other. We reach the problem of induction by raising the following questions: how does the experience of events being consistently conjoined in the past license an inference to the claim that they will continue to be so conjoined in the future? This, as it turns out, raises a question that proves very difficult to answer. In Hume’s words, “But if we still carry on our sifting humour, and ask, what is the foundation of all conclusions from experience? This implies a new question, which may be more difficult solution and explication” (EHU4.2, 32).

Hume poses his difficult question three times- first in the Treatise, then in the Abstract, and finally in the Enquiry- though there are important differences in detail, the basic move is the same in each. Our reliance on

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Summa Philosophica past experience rests, he tells us, on the principle “that instances, of which we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience,” and, with respect to the future, this amount to the assumption there will be “a change in the course of nature.” On what basis, Hume asks, can we justify this assumption? There can be no demonstrative argument to prove it, for it is a least conceivable that the course of nature might change: what is conceivable is possible; what is possible cannot be demonstrated to be false; therefore, it cannot be demonstrated that the course of nature will not change (T.1.3.6, 89).

Cartesian scepticism is motivated by the thought that our epistemic goal is certainty or indubitability. Epistemic methods are suspect to the extent that they are unable to produce indubitable beliefs. David Hume’s worry is somewhat different. Hume is willing to grant that we often get things right. Many of our beliefs about the world and its denizens are, no doubt, true, or, at the very least, are likely to be true. Hume claims, however, that we are not entitled to think of such beliefs as instances of knowledge or even as rational beliefs. We are not entitled because the methods we use to acquire those beliefs do not provide us with adequate reasons for such beliefs. It is not enough, however, that our reasons are good reasons; we must have some reasons for believing that our reasons are good reasons.

On Reason

The target of Hume’s scepticism is not simply the writings of philosophers, but the faculties of the mind that generate these writings. Hume does, of course, discuss the philosophical positions of others, and allusions to others philosophical stand points occur throughout his writings, but more often than not, such references are made in service of developing his science of man. Even nonsensical philosophical arguments are revelatory of the underlying faculties that guarantee them. Although, according to Robert J.Fogelin (1994), Hume is not careful in his use of terminology, the first book of the Treatise is largely concerned with four faculties: understanding, reason, the senses, and the imagination. By the understanding, Hume has in mind reasoning from experience, notably, causal reasoning. By reason, Hume usually has in mind demonstrative and intuitive reasoning. By the senses, Hume has in mind that faculty which seemingly gives us information about a surrounding world. By the

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Summa Philosophica imagination, Hume has in mind a faculty that generates new ideas from old by means of principles of association. Hume’s general strategy is to argue that the operations of the first three faculties are ultimately grounded in the operations of the fourth: the imagination, or as he sometimes calls it, the fantasy. Hume’s standard strategy in furthering this project is to produce sceptical argument intended to show that beliefs generated by the instinctive mechanisms of the imagination. This is most striking in the section of the Treatise entitled “of scepticism with regard to reason (T.1.4.1). Hume’s scepticism with regard to reason has not fared well. Most writers on Hume say little or nothing about it. Hume himself did not repeat it in any of his later writings.

On the Senses

Underlying Hume’s analysis of inductive inference is a claim about the kind of reasons required for justification. This claim is worth identifying, because it is intimately connected with our commonsense view of rationality. Hume’s examination of the senses begins with a comparison between the sceptical problem concerning reason and the sceptical problems concerning the senses:

Thus the sceptic continues to reason and believe, even though he asserts, that he cannot define his reason by reason; and by the same rule he must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, though he cannot pretend by any argument of philosophy to maintain its veracity (T.1.4.2,187).

Hume holds that there are unanswerable sceptical arguments against the pretention of both of these faculties, but his mode of exposition is different in the two cases. As we have just seen, in his discussion of scepticism with regard to reason, Hume begins by stating his septical argument, and then, briefly, describes those non-rational mechanisms that preserve belief despite the existence of a contrary skeptical argument. In his discussion of the senses, Hume reverse this order. He begins merely by alluding to a sceptical argument concerning the senses and then

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Summa Philosophica announces that his main task will be to examine “the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of body” (T.1.4.2, 187-8). What follows is a long, complex, and rather perplexing examination of those causal mechanisms that led human beings to adopt the false belief that our inner perception can enjoy an existence distinct from our minds and can continue to exist even when unperceived.

The sceptical argument, when it does appear in the Treatise, has two parts. The first is intended to show that “our perceptions [those things, that is, of which we are aware] are not posses’ of any independent existence.”

Convinced, perhaps wrongly, that we are only aware of our own private perceptions, the philosopher steps in and suggest that some of these perceptions are images or representations. Hume speaks of the opinion of a double existence and representation, a view he obviously associates with the philosophy of John Locke.

The second step in Hume’s sceptical argument is aimed at such double existence theories and is intended to show that no argument can establish the existence of external objects resembling our perceptions. Hume states the basic argument in only a few sentences:

The only conclusion we can draw from the existence of one thing to the other, is by means of the relation of cause and effect…the idea of this relation is derived from past experience, by which we find, that two beings are constantly conjoined together, and are always present at once to the mind (T.1.4.2, 212).

Scepticism can also be understood as a critique of the capacities of our intellectual faculties. Taken this way, Hume is a radical, unreserved and unmitigated sceptic. The doctrine of the Treatise is that our faculties, left to themselves, are wholly destructive of belief; sceptical doubt arises naturally from a profound and intense reflection on those subject, it always increases, the further we carry our reflections, whether in opposition or conformity to it

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In the words of Omoregbe (1998), Hume’s scepticism is derived from his desire to push empiricism to its logical conclusion. Hume’s philosophy shows clearly that the logical conclusion of empiricism is scepticism that anyone who resolves to remain consistently an empiricist would end up in scepticism, where Hume ended up. John Locke and George Berkeley had avoided ending up in scepticism by deviating from the empiricist way at certain points in their philosophies. Thus each of them was an inconsistent empiricist who at one point or the other deviated from the empiricist principle. But Hume resolved to be consistent with empiricism and followed it to its logical conclusion, and ended up in scepticism. We have observed how Hume, arguing as an empiricist, leads us to the final conclusion that we really do not have any good reasons for the beliefs we have, rather, that it is the work of nature. However he does not explain how or why nature does this because he held that explanation must end somewhere. One thing we must not lose sight of in Humean skeptical empiricism is the freedom it gives us to still live by our beliefs, because it seems Hume, by instinct, saw how ridiculous and unrealistic it would be for us to live without them. This is very important as it constitutes a major amendment to classical scepticism.

Rejection of Metaphysics David Hume, the hard empiricist, asserts that understanding reality is based on perception which is made of impressions and ideas existing in the mind. To him, impressions are those which enter the mind with much force, violence, sensations and emotions. However, ideas are faint images in thinking and reasoning. Sense impressions are, to him, meaningful because it is based on experience and observation just as mathematical concepts are based on the relation of ideas. However, metaphysical notions like substance, reality, mind, matter, etc are actually meaningless and unintelligible. Also, questions that metaphysicians seek to answer, like what is the nature of reality, what is the cause of the world, what is the relationship between matter and mind, etc, are all meaningless. This is because when we analyze these questions in terms of our empirical meaning criteria these questions dissolve into meaninglessness. For our knowledge of the world is only retrieved to what we experience and the inferences we make through these experiences. And so, there is no reality above what we are aware of. In other words, since metaphysics contains nothing about abstract reasoning concerning number or experimental reasoning concerning matter’s fact, we should commit metaphysical books to the flames for it contains nothing but sophistry and illusion (Pasnau: 2002).

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The Scottish philosopher’s radical refutation and rejection of metaphysical discussions make him a practical ideological anti- metaphysician. Hume believes that the only true knowledge is experimental and since metaphysical discussions, propositions etc. are, but speculations they are not worth investigating. Hume, thus, considers metaphysics as sheer sophistry and illusion. It was not surprising, therefore, when he recommended that all books dealing with metaphysics should be burnt because they could not and cannot contain any genuine knowledge. Hume is quoted as saying: When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume, of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask: Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity and number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion (Hume, Enquiry, 12,3,132).

Hume’s criticism of metaphysics is based on his radical empiricism-observation and experiment, and as such it could not accommodate any metaphysics. Hume’s first step, perhaps, to rejecting all metaphysical discourse, is the rejection of causation or causality. In Hume’s philosophy, cause is used as: 1. An object followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first ate objects similar to the second; where, if the first object had not been, the second object would never have existed. 2. An object followed by another and whose appearance always conveys the thought of that other A critical assessment of the definitions above reveals that a non-essential relationship exists between cause and the object to which it is a cause. This is evident in Hume’s crucial question; what is the origin of the idea of cause? Hume’s response to this is put in a form of argument:

All ideas come from impressions From what impression(s) is the ides of cause? None; but we must seek further.

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The idea of cause, however, must come from somewhere. It comes from the mental relation we make between objects. This mental relation can come from three distinct types. The first is spatial contiguity. Hume holds that spatial contiguity cannot demonstrate causality, (say, the orderliness of the universe is as a result of or is caused by a perfect creator – God) because cause and effect do application. The second of the three is succession. Succession too, Hume tells us, cannot prove causality. For if, for instance, one opens the door, and immediately the light goes out, the event does not make the succession of one, the effect of the other – for it could be just coincidence. The last if the three is constant conjunction. Here again. Hume holds that constant conjunction proves nothing: For in two parallel lines, one line is always associated with the other without one being the cause of the other. According to Hume, oven if there is some connection – space, time and regularity – between events, there is no necessary connection. This position is necessitated by three questions: 1. Why is it necessary to say that every existence (with a beginning) must have a cause? 2. Why do we conclude that such particular cause most necessarily have such particular effects 3. What is the mature of the inference we draw from one effect on one cause, and of the belief (of Causality) we repose in it?

Hume rejects all these forms of cause – effect relation(s) and says that they are baseless. That is, there is no reason to believe that the future (effect) will always follow the past (cause). Hume uses induction to marshal his position. His special interest is a certain pattern of inference, which is logically put as: (a) All observed As have been followed by B (b) An A is currently being observed (c) Therefore, a B will follow

Hume’s principal claim is that there is no reason to believe (c) even if (a) and (b) are true. He argues for this by claiming that we are rationally entitled to accept the inference from (a) and (b) to (c) only if we can rationally accept still another principle: That instance, of which we have had no experience, Must resemble those, of which we have had experience, And that the course of nature continuous always Uniformly the same (Hume, 1978, 89)

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There are two parts to this principle, which, following accepted practice, we will call the uniformity principle. The first part asserts a resemblance between the unobserved and the observed, and the second part asserts that nature or the world continuous uniformly. The immediate problem with their principle, which Hume tells us and as many people could notice, is that it is most likely false; that is, the future shall not always resemble the past and that the world (the phenomenal world) would not continue uniformly ed inifnitum. Moreover, it is not easy to think of ways to modify the Uniformity principle in such a way as to arrive at a plausible and cogent version that will help us to understand the existence and operation(s) of the phenomenal world. Furthermore, Hume rejects the existence of substance. He asserts that we have no perfect idea of anything. What we have is perception. The idea of substances does not exist. It is meaningless because it is not supported by any evidence. In summary, Hume’s denial and rejection of metaphysics is absolute. The self which explains personal identity is defined substantial identity. There is no room for causality in Hume’s philosophy. God as a meta-empirical reality is skeptically denied. One argument which has received widespread support for God’s existence is the design or teleological argument. The argument is founded on the observed orderliness of the universe. Hume argues that the order of the universe is totally empirical. There is no way we can infer God’s existence from it. Hume is said to have dealt a decisive blow to the design argument. He suggested that the universe is actually more like an animal or a vegetable than a watch (made by a perfect watchmaker; God, who had creates and orderly and harmonious machine that would run forever); hence we might better infer an organic impulse as creator rather than a Mind or Spirit – God. Then, pointing to the many imperfections of and in the world, he wondered whether perhaps the world was created by a second-rate deity on one of his “off” days (holidays). Hume’s general position might be put on the form of a question: Since earthquakes, diseases, idiocies, sins, death, and all manner of human sufferings are not accepted as evidence of the universe’s lack of design, what imperfection, if it did exist, would be accepted as evidence? If none is conceivable, then, the design argument and all such metaphysical arguments clearly manipulate evidence rather that basing their claim(s) on evidence. In all, one could infer from the discussions above that David Hume was a thorough-going anti- metaphysician.

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REFERENCES  D. F. Norton (1993) ed, The Cambridge Companion to Hume, London, Cambridge University Press  David Hume, (1739-40) A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an attempt to introduce the experimental Method of reasoning into Moral Subjects. 3 vols. London  David Hume, (1741-1742) Essay Moral and Politics  David Hume, (1748) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding  Omoregbe Joseph,(1998) Epistemology (Theory of Knowledge), Lagos, Nigeria, Joja Educational Research and Publishers,  Robert J. Fogelin,(1994) “Hume’s Scepticism”, David Fante Norton (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Hume, New York, USA , Cambridge University Press,

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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

IMMANUEL KANT AND THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The more fundamental attempt, for subsequent philosophy, to deal with Hume’s scepticism was developed in Germany in the second half of the eighteenth century and culminated in Kant’s critical philosophy. Such leaders of the Prussian Academy such as Jean Henry Samuel Formey, Johann Bernhard Merian, and Johann Georg Sulzer, had long been arguing against Pyrrhonism. They were among the first to read, translate (into French and German), and criticize Hume’s writings (Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 7: 1967). They saw in the sceptical tradition up to Bayle, and in Hume’s version of it, a major challenge to all man’s intellectual achievements. Although their answers to scepticism were hardly equal to the threat they saw in it, these writers helped revive the interest in and concern with scepticism in an age that thought it had solved, or was about to solve some if not all problems surrounding scepticism. The culmination of the German concern with scepticism occurred when Kant was awakened from his dogmatic slumbers by reading Hume and his opponents. Kant saw that Hume had fundamentally challenged the hope that all sceptical disputes could be settled by what Locke had called “the physiology of the understanding” and that the question. “How is knowledge possible?” had to be re-examined (Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 7: 1967). Kant’s solution can be considered as an attempt to establish a middle ground incorporating complete scepticism about metaphysical knowledge and a conviction that universal and necessarily certain knowledge existed about the conditions of all possible experience. Kant maintained that knowledge is possible and that complete scepticism is false. At this point, the problem was then to explain how this universal and necessary information could be attained, in the face of Hume’s arguments. In his view that knowledge begins with experience, but does not come from it, Kant thought and believed that he had found a revolutionary new answer to the sceptical crisis. For Kant, space and time are the necessary forms of all possible experience, the categories and the logical forms of judgment are the conditions of all knowledge about experience. For instance, according to Kant, mathematical knowledge is possible because it is not derived by induction from experience but is the way the world must be experienced. By transcendental analysis we can uncover the universal and necessary conditions imposed on all experience and judgment. But these

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Transcendental Idealism Kant, in his critique of pure Reason described his own view as formal, critical, or transcendental idealism. Nevertheless, a famous passage of that book (B274) is titled “Refutation of idealism.” Kant called the types of idealism he claimed to be refuting problematic idealism and dogmatic idealism, respectively. By problematic idealism he meant the view, which attributed to Descartes, that the existence of objects in space outside us is doubtful .That is “there is only one empirical assertion that is indubitably certain, namely, that ‘I am’”. By dogmatic idealism he meant the view, which he attributed to Berkeley, that “space and all the things to which it belongs as an inseparable condition” is “something impossible in itself and hence looks upon things in space as mere imaginations”. In the Kantian view, “dogmatic idealism is unavoidable, if space be interpreted as a property that must belong to things in themselves” (B274). Kant’s interpretation of Descartes is not quite adequate, but his interpretation of Berkeley is so completely at fault with those of Berkeley’s. In any case, Kant’s transcendental idealism is very different from the types of idealism held by some earlier philosophers, who held the view that mind and spiritual values are fundamental in the world as a whole. Kant held that it is

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Summa Philosophica not possible to gain knowledge of the world by rational thought alone, and thus he rejected all attempts such as those of Leibniz. On the other hand, he also held that mere sense experience does not give knowledge of the world either, since in the absence of interpretation, sense experience is “blind”. Thus Kant argued that unless our perceptions were organized within what he called the pure prior intuitions of space and time in terms of rational principles such as the requirement that our perceptions refer to things in causal relation with one another, knowledge of an objective world would be impossible. Without a priori intuitions of space and time and the categories of the understanding, there would be a manifold of fluctuating sensation but no knowledge of the natural world. Kant argues further that no one could become aware of himself unless, there were enduring material substances with which we could contrast his own fleeting experiences. We should not be aware of ourselves unless we were also aware of material things. This line of argument disposes of the view that we could be certain of our own existence but doubtful about the material world and also of the view that material things are mere “imaginations.” Unless there were material things in space, we should not know of our own existence or of our own imaginations. Kant’s transcendental idealism, therefore, is his view that space and time and the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience rather than features of things as they are in themselves. Whether things-in- themselves are in space and time and whether they form a causally interacting system we do not know, but unless we were so constituted as to place everything in spatiotemporal context and to synthesize our sensations according to the categories of the understanding, we should not have knowledge of an objective world. Kant did not think that this synthesizing was carried out by the empirical selves we are aware of in ourselves and others. He thought, rather a transcendental self had to be postulated as doing this, but of this transcendental self, nothing could be known, since it was a condition of knowledge and not an objective knowledge. The natural world, or the world of appearances, as he calls it, somehow depends on a transcendental self of which we can know nothing except that it is. Whereas at the empirically level selves and material things are equally real, the knowledge we have at this level presupposes the synthesizing activities of a transcendental self of which we can know nothing. Kant was regarded in his own day as a destroyer because he held that no single one of the traditionally accepted arguments for the existence of God was valid and that it is impossible to prove the immateriality and immortality of the soul. Idealist such as Leibniz and Berkeley had

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Summa Philosophica considered that they had framed philosophical arguments that favoured religious belief. Berkeley, for example, emphasized that his conclusions made atheism and scepticism untenable. He also claimed to have provided a new and cogent argument for the existence of God. However, according to Kant, sense experience cannot lead us beyond the natural world, and the categories of the understanding can be validly applied only where there are sense experiences and if applied beyond them can lead only to insoluble antinomies. For example, if the category of cause is used to transcend sense experience, then equally valid proofs can be made to show that there must be a first cause and that there cannot be a first cause. In the appendix to the Prolegomena Kant says that “idealism proper always has a mystical tendency” but that his form of idealism was intended for such purposes but only as a solution of certain problems of philosophy. All this seem to place Kant outside the main idealist tradition and to indicate that he was developing a positivistic view.

Kantian Mediation and Synthetic A Priori Judgements In the introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant asserts that “there can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience… but though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.” Kant came as a mediator between rationalism and empiricism. He did reject either empiricism or rationalism absolutely. He struck a synthesis between these two epistemological poles. He agreed with the empiricist claim that our knowledge begins with experience. He argued against the empiricists that though knowledge begins from experience, that it does not follow that it arises from experience. It is also the case, Kant argued, that what we know is the product of our own thinking faculty. Our understanding makes use of the data presented through sense perception and through a union of sensibility and understanding, knowledge arises. The things we know are begin from experience, yet the faculty of understanding comes in to intuite or makes abstraction, and sees to the coming together of experience and reason which gives rise to human knowledge. Without sensibility objects are not given to us and without understanding objects are not thought. ‘Thought without objects are empty’ and concept without thought are blind’. Knowledge is derived from the coming together of sensibility and understanding. Kant’s epistemological quest was the quest for a kind of knowledge that is synthetic a priori. He was able to locate synthetic or a posteriori propositions in the empiricist programme, and a priori propositions in the rationalist programme. The synthetic a priori judgements

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Summa Philosophica synthesized rationalism with empiricism, since it contains aspects of both doctrines. Synthetic propositions or a posteriori judgements are those propositions that are able to give new information in its predicate. Thus, they are informative. A priori judgements are self evident truths, which do not depend on experience for its veracity. Analytic propositions are those propositions whose predicate do not inform us about anything else apart from what is contained in the subject term. The truth of the predicate is already contained in the subject of the proposition, e.g., ‘A bachelor is an unmarried man’. Before Kant, all synthetic propositions were believed to be a posteriori. But Kant says that a proposition could be both synthetic and a priori. In fact, Kant says there are some synthetic a priori propositions in physics, mathematics and Ethics. He gives an example of such a proposition from physics; “every event has a cause”. Kant explains that the concept of causality is an a priori concept.

Kant’s Copernican Revolution To explain his doctrines of the categories, Kant carried out what is popularly known as Kant’s Copernican revolution. That is, Kant did something in epistemology similar to what Copernicus did in astronomy. Before Copernicus (1475 – 1543) it was generally believed that the earth was at the center of the universe, and that the sun and all other plants were moving round the earth. But Copernicus reversed this view by showing that it was the opposite, that it was the sun that was at the centre of the universe and that the earth and other plants revolves round the sun (Omoregbe 1998:93). Kant did a similar thing in epistemology. Before Kant it was generally believed that in the process of acquiring knowledge the human mind was passive while objects of perception imposed themselves on the mind. Hence people talked of things impressing themselves on the mind. But Kant reversed that and argued that it was the opposite. It is not things that impose themselves on the mind; on the contrary it is the mind that imposes itself, imposes its own structure on the things, forcing the things we perceive to conform to its own structure. The mind, in other words, imposes its own categories on objects of sense perception, forcing them to conform to these categories. The outcome is that things appear to us not as they are but as the mind makes them appear to us. For instance, a man wearing green glasses, everything he sees would be “forced” to appear as green – even though they are not really green. Thus the way things appear to that man would be different from the way they really are.

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Space and Time In this study, we mentined above how Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, attempts, inter alia, to establish the validity of knowledge and how Kant argues that human knowledge arises through the joint functioning of sensibility and intellect, or understanding. Sensibility is a passive receptivity, the power of receiving representations of the objects by which it is affected. Understanding is an active spontaneity, the power of exercising thought over the objects given us in sensible intuition (Kemp 16). Intuition is the product of sensibility and concept is the product of understanding. We also mentioned in chapter five, under the problem of space and time, how Kant reasoned that space and time are a priori forms of intuition. For Kant, space and time are a priori forms of intuition.

Kant’s first point about space is that it is not an empirical concept derived from our experience of things outside us. We discover empirically, by sensory observation, that a certain object is to the left of, or above, or further from us than, another object; but that objects in general are in spatial relations of some kind to one another is not an empirical generalization from specific spatial statements, For the very discovery that X is to the left of Y already presupposes that we have some ‘idea” of space in general. If someone asks us “What are the spatial relationships between X and Y?” we can, in principle at least, provide an answer from the results of observation. But if someone asks us “Is X in any spatial relationship to Y?” it would be absurd to try to answer this question by making this observations; for if the answer was NO, this would be conclusive proof that observations made through our senses could not possibly be relevant, and that X and Y (or one of them at least) were not located in space at all (Kemp 17). Similarly, we cannot, Kant says, imagine or represent to ourselves the absence or non-existence of space, although we can think of space as being empty of object. And since we cannot form an idea of a spaceless world, our knowledge that the world is spatial cannot have come to us through sense-experience; we can only observe like for S not to be P. Our apprehension of space then is not empirical (Kemp 17). But space is not a general concept either. For when we have a general concept there are, or many be, particular objects falling under the concept (as particular houses fall under the general concept of house). There are no particular spaces falling under the general concept of space. There can only be one, all embracing and space.

Space, then, is nothing but form of all appearance of outer sense. Space is a necessary condition of all outer objects as they appear to us, but does not necessarily underlie things as they are in themselves.

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Kant argues that we cannot have formed the concept of time from our observation or experience of events happening successively or simultaneously, for the notions of succession and simultaneity themselves presuppose time (Kemp 18). Succession and simultaneity are temporal concepts and we must therefore already have the concept of time before we can talk about, or grasp the existence of, successive or simultaneous events.

Time, again, is not a general concept, for even though we can talk about different times, they are not different instances of one concept (as here words on a page are three different instances of the concept “word”) but different parts of one and the same time. Time, then, is, like space, an a priori form of intuition. Unlike space, it is a form of our intuition or perception of ourselves and of our inner state, not of our intuition of objects outside us.

A further distinction follows: time is a necessary formal conditions of all appearances whatsoever. All objects outside us appear to us as extended in space, but all representations, whatsoever, whether or inner states or of outer objects, appear to us as succeeding or simultaneous with, one another in time (Kemp 18). We cannot say that things as they are in themselves exist in time, anymore than we can say that they are spatially extended. But all things as they appear to us in our human condition are in time-relation (Kemp 18).

Our capacity for receiving sensations, then, is so constructed that whatever it’s material, it is inevitably arranged in a temporal order and, as far as objects outside us are concerned, in a spatial order as well (Kemp 18).

Noumena and Phenomena At this point, Kant makes a distinction between things as they are in themselves (which he calls noumena) and things as they appear to us (which he calls phenomena). He further argued that we can only know phenomena (things as they appear to us). Omoregbe (1998:13) remarked that Immanuel Kant’s scepticism is derived from his Copernican Revolution and his distinction between “things as they are in themselves” and “things as they appear to us”. The former are the noumena while the latter are phenomena. The former are, according to Kant, beyond the scope of human knowledge while the later are the product of the human mind, and are the only objects of human knowledge. It follows therefore that we don’t

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Summa Philosophica really know things as they are; we only know the way they appear. But the way they appear is different from the way they are. The conclusion therefore is that we can only know appearances not the realities themselves, and this is scepticism. Thus Kant’s philosophy leads to scepticism.

Nature and Science Necessity and freedom, stared Kant in the face such that, Kant had to accept them as a problematic, when he said: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing awe and admiration, the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within” (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason). We are not here attempting to pass judgment on Kant on how he solved the problem of necessity and freedom, but to present the problematic, that of reconciling the two seemingly contradictory interpretations of events, one holding that all events are the product of necessity and the other saying that in certain aspects of human behaviour there is freedom. After presenting the problematic, our focus shifts to discuss the question of necessity since that becomes thematically relevant to a discussion about the world of nature. To Kant, then, the starry heavens were a reminder that the world, as pictured by Hobbes and Newton, is a system of bodies in motion, where every event has a specific determinate cause. Kant’s interest in science was stimulated by Martin Knutzen, his professor at the University of Konigsberg (Copleston 185). He was so fascinated by natural science that for his doctorate dissertation which he submitted to the university in 1755. He wrote on Fire (de Igne), and in the same year he published a General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (Allege-meine Naturgeschte and theorie des Himmels). The Theory of the heavens by Kant was an extension of two previous essays (1754); one on the earth’s motion round its axis, the other on the physical question whether the earth is growing old. He proposed, in the Theory of the Heavens an original anticipation of the nebular hypothesis advanced late by Laplace (Copleston 185). The “starry heavens” and his theory about the “heavens” place Kant as an astronomer. As a matter of fact, the theories of cosmogony that astronomers now tend to accept stemmed from Kant, who suggested in 1755 (probably in his Theory of the Heavens, published that year) that the sun and the planets were formed by the same type of process. In 1796, Laplace independently advanced a theory similar to Kant’s when he postulated that the sun and the planets all formed from a spinning cloud of gas called a “nebula”. This is known as the “nebular hypothesis” (Pasachoff

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124). The spinning gas supposedly threw off rings that eventually condensed to become the planets. However, Laplace’s ring formation mechanism is no longer thought to be applicable. That not withstanding, the concept of joint formation of the sun and planets from a single, rotationally flattened cloud has survived the centuries (Pasachoff 125). Again, current theories of cosmogony follow Kant and Laplace. In these nebular theories the sun and the planets condensed out of what is called a “primeval solar nebular” (Pasachoff 125). In a nutshell, Kant offered to astronomy the following ideas: that the solar system had condensed from a rotating, flattened nebula; that the Milky Way was but one of many “island universes” (that is, galaxies); and that tidal friction must slow down the Earth (Emiliani 566). Was Kant here an astronomer or a philosopher? He was an astronomer with a philosophic mind. He was a philosopher with love for astronomy: “the starry heavens above”. Although impressed by Newtonian physics, Kant feared that as the scientific method was applied to the study of all of reality including human behaviour, the whole domain of morals with its concomitant concepts of freedom and God was threatened by absorption into a mechanical universe. Again, science raised for Kant the problem of how to explain, or to justify, scientific knowledge. Kant discovered that in principle scientific knowledge is similar to metaphysical knowledge. Therefore, the justification or explanation of scientific thought on the one hand and metaphysical thought concerning freedom and morality on the other are the same. On this, Kant says” “the genuine method of metaphysics in fundamentally the same kind which Newton introduced into natural science and which was there so fruitful (Stumpf 292). Again, by thus interpreting the nature of scientific and moral thought, Kant provided a new function and a new life for philosophy. This function is suggested by the title of Kant’s major work, the Critique of Pure Reason, for now the task of philosophy became the critical appraisal of the capacities of human reason. In pursuing this new critical function; Kant achieved what he called his Copernican revolution in philosophy (Stumpf 292). The questions of “the starry heavens above “and the moral law within”, the question of necessity and freedom were, in Kant’s view, resolved by ascribing a scientific method to the former and a metaphysical approach to the latter.

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Sceptical Rejoinders to Kant Kant and his disciple Karl Friedrich Staudin (who wrote the first systematic history of scepticism, from Pyrrho to Kant) regarded Kant’s critical philosophy as the final of man’s long struggle with scepticism (Encyclopedia of philosophy vol. 7:457) Kant’s contemporaries and successors, however, saw his effort as beginning a new phase in sceptical discourse and providing a new road to Pyrrhonism. This essay will look at one of the areas where Kant’s philosophy is heavily criticized by sceptical critics, employing a portion of the earlier sceptical tradition as a way of showing that Kant had failed to resolve the sceptical crisis. G. E. Schulze (1792) also known as Aenesidemus-Schulze after the title of his major work of 1792 argued that Kant had not succeeded in establishing any genuine truths about objective reality, since as Kant himself had shown, there is no way of extending information about the conditions of thought to real objects, or things-in- themselves. But without any such extension, the objective validity of our judgment cannot be determined. At best, all that can be established is the subjective necessity of certain of our views, which is essentially what Hume had shown. So Schulz, by insisting on the inability of the Kantian analysis to move from subjective data about what people have to believe to any objective data about reality, contended that Kant had not advanced beyond Hume’s Scepticism, and that this failure of the Kantian revolution actually constituted a vindication of Hume’s views. Salomon Maimon (1790) challenged Kant’s theory from within and developed a view which he called ‘rational scepticism.’ In contrast with Hume, Maimon agreed with Kant that there were rational a priori concepts, such as those involved in mathematics. In opposition to Kant, Maimon held that the applicability of transcendental concepts to experience was itself something based on induction from experience. Since such induction could only be probable, no universal and necessary knowledge about experience could be gained. Kant had assumed that such knowledge existed, and examined how this was possible. Maimon asked whether it was, and showed that the evidence was always experiential. Inductively it might become more and more probable that a priori concepts applied to experience, but, because of Hume’s critique of induction, we must remain sceptical on this score. Maimon ruled out metaphysical knowledge as unattainable, on both Humean and Kantian grounds. Thus Maimon developed a mitigated septicism in which the reality of a priori forms of thought is granted but in which the relation of these forms to matters of fact is always in question. Knowledge (that is,

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Summa Philosophica proposition that are universal and necessary, rather than ones that are just psychologically indubitable) is possible in mathematics but not in sciences dealing with the world. Unlike logical positivists, who were to claim that mathematics was true because it consist vacuous logical tautologies, Maimon contended that mathematics was true because it was about creations of our mind. Maimon partial skepticism exposed some of the fundamental limitations of Kant’s critical philosophy as a solution to the sceptical crisis.

REFERENCES:  Paul Guyer (1992) Ed. The Cambridge Companion of Kant, New York, USA, Cambridge University Press  Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure Reason, (trans.) Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom. 1997  Gottlob Ernst Schulze. (2011). In Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/528419/Gottlob- Ernst-Schulze  Omoregbe Joseph. (1998) Epistemology (Theory of Knowledge), Lagos. Joja Educational Research and Publishers  Paul Edwards (1967) Ed. Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vol.7. USA, Macmillan, Inc.  Maimon, Salomon. Essay on Transcendental Philosophy translated and edited by Alistair Welchman, Henry Somers-Hall, Merten Reglitz, and Nick Midgley, London: Continuum, 2010.  Okoro Chiedozie (2008). Epistemology and Philosophy of History (an exercise of the critique of cognition), Nigeria, Soladem Printers Ltd

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CHAPTER NINETEEN

GERMAN IDEALISM

KANT’S HERITAGE According to Kant, all that there is is the mind and anything that is structured by the mind. He maintains that it is the mind that structures physical objects, constitutes them and makes them appear to us according its own structure. The phenomenal world (world of sense perception) is the product of the human mind. Kant, who by his Copernican Revolution, elevated the human mind from the passive role formerly assigned to it by previous philosophers to a very active role, put strict limits, nevertheless, to its cognitive capacity. On the one hand, the human mind is elevated to the almost divine position of constructing, structuring the physical world by imposing its own structures on it and making it appear the way it does, while on the other hand, the same mind is unable to grasp or to penetrate into, or to know things-in-themselves (the Noumenon), that is, things as they are in themselves as distinct from the way they appear to us. Therefore, while the phenomenal world is the product of the human mind, the noumenal world remains outside the boundary of its cognitive capacity. The implication of Kant’s dichotomized reality is that the human mind can only know a part of reality. The Kantian Copernican Revolution and the Kantian skepticism involving the unknowability of the noumena were the roots of German idealism.

JOHANN FICTHE Johann Fichte rejected Kant’s noumena and retained the phenomena as the only reality that there is. Phenomena are all that exist and are the product of the mind. Fichte followed Kant in maintaining that the phenomenal world, that is, the physical world of sense perception, is the product of the human mind. Fichte called the human mind “ego”. He rejected the unknowability of the noumena of Kant. He argued that the ego can penetrate or can know the noumenon (the thing-in itself). This ego refers to the human mind, but this human mind is only but a representation or the manifestation of the Infinite Ego, which is God. Fichte held the idea that the universe is an expression of the Infinite Ego.

SCHELLING Alarmed by the dichotomies in the Kantian and post-Kantian philosophies: subject-object, ideal-real, matter-spirit, noumena-phenomena, Schelling

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Summa Philosophica sought for a philosophy of synthesis. Schelling postulated that there is unity underlying all these dualism. According to him, all these dichotomies are manifestations of one and the same reality, namely, the Absolute. All contractions and all opposites are synthesized, harmonized and overcome in the Absolute, which is of course a spiritual reality. This means that reality is ultimately one and it is spiritual. Everything we see around us, the whole universe is a manifestation of this spiritual reality, the Absolute.

GEORG HEGEL Georg Friedrich Hegel took German idealism to the apogee of its power. Having been influenced by his predecessors – Kant, Fichte and Schelling – Hegel believed that there is only one ultimate reality which he called the Absolute Spirit (Geist). The Absolute Spirit, according to Hegel, is the totality of all beings. This Absolute Spirit, the Geist, by its nature, undergoes self-projection, self-expression, self-externalization, and self- manifestation. This process is a dialectical one and also perpetual. According to Hegel, the Absolute projected, expressed, externalized, and manifested itself in the physical universe. The physical universe is being used to further the dialectical process of self-disclosure of the Absolute spirit. In other words, the physical universe is the projection, the expression, the externalization, the manifestation and the disclosure of the Absolute Spirit. Man above all physical things is spirit. The Absolute Spirit, having suffered alienation in the universe, could only find reconciliation in man, who possesses spirit. But human spirit is only a fragment of the Absolute Spirit. Among human spirits, there are some that are master-spirits, who define every age according to their influence upon the age. These master- spirits are historical personalities, for they not only lead their fellow spirits, but also perpetuate the dialectical movement of the Absolute Spirit in history. In the Introduction to his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel summarises the argument that completes Kant’s philosophical revolution. He adopts Kant’s logic employed in the synthesis of the antinomies of pure reason, where Kant posited a thesis, negated by an antithesis and reconciled by a synthesis. Hegel also admired Kant’s idealism, but had to give a very hard knock Kant’s skepticism concerning the unknowability of the noumenon. Hegel argued that the real is rational and that the rational is real. What did he mean by this confusing and complex statement? He meant the following: that if the noumenon exists, then it is knowable. In otherwords, he queried how Kant could postulate something he could not

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Summa Philosophica know. For Hegel, Kant contradicted himself. If Kant could rationalize on the noumenon, then the noumenon, by implication, exists. Everything about Hegel is centered on his dialectics: thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Hegel contrasted being with non-being as thesis and antithesis. In the Hegelian dialectic, being is the thesis while non-being is the antithesis. The resultant synthesis is becoming. Thus, being and non- being are ‘moments’ in the process of becoming. In Hegel’s dialectical logic, we have thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In Hegel’s metaphysics, we have being, non-being and becoming as this corresponds with his logic. But the Absolute Spirit is ultimate in Hegel.

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CHAPTER TWENTY

IRRATIONALISM

Irrationalism is a doctrine in philosophy which claims that the intellectual power of reason or thinking is limited. While it repudiates the power of reason, irrationalism declares that the main method of cognition is intuition, feeling, instinct and the will. Irrationalism sees the world as disordered and chaotic, and that the world and world outlook depends on the unconscious will. Irrationalism does not denote unreasonableness, but it opposes rationalism, which relies heavily on reason. In irrationalism, the Will is ultimate.

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER In the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, German idealism took a new turn. The physical universe is still a manifestation of an ultimate spiritual reality. But whereas in Schelling’s and Hegel’s philosophies the ultimate is a rational being, developing consciously towards a definite goal, in the philosophy of Schopenhauer, the ultimate reality becomes an irrational impulse for life, a blind irrational impulse, which he calls the Will to live. For Schopenhauer, reason was not the most important reality. The Will to live is the vital force that makes things be. He placed feelings higher above reason. Schopenhauer went back to Kant and identified this ultimate, the will to live with Kant’s thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself, the noumenon, which was thrown out by Fichte, was brought back by Schopenhauer. He, however insists, contrary to Kant that there is only one “things-in-itself”. There is no plurality or multiplicity in the noumenal world, which is the real world. Plurality is often found in the world of appearance, the phenomenal world and not in the noumenal world. In the noumenal, reality is one, only one and this one reality is the Will to live. Schopenhauer thus theorized that life is a blind, irrational, erratic and unpredictable force that manifests itself in the physical world. Life is an uncontrollable impulse, a mysterious energy which stands opposed to reasoning and rationalization. This mysterious energy, Schopenhauer called the WILL. Struggle in life is meaningless and resistance is futile, since the WILL prevails.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE Friedrich Nietzsche, influenced by Schopenhauer, interpreted the WILL as the WILL TO POWER. In his book, The Will to Power, Nietzsche had

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Summa Philosophica predicted that the “Ubermensch”, the Superman would arise out of the German soil to rule the world. He, Nietzsche, had suggested that the Superman would refer to a race of people who were stronger and more righteous than the human beings of his generation. Conflict, struggle, strife, war, force, violence, terror, might, were necessary since these would purify humanity, strengthening the strong, destroying the weak. The WILL TO POWER was a force that instigated people to fight and dominate. The WILL TO POWER became, for Nietzsche, the highest moral expression in life. Democracy favoured mediocrity. Christianity preaches a slave- morality. Nietzsche advocated for a master-morality which would overturn the table of Christian morality. Nietzsche rejected peace, humility, charity, compassion, kindness as slave morality. He replaced these with war, arrogance, selfishness, ruthlessness and cruelty as master-morality of the Superman. The democratic virtues of equality, fairness and happiness he replaced with an autocracy of strength, might, deceit and pain. “God is dead”, said Nietzsche (Thus Spake Zarathustra). The superman reigns by the Will to Power.

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PART V: HISTORY OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

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CHAPTER TWENTY ONE

ANGLO-AMERICAN NEO-IDEALISM

Hegel’s philosophy was well received in Britain consequent upon English translation of his works. Thomas H. Green, Edward Caird, Bernard Bosanquet, John McTaggart, Francis Bradley and Josiah Royce were among those philosophers who took advantage of Hegel’s idealism and built their own version of idealism. They were, so to say, Hegelians trying to build on the Hegelian idealism. Since they were mostly British, their system is called British Neo-Idealism. Josiah Royce was an American who was also Hegelian in thought. Because of his American extraction coupled with the mainly British counterparts, we call this chapeter at hand “Anglo- American Neo-Idealism.

THOMAS HILL GREEN Thomas Hill Green argued that the human mind participates in the Infinite Mind. The human mind is a fragment, a spark and a microcosm of the all pervading and Infinite Mind. The universe is a manifestation, an externalization and a projection of the Infinite Mind. The human mind is inextricably inseparable from the Infinite Mind.

EDWARD CAIRD Edward Caird took for granted the duality which exists between the subjective mind and the object of cognition. According to him, the apparent subject-object duality is only illusory. There is, according to him, a unifying reality which manifests itself both as subject and as object of experience. This unifying reality, according to Caird, is God. God, he says, unifies all dualities.

JOHN MCTAGGART John McTaggart argued that matter and time do not exist. He suggested that there is only one substance in existence. There appears to be two realities, spirit and matter. In reality, only spirit exists. Matter does not exist. Since matter does not exist, it follws that time does not exist as well, since the notion of matter connotes motion, and motion involves time. The universe is composed of one all-pervading substance, which is Spirit.

BERNARD BOSANQUET The Absolute is the sum total of all things. The Absolute is the being of all beings. According to Bernard Bosanquet, there is only one being that

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Summa Philosophica endures all time and transcends all corporeality. This transcendent being is the Absolute. The Absolute manifests itself in the physical world. Like in Hegel, the Absolute is in a dialectical process of self-development towards self-actualization. Unlike Hegel, Bosanquet maintained that the Absolute is not God.

FRANCIS HERBERT BRADLEY It is very clear to many that these idealists were neither creative nor original inntheir thoughts since they were busy repeating the ideas of the German idealists, especially Hegel’s. Bradley was not an exception to this copy-cat style of philosophy. According to him, that is, according to Bradley, reality is a unified whole and one totality. There is no distinction between matter and spirit; and no distinction between subject and object. According to Bradley in his book, Appearance and Reality, the Absolute manifests itself both as matter and spirit, and as subject and object. In otherwords, there is only one reality, and that reality is the Absolute. This Absolute is real. Reality sometimes appears to be a duality of matter and spirit, subject and object. This is mere appearance. Only the Absolute is real. Again, Bradley says that this Absolute is not the Christian God.

JOSIAH ROYCE Josiah Royce was an American Neo-Idealist. He suggested that the best way to understand reality is by examination of one’s conscious experiences. The human mind is made up of fleeting conscious experiences which make the universe seem pluralistic. In otherwords, the multiple and fleeting conscious experiences in the huan mind suggests that the universe is composed of many things. Royce argues that this is illusory, for there can only be one living, great and all-inclusive mind. This mind is the Universal Mind which embraces all things. This Universal Mind contains all objects. The Universal Mind is a Universal Subject, and no object can be thought ouside this Universal Mind.

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CHAPTER TWENTY TWO

KARL MARX AND DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

Georg Hegel criticized mechanistic philosophy and metaphysical materialism which identified motion with mechanical translation. Hegel analyzed motion as a process and development. By motion, Hegel understood not just mechanical translation but also: physical, chemical, biological and social processes.Contradiction, the struggle of opposites, was the source and root of motion and vitality. Everything moved and had vitality and impulse by virtue of its internal contradiction. This was a dialectical interpretation of motion. Hegel assured that it was not the material world that moved, but the absolute spirit embodied in material objects (Gribanov 188). According to Hegel, Nature is to be regarded as a system of stages, one arising necessarily from the other and being the proximate truth of the stage from which it results (Hegel 20). Hegel’s analysis of motion tended to vitiate metaphysical materialism which was the core of philosophy of nature since antiquity. His position was to be modified by dialectical materialism. Dialectical materialism is the philosophical (and scientific) theory which is traceable to the works of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and Vladmir Lenin. It’s dialectical roots points back to Hegel’s logic, and the element of ‘synthesis’ truly to Kant’s analytic of the antinomies of pure reason. Its basic tenets are that the universe is composed solely of matter in motion; that motion is only possible in space and time; and that change is caused by conflict of opposites. Due to the fact that everything contains different elements which are in opposition, automatically, self movement (motion) occurs. Engels was Marx’s close associate who developed the doctrine of dialectical materialism. He gave autonomous status to matter. Marx linked matter to human activity and saw it only in terms of human activity. But Engels separated it from man and gave it an independent status in his book, The Dialectics of Nature. In this work, matter, as it were, gained its independence from man and began to exist on its own independently of human activity to which Marx tied it. We remember that Hegel had conceived dialectic as synthesis between spirit and matter. Marx conceived it as synthesis between man and matter, a synthesis that links man with matter. But Engels conceived it as synthesis that takes place within matter itself. Engels saw dialectic as the inner dynamic principle of matter. The dialectical structure and moment is within matter itself and not between matter and man as Marx conceived it. Engels went ahead to formulate

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Summa Philosophica three (3) laws of dialectical movement of matter. Marx and Engels both maintained that the conflict of opposing forces leads to growth, change and development, according to definite laws (Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, 179). These laws of dialectical movement of matter are:

(1) The law of transformation of quantity to quality; (2) The law of mutual interpenetration of opposites; (3) The law of Negation of Negation.

The Transformation of Quantity to Quality: Matter is said to be quantitative by Engels. Matter is self generating. Qualitative difference can only be produced by the addition and subtraction of matter according to quantitative variation. Thus a continuous accumulation of quantitative changes ultimately results in qualitative changes. This accumulation is either negative or positive. Engels does not account for how matter originated. He simply says that matter is self-generating. This implies that matter is the cause of itself. The Mutual Interpenetration of Opposites: Engels argues that opposites do not rule out nor annihilate each other. On the contrary there is a mutual interpenetration between them. They stay together to form the synthesis. Opposites are the internal logic, vital force of every dialectics. Negation of Negation: When a thesis is negated by an antithesis, the antithesis is itself negated as well, and this results in a synthesis. This synthesis becomes a new thesis which is again negated by antithesis, where a new synthesis emerges. This process goes on and on and keeps the universe afloat. Vladmir Lenin, another exponent of dialectical materialism, insists that matter is eternal, uncreated, indestructible and is the cause of all things. Everything in the world is matter in motion. There is no spiritual being. The only forces operating are those of matter in motion. “There is nothing in the world but matter in motion, and matter in motion cannot move otherwise than in space and time”. For Lenin, “development is the struggle of opposites”. All objects, all phenomena in the universe have contradictory sides in them. Yet these contradictory sides are not separable, for they are integral parts of every object. There is therefore unity of opposites in things, right from action to living things, up to the human society. Whereas Hegel’s dialectics upheld the primary of spirit (the Geist), Marx held matter as primacy but maintained the dialectics. Dialectical materialism believed that motion has a universal character and thus extended it to the material and spiritual world and to social

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Summa Philosophica phenomena. For the dialectical materialists, motion of matter was not only mechanical translation, but also: heat and light, electricity and magnetism, chemical combination and dissolution, life and finally, consciousness. According to Engels, “motion is not merely change of place in fields higher than mechanics; it is also change of quality (Engels, Dialectics of Nature 252). Dialectical materialism studies motion as connected with matter, for matter and motion are inconceivable without the other. Hence “neither motion as such nor any of its forms such as mechanical force, can therefore be separated from matter nor opposed to it as something apart or alien, without leading to an absurdity (Engels, Anti During, 467). In consequence, motion is uncreated. Like matter it exists eternally. There are only mutual transformations of one type of motion into another in nature. However, motion like matter must only be understood through study of its concrete types and forms. Thus, matter as such and motion as such have not yet been seen or otherwise experienced by anyone, but only the various, actually existing material things and forms of motion…matter as such is nothing but the totality of all sensuously perceptible forms of motion; words like matter and motion are nothing but abbreviations in which we comprehend many different sensuously perceptible things according to their common properties (“Dialectics of Nature” 235-236) Motion, in dialectical materialism is an inseparable, internally inherent, innate property of matter. Motion holds primacy and preeminence among the attributes of matter. On this, Marx said: “Among the qualities inherent in matter motion in the first and foremost” (Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, 128). Again, Engels said: “motion is the mode of existence of matter, hence more than a mere property of it” (“Anti-During” 402). We note that the doctrine of motion as developed in dialectical materialist philosophy came through generalization of the achievements of preceding materialism, development of the propositions of the Hegelian dialectic and of the achievements of the natural and social sciences. Motion in dialectical materialism was not just a work of physics, nor astronomy, nor chemistry, nor biology, but was considered as change in general (Engels, Dialectics of Nature, 247).

Historical Materialism Historical materialism refers to the application of the dialectical, materialist philosophy in the human society, where the laws of human historical development are realized through the human activity. Historical materialism was developed by Karl Marx who saw dialectic as a kind of interaction

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Summa Philosophica between man and matter, and conceived man as a product of his own activity on matter in the historical process. Thus there is dialectic in history which directs history to its goal. But the dialectic is not a spiritual force as Hegel conceived it (the absolute), nor is it blind force which exists independently of human activities. Rather it is constituted by man’s activities on matter. Society is the dialectical synthesis of man and nature.

Karl Marx’s Political Philosophy: Socialism and Communism Communism is a theory of socialism developed by Karl Marx. Socialism is a direct criticism of capitalism. Socialism sees evil in the private ownership of the means of production and the desire for private profit per capitalism, and seeks to shift such ownership to the control of the state. Technically described socialism is a political and economic theory which seeks a common and collective control of the means of production in the hands of the state. Socialism is a state-controlled ownership of the means of production. Socialism abolishes private ownership of landed property, natural resources and factories, and rejects private profit. Karl Mark is generally regarded as the father and chief exponent of socialism Communism is the highest stage of socialism, wherein there is hope that, after an overthrow of the capitalists, the proletariats would reign supreme. Marx gave an outline of the characteristic features of communism in the Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848): i. The materialistic interpretation of history. This is the view that the mode of production in material life determines the general character of other social, political and spiritual processes of life. ii. Class War “The history of all, histherto, existing society is the history of class struggle”. Marx observes that private ownership of property divides the society into two antagonistic classes: freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, oppressor and oppressed. iii. Surplus Value The surplus value, Marx believed, arose because labour power produces values above the cost of production. Marx suggested that the “surplus values” should go to labour – the labourer. The capitalist class appropriates the “surplus value” and thus exploits the labourer. iv. Social revolution It was the hope of Marx that the working class, the proletariat, would seize the means of production and overthrow the capitalist class – the bourgeoise. v. The dictatorship of the proletariat.

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A severe and intensified struggle would characterize the reign of the dominant class, the proletariats. Its dictatorship will confiscate all private capital, organize labour, compel all to work, centralize credit and speed up production. vi. The state will wither away. The society will be classless. Engels, a co-author of the Communist Manifesto, wrote: “When organizing production anew on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers, society will banish the whole state – machinery to a place which will then be the most proper for it – the museum of antiquities – side by side with the spinning wheel and the bronze axe”. There will be no classes any more in the society. vii. “From each according to his capacity to each according to his needs” shall be the new philosophy of the society. Each person will work for the society as much as his capacity carries him and will take from it what he needs.

Communism, in the real sense of the word, that is, as envisaged by Marx and Engels, did not and does not exist. Dictatorships do not abdicate power, and, so, a dictatorship of the proletariat would not let go power. And if they don’t, the state would continue to exist and would not wither away.

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CHAPTER TWENTY THREE

ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD AND PROCESS METAPHYSICS

Hussein Inusah Introduction Process metaphysics is a philosophical tradition that recommends becoming, changing and dynamism over the static being conceived by traditional metaphysicians. It considers ontology of change as an apt descriptor of reality than the ontology of static being. Process metaphysics is an old doctrine traceable to the pre-Socratic philosopher, Heraclitus. Heraclitus argues that reality is in perpetual flux and that stability and permanence are illusions. Process metaphysics can also be found in Hegel’s speculative philosophy, where he construes the history of the world as the unfolding of the dialectic Absolute Spirit, Geist. Process metaphysics presents some core issues that set it apart from classical metaphysics. Process metaphysics considers actualities (final entities of reality) not as made up of inert substances that are extended in space and time and only externally related to each other. Rather, it construes actualities as made up of atomic or momentary events. Thus, whereas substance metaphysics conceives the world as being made up of substance, process metaphysics considers organism as the basic unity of existence. Similarly, whereas substance metaphysicians conceive matter as self-sustaining, externally related, valueless, passive and without any intrinsic principle of motion, organisms, conceived by process metaphysicians are interdependent, externally and internally related, value laden and intrinsically passive. Some core proponents of process metaphysics include: Henri Bergson, Nikolai Berdyaev, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. For our purpose in this paper we shall present the views of Alfred North Whitehead and Henri Bergson.

Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947)

Alfred North Whitehead’s process metaphysics is the most advanced and sophisticated version of process metaphysics. It is an ontology that takes events rather than enduring substance as the basic unit of reality. Much of Whitehead’s metaphysics is crystallized in his epoch marking work, Processand reality. Process and Reality is an expansion of series of lectures (Gifford Lectures) which Whitehead delivered at the

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University of Edinburg during the session 1927-28. In this book, Whitehead presents a system of speculative philosophy which is based on a categorical scheme of investigation, designed to explain how concrete aspects of human experience can provide a foundation for our understanding of reality. Whitehead also investigates, more importantly, how reality can be construed as a process of becoming.

Whitehead identified four types of categories: (1) the Category of the Ultimate, (2) the Categories of Existence (eight in number) (3) the Categories of Explanation (twenty seven), and (4) the Categoreal Obligations (nine). The Category of the Ultimate is a category by which a disjunctive diversity or multiples of actual entities becomes a conjunctive unity or one. The Ultimate is a metaphysical principle (creativity) by which the ‘many’ become the ‘one,’ and the ‘one’ becomes the ‘many.’ According to Whitehead the Ultimate character pervading the universe is a drive towards the endless production of new synthesis (Whitehead 1978). Whitehead refers to this drive as the “creativity.’ For whitehead, creativity is an eternal activity and the underlying energy of realization of Actual Entities. Nothing escapes it. It is for this reason that Whitehead’s Categoreal Scheme begins with the three notions: “creativity”, “many” and the “one” which is contained within the Category of the Ultimate.

The Categories of Existence are: (1) Actual Entities (or Actual Occasions). Actual Entities are final realities of which the world is made up of. They are concrete individual existing beings in the universe. Actual entities could be likened to cells in the body, a unit which retains its individual characteristics even when it grows together with others. Actual entities preserve their self-identity and individuality as they pass through the process of becoming into being and perishing. (2) Prehensions are Concrete facts of relatedness. Through Prehension, there is the growth of relatedness among Actual Entities. (3) the Nexus indicate relations known as public matters of fact (4) Subjective Forms are private matters of fact (5) Eternal Objects are pure potentials for the specific determination of fact (6) Propositions are impure potentials for the specific determination of matters of fact (7) Multiplicities are pure disjunctions of diverse entities and (8) Contrasts (or Patterned Entities) are modes of synthesis of entities in one Prehension (Whitehead 1978:22).

The Categories of Explanation include: (1) that reality is a process consisting of the becoming of actual entities (or actual occasions) (4) that being is a potential for becoming (8) that ‘objectification’ is the mode by

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Summa Philosophica which the potentiality of an actual entity is realized in another actual entity (11) that Prehensions which involve actual entities are physical, while Prehensions which involve eternal objects are conceptual (12) that ‘positive’ Prehensions include feelings, while ‘negative’ Prehensions do not include feelings (18) that the ontological principle of any actual entity can only be found in another actual entity (i.e. that the reason or cause for an actual entity can only be found in another actual entity) (23) that the 'immediacy' of an actual entity is the self-functioning of that actual entity and (25) that ‘concrescence’ is a process in which Prehensions are integrated into a fully determinate feeling or satisfaction (Whitehead 1978:24-26). Whitehead defines a ‘satisfaction’ as a final phase of ‘Concrescence’ (or the process of integration of feeling) in which Prehensions are integrated into a concrete unity. A ‘feeling’ is the integration of an actual entity or occasion into the internal constitution of a subject.

The nine Categoreal Obligations are: (1) The Category of Subjective Unity, the idea that feelings may be integrated according to the unity of the aims of their subject. (2) The Category of Objective Identity, the view that each element in the objective datum of a satisfaction has its own identity as defined by its function in that satisfaction. (3) The Category of Objective Diversity, the view that diverse elements in the objective datum of a satisfaction each have their own function, and insofar as they are diverse, are not identical in their function in that satisfaction. (4) The Category of Conceptual Valuation, the idea that conceptual feeling may be derived from, or may reproduce, physical feeling. (5) The Category of Conceptual Reversion is the view that conceptual diversity may be derived from physical feeling. (6) The Category of Transmutation is the view that physical and conceptual feelings may be integrated into a transmuted feeling, which has a nexus of relationships as its objective datum. (7) The Category of Subjective Harmony is the idea that the importance of a conceptual feeling to a subject may depend on its congruence or harmony with the aims of the subject. (8) The Category of Subjective Intensity, the view that the intensity of a feeling may be changed by the aims of the subject. (9) Finally, the Category of Freedom and Determination, the view that concrescence is an internally-determined process in every actual entity, and that it is free from external determination (Whitehead 1978:26- 27).

Whitehead describes his metaphysics as a philosophy of organism or as an organic philosophy in that he considers reality as

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Summa Philosophica consisting of interrelated and mutually dependent parts which are involved in sustaining vital processes (Lowe ). Whitehead refers to the final realities of which the world is composed as Actual Entities or as Actual Occasions. These are the concrete facts on which our thoughts and feelings are based. The other basic elements of human experience include Prehensions (or concrete concepts and feelings) of actual entities, and the ‘nexus’ (or system of relationships) which connects the development and functioning of all actual entities (or actual occasions).

Whitehead describes Prehensions as concrete modes of analysis of the world. To prehend something is to have a concrete idea or concept of that thing. However, Whitehead counsels that Prehension is not merely a mode of thinking. A Prehension is rather a process of appropriation of an element of an actual entity, or of an element which is derived from an actual entity. An instance of Prehension of an object, or of an element of an object, changes the internal constitution of the prehending subject. Prehension is a process by which an actual entity, or prehending subject, becomes itself by appropriating elements from other actual entities. Thus, the becoming of an actual entity occurs through a concrescence of Prehensions.

According to Whitehead concrescence is a process in which Prehensions are integrated into a fully determinate feeling or satisfaction. A satisfaction is a unity of physical or mental operation attained by an actual entity. The nature of each actual entity is bipolar, physical and mental, and the concrescence of each actual entity may involve the integration of physical and conceptual feelings. The satisfaction of each actual entity is the completion of its becoming in a complex feeling, which establishes a fully determinate relation with the world.

Whitehead’s philosophy of organism is concerned with two levels of meaning and reality: the formal structure of actual entities or occasions and the ‘giveness’ of the world in which actual entities or occasions occur. According to Whitehead, actuality is the ‘giveness’ of potentiality. 'Giveness' is the definiteness of actuality, which both excludes and includes potentiality. Each actual entity is in the process of becoming another actual entity. The satisfaction of a feeling or Prehension is the attainment of its final actuality.

An actual entity may become an object of Prehension for another actual entity. Actual entities may become objects of Prehension by a

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Summa Philosophica process of either causal or presentational objectification. In causal objectification, an eternal object is directly perceived as an expression of the formal nature of an objectified actual entity. In presentational objectification, an eternal object is indirectly perceived as a result of a direct perception of an actual entity.

Whitehead also distinguishes between causal efficacy and presentational immediacy as two modes of perception. Causal efficacy is a direct perception of prior actual occasions which are causally related or relevant to a subsequent actual occasion. Presentational immediacy is a direct perception of present actual occasions, which may lead to a process of integrating these occasions with actual occasions in the past.

Whitehead describes symbolic reference as a mixed mode of perception, or as the interplay between the modes of causal efficacy and presentational immediacy. Actual entities which are perceived in the mode of immediacy may give information about physical or conceptual objects in the mode of efficacy, and physical or conceptual objects which are perceived in the mode of efficacy may give information about actual entities in the mode of immediacy. Symbolic reference is also the nexus or system of relations between symbols and meanings. Symbols and meanings may be integrated or synthesized into subjective feelings.The ‘presented locus’ of perception is a 'common ground' for causal efficacy and for presentational immediacy. The presented locus is a datum for both modes of perception, and is thus a unifying principle for physical and mental operation. The presented locus is an object of direct perception by presentational immediacy, and is an object of indirect perception by causal efficacy.

According to Whitehead, primary feelings may be physical, conceptual, or transmuted. Hybrid physical feelings combine physical and conceptual feelings. Simple physical and conceptual feelings may be integrated to form complex feelings. Purely physical feelings may be transmuted into conceptual feelings, and hybrid feelings may be transmuted into purely physical feelings. Actual occasions may be the objective data of physical feelings, while eternal objects may be the objective data of conceptual feelings.

The transmission of feelings contributes to the process of concrescence in actual entities. According to Whitehead, conceptual feelings may be integrated into more complex feelings, such as

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Summa Philosophica propositional or comparative feelings. Propositional feelings have propositions as their objective data, and may include: imaginative feelings and perceptive feelings. Comparative feelings have (comparisons or) contrasts as their objective data, and may include: intellectual feelings such as conscious perceptions and intuitive judgments and physical purposes.

Whitehead also explains that actual entities or occasions may be classified as either primary or hybrid. Primary entities include: actual entities, and pure potentials (eternal objects). Hybrid entities include: feelings, and propositions (White 1978:188-189).

Whitehead’s Process Theology

The picture of God issued by Whitehead’s process metaphysics is significantly different from the aged old picture of God–world relation. The Whiteheadian system is a remarkable deviation from classical theism conceived as the doctrine that God is completely transcendent, supernatural, beyond time and space, simple and unchanging. It is also a departure from the doctrines of pure immanence or pantheism: the belief that God and the world are identical and that God is nothing but a totality nature. Whitehead’s process metaphysics rater endorses panentheism, the belief that all is in God and God is immanent everywhere in the universe but is more than the universe.

The main reason behind the introduction of God in Whitehead metaphysics is not because Whitehead was an austere theist. The introduction of God is due to the endorsement of ‘the principle of concretion’ or limitation on actual entities. Recall Whitehead issued an unlimited number of ‘forms of definiteness’, external object. From Whitehead’s perspective, all actual entities are endowed with the creative principle of self-determination because it is only actual entities that are endowed with ‘causal efficacy’. On this account, it will be cumbersome for creative advance of actual entities to occur if the principle of concretion and limitation is not placed upon actualities. This principle must determine which forms are available for the instantation in each object and thus introduce contraries, grades or opposition among those values. According to the Whitehead’s metaphysics, actual occasion take on only a very specific selection of the eternal object that is available. For this reason, God is introduced into the system as the principle of limitation and concretion which all actual entities must respond to.

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To this end, Whitehead posits a unique Actual Entity conceived as the primordial source of the aim of definiteness or external entities. The upshot is that there cannot be actuality without final definiteness or external entities and it is this final definiteness that White calls God. From this God or Actual Entity, each temporal concrescence receives the initial aim from which itself causation starts (Pantaleon). God is thus seen as a limitation or concretion upon temporal actual entities or occasions.

Whitehead established a ‘di-polar’ nature of God. He conceived God by means of two abstractions: God’s primordial nature and His consequent nature. In this primordial nature, he envisages all eternal objects or definiteness and their actualization. In his consequent nature, he is the reaction of the world on him, prehending fully every actual entity in the world upon its concrescence. The consequent nature of God is that aspect of God that is continuously changing as the world changes and feels every experience in the world with subjective immediacy. Thus, Whitehead metaphysics characterizes God relation with the world as that of mutual transcendence, mutual immanence and creation.

Whitehead Metaphysics and the Problem of Evil

The argument from evil is the belief that an omnipotent God conceived by the Judeo-Christian-Islamic God will not allow evil or certain evil to occur. How does Whitehead solve the problem of evil in his metaphysics? Whitehead posit all actual entities including God as an instance of creativity and therefore experiential and self-determining. For this reason God is not able to override the self-determination of the actual entities. For Whitehead, for every actual entity to exist, it must be composed of creativity and this directly implies an element of self- determination (because all actual entities are endowed with causal immediacy) and a relation or nexus with all other entities.

God is an actual entity and in Whitehead’s metaphysical system, he cannot be treated in exception to all metaphysical to all metaphysical principles. Because God is an Actual Entity, he prehends and Hi is prehended just like all actual entities. In this way God cannot overturn the self-directed integration of feeling presented in the concrescence of any occasion. This implies that God cannot coerce any human to make particular decision and he cannot intervene in natural processes. Thus, God’s relationship with the world is persuasive rather than coercive. For

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References Kirk and Raven (Pre-Socratic Philosophers) Lowe V. (1962).Understanding Whitehead. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press Whitehead A. W. (1978). Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. New York: The Free Press

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CHAPTER TWENTY FOUR

HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY

Edmund Husserl was a German philosopher. His interest was epistemology but not metaphysics. Husserl was not satisfied with the way philosophers addressed the approach towards knowledge acquisition. He had to adopt the philosophy of Descartes, read Cartesianism and transformed it into a phenomenology. Husserl later described his phenomenology as 20th century Cartesianism following the footsteps of Descartes in his search for epistemological certainly. He admits the influence of Descartes on him. “No philosopher of the past has affected the sense of phenomenology as decisively as Rene Descartes. Phenomenology must honour him as its genuine patriach.”

What is Phenomenology? Phenomenology, as a method of philosophy, is generally associated with Edmund Husserl. Although the term had been used by Kant and Hegel, who used it with different meanings (Omoregbe, 1999:29), it was Husserl who enunciated it as a philosophical method. Phenomenology is described as a philosophical method the goal of which is to establish a ‘science’ of philosophy and to demonstrate the objective validity of the foundational principles of mathematics and natural science, epistemology and ontology. Husserl characterized his phenomenology as a ‘zuden Sachen Selbsts’, a return to the-things-themselves, a recursus ad fonte, that is, a return to the foundations. The things in question here are phenomena or intuitions.

Intentionality Intentionality in Husserl’s subjective idealist trend of thought asserts that “there is no object without a subject”. Put otherwise, there is a subject for every object. The central concept of phenomenology is the intentionality of consciousness. Husserl argues that intentionality affirms that consciousness is always consciousness of something. It is consciousness of something other than itself. It is consciousness of the world. In another version, it could be said that knowledge is always knowledge of something. It is knowledge of something other than itself. It is knowledge of the world. Philosophy must give knowledge of real facts, says Husserl.

The Lebens-welt For the rigourous foundation of his philosophy, Husserl urged the ‘epoche’, the bracketing of all presuppositions, and, especially, the presuppositions

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Summa Philosophica of the natural sciences. To emphasise this point Husserl urged the reduction to, that is, the leading back to the original form of human experience, the mode of experience which is prescientific; a leap back to the original form of human experience. This is the realm of man’s daily life, his life-world, the Lebens-welt. The Lebens-welt consists of all those experiences, such as, the perception, response, interpretation and synthesis or organization of the many facets of everyday affairs, which human beings are typically involved. This life-world is the source from which the sciences must abstract their objects. To that extent they provide only a partial grasp of reality. Much of the rich and meaningful elements of experience remain after the sciences have abstracted the elements of their concern. In the last analysis, the basic justification or confirmation of truth is to be found in the type of evidence that derives from events of the life-world. The totality of these events of the life-world is what Husserl calls our world-experiencing life (Stumpf, 458). It was this return to the life-world of subjectivity, which channeled many facets of phenomenology into existentialism. Husserl exerted a strong influence upon Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Heidegger, who later became Husserl’s assistant at Freiburg, prepared an article on phenomenology together with Husserl for the Encyclopedia Britannica. As time went on, Heidegger was to dedicate his Being and Time ‘To Edmund Husserl, in friendship and admiration (Heidegger, Being and Time). Even though these existentialists rejected many of Husserl’s ideas, their finished works bear the imprint of his phenomenology.

Phenomenological Epoche In the place of methodic doubt of Descartes, Husserl substitutes his “phenomenological epoche”, otherwise known as the phenomenological reduction. His basic philosophical advocacy was for us to go back to things themselves, the essesces of things. His phenomenology was the phenomenology of essences of things, the science of essences. The way back to the things themselves is what he refers to as the phenomenological epoche, phenomenological reduction, which consists in removing from our minds or putting in brackets all our prior views, ideas, preconceptions, beliefs and presuppositions about any object of investigation. Anything we ever knew about a thing, everything we have ever been told about it or what we merely conceived it to be, must all be set aside so that our minds once again become, as it were, a tabula rasa, that we might approach our object of cognition from a presuppositionless position with a completely open mind, without bias or prejudice. Nothing is taken for granted or

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Eidetic Reduction By the phenomenological imperative of Husserl, we are also required to practice “eidetic reduction” on our object of investigation. This entails the following action: we strip our object of cognition of all existential and particular traits and we focus our minds on its essence. For it is the essence that we want to know, for phenomenology, according to Husserl is an “eidetic science”, i.e, the science of essences, the science that is interested only in the essences of things. Husserl believes that since things reveal themselves (their essences) to us directly through immediate experience, error and doubt are therefore excluded. For Husserl, we realize our transcendental ego when man gets to the essences of things.

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CHAPTER TWENTY FIVE

EXISTENTIALISM: ISSUES AND PROPONENTS

INTRODUCTION Existentialism is a philosophical current that flows and focuses on the human existence and the human condition. It is, so to say,a philosophy on man. Existence, that is, the existence of man, is the primary focus of existentialism. What is man? Where did he come from? To where shall he go? Is there a meaning to life? Is life worth living at all? Why is man said to be free yet cannot do all that he wishes? Existentialism addresses questions that concern the lived experience of man. This work assumes that existentialism is a philosophy of life. The work at hand attempts to situate the rise of existentialism within a historical matrix, where Husserl’s phenomenology reacted against the excessive intellectualism heralded by the enlightenment. Existentialism shifts the focus of philosophy from minds and sheer matter to man concretely perceived: the man you can see; the man you can touch; the man you can hear; the man here; the man now. This work addresses this philosophy of the human condition: man’s sitz in leben. This study on existentialism begins with the historical background to the rise of existentialism. As this history is related, the enlightenment and positivism are taken into consideration. Yet one must meticulously note that existentialism as an intellectual projection of Kierkegaard arose as a reaction to the overly intellectual and rationalist outlook of German idealism of Hegel, taprooted in Kant. Positively speaking, Husserlian phenomenology shaped and moulded the school of thought known here as existentialism. Man is a pivotal subject in existentialism. Every other statement and treatment in existentialism is all about that entity called man. The basic tenets of existentialism are: man, the world, the others, freedom, choice, responsibility, irrationalism, anguish, dread, guilt, commitment, facticity, and death, and they are all about man. The second part of this chapter on exitentialism deals with these tenets. The third part of this chapter on the issue at hand addresses some existentialists and how they handled their themes. In the class of existentialists, we have those who were theists and those who were atheists. But the Danish Lutheran Pastor, Soren Kierkegaard was a God believer. Other existentialists on record are Karl Jaspers, Don Miguel Y Jugo Unamuno, Gabriel Marcel, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Albert Camus.

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There is a reaffirmation of existentialism as a philosophy which stresses the lived experience of man. The historical basis of existentialism is phenomenology, which rejected the excessive intellectualism which was heralded by the enlightenment. The Enlightenment was an intellectual movement, which covered the whole of Europe and America in the 18c. Its basic tenets were optimism, materialism, rationalism or apotheosis. Optimism was described as faith in progress, materialism as faith in nature, and faith in reason stood for the meaning of rationalism. In his “What is Enlightenment?”, Kant considers enlightenment as man’s release from self-imposed tutelage. Tutelage is the inability to see one’s natural powers without direction from another. This tutelage is called self-imposed because its cause is not any absence of rational competence, but simply a lack of courage and resolution to use one’s reason without direction from another. Sapere Aude! Dare to reason! Have the courage, use your own minds-is the motto of the enlightenment. Enlightenment, for Kant, is summed up in ‘To Dare To Know’.

What Is Existentialism? Existence precedes essence in existentialism. Existentialism is a philosophical movement against the degradation and depersonalization of man, which, as it were, was a consequence of the industrial revolution. Man was, in practical terms, regarded as an ‘it’. Man and the human existence are special concerns in existentialism. Existentialism is a philosophy of existence. It is an irrational trend in philosophy, which appeared in the 20th century, in an attempt, to create a New World outlook corresponding to the frame of mind of bourgeois intellectuals. Modern existentialism has its provenance in the phenomenology of Husserl. Existentialism tried to answer the question how a man should live after his liberal illusions had been shattered by historical disaster, such as the industrial revolution, the rationalism of the age of reason, Kantianism, Hegeliansim, positivism, and most currently, the Second World War. Kant’s noumenon, that the thing-in-itself is unknowable (Die Ding an Sich ist unbekentbar) had no primary place in existentialism.

The Tenets of Existentialism Existentialism, as it centers on human existence, draws its themes from human experience. Though they differ in their views about them, the existentialists generally reflect on some or all of the themes as follows: irriationalism, man and the world: the others; authentic and

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Summa Philosophica inauthentic existence; freedom, choice and responsibility; anguish and dread, commitment, facticity and death.

Man and the World The central focus of existentialism is man and the human existence. Yet there can be no human existence without the world. Prominent in their analysis on man and the world are Heidegger, Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre.

Irrationalism Irrationalism, here, should not be construed as lack of reasonableness, but rather, as anti-rationalism. As earlier pointed out, existentialism arose, in the most part, as a reaction to the excesses of rationalism. Kierkegaard chiefly reacted against the idealism of Hegel, and some of the existentialist as enunciated above, against Kantianism and Cartesianism. The absolutes confidence in the power of reason, characteristic of the Age of Reason or the Enlightenment, exaggerated the power of human reasons. Irrationalism opposes the exaggeration of the power of human reason.

The Other As a being-in-the world, man is also a being-with-others. All though existentialism is very much concerned with the existence of the individual, it nevertheless maintains that the existence of the individual implies the existence of others, since the individual could not exist without the others.

Freedom, Choice and Responsibility At the heart of existentialism is the theme of freedom. Nevertheless, freedom for the existentialists is most often referring to the very structure of the being of man, as we find in Sartre. It is not freedom of the will. It is sad to note that the existentialists do not prove the reality of human freedom. The term freedom is an elusive concept. Freedom is accompanied with responsibility, in as much as there is the situation where man must choose between or among alternative. Anguish The radicality of freedom with its concomitant pain posses a heavy burden, an anguish upon man upon realization. With this realization man tries to run away through vicious devices which constitute inauthentic existence, such as bad faith, the anonymous they, and so on. By bad-faith,

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Sartre is referring to self-deception, and the anonymous-they, for Heidegger, is being plunged in the crowd consciousness.

Commitment The existentialists submit that freedom must be committed in action. Anybody seeking freedom without commitment is only deceiving himself. For human reality, to be is to act and to cease to act is to cease to be’ (Sartre, L Existentialism, p.57). This commitment, according to Heidegger, finds expression when man listens to the voice of conscience. The voice of conscience calls the inauthentic one to actualize his possibilities through self-appropriation. The voice of conscience shatters the tyranny of the ‘they’, and appeals to man to be authentically himself.

Facticity Facticity of human existence refers to the limiting factors of human experience. Man is considered here as a limited being, even in his freedom. Death and decay, sickness, disappointments and sorrows, man’s powerlessness in the face of the force of nature, are limiting factors to man’s existence. Man, Sartre says, carries with him an emptiness, a nothingness which he tries in vain all through the course of his life to fill. It is this nothingness which separates man from himself, thus, making him ‘a being who is not what he is’. For Sartre, then, being is nothingness. For Heidegger, the facticity of human existence is the finitude of Dasein, the climax of which is death.

Death Sartre and Heidegger differ sharply on this issue. Heidegger tells us that death is a meaningful part of human life; that it is death, which confers uniqueness and meaning on human existence. Sartre on the other hand maintains that death is a meaningless absurdity, which removes all meaning from human existence.For Heidegger, then, man is a ‘sein-zum- todes’, a being-unto-death.

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EXISTENTIALIST PHILOSOPHERS

SOREN KIERKEGARRD Soren Kierkegarrd reacted or rather criticized the excesses of rationalism. He revolted against the rational emphasis in Greek wisdom, and argued that Greek philosophy had been too greatly influence by a high regard for mathematics. Although he did not want to reject either mathematics or science in their proper uses, he did reject the assumption that the mode of thought characteristics of science could be successfully employed when trying to understand human nature. Mathematics has no special place for the human individual, only for the general, the universal. Likewise, Platonic philosophy emphasized the universal form, the ‘True, the Good’. Plato’s assumption was if one knew the good he would do it. Kierkegaard thought that such an approach to ethics was a falsification of man’s real predicament.Kierkegaard aimed to underscore the idea that even when a person has knowledge, he is still in the predicament of having to make a decision. There are problems that can be solved by mathematics and physics as well as by ethics and metaphysics. But over and against such universal problems stands life, each person’s life, making demands upon the individual, and at these critical moments, general and abstract thoughts do not help. The most poignant moments in life are personal, when the individual becomes aware of himself as a subject. This subjectivity makes up each person’s unique existence. For this reason, objectivity and grand theories cannot give the whole truth about the individual self. Truth, said Kierkegaard, is subjectivity. By this strange notion he meant that, for existing, stirring, deciding persons there is not available ‘out there’, a prefabricated truth. Anticipating the pragmatism of William James, who said that truth is made’ by an act of the will, Kierkegaard wrote that what is ‘out there’ is ‘an objective uncertainty’; he argued that ‘the highest attainable truth for an existing individual is ‘an objective uncertainty held just in the passionate personal experience’. For Kierkegaard, the cultivation of mind is not important or decisive thing in life. Of more consequence is the development and maturity of personality. Kierkegaard bequeathed the legacy of subjectivity and anti- rationalism to other existentialists.

DON MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO Y JUGO Y Jugo Unamuno contends that philosophy should be focused on man, the man of flesh and bone (Unamuno, 1954:151), not the abstract man of classical philosophy. By this was meant the concrete individual

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Summa Philosophica man that really exists. The irrationalism or anti-rationalism in existentialism is exemplified in Unamuno’s philosophy. He objects to Aristotelian definition of man as a rational animal. I do not know why he has not been defined as an affective or feeling animal. Perhaps that which differentiates him from other animals is feeling rather than reason. More often I have seen a cat rean that laugh or weep (Unamuno, 3). Unamuno criticizes the Cogito. The primary reality, he says, is not the fact that I think, but the fact that I live. It would therefore be more appropriate to say ‘I feel therefore I am’. For underlying even the so-called problem of knowledge there is implied human feeling (Ibid, 36:7). This view is, however, questionable. We can agree with Unamuno that animals do not smile, laugh or weep, but that is because smiling or weeping requires consciousness which animals lack. Philosophizing, Unamuno argues, is not the work of reason alone. The will or the heart is even more active in philosophizing than reason, for it is the man of flesh and bone that philosophizes and not a disembodied spirit. Unamuno is ad veracundiam. He appeals to Kant to buttress his idea. Kant, after destroying the traditional argument for the existence of ‘the rational God of reason’ of traditional metaphysics, Kant brought in the ‘God of the heart’ who rewards the good with happiness. In his way, argues Unamuno, Kant reconstructed with his heart that which with his head had overthrown. The most central problem of philosophy, according to Unamuno, is the problem of immortality. The instinct of self-perpetuation is the foundation upon which the problem of immortality is built. This, Unamuno says, is man’s basics desire. In the Tragic Sense of Life, Knowledge is employed in the service of the necessity of life and primarily in the service of the instinct of self-prevention. This necessity and this instinct have created in man the organ of knowledge and given then such capacity as they possess. Man sees, hears, tastes and smells that which it is necessary for him to see, hear, touch, taste, and smell in order to preserve his life (Ibid, p.23). The desire for immortality manifests itself in man’s desire for fame, procreation, or the desire to immortalize one’s name. Unless one reflects on the phenomenon of death, one does not become explicitly

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Summa Philosophica aware of his taste for immortality.This is discovered when one is struck with ‘the terror of extinction’ which could follow death (Ibid, p.60). Is there any guarantee that this thirst for immortality will ever be satisfied? Is there any guarantee that we are not going to end up in extinction at death? No! Unamuno says. There is no such guarantee, no certainty that we shall survive death. It may well be that it is extinction that awaits us at death, that this fundamental human desire will be frustrated. This uncertainty about our ultimate destiny shows the tragedy of life. This is the tragic sense of life. Unamuno appeals to God and ethics as a way out of the dilemma.

KARL JASPERS Philosophy begins with the philosopher’s existence. Jaspers insists that philosophy must be relevant to the life of the individual in the concrete circumstances of his existential situation. While not repudiating science, for philosophy must be take account of science and cannot afford to ignore it, Jaspers believes that there are domains of human existence, which elude scientific investigation. These are the domains of reflective consciousness, transcendence, freedom and choice. To exist is to choose oneself and to sustain oneself is to continue to choose oneself. Man, according to Jaspers, is not a pre-determined being, but rather, a possible being whose existence depends on his choice. Man freely decides what he will be. Man’s essence is freedom. As man freely makes his decisions, he does so in the direction of transcendence, and it is the mark for personal existence in space and time. What then is time? Jaspers argues that as the future time is possibility, as the past it is the bond of fidelity, and as the present it is decision. Time, then, is not something that simply passes. It is ‘the phenomenality of existenz’.Existenz is gained in time by our own decision (Jaspers, 1971:173) Jaspers asserts, my personal choice is a choice made with a given situation, for although I do not have a fixed, given essence apart from my freedom, I, nonetheless, exist in a given situation and every choice I make is always made with a situation. Thus, my freedom is limited by my situation, which is not within my power to change. I was born on a certain day, in a certain part of the world, by certain parents and under certain circumstances. I neither choose any of these factors, nor am I free to change any of them. Besides, I am subjected to diseases, suffering,

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death, conflict, guilt, failure. These are limiting considerations of human existence. I can only accept them and decide the attitude I shall adopt towards them (see Omoregbe, p.60). These constitute the frontiers of human existence and render it insecure. There is thus a tension between my freedom to realize myself and the limiting existential conditions in which I have to strive towards the transcendence, inspired by a philosophical faith in the transcendence. To live an authentic life is to accept the limiting conditions of human existence and choose in the midst of them, while striving towards transcendence. It is only then that philosophizing really begins, for philosophizing means learning to live and learning to die. The concept of transcendence is central to Jasper’s existentialism. It is not very clear what he means by it. Man is said to be striving towards the transcendence, and in his struggle against the odds of life he is constantly reinvigorated by a philosophical faith, in the transcendence. The transcendence reveals itself in history. It can be deciphered in nature and in man’s existential experience. The five principles of philosophical faith are: That God is; That there is an absolute demand; That man is frail and imperfect; That men can live under the guidance of God, and That the reality of the world has a vanishing character between God’s existence. Each of these principles, Jaspers says, has its origin in the fundamental experience of existence. Man is linked with God by his freedom and it is through human freedom that God guides man. There is only one way of being guided by God and this way passes through freedom itself (Jaspers, Introduction, p. 23). It is also through the free decisions of men that God acts. Hence it is impossible to know what God really wants, for there is no objective guarantee that allows one to affirm categorically that one knows what God wants. God’s guidance takes place through the decisions we take. Jaspers is, in other worlds, telling us that God guides us through our moral conscience. The unique individual needs communication with others. Man experiences himself and becomes himself only in communication with others. Against my self-will, against the accident of my empirical existence, I experience myself in communication (Jaspers, Philosophy, p.173).

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Man can never become himself in isolation, for freedom doesn’t mean self- sufficiency.

GABRIEL MARCEL Gabriel Marcel’s experience of the Second World War contributed to his conviction that philosophy must be made to reflect concrete human situations. Modern civilization tends to depersonalize man by reducing him to a mere functionary (Marcel, philosophy, p.1) Marcel attacks this status quo in which the human dignity is ignored. Marcel is a philosopher of inter-subjectivity. For Marcel, interpersonal relationship is an essential aspect of human existence. Man becomes aware of himself and becomes present to himself in the presence of others selves. Thus the presence of others is essential to self-discovery, self-awareness and self-differentiation. Interpersonal relationship takes place through presence to each others as ‘I’ and ‘thou’. This presence is not limited to physical presence alone, for it can still be maintained and perpetuated when physical presence is no longer thee. This can be done, Marcel submits, through ‘creative fidelity’, that is, through the fidelity of love and friendship. Even the dead continue to be present, since one’s actions are part of oneself. One’s presence can also be extended through one’s actions since one’s actions are part of oneself. Thus, to act is to make oneself present. However, the individual must transcend his geocentricism and make himself available to the other, to have a meaningful interpersonal relationship. Like Martin Bubber, Marcel emphasizes the importance of authentic interpersonal relationship characterized by the encounter of ‘I’ and ‘thou’. This encounter of the ‘I’ and ‘thou’ in dialogues creates the ‘we’. There can be no ‘I’ without a ‘thou’ for the other as other exists for me insofar as I am open to him (insofar as he is a thou), but I am only open to him insofar as I cease to form a circle with myself within which I somehow place the other, or rather, the idea of the other; for in so doing the other becomes the idea of other, and the idea of the other is no longer the other as such, but the other qua related to me, as fragmented, as parceled out or in the process of being parceled out (Marcel, Being and haring, p. 155).

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As soon as communication is established between me and the other, we both pass from one world into another. We both go into a new sphere where transcendence takes on the aspect of love. Marcel makes a distinction between a mystery and a problem. A problem refers to something objective which is before the subject and which does not involve him. As a man has a problem he is himself most part of the problem. The problem is outside him and before him. But a mystery involves the subject who is himself part of the mystery. A problem is something, which one runs up against which bars the way. It is before me in its entirety. A mystery, on the other hand, is something in which I find myself involved whose essence is therefore not to be before me in its entirety. It is as though in this province the distinction between in me and before me loses its meaning (Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, p. 700). The question of being is not a problem but a mystery, because I am involved in the very question since I am myself a being. Marcel therefore speaks of the ‘mystery of being’. I cannot project being and treat it as an object before me, since I participate in being and I am therefore part of it. Marcel distinguishes between being and having. What I have is outside me and independent of me, but what I am is precisely myself. The question here is, how is the body to be seen? Is my body what I have or what I am? Do I have a body or I am a body? I do not possess a body as an external object possessed by a subject for in this case the subject and the object are one. Having presupposes a subject-object connection. To be, involves having, but to have is not to be. Being is much more than having. Hence man should never allow himself to be reduced or dominated by what he has since being involves having, man cannot exist without possessions but he cannot be reduced to his possessions. The human predicament in a world which seems to back meaning or purposefulness tends to lead man to despair. It is, however in the face of despair, Marcel argues, that in the divine deliverance assumes its importance. Faith is a trust, an act of commitment by which a relationship is established with God. Marcel sees man as a homo viator who is always on the move from one situation to another. Man, he submits is essentially, a wayfarer in this world. Man has no fixed abode.

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Marcel, at last, concludes that philosophizing should reflect the situational nature of human existence.

MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S EXISTENTIALIST METAPHYSICS Martin Heidegger began his book with an address on the problem of being:

Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise a new the question of the meaning of being. But are we nowadays ever perplexed at our inability to understand the expression ‘Being’? Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question. Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of being and to do so concretely (Heidegger, Being and Time, p.1). Heidegger’s preoccupation is being. The problem, which Heidegger sets out to investigate, is not the problem of man but the problem of being. Being in Heidegger is not an entity, and so does not mean God (Heidegger, Ibid, pp.7, 12). It does not mean any particular kind of being, but the ‘being of being’. Being of beings is that from which all beings derive their being. In the ontological relationship of being, in the triangular relationship of sein, Dasein, des, seiendes, the role of man is to ask question of being (seinsfrage). The best way to approach the question of being therefore is by examining the being of man. The being of the inquirer who asks the question of being whom Heidegger designates Dasein. The term ‘Dasein’ is a coinage of two German words, ‘Da’ and ‘sein’. ‘Da’, refers to ‘there’ ‘Sein’ means ‘being’. Literally, ‘Dasein’ means ‘there being’ or ‘being-there’. This ‘there’ must be understood as the human situation in which ‘sein’ becomes phenomenally evident. ‘Dasein’ as a Heideggerian notion is restricted to the rational animal of traditional thinking. It bears a radically different connotation, and should not be conceived in relation to any other entity objectively denoted ‘vorhandensein’ (being-at-hand). The term ‘Existence’ was applied exclusively to ‘dasien’ as its fundamental characteristics, for “the essence of man is in his existence (Heidegger, Ibid, p. 42).

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Heidegger proposes to study man as he is lives his daily life. Human existence is according to Hiedegger, constituted by three ontological structures, three essential structures, designated ‘existentialia’ and the method he proposed to adopt in his study is phenomenology. Nonetheless, the phenomenology in question is not the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. Heidegger transformed Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology into an existential phenomenology to suit the kind of study he had embarked upon. The three ontological structures of man are ‘faktizitat’ which refers to facticity, ‘Ekisistentialitat’, which means existentiality and ‘verfallen’ meaning fallenness. Facitcity preponders that Dasein is a being thrown into the world. As a being-in-the-world (in-der-welt-sein), dasein is born a limited being. It is the case that man is cast into the world without any prior consultation. Where he came from, how he came to be, the moment he came to be, why he came to be, are far removed from his consent and certainly man is thrown into a world beyond his choice. Dasein has no choice than to be in the world. This characteristic of Dasein’s being – this ‘that it is” – is veiled in its “whence” and “whither”, yet disclosed in itself all the more unveiledly; we call it “throwness” of this entity into its “there”…. It is thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is “there”. This expression “throwness” is meant to suggest the facticity of its being delivered over (Heidegger, ibid, p. 174). Moreover, facticity reveals man’s rootedness in the past. It explains his past is beyond his control. We cannot undo or unmake the events of the past. Dasein’s facticity reveals his limitations. Dasein can only accept, adjust and assimilate these factical givens within the inescapable limits of contingency. Existentiality connotes man’s possibility, that is, the possibility to make himself what he wants to be, the possibility to change his world, the possibility to project himself into the future and live towards his self-project. Man’s possibility is a possibility to become what it is not yet man is a being who is not yet what he is and more than he actually is at any given moment (Omoregbe, metaphysics, pp. 198-199). Man is what he is in the sense of what he is not and what he is no longer. Life, then, is a project of possibility (Lebens ist Enwurf den moglishkeit) Fallenness (verfallen), the third essential feature of man, is man’s tendency to allow himself get lost in a crowd consciousness. It is the tendency to alienate himself from his true self and live an inauthentic life.

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Dasein abandons himself to the abiding influence of communal instinct and populist opinion. He plunges himself in the crowd-consciousness, the “anonymous they”, the Dasmann. Inauthentic existence is best exemplified by a monotonous everydayness and banality’. The selfhood of everybody, Dasmann, constitutes the inauthentic, counterfeit and non-genuine man. This state of fallenness is alienating. It closes off from Dasein its authenticity. Such alienation (Entfremdung) of Dasein in its own being is a ‘downward plunge’ into the groundlessness of the inauthentic being of the seductive ‘they’. In idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity, Dasein loses itself in the publicity of the ‘one like many’. Dasein is a being-in-the-world. This means that man finds himelf in the world in the midst of things. Dasein is in the world in the sense that it deals with entities encountered within-the-world, and does so concernfully and with familiarity (Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 138). Dasein is also essentially a being-with-others (a mit-sein). He is by his very nature a social being. He can not live nor be conceived in isolation. Anxiety arises from man’s finitude and the nothingness he feels within him. Man feels abandoned and list in the world. This gives rise to anxiety and restlessness. This mood which brings Dasein to his self awareness, this anxiety, Heidegger calls ‘angst’ The phenomenon of angst reveals to Dasein his radical and irremediable finitude and shows man’s basic predicament through which he is handed over to nothingness. Anxiety calls and lifts man out of his scurrying self-forgetfulness to the vision of his wholeness. That is to the knowledge of himself as a ‘Sein-zum-Todes’ a being unto-death. Man is a being-unto-death. Knowing fully well the shortness of his life, he has to adopt an attitude towards his impending death. Authenticity requires him to appropriate his death as his own possibility, which no one can do for him. Death is a human phenomenon which permeates man’s whole life (Omoregbe, 1999:74). Man lives in an anticipation of death. His singularity, individuality, and uniqueness is manifest again in the fact that man has to undergo his own death. Dasein as a project of possibilities gives in to death. Death is the impossibility of Dasein’s possibilities. Death is that possibility that invades my present, truncates my future and monumentalizes my past. Mortals are mortals because they are capable of death as death. Animals perish but man dies. The capability of death as death affords the mortals the being-there and the being-present in the shelter of being (Curran, Overcoming Metaphysics, 1996).

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As man realizes his singularity he comes to realize the urgency of his choices. He becomes conscious of his finitude which is the source of his gult. Man is guilty from birth, guilty by the very nature of his being. This guilty is not – the guilt that man incurs by his actions. It is an ontological guilt arising from man’s finitude and inability to accomplish all his possibilities. Heidegger distinguishes objective quantitative time from subjective existential time. The former is the irreversibly passing moments of the clock. Existential time consists of the past present and future which are inseparable, for these constitute the structure of human existence. Man lives a historical existence, coming from the past and moving towards the future, which he shapes with his present choices. Man is free.

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE’S EXISTENTIALIST METAPHYSICS In Sartre, we find the climax of existentialism. Sartre made existentialism popular. He succeeded so well in popularizing it that the term existentialism became almost synonymous with the philosophy of Sartre. Heidegger would not associate with Sartre, lest he be considered a disciple of Sartre. Hence, he denies being an existentialist. Sartre, like Heidegger, adopted Husserl’s phenomenology and existentialised it to suit his own philosophy. He is an existential phenomenologist. In Sartre, there is no distinction between being and its manifestation, none between act and the potency of being. The act of a being is everything that the being is. Besides act there is nothing. Action is being, ‘agere sequitur esse’ (action follows being). Being manifests itself as it is and it does this without any intermediary. Hence, it is a phenomenon, for a phenomenon is what manifests itself (Omoregbe, Metaphysics, p.204) When we say that objects manifest being, we mean that objects themselves are being. They do not point to nor do they reveal being as a reality distinct from themselves (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p.xxv). For Sartre there are no noumena as distinct from phenomena. The being of the phenomenon is neither hidden, unperceived behind the phenomenon nor is it completely reducible to the phenomenon is such a way that its existence depends on its being perceived. There is contingency of being in Sartre. However, he rejects the traditional explanation of the contingency of being terms of a Necessary Being who is responsible for the existence of contingent beings. There is no necessity for the existence of being. The existence of being is that it

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Summa Philosophica simply is. It is just there. Its existence is not necessary. This is what Sartre calls contingency of being, for being is absurd. We spoke of absurdity, we might as well have said contingency. To exist is simply to be there. The world of explanation and reasons is not that of existence. I was beginning to understand that I had found the key to existence …to my life. I am superfluous… (Sartre, La Naus, p. 182). Sartre says that there are conscious being (etre-pour-soi) and unconscious being (etre-en-soi). He identifies ‘being-for-itself’ or conscious being with the human being, and with consciousness itself. He also identifies being- for-itslef-with ‘emptiness’, ‘negativity’ and ‘nothingness’. It constitutes in being by negating being, by separating itself from it placing itself at a distance from it. There is always a gap, an emptiness or nothingness in the conscious being and this very nothingness is the origin of its power of negation which constitutes its being. Thus, the conscious being carries within itself an emptiness which perpetually separates it from itself and from everything else. Hence, it can never identify itself with anything precisely because its existence is constituted by perpetual negation and nihilation. Nothingness is at the heart of its being which separates it from itself in such a way that it is not what it is and it is what it is not. Man is the foundation of nothingness for it is the being by whom nothingness came into the world and it is its nothingness. Human reality carries nothing within itself… man is the being through whom nothingness comes into the world… The being by whom nothingness comes into the world must be its own nothingness… man is always separated by nothingness from his existence. The being by whom nothingness arrives in the world is a being such that in its being the nothingness of its being is in question (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp.78, 79). Nothingness gives rise to negation, for it is the provenance of negation, and human reality exists by perpetually negating being. Being-in-itself is plentitude, compact density and full of itself. It does not have nothingness or negation within its being, nor can it posit itself other than it is. It is what it is and fully identical with itself. It has no reason for its being, it is just there.

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The foundation of freedom is negation, since every affirmation implies a negation, for to affirm what I am is to negate what I am not. To affirm anything is to negate its opposite. Sartre does not see freedom as a faculty of the soul or a property of the will. It is not something that man has but something that he is. Man does not simply have freedom as a quality but he is freedom, for freedom is identical with his being. Freedom, - I sought it far away; it was so near that I could not touch it, that I can’t touch it – it is infact myself. I am my freedom (Sartre, Le Sursis, p. 362). Freedom is the being of consciousness (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p.29) and consciousness in being-for-itself, which is the human being. Responsibility, choice and anguish accrue from man’s freedom. The first step of existentialism is to put the whole man in possession of what he is and to make the total responsibility of his existence repose on him. If man discover himself in a situation beyond his control, he is nevertheless responsible for the way in which he reacts to it, for freedom is the freedom of choosing. Freedom is the freedom of choosing but not the freedom of not choosing. Not to choose is, in fact, to choose not to choose (Sartrre, ibid, p.481). Responsibility goes with freedom. Freedom involves the inevitability of choice. It is therefore impossible for a free being to refuse to choose since refusal to choose is itself a choice already made. When man realizes the nature of freedom as it is concomitant with responsibility, anguish seizes hold of him. It is in anguish that man realizes the full implications of his freedom. When man realizes the immense responsibility that accompanies freedom, he tries to flee into self-deception which Sartre designates here as “bad faith”. In examining love, Sartre discovers the desire to possess the other person’s freedom is involved in love. In love it is the freedom of the other as such that we want to get rid of. The lover does not want to enslave the beloved nor does he want to force the beloved to love him for nobody is satisfied with an enforced, involuntary love. The lover wishes the beloved to love him freely; hence he wants to preserve her freedom. But at the same time, he wants to capture that freedom for himself so that the beloved will come to live for him alone, in which case the beloved will no longer be free. Hence this new contradiction, this new conflict, each of the

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Summa Philosophica lovers is entirely the captive of the other to the exclusion of anyone else (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 375). Thus, love affair is a contradictory affair. The lover wants the beloved to remain free while at the same time he tries to take possession of that freedom, thereby contradicting himself. The person wishing love from another, wants to make himself an object to the other, thereby alienating his freedom. Here in fact, we encounter the true idea of love’s enterprise: alienated freedom. But is the one who wants to be loved, who by the mere fact of wanting someone to love him alienates his freedom (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 375). A love affair is a fragile thing because a look from the third person can easily break it up and change the whole atmosphere. This, Sartre, explains, is why lovers always seek solitude where their love affair will not be destroyed by a ‘look’ from a third. Masochism explains where a person tries to reduce himself to the level of an object before another person. The Masochist places himself before the other as an object to the used, as an instrument. Sadism is an attempt to incarnate the other by violence or in order to capture his freedom. The Sadist employs physical or psychic torture, hoping thereby to be able to get hold of the freedom of the other. The failure of Sadism can lead to hate which aims to suppress. Indifference is a kind of blindness with respect to others, an attitude by which a person remains blind to other people. In his analysis of interpersonal relation, Sartre is of the opinion that we must be mindful of other people’s freedom since our own freedom depends on the freedom of other people also depends on. There would hardly be conflict in interpersonal relations then.

MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY In his phenomenology of perception, Merleau-Ponty argues that man without the world is inconceivable, nor can we conceive the world without man. Merleau-Ponty was an existentialist phenomenologist, who took up and developed the existentialist idea that man is an embodied being-in-the-world. This idea repudiates Cartesianism which sees man as essentially a mind which happens to have a body. Man is in the world and only in the world does he know himself (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p.xi).

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Things in the world are seen by man in relation to himself, either as useful to him or harmful to him, either as instruments which he can use or as obstacles in his way. Our body is in the world as the heart is in the organism. If the world is seen as an organism our body would be the organ of his organism, keeping it alive and giving its meaning. The dialectical relation between the body and the world is prior to any explicit consciousness. The body as subject perceives the world at a preconscious level, prior to any explicit conscious perception. I wonder how perception would be possible at the purported preconscious level. Even when Merleau- Ponty argues that level of consciousness, that is the preconscious level is prior to any explicit conscious perception, the purported implicit conscious perception is vague and not clear. Merleau-Ponty further argues that at this preconscious level there is a ready dialogue between the body and the world, which constitutes its natural environment. It is at this level that meaning is conferred on things by the as the subject of preconscious perception. Conscious perception and self-consciousness are higher stages of the same thing, which begins at the preconscious level. From the preconscious stage to the stage of reflective consciousness, Ponty submits that mind and body are inseparably working together. Again, I argue here that if mind and body have been working together at all stages of perception, including the preconscious level, the efficacy of the mind would have been overrun by the body, since the preconscious level of perception is prior to any explicit conscious perception. Concerning the question of freedom, Merleau-Ponty criticized Sartre, whom he says, ignored the effect of situation on freedom. Freedom as absolute and unaffected by situations makes freedom impossible. It is difficult to speak of choice in reference to absolute freedom since choices imply limiting situations. Any freedom that transcends all limits such as Sartre conceives, would not have to make any choice in any situation. There is no absolute freedom since human freedom is a situated freedom.

ALBERT CAMUS The central problem of philosophy is the problem of the meaning of human life, Albert Camus submits (Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, pp.11- 12). Everyday we go about the routine activities from morning till night. What is the meaning of the whole life endeavours and the ultimate purpose it is meant to achieve? For Camus life is absurd, the universe is absurd. This means that the universe is meaningless, human life is meaningless, and all human

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Summa Philosophica endeavours are meaningless. The whole life is absurd. In the face of such absurdity, what should man do? Camus repudiates those who think that suicide is the right answer, for suicide is a cowardly escape from a problem. It betrays lack of courage and a refusal to face reality. ‘Camus’ answer to the question of the absurdity of human life is revolt. This is a refusal to remain passive in the face of evil, injustice, oppression, etc. This is a determination to rebel against absurdity, against evil, against injustice with all the means at one’s disposal (Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, p.54). Revolt gives life its value, Spread our over the whole length of a life, it restores its majesty to that life (ibid). Camus maintains that it is by revolting that man gives meaning to his life. In the rebel, Camus suggests that it is by revolt that man creates values, not only for himself but for all men with whom he is in solidarity. Camus, so turns man to a rebel. Who is the rebel? A man who says no: but whose refusal does not imply a renunciation. He is also a man who says yes as soon as he begins to think for himself (Camus, The Rebel, p.19).

ASSESSMENT OF EXISTENTIALISM Existentialism is a reaction to idealism. Existentialism deals with concrete human situations. Therefore, it has no room for grand theorizing. The human person is seen as a subject, but not an object, he is best understood in the light of his relations with others. In other words, intersubjectivity is a product of existentialism and intersubjectvity, when extended beyond the horizons of the relations between or among individuals to that of a group of people in the society or state, is a sound element of international relations. One with a keen philosophic and scientific mind can understand the above statement in the light of internationalism. There is a basic interconnectedness of individuals in the light of becoming. There is interpersonal communion. Man’s mode of being defines his essence. The essence of man is not prefabricated, but determined by the way he lives. Of course, existence precedes essence for the existentialist; what is supercedes what ought to be. Philosophizing for the existentialists, takes off from the real life situation: the “sitz in leben”. This is a philosophy of the real phenomenologically conceived and concrete human everydayness. Existentialism is a philosophy of action. It is a call to active involvement in life. It is a call to work for progress. There is a tinge of

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Summa Philosophica optimism in existentialism: a call to an ontological commitment with life. There is a belief in progress. This is evident in existentiality, the possibility of a good future over and above mere facticity. Yet facticity teaches man to be man. It teaches man to live as man. Man must acknowledge that there are certain things he cannot do. He must accept that he is limited in nature. Man cannot, then, be superman. Man is faced by finitude. Existentialism reacts against any degradation, depersonalization or dehumanization of man, as it were, in the industrial revolution and the Second World War. Therefore, there is a basic abhorrence of hypertechnology in all its forms. That science and technology have done a litany of good to man is to over labour the obvious. Beyond this plethora of existential aid, however, the excesses of technology are a threat to man. Existentialism is a pointer to the threats of technology. And Heidegger had addressed this problem in his Question Concerning Technology and other Essays. Existentialism is the philosophy of man. It is the philosophy of the human existence, the human condition. It is the philosophy of man’s ‘sitz in leben’.

References Camus, A., (1975). The Myth of Sisyphus.Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd. ______, (1969).The Rebel. Trans. Anthony Bower, Middlesex: PenguinBooks Heidegger, M., (1973).Being and Time. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Hugh, J. Oliverman, ed. (1988). Philosophy and non-philosophy since Merleau-Ponty. New York: Routledge. Jaspers, K., (1971). Philosophy, in the existentialist tradition, ed. Nino Languilli, New York: Doubleday. ______(1974). Introduction a la philosophie. Paris: Union General d’Editions Libraire Plon Marcel, G., (1949). Philosophy and Existence. New York: Philosophical Library. ______(1935). Being and Having. Paris: Anbier. ______(1952). Metaphysical Journal. Chicago: Henry Regnem Co. Merleau-Ponty, (1962). Phenomenology of perception. New York: Humanities Press. Omoregbe, J., (1999). A simplified history of western philosophy.Vol. 3. Contemporary philosophy, Lagos: Joja Educational Research and Publishers Ltd.

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______(1999).Metaphysics without tears: A systematic and historical study. Sartre, J. (1969). Being and nothingness: An essay on phenomenological ontology. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes, London: Methuen and Co. Ltd. Sonia Kruks, (1990). Situation and human existence: Freedom, subjectivity and society. London: Unwin Hyman Ltd. Stumpf, S.E., (1982). Socrates to Sartre: A history of philosophy. McGraw Hill Inc. Unamuno, De Miguel, (1954). Tragic sense of life. New York: Dover Publications Inc.

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CHAPTER TWENTY SIX

POSITIVISM, LOGICAL POSITIVISM AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY:

FOCUS ON A.J. AYER

Inameti Lawrence Udoh

What is Positivism? Positivism began as a sort of an intellectual war between the rationalists and the empiricists. Benton confirms that “the major philosophical tendency to which positivism belongs is empiricism. It is a variant form of empiricism alongside with phenomenalism, pragmatism, operationalism, empirio-criticism, logical empiricism and others” (21). Positivism having taken root from empiricism consequently imbibed the principles of empiricism in theory and practice. It is therefore a fact, as we shall see later, that the principle of verification as outlined by Ayer was merely an extension of empiricism. The principles of empiricism believe so much in knowledge gotten from the senses. This greatly influenced their philosophical theories as well as their ideologies and methodology. As a concept positivism is an offshoot of empiricism which is a direct opposite of rationalism. By this it can be said to be a philosophy with much respect for empirical principles: “it is a school of thought or movement which holds that human knowledge as well as human progress can only come from positive (empirical) science and not from religion or metaphysics” (Omoregbe Epistemology: A Systematic and Historical Study, 95). Auguste Comte, a French philosopher is said to have been the first to coin the word positivism to designate his own system of philosophy due largely to the scientific or positive spirit or attitude of the age. Explaining this further Uduigwomen writes,

The attitude was derived from the belief that adequate knowledge of the world could only be achieved through the scientific method of carrying out empirical investigation of reality and subjecting theories derived from such investigation to empirical verification (196).

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What this means is that positivism emphasizes knowledge based on experience or knowledge attained through human senses. “Positivism is characterized by the following claims: 1. Science is the only authentic and valid knowledge 2. Facts are the only possible objects of knowledge 3. The method of philosophy is not different from that of science. 4. The main business of philosophy is to identify general principles common to all science and use those principles ad guides to human conduct and as the basis of social organization” (Uduigwomen, 196). However, there are three main types of positivism namely, social positivism, evolutionary positivism and critical positivism. Though it is not our intention to discuss them in detail, but suffice it to say that “the meeting point of all the different strands of positivism named above is the belief that enquiry should be confined to the sphere of what can be firmly established and, that is what is immediately given to the senses: (Uduigwomen 201). Following this, metaphysics, ethics and theology are to be counted as meaningless and nonsensical. This is so because metaphysics object of study is beyond what can be observed with the senses. We will say more about the aspect of positivism that relate to our study in the course of this chapter.

A Brief Historical Development of Positivism Positivism as a development in philosophy was intimately connected with innovation in scientific knowledge. It constitutes a challenge to the intellectual authority of metaphysics, transcendental philosophies, divine revelation and faith. “Within the above intellectual background combined with the social and political atmosphere of the enlightenment period of philosophy, positivism came up. This period was characterized by the political and social atmosphere of restoration of order and attempt at subordination of the individual to a higher social order to the west” (Benton, Philosophical Foundation of the three sociologies, 27). This idea kept on manifesting in positivism in one way or the other, as it developed through many stages. According to Benton:

Positivism, then in its classical nineteenth century form is an empiricist interpretation and systematization of the sciences combined with a general theory of history of society which can be understood as theoretical articulation of a definite set of political problems (280).

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Positivism, therefore, is a branch or an extension of empiricism. At the core of the principle of empiricism is the notion that the belief of the human subject about the physical world and physical existents can be objects of knowledge only if they can be subjected to experiential test. This philosophy can be traced back even to the ancient period of philosophy. Protagoras, for example, remarked in 481 BC that: “Man is the measure of all things, of those that are that they are, of those that are not that they are not” (Stumpf, 32). Though so many interpretations have been given to this assertion, the one given by Frederick Copleston confirms our positivistic view of Protagoras. He writes:

… Protagoras does not mean the individual man, but man in the specific sense. If this were so, then the meaning of the dictum would not be that “what appears to you to be true is true for you, and what appears to me to be true is true for me, but rather that the community or group or the whole human species is the criterion and standard of truth (87 – 88).

Whatever interpretation that may be given to the above, there is no doubt that the idea of eternal or absolute truth would be jeopardized. Truth is left to the subjective standard of the individual. “This is seen in Protagoras blasphemous paper on the gods, which led to his exile” (Copleston, 88).

Apart from Protagoras, a more proximate philosophical affinity to positivism can be seen in the philosophy of Sextus Empiricus (AD 250). His major positions include:

(1) Conclusions cannot be proved syllogistically but through induction. Syllogism is an instance of vicious circle. Major premise should be founded on the nature of man and not on explicit knowledge of the conclusion of syllogism. (2) The denial of the notion of cause. (3) The denial of any providence from God. (4) The denial of certainty in knowledge.

William of Ockham presented a thought so close to the contemporary positivism. He denied the unity of metaphysics as a science. He denied being as an existent and accepted it only as a unifying concept in the order of material existents. Consequently, Ockham denied the reality of the subject matter of metaphysics. It was easy then for him to see

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In so far as metaphysics is the science of being as being it is concerned not with a thing but with a concept. This abstract concept of being does not stand for a mysterious something which has to be known before we can know particular beings: It signifies all beings, not something in which beings participate (78).

In addition to the above, Ockham outrightly denied that the human intellect can have knowledge of supersensible realities. For example, he accepted that God is certainly the primus in the order of existence but not so in the order of human comprehensibility or intelligibility. The implication of this is that the idea of God which was claimed to be clear and distinct was not actually so. Again, Copleston presents Ockham’s positions thus: But, though God can be conceived in some way, can it be philosophically shown that God exists? God is indeed the most perfect object of the human intellect, the supreme intelligible reality; but He is certainly not the first object of the human intellect in the sense of being the object which is first known. The primary object of the human mind is the material things or embodied nature (180).

The presentation of Ockham’s views here by Copleston shows that Ockham fenced off metaphysical realities from the realm of things that can be known in the real sense of the word “to know”. These realities can merely be speculated upon. Thus, the close affinity of Ockham to the positivists is quite evident in his denial of the intelligibility of the supersensible and his assertion of the sensible as the only object of human knowledge. Thus, the close affinity of Ockham to the positivists is quite evident in his denial of the intelligibility of the supersensible and his assertion of the sensible as the only object of human knowledge. In the modern period, Francis Bacon assigned himself the task of reforming the philosophy and science of his day. Bacon decried the dominance of philosophy by Platonism and Aristotelianism and as such denounced their teaching as “shadows and phantoms” (Stumpf, 220), based on the existing decadence in science which was characterized by superstitious, unguided speculation. Joseph Omoregbe made this idea clearer when he remarked that:

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Unlike the Greek philosophers and the Scholastics who were inclined towards speculation; he was rather inclined towards practical experience. He emphasized the practical function of language since for him the purpose of knowledge is not contemplation but rather to extend man’s power over nature so that he can dominate and control it (24).

Bacon’s empiricism served as a foundation to the high level scientific development in knowledge as we have it today. Who knows what would have happened in man’s knowledge development if not for the empirical source of knowledge he advocated. His philosophy is based on the fact that he accepts as a source of knowledge only empirical means, thereby refuting reason as a source of knowledge. There are other empiricists philosophers like John Locke, David Hume, George Berkeley, in the modern period. Their central point of emphasis is that no knowledge beyond experience is possible. In relation to the above, John Locke in his Essay concerning human understanding opined: Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any IDEAS; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it y that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge to this I answered in one word, from EXPERIENCE; in that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself (Bk. 11 CHP1 SS 15 – 20).

Consequently, Locke saw the human mind to be a “Tabula rasa” (blank sheet) at birth. It derives all its knowledge from experience. All that the human mind can know come from impression. These impressions on the human mind come only from the outside. Consequently, he denied the existence of innate ideas. He also denied any transcendental ideas and the assertion that knowledge is an invention or creature of human understanding including universal ideas. Though David Hume and George Berkeley empiricist thought were widespread in the eighteenth century, Hume became a prominent empiricist and anti-metaphysician of the modern period. He alongside Carnap brought empiricism to its logical conclusion. In his article “Skeptical Doubts Concerning the Humean Understanding” he writes:

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All reasoning concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of CAUSE and EFFECT. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory … I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any substance, attained by reasoning APRIORI; but arises entirely from experience… (Hume 107).

He stated clearly that the principles of empiricism are directly opposed to the idea of the supernatural. Thus, Hume denied metaphysics as a means of dependable knowledge based on his empiricism. For him, only terms or ideas gotten either from sense impression or mathematical concepts can be said to be true. Sense impressions are meaningful since they can be subject to experiential or observational test. For mathematical concepts, their meaningfulness arises from their role as that which expresses relationship between ideas that are intuitively seen to be true or certain. Based on the above, Hume condemns metaphysics and its questions as meaningless. The reason is that its object of study is based on reasoning and reflection and has been found to be irreducible to empirical study. “His empiricism can be better seen in his recommendation that all metaphysical books should be committed to the flames for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion” (Ochulor, Preliminary Objection to David Hume’s Notion of Substance, 111). After Hume, cam Kant who personally confessed that Hume’s philosophy woke him from his dogmatic slumber. Pushing the issue further, he attributed the problem of the impossibility of metaphysics to the basic limit of what the human nature is capable of knowing. For Kant, although all our knowledge begins from experience, it does not mean that it all arises out of experience. Human knowledge is the product of the contact of the human faculty with the world of experiences hence his synthetic a priori knowledge. This kind of knowledge for Kant is impossible for metaphysicians because they have no way of determining if the human mental apparatus can be applicable to any reality that lies beyond the world of experience. Our logical forms and our categories function as organizing principles only within experience. In this case according to Kant metaphysics that seeks for knowledge outside the ordinary experience is impossible. All we have done above is to show that empiricism is the basis of positivism. It shows about empiricism as the basis of positivism which points to the fact that long before positivism; the urge to challenge metaphysics

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Summa Philosophica had been in motion. Consequently, the positivists could be said to have amplified this later craving which made them approach metaphysics with bias. It is important to note that positivist themes did not start in the modern or contemporary period. These themes are identifiable in antiquity and in the middle ages. “We have William of Ockham (1285 – 1349) who put forward the need to remove those things that were not necessary in philosophy. Others are Francis Bacon, saint Simon (1762 – 1825) who is said to have systematically used the term before Auguste Comte (1798 – 1857) adopted it and used it in philosophy” (Ozumba, The Philosophy of Logical positivism and the growth of science, 10). Comte’s adoption of positivism is said to be due largely to the scientific or positive spirit or attitude of the age. The attitude was derived from the belief that adequate knowledge of the world could only be achieved through the scientific method of carrying out empirical investigation of reality and subjecting theories, derived from such investigation, to empirical investigation. Comte’s positivism therefore hinges on order and progress. To him positivism aids aspiration towards a higher life for ourselves and for those around us (Ozumba, The philosophy of logical positivism and the growth of science, 10). This must have influenced Comte to suggest the initial rigor of positivism when he stated that any proposition that is not reducible to a simple enunciation of facts, particular or general does not make any sense. Let’s hear him: All investigation into the nature of beings, and their first and final causes must always be absolute, whereas the study of the laws of phenomena must be relative, since it supposes a continuous progress of speculation subject to gradual improvement of observation, without the precise reality being ever fully disclosed; so that the relative character of scientific conceptions is inseparable from the true idea of natural laws … (452).

Auguste Comte, identified three stages of man’s intellectual development. These are: the religious stage, the metaphysical stage and the positive stage. Whereas in the first and second stages, the human mind is preoccupied with the ultimate causes of things and tries to trace these causes beyond the observable phenomena, in the third stage the human mind confines itself to what is empirically observable in its explanation of things (Ochulor, Comtean Positivism and Social Engineering in Nigeria, 53). The knowledge acquired or sought is about observable phenomena and the mind abandons any attempt to explain these

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Summa Philosophica phenomena in terms of the unseen. Comte then abandoned the first and the second stages as intellectually bankrupt and held tenaciously to the third stages (positive). In this stage, man leaves all theological and metaphysical explications of ultimate reality. Man limits himself to specific data, which are subject to scientific demonstrations. Accordingly, it is the positive stage that provides the conditions for the attainment of the real knowledge of the phenomenal worlds. The word “positive” is thus used in the sense that the quest for knowledge must correspond to sensory data and perception (Alozie 174). This, therefore, means that there can be no knowledge about unseen realities that are not subject to empirical observation. The consequence of this conception was the demise of metaphysics. Rudolf Carnap, the foremost member of the Vienna circle and an eminent positivist, in stating what the demarcations are between meaningful statements and pseudo-statements identified three kinds of meaningful statements. For a statement to be meaningful, according to him, it must be a tautology, a contradiction, or an empirical statement. Tautologies or analytic statements include for instance. “America is America”, 2 + 2 = 4”. Negation of tautologies is attained by denying the first kind of statement thus: “America is not America”, it is not the case that “2 + 2 = 4” and so on. On the other hand, empirical statements are those which are verifiable by reference to observable facts of sense experiences, for example, “It is raining now”, “Tony’s car is yellow”. On the basis of this classification, Carnap concludes that metaphysical sentences which do not belong to any of the above classes are meaningful and hence constitute pseudo-statements. Concerning his rejection of metaphysics, he, according to Stumpf, writes in chapter 1 of his book, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, thus: Metaphysical propositions are neither true not false, because they assert nothing, they contain neither knowledge nor error, they he completely outside the field of knowledge of theory, outside the discussion of truth or falsehood. But they are like laughing, lyrics and music expressive. They express not so much temporary feelings as permanent emotional or volitional dispositions… The danger lies in the deceptive character of Metaphysics, it gives the illusion of knowledge without actually giving any knowledge. This is the reason why we reject it (Stumpf, 454).

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Positivism became prominent in modern times due to its development into logical positivism. Let us now look at logical positivism, a branch of positivism into which Ayer may be classified. The essence is to articulate properly the general principle of logical positivism and Ayer’s anti- metaphysical stance.

Logical Positivism “Logical positivism as a term is said to have been first employed by A. E. Blumberg and Herbert Feigl in 1931 to a set of philosophical ideas put forward by the members of the Vienna Circle” (Passmore, “word and object” in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 52). It is the 20th century development of the classical positivism of Auguste Comte. Logical positivism, otherwise called “logical empiricism”, represents a revival of early modern empiricism which was championed by John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It flourished mainly between 1922 and 1936 among a group of scholars from different academic backgrounds. Its adherents constituted themselves into what was known as the “Vienna Circle” under the leadership of Moritz Schlick (1882 – 1936). Other members of the group included people like Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Hans Hahn, Friedrick Waismann, among others. These men were mostly scientists and mathematicians turned philosophers with bias against metaphysics and religion. “The only genuine knowledge they claim is knowledge about the physical world and the only means of attaining such knowledge is science” (Omoregbe, Epistemology: A Systematic and Historical Study, 98). The group was disbanded by the rise of Adolf Hitler and the sudden murder of Schlick by one of his students who was mentally deranged. The quest for what justifies scientific beliefs over, say, metaphysical and religious beliefs, was the moving spirit of the logical positivists. As philosophers of science, they were concerned with setting out the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a statement could be said to be genuinely meaningful. Hence the formulation of what is referred to as the “principle of verification”. They recognized only two categories of significant statements namely: (i) Statements which are empirically verifiable directly or indirectly by reference to observable facts. (ii) Analytical statements which are true in virtue of the meaning of their terms. Since metaphysical and theological discourse feature and exhibit statements which belong to neither of the two classes of meaningful

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Summa Philosophica statements, they contain meaningless sentences which must be exorcised from rational discourse. More specifically, the main objectives of the logical positivists included among other things, to formulate the principle of verification which would serve as a means of distinguishing between genuine and pseudo statements or science, to be able to eliminate metaphysical language from philosophy. According to the principle of verification, a proposition is meaningful if it can be verified directly or is capable of being verified in future experience. In sum, this principle was to serve a dual purpose. Firstly, it was to serve as a criterion of demarcation between science and non-science or pseudo science. Secondly, it was to enhance the unity of science and in the process rid science of all metaphysical notions. In pursuance of these goals, Ayer (the positivists) ended up debunking metaphysical, ethical and religious assertions as meaningless. “They insist that only a strict scientific approach to knowledge is acceptable and advocate the complete rejection of all a priori propositions in all scientific analysis” (Ochulor, Philosophy: A Fundamental and Basic Science, 158).

Ayer’s Positivism Since every philosophy is a product of its context, a study of the positivism of Ayer demands a study of its background. This we hope will help in the proper understanding and interpretation of his philosophy. Ayer was influenced mainly by a group of positivist philosophers and empiricist such as Auguste Comte, Moritz Schlick, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, David Hume, among others. The logical positivists were concerned with setting out the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a Statement could be said to be genuinely meaningful. They were to formulate the principle of verification which would serve as a means of distinguishing between genuine and pseudo- statements or sciences. The principle states that “the meaning of a proposition is the method by which it is verified” (Ayer, Logical positivism, 108). Consequently, the logical positivists held that science was the only source of knowledge since it deals with knowledge about observable phenomena. Onyeocha, summarizing the contribution of the logical positivists to philosophy, opined: “Their ideal for philosophy was the unification of the science, hoping thereby to produce a unified system of meaningful and valid knowledge” (36). To achieve this, any knowledge claim must be empirically verifiable. It was their view that the success and growth of science was due largely to the restriction of the scientific endeavour to the sphere of

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Summa Philosophica experience or matters of fact. Therefore, metaphysical and theological propositions do not quality as knowledge not do they, in any way, increase man’s knowledge of reality since they cannot be verified empirically. Any discipline that purports to furnish man with knowledge about what lies beyond the physical realm is a pseudo-discipline and its propositions are meaningless. Thus, metaphysical propositions are meaningless and nonsensical. According to the positivists, in the words of Omoregbe: “The question as to whether the assertions of metaphysical proposition are true or false does not arise, they cannot be said to be true or false, but simply meaningless” (Omoregbe, Metaphysics without Tears: A Systematic and Historical Study, 128). The philosophical traits Ayer borrowed from these logical positivists had tremendous influences on him. It helped him to propound his criterion of meaning in philosophy which led to his positivism. Below is a brief but relevant study of some philosophers such as David Hume, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The essence is to articulate properly the tenet of logical positivism and also show how their philosophy influenced Ayer.

David Hume’s influence on Ayer Hume a British empiricist who lived in the intellectual atmosphere of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in his own writing made comment which dimly point to the fact that metaphysics has completely nothing to offer. In his book “A treatise on Human Nature” he held a most extreme skeptical position of going as far as the modern empiricists in questioning even the knowledge claims of science, mathematics and logical reasoning. As an empiricist he examined metaphysical and theological beliefs but because they are not within immediate sense experience he rejected them as sources of knowledge, thereby tending towards complete skepticism. This explains why he recommended that all books dealing with metaphysics and the like should be burnt because they can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion. In his book An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, he declares: When we run over libraries persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hands any volume of divinity for school metaphysics, for instance – let us ask. Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and experience No? Commit it then to the flames

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for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion (Hume xii (iii)).

Hume denied the reliability of rational arguments in philosophy and theology thereby limiting knowledge to empirical knowledge only, Ayer adopted this empiricist theory from Hume completely and displayed it in his philosophy with little or no sympathy for metaphysics. “Ayer adopted a completely negative attitude towards metaphysics or traditional philosophy and saw this attitude as both a characteristic feature of his concept of philosophy and a fundamental principle of positivism” (Ochulor: A Fundamental and Basic Science, 157 – 158).

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s influence on Ayer Wittgenstein is another person whose philosophy influenced Ayer. Wittgenstein was a logical atomist. He further generalized the verification principle after it was first defined by Moritz Schlick. “His doctrine which espouses the view that philosophy is not a theory but an activity that has to do with the clarification of language was a major influence on the school of logical positivism, which Ayer belonged to” (Popkin and Stroll, Philosophy made simple, 290). It would not be out of place therefore to say that Wittgenstein laid the proximate foundation for Ayer’s attitude towards metaphysics. According to Edwards, Ayer wrote in his “Demonstration of the impossibility of metaphysics” thus: To adopt this standpoint is to follow the example of Wittgenstein who at the end of his TRACTATUS LOGICO PHILOSOPHICUS asserts that the propositions contained in it are nonsensical. They are a means for enabling the metaphysician, who in the face of a world influenced and controlled to a great extent by science has found it very difficult to win acceptance. (Edwards 92).

Having studied under Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein become acquainted with Russell’s Principia Mathematica and his Logical Atomism. With this influence he wrote his Tractatus Logic-Philosophicus which became the bible of the logical positivists in the Vienna Circle with whom the apparently had many discussions. In this book, Wittgenstein announced that he was dealing with the problems of philosophy with an aim of showing that language sets a limit on what we can meaningfully say. According to him, “the ideal language picture or mirror the world, just as a map mirror’s it. Hence, language is meaningful only when it pictures fact or

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Summa Philosophica reality for us” (Tractatus, 4.01). The central doctrine of the book, according to Onyeocha, is it’s picture theory of reality which holds that: … language consists of propositions which picture the world. Propositions are the perceptible expressions of thoughts, and thoughts are logical pictures of facts; the world is the totality of facts (331).

What this means is that anything that is not a fact in the world (the empirical world) cannot be pictured by language, because it is outside the scope of language. For a sentence to be meaningful it must describe or be a picture of a state of affairs. Understanding a statement then boils down to grasping or knowing the state of affairs pictured in the sentence. Borrowing a lift from Russell’s logical atomism which saw the world as a composition of absolutely independent facts, Wittgenstein concluded that knowledge is nothing but knowing the copies of these atomistically independent concrete facts. Pluralisms are only but composites of singularities by means of logical relations. For him, since atoms cannot be further reduced, language as atomic composite is irreducible, which makes it impossible to speak meaningfully about a language. This also makes a logical analysis of grammar impossible. Concerning the picture theory of meaning, Wittgenstein saw a lot of statements as meaningless and nonsensical following from their inability to meet his conditions of truth-claim and meaningfulness. This posture, therefore, takes all metaphysical language, ethics and religions as meaningless and nonsensical since they neither contain nor describe facts. Any attempt to talk about such things result in meaningless utterances. For him, propositions should be able to depict facts in the world. He therefore warns that “where of one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (Wittgenstein, 4.003). The logical conclusion of his position is that metaphysical propositions gain their meaningless character from the fact of being inexpressible. All that count for knowledge belong to the jurisdiction of natural sciences and they are the only meaningful propositions to which metaphysics does not belong, hence, metaphysics is meaningless.

Bertrand Russell’s influence on Ayer Bertrand Russell was one of the leading members of the analytic movement in philosophy. According to Titus and Smith in their book Living Issues in Philosophy, Russell has not only contributed to the analytic movement, but has influenced, to a great deal the course of philosophy in the twentieth century. Realizing the short comings of idealism as a

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Summa Philosophica metaphysical system, Russell sought to provide a more realistic explanation of the nature of phenomena and our place in the universe of things” (Ozumba, The Philosophy of Logical Positivism and the Growth of Science, 13). Thus, he saw philosophy as essentially concerned with logical analysis, logical synthesis and comprehensive construction of facts as they exist in the external world. Apart from other works he published, Russell set out in his book “The Problems of Philosophy to investigate into the epistemological foundation and justification for human knowledge. He attempts to build the procedure for the acquisition and evaluation of true claims and detection of false claims. Russell makes bold to say that logic is about fact and not thought. Thus, he is of the opinion that even the law of contradiction which is one of the major tools of logic, is confirmed by fact and not thought. He writes: It must be admitted ... that logical principles are known to us, and cannot be themselves proved by experience, since all proof presupposes them. In the other hand, even that part of our knowledge which is LOGICALLY independent of experience (in the sense that experience cannot prove it) is yet elicited and caused by experience. It is on the occasion of particular experiences that we become aware of the general laws which their connexions exemplify (41).

Thus Russell rejects every speculative procedure of knowledge acquisition. Thought he says can only be of that which exists materially. In this case, he goes on to confirm the five senses as the major sources of knowledge without bias to knowledge by association. Consequently, Russell rejected the idea of universal being as merely an abstract entity. On the other hand, he held that the universal is only the relation between particular sensual entities with other sensible qualities. Having denied the real existence of the universal, Russell goes on to reject the transcendental. If all that appears is not real, he says then there will be no means of knowing the truth. Thus, he asserts: “In the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our present experiences and in some sense; no doubt knowledge is to be derived from them” (7). Bertrand Russell relied not on power of reason but on that of the senses for dependable knowledge. Facts are the only things that can offer and confirm truth and falsehood. He continues: Thus, a belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and is false when there is no corresponding fact ... it will

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be seen that minds do not CREATE the truth or falsehood ... what makes a belief true is a FACT, and this fact does not (except in exceptional cases) in any way involve the mind of the person who has the belief (129 – 130).

Having laid this foundation, Russell proceeded to elucidate the procedure or ways of acquiring knowledge. For him, only matter is real. From this, it follows that only the senses are reliable sources of acquiring knowledge since matter can only be reached directly through the senses. With the senses, we gain knowledge in two ways: (1) By acquaintance with the fact. (2) By Judgement. In this case, the different parts are judged to be related as much as they are related to the fact. Russell’s position boils down to verification. The truth of particulars and generals are obtained only by pointing to factual evidence. As a consequence of Russell’s philosophy, he rejected traditional philosophy of system building with concentration on abstract universal as a means of giving holistic answers to questions. Metaphysics, of all philosophical disciplines received the hardest of Russell’s intellectual blows. The existence and intelligibility of the transcendental which was the object of metaphysics was denied by him. The intellectual power of reason and the merely relational logic as its means was denied as a procedure of acquiring knowledge. In his words; Most philosophers or, at any rate very many – prefer to be able to prove by APRIORI metaphysical reasoning, such things as the fundamental dogmas of religion, the essential rationality of the universe, the illusions of matter, the unreality of all evil and so on ... This hope I believe is vain (14).

Having rejected traditional philosophy such as metaphysics and its methodology, he repudiated the difference and dichotomy between philosophy understood in his own way and science. He advocated for unity of method of study among the various disciplines. Between philosophy and science he saw the difference only in the critical nature of philosophy. The duty of philosophy should only be that of criticizing the methods and principles employed in science. Thus, philosophy rather than oppose science, should consider pieces of apparent knowledge in science on merit. It should only attempt to give unity and system to the body of the sciences with the justification for convictions and beliefs. In the way it will retain only

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Summa Philosophica the knowledge that is error free to some extent. There is no doubt that apart from other influences, the above group of positivistic philosophers influenced Ayer’s idea about philosophy and claim to knowledge. Hence, Ayer’s philosophy generally was shaped by their positivism.

Ayer’s Positivism and his notion of philosophy Ayer was a mathematician and a scientist before he developed interest in philosophy. As earlier stated, his philosophical contact with empiricists and analytic-minded philosophers like David Hume, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Carnap, etc., changed his view in believing that the primary task of philosophy is the clarification of meaning of propositions. As asserted by Wittgenstein, “the object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts,” (Stumpf, 446), thus, making philosophy become an activity and not a theory. Ayer joined the logical positivists whose task is to clarify the meaning of language. Having taken his stand with them, he goes on to do an explication of philosophical propositions so as to establish a foundation for meaningfulness in them and get rid of the ones with meaninglessness similar to what Descartes did in his “methodic doubt” approach to philosophy. In doing this, he adopted the verification principle as his criterion for distinguishing meaningful from meaningless propositions. As quoted by Omoregbe in his book: A Simplified History of Western Philosophy, We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person if and only if he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express – that is, if he knows what observations would lead him under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true or reject it as being false. If there is no way of verifying the truth or falsity of any proposition which purports to make statements of fact about reality, such a proposition does not meet the requirement of the principle of verification and is consequently meaningless (13).

What this means is that a sentence has literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expresses is either analytic or empirically verifiable. For Ayer, the aim of his approach is to bring clarity into philosophical ideas thereby solving problems in philosophy. He started by breaking philosophical propositions into two viz: significant statements and analytic statements. “Significant statements are either synthetic, empirical or scientific propositions which are empirically verifiable. While analytic statements are mathematical cum logical statements. Such statements do

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Summa Philosophica not claim to give any information about the world. They are analytical or tautological but they are meaningful” (Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 7). An example of analytic statement is ‘A married man is a husband’. ‘Husband’ repeats ‘A married man’ as such, no new idea is created neither is the conclusion bigger than the premise. Another example is 5 + 5 = 10. When this mathematics is expressed it means that when five objects are added to another five objects, the summation is ten. Analytic statements are, therefore, universally and necessarily true because the consistent use of words would never allow them to be anything else, hence meaningful. On the other hand, an instance of the synthetic statement is ‘the table is 5 inches high’; this has meaning when rule of measurement is applied and it proves so. It is something experimental and its meaning is based upon the empirical observations of the object referred to in the statement. It was at this point that the principle of verification had its decisive application. Ayer is of the view that philosophers’ “task is the analysis of the language of science or scientific propositions but not to discover facts of unique forms about man and the world as science does”. (Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 7). He shares the belief that philosophical theories are not tested by observation; they are neutral with respect to particular matters of fact. Ayer adopted the “verification principle” as a criterion of meaning in philosophy, thus deriving his philosophical ideas or perspective from it. With regards to his verification principle he writes; The principle of verification is supposed to furnish a criterion by which it can be determined whether or not a sentence is literally meaningful. (Language, Truth and Logic, 7).

However, this principle as a criterion of meaning was confirmed by Stumpf when he noted that “the criterion which we used to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability” (651). Consequently, Ayer developed a special contempt for metaphysics which claims to give a systematic answer and a holistic knowledge of all that there is. Hence metaphysics is not philosophy but only an expression of visions, feelings and emotions. Accordingly he asserts: ... by criticizing the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of a reality transcending the world of science and common sense ... we shall find that it is possible to be a metaphysician without believing in a

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transcendent reality, for we shall see that many metaphysical utterances are due to the commission of logical errors ... (Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 33).

From the above, metaphysics is said to lack the logic and the valid methodological procedures to acquire or offer valid knowledge. He accused metaphysics as only expressing visions, feelings and emotions; hence not part of philosophy. As opposed to the claims and assumptions of some philosophies and metaphysics in particular that philosophy should occupy itself with searching for first principles; Ayer insisted that “philosophy should take as its genuine task the clarification of meaning, concepts and assertion of sciences. The search for knowledge should follow a set of logic, proven methodology with basic assumptions, validated procedure of knowledge and a means of certain evaluation”. (Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, 7). In this, cognitive statements should be clearly distinguished from emotional statements.

Ayer’s criterion of meaning and his verification principle For Ayer (the positivists), the verification principle formed the core of his epistemic position. The principle states that “the meaning of a proposition is the method by which it is verified (Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 47). In other words, a proposition is meaningful if it can be verified directly or is capable of being verified in future experience. The assumption behind this principle was that verification must always rest upon empirical observation, that is, sense experience. The consequence of this was that the external senses became for him the only authentic sources and means of knowledge acquisition and evaluation. The verification principle becomes the basic criterion for the meaningfulness or the literal significance of a proposition. Any proposition that could not be verified by the method of observation would be said to have to meaning. Ayer in his book “Language, Truth and Logic” offers a very good description of verifiability principle thus: We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if he knows how to verify the proposition it purports to express – that is, if he knows what observation would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true or reject it as being false (Ayer, 146).

What this means is that a proposition is true if it actually can or potentially has the capacity that it can be empirically verified and false if

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Summa Philosophica otherwise. Consequently, “this principle was to serve a dual purpose. Firstly, it was to serve as a criterion of demarcation between science and non-science or pseudo-science. Secondly, it was to enhance the unity of science and in the process rid science of all metaphysical notions” (Uduigwomen, 200). In pursuance of these goals, as a logical positivist, Ayer ended up debunking metaphysical, epistemological and ethical assertions as meaningless. According to him, these assertions do not live up to the condition of empirical verifiability; only claims of empirical sciences do allowing to philosophy as a legitimate function only a residual analytic task by way of clarification or propositions. For him, the criterion of meaning is that which enables us to test whether: a sentence expresses a genuine proposition about a matter of fact or not. This shows that the question of the truth of a statement presupposes meaningfulness before an expression must make sense so as to be able to achieve the goal of impacting some meaning. Commentary on this was made by Stumpf when he posited criterion of meaning as that used “for the meaningfulness or literal significance of a proposition” (Stumpf, 454). Again, Kwasi Wiredu shares the same view with Ayer on the criterion of meaning when he noted that “words impact meaning only by being made in virtue of a process which is in principle conventional to stand for something beyond themselves” (101). However, as a logical positivist, Ayer finds the essence of this criterion of meaning in the “verification principle”. He is of the view that “The principle of verification is ... a criterion by which it can be determined whether or not a sentence is literally meaningful” (Ayer, 7). For him, a simple way to formulate it would be to say that a sentence is literally meaningful if and only if the proposition it expresses is either analytic or empirically verifiable. Thus, he disagreed that there are apriori propositions since apriori propositions themselves are epistemologically invalid based on empirical standard. By and large, the central theme in Ayer’s criterion of meaning is the fact that it must be possible to describe the kind of observation which one will have to make in order to be able to determine whether a particular proposition is significantly true or false, hence his adoption of the “verification principle” to ascertain the claim to knowledge. The “verification principle” has diverse forms but they are all geared towards two aims namely, the purging of metaphysical propositions from philosophy and the making of philosophical utterances more empirical which can lead to the identification of philosophical propositions like that of the empirical, sciences. The implication here is that every knowledge claim should be something empirical and verifiable. It makes knowledge claim by

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Summa Philosophica the logical positivists suspect since they ignore reason as a source of knowledge. Ayer is of the view that language should communication facts when they contain relationship that should be definite and dependable on one another which will make language meaningful, such that the meaningfulness of a proposition should correspond to the state of affairs. Hence, he brings to our awareness that “the criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statement of fact is the criterion of verifiability” (Ayer, 17). Ayer is of the view that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, only when the person knows how to verify the proposition in use. It is important to note here Ayer’s understanding of proposition. He does not understand proposition from the point of view of a mere sentence. He narrows down the meaning of a proposition to what is expressed by the sentence. While all propositions may be sentences, not all sentences are propositions. “A sentence qualifies as a proposition if and only if it can be actually or potentially said to empirically verifiable. That is, that a sentence will be meaningful if the person who posits it knows how to verify it and knows what observations will help to determine its truth or falsity” (Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 5). Hence, Ayer identifies two kinds of propositions that can be judged as true or false which are the only sources of knowledge. These are propositions that are either tautologous or those that can be verified in experience. These two kinds of propositions or statements include: analytic statements or propositions such as: “the bachelor is unmarried” and affirmations or denials of matters of fact that contain synthetics statements such as: “Okon is eight feet tall”. Thus, “an analytic proposition is said to be true when its definition is a tautology and false if it is a contradiction” (Stumpf, 428). On the other hand, synthetic propositions are either true or false in each case and their truth or falsity can be discovered only by reference to fact. An example of the first group of statements is to be found in mathematics and logic. Ayer however, denies that the statements in the first group can always be true when in reference to empirical situation except through observation. Titus and Smith in the book, Living Issues in Philosophy, summarised the position of Ayer thus: ... A statement is meaningful if and only if it is either analytical or empirically verifiable. That is, Ayer established what is referred to as the verificationist meaning criterion: non-analytic statements are meaningful only if they are empirically verifiable. (318).

According to Ayer “The principle of verifiability requires that for a proposition or a statement to be meaningful, it must be verifable”. (Ayer 5).

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In his initial expression of the principle, he writes in the same work quoted above, “A simple way to formulate it would be to say that a sentence had literal meaning if and only if the proposition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable”. A look at his writing in the article “Demonstration of the impossibility of metaphysics” may drive home his point well. He writes according to Edwards: I say “ask the meaning of a proposition rather than “ask the meaning of a concept” because questions about the meaning of concept reduce themselves to questions about the meaning of propositions ... I understand a proposition if I know what observations I must make in order to establish its truth or falsity. This may be more succinctly explained by saying that I understand a proposition when I know what facts would verify it. To indicate the situation which verifies a proposition is to indicate what the proposition means (557).

To ascertain these kinds of proposition, he distinguished between “practical verifiability” and “verifiability in principle”, thereby exposing us to different senses of the verification principle. He says that the proposition is verifiable in principle, if not in practice and as such significant. We know that some propositions such as “there are mountains on the further side of the moon” are not practically verifiable because of the inconveniences or presents state of things such that an attempt to make such propositions significant has to be subjected to verification by observation when we get there. By practically verification, Ayer means the criterion or process by which a person can verify his statement at anytime whether it is true or false. For example, “St. Paul’s Catholic Parish building is inside University of Calabar”. This proposition is only verifiable if one gets there and as such one can have knowledge claim of it. Concerning verification in principle, Ayer posits that propositions which cannot be verified empirically or by actual observation but are matters of fact can be verified by stating the theoretical ways in which the proposition can be verified with literal significance. This is what he means by verification in principle hence he states that: ...I do know what observations would decide it for me, if as is theoretically conceivable, I were once in a position to make them. And, therefore, I say that the proposition is verifiable in principle (Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 48).

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That there are mountains on the further side of the moon can be verified theoretically or in principle when the hindrance of reaching the venue is removed, hence significant. However, for metaphysical propositions he says: “All men are mortal” has the very nature that its truth cannot be established with certainty by any finite series of observations either in principle or in practice. He, therefore, concludes that such utterances have no literary significance and as such are meaningless. With these two ways of explicating his version of the verifiability principle, Ayer was still not satisfied. He sees some possible objections to his principle. Since it states that every proposition is either true or false, it will mean that every sentence would express what would be either true or false. I will then be objectionable to say of a sentence being literally meaningful as a criterion of expressing a proposition. This is because the above expression of the criterion will not cover obvious sentences which do express any proposition. For Ayer, this problem can only be controlled by allowing the criterion of verifiability refers to sentences rather than propositions. Otherwise, the word proposition will be used in an extended sense in such a way that every sentence will express a proposition be it literally meaningful or not. Still Ayer sees possible objection to the above solution. About the first solution he writes: This would, indeed run counter to ordinary usage, since one would not normally say of a sentence as opposed to a proposition, that it was capable of being verified, or, for that matter, that it was either true or false (Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 6).

The implication here is that a departure from ordinary usage would ensure confusion. The objection to the second solution is the departure from philosophical usage of the word proposition. For Ayer, “a proposition in philosophy expresses what could be said to be either true or false” (Ayer 7). To solve the above problem, Ayer replaced the word sentence in his first formulation with the word statement. Thus, his principle of verification reads “... a statement is held to be literally meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable” (Ayer 1). Ayer does the above as an implication to his conviction that sentences express nothing but statements. He sees statement as a technical term. However, it is to be understood also as the good expression of the meaning of sentence. It is in streamlining what a sentence expresses as also the meaning of a sentence that we can control statements to refer to empirical

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By strong verification, Ayer means that a proposition can be conclusively verified if its truth could be established in experience. Ayer did not subscribe to the strong verification because of its conclusive nature; based on the fact that it requires the impossible task of verifying all the cases before proof can be significantly adopted. For example, “All Men are Mortal”, “Bodies expand when heated”. Ayer observed that it would be impossible to determine that “all men die” before one can accept the mortality of all. He observed also that its criterion makes it impossible to make any significant statements of fact at all because going by the above proposition it is a fact that, no person has lived toward immortality. In this case, if verifiability is to be properly considered as a criterion of meaning, it must be said to refer to statements that are not strongly verifiable as basic statements are supposed to be. Verifiability will then be referred to in a weak sense which occurs when verification is possible for experience to render proposition probable. Thus he remarked; a statement is weakly verifiable and therefore meaningful, according to my criterion, if some possible sense experience would be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood (Ayer 15).

He based this on the ground that there are enough evidences to determine a proposition that is probable and to that extent significant. For example, the proposition “all men are mortal” when seen in the sense of weak verifiability principle is different from the metaphysical propositions simply because, there are no means of verifying them. Ayer chose the weak principle as his criterion of meaning for significance “it is only the weak sense of the term that is required by my principle of verification” (Ayer 12). Ayer prefers the weak verification principles since for him all scientific propositions are only probable and hardly ever conclusive.

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With further research on his criterion of meaning he discovered two other senses where the verifiability principle can also be used to explain philosophical propositions to its conclusive meaningful end. These are the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ verification methods. He noted that a statement is verifiable directly, either as an “observable statement or is such that... with one or more observable statements ... is not deducible from these other premises alone” (Ayer 17). While indirect verification is that which is indirectly verifiable, if it satisfies the following conditions: First, in conjunction with certain other premises it entails one or more directly verifiable statements which are not deducible from these other premises alone; and secondly, that these other premises do not include any other statement that is not either analytic, or directly verifiable or capable of being independently established as indirectly verifiable (Ayer 29).

Having made these demarcations, Ayer insists that the verification principle requires that a statement be literally meaningful as the condition stated above. Thus, he went on to analyse metaphysical, ethical and theological statements as meaningless, since they are not empirically verifiable, and as such they cannot be said to be true or false, but simply meaningless.

Conclusion: Implication of Ayer’s Criterion of Meaning for Philosophy The verification principle was originally formulated to mean that the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification. This means that to claim to know the meaning of statement and understand it, is to know how to verify it empirically. And if however, one is unable to know any way by which the statement can be verified, then it is concluded that the statement has no meaning. The implication of this view is that the understanding of metaphysical, theological, ethical statements regarding God and other abstract entities, turn out to be quite meaningless and nonsensical, hence their rejection. This is why Ayer remarked that we can “... begin by criticizing the metaphysical thesis that philosophy affords us knowledge of reality transcending the world of science and common sense” (Ayer 45). (i) Metaphysics Metaphysics is concerned with realities that lie beyond the empirical world. It has it s objects as “Being qua Being”, that is Being as such or absolute reality. It deals with that which is beyond the senses. In other word, it deals with such empirically unverifiable realities as “essence”,

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“the being of beings”, “the absolute” things as they are etc. Its source of knowledge claim is reason and reflection. The propositions of metaphysics are, therefore, meaningless when Ayer’s criterion of meaning, which is based on empiricism, subsumed in the “principle of verification”, is applied to them. Such metaphysical propositions such as “God exists”, “God is immortal”, and the like, cannot be verified empirically. Given that they lack literal significance as his own version of verification put it, he declares metaphysical propositions to be nonsensical and meaningless which must be exorcised from philosophy. Thus he writes: No statement which refers to a ‘reality’ transcending the limits of all possible sense experience can possibly have any literal significance ... such reality has all been devoted to the production of nonsense (Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 46).

The above quotation demonstrates the place of metaphysics in Ayer’s positivism. His rejection of metaphysics here carries the same weight as that of David Hume when he remarked that “when we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles if we take in our hands any volume of diversity of school metaphysics ... commit it then to the flames for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion” (An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding xii (iii). Following this view of the verification principle metaphysical propositions cannot pass the test of this criterion in all its ramifications. Ayer argues that metaphysical utterances have no literal significance because they are neither empirical nor analytic but at best expressions of feelings. For him, the charge against the metaphysicians is that he produces “sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant because being metaphysical, it is neither true nor false but literally senseless” (Ayer 47). The implication of these criteria of literal significance as found in Ayer’s criterion of meaning is the rejection of metaphysical proposition as source of knowledge claim. (ii) Ethics Ethics, as a branch of philosophy, is bothered about the “conduct of man, his happiness, pleasure, what he considers to be bad or good and conditions under which these values may be impeded or realized “(Ogbinaka 58). Ethics and Aesthetics are two related branches of philosophy. They belong to the speculative science. But while ethics is about the conduct of man based on right or wrong action, aesthetics deals with the standard, criterion of value judgement such as beauty or the

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Summa Philosophica beautiful, goodness, the perfect. By and large, both deal with statements of value judgement and they belong to the speculative discipline. Ayer accused philosophers in these areas of study of the difficulty to tell from their work what it is that they are seeking to discover or prove. He asks how an empiricist can assert the value of speculative knowledge claim since they are of two distinct kinds; that which relates to the question of empirical fact, and that which relates to question of value. Ayer finds to problem with the proposition which relate to questions of empirical fact since they can be verified empirically, but he objected to the statement of value since they cannot be verified empirically. He argued that statements of value are genuine synthetic propositions, but that they cannot with any show of justice be represented as hypothesis which are used for sensations and that the existence of ethics and aesthetics as branches of speculative knowledge “present an insuperable objection to our radical empiricist thesis” (Ayer 47). Ayer sought a way to situate ethical propositions, which relate to questions of value, hence he employed the theory of “ethical emotivism”. Emotivism according to Omoregbe is “an ethical theory which holds that moral judgements are simply expressions of one’s emotions, one’s feelings or one’s attitude towards an action” (Ethics: A Systematic and Historical Study, 261). This theory implies that moral judgements are expressions of emotional attitude, and are prescriptive in nature such that they cannot be empirically verified. This theory has an undertone of the logical positivists in relation to the verification principle. It doubts that moral statements are factual statements which convey any information about actions. Hence, C. L. Stevenson another exponent of ethical emotivism as quoted by Omoregbe observed that “a moral statement does two things, it expresses one’s personal feelings or attitude towards an action and aims at evoking similar feelings from other people” (Omoregbe, Ethics: A Systematic and Historical Study, 262). Ayer shares the view that a moral statement about a particular action tells nothing about that action which can be said to be true or false; it only tells us the attitude which the person who makes the statement has adopted towards the action in question. That is, it only tells us about the person’s feeling towards it but tells us nothing about the action itself. This is why, according to Omoregbe, he dismisses “metaphysical; religious and moral statements as non-factual. They give no information which can be said to be true or false because what they assert cannot be empirically verified”. (Ethics: A Systematic and Historical Study, 263). We observe that Ayer’s emotive theory rejects ethics as a source of knowledge claim based on the fact that its propositional claims are moral

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Summa Philosophica statements which are neither true nor false, express emotions, have no literal significance, are non-factual and intuitively derived, hence meaningless. According to him, “a mere appeal to intuition is worthless as a test of a proposition’s validity” since they cannot pass the test of the verification principle. He argued, according to Honderich, that all ethical statements are meaningless because they are “non-factual and only express the emotions of the speaker” (141). He maintains that it is impossible to find a criterion for determining the validity of ethical judgement not because they have an absolute validity of ordinary sense- express, but because they have no objective validity whatever. (iii) Theology Religious language is the form of language that makes claims to the knowledge of supernatural realities. From our treatment of metaphysical propositions, such language whose sense or meaning appears different from the ordinary language used in everyday life is not only strange but is fast becoming problematic in this rapidly secularized and empirically inclined world. The rejection of religious utterances follows unavoidably from the earlier rejection of metaphysics, ethical and aesthetical statements on the ground of non-empirical utterances. Such religious utterances include, “God exists”, “God is immortal” and “God give eternal life” etc. He argued that the mention of God brings us to the question of the possibility of religious knowledge, but that this possibility has already been ruled out by our treatment of metaphysics. Ayer’s fundamental question here is not whether a religious proposition such as that of the existence of God is true of false, but how it could be known to be true or false. He holds that a religious proposition cannot be believed without being understood by an understanding of the circumstances which would verify or falsify it, as to bring out its literal significance, such as the “verifiability principle”. The point, which we wish to establish, is that there cannot be any transcendent truths of religion. For sentences, which the theist uses to express such ‘truths’ are literally insignificant (Ayer, 155).

It is clear that Ayer’s verifiability principle rejects religious languages, since they cannot be verified empirically; hence he declares them as nonsensical and meaningless. For Ayer, the existence of God cannot be proved empirically because the term “God” is metaphysical, that is, it cannot be experienced empirically. He opined that: if ‘God’ is a metaphysical term then it cannot be even probable that a god exists. For to say that “God exist” is to make a metaphysical utterance that can neither

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Summa Philosophica be true nor false, “it is only apriori propositions that are logically certain. But we cannot deduce the existence of god from an a priori proposition” (Ayer 151). By and large it is to be noted that Ayer’s rejection of metaphysics, ethics and religious language as sources of knowledge was as a result of the poisoned mind he received from the logical positivists which shaped his philosophical mind. This was made clear when, according to Honderich, he declared concerning the logical positivists thus: “they were extreme empiricists, very anti-metaphysical, anti-religious and this suited my cast of mind very much” (209).

References

Alozie, Princewill I. “History and Philosophy of Science in Ancient Africa” in History and Philosophy of Science, Calabar: Dec-Ford Publishers, 1994.

______Philosophy of Physics. Calabar: University of Calabar Press, 2004.

Ayer, Alfred J., “Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics” in Edwards P. and Pap, A. (eds), A Modern Introduction to Philosophy: Readings from Classical and Contemporary Sources, New York: The Free Press, 1973.

______Logical Positivism, London: The Chance press, 1984.

Benton, T., Philosophical Foundation of the Three Sociologies, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.

Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy, vol. v. London: Burns and Dates, 1964.

______Contemporary Philosophy (Revised Edition) London: Search Press Ltd. 1978.

Hume, David. An inquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge Oxford: Claredon Press 3rd edition, 1975.

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Locke, John. “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding”, The Empiricists (Abridged by R. Taylor) New York: Dolphin Books, 1961.

Ochulor Chinenye L. “Preliminary Objection to David Hume’s Notion of Substance”. Sankofa: Journal of the Humanities 3.2 (2005): 99 – 119.

______“Comtean Positivism and Social Engineering in Nigeria” Ndunode: Calabar Journal of the Humanities 6.1 (2005): 52 – 61.

Omoregbe Joseph I., Epistemology: A Systematic and Historical Study, Lagos: Joja Educational Research and Publisher; 1998.

______Metaphysics without Tears: A Systematic and Historical Study, Lagos: Joja Educational Research and Publishers, 1996.

Ozumba, Godfrey O. The Philosophy of Logical Positivism and the Growth of Science, Calabar: Bacos Publications, 2001.

Passmore, John. “Word and Object”. In Edward Paul (ed) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 5, London: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1967.

Stumpf, Samuel E., Philosophy: History and Problems, New York: McGraw Hill Inc. 1989.

Uduigwomen, Andrew F., A Textbook of History and Philosophy of Science, 3rd edition. Aba: AAU Vitalis Book Company, 2007.

Wiredu, Kwasi, Philosophy and African Culture. London: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. by B. F. McGuiness, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.

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PART VI: AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY

African philosophy has gone beyond the age when the question of whether African philosophy exists or not held sway. African philosophers are currently bent on doing African philosophy. Innocent Asouzu’s Ibuanyidanda Complementary Philosophy typifies this contemporary African attitude. This is why this section begins with his “Ibuanyidanda and the Philosophy of Essence”, a paper he presented at the 50th inaugural lecture at the University of Calabar. It is published here by his gracious permission.

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CHAPTER TWENTY SEVEN

“IBUANYIDANDA” AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ESSENCE

Innocent I. Asouzu

I: THE CHARACTER OF PHILOSOPHY OF ESSENCE

1. Philosophy and ultimate questions

The first task in this lecture is to explicate the concept “philosophy”. From the insight thereby derived, I shall proceed to shed light on the expression “philosophy of essence”. Thereafter, I shall expound the concept “ibuanyidanda” and show how a philosophy articulated around this concept can help us avoid some of the difficulties presented by a “philosophy of essence”. The insights derived from these expositions would lead to a new understanding of philosophy as the “science of missing links”.

To the question, what is philosophy? - most philosophers are likely to agree with the observation that “What Philosophy is and what its value is, is contentious” (Jasper, Einführung in die Philosophie, 9). This observation itself is the foundation of most controversies and disagreements in philosophy, and goes to show the character of philosophy as the apex of all honest concerted efforts at understanding and explaining reality ultimately. A. J. Ayer raises a question, which he answers himself, that would enable us understand better what philosophy, and with it a philosopher is. Thus he asks: “What has the philosopher to contribute? And with what authority? The easiest way to answer this question will be to show philosophy at work in one of its branches, and for this purpose I shall start with metaphysics” (The Central Questions of Philosophy 2), which for him studies “reality as a whole”. Not only Ayer proceeds in this way, but Aristotle, one of the most famous ancient philosophers, seeks to demonstrate what philosophy is by reference to one of its branches, “metaphysics”. Because metaphysics, in the words of Aristotle studies “being qua being” or the ultimate cause of reality, it is “first philosophy”. It is in this sense that metaphysics is “arguably more fundamental” than other branches of philosophy (Carr, Metaphysics, An Introduction 2) and brings

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My understanding of philosophy in this lecture shall equally be guided by its affinity with metaphysics, in keeping with the tradition that seeks to penetrate reality ultimately and selflessly. It is within this context that the literal meaning of the word “philosophy” can become clearer. Literarily, the concept “philosophy” is taken from two Greek words “philein” (to love), and ”sophia” (wisdom). Philosophy or to philosophise is then the natural urge to love wisdom. It is not in all cases that this urge to love wisdom leads also to quest for ultimate truth. This is the case when such urge to love wisdom is guided by some mundane considerations other than truth and knowledge for knowledge sake. Hence, the moment the urge to love wisdom becomes self-serving it loses its flavour as philosophy - this is the moment philosophy degenerates to mere ideology.

It is in this selfless quest that the philosophers seek to give honest answers or opinions to the question, why there is so much suffering in the world, when the world is sustained by a necessary being, God, that cares infinitely for the world. Similarly, philosophers wish to enlighten dispassionately if life is worth living, and why? In the face of human insufficiency and the limited character of our faculties, the philosopher wonders if we can ever know truth in its entirety or if human existence is condemned to half truths, to uncertainties and falsehood. Philosophy is a practical activity which wonders over, if there is a form of enduring goodness that surpasses the evils and wickedness we experience in this world. If wicked people can be rewarded quite undeservedly, what then is justice? The philosopher dares to ask. In the face of the unsatisfactory nature of leadership styles, the philosopher would like to reflect over the nature of good governance and government in general. In all these cases, the philosopher adduces very good reasons backed by insightful arguments, and in a dispassionate mood, seeks to give answers to both practical and theoretical questions of existence. His desire is always to enlighten selflessly. How do we attain peace, harmony and brotherhood in a world that often tends to violence and segregation? This and many more are such questions that preoccupy a philosophical mind. In seeking to handle these issues, each philosopher, ultimately, strives to enhance human happiness with his questions, reflections and answers about the world. If he wishes to know if God exists or seeks to enlighten on the existence of God, he does this with the sincerity of purpose that seeks to further human happiness and not one that seeks to diminish it. This is why

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Summa Philosophica the atheistic philosopher who denies the existence of God does so in the belief that he seeks to enhance and further human happiness, just like the one that affirms God’s existence. Hence, philosophers do not see variations in opinion concerning these issues as ends in themselves. This dispassionate striving towards genuine answers, selfless enlightenment and furthering human happiness characterises the nature of philosophy.

One thing should become clear from this exposition, in the sea of opinions that characterise philosophy, pure ideological over-simplifications should never be mistaken for the real philosophical attitude. This is why neither religious fanaticism, ethnic chauvinism nor political extremism, for example, can be pursued under the guise of any philosophy. Their restricting and non-comprehensive outreach diminishes their philosophical significance grossly. Philosophy is an exercise borne from the fundamental love for truth beyond ideologies and attractive packages of pay masters and depraved consciences. As a non-ideological exercise, philosophy is not a slave to authority neither does it despise authority. If there is a master to which it owes allegiance, that master can be called “the truth” which it seeks critically and dispassionately. Hence, even if it thrives within the context of open and democratic discourse, its answers go beyond such discourse, since it has ultimate reality and truth as its guide. Hence, in all philosophical enterprises, it would be fatal to equate the truths embedded in diverse opinions with definite answers. What this means is that, to equate evidence with philosophical answers would be a big mistake. What evidence and opinions do is to give us alternatives, and in some cases, better ways of viewing those questions that puzzle us. In all those instances where very honest attempts are made to elucidate puzzles of existence philosophy is active. In all those cases where we dispassionately, and guided by truth, seek answers without sounding absolutistic, we have the philosophical temperament. In all those cases where we are committed to the openness of the future as a condition of possibility towards seeking apodictic answers into these questions of existence that agitate our minds, this future reference marks us out as realistic. Thus, we find philosophy active across the length and breadth of our daily activities. In the academia, philosophy is active in history, as philosophy of history, in law, as jurisprudence. Political philosophy coves the conceptual questions raised in political science. In the social sciences, philosophy is pursued as philosophy of social science. In the same way, philosophy is active in education, in the humanistic, natural and social sciences etc. Since there is a wide variety of these men and women of goodwill who seek dispassionate honest answers to the puzzles and problems of existence,

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Summa Philosophica we are then not surprised if the range of philosophical subject matter is as wide an varied as our world. Thus, we have philosophy of environment, business philosophy, feminist philosophy, philosophy of medicine etc. Thus, as a discipline, “philosophy of something” can always be mounted for specific areas, as the situations and times demand. This is why Solomon holds that “Philosophy is not like any other academic subject; rather it is a critical approach to all subjects” (Solomon, Introducing Philosophy, 11) It is this philosophical spirit that guided the earliest philosophers, who sought to articulate these philosophical questions when they wondered about “the first beginning”, or “origin of everything” (Coreth, Metaphysics 17).

More recently the same question has been reformulated more pointedly by Martin Heidegger who sees the fundamental question of metaphysics to subsist in the questions: “why is there anything at all, rather than nothing” (An Introduction to Metaphysics, 1). The numerous creation myths in our diverse localities are evidences of the agitation in the minds of peoples to grasp into the foundation of reality. This shows how widespread and universal this philosophical concern is. When now Ayer, in reference to Aristotle’s opinion on this matter, says that philosophy studies “reality as a whole”, we see how the subject matter of philosophy, as a science, equally constitutes the very object that agitates the minds of anyone who raises philosophical questions. Yet, it has to be noted that merely raising such questions does not automatically elevate a person to the status of a philosopher. Granted that people do not need to be very sophisticated to raise philosophical questions, yet those who merely live out of their fantasies can hardly qualify as philosophers even if fantasy is an essential ingredient of our creative and intuitive existence (Pannenberg, Anthropologie 365-372). This notwithstanding, philosophy remains an honest concerted effort to understand the fundamental questions of reality, when they strike the mind, as the cases of many ancient philosophers stand to testify. This is why even mythological thinkers, according to Aristotle, qualify as philosophers. (Metaphysica, Book A, 2).

One thing should be clear from our exposition of the notion of philosophy that would be constitutive for the articulation of an “Ibuanyidanda philosophy”, as this forms one of the foci of this lecture: Everything about philosophy has to deal with the mind-set or disposition with which we embrace reality. In its diverse modes of articulation philosophy, beyond trying to understand and explain reality, seeks to inculcate the correct type of mind-set or disposition in our relationship with the world. Having now tried to show what philosophy is, let us now proceed

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2. Aristotle and the Philosophy of Essence

Aristotle presents some of the core features of “philosophy of essence” in his work “Metaphysics”. Here, the teaching about “essence” or “substance”, as this is contrasted with accidents, plays a dominant role.

In his Metaphysics Book C, 2, Aristotle refers to metaphysics as “first philosophy” because for him, it investigates the first principles, the ultimate cause of all things and the foundation of all truths. He refers to it as “the science of substance” which “must be of the nature of Wisdom.” (Metaphysica, Book B, 2) This science that studies “substance or essence” is different from those that study the accidental or fragmentary structures of reality. Within this context Aristotle expounds:

“THERE is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others treats universally of being as being.” (Aristotle, Metaphysica Book C 1).

For Aristotle, therefore, the focus of metaphysics, as the science that treats universally of being as being, is the study of substance or essence. Even if there are many substances, Aristotle recognises that metaphysics or first philosophy has to do with the unchangeable substance. Thus, he adds:

“if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being-both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being.” (Book E, 1 – emphasis mine).

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Thus, metaphysics as the science of being qua being is the study of the unmoved immutable substance, which is the most fundamental constitution of all beings. It is in this capacity that metaphysics concentrates on determining the essential structures of all things. Thus, for Aristotle, all beings are constituted of substance and accidents. (Metaphysica Book A, 2, 6, 8). On their part the substance or essence, belongs to real character of being, because:

“if these are not substance, there is no substance and no being at all; for the accidents of these it cannot be right to call beings.” (Book B, 5 - emphasis mine).

For him, it belongs to the character of the wise to know being as being, which is the essence or substance of reality. The reason for this is because:

“the wise man knows all things, as far as possible, … secondly, that he who can learn things that are difficult, and not easy for man to know, is wise (sense-perception is common to all, and therefore easy and no mark of Wisdom); again, that he who is more exact and more capable of teaching the causes is wiser, in every branch of knowledge; and that of the sciences, also, that which is desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of Wisdom than that which is desirable on account of its results, and the superior science is more of the nature of Wisdom than the ancillary; for the wise man must not be ordered but must order, and he must not obey another, but the less wise must obey him.” (Aristotle, Metaphysica, Book A, 2 – emphasis mine).

One of the things most striking about his metaphysical teaching is that it is conceptualised with a mindset that sees reality, human interpersonal relationship and science in a polarised, exclusivist, non- complementary mode.

When, now I use the expression “philosophy of essence” in this work, this usage shall not be restricted to Aristotle’s philosophy as this is clearly articulated in his Metaphysics. The expression “philosophy of essence” is rather used here in a broader sense, to designate any attempt to understand and relate to reality after the mindset of Aristotle’s metaphysics. It is the attempt to relate to the world in a disjointed,

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3. Some Severe Implications of Fidelity to a Philosophy of Essence

3.1 Dichotomising, polarising conception of reality

Undeniably, Aristotle’s philosophy of essence played a major role in shaping the way later generations understood reality and human interpersonal relationship. This is why most later-year philosophers and scientists, who were committed to a philosophy of essence, after the mindset of Aristotle, had to contend with some of its most severe implications. It is interesting to note, that most contentions in Western philosophy, in diverse guises, revolve around the relationship of substance (essence) to accidents. Besides, most metaphysical text books, used in teaching teachers of teachers for decades, for example, subscribe to Aristotle’s radical distinction between “essence” or “substance” and “accidents”. For this reason, they subscribe largely also to Aristotle’s teaching that substance or essence does not need accidents to subsist, whereas accidents need substances on which they inhere. Going by this teaching, reality or being, in the true sense of the word, belongs to the region of substance or essence. This is why for Aristotle “if these are not substance, there is no substance and no being at all; for the accidents of these it cannot be right to call beings.” (Book B, 5). By implication this would mean that to be is to be essence or substance. This teaching would become, in diverse ways, constitutive for what is generally recognised as Aristotle’s enormous influence on the way human interpersonal relationship, science and reality are conceptualised, most especially in the Western history of ideas. Here, we are reminded that at a certain historical epoch:

"Aristotle's works, which had been preserved by Arabian scholars, were acclaimed by the Church as criteria of

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truth which were to be accepted by all Christians just as they accepted the traditional dogma of the Church. Anyone who contradicted Aristotle was to be adjudged guilty of heresy" (Sahakian 103).

This goes a long way in bringing out more clearly the type of influence Copleston had in mind when he observes that Aristotle’s metaphysics “had a tremendous influence on the subsequent thought of Europe” (Copleston, A History of Philosophy 30). Hirschberger echoes the same sentiments when he points to the fact that Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” is a clear reflection of his “Logic” (Hirschberger 163, 183; 163-208), so that his influence has actually to do with bequeathing, most especially to European thinking, the logic of his metaphysical thinking. Generally, fidelity to Aristotle’s metaphysics has resulted in the tendency to see reality as something disjointed, bifurcated and polarised; where what is essential or substantial is easily equated with what is superior, whereas what is accidental is equated with what is inferior and inconsequential. Such a dichotomising and polarising approach is not restricted to the conceptualisation of reality, but is visibly evident in the philosophy of praxis, which insists on “the primacy of practical over theoretical reason, or the primacy of practical over technical reason”. (Schwemmer, Theorie der rationalen Erklärung 25-26).

3.2. Introduction of undue rivalry in the scientific community

Metaphysics, for Aristotle, as the study of the essential or substantial structure of reality is wisdom per excellence, and in this capacity the very ideal of science. It is for this reason that he considers metaphysics a much more superior science than the other sciences (“ancillary” sciences) that study accidental qualities. This unfortunate distinction between metaphysics and the other sciences would have a tremendous consequence for the way science is understood and scientific debates conducted. It has to be noted that history of ideas in medieval Europe had much to do with liberation of human reason from ecclesiastical dogmatism which was largely dictated by a mindset deeply imbedded in Aristotle’s metaphysical orthodoxy. In spite of the critical liberal attitude ushered in by the Renaissance, most of Europe had gone through a radical transformation dictated by Aristotelianism which was imbibed in the process of education, indoctrination and socialisation. This is why even in the face of the new-won liberalism, the scientific community was not spared some of the worst excesses of a philosophy of essence while seeking for

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Summa Philosophica solutions (Asouzu, Ibuanyidanda 158-176). The new-won critical attitude notwithstanding, most scientists soon started seeing themselves as rivals and competitors paying allegiance only to the subject matter of their sciences. Here, Aristotle’s division of the sciences between a metaphysics that is superior and the other sciences that are inferior added impetus to the acrimony sustaining scientific debates. Thus speaking with one voice based on a unified perception of reality was not considered a priority. On the contrary, each researcher was inclined to see the world in a disjointed, polarised exclusive mode. In the realm of philosophy, for example, instead of philosophers speaking with one voice based on a unified subject matter, most philosophers soon found themselves defending scientific propositions in keeping with the demands of their inclinations and localised interests. Without prejudice to very honest efforts invested in the cross-fertilisation of ideas beyond national boundaries and other mundane considerations, there were visible signs of segmentation of ideas along ethnic, ideological and religious lines. It is in this way that rationalism, for example, became heavily associated with French-Rationalism, empiricism with British- Empiricism and Idealism with German-idealism. We shall have American Pragmatism later on. One of the most severe consequences of this is that scientific debates will soon be degraded to an instrument of folks ideology tussles often quite removed from the genuine concerns of science.

This trend becomes most pronounced and radicalised, later on, in what can be characterised as a reversal of fortune for those sciences that Aristotle degraded to mere ancillary status. Emboldened by what some of its practitioners considered their new-won superior status, and in an attitude that almost bordered on pure irrationalism, logical positivism, which goes by diverse names (logical empiricism, logical positivism etc), with greater intensity, rejected metaphysical knowledge. For the positivists, positive knowledge deals with facts, whereas metaphysics is a “meaningless pursuit” which claims access to knowledge inaccessible to empirical science and one which transcends this. (Kraft, The Vienna Circle 24, 30-33; Ayer, The Impossibility of Metaphysics 36; Carnap, Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language). Hence, in an eliminative, dismissive attitude towards metaphysical knowledge, positivism describes metaphysics and allied disciplines, such as theology, as grandmothers of all obscurities causing trouble in the house of science (Sauter, Der Wissenschaftsbegriff der Theologie 286). In this point, logical empiricists show their bias and their commitment to a dichotomising exclusivist type of mindset characteristic of a philosophy of essence; but this time the ancillary sciences have suddenly gained so much so in

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Summa Philosophica importance as to claim the title of substantial sciences; a title previously reserved for metaphysics. Not only logical positivism even J.S. Mill had earlier on doubted the scientific status of the social sciences ( Alan Ryan, Is the Study of Society a Science? 8-9). Here in Nigeria, the disproportionate attention that is accorded the natural sciences speaks volumes of the mindset with which we approach reality. This is all the more the case when our admission quota favours the natural sciences, which by implication are rated higher than other disciplines (Asouzu, Humanistic Education, Technology and National Development). All these are instances where contenders approach reality with a mindset that is polarised and bifurcated. This is precisely why rationalism and empiricism, for example, hardly meet.

With this, there is a radical departure from the understanding that the philosopher and the scientist are truth seekers and that wisdom is lovable. Since a philosophy of essence negates the intrinsic mutual complementary dependence between all existent realities, it easily steers a course of irrationalism. Stegmüller recognises this fact when he calls attention to the fact that in adopting an extremist stand against metaphysics, positivism found its way on the path of irrationalism believing that it can avoid all together the very problems metaphysic poses (Stegmüller, Main Currents in Contemporary Philosophy 10). This type of irrationalism is quite unavoidable for any philosophy of essence that pays undue attention to only one aspect of reality. It is also quite unavoidable for anyone who seeks to define existence as the capacity to be alone in total negation of all the other units that constitute the whole.

There are two major things we can learn from these historical facts and rivalry, most especially as this relates to the reversal of fortune between metaphysics and the other sciences. First, in changed asymmetrical situations of power imbalance those who have the advantage of power tend to lord it over those they perceive as weak, unwise and inconsequential; just as it is the prerogative of the wise to order and not to be ordered. Second, those things we designate as accidental can always be redefined in keeping with the interests guiding human beings in society to appear substantial and vice versa. Thus, knowingly or unknowingly, Aristotle elevates the human innate urge to put one’s interests first, at the cost of the interests of other stakeholders, to a folks ideological metaphysical teaching. He, thereby, underrated and even ignored the fact that, in asymmetrical situations of power imbalance those who have the advantage of power tend to interpret this in keeping with their most cherished interests and use the means at their disposal to secure their

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Summa Philosophica interests first in keeping with the promptings of our fundamental primitive instinct of self-preservation.

3.3. Evoking an artificial conflict between the subject matter of the sciences

Going by Aristotle’s approach, it would seem as if there is real opposition between the subject matter of diverse sciences. This must not be the case, because metaphysical problems are very relevant to natural sciences, just as the problems of the real world are an integral aspect of metaphysics. Since all sciences claim to do service to humanity and the world in general, they are humanistic in orientation and must be concerned with the human problems. And here, clear-cut empirical or metaphysical answers do not suffice.

It is quite unfortunate, as logical empiricism has shown, that many do not consider it worthwhile to aspire towards understanding the ultimate constitution of reality as being. If one remembers that being, so ideally constituted, remains the very motor that drives reality, no self-respecting scientist would be content with giving us half truths by focusing only on those realities that are directly accessible to experience (Asouzu, African Metaphysics and Challenges of Science). What this means is that to assign primacy to those sciences that study being over those that study its attributes is an unfortunate undertaking, if we remember that all sciences, no matter their methods, have the ultimate end to serve nature in all its ramifications. Thus the division of labour among the sciences as this is based on Aristotle’s metaphysics of essence is an unfortunate division, which unnecessarily polarises the sciences, and their practitioners. Based on this unfortunate division, many natural scientists pretend that questions that go beyond the realm of the cognitive empirical are outside the range of their investigation and responsibility.

Scientists always strive, to the best of their ability, to tell us the whole truth. What this shows is that scientists, in principle, do not seek partial grasp, but full grasp of their subject matters and by so doing they demonstrate that the ideal of science is and remains to tell us the truth and if possible the whole truth, about the world. Visible sign of commitment to truth subsists in commitment to both the metaphysical and empirical dimensions of reality, as these constitute a whole. What this implies is that any science that seeks to polarise reality, by commitment only to one aspect of it, always runs the risk of abdicating its responsibilities. As this

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Summa Philosophica matter relates specifically to philosophy, Eze claims that it is the "modest dream of philosophy to speak the truth (even if, as the case may arise, such truth needs be spoken to power)" (Eze, In Search of Reason's Traces 40). This dream is not restricted to philosophy alone, but to all sciences that seek to remain humanistic. Yet, the difficulty arises on how this truth has to be spoken to power. Here, philosophy, as the science that seeks to penetrate ultimate reality has much role to play. However, it cannot play this role convincingly if in its eagerness to speak the truth it usurps power by sounding absolutistic, as the case of Aristotle shows who idealises metaphysics beyond all conceivable limits.

In other words, all sciences must pursue the type of wisdom that never divides and never polarises in their search for truth. It is in this way that they can demonstrate that the wisdom they seek is the type that units and not one that divides. It is in this way that their truth claims must be such that reconciles the essential with the accidental, the relative with the absolute. Where, on the other hand, they seek to speak the truth as the arrogant wisdom that knows all things and commands all things, chances are that they would invariably tend to impose such truths, dogmatically and arbitrarily, on those they consider unwise.

3.4. Enhancement of “unintended ethnocentric” commitment

Consistent commitment to a philosophy of essence enhances what I call “unintended ethnocentric commitment” (Asouzu, Ibuarụ 25-63) both in inquiry and human interpersonal relationship. This phenomenon ensues the moment actors seek to encounter the world with a polarised mindset. Unintended ethnocentric commitment is unfortunately quite widespread today even within the academia. I consider its impact more severe than that of the much discussed “value-oriented bias” in inquiry. One of the major reasons for this is because we are dealing here directly with the impact of clannish and ethnic mentalities on inquiry, and as these have the capacity to complicate coexistence of peoples in a world of globalisation. I have tried to work out the major features of this phenomenon by reference to the conceited way many so-called Western philosophers and scientists relate to those they identify as non-Western philosophers and scientists (Asouzu, Ibuarụ 25-192). I call the phenomenon an “unintended intrusion” “because there is every indication that in spite of the declared goodwill of many researchers and thinkers to steer the course of scientific objectivity in their philosophical endeavours, there are often worrisome traces of unintended ethnocentric commitment in

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Summa Philosophica their minds and thinking. These are some of those biases arising from our value commitments; most especially because of the excessive importance we attach to matters that concern us most, and matters relating to our ethnic and tribal affiliations. In most cases, in doing philosophy, we often wish to uphold and defend our ethnic and tribal identities and values no matter how hard we try to steer an objective course” (Asouzu, Ibuanyidanda 13). We see this phenomenon very pronounced in the so- called “Black Athena” debate which has polarised and is tearing apart academic debates in USA (Asouzu, Ibuanyidanda 110-112). The same thing holds true for the debates surrounding the so-called, “the Philosophy of Stolen Legacy” and “Copy-Cat Philosophy” (Asouzu, Ibuarụ, 30,36, 287- 292). Here, scientific combatants waste precious time and energy contradicting each other and adducing evidence to demonstrate the indemonstrable concerning the origin philosophy. Worst still is when they accuse each other of theft. Here, they forget that all ideas, just like all human values, originate in mutual complementary dependence of all stakeholders. This issue of “unintended ethnocentric commitment” is quite widespread also in the way African philosophy is conducted. This is most especially evident in the ethnocentric–induced style of philosophising, where many African philosophers endeavour to reclaim uncritically their cultural patrimonies in the name of philosophy. This type of philosophising is evident in the works of Tempels, Kagame, Okere, Ramose, Iroegbu, and the self-proclaimed ethno-philosopher, Nwala (Asouzu, Ibuanyidanda 176- 227, Ibuarụ 36-101).

3.5. Knowledge at the service of ideology and the paradox of irrationalism of reason

Aristotle’s commitment to a philosophy of essence made it difficult for him to present, convincingly, metaphysics, which he calls “first philosophy”, as the very ideal of wisdom. If now for him “the wise man must not be ordered but must order, he must not obey another, but the less wise must obey” - a position quite in tune with Plato’s elitist idealism (Boyd William, Plato’s Republic for Today 95-110), then, acquisition of wisdom entails, among other things, all the processes needed to use knowledge as an instrument of subjugation. If it is the prerogative of wisdom to command and bring the less wise to obedience and subjugation, then Aristotle’s wisdom has the unavoidable connotation of arrogant placement of knowledge at the service of power and ideology. Worst still is the fact that it is not in the character of such knowledge or wisdom to compromise or complement. On the contrary, Aristotle’s wisdom is not bound to obey the

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Summa Philosophica less wise; it is the less wise who is bound to obey the wise whose prerogative it is to command and not to obey. This understanding of wisdom or knowledge is clearly echoed in the maxim “knowledge is power”; a saying attributed to Francis Bacon and one which stops at nothing in misusing knowledge as a veritable expansionist instrument of conquest, subjugation and domination. Many associate this doctrine with what is referred to as the triumph of “Western rationality”. Many see this doctrine clearly reflected in Aristotle’s political philosophy, when he, according to Dallmayr opines that ”barbarians should be governed by the Greeks”; a conviction which according to Dallmayr “furnished welcome support to his Macedonian pupil Alexander when he embarked on his far-flung military conquest and imperial ventures” (Dallmayr, Empire or Cosmopolis? 53). For Dallmayr “the main justification for this claim was the Greeks’ (supposed) greater rationality and self-control as compared with the barbarians” (Empire or Cosmopolis? 53). As this relates to contemporary world politics, Dallmayr sees the same Aristotelian mentality being fostered by most Western powers as they seek to be in control of most things strategic, and most especially nuclear weapons, under the supposition that they alone have the higher rationality and needed self-control to use them properly. Here, Aristotle is sometimes described by Westerners as “the master of all who know” (Asante, The Afroentric Idea 8), so that Richard Tarnas’ book “The Passion of the Western Mind”, which seeks a deep affinity between Aristotle and what is celebrated as “Western rationality”, became an instant bestseller, the moment it hit the bookstands.(Tarnas, 55). This notwithstanding, any attempt to monopolise reason by any person or groups of individuals leads invariably to the paradox of irrationalism of reason, where in our eagerness to claim reason for ourselves alone we negate the fact that reason is a universal attribute of all beings that are rational. Commitment to a philosophy of essence easily induces to paradoxes and contradictions of this type.

If philosophy must remain love of wisdom and truth, it must strive beyond all paradoxes and contradictions. In this case, it must be a philosophy of complementation and not one of rejection and exclusiveness. Here, philosophy has the duty to demolish all forms of ideology and ethnocentric inspired understanding of the world that negate the idea of mutual complementary relationship between all existent realities.

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II: FUNDAMENTAL EXISTENTIAL CHALLENGES OF PHILOSOPHY

1. Tension-laden human existential situations

It is necessary to emphasise that the tendency for human beings to relapse to extreme, exclusivist polarising measures in seeking solutions to problems is not something peculiar to a philosophy of essence, which merely served as model for all tendencies to relate to the world with a mindset that is exclusivist and divisionary. If all matters of philosophy have to deal with the type disposition or mind-set with which we embrace reality, then all types of philosophies are subject to the same criterion of legitimisation. Here, any undertaking that steers the course of philosophical orthodoxy and claims to be wisdom, has to fulfil the minimum criterion of abdicating a non-conciliatory bifurcating, divisive absolutistic type of mindset.

Unfortunately, this criterion has to contend with one of the most severe challenges to which our existence as human beings is subjected. This challenge subsists in the fact that the tendency to see the world in a polarised, exclusivist, non-conciliatory mode is something deeply entrenched in our being and consciousness. Fundamentally, human beings tend to secure their interests first, in the course of which they tend to negate the interests of others, due to the challenges of our primitive instinct of self preservation, which we share with other lower creatures. They devise all thinkable strategies to secure their interests first. However behind most of these strategies is a maxim that impels their actions and convictions. Generally, human beings act after what I call the super maxim, which states: “The nearer the better and the safer”. In keeping with this super-maxim, we assume in our actions that those persons and things nearest to us are better and safer by reason of their belonging to us intimately i.e. because they are nearest to us; these are our kith and kin, members of our community, our clan, members of our extended family system, members of our race, tribe, sex, religion, those from out local governments, our states, our churches, those who share some sort of intimate affinity with us, etc. (Asouzu, Method and Principles, (2005 edition) 78, (2004 edition) 69; Asouzu, Ibuanyidanda, 317-323; Asouzu). In seeking to preserve their interests first at the cost of other stakeholders human beings, at the same time, devise measures to negate the interests of those others they adjudge a threat to their most cherished interests and for this reason they become exclusivist and intolerant. The impact of this primitive drive on our being is all the more enhanced due to the fact that all human

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Summa Philosophica existential situations are ambivalent and tension-laden. For these reasons, our being is fundamentally bi-polar structured. This is most evident in our capacity to affirm and to negate, to preserve and to devastate, to construct and to destroy, to say yes and to say no, all at the same time. Authentic existence, from which authentic philosophising springs, entails therefore the capacity to equilibrate the tension arising from the inner recesses of our being in a way that guarantees mutual coexistence of all units within the framework of the whole. Regrettably, again, steering a course of mutual complementation and harmony is not always an easy task, since all human existential situations in addition to being ambivalent have an inherent dimension of what we call in Igbo language ihe mkpuchi anya (the phenomenon of concealment): Literally this translates to: “the thing that covers the eyes” or “the thing that impairs vision”. If the ambivalence points at the double capacity of our interests and the world in general, the phenomenon of concealment (ihe mkpuchi anya) points at our ability to mismanage this ambivalence. In all existential situations, actors are constantly exposed to the dangers of error of judgement in their relationship to the world, due to this ambivalence and ihe mkpuchi anya. We encounter an instance of such an error of judgement when, in our encounter with the world, we usually believe that “the nearer the better and the safer” and adopt this as a general principle that guides our action. Generally and naturally, we perceive and adjudge those nearest to us better and safer, but this must not always be the case since those nearest to us are not always the safest and best (Asouzu, The Challenges of Super-maxim to Judgment and Actions, xix). It is due to our disposition to commit errors of judgment of this kind, that actors also have the innate tendency to resolve conflicts in a one dimensional absolute mode and by recourse to extreme and polarising measures. Even if ihe mkpuchi anya is an existential condition that impacts on the individual, it can evoke a depraved exclusivist, non-conciliatory collective consciousness, when concerned individuals unite in pursuing certain interests they cherish most.

3. The act of existing (I di) misunderstood as the capacity to be alone, ka sọ mụ di)

Grappling successfully with the challenges posed by our tension- laden ambivalent existential situations and ihe mkpuchi anya (phenomenon of concealment) can be decisive for the type of philosophy and science we pursue, the type of society and human interpersonal relationship we are capable of building.

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One of the most adverse effects of the challenge arising from the phenomenon of concealment (ihe mkpuchi anya), is its capacity to becloud our intellect. It is another way of saying that this phenomenon has the capacity to twist our consciousness and induces us to perceive and interpret reality always depravedly. In this case, it induces us to always interpret situations only to our advantage and ignore out rightly the interests of other stakeholders and some of the most severe consequences ensuing from our actions. When this happens, we tend to perceive reality in a disharmonious, exclusivist, polarising mode and tend also to interpret the act of existing (I di) or to be, most selfishly, as the capacity to be alone (ka sọ mụ di). For this reason, human coexistence is easily perceived as a ceaseless struggle between irreconcilable opposites. It is in this way that ihe mkpuchi anya can intensify the feeling that we can live alone without the help of those we identify as inconsequential and dispensable. Such feelings are all the more intensified the moment the ego perceives itself as better than others due to certain momentary advantages bestowed by circumstances, such as position, technological achievements, learning, power, affluence, sex, religious and political affiliations and all those conditions that can make us feel superior over others. Due to this feeling of superiority over others, the ego is immediately misled to believe that it is also very wise, very crafty and capable. Besides, the ego starts to see itself as the absolute architect of its own achievements. Such an existential condition induces the feeling of omnipotence and omniscience. This is the moment the ego also starts having the feeling of absolute certainty, absolute security and invincibility. Since the ego believes that it can achieve everything alone, it also seeks absolute privileges over other stakeholders whom it perceives as inessential, inconsequential and dispensable. Because the phenomenon of concealment makes us believe that we are completely different from other stakeholders, we equally believe that we can act quite unrestrainedly. This is equivalent to the ego elevating itself to an absolute exclusivist subsisting essence capable of existing without other stakeholders; quite reminiscent of Aristotle’s essence or substance that does not need the accidents to subsist. We can then understand, why in asymmetrical situations of power imbalance, those who have the advantage of power often consider themselves substantial, untouchables and also seek to lord it over those they identify as weak, unwise, accidental and inconsequential.

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3. The paradox of human existential situations

Since our tension-laden existential situations becloud our reasoning and twist our consciousness, they easily also magnify and exaggerate our needs, build unfounded fears in us, make us unimaginative and conceal our responsibilities from us. Once caught in this disposition or mindset, actors in seeking to secure and preserve their interests easily resort to very extreme and often very irrational means thinking that these are the most viable ways of upholding their most cherished interest. So blinded, in their eagerness to uphold their interests by recourse to very questionable and often irrational means, they often also succeed in putting the social order on its head, and this notwithstanding, they persist in their actions thinking that they are acting wisely. When now the social order has been destabilised and tensions arise, due to the irrational means actors adopt in seeking solutions to their problems, they start raising alarm and start complaining about the precariousness of the situation. In making such complaints and raising an alarm, they easily forget, because beclouded by ihe mkpuchi anya, that precisely those extreme irrational measures they consider most appropriate are the very causes of the problems they are complaining about.

Here, we see how due to the impact of the phenomenon of ihe mkpuchi anya (phenomenon of concealment), it is not always immediately evident to us that we can be the very cause of those very problems that are weighing us down. In such situations, it is not always clear to us that precisely our personal anti-social acts are the very causes of the problems we are complaining about. Taking Nigeria as a typical example, we are faced with a situation, where, precisely, those things we condemn and abhor, those things which almost everyone says is wrong, is what almost everyone persists in doing, and at the same time complaining about their consequences. This is a paradox and the tragedy of human ambivalent existential situation, as this is complicated by ihe mkpuchi anya (phenomenon of concealment). It is a form of corruption of the mind, which hardly gives the victim any chances, and which can force even the strongest and keenest to their knees. Here, we see how in spite of our knowledge about a given condition that is precarious, we can hardly undertake something tangible to address it. We complain about it, but find it irresistible to do what we condemn as wrong. This notwithstanding, we hardly believe that we are the cause of the problem and this is why we complain to anyone who cares to listen. As this relates to individuals and to collective group consciousness, we always seek to rationalise the situation

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Summa Philosophica by looking for excuses and scapegoats. In looking towards the outside, we demonstrate a culpable ignorance that can only be understood be reference to the character of the phenomena that hold us down. This is a typical case where one can be the cause of one’s problems in full insight and can still not have the capacity to take responsibility for one’s action. This is the paradox.

Here in Nigeria today almost everyone is an untrained expert in almost all problems of our nation. Who does not feel overqualified to take one leadership position or the other, when the need arises? Which of us does not know the best theories and solutions to some of our most teething problems? Put up a debate today on how best to manage our overhaul- worthy lives and institutions, you will be surprised by the calibre of enlightened input you will get. But most actions which we perform contrary to demands of common sense put a big question mark on our claims to expertise, and to our sincerity of purpose, and, unfortunately also, on our sanity. It is a typical situation where one seeks to deceive oneself, tells oneself a lie and thinks that this is the best and wisest existential strategy; over and above all one thinks that one is very smart and crafty.

The global scene is not even better: the world speaks against hunger and inequalities, but those who have the advantage of power use this to make life unbearable for the weak and underprivileged. The world speaks out against violation of human rights, condemns extremism, condemns dictatorship, but those who think that it is the prerogative of the wise to order and to command, put mechanisms in place to uphold their supremacy and primacy at the risk of sounding contradictory. The world has expert theories about economic discrimination and exploitation; about asymmetry in labour and employment conditions and opportunities, about freedom of movement and immigration, but very stiff legislations and anti- immigration and labour laws are again put in place to protect what many perceive as their privileged interests and in the event they undermine the very ideals they seek to protect. In our eagerness to explore our freedom to the fullest, we embark precisely on those measures that put our lives in perpetual dangers of extinction. Since the ambivalence of our existential situations enhances our optimism, and the phenomenon of concealment (ihe mkpuchi anya) makes us blind concerning our limitations, we easily operate with false hopes believing that all problems can be solved given the time and requisite technology. Here, we may be wrong, because, in most cases precisely those measures we employ to uphold our interests at all cost are the very measures that rebound and threaten our right to exist.

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Looking at these widespread existential paradox, it becomes very clear that hardly any human problem is a localised problem. Those who think that the problems of corruption, nepotism, graft, laziness, injustice, violence, greed, embezzlement, bribery, tribalism, wastefulness, recklessness, insincerity, negligence, 419, religious fanaticism, clannish mentality, racism, cronyism, scientism, terrorism, plundering of national wealth, insatiable appetite for material possession, and all forms of irrational extreme tendencies are typical problems of any region of the world must think again.

These are universal human problem that have to deal with the structure of human consciousness which always seeks its autonomy outside the foundation of its unity. They are universal human problems, just as the phenomenon of excessive self-interest is a human problem beyond races, nations and religions. Where we are not able to manage our tension- laden existential situations well, we are likely also to develop a divisive exclusivist type of mindset which evokes those problems we abhor. With this we can clearly see the psycho-pathological dimension of the problem of any philosophy that makes recourse to extreme measures in addressing the world and reality in general. This is why most difficulties raised by a philosophy of essence can be addressed adequately within the context of a philosophy of the mind putting into consideration the fact that philosophy is all about inculcating the correct type of mindset and disposition. How to come to grips with this falls within the domain of the pedagogical and psycho-therapeutic function of ibuanyidanda philosophy.

We can now understand why the problems associated with Aristotle’s philosophy of essence are universal human problems that have to deal with human inability to come to terms with the demands of our tension-laden existential situations. For this reason, any of us can be confronted with the same problems anytime and anywhere, either as victims or as perpetrators.

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III: ADDRESSING THE SUBJECT-OBJECT TENSION AND DICHOTOMY

1. Ibuanyidanda and the philosophy of essence

If by recourse to a philosophy of essence the human consciousness easily becomes a victim of its tension-laden ambivalent situations and ihe mkpuchi anya (phenomenon of concealment), the question then arises: How can actors relate to the world in view of overcoming the divide and tension generate in human consciousness? To answer this question adequately entails looking for a strategy for addressing the major shortcomings of a philosophy of essence while retaining its benefits.

To start with, there is need to recognises the fact that the ultimate idea of being is very constitutive in our understanding of reality and in our relationship to the world. It is the very idea that drives science and society (Asouzu, African Metaphysics and Challenges of Science). In this point Aristotle is right when he points at the fundamental, enduring and ultimate character of the notion of being. However in seeking to arrive at this ultimate enduring idea of being, all the means needed to attain it must remain harmonised with the ideal it enshrines. This is where Aristotle’s approach calls for an overhaul. If for Aristotle metaphysics which ”treats universally of being as being, is the study of substance or essence” it can not do this successfully if essence and accidents are conceptualised as if they are situated at diverse regions of being.

In other words, in doing philosophy or metaphysics, there must be the possibility to relate being to its attributes in the most natural way, and such that makes it possible for us to uphold a harmonised idea of reality. Furthermore, it is only by recourse to such a harmonised idea of being that our idea of science and human interpersonal relationship can remain complete and harmonised. This can be achieved if there is a way to relate essence (substance) and accidents, ends and means, practical reason and theoretical, practical reason and technical, such that in their realisation they are mutually harmonized (Asouzu, Eine Analyse und kritische Bewertung; Kritische Betrachtung der konstruktiven Wissenschaftstheorie 106-111). Any philosophy that can help us achieve this must help the ego perceive reality, and the world in general, in a complementary mutually harmonised way. Besides, the method of such a philosophy should be adequate towards penetrating and understand the internal workings of the human consciousness in view of addressing the tension thereby generated. This is

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Summa Philosophica important because such tension is the major cause of the subject-object divide and dichotomy. Such is the character of Ibuanyidanda philosophy.

We can then say that Ibuanyidanda philosophy is a transcendent complementary comprehensive systematic inquiry into the structure and dynamics of human consciousness as to determine the reason for the subject-object tension and dichotomy by reason of which the ego always seeks its autonomy outside the foundation of its unity. It is an attempt at addressing this tension with a view to providing workable solutions towards its containment in a complementary comprehensive mutually harmonised fashion.

Contrary to a philosophy of essence which derives from a metaphysics that polarisation and absolutises aspects of reality, the major task of an ibuanyidanda philosophy is to show how a systematic non-absolutistic metaphysics is possible; it is an attempt at showing how the ego can relate to reality in a mutually harmonised non-absolutistic mode.

As this relates to the legitimising role of philosophy as the ideal of science, Ibuanyidanda philosophy wishes to show how the propositions or statements of any given science, intended for human interpersonal relationship, can be validated, both to the inside and the outside, without falling into the three fold trilemma of infinite regress, of circularity, and of arbitrariness (Hans Albert, Traktat über kritische Vernunft 11-15). Since all sciences claim to foster human happiness, ibuanyidanda philosophy wishes to show how this task of legitimisation is a responsibility mutually shared by all the sciences and not one that is reserved specifically to philosophy. With this, ibuanyidanda philosophy shows that there can be real convergence in the subject matters of diverse sciences, contrary to insinuations of a philosophy of essence for which the subject matters of the diverse sciences are at odds with each other.

Hence, ibuanyidanda philosophy wishes to demonstrate how unified statements about being and the world in general can be possible, within an integrated systematic framework, and one that allows freedom of expression and which considers all things adequately, the fragmentation of their historicity notwithstanding. Generally, ibuanyidanda philosophy wishes to show how philosophy, as wisdom, can play its legitimising role, both theoretically and practically, such that relapse to extreme measures in addressing reality and human interpersonal relationship can be curtailed and if possible eliminated.

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If now a philosophy of essence polarises reality, ibuanyidanda philosophy explores a method and principles for coalescing the real and the ideal, the essential and accidental into a system of mutual complementing units. It is a challenge to show how philosophy can be relevant to all units constituting a whole, such that the essential and accidental, the necessary and contingent, the universal and the particular, the absolute and relative, the conservative and the progressive, the constructive and the deconstructive; both the consequential and inconsequential, both the essential and inessential, both the real and the ideal, both the transcendental and world-immanent, can more easily be grappled with within the same framework.

When ibuanyidanda philosophy performs this task, it immediately portrays itself as that undertaking that seeks to penetrate and explore the idea of being, complementarily, in the dynamism of its immediacy and considers all things that exist as missing links of reality.

2. Philosophy the science of missing links of reality

Ontology means the study of being, just as biology means the study of living organisms. The designation “ontology” is used to bring out more properly the subject matter of metaphysics. If Aristotle-based metaphysics or ontology seeks an unmediated access into the notion of being in its essentiality, Ibuanyidanda ontology attempts to penetrate and grasp being, and with it ultimate reality through mediation or via the instrumentality of mutual relations. It is for this reason that while a philosophy of essence in approaching reality seeks to divide and polarise it, Ibuanyidanda ontology seeks to harmonise, complement, and unify the same.

The concept Ibuanyidanda draws its inspiration from the teachings of traditional Igbo philosophers of the complementary system of thought. The closest English equivalent to the word “Ibuanyidanda” is “complemenatrity”. Danda are ants that have the capacity, in mutual dependence and interdependence, to carry loads that appear bigger and heavier than themselves. What this implies is that they can surmount very difficult challenges when they are mutually dependent on each other in the complementation of their efforts. Hence, traditional Igbo philosophers insist that: ibu anyi danda (no task is insurmountable for danda). It is from this synthetic idea “ibu anyi danda” that served a heuristic pre-scientific function within the context of traditional Igbo experience that the synthetic-analytic

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Summa Philosophica concept “Ibuanyidanda” is derived through abstraction. (Asouzu Ibuanyidanda 11).

It is precisely this idea of mutual dependence and interdependence in complementarity, that is negated by any philosophy of essence. Within an Aristotelian context, reality can be represented ideally by recourse to the concept of essence or substance which does not need its accidents to subsist. For this classical idea of being, therefore, the notion of being is indefinable since it is only being that subsists and endures (Van Steenberghen, Fernand. Ontology 23; Dougherty, Kenneth. Metaphysics 35). In other words, there is no intermediary between being and its negation. This is why within this context the negation of being is nothingness. Due to its Aristotelian fidelity this classical notion of being shows its glaring disjunctive and exclusivist flavour. (Joseph, H.W.B. An Introduction to Logic 181-182; Stebbing, L.S. A Modern Introduction To Logic, 69-78). In Ibuanyidanda philosophy, I see it otherwise. Hence, I dare define the idea of being; here I claim that being is that on account of which anything that exists serves a missing link of reality. In other words, within an Ibuanyidanda context reality presents itself to us as missing links of reality within whose framework the idea of being reveals itself and is defined. I designate as “missing links”: “diverse units that make up an entity within the framework of the whole and as they are complementarily related. They are all the imaginable fragments, units, components, and combinations that enter into our understanding of any aspect of our world. They are also all the units and combinations necessary in the conceptualisation of an entity or of the whole. Thus missing links are, for example, thoughts and the thoughts of thoughts. They are diverse modes of manifestation of being in history. They are categories and the categories of categories. They are the units and the units of units, entities and the entities of entities, things and the things of things. They are ideas and the ideas of ideas, etc. as these can possibly be abstracted and related to each other as conditions of possibility of their perfectibility in a harmonious systemic manner” (Asouzu, Method and Principles (2005 edition), 285- 286; (2004 edition), 277-278; Asouzu, Progress in Metaphysics: The Phenomenon of “Missing Link” 82-91)

For Ibuanyidanda philosophy, therefore, to be is to be in mutual complementary relationship (ka sọ mụ adina) and its negation is to be

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Summa Philosophica alone (ka sọ mụ di) and not nothingness. This is why it is a tragedy to locate the essence of existence in the capacity to be alone (ka sọ mụ di); in the capacity to act outside of the framework provided by all missing links of reality. In this sense, the act of being and with it existence, is all it takes to affirm that anything that exists serves a missing link of reality towards the joy of being. With this, ibuanyidanda wishes to supersede that approach to reality were the idea of being can be equated to being alone ((ka sọ mụ di). By this, I affirm that being is dynamic in a complementary sense and not dynamic in a world immanent pre-deterministic sense. It is very important to remark that commitment to this repugnant idea of being in the dynamism of its world immanent pre-deterministic concomitancy is very widespread in African philosophy today, due to devastating influence of what I call the “Tempelsian Damage” among many African philosophers. (Ibuarụ 74-101).

The major task of any philosophy subsists therefore in the harmonization of our perception of reality in the face of a world that presents itself as varied and fragmented. This task can be accomplished within the context of a philosophy whose goal is to harmonise and complement reality instead of one that seeks to divide, polarise and bifurcate it. It is within such a context, that we say that philosophy is the science of missing links of reality as against a philosophy of essence for which philosophy, as wisdom is a science of pure essences. We can then understand why an ibuanyidanda philosophy is the very limit of a pure empiricist-based and pure rationalist-based truth claims. By so doing an ibuanyidanda epistemology challenges the validity of a pure empiricist or a purely rationalist based epistemology, as these form the foundation on which the ideological tension that overheats and overshadows scientific debates is located. Here, we aver that all matters of knowledge both in their genesis and further development are complementary (Ibuarụ 242-255).

One can then understand our contention that in the genesis and perfectibility of our ideas, members of the human family are interminably in a relationship of mutual dependence and interdependence in complementarity. It is for this reason that we aver that the debate concerning the origin of philosophy, and with it the “Black Athena” debate, that have polarised the Eurocentric and Afrocentric camps are ethnocentric induced excesses far removed from genuine concerns of science (Asouzu, Ibuanyidanda 110-114, Ibuarụ, 287-292). The same can be said of much of the debates based on a positivist induced rationality that seeks to do away with a metaphysical knowledge. Contrary to the pretension of these opposing camps, Ibuanyidanda, as a philosophy of mutual

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Summa Philosophica complementation, is of the view that Philosophy originated neither in Greece nor in Egypt. As wisdom, it is an exercise in mutual dependence of all missing links in their complementary interrelatedness. Hence, all cultures, peoples, races, tribes, sexes, languages, nations, religions, political affiliations etc. are in mutual complementary indebtedness to each other, in their privileges and responsibilities. For this reason, Ibuanyidanda philosophy avers that all forms of ideas and modes of knowledge, in their excogitation, in their acquisition, execution and further development are complementary. Ibuanyidanda thus pursues an idea of mutual indebtedness and interdependence in complementarity in a way that makes the issue of who takes the credit, for example in a production line, more manageable. Just as a philosophy of essence that considers being indefinable has as its subject matter all things that exist in so far as they are pure essences or being as being without qualification, ibuanyidanda philosophy likewise has as its subject matter all things that exist, but insofar as they serve each other interminably as missing links of reality.

If now the strategy of a philosophy of essence leads to divisiveness in human interpersonal relationship, this is a sure indication that its claim to be wisdom is one where theory and praxis are at variance with each other. For this reason, Ibuanyidanda philosophy sees as one of its primary functions the need to restore the broken unity between theory and praxis.

3. Harmonization of theory and praxis

A philosophy of essence targets human action due to the impact theories have on action. To revise the exclusivist, hegemonic impact arising from a philosophy of essence on human action entails pursuing a philosophy of complementation that is valid both as a theoretical and as a practical philosophy. In Ibuanyidanda philosophy we have such a philosophy which seeks to harmonise theory and praxis through its principles, imperative and what I designate as the “truth and authenticity criterion”. (Asouzu, Method and Principles, (2005) edition, 281-285; (2004 edition) 273-277). I call the metaphysical variant of the Ibuanyidanda principle, the principle of integration. This principle claims: “Anything that exists serves a missing link of reality”. The principle of progressive transformation serves as the practical variant of this principle. It states: ”All human actions are geared towards the joy of being”. The imperative of ibuanyidanda philosophy states: “Allow the limitations of being to be the cause of your joy”. Whereas the truth and authenticity criterion states:

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”never elevate any world immanent missing link to an absolute instance”.

What is striking about the principles and imperative of Ibuanyidanda philosophy and its truth and authenticity criterion is that they lay much emphasis on human insufficiency, while bearing in mind human determination to absoluteness and comprehensiveness in his future reference. Thus, Ibuanyidanda philosophy seeks to show how the essential and accidental, how being and its various modes of expression form an integrated complementary whole. Here, we wish to show how being becomes manifest as the authentic mutual joyous experience that unifies all missing links in the service they render to each other. This is the joy of being, which becomes accessibly as the experience enshrined in the affirmation sustaining all authentically well executed tasks, when we say in Igbo jide k’ iji. Thus, in the affirmation, jide k’ iji we allude to the mutual unifying experience of transcendent complementary unity of consciousness arising from the forms of the mind (akara obi/akara mmụọ or transcendent categories of unity of consciousness) which enable actors to be committed to the insight that anything that exists serves a missing link of reality. This transcendent experience remains the ultimate end of all complementary or ibuanyidanda actions and offers the possibility of experiencing being truly and concretely. It becomes most evident in concrete encounter with the opposite other as human subjects who share similar experiences and interests with each other.

4. Restoration of True Personal Autonomy

4.1. Noetic propaedeutic: The pedagogical and psycho-therapeutic dimensions of ibuanyidanda philosophy

Fortunately, there are attempts at giving philosophy a more human face far removed from some of the excesses of a philosophy of essence. For some, this can be accomplished through the rejection of what has come to be known as dogmatic system-building type of philosophy which for many signifies commitment to a stringent polarising philosophical orthodoxy. This shows how averse many have become to a philosophy of essence. However, ibuanyidanda does not see the solution in abandoning or rejecting system-building altogether, since for it the problem subsists in

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Summa Philosophica the type of mindset with which systems are built (Asouzu, Ibuanyidanda 46- 55). Determined to avoid some of the excesses of a philosophy of essence, many seek to steer a course of a more liberal democratic philosophy of culture that unifies. How successful such approaches can become depends on how adequate their methods are towards addressing the conflict arising from the structure of human consciousness. Here, many believe that the subject-object tension and divide and most especially the chasm existing between being and its attributes can be bridged very easily by recourse to various methods of discourse and dialogue. In this connection, Wilhelm Kamlah and Paul Lorenzen (Kamlah/Lorenzen Logische Propädeutik), spoke of the need for a logical propaedeutic as a precondition for all modes of rational discourse. Kamlah and Schwemmer (Kamlah, Philosophische Anthropologie; Schwemmer. Theorie der rationalen Erklärung), in their constructivism, envisaged a logical, linguistic propaedeutic of a constructive type, as a precondition for rational discourse concerning goals and norms of action in the “cultural sciences”. Having similar intentions of overcoming a philosophy of divisiveness and polarisation, intercultural philosophy (Ibuanyidanda, 28-43) pursues a cultural philosophy that seeks to unify diverse cultures through its methods of dialogue and polylogue. Both constructive philosophy of science and intercultural philosophy share the similarity that they see the need for a conducive condition to be created for the success of any form of discourse or dialogue as means of addressing the issues relating to subject-object divide and tension. Whereas constructivism locates such a condition in following methodologically pre-constructed logical and semantic rules, intercultural philosophy, on its side, locates this in following rules guiding dialogue or polylogue. By following this route, they forget that all human existential situations are ambivalent and have the inherent dimension of ihe mkpuchi anya (phenomenon of concealment). Where these challenging existential conditions are not first addressed, chances are that they have the capacity to render all pre-constructed rules ineffective. Besides, offering preconditions for the success of discourse, constructive philosophers of science, on their side, are firmly committed to the distinction between the primacy of the practical over theoretical or technical reason; a position quit in consonance with Aristotle’s philosophy of essence and division.

Generally, one can say that most recent attempts by some major European philosophers to steer a course quite removed from a philosophy of essence has to be greeted with joy. However if one comes to think of it that most of them are still caught in the web of unintended ethno-centric commitment in the way they do science and philosophy, there is every

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Summa Philosophica reason then to conclude that they still have a lot of work to do (Ibuarụ 25- 36). In other words, it is not always easy to renounce a non-conciliatory, conceited, polarising and discriminative type of mindset acquired through long years of education, socialisation and indoctrination (Ibuanyidanda, 24- 70). Since for Ibuanyidanda philosophy the problem has to do with the mind-set with which one relates to the world, there is need to probe first into the conditions needed for the mind to perform its functions well. With this, we see why I contend that all matters of philosophy have to do with the mind or with the disposition with which we relate to the world. Where the correct disposition is not given, philosophy can hardly remain that dispassionate self-less wisdom that it is.

It is for this reason that Ibuanyidanda philosophy insists on a noetic propaedeutic or the pre-pedagogy of the mind or human reason itself as the condition of possibility for all rational and ethical discourses, and for authentic human action (Asouzu, Ibuanyidanda 80-85). With its noetic propaedeutic, ibuanyidanda philosophy pursues the preconditions for authentic rational human actions and statements seeking validity within frameworks of mutual interaction. Where the mind is healthy chances are that it can enable interlocutors and actors carry out healthy and successful interaction. With this, we arrive at the pedagogical and psycho-therapeutic dimension of ibuanyidanda philosophy by reason of which it seeks to address the subject-object tension and divide inherent in human consciousness in view of containing these.

By noetic propaedeutic, I mean a pre-education of the mind, and human reason with a view to overcoming the broken unity in human consciousness caused by the challenges of the tension-laden human ambivalent existential situations and ihe mkpuchi anya (phenomenon of concealment). Through such a rigorous propaedeutic, actors are enabled to define their interests within the ambit of all missing links and to know reality in its true and authentic constitution. Thus, the major task of a noetic propaedeutic is to help the ego eliminate this broken unity and to help restore the subject to true self such that it can affirm insightfully that to be is to be in mutual complementary relationship with all missing links of reality ((ka sọ mụ adina). It is the moment actors succeed in affirming their being in this way, that we can say that they are living in the true sense of the word. It is the moment actors succeed in affirming their being within the framework of all missing links that it becomes evident to them also that to be is not to be alone (ka sọ mụ di). On the contrary, they become conscious of the fact that to be entails all the processes needed to

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Summa Philosophica overcome the demands of uche/obi akọlọ, uche aghụghọ or uche ka sọ mụ di (negative wisdom or intelligence, hegemonic or exclusivist type of mindset), which is the seat of all negative acts and exclusivist tendencies. It is by reason of the same insight that they strive always to act from the promptings of a complementary comprehensive type of mindset (obi/uche ka sọ mụ adina). Where such transformations take place, actors would come to recognise authentic existence as the capacity to gain full self- knowledge in the process of which the challenges arising from ihe mkpuchi anya (phenomenon of concealment) and human ambivalent situations are contained (Asouzu, Ibuanyidanda 313-327).

4.2. Recourse to the transcendent categories of unity of consciousness (akara obi/akara mmụọ)

Overcoming this existential tension and the phenomenon of concealment (ihe mkpuchi anya), entails a return of the subject to the inner recesses of its being and consciousness, in view of exploring some of the latent potentialities thereby imbedded and which are needed to equilibrate this tension. To start with, although the tension generated by human ambivalent situations and the phenomenon of concealment (ihe mkpuchi anya) can limit our capacities, impair our perception of our existential conditions, limit the freedom and autonomy of the individual, nevertheless, the ego is not completely condemned to its existential conditions. On the contrary, the ego has inexhaustible innate potentialities to change its situations for good. This follows from the fact that the human person, in the double capacity of his existence, is a being imbued with mechanisms that guarantee his happiness, his predicaments notwithstanding. These mechanisms are what we call in Igbo language “akara obi/akara mmụọ” or the transcendent categories of unity of consciousness. They are transcendent because they help the mind go beyond challenged existential conditions. In other words, they are not transcendental categories, even if they share in the dimension of transcendentality (Asouzu, Method and Principles (2005 edition), 142; (2004 edition), 132). These transcendent categories include: “absoluteness”, “relativity”, “historicity” “fragmentation” or ‘world-immanent predetermination”, “universality”, “comprehensiveness”, “unity”, “totality”, and “future reference”. They indicate the innate capacity of the mind to always act from the impetus deriving from these categories. The mind or intellect shares these categories with all missing links of reality, which in their relativity are determined to absoluteness. As human subject, even if these categories are innate to our being, they can be rendered ineffective, still, due to the challenges of human ambivalent

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Summa Philosophica situation and ihe mkpuchi anya. How we relate to these categories in our active engagements with other missing links goes a long way in determining the character of our being, the type of society we build, the type of philosophy and science we practice and the type and quality of actions we perform.

It is the function of philosophy to bring to the fore the legitimising role these categories play in our encounter with the world in general. It is in fulfilling this function, that Ibuanyidanda philosophy accomplishes its pedagogical and psycho-therapeutic functions. In performing this function, it portrays its positive understanding of the nature of the human person and the world in general, their predicaments notwithstanding. In other words, their insufficiency notwithstanding, the human person and all missing links of reality are destined for higher levels of legitimisation. This is precisely why in other to uphold their authenticity, actors have to encounter all missing links in full awareness of their relativity, historicity and fragmentation, while, at the same time bearing in mind their ultimate determination to absoluteness, universality, comprehensiveness, unity, totality, and future reference.

First and foremost, it is in their relativity that missing links, in their world immanent predetermination, show themselves for what they are in the ambivalence of their expression. It is within this context that the phenomenon of ihe mkpuchi anya beclouds our senses and impairs our imagination in our relationship with the world. In their relativity, missing links are fragile and insufficient, but ultimately, they are determined to comprehensiveness, absoluteness, unity, universality and totality in future reference. It is on account of this bipolar determination that human beings are subjected to tension, in the first place. For this reason, it would be a big mistake to encounter missing links only at one pole of their determination and worst still merely as relative world immanent subjects and objects. To explore the full potentialities of their being, actors have to encounter them not only as beings that are relative, but more so as ones determined to absoluteness, for example. Where actors methodically and consciously try to encounter the world in relativity and fragmentation, as aspects of authentic existence, while bearing in mind the absolute reference of the world all at the same time, they have the possibility of seeing themselves as mere mortals and the world in general as transient. With this, the danger of absolutistic ambitions and absolutisation of the ego and of world immanent missing links can be greatly curtailed. The same is applicable to the tendency to polarise missing links which remain harmonised in

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Summa Philosophica consciousness due to the fact that they are presented to us not as purely fragmented subject or objects but as beings that are also destined to absoluteness. This is why in the imperative of ibuanyidanda we demand: In all tension-laden existential situations allow the limitations of being to be the cause of your joy. That is to say, beyond their insufficiency, missing links are destined towards a higher level of legitimisation on account of which they constitute necessary dimensions of our happiness.

In other words, the challenges of our world, in its world-immanent pre-determination, notwithstanding, the world always has a positive role to play in the determination of our happiness. For this reason, adverse existential conditions or existential challenges must not be reasons for human being to indulge in deviant acts; on the contrary, the world in its insufficiency and fragmentation, even as a world that is vigorously challenged, has all it takes to uplift our being to the most exalted transcendent experience. Acting for the joy of being presupposes, therefore, encountering and grasping missing links, not only, from the fragmentation of their expression, but more so, in full awareness of the absoluteness, unity, totality, universality, comprehensiveness and future reference of their determination and constitution. In other words, in all tension-laden existential situations, the joy of being can be guaranteed if in our actions we encounter world immanent missing links, not only as fragmentary and relative entities only, but as entities destined for totality, universality, comprehensiveness and absoluteness in future reference. The openness of the future shows the capacity for all missing links to evoke new, and quite surprising experiences. In other words, it is an openness that holds possibilities for missing links in view of perfectibility, of full positive transcendence, of positive self-affirmation, of positive self- transformation and positive self-actualisation, the relativity inherent in their being notwithstanding. Without this future reference, world immanence would be self-constituting and such that attempts by missing links to exceed their relativity and fragmentation would always be self-defeating. It is in view of the future orientedness, which they bring towards each other, that they realize that there are viable alternatives in the face of difficulties and deadlocks. It is on account of this future reference, inherent in missing links, that they can put their freedom into positive use and are vicariously ready to grant the same freedom to others. It is on account of our acceptance of this future direction of our being that we dare ask philosophical questions and seek answers dispassionately and veritably. Where this future orientation is lacking, the temptation to elevate the ego to its own law giver, oblivious of its ceaseless need for validation is always

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Summa Philosophica given. It is on account of this character of our being that we have the capacity to become insightful of our mistakes and excesses, and for this reason seek amend and forgiveness. By token of this insight, we amass the courage to accept responsibility for our actions, most especially as this relates to our failings that are integral parts of the tension that threatens our being and all missing links of reality. To attain this level of insight, the subject needs to be committed to the mechanisms needed to attain full personal autonomy.

4.3. Full personal autonomy through “ima-onwe-onye” (being-in- control)

Restoration of full personal autonomy is effected by the subject in the act of ima-onwe-onye (being-in-control), as we call it in Igbo language. This is the highest form of self-consciousness through which the thinking and acting subject comes to authentic personal insight into the fact that to be is the capacity to be in control of our tension-laden existential situations and the phenomenon of ihe mkpuchi anya (phenomenon of concealment). In the act of ima-onwe-onye- the ego experiences itself therefore as a being-in-control (onye-ma-onwe-ya). As the processes needed to translate the transcendent categories of unity of consciousness into act of pure self- consciousness, the act of ima-onwe-onye is referred to as the act of existential conversion; this is nothing other than the translation of the transcendent categories of unity of consciousness into lived experience. It is ima-onwe-onye or being-in-control in action. It is in the act of existential conversion that an acting and a thinking subject is enraptured and such that finds expression in the experience of transcendent complementary unity of consciousness with all missing links.

When this transcendent complementary experience finds expression in practical acts, actors in all existential situations seek to put into practice the demands of these transcendent categories as expression of the demands of the principles and imperative of complementary reflection. It is through this act of authentic self-consciousness (ima-onwe- onye), that the human subject shows the high level of freedom and insight that characterizes its being as opposed to the form of determination characteristic of those beings that do not have the capacity to grasp and interpret this tension meaningfully. In the act of ima-onwe-onye or being-in- control, we seek to experience this tension meaningfully and interpret it as an integral part of our historicity and fragmentation which cannot be wished away just because we are rational and wise. It is in this form of meaningful,

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Summa Philosophica self-conscious management of this tension that we show the type of human beings we actually are, the type of science and philosophy we are capable of practising and the type of society and human interpersonal relationship we are capable of entering into. In the complementary transcendent act of ima-onwe-onye, actors come to full realisation that to be and to exist translate to being-in-control of all tension-laden existential situations in the evident insight that anything that exists serves a missing link of reality (ka sọ mụ adina) and in total rejection of anti-ibuanyidanda mind-set ka sọ mụ di (that I many be alone). This anti-ibuanyidanda mindset is the same uche/obi akọlọ, uche aghụghọ or uche ka sọ mụ di (negative wisdom or intelligence, hegemonic or exclusivist type of mindset) that is at the foundation of a philosophy of essence; a mindset whose prerogative is to command, to dominate, to subjugate, to absolutise and to polarise. Actors attain the highest level of this transcendent complementary act of ima- onwe-onye (authentic self consciousness) in the realisation that consistent self-interest is anti-self-interest. Here, actor come to the full insight that excessive acts of selfishness is contradictory and always boomerang on the actor. This is what I refer to as “ontological boomerang effect” (Asouzu, Ibuanyidanda 391-400). This is the moment also the limited character of the super-maxim of “the nearer the better and the safer” is exposed and the validating character of principles and laws enhanced in our consciousness.

One can, therefore, say that in the act of ima-onwe-onye, the contradictions and paradoxes enshrined in the ambivalence of all human existential situations and intensified by ihe mkpuchi anya are presented to our consciousness very lucidly and the intricate consequences of the bipolar character of our instinct of self-preservation become equally very clear to the mind. Besides, actors start to understand better the impact of excessive selfishness, and all anti-social acts on the common good. These processes lead ultimately to the unmasking of the phenomenon of concealment or ihe mkpuchi anya such that actors start to see clearly and distinctly what is demanded and expected of them as rational creatures destined for higher levels of legitimisation. When this happens, we say that any actor acting in full self-consciousness as being-in-control (onye- ma-onwe-ya) and under the guidance of the transcendent categories of unity of consciousness can never err culpably.

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Dougherty, Kenneth. Metaphysics. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Being. Graymoor Press, New York, 1965.

Eze Emmanuel C. “In Search of Reason’s Traces” In: African Philosophy and the Hermeneutics of Culture. Essays in Honour of Theophilus Okere. Edited by J. Obi Oguejiofor and Godfrey Igwebuike Onah. Münster 2005.

Green, V. H. H. Renaissance and Reformation. A Survey of European History between 1450 and 1660. London 1965.

Heidegger, Martin. An Introduction to Metaphysics. Anchor Books Edition New York 1961.

Hirschberger, Johannes. Geschichte der Philosophie I, Freiburg, Basel Wien 1976.

Iroegbu, Pantaleon. Metaphysics. The Kpim of Philosophy. International Universities Press Ltd. Owerri 1995.

Jasper Karl. Einführung in die Philosopohie. Zürich 1953.

Joseph, H.W.B. An Introduction to Logic. Oxford 1931, 181-182

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Kagame, Alexis. La Philosophie Bantoue –Rwandaise de l’Être. Bruxelles, 1956

Kamlah Wilhelm. Philosophische Anthropologie. Sprachkritische Grundlegung und Ethik. Mannheim, Wien, Zürich, 1973.

Kamlah Wilhelm-Paul Lorenzen. Logische Propädeutik, Vorschule des vernünftigen Redens. Mannheim, Wien, Zürich, 1973.

Kraft, Victor. The Vienna Circle. The Origin of Neo-Positivism. New York 1953.

Nwala, Uzodinma T. “The Concept of Traditional African Philosophy”. In: African Philosophy and Pathology of Godhood and Traditionalism. An Interdisciplinary, International Journal of Concerned African Philosophers, Vol. 2, 2005.

Okere Theophilus. African Philosophy. A Historico-Hermeneutical Investigation of the Conditions of its Possibility. University Press of America 1983.

Pannenberg, Wolfhart. Anthropologie. Anthropologie in theorogischer Perspektive. Göttingen, 1983.

Ramose, Mogobe B. African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. Mond Books. Zimbabwe, 2002.

Ryan, Alan. “Is the Study of Society a Science?”, In: Society and the Social Sciences. Edited by David Potter. London 1981.

Sahakian, William. Outline-History of Philosophy. From the Earliest Times to the Present, Barnes and Noble. Inc. New York, 1969.

Sauter, Gerhard. „Der Wissenschaftsbegriff der Theologie“, in: Evangelische Theologie, 35. Jahrgang. Juli/August 1975.

Schwemmer, Oswald. Theorie der rationalen Erklärung. Zu den methodischen Grundlagen der

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Kulturwissenschafte.Munich 1976.

Solomon, Robert. Introducing Philosophy. New York 1989.

Stebbing, L.S. A Modern Introduction To Logic, Methuen, London 1933.

Stegmüller Wolfgang. Main Currents in Contemporary German, British and American Philosophy, D. Reidel Publishing, Dordrecht, Holland, 1969.

Tarnas, Richard. The Passion of the Western Mind. Understanding the Ideas That Have Shaped Our World View. Ballantine Books, New York, 1993.

Tempels, Placide. Bantu Philosophy. Presence Africaine, Paris 1959.

Van Steenberghen, Fernand. Ontology. Translated by Martin J. Flynn, Joseph F. Wagner, London 1952.

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CHAPTER TWENTY EIGHT

ANNANG PHILOSOPHY

Ephraim Stephen Essien

Abstract This essay develops, outlines, articulates and establishes the basic foundations of Annang Philosophy. Philosophy is an ensophism. As I ensophise, this essay is a part of my pioneering ensophisation on Annang world and reality: Annang weltanschaaung.

Introduction Annang people occupy the North-Western territory of Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, West Africa. The Annang society is located within the Cross River Basin between latitudes 40.25' and 70 North and longitudes 70.15' and 90.30' East (Messenger,1959:279). The North of Annang is bounded by lni and Ikono Local Government Areas in Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, and Ikot Abasi Local Government Area of Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria is her Southern neighbour. The West is bounded by Abia and Rivers States of Nigeria, while the East is bounded by Uyo and Mkpatenin Local Government Areas of Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria. Annangland has a level landscape covered by relatively low vegetation and myriads of palms. There is a mean annual rainfall of 2030- 2540mm. Annang country has a tropical climate with wet and dry seasons. The wet season spans between March and October when the monsoon winds blow from the South-West. The dry season spans between November and February when the harmattan (ekarika) blows from the North-East. Annang land is made up of 750 villages, with a population of about two million (2,000,000) people, distributed in eight (8) local government areas: Abak, Essien Udim, Etim Ekpo, Ika, Ikot Ekpene, Obot Akara, Oruk Anam and Ukanafun. These communities are brought together by a common cultural bond and they all look up to Afaha Obong as their cradle and origin and as their traditional headquarters, where the Annang supreme deity is situated. In this essay, I shall outline the basics of Annang philosophy and thought system. Annang ontology and metaphysical outlook, Annang notion of personal identity or human nature, Annang epistemology and logic, Annang legal repertoire, philosophy of law, and moral philosophy shall be the highlights of this propadeutic cultural analytic. In otherwords, I shall

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Summa Philosophica treat the following questions in this work: 1. The notion of being in Annang Philosophy; 2. The notion of reality in Annang Philosophy; 3. The notions of causality and causation in Annang Philosophy; 4. The notions of freedom, determinism and moral responsibility in Annang Philosophy; 5. The Annang conceptions of knowledge and truth; 6. Annang system of logic; 7. Annang conception of personal identity or the nature of the human being; and 8. Annang legal system and notions of justice and punishment. This essay shall bring the active past of the Annang to cause the present action: teasing out the Annang Philosophy.

ANNANG METAPHYSICS AS THE “ITAK” (BASE) OF ANNANG PHILOSOPHY Annang Philosophy and thought system may be preliminarily regarded as a reversal of the Aristotelian-Thomistic and medieval conception of “agere sequitur esse” (action follows being). It may rather be regarded as “esse sequitur agere” (being follows action), which connotes the existentialist theme of “existence precedes essence”. However, this conception would be dashed to the ground as the Annang believe also in antecedent causes of events priorly given. The Annang conceptions of uwa (fate) and abot (nature) return the reversal to Aristotelianism. Determinism, innatism, fatalism are strong beliefs in Annang thought system and philosophy. However, there is room for freewill and its expression in Annang thought and philosophy. It is then and in similar situations that esse sequitur agree (being follows action) comes into play. Annang metaphysics is an Annang phenomenology. This phenomenology is not a Husserlian ‘to the things themselves’ (zu den Sachen Selbst), yet it alludes to a Life-world (Lebens-welt): the Annang Life-World. It is the Annang weltanschuauung. ‘Tis Annang world; a wondrous world: sweet homes of courageous people; sweet homes of daring people; sweet homes of darling people; sweet homes and land of hospitable, united people. ‘Tis Annang World: Annangus Mundus! This Annang phenomenology departs from metaphysics to ‘physis’. And even so, when metaphysics condescends from the level of ens qua ens (being as being) to that of ens mobile (mobile being) it becomes the metaphysics of the existing thing. Something is. Man exists. Here is an Annang metaphysics of life and reality. In this metaphysics the notions of the Supreme Being and causality assume primacy in discourse. Annang Metaphysics shall refer to the meaning and understanding of being and reality in Annang worldview. It shall refer to God and to causality. But, most importantly, we shall address the notion of reality by answering the question: What is Reality in Annang?

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The Notion of Being in Annang Metaphysics ‘Being’ in Annang thought is not an empty concept but one with content. The notion of ‘being’ refers to ‘existence’ and ‘God’ as the ground of existence. In Annang Philosophy, being both refers to God as well as existence. The logic behind this Annang two-dimensional notion of being is, that ‘being’ as God is the cause of ‘being’ as existence. This explains why the notion of God is best understood as a causal principle in Annang Metaphysics. Any analysis of being often points to categories of being. In the case of Annang, the categories of being are fused with the hierarchy of being.

Category and Hierarchy of Being 1. “Awasi”: God 2. “Nnem” or “mme awasi”: Deities or gods 3. “Mme Ete-Ete”: Ancestors 4. “Ekpo”: Spirits 5. “Agwo”: Man 6. “Nkpo”: Things, Infra-human beings (plants, animals, inorganic matter).

Among the problems of metaphysics and philosophy in general, Annang Metaphysics connects, in the most part, with the problems of being, man and causality. God is being and is responsible for being (existence). This wraps up the problem of being in Annang Metaphysics. In Annang thought, there is no clear-cut distinction between God and nature. Though there is a distinctive name for God in Annang, Awasi, yet when it comes to causation, God shares the same name with nature, Abot. This gives a clue to God as the causal agent of the Annang Universe. In terms of this rapprochement in the Annang conception of causation, the Annang are not far from pantheism. This is quite understandable due to their deep sense of religion, where they see God every where, yet without a temple, which they believe would confine him. Hence the name “Awasi- Ibom”, the Unlimited/Infinite God. Annang metaphysics is a pantheistic ontology.

Annang Notion of Reality Reality in Annang conception is a synthesis of idealism and materialism. The Annang have a firm belief that there are two worlds: the physical world and the spiritual world. The physical world is the world of human beings, plants, animals and inorganic beings. The spiritual world is the realm of the

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Supreme Being (Awasi-Ibom), the gods (Nnem), Ancestors (Mme Ete-Ete), Spirits (Ekpo). It is believed that there is a very close link between these two worlds. While Awasi-Ibom is believed to be high up beyond the sky, his influence is only felt through the gods, who act on his behalf and who are closer to the people. Because of his unlimitedness, Awasi-Ibom has no shrine or temple, since this would confine him and so, contradict his nature: unlimitedness. There are, however, shrines for the gods, where sacrifices are offered to Awasi Ibom through them. The ancestors are believed to act as angels, protecting and interceding for their communities they left behind in the physical world. The spirits (ekpo) are believed to dwell in their abode, the spirit –world (awio ekpo). The spirits of those who died by violence and prematurely are believed to be roaming the physical world as ghosts and they are known as “ukpaka ekpo”. “Ukpaka Ekpo” are believed to roam the physical world due to their dissatisfaction and premature or violent deaths. Prayers are often offered for their satisfaction and appeasement. The spirits are generally believed to live in the land of the dead (awio ekpo), while the soul (ukpong) does not die after the dead of the body (ikpohidem), but survives in reincarnated bodies. This idea of threefold composition of the human person as Annang notion of personal identity will be given full expression under Annang philosophical anthropology and philosophy of mind. The Annang believe that there are two worlds: Physical and Spiritual. There is no antagonism between materialism and idealism in Annang reality. Annang notion of reality is a fusion of idealism and materialism. This fusion of idealism and materialism, the spiritual and physical could be found in the Annang formation of planes of existence.

Planes of Existence 1. “Ukpobot”, “Unarod”, “Arorobot”, “Ekondo” (Cosmos, where humans live) 2. “Awio Ekpo” (Land of the spirits) “Awio Eti-Ekpo” (Land of good spirits) “Awio Idiok-Ekpo” (Land of bad spirits: “ukpaka ekpo”) “Awio Ekpo Mme Ete-Ete” (Land of the ancestors) “Awio Ekpo Nnem” (World of the gods ) 3. “Awio Awasi” (God’s Realm)

Annang Cosmology The word, cosmology, was coined by Christian Wolff in 1730. It is derived from the Greek “cosmologia”, “cosmos” meaning “order” and “logos”

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Summa Philosophica meaning “word”, “reason”, “plan”, and “study”. Cosmology then is the study of the universe. Though the use of the word “cosmology” is recent, the study of the universe has a long history involving science, philosophy, esotericism, and religion. We may, therefore, have physical (scientific) cosmology (Essien: 2007), metaphysical (philosophical) cosmology, religious cosmology, and esoteric cosmology. In general cosmology is the study of (the origin of) the universe (Pasachoff 599). Philosophical cosmology, as distinguished from other cosmologies, deals with the world as the totality of space, time and all phenomena. Philosophical cosmology seeks to draw intuitive conclusions about the nature of the universe, man, god and their relationships based on the extension of some set of presumed facts borrowed from spiritual experience and/or observation. Philosophical cosmology addresses questions about the universe which are beyond the scope of science. Philosophical (metaphysical) cosmology addresses questions such as: what is the origin of the universe? What is its first cause? Is its existence necessary? What are the ultimate material components of the universe? Does the universe have a purpose? What is the ultimate reason for the existence of the universe? Besides, philosophical cosmology differs from religious, esoteric cosmologies in that it approaches these philosophical posits using philosophical methods (e.g. dialectics) and logical reasoning. Here, we are confronted with the problem of teasing out an Annang Cosmology as a subset of Annang Metaphysics: the “Itak” (base) of Annang Philosophy. And the central concept to be determined for preliminary analysis is the concept of “Abot”. “Abot” is the Annang term for “nature”. “Abot” also refers to God as the ground and cause of being. Before we proceed, let us see other conceptions of “abot” below.

“Abotic” Conceptions: “Abot” has many conceptions, nuances and variant meanings as follows: 1. “Abot” as Nature or Creation; 2. “Abot” as Life (Existence); 3. “Abot” as Destiny; 4. “Abot” as “Uwa” (Fate); 5. “Abot” as Condition; 6. “Abot” as Land; 7. “Abot” as Tragedy; 8. “Abot” as Time (and Space); 9. “Abot” as Nation;

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10. “Abot” as Cosmos, World, Universe (Arorobot, Unarod, Ukpobot, Ekondo); 11. “Abot” as Creator (God); We shall take advantage of the last “abotic” conception as creator and deal with the metaphysical theme of causality, named in this as work “Abot” ontology or “abotology”.

“Abot” Ontology or “Abotology” as Causality Causality is the disciplined discussion of the problem of the relation between cause and effect. Causality presupposes that every event has a cause. When one mentions the term ‘cause’ the correlative term ‘effect’ is generally involved. Cause is that which determines, provokes, influences an outcome which we call effect. A cause is that by which something (an effect) is produced. Aristotle developed the complete doctrine of causality. He distinguished four causes: material cause (the stuff with which a thing is composed), the formal cause (the form of shape that a thing takes), efficient cause (the agent responsible for bringing a thing into existence) the final cause (the end or purpose for which thing is made). In current times, the word ‘cause’ is restricted to the efficient cause. Discussions on the concept of causality after Aristotle are footnotes of his analysis. Causation is believed to be universal, uniform, and necessary. The statement, ‘every event has a cause” is taken to be of universal application since there is no event that has no cause. The universality of causation itself presupposes the uniformity of nature. This means that the same kinds of causes produce the same kinds of effects always and everywhere under the same conditions. A third concept associated with the concept of causation is the concept of ‘necessary connection”. It was believed that there was a necessary connection between an event and its cause or, in other words between a cause and its effect, such that once the cause is present its effect, such that once the cause is present its effect must necessarily follow. Hume rejects the concept of necessary connection between cause and its effect. Hume pointed out that we do not perceive any such necessary connection, that it is not part of our empirical experience. If we do not perceive causality in our empirical experience, how then do we come to form the idea in our minds? Hume says it is derived from our

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habit of associating things that usually to go together in sequence (Omoregbe, 1999:23-24). For Hume, necessary connection arises from a psychological compulsion. By and large, causality presupposes that every event has a cause. The question now is the question of how and of what relevance is the principle of causality to the Annang worldview. For the Annang, experience has shown that nothing happens without a cause. And this is attested to in the following Annang proverbs: 1. Amaakud nte akaan-anwaan afehe itok, ama ideghe ajejen abokko akpa, anye ade nkpo ike abokko asop (Whenever you see an old woman run, it is either she has lost her grandchild or that she has lost her snuff bottle); 2. Ikwood isitammake ugweme (The toad does not jump during the day-if nothing disturbs its abode); 3. Isideghe nkpo ideghe nkpo ade (It is never the case that nothing happens, yet something happens); 4. Akpekud nte akaan-adeen aben itok ubaghaasen, ama ideghe nkpo awine anye, anye de anye awine nkpo (If you see an old man run in the morning, it is either he is pursuing something, or he is being pursued by something); 5. Ukeed nkpo anyene ntoongo (Every thing has a beginning); 6. Ukeed nkpo anyone ntak (Everything has a cause). Whatever exists, in the Annang scheme of things, exists by the impulse of something external to it, except the uncaused cause which is ‘causa sui generis’. In this manner of causality, the active determining by the cause and the passive receptiveness in the effect are not temporary and transient. It is a question of permanent causal efficacy and permanent dependence in the effect. In the relation the effect has a dependence which is substantial and secundum esse (according or following being). In the causal series where the dependence of the effect is substantial and secundum esse, the being, the becoming and the intelligibility here and now depend upon the here and now present causal efficacy. The Annang are naturally inclined to the principle of causality. The Annang go out to find out the ntakness (why) or the nseness (whatness) of events, especially when confronted by tragedies. ‘Abot’ (nature) is mostly used to refer to ‘Awasi-Ibom’ (the supreme being). For the Annangs, ‘Abot’ as ‘Awasi-Ibom’ is regarded as the originator of every “there is”. The causal action is inaugurated by Abot. However, there is also the causality of secondary casues. Hence, the Annang notion of ‘Awasi-Ibom’ as ‘causa efficiens’ and the divinities and principalities, which also form part of ‘abot’ cosmology.

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Ancient Annang wisdom and tradition (Eched Annang) held it that every thing has a cause (ukeed nkpo anyene ntak) and everything has a beginning; that the world or universe had a begining (arorobod anyene ntongo). The universe is believed to be the creative act of God in Annang, as we presented above under Annang cosmogony. The Annang notion of Awasi-Ibom coincides with the notion of the apeiron, the Indeterminate Boundless by Anaximander, the Greek philosopher. This is due to the concept of Ibom associated with this being. Ibom translates infinity, boundlessness. It is the Annang belief that the universe had its orgin from a divine supreme being who was self-begotten, Awasi-Ibom. He created Anyong (the sky) and Isong (the earth) and Inyang-Ibom (ocean). The details of this first creative act are not exactly known. Both Anyong (sky) and Isong (earth) existed in the heavens while water was below. Tradition has it that Anyong (sky) and Isong (earth) were joined together. Awasi-Ibom sent one of his creatures whose name is not mentioned to separate Anyong from Isong. This creature had a human form but as a giant: about seven times the size of a normal human being that we know of today. The giant came with a tool and separated Anyong from Isong. And since that time, Anyong (sky) and Isong (earth) have been at constant enmity. Whenever Anyong (sky) covers Isong (earth) we have day and whenever Isong (earth) covers Anyong (sky) we have night. Awasi- Ibom ordered Anyong and its children (the heavenly bodies: sun, moon, stars, etc) to move upward while earth was ordered to more downward. While moving downward, earth (Isong) fell into massive water, the ocean (Akpa Ibom, the Annang name for the Atlantic Ocean). A section of it was submerged in the water and the portion that floated became the dry land. The giant went to bathe in the water after he had completed his work. He got drowned and died in the water. The particles of the decayed body of the giant, tradition holds, gave birth to the living animals and plants in both land and water. His teeth which were washed ashore germinated into many plants, shrubs and grasses. His bones became the rocks; his breath became the air and the wind. The insects which stuck to the decaying head (after having been washed ashore) grew up to become the land animals. A certain animal “Ukpong-ajen” (wall gecko), which literally means “ soul of the child”, was seen licking the dust of the remains ( head) of the dead giant. Awasi-Ibom instructed Awasi-Isong to make a pot from a mixture of sand and water and put Ukpon-ajen (wall gecko) in there for eight days. Awasi-Ibom then sent “akuwe” (chameleon) to spy and monitor if Awasi- Isong had carried out the orders, without allowing anyone to see him. Akuwe (chameleon), unseen by Awasi-Isong, inspected the work of Awasi-

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Isong and reported to Awasi-Ibom that the job had been done. On the eight day, Awasi-Ibom came and spat into the pot, and in the company of Awasi- Isong, broke the pot open. Suddenly, two hitherto unknown beings (male and female) emerged from the pot. Awasi-Isong asked the male being with a thunderous voice “ade anyie?” (who are you?), to which he answered with a small voice “nde agwo” ( I am a human being). Awasi-Ibom thundered” Agwo, du uwem” (human being keep on living!). The above is the creative act of the universe by the Supreme Being in Annang cosmogony. While cosmogony refers to the creative act or creation story of the universe, cosmology refers to the study of the origin, nature and destiny of the universe. Annang cosmogony forms a central part of the Annang cosmology. For the Annang, therefore, the universe has its efficient cause in the supreme creative act of the Supreme Being, Awasi- Ibom. “Awasi Ibom” is so named to underscore his unlimitedness. Enang (1979:5) says: ‘Ibom’ means the whole limitless universe. Here accordingly, he is the Lord of the whole boundless universe and everything within it. Awasi-Ibom is ubiquitous, and, and because of this, no particular temple, place or shrine can accommodate him. He, therefore, needs no temple nor shrine since he can neither be localized nor spatialized. He transcends space and time continuum. The temple is, therefore, non-existent in the Annang religion. As the Awasi-Ibom is unlimited, so are his powers. Our own observation and experience in the Annang religion seem to disprove the view in the phenomenology of religion that the Supreme Being, Awasi- Ibom, is a withdrawn God, the so-called deus-otiosus. Awasi Ibom or Abot is the creator, the creator of the divinities, humans, animals, plants and other existents in the world. Awasi Ibom comes first in the hierarchy of existence. A multitude of spirits or gods is believed to assist Awasi Ibom in governing the universe. They do not co-create, but they co-govern. They are co-workers with Awasi Ibom, and are believed to take charge of specific aspects of life. These deities are, thus, named after the areas in which they are in charge. They carry out their functions according to their capacity. According to their order of importance, ‘Awasi Anyong’ (god of the sky) and ‘Awasi Isong’ (god of the earth) are nearer to Awasi Ibom than other deities. When libations are poured at public functions in Annang land, invocations are made to ‘Awasi Anyong’ and ‘Awasi Isong’. Awasi Anyong takes charge of the affairs of the ethereal region while Awasi Isong is concerned with the happenings on earth.

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At the head of all the deities are “Eka Awasi (mother goddess) and “Eka nnem” (mother of the deities). These two are believed to exert control over lesser deities. For sake of brevity, I shall, at this point, devise a tabular arrangement to show the names of the deities, their abodes and functions.

Name Approximate Abode Function English equivalent Awasi Sky god The sky In charge of Anyong the ethereal region Awasi Earth god The earth In charge of Isong the earth Eka Awasi Earth The earth Responsible goddess for female fertility Eka nnem Head of The earth Protection of divinity other deities Nnem god of the Road corners Protection of usung road the roads Ekpenyong god of the The wood Protecting the wood woods Ikpa isong god of the Village squares Protection of village the villages Nnem utin god of the The sun Responsible sun for sun light Nnem god of the Compound entrance Protection of idung home the home Mmiam deities of truth Compound entrance Responsible for truth and justice Idio inwang goddess of The farm Responsible farm for good harvest Nnem iman god of the Clan headquarters Protection of clan the clan Nnem akai god of the The forest Protection of forest the forest Abot god of fertility Road corners Responsible

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for reproduction Nnem goddess of Seas,rivers,streams,spring In charge of mmong water water bodies Mbama god of first Village square Responsible harvest for first harvest Esien reincarnation The forest In charge of emana deity reincarnation Nnem erim god of the The atmosphere In charge of rain rain

(cf. Enang, Salvation in a Nigerian Background, 1979).

The gods have different function put at their charge. Those with religious obligations are in charge of the religious activities of the clan, village, or home. Their ministers are the religious practitioners who make offerings on behalf of the people. They transmit the prayers and intentions of the people to the gods. Some of the gods fulfil social roles by fostering reproduction, health, long life and protection of the families. In the economic sphere, it is believed that the various ‘nnem’ help in successful growth of crops on the field and good harvest. Those with political portfolio help in the proper functioning of the village, clan or town. They aid the villages at war and support the chiefs in their political roles. Although, people, for convenience in sacrifice, locate the divinities at special abodes, their homes are porous through and through, so that the divinities could be said to be everywhere. They are personal as well as non-personal. Therefore, despite their invisibility, they are most frequently approached in personal and social needs.

ANNANG PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND Here, I shall be concerned with the Annang philosophy of man, which I named elsewhere (Essien 2010) as “Agwo Ontology”. “Agwo Ontology” contains the Annang notion of the human person. It is the Annang conception of personal identity. “Agwo Ontology” is rooted in the problems of human nature, the human identity as well as the big-time problem of mind-body dualism. “Agwo ontology” is a crucial attempt to identify these philosophical problems in the Annang intellectual thought and tradition. This section addresses the notion of man within a grand metaphysical matrix. A ‘psychsomaticism’ describes the hitherto

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Agwo Ontology: Annang notion of Personal Identity Agwo is the Annang name for man, just like the Greek anthropos, the Latin homo, the Akan nippa, the Igbo mmadu. Agwo onotology refers to the Annang onotology of man or the human person. Agwo ontology is metaphysics of man in Annang worldview. Agwo ontology is a clue to the nature of man as understood by the Annang people in general, and on the nature of the Annang man in particular.

Nside agwo? (What is man?) In order for anything to pass as man, such must, prima facie, possess the five senses, and rationality. Man, for the Annang, is a living animal of the primate kingdom, which possesses the body, five senses, effective brain for reasoning, who walks on two legs, and also capable of communicating through a language. The body and the senses alone do not make a man, but body and senses and reason do. Animals possess body and senses just as man does. The inalienable preamble in the description of man, then, is rationality. This corresponds with the definition of man by Boethius, who said that ‘man is an individual substance with a rational nature’. The Annang man believes that the seat of rationality is in the brain. Hence, the man who behaves reasonably is often described as anyene mfuro agwo, that is, one who has brain. The question, Nside agwo? (what is man?), is a question of metaphysics (ontology), though not in the same degree as the question of being (seinsfrage). Issues in philosophical anthropology and philosophy of mind are found in metaphysics. When metaphysics, from its glorified position of ens qua ens (being as being) condescends to the level of ens mobile, (mobile being), it becomes the metaphysics of the existing thing, aliquid est (something is). Parmenides posited the question, what is there? and Aristotle responded that aliquid est (something is). Aristotle, thus, made first philosophy the metaphysics of the existing thing. Perplexed by the seinsvergessenheit (forgetfulness of being), Heidegger reposited the question which had earlier been posited by the doctor of monadology,

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Leibnitz. Hence, why are there essents rather than nothing? (Heidegger, 1985). In attempting to concretize his metaphysics, Heidegger made man the subject of his inquiry. In the triangular relationship of being (Sein, Dasein, des Seiendes), man’s ontological role is to ask the question, ‘what is being?’ Hence, the question, Nside agwo? - what is man? Although an answer to the question of the meaning of man in Annang worldview has been attempted above, there is an urgency to proceed deeper into the ontological structures, nay, ontic-ontological structures of man as understood by the Annangs. Based on his traditional worldview, the Annang conception of the nature of man is three-dimensional. Western orthodoxy submits that man is psychosomatic, that is, two-dimensional. This is because, according to this psychosomaticism, man is composed of body (soma) and soul (psyche). The Annang man (agwo Annang) believes that he poseses a spirit (pneuma), as a third composition of the self. Thus, man, in Annang conception, possesses body, soul and spirit. I referred elsewhere to this credo as psychsomapneumatism (Essien:2010). The Annang conception of the ontological structure of the human person, psychsomapneumatism, vitiates, or rather overcomes this dualism of psychosomatism (Essien:2010). In the traditional Annang milieu, man is composed of body,soul (mind) and spirit. The soul and spirit are suprasensible, while the body is sensible. The Annang believe that, while the body is the palpable substance in the human person, the soul, after death, does not die, but keeps living in reincarnated bodies; that the spirit survives in the land of the dead, the abode of the ancestors. The abode of the ancestors is the land of the spirits, designated awio-ekpo in Annang language. Annang conception of personal identity, agwo ontology, is, a fortiori, founded on this psychosomapenumatism. Man is a composite of body, soul and spirit. Psychosomapneumatism vitiates a mere dualism in psychosomatism and proceeds further to entrench the doctrine of immortality of the soul. The soul is immortal. It does not die. It is the belief in Annang that the soul survives in reincarnated bodies.

Categories of Agwo (Man/Human Person) in Annang I had already mentioned above that agwo means man in Annang. This is man in the generic sense of the world. Below is how agwo is categorized in Annang: Agwodeen = male person (man); Agwo nwaan= female person (woman); Ideen= men; Ibaan= women;

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Ajen= child; Nsek Ajen= baby or infant; Ntok Ajen= children; Ikpo Agwo= Elders; Imo Agwo= Rich, wealty person; Ugwuene= Poor person; Utu= wretched person; Afoon agwo= ordinary person; Eti agwo= good person; Idiok agwo= bad person; Agwo Ilien= Real person; Agwodeen Itiaba=Complete/perfect man

Agwoodeen itiaba refers to the man who has attained the plenitude of his manhood. Itiaba is the Annang name for seven. And the number seven is a symbol of completeness or perfection in Annang thought and tradition. Nevertheless, Annang culture has no place for the celibate or eunuch. Even the Annang traditional priest or priestess must get married. He or she is considered a failure if he or she has no stable family and home and would be seen as someone who attempts to escape life’s reality and social responsibilities. The successful Annangman must maintain a stable family. The just man is one who has concern for his fellow human beings. He has concern for his neighbours and his neighbours’ property. He welcomes and accommodates a stranger, even to a fault. The just one venerates his ancestors and the supreme being, designated Awasi Ibom. Moreover, the just man gets involved in communal work and attends public meetings and gatherings aimed at sustaining communal peace. For the Annangman, ‘to exist is co-exist’, since the Annang believe strongly in togetherness (eriwuana or mboho). Hence they say “mboho ade aruru” (togetherness is strength).

The Annang Concept of Free Will The Annang uphold the belief that the human person is free. And this freedom is often expressed in his daily life. The notion of freedom in Annang conception implies that the human person can acquire and accomplish his desired goals in life without external pressures on his will. It is believed, too, that the human person is responsible for his failures or misfortunes in life. For whatever actions a person chooses, he bears responsibility for them. This is especially made evident in the proverb, “aduok ntong ke ntong akene”, meaning “The ashes follow the one who

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Annang Concept of “Uwa” as Fate and “Abot” Destiny Every human person is believed to be born with a destiny, carried by his or her soul at birth. This destiny determines a person’s life style in the world. In other words, human actions in the society are believed to have been preconditioned by nature. The joys and sorrows, happiness and sufferings, successes and triumphs, misfortunes and failures, are all believed to have been determined and programmed before one’s birth. While destiny may be understood as referring to both the pleasant and the unpleasant aspects of one’s life, fate, in particular, is believed to refer to the bitter part of one’s life. While Fate is denoted “Uwa”, destiny is denoted “Abot”. However, we must bear in mind that “Abot” means more than destiny, as we enunciated above under “Abotic Conceptions”.

The Annang Notion of Moral Responsibility As a matter of fact, destiny (abot) and fate (uwa), and the belief in them impinge on the notion of freedom. Any belief in absolute determinism or absolute freedom would make it difficult to assign moral responsibility. Total freewill would make every person to take all the responsibilities for his actions. On the otherhand, total determinism would exonerate every person from any moral responsibility. The Annang believe in the interpenetration of these two factors in human affairs. For example, when one is befallen with sickness, one assumes the duty of care for himself or herself, mostly, by going into the bush to fetch some herbs as medicine.

ANNANG EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGICAL REASONING

Annang Epistemology Epistemology is that branch of philosophy concerned with human knowledge (Ifiok): whether it is possible, how it is acquired, how it is justified, its limits, and how it is distint from mere belief, etc. This branch of philosophy is sometimes referred to as theory of knowledge. Knowledge (Ifiok), for the Annang, entails belief (Erinim ke akpaniko) and information (Mmuk). This belief might not necessarily undergo justification, for who may be able to justify acclaimed messages from the gods? Knowledge is true belief in Annang conception. Given their conception of knowledge, Truth (Akpaniko) refers to correlation with the state of affairs. The concept “Akpaniko” is a composite

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Summa Philosophica term; composing “akpan”, which, in this context, translates “most significant”, or “real”, or “principal”, or “paramount”, and the term “iko”, which means “word”. Truth (Akpaniko) in Annang Epistemology is thus associated with “Word”. Truth in Annang Epistemology involves saying what there is; sayings about the real thing. “Akpaniko” as truth means the “real word” in Annang Epistemology. Thus, truth-telling entails saying the real thing. It involves saying about the reality in context and shunning falsehood. Even when the speaker is not telling the truth, he or she already knows the truth. Hence, the liar knows the truth. Words can be spoken or unspoken. Sometimes, words can assume the mode of action and signs. Most often than not, justification of truth in Annang Epistemology takes the forms of testimonies and witnessing, which can be in spoken words. At other times, the words are unspoken, but determinable in actions. Sometimes, truth has to be determined through the practices of ordeal (ukang) and divination (nkukud); and these are firmly adhered to in Annang. Annang conceptions of knowledge (ifiok) and truth (akpaniko) are inextricably linked with the belief system and tradition in vogue in the society. While the senses are believed to serve as a channel of information, the Annang have strong belief, too, that knowledge comes through revelation and intuition. Revealed truth is believed to come from the spiritual realm to the physical realm. The Annang believe also in intuition. Beside the senses, revelation and intuition, the Annang also have belief that knowledge or traits of knowledge can be naturally passed from parents to children. This is a belief in innatism, which is associated with rationalism. The Annang tradition, therefore, has no peculiar place for a single source of human knowledge. There is interplay of empiricism, revelation, intuition and rationalism in Annang epistemology. The Annang crave for knowledge, for ‘all men, by nature, desire to know’ (Aristotle, Metaphysics). The wise man is basically the man who surmounts his problems and those of others by the application of his knowledge, knowledge gained from experience and reason. The wise one of the Annang nation utters words of wisdom and admonishes his/her fellows. It is through his/her mouth that oral history, folklore and myths are transmitted to others. At public gathering, he/she makes recourse to the wisdom of the ancients. In his/her awakening speech, he/she begins with “our fathers used to say”(Mme Ete ajid ekese ewo); and when rendering a folklore, his/her point of departure is “once upon a time” (Ete/Mma/Agwo keed aketie or Ekong Nke –e!). In story-telling, the story-teller would entone: “Ekong Nke-e!” (War story!); and the listeners would respond: “Nke Ekong Awasi!” (War story of

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God!). The story-teller could also entone: “Ete/Mma/Agwo keed aketie!” (Once upon a man/woman/person!); and the listeners would respond: “Aketie rie”? (How was he/she?). Sometimes the stories involved some animals, mostly the lion, the tortoise and the monkey (see Udondata: 2011), where the story-teller could entone: “Ikud mme Ekpe/Ebok eketie!” (There were once the tortoise and the lion/monkey); to which the listeners would respond with loud acclamation: “Eketie rie?” (How were they?). Hence, Michael Ekpenyong (2002) narrates: I recalled with nostalgic feelings the story-telling sessions in the evenings when we returned from school and our parents returned from the farms. After dinner our grandfather and other elders of the family told the stories while we the children got glued to the bamboo benches listening to intoxicating stories sometimes of epic world…. intoned to begin the stories. We would respond with deafening shouts “Nke Ekong Abasi” (story war of God). Hence, “the effectiveness of folklore as didactic method rests in the power of the word which is the vehicle of the great deeds of the ancestors” (Abanuka, 1994:45). The community invests the word with sacred authority such that in so far as it is true the word has not only the power and stamp of the ancestors but also that of divinity (Anyanwu, 1984:92). The wise one, while rendering oral history, folklore and myths makes the “once upon a time”, “in those days” or “our father used to say” to become “now”.

Logical Reasoning in Annang Thought Causality in Annang society gives no room for any belief in chance. A greater significance of causality for the Annang man is that it paves way for scientific knowledge, that is, knowledge of things through their causes (scientia rerum per ultima causa). The Annang have the ability to solve some of their existential problems, since they have knowledge of the causes of things, events and situations. For example, they have knowledge of causes of certain kinds of diseases. They build up causal arguments using their knowledge of the causes and causal arguments using their knowledge of possible cures for the diseases. A causal argument attempts to support a causal claim or hypothesis. A causal claim says or implies that one thing caused or causes another. A causal hypothesis is a causal claim put forth to explain the cause or effect of something, when the cause or effect has not yet been conclusively established. Frequently the Annang reason that one specific

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Summa Philosophica event caused another specific event. At other times, they believe that whenever a certain event occurs, that another always follows. We remember that the premises of an inductive argument are not offered as definitive evidence for the truth of their conclusion, but rather as evidence for the likelihood of the conclusion’s truth. Inductive arguments can fall anywhere on the scale from very strong to very weak. An inductive arguments premise can give powerful support for its conclusion, no support at all or anything in between. In an inductive generalization, we generalize from a sample to an entire class. We reason that, because many (or most or all or some percentage) of a sample of the members of a class or “population” have a certain property or characteristic, many (or most or all or some percentage) of the members of the class or population also have that property or characteristic. We also remember that deductive arguments begin with general claims and end with specific claims. Both the deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning are involved in the day to day lives of the Annang. We remember that Logic is not anything cultural to the extent of its being associated with a certain culture to the exclusion of others. It works according to the structure of the human mind. Thus, there is no culturalization of Logic in the strict sense of the word, save there is a fragmented culturalization of the mind.

ANNANG JURISPRUDENCE, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM Every human society is ordered by law. In otherwords, law is the foundation upon which every society is guided and brought to its purposed end. Although there are no documented instruments of law in traditional Annang society, the Annang person is aware that his or her society is sustained by laws transmitted by the elders and, say, the ancestors. With this in mind, the Annang person is self-conscious of the rewards or punishments accruing from his disposition towards the law. This law is the community norms which regulate the lives of members of the community. For instance, in the Annang society, respect for elders is a supreme virtue. Annang legal system and jurisprudence were discerned from the native customs and traditions of the society. The laws which emanated from these customs and traditions could not but bear the cultural code, stamp, seal and imprint of the society. The Annang native laws and customs spelt out duties and obligations, prohibitions and sanctions. As it were, Annang legal system, jurisprudence and philosophy of law could be categorized into the following: 1. Customs referred to as Eru-unam-mkpo;

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2. Laws referred to as Mbed; 3. Duties and Obligations collectively referred to as Utom; 4. Taboos referred to as Ibed; 5. Etiquette and Manner collectively referred to as Iro.

This categorization is typical of Udondata and Ekanem (2011).

Eru-unam-mkpo (Customs) involed the ways of doing things in the society. These were the customs and traditions obtainable in the land. They were believed to have originated from distant past and transmitted to the present through the ancestors. Due to their origin from the ancestors, they were observed with some sense of sacredness and were mostly followed with rituals. Eru-unam-mkpo guided performance of events in the society, such as birth and naming, death and burial, marriages, festivals, etc. Mbed (Laws) were specific rules and regulations in the Annang society. They also entailed prohibitions, alongside rules and regulations. Some of these specific rules were: Land tenure, whereby lands were expected to be kept fallow for seven years before they were ripe for farming; Village pathways had to be swept weekly, etc. Moreover, the village council would place intermittent injunctions restraining villagers from harvesting the palm fruits. This rule (ugwuok ajop) was so made to permit the village council to harvest the palm fruits, sell them and use the money for village projects. After the village council would have completed its duty, the villagers were permitted again to harvest their fruits. The day this injunction was lifted, called ugwuoko ajop, villagers were permitted to harvest from any palm oil tree, be it their own or not. After this day, title of ownership of the palm oil trees went back to their original owners. Utom (Duties and Obligations) referred to duties and obligations. There were duties to the community, duty to one’s family, children, grandchildren, parents, grandparents, wives, husband, father, mother, elders, strangers, friends and in-laws. Communal work, such as, sweeping of the village pathways, building of the village hall, etc, also fell within the purview of utom. Iro (Manners and Etiquette) entailed manners and etiquette which went beyond the self to how one comported himself or herself becomingly in public. A youth was always not expected to be first greeted by an elderly person, but rather, he or she was expected to greet the elder first. A youth was expected to extend two hands while having handshake with an elderly person. A youth was not expected to request handshake from an elderly person by being the first to extend his or her arms. A youth was not expected to give response to any advice given by an elderly person, for the

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Annang say “ese ekokop item, agwo isi iboroke” (Advice is listened to, but not responded to). Moreover, a youth was not expected to drink the drakes of palm wine in the presence if his elders. Litigants in disputes were expected to avoid unguarded remarks, as contraventions could incur special fines. Even though some unusual behaviours which contravened standards of good manners did not attract penalties, they were duly condemnable and frowned at. Examples are, whenever a recipient did not thank the donor; when a girl climed the tree; when a child insolently responded to the parents’ rebuke, etc. Ibed (Taboos) were associated with rituals and were thus held in absolute sacredness and sanctity. Contraventions brought undesirable material consequences to the offender and the community. Rituals were often performed to expiate and propitiate the evil committed. Some days were set aside and held to be sacred. For example, No woman was expected to fetch from the community stream on Ared market day (Usen Urua Ared). No one was expected to offend his grandchild or grandchildren (Ajejen or Nto Ajejen), his or her grandparents (Etebom and/or Ekam), his inlaws (Ukod). A woman is prohibited from having sexual intercourse with another man other than her husband. Contravention of this injunction attracts the dead of the husband, who is believed to be killed by the wife through the evil minstrels of eros called Ekpo Nka Agwo. This is not a general rule, as this rule operates contrariwise in some Annang communities. Be it as it may, this law appears to be an unjust law as the punishment for the offence does not devolve on the offender, but on another person. This contradicts the Annang belief in retribution and the belief that “the ashes follow its thrower” (Aduok ntong ke nton akene).

Annang Conception of Human Rights In the Annang society, each person is prohibited from being malicious against some groups of people, namely: one’s grandchildren, one’s grandparents and one’s inlaws. One is also bound to be hosptitable to the stranger. Although there are no clear formulations and recognition of rights in traditional African societies, we are left to link the African traditional conception of human rights with contemporary formulation of human rights (Essien: 2008). The Africans have a deep sense of human rights. These are rights such as rights of inheritance and succession, right to work, right to found a domestic society (right to marriage), right to respect and reputation, freedom of thought, speech and beliefs, freedom of association, right to education, right to property, right to life, et cetera. Let us look at each of these rights in the context of the Annang Society.

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Within this Annang weltanschaaung, the Annang people and society believe in the spirituality or sacredness of life and consider it as a primary value. However, some activities which were in vogue in uncivilized Annang society could contradict that life is primary in Annang society. Such activities were the killing of twins, which Mary Slessor fought to put an end to; and human sacrifice. Like in most African traditional societies lives were sacrificed at the burial of village or clans dignitaries. Most of the victims were captives at inter-tribal vendettas. With these in mind, would one be justified to say that life was held sacred in African traditional society and the Annang society in particular? These heinous crimes against life have, however, changed in modern Annang, possibly due to Christianity.

The Right to Life Apart from the cannibalistic, fetish and barbarous Annang of pre- Christian Africa, the authentic Annang society believes in the primacy of life. This is attested to in the adage: “uwem adi imo” (life is wealth); “itong ama adu uwem akongo nkwa” (when the neck lives it shall wear beads), “uwem/ajen akan inyene” (life/child is greater than riches), and so on. The Annang go extra mile to preserve the sanctity of life. They believe that we live our lives in trust. Thus a suicide is not given any befitting burial in Annang land since he or she is believed to infringe on the sacredness of life (Essien: 2008). Such is thrown into the forest. Even when they lose any member (except a suicide) the Annang exert much time and energy to give befitting burial, since they believe in reincarnation and the spirit-world. Their beliefs in reincarnation and also in the land of the spirit, the spirit-world, manifest a tripartite structure of human personality in Annang world view. The human person is composed of body, soul and spirit. At the death of the body, the soul enters into the cycle of reincarnation while the spirit goes to the land of the spirits, designated “awio-ekpo”. The spirit lives in the spirit- world depending on whether the person was virtuous. If he or she was not virtuous, his or her spirit is believed to roam the world. Thus, that is why they are believed to appear as ghosts. This tri-partite conception of human nature in Annang society vitiates psychosomaticism and establishes a psychosomapneumaticism (the idea that soul, body and spirit make up the human person). The Annang child is taught that it is wrong to kill since life is sacred.

Right of Inheritance and Succession The right of inheritance of property at the death of a man devolves on his sons. Among others, the eldest son (Akpan) benefits more than other sons. He inherits, by traditional belief, the father’s buildings or

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Right to Work The Annang society believes that success depends upon hardwork. Everyone within this society has right to work and to the fruits of his or her work. This right is correlative of the duty to work. There is a duty to communal work, such as the duty of keeping the village square and path ways clean. The Annang have a saying whch underscores their tenacity towards diligence and hardwork. It says: “Ifu idiagha nnien; una ubok-utom ifippe mfi”, that is “The lazy cannot eat balanced diet; the jobless cannot eat periwinkle”.

Right to Found a Domestic Society Without being told the Annang man or woman considers the right to found a domestic community a natural right. Thus he or she presumes his freedom to marry and establish a home. There is no place for celibacy in the Annang society. The successful Annang man or woman is measured in his or her ability to found a stable home. This is also part of his social responsibility and duty.

Freedom of Association In traditional African societies there is a right to associate freely with one’s own kins within an extended family, a right to associate with people outside the extended family, a right also to inter-tribal association in marriage. This right is limited in certain communities in Igbo land. There is the practice of a caste system, the “Osu”caste system. The Osu are believed to attend to certain idols and thus were seen and treated as holy sect, and due to their closeness and consequent “sacredness”, they are not related with normally. These groups of people are treated as inferior to other human beings, and as such there is no deliberate intermarriage with them. In traditional Annang society, only male initiates have the right to belong to the “Ekpo” masquerade cult. Those who have not been initiated, some males and all women are not altogether free to move about in the society during the “Ekpo” masquerade festival. At the climax of this festival, called “Ndok Ekpo”, women are not free at all to be seen outside their homes. This is usually the last week of the tenth month of the year, October. This restricts their freedom of movement.

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Right to Respect, Reputation and Freedom of Speech In view of the right to respect, the Annang give a special place to the elders and elderly. The elders, because of their experience in life, are believed to be wise. Through their mouths oral history, folklore and myths are transmitted to others. In the gathering of the people, the elder makes recourse to the wisdom of the ancients. In his awakening speech he begins with “our fathers used to say,” and when rendering a folkfore, his point of departure is “once upon a time”. The wise one while rendering oral history, folklore and myths makes the “once upon a time”, “in those days” or “our fathers used to say” become “now”. Recourse to wise sayings serves didactic purposes. Such ideal elders are cultically venerated after their death because they are believed to belong to the spiritual community of ancestors. Besides these elders, every elderly person has a right to be respected by the younger one. There is duty to respect one’s parents and elders. The Annang man or woman believes he or she has a right to a good name. This is attested to by the fact that, if he or she is blackmailed, he or she seeks redress by reporting such a case to the council of elders, be it at the family level or village level. Freedom of speech and expression is conditioned by the principle of respect. One is bound to respect one’s parents and elders in the Annang society, despite your interior conviction that you are free to speak and express your views. There are, in summary, derogations from human rights. Much emphasis is placed on collective rights than on individual rights, and duty seems to overwhelm rights in most Annang society.

Dispute Settlement, Punishment, Justice and Court System in Annang Whenever, his or rights were infringed, or whenever he or she had a case, the Annang person most often sought justice by resorting to the lineage or village council depending on the where the other litigant came from. If the parties came from the same lineage, the lineage (lineage) council would be the court of jurisdiction; if the parties to the case came from different lineages, the village council would assume jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, cases involving litigants from different villages were entertained by the clan court, which was empanelled with the village heads and ordained traditional priests called “Akuku” (the plural version of Akuku) . The court hierarchy rose from the lower to the higher. This started from the family council, to the lineage council, to the village, and to the clan

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1. Oath (Mmiam); 2. Divination (Iyong); 3. Ordeal (Ukang).

Mmiam (Oath) Mmiam was the god of justice. Recourse to mmiam decided the case and settled the disputes, since there was strong sense of belief in its efficacy, and there was no appeal available. A period of time was always given for the effect of mmiam after it had been sworn to. The oath taker was expected to suffer some affliction, mostly death, during this period. If he or she died or suffered the required affliction, he or she was deemed to have been guilty, and his or her affliction would have to be expiated per rituals. If neither affliction nor death visited him or her, he or she would be publicly declared innocent before the entire community.

Iyong (Divination) Iyong was the process and method of inquiring the will of the gods by the diviner (awia iyong). The awia iyong possessed expert powers to invoke the spirits or the gods. He would shake the rattle (ekpuud), make incantations, and cast some objects (mostly bones, pebbles, nuts, teeth or fangs of some powerful animals like cat, snake, dog, centipede, i.e., mbamba ) on the ground. Sometimes, he would gaze into some water in a bottle or in a white basin. It was believed that the gods or ancestral spirits communicated the truth through him. The operative techniques and process of Iyong was closely associated and similar to nkukud (oracle) and use-mkpo (foretelling). While iyong as a means of justice dealt with the present, it, however, delved into distant past and also looked in to the future.

Ukang (Ordeals) Ukang was primarily instituted to detect and punish offenders. It, however, operated within the realm of the magical and the mysterious. It was supernatural with physical and material effects. John Bosco Ekanem and Joseph Udondata (2011) outlined the different types of ukang in their work . These are:

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1. Ukang Ujo Aran (Ordeal of the boiling oil); 2. Ukang Ntuen-Ibok (Ordeal of the Alligator Pepper); 3. Ukang Akook Ukod (Ordeal of the Bamboo); 4. Ukang Ikpa Unam (Ordeal of the Leather); 5. Ukang Akpe Ajop (Ordeal of Oil Palm-Fruit Fibre); 6. Ukang Ndaam (Ordeal of the Raffia).

Ukang Ujo Aran (Ordeal of the Boiling Oil) In this ordeal, the ordeal specialist (awia ukang) would boil oil and would ask the suspects to dip their hands into the boiling oil. If the oil burnt the suspect, he or she was declared guilty. If it did not burn the suspect, he or she was declared innocent. Naturally, hot oil should burn the hand of the suspect. Here was a case where the awia ukang could tap into the invisible and supernatural resource of aruru and control nature by magic. Thus, the innocent would not be harmed, in this and other ordeals.

Ukang Ntuen-Ibok (Ordeal of the Alligator Pepper) After the people would have assembled, alligator pepper (ntuen-ibok) would be grinded to a powdery state and emptied into a container by the awia ukang. He would use his magical powers and order the pepper to get into the eyes of the guilty. Whoever was guilty would be detected by visible signs, which was immediate scratching of the eyes and some shouts of pains.

Ukang Akook Ukod (Ordeal of the Bamboo) Awia ukang would tie a live cock to the tip of bamboo obtained from ifiaku ukod (specie of palm-wine tree); invite seven young men (mkparawa itiaba) to carry the bamboo. After some incantations by awia ukang, invisible forces would empossess these young men and they would start running uncontrollably by themselves, but controlled by the unseen powers, until these powers directed them to the house of the culprit. Some problems with this ordeal are: a) what if the house was inhabited by many people, which was often the case, or if the culprit was no more living there, and the house inhabited by another or other persons? A ready answer to this problem was to arraign the occupants of the house before some other type of ordeal, or detect the culprit through divination, iyong. Oath-taking (Mmiam) would prolong detection of the culprit, however.

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Ukang Ikpa Unam (Ordeal of the Leather) In ukang ikpa unam, Awia Ukang directed the suspects to take turns and sit on a leather mat spread on the ground. The leather got stuck to the buttocks of the guilty person. Could the awia ukang take bribes from the guilty and capitalized on his magical powers to get the leather stick to the buttocks of the innocent person? Even though this was a possibility, the expert was expected to be a person of high regard and moral integrity. If he could do this, he would not only make mockery of the entire system, but of himself as well, as he would be punished publicly by the minstrels of justice.

Ukang Akpe Ajop (Ordeal of the Oil Pal-Fruit Fibre) Each of the suspects would be given a pair of small bundles of oil palm-fruit fibre (akpe ajop) to hold on both hands; kneel in front of the awia ukang, backing him. The awia ukang would also hold same fibres with his two hands, make incantations, get into ecstasy and shake the fibres violently. He would hold the fibres across the necks of each suspect, and, suddenly, the fibres would stick to the neck of the guilty person. They would squeeze the culprit’s neck until he or she admitted guilt.

Ukang Ndaam (Ordeal of the Raffia) In this ordeal, the awia ukang would place some strings of raffia (ndaam) in water contained in a white basin. The suspects would take turns and stir the water with the right hand. In the midst of incantations by awia ukang, the raffia strings would rise up from the water and coil around the hand of the culprit. As earlier noted above, the awia ukang could tap into the invisible and supernatural resource of aruru and control nature by magic. Thus, the innocent were always spared. Cases or offences for determination ranged from theft, adultery, battery, murder, blackmail, vandalism, trespass to land and forceful possession of land.

Arbitration and Punishment Punishment in Annang jurisprudence was retributive, deterrent and reconciliatory. Retributive methods are often employed in major offences such as murder, theft, adultery, while the reconciliatory means were employed in cases such as slander or blackmail. The guilty were made to pay fine, or make atonements in form of presenting items for rituals. In some cases, like theft and, capital punishment was often applied. Those who swore to the oath in guilt were often identified by their swollen bodies.

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Swelling of the body (njiook) was also associated with those who went against the taboos, ibed. In this later case, one would be metaphorically said to have “eaten the taboos” (adia ibed) or “eaten the gods” (adia awasi). Besides, the methods described above in the ordeals, the family as well as the lineage, village and clan courts made great use of arbitration, wherein the purposes were to reconcile the parties in a given dispute. One key factor in arbitration was that the parties had to agree to settle their dispute by arbitration, agree on the choice of panel of arbitration and to comply to the advice of the panel. This submission and agreement to arbitration by parties to a dispute is called forum prorogatum in international law and contemporary ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution). In litigation as well as arbitration, the elders and chiefs would always form a jury (aru) in order to have a consensual decision. Dissenting opinions as obiter dicta (sayings by the way) were rare among the jury. All in all, Annang has a rich and complex legal repertoire. Annang Jurisprudence, Legal System and Philosophy of Law have resemblances in contemporary laws and legal system. However, there are a lot to be modified in Annang customary, native laws and customs to suit the repugnancy doctrine, which repudiates any law that is not consistent with natural justice, equity and good conscience. Be it as it may, it is simply a better option to keep to the good laws of the society, for the ancestral Annang taught that “obedience to the law gives peace of mind”, Eched Annang ekewo “atum mbed iwuo urenge”.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION As this essay in the foundations of Annang Philosophy is entering its ‘fine’, I wish to recapitulate the questions I have answered herein: 1. The notion of being in Annang Philosophy; 2. The notion of reality in Annang Philosophy; 3. The notions of causality and causation in Annang Philosophy; 4. The notions of freedom, determinism and moral responsibility in Annang Philosophy; 5. The Annang conceptions of knowledge and truth; 6. Annang system of logic; 7. Annang conception of personal identity or the nature of the human being; and 8. Annang legal system and notions of justice and punishment. To these questions I answered as follows. ‘Being’ in Annang thought is not an empty concept but one with content. The notion of ‘being’ refers to ‘existence’ and to ‘God’ as the ground of existence. In Annang Philosophy, being refers to God as well as existence. The logic behind this Annang two-dimensional notion of being is, that ‘being’ as God is the cause of ‘being’ as existence. This explains why

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Summa Philosophica the notion of God is best understood as a causal principle in Annang Metaphysics. Annang Philosophy has a two-dimensional notion of being: Existence and God. Concerning the notions of reality and nature, the Annang believe that there are two worlds: physical and spiritual. There is no antagonism between materialism and idealism in Annang reality. Annang notion of reality is a fusion of idealism and materialism. This fusion of idealism and materialism, the spiritual and physical could be especially demonstrated in the Annang formation of planes of existence: 1. “Ukpobot”, “Unarod”, “Arorobot”, “Ekondo” (Cosmos, where humans live) 2. “Awio Ekpo” (Land of the spirits) “Awio Eti-Ekpo” (Land of good spirits) “Awio Idiok-Ekpo” (Land of bad spirits: “ukpaka ekpo”) “Awio Ekpo Mme Ete-Ete” (Land of the ancestors) “Awio Ekpo Nnem” (World of the gods ) 3. “Awio Awasi” (God’s Realm) In respect of causality, ancient Annang wisdom and tradition (Eched Annang) held it that every thing has a cause (ukeed nkpo anyene ntak) and everything has a beginning; that the world or universe had a begining (arorobod anyene ntongo). The universe is believed to be the creative act of God in Annang, as we presented above under Annang cosmogony. With regard to freedom, determinism and moral responsibility, the Annang uphold the belief that the human person is free. And this freedom is often expressed in his daily life. The notion of freedom in Annang conception implies that the human person can acquire and accomplish his desired goals in life without external pressures on his will. It is believed, too, that the human person is responsible for his failures or misfortunes in life. For whatever actions a person chooses, he bears responsibility for them. This is especially made evident in the proverb, “aduok ntong ke ntong akene”, meaning “The ashes follow the one who throws them”. However, the notion of freedom in Annang thought is highly derogated by the notions of determinism, fate and destiny. There are thus beliefs in freedom and determinism in moderate senses in Annang Philosophy. Even so, the institution of punishment for offences seems to undermine hard determinism in Annang reality. Punishment in Annang jurisprudence was retributive, deterrent and reconciliatory. Annang Epistemology consists in our notions of knowledge (Ifiok), truth (Akpaniko), belief (Erinim ke akpaniko), truth-telling (Eritang Akpaniko) and information (Mmuk). Knowledge (Ifiok), for the Annang, entails belief

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(Erinim ke akpaniko) and information (Mmuk). This belief might not necessarily undergo justification, for who may be able to justify acclaimed messages from the gods? Knowledge is true belief in Annang conception. Given our conception of knowledge, truth (Akpaniko) refers to correlation with the state of affairs. The concept “Akpaniko” is a composite term; composing “akpan”, which, in this context, translates “most significant”, or “real”, or “principal”, or “paramount”, and the term “iko”, which means “word”. “Akpan” literally means “First son”, who is believed to be the “real son”. Truth (Akpaniko) in Annang Epistemology is thus associated with “Word”. Truth in Annang Epistemology involves saying what there is; sayings about the real thing. “Akpaniko” as truth means the “real word” in Annang Epistemology. Thus, truth-telling (Eritang Akpaniko) entails saying the real thing. It involves saying about the reality in context and shunning falsehood. Even when the speaker is not telling the truth, he or she already knows the real thing (the truth) in his/her mind. Hence, the Annang saying that “the liar knows the truth.” Words can be spoken or unspoken. Sometimes, words can assume the mode of action and signs. Most often than not, justification of truth in Annang Epistemology takes the forms of testimonies and witnessing (Ntie-Nse), which can be in spoken words. At other times, the words are unspoken, but determinable in actions. Sometimes, truth has to be determined through the practices of ordeal (ukang) and divination (nkukud); and these are firmly adhered to in Annang. Annang conceptions of knowledge (ifiok) and truth (akpaniko) are inextricably linked with the belief system and tradition in vogue in the society. While the senses are believed to serve as a channel of information, the Annang have strong belief, too, that knowledge comes through revelation and intuition. Revealed truth is believed to come from the spiritual realm to the physical realm. The Annang believe also in intuition. Beside the senses, revelation and intuition, the Annang also have belief that knowledge or traits of knowledge can be naturally passed from parents to children. This is a belief in innatism, which is associated with rationalism. The Annang tradition, therefore, has no peculiar place for a single source of human knowledge. There is interplay of empiricism, revelation, intuition and rationalism in Annang epistemology. In terms of logic, causal reasoning in Annang society gives no room for any belief in chance. A greater significance of causal reasoning for the Annang man is that it paves way for scientific knowledge, that is, knowledge of things through their causes (scientia rerum per ultima causa). The Annang have the ability to solve some of their existential problems, since they have knowledge of the causes of things, events and situations.

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For example, they have knowledge of causes of certain kinds of diseases. They build up causal arguments using their knowledge of the causes and causal arguments using their knowledge of possible solutions to human problems, for example, cures for diseases. Concerning the question of personal identity, I make these salient averments: that“Agwo Ontology” contains the Annang notion of personal identity or the nature of the human person. “Agwo Ontology” is rooted in the problems of human nature, the human identity as well as the big-time problem of mind-body dualism. “Agwo ontology” is a crucial attempt to identify these philosophical problems in the Annang intellectual thought and tradition. A ‘psychsomaticism’ described the hitherto problematic of mind- body composition of the human person. This psychosomatism was vitiated by a ‘psychosomapneumatism’, a term I coined elsewhere (“Agwo Ontology” 2010) to describe a tripartite composition of the human personality (mind, body, spirit) as conceived in Annang philosophy. Psychosomapneumatism is Annang notion of human nature. By this term, I mean that the human being is composed of ukpong (soul), ikpohidem (body) and ekpo (spirit). What I have presented in this essay is a prolegomenon to Annang Philosophy; a cultural philosophy which, hitherto, never existed in the history of philosophy.

References Abanuka, B.A.(1994). New Essay on African Philosophy, Nsukka: Spiritans Publications. Anyanwu, J.C. (1984). The Meaning of Ultimate Reality in Igbo Cultural Experience in Ultimate Reality and Meaning. Vol.7, No.2. Aristotle, (1924). Metaphysics. Trans. W.D Ross. Oxford: Clarandon Press. Ekpenong, M. O.(2002). Story-telling,Imagination and God-talk. Ibadan: Kraft Books Ltd. Enang, K.(1979). Salvation in a Nigerian Background. Berlin: Verlag Von Dietrick Reimer. Essien, Ephraim S. (2007). “Einstein’s Relativity Theory and the Structure of the Universe.” Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy 10. 1: 220-228. Essien, Ephraim S. (2008). Philosophy of Peace and Conflict Beyond The United Nations. Calabar: Calabar University Press. Essien, Ephraim S. (2010). “Agwo Ontology as Metaphysics of Man in Annang Philosophy”. Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs. Essien, Ephraim S. (2011b). Summa Philosophica: An Introduction to Philosophy. North Carolina: Lulu Press

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Essien, Ephraim S. (2011c). Annang Philosophy, History and Culture. North Carolina: Lulu Press Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. (1985). Trans.John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Messenger, J.C. Jr.(1959). Religious Acculturation Among the Annang and Ibibio in Bascom and Herskovits (eds). Continuity and change in African Culture. Chicago. Omoregbe, J., (1999). Metaphysics without Tears: A Systematic and Historical Study. Lagos: Joja Educational Research and Publishers Ltd. Pasachoff, Jay A. (1995). Astronomy: From the Earth to the Universe. 4th edition. New York: Sander College Publishing. Udondata, J.P. and Ekanem, J.B. (2011). History of Annang Nation. Elohim Educational Ventures.

Oral Interviews: 1. Sir Stephen Jonah Essien, 71 years, 24 November, 2009. 2. Prof Claton Thomas Udo, 80 years, 17 November, 2009.

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CHAPTER TWENTY NINE

IMO ADE AGWO (THE HUMAN PERSON IS WEALTH): A PRINCIPLE OF TRANSCULTURAL NEO-HUMANIST PHILOSOPHY OF THE ANNANG PEOPLE

Joseph Alphonsus Okon

Abstract

Man, who is both a product and a producer of culture, often becomes the victim of/in culture. As a victim in cultures, both his latent potentials and manifest realisations suffer. Indeed, it could be safely held that patterns of the total mode of existence in the 21st century approximate to aggressive threats to human life and statehood. This paper decries this anomaly as a direct consequence of the rapid drift in morality from communally beneficial traditional values to unconscionable hybrid patterns inimical even to the individuals and groups involved. It therefore articulates the Annang fecund ideology, ‘imo ade agwo’, as the grand norm for reordering our scale of values as humans in order to guarantee human dignity, safety, development and. by extension, foster community advancement in and beyond particular cultures.

Conceptual Explications

Concepts in want of explication here are: ‘imo’, ‘ade’ and ‘agwo’. ‘Imo’, very simply put, implies wealth. Yet, the conceptualization and usage of ‘imo’ transcends wealth merely considered as material wherewithal. ‘Imo’ in Annang language, literature and philosophy entails the valuables in entirety the highest of which is the human person, for the Annang say, “akuk ade akuk, agwo ade inyene” (Money is money, but man is wealth). However, without neglecting the material wherewithal, ‘imo’ places equitable value on things like concern for one another especially at the point of need, dexterity/skilfulness, proficiency in techniques, valour, virtues, wisdom, and even the rather metaphysical rapport between the spirit world and the physical cosmos. In fact, ‘Imo’ could arguably be

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Summa Philosophica termed both the discrete and network of complex but complementary variables in nature capable of advancing human life and worth. It is whatever possesses the quality of adding value to the human person, be it conceptual, physical or relational. As such, even the climatic and weather conditions, the soil texture/ topography, the human population as well as the morality/religious orientation of the people, are indispensable variables in the definition of ‘imo’.

The concept ‘ade’ is an Annang rendition of the English verb ‘to be’ or ‘is’. Thus, ‘ade’ serves to moderate the relation of ‘imo’ to its predicate ‘Agwo’. Hence, it predicates ‘Agwo’ of ‘Imo’ in a symmetrical and equivalent context. In this context, both terms could be either used as subject or predicate without losing its meaning. “Imo ade agwo” and “Agwo ade imo” therefore mean one and the same thing.

Agwo, in itself, is the Annang term for the human person. Agwo, in Annang language, literature and philosophy is a generic term for the human person. Hence, it does not on its own differentiate between sexes or ages.

Imo Ade Agwo as an Ideology

“Imo ade agwo” could literally be rendered in English language as ‘wealth is the human person’. Again, as noted above that both ‘imo’ and ‘agwo’ could be used as subject and predicate of each other, another possible English translation could be rendered ‘the human person is wealth’. In either case, the first logical upshot from this phraseology is that “Imo ade agwo” is not a mere adage, aphorism nor a mere saying. It very quickly strikes the mind for what is, an answer to unasked humanist questions, “what is ‘imo’ in relationship to ‘agwo’?” and “what is ‘agwo’?” As an answer, “Imo ade agwo” encapsulates the basic understanding of the human person in Annang people’s epistemology and metaphysics. Hence, it is an ideology.

As an ideology, “Imo ade agwo” entails that nothing, and absolutely nothing other than the human person is worth the concept ‘wealth’. As such, it places the human person above every other thing ever to be appreciated and cared for. What this implies is that the principle, “Imo ade agwo”, is central to the Annang man’s self-worth, community consciousness, socio-political development and dimensions of

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Imo Ade Agwo as ‘Personhood-ennobling ideology’

The principle “Imo ade agwo” is central to the Annang man’s understanding of the self, his self-worth, his idea of what he stands for, as well as how he ought to relate with fellow humans and the world at large. This is so because the traditional Annang understanding of the human person is that of a self-conscious entity endowed with intelligence, will, passion and power capable of influencing other aspects of the material and spiritual nature. Man, in Annang cosmogony, is an aspect of the eternal universe. And this comes close to the thrust of personalism— a philosophical view which holds that the ultimate reality in the world is understandable in terms of persons whether as spiritual selves or actual entities (Sahakian, Outline history of philosophy, 275). “Imo ade agwo” as an ideology, considers the human person as the sole determinant of the meaning and value of both life and the lived world. Hence, intelligibility of the universe lies at the wits of man. Again, the derivation of valuables and the determination of that which is of value all depend on the will and passion of man. But these do not exhaust how “Imo ade agwo” ennobles personhood.

By defining the human person as wealth and so placing him / her above every other thing ever to be appreciated and cared for, “Imo ade agwo” endows the human person with inalienable dignity and rights. It places man as the master of both himself and his environment. It makes man a being whose life is sacrosanct. It further sees man as the determinant of values especially moral values ‘...understood to be those that make a person good purely and simply as a person’ (Fagothey, Right and Reason, 2) Thus, whereas arguments abound in the western world on the question of where and when life becomes human, an Annang man naturally understands that human life begins at conception. In this sense, “Imo ade agwo” stands against all shades of anti-life and inhuman ideologies like that of the pro-abortion advocates. It rejects, for instance, L.Summer’s view that human personhood arrives only when “the foetus is sentient, able to feel and sense as a conscious being” (Abortion and Moral Theory,42). On the contrary, “Imo ade agwo” holds that personhood is endowed as a natural inherent quality at conception. “...Whereas what enters into that unique union at conception are both necessary

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Summa Philosophica complements of the two sufficiently necessary substrates for the generative life of humans, the products of that union becomes human by a causal series efficacy that follows from the being of the sources” (Okon, “Rethinking the Idea of Human Personhood” in: Personhood and Personal Identity: A Philosophical Study, 2010: 17-18). The Annang man, therefore, values human life even from conception. Hence, abortion culture is alien to the Annang culture. “Imo ade agwo” as an ideology decries the avalanche of abortion cases among Annang youths of our day as an aberration, a far cry from the traditional values for human life. “Imo ade agwo” holds that adequate appreciation of the human person would naturally prevent such destruction of life in the womb and other forms of anti-life behavioural patterns like assassinations, homicides, genocides, armed robbery and kidnapping.

“Imo ade agwo” further entails that the human person is neither an object for experimentation nor a subject for any form of abuse like economic exploitations. Hence, employment with no commensurate remuneration amounts to modern slavery within the context of “Imo ade agwo”. Man must therefore be adequately appreciated and cared for. This point agrees with deontological ethical position of Immanuel Kant that ‘persons have intrinsic value as ends in themselves’ (Sahakian, Outline history of philosophy,275). No man should therefore be used as an object for another goal. “Imo ade agwo” decries the instances of slavery, employment with no commensurate remuneration and wilful use of poor, unsuspecting and vulnerable youth (in fact, any human person) for rituals and tasks that would cost their lives as dehumanization of the person. “Imo ade agwo” therefore makes the point that such anti-life trends put the entire human race at the risk of auto-annihilation. Hence, there is need to overhaul the trends.

Imo Ade Agwo as ‘A Transcultural Humanist Ideology’

The observation that ‘imo ade agwo’ is personhood ennobling does not imply an exultation of the individual in contra disposition to his / her fellows. Rather, the exultation of the human person in ‘imo ade agwo’ is common to all humans. Because it is common, it places all humans on equal status. Thus, in advocating attitudinal changes in behaviour for the advancement of the human person, ‘Imo ade agwo’ anticipates the overall good of human beings the world over. By this intent, it suffices as a humanist ideology. Humanism is an approach in study, philosophy, world

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Summa Philosophica view or practice that focuses on human values and concerns (From Wikipedia, the free Encyclopaedia) ‘Imo ade agwo’ is one of such approaches as it calls for a revaluation of the modern cultures with a view to overhauling anti-human behaviours in order to advance the welfare of both individual persons and generality of the human race. In this sense, the principle ‘imo ade agwo’, considers not a particular person as the fount of wealth. It advocates the appreciation of human beings irrespective of tongue and tribe, occupational or religious disposition and any form of perceptible difference in the mode of existence. What this amounts to is the point that ‘Imo ade agwo’ is not a culture bound philosophy of persons and community development. Though it arose in the traditional Annang philosophic culture, what it stands for goes beyond Annang culture. Hence, ‘Imo ade agwo’ is a transcultural humanist philosophy. This is so because, ‘Imo ade agwo’ advocates adequate appreciation of the human person irrespective of cultural affinity and or any other accidental differentia. It is transcultural also because, ‘Imo ade agwo’ would fail to achieve its ultimate objective if it is not imbibed and promoted across cultures. This is why the principle of ‘Imo ade agwo’ is not to be promoted only by a particular class of humans, like teachers, but by all persons from all walks of life to include pastors, politicians, business men, women in all fields, students and others. ‘Imo ade agwo’ also needs to be corroborated and promoted in other cultures. These observations, however, has lots of implications.

Implications of Imo Ade Agwo as ‘A Transcultural Humanist Ideology’

Though some implications of the principle of ‘Imo ade agwo’ have been highlighted under our consideration of the principle as a personhood ennobling ideology, further implications still abound.

First of all, ‘imo ade agwo’ as articulated, comes as a clarion call for the revaluation of modern behavioural patterns which, hitherto, pose danger /threats to human progress the world over. Hence, it is primarily an ethical advocacy in the interest of man as man. This follows from the fact that ‘imo ade agwo’ queries the rising spate of man’s inhumanity to man, interstate rift and even the root causes of cold/ actual wars between peoples and nations. The principle therefore entails that adequate respect (the lack of which is the root of animosity/hatred) for persons and nationhood be made central in our consideration of fellow humans in order to ensure/sustain peace and harmony in the world. ‘Imo

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Summa Philosophica ade agwo’ therefore begins naturally from an Annang philosophical stand point advocating an ethical revaluation of values not solely in the interest of the Annang man but the entire human race. This is so because what affects one member of a class, gradually extends to affect other members of the same class as ‘imo ade agwo’ understands that: ‘inama ajen ijak adep’ (nothing befalls the baby and spares its nanny); ‘se ’kinam anna Akpan aya anam anna Udo’ (What befell Akpan will befall Udo). These and similar axioms in Annang philosophy encapsulates the Annang conception of the universe as one (monist ideology) as well as our metaphysical notion of interconnectivity. Humans are so naturally interconnected that an effect on one man somewhere impacts on every other man anywhere in the world, albeit sooner or later. This further explains another axiom which holds that ‘atok nkum idim, edem ette adinwongo, edem eka aya anwong’( whoever urinates into the stream would either have his/her paternal or maternal relations to drink unsafe water). The principle therefore implies that geographic and cultural differences do not suffice to make any class of people autonomous and independent of others.

This transcultural dimensionality of the principle portrays yet its other dimension of reaching beyond the ordinary/ physical. ‘Imo ade agwo’ is also transcendental. In as much as ‘imo’ in Annang also implies the rather metaphysical rapport between the spirit world and the physical cosmos, the principle underscores that human life goes beyond the mere physical plane. As such, value need be adequately attached to the transcendental aspects of being. It makes the point that human life need not be considered in isolation from facts, known and unknown, in the history of humans, especially memories of the ancestors, human-spirit rapport and indeed the entire gamut of religious awareness. The principle, therefore, calls for a revaluation of our modern God-consciousness. How, in our day, does a worshipper think of God, relate with his/her God as well as allow his/her God-consciousness to influence his/her relationship with fellow human beings and the environment? Does the incursion and in some cases, outright overthrow of one religious system by another alien to a people better the people’s God- consciousness or leave them in a religious vacuum? How about the attitude of a people who, in their judgement, have embraced a certain new religion even as leaders of the new religion yet their lifestyles fall short of the tenets of that new religion? Again, are others who neither understand nor believe what they have embraced. Should our generation be allowed to remain with confused religious currents tossed about by all waves of opinions? How best can our God-consciousness be articulated into an effective guide in

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Summa Philosophica our interpersonal and international relationships? Does the doctrinal difference in the Judaeo-Christian and Arab-Islam religions suffice for some ontological difference in the personhood of the worshippers and so justify wanton animosity, disregard and destruction of one by the other? Above all, does the significant difference in Judaeo-Christian religion which has dislodged the traditional religions introduce some lacuna in the connatural man-God worship pattern thereby dislodging the worshipper from his/her natural God? ‘Imo ade agwo’ makes the point that adequate answers to questions of the type above can guarantee a balanced and humane basis for harmonious and progressive living. By this token, the principle ‘imo ade agwo’ is not humanistic solely from a secular perspective. It certainly acknowledges the religious dimension of the human person but queries the hitherto religious outlooks with a view to revaluating same in the interest of the human persons. Another implication of the principle ‘Imo ade agwo’ is the rejection of all forms of discrimination especially against women. The principle ‘Imo ade agwo’ sees the human person as one and the same irrespective of sex and colour. Hence, there is no discrimination on sex, creed, colour, height, material wherewithal and or socio-religious status. ‘Imo ade agwo’ understands such differences as accidental to the ontologically necessary quality of humanness; hence, inconsequential. It therefore decries the unfortunate premium on over celebrating male children at birth as if the female children were not worth same celebration. And this begs the question of the ontological difference between the male and female children. The principle ‘Imo ade agwo’ entails that equal respects should be given to every human person and opportunities equitably distributed. The principle ‘Imo ade agwo’ further entails an all cooperative and mutually complementary relationship among humans. And this leads to the implication of the principle on community consciousness.

Imo Ade Agwo as a principle directly promotes community- consciousness and development. Because it considers personhood as one and interconnected, it brings the mind to quickly appreciate the community as person writ large. And so, it enables the persons involved to develop great sense of bonding and solidarity as members of a group or place. With the understanding that the welfare of one could impact positively on others (eto isidaha ikpong iforo akai, that is, one tree does not make a forest), the principle encourages mutual supports and collaborations even in the development of common facilities like roads, markets, assembly halls and the like. It makes life in the state/ community worth living.

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In addition to community-consciousness, ‘Imo ade agwo’ envisages a truly democratic system of governance. This follows from the Annang understanding that ‘obong isi ‘bongo ikpong’ (The king does not govern alone ), which implies that the leader needs to carry his/her subjects along the paths of governance. But it does not promote insubordinate/obstinate followership, for “two cocks do not crow on the same roof” (akiko iba ibongo ke idak akom keed). What the principle envisages is a mutually responsible rapport between the governor and the governed. And for this to work, adequate representation is conditio sine qua non. No leader is encouraged to adopt a king-subject dictatorship wherein the subjects’ opinions amount to nothing; no leader is encouraged to stay aloof from his/her followers. The principle encourages mutual dialectics between the leadership and followership adequately moderated to avoid high jacking by political jobbers and possible distortion of facts through misrepresentations (urua afon aka idem, that is, “It is better to go to the market by yourself”).

Moreover, the principle ‘Imo ade agwo’ assigns onerous responsibility to the enlightened and political class. Among such responsibilities is the task of enlightening the public on the tenets of ‘Imo ade agwo’ through schools, churches, the media, the family and avenues available to man. Again, the principle expects much collaboration among this class of leaders in terms of using their good offices to facilitate infrastructural development in the communities; human capital development to include community/ state educational scholarships; micro credit facilities for small and medium scale entrepreneurs and the likes. Above all, such leaders need to assume the role of think tanks for the people and offer guide/plan for the communities’ futuristic development. In other words, it is the role of such leaders of thought to guide its youths on choice of careers and similar life enhancing ventures. The principle ‘Imo ade agwo’ further requires a well ordered educational curricula for the reorientation of the people especially the youth. This follows from the principle’s stance that the youth is the future of the human race. Hence, youth development need to be placed central in the affairs of the elites and all if the future is to be secured.

Conclusion

This paper sought to articulate the Annang fecund ideology ‘imo ade agwo’ as the grand norm for reordering our scale of values as humans in order to guarantee human dignity, safety, development and, by extension, foster community advancement in and beyond particular

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Summa Philosophica cultures. Efforts have been made to demonstrate the principle ‘imo ade agwo’ as a philosophic principle with superlative concern for the pragmatic good, nay, welfare and advancement of the human person. In our considerations so far, ‘imo ade agwo’ suffices as a principle of transcultural humanism which acknowledges both the secular and religious dimensions of the human person. What need to be added is that the principle ‘imo ade agwo’ is also welfarist in as much as human welfare is its overall concern. This philosophy, as seen, has far reaching implications for all members of the human race even beyond the identified few.

In conclusion, therefore, it must be observed that articulators and proponents of the fecund ideology ‘imo ade agwo’ need to put in much time and other resources in order to propagate tenets of the ideology first, among the Annang people for strategic self-management and relevance in both state and national affairs against the hitherto histrionic self- presentation of unguided individuals in human endeavours where they turn out incompetent and misfits. Again, proponents of the principle ‘imo ade agwo’ need to spread this principle beyond Annang culture at least as a marketable aspect of our cultural heritage and an index for global peace and enhancement of the human person. However, sincerity must be imbibed in acknowledging that what is here articulated might not be exhaustive of the plausible contents and significance of ‘imo ade agwo’. Further researches on the principle are therefore encouraged.

References

Fagothey, A. Right and Reason ( 8th ed.) London: Charlie E. Merrill Pub. 1986. Okon, Joseph A. “Rethinking the Idea of Human Personhood” In Personhood and Personal Identity: A philosophical Study Ed. M.F. Asiegbu and J.C. Chukwuokolo. Enugu: SNAAP Press 2010. Pp 15—19. Sumner, L.W. Abortion and Moral Theory. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1981. Sahakian, W, S. Outline History of Philosophy. Boston University Press. 1971 Wikipedia: free internet encyclopeadia

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CHAPTER THIRTY

IGBO METAPHYSICS, YORUBA METAPHYSICS AND KEMETIC (EGYPTIAN) PHILOSOPHY

Chiedozie Okoro

In the Prolegomena, Kant describes the general nature of metaphysics thus:

As it concerns the source of metaphysical cognition, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles (i.e. propositions and concepts) must never be derived from experience. It must not be physical but metaphysical, that is, knowledge lying beyond experience. It can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori cognition, coming from pure understanding and pure reason (1983: 107).

Whichever way we define metaphysics, the important thing is that it is a transcendental science that deals with beyondness of being.

African Metaphysics in Perspective

In the most ordinary sense African metaphysics is the African theory of being, doctrine on reality, or notion of transcendence (i.e. beyondness) which constitutes first principles for organizing experience. It is the African perspective of what first philosophy is. It is what Africans regard as the basic axioms or first principles of existence. It is the African method of “transcendental inquiry” (Iroegbu, 1995: 26). It is the African account of the reciprocity between being and human being. It is the African description of human transcendence and how humans are able to simulate theory and action for directing human affairs and for the task of societal and universe transformation. But why is African metaphysics regarded as integrative?

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General Traits of African Metaphysics

The general trait of any metaphysical system which is distinctively African is that it is basically integrative. To speak of integrative metaphysics or the metaphysics of integration therefore, is to simply say that African metaphysics is the metaphysics of harmony, which in turn makes African philosophy as a whole the philosophy of harmony. Innocent Chilaka Onyewuenyi reiterates this point in his book entitled: The African Origin of Greek Philosophy: An Exercise in Afrocentrism. Narrating his journey towards self-rediscovery, he tells the story of how he was introduced into the study of African philosophy by Rev. John E. Brooks, S. J., who emphatically describes African philosophy as the “philosophy of harmony” (1994: 27). What then do we mean by integrative metaphysics?

Integrative Metaphysics Defined

Integrative metaphysics simply means the metaphysical system which regards spirit, force, life-force, or vital-force as the primordial principle which permeates all things and is responsible for unity in diversity. It is a metaphysical system which sees spirit (i.e. mind, idea, subject and all things mental or spiritual) and matter (i.e. body, object and all things physical) as being equi-primordial and complementary.

Since for the African the primary element that sustains the universe is spirit, C.S. Momoh, a member of the purist school of thought, maintains that African metaphysics can best be defined as the “African doctrine on the spiritual” (2000: 8). Thus for the African, “the concept of reality encompasses the totality of everything that exists visible or invisible, real, actual or potential” (Ibid.). And because this metaphysical system does not bifurcate mind from body, subject from object; because it does not separate politics from economy, economy from religion, religion from culture, culture from spirituality, spirituality from education, education from physical existence, physical existence from the totality of life; because it does not create a hiatus between theory and practice, action and reaction; it is referred to as an inclusive system and therefore, integrative. Contrary to classical Western metaphysics which is monistic and reductionistic, African metaphysics is dualistic and pluralistic in orientation. And whereas classical Western metaphysics dissociates entities and is thus absolutist, totalitarian and impositional, African metaphysics associates entities and is therefore accommodating and tolerant of contrary views and opinions; whereas Western metaphysical system operates on the law of excluded

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Summa Philosophica middle, exclusivity is alien to the African metaphysical system, it is rather inclusive in character. The aim of African metaphysics is to harmonize all opposites by way of interfusion or integration. This system of metaphysics is also known as metaphysical vitalism, metaphysical symbiosis, spiritual primacism, or the principle of interpenetrability of forces. The metaphysical system of the West closest to the Africa metaphysics of integration is Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology. Our next task is to describe this integrative metaphysics in vivid details.

Description of Integrative Metaphysics

Marx Scheler in his “sociology of knowledge” tries to show that human conceptions of reality differ from society to society. Making reference to Europe and Asia, he succinctly shows that both continents have pursued the task of knowledge acquisition from different directions.

Europe was going from matter to the soul, Asia from the soul to matter. Therefore, the stages of evolution must be fundamentally different in the two cases – until the point is reached where they meet in a cultural synthesis which is already underway (Mannheim, 1959, 16 – 17; quoted by Onwuejeogwu, 1997, 84).

Marx Scheler did so well in identifying the conceptual and cultural differences between Europe and Asia. He however, could not see that the cultural synthesis he seeks between Europe and Asia is exactly what African thought system is all about. Africans do not see the world as a pure rational abstraction or as mere appearances; they simply reproduce reality in the life-world. We define the life-world as man’s native transcendental capacity to effectively and pragmatically synchronize the objective world with subjective understanding. It is the visioning of the world about us imaged in symbolic forms. In such a symbolic representation of the world things are not compartmentalized. On the contrary, in the universe of the life-forces things are inclusively interconnected and interpenetrating. This explains why the African cosmos is said to cyclical, hierarchical and tripological in outlook. Chinweizu describes the African cosmos as one that operates the logic of “concentric circles” (Chinweizu, 2005: 140). In other words, the cyclical nature of the African cosmos rotates and revolves on a triangular dimension otherwise known as the tripod. The cosmos, society and man are said to live in a symbiotic unity. Holism is the appropriate word for

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Summa Philosophica describing the African understanding of the inter-relationship between the cosmos, society and man. Each is an individual whole energized and interconnected to the other by spirit. Spirit as the motivating element ensures that the cosmos, society and man are one intricate web, harmoniously integrated. This inter-fusion is such that the “world order is replicated in the “social order” and the “social order” is replicated” in the “self order” and vice versa. Again, by way of interfusion, the three orders are said to be identical and hierarchical. Whereas the hierarchicization of the forces and their identical nature requires that: “ All forces be strengthened and not weakened, that an individual should be seen in the light of the whole and that meaning, significance and value depend on the art of integration” (Anyanwu, 1981: 371). By implication, world reorientation, social reconstruction, should begin from the enlightenment and reformation of the self, for the re-attunement of the self-order to the social and the cosmic orders. Furthermore, in the tripological conception of the cosmos in which forces and hierarchies interfuse, we do not speak of disunity or dissociation, but of association, co-existence and co-operation. We do not speak of isolated activities, but of symbiosis. In the universe of holism, things are not compartmentalized, departmentalized and fragmented. Based on this, K.C. Anyanwu drew the following submissions about the African view of man and the cosmos:

(i) Since there are no isolated life forces in the universe, there can be no isolated individual person (ii) Society is the manifestation of the order of the universe. (iii)All relationships between all the life forces ought to be strengthened and not weakened. (iv)There is no dissociation of sensibility in the African culture. The duality of experience should not harden into dualism. Politics therefore, should not be discussed as if it were separated from religion or religion as if it were separated from all practical activities (Anyanwu,1983: 53 – 54).

The African considers man and society to be embodiments of spirituality and physicality, which in turn rotates upon the cyclic triad or the tripod. Ancestors, living humans and unborn children represent the past, the present and the future respectively. This cyclic triad is most visible in the age-grade system.

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Age-grade is seen as a movement of the future through the present into the past, the future is transformed into the present by various ceremonies; the present is transform into the past by retirement and mortuary rites; and the past is transformed into the future by reincarnation (Onwuejeogwu, 1997: 115).

In the same vein, “every normal individual has three levels of existence: as an individual, as a member of a group, and as a member of a community” (Anyanwu, 1981: 371). The same is applicable to the leader in traditional African. He is seen “as a symbol of authority representing the land as an embodiment of the spirit world, physical man and unborn children” (Ibid.). All of these are however, made possible by spirit which happens to be the coordinating force. “Spirit embraces the power of beliefs, ideas and thoughts. It constitutes the source of authority, vitality, possibilities, law and integration. Spirit adds depth and cohesion to life. As a unifying principle, it eliminates all individual and group boundaries and creates a wider and deeper social consciousness or community of people” (p. 372).Wisdom consists in the harmonization of the tripartite compositions of man and his society. This is usually done in a hierarchicized order with the singular purpose of unifying the horizontal and vertical factors in man and in the society. The tripological synergy that constitutes the essential attribute of the African cosmos is often represented with the aid of an equilateral triangle. To the extreme right of the equilateral triangle we place spirit (or idealism, capitalism, theism and so on) and to the extreme left we place matter (or materialism, socialism, atheism and so on). Harmony is accomplished by symbolically moving to the center which should allow for a perpendicular upward thrust to the apex of the equilateral triangle to make for balance or unity. The question that follows concerns what structure or principle of reality makes this tripological synergy or balance possible? This latter question takes us to the issue of duality in African metaphysics. Duality in African thought system is not the same as the principle of dualism. Whereas dualism allows for the bifurcation of things into compartments, duality on the other hand refers to the complementarity of the entities that comprise nature which occur in a pair. Thus for the traditional African, Being and non- Being, mind and matter, are equi-primordially predisposed. However, of two things that are equi-primordially predisposed, one has primacy over the other. In the light of this, the Igbo say “Ihe di abuo ofu ka ibeya” (in the duality of things one has primacy over the other). Granted

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Summa Philosophica then that spirit and matter are equi-primordially predisposed, spirit as the animating and organizing principle has primacy over matter, thereby giving preference to spirit, thought or mind as “the creative power”, “the principle of order or form”, the “artificer” and “potter” (James, 1959, 140). The primacy placed on spirit does not imply the denial of the existence of matter; it simply means that every material thing is endowed with spirit force which can be likened to soul, mind, psyche, vital-force or life-force. C. S. Momoh sheds more light on this. The African conception is one of spiritual primacy, not exclusivity nor dualism. For any physical thing, active or inert, dead or alive, the African conception is that it is primarily spirit or spiritual, not that it is absolutely and exclusively spirit or spiritual. The doctrine of spiritual primacy makes allowance for matter or the physical … In other words the African is more interested in the spirit, mind, soul, or vital and psychic force in a tuber of yam, a tree or a flower (2000, 8).

The above view is strongly upheld by D. E. Idoniboye who emphatically states thus; The ontology of any distinctively African world-view is replete with spirit; spirit is the animating, sustaining creative life-force of the universe. Spirit is real. It is as real as matter. Its reality is primordial and it is if not superior at least as primitive as that of matter. In its pure state it is unembodied (1973, 83).

Now, since it is obvious that emphasis on life-force or vital-force does not imply the denial of the material world it follows that the African thought system operates on the simultaneity of spiritual transcendentalism and spiritual realism. Nevertheless, insofar as life-force is primary and paramount to matter and if this entails the acknowledgement of the permeating and pervading strength of life-force, it means that the African cosmos is one of plenum of forces.Elements behave magically, miraculously as they symbiotically interact. And since spirit interlinks, interconnects and interpenetrates all things, it follows, that everything is in everything. As K.C. Anyanwu puts it, the African thought system “cannot condone regimentations because there is a continuous interplay, intermingling and interdependence between spirit [forces] and the material world” (1981: 87). Needless to say, in the universe of forces, things magically transform and transmute through the symbolic interaction of

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Summa Philosophica elements. And because it is spirit that necessitates the elemental symbolic interaction and alteration of things, it means that spirit has the power to interpenetrate and interconnect all things. The African principle of metaphysical vitalism is comparable to the theory of electromagnetism. In simple terms, electromagnetism states that particles, or waves, or energy, or force, or light, form the furniture or base of the universe. Newton thought that the laws of physics are absolutely correct and established the absolute as the substantial concept of space. Electromagnetism proves the contrary. It states that nothing is absolute about space or the laws of physics. Rather, “man is the initiator or creator of the phenomenon he observes, an idea which shows the great extent to which our subjective mind determines or figures in our objective knowledge of the world” (Anyanwu, 1981, 33). In physics, examples of the electromagnetic theory include; Einstein’s theory of relativism, Heisenberg’s theory of indeterminacy and David Bohm’s theory of hollowmovements. These have their equivalence in biology in Rupert Sheldrake’s theory of morphogenetism which states that the chemical substance DNA is the form of life. Thus for electromagnetism and the principle of vitalism in African philosophy the universe is populated by force or energy. It is in the light of this that Anyanwu states that: “The universe of life-force is one of transformation and transmutation” (1981: 93), and in such a world of aesthetic continuum, things change both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is a world of spontaneity. Summing up the essential characteristic of African metaphysics, J. I. Unah states that contrary to his Western (traditional) counterpart, the African does not seek for the substratum (i.e. fundamental or elementary stuff) from which all things evolved, the African does not ask the question “why is there something instead of nothing”? He knows that nothing (force) is the foundation of the world and that this nothing is not emptiness but the energy or soul animating and sustaining the universe; he knows that this nothing like the void is limitless and boundless. Thus the questions central to his mind are as follows;

What is that simple unifying element that permeates every nature? What is that ultimate universal principle which makes it possible for things to be and to have meaning? What is this ultimate cosmic principle by reason of which things come to be? (Unah, 1996 & 1999, 339-40 & 8-10 respectively).

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From the above, we gather the simple fact that for the African, force makes possible the dualistic complementarity of Being and non-Being thereby making the universe to be in a perpetual state of becoming

Igbo Metaphysics

Igbo metaphysics like that of any African people is integrative. The essence of Igbo metaphysics is captured by Innocent I. Asouzu (2007) in the concept of ibuanyidanda, which he describes as “new complementary ontology”. The concept ibuanyidanda draws its inspiration from the teachings of traditional Igbo philosophers of the complementary system of thought. For these Igbo philosophers, the idea of complementarity is inferred from observing a species of ants called danda. These ants (danda) have the capacity to carry loads that appear bigger and heavier than them. What this implies is that they can surmount very difficult tasks when they are mutually dependent on one another in the complementation of their efforts. Hence, these traditional Igbo philosophers insist that: ibuanyidanda (no task is insurmountable for danda). This is the idea of mutual dependence in complementarity (p. 11).

The concept ibuanyidanda is meant to present the notions of being and reality in their “intrinsic interrelatedness devoid of polarization and exclusiveness” (p. 10). In other words, the concept is meant to show the complementarity in duality which endows Igbo metaphysics with pluralistic features. Asouzu captures this later point as follows:

Hence, it is by understanding being in this sense of not being alone (ka so mu adina) that it will become clearer what is implied by the idea of ibuanyidanda (complementarity) which is another way of saying that anything that exists serves a missing link of reality or that whatever exists has head and tail-end (ihe di, nwere isi na odu)

Complementarity englobes the idea that nothing and no one is an island in the universe of forces, a foundation is propped up by another and another

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Summa Philosophica by another and so on. Analyzing the nature of Igbo cosmos, Chieke Ifemesia, observes as follows: In the [Igbo] cosmology, nothing is absolute. Everything, everybody, however apparently independent, depends upon something else. Interdependence, exhibited now as duality or reciprocity, now as ambivalence or complementarities, has always been the fundamental Principle of the [Igbo] philosophy of life (1979: 67 & 68).

In actual fact the idea of complementarity is meant to create checks and balance in the society. It is in this sense that the Igbo say that – fast moving feet (ukwu wam wam) are checkmated by vigilant eyes (anya wam wam). This takes us to the theory of duality in Igbo metaphysics (recall that duality in African metaphysics is the basis for complementarity and pluralism). The duality of being, reality and experience is aptly captured in Abriko (i.e. verses of wisdom dealing on how to apply knowledge in solving the riddles of the world) which states as follows: uwabungwugwu (the world is a package), ndimayagagbaasia (those who understand it will untie the riddles therein). Uwa as ngwugwu (the world as a package) consists of the ngwugwu la ihe di nime ngwugwu (i.e. the package and its content) both of which are complementary. This means that uwa (the world) comprises form (i.e. mind or spirit)and matter (i.e. body). Pantaleon Iroegbu in his concept of uwa ontology explains that the Igbo uwa like the Yoruba aiye, Efik obot, and Huasa duniya kasa, has a deeper meaning than the English world (which ordinarily refers to the material world). When the Igbo speak of uwa, they have in mind:

The entirety of existence, from God the highest being to inanimate beings of our cosmos, can be summarized in the englobing concept of the Igbo term uwa. Uwa is all- inclusive. It mirrors being, existence, entity, all reality. It englobes all that is, animate and inanimate, visible and invisible. It is comprehensive, universal and global. It is transcendent and immanent in scope as well as explicative and prospectively elastic (1995: 339).

Iroegbu further explains that uwa consists of six zones which include: Uwa anyi (our cosmos), the divine world of the Supreme Being (Chukwu), Godian-world of powerful spirits (i.e. Ala, Anyanwu, Amadioha etc), Good- spirit world (mmuo oma), Bad-spirit world (ajo mmuo, chi ojoo) and the Ancestral-world (Ndichie). Uwa also connotes the following: Life or

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Summa Philosophica existence (uwa m la uwa gi), Cosmos (uwa gburugburu), Field of action (uwa ndi nta; meaning the world of hunters), Time and space (uwa mbu ka mma), Destiny (uwa oma), Fate (uwa ojoo; depicting bad-world), Condition (uwa alighili), Tragedy (uwa ike), Age-limit (uwa umuaka; meaning children’s world), Nature (uwa osisi, mmiri, na kpakpandu; meaning the world of trees, rivers and stars), Persons (ndi uwa, umu uwa; humans in general), Nation (uwa anyi na ha mekoro ihe; signifying coexistence and cooperation), Land and the people living in it (uwa Igbo, ala Igbo; referring to Igbo land or the Igbo world), Earth (uwa nile), and the totality of the world as an abstraction (uwa) (pp. 339 – 341). To the fore going we add the Igbo expression; uwa a; referring to the intricateness of the world and human intrigues all of which make the world complex.

Pantaleon Iroegbu’s presentation of uwa is quite comprehensive. Nonetheless, his rendition of uwa as reality or being seems to contradict the teachings of Abriko. The study of Abriko reveals that the Igbo ihie would more appropriately represent reality, while adu would more appropriately represent being. To illustrate, Abriko says ni ihie (in reality), ihe di abuo (things consist of two parts). The assumption is that everything consists of the material and immaterial. The material part is referred to as uwa, while the immaterial part is referred to as mmuo, such that all entities that make up reality consist of uwa na mmuo (i.e. the material and the immaterial). Whatever is in uwa is controlled by the four principles of eke, orie, afo and nkwo. In the same vein, whatever is in mmuo is controlled by the principles of eke, agwu and chi. It follows that the totality of existence, the totality of all that there is, is in ihie in the sense that whatever exists has both anthropological and ontological essences. This includes the uwa concept itself.

To substantiate the statement made above, Abriko tells of the story of Tortoise the debtor. To avoid being pestered by his creditor, he left a strict instruction to his wife not to be disturbed and then went to sleep. In his sleep he dreamt of being made a king and after the coronation he was being escorted home amidst fanfare. In the euphoric dream moment, he began to feel happy in his sleep and at that instance his wife woke him from sleep and announced to him the arrival of his creditor. When the Tortoise awoke to behold the reality of his debt he exclaimed nhia bu uwa, ala mmuo ka mma, meaning this is the world the land of the spirit (i.e. dream world) is better. He willfully went back to sleep. This time he dreamt of being caught while stealing and of being flogged mercilessly. He began to offer mournful shrieks in his sleep and had to be awoken. He awoke this

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Summa Philosophica time with a different mentality. He exclaimed nke dina uwa diri na uwa, nke dina mmuo diri na mmuo meaning let that which of the world remain in the world and that which belongs to the spirit remain in the spirit. It is clear from the foregoing that though uwa consists of both the material and the immaterial, but it does not adequately capture the Igbo notion of reality or being.

Furthermore, the appropriate Igbo word for being would be adu or adi meaning to be (i.e. the Greek to on or the German sein). Here, du which is the short form of ihe na du adu, connoting that which endows entities with life and di whichis a short form of ihe di adi, meaning that which is primordial; would refer to being as the primeval source embodied in all reality, the ground in which reality is rooted and garners nourishment, or simply the fountain from which everything derives. From adu/adi (being)would then derive mmadu/mmadi (human being) and all that is endowed with life (i.e. ndu). Note, however, that ndu (i.e. Yoruba emi) in the present context connotes life-force or spirit. In that case, ndu as life- force or spirit would refer to that which endows humans with the power of existentiality or transcendence, just as it endows animate or inanimate things with potentiality. Since everything is endowed with ndu, it means that everything is endowed with chi. By implication, spirit or life-force permeates everything. So for the Igbo, as it is for other African people, all things in the universe are endowed with life-force. This would explain why the Igbo, like their other African counterparts, see the earth and the entire cosmos as sacred.

An analysis of the Igbo mmadu reveals that the term is a compound word that consists of the prefix mma, which could mean beauty or goodness and the suffix ndu, which translates as life or existence. Therefore, the Igbo mmadu could actually be pronounced mma-ndu, which could variously translate as “the beauty of life”, “the goodness of life”, or “the spice of existence”. Ultimately, what all this boil down to is that man himself is the “intrinsic goodness” (Ekei, 2001: 93). Shedding further light on this matter, J.C. Ekei draws inspiration from E.M.P. Edeh and M.I. Mozia. E.M.P. Edeh captures the term man in the concept Mma-dimeaning “good that is” (1985: 100; cited by Ekei, 92) or “the goodness that is there”. This does not mean that man is the good in se, but that he shares the attribute of the cosmos as perfect goodness or beauty and that of his “maker as the highest good” (Ibid.). M.I. Mozia on his own part thinks that the concept man is best captured in the expression mma-ndu, meaning

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“the goodness of life” or the “synthesis of all that is good in creation” (1982: 185; cited by Ekei, 92).

It is obvious from the above that the Igbo express a “cosmological optimism” (Okafor, 1992: 13ff) about the world. The Igbo “regard the world as ontologically good, perfect in structure, beautiful in design, and one whose architect is admirable and adorable” (p.14). The beauty, perfection and goodness of the world are captured by the Igbo in the song Oyooyo uwadiyawhich translatesthus: Beautiful the world extends (Ibid.). V.C. Uchendu reiterates this point in a dialogue between an Igbo leader/philosopher and a distinguished foreign visitor who made disparaging remarks about the host’s country as follows:

Do you say that my country is bad? Can the earth or the trees or the mud walls speak? How do they offend? No! The visitor answered. As far as I know they don’t. ‘Well answered’, the Leader/philosopher replied. Never speak badly of my country again. Should any of my people offend you, accuse them directly (1965: 18).

Next, we briefly examine the Igbo conception of human ontology. But before we embark on this analysis we like to state that for the Igbo, man is a composite of ahu or aru (body) and mmuo (spirit). Whereas ahu or aru is subject to the four modal causes/forces of eke, orie, afo andnkwo, mmuo mmadu (human soul or spirit) is a tripartite composite of eke, agwu and chi. Whereas to ahu belongs all human physiological, anthropological and neurological functions, mmuo is the spiritual/metaphysical essence in man. We now go back to the analysis of Igbo conception of human ontology.

In Igbo ontology of person, eke depicts human nature. For instance, it is in the nature of man to be egocentric, altruistic or conscientious, just as it is the nature of man to be scientific, technological, philosophical or otherwise. Eke therefore, refers the human anthropological essence. Agwu is the state of probability in man. Probability in this instance would mean that man is a being in a state of flux or becoming. The tendency then is that he may (probably) bring his anthropological attributes into manifestation and he may (probably) not. Probability in this wise will then depict the intrigues, mischief and intricacies in life, which is why Agwu in Igbo cosmology is also regarded as the deity of psychology and psychiatry that ingenuously polices human and cosmic affairs. Chi captures man as a being of possibilities and potentialities whose existence is mostly

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Summa Philosophica futuristic. It is through the mastery of chi that the limitations of agwu are overcome. Chi is also the fashioner of the ideas and concepts for directing human destiny towards the actualization of human anthropological attributes. Chi is regarded as the essence of the creator in man, making chi to be immortal.

The Igbo notion of immortality is captured in the doctrine of reincarnation. By reincarnation (i.e. doctrine on the immortality of the soul) the Igbo do not mean metempsychosis or transmigration (i.e. as it is with the Indian samsara), but the incarnation of the essential traits, sparks or attributes of an ascended ancestor in a new born. Hence the Igbo notion of reincarnation is closer to the Buddhist anata. The Buddhist chant om mani pad mi hum meaning hail to man’s overself, shows that at the attainment of nirvana, only the essential sparks of the ascended master reincarnates.Thus for the Igbo, reincarnation further confirms the dualistic reciprocity and complementarity between spirit and matter and between the world of immortals and the world of mortals. This close dualistic affinity also confirms the view among Africans in general that life-force operates on the logic of cyclical triad (i.e. the law of concentric circles). Ascended ancestors as the past mutate to the spirit world as the future only to reincarnate anew into the present world of humans. This way, continuity, cohesion and balance are ensured.

Furthermore, based on the concept of reincarnation, the Igbo do not regard death as punishment to man. Death is rather a natural process by which the energy base of the universe (i.e. spirit) is renewed. Death is only part of the process of universe regeneration which is otherwise known as recycling. Recyclement is the order of the universe. As the old pass on, the new evolve to replace the old. We see this demonstrated by the plantain/banana plant which always brings forth a new shoot to replace the aged and fading mother plant. We see it too in the Bantu concept of the absolute phallus that eternally spermatizes the universe for sake of continuity.

So for the Igbo, reincarnation and death are facts of life meant to augment existence in general. Thus, as factors that enable continuity of existence, reincarnation and death rotate on the four primordial forces of eke, orie, afo and nkwo. These four primordial forces represent the Igbo way of classifying the totality of existence. These four are not just market days but four modal forces or causes comparable to Greek four principal elements: water, air, fire and earth; to the Jewish four elements: yod (fire),

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Summa Philosophica he (water), vau (air or life) and he (earth) [the four packaged together would yield YHVH, meaning Yahweh – the I am that I am); and to the Bantu four primordial forces of Muntu, Kintu, Hantu, and Kuntu all of which are stems of the most primordial ntu. The four primordial forces of eke, orie, afo and nkwo interplay in the form of pairs as follows: eke la afo (eke and afo); orie la nkwo (orie and nkwo) and as they do so they spontaneously bring about cohesion, stability and alteration. To illustrate, nkwo refers to things in a state of decomposition (i.e. the Igbo nkwori or ntari, meaning to chew), orie refers to things in motion or process (i.e. the Igbo rie, connoting digestion), afo refers to things contained or in a container (i.e. the Igbo ihe doro na afo, referring to the stomach as a container), while eke refers to things conditioned (i.e. the Igbo ihe ekereke, referring to a package or tied bundle). By implication, Igbo thought process acknowledges the complementary duality of opposites and contraries in the universe responsible for unity in diversity and also for pluralistic existence.

When we use these four primordial forces to evaluate the issues of death and reincarnation, we would come to the realization that four (4) is the base number sustaining the entire universe. For instance, the organization of events on quarterly basis (i.e. number four) yields a cyclical triad of three (i.e. the equilateral triangle superimposed in a circle). Here, we see the Igbo contemplate the entire universe as a circle and inside the circle is an equilateral triangle, so that there is a circular triad of past, present and future, cosmos, society and man, spirit, mind and body etc, all ensconced in one. When we combine four (4) and three (3) we get the prime number seven (7) which holistically encapsulates even and odd, thereby simulating opposites and contraries. This might explain why the number seven (7) is seen by the Igbo as perfect. So at death, man departs from the worlds of eke and afo, and then transits to orie and nkwo. Whereas his spirit takes a flight to orie, his body undergoes decomposition at nkwo. At the point of reincarnation, man becomes once more reconditioned in eke an in afo, that is to say, as a complete entity of spirit, mind and body.

Now, recall we said that for the Igbo, uwa (the world) is a package and that those who understand the mystery of this package will unknot it. The act of unknotting the riddles of the package and the contents therein is known as gbaasia or tuasia. Gbaasia or Tuasia is a process of epistemological enquiry which belongs in the body and activity of knowledge known as Mgbaasi (i.e. Igbo equivalent of philosophy). Therefore, Mgbaasi spells out theories about reality and about Being. The

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Summa Philosophica mastery and artistry of gbaasia is mgbaasi. In mgbaasi are contained ntoala and usoro. Ntoala in this instance means the ontology of culture or the ground in which reality as omenala (i.e. the anthropological study of culture) is rooted. Usoro deals with the ordering of reality. In it is encapsulated epistemology, ethics and logic and is meant to proffer methodology and structure of discourse as well as professional discipline to guide and guard research.

Dibia is the adept at mgbaasi gained through the mastery of ebia. Ebia etymologically derives from bia, which simply means come, signifying that ebia is essentially an inflow or a sort of ethereal essence seeking for a ready vehicle to inhabit. It is in this sense that the Igbo say that ebia na bia bia (meaning that ebia is an inflow). The Igbo also say, ebia ma onye ‘nkeya meaning that ebia knows its own. Thus, ebia is a metaphysical essence which in subjective terms connotes talent (i.e. ability intrinsic to its owner) and in objective terms it connotes science in the sense that one with an inflow has the primordial know-how of a field of knowledge. Through the act of education ebia translates into nka. Nka means art or craft. It could also mean artistry. As a metaphysical attribute nka would then connote the primordial principle of formation, creativity, invention, discovery, exploration, planning and governance. In this wise, nka can be regarded as the equivalent of the Egyptian ptah (i.e. logos) and also the Greek logos or the Chinese Tao. Hence, nka is the outward expression of ebia, making ebia to become manifest physically through intersubjective discourse. The manifestation of ebia through nka happens within usoro such that nka becomes the laboratory activities of ebia. Existence in itself is nka or an art reminiscent of nka. In essence, the organization of experience is not possible without nka. The acts of speech, science, law, governance, commerce, economics, engineering, technology, philosophy etc, are but nka in manifestation. By implication existence is constituted by ebia and nka in continuous mutation. The mastery of ebia through nka and the use of nka in organizing experience is dibia. In professional terms therefore, dibia is not just a fortune teller but an adept or specialist in ebia (science), who through the use of nka and usoro tackles problems both at individual and societal levels. The implication of all this is that for the Igbo knowledge is primarily metaphysical or simply spiritual.

Yoruba Metaphysics

Complementarity in Yoruba thought system is represented by so many proverbs and one of such goes thus: owo omode o to pepe ti agba

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According to Moses Akin Makinde and Kola Abimbola, the totality of reality for the Yoruba consists of the spiritual world of supernatural forces and the physical or natural world of animate and inanimate things, which we henceforth render as the immaterial and the material. According to Kola Abimbola:

Yorùbá religion divides the cosmos into two realms of existence, the spiritual world and the natural world.The spiritual world is the abode of supernatural forces such as Olódùmarè (the Yorùbá High God), the Òrìsà (all the Yorùbá divinities), the Ajogun (anti-gods or the malevolent supernatural powers), the Àjë (who are translated inadequately into English as "witches"), and the ancestors. The natural world is composed of humans, animals and plants (2001).

Furthermore, the Yorùbá supernatural world consists of existential and functional hierarchies. In the existential hierarchy, we can identify four levels of chronological/existential superiority:

Level 1: Olódùmarè, Ôbàtálá, Ifá and Èÿù. Level 2: The other divinities; the Ajogun (i.e., evil supernatural forces--we can call them anti-gods); the Àjë (often improperly translated as ‘witches‘). Level 3: Humans; plants and animals. Level 4: The ancestors (Ibid.).

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Kola Abimbola goes ahead to state that the world of the ancestors derives from that of humans because one condition for becoming an ancestor in the Yorùbá cosmos is to have lived a morally worthy life here on earth. Hence one must have lived life as a human before becoming an ancestor. He then explains that “if one does not pay careful attention to the details of Yorùbá theology, it is easy to misunderstand the status of the ancestors. This is because within the functional hierarch, the ancestors are above humans (but are placed below the divinities)” (Ibid). Hence, in the functional hierarchy, Olódùmarè is undoubtedly supreme as the chief executive. Olódùmarè is the final arbiter in all functional issues in the Yorùbá cosmos. However, a close affinity exists between the two realms of the immaterial and the material as: “Spiritual beings visit the natural world regularly and through divination, sacrifice and spirit possession, natural beings can also partake in the spiritual world occasionally. The spiritual and natural worlds are, therefore, interdependent” (Ibid.).

Interdependence is not only between the supernatural and the natural but also within the supernatural and natural as well. We see this in the act of universe formation and the things therein. For instance, Ifá poems reveal that three divinities have always coexisted with Olódùmarè and these are Ôbàtálá, Ifá, and Èÿù (i.e. Esu). This means that Olódùmarè did not create these three, they rather coexisted with him, it also means that there was interdependence in the task of universe formation. This is most evident in the creation of humans and in the administration of cosmic and earthly affairs.

Moreover, when it comes to the creation of humans and the world, it is quite clear from Ifá poems that there was a division of labor among Olódùmarè, two other divinities, and a third spiritual entity who is not regarded as a divinity. It was Ògún who fashioned skeletons, Ôbàtálá molded forms and shapes, and Olódùmarè imparted the breath of life. We also have Ajàlá, an entity who is not regarded as a divinity, but who molds the Orí (i.e., "innerheads") of humans. Orí is the principle of "destiny" in the sense that it embodies each individual’s potentialities for success and/or failure on earth.Moreover, when it comes to day-to-day administration of aye (the natural world) and Õrun (the supernatural world), Olódùmarè has delegated responsibility to the divinities. This is precisely why the

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Yorùbá do not often pray to Olódùmarè. They do not worship, offer sacrifices, nor build temples for Olódùmarè. Indeed, in terms of the day-to-day administration of the cosmos, Èÿù, who functions as the universal policeman, is the most important divinity (Ibid.).

We can see from the above a perfect plan in division of labour. Whereas Ògún fashions skeletons, Ôbàtálá molds forms and shapes, Ajàlá designs the Orí (i.e. innerheads), to Olódùmarè belongs the task of imparting the breath of life. The foregoing is corroborated by M. A. Makinde who explains that the “creation of ara (body) is a task undertaken by Orisanla (Ôbàtálá), Ogun (god of iron) shapes or carves the owo (hands) and ese (legs), including fingers and toes, Ajala gives the ori (inner head), while Olódùmarè gives the emi (breath of life)” (2007: 104 - 105). For Makinde, Olódùmarè’s function in the formation of humans has pre-eminence over those of other spiritual entities in the sense that the physical and metaphysical assemblage of those other entities would remain inert without the vital force (emi) which endows humans with existence. The foregoing analysis further raises other issues such as Yoruba conceptions of the human personality, the questions of evil, justice and of course, human destiny.

On the question of human personality Makinde explains that the Yoruba have a tripartite conception of a person which includes “the ara (body), emi (spirit or soul) and ori (inner head)” (pp. 103 – 107). These three components of man however play a duality of purpose. As Makinde explains: “In Yoruba thought, for instance, the head in its spiritual plane as ‘inner head’ may be said to have affinity with the world of ideas like the soul while, in its physical plane, it may be said to have affinity with the world of senses. Hence, the use of these words: head, breast or chest, suggest that they are entities which exist both in the physical and spiritual planes” (p. 109). The foregoing explanation would then make it clear why in Yoruba thought emi and ori which are metaphysical entities cannot function in the physical plane without the assistance of owo and ese both of which belong to ara. E. D. Babatunde on his part explains that the Yoruba eniyan (human being) is a personality that comprises the “ara (body), emi (the vital-force), ori (head or inner head), okan (heart) and ikun or inu (stomach)” (2000: 336). As he explains, because emi is the vital-force the Yoruba refer to the human being as eda elemi (meaning breathing

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Summa Philosophica creature). Ori on the other hand plays a role that is both physical and metaphysical. As a physical entity, ori is the “host of the senses gbigbo ran (hearing), reran (seeing), gbigbo oorun (smelling) and ji jeun (the power of eating)” (Ibid.). In Makinde view ori is the seat of opolo (2007: 110) or brainwhich in Babatunde’s view makes ori to be the controller of the remaining parts of the body. In Babatunde’s view ori as a metaphysical/spiritual entity represents the uniqueness or essence of man which makes it “the host or seat of wisdom, intelligence and thinking” (Babatunde, 2000: 336). This apart, Babatunde seems to suggest that because ori is sometimes referred to as ori inu, a connection should then exist between ori and inu or ikun (Babatunde, 332).

In “Eniyan: A Critical Analysis of the Yoruba Concept of Person” Barry Hallen (2000) attempts an exhaustive account of the issue at hand. He examines the views of Yoruba scholars on eniyan among whom are Ellis, Lucas, Idowu and Wande Abimbola. For Ellis components of Yoruba personality may be divided into two main groups: “(1) the soul or vehicle of personal existence referred to as iwin or okkan and(2) a set of three internal guardian spirits: (a) olori,(b) ipin-ijeun and (c) iponri. Okan says Ellis, is heart. He suggests that ojiji or oji (meaning shadow, shade or ghost) serves as additional reference for iwin. Iponri is the big toe while,olori or oni-ori is same as ori (pp. 289 – 290). To Lucas eniyan consists of ara, emi and okan. Ara is the medium through which we relate to the physical world, it is the divine element in man or the seat of life, while okan plays roles which are both physical and spiritual. Okan is the physical heart, it is also the life-force in man which has the ability to embody and disembody. It is the source of insanity (pp. 291 – 293). Bolagi Idowu and Wande Abimbola on their part attempt to shed further light on this issue. According to Idowu emi is invisible, intangible and hence, spiritual. Ori is the word for physical head, while ori-inu refers to the inner or internal head. Inu more appropriately refers to intinstines which are thought to be the source of strength and resourcefulness. Ipin is same as portion. When then we conjoin ori and ipin to derive iponri, we then speak of ori as the director of human destiny. Ori therefore functions as (1) personality soul, (2) chooser of destiny and (3) externalized (or subliminal) guardian and protector (pp. 295 297). Wande Abimbola’s account is more ontological. According to Barry Hallen, Wande identifies emi, ori and eseas the principal components of eniyan. Emi is the imperishable element in man,ori is the element of destiny, while ese is the facilitator of ori here on earth (pp. 297 – 298). All of this goes to show that for the Yoruba man is a complex being that need to be studied comprehensively.

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Next is the issue of human destiny. The impression gathered from our discourse on ori is that ori in Yoruba thought is generally associated with human destiny. This at least seems to be the thinking of Makinde who in his work entitled: “A Philosophical Analysis of the Yoruba Concepts of Ori and Human Destiny”. Here, Makinde examines the ori concept alongside the concepts of predestination and fatalism. He concludes by stating that since for the Yoruba sacrifices can be made to alter a particular destiny, conflict then ensues between the choice of an ori and the act of propitiation. Could it then be that the individual involved is ignorant of the choice made in the spirit world and if this be the case, could that be the reason for making a second and conscious choice now? Whichever way we look at this, it simply implies that human life is essentially existential. Kola Abimbola attempts a resolution of this conflict. He explains that:

The role of Orí in the Yorùbá conception of personhood is often misunderstood. Having been weaned on the staple Western diet of freewill and determinism, many contemporary philosophers of African thought have spilled much unnecessary ink on the question of how the Yorùbá can maintain free will, punishment and reward alongside the conception of ‘inner head’. The fact of the matter is that this is all much ado about nothing. Ifá poems make a very clear cut distinction among Orí (the principle of actualization and earthly success or failure), çsê (the principle of individual strife and struggle), and Ìwà (good character) (2001).

Kola wonders why most philosophers who quote various Ifá poems in relation to this issue often do so from Western perspective. And this is in spite of fact that the poems themselves (and Wande Abíðbölá’s own expositions) discuss Orí within the context of earthly success and failure. Besides, the concept of Ìwà in Yoruba thought makes it crystal clear that the individual is a free moral agent. Unfortunately, Anglo-American philosophy which makes no distinction between determinism vis-à-vis earthly success and determinism vis-àvis moral character is transmitted wholesale into Yorùbá thought. Unless one can point to situations in which Yorùbá culture punishes people for lack of earthly success and achievement, says Kola, discussing Orí in relation to moral responsibility and autonomy is misplaced.

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Why then is Esu the symbol of cosmic policing and justice in general? We should note at this juncture that for the Yoruba, as it is for every African people, there is no Satan in the Biblical or Koranic sense who as evil incarnate rivals or contests with God in every ramification. For the Yoruba, Esu (the Igbo Agwu) is an appointee of God who oversees human and cosmic activities, a status that bestores on it a divinity of cosmic policing. Now justice consists in awarding to everyone his/her due reward or punishment. This essentially is the role of Esu. To illustrate, when we ask for our daily bread through prayers, we are definitely not appealing to God. The entity we are deliberately or inadvertently appealing to is Esu. This is because the only way we can obtain our daily bread is by solving one problem or another. Life is all about problem solving. Problems sustain life; problems propel solutions, such that life becomes a constancy of tinkering on how best to organize human existence.

So on a certain morning, vulcanizer, panel beater, mechanic, doctor, lawyer, insurance broker, banker, coffin seller etc, all prayed for daily bread. Vehicles got on the highway to their various destinations. Unknown to most of them, robbers left some nails tucked into oranges on the highway overnight. A particular car ran over one of the oranges in which a six inch nail was concealed. One of the tires got burst, making the driver lose control. Another car following closely behind hit the car with punctured tire and before long there was multiple accident. Damage of all kinds and degrees were incurred variously. Of course such incidence provides multiple avenues for all who have prayed for daily bread. The media person will fetch news, the vulcanizer, panel beater and mechanic have been provided with jobs, the injured will be rushed to the hospital and should any death occur, the mortuary attendant and coffin seller are not left out of the gain. Those who feel cheated in the process of settlement concerning the accident will go to court. Those with insurance coverage will call on their brokers for the replacement of their cars. Such transaction would normally be through the bank. How about construction companies, the road safety and the police? All will be engaged one way or another in helping to solve the problem at hand thereby justifying why they earn salaries. In the thinking of the Yoruba (as it is for other African people) such a contrivance cannot be the handiwork of God almighty but of Esu, who through intrigue and mischief brings about balance and cohesion in the universe.

Recall that the accident occurred due to the evil plan of robbers. Recall also that this evil plan of robbers ended in an accident which in turn

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Summa Philosophica provided multiple opportunities for all sorts of professionals. Hence, without the evil machinations of the robbers the prayers of bread seekers will not answered. What this means is that for the Yoruba (and for Africans in general) there is a duality of reciprocity between evil and good. Put differently, evil and good are inclusive, not exclusive and therefore, complementary. Kola Abimbola sheds more light on this.

I have relied upon this conception in a discussion of the problem of evil. The focus of my analysis was not the standard problem of evil in relation to the existence of God. Rather I posed an epistemological question about the rationality of the belief in God given that moral and natural evil exist in the world. The answer implicit in Yorùbá theology seems to be the following. We ought to distinguish between concepts and instantiations. The concept of good makes no sense independently of a concept of evil to contrast good with. In fact, Yorùbá theology suggests that there can be no such thing as a perfectly good world unless we understand the meaning of evil (2001).

It is clear from the above that among the Yoruba good as a concept cannot be understood outside the concept of evil. But as Kola further argues, a concept need not have instantiations.

In the Yorùbá cosmos, instantiations of evil are the handiwork of natural beings (such as humans) and supernatural beings (such as the anti-gods known as Ajogun). Contemporary Yorùbá society operates on this poly-demonic conception of evil and responsibility. In Yorùbá culture, the malevolent supernatural being called Àrùn (Disease) can be held responsible for disease, just as a human being can be held responsible for an evil act that was up to that person (and not up to a malevolent force). The question, of course then is this: how do we determine when a malevolent force is responsible for an evil act? The answer supplied by Yorùbá theology is: divination. This is precisely why, up till today, all Yorùbá medical practitioners are also diviners (Ibid.).

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So evil emanates neither from Olodumare nor from Esu, but from malevolent spirits and diabolical human beings. Thus contrary to Anglo- Christian theology which holds Satan responsible for all evil deeds, for the Yoruba metaphysical evil emanates from evil supernatural forces called the Ajogun. There are two hundred plus one (200+1) of these forces in the cosmos. The Ajogun have eight warlords: Ikú (death), Àrùn (Disease), Òfò (Loss), Êgbà (Paralysis), Õràn (Bigtrouble), Èpè (Curse), Êwõn (Imprisonment), Èÿe (Afflictions). In the same vein, the Ajogun could also be responsible for natural and moral evil. For instance, while Ikú (the supernatural force called death), might be responsible for a car accident, another evil force called Omìmì is responsible for earthquakes and earth tremors (Ibid.). Interestingly, the poly-demonic forces, like modern day computer virus system keeps expanding. Lets listen to Kola Abimbola once more.

Note that 200+1evil supernatural forces is not the same as 201 supernatural forces! The extra 1 is actually the set of all those evil forces that did not originally descend from the supernatural world at the time the natural world was created. In short, the Yorùbá conception of evil contains what we may call a principle of elasticity that allows it to incorporate any new force of evil into its pantheon. The principle of elasticity also applies to the divinities who are 400+1 in number (Ibid.).

Next is the Yoruba concept of heaven (orun). In “Immortality of the Soul and the Yoruba Theory of Seven Heavens (Orun Meje), Makinde speaks of heaven among the Yoruba to be sometime mainly associated with life after death, implying the it is entirely other-worldly concept. According to Kola Abimbola, scholars as Bolaji Idowu and Benjamin Ray also give the impression that the Õrun of Yorùbá theology is somewhat equivalent to the heaven of Christiantheology. Kola goes on to argue that “Õrun, (often improperly translated as heaven) is divided into two parts: ÕrunÒkè (i.e. heaven above) and ÕrunOdò (i.e. heaven below). Only three supernatural entities reside at ÕrunÒkè: these are Olódùmarè (the Yorùbá High God), Õranñfê, and, ßàgó (the god of thunder and lightning). ÕrunÒkè as the name suggests is located above in the skies, while ÕrunOdò is located inside the earth’s crust. All the other supernatural entities (ancestors, the other divinities, the Ajogun, etc., including Olódùmarè, who resides in Õrun above) reside at ÕrunOdò (Ibid.). This apart, the Yoruba generally do not

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One last thing to note is that traditionally, the Yoruba like the Igbo counted four (4) days in a week, not seven days as is done in contemporary time. This means that the seven day a week factor in Yoruba cosmology is a fall out of the influence of Christianity. Again, Kola Abimbola’s view on this matter is most handy.

Traditional Yorùbá society operated on a four day week, and as such there is no fifth day that is "set apart for the worship of the Deity". "Every fifth day" in Yorùbá numerology is actually "every fourth day" in Western numerology! This is because Yorùbá society operates on an inclusive counting system while the Western system is exclusive. For instance, if today is a Monday and we have scheduled a meeting for next Monday, then, from the Western conceptual scheme, one would say our next meeting is in seven days time. But from the Yorùbá conceptual scheme, next Monday is in eight days time because we count the current day as well. So although the traditional Yorùbá priest would say that s/he worships the divinities at least "every fifth day", there is actually no fifth day in the Yorùbá week.

The point to be gathered from the forgoing is that numerology provides the basis for mathematical interpretation of the days in a week and hence, it also provided the basis for societal organization.

Kemetic (Egyptian) Philosophy

Kemetic or Egyptian philosophy is fondly referred to as the mystery system. It was so fondly called because it contained the teachings of the inner secrets about the origin and order of things in the universe. These mysteries were taught under the seven arts and seven sciences, meant to train the mind on the mastery of the self and the forces of nature. Hence, those with knowledge of the mysteries were considered to be adepts or simply wise. It is interesting to note that when the Greeks encountered the same corpus of knowledge, they on their own part referred to it as Sophia, meaning wisdom. But to be wise is to have deep knowledge

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According to Innocent Chilaka Onyewuanyi, Kemetic philosophy spreads out in five systems. We have the “Hermopolitan system, the Heliopolitan system, the Memphite theology, the Akhenatonian (also spelt Akhenatenian) system which introduced monotheism into ancient Egypt and the Amarna theology” (1994: 179 – 206) which was another version of monotheism. We can therefore divide Kemetic philosophy into two main stages. These are the stage preceding the advent of monotheism and the stage that ushered in the birth of monotheism. The first stage bears a lot in common with traditional African thought system. Here, we see the laws of complementarity and interdependence at play. This first stage also happens to be the foundation of what today is known as Greek philosophy. In fact, George G. M. James is of the view that Greek philosophy and by implication Greek classics is stolen Egyptian philosophy and classics. And in the view of I. C. Onyewuenyi, Kemetic philosophy provided the prototype (i.e. origin) for Greek philosophy. The second stage of Kemetic philosophy which is the monotheistic stage preceded all monotheistic systems including Moses’ Yahwism or Jewish Judaism, Christianity and of course Islam. The first stage of Kemetic philosophy consists of three systems which are the Hermopolitan, the Heliopolitan and the Memphite. “In the Hermopolitan system, the god Amun with the Ogdoad was employed as symbols of the divine in the creation of the universe. The Heliopolitan system stressed Atum and the Ennead. The Memphite theology accentuated the god Ptah-Ra and the Ennead” (p. 178). As Onyewuenyi explains these were three systems of Egyptian cosmology and cosmogony that developed in the three different cities of Hermopolis, Heliopolis and Memphis. They are three different ways of explaining the origin of things, each, acting as a sort of improvement on the preceding one. Of note, all three systems agree that life began from “primordial abyss, Nun” (p. 179) also variously addressed as primeval waters Nun, chaos, the formless and boundless and the hidden. However, the Hermopolitan system states that Amun is the most primordial entity that preceded every other entity and also conceived the pattern of universe creation/evolution. Onyewuenyi makes James Allen’s view on this issue assessable.

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Something or someone had to be responsible for positing the Chaos from which order would result when creation proper actually took place. The Hermopolitan system makes Amun the “intellectual” principle that “thought” out this idea. He perceived the pattern of existence long before creation. In his hiddenness he projected existence. In the concept of Amun, Egyptians reached the limit of speculation into the causes and origin of existence…. Amun is the ultimate god, first and origin of all others. His existence surpasses but does not cancel that of other gods. Amun is one as the single ultimate cause of all existence, but many in its realization. His is transcendent as the pre-existing creator, but immanent in his creation. His ultimate nature is unknowable in itself (Allen, 1988: 62; cited by Onyewuenyi, 1994: 180).

Just as with the Yoruba creation story, we see Amun, like Olodumare cooperating with other gods in the course of universe formation. In the Heliopolitan system, Atum takes the place of Amun. But Atum is not as primordial as Amun since he (Atum) actually crests at the back of another higher principle known as Ptah before it proceeded to play a role in the act of universe formation. Besides, Amun still stands as the most primordial of all the gods In Memphite theology, Ptah plays the principal role in creation. Unlike the Hermopolitan Amun and the Heliopolitan Atum which were physical gods, the Memphite Ptah is an intellectual principle of creation. Hence, we can say that the Memphite system shows how far “Egyptians could go towards a creation in philosophical terms” (Wilson, 1946: 56; cited by Onyewuenyi, 1994: 201). The philosophical twist here can be seen in the fact that Ptah is equated with Logos which as the principle of intelligibility contemplates and speculates about the forms of things, while Atum forges the thoughts of Ptah into finished physical products. At the stage of Memphite theology therefore, Ptah takes over the role of Amun as the most primordial principle of creation in Egyptian philosophy.

Another thing of importance to note at this first stage of Egyptian philosophy is that the creation stories set the stage for a discourse on the issues of permanence and change. In Kemetic cosmology and cosmogony, the notion of change is built on the doctrines of “(a) Opposites and Contraries (b) Change or Transmutation and (c) on the view that the life and function of the universe is due to any of the four elements: fire, water,

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Summa Philosophica earth, air” (James, 1988: 81). Thus, by 5000 BC, ancient Egyptians captured the concept of change (transmutation or alteration) in the form of a double square diagram (i.e. with inner and outer squares). According to George James; this ancient theory was expressed by a diagram formed by outer and inner squares. The corners of the outer square carried the names of elements: fire, water, earth and air. The corners of the inner square, being at the mid points of the sides of the outer square, carried the four fundamental qualities, the hot, the cold, the dry and the wet. The diagram explains that fire is hot and dry; earth is dry and cold; water is cold and wet; and air is wet and hot. Accordingly water is an embodiment of cold and wet qualities, and when cold quality is replaced by the hot quality, the element water is changed into the element air, with the wet and hot qualities (Ibid.).

Contraries breed conflicts generated through the opposites of negatives and positives as manifested in the elements: earth, fire, water and air. Earth and the all things in it are in a constant state of becoming. As the element fire heats up all things, alteration, transformation and transmutation (change) occur. Hence, with the constancy of fire (heat) ice melts to become water, water evaporates to become air, and with the presence or absence of heat, air can become hot or cold, causing change in temperature, weather conditions and with time, climatic conditions.

In actual fact, the doctrines of opposites and contraries derive from the belief that the universe is eternally governed by plurality and so there is a perpetual struggle between the one and the many, unity and diversity, order and chaos etc. By implication, the universe is in eternal state of becoming. Nevertheless, this perpetual state of flux would not be possible without the coordinating functions of the primordial principles of Ptah and Atum. Ptah being the more primeval of the two primordial forces is the same as the Logos who as the principle of intelligibility fashioned the universe out of fire. George James makes Jamblichus view on this matter available. “The Egyptian God Ptah was the God of order and form in creation, an Intellectual Principle. This God was also recognized as the Divine Artificer, who fashioned the universe out of fire” (p. 69). To paraphrase James, Ptah as the Primate of the Gods conceived in his heart everything that exists and by His utterance created them all. He is first to emerge from the primeval waters of Nun in the form of a Primeval Hill. Accordingly, Ptah is accredited with the following attributes: (a) The Primate of the Gods or The God of Gods (b) The Logos. Thought and creative utterance and power (c) The God of order and form and (d) The Divine Artificer and Porter (pp. 139 – 140).

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Atum (also known as Atom or Aten) is the second primordial principle to emerge from the primeval waters of Nun. Thus sun God (Ra) Atum also emerges from the primeval waters to crest upon Primeval Hill Ptah from where He (Atum) projected four pairs of parts of His body to form the Ogdoad and proceeded to create eight other Gods who then comprised the Ennead. Thus like Ptah, Atum traverses the three stages of chaos, order and development in Egyptian cosmology and cosmogony. And whereas Ptah as Logos intellectualizes and idealizes the forms of things, Atum as the Demiurge translates the intellectualizations and idealizations of Ptah into final or concrete state of affairs. It is by sitting on Primeval Hill Ptah to accomplish the task of universe formation that Atum became the Demiurge and by causing a total of eight other gods to move out of His body without being moved that Atum assumes the position of the “Prime Mover Unmoved” (p. 143) or the “Uncaused Cause” (i.e. the Christian Ens Causa Sui). It is then through this entangled intermingling that the universe is in a perpetual state of becoming, of creation and transformation, of alteration and transmutation. In the philosophy of Plato (427 – 347) the Demiurge (i.e. Egyptian Atum) is presented as the: “Divine craftsman who bears the same relationship to the cosmos as the carpenter bears to his tables. The divine craftsman constructed the cosmos according to an idea or plan, so that the cosmos and everything in it are replicas (and always imperfect ones because of the limitations inherent in the materials) of eternal ideas or forms” (Lindberg, 1992: 36). Again, from this same concept of Atum as the Demiurge, as the Prime Mover Unmoved and as the Uncaused Cause, Aristotle would derive the doctrines of the Unmoved Mover and Uncaused Cause. Aquinas later derived the same doctrines from Aristotle. George James explains that Egyptian cosmology consists of three parts each being supplementary to the other and presenting a complete philosophy by their combination. Part (I) deals with the Gods of chaos, part (II) deals with the Gods of order and arrangement in creation, and part (III) deals with the Primate of the Gods, through whose Logos creation was accomplished. In part (I) pre- creation or chaos is represented by (i) Ptah the Primate of the Gods emerging from the primeval waters Nun in the form of a Hill [i.e. Ta-tjenen meaning the Risen Land] (ii) Atum [i.e. Atom the sun God] immediately joining Ptah, by emerging also from the chaotic waters Nun, and sitting upon Him [the Hill] (p. 102).

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Primeval waters Nun then depicts the pre-creation or chaos from which emerged Ptah (i.e. Logos as the principle of intelligibility, intellectualization and idealization) and Atum (the finisher and executor of the ideas and concepts fashioned by Logos), who then instructed order or unity into chaos or diversity to bring about progress and development (note that in the Hermopolitan system the functions of Nun, Ptah, and Atum in creation were preceded by that of Amun). Hence, at the second stage of universe formation, a dialectics and a hermeneutics of change ensue. “Atum, having absorbed the thought and creative power of Ptah, then proceeds with the work of creation (i.e. task of ordering things to be). He names four pairs of parts of His own body, which became Gods (i.e. the Ogdoad), and in this way, eight Gods are created, who together with Atum become nine Gods in one family or Godhead called the Ennead” (p. 103). The Ogdoad then comprise four pairs of male and female Gods who themselves emerged from primeval waters Nun and absorbing the qualities of Ptah would be projected through the body of Atum in the form of frogs and serpents, in the following order.

Nun and Naunet [i.e. primeval ocean or water (matter) and the counter heaven (space)] Huh and Hauhet [i.e. the Illimitable or the Boundless and its opposite] Kuk and Kauket [i.e. darkness or obscurity and its opposite] Amun or Amon and Amaunet [i.e. the hidden or concealed and its opposite] (pp. 75, 102 & 140)

We immediately see in the above the opposites and contraries through whose interactions transformation, transmutation and alteration occur. In the Ennead, we see the concrete elements and personalities responsible for change in the physical realm become manifest. They include; “Shu (Air), Tefnut (Moisture), Geb (Earth), Nut (Sky), Ausar or Osiris (principle of omnipotence and omniscience represented with the eternal naked eye from which Anaxagoras got the doctrine of Nous), Auset or Isis (Ausar’s wife, female principle), Seth (agent of evil, opposite of good) and Nephthys (female principle in the unseen world)” (pp. 142 – 143). The highlights of the discourse on change in Egyptian cosmology and cosmogony are therefore as follows:

Water is the source of all things.

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Formation (i.e. creation) was accomplished by the unity of two creative principles: Ptah and Atum, i.e. the unity of Mind (Nous) with Logos (creative utterance). Atum was the Demiurge or Intermediate God in the process of formation. He was also sun God or fire God Opposite principles control the universe, and The elements in creation were Fire (Atum), Water (Nun), Earth (Ptah or Ta-tjenen) and Air (Shu) (p. 141).

Evident in the foregoing is the equi-primordiality (co-primevality or that both principles are primary and complementary) of Nothingness (non-Being) and Being, whose intermingling results in perpetual flux, making the universe and the things in it to be in a continuous state of Becoming. Among the Greeks and much later with the evolution of phenomenological ontology, the treatment of non-Being, Being and Becoming will give rise to the methodological orientations of dialectics and hermeneutics. The second stage of Kemetic philosophy is characterized by the evolution of monotheism and it comprises Akenaton’s single god and the Amarna theology. Pharaoh Akhenaton (1350 BC) of the eighteenth dynasty, originally known as Pharaoh Amenophis IV, son of Amenophis III and grandson of Thutmose III introduces into Kemetic cosmology and religion the idea of an absolute God who is intolerant of any other. He (the new God) alone reigned in his sky as eternal and supreme without any rival or assistant. This single absolute God is known as Aten and unlike “the traditional gods, it did not create any gods and there is no known process by which he created the world, he is exclusively single as god ; every other existent is a creature” (Onyewuenyi, 206). Onyewuenyi goes further to suggest that: “It is significant to note that the Jews were still in Egypt when Akhenaton of the Eighteenth Dynasty introduced monotheism as the religion of the whole Egyptian empire. It was during the Nineteenth Dynasty, under Ramses II, that the Jews were extremely oppressed; resulting in their eventual exodus under the leadership of the Egyptian trained Moses. Evidently, Egyptian monotheism anticipated Jewish monotheism, and the theory often articulated that Jewish monotheism is an improvement on Egyptian monotheism is false” (p. 208). Amarna theology takes its name after Tel el Amarna, the capital city of Egypt during Pharaoh Akhenaton’s reign. The Amarna theology presents “Amun in his respect as Sun-god, praising him under the names of Ra, Kheperi, Horakhtoy, Khnum, Amun and Aten” (p. 206). However, unlike Akhenaton’s sole universal god, the Sun-god of Amarna theology was still addressed in traditional terms. He was “King of the gods, lord of all

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So far, we have seen the stages of development in Kemetic philosophy. It moved from the stage of poly-gods to mono-god. Needless to say, at both stages of development it provided the impetus for the emergence of later Greek, Jewish, Christian and Islamic thoughts. For instance the doctrine of salvation (Summum Bonum) in Kemetic philosophy became for the Greeks the ethical search for the ideal life, the doctrine of Nun is the same as Parmenidean Being, Lord Ausar (depicted as the omniscient naked eye in an equilateral triangle) is the same as Anaxagoras’s nous, Ptah and Atum provide the bases for Heraclitan Logos and fire, Amun/Atum is the same as Plato’s Demiurge and Aristotle’s Prime Mover Unmoved, Atum (Fire), Nun (Water), Ptah or Ta-tjenen (Earth) and Shu (Air) provide the bases for the four elements (air, water, earth and fire) of the Eleatic school, Egyptian Ausar is same as Greek Osiris, while Egyptian Auset is same as Greek Isis etc. We have already seen that the monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam were all cloned from Akhenaton’s single god.

References Abimbola, K. (2001), “Spirituality and Applied Ethics: An African Perspective” in West Africa Review ISSN: 1525- 4488

Allen, James P. (1988), Genesis in Egypt: The Philosophy of Ancient Creation Accounts, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press; cited by

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Onyewueyi, I. C. (1994), The African Origin of Greek Philosophy: An Exercise in Afrocentrism, Nsukka: University of Nigeria Press.

Anyanwu, K.C. (1981), African Philosophy: An introduction to the philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa, Rome: Catholic Book Agency.

______(1983), “Presuppositions of African Socialism” in The Nigerian Journal Of Philosophy, vol. 3.

Asouzu, I.I. (2007), Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology Beyond World Immanentism, Ethnocentric Reduction and Impositions. Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2007.

Babatunde, E. D. (2000), “Bini and Yoruba Notions of the Human Personality” in Substance of African Philosophy,(ed. C. S. Momoh), Auchi: African Philosophy Project Publication.

Chinweizu (2005), “Gender and Monotheism: The Assault by Monotheism on African Gender Diarchy”, published as Appendix in Anatomy of Female Power: A Masculinist Dissection of Matriarchy (New Edition), Lagos: Pero Press.

Edeh, E.M.P. (1985), Towards an Igbo Metaphysics, Chicago: Layota University Press

Ekei, J.C. (2001), Justice in Communalism: A foundation of Ethics in African Philosophy, Lagos: Realm Communication Ltd.

Hallen, B. (2000) “Eniyan: A Critical Analysis of the Yoruba Concepts of Person” in Substance of African Philosophy, (ed. C. S. Momoh), Auchi: African Philosophy Project Publication.

Idoniboye, D.E. (1973), “The idea of African Philosophy: The concept of spirit in African Metaphysics” in SecondOrder: An African Journal of Philosophy vol.11, No.1. Ifemesia, C. (1979), Traditional Human Living Among the Igbo: A Historical Perspective,[Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers.

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Iroegbu, Pantaleon (1995), Metaphysics: The Kpim of Philosophy, Owerri: International University Press Ltd.

James, G. M. G. (1988), Stolen Legacy, San Francisco: Julian Richardson Associates.

Makinde, M. A. (2007), African Philosophy: The Demise of a Controversy, Ile-Ife: Obafemi Awolowo University Press.

Mannheim, K. (1959), Essays on Sociology of Knowledge (ed. P. Kecskemeti), London: Routledge and Kegan Ltd.

Momoh, C.S. (2000), ed. The Substance of African Philosophy, Auchi: African Philosophy Project Publication.

Mozia, (1982), “solidarity in the Church and solidarity among the Igbo of Nigeria” [PhD Thesis at Lateran University, Rome; cited by Ekei (2001),Justice in Communalism: A foundation of Ethics in African Philosophy, Lagos: Realm Communication Ltd.].

Okafor, F.U. (1992), Igbo Philosophy of Law, Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd.

Onwuejeogwu, M. A. (1997), Afa Symbolism and Phenomenology in Nri Kingdom and Hegemony: An African Philosophy of Social Action, Benin City: Ethiope Publishing Corporation.

Onyewuenyi, I. C. (1978), “Towards an African Philosophy” in Readings in African Humanities: African Cultural Development, (ed. Kalu. O. U.) Nsukka: University of Nsukka Press.

______(1994), The African Origin of Greek Philosophy: An Exercise in Afrocentrism, Nsukka: University of Nigeria Press.

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Uchendu, V.C. (1965), The Igbo Southeast of Nigeria,New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Unah, J. I. (1996), ed., Metaphysics, Phenomenology and African Philosophy, Ibadan: Hope Publications.

______(1997), Heidegger, Through Kant to Fundamental Ontology, Ibadan: Hope Publications. ______(1999), African Philosophy: Trends and Projections in Six Essays, Lagos: Concept Publications.

Wilson, John A. (1946), “Egypt: The Nature of the Universe” in The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man, (ed.Henri Frankfort), Chicago: University of Chicago Press; cited by Onyewueyi, I. C. (1994), TheAfrican Origin of Greek Philosophy: An Exercise in Afrocentrism, Nsukka: University of Nigeria Press.

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CHAPTER THIRTY ONE

KWAME GYEKYE’S AKAN METAPHYSICS

In his book, An Essay on African Philosophy Thought: The Akan conceptual scheme; (1987), Kwame Gyekye, of the University of Ghana, presents us with the view of reality in its different aspects by his native culture, the Akan. We shall briefly present his study in four headings before drawing.

i. Categories of being ii. Causality iii. The person iv. Destiny, free will and Responsibility

Categories of Being Primary in the Akan doctrine of being is the reality of a Supreme Being (Onyame, Onyankopon). This is in descending hierarchy followed by the reality of gods and goddesses, ancestors, humans and the physical empirical world in its various contents. In Akan ontology, the gradation of beings is not pyramidal as Parrinder would claim for African societies. It is rather vertical: god, Spirits, Ancestors, Humans and other cosmic beings. The ancestors who were formerly humans occupy a privileged status having acquired higher powers in the spiritual-world. Gyekey narrates a traditional prayer pervading Akan religious practice from which the Akan ontology of the hierarchy (therefore reality) of being is derived. Supreme god, who is alone great, upon whom men learn and do not fall, receive this wine and drink. Earth goddess, whose day of worship is Thursday, receive this wine and drink. Spirits of our ancestors receive this wine and drink (Gyekye 1987:68,75). Though God is viewed alongside other beings, yet he is a causa sui generis (special case apart). That he is worshipped proves him to be real among the Akans. The qualities attributed to him bring out his ontological status as the ultimate ground of all realities: the Nyame is the great, the creator of all things. He is infinite, Absolute, Eternal. He is he who endures from ancient times, Boundless and unsurpassed. Finally he is invisible and omnipresent.

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Susun (spirit) As for the Ashanti, so for the Akan and many other African traditional societies, spirits inhabit the universe: the highest sunsun being God, then the lower spirits. Different phenomenal beings in their hierarchies share in sunsun. Man, for example, has a sunsun aspect in his being. The hierarchy of beings is an index of the hierarchy of power. Gyekye notes therefore that a higher being can destroy or affect beings lower to it. God can do so to all other beings. What Onyame has established, no living man can thwart or subvert. A man can kill a fellow man, but he cannot annihilate him. Only God can. This view touches correspondingly on the Akan concept of causality.

For the Akan, Asem biara wo ne farebae, that is, Everything has a cause (Gyekye, 1987: 77) This means that nothing can be without being caused. Nothing happens without being caused. Even ordinarily normal events; birth, crisis, illness and death have a primordial cause behind them. Not excluded are extraordinary phenomena like: earthquakes, drought, flood, bush fire, and other “natural” or climatic phenomena. All are caused by some being for some purpose. A given person, Kwasi Okolo, on his way to the farm like many others, encounters a strong wind. But Kwasi Okoko unfortunately is at the position of a weak tree, which the wind blows down. The strong branch hits Kwasi Okolo and he dies on the spot or later on at home or hospital. Causality here is not just explained by the gale or accidental presence of Kwasi Okolo under the tree. The physical elements are not excluded. But they are not enough explanation. The natural turn of events has a supernatural side to it. Thus for the Akan, In our complex and bizarre world, physical laws, which are the creation of human intellects, cannot claim to exhaust all possible explanations of events and behavior (Ibid.,pp.83-84). The Akan searches deeper. He questions: Why this particular man, Kwasi Okolo Why at that particular time and spot? Generally the traditional Akan goes in to find out a deeper socio- religious and transcendental cause of the tragedy of Kwasi Okolo. Often it is a punishment by a spirit. It could be a nemesis or a sanction for some offence: personal or communal. Or it could be a “presage”, i.e a warning to all and sundry about some disorder to come and to be avoided. Generally, a native priest or doctor does the explicative role of saying the deeper

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The Person Theorists and interpreters of Akan metaphysics of the human person are agreed neither on the exact constituents of the person, nor on the precise meaning and relationship of the terms proposed. The general theory is that the human person is constituted of three elements. The Okra (soul), sunsun (Spirit) and Honhom or Nipadua (body) Gkyekye accepts this list and gives an interpretation, which sees Okra as soul that is immaterial. Okra constitutes the individuals life-force. It has a close link with Honhom, breadth. Infact the Okra is the ontological reality that causes the breathing effected by the Homhom. But Kwasi Wiredu identifies five different elements: 1. Nipadua (body) 2. Okra (soul, approximately) 3.Sunsun (character) 4.Ntoro (genes from the father) and 5.Mogya (blood from the mother, to become ghost at death) (Wiredu 1987:161).

Okra, sunsun and honhom In a late article, Wiredu takes a clearer stand as to the meaning of Okra. To translate it simple as soul, he now asserts, is “quite definitely wrong”(Wiredu 1980:47). He prefers to term it a life-giving entity defined as “that whose presence in the body means life, and whose absence means death, and which also receives the individual’s destiny from God”(Wiredu 1987:162). Okra cannot be equiperated with the English term spirit argues Wiredu, because while the soul is purely immaterial, Okra is quasi-physical and has para-physical properties. Gyekye outrightly rejects this. The Akan, he argues, believe in disembodied survival or life after death. If Okra were partly physical, such a survival would be impossible. For Gyekye, thought (adwen) is strictly speaking, the activity of the sunsun, which later is a part of Okra (soul). What then is sunsun?

Sunsun (Spirit) This is generally the mystical force in any given reality. Specifically it is the activating principle in a person. It is essence of a given reality: deity, man or plant. It activates the being and gives it identity and functionality. It is the power of action in extraordinary ways. It is the font of personality and strength (HK Minks). It “is that which is responsible for the total effect communicated by an individual’s personality, without trying to appropriate to it any more simple English term (Wiredu). The mind is a

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Okra-Sunsun Relationship While many equate both aspects of Okra and Sunsun, Gyekye acknowledges the complexity of their relationship. He holds that in the thought of many Akans, though closely related, they are different. For instance, in dreams it is not the Okra, but the sunsun that leaves the body to roam about to contact other spirits. If the Okra leaves the body the person is dead. One can say that while the Okra is the seat of life, the sunsun is the operative principles: the Okra in action. Both however are complexity is to follow Ogbu Kalu and render the Okra as spirit-soul and sunsun as personality-soul. In this case what reincarnates is the sunsun, and not the Okra for the reincarnate shares the personality traits, not necessarily the soul, of the living-dead. Honam (body) is the physique: its relation to the Okra (soul) and sunsun, (spirit) is not dualistic but unitive. The person is body – (blood) and soul (- spirit) in unity. Though different elements, their interactiosn are close and unitive. Gyekye defines this as an interactionist psychophysical dualism and believes it to be a realistic Akan doctrine of personality. He concludes: From the point of view of the Akan metaphysics of the person and of the world in general, this seems to imply that a human being is not just an assemblage of flesh and bone, that he or she is a complex being who cannot be explained by the same laws of physics used to explain inanimate things, and that our world cannot be reduced to physics (Gyekye 1987:103).

Destiny, Free Will, and Responsibility Destiny or fate (Nkrabea) generally in Akan traditional thought, is the message borne by a person’s soul that determines the general outlines of the person’s life in the world. This is concretized in the basic attributes of a person. The omnipotent Supreme Being gives these attributes. They influence in general outlines a person’s behavour and character. They may not necessarily determine the concrete. Yet because the basic qualities do not change, his way of life leading to his destiny is not changed. There is no by-pass of God’s destiny. God’s destiny cannot be altered. No living many can subvert the order (arrangement) of God (Ibid., 113).

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Yet man has a role to play to shape and realize his end of destiny. Each individual is fitted for some specific type of action. Each person has something in order to arrive at something. Failures are explained by either the inability to discover one’s talent and develop and use them, or the error in involving oneself in other areas, not areas destined for one (Ibid., 119).

Free will That man is fundamentally free is argued by Gyekye thus: Because Nkrabea (destiny) expresses only the basic attribute of the individual, and because Nkrabea is general and not specific, human actions are not fated or necessitated” (Ibid., 121). Akan metaphysics of freedom as presented by Gyekye maintains that the individual is free and can make meaningful progress of his existence within the general framework of destiny. This means that by destiny, there are things the individual cannot do, levels he cannot step over. But by free choice there are areas he can transcend, acquire and accomplish. Trying hard, the Akan says, breaks the back of misfortune. Genrally they accept that one is not born with “bad head”, but one takes it on the earth. One chooses one’s way of life. And if a man in unhappy, his conduct is the cause. Accident means a caused, but unintended event. Moral evil comes from the exercise of man’s free will and of evil spirits (bad deities).

Responsibility If god is wholly good as the Akan asserts, he cannot be held responsible for evil in the world. Their doctrine of causality attributes evil and its consequences to evil spirits, to man’s badness, and the effect there from. For his good deeds, man is rewarded. For his evil ones, he is punished either here or hereafter. Man is fully held responsible for his acts: good or bad. When vevil spirits come to play, man has the imperative to drive them away via the appropriate channels and rituals. At the end, he is ultimately responsible for his fate. Summarily, one would conclude that, for the Akans, Nkrabea (destiny) is realized in the contours of free will and responsibility, limited as both are.

Conclusion Certain items have been presented above: the categories of being: from God to inanimate beigns: universal causality as explanatory of all creaturely effects; the human person as a body/blood, and soul/spirit, composite; and the understanding of, and relationship among destiny, free will and responsibility. These and many others as discussed by Gyekye

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PART VII: THE RELEVANCE OF PHILOSOPHY

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CHAPTER THIRTY TWO

PHILOSOPHY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL REFLECTION ON THE NIGERIAN CHALLENGE

Andrew O. Efemini

ABSTRACT Philosophy as an essentially critical and rational discipline has a lot to offer in any discussion of development both as a concept and human experience. Development is not the same as economic growth, rather development is a value-laden concept which is human-centered. Development is about how human beings are faring in the complex interaction with the environment. The paper argues that development as a desirable human phenomenon is best realized by States that are guided by inclusive conception of justice similar to the ideas of John Rawls and unlike the utilitarian pursuit of pleasure and happiness for the majority. The point is further made that Nigeria is unable to serve as a vehicle for realizing our conception of development because of the failure of politics and the faulty state-building process which manifests in the problematic pseudo- democratic political arrangements. Finally the paper argues that Nigeria’s path to sustainable development must include a constitutional reform which guarantees legally justiciable social, political, and economic rights for all Nigerians.

INTRODUCTION There is a definite relationship between philosophy and national development. In other words, the question ‘is there a relationship between philosophy and national development’ cannot be equated in terms of philosophical status with questions like ‘is there human mind’ or ‘does God exist’ or ‘what is the essence of human life. However attempts to state or define the nature of relationship between philosophy and development will ordinarily generate some contentions and disputations the way ‘mind’ ‘God’ and ‘essence of human life’ issues will.

Our goal in this paper therefore is to provide working definitions for key concepts that are relevant to the topic and thereafter examine the role of the philosopher in driving the vehicle of development forward. The concepts that require elucidation are ‘philosophy’ ‘development’ and ‘national development.’

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WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? Philosophy literally means love of wisdom. This is the translation for philein (to love) and sophia (wisdom). The Greeks understand by ‘love’ desire or quest and ‘wisdom’ for them means ‘knowledge.’ We can therefore infer that philosophy for the Greeks represents man’s desire for knowledge.

A few words about the nature of philosophical desire are important at this stage. When we desire to know the answer to 17+16, we are looking for a specific answer which is 33. This desire is not philosophical but mathematical. However, once we ask how we know that 17+16=33 or ‘what are numbers?’ philosophical challenges arise.

One difference between the philosophical and mathematical questions is that the answer to the philosophical question is indefinite whereas the answer to the mathematical question is definite. In addressing philosophical questions, there is no requirement for a definite common axiomatic response from those attempting to address those questions. It is logically plausible to argue for or against the existence of ‘mind’ ‘God’ ‘freedom’ etc.

On the other hand, if one replies that ‘4+3=5’ or that ‘17+16=26’ or that ‘15- 4=2’ mathematicians would ask for a mental test for that person because they would all argue that the answers supplied differ from the expected answers. Mathematicians or even commonsense would supply ‘7’ ‘33’ and ‘11’ respectively for the problems.

One other point about the nature of philosophical desire needs to be made. Given the fact that philosophers seldom have consensus as a general result from their efforts, we can imagine that the desire of the philosopher would be unending and persistent. Each response to a philosophical question like a cancerous growth produces multiple more questions. We find ourselves struggling to address more and more issues as we grapple with immediate ones. We can at this stage, define philosophy as the unending quest or search for knowledge.

Philosophers ordinarily ask innocent and harmless questions but discover to their shock that addressing those questions will take eternity to resolve. Usually, questions that are not resolved to everybody’s satisfaction are fundamental and general in nature. The ability to ask basic, general, and fundamental questions is crucial for any person who intends to pursue a career in philosophy.

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In philosophy, we are interested in examining issues to see how they fit into our overall conception of reality. Reality here is conceived of as the totality of all that there is. This is partly why we say that the object of philosophical inquiry is all conceivable ideas. Socrates once cautioned that ‘the unexamined life is not worth living.’ Following the Socratic Method, which is known as the ‘midwifery method’ we are encouraged to ask questions which help us search for deep answers inside us by exercising our rational ability.

We can infer that philosophy is a rational discipline which seeks to justify through argumentation rather than experimentation the positions that we take on issues. We try to offer reasons why we think one position is more justifiable than others. One’s reason(s) for holding a position is further subjected to questioning by others and the circle continues ad infinitum. According to Kwame A. Appiah (2003: xviii) “philosophy is one way to enrich your ability to examine the assumptions and ambitions that guide your life.”

For Anand Amaladass (2001:6): The philosopher is one who thinks reasonably, attempts to bring clarity- that means order, and that means, again, the intellect, in the world and in life. Historically seen, philosophy was a reasonable,scientific activity, a teaching, and not poetry. Amaladass (2001: 9) again insists that philosophy is: … a radical science, in the sense that it goes to the roots, deeper than other sciences. It will further analyze and question where the others are satisfied. For our purpose in this paper we shall simply take philosophy to be that discipline that questions our basic beliefs and ideas about things in general with a view to ensure that we have rational justification for holding the beliefs. We shall apply this view of philosophy to the idea, concept, issues and problems of development.

WHAT IS DEVELOPMENT? There is a tendency to equate development with economic growth. In this regard, a country or nation is said to be developing if its Gross National Product (GNP), Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and per capita income are rising or increasing. We notice that scholars who belong to this school of thought emphasize the economic dimension of development. To access the

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Summa Philosophica development of a country, we are advised to look at the economic indices of the society.

It is important that we do not equate economic growth with development. As Claude Ake (1996: 125) puts it “development is not economic growth even though economic growth in large measure determines its possibility.” The point Ake is making is that economic growth is crucial and necessary for sustainable development but it is not enough or sufficient to bring it about. In other words, we must go beyond economic growth if we are serious about realizing development. Daniel A. Offiong (1980: 151) warns us against what he refers to as ‘growth without development.” This happens when: There is real growth in terms of conventional economic indicators, but its concomitant problem is the coexistence of a relatively well-off and dynamic sector and a sector of stagnant and even growing misery. The point being made is that the crisis of distribution of economic benefits to a society can produce destabilizing social consequences arising from wide gaps between the rich and the poor. The point is that economic growth can occur in a society in such a way that it leaves a majority of the people in poverty while an infinitesimal segment of the population live in affluence.

Ake (1992:9) restates his views on the relationship between development and economic growth thus: …growth, essential as it is for creating the resources that can provide people with better life, is not an assurance by itself of people– centered development. The process of growth has to be oriented so as to raise the income and productivity of the poor and to promote a sustainable use of the scare natural resources and the environment. The real fear expressed by critics of economic growth as yardstick for measuring development is the fact that it does not pay sufficient attention to poverty, social inequality, and the abandonment of a large segment of the population which are all compatible with economic growth.

What then is development? The first point to note is that development is a multi faceted concept. It is not a concept that yields a consensus for those struggling with its definition. However, we can all argue that development is about people. Consequently, we can reach a conclusion that will not be rigidly disputed which maintains that development is a people-centered concept. Without reference to human beings, development will simply be

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Summa Philosophica an abstract concept with little or no meaning. Development according to Ake is not a project which can be executed above the people. It is something the people must own and drive with their energies and resources. As Ake (1996: 125) puts it: Development is not a project but a process. Development is the process by which people create and recreate themselves and their life circumstances to realize higher levels of civilization in accordance with their own choices and values. The UNDP (1990: iii) in its report supports the argument that development is about the people when it insists “We are rediscovering the essential truth that people must be at the centre of all development. The purpose of development is to offer people more options.”

The real challenge which is philosophical has to do with our conception of how development ought to involve the people. If we all agree that any talk about development which is pursued at the expense of the people is contradictory in terms, the question is which people are we talking about? Everybody, a few people, the majority or what?

Can a society be said to be developing or developed if it produces happiness for the majority members or if it takes care of the interest of all members of a society? The point is that the concept of development is intimately connected with the concept of justice and more specifically social justice. In a serious discussion of development in any society, we must be interested in the following issues among others: 1. The place and welfare of children 2. The place and welfare of men and women 3. The quality and access to education 4. The quality and access to health care. 5. The quality and access to housing 6. The quality of leisure hours. In a fundamental sense, development is about the quality of life available to the people. The emphasis is on quality rather than quantity. Development ultimately is about human welfare. It is a participatory concept and not ad hoc accidental non-sustainable and piecemeal increase in consumables. Our next effort is to place development within the context of national development.

What is national development or when is a nation said to be developed? We appreciate the fact that human welfare and decent living conditions are the ultimate goals of development but we still need to grapple with the

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Summa Philosophica problem of defining the concept of national development. Why is United States regarded as developed and Nigeria not?

At the level of a nation, development has something to do with self reliance. In other words, genuine development must be pursued on the basis of principle of self reliance which is based on the people’s creative energy. The point is that a nation can only be truly described as developed if it takes charge or is responsible for mobilizing its people in terms of the decisions and the resources needed to realize their conception of development. It is the responsibility of a nation striving for development to create and recreate the conditions that will lead to better life for the people, especially the ordinary people who are the victims of bad politics.

Ake makes the point about self reliance when he argues in favor of endogenous development as against exogenous development. As he put it (1996: 6): A necessary element of successful development strategies is the willingness of the developing society to accept unequivocally the responsibility for developing itself. Without prejudice to the catalytic role of a supportive international environment, there is nothing like exogenous development. All development is endogenous. Again we are stating a preference for endogenous development because we believe that it is more participatory and more sustainable. This point was made by Robert Bernasconi (1998: 23) who argues: … there are many reasons, both socio-economic and political, for supporting endogenous development. For example, it is liable to be more effective both in the short term because it arises from understanding of the local conditions that foreign agencies will never attain and in the long term because it allows the population to retain their autonomy. Endogenous development could generate commitment from the people once they realize that it is their future that is at stake. It is important that the people become both the means and the end of the development process.

The values identified so far with national development are incompatible with certain forms of policies. Policies that rest on external borrowings without marching policies to utilize those borrowed funds for sustained industrialization on self reliant long term goals, policies that promote economies that depend on foreign technology which result in capital flight, policies that tie national economies to the policies of international financial institutions and policies that seek for markets offshore without promoting local markets are not likely to lead to sustainable development.

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PHILOSOPHY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA As students of philosophy, we should be able to raise fundamental questions about the obstacles and prospects of sustainable development in Nigeria. Can Nigeria overcome the challenges standing between her and a decent and prosperous living standard for her people? If the answer to the above is in the affirmative how do we achieve that? Two questions need to be addressed in order to pave way for examining the question of the prospects for development in Nigeria.

The first question is essentially empirical. We need to understand the reality of the problem in Nigeria. Where are we and how are the people faring? This question has to be addressed given the backdrop of our earlier position that development is really about human beings and their well- being. The general consensus is that Nigeria is a developing country with enormous potentials but bogged down with deep seated challenges. We can list the following as the key elements of Nigeria’s reality: 1. Massive unemployment due to the insignificant growth in industrialization and manufacturing. It is not unusual to find university graduates unemployed five to ten years after graduation. The situation is worse for non-university or tertiary institutions graduates. The massive scale of unemployment means that the society would have to cope with millions of restive, agitated, irritated, frustrated, suffering, abandoned, militant, alienated, psychologically traumatized, and deeply dehumanized citizens.

One consequence of the unemployment situation is that the unemployed rely on the employed for survival. This negatively affects saving capacity of the population with its bad consequences for investment. It is normal to see ten or more members of an extended family depend on one member of the extended family for support to survive the harsh reality of life in Nigeria. Millions of unproductive manpower results in dependency of grave proportion to the society and crimes that no longer exist in well ordered and organized societies.

2. Over dependence on oil is another challenge which confronts Nigeria in a special way. The Nigerian economy which used to rely on agricultural products from the different regions now depends on oil for its survival. This has several political and

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economic consequences for Nigeria. In the first place, the fall of revenue from the other sectors implies a reduction in the total revenue available to the people and anger from the oil-bearing communities. The Niger Delta crisis is a manifestation of this crisis.

3. Neglect and non-integration of rural communities into modern civilization. In Nigeria’s rural communities you find millions of people without formal education, with no access to basic amenities, unemployed and unemployable engaged in subsistence farming or agricultural activities yielding less than 50cents or 100naira a day. They are Nigeria’s wretched of the earth. We notice in these communities a reproduction of misery, suffering, and pre-modern mode of thought. People are born; they live and die in ways that are incompatible with advances made in the fields of science and technology by man. The existence of these communities is an indictment of the elite and raises serious questions about the legitimacy of the State in Nigeria.

The next question we need to address is the question of why Nigeria is finding it difficult to transform the living conditions of her people. What are the obstacles to sustainable development in Nigeria? The chief reason for Nigeria’s woes is politics. Bad political environment has made it difficult for Nigeria’s economy to grow and perform in a manner that will lead to new lease of life for the population.

Nigeria is particularly unfortunate because the failure of the state-building project of the colonial past still hunts the country. There was hardly a ‘state as state’ at the end of colonial rule and till date we have not overcome the faulty state building process imposed on us by colonialism. The British in creating Nigeria brought together ethnically diverse population with different metaphysical worldviews which as we have come to realize are irreconcilable. These metaphysical differences have been source of tension, conflicts, and violence in Nigeria. The struggle to enmesh the State in the struggle of these worldviews has resulted in deeper conflicts.

The philosopher has an enormous responsibility to interrogate these worldviews to see if we can find a basis for sharing common destiny in ways that respect the rights of individuals and all groups. This is important because as we can see religious differences have led to the practice of

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Sharia law, customary law, and English common law in various parts of the country. The fact that there are different economic and socio-political practices allowed by these laws is quite instructive.

Sharia law for example outlaws the consumption of alcohol and restricts its sale even for non-Moslems. It is understandable that one has the right to decide on whether to drink or not to drink but the restriction of access to alcohol for non-Moslems is problematic. It is imperative that mutual tolerance form part of our social habits in Nigeria. It is the duty of philosophers to examine the idea of tolerance and the limits of tolerance if any in the pursuit of any cooperative project.

What kind of State will best protect the interests of individuals in a pluralistic and multicultural setting? This question confronts Nigeria in a special way. In Nigeria we have centrifugal and strong agitations from ethnic, religious, professional, and other groups. These agitations have influenced and continue to influence economic and political policies of government. The existence of these agitations takes us back to the challenge posed by Socrates’ ‘the unexamined life is not worth living’

At this stage we must attempt to speculate on the overall vision that should guide the direction of development in Nigeria. The views of utilitarians and John Rawls will influence our discussion. Utilitarianism is the doctrine which supports the promotion of happiness rather than pain for the greatest number of people. In other words, by utilitarian standards, a society is just if it can be shown that the interest of the majority is being served.

It must be noted that utilitarian principles influence democratic practices in a fundamental way. The idea of voting rests in most cases on the assumption that majority wins an election and the pursuit of policies supported by the majority is quite legitimate. Do we then recommend utilitarianism as the principle that should guide us? Is majoritarianism a perfect doctrine? Are there no shortcomings that we can associate with utilitarianism?

In a pluralistic society like Nigeria, is there no obvious danger in implementing social and economic policies on the basis of utilitarian principle? What happens to the minority groups? Is majoritarianism not compatible with slavery and oppression of the minorities? These questions should be answered bearing in mind Immanuel Kant’s Categorical

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Imperative which in its second formulation advocates that all men be treated as ends and no man as means. Kant’s argument is that unless we treat people as end-in-them-selves, we will be treating them as means to other people’s end which is compatible with slavery. We must therefore insist that all economic and social policies treat every Nigerian as end. This will entail pursuing policies that are inclusive rather than exclusive.

A major critic of utilitarianism is John Rawls. Rawls’ major attack against utilitarianism is the fact that utilitarianism is compatible with slavery of the minority. For Rawls any society where slavery is tolerated is inherently unjust and should not be reformed rather than tolerated. Rawls (1973: 3) puts it thus: Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust.

Unfortunately, the basic institutions of society in Nigeria are not only unjust but are a major source of conflicts and human sufferings. Basic institutions for Rawls include Political constitutions. A lesson is that Nigeria’s Constitution which is supposed to be the basis of our shared destiny should be reformed or abolished since we can point to several sections of the Constitution that are problematic, contentious, and outright unjust.

Presently Nigeria is governed under the 1999 Constitution which from facts is an imposed document by the military and their civilian collaborators. The opening section of this document presupposes the democratic participation of the people in the enactment of this vital document when it states “We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Having firmly and solemnly resolved”. Jumai Audi (2003, 105) while commenting on this section of the Constitution remarks that it is not true that the Constitution was put together by the people but rather it was a product of manipulation by the elite in power at the time.

The following are some examples of bitter disagreement as subsequent events have shown; the basic structure of the State (composition of local government and state creation), power and limit of authority of constituent units of the federating units, the role and place of religion in the public and private lives of Nigerians especially the females. The Constitution as a document which is supposed to define the basic institutions promotes

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Summa Philosophica discrimination in several ways. It has no clear position on citizenship rights and its fundamental principles of state policies are not enforceable. In this regards regard, nobody takes responsibility for the debased living conditions which Nigerians are passing through (hunger, unemployment, insecurity, poor health, poor infrastructure, etc.)

Our goal we should pursue as a nation is to ensure that each Nigerian’s basic rights are protected. We must uphold Rawls’ position that: Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others (Rawls: 3). As students of philosophy, we must reflect on the implications of these fundamental ideas for sustainable development in Nigeria.

What kind of State can best promote the idea and vision of development we have in mind? It can strongly be argued that democratic States are best placed to protect the people. This means there is a link between democracy and development. Democracy puts the people in charge of their own destiny and enables them to serve as the source of legitimacy of government. However, we must be aware that democracy is not a pure and class neutral concept. We can agree that democracy is peoples’ government but we need to struggle to ensure that democracy is not just about periodic elections but that it represents the empowerment of the people in the governance process. In the Nigerian situation, it must be directed towards emancipating and empowering the ordinary people and rural dwellers who are the real victims of Nigeria’s political economy.

The Way forward for Nigeria In this section, we shall attempt to speculate on the appropriate path to realizing the conception of development and vision of society being advocated for Nigeria. We do this conscious of the criticism of philosophers as dreamers, and people whose ideas remain only in the realm of “Plato’s world of forms”. One inference from our presentation so far is the view that the main challenge before Nigeria is the creation of appropriate political environment for reengineering sustainable development. The implication of this inference is that establishing the appropriate political environment for development should attract everybody’s attention. Claude Ake (1995, 72) offers a clear statement on the relationship between politics and the African development challenge in the following words:

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We have seen the African crisis broadly as a crisis of development and more specifically as an economic crisis, because of the compelling presence of its economic dimensions: the relentless falls in real incomes, share of world investment and trade, commodity prices and food production; growing malnutrition, decaying cities and collapsing infrastructure. But the crisis is, to my mind, primarily a crisis of politics, from which the economic crisis derives.

Ake (1989: 54) again warns that: We are never going to understand the current crisis in Africa much less contain it as long as we continue to think of it as an economic crisis. What is before us now is primarily a political crisis; its economic consequences are serious as we know only too well, but they are nonetheless incidental. Not only is the crisis essentially political in character, it is also political in its origin. Ake argues that development and economic policies are conceptualized and implemented not in a vacuum but within political context. There has to be government and a state to decide on what policies can bring about development.

A major Constitutional reform is recommended for Nigeria. The goal of the reform is to ensure that the Constitution that guides how Nigerians live is all inclusive, fair, truly federal, and establishes just Basic Institutions which promote the well being of all Nigerians. The Constitutional reform will essentially lead to the recreation of the Nigerian State which presently is deformed. It is difficult to imagine how the Nigerian State will be recreated without a Constitutional conference similar to what the United States had in 1787. That conference produced a revolutionary result when it abandoned the articles of confederation for a true federal Constitution that is now more than two hundred years old. The sort of power, which the constitutional conference should have, sometimes leads people to call for a Sovereign National Conference. It is not the name we call such a conference that is important. Rather the crucial thing is that the constitution that emerges from such conference should form the basis of the redefinition of how people live and relate to one another as citizens of the same country. The new Constitution should guarantee Citizenship rights to all Nigerians. These rights should include political, social, and economic rights. There should be no room for tolerating discrimination against any Nigerian on the basis of indigene-settler controversy. Realizing the norm of non

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Summa Philosophica discrimination would require subjection of group rights to strict state control. Group rights should in no way interfere with rights of individuals guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus no Nigerian should be denied the right to vote or be voted for on the basis of being considered a non indigene. Freedom of worship or to hold religious views again should be guaranteed by the Constitution. Guaranteeing rights associated with religious belief sometimes can be problematic because of the apparent conflicts or differences in what Rawls terms ‘metaphysical doctrines’. Managing religious pluralism has remained a major challenge even for advanced democracies as we have seen in strong agitations by Moslems in the United Kingdom for certain rights including Sharia. However, it does appear that states that strife to separate religion from the state would be more stable and would be in a position to promote basic rights of citizens than states where religious identity of groups dominate state politics. One only needs to look at the Middle East, North Africa, and part of Asia to see the consequences of non separation of religion from state. In the case of Nigeria there is the need to distance the state from religion in certain regards. A situation where the presidency wears Moslem or Christian mask depending on who the President is can only lead to resentment by those whose religion or beliefs are outside the presidency. Religion it is said is a private affair and this should be so on paper and in reality. There should be no spending of public resources on religious matters. Billions of naira is spent on donations to religious groups, sending people to pilgrimage, and lobbying religious leaders during political campaigns. The emerging Constitution of Nigeria ought to make it clear that it is a crime not to separate religion from the State. Besides the issue of norms and constitutional reform, the character and nature of politics in Nigeria ought to change. There is a need for a paradigm shift in terms of how we play politics. One of the evidence of the failure of the state building process in Nigeria is that our politics is essentially warfare-like. Democracy in Nigeria at best is deformed. Rigged elections, uninspiring leaders, lack of ideologically driven parties, and command structured political processes are some of the challenges facing the country’s democracy. Resolving Nigeria’s political dilemma would require a comprehensive electoral reform driven by the principles of one man one vote. This should be taken together with the overriding goal of establishing a society where each individual is guaranteed basic economic and social rights. Reforming the electoral system should take into account the advances in technology to check abuse by the political elites. A situation where votes are manipulated through inflation and falsification of figures, multiple voting,

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Summa Philosophica destruction of voting materials, and outright announcement of fictitious results presuppose that there is no available technology to check these incidents. This claim is clearly false and we need to learn from the experiences of countries like China, South Africa, and of recent Ghana. Needless, to restate the point, that unless we fix our politics as a country, every national effort will be ad hoc and destined to fail. This has been the situation in Nigeria since 1914. Neither politics under colonialism nor politics post independence Nigeria has measured up to global standards. This in our view is the major reason for Nigeria’s continued underdevelopment. Once politics is fixed, the economic challenges facing Nigeria will be far easier to address. Needless to offer speculative insight into the real policy options that will be open to a politically reformed Nigeria wishing to overcome underdevelopment. One thing that is certain is that that Nigeria cannot be managed on the basis of importation of fuel when it is in the national interest to refine fuel locally. It will be a Nigeria where every citizen’s right to work will become the main stay of government. Agricultural revolution, industrialization, and revolutionary health, education, and infrastructural reforms will follow once politics is fixed. A self–reliant philosophy of development is recommended for a politically reformed Nigeria.

CONCLUSION Philosophy as a discipline must in addition to other challenges focus on the human living conditions. This task will entail asking what form of life is best suited for man and for man in a pluralistic society like Nigeria. Doing the above has led us to the position that development ought to be about human beings and the promotion of human welfare and well being. We are inclined to favor a commitment to justice as a fundamental way to drive the development agenda forward. The conception of justice advocated is one that protects all Nigerians. Rawls’ view that each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice which society as a whole cannot override is instructive. Finally, we advocate a democratic State through constitutional and electoral reform as preconditions for repositioning the Nigeria state. Such a state must seek to emancipate the rural dwellers and uplift the living conditions of the ordinary people.

REFERENCES 1. Alfred William Benn, (1914) The Greek Philosophers London: Smith Elder and Co.

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2. Anand Amaladass (2001) Introduction to Philosophy Chennai: Satya Nilayan . 3. Daniel A. Offiong (1980) Imperialism and Dependency Enugu: Fourth Dimension. 4. Claude Ake (1992) The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa Ibadan: CREDU 5. Claude Ake (1995) “The Democratisation of Disempowerment” in Jochen Hippler (ed.) The Democratisation of Disempowerment: The Problem of Democracy in the Third World London: Pluto 6. Claude Ake (1996) Democracy and Development in Africa Washington DC: The Brooking Institution. 7. Claude Ake (1996) Development Strategy for Nigeria after the Structural Adjustment Programme Ibadan: Development Policy Centre 8. Claude Ake, (1989) “How Politics Underdevelops Africa” in Julius Ihonvbere (ed.) The Political Economy of Crisis and Underdevelopment in Africa: Selected Works of Claude Ake, Lagos: JAD 9. Claude Ake (1981), A Political Economy of Africa New York: Longman 10. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) 11. John Rawls (1971) A Theory of Justice New York: Harvard University Press 12. Jummai Audi (2003) “Women’s Rights, Religion and the !999 Constitution” in Abiola Akiyode-Afolabi (ed.) Gender Gaps in the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria Lagos: Women Advocates Research & Documentation Center (WARDC) 13. Kwame A. Appiah (2003) Thinking it Through: An Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy Oxford: Oxford University Press 14. The Journal of African Philosophy vol. II, no. 1, 1998.

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PART VIII: INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC

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CHAPTER THIRTY THREE

BASIC CONCEPTS IN LOGIC

Meaning and Use of Logic

Logic is the art or science of correct reasoning. It is the study of the rules, principles and methods used to identify correct reasoning from incorrect reasoning. In other words, logic deals with the standard for demarcating correct argument from incorrect argument. Logic is essentially a branch of philosophy. Other core branches of philosophy are epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics. There are sub-branches of philosophy or what we could call dimensions of philosophy. Some of these dimensions of philosophy are: social and political philosophy, philosophy of law (otherwise called jurisprudence or legal philosophy), philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of medicine, environmental philosophy, philosophy of education, and so on. Logic as a name is derived from the Greek word, “logos” which originally means “word” or “speech”. However, for the Sophists, “logos” means “discourse”, while for Aristotle, “logos” means “reasoned discourse”.

Logic as a discipline deals with the criteria and the principles which can be used to test arguments and to sort correct arguments from bad or incorrect arguments generally called “fallacies”. The expert in logic, that is, the logician, is concerned with reasoning; whether the reasoning follows the principles laid down for demarcating correct ones from the incorrect ones. The logician sorts good arguments from bad ones. The student of logic is taught how to sort out good arguments from bad ones. The standards for measuring correct from incorrect reasoning are the principles of logic.

Historically, Logic started with Aristotle in his book called Organon. Here, Aristotle laid down the fundamental and basic principles which every reasoned discourse should follow. This does not imply in any way that before Aristotle or before philosophy, that human beings were not reasoning. Human beings were actually reasoning, but logic was not established as a formal discipline, involving the form and quality of arguments.

The study of logic, although a core branch of philosophy, goes beyond the corridors of the department of philosophy. Since every discipline is involved in “reasoned discourse” (to use Aristotle’s phrase), the study of logic and its importance, relevance and significance, is an academic obligation of every

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Summa Philosophica tertiary education student, nay every university student, especially in Nigeria, under the course title, “Introduction to Philosophy and Logic”. One may want to query why non-philosophy students should bother themselves with the study of logic. It is due to the fact that Logic applies to all disciplines

Logic is the foundation of computer science. The logical circuits in the computer are made with the knowledge of the logic of George Boole, involving logical operations. Boolean logic dovetails into algebra in mathematics. Besides algebra there is a presence of logic in mathematics in the set theory. The logicists, such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Whitehead had to claim that mathematics is reducible to logic. Logicism is the name given to the claim that mathematics is reducible to logic. This is to say that logic is the foundation of mathematics. The empirical sciences mainly employ inductive logic in the scientific methodology, and sentential logic is the basis of logical circuits in physics and engineering.

The students of the arts, humanities and social sciences are involved in the use of language and arguments all the way. Semantics cannot do without logic, especially in determining the meaning of words and speech. The students of law use logic in their arguments and the legal profession needs logic, especially in evidence and cross-examination. Logic with its relevance finds a place in our everyday communication.

Logic as an art of correct reasoning, as a study of the basic and fundamental rules governing reasoning and arguments, is a basic study in our university system due to its applicability and relevance.

ARGUMENTS

Argument does not mean a quarrel, a disagreement or any belligerent controversy. An argument is a set of propositions in logic wherein one proposition (the conclusion) is supported by other propositions called the premises. While the conclusion is the principal claim in an argument, the premises serve or act as the proof for the conclusion. For example, in the argument:

All human beings are mortal

Ikpaha Eduok is a human being

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Therefore Ikpaha Eduok is mortal

The principal claim is the last proposition which is the conclusion – Therefore Ikpaha Eduok is mortal. Why is Ikpaha Eduok mortal? The answer is provided in the premises, that is, because “All human beings are mortal” and “Ikpaha Eduok is a human being”.

The two major components of an argument are the premises and the conclusion. As pointed out above, the conclusion is the main claim in an argument while the premises are the proof for the conclusion. It is worthy to note that every statement used in an argument is called a proposition. A proposition is a statement in a logical argument which can be assessed as true or false. Every statement in logic, that is, a proposition, can be assessed or evaluated as either being true or false. If, for example, a teacher commands a student to stand up, saying, “stand up!”, the command “stand up” cannot be said to be true or false. In the statement, “All human beings are mortal”, we can evaluate whether it is true or false. Any sentence which can be assessed as true or false is called a statement, used in logic as a proposition. A proposition therefore has truth value, that is, it can be assessed as either true or false. Arguments therefore contain propositions, some of which are the premises and one of which is the conclusion.

Premise and Conclusion Indicators

There are certain preceding words in a proposition which can be used to identify whether such a proposition is a conclusion or a premise. Conclusions can be identified with words, such as, “therefore”, “finally”, “consequently”, “conclusively”, “in conclusion”, “in summary”, “so”, “hence”, “thus”. Premises can be identified with words, such as, ”since”, “in so far as”, “in as much as “, “because”, “for the reason that”.

Copi (2005:20-21) gives an elaborate list for the conclusion and premises respectively as follows: therefore, in consequence, for these reasons, which means that, hence, consequently, it follows that, which entails that, thus, proves that, we may infer, which implies that, so, as a result, I conclude that, which allows us to infer that, accordingly, for this reason, which shows that, which points to the conclusion that.

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For the premises, Copi lists: since, as indicated by, because, the reason is that, for, for the reason that, as, follows from, may be derived from, as shown by, may be deduced from, in as much as, in view of the fact that.

TYPES OF ARGUMENTS

Arguments are generally categorized into two types:

1. Deductive Argument or Deduction

2. Inductive Argument or Induction

Deductive Argument or Deduction

A deductive argument is that type of argument which makes the claim that its premises (if true) provide incontestable proofs for the truth of its conclusion. Deductive arguments most often (though not always) begin with a universal, general proposition and end with a particular, specific proposition. For example, in the common example,

All human beings are mortal

Ikpaha Eduok is a human being

Therefore Ikpaha Eduok is mortal

The first premise is a universal proposition since “All” includes every human person on earth; while the conclusion “Therefore Ikpaha Eduok is mortal” involves only one, specific, and particular human being. In other words, the conclusion of a deductive argument most often has a particular character, whether it is the first proposition or the last; while the premises most often has a general, universal character.

However, it must be noted that the premises of any deductive argument (deduction) provide irrefutable, incontestable and unshakable proofs and grounds for the claim made in the conclusion. The premises of a deductive argument are the guarantee for the truth of its conclusion.

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If a deductive argument valid and the contents are true, such an argument is said be correct; otherwise incorrect.

A deductive argument can be invalid if the premises when true fail to establish the conclusion incontestably and irrefutably. Validity of a deductive argument means that it is not possible for its conclusion to be false if its premises are true. Validity means that, if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. A deductive argument is either valid or invalid.

The validity of a deductive argument makes the argument to be certain. That is to say, that we are absolutely sure and certain about the truth in a deductive argument. Deductive arguments are certain in as much as they are valid. So, apart from validity as its feature, certainty, apodictic certainty can be attributed to deductive arguments.

The principal role of deductive logic, therefore, is to discriminate valid arguments from invalid ones. The relationship between the premises and the conclusion is that of absolute necessity.

Inductive Argument or Induction

Unlike deductive argument, inductive arguments are uncertain, shaky or shakable and probable.

Let us see the example below:

Akpa Aduok Ikwa is a politician and a corrupt person

Mmafiong Ikpong is a politician and a corrupt person

All politicians are probably corrupt persons.

The conclusion, “All politicians are probably corrupt persons”, is not absolutely certain, but probable or uncertain. We cannot absolutely claim that all politicians are corrupt despite the fact that we have several corrupt politicians. Inductive arguments make inferences from particular instances. Inductive argument is most often used in scientific methodology, where the scientists make probable conclusions based on particular studies of events and phenomena.

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All in all, validity or invalidity, certainty and necessity belong to deductive argument; while uncertainty and probability belong to inductive argument.

THE THREE LAWS OF THOUGHT

Some traditional thinkers, like Aristotle, who regarded logic as “the science of the laws of thought”, established that there are three basic laws of thought. Total and unmitigated obedience to these laws would guarantee correct reasoning. These laws are:

1. The Law of Identity

2. The Law of Contradiction or Non-Contradiction

3. The Law of Excluded Middle

THE LAW OF IDENTITY

The Law of identity is usually stated as A=A.

In other words, a thing (be it an object or statement) is identical to itself. We can say here that a thing is a thing; a thing is identical to itself; a thing is equal to itself.

A thing is what it is and not another thing. If a thing is equal to itself, and “A” stands for a thing, then “A=A”.

LAW OF CONTRADICTION OR NON-CONTRADICTION

The law of contradiction or non-contradiction states that “A” “B”. In other words, “A” and “not not A” are the same. Is it confusing? Let’s look at it this way: Suppose we have two things, “A” and “B”. “A” is “A” and “B” is “B”. “not A” is something other than “A”. Given a world of only “A” and “B”, “not A” would be “B”. If “not A” is “B”, “not not A” would be “A”, since “not not A” negates “not A” which was “B”. Hence the law states that “A” “B”.

Still confusing, then take it this way: A thing cannot be what it is and be another thing at the same time. A statement cannot be both true and false

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Aristotle affirmed that of two contradictories, one must be true and it is impossible for anything both to be, and not to be. Two contradictory statements cannot be ascribed to the same subject at the same time. A thing cannot be, and not be at the same time. A statement cannot be absolutely true and false simultaneously.

LAW OF EXCLUDED MIDDLE

This law states: ”A” or “B”, “True” or “False”. A statement is either true or false, excluding a middle status of being both true and false. This law states that every statement is either true or false. This law is often identified in statements involving “Either…or…”

We use the laws of thought in completing truth tables. We place either a “T” or an “F” in the initial columns of each row of a truth table, being guided by the law of excluded middle. Being guided by the law of contradiction/non- contradiction, we do not put both “T” and “F” together. Having put a “T” under a symbol in a given row, then (being guided by the principle of identity) when we encounter that symbol in other columns of that row we regard it as still being assigned a “T”. The three laws of thought are principles which govern the construction of truth tables.

However, there have been objections to those laws from many philosophers. This implies that the laws are not regarded by the critics as sacrosanct. Hegel and Marx with their followers objected to those laws of thought in their dialectical and fuzzy logic. This dialectical logic avers that any given thesis generates its opposite (anti-thesis) with unmediated immediacy. Hegel also argues that Being and Non-Being are one and the same thing. Hegel may be wrong after all. I object to Hegel all the same.

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CHAPTER THIRTY FOUR

PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC

CATEGORICAL PROPOSITIONS AND CLASSES

Aristotle based deductive argument on propositions called “categorical propositions’’. Categorical propositions are so called because they are about categories or classes. A class or category is a collection of objects which have specified characteristics in common. A categorical proposition is an affirmation or denial of the relation of inclusion or exclusion between one class term and another either in whole or in part.

If every member of one class is also a member of a second class, like the class of pigs and the class of mammals, then the first is said to be included or contained in the second. If some but perhaps not all members of one class are also members of another, like the class of females and the class of athletes, then the first class may be said to be partially contained in the second class (Copi 2005.182). If the two classes have no members in common, like class of all triangles and the class of all circles, the two classes may be said to be excluded from one another.

Types of Categorical Propositions There are four different types of categorical propositions:

1. Universal affirmative propositions (called “A” propositions) 2. Universal negative propositions (called “E” propositions) 3. Particular affirmative propositions (called “I” propositions) 4. Particular negative propositions (called “O” propositions)

This corresponds with the examples below: 1. All politicians are liars 2. No politicians are liars 3. Some politicians are liars 4. Some politicians are not liars

In a universal affirmative proposition, for example, “All politicians are liars”, every member of the first class is also a member of second class. In this

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All “S” is “P”.

In a universal negative proposition, for example, “No politicians are liars”, the first class is wholly excluded from the second class. In other words, there is no member of the first class that is also a member of the second class. The proposition, “No politicians are liars” denies of politicians universally that they are liars. Schematically, any universal negative proposition can be written as:

No “S” is “P”

The universal negative proposition denies that the relation of class inclusion holds between the two classes. Here, the denial is universal. This is why it is called universal negative. A particular affirmative proposition, for example, “Some politicians are liars“, claims that the class of politicians and the class of liars have some members in common. Schematically we write a particular affirmative proposition as:

Some “S” is “P”

A particular negative proposition, for example, “Some politicians are not liars”, does not refer to politicians universally but to some members, like in the case of a particular affirmative. However, it denies or does not affirm that the particular members of the first class are in the second class. Schematically, we can write a particular negative proposition as:

Some “S” is not “P”

In summary, we have the following schematic description of the four categorical propositions:

All “S” is “P” No “S” is “P”

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Some “S” is “P” Some “S” is not “P”

Quality and Quantity of Categorical Propositions

Quality Every standard form categorical proposition has a quality of either being affirmative or negative and a quantity of either being universal or particular. Both universal affirmative and particular affirmative propositions are affirmative in quality. Their letter names “A” and “I” are derived from the Latin word, “AffrImo”, meaning, “I Affirm”. Both universal negative and particular negative propositions are negative in quality. Their letter names “E” and “O” are derived from the Latin word,”nEgO”, meaning, “I deny”.

Quantity Every standard form categorical proposition has a quantity of either being universal or particular. Whenever the proposition refers to all members of the class designated by its subject term, its quantity is said to be universal. The “A” and “E” propositions are universal in quantity. Whenever the proposition refers to some members of the class designated by its subject term, its quantity is said to be particular. The ‘I’ and “O” propositions are particular in quantity.

It is observable that every standard form categorical proposition begins with one of these words: “All” or “No” or “Some”. “All” or “No” shows that the proposition is universal in quantity; “Some” indicates that the proposition is particular in quantity. Therefore, we have the four standard-form categorical propositions as follows:

“A” “E” “I” “O”

General Schema of Standard-Form Categorical Propositions We remember when we represented the standard-form categorical propositions above as “All S is P” ,”No S is P” , “Some S is P” , and “Some S is not P”. ”S” refers to the subject term while “P” designates the predicate. We have the subject term and the predicate as components of a

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quantifier (subject term) copula (predicate term)

In the example, “All politicians are liars”, “All” is the quantifier, “politicians” is the subject term, “are” is the copula, and “liars” is the predicate term.

THE NOTION OF DISTRIBUTION A proposition distributes a term if it refers to the all members of the class designated by the term. A term is said to be distributed when the entirety of the term is referred to. Again, a term is distributed when there is either total inclusion of the term in the other or when there is total exclusion of the term from the other. In the “A” proposition, say, “All politicians are liars”, all politicians are found in the class of liars. Therefore, all politicians are distributed in the class of liars but not all liars are politicians, since we can have some liars who are not politicians. Liars are not distributed in the class of politicians. The subject term of an “A” proposition is distributed but the predicate of an “A” proposition is undistributed. In the “E” proposition, say, “No politicians are liars”, both the subject term and predicate term are distributed. The whole of the class of politicians is said to be excluded from the class of liars. All members of the class designated by its subject term are referred to by an “E” proposition, which is therefore said to distribute its subject term. In asserting that the whole class of politicians is excluded from the class of liars it is also asserted that the whole class of liars is excluded from the class of politicians. Each and every liar is not a politician and each and every politician is not a liar. No member of the class of politicians is among any of the member of liars and vice versa. In the “I” proposition, say, “Some politicians are liars”, no assertion is made about all politicians and no assertion is made about all liars either. Nothing

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is said about each and every politician, nor about each and every liar. None of the two classes is wholly included or wholly excluded from the other. Therefore the subject term of an “I” proposition in undistributed and the predicate term is also undistributed. In the “O” proposition, say “Some politicians are not liars”, nothing is said about all politicians but about some politicians. Some politicians are not liars; may be some politicians are liars. So, there is no total exclusion of the class of politicians from the class of liars. Therefore, the subject term of the “O” proposition in undistributed. However, each and every liar is excluded from the class of politicians. The predicate term of “O” proposition is distributed because there is total exclusion of predicate term from the subject term.

FORM OF PROPOSITION DISTRIBUTION Subject(S) Predicate(P) A All S is P Distributed Undistributed E No S is P Distributed Distributed I Some S is P Undistributed Undistributed O Some S is not P Undistributed Distributed

In summary, we have the following to say regarding distribution: that universal propositions distribute their subject terms, while particular propositions do not distribute their subject terms. Affirmative propositions do not distribute their predicate terms while negative propositions distribute their predicate terms.

SQUARE OF OPPOSITION “Opposition” in propositional logic occurs when standard-form categorical propositions have same subject and predicate terms, but differ in quantity or quality or in both. Certain truth relations are correlated with various kinds of opposition. These are:

1. Contradiction 2. Contraries 3. Sub-contraries 4. Subalternation

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Contradictories Two propositions are contradictories if one is the denial or negation of the other. Two propositions are contradictories if they cannot both be true and cannot both be false. In other words, two propositions having the same subject term and predicate term but differ from each other in quantity and quality are contradictories . The “A” and “O” and the “E” and “I” propositions differ in both quantity and quality. Therefore the “A” and “O” propositions and the “E” and “I” propositions are contradictories. The contradictory of ‘All A is P” is “Some S is not P”; and the contradictory of “No S is P” is “Some S is P”.

Contraries We have contraries if two propositions cannot both be true. In other words, two propositions are contraries if the truth of one entails the falsity of the other. Contraries differ only in quality but may have same quantity. The “A” and “E” propositions are contraries. They cannot both be true but they can both be false.

Sub-Contraries Sub-contraries are two propositions which can both be true but cannot both be false. They differ in quality. The “I “and “O” propositions are sub- contraries.

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Sub-alternation There is sub-alternation whenever two propositions having the same subject and predicate terms agree in quality but differ in quantity. “A” and ‘I’ and “E” and “O” respectively have same quality but different quantities. “A” corresponds to “I” and “E” corresponds to “O”. These corresponding propositions are called sub-alterns.

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CHAPTER THIRTY FIVE

THE LOGIC OF SYLLOGISM

Standard-Form Categorical Syllogism

What is syllogism? A syllogism refers to a deductive argument which has two premises and a conclusion. What is Categorical Syllogism? A categorical syllogism is a deductive argument which consists of three categorical propositions that collectively contains exactly three terms, each of which occurs in exactly two of the propositions.

Major Term, Minor Term, and Middle Term

There are three terms in a syllogism, namely, the major term, the minor term, and the middle term. The Major Term is the term that occurs as the predicate of the conclusion.

The Minor Term is the term that occurs as the subject term of the conclusion. The Middle Term is the term that occurs in the premises but does not appear in the conclusion. The premise containing the major term is called the major premise, while the premise containing the minor term is called the minor premise.

In a standard-form syllogism, the major premise is stated first, followed by the minor premise, and then follows the conclusion.

In summary, major term is the predicate term of the conclusion; minor term is the subject term of the conclusion; while middle term does not appear in the conclusion, but appears in both premises.

MOOD AND FIGURE

The types of the standard-form categorical propositions identified by the letters: A, E, l, O, determine the mood of a standard-form syllogism. Since a syllogism contains three categorical propositions, the mood of every syllogism is represented by three letters, in a specific order. The first letter names the type of the syllogism's major premise, the second names the type of its minor premise, and the third names the type of its conclusion. In the example below:

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No heroes are cowards

Some captains are cowards

Therefore some captains are not heroes

The mood is EIO.

The figure of a standard form categorical syllogism refers to the position of the middle term. Syllogisms can have only four possible different figures. The first figure has the middle term as the subject term of the major premise and predicate term of the minor premise. The second figure has the middle term as the predicate term of both premises. The third figure has the middle term as the subject term of both premises, while the fourth figure has the middle term as the predicate term of the major premise and the subject term of the minor premise (See Ucheaga, 2001:135). We have it as follows:

M-P P-M M-P P-M

S-M S-M M-S M-S

.'.S-P .'.S-P .'.S-P .'.S-P

First Figure Second Figure Third Figure Fourth Figure

Rules of Syllogism and Syllogistic Fallacies

Rule 1: Avoid four terms, lest one commits the fallacy of four terms.

Rule 2: Distribute the middle term in at least one premise, lest one commits the fallacy undistributed middle.

Rule 3: Any term distributed in the conclusion must be distributed in the premises, lest one commits the fallacy of “illicit major" or “illicit minor".

Rule 4: Avoid two negative premises, lest one commits the fallacy of exclusive premises.

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Rule 5: If either premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative, lest one commits the fallacy of drawing an affirmative conclusion from a negative premise.

Rule 6: From two universal premises no particular conclusion may be drawn, lest one commits the existential fallacy.

SORITES

A sorites is an argument whose conclusion is inferred from its premises by a chain of syllogistic inferences in which the conclusion of each inference serves as a premise for the next, and the conclusion of the last syllogism is the conclusion of the entire argument. In other words, we have occasions when a single categorical syllogism will not suffice to account for our ability to draw a desired conclusion from a group of premises.

Copi (2005:275) gives the following examples:

All diplomats are tactful

Some government officials are diplomats

All government officials are people in public life

One cannot draw the conclusion that “some people in public life are tactful by a single syllogistic inference, yet the indicated conclusion is entailed by the stated premises.

Enthymemes

Enthymemes refer to a possible syllogism where the premises are stated but the conclusion is not stated explicitly. Only part of the argument in stated, while the rest is being “understood “. Simply put, enthymeme or an enthymematic argument is an incompletely stated argument. In the argument that:

All nature-born Americans are citizens

Romney is a native-born American

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We are left to understand that Romney is a citizen.

THE DILEMMA

The dilemma is a common form of argument in ordinary everyday language which is most commonly used in debates and rhetoric. It is one of the most potent means of persuasion. In debates we use dilemma to defend our speech, to counter an argument and to subdue any opposition arising in form of an unwelcome speech or argument. In dilemma, we place our opponent in an unpleasant or unacceptable position. This is because of the fact that when a person is said to be in a dilemma, it suggests that such a person is in a position to choose between two options or alternatives, both of which are bad or unpleasant. We can here recall how we were taught in our school days grammar, how one could find himself or herself “between the devil and the deep blue sea”.

In logic and rhetoric, a dilemma pushes an opponent into a corner and defeats him/her there. Students of philosophy, law and political science, whose lives after school may involve debates and disputations, will find the topic of dilemma very interesting. For example, the legal expert would find dilemma very relevant in cross-examination, and the politician may use it during political debates, where he/she may have to subdue his/her opponents logically. We shall below consider two locus classicus examples of dilemma and counter-dilemma:

Example 1

Euathlus wanted to become a lawyer, but was not able to pay the required tuition. He made an agreement with his teacher, Protagoras, according to which the teacher would teach him but not receive payment until Euathlus won his first case. Euathlus eventually completed his courses of study, but delayed going into practice. Tired of waiting for his money, Protagoras brought suit against his former pupil for the tuition money that was owed. Euathlus pleaded his own case in court. Protagoras presented his side of the case in a devastating dilemma as follows:

If Euathlus loses this case, then he must pay me (by the judgment of the court); if he wins this case, then he must pay me (by the terms of the contract). He must either lose or win the case. Therefore Euathlus must pay me.

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Euthalus, who had learned well from the teacher, offered the court the following counter-dilemma in rebuttal:

If I win this case, I shall not have to pay Protagoras (by the judgment of the court); if I lose this case, I shall not have to pay Protagoras (by the terms of the contract, for then I shall not yet have won my first case). I must either win or lose this case. Therefore I do not have to pay Protagoras.

Example 2

An Athenian mother pushes her son into a dilemma, attempting to persuade him not to enter politics as follows:

If you say what is just, men will hate you; and if you say what is unjust, the gods will hate you. But you must either say the one or the other; therefore, you will be hated.

The Athenian son rebutted the dilemma with the following one:

If I say what is just, the gods will love me; and if I say what is unjust, men will love me. I must say either one or the other. Therefore, I shall be loved.

Following a similar procedure the rebutting dilemma or counter-dilemma serves to establish a conclusion different from that of the original.

The dilemma (from the Greek “lemma”, “assumption“) was given the name in Latin of “horned syllogism” (syllogismus cornatus) since the opponent was supposed to be impaled on one or the other of the alternatives, which were pictured as horns.

Responding to a dilemma

Three possible ways of evading or refutting the conclusion of a dilemma are:

1. Grasping the dilemma by horns 2. Going (escaping) between the horns 3. Rebuttal (counter-dilemma)

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1. Grasping the dilemma by horns involves rejecting the premises that is a conjunction.

To deny a conjunction, we need to deny one of its conjuncts. We thus attempt to demonstrate that at least one of its parts is false.

2. Going (escaping) between the horns involves rejecting its disjunctive premises.

We deny that the minor premise represents a true disjunct, and that the consequent really follows from the antecedent.

3. Rebuttal (counter-dilemma) involves constructing another dilemma whose conclusion is opposed to the conclusion of the original. The two examples above of the issues between Protagoras and Euathlus, and that of the Athenian mother and her son are rebuttals.

It should be noted that responses to dilemmas do not necessarily invalidate the original dilemma, but are ways of avoiding its conclusion without challenging the formal validity of the argument.

References Copi, Irving. 2005. Introduction to Logic. 11th Edition. New York: Macmillan. Ucheaga, Dorothy. 2001. Rudiments of Logic. Calabar: Calabar University Press

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CHAPTER THIRTY SIX

SYMBOLIC LOGIC

“Because language is misleading, as well as because it is diffuse and inexact when applied to logic”, says Bertrand Russell, “logical symbolism is absolutely necessary to any exact or thorough treatment of our subject.” Symbolic logic is one of the two major aspects of logic (the other being material or traditional logic) which uses symbols in place of words. It is often referred to as modern logic. Ancient, classical, material, informal, traditional or Aristotelian logic had, up to this moment, been the concern of the previous chapters of this book. Symbolic logic is often called modern logic or mathematical logic. Unlike Aristotelian logic which emphasized syllogisms, modern logic deals with connectives and the internal structure of propositions and arguments. In order to deal with the logical heart or the internal structure of an argument, artificial symbols are used. An advantage of these symbolisms is the somewhat absence of linguistic defects. Alfred North Whitehead (1911) argued that symbols facilitate our thinking about an argument, when he said: “By the aid of symbolism we can make transitions in reasoning almost mechanically by the eyes, which otherwise would call into play the higher faculties of the brain”. Just like Aristotle with his disciple, Theophrastus, established the science of logic in ancient time, George Boole and Augustus De Morgan were the pathfinders of modern logic. Modern logic was thereafter developed by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead. But Frege is reputed to be greatest logician of the modern time. Symbolic logic is the aspect of logic which employs symbolic notations. In this section we shall analyze the notions of statement variable and of a truth function, and we shall treat of logical operators, logical connectives and logical constants. The logical operators involve Conjunction, Negation, Disjunction, Material Implication and Material Equivalence. We shall also indicate the distinction between a material equivalence and logical equivalence.

THE NOTION OF STATEMENT VARIABLE

A statement variable holds the place of a statement. It is a variable which is used in place of statements. Lower case letters such as p,q,r,s,t….are used as variables. In algebra, a,b,c or x,y are most often used. We shall make

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Ama is a Ghanaian can be represented by the statement variable ”p”. The variable “p”, following a logical convention, is often used as the first variable. An argument containing many statements, such as: All human beings are mortal Ikpaha Eduok is a human being Therefore Ikpaha Eduok is mortal will be symbolized as: p q .'. r

THE NOTION OF TRUTH VALUE The idea of truth value involves the assumption that every statement is either true or false. The idea of the law of excluded middle which we treated earlier restricts us to estimate every statement as being either true or false. In propositional calculus, therefore, there are two possibilities for any statement, namely, its truth or falsity. Since every statement is either true or false, then every statement has a truth value. The truth value of a true statement is true, while the truth value of a false statement is false.

LOGICAL OPERATORS, LOGICAL CONNECTIVES, LOGICAL CONSTANTS In English grammar, a simple statement is one that does not contain any other statement as a component. An example of a simple statement is: “Abuja is neat”. A compound statement is one that contains another statement as a component. An example of a compound statement is: “Abuja is neat and Abuja is the capital of Nigeria”. “Abuja is neat” is a simple statement. “Abuja is the capital of Nigeria” is another simple statement. When put together, they form the compound statement, “Abuja is neat and Abuja is the capital of Nigeria”. Symbolic logic makes use of both simple and compound statements. However, there is more dominance or prevalence of the use of compound statements. A logical constant is a logical sign which has a fixed specific meaning in logic. We have the following logical constants with their symbols: Negation ~ (the ‘not’) Conjunction . (the ‘and’)

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Disjunction v (the ‘or’) Material Implication → (the “if…then…”) Material Equivalence ≡ (the “if… and only if…”)

Logical Operators and Logical Connectives There are five logical operator and four logical connectives based on their functions. The logical operators are: Negation ~ Conjunction . Disjunction v Material implication → Material equivalence ≡ Since negation does not connect two or more statements, it is not a logical connective. The logical connectives are therefore: Conjunction . Disjunction v Material implication → Material equivalence ≡ They are called logical connectives because they connect simple statements in a compound statement.

NEGATION (NOT) Any affirmative statement is negated if the word “not” is introduced into it. Let us suppose that the statement, “Abuja is neat” is true. This statement can be negated by saying, “Abuja is not neat”. The logical symbol for negation is a curl or tilde “~ “. Using the variable ‘p’ to symbolize “Abuja is neat”, the negation of “Abuja is neat”, that is, “Abuja is not neat” becomes ~p. When “~” is used in a statement which was originally true, the result is a false one, and when it is used in a false statement, the result will be a true statement. In terms of truth value, “T” stands for true and “F” stands for false. “~T” is “F” and “~F” is “T”. In the truth value table we have:

P ~ p T F F T

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CONJUNCTION (AND) A compound statement expressing conjunction links two statements by the word “and”. In the statement: “Abuja is neat and Abuja is the capital of Nigeria”, the two simple statements are conjuncts. Conjuncts are therefore the components of a conjunction. The statement, “Abuja is neat” is the first conjunct, while the statement, “Abuja is the capital of Nigeria” is the second conjunct. The dot (.) or an inverted vee (^) is used to symbolize “and“. In this book we use the dot (.). Thus the conjunction, “Abuja is neat and Abuja is the capital of Nigeria” becomes “Abuja is neat . Abuja is the capital of Nigeria”. Using the variable “p” to stand for “Abuja is neat” and the variable “q” to stand for “Abuja is the capital of Nigeria”, the original statement becomes “p and q”, which logically reduces to “p.q”. As a rule, a conjunction requires both conjuncts to be true for the entire conjunction to be true. The rule here in conjunction is that when both conjuncts are true, the conjunction is true, otherwise it is false. Representing a conjunction graphically in a truth table we have:

P q p.q T T T T F F F T F F F F

Conjunction says that when: p is true and q is true, then p.q is true p is true and q is false, then p.q is false p is false and q is true, then p.q is false p is false and q is false, then p.q is false

DISTUNCTION (OR) The disjunction or alternation of two statements is formed by inserting the word “or” between them. The components of a disjunction are called “disjuncts” or “alternatives”. An example of a disjunction is:

“Either Maame is sick or Maame has gone to Accra”

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The symbol for disjunction is the wedge, “v”, which is the initial letter of the Latin word “vel” which stands for “or”. Using the variable “p” to stand for “Maame is sick” and the variable “q” to stand for “Maame has gone to Accra”, the above statement may be symbolized as: pvq

There are two senses of disjunction, namely, the weak or inclusive disjunction and the strong or exclusive disjunction. We have the inclusive or and the exclusive or. The weak or inclusive disjunction is true in case one or the other or both disjuncts are true; and false if only both disjuncts are false. The inclusive or has the sense of “either, possibly both” true disjuncts for the disjunction to be true. In a strong disjunction or exclusive or, the meaning of “or” is not “at least one” but “at least one or at most one”. Where a restaurant lists “garri or fufu” on its lunch menu, it is clearly meant that, for the stated price of the meal, the lunch may have one or the other but not both. In inclusive disjunction at least one of the statements in true and can both be true; while in exclusive disjunction, at least one of the statements is true but cannot both be true. The example given above, that is, either Manne is sick or Maame has gone to Accra” is an inclusive disjunction. We symbolized it as pvq. And with the rule regarding inclusive disjunction, that at least one disjunct must be true to have a true disjunction, we have the following truth table:

p q Pvq T T T T F T F T T F F F

It should be noted that the word “unless” can be used to form the disjunction of two statements.

CONDITIONAL OR MATERIAL IMPLICATION ( ) Two statements combined by placing the word “if” before the first and inserting the word “then” between them, result in a compound statement called a conditional statement or hypothetical statement or implicative statement or simply implication. The compound statement that follows the “if” is called the “antecedent” or “implicans “or” “protasis”, while the

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“If Manchester United wins the match then they will win the title”.

“Manchester United wins the match” is the antecedent, while “they will win the title” is the consequent. One of the symbols for conditional is the arrow “ “. Using the arrow sign, the above example, “If Manchester United wins the match then they will win the title”, we have the following notation: p q.

A conditional statement rules that we cannot have a true antecedent with a false consequent. In other words, if the antecedent is true, and the consequent is false, then the implication is false. As soon as there is a true antecedent and a false consequent, the implication is false. With this rule in mind, we have the following truth table:

p q p q T T T T F F F T T F F T

How can a false antecedent materially imply a true consequent thus making the implication true and how can a false antecedent materially imply a false consequent thus making the implication true? We can observe that in the 3rd and 4th rows that we have true implications with false consequents. How? This oddity can be obviated in the following mathematical analysis:

If 1<2 then 1<4 (If 1 is less than 2, then 1 is less than 4). 1<2 is true and 1<4 is true.

For the apparent oddities in the third and forth rows, we have the following examples to justify them:

If 3<2 then 3<4 (If 3 is less than 2 then 3 is less than 4). We know 3<2 in false and 3<4 is true; and this applies to the third row.

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To justify the 4th row, we have: If 4<2 then 4<4

(If 4 is less than 2 then 4 is less than 4). We know that 4<2 in false and that 4<4 is false; and this applies to the 4th row.

BI-CONDITIONAL OR MATERIAL EQUIVALENCE Material equivalence is the truth functional connective which asserts that the statement it connects has the same truth value, that is, both true and both false. Material equivalence means that the two statements are both true and both false. In other words, we have true material equivalence when both statements are true and when both statement are false. If “true” and “true”, then true; if “false” and “false”, then true. Thus, “If and only if” is associated with material equivalence. “If and only if” can explain why material implication is called bi-conditional, since there are two “if’s”, for one “if” belongs to conditional. The logical symbol for material equivalence is the triple-bar sign “≡”. For two statements that are materially equivalent, we can write p≡q. The statement, “The student will be awarded his degree if and only if he fulfills all the university requirements”, can be symbolized as:

p≡q

What this means is that the student being awarded his degree is same as his having fulfilled all the university requirements. On the other way round, his having fulfilled all the university requirements is the same as his being awarded his degree, for he fulfilled all the university requirements. With the rule regarding material equivalence that both statements must have same values for the material equivalence to be true, we present the following truth table:

p q p ≡ q T T T T F F F T F F F T

Material equivalence means both statements are both true and both false.

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LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE DISTINGUISHED FROM MATERIAL EQUIVALENCE There is a slight distinction between material equivalence and logical equivalence. Material equivalence means that both statements are both true and both false. Statements that are materially equivalent do not mean that they can be substituted for one another. The statements “Nigeria is larger than Ghana” and ”Lome is the capital of Togo” are materially equivalent because they are both true, but one cannot replace the other. When one statement replaces another we have logical equivalence. Two statements that can replace one another are logically equivalent. This means that these statements have the same truth value and are also equivalent in meaning. There will not be and there cannot be any case in which one of these statements is true while the other is false. Two statements are logically equivalent when the statement of their material equivalence is a tautology. For being tautologically materially equivalent, there is a small “T” immediately above the triple bar “≡”, such that “ T ” symbolizes logical equivalence. Logical equivalence is thus a tautological material equivalence. Logical equivalence carries with it the idea of replacement. That is to say, that one statement can replace the other. De Morgan’s theorems are classical examples of logical equivalences. We shall discuss De Morgan’s theorems under rules of replacement later in the next section.

TRUTH VALUE TABLE From the above truth tables already constructed for negation, conjunction, disjunction, implication and equivalence, it is quite conspicuous that there are strings of T's and F's running vertically and horizontally. T's represent True, while F's represent False. The string of T's and T's running down vertically is called the “column” of the truth table. The string of T's and F’s running down horizontally is called the “row” of the truth table. From the example below,

Column1 Column2 Conjunction Disjunction Implication Equivalence p q p. q Pvq p q p≡q 1 T T T T T T 2 T F F T F F 3 F T F T T F 4 F F F F T T

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columns 1 and 2 are called the reference or lead columns. We calculate the rest of the table according to the rule concerning each logical connective: if it is a conjunction, both conjuncts must be true for the conjunction to be true, otherwise false; if it is a disjunction, at least one disjunct must be true for the disjunction to be true; if it is an implication, any true antecedent with a false consequent will make a false implication; and in equivalence, both statements must be true or both false for there to be an a equivalence. Let us look at each logical connective in truth table perspective.

Conjunction p q p .q P q P q p .q T T T T T T F T F F F T F T F

F F F F F

Disjunction (Inclusive or) p v q ~p .'.q P q pvq ~p q T T T F T T F T F F F T T T T F F F T F

Material Implication

1. Modus ponens p q p .'.q

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P q p q p Q T T T T T T F F T F F T T F T F F T F F

2. Modus Tollens p q ~q .'. ~p

P q p q ~q ~p T T T F F T F F T F F T T F T F F T T T

Material Equivalence p≡ q q≡p

p Tautological,q Contradictory,p≡q andq≡p contingent propositions only T's or only F's or a combination of T's and F's. T T T T T F F F F T F F F F T T

TAUTOLOGY, CONTRADICTION AND CONTINGENT PROPOSITIONS

The final columns of truth tables can contain only T’s or only F’s or a combination of T’s and F’s. Tautology occurs if the truth value of a proposition has 'T' in every row in the final column of its truth table. Contradiction occurs if the truth value in the final column are all F. Contingent propositions occur if the truth table

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CHAPTER THIRTY SEVEN

FORMAL PROOF OF VALIDITY

A formal proof that a given argument is valid is a sequence of statements each of which is either a premise of that argument or follows from preceding statements of the sequence by an elementary valid argument, such that the last statement in the sequence is the conclusion of the argument whose validity is being proved. An elementary valid argument is any argument that is a substitution instance of an elementary valid argument form. Any substitution instance of an elementary valid argument form is an elementary valid argument. Truth tables are used to test the validity of any argument. However, truth table construction can be tedious and cumbersome. Alternatively, a more efficient method of establishing the validity of an extended argument is by deducing its conclusion from its premises by a sequence of elementary arguments each of which is known to be valid. There are certain rules for deduction, that is, for deducing a conclusion from premises of an argument. The first set of rules is referred to as Rules of Inference while the second set is called Rules of Replacement.

RULES OF INFERENCE There are nine rules of inference or principles of deduction. These are:

1. Modus Ponens (M.P.) p q p .'. q

2. Modus Tollens (M.T.) p q ~ q .'. ~ p

3. Hypothetical Syllogism (H.S.) p q q r .'. p r

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4. Disjunctive Syllogism (D.S.) p v q ~ p .'. q

5. Constructive Dilemma (C.D.) (p q). (r s) p v r .'. q v s

6. Absorption (Abs.) p q .'. p (p.q)

7. Simplification (Simp.) p.q .'. p

8. Conjunction (Conj.) p q .'. p.q

9. Addition (Add.) p .'. qvq

Let us go back to the rules and explain them one after the other.

1. Modus Ponens (M.P) p→q p .·. q

Modus ponens is the Latin version for “the mode” (modus) “of putting” (ponens). It claims that if any two statements “A1” and “A1→A2“ are given, that “A2“ may be inferred. For example: 1. pvq as given 2. (pvq) → (p.q) as given 3. p.q from 1 and 2 by modus ponens

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2. Modus Tollens (M.T) p→q ~ q .'. ~ p

Modus Tollens is the Latin version for “the mode” (modus) “of taking away” (tollens). Modus Tollens allows us to infer from any two given statements, ~A2 and "A1→A2”, “~A1”. Modus Tollens makes the point that given the conditional, p→q, if the consequent is denied, ~ p, can be inferred.

3. Hypothetical Syllogism (H.S.) p→q q→r .·. p→r This rule states that given any two statements, A1→A2 and A2→A3”, that the conclusion “A1→A3” may be inferred.

4. Disjunctive Syllogism p v q ~p .·. q This rule makes the point that if a disjunction, A1 v A2 is conjoined with a denial of one of the disjuncts, ~ A1, then the other disjunct, A2, can be inferred. If it is ~ A2 then A1 can be inferred.

5. Constructive Dilemma (C.D) (p→q). (r→s) pvr .·. q v s This rules allows us to inter from any two statements “(A1→A2). (A3→A4)” and “A1 v A3” another statement “A2 v A4”

6. Absorption (Abs.) p → q .·. p → (p.q)

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This rule stipulates that by absorption, “A1” can imply itself in conjunction with anything “A2” given a conditional statement “A1 A2”.

7. Simplification (Simp.) p.q p This rule demands that giving any truth functional formula of the form of conjunction any one of the conjuncts can be inferred. From “A1 . A2”,”A1” can be inferred and from “A1 . A2”, “A2”, can be inferred.

8. Conjunction (Conj.) p q .·. p.q

This rule requires that, given any two statements “A1 and A2”, their conjunction, “A1 . A2” may be inferred.

9. Addition (Add.) p pvq

This rules requires that, given any statement “A1”, its disjunction with any statement that suits us may be inferred such that we can have “A1 v B2“ or “B2 v A1”.

RULES OF REPLACEMENT OR EQUIVALENCE

Since there are many valid truth-functional arguments whose validity cannot be proved using only the nine rules of inference given above, additional rules are required to construct a formal proof of validity for the obviously valid argument. The rules of replacement permit us to infer from any statement the result of replacing any component of that statement by any other statement logically equivalent to the component replaced. We remember that logically equivalent statements means that they have the same truth value, that is, both true and both false, and that they are also equivalent in meaning, capable of replacing one another. The rules of replacement are:

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10. Double Negation (D. N.) p ≡ ~ ~ p

The principle of double negation states that: “Any statement can be replaced with its double negation, and any doubly negated statements can be replaced with the statement”. Given A B, we can infer A ~ ~ B Given ~ ~ (AvB), AvB can be inferred by this rule.

11. De Morgan’s Theorems (DE M) ~ (pvq) ≡ (~ p. ~ q) ~ (p.q) ≡ (~ p v~ q)

De Morgan’s rule has two versions. The first rule, ~ (pvq) ≡ ~ P. ~ q states that “The negation of a disjunction can be replaced with a conjunction by dropping the negation sign, replacing the disjunction with conjunction, and negating each of the resulting conjuncts and vice versa”.

The second rule, ~ (p.vq) ≡ (~ pv~ q) states that: “The negation of a conjunction can be replaced with a disjunction by dropping the negation sign, replacing the conjunction with a disjunction, and negating each of the resulting disjuncts and vice versa”.

Given ~ (AvB), we can infer (~ A . ~ B); Given ~ (~ A . ~~ B), AvB can be inferred.

12. Commutation (Com.) (pvq) ≡ (qvp) (p.q) ≡ (q.p) The idea of commutation is, that the order in which conjunctions and disjunctions are written does not impinge upon their truth value. Given (A.B) (C.D), (B.A) (D.C) can be inferred Given (AvB) (CvD), (BvA) (DvC) can be inferred

13. Association (Assoc.) (p.q).r ≡ p. (q.r)

(pvq) v r ≡ pv(qvr)

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Association claims that the truth value of conjunction and disjunction is not affected by the grouping of their components, except in a conditional. The rule holds for conjunction and disjunction, but does not hold for conditional.

14. Distribution (Dist.) p. (qvr) ≡ ( p.q) v (p.r)

p v (q.r) ≡ (pvq). (p v r)

It should be noted that in both the original expression and its logical equivalent, that the same logical connective appears first.

15. Material Implication (M.I) (p q) ≡ (~pvq)

It should be noted in this rule that conditionals and disjunctions can be substituted for one another. Given A B, ~ A v B can be inferred. Given A (B v C), ~ A v (BvC) can be inferred.

16. Transposition (Trans.) (p q) ≡ (~q ~ p)

Transposition permits the antecedents and consequents of conditionals to be interchanged. However, there is only change in the values of the components that are interchanged because (p q) is not logically equivalent to (q p). According to this rule, if (~ A B) is given, we can infer (~B A); and if (~ A ~ B) in given, we can infer (B A).

17. Material Equivalence (p ≡ q) ≡ (p q). (q p)

(p ≡ q) ≡ (p.q) v (~p . ~q)

Material equivalence rule has two versions. The first version takes our minds back to the idea underlying material equivalence; that it results from the joint assertion of two conditionals. The second version takes our minds back to the rule governing truth table construction for material equivalence, which is, that “p ≡ q” is true if and only if either p and q are both true or both p and q are false.

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The formula (p.q) v (~ p . ~ p) is equivalent to stating p ≡ q.

18. Exportation (Exp.) (p.q) r ≡ p (q r)

The rule of exportation shows that p and q are the antecedents of r in both its original statement and its equivalence.

19. Tautology (Taut.) p ≡ (pvp) p ≡ (p.p)

The truth conditions for disjunctions and conjunctions are applied in the two versions of tautology respectively.

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CHAPTER THIRTY EIGHT

A BRIEF HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF LOGIC

Nkutobong Pius Ekpoudom

Many students and non-students do not know the history and development of logic. It is against this backdrop that this study is undertaken. Logic must be known to have started with someone, somewhere and sometime. It is an important, if not the most important, branch of philosophy, partly because all of philosophy deals with reasoning and argument. It forms an integral and central part of philosophy. As such, it is essential that we trace its history and development.

What is logic? According to Copi, “Logic is the study of the methods and principles used to distinguish correct reasoning from incorrect reasoning (3). Obiajulu and Ejike aver that “logic is the study of the art or the proper way of reasoning which enables us to proceed with order, ease, and correctness in the art of reasoning itself (2). The father of logic, Aristotle, defined logic as “thinking on thinking”. It is thinking thinking itself. Essien defines logic as the branch of philosophy which is concerned with the processes involved in reasoning; as the study of procedure and the rules governing reasoning (Essien,109).

Logic: History and Development Fundamentally, there are three periods as far as tracing the development of logic is concerned. These periods are: The ancient period The roman (medieval) period The modern and contemporary period

ANCIENT LOGIC The history of logic in ancient time is traceable to Aristotle. Of all his contributions to logic, the most renowned is the syllogism. According to Aristotle (quoted in Ucheaga), “a syllogism is an argument in which certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them” (337). This has been defined simply by Copi as an argument in which a conclusion is inferred from two premises” (153). In Aristotelian logic, therefore, a syllogism is said to be in standard form when

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Besides the Aristotelian school of logic, there was another school of logic in the ancient period. This was the Megarian school. On the Megarian logic, Ucheaga writes: The Megarians represented by Diodorus and Philo were important for being the first in the history of logic to inquire into the meaning of “if… then…” propositions. For Diodorus, an implication is true if and only if it is not possible for it to have a true antecedent and a false consequent. Philo elaborated upon the conditions under which an implication is true. There are three of such, namely, if its antecedent and consequent are: (1) both true (2) both false (3) its antecedent is false and its consequent is true (340).

The Stoics are also known for their contributions to logic. They adopted the Megarian logic and systemized it. According to the Stoics, propositions are of two types: one, simple, the other non-simple.

ROMAN (MEDIEVAL) LOGIC The Roman Medieval period of logic is known for the development of a general theory of inference and rules of implications. Added to this, this period also witnessed the study of general truths about reality, reflected in the form of thoughts and expressed in language. Medieval logicians realized that there were other non-Aristotelian approaches to logical subjects, questions, and methods that could be investigated. The new approaches primarily included works on the signification and the supposition of terms, a distinction showing some similarity to the modern distinction between meaning and reference. The theory of signification deals with the capability of descriptive terms to function as signs, i.e., their property of being meaningful. The theory of supposition was concerned with the type of reference that terms in their function as subjects and predicate obtain in the context of different propositions (“History of Medieval Logic: A General overview” in www.ontology.co/logic). Among the medieval logicians are Peter Abelard and Willam of Ockham, among others.

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MODERN LOGIC Modern logicians were mainly mathematicians. Among them were George Boole, Augustus de Morgan, Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead and Gottlob Frege, a German mathematician known for reducing arithmetic to logic. George Boole and Augustus De Morgan were also outstanding for their introduction of what is now referred as the Boolean logic and De Morgan’s theorems respectively. The mathematician-logicians introduced mathematical symbols into logic. That is why modern and contemporary logic are also known as symbolic logic. Frege formalized the sentential calculus into an axiomatic system; introduced quantifiers into his formal system; and discovered that arithmetic can be reduced to logic. This reduction is accomplished by defining the concepts of pure mathematics in terms of the primitive notions of his logical system which included negation, implication and universality. The idea that mathematics is reducible to logic is called logicism. Founded by Frege, logicism was later developed by Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead in their book, Principia Mathematica.

References Copi, I. Introduction to Logic. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc. 1979.

Essien, E. Annang Philosophy, History and Culture North Carolina: Lulu Press, 2011.

Obiajulu, M. and Ejike, A. Introduction to the World of Philosophy and Logic. Onitsha: UCHAC Productions, 2006.

Ucheaga, D. “The History and Development of Logic” in Philosophy and Logic Today. Edited by Innocent Asouzu. Calabar: The Africa Pacific and Allied Press, 2002.

“History of Medieval Logic: A General overview” in www.ontology .co/logic.

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CHAPTER THIRTY NINE

THE NOTION OF DEFINITION IN LOGIC

Inameti Lawrence Udo

Logic, as popularly perceived, is interested in the study of arguments. Arguments will be useless if participants are not conscious of the meaning of the words, ideas, concepts and phenomena used in the premises and in the conclusion. To be conscious of the meaning of concepts, ideas, words, things or phenomena, ascertaining the definition of the required category becomes a sine qua non.

The fundamental duty of definition is to clear ambiguity and vagueness by clarifying, describing and delineating the distinguishing or defining characteristics of concepts. Clarification here means to make explicit what is implied in concepts (Rai, 156). When a term has more than one distinct meaning in a given context and the context fails to clarify the intention then it is ambiguous. Similarly, vagueness occurs when there are “borderline cases so that it cannot be determined whether the term should be applied to them or not” (Copi and Cohen, 173). This explains why there cannot be any serious philosophical discourse without definition of terms in a manner accurate or precise enough as to leave no one in doubt about its meaning. Terms such as “line”, “like”, “late”, etc., are ambiguous and need to be defined to make their meanings explicit. For instance, “late” could mean death or arriving at a place behind time. The word “like” could mean similarity or being pleased. So, failure to define them may lead to abuse thereby causing misunderstanding, error in reasoning and confusion.

According to Max Black, in definition we define words not things and this must be done to take care of ambiguity, disagreement in intended meaning to achieve clarity and explicitness (Critical Thinking, 216). Ijiomah Chris is also of this view when he writes;

But we must remember that definitions are about words and not about things they represent. In this sense definitions are exercise within meta- language. We can define the words “Iroko” or “chief” since they have meaning. But we cannot define the objects “iroko” or “chief”. We can use iroko tree, talk with chief or use both of them, but we cannot define them since they are no symbols that have meaning which can be explained. Even when we refer to an object in our attempt to define it, we only do that in order to define the symbol representing the objects (Modern Logic, 30).

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Components of Definition

There are two technical words that need to be understood in the study of definition. There are definiendum and definiens. The symbol being defined is called definiendum, while the group of symbols used in defining the definendum is the definiens (Copi and Cohen, 169). The definiendum is always written on the left hand side while the definiens occupies the right hand side.

Rules of Definition

According to Stebbing (425), the rules concerned with the nature of definitions include the following:

(a) That the definiens must be equivalent to the definendum, which means that; (b) The definiens must not be wider than the definiendum and consequently;

This means that;

(d) The definiens should not include any expression that occurs in the definiendum, or that could be defined only in terms of it;

(e) The definiens should not be expressed in obscure or figurative language;

(f) The definiens should not be expressed negatively unless the definiendum is negative.

We can go on to state other rules for definitions that:

(g) A definition should capture a thing’s essence, that is, what makes a thing what it is and not another;

(h) It should state the essential characteristics of the term to be defined (definiendum);

(i) It should neither be too broad nor too narrow;

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(j) It must avoid the danger of circularity;

(k) Above all, it must avoid ambiguity and the multiplication of the explicandum. This is why Robert Cohen et al emphasize the needs for adequacy, absence of tautology and absence of circularity in definitions (Foundations of the Logical Theory of Scientific Knowledge, 25).

TYPES OF DEFINITION

Having said the foregoing, we shall now proceed to discuss the different types of definition.

1. STIPULATIVE DEFINITION:

Stipulative definition occurs when one ordains or introduces new meaning to familiar words in order to differentiate from other possible meanings. In other words, when one gives his/her own meaning to words or symbols we say that the definition is stipulated by him. This is often done for the reasons of convenience, secrecy, not being satisfied with the meaning of a word, economy and for psychological purpose.

Stipulative definition may not be effective in terms of helping to solve genuine disagreements, but it is important because it increases our vocabulary. “It also helps man to exercise his linguistic liberty in coining or specifying his subjective meaning for words and concepts“ (Ozumba, 279). For example, I can decide to coin the word “Annangism” which is neither an English word nor an Annang word. What I need to do is to stipulate a meaning for it. I can decide to say that it means “excessive interest in Annang affairs”.

Ephraim Stephen Essien, in his books, Annang Philosophy, History and Culture (2011: 3) and Philosophy of Peace beyond the United Nations (2008: 39-40), has so far coined a number of words and has given stipulative definitions to them. These new words coined by Essien are as follows:

1. “AFROLOGY” means “Study of Africa” or “African Studies”. 2. “AFROPHILIA” means “Love for Africa”. 3. “PSYCHOSOMAPNEUMATISM” means “the soul-body-spirit composition of the self”. 4. “ENSOPHIZATION” means “impartation of wisdom”.

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5. “ENSOPHIZE” means “to give wisdom”. 6. “ENSOPHISM” means “the science of imparting wisdom”, which is philosophy. 7. “BELLIFISM” means “war-oriented doctrines”. 8. “BELLIFICATION” means “war-oriented activities”. 9. “BELLIFY” means “to make war”. 10. DEBELLIFISM (Essien’s peace theory) means “renunciation of war”. 11. “DEBELLIFICATION” means “acts of renunciation of war”. 12. “DEBELLIFY” means “to renounce war”; “to make peace”. 13. “PAXOLOGY” stands for “peace studies”.

A stipulative definition defines a symbol without recourse to any previous definition. It can also be called nominal definition. Nominal (from Latin word “nomen”= name) definition is concerned with the use of a familiar word or symbol to replace as an equivalence for the new definiendum. 8=4+4 is a good example of a nominal definition.

2. LEXICAL DEFINITION

By lexical definition we mean the dictionary meaning of words or concepts. It does not in any way give a definiendum a new meaning (like stipulative definition). It rather offers the conventional definition of it. In lexical definition a word may be ambiguous by having more than one meaning, but all these different meanings and their contexts and situations are clearly spelt out. For example the word “like” has more than one meaning. It is used to refer to something that has a similarity. But the word also can be used to refer to somebody’s opinion of something or to find something pleasant, attractive or satisfactory. A good dictionary will provide all of the above meanings and more for the word “like”. It is now left for the writer speaker or audience to decipher or stipulate which meaning of the word applies in the circumstance.

(3) PRECISING DEFINITION

This kind of definition serves to reduce or remove vagueness in word or phrase, while stipulative and lexical definitions serve to reduce ambiguity. Ambiguity occurs when a term has more than one distinct meaning and the context does not make clear which is intended.

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On the other hand, a term is vague “when there exist ‘borderline’ cases, so that it cannot be determined whether the term should be applied to them or not” (Copi, Cohen, 106). Precise definition does not assign new meaning to its definiendum like stipulative definition. What it does is to allow the definiendum to remain true to established usage while it goes beyond to reduce vagueness such that the meaning of a word or phrase becomes exact and precise. Precise definition does not encourage the use of such words as “it is like”, “may be”, “about”, “something like that“, etc.

(4) THEORETICAL DEFINITION

A theoretical definition demands a comprehensive, a wider or an all- encompassing understanding or definition of a term. “A theoretical definition of a term is a definition that attempts to formulate a theoretically adequate or scientifically useful description of the objects to which the term applies” (Copi, Cohen, 109). It therefore aims at developing a coherent theoretical analysis of the subjects at hand. And this it does by proposing a theory or theories in the area where the term to be defined is located. The real issue in theoretical definitions “is not merely to overcome ambiguity nor is it merely to achieve precision. It is to formulate a theory within which a fully adequate definition of important terms could be stated“ (Uduma, 151). A theoretical definition of a word like “heat” could be given in order to develop a better theory of heat, such as in thermodynamics in physics.

(5) PERSUASIVE DEFINITION

When we talk of persuasive definition we mean a kind of definition used to form a change of attitude in people. It is aimed at resolving disputes by influencing the attitudes, or stirring the emotions of people. “As such, when a definition is recognized as persuasive, it is not accepted as legitimate and often considered fallacious (Uduma, Logic and Critical Thinking, 152). The reason is that they are put forth not as legitimate attempt to define, but rather to make point about the view point expressed. It is done to persuade and make one take a position the persuader has in mind.

This is common in areas of politics, religion, sex, etc., where participants are often concerned about swaying people to one side or another so as to pitch their tents with them.

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In persuasive definition there is manipulation and subtle injection of emotive words which can be an obstacle in distinguishing between correct from incorrect reasoning. “Diplomacy is part and parcel of persuasive definition. It is tricky and slippery” (Ijiomah, Modern Logic, 35) and it functions expressively and directivity.

(6) ABBREVIATIVE DEFINITION

When an abbreviation is used in an expression to replace a longer one without loss of meaning, this is considered an abbreviative definition. Examples of this type of definition are the use of O. A. U instead of Organization of African Unity, ECOWAS meaning, Economic Community of West African State, etc. Although this type of definition is economical, it, however, does not remove ambiguity or vagueness.

We conclude this analysis on definitions by reminding ourselves that the fundamental duty of definition is to clear ambiguity and vagueness by clarifying, describing and delineating the distinguishing or defining characteristics of word and concepts.

REFERENCES

* Stabbing, L. S. Modern Introduction to Logic, London: Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1933

* Dictionary of Philosophy, Moscow Progress Publishers, 1984

* Rai, C. Studies in Philosophical Methods, Jabalpur: University of Jabalpur, 1980.

* Copi, I. and Cohen, C. Introduction to Logic, Ninth Edition, 1998

* Essien, Ephraim-Stephen. Philosophy of Peace and Conflict beyond the United Nations. Calabar: Calabar University Press, 2008

* Essien, Ephraim-Stephen. Annang Philosophy, History and Culture: An Inquiry in Afrology and Afrophilia. North Carolina: Lulu Press, 2011

* Max Black, Critical Thinking. London: Prentice-Hall Books

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* Ijiomah Chris, Modern Logic: A Systematic Approach to the Study of Logic. Owerri: A. P. Publications, 1995

* Robert Cohen and Marx, W. Wart Ofsky. Foundations of the Logical theory of Scientific Knowledge. Dordrecht-Holland, D Reidel Publishing Company, 1973.

* Ozumba, Godfrey, ”Definition” In: A Concise Introduction to Philosophy and Logic. Uduigwomen, A. and Ozumba, G., ed.), Calabar: Centaur publishers, 2000.

* Hawkins, J. Oxford Minireference Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

* Gorsky, D.P. Definitions. Progress Publishers, 1974

* Uduma, O., Logic and Critical Thinking. Abakailiki: Willyrose & Apple Seed Publishing, 2008.

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