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PART EIGHT Skepticism Bibliography, 1989-1991 JOSE R. MAlA NETO INTRODUCTION The Foundation for Intellectual History has entrusted me to prepare a bibliography on skepticism outlining the scope and nature of the present-day interest in this subject. Starting with philosophical journals and books published in North America and Western Europe I have tried-within the limits of the available bibliographical information-to expand the search to other scholarly fields in the humanities as well as to publications from other parts of the world. Because of this geographical and disciplinary expansion, however, the years of publication was limited to 1989-91 trusting that three years would provide a reasonably representative sample. Before indicating the main features of the current scholarly interest in skepticism some remarks on the design of the bibliography and its main limitations are in order. 1. The bibliography comprises books, articles, and essay reviews. The main sources were The Philosopher's Index, the French catalogue FRANCIS, the Humanities and Social Sciences indices, the Library of Congress catalogue, the MLA bibliography, and current philosophical bibliographies printed in Paris and Louvain. I also directly examined the main philosophical journals for this period and checked each article or book referred to in the sources that did not provide an abstract. Whenever available, I reproduced the author's own abstract or the abstract given by one of the bibliographies I used. In other cases I edited some central part of the text in which the author summarizes his or her goals and/or principal results. When no source is indicated, the abstract is mine. 2. Skepticism is such a crucial issue in epistemology that almost no publication in the field can fail to deal with it. In order to keep the bibliography to a manageable size I decided to include only those publications in which skepticism is the main topic. Since this is not always easy to tell from the title, I am aware that some publications may have been left out. 3. Although I tried to be as inclusive as possible, some books and journals were either not available in the libraries consulted or not indexed in the bibliographies used. This is particularly true of publications written in languages other than English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese. 4. My criterion for classification by subject was the following. If a publication deals predominantly with a person, the latter's name is indicated as the subject. In all other cases I classified the publication under intellectual disciplines. Many items 387 J. van der Zande and R.H. Popkin (eds.), The Skeptical Tradition around 1800, 387-391. © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. 388 Skepticism Bibliography could be classified under more than one heading. For example, contemporary epistemologists often deal extensively with the skeptical arguments of Descartes and Hume. If the purpose of these epistemologists was not a textual examination their publications were classified under the heading "epistemology." There is, of course, an element of arbitrariness involved because it is not always clear whether an author discusses, for instance, primarily Davidson'S argument against skepticism or skepticism in general. Moreover, scholarly disciplines are not clearly distinguished from one another and skepticism often cuts across different fields (epistemology, literature, ethics, history of philosophy, and so on). The abstracts provide some clarification. The subject classification is meant only to provide a preliminary, panoramic view of the main themes and topics related to skepticism. The items compiled in this bibliography can be roughly divided into three main fields: i) ancient skepticism; ii) contemporary epistemology and ethics; and iii) the modern skeptical tradition. i) The large number of publications (41 items) on ancient skepticism in just three years attests to the tremendous development of this field since the 1970s. Of the two ancient skeptical schools, Pyrrhonism has received much more attention than Academic skepticism, although the revival of interest in ancient skepticism also includes a quantitative and qualitative increase of studies on Academic skepticism. Most studies consist of technical, exegetical analysis of the works of Sextus Empiricus, the only surviving works by an ancient skeptical author. Ancient skepticism, in particular Pyrrhonism, was not merely, or even mainly, according to many scholars, an epistemological position, but a way of life. Most contemporary scholars therefore discuss the nature of the ancient skeptics' practical goal of ataraxia (peace of mind), how it can be achieved and how it affects the life of the skeptic. Is a Pyrrhonian life at all possible? If it is, how does it differ from the life of the dogmatist and of the non-philosopher? Furthermore, the discovery of the practical thrust of ancient skepticism has led to inquiries concerning the scope of the ancient skeptic's epoche or suspension of judgment. Is it restricted to philosophical beliefs? What kind of assent is withdrawn? What is the nature of the assent to appearances that the Pyrrhonian philosopher accepts as his main practical rule? Practical aspects of ancient skepticism are also the focus of attention in another theme explored by modern scholars, namely, the philosophical value of the skeptical modes (arguments) and the nature of the skeptic's zetesis (investigation). How good and effective are the arguments of the skeptics? Are the skeptics committed to the arguments they use against the dogmatists? Finally, a major topic of interest is the comparison of ancient with modern kinds of skepticism, in particular Cartesian and Humean skepticism. Is the problem of the external world also a problem for the ancient skeptics? Does the criterion of following appearances commit the skeptics to anti-realism? Can the modern skeptic legitimately break with the ancient skeptical tradition and isolate his skepticism from practical life? Were the ancient skeptics anti-realists? And historically, how did skepticism evolve from a kind of mental therapy to a kind of epistemological Skepticism Bibliography 389 disease? There is much more controversy than consensus about these topics but the various debates have no doubt contributed to the quality of the investigation. Of particular importance are Myles Burnyeat's articles "Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism" (Doubt and Dogmatism, ed. M. Schofield, M.F. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes [Oxford, 1980], reprinted in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. M.F. Burnyeat [Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1983]), and "The Skeptic in His Place and Time" (Philosophy in History, ed. R. Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner [Cambridge, 1984]). Important too is Jonathan Barnes' work on these topics and his philosophi­ cal analysis of the Pyrrhonian modes. Barnes' and Julia Annas' The Modes of Skepticism (Cambridge, 1985) is another major reference in contemporary scholarly works on ancient skepticism. With respect to the origins of Pyrrhonism, new perspectives on Pyrrho have been opened by Fernanda Declava Caizzi's research. ii) Skepticism is a major polemical topic among contemporary epistemologists. Of the roughly seventy articles and books in this field, about 65 percent rejects and 35 percent upholds a skeptical position. The defenders of skepticism usually employ an arsenal of sophisticated philosophical analyses to strengthen and reconstruct Descartes' and Hume's doubts about the existence of the external world and Hume's doubt about causation. Barry Stroud's defense of the cogency of the Cartesian dream argument (among others) in his The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism (Oxford, 1984) has been a major challenge to contemporary epistemologists. The skeptical arguments are also updated. Whereas there are almost no references to Descartes' evil demon in the literature there are plenty to a brain kept in a vat hooked up to a computer powerful enough to supply this brain with all the experiences we ordinarily have. The bibliography shows that the majority of epistemologists reject skepticism, although this usually does not translate into actual refutations. The foundational Cartesian type of response to skepticism is definitely out of fashion. Among the principle arguments against skepticism are that the skeptical position involves a performative contradiction, usually of a linguistic kind; that the skeptic's standards of knowledge and certainty are beyond scientific and ordinary practice; and that the skeptical alternative-for instance, the possibility that one may be dreaming-is not relevant in most cognitive situations. These responses to skepticism strike more at practical dimensions of the skeptical position than at the skeptical arguments themselves. One basic practical presupposition of skepticism is directly challenged by some anti-skeptical philosophers who, often influenced by William James, contest the skeptic's strict commitment to intellectual integrity. Shall we give our assent only to those propositions whose evidence is demonstrative? These present-day anti­ skeptics unwittingly take issue with the basic principle of Academic skepticism according to Cicero's interpretation of Arcesilaus. Finally, a note must also be added to the original interpretation of skepticism by Stanley Cavell. The skeptical quest for certainty about the existence of an external world and other minds is interpreted by Cavell as a lack of acknowledgment of the world and others. Cavell's views on skepticism
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