Neuropsychology of Implicit Emotion Regulation Through Fictional Reappraisal

Cognitive Neuropsychology of Implicit Emotion Regulation through Fictional Reappraisal

Dominique Makowski Université Paris Descartes École doctorale 261 – 3CH

This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Defence Committee − Pr. Serge Nicolas (Thesis Supervisor) Université Paris Descartes − Pr. Pierre Philippot (Rapporteur) Université catholique de Louvain − Pr. Sandrine Vieillard (Rapporteur) Université Paris Nanterre − Pr. André Didierjean Université de Franche-Comté − Pr. Pascale Piolino Université Paris Descartes − Dr. Jérôme Pelletier Institut Jean Nicod, CNRS-EHESS-ENS − Dr. Marco Sperduti Université Paris Descartes

Publicly Defended in Paris, the 29th November 2018

I would like to dedicate this thesis to the part of the cosmos that I’ll experience as Self a few cognitive computations from now, as I reminder of dos and don’ts.

Declaration

I, Dominique Makowski, hereby declare that except where specific reference is made to the work of others, the contents of this dissertation are original and have not been submitted in whole or in part for consideration for any other degree or qualification in this, or any other university. This dissertation is my own work and contains nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration with others, except as specified in the text and Acknowledgements.

Dominique Makowski

Acknowledgements

The work, time and effort that have gone into this PhD thesis have certainly made this a life-changing journey. Its completion would not have been possible without the support, collaboration, and encouragement of so many people. Importantly, this thesis would not be of real existence if Prof. Pascale Piolino and Dr. Jérôme Pelletier did not initiate and lead the FICTION project, aimed at exploring the relationship between fiction and emotion by bringing and bridging together science and philosophy. This thesis is a continuation and extension of a set of initial ideas and hypotheses, further nurtured within the culture and knowledge of my thesis supervisor, the Prof. Serge Nicolas. I would like to thank the doctoral committee, including Prof. Pierre Philippot, Prof. Sandrine Vieillard and Prof. André Didierjean. It is an honour to have my work judged and gauged through the lens of their expertise and experience. I also thank all the participants that underwent my experiments. I will continue my personal acknowledgements in French. viii

Je voudrais commencer par remercier collègues et amis, rencontres ou moments, qui ne se retrouveront malheureusement pas nominativement ci-dessous, mais qui ont contribué, d’une manière ou d’une autre, à faire de mon chemin ce qu’il est. Par ailleurs, les personnes concernées m’excuseront d’avance pour la non-exhaustivité de ces remerciements, dont la forme, parfois cryptique et occulte aux yeux profanes, ne pourra masquer la limite du fond. En particulier, ceux qui trouveront leur mention trop courte ou trop plate, qui auraient aimé un bal, une cérémonie, des feux d’artifices ou l’équivalent d’une thèse entière pour décrire et relater nos liens, anecdotes et souvenirs. Ensuite, par ordre alphabétique (quand cela m’arrange); Merci à la Ballas team: David, pour être toujours al pour moi (toujours sauf quand son cœur se vole). Dr. Maxime, Éric et Quentin, pour m’avoir tant appris sur le rap de qualité et également Mike le forgeron, Simon, FP et B2O. Aux Burritos, Matthieu et Franky (les meilleurs 1.1), Axel (mon seul, mais meilleur, manant restant *tête de cochon*) et cette grosse . . . de Lukas. Et le large Tamass, aussi (mais est-il vraiment un burritos ?). Pour le good times et les memes, et pour avoir supporté la brume et la fumée. Aux Neuros, Solène, pour son soutien de longue date, ainsi que Cloélia, Gaston (et ses poules virtuelles), Zoé, Lison et Adriano MF, au sein desquels ma position de Shaman aura été mise à rude épreuve. Pour nos diverses aventures (en particulier le nouvel an à Utrecht), les parties de Rami, et les nombreux souvenirs non-encodés. A Hélène, pour qui quelques mots, aussi bien choisi soient-ils, apparaissent comme dérisoire pour exprimer l’importance qu’elle a pour moi, et l’affection que j’ai pour elle. A Thomas, et Antoine, toujours, pour leur présence lointaine, mais sûre et certaine. A Betty pour son soutien infaillible, dont j’attends la thèse sur la loi d’attraction. A Stéphanie qui, effectivement, aura fini première dans cette longue course aux nombreux virages. Mais aussi les autres doctorants ou docteurs, comme Marina, Alexis, Tristan, Camille et Héline, pour leurs contributions, individuellement variés, dans ma motivation. A mes collègues, en particulier Léo et Laurie, qui ont empli de talent et de force le bureau 4017. Laurie, pour son soutien, son écoute, et sa froideur légendaire et Léo, le démineur le plus rapide, pour son rôle dans l’initiation de nombreux projets, sans qui un large pan de mes intérêts et compétences n’existerait pas. Kouloud, pour son enthousiasme et sa spontanéité et Henri, comme le veut la tradition, qui garantit l’ouverture de ce bureau vers l’extérieur. Per Silvia e s’ta Cosimo fa rate! Per loro passaggio breve ma memorabile. ix

Sans oublier les autres membres du laboratoire Mémoire et Cognition, notamment Simon, Allan, Jean-Charles, Prany, Sophie, Marion, Pauline, Alexia, Isabelle et Éric. Les stagiaires, dont certains ont contribué de manière très concrète à la réalisation de certaines des études de cette thèse. Fred, pour sa présence rassurante, son aide et sa bienveillance, ainsi que Valentina, dont le rôle dans la déconstruction Derridienne du second acte ne peut qu’augurer (en tout cas je l’espère), un troisième à l’image du premier. Au clan. Un sublime étrange consortium anarcho-bobo-monarcho-philosophico-artistico- communo-impérialiste. En particulier, Philippe Blonde pour son intérêt des chats de Poitiers et de la grand’goule, "Sans, Souci". Pour son sens du service et de la droiture désintéressé, à qui le temps donnera, j’en suis sûr, le zeste révolutionnaire nécessaire à tout grand despote éclairé. Qu’il n’oublie pas, tout au long de sa future grande carrière, que "ce qui compte ce n’est pas le vote, c’est comment on compte les votes". Silim! Je me dois de mentionner également d’autres figures, qu’on pourrait qualifier de "maîtres", comme Yannick Gounden (pour m’avoir apporté un témoignage visuel et intellectuel de l’après-master lors de mon premier stage), Sandrine Rossi (pour m’avoir, dans son formidable encadrement de la recherche en neuroesthétique, prodigué certains conseils si pertinents que je continue à les citer et les transmettre mot pour mot aujourd’hui), ainsi que Sophie Fleury, Emmanuel Guiliano et Séverine Hatif (pour avoir partagé leur pratique, expérience et vision clinique). Merci pour m’avoir encadré, guidé et tant appris à un moment ou à un autre. Je remercie aussi toute la team de l’ANR fiction, incluant bien sûr Jérome Pelletier, Margherita Arcangeli, Stéphane Lemaire, Stéphane Dokic, Marco Sperduti et Tiziana Zalla, dont les profondes réflexions ont posé les bases sur lesquelles ce projet a pu grandir etmûrir. Fidèle à ma tendance à l’éparpillement, je me recentre maintenant pour remercier Pas- cale Piolino. Bien que cette collaboration, via une implication de de tout instant, lui ait (malheureusement) fait expérimenter la régulation émotionnelle (ainsi que la fiction) à la première personne et de manière très embodied, cette relation, intellectuellement passionnelle et personnellement enrichissante, aura produit, certes non sans quelques étincelles, son lot de bons résultats, de souvenirs épisodiques et d’émotions positives. De par sa vision et nos nombreux échanges, aussi passionnants que stimulants, Pascale aura été la génitrice d’un "on" qui perdurera, je l’espère, pour de nombreuses années encore. Bien sûr, Serge Nicolas, pour sa guidance et son soutien (et ce, depuis mon premier stage en L2 sur l’effet de la couleur sur la mémoire !) mais aussi sa confiance, sa bienveillance et son influence. Il a été, sûrement sans le savoir, un véritable modèle dans ma formationet mon développement, aussi bien intellectuel que personnel. x

Et, évidemment, Marco Sperduti. Mon Hulk, mon Obi-Wan, mon captain Metaphysics. Pour m’avoir fait atteindre un working knowledge en italien (bene), pour tous ces "trous" (concept dérivé d’une propriété) partagé qui nous ont permis de comprendre, l’espace d’un instant éphémère, l’Homme, les dieux, le temps et l’univers. Pour m’avoir apporté la puissance écarlate du whatever et du pseudo-profound BS. Pour sa collectivisation des shots de fin de soirée. Marco, dont la force du marteau peut forger les plus belles idéeset dont la faucille peut trancher les plus passionnés débats. Dont la pertinence de la pensée perdure même après suppression de ses commentaires. Sans qui ce travail n’aurait été qu’une simulation de thèse. Pour m’avoir supporté (dans tous les sens du terme), élevé (dans tous les sens du terme à nouveau), et exercé avec merveille son rôle de dictateur de thèse. Lucie, pour m’avoir accompagné et comblé, dans les moments difficiles comme dans les moments de joie. Pour étinceler comme une étoile lorsque l’obscurité tombe. Ma famille et mes parents, pour leur soutien indéfectible, constant, sans réserve et sans faille.

Enfin, la pizza, pour son amour réciproque. .— . / ...- — .. ... / –.- ..- . / - ..- / .- ... / - .-. — ..- ...- . / .-.. . / – ...... - –. . / ... . -.-. .-. . - .-.-.- / ..-. . .-.. .. -.-. .. - .- - .. — -. ... .-.-.- / .— .—-. .- .. – . .-. .- .. ... / -.– / .-. . – . .-. -.-. .. . .-. / –.- ..- . .-.. –.- ..- . ... / .–. . .-. ... — -. -. . ... / ... ..- .–. .–. .-.. . – . -. - .- .. .-. . ... –..– / - . .-.. .-...... / –.- ..- . / .-.. .- ..- .-. .. . –..– / . -. -.-. — .-. . / ..- -. . / ..-. — .. ... –..– / .–. — ..- .-. / ... — -. / ... — ..- - .. . -. / .–. .- .-. - .. -.-. ..- .-...... -. / . - / ... — -. / .- .. -.. . / -.. .- -. ... / – .- / ..-. — .-. – .- - .. — -. / -.. . / - ...... -. .- .–. . ..- - . .-.-.- / .–. ..- ...... -....- - -....- . .-.. .-.. . / ..- -. / .— — ..- .-. / .- .-.. .-.. . .-. / .— ..- ... –.- ..- .—-. .- ..- / -... — ..- - / -.. ..- / - . ... - / -.. . / .-.. .- / ... .- .-.. .-.. . / .-. ...- .-.-.- / – .- .-. .. -. . –..– / .–. — ..- .-. / – . - - .-. . / . -. / . ...- .. -.. . -. -.-. . / –.- ..- .—-. .- ..- -.-. ..- -. / .–...... -.. — ... — .–...... / -. . / .–. — ..- .-. .-. .- / .— .- – .- .. ... / . - .-. . / -.-. — – .–. .-...... -.-.- / – .- .-. -.-. — –..– / .–. — ..- .-. / .- ...- — .. .-. / -.. .. .-. .. –. . / -.-. . - - . / - ...... / .- ...- . -.-. / -... .-. .. — .-.-.- / – — –.. .- .-. - –..– / -.. — -. - / .-.. . / ... ..- -... .-.. .. – . / -.. — -. / –. .. — ...- .- -. -. .. / – .—-. .- / .- -.-. -.-. — – .–. .- –. -. . .-.-.- / - — ..- - / .-...... / .... .- - . .-. ... –..– / .–. — ..- .-. / – .—-. .- ...- — .. .-. / -.. — -. -. . / .-.. .- / – — - .. ...- .- - .. — -. / -.. .—-. .- ...- .- -. -.-. . .-. / . - / - .- -. - / -.. .—-. .- ..- - .-. . ... / . -. -.-. — .-. . –..– / -.. — -. - / .-.. .- / .–. .-.. ..- ... / -... . .-.. .-.. . / -...... / .-...... - . ... / -. . / ... .- ..- .-. .- .. - / .... — -. — .-. . .-. / .-.. .- / -.-. — -. - .-. .. -... ..- - .. — -. .-.-.- Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to examine how, and under what circumstances, beliefs about reality can lead to emotion regulation. This discussion is centred around four studies operationalising fictional reappraisal as a modulation of the nature of an affective stimulus (presenting it to participants as real or fictional). They investigated the effect of this mechanism on phenomenal, bodily and brain markers of the emotional experience, as well as its interaction with Self-related processes (studies 1 and 3), executive functions (studies 2 and 4) or interoceptive abilities (study 4). Results suggest that fictional reappraisal is an efficient strategy to down-regulate the emotional experience, encompassing the subjective and objective aspects of the emotional response. Although emotions are modulated by Self-referential processes, no interaction with fictional reappraisal was reported. Instead, the evidence suggests that executive and interoceptive skills play a role in the effectiveness of fictional reappraisal as an implicit emotion regulation strategy. These findings are discussed in the context of their importance for fundamental affective science, their clinical implications, as well as scientific leads for a science of the sense of reality.

Keywords: Emotion Regulation, Fiction, Fictional Reappraisal, Sense of Reality

Résumé

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’examiner comment les croyances sur la réalité peuvent amener à une régulation émotionnelle. Cette discussion est centrée autour de 4 études opérationnal- isant la réévaluation par la fiction comme une modulation de la nature d’un stimulus affectif (en le présentant à des participants comme étant réel ou fictionnel). Elles étudient l’effet de ce mécanisme sur l’expérience émotionnelle dans sa composante phénoménologique, physiologique et neurale, ainsi que son interaction avec le Self (études 1 et 3), les fonctions exécutives (études 2 et 4) et l’intéroception (étude 4). Les résultats suggèrent que la réévalua- tion par la fiction est une stratégie efficace pour atténuer l’expérience émotionnelle, englobant ses aspects subjectifs et objectifs. Bien que l’émotion soit modulée par les processus de référence à soi, nos travaux suggèrent une absence d’interaction avec la fiction. Par contre, les données soulignent le rôle des capacités exécutives et intéroceptives dans l’efficience de la réévaluation par la fiction. Ces résultats sont discutés dans le contexte de leur importance pour les sciences affectives fondamentales, leurs implications cliniques, ainsi que comme nouvelles pistes pour une science du sentiment de réalité.

Mots-clés: Régulation émotionnelle, fiction, réévaluation par la fiction, sentiment de réalité

Table of contents

List of figures xvii

Nomenclature xix

Exordium 1

Thesis Outline 5

I On Emotion and Emotion Regulation 7 1 The Emotional Chaos ...... 9 2 The Ancient Roots ...... 11 3 Emotions in Science ...... 15 3.1 The Theory of Basic Emotions ...... 15 3.2 The Appraisal Models ...... 17 3.3 The Constructionist Approach ...... 18 3.4 A Predictive-Coding Account of Construction ...... 20 4 Emotion Regulation ...... 22 4.1 The Process Model of Emotion Regulation ...... 24 4.2 Neural Underpinnings of Emotion Regulation ...... 28 4.3 Interindividual Abilities Modulating Emotion Regulation ...... 31

II On Emotions, Fiction and The Self 35 1 Why Fictional Reappraisal? ...... 37 2 The Paradox of Fiction: Emotional Response toward Fiction and the Modu- latory Role of Self-relevance ...... 38

III On Fictional Reappraisal and Executive Functions 47 1 Reframing Fictional Reappraisal ...... 49 2 The Distinctive Role of Executive Functions in Implicit Emotion Regulation 50 xvi Table of contents

IV On the Multimodal Impact of Fictional Reappraisal 59 1 The Need for Replication and Validation ...... 61 2 Phenomenal, Bodily and Brain Correlates of Fictional Reappraisal . . . . . 62

V On the Determinants of Fictional Reappraisal 125 1 What are the Abilities Supporting this Effect? ...... 127 2 Bodily, Cognitive and Personality Determinants of Implicit Emotion Regula- tion through Fictional Reappraisal ...... 128

VI General Discussion 161 1 Summary ...... 162 2 Limitations and Perspectives ...... 163

VII Closing Thoughts 173 1 A Sand Grain in the Desert of the Real ...... 174 2 What is the Sense of Reality? Origin, Architecture, Mechanisms ...... 175

References 225

Appendix A Study 3: Supplementary Materials 1 239

Appendix B Study 3: Supplementary Materials 2 253

Appendix C Study 4: Supplementary Materials 1 257

Appendix D Study 4: Supplementary Materials 2 267

Appendix E Makowski et al. (2017): "Being there" and Remembering it: Pres- ence Improves Memory Encoding 277

Appendix F Nicolas, S., & Makowski, D. (2017). Centenaire Ribot (I). La récep- tion de l’oeuvre de Théodule Ribot chez l’éditeur Ladrange (1870-1873) 287 List of figures

I.1 Perspectives on emotion can be loosely arranged along a continuum. . . . . 19 I.2 Schematic representations of three different perspectives on emotion generation and emotion regulation...... 23 I.3 The Process Model of Emotion Regulation...... 25 I.4 Emotion Regulation in the Extended Process Model...... 27 I.5 A Model of Neural Processing of Emotion Regulation...... 30

VI.1 Distribution of the presence felt toward a movie at the theatre...... 165 VI.2 Clinical Implications...... 167 VI.3 Effect of Exposure-related Desensitisation in Reality and Simulation. . . . . 170

Nomenclature

Acronyms / Abbreviations

ACC Anterior Cingular Cortex

AI Anterior Insula

Amy Amygdala dlPFC Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex

ECG Electrocardiograph (Cardiac Activity)

EDA Eletrodermal Activity

EEG Electroencephalograph

ER Emotion Regulation

ERP Event Related Potential

MPE Maximum Probability of Effect mPFC Medial Prefrontal Cortex

PCC Posterior Cingular Cortex

PFC Prefrontal Cortex

SCR Skin Conductance Response

SoR Sense of Reality vlPFC Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex

Exordium.

Paris, January 2018.

The cold winter wind howls as the pale sun falls beneath the grey roofs horizon. Yet, I experience it as a distant landscape, almost a background, as my mind ventures through thoughts, questions and doubts. If I decided to follow one of this particular mental path and look down the stream, what would I see? Right now, interrogations. Many of them. Why am I writing some sort of foreword, when my dissertation is not even started? Does it have any place in scientific thesis? Am I doing things, once again, backwards? I realise that it all ties back to one underlying concern: why did I take so much time to feel ready to start writing, though I had the papers, ideas and trust in my work to do it? Critically, – and despite my strong prior considering this sensation as caused by well- known cognitive biases involving self-referential processes triggered by my overinflated Ego

(what’s that?), the sensory evidence that I collected throughout the years cast shadows on the idea that this thesis development was similar to the majority of them. I can recall a running joke about my thesis that existed (and, in fact, still does exist) in my lab and beyond. « What is Dominique doing? What’s his PhD topic? He doesn’t know either ». I laughed along carelessly, being confident that what I was doing had its importance as much as its internal coherence. Nevertheless, other questions kept estranging me. For instance, students that didn’t know me much would often ask me quite seriously if “the study I was working on was a thesis study”. They meant to ask if that study was planned from the beginning and would be present in the final manuscript. And most of the time, I wouldn’t know the answer. Or, more specifically, I had the selfish feeling that the question didn’t apply tomycase. Maybe I should have taken that as a bad omen. Indeed, embracing a thesis/extra-thesis work distinction is probably the correct way to go smoothly through a PhD. You stick to what was planned and remain cautious about "extra" things. You might now wonder, why did people ask me that question. Well, while they had a vague prior that my topic had something to do with emotions and reality (« and stuff like that »), their expectations were often contradicted by what they were seeing. 2 Exordium

For example, on my first year, I started to run an experiment to create a test of"pattern identification" in a pseudo-randomly generated cloud of points, while developing afull battery of executive functions examination. On my second year, I learnt three programming languages and built a whole framework for creating computerised psychological tasks and experiments while helping my supervisor to publish papers on the history of psychology. On my third year, I wrote a paper on the zodiac signs (awaiting to be submitted), which I’m actually very proud of, even though the majority of people will find it « not serious enough » for what they think is science. Finally, a few days ago, I almost got caught by the irrepressible desire to create a neurocognitive assessment task based on visual illusions [April edit: I did it]. While a vast amount of these "ideas" consist of few lines scrapped in long-lost notebooks, I’ve spent non-negligible time working on several of them. Some of them paid off, but the rest could be considered – if you consider publishable papers only – as failures. From the exterior, my activity could look like disorganised and scattered, yet it could be that its dorsal spine is just well hidden to nearsighted eyes (note that, ironically, I’m nearsighted myself ). Anyway, that’s probably where you think: « boy, everybody has ideas. The hard part is to control that flow to select and develop the best ones ». And that’s probably true. Surely, if I was brighter, I might have written two or three papers more on emotion regulation and fictional reappraisal. But would I want it that way? I started this PhD to (at least, try to) do scientific research. As far as my ambitions were mature, I wanted to become a scientist. Experimenting, testing and understanding the laws that govern nature and one of its most complex creation is a joy that remained unstained by research-related downsides and flaws. Even if I won a one billion euros lottery (which Ihope will happen), I would certainly continue getting involved in research (although probably a drink in my hand, at a swimming pool in a paradise island). The point is, I apprehended these PhD years not as a time devoted to obtaining a particular degree or recognition, but as a time where I could finally do (and be paid to do) what I wanted: research. However, it is important to note that I had the chance, with this mindset, to find myself in the perfect place at the right moment, both topic and management side. Indeed, my master thesis mingled with neuroaesthetics, a topic that I incredibly enjoyed. Unfortunately, due to practical and political reasons, I could not pursue in this field for my PhD. Meanwhile, I had the opportunity of getting accepted in the Memory & Cognition Lab’ to take part in a project bridging philosophy and neuroscience. A perfect topic with much to learn and much to do, which awakened my interest in more fundamental reflections on the Human mind. On the management side, my supervisors granted me an incredible amount of freedom. I could manage my time, work and goals almost as I desired (as long as I was not on skiing holidays during a lab’ seminar). I’ll never thank them enough, even though I’m not sure they 3 considered this experience as successful. While I tried things and learnt a lot, I also made many mistakes. Some of which could have been avoided, some of which were necessary in the trial-and-error process of learning. Interestingly, this possible lack of firm directions might have to do with my research area per se, as I worked on an on-going development lab’ axis with on-going development tools (rather than its traditional and core interest and methods). Indeed, the lab I considered as home is specialised in the field of memory with a central technique: virtual reality. And yet, due to some aléas in the course of my PhD, my work doesn’t contain much of these topics and techniques. Surely, I could argue that I’m connected to this lab’ through memory- related aspects, such as the Self and consciousness, and that using virtual reality presuppose some considerations on the concept of "reality" itself. Nevertheless, this theoretical and methodological detachment could be considered as one more piece of evidence that sets this work apart. To wrap this unnecessary foreword that many will consider out of place for a scientific thesis, I will finish on a positive note. This has been hitherto an amusing experience. Some would say the doctorate is the end of an adventure, I would rather see it is a beginning. As the compulsive ingestion of savoir, savoir-faire and savoir-être that melt and transmute into a scaffolding for ever-growing thoughts and reflections. On a practical level, the things I’m the most happy with is the technical autonomy I managed to achieve and the theoretical curiosity that I managed to cultivate. I’m also satisfied with the extra-extra-thesis stuff that I did: writing a fantasy book, getting a degree in psychotherapy, following history of arts courses, going on vacation, partying with friends & enjoying life. Dear reader, the time has come now to stop writing these few meta-thesis lines and focus on writing the thesis itself. I wish you a very pleasant reading, as well as a very good luck to me, for the journey ahead is long and full of reality.

« I don’t like the looks of it », said the King: « however, it may kiss my hand, if it likes. » « I’d rather not », the Cat remarked.

– The Cheshire Cat, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Carroll, 1865

Thesis Outline

This thesis aims at better defining and understanding Fictional Reappraisal, the name given to a modulation of emotion related to a change in the appraisal of the reality of a stimulus. This manuscript includes four experimental studies, presenting in a chronologically faithful way the non-linear evolution of our investigations and the slow unfolding of my understanding of the phenomenon. The topic of this manuscript is set at the crossroads of two vaster fields, emotions and the sense of reality, that it will attempt to bridge. The first chapterwill discuss some conceptual elements about emotions and emotion regulation relevant to our further theoretical peregrinations, and the closing chapter will illustrate how our investigation fits inside the much larger concept of sense of reality. In between, the four following experiments can be seen, in fact, as two pairs, one investigating fictional reappraisal and its possible relationship to the Self (through self-referential processing), and the other seeking the determinants of the efficiency of fictional reappraisal. While we could have grouped these experiments differently, we feel that keeping the true order of their production will mirror the dynamic process underlying this work. Thus, and despite the fact that a thesis is, in essence, the crystallisation of this on-going process, we hope that the reader will perceive and follow the development of the theoretical ideas, methods, paradigms and technical tools presented throughout the manuscript. The experimental part will be followed by a brief summary of the findings, a critique presentation of my work as well as an emphasis on the limits as ahorizon to transcend.

CHAPTER I

On Emotion and Emotion Regulation

« To live is to suffer. To survive, well, that’s to find meaning in the suffering. »

– DMX, Slippin’ ABSTRACT

Many scientists and philosophers have sought to characterise and capture the underlying structure of emotion. Years of reflection have placed this phenomenon atthe centre of mental life, and theories have grown to explain, endure, harness or counteract their effect. In this chapter, we will introduce some of the more ancient ideas about emotions, and connect them with the most recent scientific proposals. We will then present a relevant subset of the scientific literature about emotion regulation, laying a theoretical framework to pursue the exploration of fictional reappraisal. 1 The Emotional Chaos 9

1 The Emotional Chaos

MOTIONS are a curious entity. While it is probably one of the concepts we most frequently talk about and use in our daily life, its formal definition remains a challenge. As put by Fehr and Russell (1984, p. 464), "Every- E one knows what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition. Then, it seems, no one knows". Emotion, passion, affect, mood, feeling, suffering, sentiment, excitability, gut reaction. . . The many words and appellations related this entity endorse nuances and discrepancies in their meaning which present in turn variations based on the field, historical period or speaker. Beyond its names, this protean object appears itself as inherently multifaceted, resulting in a tremendous amount of competing definitions. Four decades ago, Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) gathered 91 scientific definitions, emphasis- ing its behavioural expression, physiological mechanisms, subjective component, categories of stimuli, benefits or hindrance. Therefore, overcoming this "conceptual and definitional chaos" (Buck, 1990, p. 330) represents one of the greatest challenges for the research on emotions (Plutchik, 1994). Nevertheless, while the core definition and formalisation remain a hot topic, there isa consensus on a number of fundamental points (Mohiyeddini and Bauer, 2013):

• Multimodal construct: Emotions involve multiple components reflecting behavioural, expressive, experiential and physiological changes (Izard, 1993).

• Adaptative value: Emotions have merged through the course of evolutionary history in order to increase the adaptability of responses in a rapidly and constantly changing environment (Lazarus, 1991a), being crucial to the organism-environment fit (Darwin, 1872; Izard, 1971; Levenson, 1994).

• External-Internal Dynamics: Emotions are generated and maintained in a dynamic transactional process between the organism and the environment (Lazarus, 1966).

• Culturally Anchored: Emotions are influenced by cultural ideas and images, and shaped through sociocultural priors regarding what we feel, what we should feel, and how we express it (Ekman, 1971; Hochschild, 1979; Uchida et al., 2009).

• Social Role: Emotions play a fundamental role in social behaviour, being at the roots of empathy (thus laying the foundations for moral behaviour; Eisenberg and Fabes (1990), providing insights into others’ behaviour and motivations, and necessary for optimal social interactions and relationships (Averill, 1980; Isen, 1987). 10 On Emotion and Emotion Regulation

• Health Importance: Having appropriate emotions in regards to one’s context, goals and state are positively related to culturally endorsed characteristics, such as wellbeing, job satisfaction or resilience (Gross and John, 2003; Tugade et al., 2004). Critically, emotional dysregulation is associated with mental and personality disorders (Aldao et al., 2010; Gross, 1998a).

And yet, once we have said that, we have said nothing on what actually emotionsare. Critically, giving a formal definition appears as insufficient: a complete account ofthis phenomenon should strive at appraising the role, nature, underpinnings and importance of emotions for the Human experience, consciousness and life. And this is, in fact, a quest that mankind has pursued from its dawn. 2 The Ancient Roots 11

2 The Ancient Roots

F we look back in the past, thousands of years from now, it appears that people and early civilisations shared a more holistic vision of existence. Each person was part of the cosmos, where the physical world was con- I nected with the spiritual world. Thus, in accord with the expression "as above, as below", the physical body could not be comprehended without its connection to the spiritual body, the centre of mind, reason and self. While a harmonic connection between these elements was synonym of life, health and wellbeing, disconnection could only result in tribulations. Worldwide, the familiar expression "losing his mind/reason" designate people with symptoms of mental disorders. Early before writing, a lot of societies believed that illness appeared because mind, or soul, was disconnected from the body (Ratcliffe, 2008). For example, in South America, a person suffering from susto, Spanish for "fright", have their soul separated from their body, lost, because of a curse (Ellenberger, 2008). Thus, the role of the shaman is to find ways to bring back what have been lost. If we consider the bodyasa cardinal ingredient of emotions (as suggested by the most recent scientific accounts), then the shamanistic view can be understood in terms of connection with one’s emotions, which would be a key to health and well-being. Interestingly, the Sanskrit words for "existence" and for "feelings" or "emotions" (bhãva) are the same (Shweder et al., 1993). Between the 3rd and 11th centuries A.D., Hindu philosophers posited the existence of four "primary" emotions: passion, anger, perseverance and disgust (the latter sometimes substituted by, or linked to serenity, in a causal sequence that starts with revulsion over attachment in the world and ends with detachment and salvation). Despite some noteworthy attempts (See Turner and Schechner, 1988), this early "categorical" account of emotions hardly overlaps with more recent conceptualisations (Ekman, 1984; Ekman et al., 1980). Interestingly, the canonical Sanskrit text about emotions (the Rasãd- hyãya) describes them by their "symbolic" (one could even say "cognitive") structure: in terms of causes (all the setting and events that make manifest a particular state of the world and, critically, one’s relation to it), consequences (physiological and behavioural responses), and accompanying mental states. This quite elaborate account suggests that emotions would be units based on a particular pattern of multi-modal markers. This, obviously, echoes with contemporary theories of emotions. Moreover, the tight relationship between emotions and existence could be seen as an hint toward a relationship between emotions and the phenomenological reality of an entity. 12 On Emotion and Emotion Regulation

The fact that several Indo-Tibetan languages have no direct translations for the word emotions (Sanskrit, Pali, Tibetan; Ekman et al., 2005) is already informative about their conception of emotions. They do not see them as a separate process, or state (as do many modern psychologists), but rather as integrated into every aspect of life. Buddhism, in particular, places (what we call) emotions at the centre of its conceptualisation of cosmos and consciousness. It distinguishes between two general states: "sukha" and "duhkha", which could respectively be translated to "happiness" and "suffering". While this dissociation could be seen as analogous to the modern occidental separation between "positive" and "negative" emotions, it is profoundly different. For Buddhists, sukha is a state that arises from unfiltered awareness of the true nature of reality (Ekman et al., 2005). Contrarily, duhkha is the core suffering that comes from misapprehending the nature of reality. Critically, Buddhists consider some emotions (or mental states) as fundamentally bad ("toxins for the mind"; Ekman et al., 2005), independently of their intensity or the context in which they arise. The two most important negative states are craving and hatred, which would be supported by a deceptively reified distinction (considered as real) between the subject and the object. This, in turn, leads to considering an object as "mine" (or "me"). Then, craving and hatred rise as one misplaces the source of satisfaction within the external object rather than in the mind alone. In other words, these afflictive emotions are generated by a strong sense of reality, that assumes a distinction between the "I" and the world. This terrain, associated with the projection of autonomy, singularity and permanence, creates an attachment to the "I" and what is mine, and repulsion the other and what is others. Curiously, modern psychologists do not support the distinction between inherently good and bad emotions. Following Aristotelian ethics, they support (in general) what could be seen as the tempered mind hypothesis: all emotions are healthy as long as they are not excessive or inappropriate to the time and place. This view is rooted in occidental philosophy, itself born from the idealistic school of Greek philosophy. Aristotle, Plato’s disciple, defined the emotions as follows: "that which leads one’s condition to become so transformed that his judgement is affected, and which is accompanied by pleasure and pain." Two important elements emerge from this definition: the notion of valence (pleasure/pain) and the clouding of judgement. It is interesting to note that placing the effect of emotions on cognition (judgement) as the central part strikingly echoes with modern conceptualisation and the role of emotions. Indeed, the formalisation of philosophy in ancient Greece, its impregnation by the Platonist school has led to a modern (and western) development focused on the pursuit of reason. Emotions have, since then, lurked in the shadows, often as a paradigmatic threat to reason and a danger to philosophers (Solomon, 2008). 2 The Ancient Roots 13

Nevertheless, the two main other Greek schools of philosophy, Stoicism and Epicure- anism, offer a different view on this phenomenon. Critically, they underline the role of belief and intention in shaping emotional reactions. For Stoics, in contrast to the Platonists, emotions are not to be associated with non-rational parts of the psyche, but depending on rational processes (Gill, 2010). Emotions are viewed as a sub-part of motivation, specifically triggered by the consent to react in a given way in a given context. Interestingly, their cate- gorisation of emotions could be seen as following two axes, time (present or future) and value (good or bad). For example, desire and fear are good and bad in the future, while pleasure and pain are good and bad in the present, respectively. One important feature of the stoic thinking is the idea that despite being a fully rational (in terms of their genesis) phenomenon, emotions are "diseased" states of mind. For Stoics, emotions such as pleasure, pain, desire and fear reflect an over-inflated attachment to things that beings are naturally drawn to,such as health, property, pleasure or wealth. And wise Stoics recognise this erroneous valuation and focus on the pursuit of the only thing that really matters; virtue. One of the differences of Epicureanism is the central part of the "affective" (or "feeling") dimension of emotions, which Stoics (with the term "bites") consider mostly for pre-emotions (reactions that lack the rationality of full-scale emotions). Interestingly, for the development of the present work, Stoics also included, among these pre-emotions, involuntary or instinctive physiological reactions, as well as the imaginative engagement in fiction created in the theatre (Graver, 2008). Critically, Epicureanism underlines the role of (misguided) beliefs in generating emotions, creating the distinction between "natural" and "empty" emotions. The former is related to things that Epicureanism seek (the absence of pain and an undisturbed mind) or that triggers pleasurable states, while the latter is oriented toward objects which make no contribution to these ends (such as symbols of status). This distinction is orthogonally imposed on emotional states. For instance, anger can be natural (consistent with a correct understanding of reality) and empty (reflecting erroneous beliefs about it). Thus, "naturally" angry Epicureans would see taking revenge as a painful necessity rather than a source of pleasure (Cicero, 1931). Finally, the two non-Platonist schools put the Human subjects fully responsible for their emotions (and empowers them to change them). Indeed, despite the fact that all beings have emotional tendencies, Humans (unlike wild animals) can modify them (Bobzien, 2000). The goal of the Epicurean therapy is then to help people to revise their "empty" beliefs with "natural ones". The words "emotion" itself stems from emovere, a Latin word for "to set in motion", "to displace" and "to move out" (Ahmed, 2004), priming the view that emotions are "powerful forces" (Mohiyeddini and Bauer, 2013) that cause changes in human behaviour, cognition and perception (Frijda, 1986). The Christian philosopher Augustine (354-430), a major 14 On Emotion and Emotion Regulation

thinker of the late Roman empire, agreed with this, often calling emotions "disturbances" or perturbationes. Nevertheless, he believed that the Stoics were wrong in their journey of becoming free of emotions. Based on the Bible, a text full of references to emotions (love enemies, being compassionate, distressed when facing temptation), Augustine believed that some emotions are to be cultivated, rather than overcome (for example, the fear of God would be a "positive" emotion, in that sense). In summary, antique uptakes on emotions lay a ground for the following debate over the mind/body problem, itself at the roots of the opposition between dualism and materialism. While the dualist views reached the pinnacle of success during the Enlightenment era and further, quite ironically, in religious teachings, the materialist view has been spreading along with the development of science. The overall contribution of this debate (and of the thinkers involved in it) to modern theories is well summarised by successful authors such as Damasio (Damasio, 2003, 2006), becoming well acknowledged by the scientific community, as shown by the myriad of mentions in the introduction of emotions-related textbooks. Nevertheless, this very brief historical overview was aimed at giving a glimpse at the richness, complexity and sophistication of ancient conceptualisations of emotions. These early views, in particular, the non-Platonist approaches, strongly echo with the most recent scientific discoveries on the brain, emotions or psychotherapy. It is only very recently that scientists re-placed emotions at the heart of cognition, connecting it back with the body, integrating it in all our psychological processes as a central aspect of our everyday conscious experience. Interestingly, as we will see in the next section, the modern considerations on the nature of emotions are currently rediscovering and reinterpreting this ancient knowledge, and even renewing what could have been seen as primitive conceptualisations. 3 Emotions in Science 15

3 Emotions in Science

ONTRARY to a widespread belief among scientists, coining affective science, or the inclusion of emotions as an important parameter for mental life and cognitive processing, the interest in emotions is probably as old as C reasoning itself. From Orient to Occident, the understanding and successful coping with our emotional states were (and still is) a central challenge for lots of religions and spiritualisms (Lopez, 2002; Ratcliffe, 2008). On the other hand, as shown in the previous section, this interest has also evolved through a thorough philosophical inquiry about the nature, role and contributions of emotions to psychology, life and reality. But the roots of a scientific investigation of the phenomenon are to be traced back tothe Renaissance, which glorified a "logic and reason above all" vision of human intelligence (Damasio, 2008). In reaction to this movement, Romanticism distinguished and elevated the place and the role of emotions and feelings upon reasoning, becoming an approach to art, creation and life (Richardson, 2001). Critically, the history of formal scientific exploration of emotions is usually divided into three eras (Gergen, 1995; Hansell, 1989; Lazarus, 1993). It started with the "golden years" with Darwin’s 1872 publication of The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Then, as psychology mutated from the science of the mind (James, 1890) into the science of behaviour (with authors such as Skinner and Watson), the interest in the subjective experience of emotions fell out of fashion. Following these "Dark Ages", the "Renaissance" flourished in the mid-twentieth century, with famous studies and theories (Arnold, 1960; Ekman, 1971; Lazarus, 1966) strongly influencing research and its outcomes for the years to come. Although creating an elegant storyline, some scholars argue that the names of these eras are misleading (Gendron and Feldman Barrett, 2009). In fact, they all contributed to the creation and growth of the three main perspectives on emotions: the Basic Emotion theory, the Appraisal models and the Constructionist approach1 (see Figure I.1).

3.1 The Theory of Basic Emotions

Charles Darwin is considered as one of the principal inspiration for the basic emotion approach. In relationship to his theory of evolution (positing, among other things, that humans have a common ancestry with other species), he suggested that many patterns of gestures in animals are caused by internal mental states seeking expression, thus called "emotional expressions". For example, he wrote that "With mankind some expressions,

1Although we will decompose these models for the sake of clarity, keep in mind that they rather constitute a complex continuum of theories and models (Gross and Feldman Barrett, 2011). 16 On Emotion and Emotion Regulation

such as the bristling of the hair under the influence of extreme terror, or the uncovering of teeth, under that of furious rage, can hardly be understood, except on the belief that man once existed in a much lower and animal-like condition" (Darwin, 1872, p. 12). In fact, its interpretation of some human reactions as vestiges of their evolutionary past was but an evidence for Darwin to support his theory of natural selection. Although it was not Darwin’s intention to develop a model of emotion, it had a major influence on the development of the basic emotions theory and beyond 2. Basic emotion models posit that some emotions are automatically triggered by objects and events in the world. Critically, they assume that instances of these emotions are analogous and can be regrouped into categories that share the same pattern of behaviour, bodily changes, facial expressions and experience. In modern accounts of this theory, this limited number of emotions are supported by dedicated neural networks, hardwired into the brain in the early stages of life. These basic (or primary) emotions are seen as basic building blocs or fundamental atoms, and cannot be decomposed into anything else. One of the main modern defenders of this approach is Ekman (Ekman, 1992, 1999; Ekman and Cordaro, 2011) and his famous work with facial expressions, that strove at identifying different patterns of such expressions and their universal value by comparing them across countries, societies and cultures. However, these studies, and the theory they are meant to support, are currently undergoing a growing criticism from the affective science community (Barrett, 2017). Indeed, the basic emotion theory assumes that instances of each emotion category share a more or less complex, but distinctive, pattern of changes (encompassing autonomic, brain or mental dimensions and their combination). While there has been an astonishing amount of studies seeking such fingerprints (using all kinds of recording devices and cutting-edge machine- learning tools), the evidence for their existence appears as scarce (Gendron et al., 2018; Siegel et al., 2018; Touroutoglou et al., 2015): "Even after a century of effort, scientific research has not revealed a consistent, physical fingerprint for even a single emotion. [...] You can experience anger with or without a spike in blood pressure. You can experience fear with or without an amygdala" (Barett, 2017, p. xii). Instead, replication attempts and new evidence emphasise instead the inconsistency and unreliability of the relationship between how (and what) we feel and bodily markers and the absence of autonomic or expressive stable "fingerprints" of emotional states.

2Facebook commissioned a set of emoticons based on Darwin’s writings (Sharrock, 2013, How Facebook, A Pixar Artist, And Charles Darwin Are Reinventing The Emoticon. Buzzfeed, February 8). 3 Emotions in Science 17

3.2 The Appraisal Models

The second most popular perspective on emotions assumes that emotions are not merely triggered in a reflexive way but arise from a meaningful interpretation by an individual of objects and events (Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1991b; Scherer, 2005; Scherer et al., 2001). They are mental states as well as intentional states (referring to objects in the world), but it is the meaning (an automatic appraisal process) that drives the kind of emotion (Frijda, 1988), rather than the object per se. This conceptualisation emphasises the relationship between the object and the subject, and underlines the idiosyncratic nature of emotions. Typically, appraisals are seen as mechanisms (or switches) that help to coordinate activation of the other components of the emotional response (behaviour, physiological response and subjective experience). Five appraisal dimensions are typically present across different appraisal model (Moors et al., 2013; Scherer, 2001). Relevance refers to how important an event is to one’s currently active goals, valence is how positive or negative a situation is, likelihood involves the probability regarding the current situation and its outcome, agency involves responsibility and causal attribution and coping potential finally refers to the resources available for changing the situation or one’s reaction to it. Another popular framework, the Component Process Model (CPM; Sander et al., 2005), integrates a three-fold layered organisation of appraisals and sub-appraisals (the Stimulus Evaluation Checks; SECS), which would take different forms depending on the level of processing (the sensory-motor, schematic and conceptual levels; Leventhal, 1984). For instance, Goal Relevance can refer to basic needs, acquired needs (motives) or conscious goals (plans), respectively to the level of processing. Appraisal models come in different flavours, with some of them closely related to basic emotions (appraisals are like switches that trigger a particular response) and others seeing appraisals as ways of experiencing the world (for instance, to be in a state of sadness is to experience loss), blurring the distinction between the "general" phenomenal experience and emotions (Barrett et al., 2007). Nevertheless, as reflected by their conceptual and empirical proximity with computational models or deep-learning algorithms, the appraisal theories often subscribe to a reactive view of cognition (in general; although pro-active processes, such as the appraisal of novelty, predictability and familiarity in the relevance dimension, are often incorporated). In most of the models, the emotional stimulus is suddenly there, presented as a sensory input, triggering a chain-reaction (with degrees of recursion) that will result in a particular conscious appraisal and response behaviour. Instead, the constructionist approach tends to reverse this relationship, conceptualising the emotional stimulus not as the input, but as the output of a complex set of predictions. 18 On Emotion and Emotion Regulation

3.3 The Constructionist Approach

Defining psychology as "a science of the relations of mind and brain" (thus qualifying as an early theoretical neuropsychologist), William James developed a thesis opposing the view that emotions are mental states which themselves trigger a specific pattern of bodily changes (Dumas, 1903). Instead, he suggested that bodily changes automatically follow the perception of a situation, and that the feeling (i.e., the elaboration) of these changes was the emotion (James, 1884, pp. 189–190). The second important aspect of his theory was that a particular instance of emotion was related to a particular pattern of changes in the body. This perspective has become known as the James-Lange theory (so named because of Carl Lange that developed a similar view, although more focused on the vasomotor system, independently of James). After a first wave of severe criticism from its contemporaries (Sherrington, 1899; Wundt, 1891), his theory was contested by Cannon (1927): 1) decerebrated animals still exhibit emotional behaviours (rage and fear) and 2) autonomic changes are too slow and not specific enough to reflect the rapidity and diversity of emotional experiences. Nevertheless, his theory was recently rehabilitated and popularised by authors such as Damasio (2008). It is interesting to note that James was associated with both the basic emotion and the appraisal theories. The former was probably caused by his writings on emotions as instinctual reactions to specific objects of the world (James, 1884), as well as because of its proximity with Lange, who assumed primal and biological underpinnings for discrete emotions. Furthermore, the fact that he suggested that the global situation (rather than a single extracted object) is a key to unlock a particular set of bodily changes was interpreted (Ellsworth, 1994) as a reference to the "meaning analysis" at the heart of appraisal theories. However, recent re-readings of the history of affective science disprove these elements and classify James as a tenant of the constructionist approach (Gendron and Feldman Barrett, 2009). Besides the tangled heritage of James, Wundt is the other major figure of the Golden Years who envisioned a constructionist approach to emotion. Importantly, his work describes "simple feelings", which he believed to have three independent qualities: pleasant/unpleasant, arousing / subduing and strain/relaxation. This obviously echoes with modern "dimensional" accounts of emotions (Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999; Fontaine et al., 2007; Russell and Barrett, 1999; Watson and Tellegen, 1985), which attempt at defining the features that compose the multidimensional space that best accounts for the similarities and differences in emotions. Wundt’s views had also an important influence for the concept of "core affect", considered as one of the fundamental aspects of the conscious emotional experience by constructionists (Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Russell, 2003, 2009; Yik et al., 2011). It is defined as "that neurophysiological state consciously accessible as the simplest raw (nonreflective) feelings evident in moods and emotions" (Russell, 2003, p. 148). In other words, core affect is simply 3 Emotions in Science 19 the fact of feeling good or bad and drowsy or energised (although arousal has been recently discussed due to its wide heterogeneity and inconsistency in expression; Satpute et al., 2018). This is somewhat related to Ribot’s underrated contribution to affective science (Ribot, 1896). Indeed, while subscribing to the idea of basic emotions (distinguishing five primitive, irreducible and innate emotions from their derivatives, the secondary emotions) connected to organic reactions (sensations), the founder of French modern psychology (Nicolas and Makowski, 2017) described these physiological reactions as the origin of pure affective states, i.e., subjective states that are unrelated to perception, images or concepts, being simply pleasant, unpleasant or mixed (Nicolas, 2005, chap. III, pp. 104-146). Unlike the basic emotion, the constructionist approach refutes the idea of any "specific" or "devoted" physical or neurocognitive underpinnings of emotions (that is why we discuss the processes involved in emotions rather than any "neuroanatomical basis of emotions"). Instead, all mental states (including emotions) are seen as emerging from an ongoing, continually modified psychologically constructive process that involves more basic ingredients. Such ingredients usually include some form of bodily information; raw sensations (James, 1884), arousal (Schachter and Singer, 1962), affect (Russell, 2003) or motivational states of approach / avoidance (Davidson, 1992), and a process by which a state is made meaningful as related to an object; social referencing (Schachter and Singer, 1962), attribution (Russell, 2003), self-relevance (Herbert et al., 2011) or situated categorisations (Barrett, 2006). One of the suggested general mechanism by which this psychological construction is rendered is known as predictive coding.

Fig. I.1 Perspectives on emotion can be loosely arranged along a continuum. Gross and Feldman Barrett (2011) have populated this continuum with representative theorists/researchers drawn from the field of psychology. They distinguish three "zones": (1) basic emotion, in red, e.g., MacDougall (1908/1921), Panksepp (1998), Buck (1999), Davis (1992), LeDoux (2000), Tomkins (1962, 1963), Ekman (1972), Izard (1993), Levenson (1994), and Damasio (1999); (2) appraisal, in yellow, e.g., Arnold (1960a, 1960b), Roseman (1991), Lazarus (1991), Frijda (1986), Scherer (1984), Smith and Ellsworth (1985), Leventhal (1984), and Clore and Ortony (2008); (3) psychological construction, in green, e.g., Wundt (1897/1998), Barrett (2009), Harlow and Stagner (1933), Mandler (1975), Schachter and Singer (1962), Duffy (1941); Russell (2003), and James (1884). Adapted from Gross and Feldman Barrett (2011). 20 On Emotion and Emotion Regulation

3.4 A Predictive-Coding Account of Construction

During the last century, a great amount of effort has been devoted to develop, use and emphasise the notion of the brain as a passive information processing organ (especially with the advances in electronics and computers, leading to the popularisation of the brain-computer analogy). In this framework, the brain is a data processing device, that receives information from the senses about the world (the external and internal state). After processing this data, it eventually issues various commands to adjust some parameters. Nevertheless, this classical view appears as erroneous, being revised by modern cognitive neuroscience in favour of theories of embodiment and self-organisation (Friston, 2010). Specifically, recent proposals support the general model of the brain as a predictive machine. Within this framework, the brain strives at reducing uncertainty and rendering its environment predictable (Friston and Kiebel, 2009). This "prediction error" minimisation can be achieved, for example, by revising our expectations (what I see in the distance is not a cloud but a flock of birds), their precision (giving more weight to the processing of relevant information) or by undertaking actions (I move my hand to fulfil the prediction of my hand moving). Within the predictive coding framework, our conscious experience emerges from the brain’s "best guess" (i.e., the best prediction) about one’s external and internal environment. The Bayesian brain hypothesis, through the predictive coding framework, is a biologically (Clark, 2013) and mathematically (Buckley et al., 2017) plausible theory with a considerable amount of empirical support (Friston, 2008). In short, this theory suggests that representations in higher levels of the neuronal hierarchy generate predictions about representations in lower levels. These descending predictions are compared with the actual sensory samples to compute a prediction error, which is fed back up the hierarchy to inform the higher-levels representations. Although originally developed in the field of perception, this framework has been extended to other aspects of cognition, such as attention (Feldman and Friston, 2010), interoception, and (Seth, 2013) features of the sense of reality (Seth, 2014a,b; Seth et al., 2012). Critically for the present chapter, it has also been applied to emotions (Barrett and Sim- mons, 2015; Clark et al., 2018; Seth and Friston, 2016). Indeed, recent theoretical suggestions have converged on the idea that emotions might be the reflection of changes in the uncertainty about the somatic consequences of action (Joffily and Coricelli, 2013; Seth and Friston, 2016; Wager et al., 2015). In other words, emotional states might be supported by the accuracy by which the physiological state can be predicted. In this framework, negative emotions could contextualise events that induce expectations of uncertainty about physiological states, while positive emotions contextualise events that resolve this uncertainty (Barrett and Satpute, 2013; Gu et al., 2013). Within this framework, one can also think of moods (long-term 3 Emotions in Science 21 average of emotional states) as hyperpriors (i.e., expectations about expectations) on the predictability of the world (i.e., on emotions). For example, depression would correspond to unpredictable outcomes (negative emotions) predicted with high precision (i.e., expected through hyperpriors, resulting in a self-maintaining and resistant negative state). On the contrary, mania would correspond to the precise expectations of positive emotions of a predictable and controllable world. Accordingly, the ability to appreciate the unpredictability of one’s actions is dampened, leading to the emergence of overconfident, high-risk behaviours (Mason et al., 2017). While this predictive account of emotions bridges together psychological construction theories with the appraisal theories through the importance of beliefs (reinterpreted as statistical priors), and despite its neurobiological plausibility, it is still a cutting-edge approach in further need of empirical validation. Importantly, the constructionist theories emphasise the place of emotional states in everyday conscious experience. Emotions are not transient, do not appear then disappear, but are constantly colouring our way of being in the world, giving sense and meaning to events and objects that we can reflect on. Russell (2003) compared affect to temperature. It isalways felt, but most of the time in the background (our cognition is not cluttered with feelings and reflection about how "normal" the temperature is). However, it is often foregrounded when there are large increases in intensity (allowing for convenient chit chat such as "what a hot day!"). Recent accounts carry this idea of continuous affect even further. Based on cognitive and neuroscientific evidence, Duncan and Barrett (2007) have suggested that affect isacore feature of consciousness, critically contributing to the development and maintenance of a unified conscious space and experience. In summary, recent models tend to converge to the idea that emotions are not to be dissociated, or opposed to, other cognitive processes or states. There is no specific neural network, nor structure, nor cognitive process devoted to emotions. They become particular entities at a phenomenological (or proto-phenomenological) level, colouring and filtering the way we experience the world. In fact, this conceptualisation coincides with antique and oriental philosophical accounts, underlining the proximity between emotions, existence and well-being. And yet, whether emotions are seen as a threat to reason or the distorting mirror or reality, it is, most of the time, not their existence and structure that is taught. It is but their conquest. How to overcome, surmount and survive the cognitive biases related to emotional states. 22 On Emotion and Emotion Regulation

4 Emotion Regulation

« If you are distressed by anything external, the pain is not due to the thing itself, but to your estimate of it; and this you have the power to revoke at any moment. »

– Marcus Aurelius (AD 121-180), Meditation VIII, 45

HAT we do to influence the emotions we have, when we have them, and how we experience and express them is referred to as emotion regulation (Gross, 1998b). This issue is central is many scientific (e.g., stress and W coping, Lazarus, 1966; attachment, Bowlby, 1969; and self regulation, Mischel et al., 1989) and pseudo-scientific (Freud, 1920) accounts of various psychological phenomena. Moreover, mood-disorders, anxiety-related disorders, substance-related and addictive disorders as well as several personality disorders are often seen as related to a poor ability to regulate emotions (Fox et al., 2008; Gross and John, 2003; Gross and Muñoz, 1995; Martin and Dahlen, 2005; Sheppes et al., 2015). Curiously, the term "emotion regulation" is itself very recent (until 1990, only four studies contained this expression, Gross and Feldman Barrett, 2011), although its field is currently undergoing an exponential growth (Gross, 2015a). 4 Emotion Regulation 23

Fig. I.2 Schematic representations of three different perspectives on emotion generation and emotion regulation. Panels A and B: red represents emotion generation and blue represents emotion regulation. Panel C: different colours represent distributed networks for basic ingredients of the mind. Arrows depict the flow of information. In extreme basic emotion views, objects are thought to trigger subcortical generators (such as the amygdala) in an obligatory way (Panksepp, 2004). Thus, emotion regulation refers to a separate set of processes acting upon the former, primarily by cortical modulation of subcortical circuits. In appraisal theories, the sharp separation between emotion generators and control systems tend to fade. Emotion arises in the context of a person-situation transaction that compels attention, has a particular meaning to an individual, and gives rise to a coordinated yet malleable multi-system response, defining specific aspects that can be acted upon. In the psychological construction perspective, emotions are viewed as continually constructed from psychological ingredients, such as information from the body and the creation of a meaningful relationship between an affective state and an object. Thus, emotion regulation could refer to modifying the ingredients. However, in the most elemental forms of psychological construction, where the distinction between emotion generation and regulation is seen as arbitrary and lacking biological underpinnings (Barrett and Bliss-Moreau, 2009), the distinction between them might lie in the subjective experience of agency. Emotion generation might refer to instances when there is no sense of agency in making an affective state meaningful, whereas regulation refers to instances that are accompanied by an experience of agency. Adapted from Gross and Feldman Barrett (2011).

And yet, the term "emotion regulation" is not trivial, assuming a distinction between regulation and generation processes. This is problematic, at least from the standpoint of psychological construction models, in which features of what is traditionally referred to as emotions are interwoven with every aspect of cognition. In this framework, the distinction between emotion generation and emotion regulation is anything but clear-cut. The modification of an emotional state, or even the sole possibility of its modification, isalready a core feature to define and characterise this particular emotional state. Moreover, the term "regulation" evokes processes arising after the emotion has been generated (or constructed). These are important issues to keep in mind, especially in paradigms (such as ours) where emotion regulation is believed to be triggered from the beginning of the emotional event, in the form of a prior belief (for instance, presenting the content as fictional). Can the 24 On Emotion and Emotion Regulation

knowledge implicitly influence the subsequent emotion we have be considered as regulation per se? Although the definition and conceptualisation of emotion regulation highly depend on the underlying approach to emotions (see Figure I.2), attempts have been made to find a common ground for exploring the act of modifying emotions. The "modal model" of emotion was designed to be a general framework and a basis for investigating emotion regulation, unifying features that are common to many different approaches to emotion (Gross, 2015a).

4.1 The Process Model of Emotion Regulation

The modal model of emotion can be described as a loop (or sequence) of steps, in which the entry is a psychologically relevant situation. This situation can be referring to features of the external environment (e.g., an angry looking reviewer) or to the activation of internal representations (e.g., the thought that of an angry reviewer). These situations are then (atten- tionally) attended to, and appraised in terms of what they mean in light of the individual’s currently active goals (Moors et al., 2013). This contextual evaluation triggers the loosely coupled changes in subjective, behavioural, and physiological systems characterising emotion. Importantly, this emotional response often modifies one of the previous steps (such as the situation), creating a recursive spiral of unfolding processes. Based on this operationalisation of emotion dynamics, the most commonly used framework for exploring emotion regulation is the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998a,b). It describes various processes that can apply to each step of the modal model of emotion (see Figure I.3). For example, one can attempt to regulate the emotion by selecting or modifying the situation, or by deploying attention differently to change the available information. Alternatively, one can try operating a cognitive change to change the appraisals of the situation, or act on the emotional response systems. Note that these cognitive processes are themselves at the heart of various strategies (techniques). For instance, modifying the attentional engagement (thus the available information) can be seen as the core cognitive mechanism of strategy such as distraction. Similarly, modifying the situation step is the process involved in dysfunctional strategies such as avoidance. Thus, rather than being a unitary process, emotion regulation is conceptualised as an umbrella term for various strategies (Webb et al., 2012), differing in the moment, the target of their action, the degree of voluntary control and the prominence of the emotion regulation goal as explicit vs implicit (Braunstein et al., 2017). The process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998b, 2015b), suggests that emotions can be regulated via cognitive processes that intervene at specific moments of the emotional dynamics. An important distinction is to be made between explicit and implicit emotion regulation strategies. Indeed, some implementations of emotion regulation strategies have an explicit 4 Emotion Regulation 25 representation of their goal. They usually involve a conscious desire to change the emotion (e.g., the goal to feel happier). On the contrary, implicit emotion regulation refers to the absence of a conscious desire to change one’s emotion. For instance, affect labelling tasks require the participant to select the correct name (e.g., fear) for a target’s emotional state. The act of deciding the appropriate semantic label reduces behavioural and brain markers of emotion (Burklund et al., 2014; Lieberman et al., 2007, 2011). Although this strategy engages regions implicated in controlled processes (e.g. right vlPFC), the participants do not consciously aim at reducing their emotion (Cohen and Lieberman, 2010; Torrisi et al., 2013).

Fig. I.3 The Process Model of Emotion Regulation. The various emotion regulation strategies are related to different mechanisms intervening at specific moments in the emotion dynamics. Adapted from Gross (1998a).

The process model of emotion regulation provides a description of emotional components in relationship with cognitive processes, and allows for the formalisation and description of various strategies. However, the reason why a person initiates (or fails to) a particular strategy rather than another, is an important aspect of the study of emotion regulation described in the extended process model of emotion regulation (see Figure I.4). The core concept of this framework is that emotions involve valuation (i.e., a "good for me" versus "bad for me" distinction). A valuation system can be represented by distinguishing among states of the world ("W"), perceptions of those states ("P"), negative or positive valuations of these perceptions in light of a relevant goal ("V"), and actions undertaken to realise the goal ("A"), which can be mental operations (e.g., attending to a stimulus) or physical actions (e.g., reaching for an object). Many of such valuation systems (again, a spiral looping through 26 On Emotion and Emotion Regulation these aspects) can be active simultaneously and can interact one with another. Moreover, one valuation system can "incorporate", or trigger another, second-level system. For instance, a first-level valuation system can evaluate a spider a "bad for me" and set thechanges corresponding to a negative emotion. But now, a second-level valuation system can take the former system (generating negative emotions) as target and valuate it as "bad for me" (I shouldn’t feel negative emotions as it is a fake spider), and set as current goal to modify the unfolding emotional response (Gross and Feldman Barrett, 2011), with actions described by the process model. Thus, this framework extends the process model by including three meta-steps to emotion regulation; identification (whether to regulate emotion), selection (what strategy to use), and implementation (the efficient implementation of a particular strategy). This thesis focuses on one aspect, implementation, of one very specific strategy, fictional reappraisal, itself belonging to the domain of cognitive change. 4 Emotion Regulation 27

Fig. I.4 Emotion Regulation in the Extended Process Model. The first-level valuation system generates an unsatisfactory outcome (an unwanted emotion), becoming the target of a second-level valuation system which will perceive it (P), valuate it (V), and implement actions aiming to change the world (the situation), the perception of the world (attendance), the cognitive representation (the meaning) of the world (W), or emotion-related actions (A; the emotional response). Adapted from Gross (2015b). 28 On Emotion and Emotion Regulation

Cognitive change, the most studied form of emotion regulation, involves the voluntary or involuntary change in the appraisals of an event. It has been, at first, presented as a unique strategy. However, appraisals are conceptualised as a set of distinct dimensions (for example, relevance, valence, agency, likelihood...). Therefore, it is unsurprising that the understanding of "reappraisal" as a unique strategy has been recently re-framed into a broader category. It encompasses strategies such as positive reappraisal (creating and focusing on a positive aspect of the stimulus), detachment (disengaging from all emotional implications), distancing and/or decentring (perspective change to consider an event "from the outside") and fictional reappraisal. Cognitive change is considered an efficient and adaptive strategy (Aldao et al., 2010; Gross and Muñoz, 1995) which can be used to effectively decrease the subjective experience of negative emotions Gross (1998a, 2015a). It also leads to lesser activation in the amygdala (Ochsner and Gross, 2008; Ochsner et al., 2004) and ventral striatum (Staudinger et al., 2009). However, its effect on autonomic response systems remains unclear with studies reporting either no effect or a small effect (Gross, 1998a; Kim and Hamann, 2012; Sheppes and Meiran, 2007; Shiota and Levenson, 2012; Wolgast et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the exact cognitive abilities supporting, or involved in, each of these strategies remains unclear, and understanding their neural correlates give us insights about their neurocognitive implementation.

4.2 Neural Underpinnings of Emotion Regulation

The brain structure traditionally attached to the processing of emotions is the amygdala. However, scientific evidence is now clear on the fact that this collection of smaller discrete nuclei is not sufficient nor necessary for the subjective experience. Indeed, number of studies show that its activation was not only linked to the presentation of fear-inducing stimuli, but to relevance detection in general (N’Diaye et al., 2009; Ousdal et al., 2008). This suggests that the amygdala is related to the detection of relevant stimuli (Sander et al., 2003) rather than negative emotions per se. This explanation also explains its activation in emotional processing, as "relevance" is a major aspect of emotion dynamics. Importantly, the amygdala has extensive reciprocal connections with the prefrontal cortex (PFC), and impairments of this connectivity can be related to impulsive and aggressive behaviour (New et al., 2007). Neuroimaging studies of emotion regulation, and especially reappraisal (the most studied; Buhle et al., 2014), have indeed consistently reported activation in the PFC, particularly in lateral and medial regions encompassing the dorsal and ventral prefrontal cortex, as well as the anterior cingulate cortex (Buhle et al., 2014; Kohn et al., 2014; Morawetz et al., 2017). The neurofunctional model of Kohn et al., 2014 (see Figure I.5) suggests that at the ventrolateral PFC initiates the appraisal and signals the need to regulate the emotion to the 4 Emotion Regulation 29 dorsolateral PFC, which then processes the regulation itself and gives a feedforward signal (via the ACC or directly) to other regions such as the angular gyrus, supplementary motor area, superior temporal gyrus, amygdala and basal ganglia, which in turn participate in the generation of a (regulated) emotional state. While regions supporting executive functions (Bush et al., 2000; Niendam et al., 2012) are believed to be essential to an effective emotion regulation (Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Ochsner et al., 2012), it is important to note that non-prefrontal regions might also play a pivotal role in this ability. For example, Morawetz et al., 2017 showed that the anterior insula (involved in interoception) and the supplementary motor area were consistently activated in emotion regulation, independently of the regulation strategy. 30 On Emotion and Emotion Regulation

Fig. I.5 A Model of Neural Processing of Emotion Regulation. Affective arousal is relayed via amygdala and basal ganglia to the VLPFC and the anterior insula, as well as SMA, angular gyrus and STG (a). The VLPFC initiates the appraisal and signals the need to regulate to the DLPFC (b). The DLFPC processes the regulation itself and sends a feedforward signal to initiate the generation of a (regulated) emotional state (c). Adapted from Kohn et al. (2014). 4 Emotion Regulation 31

4.3 Interindividual Abilities Modulating Emotion Regulation

While the process model of emotion regulation attempts to make a correspondence between strategies of emotion regulation and their core mechanism (for example, attentional deployment for distraction), the cognitive processes supporting strategies related to cognitive change remain unclear. Moreover, the extensive neuroimaging literature shows the engagement of large networks involved in several cognitive domains such as cognitive control or interoception. Furthermore, these results could be misleading due to the predominant use of explicit and controlled forms of reappraisal (often instructing the participants to "reappraise the stimulus in a positive way"), which in turn could increase the cognitive load, further reflected by the activation of prefrontal areas. Finally, the step of valuation and meaning, although critical in the appraisal and constructionist approaches, is often under-studied in the context of emotion regulation. The missing link between theoretical models and neural activity, i.e., the cognitive processes supporting the strategies that people use in their daily life, appear as even harder to grasp if we take into account the multidimensionality of these cognitive domains. For example, while executive functions could be defined as a set of processes supporting goal- oriented behaviour and thoughts and devoted to the representation and monitoring of short- term goals and flexible control of the action, they are not a unitary construct. Many theoretical accounts emphasise the distinctiveness and specificity of the various processes involved, such as inhibition, mental set shifting and working memory (Friedman and Miyake, 2017; Miyake et al., 2000). A similar argument can be made regarding interoceptive abilities, that have also been theorised to be involved in emotion dynamics, encompassing emotional reactivity (Dunn et al., 2010; Zaki et al., 2012), and regulation (Füstös et al., 2012; Kever et al., 2015). Indeed, a recent account of interoceptive abilities suggests a distinction between at least three independent processes such as interoceptive accuracy, interoceptive sensibility, and interoceptive awareness (Garfinkel et al., 2015). Finally, self-referential processing, at the possible core of emotion through the valuation step and which network modulates emotional reactivity (Eippert et al., 2007; Herbert et al., 2011; Yoshimura et al., 2009), is not a unitary system either (Conway et al., 2004; Klein and Gangi, 2010; Prebble et al., 2013), distinguishing, for example, an autobiographical and a conceptual level (Conway, 2005; Martinelli et al., 2013). Thus, one area of possible improvements in the field of emotion regulation is the mapping of the precise cognitive underpinnings for each particular strategy. The recent development of the neuropsychological approach outside the field of neurology pinpoints the cognitive level as a relevant entry point for explaining a variety of psychological disorders and daily-life difficulties. Moreover, this approach also provides concrete applications through the development of tools and techniques for the detection, assessment and rehabilitation of specific cognitive abilities. Nurtured within this neuropsychological background, this thesis aims at better understanding the cognitive determinants (specific processes involved in the modulation) of one strictly-targeted implicit emotion regulation strategy. In contrast to a more experimental approach consisting in the perturbation of a target process during emotion regulation, an interindividual approach was chosen for most of the studied aspects: the natural efficiency of each cognitive process will be compared to emotion regulation performance across participants. This approach is justified by the potential outcome of this thesis results, which long-term aim is to add evidence for the efficiency and provide suggestions for the improvement of emotion regulation disorders treatment. In summary, emotion regulation refers to a wide range of strategies, supported by distinct cognitive mechanisms and related to different neural networks. Cognitive change, a family of strategies involving the change in the appraisal of emotional stimuli, has its efficiency related to mental health and well-being. The literature suggests that executive functions, interoception or self-referential valuation systems might be important for its implementation and usage. However, the exact role and nature of the cognitive processes involved in specific strategies remain unclear. KEY POINTS

• Emotions are at the centre of the quest of self-understanding, and a core component of our conscious experience.

• Emotions regulation is a central key aspect of emotion dynamics, and its efficiency is related to well-being and mental health.

• The precise and distinct cognitive determinants of strategies based on cognitive change remains unclear.

CHAPTER II

On Emotions, Fiction and The Self

« Beyond the fiction of reality, there is the reality of the fiction.»

– Salvoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, 2012 ABSTRACT

There is a philosophical debate dealing with the interaction of the belief that the events we are facing are not real (fictional) and emotions. This controversy is supported by the lack of scientific data regarding this phenomenon. Interestingly, the neuroscientific literature suggests that simulation monitoring might be related to self-referential processing, which is in turn known for modulating the emotional response. As such, we present a first study operationalising the effect of fiction on subjective and objective (skin conductance) measures of emotions and its interaction with self-relevance. The results suggest that fiction triggers a down-regulation of the emotional experience independently of autobiographical self-relevance. 1 Why Fictional Reappraisal? 37

1 Why Fictional Reappraisal?

NDEED, why focus on this particular strategy? Why not target a more popular one, such as positive reappraisal? In fact, the research presented in this thesis did not start with emotion regulation as a focus and framework, I but rather as the continuity of a project attempting to bridge philosophy (Pelletier, 2005) and neuroscience. A project centred around a question, the paradox of fiction, which is the starting point of our exploration. This philosophical debate started with its formal formulation by Radford and Weston (1975) to address the "issue" of emotions directed toward fictional events or characters. Although its very existence asa paradox is philosophically criticised (Tullmann and Buckwalter, 2014; Young, 2010), it had never received a formal scientific rejection. Importantly, offered an interesting approach for the investigation of the relationship between emotions and the Self. Indeed, one of the main hypothesis to solve the paradox suggests that engagement in fiction triggers quasi-emotions rather than genuine emotions (Saatela, 1994). In other words, emotions which differed in terms of type or characteristics (for instance, stripped from some behavioural reaction). At the same time, several neuroscientific studies pointed out that the processing ofreal characters activated cortical midline structures (Abraham et al., 2008; Han et al., 2005), a network involved in self-referential processing, while engagement in fiction was related to a disengagement of such structures (Abraham et al., 2008; Altmann et al., 2012; Metz-Lutz et al., 2010). This led to the formulation of a first hypothesis: what if emotions toward reality engaged the Self network more than emotions toward fiction. Indeed, in a neuroscientific framework, the quasi-emotions proposal could be reframed, and rephrased, as, for instance, semantic emotions, i.e., emotions that would lack episodic properties (e.g., self-relevance and auto- noetic consciousness), that would be guided by socially learnt scripts (one must feel sad toward this kind of event) rather than truly, genuinely triggered by an affected Self. This appealing hypothesis had to be empirically tested. Acta Psychologica 165 (2016) 53–59

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Acta Psychologica

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/actpsy

The paradox of ﬁction: Emotional response toward ﬁction and the modulatory role of self-relevance

Marco Sperduti a,b,⁎,1, Margherita Arcangeli c,1, Dominique Makowski a,b,PranyWantzena,b, Tiziana Zalla c, Stéphane Lemaire d, Jérôme Dokic c, Jérôme Pelletier c,e, Pascale Piolino a,b,f a Paris Descartes University, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Institute of Psychology, Memory and Cognition Laboratory, Boulogne Billancourt, France b INSERM UMR S894, Center for Psychiatry and Neurosciences, Paris, France c Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS-EHESS-ENS), UMR 8129 Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France d Université de Rennes 1, Rennes, France e Ecole des Haute Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, France f Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), France article info abstract

Article history: For over forty years, philosophers have struggled with the “paradox of fiction”, which is the issue of how we can Received 6 March 2015 get emotionally involved with fictional characters and events. The few neuroscientific studies investigating the Received in revised form 12 February 2016 distinction between the processing of real and fictional entities have evidenced that midline cortical structures Accepted 23 February 2016 and lateral fronto-parietal regions are more engaged for real and fictional entities, respectively. Interestingly, Available online xxxx the former network is engaged in autobiographical memory retrieval and self-reference, processes that are Keywords: known to boost emotional reactivity, while the latter underpins emotion regulation. Thus, a possible modulation fi Emotion of the emotional response according to the nature (real or ctional) of the stimulus is conceivable. To test this Fiction hypothesis, we presented short emotional (negative and positive) and neutral video as fictional or real. For neg- Self ative material, we found that subjective emotional experience, but not physiological arousal measured by elec- Electrodermal activity trodermal activity, was reduced in the fictional condition. Moreover, the amount of personal memories linked to the scenes counteracted this effect boosting the subjective emotional response. On the contrary, personal memories elicited by the scenes, but not fiction, modulate the emotional response for positive material. These results suggest that when a stimulus triggers a personal memory, the emotional response is less prone to be modulated by contextual factors, and suggest that personal engagement could be responsible for emotional reaction toward fiction. We discuss these results in the emotion regulation framework and underline their implications in informing theoretical accounts of emotion in the neuroscientific domain and the philosophical debate on the paradox of emotional response to fiction. © 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.

1. Introduction events. Arguably we do not feel any motivation to help Anna. Third, emotions triggered by fictions are directed toward characters and Fictions of all kinds (e.g., novels, movies) generate strong emotional events that do not exist. These differences might lead to think that our experiences in large audiences. For example, when reading Anna affective responses toward fictional characters and events cannot be Karenina one may feel pity toward Anna. However, it seems that emo- properly classified as emotions (e.g., Walton, 1978, 1990). tions toward fiction and emotions toward real-life events are not on a For over forty years, philosophers have struggled with the “paradox of par. The former differ from the latter in at least three respects. First, fiction”, which is the issue of how we can get emotionally involved with they do not result in the full range of behaviours that emotions toward fictional characters and events (the explicit formulation of the paradox real-life people and events produce. For instance, in watching a scary is due to Radford, 1975; Weston, 1975; Walton, 1978). Typically this par- movie, though we feel fear, we do not usually panic and run out of the adox has been described as an inconsistent triad (see, among others, cinema. Second, we lack obligations toward fictional characters and Gendler Szabó & Kovakovich, 2006): (a) response condition (e.g., I feel genuine pity toward Anna Karenina), (b) belief condition (e.g., I believe that Anna Karenina is a fictional character), (c) coordination condition ⁎ Corresponding author at: UMR S894, Laboratoire Mémoire et Cognition, Centre de (e.g., in order to feel a genuine emotion one should not believe that the Psychiatrie et Neurosciences, Université Paris Descartes, 2 ter rue d'Alesia, 75014 Paris, object of the relevant emotion is fictional). Philosophers have tried to France. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Sperduti). solve the paradox mainly by rejecting either (a), (e.g., Radford, 1975; 1 M.S. and M.A. are co-first authors. Walton, 1978, 1990; Charlton, 1984; Neill, 1991; Siiatela, 1994; Hartz,

1999; Zemach, 2003) or (c) (e.g., Carroll, 1990, 2010; Moran, 1994; Gaut, good indicator of the arousal dimension of emotions, and it has been re- 2007). ported to correlate with subjective rating of emotional arousal A recent turn in the philosophical debate exploits neuropsychologi- (Sequeira, Hot, Silvert, & Delplanque, 2009). Moreover, we asked sub- cal data in order to address the paradox. Authors following this ap- jects to indicate to what extent each scene evoked a personal memory. proach (e.g., Gendler Szabó & Kovakovich, 2006; Weinberg & Meskin, Our two main hypotheses, based on the aforementioned studies 2006) take for granted that our emotional reactions to fictions are phe- were: 1) a diminished emotional responses elicited by scenes presented nomenologically and physically robust, and are primarily concerned as fictional compared to real scenes, due to a down regulation in the for- with what grounds them, more than with rejecting either (a) or (c). mer condition, and 2) a greater intensity in the emotional responses for Moreover, their analyses are based on studies not directly focused on scenes associated to personal memories regardless of fictional and real emotional reactions to fictions (e.g., studies on emotions in practical scenes. reasoning, research on the cognitive architecture of imagination). Our work fits in this line of research, by proposing an experimental study 2. Materials and methods that directly assesses this issue. Our hypothesis is that even if emotions toward fiction can be classified as genuine, the aforementioned peculiar 2.1. Subjects aspects would result in a phenomenological/subjective difference. Besides emotional processing, there are a handful of neuroscientific Twenty-nine healthy young volunteers (20 females; mean age studies about the distinction between real and fictional events. These 21.97 ± 2.44 years participated in the study. All participants took part studies reported that real characters or events described as such engage in the experiment after signing an informed written consent in accor- to a greater extent cortical midline structures, especially the ventrome- dance with the declaration of Helsinki and the local ethics committee dial prefrontal cortex (Abraham, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2008; Han, of the Paris Descartes University. Jiang, Humphreys, Zhou, & Cai, 2005), while fiction recruits lateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (Abraham et al., 2008; 2.2. Procedure Altmann et al., 2014; Metz-Lutz, Bressan, Heider, & Otzenberger, 2010). The first set of regions is linked to autobiographical memory The study took place in a quiet experimental room whose tempera- and self-referential processing (Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 2013; ture was kept at about 24 degrees. Since all the scenes were very realis- Northoff et al., 2006) that, in turn, has been shown to boost emotional tic we made up a story to present the scenes either as real or fictional. response (Herbert, Pauli, & Herbert, 2010, Herbert, Herbert, & Pauli, Participants were explained that they would see a sequence of short 2011; Fields & Kuperberg, 2012). The latter underpins cognitive control videos, the content of which could be either real (documentary or ama- and emotion regulation (Hermann et al., 2009; Ochsner and Gross, teur video) or fictional (mokumentary — films depicting fictional events 2005; Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012), in particular emotional down- as real and shot in a documentary style). All subjects were asked to read regulation (for a recent meta-analysis see Buhle et al., 2014). the French definition of “mokumentary” on Wikipedia (http://fr. These findings strongly suggest that contextual information about wikipedia.org/wiki/Faux_documentaire) and were given two examples the nature (real or fictional) of an event could influence the related of famous “mokumentaries”: The Blair Witch Project (1999) and Para- emotional response. Nevertheless, to our knowledge there are only normal Activity (2007). two studies that tried to directly investigate this possibility. Goldstein The experiment was divided in two phases. In the first phase we pre- (2009) did not report any difference in subjective rating of sadness sented 36 scenes in 4 blocks of 9 scenes (3 negative, 3 positive, 3 neu- and anxiety between films that were presented either as based on real tral). Scenes were extracted from films, documentaries, YouTube, and or fictional stories. However, participants that have experienced in private amateur videos. The criteria for selecting the videos were the fol- their lives an event similar to that experienced by the protagonist of lowing: I) color video, II) containing at least one human character, III) the clip (self-relevance) scored the films as sadder and more anxious, not containing evident camera movements or cuts, IV) having a plausi- independently of the nature of the clip. On the contrary, LaMarre and ble and realistic content, V) emotion should be conveyed by the global Landreville (2009) showed that participants felt guiltier, but no differ- context of the scene and not by specific details (e.g., facial expression). ence was evident for disgust rating, after a documentary compared to To this end we avoided scenes containing “close up”. The rationale of a fictional film of the same historical fact (e.g., the Rwanda genocide). these criteria was that we wanted a homogeneous material (criteria I Even if these results give some interesting information about the and II), that would be perceived as realistic (criteria III and IV), since modulation of emotion by the fictional context, several methodological we reasoned that realistic scenes could be presented as fictional, but issues hinder clear conclusions. First, both studies only employed sub- the opposite would be more difficult. Finally, we would avoid automatic jective self-report of emotion. Second, in the study of Goldstein (2009) and fast emotional reaction prompted by emotional expression of faces the manipulation of reality could not have been effective. Indeed, (e.g., Tamietto et al., 2009; criterion V). All videos were selected by the while the scenes were presented as based on real or invented facts, agreement of two among the authors (M.S., and M.A.). Audio was re- they had clear fictional features, since they were extracted from popular moved from all scenes. All selected scenes were previously validated films (e.g., Kramer vs. Kramer, 1979), and this could have led subjects to on an independent sample (detailed information about the validation ignore the nature of the scene. Concerning LaMarre and Landreville and the selection of the experimental material see Supplementary ma- (2009)'s study, it is not clear if the difference reported is due to the na- terial 1). The final 36 scenes were selected based on this preliminary ture of the stimulus (documentary or film) or just to a difference in the validation. The scene had a mean duration of 4.61 s (range 3.48– stimulus itself. 5.99 s) for negative, 4.68 s (range 3.44–5.30 s) for positive, and 4.39 The aim of the present work was twofold: to the one hand, we (range 3.28–5.32 s) for neutral scenes. The duration of the scenes did wanted to investigate the modulation of the emotional response by not differed between the three valences (F(2,33) = 0.67, p N 0.05, 2 the nature of stimulus (real or fictional) with a rigorous methodological η p = 0.04). For an example of one scene for each valence see Supple- approach. To the other hand, we aimed at understanding the impact of mentary material 2–4. self-relevance on the emotional response, and the interaction between Each block was preceded by a word cue (FICTION or REAL) indicating the two factors. To this end we used pre-validated emotional videos the “nature” of the scenes in the block. The presentation of the scenes in that were presented either as real or fictional. We recorded both the the two conditions (fiction and real) was counterbalanced among sub- subjective rating of emotional response (intensity and valence), and jects, as well as the order of blocks (i.e., some subjects saw a “real” an objective measure of autonomic arousal, the electrodermal activity block first and others a “fictional” block first). The two real and two fic- (EDA). The rationale of this choice was that EDA is considered as a tional blocks were alternated. Presentation of the scenes in each block M. Sperduti et al. / Acta Psychologica 165 (2016) 53–59 55 was randomized. Subjects were simply asked to pay attention to the 2.4. Data analysis cues preceding each block and to the scenes. For each block the sequence of events was as follows: a word cue The analysis of the EDA signal was carried out using AcqKnowledge (FICTION or REAL) was presented at the beginning of each block for Software (Version 4.3; Biopac Systems). Tonic EDA signal was first 3 s, then a baseline (randomly moving colored dots) of 20 s was pre- down sampled at 15.7 Hz, then a low-pass filter at 1 Hz was applied. sented between each scene, and finally a scene was presented. The in- Phasic EDA was derived from the tonic signal with the AcqKnowledge terval between each block was 5 s. For a schematic representation of function Smoothing baseline removal with a baseline window of 8 s. the protocol see Fig. 1. During the first phase, EDA was continuously Then, we extracted the peak of EDA activity for each stimulus in a recorded. time window starting 1 s after stimulus presentation and ending 6 s At the end of the first phase, the same scenes were presented ran- after stimulus offset. Extracted EDA peak values were finally trans- domly in a single block without any cue. This time, subjects were formed using the square root function to approach normal distribution asked to rate each scene on a scale ranging from 0 to 7 on four features: (for a similar method see Silvert, Delplanque, Bouwalerh, Verpoort, & the intensity of perceived emotion (0 = not intense, 7 = very intense), Sequeira, 2004). the valence of perceived emotion (0 = very negative, 7 = very positive), the degree of personal memory linked to the scene (0 = no mem- 2.5. Statistical data analysis ory, 7 = a very precise memory), and the nature of the scene (0 = real, 7=fictional) that was used as a control for our experimental For each variable of interest we conducted a 2 nature (real-fic- manipulation. tion) × 3 valence (negative–positive–neutral) repeated measures Stimuli presentation, data recording and synchronization between ANOVA. Bonferroni correction was applied to post-hoc comparisons if stimuli presentation and electrophysiological data acquisition were au- not otherwise specified. Effect sizes are reported as partial eta-squared 2 tomatically accomplished using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007, 2008). (η p). Descriptive statistics for all the variables are reported in Table 1. In order to test our second hypothesis on the impact of personal memory on the emotional response, and its interaction with the nature 2.3. Data acquisition of the scene, we used linear mixed-effects models (LMMs). We report 95% confidence intervals based on the estimated local curvature of the Electrodermal activity (EDA) was recorded using the BIOPAC MP150 likelihood surface (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). We fitted system (Biopac Systems, Goleta, CA, USA), and AcqKnowledge Software three full linear mixed effects models in order to predict EDA, the sub- (Version 4.3; Biopac Systems) at 1000 Hz. EDA was measured using two jective intensity and the subjective valence. As fixed effects, we entered Ag–AgCl electrodes attached to the intermediate phalanx of the index personal memory (this variable was preliminary centered around 0 and and ring fingers of the nondominant hand. Isotonic paste (BIOPAC Gel treated as a continuous predictor), the nature of scenes (real–fiction), 101) was used as the electrolyte. Electrodes were attached prior to the and the valences (neutral–negative–positive) as categorical factors. beginning of the task, and at least 5 min of activity were recorded before Items and participants were entered as random factors. Following re- starting the experiment in order to allow participants to adapt to the recent recommendation (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013), fixed factors cording equipment, and to allow EDA levels to stabilize (see Fowles were modelled as random slopes. In particular, the valence and nature et al., 1981). were added as random slopes over participants, and the nature as

Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the experimental protocols. A) Presentation of scenes was organized in 4 blocks, each containing 9 scenes (3 for each emotional valence). Each block started with the presentation of a cue (Real or Fiction) that lasts 3 s. After a baseline of 20 s a scene was presented, and the sequence was repeated for the 9 scenes in the block. An interval of 5 s separated each block. In this ﬁrst phase electrodermal activity (EDA) was continuously recorded. B) In the second phase of the experiment, participants were showed the same scenes. After each scene, subjects were asked to rate their subjective emotional experience (intensity and valence), the degree of personal memory evoked by the scene, and the nature of the scene (real or ﬁctional). 56 M. Sperduti et al. / Acta Psychologica 165 (2016) 53–59

Table 1 compared to the fictional condition (p b 0.01). For a graphical represen- Descriptive statistics for all the variables of interest. tation of the results see Fig. 3. Real Fiction For the valence, we found similar results, with a significant main effect of the valence of the scene (F(2,56) = 746.85, p b 0.001; η2 = INT-NEG 5.48 [1.18] 5.02 [1.25] p fi INT-POS 4.69 [0.86] 4.49 [0.83] 0.96), that was further characterized by a signi cant valence × nature 2 INT-NEU 1.37 [0.81] 1.41 [1.06] interaction (F(2,56) = 3.58, p b 0.05; η p = 0.11). Post-hoc revealed VAL-NEG 0.67 [0.49] 0.88 [0.57] that positive scenes were judged more positive than neutral and nega- VAL-POS 5.97 [0.62] 5.79 [0.63] tive ones (both p b 0.001), and neutral scenes were judged more posi- VAL-NEU 3.69 [0.55] 3.65 [0.49] b MEM-NEG 2.14 [1.66] 2.15 [1.68] tive than negative ones (p 0.001). The interaction was due to the MEM-POS 3.81 [1.16] 4.15 [1.19] fact that negative scenes were judged more negative in the real condi- MEM-NEU 2.29 [1.03] 1.69 [0.93] tion compared to the fictional condition (p b 0.05 using Fisher's LSD), NAT-NEG 1.46 [1.04] 2.15 [1.53] while for positive and neutral scenes the judgment of valence did not NAT-POS 1.54 [1.12] 2.13 [1.27] differ between the two conditions. The main effect of the nature (F NAT-NEU 1.98 [1.32] 2.80 [1.42] N η2 fi EDA-NEG 0.44 [0.46] 0.42 [0.41] (1,28) = 0.005, p 0.05; p = 0.0002) was not signi cant. For a graph- EDA-POS 0.43 [0.44] 0.39 [0.41] ical representation of the results see Fig. 4. EDA-NEU 0.34 [0.38] 0.33 [0.45] For personal memories, we obtained a main effect of the valence of 2 In the table are reported the mean and the standard deviation (in brackets) for all the var- the scene (F(2,56) = 58.65, p b 0.001; η p = 0.68) that was due to iables of interest in the real and fiction conditions. INT = intensity, VAL = valence, MEM the fact that positive scenes elicited more personal memories compared = personal memories, NAT = nature of the scene, EDA = electrodermal activity, NEG = to negative and neutral ones (both p b 0.001). We also found a signifi- negative, POS = positive, NEU = neutral. cant interaction between the nature of the scene and the valence (F 2 (2,56) = 7.36, p b 0.01; η p = 0.21). The interaction was due to the random slope over items. Correlations between random effects were fact that the difference between the real and the fictional conditions also modelled. We also specified additional models in which the nature was only observed for neutral scenes, the former were associated with factor, personal memory and their interaction were nested in the va- higher personal memory scores (p b 0.05). lence factor. The R code for the linear mixed-effects models is provided For the nature, we observed a main effect of the nature of the scene 2 in Supplementary material 5. (F(1,28) = 12.07, p b 0.01; η p = 0.3) that was due to the fact that scenes presented as real were also later judged as more real by the par- 3. Results ticipants. We also found a main effect of the valence of the scene. Post- hoc revealed that neutral scenes were judged more fictional than nega- 3.1. EDA results tive (p b 0.01) and positive (p b 0.05) ones, while there was no difference between these last two categories. We only found a significant main effect of valence (F(2,56) = 11.45, 2 p b 0.001; η p = 0.29), due to the fact that negative (p b 0.001) and pos- 3.3. Mixed model itive (p b 0.01) scenes elicited a stronger EDA activity compared to neutral scenes, whereas the difference between negative and positive 3.3.1. EDA scenes was not significant (p N 0.5). The main effect of the nature (F The overall model predicting EDA successfully converged and ex- 2 2 (1,28) = 1.25, p N 0.05; η p = 0.04) as well as the interaction (F plained 79% of the variance (the conditional R ,seeBarton, 2015). The 2 2 (2,56) = 0.12, p N 0.05; η p = 0.004) between the two factors were variance explained by fixed factors was rather small (marginal R = not significant. For a graphical representation of the results see Fig. 2. 0.008). The intercept, corresponding to the EDA in the neutral valence and real nature, was of 0.29. Compared to this, both negative and posi- 3.2. Behavioral results tive valence lead to a significant increase (respectively, β = 0.11, 95% CI [0.03, 0.18], p b 0.01; β = 0.08, 95% CI [0.01, 0.15], p b 0.05). Compared For the intensity, we observed a significant main effect of valence (F to the intercept (i.e., in the neutral valence), the fiction nature did not 2 (2,56) = 247.7, p b 0.001; η p = 0.88), that was further characterized modulate the EDA (β = 0.00, 95% CI [−0.06, 0.06], p N 0.05). There by a significant valence x nature interaction (F(2,56) = 3.98, p b 0.05; was no interaction between fiction and the positive and negative va- 2 η p = 0.12), while the main effect of the nature was not significant (F lence (respectively, β = −0.03, 95% CI [−0.11, 0.06], p N 0.05; 2 (1,28) = 1.83, p N 0.05; η p = 0.06). Post-hoc revealed that indepen- β = −0.02, 95% CI [−0.11, 0.06], p N 0.05). The effect of personal mem- dently of the nature of the scenes, negative scenes were judged more in- ory was not significant (β = −0.01, 95% CI [−0.02, 0.01], p N 0.05). Per- tensethanpositive(pb 0.01) and neutral (p b 0.001) ones, and positive sonal memory did not interact with the negative and the positive scenes were judged more intense than neutral ones (p b 0.001). More- valences (respectively, β = 0.01, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.03], p N 0.05; β = over, negative scenes were judged more intense in the real condition 0.01, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.03], p N 0.05), neither with the effect of fiction

Fig. 2. EDA results showing the main effect of the valence, greater EDA activity was observed for negative and positive scenes compared to neutral ones. Errors bars Fig. 3. Subjective rating of the emotional intensity for each experimental condition. Errors represent SEM. **p b 0.01, ***p b 0.001. bars represent SEM. **p b 0.01, ***p b 0.001. M. Sperduti et al. / Acta Psychologica 165 (2016) 53–59 57

3.3.3. Subjective valence For the subjective valence, the overall model successfully converged and explained 82% of the variance of the endogen, and 79% was explained by the fixed factors. The intercept, corresponding to the subjective valence (measured on a 0–7 scale) in the neutral valence and real nature, was of 3.69. Compared to this, negative valence lead to a significant decrease and the positive valence to a significant increase (respectively, β = −3.04, 95% CI [−3.39, −2.70], p b 0.001; β = 2.16, 95% CI [1.87, 2.44], p b 0.001). Compared to the intercept (i.e., in the neutral valence), neither the fiction nature nor personal memories did modulate the subjective valence (respectively, β =0.02,95%CI[−0.28, 0.32], p N 0.05; β = 0.01, 95% CI [−0.06, 0.07], p N 0.05). The effect of fiction Fig. 4. Subjective rating of the emotional valence for each experimental condition. Errors did not interact with the effects of negative and positive valences (re- bars represent SEM. *p (uncorrected) b 0.05, **p b 0.01, ***p b 0.001. spectively, β = 0.18, 95% CI [−0.21, 0.57], p N 0.05; β = −0.32, 95% CI [−0.75, 0.10], p N 0.05). The effect of personal memory significantly (β =0.01,95%CI[−0.01, 0.04], p N 0.05), nor with the effect of interac- interacted with the positive valence, leading to an increase of subjective tions between fiction and the negative and positive valences (respec- valence (β = 0.11, 95% CI [0.01, 0.20], p b 0.05). No interaction was tively, β = −0.01, 95% CI [−0.04, 0.02], p N 0.05; β = −0.02, 95% CI found with the negative valence (β = −0.04, 95% CI [−0.14, 0.06], [−0.05, 0.01], p N 0.05). p N 0.05), the effect of fiction (β =0.06,95%CI[−0.05, 0.16], The nested model did not reveal any significant effect of fiction, per- p N 0.05), nor with the interactions between fiction and the negative sonal memories or their interaction in the neutral, the negative or the and positive valences (respectively, β = −0.07, 95% CI [−0.22, 0.07], positive valence (respectively, β = 0.00, 95% CI [−0.06, 0.03], p N 0.05; β =0.00,95%CI[−0.14, 0.15], p N 0.05). p N 0.05; β = −0.03, 95% CI [−0.09, 0.04], p N 0.05; β = −0.02, 95% The nested model showed that the effect of fiction lead to a decrease CI [−0.08, 0.03], p N 0.05; β = −0.01, 95% CI [−0.02, 0.01], p N 0.05; of subjective valence in the positive valence, but not in the negative or β = 0.00, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.02], p N 0.05; β = 0.00, 95% CI [−0.02, the neutral one (respectively, β = −0.31, 95% CI [−0.59, −0.02], 0.02], p N 0.05; β =0.01,95%CI[−0.01, 0.04], p N 0.05; β = 0.00, 95% p b 0.05; β = 0.02, 95% CI [−0.28, 0.32], p N 0.05; β = 0.20, 95% CI CI [−0.02, 0.03], p N 0.05; β = −0.01, 95% CI [−0.03, 0.01], p N 0.05). [−0.05, 0.45], p N 0.05). Personal memories was significantly linked with the outcome variable in the positive valence, but not in the neutral or the negative one (respectively, β = 0.11, 95% CI [0.04, 0.18], p b 0.05; 3.3.2. Subjective intensity β = 0.01, 95% CI [−0.06, 0.07], p N 0.05; β = −0.03, 95% CI [−0.10, For the subjective intensity, the overall model successfully con- 0.04], p N 0.05). Finally, the interaction between the effect of fiction verged and explained 66% of the variance of the endogen, and 52% and personal memories did not reach significance in none of the va- was explained by the fixed factors. The intercept, corresponding to the lences (neutral, β = 0.06, 95% CI [−0.05,0.16],pN 0.05; negative, Subjective Intensity (measured on a 0–7 scale) in the neutral valence β = −0.02, 95% CI [−0.11, 0.08], p N 0.05; positive, β = 0.06, 95% CI and real nature, was of 1.42. Compared to this, both negative and posi- [−0.04, 0.16], p N 0.05). tive valence lead to a significant increase of subjective intensity (respectively, β = 4.09, 95% CI [3.45, 4.74], p b 0.001; β = 3.06, 95% CI [2.52, 4. Discussion 3.60], p b 0.001). Compared to the intercept (i.e., in the neutral valence), the fiction nature did not modulate the subjective intensity (β =0.21, Here we investigated the difference of emotional response toward 95% CI [−0.20, 0.61], p N 0.05). However, the effect of fiction interacted video clips that were presented as real or fictional. In agreement with with the effects of negative valence (β = −0.61, 95% CI [−1.06, −0.16], our first hypothesis, the main findings of our work, confirmed by both p b 0.01), and showed a trend toward significance for positive valences repeated measure ANOVA and mixed-effects models, showed that in (β = −0.46, 95% CI [−0.95, 0.02], p = 0.063). In both cases the interac- the fictional condition the emotional response was weaker than in the tion leaded to a decrease of subjective intensity when the scenes were real condition. This effect was only evident for the subjective intensity presented as fictional. The main effect of personal memory was signifi- and valence rating, and not for the physiological arousal. Moreover, cant (β = 0.12, 95% CI [0.03, 0.22], p b 0.05). The effect of personal this difference was more pronounced for negative emotions. Impor- memories did not interact with the negative and the positive valences tantly, the effectiveness of our experimental manipulation was sup- (respectively, β = −0.06, 95% CI [−0.21, 0.08], p N 0.05; β =0.07, ported by the fact that participants subjectively rated as more fictional 95% CI [−0.07, 0.21], p N 0.05), neither with the effect of fiction (β = scenes that were presented as such, compared to those presented as 0.10, 95% CI [−0.05, 0.25], p N 0.05), nor with the interactions between real. In line with our second hypothesis, we found that scenes that elic- fiction and the negative and positive valences (respectively, β = 0.01, ited more personal memories were also scored more emotionally in- 95% CI [−0.19, 0.21], p N 0.05; β = −0.11, 95% CI [−0.30, 0.09], tense regardless of the condition. This effect seemed to be more robust p N 0.05). for positive material. Again, this result was only evident for the subjec- The nested model showed that the effect of fiction was only signifi- tive report of emotional experience and not for the physiological cant in the negative valence, but not in the positive or the neutral one arousal. (respectively, β = −0.40, 95% CI [−0.81, 0.00], p = 0.053; As suggested in the introduction these findings could be explained β = −0.26, 95% CI [−0.63, 0.12], p N 0.05; β = 0.21, 95% CI [−0.20, by a diminished emotional response induced by some form of emotion 0.62], p N 0.05). Personal memories was significantly linked with the regulation when facing fiction. Emotion regulation refers to the dy- outcome variable in the neutral and positive valence, but not in the neg- namic process of influencing the nature of our emotional response, ative one (respectively, β = 0.12, 95% CI [0.03, 0.22], p b 0.05; β =0.19, and could intervene at different stages of the emotional generative pro- 95% CI [0.09, 0.29], p b 0.001; β =0.06,95%CI[−0.05, 0.17], p N 0.05). cess. Cognitive change is a widely studied regulatory strategy defined as Finally, the interaction between the effect of fiction and personal mem- a change in one of the features of a stimulus such as the meaning (“re- ories did not reach significance for none of the valences (neutral, β = appraisal”) or the psychological distance (“distancing”). The first mech- 0.10, 95% CI [−0.05, 0.25], p N 0.05; negative, β = 0.11, 95% CI anism is believed to be one of the most efficient and adaptive for [−0.03, 0.26], p N 0.05; positive, β = −0.01, 95% CI [−0.14, 0.13], regulating emotional response (Gross, 2002). While cognitive change p N 0.05). is often studied in the framework of emotion regulation in the form of 58 M. Sperduti et al. / Acta Psychologica 165 (2016) 53–59 reappraisal, it can be at stake in emotional generation per se in the form negative images through the instruction of imagining that the situation of the initial appraisal of a given situation. Appraisal or reappraisal is depicted was real and involved the participant, produced an increase of thought to impact emotion in an early phase of the emotion generating activity in frontal areas, and in the amygdala. The authors also reported process, before a full-fledged response takes place (Gross & Thompson, an increased EDA activity. Again this increased EDA response during 2007). voluntary control of emotion, independently of the direction of the Neuroimaging studies showed that reappraisal recruits prefrontal modulation, could be linked to the cognitive effort more than to the regions, and is concomitantly linked to reduced insula and amygdala ac- emotion modulation per se (Hartley et al., 2012). Our data are in agree- tivity (Eippert et al., 2007; Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008). Since ment with these findings. Indeed, we found that positive scenes (re- correlations between amygdala activity and autonomic nervous system gardless of the condition) that were linked to a greater amount of response are often reported (e.g., Phelps et al., 2001), we would have personal memories were also judged more intense. expected to find decreased EDA in the fiction condition. Nevertheless, We suggest that when confronted with fiction some kind of implicit Eippert et al. (2007) showed, during down regulation of emotion emotion regulation, resulting by cognitive change due to knowledge of using reappraisal, a trend toward an increase of the EDA response. Un- the fictional nature of the stimulus, would take place resulting in a fortunately, the authors did not report whether reappraisal influenced weaker subjective emotional response. However, stimuli that elicit per- subjective judgment of emotional intensity. On the contrary, Goldin sonal memories in both fiction and real conditions, in line with the find- et al. (2008) showed that reappraisal was effective in reducing subjec- ings of Goldstein (2009), could prompt emotion up-regulation. Thus, tive emotional experience. self-engagement through personal memory recollection could be one We suggest that while watching fiction, cognitive change is at stake. of the processes responsible of our emotional engagement toward fic- Nevertheless, in previously cited studies an increase of EDA has been re- tion. Regarding the philosophical debate about the nature of emotion ported (importantly during down regulation), while we did not find any toward fiction our data seem to suggest that the fiction-directed emo- EDA modulation. One explanation is that most of the studies investigat- tions are physically robust, as witnessed by a physiological arousal com- ing emotional control used explicit emotion regulation strategies. These parable to real material, and can be seen as genuine emotions. The strategies could be cognitively effortful, and it has been shown that in- answer to the paradox of fiction should probably be sought not in emo- creasing task difficulty, thus engaging more cognitive resources, results tion per se, but in factors and mechanisms modulating it. Our study sug- in increased EDA activity (Hartley, Maquestiaux, Brooks, Festini, & gests that two candidates are emotion regulation and self-referential Frazier, 2012). Conversely, modulation of emotional response toward processes. fiction could be more implicit and automatic. Interestingly, a recent study (Burklund, Creswell, Irwin, & Lieberman, 2014) compares two Funding emotion regulation strategies, namely reappraisal and affect labeling — which can be considered respectively as an intentional and an inci- This work was supported by the “AgenceNationaledelaRecherche” dental emotion regulation strategy. This study showed that affect label- (grant number: ANR-11-EMCO-0008). ing activated to a greater extent lateral prefrontal and parietal regions — broadly corresponding to regions that have been reported during pro- Acknowledgements cessing of fictional characters (Abraham et al., 2008; Metz-Lutz et al., 2010). These data could suggest that probably, during fictional experi- We would like to thank Monica Pollina for her help in data collection ence, people implicitly use semantic representations to label the emo- and the participants of this study. tional content of the stimulus that, in turn, would result in a modification of the emotional subjective response. Even if we did not have any explicit hypothesis on the modulation of Appendix A. Supplementary data the emotional response by the nature of the stimulus according to the valence, we did report that this effect was more robust for negative Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx. scenes. Ever since Aristotle, negative emotions in fictional contexts doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2016.02.003. have been considered peculiar. 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Puzzling over the imagination: Philosophical problems-, ar influence of documentary and historical reenactment films on engagement, affect, chitectural solutions. In S. Nichols (Ed.), The architecture of the imagination new essays issue interest, and learning. Mass Communication and Society, 12(4), 537–555. on pretence, possibility and fiction (pp. 175–202). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Martinelli, P., Sperduti, M., & Piolino, P. (2013). Neural substrates of the self-memory sys- Weston, P. (1975). How can we be moved by the fate of Anna Karenina? Proceedings of the tem: New insights from a meta-analysis. Human Brain Mapping, 34(7), 1515–1529. Aristotelian Society, 49,81–93. Metz-Lutz, M. N., Bressan, Y., Heider, N., & Otzenberger, H. (2010). What physiological Yoshimura, S., Ueda, K., Suzuki, S. I., Onoda, K., Okamoto, Y., & Yamawaki, S. (2009). Self- changes and cerebral traces tell us about adhesion to fiction during theater- referential processing of negative stimuli within the ventral anterior cingulate gyrus watching? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 4. and right amygdala. Brain and Cognition, 69(1), 218–225. Moran, R. (1994). The expression of feeling in imagination. The Philosophical Review, 103, Zemach, E. M. (2003). Fiction and Metaphysics. Philosophical Review, 112,427–431. 75–106. KEY POINTS

• Presenting emotional content as fictional triggers a down-regulation of the emotional experience.

• Self-relevance is related to an up-regulation of emotions.

• The up and down-regulation by self-relevance and fictional appear as orthogonal mechanisms.

CHAPTER III

On Fictional Reappraisal and Executive Functions

« Doctors say I’m the illest, cause I’m suffering from realness »

– Kanye West, Ni**as In Paris ABSTRACT

While we explored the effect of fiction through a philosophical and neuroscientific prism suggesting a link with self-referential processes, our study suggested that the modulation of emotion by fiction might, in fact, be better understood in the framework of emotion regulation. Therefore, this second study investigating the link between what we called fictional reappraisal (the emotion regulation induced by fiction) and executive functions, known to be involved in other forms of emotion regulation. 1 Reframing Fictional Reappraisal 49

1 Reframing Fictional Reappraisal

HE previous study suggested that the modulation of emotion by fiction might, in fact, be better understood in the framework of emotion regulation, as changing the meaning of an emotional stimulus to change its affective load T has been extensively studied under the label of "reappraisal". However, this form of emotion regulation has been recently reconsidered as a family of strategies, possibly supported by different neural pathways (Dörfel et al., 2014). This category, involving the explicit or implicit change of the meaning or the nature of the mental representation of an event (Davis et al., 2011). It encompasses strategies such as positive reappraisal (creating and focusing on a positive aspect of the stimulus; Moser et al., 2014), detachment (disengaging from all emotional implications; Shiota and Levenson, 2012), distancing or decentring (perspective change to consider an event “from the outside”; Bernstein et al., 2015; Kross and Ayduk, 2011). Based on the conceptual definition of reappraisal and pattern of effect (acting primarily on the subjective dimension of the emotional experience; Gross, 2015a), it appears as the most relevant category to describe and understand our manipulation. To distinguish it from others types of strategies1 and underline its possible specificity (in particular its relationship with the processing of the non-real), we decidedto label this strategy fictional reappraisal. Cognitive change was theorised to be primarily supported by executive functions, a claim supported by neuroimaging studies showing the involvement of the fronto-cingular network, encompassing the dorsal and ventral prefrontal cortices as well as the anterior cingulate cortex (Braunstein et al., 2017; Buhle et al., 2014). However, executive functions are not a unitary construct, but a set of distinct processes (such as inhibition, mental set shifting and updating in working memory; Friedman and Miyake, 2017; Miyake et al., 2000), and the specific contribution of different executive functions is still a matter of debate. While several studies have emphasized the role of working memory (Opitz et al., 2014; Schmeichel and Demaree, 2010; Schmeichel et al., 2008), others have highlighted the role of shifting (McRae et al., 2012) and inhibition (Joormann and Gotlib, 2010). However, the majority of these findings are based on the use of explicit implementations of emotion regulation. Critically, the executive contribution to implicit fictional reappraisal is yet to be explored.

1Strategies are to be seen as the activation of a specific set of mechanisms aimed at operating agiven modification. Importantly, a strategy can be implemented in a conscious and controlled, or in an implicitand automatic, fashion. Acta Psychologica 173 (2017) 13–20

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Acta Psychologica

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/actpsy

The distinctive role of executive functions in implicit emotion regulation

Marco Sperduti a,b,⁎,1, Dominique Makowski a,b,1, Margherita Arcangeli c, Prany Wantzen a,b, Tiziana Zalla c, Stéphane Lemaire d, Jérôme Dokic c, Jérôme Pelletier c,e, Pascale Piolino a,b,f a Memory and Cognition Lab, Institute of Psychology, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris, France b INSERM UMR S894, Center for Psychiatry and Neurosciences, Paris, France c Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS-EHESS-ENS), Département d'Etudes Cognitives, Ecole Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University, Paris, France d Université de Rennes 1, Rennes, France e Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, France f Institut Universitaire de France (IUF), France article info abstract

Article history: Several theoretical models stress the role of executive functions in emotion regulation (ER). However, most of the Received 31 March 2016 previous studies on ER employed explicit regulatory strategies that could have engaged executive functions, be- Received in revised form 24 November 2016 yond regulatory processes per se. Recently, there has been renewed interest in implicit forms of ER, believed to be Accepted 4 December 2016 closer to daily-life requirements. While various studies have shown that implicit and explicit ER engage partially Available online xxxx overlapping neurocognitive processes, the contribution of different executive functions in implicit ER has not been investigated. In the present study, we presented participants with negatively valenced pictures of varying Keywords: fi Emotion regulation emotional intensity preceded by short texts describing them as either ctional or real. This manipulation was Fiction meant to induce a spontaneous emotional down-regulation. We recorded electrodermal activity (EDA) and sub- Executive functions jective reports of emotion arousal. Executive functions (updating, switching, and inhibition) were also assessed. Working memory No difference was found between the fictional and real condition on EDA. A diminished self-reported arousal was observed, however, when pictures were described as fictional for high- and mild-intensity material, but not for neutral material. The amount of down-regulation in the fictional condition was found to be predicted by interindividual variability in updating performances, but not by the other measures of executive functions, suggesting its implication even in implicit forms of ER. The relationship between down-regulation and updating was significant only for high-intensity material. We discuss the role of updating in relation to the consciousness of one's emotional state. © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction considered as respectively adaptive and maladaptive strategies, some studies showed that suppression abilities and emotional avoidance Emotion regulation (ER) is the process of modifying the intensity, are, respectively, a positive predictor of distress adjustment (Bonanno, the duration or the type of a given emotional response in order to main- Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004), and have a long-term adap- tain an adaptive behaviour. ER can intervene at different moments of tive value after real life grief (Bonanno, Keltner, Holen, & Horowitz, the emotion generative process. Accordingly, ER strategies have been 1995). classified as antecedent and response focused, corresponding to modu- Reappraisal has been described as an adaptive ER strategy (Aldao, latory processes acting, respectively, before and after a full-fledged Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010), and has therefore undergone ex- emotion response has emerged (Gross, 1998). The former encompasses tensive research compared to other strategies. Previously considered as attentional redeployment and reappraisal, while the latter is described a unitary construct, recent studies have underlined its complexity. It is as behavioural suppression (Gross, 2014). While they are commonly now conceptualized as a global term encompassing several mechanisms (Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012). Positive reappraisal seeks to focus on or create a positive aspect or meaning for a stimulus. Detached reappraisal, or “detachment”, differs conceptually as it strives to lower the self-rele- ⁎ Corresponding author at: 71 Avenue Ed. Vaillant, 92100 Boulogne Billancourt, France; vance of the emotional event, disrupting the relationship between the 2 ter rue d'Alésia, 75014 Paris, France. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Sperduti). event and the self, by acting for example, as if one was not personally 1 Marco Sperduti and Dominique Makowski are co-first authors. concerned by the event or the stimulus, but merely a neutral observer.

Distancing, on the other hand, requires a change in perspective, usually ER abilities (Schmeichel & Demaree, 2010; Schmeichel et al., 2008), from the first- to the third-person perspective (e.g., to see yourself as a while performances in simple working memory tasks (digit span) fly on the wall; Kross & Ayduk, 2011; Mischkowski, Kross, & Bushman, were not (Gyurak et al., 2009, 2012). These findings suggest that com- 2012). Finally, what could be called fictional reappraisal aims to lower plex executive functions could be better predictors of regulatory abili- the “realness” of a stimulus by reinterpreting its nature, or by giving it ties. Nevertheless, no previous study employed different measures of a fictional context (e.g., “it's not blood but ketchup”; Mocaiber et al., the same cognitive ability (e.g., working memory) to directly test this 2010; Mocaiber et al., 2011). While most studies asked participants to hypothesis. exert an “unspecified” cognitive reappraisal (although some studies The majority of studies explicitly asked participants to engage in one did try tracking the strategies used afterwards; Moser, Most, & of the aforementioned ER strategies to modulate their emotional expe- Simons, 2010), recent protocols tend to prompt participants to perform rience. The voluntary deployment of ER could require the mobilization aspecific subtype, or a combination of subtypes (e.g., detachment and of cognitive resources and be intrinsically effortful (for a recent review distancing; Koenigsberg et al., 2009; Ochsner et al., 2004). Indeed, see Gyurak, Gross, and Etkin, 2011). It is therefore not clear if the activa- Dörfel et al. (2014) suggested that detachment is supported by different tion of brain structures subserving cognitive control during ER, and the neural pathways from those supporting reinterpretation-based strate- link between executive functions and ER abilities, are due to ER per se, gies, such as fictional reappraisal (note, however, that as the instruc- or are linked to the voluntary and effortful nature of these tasks. tions were to “reinterpret the picture so that it no longer elicits a Beyond voluntary ER, different forms of implicit ER have been negative response” p. 300, they did not allow for a clear delineation described. These processes differ from explicit forms of ER in that and could also have included features of positive reappraisal). The au- regulation occurs without explicit instructions to modulate the thors emphasized that only the interpretation-based strategy activated emotional response and the regulatory process remains outside the the orbitofrontal cortex and the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. They participants' awareness (Gyurak et al., 2011). For example, several pointed out the role of the anterior part of the latter structure in retriev- studies have shown that asking participants to verbally label the ing conceptual representations from memory and the middle part in emotional expression of faces or their emotional reaction elicited by selecting the right representation (and inhibiting the others), stressing arousing pictures produced an incidental emotional modulation the complex role of cognitive control in this type of emotion regulation. witnessed by diminished emotional subjective rating and decreased In general, neuroimaging studies of ER have consistently reported activity in brain regions devoted to processing emotion (Burklund, activation in lateral and medial frontal regions encompassing the dorsal David Creswell, Irwin, & Lieberman, 2014; Lieberman et al., 2007). Inter- and ventral prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex (for a estingly, these studies also showed that implicit ER activated the same meta-analysis of instructed emotion regulation protocols see Buhle et frontal regions recruited during reappraisal, suggesting that explicit al., 2014). Interestingly, this fronto-cingular network is involved in do- and implicit ER processes could be subserved by partially overlapping main general cognitive control (Niendam et al., 2012). These findings mechanisms. are in agreement with theoretical models invoking a central role of cog- Contextual cues have also been shown to incidentally modulate nitive control processes in emotion regulation (Bush, Luu, & Posner, emotional response. For example, verbal descriptions presented 2000; Makowski, Sperduti, Blanchet, Nicolas, & Piolino, 2015; Ochsner, prior to showing negative pictures and describing the stimuli as more Silvers, & Buhle, 2012; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). neutral or more negative have been shown to modulate the neural sig- Nevertheless, as proposed by Miyake et al. (2000), cognitive control nature and the subjective rating of emotion (Foti & Hajcak, 2008; is not a unitary phenomenon, but encompasses at least three different Macnamara, Foti, & Hajcak, 2009). In particular negative images preced- executive processes: switching, updating, and inhibition. Switching cor- ed by a neutral description elicited a reduced late positive potential responds to the ability to flexibly switch between different tasks at (LPP) and were judged as less unpleasant. hand, updating to the monitoring and continuous manipulation and re- Other studies showed that describing emotional material as fictional freshing of working memory content, and inhibition to the voluntary (by means of short texts) could trigger implicit emotion regulation pro- suppression of prepotent or habitual responses. Only a few studies cesses (Mocaiber et al., 2011; Mocaiber et al., 2010; Sperduti et al., have investigated the contribution of specific executive functions (EF) 2016). Mocaiber et al. (2010) showed that mutilation pictures that to ER efficiency. Schmeichel, Volokhov, and Demaree (2008) showed were presented as fictional (movie scenes) elicited a smaller LPP com- that participants with higher working memory scores (operation span pared to similar pictures presented as real. In a further neuroimaging task) were better able to use suppression and reappraisal to reduce study, using the same manipulation, the authors reported the activation their expressive and subjective emotional reactions. In the same vein, of brain regions associated with emotional processing – amygdala and Opitz, Lee, Gross, and Urry (2014) reported that fluid cognitive intelli- insula – in the real, but not in the fictional condition (Mocaiber et al., gence (comprising a working memory measure) predicted the efficacy 2011), while the fictional condition triggered activity in prefrontal re- of using reappraisal to modulate emotional response. gions. Oliveira et al. (2009), using a similar protocol, showed an effect Studies employing multiple measures of EF have reported contrast- of a personality trait (positive affect, measured by the PANAS-T; ing results. For example, McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, and Gross (2012), Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) on emotion regulation abilities. Only in line with the aforementioned studies, showed that working memory the high positive affect subgroup showed a reduction in physiological (operation span task) and switching (global/local task), but not inhibi- arousal, measured by means of electrodermal activity (EDA) and tion abilities, positively correlated with reappraisal efficiency. On the heart-rate deceleration, toward pictures described as fictional. The au- contrary, in two studies, Gyurak et al. (2009) and Gyurak, Goodkind, thors suggested that since positive affect increases cognitive flexibility Kramer, Miller, and Levenson (2012) reported that only verbal fluency, (Dreisbach, 2006), individuals with high positive affect could be more but not inhibition, working memory (composite score of digit and spa- efficient in modulating their emotion response. In a more recent tial span) or task switching (TMT), was linked to higher abilities to reg- study, we showed, using more ecologically valid material (movie ulate emotion using suppression. These findings suggest that different clips), compared to previous studies employing pictures (Mocaiber et EF could be engaged depending on the ER strategy at stake. Working al., 2010, 2011; Oliveira et al., 2009), that scenes presented as fictional memory could be necessary during reappraisal since the alternative in- were judged as less arousing (Sperduti et al., 2016). Moreover, we re- terpretation of the stimuli should likely be held in memory to be effec- ported that modulation of subjective emotion by fictional description tive in modulating the emotional response. Moreover, it should be was evident for negative, but not for positive scenes. It has to be noted that previous studies employed different working memory mea- noted, however, that negative scenes were also judged more arousing sures, reporting that more complex working memory tasks (operation than positive ones. Thus, it is not clear if this difference was driven by span task) requiring storing and active manipulation were related to valence or intensity. M. Sperduti et al. / Acta Psychologica 173 (2017) 13–20 15

Thus, the intensity of the material can possibly modulate the impact 2. Materials and methods of implicit fictional reappraisal on the down-regulation of emotional responses. Indeed, emotion regulation can vary depending on the intensi- 2.1. Participants ty of the material. A series of studies have shown that in order to effectively adapt emotion regulatory goals, people tend to adopt a dis- Thirty-seven participants took part in the experiment. Three partic- traction strategy when confronted with high negative intensity materi- ipants were excluded from the analyses due to technical problems. al, while they are more prone to engage in reappraisal when dealing Thus, the final sample was composed of 34 healthy participants (26 fe- with low negative intensity situations (Sheppes et al., 2014; Sheppes, males; mean age 22.24 ± 2.94). All participants signed an informed Scheibe, Suri, & Gross, 2011; Sheppes & Levin, 2013). According to consent form in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki, and the these authors, early attentional disengagement prevents emotional in- study was approved by the local ethics committee of the University formation from gathering force, and is more effective with high-intensi- Paris Descartes. All participants were right-handed and reported having ty emotional material, while reappraisal is sufficient to manage low- no psychiatric or neurological history. intensity material and has greater benefits in terms of long-term adaptation. Moreover, the two strategies are considered to differ in terms of 2.2. Materials cognitive costs, with distraction being less demanding than reappraisal, which requires the active generation and maintenance of an alternative Forty images were selected from the IAPS database (Lang et al., explanation that is often in conflict with the actual emotional situation. 1997). Thirty-six were used as experimental stimuli and four as con- Still, a study that prompted participants to use reappraisal to regulate trols. The 36 experimental stimuli were divided into three categories ac- emotion elicited by high- and low-intensity emotional stimuli reported cording to their intensity: 12 “Neutral” (intensity between 1 and 3), 12 that reappraisal of high-intensity pictures produced a greater reduction “Mild” (intensity between 4 and 5), and 12 “High” (intensity between 6 in negative affect, compared to low-intensity ones, even if the down- and 7). The “Mild” and the “High” images were taken from the negative regulation of the emotional response was significant for both kinds of subset of the IAPS. Four images were chosen for their abstract pictorial stimuli (Silvers, Wager, Weber, & Ochsner, 2014). It has to be noted, content (e.g., picture no. 7238 represents yellow and blue spheres of nevertheless, that reappraisal in the high-intensity condition was ac- varying radius on a black background) and were employed as a manip- companied by greater activity in several prefrontal regions, probably ulation check. The criteria for selecting the 36 images were the follow- denoting, in accordance with the aforementioned studies, a greater re- ing: 1) The image had to be plausible when presented either as real or cruitment of executive functions when employing this strategy, above as fictional2, and 2) we selected pictures with a variety of content all when dealing with highly arousing material. (e.g., not only mutilations or car crashes in the high intensity category) To date, the effect of intensity on implicit forms of ER, and the impact to avoid material-related biases. For a complete list of the selected im- of different executive functions on the efficiency of this process have not ages see Supplementary Material 1. been tested. To fill this gap, we presented participants with negatively We created two descriptive texts for each image, one presenting it as valenced pictures of varying emotional intensity selected from the In- real (e.g., Body of an injured man) and the other one as fictional (e.g., In- ternational Affective Pictures Systems (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & jury makeup on a man). There was no difference in the length of the Cuthbert, 1997). Each stimulus was preceded by a short text describing sentences across the two conditions (t (70) = −0.21, p = 0.83). The it as either fictional or real. In other words, we provided reappraised in- 4 abstract images were preceded by a meaningless sentence containing terpretations specific to each stimulus. Thus, contrary to most previous a pseudo-word (e.g., Summer lacks glogne).3 studies we gave specific cues to reinterpret the stimulus, rather than general instructions (e.g., real vs. fake) which require participants to generate their own personal alternative interpretation. This procedure 2.3. Procedure has a twofold purpose: 1) it strives to lower the cognitive demand associated with the task, since producing an alternative interpretation in The study was divided into three phases: EDA recording during pre- conflict with the initial appraisal of the stimulus is a cognitively de- sentation of the images, each of which was preceded by a short descrip- manding process. However, either generating or prompting a specific tion, then the executive functioning testing, and finally recording of the interpretation requires participants to activate and maintain the subjective emotional rating during a second presentation of the images. alternative meaning. Thus, even in our protocol, high-level executive The study took place in a quiet experimental room whose tempera- processes should play a pivotal role; 2) it prompts an implicit (partici- ture was kept at about 24 degrees. Participants were told that they pants are not aware of the regulatory nature of the task), rather than would see a series of emotional images preceded by a short description. an explicit emotion regulation process (participants know that they They were instructed to read the descriptions carefully. To ensure that have to reduce their emotion experience). Distinct executive functions they followed the instructions they were warned that they would see - inhibition, switching, working memory capacity and updating - were some images preceded by a strange title (the 4 abstract images), and assessed by standard neuropsychological tests. We recorded subjective that they should press the space bar whenever they read one of these rating of intensity, as well as electrodermal activity (EDA). The rationale titles. for this choice was that EDA is considered as a good physiological indi- During the first phase, subjects wore acoustically isolating head- cator of the arousal dimension of emotions (Sequeira, Hot, Silvert, & phones to reduce possible noise that could induce artefacts in the EDA Delplanque, 2009). signal, and the light in the room was turned off to facilitate concentra- Based on the aforementioned literature we made three main hy- tion on the stimuli. The sequence of events was as follows: the descrip- potheses: 1) we expected to find a greater emotional response for pic- tive texts were presented for 5 s. After a variable interval (7–10 s, in 1 s tures presented as real; 2) we expected that the difference between steps), an image was presented for 6 s (as for the validation of the IAPS the emotional response toward real and fictional pictures would be database), and was followed by another variable interval (16–19 s, in 1 s greater for stimuli of higher intensity; 3) we predicted that participants steps) to allow the EDA to return to baseline. During this phase, EDA was showing higher implicit emotional regulation abilities (difference in emotion reaction between the real and the fictional condition) would 2 Several images in the IAPS database are obviously a set-up (e.g., image no. 6313 have better executive scores. In particular, since ER has been shown to representing a knife attack). This kind of picture could not have been presented as real. On the contrary, pictures depicting simple objects (e.g., a tea cup) or landscapes are diffi- require more cognitive and neuronal resources when facing highly cult to present as fictional. arousing stimuli, we expected that the link between ER and executive 3 Even if pseudo-words could be more salient than real words, we chose to employ this functions would be more pronounced for high-intensity material. kind of material to create “objectively” meaningless sentences. 16 M. Sperduti et al. / Acta Psychologica 173 (2017) 13–20

Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the experimental protocol. Short texts were presented to the participant for 5 s. After a variable interval ranging between 7 and 10 s, the stimulus was presented for 6 s. After another variable interval (16–19 s), the next trial began. continuously recorded. Images were randomly presented and the as- The Stroop inhibition score was calculated by subtracting the time of signment of each image to the real or fictional condition was the interference task from the colour naming task (Godefroy, 2008). The counterbalanced across participants. For a schematic representation of Trail Making Test (TMT) score was the difference between time for the protocol see Fig. 1. Stimuli were presented on a 24″ screen. Presen- completing part B and part A. For both tests a lower time corresponds tation of the stimuli, recording of data, and synchronization with EDA to a better performance. For updating (the n-back task) and capacity recording was automatically accomplished using PsychoPy© 1.80.04 (digit span) measures, we kept the maximum span. The former two (Peirce, 2007). scores were reversed so that higher scores correspond to better In the second phase, participants carried out an executive function- performances. ing assessment including measures of inhibition (The Stroop task; All statistical analyses were run using the open-source language R Stroop, 1935), switching (the Trail Making Test; Reitan, 1955)and 3.3.1 (R Development Core Team, 2008). two tasks related to working memory: updating (the n-back test; Quinette et al., 2003) and capacity (forward digit span). These executive 3. Results tests were performed following the guidelines of the French neuropsychological consortium on executive functioning assessment (Godefroy, 3.1. Effect of nature and intensity 2008). During the third phase, the 36 experimental pictures were presented In order to test the effect of nature and intensity, we used linear again and the participants were asked to rate the intensity (0 = Neutral mixed-effects modelling (LMMs; Bates, 2005; Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, - 7 = Very Intense) of their subjective emotional experience. This time, & Christensen, 2014). LMMs are statistical models containing both no descriptive text indicated whether the image was fictional or real. No fixed effects (explanatory variables) and random effects (variance com- emphasis was placed on this distinction during the whole experiment to ponents). This framework has been increasingly used in recent years as ensure the implicitness of the manipulation. it has been shown to outperform traditional procedures such as repeated measures ANOVA. LMMs are particularly suited to cases in which ex- 2.4. Data acquisition and analysis perimental stimuli are heterogeneous (e.g., words, images) as they can take into account the variance due to the items. Moreover, LMMs do not EDA was recorded using the BIOPAC MP150 system (Biopac Systems, depend on limited assumptions about the variance-covariance matrix Goleta, CA, USA) and AcqKnowledge Software (Version 4.3; Biopac and can accommodate missing data (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Systems) at 1000 Hz. EDA was measured using two Ag-AgCl electrodes Kristensen & Hansen, 2004; Magezi, 2015). We report 95% confidence attached to the intermediate phalanx of the index and ring fingers of intervals based on the estimated local curvature of the likelihood sur- the non-dominant hand. Isotonic paste (BIOPAC Gel 101) was used as face (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). We fitted two full linear the electrolyte. Electrodes were attached prior to the beginning of the mixed-effects models designed to predict EDA and subjective intensity. task, and at least 5 min of activity were recorded before starting the As fixed factor, we entered the nature (real – fictional), nested within experiment in order to allow participants to adapt to the recording the intensity (neutral – mild – high), while items and participants equipment, and to allow EDA levels to stabilize (see Fowles et al., 1981). were entered as random factors. Additionally, following recent recom- Analysis of the EDA signal was carried out using AcqKnowledge mendations (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013), fixed factor terms Software (Version 4.3; Biopac Systems). The tonic EDA signal was first down-sampled at 15.7 Hz, and then a low-pass filter at 1 Hz was Table 1 applied. Phasic EDA was derived from the tonic signal with the Descriptive statistics. AcqKnowledge© function Smoothing baseline removal with a baseline Intensity Nature EDA Subjective Intensity window of 8 s. Then, the peak of EDA activity for each stimulus was ex- Neutral Real 0.21 ± 0.24 1.69 ± 1.99 tracted in a time window starting 1 s after the stimulus onset and end- Neutral Fiction 0.22 ± 0.24 1.55 ± 1.91 ing with the stimulus offset. Peak values were finally transformed using Mild Real 0.28 ± 0.30 4.23 ± 2.04 the square root function to approach a normal distribution (for a similar Mild Fiction 0.29 ± 0.30 3.70 ± 1.99 method see Silvert, Delplanque, Bouwalerh, Verpoort, & Sequeira, High Real 0.39 ± 0.35 4.91 ± 1.78 High Fiction 0.35 ± 0.33 4.67 ± 1.77 2004). M. Sperduti et al. / Acta Psychologica 173 (2017) 13–20 17 were modelled as random slopes over random factors. In particular, all fixed factors were modelled as random slope over participants, and the nature as random slope over items. Correlations between random effects were also modelled. Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1. The R code for the linear mixed-effects models is available in Supplementary Material 2.

3.1.1. EDA The overall model predicting EDA successfully converged and explained 38% (the conditional R2), while the fixed factors explained 4% (marginal R2) of the variance of the endogen. The intercept, corresponding to the EDA in the neutral intensity and real nature, was 0.22. Com- pared to this, the mild and the high intensities resulted in a significant increase in EDA (respectively, β = 0.06, 95% CI [0.00, 0.12], p b 0.05; β = 0.17, 95% CI [0.09, 0.25], p b 0.001). Post-hoc analysis (Tukey) showed that the difference between mild and high intensity (averaged Fig. 3. Results showing the effect of fiction on subjective intensity within each condition. Lower subjective intensity was observed for fiction in the mild and the high intensities. over the two levels of nature) was significant (d = −0.9, p b 0.01). The The lower and upper “hinges” of the boxes correspond to the first and third quartiles effect of fiction was not significant in the neutral, mild or high intensity (the 25th and 75th percentiles). The whiskers extend from the hinge of the box to the conditions (respectively, β = 0.01, 95% CI [−0.05, 0.07], p N 0.05; β = extreme value that is within 1.5 of the distance between the first and third quartiles. 0.01, 95% CI [−0.06, 0.08], p N 0.05; β = −0.03, 95% CI [−0.11, 0.04], p N 0.05). See Fig. 2. conditions for EDA and subjective intensity, normalized on their value in the real condition, separately for the high and the mild intensity con- 3.1.2. Subjective intensity ditions (a greater difference meaning that the real condition resulted in The overall model predicting subjective intensity successfully con- a higher response than the fictional condition). The t-test on this ratio verged and explained 67% of the variance of the endogen. The variance comparing mild- and high-intensity was not significant either for EDA explained by fixed factors was 41%. The intercept, corresponding to sub- (mean high = 0.01 ± 0.13, mean mild = −0.01 ± 0.13, t(33) = jective intensity (measured on a 0–7 scale) in the neutral intensity and 0.54, p N 0.05) nor for subjective intensity (mean high = 0.06 ± 0.14, real nature, was 1.75. Compared to the intercept, the mild and the high mean mild = 0.02 ± 0.48, t(33) = 0.46, p N 0.05). intensity conditions resulted in a significant increase in subjective intensity (respectively, β = 2.57, 95% CI [1.68, 3.45], p b 0.001; β = 3.3. The role of inhibition, switching and updating 4.07, 95% CI [3.16, 4.99], p b 0.001). Post-hoc analysis (Tukey) showed that the difference between mild and high intensity (averaged over In order to investigate the relationship between the effect of fiction the levels of nature) was significant (d = −1.57, p b 0.001). The fiction- and the four executive scores, we ran multiple regressions to predict al condition led to a significant decrease in subjective intensity in the the ratio of the differences between the fictional and the real conditions mild and high intensity conditions (respectively, β = −0.56, 95% CI for both EDA and subjective intensity. All the scores were centred and [−1.00, −0.11], p b 0.05; β = −0.48, 95% CI [−0.90, −0.06], scaled. An initial multiple linear regression model comprised the four p b 0.05), but not in the neutral one (β = −0.10, 95% CI [−0.52, executive scores (inhibition, switching, updating, and capacity). We 0.32], p N 0.05). The difference between mild and high intensity then applied a forward and backward stepwise model selection proce- remained significant in the fictional condition (d = −1.59, p ≤ 0.001). dure to identify the final model that best fitted the data (based on the See Fig. 3. AIC).

3.2. The effect of stimulus intensity on emotion regulation 3.3.1. EDA

In order to test our second hypothesis, we computed, for each partic- 3.3.1.1. Mild intensity. The initial regression model was not significant ipant, the ratio of the differences between the fictional and the real (F(4,29) = 0.63, p N 0.05), with a multiple R2 of 0.08. Within this model, none of the executive scores (inhibition, switching, updating and capacity) was a significant predictor (respectively, β = −0.002, t = −1.11, p N 0.05; β = 0.001, t = 0.45, p N 0.05; β = 0.006, t = 0.14, p N 0.05; β = −0.03, t = −1.08, p N 0.05). The stepwise procedure revealed that the best model was a constant model (with no other predictors than the intercept).

3.3.1.2. High intensity. The initial regression model was not signiﬁcant (F(2,29) = 0.69, p N 0.05), with a multiple R2 of 0.09. Within this model, none of the executive scores (inhibition, switching, updating and capacity) was a signiﬁcant predictor (respectively, β =0.002,t = 0.78, p N 0.05; β = −0.02, t = −0.73, p N 0.05; β = 0.008, t = 0.18, p N 0.05; β =0.02,t =1.00,pN 0.05). The stepwise procedure revealed that the best model was a constant model.

3.3.2. Subjective intensity

Fig. 2. EDA results showing the effect of intensity. Greater EDA activity was observed for 3.3.2.1. Mild intensity. The initial regression model was not significant mild- and high-intensity pictures compared to neutral ones. The lower and upper (F(2,29) = 0.26, p N 0.05), with a multiple R2 of 0.03. Within this “hinges” of the boxes correspond to the first and third quartiles (the 25th and 75th percentiles). The whiskers extend from the hinge of the box to the extreme value that is model, none of the executive scores (inhibition, switching, updating within 1.5 of the distance between the first and third quartiles. and capacity) was a significant predictor (respectively, β =0.001,t = 18 M. Sperduti et al. / Acta Psychologica 173 (2017) 13–20

0.13, p N 0.05; β = −0.006, t = −0.72, p N 0.05; β = −0.06, t = −0.40, during the film. These findings suggest, also according to Eippert et al. p N 0.05; β = −0.05, t = −0.52, p N 0.05). The stepwise procedure re- (2007, p. 419),that“effective downregulation of autonomic responses vealed that the best model was a constant model. might need some preparation”. Even if we presented the description before the pictures, our event-related protocol was probably too fast to 3.3.2.2. High intensity. The initial regression model was not significant permit a modulation of EDA. Nevertheless, another possibility is that (F(2,29) = 1.14, p N 0.05), with a multiple R2 of 0.14. Within this implicit fictional reappraisal dos not actually modulates physiological model, none of the executive scores (inhibition, switching, updating arousal. This would be in line with the idea that emotions elicited by ap- and capacity) was a significant predictor (respectively, β = −0.0004, praisal of fictional objects, compared to real objects, would more pertain t = −0.17, p N 0.05; β = −0.001, t = −0.56, p N 0.05; β =0.06,t = to what Frijda and Sundararajan (2007) called refined emotions. This 1.41, p N 0.05; β =0.002,t = 0.06, p N 0.05). However, the stepwise pro- kind of emotion would be characterized by detachment and self-reflec- cedure revealed that the best model was that with updating as a unique tive awareness, and would mainly activate the subjective component of predictor. This model was significant (F(1,32) = 4.49, p b 0.05), with a the emotional reaction (e.g., feeling; Zentner, Grandjean, & Scherer, multiple R2 of 0.12. Within this model, a greater updating score was 2008). This is also coherent with a recent study showing that subjective linked to a greater difference of subjective intensity between the fiction- rating, but not corrugator activation, was modulated by presenting pic- al and the real nature (β =0.07,t =2.12,pb 0.05). To test our hypoth- tures as artworks, as opposed to a non-art reality context (Gerger, Leder, eses further, we also build a simple regression model with working & Kremer, 2014). Thus, it is possible that fictional reappraisal preferen- memory (WM) capacity as unique predictor. This model was not signif- tially modulate this component rather than the behavioural or physio- icant (F(1,32) = 1.41, p N 0.05), and WM capacity was not a significant logical aspects. Further studies, employing different measure are predictor (β = 0.03, t = 1.19, p N 0.05). needed to test this hypothesis and to investigate the time course of Finally, to directly test the interaction between updating and objec- the effect of emotion regulation strategies on peripheral measures of au- tive intensity suggested by the previous analysis, we ran a regression tonomic response. model on the difference between real and fictional intensities with the Contrary to our second hypothesis we did not report a significant objective intensity (mild and high) and WM updating as predictors difference in emotion down-regulation between the high- and mild-in- (R2 = 0.02). The interaction between the two predictors was not signif- tensity conditions. This result is partially incongruent with a recent icant (beta = −0.1, 95% CI [−0.27, 0.07], p = 0.24). study showing that when using reappraisal to down-regulate emotion induced by negative material there was a greater decrease in negative 4. Discussion affect for high- compared to low-intensity pictures (Silvers et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the authors also reported that the proportional re- Emotion regulation is a fundamental ability to flexibly adapt one's duction, compared to baseline (watching condition without reappraisal behaviour to contextual situations and personal goals. Voluntary and ef- instruction), of negative affect was significant for both high- and low-in- fortful forms of ER have been the most extensively studied in the neuro- tensity trials. Moreover, when comparing the two conditions on this scientific domain. However, ER is repeatedly prompted in daily life by proportional change, only a marginal difference, that did not reach sig- continuous encounters with salient emotional situations. Thus, it is un- nificance, was reported. Thus, both studies suggest that emotional down likely that ER concerns only controlled and effortful processes. Implicit regulation could be effective independently of the intensity of the stim- ER may be advantageous in dealing with real-life regulatory require- ulus. The divergence between our and Silvers et al. (2014)'s findings ments (Koole & Rothermund, 2011). In the last few years, renewed in- could be due to the fact that they employed an explicit ER strategy, terest on this topic has emerged and different forms of implicit ER while here no emotion regulation instructions were given. It is likely have been described (Gyurak et al., 2011; Koole & Rothermund, 2011). that to achieve greater emotional down-regulation when facing high- Even if some studies have reported that implicit and explicit ER may en- intensity stimuli, voluntary emotional regulation strategies would be gage at least partially overlapping brain structures (Mocaiber et al., necessary. Our findings partially support this interpretation, since we 2011), and that they may similarly depend on cognitive control abilities found that updating performances predicted down-regulation only in (Oliveira et al., 2009), to date there has been no systematic study inves- the high-intensity condition. However, a supplementary analysis tigating the link between different executive functions and implicit ER. showed that the interaction between stimulus intensity and updating In the present study, we delivered negative images preceded by performances in predicting down-regulation was not significant. Thus, short sentences describing the stimuli as real or fictional. Moreover, the hypothesis of a progressive recruitment of cognitive resources we administered standard neuropsychological tests to measure inhibi- with increasing emotional stimulus intensities should be taken with tion, switching and updating abilities according to recent models of ex- caution and deserves further studies. ecutive functions (Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al., 2000). Our principal finding, according to our third hypothesis, is that the In line with our first hypothesis and previous findings (Mocaiber et amount of emotion regulation, assessed by the difference in the intensi- al., 2011; Mocaiber et al., 2010; Sperduti et al., 2016), we reported ty rating between the real and the fictional condition, correlated with that pictures preceded by a fictional description were rated as less in- updating abilities, but not with inhibition, switching or working memo- tense. Our results suggest that presenting negative material as fictional, ry capacity. This result is consistent with theoretical models of ER, such without any explicit emotional regulation requirement, could be an ef- as those evoking a cognitive control of emotions (Ochsner et al., 2012; ficient and sufficient manipulation to trigger implicit emotional regula- Ochsner & Gross, 2005), and extends this link to implicit forms of ER. tion processes. On the contrary, we did not find any modulation in EDA As discussed in the introduction, studies investigating the link between response by the fictional context. Previous studies have also failed to re- ER and different executive functions have reported contrasting results. port a modulation in peripheral measures of autonomic response McRae et al. (2012), showed that working memory and set-shifting, (Eippert et al., 2007; Sperduti et al., 2016) during down-regulation of but not inhibition abilities, positively correlated with reappraisal negative material. Interestingly, Eippert et al. (2007) also reported a sig- efficiency, while Gyurak et al. (2009, 2012) reported that only verbal nificant increase in skin conductance response during up-regulation, fluency, but not inhibition, working memory or behavioural flexibility, suggesting that up- and down-regulation of emotion could be different- was linked to higher abilities to suppress a behavioural emotional rely tracked by autonomic modulation. Nevertheless, a seminal study on sponse. It has to be noted that, even if implicit, ER processes induced emotion down-regulation showed a decrease in EDA (Lazarus & Alfert, by verbal descriptions could be more similar to reappraisal than to sup- 1964). Interestingly, in this study modulation of EDA was greater pression. Thus, our results are consistent with a well-documented link when the down-regulation instructions were presented before an emo- between some forms of ER (i.e., reappraisal) and working memory tionally arousing film than when they were presented as a commentary (MacNamara, Ferri, & Hajcak, 2011; McRae et al., 2012; Schmeichel et M. Sperduti et al. / Acta Psychologica 173 (2017) 13–20 19 al., 2008). Moreover, beyond reappraisal, working memory abilities help in data collection and all the participants, as well as Elizabeth have been shown to modulate the emotion response after negative Rowley-Jolivet for proofreading. feedback about one's own emotional intelligence (Schmeichel & Demaree, 2010). The authors reported that after the negative feedback, References participants with higher working memory performance showed increased self-enhancement, which is considered as a form of ER to main- Aldao, A., Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Schweizer, S. (2010). 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(http://doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.8.4.494). KEY POINTS

• The literature underlines the importance of executive functions in emotion regulation.

• The distinctive impact and importance of different executive functions for fictional reappraisal are unknown.

• We found that working memory was associated with the efficiency of fictional reappraisal. CHAPTER IV

On the Multimodal Impact of Fictional Reappraisal ABSTRACT

This third study was designed to correct some of the flaws and limits underlined by the previous two studies. We also expanded the measures to include cardiac (ECG) and brain activity (EEG). Coherently with the first study, we replicated the orthogonality of self-relevance with fictional reappraisal. However, we showed that this strategy also affected the bodily signals (heart rate deceleration and skin conductance response) as well as brain markers of emotions (the late positive potential), thus confirming the efficiency of fictional reappraisal as an implicit emotion regulation strategy. 1 The Need for Replication and Validation 61

1 The Need for Replication and Validation

HE two previous studies suggested that fictional reappraisal was an efficient strategy for decreasing the subjective aspects of emotions. However, its effect on physiological variables remained unclear: although non-significant, T there was a trend suggesting a lowered skin conductance response in the fictional condition. Moreover, some methodological limits prevented us to draw strong conclusions about fictional reappraisal. For instance, we did not know ifthe participants actually believed in the cover story and the cues (priming whether the picture was real or fictional). Therefore, we decided to run a third experiment to address the flaws and limitations of the first ones. An experiment using an enhanced paradigm, with better stimuli, more trials, more participants and a comprehensive neurophysiological monitoring, including EDA, ECG and EEG. Critically, we also measured more aspects of the cognitive state, such as the level of subjective belief of the participant during each trial. As the long-term aim was to understand the personal determinants that support variability in fictional reappraisal efficiency, we decided to split the exploration of the data obtained through this study. This first part is mainly devoted to replication and clarification of previous results, while the second is dedicated to the assessment of possible determinants. In the next following paper, we will try to replicate previous results regarding the effect of fictional reappraisal on subjective emotion and EDA, and we will expand this aspect to the study of other markers (such as ECG and ERPs). We will also further explore the role of self-relevance by distinguishing its autobiographical and conceptual aspects. Running head: FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 1

1 Phenomenal, Bodily and Brain Correlates of Fictional Reappraisal as an Implicit Emotion

2 Regulation Strategy

3 Dominique Makowski a, b, *, Marco Sperduti a, b, Jérôme Pelletier c, e, Phillippe Blondé a, b,

4 Valentina La Corte a, b, Margherita Arcangeli c, Tiziana Zalla c, †, Stéphane Lemaire d, Jérôme

5 Dokic c, Serge Nicolas a, b, f & Pascale Piolino a, b, f, *

7 a Memory and Cognition Lab’, Institute of Psychology, University of Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris,

8 France

9 b Center for Psychiatry & Neuroscience, INSERM U894, Paris, France

10 c Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS-EHESS-ENS), Département d’Etudes Cognitives, Ecole Normale

11 Supérieure, PSL Research University, Paris, France.

12 d Université de Rennes 1, Rennes, France.

13 e Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, France.

14 f Institut Universitaire de France, France

This study was submitted and is currently under review in Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 2

15 Author Note

16 * Corresponding authors

17 † Deceased June 2018

18 71 avenue Ed. Vaillant, 92100 Boulogne Billancourt, France

19 [email protected] (Dominique Makowski),

20 [email protected] (Pascale Piolino) FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 3

21 Abstract

22 The ability to modulate our emotional experience, depending on our current goal and

23 context, is of critical importance for adaptive behavior. This ability encompasses various emotion

24 regulation strategies, such as fictional reappraisal, at stake whenever engaging into fictional works

25 (e.g., movies, books, video games or virtual environments). Neuroscientific studies investigating

26 the distinction between the processing of real and fictional entities have reported the involvement

27 of brain structures related to self-relevance and emotion regulation, suggesting a threefold

28 interaction between the appraisal of reality, aspects of the Self and emotions. The main aim of this

29 study is to investigate the effect of implicit fictional reappraisal on different components of

30 emotion, as well as on the modulatory role of autobiographical and conceptual self-relevance.

31 While recording electrodermal, cardiac and brain activity (EEG), we presented negative and

32 neutral pictures to 33 participants, describing them as either real or fictional. After each stimulus,

33 the participants reported their subjective emotional experience, self-relevance of the stimuli as well

34 as their agreement with their description. Using the Bayesian mixed-modelling framework, we

35 showed that stimuli presented as fictional, compared to real, were subjectively appraised as less

36 intense and less negative, and elicited lower skin conductance response, stronger heart rate

37 deceleration and lower late positive potential amplitudes. Finally, these phenomenal and

38 physiological changes did, to a moderate extent, rely on variations of specific aspects of self-

39 relevance. Implications for the neuroscientific study of implicit emotion regulation are discussed.

40 Keywords: Fictional Reappraisal; Implicit Emotion Regulation; Fiction; Simulation

41 Monitoring; Sense of Reality; Self-Relevance FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 4

42 Phenomenal, Bodily and Brain Correlates of Fictional Reappraisal as an Implicit Emotion

43 Regulation Strategy

44 Introduction

45 The ability to modulate our emotional experience, depending on our current goal and

46 context, is of critical importance for adaptive survival (Gross, 1998). In our societies, efficient

47 emotion regulation (ER) is correlated with culturally endorsed characteristics, such as wellbeing,

48 job satisfaction, resilience and mindfulness (Gross & John, 2003; Hülsheger, Alberts, Feinholdt,

49 & Lang, 2013; John & Gross, 2004a; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2007; Tugade, Fredrickson, &

50 Feldman Barrett, 2004), and its deficits are associated with mental and personality disorders

51 (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Gross, 1998). Rather than being a unitary process,

52 ER is conceptualized as an umbrella term for various strategies (Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012),

53 differing in the moment (antecedent vs response focused strategies), the target of their action (the

54 context, the attention focus, the cognitive representation of the event or the bodily state; Gross,

55 2002), the degree of voluntary control and the prominence of the ER goal (explicit vs implicit;

56 Braunstein, Gross, & Ochsner, 2017). These strategies were originally classified as inherently

57 maladaptive or adaptive (positive vs negative, healthy vs unhealthy; John & Gross, 2004b).

58 Nevertheless, other conceptual frameworks do not emphasize such distinction, suggesting instead

59 that a global ER efficiency would more likely depend on the flexible implementation of a given

60 strategy depending on the context (Aldao, 2013; Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Troy,

61 Shallcross, & Mauss, 2013).

62 In order to precisely map the neurocognitive correlates of each of these strategies, recent

63 research has focused on sharpening and refining their definition. One of the most studied form of

64 ER, cognitive change, was at first presented as a unique strategy (with reappraisal as its core FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 5

65 mechanism; Buhle et al., 2014). It has been recently reframed into a broader category, possibly

66 supported by different neural pathways (Dörfel et al., 2014). This form of ER involves the

67 voluntary or implicit change of the meaning or the nature of the mental representation of an event

68 (Davis, Gross, & Ochsner, 2011). It encompasses strategies such as positive reappraisal (creating

69 and focusing on a positive aspect of the stimulus; Moser, Hartwig, Moran, Jendrusina, & Kross,

70 2014), detachment (disengaging from all emotional implications; Shiota & Levenson, 2012),

71 distancing or decentring (perspective change to consider an event “from the outside”; Bernstein et

72 al., 2015; Kross & Ayduk, 2011) and fictional reappraisal (Sperduti et al., 2017).

73 The latter holds a particular place in the nebula of ER strategies as it aims at changing the

74 intrinsic nature of the mental representation of an event, appraising it as more or less real (Sperduti

75 et al., 2017). Although the term “reappraisal” usually refers to a change occurring after the stimulus

76 presentation, it can also takes the form of a prior information that will bias its evaluation (Sperduti

77 et al., 2016). This strategy is at stake whenever engaging into fictional experiences, such as movies,

78 books, video games, virtual environments and possibly extending to memories and thoughts, to

79 help us manage our emotional reaction (“it’s just a movie, it’s not for real”; “this video depicting

80 a dramatic car crash must be a fake”). It has also been intuitively used by advertisers in an attempt

81 to increase the emotional appeal of a product (“a movie based on real events”). Moreover, it

82 encounters an echo in modified states of consciousness (drug’s effects and mystical experiences;

83 Carhart-Harris et al., 2012; Lebedev et al., 2015), as well as several psychiatric disorders and

84 symptoms characterized by an improper appraisal of real and non-real events, such as

85 hallucinations, delusions, post-traumatic flashbacks, depersonalization/derealisation disorder

86 (Bentall, 1990; Bryant & Mallard, 2003; Northoff & Duncan, 2016; Sedeño et al., 2014). Despite

87 our frequent engagement with fiction in everyday life and its relationship with serious conditions FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 6

88 affecting one’s core sense of self, fictional reappraisal has received, to date, only minimal attention

89 from the scientific community.

90 In laboratory contexts, fictional reappraisal has been successfully operationalized by

91 changing the context of a given stimulus, from real to fictional (e.g., “it's not blood but ketchup”).

92 The central finding highlighted by studies using this procedure is that presenting a realistic

93 stimulus as fictitious attenuated the associated emotional experience (Sperduti et al., 2017),

94 modulated the phenomenal and the neurophysiological emotional response (with a decreased late

95 positive potential (LPP) amplitude; Mocaiber et al., 2009, 2010), and decreased the activity in

96 brain regions usually associated with emotional processing (i.e., amygdala and insula; Mocaiber

97 et al., 2011). On the bodily signals side, one study investigating heart rate variability suggests that

98 fictional reappraisal lowers the cardiac deceleration difference between negative and neutral

99 stimuli (Mocaiber et al., 2011). Nevertheless, its effect on skin conductance response (SCR)

100 remain unclear, as previous studies either did not directly compare fiction and reality conditions

101 (Oliveira et al., 2009) or did not report significant differences between fiction and reality (Sperduti,

102 Makowski, & Piolino, 2016; Sperduti et al., 2017). Interestingly, the effect of fictional reappraisal

103 has been shown to be modulated by the participants’ affective state (Mocaiber et al., 2009; Oliveira

104 et al., 2009), their executive abilities (Sperduti et al., 2017) and the self-relevance of the stimuli

105 (Sperduti et al., 2016). It is important to note that these protocols were based on an implicit

106 manipulation, designed to mimic real-world phenomena. Indeed, it is rather rare to see explicit use

107 of fictional reappraisal (e.g., “I should regulate my emotions by thinking that what I see is

108 fictitious”) in daily life. Most of the time, it takes the form of a prior information that we have

109 about our current experience (e.g., going to a movie theatre, I know that what I am going to see is FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 7

110 not real), leading us to adjust our reactions, - or revise our expectations. Unfortunately, none of

111 these studies controlled the level of belief in the experimental manipulation.

112 The core cognitive mechanism supporting fictional reappraisal is the one that discriminates

113 between what is real and what is not, for which a more generic and neutral term than fiction

114 (referring to stories based on imaginary events) could be simulation. As such, the function of

115 tagging the content of the experience as genuine or simulated can be referred to as simulation

116 monitoring. This notion is to be distinguished from reality monitoring (more unambiguously

117 referred to as source monitoring), a concept used in memory studies that covers the ability to decide

118 whether a recollected information initially had an external or an internal source (Johnson,

119 Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981). Instead, simulation monitoring deals with

120 the nature of the experience: it covers the tagging of the content of an experience as genuine or

121 simulated, and the adjustment to it. While this mechanism could be considered as anecdotal until

122 a few years ago, the exponential growth of technology urge psychological science to start exploring

123 the cognitive features that will, tomorrow, be of critical importance. Through virtual and

124 augmented reality, and new forms of fiction, simulations of all kind will populate our everyday

125 world, and distinguishing between the two, in order to adjust one’s behaviour to their different

126 implications and consequences, will withhold a major adaptive value.

127 A handful of neuroscientific works have explored the neural underpinning of the distinction

128 between real and fictional events. These studies reported that appraising an event as fictional

129 engaged lateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (Abraham, von Cramon, &

130 Schubotz, 2008; Altmann, Bohrn, Lubrich, Menninghaus, & Jacobs, 2012; Metz-Lutz, Bressan,

131 Heider, & Otzenberger, 2010), involved in cognitive control and ER (Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle,

132 2012; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). On the other hand, reality engaged to a greater extent cortical FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 8

133 midline structures (Abraham et al., 2008; Han, Jiang, Humphreys, Zhou, & Cai, 2005; Hsu, Conrad,

134 & Jacobs, 2014), known to be involved in autobiographical memory and self-referential processing

135 (Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 2013; Northoff, 2005). While this Self-related network modulates

136 the emotional reactivity (Eippert et al., 2007; Herbert, Herbert, & Pauli, 2011; Yoshimura et al.,

137 2009), it is unclear how the relationship between emotions and self-relevance interacts with

138 simulation monitoring. For instance, Sperduti et al. (2016) showed that high self-relevance

139 increased the intensity of the emotional response, but also that this effect was independent of the

140 reality (fiction or real) condition. However, self-reference was exclusively operationalized as the

141 amount of autobiographical memory linked to the stimulus. This is important, as the Self is not a

142 unitary system (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004; Klein & Gangi, 2010; Prebble, Addis, & Tippett,

143 2012). The Self Memory System model distinguishes between at least two levels of

144 representations: a conceptual system, built upon generalized life experiences, values and goals,

145 and an autobiographical system, grounded in autobiographical episodic memories (Conway, 2005;

146 Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 2013). Usual measures or modulations of self-relevance, including

147 inquiry about how an item relates to oneself (e.g., in case of adjectives), the amount of

148 autobiographical memories elicited, or how a stimulus is relevant to one’s values, might indeed

149 load specifically on different facets of the Self (Compère et al., 2016; Klein, Loftus, & Burton,

150 1989). Assessing different components of self-relevance might, thus, reveal new associations and

151 interactions.

152 The main goal of this study was to investigate, through simultaneous multimodal

153 recordings, the neural, bodily and phenomenal changes induced by the appraisal of an emotional

154 stimulus as simulation, and investigating the modulatory role of two facets of the Self;

155 autobiographical and conceptual relevance. Using a procedure derived from our previous studies FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 9

156 (Sperduti et al., 2016, 2017), we presented realistic pictures as either simulation (fiction) or reality.

157 To overcome limitations of previous studies (Mocaiber et al., 2009, 2011; Sperduti et al., 2016),

158 we assessed participants’ subjective belief regarding the nature of the stimulus in order to examine

159 the effectiveness of experimental manipulation. Our hypotheses cover the experimental

160 manipulation per se, its effect on emotion and the relationship with self-relevance.

161 We expect that inherently realistic pictures will elicit higher adhesion (operationalized

162 through a higher belief rate) when presented as real than when presented as simulations. However,

163 we also posit that the judgment about the reality of the content experience is flexible, transient and

164 impermanent, and can thus be easily modulated (resulting in a non-negligible belief rate in the

165 simulation condition). Moreover, we postulate that changes induced by simulation monitoring

166 modulation are subordinate to subjective, non-automatic and slow cognitive elaboration. As such,

167 objective components (physiological and neural responses) should be preferentially modulated by

168 the objective (i.e., the experimentally attributed) condition (whether the picture was presented as

169 real or simulation) while subjective components (the phenomenal experience) should be more

170 dependent on the subjective elaboration of the condition (that includes whether the participant

171 believed, or not, in the given context). Finally, we posit that simulation monitoring is a one-

172 dimensional construct with two extremities: simulation and reality. If that is correct, a stimulus

173 can either be appraised as one or the other (with varying degree of certainty), implying that an item

174 presented as real, and not believed to be so, will necessarily be appraised as simulation and vice

175 versa.

176 Regarding emotions, we expect that presenting an emotional stimulus as simulation will

177 have a down-regulatory effect on emotion (Mocaiber et al., 2011; Mocaiber et al., 2010; Sperduti

178 et al., 2016, 2017). However, the existing literature is unclear regarding the domain of action of FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 10

179 fictional reappraisal. Indeed, while several studies have reported that presenting a stimulus as

180 simulation would decrease the subjective emotion experience (Sperduti et al., 2016, 2017) and the

181 LPP (Mocaiber et al., 2009, 2010), a neural marker of emotional arousal (See Schupp et al., 2000),

182 its effect on bodily signals remain controversial. Indeed, studies monitoring autonomic changes

183 did not directly compare the simulation and reality conditions (Mocaiber et al., 2011; Oliveira et

184 al., 2009), and our own research group did not report any differences in electrodermal activity

185 (Sperduti et al., 2016, 2017). To address the gap left open by those studies, we synchronously

186 measured different emotion-related components, including neural (EEG) markers, bodily and

187 phenomenal changes, expecting that simulation will mainly affect the phenomenal, conscious level

188 of emotional experience and its neural correlate, the LPP, which has been shown to be responsive

189 to comparable manipulations (Foti & Hajcak, 2008; Mocaiber et al., 2011; Mocaiber et al., 2010),

190 rather than automatic autonomic responses such as heart rate or electrodermal activity.

191 Although the involvement of Self-related structures was highlighted by fMRI studies on

192 the distinction between reality and fiction (Abraham et al., 2008; Metz-Lutz et al., 2010), the role

193 of Self-related processes as modulators of the response toward fiction remain unclear. Previous

194 research suggests that the emotional difference experienced toward reality and fiction is unaltered

195 by autobiographical relevance (Sperduti et al., 2016), but the impact of conceptual relevance has

196 never been investigated. Therefore, we tried to replicate the previous results concerning the

197 orthogonality of fiction and autobiographical relevance and look for an interaction effect with

198 conceptual relevance. Indeed, when engaging with fictional events to which our reactions have no

199 “real” world consequences, it can be assumed that there is less need to behave coherently with

200 one’s values and goals. This cognitive state, favourable to impersonation and “plays”, might

201 disconnect the influence of conceptual relevance. On the contrary, it is evolutionary plausible that FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 11

202 the conceptual Self would modulate preferably the response toward real events, as their

203 consequences are of “real” importance for adaptive survival.

204 Methods

205 Participants

206 Thirty-five participants were recruited using internet advertisement. Inclusion criteria were

207 age between 18 and 29, right-hand laterality, native French language and absence of neurological

208 or psychiatric disorders. Participants were warned that they might be exposed to emotional and

209 shocking material and that they could withdraw anytime from the study. They were asked to

210 provide informed and written consent and were given 25€ for their participation. Two participants

211 were excluded, one because of technical problem in the EEG recording and the other because of

212 falling asleep. The final sample included 33 participants (age: 24.14 ± 2.67, 78.79% ♀, years of

213 superior education: 3.00 ± 1.89). The study was approved by the local ethics committee of the

214 Paris Descartes University.

215 Protocol

216 Experimental sessions started at 1:30 pm in a sound-attenuated, dimly lit room. The task

217 discussed in the present paper took place in the context of a broader protocol including

218 questionnaires and neuropsychological tests. Tasks not relevant for the current study will not be

219 presented. Average duration, including participant briefing, electrophysiological setup preparation,

220 tests and debriefing was about 3 hours.

221 Materials

222 One hundred twenty eight pictures (64 negative and 64 neutral) were selected from the

223 standardized, wide-range, high-quality, realistic Nencki Affective Picture System (NAPS;

224 Marchewka, Żurawski, Jednoróg, & Grabowska, 2014). The stimuli had comparable nature (all FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 12

225 selected from the “faces” and “people” subcategories) and diverse content (in particular, the

226 negative items included pictures of mutilations, war images, diseases, car crashes, surgical

227 operations, natural disasters, …). Using the original validation ratings, the two sets of pictures

228 (negative and neutral) statistically differed in terms of arousal (Mnegative = 7.15 ± 0.32, Mneutral =

229 4.45 ± 0.25, t(126) = 52.77, p < .001), valence (Mnegative = 2.42 ± 0.54, Mneutral = 5.82 ± 0.33, t(126)

230 = -42.77, p < .001), approach/avoidance (Mnegative = 2.74 ± 0.90, Mneutral = 5.63 ± 0.35, t(126) = -

231 23.79, p < .001), but not in luminance (Mnegative = 107.78 ± 30.47, Mneutral = 107.10 ± 26.39, t(126)

232 = 0.13, p > .05) or entropy (index of image complexity; Mnegative = 7.54 ± 0.34, Mneutral = 7.60 ±

233 0.27, t(126) = -1.11, p > .05).

234 Procedure

235 Participants were tested on a 24-inch monitor (1920 x 1080, 60 Hz) at a distance of 80 cm.

236 The experiment was programmed in Python 3.5 using the Neuropsydia module (Makowski &

237 Dutriaux, 2017). At the beginning of each session, the program randomly picked 96 images (48 in

238 each emotion condition) out of the initial set. Each picture was randomly assigned to one of the

239 two experimental conditions (“Reality” or “Simulation”), resulting in 24 pictures for each of the

240 four combinations of emotion (neutral and negative) and condition. The 36 remaining stimuli were

241 used as lures in a subsequent recognition task that is not discussed in the present study.

242 The task started with an instructions screen that also displayed the logo of the university,

243 alongside with the logo of the European Film Academy. In order to amplify the credibility of the

244 manipulation, the experimenter explained that this study was done in collaboration with this

245 institute, taking interest in “the changes that might occur when we know that something is real or

246 not”. It continued as follows: “the European Film Academy provided us with a database, where

247 half were images extracted from documentaries or amateur pictures, representing real events and FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 13

248 people, while the other half were images extracted from movies or pictures taken in studios or film

249 sets. These include actors, movie props, stuntmen, movie makeup or CGI and can be thus qualified

250 as simulations. Before each picture, a cue, describing its nature, will be presented. The word

251 REAL will be displayed when the content is genuine, while SIMULATION will indicate that the

252 content is fictitious. Note that this information will be true most of the time. However, there might

253 be a few cases where it won’t. Therefore, after each picture, you will have to rate whether you

254 believed in the given context or not”. This last instruction was meant to ensure that a picture for

255 which the manipulation would be problematic (e.g., an obviously real picture coupled with the

256 simulation context) would not cast doubt on the instructions or the trust in the experiment.

257 Moreover, this transformed a passive manipulation into active, self-generated beliefs, as the

258 participant explicitly had to state its opinion regarding the nature of the image, reinforcing its

259 possible effect. Finally, the six scales assessing the emotional experience, self-relevance and

260 subjective belief (See Measures section) were introduced and explained to the participants.

261 This was followed by a training phase, consisting in 4 pictures selected from the GAPED

262 database (Dan-Glauser & Scherer, 2011), containing credible examples of the real (H038: African

263 child with burnings and H106: tramps) and simulation (H123: movie-like image of an execution

264 table and H079: people wearing Ku-Klux Klan outfits that could easily be disguised people)

265 categories. The experimenter made sure that each subjective scale was understood.

266 The task structure was as follows (see Fig. 1): each trial started with a black fixation cross

267 on a neutral grey screen (128, 128, 128 in RGB mode) with a randomly jittered duration (3 - 5 s).

268 A cue (REAL or SIMULATION) was then displayed for 3 seconds. After another fixation cross (3

269 – 5 s), the picture was displayed for 3 seconds, followed by a grey screen (4 s). This stimulus

270 presentation duration, shorter than in traditional ER studies, was chosen to preserve the response FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 14

271 intuitiveness by minimizing the deep and elaborate analysis of pictures’ details and images’

272 features (such as view angle, focus and blur, image post-editing…) that might influence the

273 participant’s opinion.

274

275 Figure 1. The implicit fictional reappraisal procedure. 96 pictures, negative and neutral, were presented, cued by the

276 experimental condition (reality/simulation). We recorded central and autonomic activity during stimulus presentation

277 through EEG, ECG and EDA. After each stimulus, we assessed features of the phenomenal experience, such as the

278 arousal, the valence, the self-relevance and the degree of belief toward the condition. To control for cross-

279 contamination between measures, the visual scales were presented by group in a random order.

280 Finally, six scales (see Measures section), divided in three blocks assessing the emotional

281 response (arousal, valence and feeling of control), self-relevance (autobiographical and conceptual

282 relevance) and simulation monitoring were displayed after each picture. To control for cross-

283 contamination between measures, these three blocks were presented in a random order. FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 15

284 There was a short break (approx. 2 min) at the middle of the main task (also used to check

285 the signal’s recoding). Then, the protocol continued with several questionnaires and tests, and a

286 recognition task took place at the end, requesting the participant to identify the pictures that where

287 incidentally encoded. However, this task is not relevant for the current hypotheses and will thus

288 not be discussed. The total experiment’s duration was about 3 hours (including neurophysiological

289 equipment setup and post-experiment debriefing).

290 Measures

291 Phenomenal Experience

292 Six behavioural variables were collected by visual analogue scales presented after each

293 picture. As the scales axes were unmarked (aside from labelled extremities), the scores were

294 normalized participant-wise to ensure homogeneity.

295 The emotional subjective response was assessed through three dimensions: arousal,

296 valence and feeling of control. Arousal was explained as “whether the emotion that you might have

297 felt was intense or not” (with extremities labelled as “not intense”, “intense”). Valence attempted

298 to capture “whether that emotion was rather positive and pleasant, or negative and unpleasant”

299 (extremities: “negative” and “positive”). Finally, feeling of control was the subjective “amount of

300 control that you felt toward that emotion. Whether you could easily control it or whether you got

301 overwhelmed by it” (extremities: “controllable” and “uncontrollable”). However, to keep the paper

302 concise, this last scale will not be discussed (but are included in Supplementary Materials), as it

303 showed the same pattern of results than arousal in all subsequent analyses.

304 Self-relevance was assessed through two dimensions: autobiographical relevance and

305 conceptual relevance. The former was explained as “whether the content in the picture reminds

306 you an episode that you have personally experienced as an actor or an observer” (extremities: FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 16

307 “not at all” and “absolutely”). Conceptual relevance was presented as the personal importance

308 attributed to the picture’s content (extremities: “not at all” or “absolutely”). The following example

309 was given: “some people are more or less involved in the animal cause. For the highly-involved

310 people, seeing pictures of animals under certain circumstances can be particularly important and

311 generate particular feelings, as it echoes with their values”.

312 The last scale enquired the participant’s belief about the nature of the image, whether she

313 thought the picture involved simulation or reality. The participant had to express its agreement

314 with the description (extremities: “yes” and “no”). A central point was drawn on this scale, visually

315 delimiting the “yes” and “no” answers. This scale was preferred to a more straightforward

316 “personal opinion” scale (with “fiction” and “reality” as extremities) as it underlines the

317 importance, for the participant, to pay attention to the visual cue. A simulation monitoring index

318 was created by orienting the belief scores condition-wise (i.e., the “yes” extremity was replaced

319 by the cued condition and the “no” extremity by the remaining condition). Finally, the centre-

320 based dichotomization of the simulation monitoring index let to the “Subjective Condition” factor

321 (reality/simulation) used for further comparison with the “Objective Condition”.

322 Bodily Signals

323 Signal Acquisition

324 Electrodermal (EDA) and cardiac (ECG) activity was recorded using Biopac MP150

325 system (Biopac Systems Inc., USA) and the AcqKnowledge Software 4.3 with a sampling

326 frequency of 1000 Hz. EDA was measured using two Ag-AgCl electrodes attached to the

327 intermediate phalanx of the index and ring fingers of the non-dominant hand. To maximize the

328 QRS signal, ECG electrodes were placed according to a modified lead II configuration (Takuma

329 et al., 1995), on the right and left subclavicular spaces (the deltopectoral fossae) and on the left FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 17

330 lower rib. About 5 min of activity was recorded before starting the experiment to allow participants

331 to adapt to the recording equipment, and to allow EDA levels to stabilize (Fowles et al., 1981).

332 Event timings were also recorded by Biopac using a photosensor attached to a corner of the screen

333 that sent a trigger whenever a small rectangle turned to black at the precise onset of each stimulus.

334 Signal Processing

335 Bodily signals processing was carried out using the NeuroKit package (Makowski, 2017).

336 EDA signal was first normalized, down-sampled to 100 Hz, then processed using the new cvxEDA

337 algorithm based on convex-optimization (Greco, Valenza, Lanata, Scilingo, & Citi, 2016). The

338 ECG signal was FIR bandpass filtered (3–45 Hz, 3rd order), and R peaks were identified using

339 Hamilton's (2002) segmenter. Next, R-R intervals were computed, and artefacts (including ectopic

340 beats) were detected by physiological and statistical methods (see NeuroKit’s ecg_hrv() function).

341 The signal was submitted to cubic spline interpolation and transformed into heart rate.

342 Computed Features

343 The phasic component of EDA was used to identify event-related Skin-Conductance

344 Responses (SCRs) which onsets and subsequent peaks were in a 1 - 7 s post-stimulus window. The

345 SCR magnitude was log transformed to approach a normal distribution (Braithwaite, Watson,

346 Jones, & Rowe, 2013). The baseline heart rate was computed on the 3 seconds preceding each

347 stimulus, and the heart rate difference was computed by subtracting the mean heart rate on a 3 s

348 post-stimulus onset window from the baseline.

349 EEG

350 Signal Acquisition

351 EEG data were collected from 64 scalp sites using recording caps (EasyCap GmbH,

352 Germany) based on the 10–20 international system. The EEG was amplified using a 64-channel FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 18

353 BrainAmp amplifier (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany) and sampled at 1000 Hz. The

354 signal was recorded using a right mastoid reference electrode. Horizontal and vertical electro-

355 oculograms (HEOG and VEOG) were used to measure eye movements and detect eye blinks.

356 Impedance was kept below 5 kΩ throughout the task with three correction phases; at the session’s

357 beginning, during the training phase and during a pause at the middle of the main task. As for

358 bodily signals, stimuli’s actual display timings were recorded alongside the EEG with BrainVision

359 Recorder 1.21 using a photosensor, ensuring the highest standards quality in terms of precision.

360 Signal Processing

361 EEG signal processing was carried out using Python packages MNE (Gramfort et al., 2013,

362 2014) and NeuroKit (Makowski, 2017). Data were re-referenced to mastoid electrodes (TP9 –

363 TP10), band-pass filtered (1–30 Hz) and down-sampled to 250 Hz. Stimulus-synchronized epochs

364 were extracted from 250 ms before to 3000 ms after picture onset and baseline corrected. Next,

365 epochs containing bad signal were automatically detected, then repaired or discarded (16.3%)

366 using the newly developed autoreject algorithm (Jas, Engemann, Bekhti, Raimondo, & Gramfort,

367 2017). The number of rejected epochs did not differ between experimental conditions (See

368 Supplementary Materials). Finally, all sets were corrected for eye-blink artefacts by applying

369 ICA.

370 Computed Features

371 Based on a large body of prior research (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang,

372 2000; Hajcak & Nieuwenhuis, 2006; Keil et al., 2002; Schupp et al., 2000), the LPP was quantified

373 trial-wise as the mean activity of central–parietal electrodes (CP1, CP2, CP3, CP4, CP5, CP6, CPz)

374 in a window between 400 and 700 ms after stimulus onset (Moran, Jendrusina, & Moser, 2013;

375 Pastor et al., 2008). FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 19

376 Data Analysis

377 Statistics were done using R 3.4.1 (R Development Core Team, 2008). As we decided to

378 present a Bayesian version of the statistical models in the paper, the frequentist equivalent, as well

379 as more details regarding the current analysis, can be found in Supplementary Materials.

380 Bayesian Mixed-Models

381 The Mixed modelling framework allows estimated effects to vary by group at lower levels

382 while estimating population-level effects through the specification of fixed (explanatory variables)

383 and random (variance components) effects. Outperforming traditional procedures such as repeated

384 measures ANOVA (Kristensen & Hansen, 2004), these models are particularly suited to cases in

385 which experimental stimuli are heterogeneous (e.g., images) as the item-related variance, in

386 addition to the variance induced by participants, can be accounted for (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates,

387 2008; Magezi, 2015). Moreover, mixed models can handle unbalanced data, nested designs,

388 crossed random effects and missing data. However, maximum likelihood estimation of the

389 parameters tends to underestimate uncertainties and overfit the data. More broadly, the frequentist

390 approach has been associated with the focus on null hypothesis testing, and the misuse of p values

391 has been shown to critically contribute to the reproducibility crisis of psychological science

392 (Chambers, Feredoes, Muthukumaraswamy, Suresh, & Etchells, 2014; Szucs & Ioannidis, 2016).

393 There is a general agreement that the generalization of the Bayesian approach is a way of

394 overcoming these issues (Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2016). Beyond these methodological benefits,

395 reasons to prefer this approach is better accuracy in noisy data, the possibility of introducing prior

396 knowledge into the analysis and, critically, results intuitiveness and their straightforward

397 interpretation (Kruschke, 2011; Kruschke, Aguinis, & Joo, 2012; Wagenmakers et al., 2018). FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 20

398 Full Bayesian mixed linear models were fitted using the rstanarm R wrapper for the stan

399 probabilistic language (Gabry & Goodrich, 2016) and their interpretation was carried out with the

400 psycho package (Makowski, 2018b). Bayesian inference was done using Markov Chain Monte

401 Carlo (MCMC) sampling. The prior distributions of all effects were set as weakly informative

402 (normal distributions; M = 0, SD = 1), meaning that we did not expect effects different from null

403 in any particular direction. For all our models (unless specified), we entered random intercepts for

404 the participants (to account for inter-individual variability), the items (to account for item

405 specificities) and the trial number (ranging from 1 to 96) to account for possible effects of

406 redundancy, exposition, habituation and fatigue. For each model and each coefficient, we will

407 present several characteristics of the posterior distribution, such as its median (a robust estimate

408 comparable to the beta from frequentist linear models), MAD (median absolute deviation, a robust

409 equivalent of standard deviation) and the 95% credible interval. Instead of the p value as an index

410 of effect existence, we also computed the maximum probability of effect (MPE), i.e., the maximum

411 probability that the effect is different from 0 in the median’s direction (if 100%, we returned the

412 100% instead of the 95% CI). Overall, an effect was considered as inconsistent if its maximum

413 probability (MPE) was lower than 95% (Makowski, 2018a). The frequentist version of all our

414 analysis (that, in our case, returns similar results) is available in the Supplementary Materials.

415 Finally, all outcome variables, unless specified, were standardized, so that the coefficients

416 drawn from the different models are equivalent in many ways to Cohen’s d (in particular, they are

417 expressed in terms of standard deviations). This opens up the possibility of using Cohen's (1977)

418 heuristics for effect size interpretation (very large > 1.3; large > 0.8; medium > 0.5; small > 0.2;

419 very small < 0.2). As Bayesian analysis returns the actual probability distribution of the

420 coefficients, it is therefore possible to compute the probability associated with each effect size. FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 21

421 Model Selection

422 We made the hypothesis that objective physiological components change might be better

423 explained by the objective condition (tight to the cue displaying whether the subsequent picture

424 was reality or simulation), while some late components (such as the phenomenal experience) will

425 be better explained by the subjective condition (the participant’s belief about the picture’s nature).

426 Comparing models with the objective condition versus the subjective condition as predictor and

427 see which one better fits the data is a way of answering that proposition. We also made the

428 hypothesis that simulation monitoring was unidimensional. This is the equivalent, in this study, of

429 saying that items presented as one category, but non-believed, elicit the same changes that items

430 presented as the other category, and believed to be so. If that’s not the case, adding the belief factor

431 (believed vs. non-believed) should increase its data fitting aptitude, leading it to outperform other

432 models.

433 With the aim to validate our model, we compared the predictive power of three models to

434 explain each outcome variables. For that, we will use leave-one-out (LOO) cross-validation

435 (Vehtari, Gelman, & Gabry, 2017), a comparable yet superior to AIC-like formulas (Gelman,

436 Hwang, & Vehtari, 2014). We will return the expected log point-wise predictive density (ELPD)

437 and the LOO information criterion (LOOIC) of the best model and respective differences of the

438 two other models. Similarly, to the AIC and the BIC, the model with the smallest absolute indices

439 is preferred. All indices are summarized in Table 1.

440 For each outcome variable, models with either the objective condition as predictor

441 (Objective Model), the subjective condition (Subjective Model) or the objective condition

442 associated with the belief factor (Belief Model) will be compared. Other predictors (the emotion FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 22

443 condition), random effects and priors are unchanged. We will then describe and interpret the model

444 that best explain the data.

445 Model Interpretation

446 The statistics of this paper are built upon two types of models, one predicting main outcome

447 variables with two predictors (emotion (negative/neutral), reality/simulation condition (either

448 objective or subjective, depending of the best model). The second type will add to those models

449 linear covariates (autobiographical and conceptual relevance) to see their influence on the effect

450 of simulation. We expect, indeed, that the variations induced by the fact that an item is presented

451 or perceived as simulation will be either amplified or weakened by these covariates.

452 Multiple linear regression outputs description and interpretation can be challenging.

453 Throughout the paper, most of models will have a 2x2 levels structure of categorical predictors

454 (Negative/Neutral vs Reality/Simulation). Our baseline condition (referred to as the intercept) is

455 reality-neutral. We will focus on three coefficients: the emotion effect in reality (the change from

456 reality-neutral to reality-negative), the simulation effect for neutral pictures (the change from

457 reality-neutral to simulation-neutral) and the simulation effect for negative pictures (the change

458 from reality-negative to simulation-negative). The fourth coefficient, the emotion effect in

459 simulation (the change from simulation-neutral to simulation-negative) was also computed by

460 changing the reference levels of the model.

461 In the last part, in order to see how self-relevance influences the previous effects, we will

462 iteratively add its features to the previous models. This will estimate the parametric modulation of

463 the outcome Y, in each condition, according to variations of a new variable X. All models’ full

464 description can be found in Supplementary Materials. However, to concisely answer our

465 hypotheses and increase the clarity and readability of the results section, we will only report two FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 23

466 effects: the slope (the correlation) between X and Y in the reality condition (our reference level)

467 and the modulation of this slope (the interaction) created by the simulation condition. These two

468 effects allow us to answer whether higher scores of X modulates the difference between simulation

469 and reality (in case the interaction effect is probable), and whether this modulation is caused by

470 augmentation or reduction in either one or both conditions.

471 Manipulation Check

472 The first part of the results section will focus on testing whether the experimental

473 manipulation succeeded. In our study, manipulation check consists in showing that our

474 manipulation induced effective changes in simulation monitoring, meaning that the experimental

475 condition (reality or simulation) induced the corresponding modulation on the simulation

476 monitoring scale. Then, we will investigate the importance of the belief rate to see if simple

477 instructions put on top of realistic pictures can consistently induce simulation monitoring changes.

478 The second part will systematically test the effect of simulation on each outcome for the best model,

479 and the last part will investigate the modulatory role of self-relevance. Additional (post-hoc)

480 analysis investigating the role of heart rate variability on subjective belief (see Discussion) are

481 presented in Supplementary Materials 2.

482 Results

483 Inducing Simulation Monitoring Changes

484 Simulation monitoring

485 We fitted a Bayesian mixed-model to predict Simulation Monitoring with the Objective

486 Condition as unique predictor. Lower and higher scores indicate, respectively, “reality” and

487 “simulation”. The intercept, corresponding to the reality condition, was of -0.39 (MAD = 0.036,

488 100% CI [-0.49, -0.26]). Compared to it, there is a probability of 100% that the simulation FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 24

489 condition led to an increase between 0.68 and 0.87 (Median = 0.77, MAD = 0.031). There is a

490 probability of 81.33% that this effect size is medium and 18.67% that this effect size is large.

491 Belief Rate

492 Data were grouped by participants, objective condition and emotion, and the belief rate

493 (number of “believed” answers in each category) was computed. The average belief rate (0.68 ±

494 0.22) was significantly higher than 0.5 (t(32) = 8.95, p < .001).

495 We fitted a Bayesian mixed-model to predict the belief rate with the Objective Condition

496 and the Emotion as predictors (See Fig. 2). We entered participants as a unique random factor.

497 Within this model, the intercept (reality-neutral) was of 0.87 (MAD = 0.028, 100% CI [0.77, 0.97]).

498 Compared to that, there is a probability of 100% that the negative emotion, for the reality condition,

499 led to a decrease of belief rate between -0.28 and -0.051 (Median = -0.17, MAD = 0.032). The

500 simulation effect in neutral was, with 100% of probability, between -0.48 and -0.23 (Median = -

501 0.35, MAD = 0.031). The simulation effect in negative was, with 100% of probability, between -

502 0.24 and -0.01 (Median = -0.13, MAD = 0.035). Finally, the negative emotion effect in simulation

503 was superior to 0 with only 75.7% of probability (Median = 0.048, MAD = 0.033, 95% CI [-0.021,

504 0.11]). FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 25

505

506 Figure 2. The belief rate (i.e., the percentage of believed descriptions) for negative and neutral pictures depending on

507 the objective condition.

508 The Effect of Simulation Monitoring

1 Table 1 2 Model selection. Outcome Objective Subjective Belief Arousal 7768.43 / -3884.22 7729.28 / -3864.64 7739.99 / -3869.99 Valence 5761.84 / -2880.92 5743.75 / -2871.88 5745.09 / -2872.54 SCR 8727.25 / -4363.63 8732.54 / -4366.27 8730.12 / -4365.06 Heart Rate 8578.16 / -4289.08 8577.74 / -4288.87 8581.18 / -4290.59 LPP 5437.32 / -2718.66 5448.61 / -2724.31 5445.99 / -2723 3 Note: For each outcome variable, models with either the objective condition as predictor

4 (Objective), the subjective condition (Subjective) or the objective condition associated with the

5 belief factor (Belief) were compared using leave-one-out (LOO) cross-validation. Cells contain

6 the LOO information criterion (LOOIC) and the expected log point-wise predictive density

7 (ELPD). Bold results indicate the smallest absolute indices, and thus the model that better fits

8 the data. 509 FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 26

510 All effects are summarized in Table 2 and Fig. 3.

511 Phenomenal Experience

512 Arousal

513 LOO cross-validation showed that the subjective model (LOOIC = 7729.28, ELPD = -

514 3864.64) outperformed the belief model (dLOOIC = 10.71, dELPD = -5.35) and the objective model

515 (dLOOIC = 39.15-19.58, dELPD = -19.58). Within this model, the intercept (reality-neutral) was of -

516 0.45 (MAD = 0.046, 100% CI [-0.59, -0.29]). Compared to that, there is a probability of 100% that

517 the emotion led, in the reality condition, to an increase of arousal between 0.81 and 1.27 (Median

518 = 1.05, MAD = 0.068). This effect is large with a probability of 100%. The simulation effect in

519 neutral led, with 100% of probability, to a decrease of arousal between -0.31 and -0.012 (Median

520 = -0.15, MAD = 0.045). This effect is small or very small with respective probabilities of 10.80%

521 and 89.20%. The simulation effect in negative led, with 100% of probability, to a decrease of

522 arousal between -0.40 and -0.13 (Median = -0.25, MAD = 0.043). This effect is small or very small

523 with respective probabilities of 89.47% and 10.53%. Finally, the emotion effect in simulation led,

524 with 100% of probability, to an increase of arousal between 0.70 and 1.17 (Median = 0.94, MAD

525 = 0.072). This effect is large or medium with respective probabilities of 97.53% and 2.47%. FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 27

526

527 Figure 3. The effect of the reality condition (objective, i.e., as presented by the experimental cue or subjective, i.e.,

528 as believed by the participant) on arousal, valence, skin conductance response (expressed in standard deviations) and

529 heart rate difference (expressed in bpm change compared to baseline). Error bars represent bootstrapped 95%

530 confidence interval. Note that these plots do not take into account the variability induced by random factors, thus not

531 representing, with perfect fidelity, the models described in the results section. FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 28

532

533 Valence

534 LOO cross-validation showed that the subjective model (LOOIC = 5743.75, ELPD = -

535 2871.88) outperformed the belief model (dLOOIC = 1.34, dELPD = -0.66) and the objective model

536 (dLOOIC = 18.09, dELPD = -9.04). Within this model, the intercept (reality-neutral) was of 0.78 (MAD

537 = 0.040, 100% CI [0.64, 0.92]). Compared to that, there is a probability of 100% that the negative

538 emotion led, in the reality condition, to a decrease of valence between -1.79 and -1.42 (Median =

539 -1.61, MAD = 0.056). This effect is very large with a probability of 100%. The simulation effect

540 in neutral led, with a probability of 96.93%, to a decrease of valence between -0.18 and 0 (Median

541 = -0.062, MAD = 0.032, 95% CI [-0.13, -0.0037]). This effect is very small or opposite with

542 respective probabilities of 96.93% and 3.07%. The simulation effect in negative led, with a

543 probability of 100%, to an increase of valence between 0.061 and 0.25 (Median = 0.15, MAD =

544 0.032). This effect is small or very small with respective probabilities of 6.20% and 93.80%.

545 Finally, the emotion effect in simulation led, with 100% of probability, to a decrease of valence

546 between -1.59 and -1.16 (Median = -1.39, MAD = 0.064). This effect is very large or large with

547 respective probabilities of 91.40% and 8.60%.

548 Bodily Signals

549 Skin Conductance Response (SCR)

550 LOO cross-validation showed that the objective model (LOOIC = 8727.25, ELPD = -

551 4363.63) outperformed the belief model (dLOOIC = 2.87, dELPD = -1.43) and the subjective model

552 (dLOOIC = 5.29, dELPD = -2.64). Within this model, the intercept (reality-neutral) was of -0.079

553 (MAD = 0.064, 95% CI [-0.20, 0.058]). Compared to that, there is a probability of 100% that the

554 negative emotion led, in the reality condition, to an increase of SCR magnitude between 0.033 and FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 29

555 0.42 (Median = 0.23, MAD = 0.055). This effect is small or very small with respective probabilities

556 of 73.07% and 26.93%. The simulation effect in neutral led, with a probability of 86.13%, to a

557 decrease of SCR magnitude between -0.21 and 0 (Median = -0.054, MAD = 0.046, 95% CI [-0.15,

558 0.034]). This effect is small, very small or opposite with respective probabilities of 0.13%, 86%

559 and 13.87%. The simulation effect in negative led, with a probability of 97.47%, to a decrease of

560 SCR magnitude between -0.23 and 0 (Median = -0.093, MAD = 0.048, 95% CI [-0.19, -0.0069]).

561 This effect is small, very small or opposite with respective probabilities of 0.93%, 96.53% and

562 2.53%. Finally, the emotion effect in simulation led, with 100% of probability, to an increase of

563 SCR magnitude between 0.032 and 0.37 (Median = 0.20, MAD = 0.051). This effect is small or

564 very small with respective probabilities of 47.80% and 52.20%.

565 Heart Rate

566 LOO cross-validation showed that the subjective model (LOOIC = 8577.74, ELPD = -

567 4288.87) outperformed the objective model (dLOOIC = 0.42, dELPD = -0.21) and the belief model

568 (dLOOIC = 3.44, dELPD = -1.72). Note that, for interpretation purpose, the parameters were obtained

569 on a non-standardized version of the variable (expressed in BPM differences with baseline). The

570 outcome was then standardized and the model re-fitted to compute effect sizes. Within this model,

571 the intercept (reality-neutral) was of -3.22 (MAD = 0.31, 100% CI [-4.22, -1.97]). Compared to

572 that, there is a probability of 100% that the negative emotion led, in the reality condition, to a

573 stronger heart rate deceleration, between -1.52 and -0.044 (Median = -0.68, MAD = 0.20). This

574 effect is small or very small with respective probabilities of 10.80% and 89.20%. The simulation

575 effect in neutral led, with a probability of only 54.80%, to a stronger heart rate deceleration,

576 between -0.91 and 0 (Median = -0.025, MAD = 0.24, 95% CI [-0.52, 0.46]). This effect is very

577 small or opposite with respective probabilities of 54.80% and 45.20%. The simulation effect in FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 30

578 negative led, with a probability of 99.27%, to a stronger heart rate deceleration, between -1.32 and

579 0 (Median = -0.56, MAD = 0.22, 95% CI [-0.99, -0.12]). This effect is small, very small or opposite

580 with respective probabilities of 5.13%, 94.14% and 0.73%. Finally, the emotion effect in

581 simulation led, with 100% of probability, to a stronger heart rate deceleration, between -2.09 and

582 -0.41 (Median = -1.21, MAD = 0.25). This effect is small or very small with respective

583 probabilities of 86% and 14%.

584 EEG

585 Late Positive Potential (LPP)

586 LOO cross-validation showed that the objective model (LOOIC = 5437.32, ELPD = -

587 2718.66) outperformed the belief model (dLOOIC = 8.67, dELPD = -4.34) and the subjective model

588 (dLOOIC = 11.29, dELPD = -5.65). Within this model, the intercept (reality-neutral) was of -0.14

589 (MAD = 0.15, 95% CI [-0.42, 0.14]). Compared to that, there is a probability of 100% that the

590 negative emotion led, in the reality condition, to a higher LPP amplitude, between 0.034 and 0.33

591 (Median = 0.19, MAD = 0.039). This effect is small or very small with respective probabilities of

592 39.07% and 60.93%. The simulation effect in neutral led, with a probability of 93.67%, to a higher

593 LPP amplitude, between 0 and 0.15 (Median = 0.050, MAD = 0.036, 95% CI [-0.014, 0.12]). This

594 effect is very small or opposite with respective probabilities of 93.67% and 6.33%. The simulation

595 effect in negative led, with a probability of 99.80%, to a lower LPP amplitude, between -0.24 and

596 0 (Median = -0.10, MAD = 0.034, 95% CI [-0.18, -0.039]). This effect is small, very small or

597 opposite with respective probabilities of 0.53%, 99.27% and 0.20%. Finally, the emotion effect in

598 simulation led, with only 81.20% of probability, to a higher LPP amplitude, between 0 and 0.17

599 (Median = 0.035, MAD = 0.039, 95% CI [-0.043, 0.12]). This effect is very small or opposite with

600 respective probabilities of 81.20% and 18.80%. See Fig. 4. FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 31

1 Table 2 2 Main effects. Reality: Simulation: Negative: Neutral: Outcome Model Neutral → Neutral → Reality → Reality → Negative Negative Simulation Simulation Arousal Subjective 1.05 (100%) 0.94 (100%) -0.25 (100%) -0.15 (100%) -0.062 Valence Subjective -1.61 (100%) -1.39 (100%) 0.15 (100%) (96.93%) -0.093 -0.054 SCR Objective 0.23 (100%) 0.20 (100%) (97.47%) (86.13%) Heart -0.025 Subjective -0.68 (100%) -1.21 (100%) -0.56 (99.27%) Rate (54.80%) LPP Objective 0.19 (100%) 0.035 (81.20%) -0.10 (99.80%) 0.05 (93.67%)

3 Note: Values include the effect median as well as the maximum probability that the effect is in

4 the same direction than the median. Apart from heart rate variation coefficients (which unit is

5 BPM), all other effects are standardized coefficients. 601 FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 32

602

603 Figure 4. The evoked activity for the centro-parietal sensors depending on the objective condition extracted for a time

604 window extending between 250 ms before and 1750 ms after stimuli onset. We showed an attenuation of the late

605 positive potential, extracted as the average activity in the 400-700 ms window, compared to the negative – reality

606 condition. FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 33

607

608 Impact of Self-Relevance

609 In this part, the two self-relevance variables will successively be added to the best model

610 explaining each of the outcomes presented above, to see how they modulate them in the negative

611 condition (See Fig. 5).

612 FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 34

613

614 Figure 5. The interaction between simulation and the relationship between facets of self-relevance and subjective

615 valence, skin conductance response and heart rate deceleration in the negative condition. The red line represents the

616 median value of the relationship between the outcome and the covariate in the reality condition. Compared to that, the

617 relationship in the simulation condition is represented by the blue lines (the bold line represents the effect’s median,

618 and transparent lines are all the possible effects based on the posterior distribution). FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 35

619 Autobiographical Relevance

620 Autobiographical relevance is positively linked to subjective arousal in the reality

621 condition (Median = 0.064, MAD = 0.032, 95% CI [-0.004, 0.13], MPE = 96.87%). This

622 relationship is not modulated by the simulation condition (Median = 0.013, MAD = 0.050, 95%

623 CI [-0.085, 0.11], MPE = 60.67%).

624 Autobiographical relevance is positively linked to subjective valence in the reality

625 condition (Median = 0.05, MAD = 0.024, 95% CI [0, 0.097], MPE = 97.47%). This relationship

626 is decreased by the simulation condition (Median = -0.069, MAD = 0.037, 95% CI [-0.15, -0.0039],

627 MPE = 97.47%). In other words, autobiographical relevance diminishes the difference of valence

628 between reality and simulation.

629 Autobiographical relevance is positively linked to skin conductance response magnitude

630 in the reality condition (Median = 0.065, MAD = 0.041, 95% CI [-0.015, 0.15], MPE = 95.27%).

631 This relationship is not modulated by the simulation condition (Median = 0.036, MAD = 0.058,

632 95% CI [-0.081, 0.14], MPE = 70.93%).

633 Autobiographical relevance was not linked, with enough certainty, to heart rate difference

634 in the reality condition (Median = 0.22, MAD = 0.18, 95% CI [-0.15, 0.57], MPE = 86.53%). This

635 was not modulated by the simulation condition (Median = -0.048, MAD = 0.27, 95% CI [-0.6, 0.5],

636 MPE = 57.73%).

637 Autobiographical relevance was not linked to the LPP amplitude in the reality condition

638 (Median = -0.0094, MAD = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.069, 0.055], MPE = 62.27%). This was not

639 modulated by the simulation condition (Median = -0.011, MAD = 0.043, 95% CI [-0.098, 0.075],

640 MPE = 60%). FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 36

641 Conceptual Relevance

642 Conceptual relevance is positively linked to subjective arousal in the reality condition

643 (Median = 0.28, MAD = 0.028, 95% CI [0.22, 0.34], MPE = 100%). This relationship is not

644 modulated by the simulation condition (Median = -0.024, MAD = 0.041, 95% CI [-0.11, 0.058],

645 MPE = 71.47%).

646 Conceptual relevance is positively linked to subjective valence in the reality condition

647 (Median = -0.13, MAD = 0.021, 95% CI [-0.17, -0.087], MPE = 100%). This relationship is not

648 modulated by the simulation condition (Median = -0.018, MAD = 0.029, 95% CI [-0.079, 0.043],

649 MPE = 74.93%).

650 Conceptual relevance is, with moderate certainty, positively linked to skin conductance

651 response magnitude in the reality condition (Median = 0.056, MAD = 0.037, 95% CI [-0.015, 0.13],

652 MPE = 93.87%). This relationship is, with moderate certainty, decreased by the simulation

653 condition (Median = -0.073, MAD = 0.048, 95% CI [-0.17, 0.02], MPE = 92.47%). In other words,

654 conceptual relevance increases the difference of SCR between reality and simulation.

655 Conceptual relevance was not linked, with enough certainty, to heart rate deceleration in

656 the reality condition (Median = -0.15, MAD = 0.15, 95% CI [-0.46, 0.16], MPE = 83.73%).

657 However, this possible effect was, with moderate certainty, modulated by the simulation condition

658 (Median = 0.35, MAD = 0.24, 95% CI [-0.14, 0.8], MPE = 92.20%). In other words, conceptual

659 relevance diminishes, with moderate certainty, the difference of heart rate deceleration between

660 reality and simulation.

661 Conceptual relevance was not linked, with enough certainty, to the LPP amplitude in the

662 reality condition (Median = 0.033, MAD = 0.028, 95% CI [-0.024, 0.086], MPE = 87.67%). This FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 37

663 was not modulated by the simulation condition (Median = -0.021, MAD = 0.038, 95% CI [-0.096,

664 0.051], MPE = 71.40%).

665 Discussion

666 The main aim of this study was to investigate the effect of fictional reappraisal on different

667 components of emotion, as well as on the modulatory role of two facets of self-relevance. While

668 recording brain and bodily activity through EEG, EDA and ECG, we presented negative and

669 neutral pictures to participants, presenting them as either depicting real or simulated (i.e., involving,

670 for instance, actors, makeup, props, CGI) events. We also monitored features of the participant’s

671 subjective experience, such as arousal, valence and his/her belief in the given description. Through

672 Bayesian analyses, that allowed us to neatly delineate between the probability of existence,

673 direction and importance of an effect, we showed that engagement in simulations acted as an ER

674 mechanism, attenuating most of the components of the emotional experience, an effect that

675 selectively interacted with facets of self-relevance. Critically, the measure of the subjective belief

676 about the nature of the stimulus gave us a feedback on our experimental manipulation, allowing

677 us to explore the actual effect of presenting a realistic stimulus as a simulation. Did the participant

678 effectively adhere to the cue, believing that the content of their experience is not real, but a mere

679 simulation of reality?

680 Simulations will become more and more common as technological advance will continue

681 to grow. And yet, they are relatively recent. For a long time, mankind has struggled with little more

682 dreams and imagination to escape the unforgiving reality, where actions can have major survival-

683 impacting consequences. This evolutionary view, suggesting that our brain is preferably and

684 naturally tuned toward, - or disposed to experience, reality, might withhold a key to the paradox

685 of fiction (Radford & Weston, 1975), raging for over forty years to explain why we experience FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 38

686 emotions toward events and characters that we know do not exist. However, it renders

687 counterintuitive the postulate that triggering simulation beliefs toward realistic material is easy.

688 Contrary to other studies using a comparable procedure (Mocaiber et al., 2010; Sperduti et al.,

689 2016), we recorded the participant’s belief toward the given context. Unsurprisingly, presenting

690 realistic stimuli as real induced a higher belief rate than presenting them as simulations, which

691 belief rate remained superior to 50%. Although showing than more than one of two stimuli was

692 accepted as simulation is satisfying for our hypothesis (positing than the simulation induction can

693 be possible), it underlines the importance of measuring the belief component in future studies, as

694 the non-complete adherence to instructions might shadow the observations.

695 Interestingly, the simple fact that the pictures presented as reality were emotional

696 significantly decreased the belief rate (i.e., most of them were considered as simulations). One

697 possibility is that works of fiction (movies, stories) imply, most of the time, an emotional

698 component. Therefore, as fiction and emotion are connected in everyday life, a simple process of

699 classical conditioning might explain the tendency to classify emotional stimuli as simulations. Yet,

700 the literature taking interest in the concept of presence (the feeling of being located in the current

701 experience and respond to it as if it was real) showed that emotions tend to increase the feeling of

702 reality, rather than decreasing it (Baños et al., 2008; Baños et al., 2004; Makowski, Sperduti,

703 Nicolas, & Piolino, 2017; Riva et al., 2007; Västfjäll, 2003). This apparent contradiction might be

704 better explained by the context of ER. As negative pictures were unpleasant and enjoyment from

705 them hard to find, participants might have used fictional reappraisal spontaneously, as the general

706 instructions were compatible with that option (i.e., they were told that a small portion of the

707 descriptions would not be true). Based on the literature showing that engagement in spontaneous

708 ER is associated with cognitive control abilities (Gyurak et al., 2009; Hofmann, Schmeichel, & FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 39

709 Baddeley, 2012; Schmeichel & Demaree, 2010), this “spontaneous fictional reappraisal”

710 hypothesis could be tested by checking if better executive abilities were associated with a lower

711 belief rate in the negative-reality condition.

712 Finally, we investigated the status of the “non-believed” items. We made the hypothesis

713 that simulation monitoring is a unidimensional construct, resulting in non-believed trials of a given

714 nature to be equivalent to believed trials of the opposite nature. Our data support this hypothesis

715 to the extent that models specifying whether the participant believed in the given context were

716 outperformed by models where non-believed categories are assimilated with opposite conditions.

717 In other words, stating that the participant “did not believe that the item was referring to simulation”

718 is not more informative than stating that he “did believe that the item was referring to reality”.

719 This suggests that the output of the simulation monitoring mechanism evolves between two

720 opposing extremities; simulation and reality, with varying degrees of certainty. What is not

721 classified as simulation is appraised as reality and vice versa.

722 The subjective belief about the nature of the stimuli seems to play a role in several aspects

723 of the participant’s response. Indeed, our data tend to support a distinction between objective

724 condition (i.e., the experimentally induced nature) and the subjective condition (i.e., their own

725 belief about the stimulus’ nature). Variations in some components (subjective arousal, valence,

726 and heart rate variations) were better explained by the subjective condition while variations in

727 other components (skin conductance response and LPP amplitude) where better explained by the

728 objective condition. Taking aside heart-rate variations, we interpret these results following the

729 elaboration hypothesis. Simulation monitoring is a slow mechanism, intertwined with many other

730 processes and mechanisms, connected to external experience, internal states, current context and

731 future goals. Our experimental manipulation takes the form of a prior information that pulls the FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 40

732 simulation monitoring output toward one or the other extreme, setting up expectations

733 (predictions) regarding the external percept as well as expectations regarding the bodily state. Then,

734 any mismatch between these components will push our opinion regarding the nature in opposite

735 direction, through uncertainty to the other pole. As we hypothesized that this modulation is slow,

736 we predicted that objective components variations would be mostly influenced by the prior

737 information, while later components by the participants’ posterior conclusion regarding the

738 stimulus’ nature. Our hypothesis was verified for late components, such as phenomenal experience,

739 as well as for bodily and neural, components such as LPP and skin conductance response. The

740 latter, in spite of being a late response due to its slow physiological dynamics, is believed to be

741 triggered by some sort of “gut” reaction, present in implicit manipulations (Öhman, Flykt, &

742 Esteves, 2001; Öhman & Soares, 1993) and related to the activation of emotion and interoception-

743 related regions (Laine, Spitler, Mosher, & Gothard, 2009; Nagai, Critchley, Featherstone, Trimble,

744 & Dolan, 2004; Williams et al., 2001).

745 However, contrary to our expectations, heart rate changes were better explained by the

746 subjective condition. What is different about the heart? Considering the fact that regression models

747 do not describe causal interactions but are mere advocates of relationship, it is possible that it is

748 not the subjective condition that induces heart rate variations, but heart rate variations that critically

749 influences the subsequent appraisal of reality. This becomes plausible if we consider heart rate

750 variations not as a direct correlate of emotional experience, but rather as an implicit index of

751 engagement in ER. Indeed, contrary to the other physiological components (discussed below), its

752 variations in the negative condition were not attenuated (i.e., closer to neutral), but amplified, by

753 simulation. This is in line with broader literature on ER shows that engaging in cognitive change

754 when facing an emotional stimulus yields stronger heart rate decrease compared to suppression or FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 41

755 absence of ER (Denson, Grisham, & Moulds, 2011; Kalisch et al., 2006). This has to be put in

756 relation with the fact that higher heart rate variability is associated with better cognitive control

757 abilities and increased prefrontal activity during emotional experiences (Hansen, Johnsen, &

758 Thayer, 2003; Jönsson & Sonnby-Borgström, 2003; Lane et al., 2009; Thayer & Lane, 2000) that,

759 in turn, are believed to play a critical role in cognitive and fictional reappraisal (Ochsner & Gross,

760 2008; Sperduti et al., 2017). Based on the above-mentioned findings, we make the hypothesis that

761 participants with higher emotion regulation skills will naturally engage in fictional reappraisal,

762 thus appraising negative pictures as simulations. Consequently, heart rate variations, an index of

763 this engagement in ER, would be more strongly related to the subjective, compared to the objective

764 condition. This claim is backed up by an additional post-hoc analysis (presented in

765 Supplementary Materials 2) suggesting an interaction between the condition and heart rate

766 deceleration in its relationship to subjective belief for negative pictures: a stronger variability

767 (through deceleration) was related to a higher belief in simulation and a lower belief in reality.

768 Nevertheless, the discrepancies with previous findings investigating fictional reappraisal

769 (Mocaiber et al., 2011) could also be explained by methodological differences. In our paradigm,

770 participants had to pay attention to the cue, the subsequent stimulus and actively engage in

771 simulation monitoring to be able to express their belief about it. This intensification of cognitive

772 activity could be maximized in the simulation condition where certainty was lower, resulting in a

773 heightened attention, known to be related to cardiac deceleration (Boutcher & Zinsser, 1990;

774 Bradley, 2009; Graham & Clifton, 1966). Nevertheless, further studies are needed to address the

775 interaction between cardiac activity, emotions and fictional reappraisal.

776 Contrary to heart rate, the SCR amplitude was lower in the simulation condition. Although

777 being in line with previous studies on cognitive reappraisal (Wolgast, Lundh, & Viborg, 2011), it FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 42

778 contradicts the findings done by our own research team, which did not report EDA modulations

779 by fictional reappraisal (Sperduti et al., 2016, 2017). This could be due to methodological

780 limitations. Indeed, in both previous studies, an attenuating trend was still present, although

781 statistically not significant. Beyond differences related to the procedure itself, the current research

782 is endowed with more statistical power (more stimuli, more participants), better signal EDA

783 processing algorithms (Greco et al., 2016) and more powerful statistical models. Thus, all these

784 findings, taking together, suggest that presenting a stimulus as fictitious lead to a small, yet

785 effective, decrease of physiological arousal.

786 This decrease was in line with the neural correlate of emotional arousal, the LPP (Cuthbert

787 et al., 2000; Schupp et al., 2000), whose amplitude was attenuated when negative pictures were

788 presented as simulations. Following that, we also found a global attenuating effect of simulation

789 on the phenomenal experience. Indeed, it reduced subjective arousal (for both negative and neutral

790 stimuli) but also, and distinctively, valence: negative pictures were judged less negative and neutral

791 pictures less positive when presented as simulations. This suggests that valence and arousal are

792 two features of the emotional experience affected by fictional reappraisal.

793 Interestingly, we also found a trend toward a lower LPP amplitude for neutral pictures

794 presented as reality compared to neutral pictures presented as simulation. This could be related to

795 the capture of another ERP component, namely the N400, whose time course overlaps with the

796 window used in our analyses (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). This component is believed to reflect

797 the creation of meaning through expectations shaped by previous experiences and contextual

798 information (Amoruso et al., 2013) and is sensitive to their violation (e.g., in semantic

799 incongruities; Kutas, Hillyard, & others, 1980). In our case, it is possible that the contextual

800 information about the reality of the upcoming stimulus creates the expectation that the stimulus FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 43

801 will be more emotional than if it was simulation. As the stimulus that appears is neutral, the

802 mismatch between the prior expectation and the evidence generates an incongruity reflected by a

803 stronger negative signal deflection. Although this hypothesis remains speculative, it highlights the

804 predictive coding framework (Friston, 2010; Seth & Friston, 2016) as a candidate for

805 understanding the effect of fictional reappraisal.

806 Finally, we made the hypothesis that the relationship between self-relevance and emotions

807 would be differently impacted by the reality/simulation manipulation, depending on the facet of

808 self-relevance. To test that, we monitored two features related to distinct aspects of the Self

809 (Conway et al., 2004; Martinelli et al., 2013; Prebble et al., 2012): autobiographical (the link

810 between the stimulus and one’s personal memories) and conceptual (the link between the stimulus

811 and one’s values system) relevance. We made the hypothesis that the relationship between

812 autobiographical relevance and emotion would be unaltered by the experimental condition, while

813 the relationship between conceptual relevance and emotion would interact with simulation.

814 However, this hypothesis was only partially supported by our data. Indeed, while we found a

815 relationship between the two aspects of self-relevance and most of the emotional response

816 measures in the reality condition, the simulation condition changed this effect only for a few

817 variables.

818 Interestingly, autobiographical relevance did interact with simulation for subjective

819 valence. Indeed, while negative pictures with high autobiographical relevance elicited a more

820 intense emotion experience, they were, if presented as reality, also judged less negative. This

821 “positivity” bias was less important in the simulation condition, leading to a shrinkage of the

822 difference between reality and simulation. Although counterintuitive, this result is coherent with

823 previous research that found a correlation between autobiographical relevance and valence only FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 44

824 for positive stimuli (Sperduti et al., 2016). This could be related to the self-positivity bias,

825 suggesting that healthy individuals have, in general, better encoding and retrieval of self-referent,

826 positive, information (Moran, Macrae, Heatherton, Wyland, & Kelley, 2006; Watson, Dritschel,

827 Obonsawin, & Jentzsch, 2007). Moreover, a recent study suggests that this bias could be actively

828 available online, meaning that individuals are more likely to expect positive information in self-

829 relevant stimuli (Fields & Kuperberg, 2015). As such, the reality condition could prime

830 autobiographical relevance and, therefore, less negative emotional expectations. However, testing

831 this speculative hypothesis is beyond the scope of the present analyses, thus requiring further,

832 precise, investigation. It is also important to note that the neural marker of emotional experience

833 was not modulated neither by autobiographical nor conceptual relevance, as those characteristics

834 are known to modulate earlier ERP components (Fields & Kuperberg, 2012, 2015; Miyakoshi,

835 Nomura, & Ohira, 2007; Watson et al., 2007). On a bodily level, the skin conductance response

836 was positively associated with conceptual and autobiographical relevance in the reality condition.

837 However, contrary to phenomenal variables, only the former was impacted by simulation.

838 Negative items with high conceptual relevance produced stronger SCR only when presented as

839 real, this link being disrupted by the simulation condition. Heart rate data yielded uncertain results,

840 resulting in a trend suggesting that conceptual relevance was associated with a higher heart rate

841 deceleration, but only in the reality condition. Again, in fiction, conceptual relevance was unrelated

842 to heart rate deceleration. Taken together, this complex interaction between facets of self-relevance

843 and aspects of the emotional response underlines the need for further research to delineate the role

844 and underpinnings of each component. Critically to the aim of our work, it suggests that self-

845 relevance is not a cardinal feature supporting the emotional changes induced by fictional

846 reappraisal. While self-relevance is indeed a strong modulator of emotions, its effect on the FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 45

847 difference between reality and simulation was only found for a small subset of dimensions. Our

848 data suggest that autobiographical and conceptual relevance would modulate the difference for

849 phenomenal (in particular valence), and bodily (electrodermal and cardiac activity) components of

850 emotions, respectively.

851 Limitations and Further Directions

852 A few points should be mentioned regarding the procedure used in this study. First of all,

853 by suggesting that most of the cues (but not all) preceding the pictures are true allowed, in our

854 opinion, a beneficial trade-off regarding the general trust in the instructions (creating a bias for

855 uncertain items and accounting for possible problematic stimuli). Nevertheless, this could also lead

856 to a diminished belief rate, possibly exacerbating some of the findings surrounding the belief rate

857 (for example, participants could have thought of the wonders and achievements of make-up and

858 other movies techniques, creating distortions and misattributions of belief). Future studies should

859 investigate the effect and strength of prior expectations on simulation monitoring. Furthermore,

860 the mere presence of the belief scale could induce changes, as it implicitly triggers meta-cognitive

861 processes, possibly causing distortions or psychological distance from the experience. While this

862 is related to a more general critique of the use of self-reports, future studies should investigate their

863 impact for simulation monitoring (contrasting experiments or blocks with and without self-reports)

864 and explore the existence of implicit correlates. This demanding cognitive activity, as well as the

865 randomized design (demanding flexibility and easing between-condition comparisons) could

866 explain the unexpected (although coherent with regards to a broader ER literature) findings about

867 heart rate. Nevertheless, this study highlights the need of a thorough exploration of the relationship

868 between autonomic (re)activity, emotions and simulation monitoring. In our opinion, bodily FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 46

869 signals, as well as their influence and perception (Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2011) might withhold

870 a key for understanding the appraisal of reality.

871 In summary, beyond opening many questions that will need to be addressed in future

872 studies, our research showed that presenting emotional stimuli as fictional, as opposed to real,

873 attenuates the emotional response. The stimulus is subjectively appraised as less intense and less

874 negative, and elicits lower SCR and LPP amplitudes. Finally, these phenomenal and physiological

875 changes did not exclusively rely on variations of autobiographical and conceptual self-relevance.

876 We suggest that this implicit ER strategy might be supported by the engagement of executive

877 functions, which is coherent with the reported increase of heart rate deceleration when engaging

878 in fiction. Thus, further studies should investigate other potential determinants of fictional

879 reappraisal as an ER strategy.

880 Funding

881 This work was supported by the “Agence Nationale de la Recherche” (grant number: ANR-

882 11-EMCO-0008).

883 Acknowledgements

884 We thank neuropsychology students I. Maillard and C. Lepaulmier for their help in data

885 collection, as well as T. A. Anderson for inspiration.

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1211 Wagenmakers, E.-J., Marsman, M., Jamil, T., Ly, A., Verhagen, J., Love, J., … others. (2018).

1212 Bayesian inference for psychology. Part I: Theoretical advantages and practical ramifications.

1213 Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25(1), 35–57. FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 61

1214 Watson, L. A., Dritschel, B., Obonsawin, M. C., & Jentzsch, I. (2007). Seeing yourself in a positive

1215 light: brain correlates of the self-positivity bias. Brain Research, 1152, 106–110.

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1226 referential processing of negative stimuli within the ventral anterior cingulate gyrus and right

1227 amygdala. Brain and Cognition, 69(1), 218–225. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2008.07.010

1228 KEY POINTS

• This study shows that fictional reappraisal impacts more than only the subjective dimension of the emotional response, including its bodily (Skin Conductance Response and Heart Rate Deceleration) and brain markers (the Late Positive Potential).

• We replicated findings showing that Self-relevance has mostly an orthogonal relationship with fictional reappraisal.

• While fictional reappraisal was related to a general attenuation of emotional indices, heart rate variability exhibited a opposite pattern, with a stronger heart rate deceleration when people engaged in fiction.

CHAPTER V

On the Determinants of Fictional Reappraisal ABSTRACT

The fourth study is based on the previous experiment. It aims at going further the second study investigating the role of multiple domains of executive and interoceptive abilities, as well as empathy skills, in the effect of fictional reappraisal. By investigating the relationship between these determinants and the emotional experience in reality and fiction. Many of these dispositional characteristics had a "domain-general" effect (modulating the emotion in both conditions), some executive and interoceptive subdimensions, as well as empathy, were involved in one or the other conditions only, leading to more or less difference between the emotion toward reality and fiction. 1 What are the Abilities Supporting this Effect? 127

1 What are the Abilities Supporting this Effect?

AKEN together, the previous studies allowed to validate that fictional reappraisal is an effective emotion regulation strategy. However, this effect exhibited inter-individual variability, being strong and effective for some T people and small for others. Moreover, the neurocognitive mechanisms supporting this effect remain controversial (for instance, the contribution of executive functions, in particular updating, found in study n°2, was rather modest in terms of effect size). Thus, this study aimed at testing the contribution of a wider range of cognitive domains. Based on the literature, we decided to include cognitive control (executive functions as well as some more general attention-related mechanisms), interoception and empathy personality skills. Importantly, a special focus was made on the specificity of the processes involved ina particular function (indeed, many of such domains, such as executive functions, attention and interoception, are believed to be constituted by a set of independent processes). The neuropsychological approach chosen for this thesis is important here. Indeed, we interpret a correlation between one’s natural specific cognitive process’ efficiency (as measured with a task unrelated to the experimental paradigm aimed at establishing a global and general measure of skills) and the magnitude of the effect of fictional reapppraisal as evidence that this cognitive process is actively involved during the task at hand (here, the strategy of fictional reappraisal). Running head: DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 1

1 Bodily, Cognitive and Personality Determinants of Implicit Emotion Regulation through

2 Fictional Reappraisal

3 Dominique Makowski a, b, *, Marco Sperduti a, b, Jérôme Pelletier c, e, Phillippe Blondé a, b,

4 Valentina La Corte a, b, Margherita Arcangeli c, Tiziana Zalla c, †, Stéphane Lemaire d, Jérôme

5 Dokic c, Serge Nicolas a, b, f & Pascale Piolino a, b, f, *

7 a Memory and Cognition Lab’, Institute of Psychology, University of Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris,

8 France

9 b Center for Psychiatry & Neuroscience, INSERM U894, Paris, France

10 c Institut Jean Nicod (CNRS-EHESS-ENS), Département d’Etudes Cognitives, Ecole Normale

11 Supérieure, PSL Research University, Paris, France.

12 d Université de Rennes 1, Rennes, France.

13 e Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris, France.

f Institut Universitaire de France, France

14 This study is ready for submission.

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 2

15 Author Note

16 * Corresponding authors

17 † Deceased June 2018

18 71 avenue Ed. Vaillant, 92100 Boulogne Billancourt, France

19 [email protected] (Dominique Makowski),

20 [email protected] (Pascale Piolino)

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 3

21 Abstract

22 Effectively dealing with emotional events is critical for achieving well-being. However,

23 the interindividual differences modulating this ability remain unclear. This study investigated the

24 impact of executive functions, interoceptive abilities and personality features on implicit fictional

25 reappraisal. This emotion regulation strategy, used in daily life (whenever engaging with books,

26 movies or video-games), was operationalized by presenting emotional pictures as simulations

27 (involving actors, stuntmen or CGI), rather than reality. We extracted a composite index of emotion

28 based on subjective, bodily (EDA and ECG) and neural (EEG) markers, which was attenuated in

29 the simulation condition compared to reality. We observed that some abilities, such as response

30 inhibition, working memory updating, interoceptive accuracy and sensitivity, were related to a

31 domain-general emotion regulation, independently of the experimental condition. Other

32 dispositional features lead to a modulation of the difference between reality and simulation

33 specifically impacting emotion in reality or fiction. In particular, working memory capacity,

34 processing speed and mental set shifting specifically modulated the emotion in fiction, while

35 interoceptive awareness and empathy in reality. The results suggest that engagement in fiction

36 would allow the emotion to be effectively regulated by less demanding forms of executive

37 processes and lower the impact of empathy. On the other hand, believing in reality would increase

38 the use of interoceptive cues to down-regulate one’s emotions. Philosophical and clinical

39 implications are discussed.

40 Keywords: Fictional Reappraisal, Emotion Regulation, Fiction, Simulation Monitoring,

41 Sense of Reality

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 4

42 odily, Cognitive and Personality Determinants of Implicit Emotion Regulation through

43 Fictional Reappraisa

44 Introduction

45 Effectively dealing with emotional events is a key feature of well-being (Gross & John,

46 2003). Far from being a unitary process, emotion regulation (ER) covers a wide range of strategies

47 that can be described depending on the awareness of the ER goal (implicit vs explicit) and the

48 nature of the emotion change process (automatic vs controlled; See Braunstein, Gross, & Ochsner,

49 2017). These strategies can involve the modulation of the exposure to the emotional stimulus (e.g.,

50 situation modification, attention re-deployment) the control of the behavioural response (e.g.,

51 response suppression), or the modification of the appraisal of the emotional event (e.g., cognitive

52 change; Gross, 1998b, 2015). The tendency to use reappraisal, as well as its efficiency in

53 modulating emotion, is positively related to wellbeing, job satisfaction, resilience and mindfulness

54 (Gross & John, 2003; Hülsheger, Alberts, Feinholdt, & Lang, 2013; John & Gross, 2004a; Tugade

55 & Fredrickson, 2007; Tugade, Fredrickson, & Feldman Barrett, 2004). On the contrary, its deficits

56 are associated with psychiatric and personality disorders (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer,

57 2010; Gross, 1998). Thus, understanding the interindividual differences associated with an

58 effective use of this mechanism is of critical importance for fundamental and clinical affective

59 science.

60 A particular case of “reappraisal” is fictional reappraisal, consisting in reframing an event

61 as fictional (Sperduti et al., 2017). This process can be triggered implicitly (by presenting

62 emotional stimuli as fictional: “it’s not blood but ketchup”) and is believed to modulate both

63 implicit and explicit emotional components (e.g., early physiological, but also later

64 phenomenological features; see Makowski, under review). This form of ER is possibly at stake

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 5

65 whenever engaging in fictional worlds (movies, books, virtual or augmented reality), but also

66 likely exploited in several cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) techniques such as exposure in

67 virtual reality or imagination, and alternative thoughts generation; Alford & Beck, 1998;

68 Emmelkamp & Wessels, 1975; Powers & Emmelkamp, 2008). Due to its ecological validity and

69 clinical relevance, fictional reappraisal is a perfect candidate to study the interindividual

70 determinants of implicit forms of ER.

71 Several models emphasize the role of executive functions in ER (Bush, Luu, & Posner,

72 2000; Kohn et al., 2014; Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 2012; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). This

73 “executive contribution” hypothesis is supported by neuroimaging studies showing the

74 involvement of the fronto-cingular network, encompassing the dorsal and ventral prefrontal

75 cortices as well as the anterior cingulate cortex (Braunstein et al., 2017; Buhle et al., 2013). These

76 brain regions are involved in domain general cognitive control (see Niendam et al., 2012),

77 including different mechanisms such as response inhibition, conflict monitoring and working

78 memory (Aron, 2008; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014; Barbey, Koenigs, & Grafman, 2013; Van

79 Veen & Carter, 2002). However, the specific contribution of different executive functions to ER is

80 still a matter of debate. While several studies have underlined the pivotal role of working memory

81 capacity (Opitz, Lee, Gross, & Urry, 2014; Schmeichel & Demaree, 2010; Schmeichel, Volokhov,

82 & Demaree, 2008) and updating (Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012; Ochsner & Gross,

83 2008; Sperduti et al., 2017), other have highlighted the role of shifting (McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John,

84 & Gross, 2012) and inhibition (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). However, the involvement of specific

85 executive functions may depend on the ER strategy at stake. For example, working memory and

86 shifting, but not inhibition, have been shown to positively correlate with reappraisal efficiency

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 6

87 (McRae, Gross, et al., 2012), while only verbal fluency was related to suppression abilities (Gyurak

88 et al., 2009; Gyurak, Goodkind, Kramer, Miller, & Levenson, 2012).

89 Interoceptive abilities have also been theorized to play a critical role in emotion dynamics,

90 encompassing emotional reactivity (Dunn et al., 2010; Zaki, Davis, & Ochsner, 2012), and

91 regulation (Füstös, Gramann, Herbert, & Pollatos, 2012; Kever, Pollatos, Vermeulen, & Grynberg,

92 2015). This is consistent with the involvement in ER of brain regions, such as the anterior insula

93 and the anterior cingulate cortex (Buhle et al., 2013; Carlson & Mujica-Parodi, 2010; Giuliani,

94 Drabant, Bhatnagar, & Gross, 2011), responsible for the processing of interoceptive signals.

95 However, these studies have only investigated the link between one component of interoception,

96 namely interoceptive accuracy, and ER. Nevertheless, a recent account of interoceptive abilities

97 suggests a distinction between three independent, but interactive, processes, namely: interoceptive

98 accuracy, interoceptive sensibility, and interoceptive awareness (Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki,

99 & Critchley, 2015). The first corresponds to the objective precision in the reporting of interoceptive

100 signals, while the second refers to the ability to subjectively report the interoceptive experience.

101 The third corresponds to the relationship between objective and subjective measures of

102 interoception. To date, the specific contribution of these different interoceptive components to ER

103 is unknown.

104 Interestingly, several ER studies reported the activation of ventral and medial prefrontal

105 cortices, and inferior parietal junction (Braunstein et al., 2017; Buhle et al., 2013). These regions

106 play an important role in empathy (Mathur, Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010; Samson, Apperly,

107 Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004) and self-related processes (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, &

108 Raichle, 2001; Lin, Horner, & Burgess, 2016; Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 2013). However,

109 while the former was shown to be related to ER (Schipper & Petermann, 2013), the latter was

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 7

110 primarily hypothesised as an important component for affective state generation (Eippert et al.,

111 2007; Herbert, Herbert, & Pauli, 2011; Yoshimura et al., 2009) rather than its effective regulation.

112 Of interest for this paper, studies investigating the role of self-relevance as a modulatory

113 mechanism of implicit fictional reappraisal reported a positive link with the emotional state in

114 general (more self-relevant material increased the emotional response), but not a consistent

115 interaction with the “regulatory” condition (in that case, the simulation condition; Sperduti et al.,

116 2016, Makowski, under review). These findings suggest that variations in self-relevance are not

117 associated with variations of ER magnitude. Thus, in this work, we will only focus on the effect

118 of empathy on ER.

119 The goal of the present study is to understand the distinctive contribution of interindividual

120 differences to implicit ER through fictional reappraisal. These differences encompass variability

121 in general and executive functioning, interoceptive abilities and empathy. This work is based on

122 the data of a prior study (Makowski, under review) exploring the effect of presenting negative

123 pictures as simulations (i.e., involving actors, movie makeup, CGI, stuntmen…) or reality on

124 phenomenal (subjective arousal, valence and feeling of control), physiological (heart rate

125 deceleration, skin conductance response), and neural (late positive potential (LPP); Schupp et al.,

126 2000) markers of emotion. The present study aims at investigating the interindividual variables

127 (referred to as features) modulating the difference between reality and simulation for the different

128 components of emotional response (referred to as outcomes). Based on previous research, we make

129 the hypothesis that executive functions (in particular updating; Sperduti et al., 2017) would be

130 linked to a better ER. Concerning interoceptive abilities, we predict that accuracy should follow

131 the same pattern of executive functions. The investigation of the remaining two components is

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 8

132 more exploratory. On the contrary, empathy should be linked with increased emotional response,

133 specifically in the reality condition.

134 Methods

135 Participants

136 Thirty-five participants were recruited using internet advertisement. Inclusion criteria were

137 age between 18 and 29, right-hand laterality, native French language and absence of neurological

138 or psychiatric disorders. Three participants were excluded because of technical problem in the

139 physiological recording. The final sample included 32 participants (age: 24.15 ± 2.71, 81.25% ♀,

140 years of superior education: 3.00 ± 1.92). The study was approved by the local ethics committee

141 of the Paris Descartes University.

142 Procedure

143 The protocol started, after physiological recordings setup, by a heartbeat counting task

144 designed to measure different aspects of interoception. Executive functions tasks and

145 questionnaires were administered in a pseudo-randomized order before and after the fictional

146 reappraisal task. This task consisted in presenting 48 negative and 48 neutral realistic pictures

147 either as reality or simulation (by means of a preceding cue, for details see Makowski, under

148 review). Physiological measures included ECG, EDA and EEG, from which we extracted heart

149 rate deceleration (HRV), skin conductance response (SCR) and late positive potential (LPP)

150 amplitudes as emotional markers. Visual analogue scales, following each picture, measured the

151 subjective arousal, the valence and the feeling of control toward the participant’s emotional

152 experience. Moreover, an additional scale of agreement with the description (whether the stimulus

153 was real of fictional) was presented. A summary of outcomes and features can be found in Table

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 9

154 1 and Table 2, respectively. Moreover, a detailed description of the protocol, including descriptions

155 of all tasks and measures, can be found in Supplementary Materials 1.

156 Table 1. The description of emotional outcomes and their loading in the generation of the composite index of

157 emotion.

Outcome Procedure Score Loading Visual Subjective Arousal Analogue 0 (not intense) to 100 (intense) 0.85 Scale Visual Subjective Valence Analogue -100 (positive) to 100 (negative) 0.73 Scale Visual Subjective Control Analogue 0 (low amount of control) to100 (high amount of control) -0.85 toward Emotions Scale Skin Conductance Amplitude of the peak of phasic EDA in a 1 – 7 s post- EDA 0.32 Response stimulus window) Minimum heart rate in the window covering stimulus Heart Rate ECG display (0 – 3 s) subtracted from heart rate baseline (the 0.12 Deceleration ‘mean in the 3 s window preceding each stimulus) Mean activity of central–parietal electrodes (CP1, CP2, CP3, Late Positive EEG CP4, CP5, CP6, CPz) in a window between 400 and 700 ms 0.17 Potential after stimulus onset 158

159 Table 2. Description of features.

Mean (prior to Variable Domain Procedure Interpretation standardization) Tendency to be sensitive to Empathy Personality Questionnaire 6.87 ± 2.14 other’s feelings Working Executive The ability to store information Memory Digit-letter span 6.19 ± 1.06 Functions in working memory Capacity Working The ability to manipulate Executive Memory n-back task 2.82 ± 1.38 information in working Functions Updating memory Executive The ability to flexibly shift Shifting Switch task 1.08 ± 0.30 Functions mental sets Conflict Executive The ability to manage two Flanker task 0.11 ± 0.07 Resolution Functions concurrent representations Response Executive The ability to inhibit non- Go/no-go 0.78 ± 1.01 Inhibition Functions relevant behaviours Response Executive Simple response The ability to produce a 0.68 ± 0.15 Selection Functions selection task stimulus-related response Processing Executive General alertness and Reaction time task 309.21 ± 27.95 Speed Functions processing speed

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 10

Heartbeat counting Objective accuracy in detecting Accuracy Interoception 0.60 ± 0.29 task internal bodily sensations Self-perceived dispositional Heartbeat counting Sensibility Interoception 0.36 ± 0.18 tendency to be interoceptively task cognisant Heartbeat counting Metacognitive awareness of Awareness Interoception 0.23 ± 0.57 task interoceptive accuracy 160

161 Data Analysis

162 In order to understand what features modulate the difference induced by simulation when

163 exposed to negative pictures (where the effect is the strongest; Sperduti et al., 2017), we started by

164 reducing the number of emotional markers by means of PCA. We then present our base model for

165 this new composite index, assessing the effect of the emotion (negative vs. neutral) and simulation

166 (reality vs. simulation) conditions. We then added each feature to this model and took interest in

167 two parameters: the relationship between the feature and the emotional index for negative pictures

168 in the reality condition (our reference level), and the interaction between this feature and the effect

169 of simulation. The former represents whether a feature increase (for instance inhibition efficiency)

170 is related to an increase or decrease of the emotional index when pictures are presented as real. If

171 the interaction with simulation is significant, it means that this relationship is different for pictures

172 presented as fictional, and we can then conclude that this feature modulates the difference between

173 reality and simulation. Indeed, if the index is higher for reality than simulation, their difference is

174 increased by a feature if its relationship with emotion is more positive in reality than in simulation

175 and vice versa. For the sake of clarity, we report only those parameters for effects that were

176 significantly related to the index. However, all models are fully described in Supplementary

177 Materials 2.

178 Note that the analyses are performed under the Bayesian framework, that allows to directly

179 compute the probability distribution of each effect compatible with observed data, rather than

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 11

180 estimating its theoretical “true” value under numerous assumptions. For each effect, we will report

181 several characteristics of their posterior distribution, such as the Median, the MAD (robust estimate

182 of the SD), the 90% Credible Interval (CI). In this context, statistical “significance” refers here to

183 the Maximum Probability of Effect (MPE; the probability that the effect is negative or positive).

184 We will discuss effects which MPE is superior to 95% (Makowski, 2018b).

185 Results

186 Outcomes Reduction

187 Statistics were performed using R 3.5.0 (R Core Team, 2018) with the rstanarm (Gabry &

188 Goodrich, 2016) and the psycho (Makowski, 2018c) packages. After the removal of trials for which

189 participants did not trust the experimental manipulation (i.e., that didn’t agree with the description),

190 the average number of trials (including negative and neutral pictures) for a participant was of 38.03

191 ± 5.96 and 26.31 ± 9.76 for the reality and simulation conditions, respectively.

192 The Method Agreement Procedure (based on Optimal Coordinates, Acceleration Factor,

193 Velicer MAP, BIC and Sample Size Adjusted BIC; Makowski, 2018a) suggested that the 6 outcome

194 variables (see Table 1) could optimally be represented by a single principal component. This index,

195 labelled “Emotion”, represents alone 35% variance related to subjective arousal (0.85), subjective

196 feeling of control (-0.85), negative subjective valence (0.73), SCR magnitude (0.32), LPP

197 amplitude (0.17) and marginally to HRV (0.12).

198 We then fitted a Markov Chain Monte Carlo linear mixed model (4 chains, each with 2000

199 iterations and a warmup of 1000) to predict the new Emotion index with the emotion condition

200 (negative vs. neutral pictures) and the experimental condition (reality vs. fiction). Priors were set

201 as mildly informative (normal distribution of mean 0 and SD 1). We entered the participants, the

202 items and the trial order as random effects. The model had an explanatory power (R²) of about

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 12

203 54.44% (MAD = 0.010, 90% CI [0.53, 0.56], LOO-adj. R² = 0.51). The intercept, corresponding

204 to the negative-reality condition, was at 0.85. Within this model, the difference between the

205 negative and the neutral conditions (in reality) has a probability of 100% of being positive (Median

206 = -1.47, MAD = 0.068, 90% CI [-1.59, -1.37]). This effect can be considered as large with a

207 probability of 100%. The difference between simulation and reality, for negative pictures, has a

208 probability of 100% of being negative (Median = -0.29, MAD = 0.045, 90% CI [-0.36, -0.21]).

209 This effect (about 20% of reduction) can be considered as small or very small with respective

210 probabilities of 97.35% and 2.65%. Finally, this effect is smaller in the neutral condition with a

211 probability of 100% (Median = 0.26, MAD = 0.064, 90% CI [0.16, 0.37], ROPE = 0). The

212 interaction can be considered as small or very small with respective probabilities of 82.03% and

213 17.97%. See Figure 1.

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 13

214

215 Figure 1. The marginal effects (with ranges representing the 90% Credible Interval) of the experimental

216 conditions (negative and neutral pictures presented as depicting real or fictional events) on the composite index of

217 emotion. The black arrow represents the difference for which we investigate the interindividual determinants.

218 Interindividual Determinants

219 As all models are fully described in Supplementary Statistics 2, we will only mention the

220 median and the MPE of the two parameters of interest. Features (see Table 2) that down-regulated

221 the emotion independently of the condition (with no interaction associated with simulation)

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 14

222 included interoceptive accuracy (Reality: -0.04, 91%; Interaction: 0.02, 65.5%), response

223 inhibition (Reality: -0.08, 98.7%; Interaction: 0.02, 66.2%) and updating in working memory

224 (Reality: -0.11, 100%; Interaction: 0.02, 67.1%). Feature that up-regulated the emotion

225 independently of the condition included interoceptive sensibility (Reality: 0.05, 93.8%;

226 Interaction: 0.01, 59.5%) and conflict resolution (Reality: 0.06, 94.9%; Interaction: 0.01, 57.1%).

227 Features that increased the difference between reality and fiction included working

228 memory capacity (Reality: 0.02, 74.8%; Interaction: -0.08, 94.5%) and processing speed (Reality:

229 -0.01, 58%; Interaction: -0.08, 95.6%). This effect was supported by an emotional down-regulation

230 in the simulation condition only. Moreover, shifting (Reality: 0.08, 99.2%; Interaction: -0.1,

231 98.8%) and empathy (Reality: 0.12, 100%; Interaction: -0.07, 91.9%) also increased this difference.

232 Nevertheless, in this case the effect was supported by an emotional up-regulation in the reality

233 condition only. Finally, interoceptive awareness was related to a decrease of the difference between

234 reality and fiction through an emotional down-regulation in the reality condition only (Reality: -

235 0.06, 95.5%; Interaction: 0.07, 92.6%). See Figure 2 and Figure 3.

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 15

236

237 Figure 2. Distributions represent the possible effects probabilities (Bayesian posterior distributions) of the

238 relationship between each feature and the composite index of emotion in the reality condition (in grey) and in

239 simulation (in colour). We notified with R+/R-/R= and S+/S-/S= symbols when the increase of a feature was

240 respectively related to an up-regulation, down-regulation or an absence of regulation of emotion in the reality and

241 simulation condition. Moreover, we added the Δ symbol when the effect in simulation was statistically different from

242 the effect in reality, leading to an increase (Δ+) or decrease (Δ-) of the difference between reality and simulation. The

243 colours represent the tasks (heart beat counting task for interoception, Cognitive Control (CoCon) task, Working

244 Memory (WM) and Switching tasks for executive functions, and self-reported questions for empathy).

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 16

245

246 Figure 3. A summary illustrating how interindividual characteristics impact the composite index of emotion

247 for pictures presented as depicting real (reality) or fictional (simulation) events. Red and green arrows show whether

248 increase in a feature is related to a down-regulation or up-regulation of emotion, respectively. Importantly, features

249 that impacted the emotion only in one condition are the ones that modulated the emotional difference between reality

250 and simulation.

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 17

251 Discussion

252 Theoretical accounts of ER underline the role of a large set of cognitive processes and

253 personality traits in the modulation of its efficiency. The goal of this study was to understand the

254 contribution of these interindividual differences to the effectiveness of an implicit ER strategy,

255 fictional reappraisal. By assessing a vast number of variables spread across different domains, we

256 were able to outline a comprehensive picture of implicit ER modulators.

257 We started by extracting a single composite index of emotion, that we show to be optimal

258 for representing subjective and objective characteristics of emotions. s a coherence between

259 physiological changes and phenomenal states, it is interesting, yet not surprising, to note that only

260 a small amount of the variability of physiological markers contributed to this index. While this

261 could be simply related to the fact that subjective reports are more robust than physiological

262 measures, an additional possible explanation is that the physiological markers are known to be

263 triggered in tasks that do not necessarily involve emotional content. For instance, SCR is

264 sometimes used as a reliable marker of effort and cognitive workload (Nourbakhsh, Wang, Chen,

265 & Calvo, 2012; Setz et al., 2010; Shimomura et al., 2008), Heart rate variability changes are

266 reported in relation to frontal activation (Thayer, Åhs, Fredrikson, Sollers, & Wager, 2012) and

267 attentional engagement (Graham & Clifton, 1966; Luque-Casado, Perales, Cárdenas, & Sanabria,

268 2016), and the late positive complex is seen as family of different components (Ibanez et al., 2012)

269 sensitive to motivational relevance (Schupp et al., 2000), contextual information (Hurtado, Haye,

270 González, Manes, & Ibáñez, 2009) or various aspects of memory (Johnson Jr, Barnhardt, & Zhu,

271 2003; MacNamara, Ferri, & Hajcak, 2011; Neville, Kutas, Chesney, & Schmidt, 1986). Given this

272 heterogeneity, we feel that the computation of a combinatory composite index allowed the

273 extraction of the aspect of each measure that effectively represented the emotional experience,

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 18

274 limiting the noise, artefacts and confounds present when using a single measure of

275 emotions.onsistently with previous research (Mocaiber et al., 2011; Mocaiber et al., 2009, 2010,

276 2011, Sperduti et al., 2016, 2017), this emotional index was impacted by fictional reappraisal:

277 presenting a stimulus as depicting fictional events was related to a decrease of emotion of about

278 20%. Understanding the interindividual variability of this effect was the main aim of this study.

279 Thus, we tested the relationship between emotion and distinct executive, interoceptive and

280 empathy. Interestingly, almost all our candidate determinants played a role in modulating emotion.

281 However, the results highlighted several distinct patterns of contribution.

282 First of all, most of the “executive” mechanisms were related to a better down-regulation

283 of emotion. Updating in working memory and inhibition were related to emotional down-

284 regulation in both reality and simulation. On the contrary, working memory capacity (forward digit

285 span) and processing speed (measured with a simple reaction time task) enhanced ER triggered by

286 simulation. These results partially contradict our previous findings (Sperduti et al., 2017), where

287 we reported that updating in working memory, but not working memory capacity, was related to

288 the emotional difference between reality and simulation. Nevertheless, it should be noted that

289 while in our previous study participants were only asked to watch the pictures and pay attention to

290 the preceding description, they were here actively engaged in judging the nature (real or fictional)

291 of the stimuli. Thus, it is possible that in this experimental setting, higher-order executive abilities

292 were at stake in both fiction and reality in order to execute the task at hand. Concerning working

293 memory capacity and processing speed, our results are in line with the proposal that fluid cognitive

294 abilities are positively related to reappraisal efficiency. Indeed, Opitz et al. (2014) showed for

295 example that working memory capacity and processing speed were related to a common latent

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 19

296 factor, which was in turn positively correlated with both up- and down-regulation of emotion

297 through reappraisal.

298 In general, these results suggest a dissociation between higher-order, cognitively

299 demanding, executive processes that impact the emotion in both conditions and fluid cognitive

300 abilities derived from less complex tasks (possibly reflecting the underlying engagement of

301 attentional resources rather than the recruitment of executive processes per se) that modulate the

302 emotion only in simulation. In other words, lower-order control abilities, alone, were not sufficient

303 to foster ER in reality but became relevant in simulation. This suggests that appraising an

304 emotional stimulus as fictional lowers the executive requirements to achieve ER, and that the

305 recruitment of more demanding forms of cognitive control also strengthens spontaneous ER for

306 non-fictional events, underlining the adaptive nature of these executive mechanisms, tailored to

307 deal with real-life events.

308 However, it is interesting to note that two other cognitive control components presented a

309 different pattern. First, mental set shifting ability was associated with an increased difference

310 between reality and simulation. As our experimental task involved the random succession of trials

311 contrasting simulation with reality, this result is coherent with the adaptive nature and role of this

312 ability in easily switching between different set of mental rules. Although we found that this effect

313 was driven by an up-regulation of emotion when stimuli were presented as real, there was a trend

314 suggesting a possible down-regulation in the simulation condition. This would be coherent with

315 the hypothesized role of switching in maximizing the difference between the cognitive states

316 related to reality and simulation, by fostering up-regulation in the former and down-regulation in

317 the latter. The main unexpected result, however, is the general up-regulation of emotion by conflict

318 resolution. Even if counterintuitive, this finding could possibly be explained by attentional

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 20

319 processes. Indeed, one of the role of conflict monitoring is to allocate attentional resources toward

320 relevant events and avoid distraction by irrelevant ones. As distraction is considered as an efficient

321 ER strategy (e.g., Kanske, Heissler, Schönfelder, Bongers, & Wessa, 2011), it is likely that the

322 elicited attentional engagement toward the emotional stimuli could have the contrary effect of

323 boosting the emotional reaction. Nevertheless, this speculative hypothesis needs to be addressed

324 by future studies.

325 One of the most interesting result is the distinctive role of interoceptive subdimensions.

326 The objective accuracy of the participants’ interoceptive reports was related to a down-regulation

327 of emotion in both conditions, contrary to a previous study reporting a correlation with explicit

328 cognitive reappraisal (Füstös et al., 2012). A plausible explanation is that objective interoceptive

329 skills are related to a better ER (consistently with the literature; Füstös et al., 2012; Kever et al.,

330 2015) in explicit tasks, and to general emotional reactivity in situation where regulation is not

331 explicitly instructed. On the contrary, the tendency to attend and trust interoceptive signals

332 (interoceptive sensibility), independently of their actual accuracy, was related to a stronger

333 emotional reactivity. Critically, interoceptive awareness (the coherence between the subjective

334 confidence and objective accuracy), the meta-cognitive dimension of interoception, was related to

335 a down-regulation of emotion only in the reality condition, thus diminishing the difference with

336 simulation. This might suggest that the accurate connection between bodily signals and their

337 conscious appraisal, by specifically modulating the emotion in reality, would foster the

338 differentiation of ER to adapt to what is real, compared to what is not. This multi-dimensional

339 interaction between interoception and ER, as well as its role in the appraisal of reality (Seth, Suzuki,

340 & Critchley, 2011), are topics in need of further exploration.

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 21

341 As expected, we found that participants with high levels of empathy had stronger emotions,

342 but only when believing that the stimuli were real, suggesting that empathy is a “real-world

343 directed” process. Two non-exclusive hypotheses can be considered. First, the ability to put oneself

344 in the place of another would be facilitated by the knowledge of their reality, as one can draw from

345 previous experience to develop a mental model of the target’s cognitive state. Another view would

346 emphasize on the hindering role of simulation on the expression of empathy. Indeed, the people

347 depicted in the pictures presented as simulations are supposedly actors and stuntmen. Thus, they

348 are not supposed to be genuinely affected by what is happening to them. As they do not feel sad,

349 hurt or in pain, the viewer does not feel it either.

350 In conclusion, the present study confirmed the importance of executive functions and

351 interoception for ER efficiency, as well as its social dimension through the role of empathy.

352 Moreover, it sheds light upon the mechanisms underlying the effect of these components and

353 underlines the diversity and finesse of their mode of action. While several interindividual abilities

354 had a “domain-general” effect, either up- or down-regulating the emotion independently on the

355 experimental condition, others were specifically involved when facing reality or simulation. This

356 suggests that changing the beliefs about the nature of an event actually changes the set of cognitive

357 processes (or their efficiency) involved in its elaboration. On the one hand, engagement in fiction

358 would allow the emotion to be effectively regulated by less demanding forms of executive

359 processes. Moreover, the fictional context would lower the impact of dispositional personality

360 traits, such as empathy. On the other hand, believing in reality would increase the use of

361 interoceptive cues to down-regulate one’s emotions.

362 On a clinical level, our results could be of importance for clinical application. Indeed, the

363 training and rehabilitation of an adaptive and efficient ER is one of the main goal of psychotherapy

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 22

364 (Berking et al., 2008; Rottenberg & Gross, 2007). In particular, Cognitive Behavioural Therapy

365 (CBT; Beck, 2005) uses several techniques supported by a distinction between real and non-real

366 events. For example, exposure protocols (which core idea is to gradually expose patients to the

367 feared situation in a way that allows them to control their emotion) are often realized in virtual

368 reality (Powers & Emmelkamp, 2008) or imagination (Emmelkamp & Wessels, 1975). The

369 underlying hypothesis is that the simulated context would be able to generate a high sense of reality

370 (ecologically emulating real-life events and reactions) and, at the same time, increase the

371 regulatory ability, facilitating the transfer to daily life. Alternative thoughts generation are another

372 cornerstone of CBT, involving to generate multiple explanations of a given emotional scenario in

373 order to decrease the belief in its reality (Alford & Beck, 1998). Imagery rescripting is also a

374 central technique for patients who struggle with distressing intrusive imagery, such as those

375 suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression or phobia (Holmes, Arntz, &

376 Smucker, 2007). This treatment involves the creation of a positive mental image that would

377 counteract the traumatic images (Hackmann, Bennett-Levy, & Holmes, 2011). If those techniques

378 indeed involve fictional reappraisal, our data could be useful to envision possible enhancements.

379 First of all, good candidates for these techniques, i.e., patients for which the simulated

380 nature of the stimuli would effectively lower the level of distress, could be identified by a

381 neuropsychological examination. For example, our results suggest that patients with high empathy,

382 efficient shifting and attentional abilities (i.e., the cognitive conditions under which fictional

383 reappraisal is the more effective) would prominently benefit from these techniques. However, the

384 development of executive functions (through cognitive rehabilitation), and interoceptive skills (for

385 example by means of mindfulness and biofeedback interventions; Farb, Segal, & Anderson, 2012;

386 Lobel et al., 2016; Teper, Segal, & Inzlicht, 2013) could be targeted to enhance a general-purpose

DETERMINANTS OF FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 23

387 ER, easing the transition from therapy to reality by developing ER both in simulated environment

388 and for real distressing events.

389 Funding

390 This work was supported by the “Agence Nationale de la Recherche” (grant number: ANR-

391 11-EMCO-0008, “Emotion in Fiction” project).

392 Acknowledgements

393 We thank neuropsychology students I. Maillard and C. Lepaulmier for their help in data

394 collection, as well as Dr J. Crane for its example on how fictionional stimuli can create emotions.

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KEY POINTS

• Our emotional experience is modulated by executive and interoceptive abilities, as well as personality traits.

• Some of these features specifically impact the emotion when the stimulus is appraised as fictional.

• Fictional reappraisal triggers emotion regulation by lowering the executive requirements necessary to down-regulate the emotional experience. CHAPTER VI

General Discussion 162 General Discussion

1 Summary

HE exploration of emotions has a long history. They were, and still are, placed at the heart of our mental life. Interestingly, while several oriental religions directly and explicitly connect emotions to the existence (or T reaching) of reality, the occidental philosophical traditions developed a strong distinction between emotions and reason (with the former being often described as a threat to the latter). Recent scientific models tend to validate the proximity (and core integration) of emotional components into every aspects of cognition and consciousness. Furthermore, appraisal and constructionist views underline the importance and centrality of beliefs and meaning as critical ingredients of emotions. Thus, by inducing variations in the belief about the reality of emotional events, this thesis holds an particular place within the conceptual fields and traditions composing affective science. In specific terms, this thesis took interest in fictional reappraisal as an implicit emotion regulation strategy. The goal was to estimate its effect on multiple components of emotion, including phenomenal, bodily and brain markers, and investigate the inter-individual determinants contributing to the variability of this phenomenon. We operationalised fictional reappraisal by presenting an emotional visual material (short excerpts of films (study 1 only) or pictures) as fictional with more or less explicit preceding descriptions (ranged from simply writing Fiction / Reality to personalised descriptions of the content of the stimuli inducing the expected belief). Fiction, in our studies, corresponded to the belief that the stimuli were representations of simulated events or objects. For instance, involving actors, CGI, movie make-up, stuntmen or such. The most important result was that changing the belief about the nature of an event is an efficient way to decrease one’s emotional response. Although the first two studies underlined this effect on the subjective aspect of emotions, the last two studies, more robust, showed that fictional reappraisal also diminished the magnitude of bodily and brain markers. Starting from a philosophical standpoint, we had a strong prior hypothesis regarding the relationship between fiction and self-referential processes. The core idea was thatthe processing of reality was related to the Self, and that engagement in fiction would be related to a disengagement of Self-related mechanisms. Thus, we reasoned, there should be an interaction between the degree of self-relevance elicited by an event and the effect of fictional reappraisal. The more self-referential processes are activated, and the less appraising an event as fictional (and its effect) would "work". However, the first and the third studies, investigating the relationship with two aspectsof self-relevance (conceptual and autobiographical relevance), did not support this hypothesis. 2 Limitations and Perspectives 163

Although we found that Self-relevance had a positive relationship with emotion, this link was mainly independent of the condition (real or fiction). At the same time, the pattern of the effect of fiction appeared as similar to the one described in studies on reappraisal, a strategy for emotion regulation (hence the given name, fictional reappraisal). Thus, we looked for other possible determinants of fictional reappraisal, based on those involved in emotion regulation. Study 2 focused on the role of executive functions in modulating the subjective emotional difference between reality vs. in fiction. Study 4 went further by exploring different typesof features (interoceptive abilities, personality traits. . . ), and by exploring not only what features impacted the difference, but also the underlying processes. In general, the results supported the role of executive and interoceptive abilities as modulators of emotion. Interestingly, the majority of these skills were able to modulate the emotion independently of the condition (fiction and real). However, engaging in fiction allowed other mechanisms (mostly related to attention) to contribute to emotion regulation. On the contrary, others interindividual characteristics, such as interoceptive awareness and empathy, were active only when the participants believed that the stimulus was real.

2 Limitations and Perspectives

This thesis was mainly centred around a unique paradigm, consisting of a modification of the beliefs about a stimulus by means of a short preceding description. However, despite the general replication of findings, the reader might have noted some discrepancies in the results. In particular, study 1 and 2 did not report fictional reappraisal effect on skin conductance, which was reported by the third experiment. As discussed in the previous chapter, we believe this is mainly caused by the lack of robustness of the 2 first experiments: Although not significant, the results showed the same pattern than the one confirmed by study 3,witha regulatory effect covering the autonomic response. Another discrepancy can be observed between study 2 and study 4, the former showing that updating modulates the difference between fiction and reality, while the latter showing only a general (i.e., independent of the condition) down-regulatory role played by updating. Although we discussed this in the paper by underlining the difference in paradigm (the first one was more "passive" than the second), some additional information is worth mentioning here. First of all, it has to be noted that the effect in study 2 was relatively small, and based on an averaging of all the trials for each participant. Study 4, on the contrary, adopted a more conservative approach with a different (and better) statistical analysis. Critically, the task used to measure updating was not the same. Indeed, study 4 used a computerised version 164 General Discussion

consisting in responding whether each stimulus of a sequence was the same than the nth stimulus preceding it (the n-back task). On the contrary, study 2 used an oral running span task where the participants had to recall the nth last digits of a sequence. One of the reasons to change the task between studies was that we felt that the latter was too similar to a traditional digit span, being possibly low loaded by the updating process (indeed, participants could elaborate strategies to start encoding the digits not from the beginning, reducing, even more, the updating aspect that was supposedly differentiating it from a working memory capacity task, such as the digit span). This intuition has received empirical support in study 4, where we found that working memory capacity, as measured by a simple digit span, was indeed related to an increase of the difference between fiction and reality. Beyond these results-related considerations, a conceptual limitation could be seen in the fact that we worked with representations, i.e., pictures or movies representing events and people. There is a subtlety here. Indeed, the material consisted of "real" pictures representing, for instance, fake dead bodies. One could point out that representations are, in a sense, already "simulations", and that we in fact "simulated simulations". The issue this raises is the following: if the participants were directly confronted to dead bodies vs. movie make-up probes, would the effect be different? Although this remains a question in need of scientific investigation, there are reasons to believe that our paradigm can be generalised to "direct- experience" scenarios. First of all, a compelling body of literature tends to suggests that the sense of reality can be quite high for certain kinds or representations, such as movies (e.g., Makowski et al., 2017, available as appendix, and Figure VI.1). This propensity to feel "real" (and the fact that it varies linearly rather than being categorical) suggests that the effect of fictional reappraisal would vary in degree (strength), depending on the level ofsense reality (in particular, the presence dimension), rather than being intrinsically different for representations compared to direct exposure. Moreover, this issue also raises the question of what a representation is. While an axiomatic statement (although debatable, see Chapter 7) could be that direct experience of everyday reality is not a representation, this creates a number of subsequent interrogations. For instance, is a fully immersive, i.e., phenomenally indistinguishable from reality, virtual environment a representation? If not, what are the features that dissociate a representation from direct experience? Interactivity? Level of immersion? And if we consider that a simulated environment is indeed a representation, then are all simulations, representations? Where is the crossing line? Further studies could test the effect of representation by presenting emotional stimuli either as a picture or a picture of a picture (and even further, varying the degree (amount) of representational layers). We could indeed make the hypothesis that presenting something as a representation of a representation would increase psychological 2 Limitations and Perspectives 165 distance, and potentially benefit emotion regulation as well (Davis et al., 2011). One could then mix this paradigm with fictional reappraisal to assess the presence or absence of interaction between fictional reappraisal and "representational distancing".

Fig. VI.1 Distribution of the presence felt toward a movie at the theatre. The figure illustrates that 30% of participants (in red) rated their level of presence above 2/3rd of the scale (> 66%) and that 58% of them (in purple and red) rated it above the half (> 50%). This figure is based on the data of Makowski et al. (2017), asking the participants to rate their subjective level of presence toward the movie Avengers: Age of Ultron a few days after having seen it in the theatres. Presence was measured by 14 questions (e.g., "I was reacting to everything I was seeing as it was real"; α = 0.93).

Another important question and limitation related to the choice of our paradigm tackles the continuous nature of fiction (or reality). Indeed, our experimental procedures considered reality and fiction as two discrete and distinct categories. However, we ourselves would support the idea that simulation and reality are the extremities of a unique dimension. As such, events and objects could be appraised are more or less real, and more or less fictional. Concrete examples of this gradient could be found in media. For example, a documentary and a fantasy movie would be the extremities of a continuum along which would lie different genres, such as reality TV, biographical films (biopics), movies with realistic topics (about true events) and so on, all with varying degrees of fictionality. However, future studies investigating simulation as a degree should be cautious and control for its entanglement with the level of certainty. For instance, in our third experiment, the participants had to assess their level of agreement with the description. Although in 166 General Discussion

this case, the question referred to their confidence in their judgement rather than the degree of fictionality (as the instructions explicitly stated the existence of two separate setsof pictures; and thus, two distinct categories), this distinction could be unclear for other real-life examples. Imagine yourself watching a reality TV show (such as the French Secret Story) when suddenly, something unrealistic and far-fetched happens (a participant decides to marry another participant a few minutes after they met). In order to help us manage our momentarily break in presence (demonstrated by the "oh common, seriously?!" exclamation), we might, in this scenario, bring to the forefront of our consciousness the knowledge that some parts of such shows are scripted and written, and that their characters are sometimes not acting naturally. While this mental operation helped us explain the events, possibly decreasing the feeling of discomfort related to incongruity, let us reflect on what exactly happened here. Did this unrealistic event trigger a reappraisal of the show that increased its level of fictionality? Or did we, for a few seconds, had a lower certainty (i.e., doubts) concerning the reality of the show. Was it a doubt toward reality or a confidence toward a lower-degree of reality? Are they truly dissociated? To answer this issue, future studies could aim at modulating the degree of confidence independently of the level of reality, and investigate their respective effect, as well as interaction. 2 Limitations and Perspectives 167

Fig. VI.2 Clinical Implications. Upper panel: several Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) techniques could be related to fictional reappraisal, which efficiency depends on executive functions, interoceptive abilities and empathy skills. Several therapeutic programs, such as cognitive rehabilitation, mindfulness meditation or compassion-focused therapy, can be targeted specifically to improve these abilities. Lower panel: Example ofa combination of existing therapeutic programs for a personalised care, adapted to the neuropsychological profile of the patient. See text for details.

On a clinical level, this thesis has two levels of implication. A general one, as emotion regulation deficits are usually the main complaint of patients (expressed through concepts 168 General Discussion

of sadness, stress, anger and such) and the primary reason for consultation. Unsurprisingly, emotion regulation rehabilitation is the primary target of psychotherapeutic programs. Our results generally support the idea that the external implementation of emotion regulation strategies leads to an effective down-regulation of emotion on a subjective level, but also for the brain and bodily aspects the emotional response. Importantly, we highlighted the connection between high-level strategies and cognitive mechanisms, suggesting that deficits in emotion regulation, as well as their treatment, is somewhat constrained by the cognitive abilities of the patient. On a more specific level, it is to note that this PhD coincided with my training in Cognitive- Behavioural Therapy (CBT). Thus, it struck me to discover the techniques used and developed through this framework as some of them, such as exposition, alternative thoughts generation or image re-scripting presented conceptual similarities (in the use of a fictional environment, or in the emphasis on the uncertainty, or non-plausibility of the content of dysfunctional thoughts) with our experimental manipulation and operationalization fictional reappraisal. I started to see possible connections between this empirical data and psychotherapy. Critically, our studies suggest that executive functions, interoceptive abilities and empathy modulate the magnitude of the effect of fictional reappraisal. Interestingly, several existing therapeutic programs, such as cognitive rehabilitation, mindfulness meditation or compassion-focused therapy, can be targeted specifically to improve these abilities. By bridging neuropsychology, cognitive science and psychotherapy together, this knowledge could lead to an improvement of psychological care. Indeed, I believe that one of the main areas of improvements is not the development of a new therapeutic program per se, but rather the smart integration of existing programs, informed of course by the desires of the patient, but also (and importantly) by its neuropsychological profile (see Figure VI.2). The inter-individual variability in the outcome of psychotherapy could be explained by the adequacy of the techniques used to treat a patient and its cognitive abilities. For example, a patient with severe depression, a disorder impacting processing speed and executive functioning, might not benefit from techniques requiring a large amount of cognitive resources (e.g., techniques aimed at cognitive restructuring). For instance, our findings suggested that patients with low executive and interoceptive skills, but high empathy, are those in which the effect of fictional reappraisal is the stronger. Thus, they are good candidates to heavily benefit from techniques using fictional reappraisal to lower their immediate distress. However, a long-term plan should include techniques to improve their executive and interoceptive deficits, to ease the transfer to real-life events. On the contrary, people with high executive and interoceptive skills and low empathy would not benefit from fictional reappraisal based techniques. Thus, other programs and techniques, such as cognitive restructuring or compassion-focused therapy could be 2 Limitations and Perspectives 169 suited, with a possible swap of the latter in favour of fictional reappraisal techniques, later on, if needed. Obviously, these leads for the development of a neuropsychological therapy (i.e., personalised integration of existing interventions and techniques based on the patient’s cognitive strengths and weaknesses) are highly speculative and need to be scientifically addressed. Another interesting suggestion that I have received after presenting these results at a conference was the effect of fictional reappraisal on "exposure". In particular, one of the underlying process of exposure-based therapeutic techniques is desensitisation, i.e., the progressive attenuation of the emotional response related to a repeated exposition of the negative stimuli. Thus, the question inquired whether a possible side-effect of fictional reappraisal was to increase the exposure-related desensitisation. In other words, if the repetition of stimuli presented as fictional led to a higher attenuation compared tothe repetition of stimuli presented as real. This was an interesting question, as our last study included 96 trials, which was possibly large enough for a "desensitisation" effect to appear. However, in our analyses, we specifically adjusted the statistical models for the trial’s order to remove the eventual contribution of processes related to their repetition (by adding the trial’s order as a random factor). Thus, I performed an additional analysis to see if the trial order (the stimulus rank, between 1 and 96), was related to a change in the emotional index. The results revealed a pattern suggesting that the repetition of negative pictures repetition was indeed related to an emotional desensitisation (i.e., a negative linear relationship between the emotional response and the trial order). However, this trending effect was only present in the reality condition (see Figure VI.3). This suggests, on the contrary, that fiction is less prone to emotional desensitisation. Although one must remain very cautious about these statistical findings, as well as with its relevance for therapeutic exposure-based techniques, they could possibly reflect the engagement of higher-order executive functions in reality, which could contribute to the automation of response adjustments (supporting desensitisation). The fact that these executive processes are less engaged for items appraised as fictional, the desensitisation could be less important. Even more speculatively, these data could be related to the apparent long-lasting appeal and enjoyment related to fictional works (plays, movies. . . ). The need for adjustment learning being "put on hold" when engaging in fiction, we continue to be moved by the fate of Anna Karenina (or the movie Love Actually, for me), at each reading or viewing. Obviously, this hypothesis needs to be specifically addressed in further studies investigating the possible relationship between fictional reappraisal in the lab’, and real-life therapeutic care. 170 General Discussion

Fig. VI.3 Effect of Exposure-related Desensitisation in Reality and Simulation. This analysis, performed on the data of study n°4, revealed a trend (a probability of 95.35% of being negative; Median = -0.0019, 90% CI [-0.0038, 0]) showing that the desensitisation effect (the attenuation of emotions related to a repeated exposure to negative stimuli) was present in the reality condition, but not in simulation (which exhibited a probability of only 69.05% of being negative; Median = -0.00063, MAD = 90% CI [-0.0028, 0.0015]).

Finally, another interrogation commonly raised is the possible meaning of our results for fictionalised violence. Indeed, there have recently been several political and/or societal debates regarding the exposure of youth to violence in video-games or TV. The general question of exposure to violent fictional stimuli can be organised in two separated issues, 1) whether children or adolescents are more prone to be emotionally affected by violent fictional works and 2) whether this exposure and its effect transfers to reality contexts. While the latter argument cannot be easily addressed by our data (due to the random succession of conditions in our experimental design), there is now an important amount of scientific evidence supporting the negative effect of exposure to violent fictional works, showing for instance that exposure to violent video games or TV shows is a causal risk factor for increased aggressive behaviour, aggressive affect and for decreased empathy and pro-social behaviour (Anderson et al., 2010; Silvern and Williamson, 1987). Moreover, experimental studies reported that for example that participants exhibited a lower emotional reactivity toward filmed real violence after playing a violent video game for 20 minutes, demonstrating an existing an emotional desensitization to "real" violence following engagement in fiction (Anderson and Bushman, 2001; Carnagey et al., 2007). Regarding the reactivity of younger 2 Limitations and Perspectives 171 people, one of the intuitive underlying ideas is often that young people are less able to cope with the non-reality (either through fictionality or representationality) of such stimuli, leading them to be more affected by this kind of material. This hypothesis is in line with empirical data on general emotion regulation. Indeed, the well-documented late and slow development of frontal brain regions, and the resulting immaturity of executive functions in children and adolescents conflicts with their importance in several forms of emotion regulation, supporting the idea that young people are more affected by emotional content (Silvers et al., 2012). However, our data suggest that fiction is a relatively "low-cost" strategy (in terms of cognitive control skills), which could explain the strong appeal of fictionalised emotional material to this public. Indeed, this kind of content would particularly grant younger people a relative ability to cope with it. Thus, in order to experience strong emotions (referred to as sensation seeking; Zuckerman et al., 1978) in a controlled and safe environment, young people would naturally turn toward fictionalised works, which offer an interesting balance of emotions and control. This hypothesis could possibly be addressed by investigating the relationship between executive functions, the tendency to engage in fictional emotional material, and age. In conclusion, stemming from a philosophical debate, this thesis allowed to isolate and understand the emotional changes induced by the belief in fiction. These results are important for philosophy, providing scientific evidence to discard several argu- ments, for fundamental affective neuroscience, by expanding and adding fine-grained distinctions to the field of reappraisal, and for clinical applications, due to its possible proximity with psychotherapeutic techniques. Future studies should explore the issues and hypotheses opened by the present work.

CHAPTER VII

Closing Thoughts

« - Do not try to bend the spoon; that’s impossible. Instead, only try to realise the truth. » « - What truth? » « - There is no spoon. »

– The Wachowski’s, The Matrix, 1999 174 Closing Thoughts

1 A Sand Grain in the Desert of the Real

AST but not least, I would like now to emphasise the tiny size of the portion tackled by this thesis, in regards to its parent fields. One of the framework this work fits into is, obviously, emotion and emotion regulation. Addi- L tionally, I mentioned here and there that the other was the sense of reality. The truth is, however, that it was an abusive or misleading choice of words. Indeed, contrary to emotion regulation, the sense of reality is not a well-defined concept. In fact, it is not a scientifically defined concept at all. During this thesis, my interest and passion cyclically revolved, in a chaotic trajectory, around and between these two cores. On the one side, the Jovian emotion regulation, when I needed a solid ground, relevant and fitted to my clinical ambitions and neurocognitive approach. On the other side, the nebula of the sense of reality, to satisfy the need of unknown, the tolerance to uncertainty and lust for unexplored territories. As the reader might have found out now, my work during these years of PhD went a bit beyond (and around) the studies presented in this manuscript, attempting to grasp other aspects of the sense of reality. While this, surely, contributed to the scattered and anarchic developments reflected by this thesis, these multiple fields, frameworks and topics of interests (and the freedom topursue them) allowed me to develop, in the end, a more comprehensive and general view of the concept of the sense of reality. Thus, the following piece of work will present my current conceptualisation of the sense of reality, in which simulation monitoring, the mechanism supporting fictional reappraisal, is just a tiny wheel. This presentation aims at being the first part of a two-fold discussion, focused on the structure of the sense of reality, while the second (a work in progress, thus not included in this thesis) will discuss how a large amount of mechanisms (such as derealisation, decentring, detachment, decoupling, dereification, defusion, autoscopy, hallucinations, ego- dissolution, lucid dreaming and fictional reappraisal), disorders (Syndromes of Capgras, Cotard, Charles-Bonnet, but also depersonalisation-derealisation, schizophrenia and post- traumatic stress disorders) and states (dreams, mindfulness, psychedelic experiences) could be reframed and discussed in the broader framework of the sense of reality. Running head: THE SENSE OF REALITY

1 What is the Sense of Reality?

2 Part 1: Origin, Architecture and Mechanisms

3 Dominique Makowskia,b,, Marco Sperduti a,b,, Serge Nicolasa,b,c, Pascale Piolinoa,b,c

5 a Memory and Cognition Lab, Institute of Psychology, University of Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris,

6 France

7 b Center for Psychiatry & Neuroscience, INSERM U894, Paris, France

8 c Institut Universitaire de France, France

9 This manuscript is in preparation.

THE SENSE OF REALITY

11 Author Note

12 * Corresponding authors

13 71 avenue Ed. Vaillant, 92100 Boulogne Billancourt, France

14 [email protected] (Dominique Makowski),

15 [email protected] (Pascale Piolino)

16 Note: this paper was written in the context of the first author’s doctoral thesis.

THE SENSE OF REALITY

18 Abstract

19 Several trans-humanists posited that we are statistically certain to be living in a simulated reality.

20 And yet, the majority of people can’t help but experience a fully deployed sense of reality: they

21 are endowed with an intuitive feeling and belief that they are real, present and belonging to a real

22 world. The sense of reality is still, in fact, an essential issue for many philosophers and theorists.

23 Moreover, due to the exponential expansion of virtual technology, simulated worlds will replace

24 or blend with our own in the next few years. It is therefore of critical importance to understand

25 our sense of reality, in order to promote a scientific framing for technological development that

26 would guarantee psychological health and well-being. Today, we have enough scientific

27 evidences to draw a first outline of the neurocognitive organization of this fundamental property

28 of consciousness. This paper aims at gathering the pieces scattered across different research

29 fields into one, unifying framework of the sense of reality. After outlining the philosophical

30 background, we first discuss the nature of reality, resulting in a neutral taxonomy distinguishing

31 between the absolute and the experienced, conditional and unconditional, common or simulated

32 realities. Then, based on a review of the neuroscientific literature, we suggest a structure-

33 functional architecture based on two main dimensions: feeling and believing reality. The former

34 is related to two mechanisms, Self presence and perceptual presence, which support our intuitive

35 relationship with the environment. The latter includes source monitoring, the ability to

36 distinguish between endogenous and exogenous aspects of our experience, and simulation

37 monitoring that differentiates the experience of genuinely real vs. fictional events or characters.

38 We then discuss the place of a third dimension, absorption, as the attentional aperture mechanism

39 of the conscious experience.

THE SENSE OF REALITY

40 Keywords: Sense of Reality, Presence, Fiction, Absorption, Consciousness, Simulation

41 Monitoring

THE SENSE OF REALITY

42 What is the Sense of Reality?

43 Part 1: Origin, Architecture and Mechanisms

45 Ceci n’est pas un article.

46 In 1896, the Lumière brothers presented a 50-seconds long movie of a train's arrival at La

47 Ciotat station. Intense fear and awe rose among the audience, as if they could not realize that it

48 was not a real train heading down toward them, but a mere illusion. Several decades later, the

49 edges of our reality continue to fade. Through virtual reality, augmented reality and new forms of

50 fictions, simulations of all kind will soon populate our everyday experience and challenge our

51 intuitive feeling and belief concerning its reality. Considered for a long time as the core topic of

52 philosophy, understanding reality and the different aspects of its experience has been relegated to

53 an anecdotic position in modern science. But with the exponential growth of our ability to

54 simulate new worlds, this topic appears to be of critical importance to understand, inform and

55 guide the developments of tomorrow’s society.

56 Wandering visitor, intrepid reader, be warned. The primary aim of this paper is to

57 confront what most of healthy people take for granted: reality. An attempt to understand this

58 basic assumption that creates an intuitive feeling and belief that we are real, present and

59 belonging to a larger, real, world. The present work aims at investigating the existence and

60 purpose of such sense of reality, its possible architecture, mechanisms and the result of its

61 modification or alteration, in the form of normal and abnormal phenomena as well as

62 neuropsychiatric disorders. Based on the existing literature on related constructs, we suggest that

63 the sense of reality, a background scaffolding allowing for consciousness to be and for mental

64 representations to make sense, is not a unitary concept. It is built upon at least two distinct

THE SENSE OF REALITY

65 dimensions: feeling, allowing presence and connection with the world and believing, framing and

66 rendering it intelligible. Throughout the paper, we will strive to gather evidence suggesting that

67 the sense of reality is a primal form of relationship with our environment, generating the

68 fundamental distinction between the Self and its environment, a prerequisite for healthy

69 conscious experience. We argue that features of the sense of reality include transparency,

70 flexibility and instability. As it is a constructed system, it can be deconstructed and disintegrated.

71 However, before investigating the possible structure and mechanisms at the roots of the

72 sense of reality, one must first settle over a description of the concept of reality itself, as a

73 foundation upon which to build our further considerations.

74 On the Nature of Reality

75 Philosophical Background

76 One of the most essential debates in philosophy and metaphysics addresses the "true"

77 nature of the world and reality. Among the many views hold by different philosophical schools,

78 one core notion has emerged quite early and has been since always present. Although regularly

79 renamed, criticized and updated, what could be called the “two-realities proposal” find a first

80 conceptualization within the oriental philosophical tradition. Indian philosophy (The Upanishads,

81 6th century BC) distinguishes the absolute reality (the Unknowable) from the relative reality

82 (Taimni, 2014). Buddha (5th century BC) makes a distinction between reality “as it is”

83 (“Yathabhuta”) and reality as perceived (Shuttle, 2008). On the western side, the pre-Socratic

84 atomist Democritus (-460 -370 BC) makes a distinction between the “bastard” knowledge,

85 acquired through the senses; subjective and insufficient, and the “legitimate” knowledge, an

86 elaboration of the former through reasoning. Plato (-460 -370 BC), within his theory of forms,

87 also discusses a distinction between the apparent world, which constantly changes, and the world

THE SENSE OF REALITY

88 of forms / ideas, unchanging and unseen, cause of what is apparent, that can only be grasped by

89 the process of intellectualization and philosophical thinking (Irwin, 2002). This two realities

90 framework finds echo centuries later in the work of Kant or Schopenhauer. The former

91 distinguishes between a world of noumena (a world with things that are not objects of the senses

92 but “thing-in-themselves”; Kant, 1781), and a world of phenomena (with things interpreted in

93 perception and reflection: as they appear to us). Strongly inspired by the previous views,

94 Shopenhauer (1788 - 1860) proposes that reality is both will and representation. He also

95 emphasizes on the central role of the body and bodily reflection as a way to apprehend the

96 ultimate reality (which is will): as we are bound only to the appearance of almost all items of the

97 universe, the body is the only entity which we can know from the inside. As such, approaching

98 the inner nature of the bodily Self coincides with approaching will, the ultimate reality. Nietzsche

99 (1844 – 1900), on the other hand, postulates that reality is not representation but rather the

100 process of interpretation itself (Benoit, 2006), making a step forward toward a dynamic

101 conceptualization of reality.

102 Absolute & Experienced Reality

103 Obviously, each of these historical conceptualizations (and many more not cited here)

104 would require a proper presentation to honour their complexity, and discuss their similarities,

105 nuances and discrepancies. The core notion that emerges, however, is that of a separation

106 between two worlds, emphasizing the notion that what we experience and what is are not alike.

107 Remaining within this long philosophical tradition, we agree with this general framework, that

108 we will neutrally (i.e., detached from any specific theologico-philosophical tradition) refer to as

109 the physical and the experienced reality. The former is made of physical entities such as atoms

110 and energy. We do not experience this world, in which colours, sounds, or objects are just

THE SENSE OF REALITY

111 particular structures or arrangements of those physical entities. Even the bodily Self (i.e., the

112 physical origin of one’s cognition) has a hazy meaning, as it is nothing more than a gathering of

113 physical entities in constant interaction between themselves as well as with their environment.

114 Nevertheless, this realm is not totally out of reach. To a certain extent, an absolute knowledge of

115 it is possible: although we do not experience the infrared colour or Wi-Fi waves, we know that

116 these exist.

117 On the contrary, the experienced reality is what a subjective creation. A world populated

118 with phenomenological objects or entities that “I”, the observer, - the meaningful Self that is

119 generated, perceive and with which I can eventually interact. It is related to Husserl’s

120 phenomenological concept of “lifeworld” (lebenswelt), a “person's subjective construction of

121 reality, which he or she forms under the condition of his or her life circumstances” (Kraus, 2015,

122 p. 4). This world is dependent of the observer, of its mental state (e.g., mood; Chepenik, Cornew,

123 & Farah, 2007; Clark, Watson, & Friston, 2018), and perceptive abilities (the subjective reality of

124 a bat might be quite different of our own; Nagel, 1974). The experienced reality is designed to

125 underline salient objects and highlight the link between us and them, with the promise of a better

126 adaptation to our environment and, ultimately, survival. And yet, absolute knowledge of this

127 reality is complicated to achieve. For example, a question many children instinctively ask is “do

128 we see the same colours in the same way?”. Is one’s red the same as everyone’s? Recent findings

129 tend to demonstrate that there is no compelling evidence that this would be the case (Mancuso et

130 al., 2009), suggesting that one’s conscious representation of a colour is different of another’s

131 one. Again, the experienced reality is not a mere image of the absolute reality, but rather a very

132 selective process of representation and interpretation (Metzinger, 2009), serving our own and

133 very personal interests.

THE SENSE OF REALITY

134 While investigating the structure of the absolute reality is the work of physicists,

135 scientific exploration of experienced reality falls within the scope of cognitive neuropsychology

136 which, nurtured in a vast philosophical tradition, must deal with another critical concept: A self

137 within a world.

138 The Self & its Environment

139 The most basic structural, functional, and biological unit of all known living organisms is

140 the cell. Its fundamental property is the separation between itself and the surrounding

141 environment. This property might also be of critical importance in higher order processes such as

142 consciousness, as its disintegration leads to Self-related disorders such as schizophrenia

143 (Northoff & Duncan, 2016). To put this in perspective with the previous part, “you” or “me” is a

144 portion of the objective reality, made of atoms and energy. A portion creating a representation

145 (the subjective reality) of its environment, of our self, and separating the two of them. Through

146 exteroception, we acquire a representation of both our environment and self (through vision,

147 touch…), that completes the representation acquired through interoceptive processes (that return

148 information about bodily state). However, this active representation of our environment and self,

149 remains most of the time tied to the objective reality: an elaboration upon what is perceived

150 through our senses (again, both exteroception and interoception). But it is not always the case.

151 Origins of the World

152 Imagine a tired cat, casually slumbering in a cosy cardboard box. As its cognitive control

153 abilities loosen, its mind wanders away. The cat starts daydreaming and imagines itself chasing a

154 mouse. This scene, generated by its brain, might take over its representation of the now and

155 there. He will, for some time, experience another reality, with another representation of the

156 world: a different visual scene, different sounds, and another representation of itself, of its state.

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157 He would be stalking, moving, running, and, if lucky enough, eating. However, if a sudden

158 sound occurs in its common environment (the world in which the cat is lazily laying), the animal

159 might be able to drag its attention back to its absolute-reality-based, or conditional experienced

160 reality: a world based on the here and now. The mechanism of decentration, allowing us to

161 seamlessly travel in space and time, is one way of modulating the sense of reality that illustrates

162 another critical distinction: whether our current experienced reality is generated as related, in a

163 non-causal nor deterministic way, to inputs of the absolute reality, thus being conditional (as

164 conditioned by, bound to, the absolute reality); an elaboration upon the signals acquired through

165 the senses, or whether it is unconditional, being mostly independent of it. Rather than two

166 separate states, this distinction is possibly best represented as a continuous gradient. In fact,

167 being entirely present in the here and now is even thought to be a tough achievement (and the

168 main goal of several meditation types such as mindfulness; Brown & Ryan, 2003), and being

169 totally immersed and hermetic to sensory data is a rather rare state, possibly found in deep sleep

170 or coma. Therefore, it seems more plausible that our sense of reality evolves somewhere between

171 conditionality and unconditionality.

172 Common & Simulated Realities

173 The last distinction to make, in order to attempt at a description of the complexity of our

174 relationship with the world, connects one of the most famous philosophical paradox with the

175 latest technological possibilities. In the Allegory of the Cave, Plato describes a group of people

176 who, all their lives, have lived chained in a cave, forced to face its bare wall. As a result, the only

177 scenery they could experience were shadows of objects passing in front of a fire behind them. All

178 their reality, their experience of the environment, their realm of possibilities was limited to those

179 shadows. However, one day, a prisoner would eventually break his chains, turn around, exit the

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180 cave and discover the true reality. Plato compared this to the journey of a philosopher, which

181 goal was precisely to investigate the true nature of reality. This question was asked centuries

182 later, in 1641, by Descartes in his meditations on first philosophy, where he hypothesized the

183 existence of an evil demon "as clever and deceitful as he is powerful, who has directed his entire

184 effort to misleading me". The evil demon would create an illusion of a complete world to

185 Descartes' senses: his body along with bodily signals, external perceptions, and other minds with

186 which he could interact with (Mohler, 2016). Descartes concludes that there is no way to know if

187 this is actually the case, and that our only remaining power is to suspend our judgment. But in

188 order for the evil demon to deceive us, there must be an “us”. This doubt, here directed toward

189 the existence of reality, let us conclude that we think and thus, that we exist. Cogito ergo sum.

190 This thought experiment was updated by Putnam (1981) in the form of the brain in a vat

191 scenario, where a mad scientist had removed your brain and placed it into a vat to keep it alive.

192 He further connected the brain to a powerful computer that sends signals that perfectly imitate

193 those acquired through senses. You would be feeling like running around in the sand on a fresh

194 summer day while, really, you (i.e., your brain) would be floating in a jar. This idea was again

195 reinterpreted by the Wachowski brothers in the famous movie Matrix (1999).

196 Although often discussed, philosophically refuted (Gemes, 2009), or metaphysically

197 validated (Kung, 2011), these “global sceptical scenarios” have nourished millennia of human

198 creativity through art, thoughts and technological advance. Indeed, the possibilities presented

199 above involve extreme cases of virtual realities, where the distinction between the different

200 levels of reality is impossible to make. Forty years ago, they were little more than hypothetical

201 thought experiments. But today, their meaning changed drastically as we are developing more

202 and more immersive virtual reality setups that will, in the near future, encompass all our senses.

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203 And “lower technology” devices are not outdone: a movie, a book, a painting, or any other media

204 also withholds the power to transport us, for a time, into another reality.

205 This complexity has led to a terminological chaos: the primary, fundamental, objective,

206 true, prevalent, base, self-evoked reality as opposed to the secondary, relative, subjective, virtual,

207 false, media-evoked reality. Therefore, we propose a purely descriptive approach to realities,

208 without hierarchy or inference about their nature: the common reality is the world we experience

209 the most often when in a wakeful state, that is characterized by continuity and stability, while a

210 simulated reality is a temporary world we experience when dreaming, mind-wandering, playing a

211 video-game or watching a movie, which aims at simulating (not necessary all) features of the

212 common reality.

213 Note that this common / simulated distinction can also apply to objects. A painting of a

214 landscape, as well as actors performing the role of another characters, are both simulations: they

215 might try to emulate characteristics of objects of the common world (which could be called

216 “genuine” objects, i.e., objects that are what they genuinely are). Nevertheless, simulations can

217 vary and differ in the way they try to simulate something: a (realistic) painting is a perceptual

218 representation of something targeted at fooling our visual perception system, while the play of

219 actors could be aimed at fooling our epistemic belief that the actors are genuinely the characters

220 they play.

221 Inception

222 To further demonstrate the complexity of these concepts and the need for a precise

223 description, we need to mention the possibility of embedded realities. In a remarkable paper,

224 Pillai, Schmidt, & Richir (2013) propose a model in which our consciousness would be evolving

225 along an axis that has dream reality as one pole, the extreme of what they call self-evoked reality

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226 (a dimension containing other less “reality evoking” states such as planning, daydreaming or

227 lucid dreaming), and the perfect simulated reality as the other pole (an extreme of media-evoked

228 reality). The authors then discuss the possibility of embedding those levels of reality: thinking

229 within a virtual environment would be an example of a shift of consciousness toward the self-

230 evoked reality within media-evoked reality. We could also imagine simulations within a

231 simulation, such as mini-games embedded within a game, where the player gets immersed in an

232 activity while already immersed in the persona of the character he is playing. Another possibility

233 is that you could dream (therefore in a self-evoked reality) of being in a virtual environment (a

234 media-evoked reality) and, at least theoretically, you might be dreaming of dreaming… Thus,

235 being aware of this Russian dolls-like embedding feature might be of importance when

236 prompting and assessing a particular “state of reality”.

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237 Summary

238

239 Figure 1. The nature of realities. We propose a unifying terminology to describe the various realities. The 240 objective reality is the physical world, which elaboration gives rise to the subjective reality that we (as a 241 Self) live in (i.e., in an “external” environment). This subjective reality can be tight to the objective 242 “external” reality (conditioned by it) or generated solely by the brain in an unconditional fashion (as in 243 dreams or imagination). 244 Addressing the complexity of realities is a challenge. Millennia of philosophical

245 exploration did not converge into one unitary framework, leaving this question as subsidiary and

246 anecdotal in modern science. We stress that several distinctions are critical to better understand

247 and delineate the cognitive processes supporting our relationship with ourselves and the world.

248 First, separating the absolute and the experienced reality. The former being the physical world in

249 which our body and brain are particular arrangements of matter and energy. This portion that we

250 call Self is endowed with the ability to create a meaningful interpretation of the world: the

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251 experienced reality, where it has a phenomenological distinct representation of itself and its

252 environment. Importantly, while the experienced self is often a “representation” of the absolute

253 self, and the subjective environment is often a representation of the objective environment, it is

254 not always the case. The brain has indeed the ability to recreate those representations, with which

255 we can travel in time and space. The experienced reality ceases to be conditioned to the absolute

256 reality and becomes generated ex nihilo (at least in principle), in an unconditional fashion. But

257 even when conditional (i.e., related to the sensory inputs), reality can be common or simulated.

258 The former refers to the daily regular reality we evolve in, while the latter refers to an alternate

259 reality that takes over for a certain amount of time.

260 However, despite the critical differences in the origin or processes involved in the

261 generation of these different realities, the phenomenological changes that occur when switching

262 between them are extremely subtle. Whether we are in a wakeful state, dreaming, immersed in a

263 memory or in a virtual environment, it seems that we experience the reality in a similar way: our

264 reactions, behaviours and cognitive processes are not drastically different and withhold an

265 intrinsic coherence: we experience a sense of reality.

266 Beyond Reality: The Sense of Reality

267 In his famous simulation argument, the transhumanist Bostrom (2003, 2011) posits that

268 we are living in a computer-generated reality. The logic behind this assumption is that an

269 advanced civilization, with enormous computing power, might want to create powerful artificial

270 intelligence that would be evolving in simulated world (an infinitely more evolved “The Sims™”

271 Game). These “sims” (the virtual intelligences populating the simulation) might be endowed

272 with consciousness, and live their lives in this world, unable to distinguish its simulated nature

273 from the “primary” reality. Moreover, similarly to games that are running on many computers in

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274 the world, there could be an important number of these simulated worlds. Moreover, it could

275 reach a point where a simulation could be created inside another simulation. Thus, the number of

276 “sims” would quickly exceed the number of consciousness’s living in the primary (i.e., non-

277 computer-generated) reality. Thus, it is statistically plausible that we are, indeed, simulated

278 “sims” living in a simulated reality.

279 Nevertheless, this thrilling hypothesis is somehow irrelevant from a phenomenological

280 and psychological perspective, for the majority of people cannot help but experience a fully

281 deployed sense of reality. They are endowed with an intuitive feeling and belief that they are

282 real, present and belonging to a real world. They rarely doubt it, and even if they do so, it is

283 mostly in a philosophical fashion, that does not entail a genuine sensation of uncertainty toward

284 the nature of the world.

285 History of the Sense of Reality

286 Contrary to what the title of the paper might suggest, the sense of reality is not a

287 consensually well-defined concept. In fact, there are only few cases of this exact formulation.

288 One can be found within the psychoanalytic terminology, initially referring to the development

289 of the reality principle: how the child progressively shifts from being governed by the pleasure

290 principle to finally adapt itself to a “castrating” reality (Ferenczi, 1913; Greenacre, 1973). Some

291 psychodynamic theories have incorporated another feature: reality testing and reality (or source)

292 monitoring, i.e., categorizing the source of a stimulus as being internal or external (Lichtenberg,

293 1977), which has an obvious echo in neuropsychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia, which

294 deficit (or modification) in source monitoring appears to be one of the core mechanism (Bentall,

295 1990; Bentall, Baker, & Havers, 1991; Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994; Dias, 2010).

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296 Interestingly, within this field, some authors discuss the concept of reality as a result of

297 two dimensions. Weisman (1958) connects the reality sense with feeling and reality testing with

298 thinking, proposing (in a psychodynamic terminology) that the former provides the “libidinal

299 coordinates”, while the latter supplies the “intellectual coordinates” to experience. “In other

300 words, reality is not an absolute property of the world, but is a product of reality evaluation, a

301 complex process of thought and feeling which decides what is real as much by the intensity as by

302 the invariant nature of experience” (Weisman, 1958, p. 228). The literature has evolved

303 throughout the years, separating the sense of reality from source monitoring and associated

304 concepts. The former was reduced to the feeling part and had become an object of study of

305 phenomenology, while the latter became a topic of cognitive psychology and neuroscience. It is

306 only recently that the feeling aspect of the sense of reality has gained a renewed interest, with the

307 emergence of virtual reality, in the form of what is often referred to as “presence”.

308 Feeling Reality: Presence, Emotion, Interoception

309 Phenomenological description

310 Inspired by the developing Gestalt theory of perception, the philosopher Merleau-Ponty

311 (1908 – 1961) suggests that we do not perceive objects as physical entities but rather as a

312 correlate of our body and its sensory-motor functions (Merleau-Ponty, 2013). He emphasises on

313 the role of the body as the primary site of knowing the world, defining the contour of what is

314 today referred to as embodied cognition. In parallel, transcending the subject/object dissociation,

315 Heidegger (1889 – 1976) posits that consciousness is always of something. There is no subject

316 without an object, and no observer without something that is observed. Moreover, he underlines

317 that the subject is always somewhere, as denoted by the name of his central concept; being-in-

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318 the-world. For Heidegger, we interpret and understand the world in terms of possibilities, as

319 much as we located in it (Heidegger, 2010).

320 These are the philosophical stems of the modern concept of presence (Zahorik & Jenison,

321 1998). Originally introduced to describe the feeling that may arise when agents remotely interact

322 with teleoperated devices (telepresence; Minsky, 1980), the study of presence took-off in the

323 90’s, mainly restricted to the field of cyberpsychology and its use of virtual reality (VR). Defined

324 as a “suspension of disbelief” (Slater & Usoh, 1993) - thus linking it directly with the

325 philosophical debate on fiction (see below) - its description evolved to an “illusion of non-

326 mediation” (Lombard & Ditton, 1997), emphasizing on the relationship between the subject and

327 the environment rather than on the judgment about the nature of the latter. Twenty years later, the

328 concept of presence grew and extent to the feeling of "being there": the feeling of being spatially

329 located in, fully engaged in, and responding to (consciously or not) a perceived mediated

330 environment around the Self as if it was real (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005; Slater, Lotto,

331 Arnold, Sánchez-Vives, & Sanchez-Vives, 2009; Waterworth, Waterworth, Mantovani, & Riva,

332 2010). Lately, this concept has been received a great interest from researchers working in

333 different fields such as psychiatry, computational neuroscience and philosophy (Seth, Suzuki, &

334 Critchley, 2011). Linking the concept with centuries of philosophical inquiry, some of these

335 authors suggested that presence in mediated worlds did not fundamentally differ from presence

336 in the real one (Riva, Waterworth, & Waterworth, 2004), leading to set presence as a key

337 phenomenon for understanding normal and altered consciousness states (Loomis, 1992; Sanchez-

338 Vives & Slater, 2005; Seth et al., 2011).

339 Current research on presence can be roughly grouped into structural and computational

340 models. The former investigates the structure, facets and components of presence, while the

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341 latter put the emphasis on the cognitive processes underlying this phenomenon. Structural

342 models seem to converge on a definition of presence that include three factors (Freeman,

343 Lessiter, Pugh, & Keogh, 2005): sense of physical space (in a contiguous spatial environment),

344 naturalness (realism and believability of the content) and engagement (interest in the mediated

345 environment), with a core division between “user” and “media” characteristics. Riva et al. (2004)

346 also depict a three layers architecture of presence, including proto-presence (an embodied

347 presence related to the level of perception-action coupling), core-presence (conscious and

348 selective activity in order to integrate sensory occurrences into coherent percepts) and extended-

349 presence (making sense of the core-presence through past experience). This model was meant by

350 the authors to mirror Damasio's (1999) model of the Self including the proto-self (a non-

351 conscious collection of neural patterns that are representative of the body's internal state), the

352 core-self (the emergent process occurring with the conscious awareness of feelings associated

353 with bodily changes) and the autobiographical-self (the persistence of consciousness beyond the

354 here and the now), thus emphasizing the tight connection between presence and the Self, and the

355 importance of the former to give rise to the latter.

356 Neuroscientific and Computational Account

357 Seth's et al. (2011) computational model of presence is set in the most advanced

358 framework of how the brain works. Indeed, the Bayesian brain hypothesis, through the predictive

359 coding framework, is a biologically (A. Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013) and

360 mathematically (Buckley, Kim, McGregor, & Seth, 2017) plausible theory with a considerable

361 amount of empirical support (Friston, 2008; Mumford, 1992). Within this framework, the brain

362 continually generates predictions and aims at reducing uncertainty and rendering its environment

363 predictable (Friston & Kiebel, 2009). Critically, it suggests that our conscious experience

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364 emerges from the brain’s “best guess” (i.e., the best prediction) about one’s external and internal

365 environment, rather than on the processing of the sensory data. The predictive coding account of

366 presence posits that this feeling would rely on continuous prediction of emotional and bodily

367 states through interoceptive processes (Diemer et al., 2015). Specifically, presence emerges when

368 predictions of interoceptive signals match the actual samples (which comparison would be

369 processed by the insular cortex). In other words, presence would be related to an “accurate”

370 model of our interoceptive state. We feel as present and belonging (as this model also explicitly

371 connects presence with agency) to the world as our bodily relationship to it is seamless and fluid.

372 Importantly, this predictive account presents presence as a fundamental property of

373 consciousness and emphasizes the tight relationship with autonomic variations and thus,

374 emotions.

375 Presence and emotions seem indeed to share a strong, synergistic (Baños et al., 2008;

376 Baños et al., 2004; Bouchard, St-Jacques, Robillard, & Renaud, 2008; Robillard, Bouchard,

377 Fournier, & Renaud, 2003), perhaps even circular (Riva et al., 2007), relationship, leading some

378 authors to define presence as “people’s emotional engagement with reality and their

379 environment” (Huang & Alessi, 1999, p. 148). This tight relationship between presence,

380 emotions and bodily states finds again an echo in modern philosophy. The neo-phenomenologist

381 Ratcliffe (2008), in his remarkable book entitled feelings of being: phenomenology, psychiatry

382 and the sense of reality, take bodily feelings as a starting point of his exploration, among which

383 he places “existential feelings”, the focus of his discussion. “Existential feelings are both

384 ‘feelings of the body’ and ‘ways of finding oneself in a world’. By a ‘way of finding oneself in

385 the world’, I [the author] mean a sense of the reality of self and of the world, which is

386 inextricable from a changeable feeling of relatedness between body and world” (Ratcliffe, 2008,

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387 p. 2). The author suggests that many psychiatric illnesses can be understood in terms of

388 existential feelings, emphasizing on the role of the body-world relation in their generation.

389 According to Damasio (1999), the minimal level of experience arises at the interplay

390 between two components, “the organism” and “the object”. As put by Herbelin, Salomon, Serino,

391 & Blanke (2016, p. 85), “we experience the world from the physical location and with an

392 egocentric perspective of the body, which we feel as our own”. Recently, VR studies updated the

393 concept of bodily self-consciousness to develop (and manipulate) the sense of embodiment,

394 tightly linked with presence, defined as “the ensemble of sensations that arise in conjunction

395 with being inside, having, and controlling a body” (Kilteni, Groten, & Slater, 2012). Herbelin et

396 al. (2016) suggest the involvement of three independent dimensions: the sense of agency, body

397 ownership and the sense of self-location. The authors, after reviewing the neural underpinnings

398 involved in phenomena such as out of body experiences, the rubber hand illusion, enfacement,

399 full body illusion and agency paradigms, underline the role of the insula and the temporo-parietal

400 junction (TPJ).

401 However, Seth’s team recently applied the predictive coding framework to explain

402 another “aspect” of consciousness; perceptual presence. The feeling that the objects within our

403 environment, rather the Self, are part of the world. Interestingly, a functional explanation of this

404 notion has been proposed by Noë (2004) within the sensorimotor contingencies theory (O’Regan

405 & Noe, 2001). This framework, rooted in the philosophy of perception of Merleau-Ponty, inherits

406 both from the notion of “affordance” (Gibson, 1979) and from enactive and embodied cognitive

407 science (Thompson & Varela, 2001). It emphasizes on the importance of brain-body-world

408 interactions in cognitive processes (Seth, 2014a). Within this framework, the perception of a

409 stimulus as real and present is created by practical mastery of the sensorimotor contingencies

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410 governing how the sensory responses elicited by the stimulus will behave in different situations.

411 However, Seth (2014) suggests that this account of perceptual presence (“the phenomenological

412 property that the perceptual content is experienced as being part of the real world”, p. 100) has

413 two major flaws: 1) it remains unclear how this model would work on a neural level, and 2) it

414 does not account for instances of perception which do not involve sensorimotor contingencies.

415 To explain the “felt presence of objects”, Seth (2014a, 2014b) extended this model by suggesting

416 that the brain could also generate multiple predictions of the world and integrate them into one

417 unified model. Perceptual models would incorporate explicitly “counterfactual” elements,

418 encoding how the perceptual properties would change under many possible actions (if the apple

419 is grabbed, rotated or looked on from another angle), even if those actions are not performed.

420 This “counterfactual richness” would determine the degree of perceptual presence of a stimulus.

421 For illustration, the pipe represented on a painting would be related to a generative model that is

422 counterfactually poor (the repertoire of actions that one can perform on the object is limited).

423 Thus, it would be appraised with less perceptual presence than a genuine pipe, and eventually

424 correctly classified as a painting.

425 Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether “perceptual presence” (the felt presence of the

426 environment) is distinct from the traditional conceptualisation of presence as centred around the

427 Self (the feeling of being present in the world), as these might rely on different mechanisms

428 (counterfactual predictions on exteroceptive data and predictive accuracy of interceptive states,

429 respectively). Thus, to avoid any ambiguity, we will refer to the traditional conceptualisation of

430 presence as Self presence, to underline its distinctiveness (both at a scientific and conceptual

431 level) from perceptual presence.

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432 Taken together, these works suggest that Self and perceptual presence, two dimensions of

433 the feeling dimension of the sense of reality, would emerge from coherence. A form of coherence

434 between our expectations (and predictions) on the external and internal state of the world and the

435 actual data. This coherent integration of multisensory signals creates a stable representation of a

436 bodily self as opposed to its environment (Bzdok et al., 2013; Chang, Yarkoni, Khaw, & Sanfey,

437 2013) that, in turn, leads to a smooth appraisal of the world. This coherence, deploying itself on

438 different levels, would also be related to the sense of agency, of self-location and bodily

439 ownership that, together, give birth a minimal, but essential relationship between ourselves and

440 the environment. It makes you feel real, present in-, and belonging to-, a (real) environment.

441 Believing Reality: Source and Simulation Monitoring

442 We believe that feeling reality cannot lead to a proper explanation of the emergence of the

443 human conscious experience without a high-level integration and elaboration of the previously

444 described processes, leading to a fully deployed sense of reality. Importantly, feeling must be

445 accompanied with a form of believing. Note that believing reality is not an explicit statement that

446 we do, but rather an intuitive premise to all other facts. It is not a knowledge learnt as other facts

447 are, nor a belief in the sense of faith. It is not limited to a consideration about the nature of

448 environment, but encompasses the intimate belief that we, as a distinct entity of the world, are

449 real too. As such, it is not only believing in reality, or believing the reality of something, it is an

450 implicit axiomal statement we are endowed with in order for the rest of our experience to be

451 unified.

452 Interestingly, in his recent account of perceptual presence (the felt presence of the objects

453 in the world), Seth (2014a) distinguishes between three subtypes of “veridicality” (i.e., realness):

454 objective, subjective and doxastic. The former refers to the fact that a perceived object actually is

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455 “real” (i.e., part of the common reality). The second refers to the fact that this object is

456 experienced as being part of the “real world”. Finally, doxastic veridicality refers to the cognitive

457 understanding of this object as reflecting a property of this real world. The author further suggest

458 that this last component could be altered, while subjective veridicality would be preserved, as in

459 lucid dreaming, where the subject experience its dreams as real but, at the same time, knows that

460 they are not. Indeed, we agreed that these two dimensions (the experience, or feeling, and the

461 cognitive understanding, or believing, of an experience as real) are in fact distinct and will

462 suggest other cases that could be interpreted in terms of double dissociations.

463 Believing that our current experience is genuinely real involves two orthogonal aspects.

464 1) Believing that the object of experience is part of the conditional reality (i.e., not imagined, not

465 “spawned” by our brains) and 2) that it is not fictitious (i.e., not made-up or simulated). The

466 former refers to source monitoring (tracking the origin of the experience) and the latter refers to

467 simulation monitoring, a concept approached by philosophy and science mostly through the

468 study of fiction.

469 Source Monitoring

470 Interestingly, this twofold question has been raised by Plato and his apprentice Aristotle

471 in their inquiries on dreams and on fiction. In three treatises of the Parva Naturalis – on Sleep

472 and Wakefulness, On Dreams & On Divination during sleep, Aristotle observes that, while

473 dreaming, we almost completely lose the ability to distinguish between what is an external and

474 what is an imagined object, even though the events that are occurring are often completely

475 aberrant. Aristotle believed that the reason of that “objectification”, - or “reification”, of

476 internally created experiences is the modification of the contrast between the stream of

477 imagination and the steam of perception, that would be diminished when sleeping. “With the

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478 senses shut off, remnants of sensation linger in the blood and, arriving at the heart [Aristotle

479 believed that the heart was the seat of thought and reason], are seen as a dream. During

480 wakefulness, these sensual remnants go unnoticed because they exist next to the more immediate

481 sensual movements of perception, like a small fire next to a great one” (Holowchak, 1996, p.

482 405). While dreams serve as a debate ground for understanding the nature of common reality

483 (referred to as the dream argument by philosophers), it is also a study case for cognitive scientist

484 as a normal deficit in source monitoring.

485 However, the study of source monitoring is also strongly tight with abnormal deficits

486 such as those occurring in psychopathology, especially in schizophrenia spectrum, where the

487 phenotypic trait marker is a disturbance in the pre-reflective - or “minimal” – Self (Nelson,

488 Whitford, Lavoie, & Sass, 2014; Parnas, Handest, Saebye, & Jansson, 2003; Sass & Parnas,

489 2003; Sass, Parnas, & Zahavi, 2011). Following Aristotle’s intuition, Nelson, Whitford, Lavoie,

490 & Sass (2014) suggest that one of the two mechanisms underlying these disturbances are what

491 the authors call hyper-reflexivity, i.e., a “heightened awareness of aspects of one's experience that

492 are normally tacit and implicit and “in the background” of experience (e.g., awareness of the act

493 of breathing or sensations while walking, or of the “inner speech” that mediates our thinking).

494 This has the effect of objectifying these aspects of experience, thereby forcing them to be

495 experienced as if they were external objects” (Nelson et al., 2014, p. 2). The authors posit that

496 the second mechanism underlying these disturbances is a diminished self-affection, that refers to

497 a weakened sense of existing as a subject of awareness. Northoff & Duncan (2016) recently

498 attempted to unify the field of Self-disturbances with their “spatiotemporal psychopathology”

499 proposal. The core idea is to reinterpret symptoms in spatiotemporal terms of the resting state

500 brain activity rather than in sensorimotor, affective or cognitive terms (Northoff, 2018; Northoff

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501 & Stanghellini, 2016). They applied this framework to Schizophrenia, suggesting that the related

502 resting-state abnormalities, giving rise to Schizophrenic symptoms, are the reflection of a

503 confusion between internal mental contents, internal bodily contents and external mental

504 contents, thus echoing (although with new hypotheses as to its genesis) the theories revolving

505 around source monitoring.

506 Source monitoring covers the ability to make the right decision about the source of an

507 experience. Deficits in source monitoring lead to the confusion of endogenous and exogenous

508 experiences, giving birth to various phenomena such as hallucinations, dissociative memory (i.e.,

509 not being able to tell whether it was you or someone else that did something, or whether you just

510 imagined doing it instead of actually doing it; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) and

511 thought disorders such as thought insertion and thought withdrawal. On a neurocognitive level,

512 the framework of predictive coding can here also directly cast light on the processes involved

513 (Friston, 2010). Indeed, the corollary discharge impairment theory is built upon the fact that in

514 the presence of an external environment, inner experiences are attenuated in perception (“sensory

515 attenation”; Nelson et al., 2014). However, for source monitoring disorders, regions generating

516 the action or thought might be prevented from informing others brain regions that it is a self-

517 generated action or thought (Keefe, 1998; Nelson et al., 2014; Poulet & Hedwig, 2007). This

518 would create an increase of prediction error, thus avoiding a dampening of the experience in

519 perception, leading to the attribution of an external sources to it (Crapse & Sommer, 2008;

520 Stephan, Friston, & Frith, 2009). On a brain level, differences in source monitoring has been

521 related to morphological (Buda, Fornito, Bergström, & Simons, 2011) as well task-related brain

522 activity (Gallo, Mcdonough, & Scimeca, 2009), especially in the prefrontal cortex. However,

523 recent findings suggest that the neural correlates of such disturbances might lie in the

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524 spatiotemporal connectivity between different brain networks. One of the candidate is the

525 coherence between the default mode network (DMN), that includes regions such as the medial

526 prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), with the central executive

527 network (CEN), that includes the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and the posterior parietal

528 cortex, and in particular the intraparietal sulcus (IPS). The former network is related to internal

529 mental contents, being involved in decentring-based phenomena (e.g., projecting oneself into

530 another reality when day-dreaming, mind-wandering, re-experiencing episodic memories or

531 thinking with someone else’s perspective; Sherman et al., 2014), while the second shows

532 activation in executive control tasks. Interestingly, those two networks appear anti-correlated in

533 healthy adults (Menon & Uddin, 2010), but positively correlated in schizophrenia (Littow et al.,

534 2015; Tu, Lee, Chen, Li, & Su, 2013), as well as in healthy patients with transient psychotic

535 symptoms induced by psychedelic drugs such as psilocybin (Carhart-Harris et al., 2013). This

536 implies that internal and external mental contents are no longer reciprocally modulated, resulting

537 in less segregation between them. Therefore, “the distinction between thought contents related to

538 the internal self and those associated with the external environment becomes blurred” (Northoff

539 & Duncan, 2016, p. 11).

540 In summary, source monitoring is a critical mechanism of the sense of reality, which

541 endows us with the ability to track the origin of our experiences and distinguish between our

542 internal and the external milieu. In our terminology, to consciously separate conditional reality

543 from unconditional reality. This ability might be related to the combination and connectivity

544 between internal and external signals. On a neural level, it seems linked to the reciprocal

545 modulation, spatiotemporal coherence and integration of two distinct brain networks, the DMN

546 and the CEN, supporting respectively internally and externally focused cognition.

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547 Simulation Monitoring

548 In summer 2016, the world of Pokémon™ blended with our own, leading to the surge of

549 millions of people going out to chase these creatures. Although knowing that these did not exist

550 in “real life”, players could get deeply immersed, so absorbed in the game that some of them

551 even died (e.g., from train and car accidents), having forgot the dangers of non-augmented

552 reality.

553 Interestingly, simulation monitoring is, to our knowledge, the less scientifically studied

554 dimension of the sense of reality. For years, it has remained a question for philosophers, artists

555 and poets: how is it that humans can get involved in fictional works, feel emotions and be

556 affected by them, although knowing, at the same time, that the depicted events and characters are

557 not real. And yet, with virtual reality technology taking over parts of our lives in an exponentially

558 growing speed, it has become a challenge to understand the mechanisms that allow us to

559 correctly tag the simulated and the genuine aspects of our experience. Furthermore,

560 understanding the effect on our cognitive processes of this differentiation is critical to

561 accompany the technological developments and preserve their safety for psychological health

562 and well-being.

563 The voluntary creation of virtual realities can be traced back to the dawn of human

564 society itself, where mankind expressed his ideas, feelings, thoughts and dreams by representing

565 them on the walls of a cave. As technology progressed, media evolved as well, positioning us

566 today on the verge of extreme possibilities of reality simulation (Pillai et al., 2013). In Poetics,

567 Aristotle suggested that the key process allowing for a full engagement toward fiction was

568 identification with the characters and the event. In modern terms, this would refer to theory of

569 mind (the ability to identify, predict and separate one’s mental states from others’) and self-

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570 referential processes. The few neuroscientific data available tend to support Aristotle’s

571 hypothesis. Indeed, the mPFC, part of the default mode network underlying these cognitive

572 process (Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 2013; Seitz, Nickel, & Azari, 2006), is the region which

573 show lower activation when confronted with fictional characters or events (Abraham, von

574 Cramon, & Schubotz, 2008; Han, Jiang, Humphreys, Zhou, & Cai, 2005).

575 During the romantic era, the poet and aesthetic philosopher Coleridge introduced the

576 concept of “suspension of disbelief” (or, more elegantly put, “poetic faith”), defined as a

577 willingness to suspend one's critical faculties and believe the unbelievable, often for the sake of

578 enjoyment (Coleridge & Shawcross, 1907). Holland (2003), in its neuro-psychoanalytic account

579 of suspension of disbelief, suggests that humans have a natural tendency to believe. It is

580 disbelieving that requires effortful and late processes of cognitive control. Interestingly, this

581 concept could be linked with aesthetic philosophy, and especially in Kant’s notion of

582 disinterested pleasure (Kant & Pluhar, 1987), that led to the notion that aesthetic experience

583 would require a form “psychological distance” or “detachment” from the object (Bullough, 1912;

584 Cupchik, 2002). In the same vein, Schopenhauer believed that aesthetic contemplation allowed

585 the subject to resist its desire and emotional needs and cares by a self-detachment (“we are, so to

586 speak, rid of ourselves”; Schopenhauer; 2012, Vol. I, § 68). The subject enters a world purely as

587 representation and, through disconnection with the world as will, diminishes anguish and

588 suffering.

589 In summary, philosophy and aesthetics have related belief and disbelief in simulation

590 (mainly involving fictional works and art) between some form of inhibition (of belief or Self)

591 and (negative) emotional engagement. Again, neuroscience tends to give credit to this

592 supposition, as the brain regions recruited when facing fiction include the lateral prefrontal

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593 cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (Abraham et al., 2008; Han et al., 2005; Metz-Lutz, Bressan,

594 Heider, & Otzenberger, 2010), regions supporting emotional processing, affect generation and

595 appraisal, as well as emotion regulation and cognitive control (Buhle et al., 2013; Ochsner,

596 Silvers, & Buhle, 2012).

597 Within this field, one of the important issue that has been raised by philosophers is, can

598 we feel real (or really feel) emotions toward an experience tagged as fictional? Indeed, the study

599 of simulation monitoring has to be connected with the “paradox of fiction” (Radford & Weston,

600 1975), which asks how we can get emotionally involved with fictional characters and events.

601 This paradox is typically presented in three incompatible premises. a) In order to experience

602 emotions, we must believe that the characters or events really exist or have existed, b) this belief

603 is lacking when engaging with fiction and c) that we experience genuine emotions toward

604 fiction. From the raging debate since the formulation of the paradox forty years ago, three main

605 proposals have been suggested in order to resolve the conflict between these premises. The

606 thought theory denies a) by suggesting that we do need to truly believe that the characters or

607 events are real, it is sufficient to be “mentally present” (Lamarque, 1981; Lamarque & Olsen,

608 1994). In other words, it is the thought of the monster that frightens us, not its mere

609 representation on the theatre screen. The illusion theory denies b) by claiming that we do

610 experience, in fact, a form of “suspension of disbelief”. When fully absorbed in a fictional work,

611 we might consider (or experience), for a very brief moment, when the thrill is as its height, the

612 characters and the events as real. Finally, the pretend theory denies c) by suggesting that

613 emotions that we feel toward fiction are not genuine but rather quasi-emotions (Walton, 1978),

614 which could differ from “normal” emotions on physiological and behavioural levels. A classic

THE SENSE OF REALITY

615 example is that we do not run out from the theatre each time a monster attacks us, a reaction we

616 would probably have in “real” life (i.e., in the common, not simulated reality).

617 We deny the three premises at the same time and suggest an integrative solving of the

618 paradox. First, in order to trigger an emotional response, it does not matter whether the object is

619 simulated or not (fictional or real). Indeed, the literature has shown that an emotionally appealing

620 (and/or self-relevant) experience will increase our sense of presence (Baños et al., 2008; Baños

621 et al., 2004; Makowski, Sperduti, Nicolas, & Piolino, 2017; Riva et al., 2007). This suggests that

622 we can totally experience a high feeling of reality toward fictional events, involving emotions.

623 However, we also believe that simulation tagging comes as a later top-down process that will

624 attenuate the emotional response (Mocaiber et al., 2009, 2010, 2011, Sperduti et al., 2016, 2017).

625 This effect, that we named fictional reappraisal (Sperduti et al., 2017), is often existing as a prior

626 information that we have about the fictionality of the content of our experience (for instance

627 when we go to theatre). However, whether this emotion modulation is tight to this prior, globally

628 encompassing the emotional dynamics (i.e., influencing emotion generation as well as

629 regulation), or fostered by an afterward consideration possibly becoming conscious when

630 overwhelmed by emotions in order to exert their regulation (our inner voice that says “come on,

631 it is obviously fake blood, no need to be that terrified”) is still a matter of debate. Finally, in

632 respect to the quasi-emotions proposal (i.e., emotions deprived from several features such as

633 behavioural reactions), the neuropsychological data suggests that it might even be false under

634 certain circumstances. For example, children, which cognitive control abilities are still immature

635 might sometimes express behavioural reactions, including hiding their eyes or leaving the room

636 when confronted to emotional movies, which is in line with the implication of the executive

THE SENSE OF REALITY

637 functions in fictional reappraisal as posited in adults (Mocaiber et al., 2009; Sperduti et al.,

638 2017).

639 While the processes supporting simulation monitoring remain unknown, it is likely that

640 simulation monitoring would rely, at least to some extent, on the feeling aspect of the sense of

641 reality. It appears as plausible that an environment in which we feel present and belonging in,

642 containing objects with objecthood (that perceptually or physically respond to our actions) would

643 generate the intuitive belief of its authenticity. However, the evidence suggests a bilateral

644 relationship. Indeed, retroactive (down) regulation by simulation monitoring (of the fully-fledged

645 affective response) could affect the feeling aspect. Indeed, since the emotional response is

646 correlated this “bodily” dimension (in particular Self presence), its sudden attenuation by

647 simulation monitoring might disrupt this feeling and lead to an empirically reported phenomenon

648 called a “break in presence” ( Slater, Brogni, & Steed, 2003; Slater & Steed, 2000).

649 In conclusion, believing reality is an important part of the sense of reality supported by

650 (at least) two distinct mechanisms: source monitoring, the ability to discriminate between

651 exogenous and endogenous aspects of our experience, and simulation monitoring, the tagging of

652 the experience as simulated or genuine. Those two mechanisms seem to be independent: A

653 perfect computer-generated virtual environment would differ from the common reality only by

654 our knowledge of it being a simulation (bur source monitoring would correctly interpret the

655 environment as perceived by exteroception). Another extreme example includes imagining an

656 event (episodic thinking) vs. episodically remembering a memory. These two experiences, both

657 endogenous, share the same phenomenological features (as they are indeed mostly supported by

658 the same neural network; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire,

659 2007). Their main difference is the conscious tagging of the experience, one being considered as

THE SENSE OF REALITY

660 “real” (something that actually happened), and the other with varying degrees of fictionality

661 (depending on the possibility of an event to occur or its psychological distance). Moreover,

662 believing reality is, to a certain extent, independent from feeling reality. In the previous examples

663 (common reality, perfect simulation, episodic memory, episodic imagined thought), one can feel

664 more or less real. Examples of modulations, dissociations and alterations will be discussed in

665 Part 2.

666 Absorption: Attention and Engagement

667 Although we consider feeling and believing as two distinct dimensions, it is their

668 integration that gives rise to a fully deployed sense of reality. However, the evidence suggests

669 that another function might be involved in the shaping of our conscious experience of reality:

670 absorption. This concept was initially defined by Tellegen & Atkinson (1974, p. 268) as

671 “disposition for having episodes of ‘total’ attention that fully engage perceptive and imaginative

672 resources”. The authors conceptualized this concept as a trait, developing the Tellegen’s

673 Absorption Scale, as well as an attentional state of consciousness. Critically, the authors

674 suggested that absorbed attending resulted in a “heightened sense of reality of the attentional

675 object, imperviousness to distracting events, and an altered sense of reality in general, including

676 an empathically altered sense of self” (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974, p. 268).

677 Interestingly, Riva et al. (2004), in their description of presence, go beyond the

678 description of the three different levels (proto-presence, core-presence and extended-presence)

679 by adding three meta-dimensions, corresponding to the way the three aforementioned layers are

680 integrated (Waterworth & Waterworth, 2001). The focus (the degree to which the three layers of

681 presence are integrated toward a particular situation), the locus (the extent to which the observer

682 is attending to the real world or to a world conveyed through the media) and the sensus (the level

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683 of consciousness or attentional arousal of the observer, also referred to as the sense of presence;

684 Herbelin et al., 2016). These metalevels connect presence with attentional processes, and

685 specifically with the attentional engagement toward the external world.

686 We suggest bridging these two aspects and extending Tellegen’s concept of absorption

687 beyond the attentional engagement toward “imaginative resources” (i.e., the internal world) by

688 including the attentional engagement toward the “external” environment. As such, absorption

689 would be defined as the level of attentional resources devoted to the processing of a particular

690 experience or aspect of it, whether this experience is based on the conditional or unconditional

691 reality. In phenomenological terms, how much of the conscious space is occupied by the

692 experience or by an aspect of it. Following this extension, a question arises: are “internal” and

693 “external” absorption alike? While the two might arguably be supported by attentional processes,

694 a recent review supports their independence at a process level (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne,

695 2010), and stable attentional biases found in pathology (Brown & Marsden, 1988; Ingram, 1990;

696 Mansell, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003) suggest the same at a trait level (i.e., people can show

697 independently more or less propensity to be internally or externally absorbed).

698 However, the dissociation between internal and external absorption becomes an issue in

699 our sense of reality framework. In particular, at what level arises this distinction? Is it connected

700 to the objective unconditional/conditional reality or its tagging by source monitoring processing?

701 For instance, is absorption toward hallucinations (an internal experience erroneously tagged as

702 external) considered as internal or external? The reverse case might appear when concentrating

703 on what we see (e.g., the approaching monster) in dreams. Does it remain internal absorption,

704 even though the monster is considered as external? Hence, it seems like that a more fine-grained

705 approach to the concept of absorption is required to precisely delineate these questions.

THE SENSE OF REALITY

706

707 Summary

708

709 Figure 2. Functional architecture supporting the Sense of Reality. The red, blue and yellow 710 colours refer to the three dimensions of the Sense of Reality: Feeling, Believing and Absorption, 711 respectively. Feeling reality is supported by the Self Presence (the feeling of belonging and being 712 present in the environment), related to the accuracy of interoception, and Perceptual Presence 713 (the felt presence of objects of the world), related to the counterfactual richness of exteroception. 714 The mutual integration between interoception and exteroception is related to source monitoring, 715 which role is to label the experience as being “internally” or “externally” generated. The 716 second mechanism of Believing, simulation monitoring, tags the content of experience as being 717 “genuine” or “simulated” and possibly interacts with feeling. Finally, absorption can be seen as 718 the attentional aperture of consciousness, reflecting the degree of attentional engagement in the 719 experience. Altogether, these components give rise to a transparent background to conscious 720 experience.

THE SENSE OF REALITY

721 The sense of reality can be defined as an intuitive feeling and belief that one is real,

722 present in - and belonging to - a real world. It is a background scaffolding allowing for stable

723 conscious experience to be and for mental representations to make sense. In that, it is an

724 emerging feature of protoconsciousness. Based on a selective review of the neuroscientific

725 literature giving answers to essential philosophical issues, we suggested a structure-functional

726 architecture of the sense of reality, including distinct dimensions based on different mechanisms,

727 powered by neurocognitive processes involving distinct brain networks.

728 Conclusion

729 Feeling reality is based on the interaction and integration within and between

730 exteroception and interoception. It gives rise to the creation of a distinction between Self and the

731 environment, allowing us to feel embodied and connected to the world. Believing reality, on the

732 other hand, refers to the ability of judging whether our current experience is related to

733 exteroception or not, and whether it is simulated or genuine. This modulation exerts, in turn, a

734 retro-control over other neurocognitive mechanisms, functions and states (triggering for instance

735 emotion regulation). Both feeling and believing reality are able to impact and to be impacted by

736 our level of absorption: the amount of attentional engagement toward the experience or an aspect

737 of it. In the end, all these parts blend together, creating a transparent background for conscious

738 experience without which there is neither stable Self, nor coherent world upon which we can

739 ultimately interact and survive (O’Regan & Noe, 2001; Seth, 2014a). Nevertheless, as we will

740 discuss in Part 2, the evidence suggests that the sense of reality is not a stable and rigid

741 scaffolding, but a flexible feature of protoconsciousness, that can be subject to voluntary and

742 involuntary modulation, as well as long-lasting disturbance.

THE SENSE OF REALITY

743 Acknowledgements

744 I would like to thank Dr. M. Aubry for her help in the conceptualization of abstract and

745 embodied layers of reality.

746

747

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Appendix A

Study 3: Supplementary Materials 1 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

TABLE OF CONTENTS EEG - Number of Trials per Condition ...... 2 Average number of rejected trials per condition...... 2 ANOVA on the percentage of rejected trials ...... 2 The Effect of Simulation Monitoring ...... 2 Model Selection ...... 2 Models ...... 2 Arousal ...... 2 Valence ...... 3 Control ...... 3 SCR ...... 3 Heart Rate ...... 4 LPP ...... 4 Impact of Self-Relevance ...... 5 Autobiographical Relevance ...... 5 Arousal ...... 5 Valence ...... 5 Control ...... 6 SCR ...... 7 Heart Rate ...... 7 LPP ...... 8 Conceptual Relevance ...... 8 Arousal ...... 8 Valence ...... 9 Control ...... 9 SCR ...... 10 Heart Rate ...... 10 LPP ...... 11

This report contains the full statistical analysis for part 2 (The Effect of Simulation Monitoring) and 3 (Impact of Self-Relevance) of the result section. It provides the full statistical models description, along with the R code to generate it.

EEG - NUMBER OF TRIALS PER CONDITION

AVERAGE NUMBER OF REJECTED TRIALS PER CONDITION Emotion Condition Percentage of Removed Trials Mean Amplitude (10^6) ± SD Neutral Reality 16.79 5.15 ± 4.13 Neutral Simulation 16.67 5.51 ± 4.34 Negative Reality 16.04 6.72 ± 4.66 Negative Simulation 15.78 5.84 ± 4.12

ANOVA ON THE PERCENTAGE OF REJECTED TRIALS term df sumsq meansq statistic p.value Emotion 1 22.23 22.23 0.04 0.85 Condition 1 1.18 1.18 0.00 0.96 Emotion:Condition 1 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.99 Residuals 128 76123.74 594.72

THE EFFECT OF SIMULATION MONITORING MODEL SELECTION The LOO information criterion (LOOIC) and the expected log point-wise predictive density (ELPD) of Bayesian model comparison, and the AIC and BIC from the frequentist model comparison. Smallest values, indicating the model that best fitted the data, are annotated with a star. Variable Model LOOIC ELPD AIC BIC Subjective Arousal Objective 7768.43 -3884.22 7867 7915.49 Subjective Arousal Subjective 7729.28* -3864.64* 7832.14* 7880.62* Subjective Arousal Belief 7739.99 -3869.99 7837.77 7910.5 Subjective Valence Objective 5761.84 -2880.92 5897.72 5946.21 Subjective Valence Subjective 5743.75* -2871.88* 5878.51* 5927* Subjective Valence Belief 5745.09 -2872.54 5880.78 5953.51 Subjective Control Objective 8146.74 -4073.37 8226.91 8275.39 Subjective Control Subjective 8131.02* -4065.51* 8209.97* 8258.46* Subjective Control Belief 8140.09 -4070.04 8216.55 8289.28 SCR Magnitude Objective 8727.25* -4363.63* 8768.95* 8817.44* SCR Magnitude Subjective 8732.54 -4366.27 8772.05 8820.54 SCR Magnitude Belief 8730.12 -4365.06 8775.99 8848.72 Heart Rate Deceleration Objective 8578.16 -4289.08 8636.65 8685.13 Heart Rate Deceleration Subjective 8577.74* -4288.87* 8635.22* 8683.71* Heart Rate Deceleration Belief 8581.18 -4290.59 8639.33 8712.06 LPP Amplitude Objective 5437.32* -2718.66* 5553.12* 5600.19* LPP Amplitude Subjective 5448.61 -2724.31 5562.87 5609.93 LPP Amplitude Belief 5445.99 -2723 5559.81 5630.4

MODELS

AROUSAL

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_Subjective_Arousal ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(c(0, 0, 0), c(1, 1, 1)), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 100 -0.45 0.05 -0.45 0.05 -0.53 -0.35 EmotionNegative 100 1.05 0.07 1.05 0.07 0.93 1.19 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 100 -0.15 0.05 -0.15 0.04 -0.23 -0.06 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 100 -0.25 0.04 -0.25 0.04 -0.34 -0.18

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_Subjective_Arousal ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) -0.45 0.05 -9.42 155.65 0.00 0.00 0 Very Small EmotionNegative 1.06 0.07 15.73 162.14 0.53 0.03 0 Medium EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation -0.15 0.04 -3.27 3107.94 -0.05 0.02 0 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation -0.26 0.04 -5.95 3145.33 -0.11 0.02 0 Very Small

VALENCE

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_Subjective_Valence ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(c(0, 0, 0), c(1, 1, 1)), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 100.00 0.78 0.04 0.78 0.04 0.70 0.86 EmotionNegative 100.00 -1.61 0.06 -1.61 0.06 -1.71 -1.49 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 96.93 -0.06 0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.13 0.00 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 100.00 0.15 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.21

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_Subjective_Valence ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) 0.78 0.04 19.87 146.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 Very Small EmotionNegative -1.61 0.06 -28.77 153.84 -0.80 0.03 0.00 Large EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation -0.06 0.03 -1.93 3095.35 -0.02 0.01 0.05 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 0.15 0.03 4.86 3132.53 0.06 0.01 0.00 Very Small

CONTROL

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_Subjective_Control ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(c(0, 0, 0), c(1, 1, 1)), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 100.00 0.41 0.05 0.41 0.05 0.31 0.49 EmotionNegative 100.00 -0.92 0.07 -0.92 0.07 -1.05 -0.79 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 70.27 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.07 0.12 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 100.00 0.22 0.04 0.22 0.04 0.13 0.30

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_Subjective_Control ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) 0.41 0.05 8.91 157.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 Very Small EmotionNegative -0.92 0.07 -14.08 172.22 -0.46 0.03 0.00 Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 0.02 0.05 0.51 3125.15 0.01 0.02 0.61 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 0.22 0.05 4.75 3157.91 0.09 0.02 0.00 Very Small

SCR

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_SCR ~ Emotion / Objective_Condition + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(c(0, 0, 0), c(1, 1, 1)), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 87.80 -0.08 0.06 -0.08 0.07 -0.20 0.06 EmotionNegative 100.00 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.12 0.33 EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation 86.13 -0.05 0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.15 0.03 EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation 97.47 -0.09 0.05 -0.09 0.05 -0.19 -0.01

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_SCR ~ Emotion / Objective_Condition + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) -0.08 0.06 -1.28 62.77 0.00 0.00 0.21 Very Small EmotionNegative 0.23 0.05 4.40 330.86 0.12 0.03 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation -0.06 0.05 -1.15 3121.43 -0.02 0.02 0.25 Very Small EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation -0.09 0.05 -1.92 3125.50 -0.04 0.02 0.06 Very Small

HEART RATE

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_Heart_Rate ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(c(0, 0, 0), c(1, 1, 1)), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 93.07 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.07 -0.04 0.25 EmotionNegative 99.93 -0.14 0.04 -0.15 0.04 -0.23 -0.06 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 55.60 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.11 0.08 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 99.67 -0.12 0.05 -0.12 0.05 -0.22 -0.03

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_Heart_Rate ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) 0.10 0.07 1.48 40.94 0.00 0.00 0.15 Very Small EmotionNegative -0.15 0.04 -3.46 3133.38 -0.07 0.02 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation -0.01 0.05 -0.14 3144.15 0.00 0.02 0.89 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation -0.12 0.05 -2.56 3139.69 -0.05 0.02 0.01 Very Small

LPP

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_LPP ~ Emotion / Objective_Condition + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(c(0, 0, 0), c(1, 1, 1)), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 82.33 -0.14 0.15 -0.13 0.15 -0.42 0.14 EmotionNegative 100.00 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.11 0.26 EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation 93.67 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.12 EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation 99.80 -0.10 0.03 -0.10 0.04 -0.18 -0.04

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_LPP ~ Emotion / Objective_Condition + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) -0.12 0.13 -0.93 33.55 0.00 0.00 0.36 Very Small EmotionNegative 0.19 0.04 4.65 334.75 0.09 0.02 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation 0.05 0.04 1.36 2598.02 0.02 0.02 0.18 Very Small EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation -0.10 0.04 -2.82 2611.02 -0.04 0.02 0.00 Very Small

IMPACT OF SELF-RELEVANCE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL RELEVANCE

AROUSAL

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_Subjective_Arousal ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Autobiographical_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(0, 1), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 100.00 -0.49 0.05 -0.49 0.05 -0.57 -0.40 EmotionNegative 100.00 1.11 0.07 1.11 0.07 0.99 1.25 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 99.60 -0.13 0.05 -0.13 0.04 -0.22 -0.04 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 100.00 -0.24 0.05 -0.24 0.05 -0.32 -0.15 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 100.00 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.11 0.19 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 96.47 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.12 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 100.00 0.14 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.07 0.22 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 96.67 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.15

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_Subjective_Arousal ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Autobiographical_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=d f) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) - 0.05 - 159.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 Very Small 0.49 10.34 EmotionNegative 1.11 0.07 16.57 166.79 0.56 0.03 0.00 Medium EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation - 0.04 -2.87 3101.14 -0.05 0.02 0.00 Very Small 0.13 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation - 0.04 -5.42 3134.52 -0.10 0.02 0.00 Very Small 0.24 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 0.15 0.02 6.75 3153.84 0.10 0.02 0.00 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 0.06 0.03 1.89 3102.80 0.03 0.01 0.06 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 0.14 0.04 3.81 3103.15 0.06 0.01 0.00 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 0.08 0.04 2.03 3086.75 0.03 0.02 0.04 Very Small

VALENCE

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_Subjective_Valence ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Autobiographical_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(0, 1), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 100.00 0.75 0.04 0.75 0.04 0.67 0.82 EmotionNegative 100.00 -1.57 0.05 -1.57 0.05 -1.67 -1.46 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 94.87 -0.06 0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.12 0.02 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 100.00 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.08 0.20 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 100.00 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.07 0.13 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 97.80 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.10 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 100.00 0.12 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.19 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 76.33 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.04

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_Subjective_Valence ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Autobiographical_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data= df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) 0.75 0.04 19.68 151.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 Very Small EmotionNegative - 0.05 - 158.46 -0.79 0.03 0.00 Medium 1.57 28.92 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation - 0.03 -1.71 3089.60 -0.02 0.01 0.09 Very Small 0.06 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 0.14 0.03 4.27 3121.84 0.06 0.01 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 0.10 0.02 6.30 3142.25 0.07 0.01 0.00 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 0.05 0.02 2.08 3090.15 0.02 0.01 0.04 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 0.13 0.03 4.56 3091.91 0.05 0.01 0.00 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance - 0.03 -0.69 3076.63 -0.01 0.01 0.49 Very Small 0.02

CONTROL

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_Subjective_Control ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Autobiographical_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(0, 1), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 100.00 0.43 0.05 0.43 0.05 0.34 0.53 EmotionNegative 100.00 -0.96 0.07 -0.96 0.07 -1.09 -0.84 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 64.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.08 0.11 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 100.00 0.19 0.05 0.19 0.05 0.11 0.30 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 100.00 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.14 -0.05 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 96.07 -0.06 0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.12 0.01 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 99.67 -0.11 0.04 -0.11 0.04 -0.19 -0.03 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 99.67 -0.11 0.04 -0.11 0.04 -0.19 -0.03

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_Subjective_Control ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Autobiographical_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=d f) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) 0.43 0.05 9.40 164.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 Very Small EmotionNegative - 0.07 - 177.75 -0.48 0.03 0.00 Small 0.96 14.57 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 0.02 0.05 0.32 3114.72 0.01 0.02 0.75 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 0.19 0.05 4.07 3146.59 0.08 0.02 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance - 0.02 -4.09 3159.68 -0.07 0.02 0.00 Very Small 0.10 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance - 0.04 -1.74 3114.85 -0.03 0.02 0.08 Very Small 0.06 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance - 0.04 -2.66 3116.01 -0.04 0.02 0.01 Very Small 0.11 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance - 0.04 -2.63 3097.29 -0.04 0.02 0.01 Very Small 0.11

SCR

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_SCR ~ Emotion / Objective_Condition / Z_Autobiographical_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(0, 1), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 88.20 -0.08 0.06 -0.08 0.06 -0.20 0.05 EmotionNegative 100.00 0.24 0.05 0.24 0.06 0.14 0.35 EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation 88.47 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.15 0.03 EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation 95.20 -0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.18 0.02 EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 72.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.04 EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 95.33 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.15 EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 68.93 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.04 EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 99.20 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.17

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_SCR ~ Emotion / Objective_Condition / Z_Autobiographical_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) -0.07 0.06 -1.18 65.27 0.00 0.00 0.24 Very Small EmotionNegative 0.24 0.05 4.46 358.75 0.12 0.03 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation -0.06 0.05 -1.17 3117.74 -0.02 0.02 0.24 Very Small EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation -0.08 0.05 -1.69 3119.84 -0.04 0.02 0.09 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance -0.02 0.03 -0.58 3054.91 -0.01 0.02 0.56 Very Small EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 0.07 0.04 1.69 3141.83 0.03 0.02 0.09 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance -0.02 0.03 -0.50 3053.31 -0.01 0.02 0.62 Very Small EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 0.10 0.04 2.29 3135.67 0.04 0.02 0.02 Very Small

HEART RATE

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_Heart_Rate ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Autobiographical_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(0, 1), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 96.07 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 -0.01 0.24 EmotionNegative 99.93 -0.15 0.04 -0.15 0.04 -0.24 -0.07 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 70.53 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.12 0.08 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 99.13 -0.12 0.05 -0.12 0.05 -0.21 -0.02 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 89.93 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.02 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 87.80 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.12 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 94.33 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.16 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 77.67 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.13

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_Heart_Rate ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Autobiographical_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) 0.11 0.07 1.60 41.79 0.00 0.00 0.12 Very Small EmotionNegative -0.15 0.04 -3.41 3129.35 -0.07 0.02 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation -0.03 0.05 -0.50 3139.82 -0.01 0.02 0.61 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation -0.12 0.05 -2.36 3135.51 -0.05 0.02 0.02 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance -0.03 0.02 -1.32 3133.37 -0.02 0.02 0.19 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 0.04 0.04 1.19 3137.45 0.02 0.02 0.24 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 0.07 0.04 1.59 3136.91 0.03 0.02 0.11 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 0.04 0.04 0.81 3140.60 0.01 0.02 0.42 Very Small

LPP

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_LPP ~ Emotion / Objective_Condition / Z_Autobiographical_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(0, 1), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 85.33 -0.12 0.14 -0.14 0.13 -0.40 0.10 EmotionNegative 100.00 0.19 0.04 0.18 0.04 0.10 0.27 EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation 92.80 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.13 EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation 99.67 -0.11 0.04 -0.11 0.04 -0.18 -0.02 EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 54.93 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.05 EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 60.60 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.05 EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 90.87 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.08 0.02 EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 72.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.04

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_LPP ~ Emotion / Objective_Condition / Z_Autobiographical_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) -0.12 0.13 -0.93 33.69 0.00 0.00 0.36 Very Small EmotionNegative 0.19 0.04 4.52 362.58 0.09 0.02 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation 0.06 0.04 1.49 2598.04 0.02 0.02 0.14 Very Small EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation -0.11 0.04 -2.79 2606.29 -0.05 0.02 0.01 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance 0.00 0.02 0.12 2521.21 0.00 0.01 0.91 Very Small EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance -0.01 0.03 -0.26 2612.06 0.00 0.01 0.80 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance -0.03 0.03 -1.34 2561.15 -0.02 0.01 0.18 Very Small EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Autobiographical_Relevance -0.02 0.03 -0.58 2608.47 -0.01 0.01 0.56 Very Small

CONCEPTUAL RELEVANCE

AROUSAL

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_Subjective_Arousal ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Conceptual_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data= df, prior=normal(0, 1), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 100 -0.33 0.04 -0.32 0.04 -0.40 -0.24 EmotionNegative 100 0.80 0.06 0.80 0.06 0.67 0.90 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 100 -0.17 0.05 -0.17 0.05 -0.25 -0.07 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 100 -0.18 0.04 -0.18 0.04 -0.26 -0.09 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 100 0.34 0.03 0.34 0.03 0.29 0.40 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 100 0.28 0.03 0.28 0.03 0.23 0.33 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 100 0.21 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.13 0.28 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 100 0.26 0.03 0.26 0.03 0.20 0.32

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_Subjective_Arousal ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Conceptual_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) -0.33 0.04 -7.67 174.80 0.00 0.00 0 Very Small EmotionNegative 0.80 0.06 13.01 193.39 0.40 0.03 0 Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation -0.17 0.05 -3.49 3116.62 -0.06 0.02 0 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation -0.18 0.04 -4.06 3150.37 -0.07 0.02 0 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 0.34 0.03 12.21 3129.62 0.18 0.01 0 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 0.28 0.03 10.14 3142.69 0.16 0.02 0 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 0.21 0.04 4.91 3109.07 0.08 0.02 0 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 0.26 0.03 8.02 3155.13 0.12 0.01 0 Very Small

VALENCE

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_Subjective_Valence ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Conceptual_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data= df, prior=normal(0, 1), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 100.00 0.80 0.04 0.80 0.04 0.72 0.87 EmotionNegative 100.00 -1.57 0.06 -1.57 0.06 -1.68 -1.46 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 99.40 -0.09 0.04 -0.09 0.04 -0.17 -0.02 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 100.00 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.19 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 99.93 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.11 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 100.00 -0.13 0.02 -0.13 0.02 -0.17 -0.09 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 57.87 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.07 0.06 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 100.00 -0.15 0.02 -0.15 0.03 -0.20 -0.10

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_Subjective_Valence ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Conceptual_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) 0.80 0.04 21.07 159.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 Very Small EmotionNegative -1.57 0.05 -28.61 172.42 -0.78 0.03 0.00 Medium EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation -0.09 0.04 -2.49 3094.18 -0.03 0.01 0.01 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 0.12 0.03 3.73 3129.80 0.05 0.01 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 0.07 0.02 3.23 3106.07 0.04 0.01 0.00 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance -0.13 0.02 -6.09 3159.40 -0.07 0.01 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance -0.01 0.03 -0.17 3088.61 0.00 0.01 0.86 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance -0.15 0.02 -6.07 3139.40 -0.07 0.01 0.00 Very Small

CONTROL

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_Subjective_Control ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Conceptual_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=d f, prior=normal(0, 1), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 100.00 0.37 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.29 0.46 EmotionNegative 100.00 -0.78 0.07 -0.78 0.07 -0.90 -0.65 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 52.20 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.11 0.11 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 99.93 0.15 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.23 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 100.00 -0.11 0.03 -0.11 0.03 -0.18 -0.05 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 100.00 -0.21 0.03 -0.21 0.03 -0.27 -0.15 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 99.93 -0.15 0.05 -0.14 0.05 -0.23 -0.05 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 100.00 -0.15 0.04 -0.15 0.04 -0.22 -0.09

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_Subjective_Control ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Conceptual_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) 0.37 0.05 8.18 179.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 Very Small EmotionNegative -0.78 0.07 -11.94 203.39 -0.39 0.03 0.00 Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 0.00 0.05 -0.07 3123.74 0.00 0.02 0.94 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 0.15 0.05 3.11 3154.60 0.06 0.02 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance -0.11 0.03 -3.55 3136.43 -0.06 0.02 0.00 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance -0.21 0.03 -6.95 3128.96 -0.12 0.02 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance -0.14 0.05 -3.11 3115.90 -0.05 0.02 0.00 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance -0.15 0.04 -4.37 3157.07 -0.07 0.02 0.00 Very Small

SCR

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_SCR ~ Emotion / Objective_Condition / Z_Conceptual_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(0, 1), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 88.07 -0.08 0.07 -0.08 0.06 -0.19 0.06 EmotionNegative 99.93 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.06 0.09 0.31 EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation 86.67 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.17 0.04 EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation 89.13 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.16 0.04 EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 75.80 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.11 EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 94.67 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 -0.01 0.12 EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 62.67 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.07 0.09 EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 69.53 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.08 0.05

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_SCR ~ Emotion / Objective_Condition / Z_Conceptual_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) -0.07 0.06 -1.09 68.90 0.00 0.00 0.28 Very Small EmotionNegative 0.20 0.06 3.54 406.88 0.10 0.03 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation -0.06 0.05 -1.14 3122.72 -0.03 0.02 0.25 Very Small EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation -0.06 0.05 -1.23 3123.70 -0.03 0.02 0.22 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 0.03 0.04 0.74 3104.57 0.01 0.02 0.46 Very Small EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 0.06 0.04 1.56 2919.92 0.03 0.02 0.12 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 0.01 0.04 0.27 3147.32 0.01 0.02 0.79 Very Small EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance -0.02 0.03 -0.44 2753.56 -0.01 0.02 0.66 Very Small

HEART RATE

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_Heart_Rate ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Conceptual_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(0, 1), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 94.53 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.07 -0.02 0.25 EmotionNegative 99.93 -0.14 0.05 -0.14 0.05 -0.25 -0.06 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 57.00 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.13 0.10 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation 99.80 -0.15 0.05 -0.15 0.05 -0.24 -0.05 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 91.73 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.11 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 84.67 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.09 0.03 EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 68.67 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.08 0.13 EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 87.80 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.11

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_Heart_Rate ~ Emotion / Subjective_Condition / Z_Conceptual_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) 0.12 0.07 1.68 43.48 0.00 0.00 0.10 Very Small EmotionNegative -0.15 0.05 -3.14 3129.92 -0.07 0.02 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation -0.01 0.06 -0.19 3139.66 0.00 0.02 0.85 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation -0.15 0.05 -2.92 3135.72 -0.06 0.02 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 0.04 0.03 1.27 3145.91 0.02 0.02 0.20 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance -0.03 0.03 -1.06 3139.18 -0.02 0.02 0.29 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 0.02 0.05 0.48 3141.01 0.01 0.02 0.63 Very Small EmotionNegative:Subjective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 0.04 0.04 1.12 3143.18 0.02 0.02 0.26 Very Small

LPP

BAYESIAN VERSION fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Z_LPP ~ Emotion / Objective_Condition / Z_Conceptual_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(0, 1), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) results <- psycho::analyze(fit, Effect_Size=T) summary(results) Variable MPE Median MAD Mean SD 95_CI_lower 95_CI_higher (Intercept) 80.27 -0.10 0.14 -0.11 0.14 -0.38 0.13 EmotionNegative 100.00 0.18 0.04 0.18 0.04 0.10 0.27 EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation 93.07 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.14 EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation 99.00 -0.09 0.04 -0.09 0.04 -0.17 -0.02 EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 77.73 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.09 0.03 EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 90.60 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.08 EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 52.13 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.06 0.06 EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 68.47 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.06

FREQUENTIST VERSION fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Z_LPP ~ Emotion / Objective_Condition / Z_Conceptual_Relevance + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) results <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(results) Coef SE t df Coef.std SE.std p Effect_Size (Intercept) -0.13 0.13 -0.99 34.04 0.00 0.00 0.33 Very Small EmotionNegative 0.18 0.04 4.13 424.51 0.09 0.02 0.00 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation 0.06 0.04 1.46 2596.90 0.03 0.02 0.14 Very Small EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation -0.09 0.04 -2.32 2609.78 -0.04 0.02 0.02 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance -0.03 0.03 -0.82 2561.73 -0.01 0.01 0.41 Very Small EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionReality:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 0.03 0.03 1.24 2449.17 0.02 0.01 0.22 Very Small EmotionNeutral:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 0.00 0.03 0.07 2600.72 0.00 0.01 0.95 Very Small EmotionNegative:Objective_ConditionSimulation:Z_Conceptual_Relevance 0.01 0.03 0.48 2254.68 0.01 0.01 0.63 Very Small

Appendix B

Study 3: Supplementary Materials 2 SUPPLEMENTARY STATISTICS 2 Dominique Makowski TABLE OF CONTENTS Effect of HRV on Subjective Belief Scale ...... 1 Frequentist ...... 1 Bayesian ...... 1 Visualization ...... 1

This report contains the additional (post-hoc) analysis investigating the role of Heart Rate Variability on Subjective Belief. EFFECT OF HRV ON SUBJECTIVE BELIEF SCALE FREQUENTIST fit <- lmerTest::lmer(Subjective_Belief ~ Emotion / Condition * Heart_Rate + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df) rez <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(rez) Variable Coef t df p (Intercept) 6.12 1.10 92.97 > .1 EmotionNegative 1.62 0.28 808.56 > .1 Heart_Rate 2.11 0.92 2023.76 > .1 EmotionNeutral:ConditionReality 61.14 11.89 2025.43 < .001*** EmotionNegative:ConditionReality 28.53 4.82 2035.59 < .001*** EmotionNegative:Heart_Rate -5.90 -1.78 2028.40 = 0.08° EmotionNeutral:ConditionReality:Heart_Rate 0.54 0.17 2021.04 > .1 EmotionNegative:ConditionReality:Heart_Rate 7.14 2.16 2035.19 < .05* BAYESIAN fit <- rstanarm::stan_lmer(Subjective_Belief ~ Emotion / Condition * Heart_Rate + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order), data=df, prior=normal(rep(0, 7), rep(1, 7)), prior_intercept=normal(0, 1), chains = 3, iter = 1000, seed=666) rez <- psycho::analyze(fit) summary(rez) Variable Median MAD CI_lower CI_higher MPE R2 0.23 0.02 0.20 0.25 (Intercept) 5.70 5.61 -4.13 14.59 EmotionNegative 1.47 5.86 -7.51 10.87 61.00 Heart_Rate 2.23 2.30 -1.63 5.74 83.60 EmotionNeutral:ConditionReality 60.81 5.28 53.08 69.84 100.00 EmotionNegative:ConditionReality 28.42 5.72 19.13 38.28 100.00 EmotionNegative:Heart_Rate -6.13 3.32 -11.16 -0.81 97.20 EmotionNeutral:ConditionReality:Heart_Rate 0.38 3.16 -4.74 5.18 53.93 EmotionNegative:ConditionReality:Heart_Rate 7.20 3.36 1.27 12.04 98.47 VISUALIZATION

The results suggest an interaction between the condition and heart rate deceleration in its relationship to subjective belief in the negative condition: a stronger variability (through deceleration) is related to a higher belief in simulation and a lower belief in reality.

Appendix C

Study 4: Supplementary Materials 1 1

1 Supplementary Materials 1

2 Procedures, Tasks & Measures

4 Tasks

5 Fictional Reappraisal Procedure

6 The central task, built to implicitly activate the fictional reappraisal strategy, is thoroughly

7 described in Makowski et al. (under review). The experiment, programmed with Neuropsydia

8 (Makowski & Dutriaux, 2017), consisted in the presentation (3 s) of 96 neutral and negative NAPS

9 pictures of faces and people (Marchewka, Żurawski, Jednoróg, & Grabowska, 2014), randomly

10 preceded by the “simulation” or “reality” words (presented for 3 s). Each trial was followed by

11 analogue scales assessing features of the phenomenal experience, such as emotional arousal,

12 valence or the subjective feeling of control toward that emotion, self-relevance (studied in the

13 original paper) as well as the level of belief toward the presented context.

14 Heartbeat Counting

15 The heartbeat counting task (Garfinkel, Seth, Barrett, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2015) consisted

16 of 5 intervals (30 s, 37.5 s, 45 s, 52.5 s, 60 s), presented in a random order, during which the

17 participant had to count his heartbeats. Participants’ answer was recorded after each interval,

18 followed by a scale enquiring the participant’s degree of confidence toward his answer.

19 Executive Functioning

20 Working memory (WM) abilities were measured using a computerized version of the

21 forward digit-letter span (the participant had to reproduce length-increasing sequences of random

22 digits and letters), followed by a computerized version of the n-back task. In the latter, randomly

23 generated sequences of three digits (0, 1 and 2) were presented to the participants, digit after digit. FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 2

24 For each stimulus, the participant had to tell whether the current stimulus was the same than the

25 nth stimulus preceding it.

26 Mental set shifting (switching) was measured using a computerized task organized in three

27 phases. In phase one, 30 randomly selected digits (from 1 to 9 without “5”) appeared above a

28 horizontal line: the participant had to answer, as quickly as he could, whether the stimulus was odd

29 or even. In phase two, the same number of digits appeared below the horizontal line, and the

30 participant had to answer whether the digit was inferior or superior to 5. In phase 3, digits (n = 80)

31 appeared successively above and below the horizontal line, and the participant had to shift between

32 the two rules tested separately before.

33 Different components of cognitive control were assessed using the Cognitive Control task

34 (CoCon; see Makowski et al., under review, for a detailed description). In this task, participants

35 had to respond the same stimuli under different conditions that successively added control

36 constraints, allowing to delineate processes such as response inhibition, conflict resolution,

37 response selection speed and simple reaction time, a good measure of processing speed and fluid

38 intelligence (Jakobsen, Sorensen, Rask, Jensen, & Kondrup, 2011; Sheppard & Vernon, 2008;

39 Woods, Wyma, Yund, Herron, & Reed, 2015). The CoCon task is freely available at

40 https://github.com/DominiqueMakowski/CoCon.py.

41 Questionnaires

42 Dispositional characteristics were assessed using computerized questionnaires. Empathy

43 was assessed using three questions selected from the Agreeableness subscale of the mini-IPIP6

44 (Milojev, Osborne, Greaves, Barlow, & Sibley, 2013; Sibley et al., 2011): “I sympathize with

45 others’ feelings”; “I am not interested in other people’s problems” (reversed); “I feel others’

46 emotions”. FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 3

47 Neurophysiological Recording

48 Electrodermal (EDA) and cardiac (ECG) activity was recorded using Biopac MP150

49 system (Biopac Systems Inc., USA) and the AcqKnowledge Software 4.3 with a sampling

50 frequency of 1000 Hz. EDA was measured using two Ag-AgCl electrodes attached to the

51 intermediate phalanx of the index and ring fingers of the non-dominant hand. EDA signal was first

52 normalized, down-sampled to 100 Hz, then processed using the cvxEDA algorithm based on

53 convex-optimization (Greco, Valenza, Lanata, Scilingo, & Citi, 2016).

54 ECG electrodes were placed according to a modified lead II configuration (Takuma et al.,

55 1995) on the right and left subclavicular spaces (the deltopectoral fossae) and on the left lower rib.

56 Bodily signals processing was carried out using the NeuroKit package (Makowski, 2017). The

57 ECG signal was FIR bandpass filtered (3–45 Hz, 3rd order), and R peaks were identified using

58 Hamilton's (2002) segmenter. Next, R-R intervals were computed and submitted to cubic spline

59 interpolation.

60 EEG data were collected from 64 scalp sites using recording caps (EasyCap GmbH,

61 Germany) based on the 10–20 international system. The EEG was amplified using a 64-channel

62 BrainAmp amplifier (Brain Products GmbH, Munich, Germany) and sampled at 1000 Hz. The

63 signal was recorded using a right mastoid reference electrode. Horizontal and vertical electro-

64 oculograms (HEOG and VEOG) were used to measure eye movements and detect eye blinks.

65 Impedance was kept below 5 kΩ. EEG signal processing was carried out using Python packages

66 MNE (Gramfort et al., 2013, 2014) and NeuroKit (Makowski, 2017). The signal was re-referenced

67 to mastoid electrodes (TP9 – TP10), band-pass filtered (1–30 Hz) and down-sampled to 250 Hz.

68 Stimulus-synchronized epochs were extracted from 250 ms before to 3000 ms after picture onset

69 and baseline corrected. Next, epochs containing bad signal were automatically detected, then FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 4

70 repaired or discarded (16.3%) using the autoreject algorithm (Jas, Engemann, Bekhti, Raimondo,

71 & Gramfort, 2017). Finally, all sets were corrected for eye-blink artefacts by applying ICA.

72 Measures

73 Outcomes

74 The emotional subjective response was assessed through three dimensions: arousal

75 (“whether the emotion that you might have felt was intense or not”), valence (“whether that

76 emotion was rather positive and pleasant, or negative and unpleasant”) and feeling of control

77 (“amount of control that you felt toward that emotion”). Physiological markers included log

78 transformed skin conductance response (SCR) amplitude (the peak of the phasic EDA in a 1 – 7 s

79 post-stimulus window), heart rate deceleration (minimum heart rate in the window covering

80 stimulus display (0 – 3 s) subtracted from heart rate baseline, defined as the mean in the 3 s window

81 preceding each stimulus). Finally, the Late Positive Potential (LPP) was quantified for each epoch

82 as the mean activity of central–parietal electrodes (CP1, CP2, CP3, CP4, CP5, CP6, CPz) in a

83 window between 400 and 700 ms after stimulus onset (Moran, Jendrusina, & Moser, 2013; Pastor

84 et al., 2008).

85 Features

86 Interoceptive abilities were measured through three dissociable interoceptive processes:

87 accuracy, sensibility and awareness (Garfinkel et al., 2015). For each participant, the average

88 accuracy over the 5 trials of the heartbeat counting task was quantified using the following

89 formula: 1 − (|nbeatsreal − nbeatsreported|)/((nbeatsreal + nbeatsreported)/2). Sensitivity was computed as the

90 average confidence of the participant, and awareness was indexed as the trial-wise correlation

91 between accuracy and confidence. FICTIONAL REAPPRAISAL 5

92 Working memory capacity was measured as the max length of the digits and letters series

93 that the participant could successfully recollect more than 3 times. Updating was measured as the

94 max n at which the participant answered correctly more than 3 times. Switching was indexed as

95 the average correct response time in switch phase minus the average correct response time of the

96 no-switch phases, divided by the latter (RTP3 – (RTP1 + RTP2)/2 / (RTP1 + RTP2)/2). Simple reaction

97 time, a measure of processing speed, was measured with the CoCon task as the average reaction

98 time of correct answers in phase 1. Response selection was measured as the average correct

99 response time in phase 2 minus simple reaction time, divided by the latter (RTP2 – RTP1 / RTP1).

100 Response inhibition was measured as the number of errors in no/go trials in phase 3. Conflict

101 resolution was indexed as the average correct response time in incongruent trials of phase 4 minus

102 the average correct response time of congruent trials, divided by the latter (RTincong – RTcong /

103 RTcong).

104 The empathy-related questions showed a good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha =

105 0.87).

106 All scores were normalized, and the following were reversed for more straightforward

107 interpretation (See Table 2): processing speed, response selection, response inhibition, conflict

108 resolution and shifting. Also, subjective control and subjective valence outcomes were also

109 reversed, so that higher scores mean, respectively, more control and more negative.

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Appendix D

Study 4: Supplementary Materials 2 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 2

Dominique Makowski TABLE OF CONTENTS

Interoception ...... 3 Awareness ...... 3 Sensibility ...... 3 Accuracy ...... 4 Executive Functions ...... 5 CoCon - Processing Speed ...... 5 CoCon - Response Selection ...... 5 CoCon - Response Inhibition ...... 6 CoCon - Conflict Resolution ...... 6 Switching - Shifting...... 6 Working Memory - Updating ...... 7 Working Memory - Capacity ...... 7 Personality Traits ...... 9 Empathy ...... 9

This report contains the full statistical analysis of the result section. It provides the full statistical models description, along with the R code to generate it. INTEROCEPTION AWARENESS

## [1] "Emotion_Index ~ Emotion / Condition * Interoception_Awareness + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order)"

Variable Median MAD CI_lower CI_higher MPE 90% CI

R2 0.55 0.01 0.52 0.56 [0.52, 0.56]

(Intercept) 0.86 0.05 0.76 0.94 [0.76, 0.94]

EmotionNeutral -1.49 0.07 -1.61 -1.37 100.00 [-1.61, - 1.37]

Interoceptive_Awareness -0.06 0.04 -0.12 -0.01 95.55 [-0.12, - 0.0056]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation -0.32 0.05 -0.41 -0.24 100.00 [-0.41, - 0.24]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation -0.03 0.05 -0.11 0.05 73.88 [-0.11, 0.049]

EmotionNeutral:Interoceptive_Awareness 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.19 99.22 [0.033, 0.19]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation:Interoceptive_Awareness 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.16 92.62 [-0.0090, 0.16]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation:Interoceptive_Awareness 0.00 0.05 -0.08 0.08 50.15 [-0.076, 0.084]

SENSIBILITY

## [1] "Emotion_Index ~ Emotion / Condition * Interoception_Sensibility + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order)"

Variable Median MAD CI_lower CI_higher MPE 90% CI

R2 0.55 0.01 0.53 0.57 [0.53, 0.57]

(Intercept) 0.85 0.05 0.76 0.94 [0.76, 0.94]

EmotionNeutral -1.47 0.07 -1.59 -1.35 100.00 [-1.59, - 1.35]

Interoceptive_Sensibility 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.11 93.77 [-0.0056, 0.11]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation -0.30 0.05 -0.39 -0.22 100.00 [-0.39, - 0.22]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation -0.04 0.05 -0.11 0.04 79.33 [-0.11, 0.039]

EmotionNeutral:Interoceptive_Sensibility -0.11 0.04 -0.18 -0.03 98.95 [-0.18, - 0.031]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation:Interoceptive_Sensibility 0.01 0.05 -0.07 0.09 59.52 [-0.070, 0.094]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation:Interoceptive_Sensibility 0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.10 67.42 [-0.054, 0.097]

ACCURACY

## [1] "Emotion_Index ~ Emotion / Condition * Interoception_Accuracy + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order)"

Variable Median MAD CI_lower CI_higher MPE 90% CI

R2 0.54 0.01 0.52 0.56 [0.52, 0.56]

(Intercept) 0.85 0.05 0.77 0.94 [0.77, 0.94]

EmotionNeutral -1.47 0.07 -1.59 -1.35 100.00 [-1.59, - 1.35]

Interoceptive_Accuracy -0.04 0.03 -0.10 0.01 91.03 [-0.10, 0.0075]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation -0.32 0.05 -0.40 -0.23 100.00 [-0.40, - 0.23]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation -0.03 0.05 -0.12 0.05 75.62 [-0.12, 0.046]

EmotionNeutral:Interoceptive_Accuracy 0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.08 54.80 [-0.060, 0.084]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation:Interoceptive_Accuracy 0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.10 65.45 [-0.057, 0.098]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation:Interoceptive_Accuracy 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.15 92.80 [-0.0077, 0.15] EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS COCON - PROCESSING SPEED

## [1] "Emotion_Index ~ Emotion / Condition * CoCon_Core_Speed + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order)"

Variable Median MAD CI_lower CI_higher MPE 90% CI

R2 0.55 0.01 0.53 0.56 [0.53, 0.56]

(Intercept) 0.85 0.05 0.77 0.94 [0.77, 0.94]

EmotionNeutral -1.47 0.07 -1.59 -1.35 100.00 [-1.59, -1.35]

Processing_Speed -0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.05 58.03 [-0.058, 0.047]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation -0.31 0.05 -0.40 -0.23 100.00 [-0.40, -0.23]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation -0.03 0.05 -0.11 0.05 76.15 [-0.11, 0.045]

EmotionNeutral:Processing_Speed 0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.13 90.80 [-0.012, 0.13]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation:Processing_Speed -0.08 0.05 -0.16 -0.01 95.62 [-0.16, -0.0056]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation:Processing_Speed -0.01 0.05 -0.08 0.07 55.25 [-0.084, 0.066]

COCON - RESPONSE SELECTION

## [1] "Emotion_Index ~ Emotion / Condition * CoCon_Response + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order)"

Variable Median MAD CI_lower CI_higher MPE 90% CI

R2 0.54 0.01 0.52 0.56 [0.52, 0.56]

(Intercept) 0.84 0.05 0.75 0.93 [0.75, 0.93]

EmotionNeutral -1.47 0.07 -1.59 -1.35 100.00 [-1.59, -1.35]

Response_Selection -0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.01 87.72 [-0.088, 0.014]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation -0.32 0.05 -0.40 -0.23 100.00 [-0.40, -0.23]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation -0.03 0.05 -0.12 0.04 75.88 [-0.12, 0.042]

EmotionNeutral:Response_Selection 0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.08 64.08 [-0.050, 0.084]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation:Response_Selection -0.02 0.05 -0.10 0.06 62.32 [-0.097, 0.062]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation:Response_Selection 0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.11 73.32 [-0.050, 0.11] COCON - RESPONSE INHIBITION

## [1] "Emotion_Index ~ Emotion / Condition * CoCon_Inhibition + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order)"

Variable Median MAD CI_lower CI_higher MPE 90% CI

R2 0.55 0.01 0.53 0.57 [0.53, 0.57]

(Intercept) 0.85 0.05 0.76 0.93 [0.76, 0.93]

EmotionNeutral -1.48 0.07 -1.60 -1.36 100.00 [-1.60, -1.36]

Response_Inhibition -0.08 0.04 -0.15 -0.02 98.67 [-0.15, -0.021]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation -0.32 0.05 -0.40 -0.24 100.00 [-0.40, -0.24]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation -0.03 0.05 -0.10 0.06 70.10 [-0.10, 0.061]

EmotionNeutral:Response_Inhibition 0.16 0.05 0.08 0.24 99.98 [0.081, 0.24]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation:Response_Inhibition 0.02 0.06 -0.07 0.11 66.17 [-0.073, 0.11]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation:Response_Inhibition -0.06 0.05 -0.14 0.02 87.58 [-0.14, 0.021]

COCON - CONFLICT RESOLUTION

## [1] "Emotion_Index ~ Emotion / Condition * CoCon_Conflict + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order)"

Variable Median MAD CI_lower CI_higher MPE 90% CI

R2 0.54 0.01 0.52 0.56 [0.52, 0.56]

(Intercept) 0.84 0.05 0.75 0.93 [0.75, 0.93]

EmotionNeutral -1.46 0.07 -1.59 -1.35 100.00 [-1.59, -1.35]

Conflict_Resolution 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.12 94.88 [0, 0.12]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation -0.33 0.05 -0.42 -0.25 100.00 [-0.42, -0.25]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation -0.03 0.05 -0.11 0.05 74.58 [-0.11, 0.050]

EmotionNeutral:Conflict_Resolution -0.11 0.05 -0.18 -0.04 99.38 [-0.18, -0.035]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation:Conflict_Resolution 0.01 0.05 -0.07 0.09 57.12 [-0.071, 0.095]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation:Conflict_Resolution 0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.11 72.60 [-0.051, 0.11]

SWITCHING - SHIFTING

## [1] "Emotion_Index ~ Emotion / Condition * Switch_Switching_Speed + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order)" Variable Median MAD CI_lower CI_higher MPE 90% CI

R2 0.54 0.01 0.52 0.56 [0.52, 0.56]

(Intercept) 0.85 0.05 0.76 0.94 [0.76, 0.94]

EmotionNeutral -1.47 0.07 -1.59 -1.35 100.00 [-1.59, -1.35]

Shifting 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.14 99.20 [0.027, 0.14]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation -0.32 0.05 -0.40 -0.23 100.00 [-0.40, -0.23]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation -0.04 0.05 -0.12 0.04 76.38 [-0.12, 0.044]

EmotionNeutral:Shifting -0.16 0.05 -0.23 -0.09 99.98 [-0.23, -0.088]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation:Shifting -0.10 0.05 -0.18 -0.02 98.75 [-0.18, -0.020]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation:Shifting 0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.10 71.80 [-0.054, 0.10]

WORKING MEMORY - UPDATING

## [1] "Emotion_Index ~ Emotion / Condition * SimAct_Updating_Span + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order)"

Variable Median MAD CI_lower CI_higher MPE 90% CI

R2 0.55 0.01 0.53 0.57 [0.53, 0.57]

(Intercept) 0.85 0.05 0.76 0.93 [0.76, 0.93]

EmotionNeutral -1.46 0.07 -1.58 -1.35 100.00 [-1.58, -1.35]

Updating -0.11 0.03 -0.17 -0.06 100.00 [-0.17, -0.055]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation -0.32 0.05 -0.40 -0.24 100.00 [-0.40, -0.24]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation -0.04 0.05 -0.12 0.04 78.65 [-0.12, 0.043]

EmotionNeutral:Updating 0.19 0.05 0.11 0.26 100.00 [0.11, 0.26]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation:Updating 0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.11 67.07 [-0.056, 0.11]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation:Updating -0.03 0.05 -0.11 0.05 71.90 [-0.11, 0.047]

WORKING MEMORY - CAPACITY

## [1] "Emotion_Index ~ Emotion / Condition * SimAct_Capacity_Span + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order)"

Variable Median MAD CI_lower CI_higher MPE 90% CI

R2 0.54 0.01 0.52 0.56 [0.52, 0.56] (Intercept) 0.85 0.05 0.76 0.93 [0.76, 0.93]

EmotionNeutral -1.47 0.07 -1.58 -1.35 100.00 [-1.58, -1.35]

Capacity 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.08 74.75 [-0.032, 0.077]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation -0.31 0.05 -0.39 -0.23 100.00 [-0.39, -0.23]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation -0.04 0.05 -0.12 0.04 76.75 [-0.12, 0.041]

EmotionNeutral:Capacity -0.05 0.04 -0.12 0.02 88.05 [-0.12, 0.025]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation:Capacity -0.08 0.05 -0.16 0.00 94.50 [-0.16, 0.0025]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation:Capacity 0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.11 71.05 [-0.051, 0.11] PERSONALITY TRAITS EMPATHY

## [1] "Emotion_Index ~ Emotion / Condition * Persona_Empathy + (1|Participant_ID) + (1|Item) + (1|Order)"

Variable Median MAD CI_lower CI_higher MPE 90% CI

R2 0.55 0.01 0.53 0.57 [0.53, 0.57]

(Intercept) 0.84 0.05 0.76 0.94 [0.76, 0.94]

EmotionNeutral -1.47 0.07 -1.59 -1.36 100.00 [-1.59, -1.36]

Empathy 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.17 99.98 [0.061, 0.17]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation -0.31 0.05 -0.39 -0.23 100.00 [-0.39, -0.23]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation -0.03 0.05 -0.11 0.05 75.17 [-0.11, 0.048]

EmotionNeutral:Empathy -0.20 0.05 -0.28 -0.13 100.00 [-0.28, -0.13]

EmotionNegative:ConditionSimulation:Empathy -0.07 0.05 -0.15 0.02 91.88 [-0.15, 0.016]

EmotionNeutral:ConditionSimulation:Empathy 0.01 0.05 -0.07 0.09 54.97 [-0.069, 0.086]

Appendix E

Makowski et al. (2017): "Being there" and Remembering it: Presence Improves Memory Encoding Consciousness and Cognition 53 (2017) 194–202

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Consciousness and Cognition

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/concog

“Being there” and remembering it: Presence improves memory MARK encoding ⁎ ⁎ Dominique Makowskia,b, ,1, Marco Sperdutia,b,1, Serge Nicolasa,b, Pascale Piolinoa,b,c, a Memory and Cognition Lab, Institute of Psychology, University of Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris, France b Center for Psychiatry & Neuroscience, INSERM U894, Paris, France c Institut Universitaire de France, France

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT

Keywords: Few studies have investigated the link between episodic memory and presence: the feeling of Presence “being there” and reacting to a stimulus as if it were real. We collected data from 244 participants Memory encoding after they had watched the movie Avengers: Age of Ultron. They answered questions about factual Emotion (details of the movie) and temporal memory (order of the scenes) about the movie, as well as Consciousness their emotion experience and their sense of presence during the projection. Both higher emotion Sense of reality experience and sense of presence were related to better factual memory, but not to temporal Absorption order memory. Crucially, the link between emotion and factual memory was mediated by the sense of presence. We interpreted the role of presence as an external absorption of the attentional focus toward the stimulus, thus enhancing memory encoding. Our ﬁndings could shed light on the cognitive processes underlying memory impairments in psychiatric conditions characterized by an altered sense of reality.

“Virtual Reality is the representation of possible worlds and possible selves, with the aim of making them appear as real as possible—i- deally, by creating a subjective sense of “presence” in the user. Interestingly, some of our best theories of the human mind and conscious experience describe it in a very similar way” Thomas Metzinger, “2016: What do you consider the most interesting recent scientiﬁc news?” Edge.org.

1. Introduction

Humans are endowed with the ability to create realistic mental representations of events that are, have been or might be. At the heart of this ability to transcend time and space lies episodic memory (EM), deﬁned as the conscious re-experiencing of personal events combined with the recollection of the phenomenological, spatial and temporal encoding contexts (Tulving, 2002). These multiple components are linked together by a neurocognitive process known as binding (Kessels, Hobbel, & Postma, 2007). Ongoing research indicates that the quality of the encoded memory trace is modulated by several aspects of the stimulus as well as by the brain and body states during encoding (Hayes et al., 2010; Otten, Henson, & Rugg, 2002). One of the factors facilitating subsequent recollection is the emotional nature of the stimulus to be encoded. This emotion-related memory enhancement is strong, long-lasting (Yonelinas & Ritchey, 2015) and is based on the close neuro-anatomical connection and interaction between the amygdala and the hippocampus (Greenberg et al., 2005; Richardson, Strange, & Dolan, 2004). For example, both pleasant and unpleasant pictures are

⁎ Corresponding authors at: 71 avenue Ed. Vaillant, 92100 Boulogne Billancourt, France. 2 ter rue d’Alésia, 75014 Paris, France. E-mail address: [email protected] (D. Makowski). 1 These two authors contributed equally to the study. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017.06.015 Received 22 May 2016; Received in revised form 19 June 2017; Accepted 23 June 2017 Available online 01 July 2017 1053-8100/ © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. D. Makowski et al. Consciousness and Cognition 53 (2017) 194–202 better recalled than neutral ones and elicit an earlier neural processing, indicating a privileged access of emotional stimuli to cognitive resources (Dolcos & Cabeza, 2002). The same pattern of results has been found for other emotional material such as words (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003) and faces (Sergerie, Lepage, & Armony, 2005). The literature suggests that emotions “capture” attention toward the stimulus (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001), allocating cognitive resources for in-depth processing that, in turn, facilitates memory encoding. Indeed, attention plays a pivotal role in memory encoding. Several studies have shown an advantage in subsequent recollection for items encoded in a full compared to a divided attention condition (Anderson et al., 2000; Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Gavrilescu, & Anderson, 2000). The literature suggests a dissociation between top-down and bottom-up attentional mechanisms in memory formation (Turk-Browne, Golomb, & Chun, 2013). Top-down orienting of attention may facilitate the elaboration of the stimuli in sensory brain structures that, in turn, provide a high-fidelity representation to the hippocampus, leading to a better encoding. On the other hand, bottom-up attention reallocation could exert an opposite effect, hindering memory encoding. Another phenomenon linked to enhanced memory performances is the so-called enactment effect (Engelkamp, 1998). Sentences describing actions are better remembered if, during the encoding phase, they are performed by the subject, compared to conditions in which they are performed by the experimenter or encoded verbally (Mulligan & Hornstein, 2003). The role of active motor interaction in enhancing episodic memory encoding has been replicated in more realistic settings using virtual reality (Brooks, 1999; Jebara, Orriols, Zaoui, Berthoz, & Piolino, 2014; Plancher, Barra, Orriols, & Piolino, 2012). In these studies, participants who were allowed to actively interact with a virtual environment showed better binding performance in a subsequent recall test than those assigned to passive navigation. More recently, in an elegant study, Bergouignan, Nyberg, and Ehrsson (2014), using an out-of-body illusion induced during an ecologically salient social interaction, showed that experiencing events from the first-person perspective of one’s own body is necessary for accurate EM encoding. Interestingly, first-person perspective, interactivity, emotion experience and attentional engagement are together the pillars of presence (Coelho, Tichon, Hine, Wallis, & Riva, 2006; Witmer & Singer, 1998). Presence is commonly defined as the feeling of “being there”, i.e. the feeling of being located in, and responding to (whether consciously or not) a mediated environment as if it were real (Barfield, Zeltzer, Sheridan, & Slater, 1995; Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005). Originally introduced to describe the feeling that may arise when agents remotely interact with teleoperator devices (telepresence; Minsky, 1980), presence has subsequently been studied mainly in the field of virtual reality (VR). Lately, this concept has received considerable attention from researchers working in different domains such as psychiatry, cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy (Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2012), and its definition has extended to the feeling of being located and fully engaged in a perceived external world around the self (Waterworth, Waterworth, Mantovani, & Riva, 2010). Some authors have even suggested that presence in mediated worlds does not fundamentally differ from presence in the real one (Riva, Waterworth, & Waterworth, 2004). Thus, nowadays, it is considered as a key phenomenon for understanding normal and altered states of consciousness (Loomis, 1992; Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005; Seth et al., 2012). While the increasing popularity of the investigation on presence in different theoretical domains has certainly produced important insights, it has also led to some confusion in the terminology employed in the literature. For the sake of clarity, in the following, we will brie fly summarize the major current theoretical frameworks and define the terminology employed throughout the present work. In the VR domain the study of presence is tightly linked to that of immersion that is defined as the extent to which a system can, thanks to its technical properties, deliver a convincing (real-like) and surrounding (isolating from the real world) environment with which an agent can interact (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005). Many features of the system contribute to its immersive capability, such as the field of view, the frame rate, the stereopsis, the presence of coherent multisensory information, the degree of accuracy in matching the simulated sensory data with proprioceptive signals, and the possibility to interact with the virtual environment. All these features are objective properties of the system and are also referred to as media form (Coelho et al., 2006). Hereafter, we will use the term media immersion (Slater, 1999) to refer to this component. Beyond technical features of the system, the content of the mediated environment could influence presence. For example, emotional features or narrative consistency of the scenario can increase presence irrespective of media immersion (Coelho et al., 2006; Gorini, Capideville, De Leo, Mantovani, & Riva, 2011). We will call all these features media content. Finally, neurocognitive features of the participants, such as attentional engagement toward and willingness to endorse the mediated scenario, could play a role in modulating presence. Several theoretical proposals have suggested that presence in inseparable from attentional factors (e.g., Witmer & Singer, 1998). Selective attention toward the virtual world, and the exclusion of distracting information (i.e., the real environment or self-generated thoughts) seem a central precondition to experience presence (Darken, Bernatovich, Lawson, & Peterson, 1999). These processes will be referred to as user characteristics. The term presence will only be used here to indicate the subjective response to the mediated environment that likely results from the interaction of all the aforementioned components. Given the overlap between the factors influencing memory encoding and those triggering presence, it is surprising that no study has directly investigated the link between these two processes. Here, for the first time, we tested the hypothesis that increased presence would facilitate memory encoding. Moreover, we investigated this phenomenon in a highly ecological setting, taking advantage of the renewed interest in 3D movies and the large audiences they reach. Some studies suggest that movies presented in 3D are rated as more credible, more realistic and more immersive than those in 2D (Pölönen, Salmimaa, Aaltonen, Häkkinen, & Takatalo, 2009), resulting in an increased presence (IJsselsteijn, de Ridder, Hamberg, Bouwhuis, & Freeman, 1998; IJsselsteijn et al., 2001). Consequently, we hypothesised that thanks to a greater media immersion, a movie in 3D, compared to 2D, would be associated with increased presence and consequently be associated with better memory performance. Moreover, as presence is also modulated by other factors than media immersion, we expected that, independently of the movie format, the subjectively reported presence would be associated with memory performance. This original methodology allowed us both to exert a rigorous control on the stimulus (the movie was the same for all subjects) and to have a fully ecological in-field setting. The people going to the cinema were self-motivated in doing so, and contrary to most experimental settings, they were unaware that they were taking part in a memory test, making it

195 D. Makowski et al. Consciousness and Cognition 53 (2017) 194–202

Table 1 Summary statistics.

Score 2D 3D 95% CI p value

Participants Population n = 115 (33% ♀) n = 129 (30% ♀) Age 26.67 ± 7.63 26.55 ± 8.44 [−2.15;1.92] > 0.05 Delay 7.20 ± 6.31 8.91 ± 5.97 [−3.26;−0.16] > 0.05 Familiarity with characters 6.25 ± 1.02 6.05 ± 1.17 [−0.07;0.48] > 0.05

Variables of interest Emotion experience 4.23 ± 1.26 4.30 ± 1.20 [−0.38;0.64] > 0.05 Presence 4.19 ± 1.48 4.32 ± 1.28 [−0.46;0.21] > 0.05 Factual memory 0.57 ± 0.15 0.54 ± 0.15 [−0.01;0.06] > 0.05 Temporal order memory 0.49 ± 0.76 0.44 ± 0.84 [−0.02;0.12] > 0.05

In the upper part of the table are reported: the age, the number of participants in each set-up (2D-3D), the delay between seeing the movie and responding to the questionnaire expressed in days, the familiarity with this particular ﬁlm-genre, the level of familiarity with the movie characters. The latter two variables were measured on a 7-point scale. The bottom part reports the summary statistics for the variables of interest: emotion experience (range 1–7), presence (range 1–7), factual memory (range 0–1), and temporal order memory (range 0–1). The p values are Bonferroni corrected. possible to study incidental encoding processes that are closer to those at stake in the formation of episodic memories.

2. Material and methods

2.1. Participants

Two hundred and sixty-eight participants completed the on-line questionnaire. Forms received more than 30 days after the participants had watched the movie were excluded, however, leading to a final sample of 244 participants, among whom 115 (47%) viewed the movie in 2D and 129 (53%) in 3D (respectively; mean age: 26.56 ± 7.63, mean age: 26.67 ± 8.44). The two groups did not differ in gender ratio (2D 33% Female, 3D 30% Female, χ2 = 0.21, p > 0.05). There was no difference between the two groups in age, delay between seeing the movie and the completion of the questionnaire, and familiarity with the movie characters (see Table 1). Participants were fully informed of the academic nature of the study and the voluntary nature of their participation. The local ethics committee approved the study.

2.2. The movie

The perquisites for the movie were to include live-action actors and scenes, to be available in both 2D and 3D format, and to be widely appealing and potentially attended by a large and diverse audience. For these reasons, the movie Avengers: Age of Ultron (Whedon, 2015, http://marvel.com/avengers) was chosen. The movie set is a realistic world with elements of fantasy (super-heroes) and mixed features of many sub-genres of narrative interest, such as action, comedy, romance, and drama (see Supplementary Table 1 for the synopsis of the movie).

2.3. Procedure

We distributed handouts to people leaving theatres after watching the movie, with a link to an on-line questionnaire, and used advertisement on social networks. Questions measuring demographic information (age, sex, familiarity with the movie characters), memory, emotional experience, and presence were presented (described below). The form was put on-line using Google Forms©, and statistical analyses were performed using R (R Development Core Team, 2008). For each dimension, a Cronbach's alpha superior to 0.70 was considered as an acceptable internal reliability index (Darren & Mallery, 1999), leading to the averaging of the scores.

2.3.1. Factual memory Twenty-seven memory questions were constructed by the ﬁrst two authors immediately after the projection of the movie (notes to construct the questionnaire were taken during the projection of the movie). These questions had four possible answers, plus one “I don't know” (e.g., what is the colour of the cocktail that Bruce Banner and Natasha drink at Stark’s party? Red, Blue, Green, Transparent, I don’t know). Scores were collected on a binary true/false mode. However, from this initial set of questions, two were removed, one for being non-sensitive (100% of correct answers), and the other one for having an arguable answer. The memory score was computed as the ratio of correct answers on the number of questions. The list of questions is presented in the Supplementary Table 2.

2.3.2. Temporal order memory Temporal order memory was tested by asking participants to rearrange in the correct sequence verbal descriptions of 10 important scenes from the movie (see Supplementary Table 3). The order of the scenes was randomised across participants. One point

196 D. Makowski et al. Consciousness and Cognition 53 (2017) 194–202 was assigned to each scene that was correctly placed between the previous and the following scene. For example, the answer was scored as correct if the scene n°4 was placed between scenes n°3 and n°5. The total score was computed as the ratio of correct answers on the maximum score 10.

2.3.3. Presence Presence was measured by 14 questions (on a 7-point Likert scale, e.g., “I was reacting to everything I was seeing as it was real”) speciﬁcally constructed for the current study, but heavily based on the leading questionnaire on Presence: the ITC-Sense of Presence Inventory (ITC-SOPI; Lessiter, Freeman, Keogh, Davidoﬀ, & Keogh, 2001). This questionnaire showed excellent internal reliability (α = 0.93). Items are reported in Supplementary Table 4.

2.3.4. Emotion experience Three questions (on a 7-point Likert scale) were administered as a measure of the emotion experience during the ﬁlm: the prevalent valence of emotions (Negative - Positive), the overall intensity of emotions (Weak-Strong), and the frequency at which these emotions were experienced during the ﬁlm (Never-Very Frequently). However, due to a strong correlation among the three scores (intensity – frequency: r = 0.76, p < 0.001; valence – intensity: r = 0.64, p < 0.001; valence – frequency: r = 0.60, p < 0.001, α = 0.86), they were averaged into a single measure.

3. Results

3.1. The immersive 3D setup

There was no significant difference between participants who saw the film in 3D and those who saw it in 2D in any of the variables of interest: factual memory (t(242) = 1.96, p > 0.1, 95% CI [−0.001,0.45]), temporal order memory (t(242) = 1.34, p > 0.1, 95% CI [−0.23,1.20]), presence (t(242) = −0.53, p > 0.1, 95% CI [−0.86,0.49]), and emotional experience (t(242) = −0.96, p > 0.1, 95% CI [−0.51,0.17]), see Table 1.

3.2. Correlation analysis

We ran correlations between the variables of interest on the whole sample. Emotion experience, presence, and factual memory were strongly correlated (see Table 2). Nevertheless, partial correlations showed that the link between emotion experience and ∗ factual memory was mediated by subjective presence (r = 0.12, p > 0.05). On the contrary, the correlation between presence and ∗ factual memory remained significant even when controlling for the emotion experience (r = 0.15, p < 0.05; see Fig. 1). The temporal order memory score correlated with factual memory (r = 0.44, p < 0.001), but we did not find any significant correlations between this measure and the emotion experience (r = −0.004, p > 0.05) or subjective presence (r = 0.03, p > 0.05).

3.3. Mediation analysis

To further support the results of the previous analysis, we ran a mediation analysis employing structural equation modelling (lavaan R package; Rosseel, 2012; Shevlin et al., 2015). A mediation model was fitted, with emotion experience as predictor, factual memory as outcome, and presence as mediator. As recommended, bootstrapping (nsim = 1000) was used to estimate standard errors (SE). The R code for this analysis is provided in the supplementary materials. Within this model, the “direct” effect of emotion experience on factual memory did not reach significance (β = 0.018, SE = 0.010, p > 0.05). Concerning the mediation path, presence was significantly predicted by emotion experience (β = 1.34, SE = 0.11, p < 0.001), and factual memory by presence (β = 0.010, SE = 0.005, p < 0.05). Overall, the “indirect” effect of emotion experience on factual memory (the one mediated by presence) was significant (β = 0.014, SE = 0.006, p < 0.05), as well as the total effect (both the direct and indirect effects; β = 0.032, SE = 0.008, p < 0.001). In order to address the issue of the alternative effect direction, we also fitted the model with presence as predictor, factual memory as outcome, and emotion experience as mediator. The same parameters were used. Within this model, the “direct” effect of presence on factual memory was significant (β = 0.010, SE = 0.004, p < 0.05). Concerning the mediation path, emotion

Table 2 Correlations between the variables of interest.

Presence Factual memory Temporal memory

Emotion experience 0.62*** 0.26*** 0.006 Presence 0.27*** 0.06 Factual memory 0.45***

*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. *** p < 0.001

197 D. Makowski et al. Consciousness and Cognition 53 (2017) 194–202

Fig. 1. Relationship between presence, emotion and memory. The correlations between Presence, Emotion, Factual and Temporal Memory on the whole sample. The r*'s are the estimated partial correlation coefficients when adjusting for the factor in brackets. (***p < 0.001, *p < 0.05, NS: p > 0.05). experience was significantly predicted by presence (β = 0.28, SE = 0.023, p < 0.001), but factual memory was not predicted by emotion experience (β = 0.018, SE = 0.010, p > 0.05). Overall, the “indirect” effect of presence on factual memory (the one mediated by emotion experience) was not significant (β = 0.005, SE = 0.003, p > 0.05), as opposed to the total effect (both the direct and indirect effects; β = 0.015, SE = 0.003, p < 0.001).

4. Discussion

In this study, we gathered data on memory for a “real-life” event (viewing a movie) that was inherently self-relevant, since participants were internally motivated and had no knowledge of the experimental purpose during the event. We hypothesised that the higher media immersion provided by a 3D set-up would increase presence that, in turn, would facilitate memory encoding. Moreover, we expected that presence, independently of the presentation format, would modulate subsequent memory performance. The first hypothesis was not confirmed. There was no difference between the 3D and the 2D conditions on presence or on the two memory scores (factual and temporal order memory). We found however that, independently of the movie format (2D-3D), the subjective sense of presence was correlated with the emotion experience and the factual memory score. Moreover, presence mediated the correlation between emotion experience and the factual memory scores.

4.1. Presence is not modulated by the 3D set-up, but by the emotion experience

Contrary to some previous studies, we did not observe a modulation of presence by the 3D setup (IJsselsteijn et al., 1998, 2001; Rooney, Benson, & Hennessy, 2012; Rooney & Hennessy, 2013). Despite the fact that a previous study did not report it either (Baños et al., 2008), several hypotheses can be put forward to explain this result. Firstly, some of the aforementioned studies (IJsselsteijn et al., 1998, 2001) used a specific laboratory apparatus, where the subject was alone and the stereoscopic depth adjusted to her position, rather than generic theater technology. Rooney et al. (2012) used a mini 3D cinema (2.5 m2) that can be considered, along with the study by Baños et al. (2008), comparable to the setting of the present work. In these two studies, presence was measured by a specific subscale of the ITC-Sense of Presence Inventory (ITC-SOPI) (Lessiter et al., 2001): the ecological validity subscale. This measure indicates “the level to which a viewer perceives the mediated environment as lifelike and real” (Rooney et al., 2012, pp. 412–413). Nevertheless, recently other factors influencing presence such as emotional engagement, self-relevance, and narrative consistency have been emphasized, beyond the perceptual aspects of the experience. For example, Hall (2003) identified six dimensions that contribute to realism, and perceptual persuasiveness is only one of them. It is therefore possible that the 3D condition did not yield alone a sufficient difference to operate a significant modulation on the sense of presence. In accordance with previous studies, we found that the sense of presence was strongly correlated with the emotion experience. The role of emotions in triggering a sense of presence has been demonstrated by many studies and is often considered as the most important predictor of presence (Baños et al., 2004, 2008; Riva et al., 2007; Villani, Repetto, Cipresso, & Riva, 2012; Västfjäll, 2003). Tan, Lewis, Avis, and Withers (2008) proposed that presence, attention and emotion sustain each other in a symbiotic fashion. Seth et al. (2012) go a step further, suggesting that presence is mainly related to interoceptive inputs, and thus intrinsically connected to emotions, rather than exteroceptive ones. They argue that emotional engagement is sufficient to generate a feeling of “being there”, as suggested by the high sense of presence that one can experience when reading a good book (a medium with low media immersion). In this wider view of presence as a multi-determined construct, the absence of noticeable modulation of the sense of presence by the 3D setting is not incoherent.

198 D. Makowski et al. Consciousness and Cognition 53 (2017) 194–202

Another issue concerns the nature of the movie itself (media content), involving non-realistic fictive elements (such as super- heroes, robots, etc.). However, since both groups saw the same fictional movie, it is unlikely that the impact of the media content can explain our findings. Nevertheless, the effect of fiction on cognition, and more specifically on emotion, has been a hot topic in philosophy, and has just started to attract the interest of neuroscientists. Known as the “paradox of fiction”, it summarily posits that one cannot feel genuine emotions toward characters and events while knowing and believing that they are not real (Radford & Weston, 1975). Experimental studies suggest that the difference in emotions toward reality and fiction lies in the intensity of their expression, rather than in their essence. Several studies indicate that fiction induces a form of emotion down regulation (Mocaiber et al., 2010; Sperduti et al., 2016, 2017). Probably, fiction constitutes an appraising framework mediating the link between emotion and presence. Overall, the findings are coherent with a synergetic and almost circular link between emotion, presence and fictional appraisal. Indeed, while emotion can prompt presence, appraising an event as fictional seems to down regulate emotion, and may produce a diminished presence. On the other hand, fictional events recognized as such can still be experienced as intensely emotional and produce a high presence according to our current results and many VR experiments (that are set in a fictive world).

4.2. Temporal order memory is not modulated by presence

Contrarily to factual memory, memory for temporal order correlated neither with the emotion experience nor with the degree of subjective presence. The knowledge of the mechanisms subserving the encoding of contextual information (i.e., temporal order) is relatively sparse. There is compelling evidence suggesting that they could partially be dissociated from those engaged in factual memory encoding, since item and contextual memory encoding have been shown to recruit different medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures (Davachi, Mitchell, & Wagner, 2003). Moreover, temporal order memory, but not memory for items, has been reported to be impaired in patients with frontal lobe lesions (Mangels, 1997; Shimamura, Janowsky, & Squire, 1990), and a similar dissociation, related to the diminished recruitment of frontal structures, has been reported in normal aging (Cabeza, Anderson, Houle, Mangels, & Nyberg, 2000). The role of emotion in modulating the encoding of contextual temporal information is not well understood, and results in this domain are quite contradictory (for a recent review, see Chiu, Dolcos, Gonsalves, & Cohen, 2013). For example, Schmidt, Patnaik, and Kensinger (2011) reported that items characterized by high arousal, independently of their valence (positive or negative), were better remembered along with their temporal context, compared with low arousal items. On the contrary, Huntjens, Wessel, Postma, van Wees-Cieraad, and de Jong (2015) reported that participants performed less well in reordering highly arousing pictures in the correct temporal sequence, and that this effect was more pronounced for negative material. Using a more ecological approach, Zlomuzica, Preusser, Totzeck, Dere, and Margraf (2015) showed that negative emotion arousal induced by short movie clips, prior to the navigation of a virtual reality scenario, was associated with poorer memory for the spatial context, but not for the temporal order of events encountered in the scenario. The absence of modulation of temporal order memory by the emotion in the present work is in agreement with the latter study. The discrepancy between the aforementioned results might be due to methodological differences. Indeed, it is important to note that in the first two studies, the authors directly manipulated the emotional features (valence and arousal) of the item to be encoded, and employed intentional encoding, while Zlomuzica et al. (2015) induced an emotional state before incidental encoding of neutral material. Further work should elucidate in which circumstances emotion modulates the encoding of contextual information, in particular temporal memory.

4.3. Emotion and presence enhance factual memory encoding

We found that people that had a stronger emotion experience showed better factual memory scores. The encoding advantage of emotional material has been repeatedly reported (e.g., Dolcos & Cabeza, 2002). However, it is important to note that most of the previous studies manipulated the emotional content of the to-be-encoded material and not the participants’ emotional state. Thus, it is not clear how the magnitude of emotional reaction to the same material can influence memory encoding. Interestingly, two studies have shown that the interindividual variability in the activity of the amygdala while watching arousing films correlated with subsequent recall (Cahill et al., 1996; Canli, Zhao, Brewer, Gabrieli, & Cahill, 2000). These findings, together with our data, suggest that the subjective emotional state in reaction to the same objective stimulus could enhance memory encoding through a mechanism subserved by the activation of the amygdala and its modulation of perceptual and higher-level cortical areas responsible for attentional control (Hamann, 2001; Murty, Ritchey, Adcock, & LaBar, 2011). Beside the correlation between the emotion experience and memory performance, we also found that greater presence coincided with higher factual memory scores. Due to the strong correlation between presence and emotion, one plausible explanation is that this result simply reflects the effect of emotion on memory. Nevertheless, we do not only report that the link between presence and memory remained significant after adjusting for emotion but, centrally, we found that presence mediates the link between emotion and memory. What mechanism could explain the additional advantage of presence, beyond emotion, on memory encoding? One possible explanation is that enhanced presence is characterized by an increased attentional engagement toward the event (in this case the film). As mentioned in the introduction, attentional engagement seems to be a central mechanism grounding presence. Indirect evidence for this hypothesis comes from a study showing that trait-absorption is associated with superior autobiographical memory abilities (Patihis, 2016). This concept is linked to that of presence since it is defined as the “disposition for having episodes of ‘total’ attention that fully engage perceptive and imaginative resources, resulting in a heightened sense of reality towards the object of attention” (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974, p. 268). The author explained these findings by proposing that absorption may enhance attention during the encoding phase. Interestingly, higher absorption has also been linked to an increased false memory rate

199 D. Makowski et al. Consciousness and Cognition 53 (2017) 194–202 employing a classical Deese-Roediger and McDermott paradigm (DRM; Meyersburg, Bogdan, Gallo, & McNally, 2009), and to enhanced susceptibility to misinformation in false memory formation in participants with highly superior autobiographical memory (Patihis et al., 2013). Taken together, and in line with the results of Merckelbach (2004), these findings suggest that increased presence could have either a beneficial or a detrimental effect on memory performance depending on whether misleading information is present or not. The impact of attentional processes on memory is well documented, and seems to act mostly during the encoding phase. Indeed, several studies have reported that memory performance is hindered by divided attention during encoding, but not during retrieval (Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge, & Thomson, 1984; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996; Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Guez, & Dori, 1998; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2000). This attentional benefit on encoding processes is sustained by the enhanced recruitment of prefrontal regions that exert a top-down modulation on sensory and medial temporal lobe structures (Kensinger, Clarke, & Corkin, 2003; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2000; Turk-Browne et al., 2013; Uncapher & Rugg, 2005). We propose that presence is linked to selective attention toward the stimulus, and consequently to reduced processing of irrelevant external (e.g., noises produced by other people in the theater) and internal (e.g., self-generated thoughts) distractors. We suggest that this mechanism is subserved by the recruitment of top-down attentional structures, such as the prefrontal cortex. This is consistent with neuroimaging findings showing that the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is activated during episodes of adhesion (the belief that the fiction is real) toward a theater play (Metz-Lutz, Bressan, Heider, & Otzenberger, 2010). This region has repeatedly been associated with successful memory encoding (for a recent meta-analysis see Kim, 2011), and its activity is reduced during encoding under divided attention (Uncapher & Rugg, 2005).

4.4. Presence as a conscious state and its alteration: impact on memory

We showed, in line with previous findings, that subjective presence was linked to the emotional reaction toward the event (a film). Nevertheless, it seems that presence cannot be explained by the emotion experience alone, since its effect on subsequent memory performance remained significant when adjusting for the emotion experience at encoding. We suggest that, when facing an event, an emotional reaction could constitute a pre-attentional mechanism that enhances perceptual processing and engages attentional resources in a bottom-up fashion. This then acts as a trigger for the sense of presence. Presence is subsequently sustained by top-down attentional processes, which further accrue selective attention toward the on-going event, and eventually diminish resource allocation toward possible distractors. Indeed, emotions and attention are two interacting systems. On the one hand, emotional stimuli can capture attention. On the other hand, attention is necessary to sustain emotional reaction. We suggest that these mechanisms are subserved by two independent, but interacting, networks sustaining their activity reciprocally. The first network is composed of areas linked to emotional processing including the amygdala, and the second encompasses fronto-parietal structures responsible for attentional control. Both networks have been shown to modulate activity in medial temporal structures (the hippocampus and parahippocampus) during memory encoding. Thus, increased presence may constitute an optimal state of consciousness to favour memory encoding. Some authors have suggested that presence in mediated worlds does not fundamentally differ from presence in the real one (Riva et al., 2004). Interestingly, several psychiatric disorders, such as depersonalization/derealization disorders (DDD), are characterized by both an altered sense of reality (diminished presence in our framework) and memory impairments (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Our study suggests that these two dysfunctional processes could be closely linked, in that decreased presence could lead to impaired memory encoding. Even if speculative, this hypothesis could be of epistemological relevance in guiding and reframing neuropsychiatric research on depersonalization and derealization as altered states of consciousness.

5. Limitations, perspectives and conclusion

The major limitation of our study that was due to the very nature of the methodology employed, is that we only collected self- reported measures of emotion and presence. Future studies, using a similar methodology, but in more controlled laboratory settings, could take advantage of the use of real-time physiological (e.g., Skin Conductance Response and EEG) and behavioural (e.g., eye tracking) measures as objective markers of emotional and attentional processes. Nevertheless, using an ecologically valid procedure we were able to show that increased presence was associated with memory accuracy. We have proposed that this benefit results from the interaction of emotional and attentional processes. We further suggest that presence could be conceptualised as a state of consciousness and that its alteration, observed in several psychiatric conditions, could be at the root of the memory dysfunctions reported in these disorders. This study could represent a step toward a neuroscientific approach to the study of presence as an integrative field of research at the crossroads between emotion, attention, memory, and consciousness. Future studies should elucidate the neural underpinning of presence and its dysfunction in psychiatric diseases.

Acknowledgements

We thank all the participants for the time they devoted to our study, Léo Dutriaux for his help, Elizabeth Rowley-Jolivet for proofreading, and Dr Bruce Banner for his inﬂuence.

200 D. Makowski et al. Consciousness and Cognition 53 (2017) 194–202

Appendix A. Supplementary material

Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2017. 06.015.

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202 Appendix F

Nicolas, S., & Makowski, D. (2017). Centenaire Ribot (I). La réception de l’oeuvre de Théodule Ribot chez l’éditeur Ladrange (1870-1873) bulletin de psychologie / tome 70 (3) / 549 / mai-juin 2017 163

Centenaire Ribot (première partie). La réception de l’œuvre de Théodule Ribot publiée chez l’éditeur Ladrange (1870-1873)

Nicolas Serge a Makowski Dominique a

Résumé : Le centenaire de la disparition de Ribot est l’occasion d’apporter la lumière sur l’œuvre de ce fondateur de la psychologie française moderne. Les livres de Ribot seront diffusés chez les plus grands éditeurs français de l’époque. Les auteurs de l’article s’intéressent à la présentation de l’œuvre de jeunesse de Ribot, publiée chez l’éditeur parisien Jean-Baptiste Ladrange. Du- rant la période 1870-1873, Ribot publiera un premier livre sur la psychologie anglaise (1870), dont l’introduction peut être considérée comme le manifeste fondateur de la nouvelle psychologie française, puis sa thèse de doctorat (1873) sur la question de l’hérédité psychologique, qui porte en germe bien des élé- ments de son œuvre future. a Université Paris Descartes, Équipe Mémoire et cognition, Institut de psychologie, Centre de psychiatrie et neurosciences, INSERM UMR U894, Ribot’s Centenary (Part One). The Reception of Théodule Ribot’s Work Paris, France. Published by Ladrange (1870-1873) Correspondance : Serge Nicolas, Institut de Abstract: The centenary of Ribot’s death is an opportunity to shed light upon Psychologie, Laboratoire mémoire et cognition. the work of this founder of modern French psychology. Ribot’s books were 71 avenue Edouard Vaillant. 92774 Boulogne promoted by the greatest publishers of that time. The authors of this paper focus Billancourt Cedex, France. on the presentation of Ribot’s early work, published by the French editor Jean- Courriel : [email protected] Baptiste Ladrange. Between 1870 and 1873, Ribot published his first book, on English psychology (1870), the introduction of which can be considered as Texte reçu le 27 mai 2016 et accepté le 20 juin the founding manifesto of the new French psychology, and his doctoral thesis 2016 (1873) on the question of psychological heredity, which carries the seeds of http://www.bulletindepsychologie.net many elements of his future work.

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« Une bonne collection de monographies et de mémoires Né le 18 décembre 1839 à Guingamp, en sur des points spéciaux serait peut-être le meilleur Bretagne, il poursuit ses études jusqu’au baccalau- service que l’on puisse maintenant rendre aux études réat, puis est contraint par son père de travailler dans psychologiques » (Ribot, 1870, p. 41) l’administration. Mais là n’est pas son ambition, il démissionne trois ans plus tard à sa majorité, afin de préparer le concours d’admission à l’École normale Située à mi-chemin entre la philosophie et les supérieure (ENS) qu’il obtient en 1862 après une sciences, la psychologie est une discipline en voie première tentative infructueuse. De novembre 1862 de formation au cours du xixe siècle (Nicolas, 2016). à décembre 1865, il est ainsi étudiant à Paris et Comme on va le voir, le philosophe Théodule Ribot côtoie, à l’ENS 1, des condisciples qui vont devenir (1839-1916) (voir Nicolas, 2005 ; Nicolas, Murray, des amis intimes, notamment le futur éditeur, en 1999), dont on fête cette année le centenaire de la 1884, Félix Alcan (1841-1925) et le futur professeur disparition, va devenir en France une figure majeure de philosophie, en 1881, à l’université de Bordeaux, de cette nouvelle psychologie, dégagée des consid- Alfred Espinas (1844-1922), dont nous aurons à érations métaphysiques poussiéreuses prisées par ses reparler. Il eut pour maîtres en philosophie à l’ENS devanciers (Nicolas, 2007). Le Bulletin de psychol- deux figures importantes de l’époque : le profes- ogie a fêté, à diverses occasions, ce père fondateur seur Elme Caro (1826-1887, voir figure 2) et Albert de la psychologie française (par exemple,Voutsinas, Lemoine (1824-1874, voir figure 3). Alors que le 1988). Il ne faut pas oublier que le nom de Ribot (voir figure 1) est associé, en France, à l’introduction de l’enseignement moderne de la psychologie, d’abord à la Sorbonne, en 1885 (Nicolas, 2000), puis au Collège de France, en 1888 (Nicolas, Charvillat, 2001) : il fut, d’ailleurs, parmi les premiers au monde à être titulaire d’une chaire de « Psychologie expérimentale [et comparée] » (nombre d’autres grands psychologues de son époque étaient détenteurs, non pas d’une chaire de psychologie, mais de philosophie ou de physiologie). Le centenaire de la disparition de Ribot nous fournit l’occasion de revenir sur le contenu des premiers livres du fondateur de la psychologie française moderne. Mais, d’abord, quelques mots sur le personnage lui- même et son parcours, avant de rappeler la réception Figure 2. Portrait d’Elme Caro (1826-1887) (collection de ses premiers ouvrages les plus emblématiques. personnelle S. Nicolas)

Figure 3. Photo d’Albert Lemoine (1824-1874) (collection personnelle S. Nicolas)

1. Le 18 mai 2016 a été inaugurée par le département d’études cognitives (DEC), la salle « Théodule Ribot » à l’École normale supérieure (ENS). Cet acte constitue la Figure 1. Portrait de Théodule Ribot (1839-1916) (collec- preuve de l’importance aujourd’hui accordée au personnage tion personnelle S. Nicolas) et à sa place dans l’histoire intellectuelle.

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premier le dégoûtera des leçons oratoires héritées par Bénard et Véra, d’Aristote, traduites par Barthé- de la philosophie de Victor Cousin (1792-1867), lemy-Saint-Hilaire, d’Hamilton et de Stuart Mill, le second lui fera néanmoins aimer la psychologie traduites par Louis Peisse. Il publia également les orientée vers la physiologie et la pathologie. écrits de Ravaisson, Vacherot, Alfred Maury, Paul Janet, Alfred Fouillée, Ollé-Laprune et, bien sûr, Après avoir enfin obtenu, en 1866, son agrégation les premiers livres de Ribot. Les idées novatrices de philosophie après une première tentative infruc- qu’apportent les jeunes auteurs sont les bienvenues tueuse, il est nommé professeur titulaire au lycée chez Ladrange. Le projet d’ouvrage de Ribot sur la de Vesoul. C’est là qu’il s’enthousiasme notam- psychologie anglaise contemporaine est, ainsi, très ment pour les écrits d’Herbert Spencer (1820- bien accueilli, comme le seront ses deux thèses de 1903), qui deviendra son maître en psychologie. En doctorat, dont nous parlerons dans la suite. 1868, il est nommé au lycée de Laval, une ville plus accueillante que Vesoul et, surtout, plus proche de Guingamp. C’est à cette période qu’il lit assidûment Un premier ouvrage sur la les écrits des philosophes associationnistes britan- psychologie associationniste niques (J. Mill, J. S. Mill, A. Bain, etc.). Il a 31 ans anglaise (1870) : Vers une lorsque paraît en librairie, le 1er février 1870, son psychologie objective premier livre (Ribot, 1870) portant sur la psychol- Sorti des presses de l’imprimerie Belin à Saint- ogie anglaise de l’époque, chez l’éditeur Ladrange, Cloud le 24 décembre 1869, c’est le 1er février 1870 connu pour avoir fait imprimer les œuvres des que paraît officiellement, chez l’éditeur Ladrange, plus grands philosophes de l’époque. Cet ouvrage l’ouvrage de Ribot sur La psychologie anglaise marquera une date dans l’histoire de la nouvelle contemporaine (Ribot, 1870), où il présente, aux psychologie française et inaugurera, par bien des lecteurs français, la psychologie association- points, son œuvre ultérieure. Très critique envers niste anglaise, pratiquement inconnue en France la psychologie classique de son temps, il subira, à cette époque (voir cependant : Taine, 1861, pendant des années, les assauts des philosophes et 1864 ; Laugel, 1864 ; Mervoyer, 1864). À cause métaphysiciens spiritualistes, héritiers de l’œuvre de sa nouveauté, l’ouvrage a d’emblée du succès de Cousin. Cependant, les éditeurs de l’époque (2e édition remaniée en 1875, 3e en 1883 ; traduc- feront confiance à Ribot en lui assurant la diffusion tions en anglais, en russe, en polonais, en espagnol, de ses travaux. Après la défaite contre la Prusse en allemand). Ce livre (figure 4) est généralement (1871), la France républicaine est éprise de liberté considéré comme l’un des premiers manifestes de et est à la recherche d’idées nouvelles. C’est cette la nouvelle psychologie (voir aussi Taine, 1870), liberté d’opinion que revendique Ribot qui publiera car, dans l’introduction qu’il donne à l’ouvrage, ainsi ses ouvrages chez les grands éditeurs parisiens Ribot établit une critique de la psychologie spiri- (successivement Ladrange, Baillière et Alcan), qui tualiste de son époque et essaye de promouvoir cherchent à attirer de nouveaux auteurs ayant des une psychologie nouvelle à caractère scientifique. vues novatrices, en phase avec l’époque nouvelle Dans cette longue introduction, Ribot revendique, qui s’annonce. Nous allons nous intéresser, dans cet pour la psychologie, le droit d’exister à côté et article, à l’œuvre de jeunesse de Ribot, publiée chez en dehors de la philosophie, et de se constituer l’éditeur Ladrange. comme science autonome. Il revendique également, pour la psychologie, une méthode propre, qui est Jean-Baptiste Ladrange (1793-1879) fut, au l’expérience, entendue au sens le plus large, et non cours de la première moitié du xixe siècle, l’un des pas seulement l’expérience intime ou introspection éditeurs parisiens les plus connus. Pendant plus d’un (qu’il ne rejette pas, par ailleurs). Ribot voulait que demi-siècle, il a attaché son nom à des publications la philosophie s’écarte de la métaphysique et choi- scientifiques, littéraires et philosophiques d’auteurs sisse pour objet la psychologie qui ne pouvait être majeurs dans ces domaines (voir Baillière, 1879). que de nature scientifique, positive, expérimentale. C’est en 1835 qu’il fonde sa librairie philosophique. Le grand mouvement libéral qui suivit 1830 amena Il écrit ainsi : « Notre dessein est de montrer que la chez lui les maîtres de la philosophie : Cousin, Jouf- psychologie peut se constituer en science indépen- froy, Damiron, Rémusat, Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire, dante, de rechercher à quelles conditions elle le Gérando, etc. À côté de leurs œuvres, il publia, peut, et de voir si chez plusieurs contemporains notamment, celles de Maine de Biran, rassem- cette indépendance n’est pas déjà un fait accompli. blées par Cousin, de Kant, traduites par Tissot et Au premier abord, je le sais, cette proposition peut Barni (14 volumes in-8°), de Strauss, traduites par paraître inacceptable. La psychologie n’est-elle E. Littré, de Ritter, traduites par Tissot, Trullard et pas la base de la philosophie, et son objet d’étude Challemel-Lacour (9 volumes), de Hegel, traduites le plus constant sinon le plus ancien ? Comment

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les séparer ? Il y a là une équivoque qu’il faut La psychologie doit être purement expérimentale, résoudre » (Ribot, 1870, p. 18-19). La psychologie, elle ne doit avoir pour objet que les phénomènes, entendue dans son sens ordinaire, est une étude leurs lois et leurs causes immédiates ; elle ne doit plus occupée d’abstractions que de faits, fondée s’occuper ni de l’âme ni de son essence, car cette sur une méthode subjective et remplie de discus- question, qui est au-dessus de l’expérience et en sions métaphysiques. Selon Ribot, la psychologie dehors de la vérification, appartient à la métaphy- expérimentale (pour une discussion sur le sens du sique. La méthode à employer doit être à la fois mot « expérimental » à cette époque, voir Carroy et subjective et objective. « Les discussions entre ceux Plas, 1996), seule, constitue toute la psychologie, le qui ne veulent admettre que l’observation intérieure, reste étant de la métaphysique. La métaphysique, comme Jouffroy, et ceux qui ne reconnaissent que voilà l’ennemi que désignera toujours Ribot (lettre l’observation extérieure, comme Broussais, ressem- à Espinas du 15 juillet 1871 ; voir Lenoir, 1957) : blent à ces combats indécis après lesquels chacun « La métaphysique ne pourra jamais donner que des s’attribue la victoire. » (Ribot, 1870, p. 30). En fait, possibilités, puisqu’elle n’est pas vérifiable, ne fera influencé par les écrits de John Stuart Mill (1806- jamais, au point de vue scientifique, que gâter toute 1873) et de Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), qu’il science où elle entre ». Ribot aimait l’ironie de analyse dans son livre, il pense que ces méthodes Voltaire, qui disait autrefois : « Quand deux philos- se complètent réciproquement, la méthode subjec- ophes discutent sans se comprendre, ils font de la tive procédant par analyse et la méthode objective métaphysique ; quand ils ne se comprennent plus par synthèse ; la méthode intérieure (subjective) eux-mêmes, ils font de la haute métaphysique » étant la plus nécessaire, puisque sans elle on ne sait (cité par Ernest-Charles, 1905). Or, les philoso- pas même de quoi on parle, la méthode extérieure phes ont, pendant trop longtemps, négligé l’étude (objective) étant la plus féconde, puisque le champ des faits pour la construction de théories stériles. de son investigation est presque illimité. « Mais en La psychologie ne doit plus être cette partie de la quoi consiste cette méthode objective ? À étudier philosophie qui a pour objet la connaissance de les états psychologiques au dehors, non au dedans, l’âme et de ses facultés, étudiées par le seul moyen dans les faits matériels qui les traduisent, non dans de la conscience, comme l’avait imaginé Adolphe la conscience qui leur donne naissance (…) Les Garnier (1800-1864) avec son traité des facultés dérangements morbides de l’organisme qui entraî- de l’âme (Garnier, 1852). Certes, la psychologie nent des désordres intellectuels, les anomalies, les doit utiliser, comme méthode d’observation, la monstres dans l’ordre psychologique, sont pour réflexion (ou observation intérieure), mais celle-ci nous comme des expériences préparées par la nature est insuffisante pour constituer la psychologie et d’autant plus précieuses qu’ici l’expérimentation comme science. « De deux choses l’une : ou bien est plus rare. L’étude des instincts, passions et habi- la psychologie se borne à l’observation intérieure, tudes des divers animaux nous fournit des faits et alors étant complètement individuelle, elle est dont l’interprétation (souvent difficile) permet, par comme enfermée dans une impasse et n’a plus induction, déduction ou analogie, de reconstruire un aucun caractère scientifique ; ou bien elle s’étend mode d’existence psychologique. Enfin la méthode aux autres hommes, cherche des lois, induit, objective, au lieu d’être personnelle comme la raisonne, et alors elle est susceptible de progrès ; simple méthode de réflexion, emprunte aux faits mais sa méthode est en grande partie objective. un caractère impersonnel, elle se plie devant eux, L’observation intérieure seule ne suffit donc pas à elle moule ses théories sur la réalité. Entre autres la plus timide psychologie. » (Ribot, 1870, p. 23). avantages, je n’en veux signaler que deux : elle La psychologie doit, ainsi, devenir une science introduit dans la psychologie l’idée de progrès, elle indépendante en se séparant de la métaphysique. rend possible une psychologie comparée. » (Ribot, Ribot note les progrès des sciences physiques et 1870, p. 31). Si l’on doit tracer les divisions d’une naturelles, de la linguistique et de l’histoire, qui psychologie scientifique, elle devrait contenir, selon ont révélé des faits inattendus, suggéré des aperçus Ribot : 1° une psychologie générale, centrée sur nouveaux : études sur le mécanisme des sensations, l’étude des phénomènes de conscience, sensations, sur les conditions de la mémoire, sur les effets de pensées, émotions, volitions, etc., considérés sous l’imagination et de l’association des idées, sur les leurs aspects les plus généraux ; 2° une psychol- rêves, le somnambulisme, l’extase, l’hallucination, ogie comparée, l’idée de progrès, d’évolution ou de la folie et l’idiotie… Il souligne également qu’au développement étant devenue prépondérante dans cours des dernières années, certains physiolo- toutes les sciences qui ont pour objet le vivant ; 3° gistes (Helmholtz, Hirsch, Donders, Wundt, une psychologie pathologique, l’étude des dévia- Marey, etc.), se sont efforcés de soumettre les actes tions est utile pour l’intelligence complète des psychologiques au contrôle précis de la mesure. phénomènes.

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sait nécessairement à ce résultat. Du moment que tout phénomène psychologique se réduit à constater la relation des phénomènes entre eux et à en dégager une loi, il n’y a plus qu’une chose qui intéresse la science, à savoir si et comment ces phénomènes s’associent dans leur succession ou leur concomi- tance. C’est là toute l’explication que peut chercher une psychologie qui ne prétend pas atteindre les causes internes des phénomènes. La psychologie que John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) propose n’a pas fait l’objet d’un ouvrage spécial, mais on la trouve exposée dans plusieurs écrits importants (Mill, 1843 ; 1859a ; 1865). Dans le sixième livre (chapitre IV) de son fameux ouvrage « Système de logique déductive et inductive », Mill (1843, p. 436) affirme l’existence d’une science de l’esprit à part entière, qu’il nomme « psychologie », même s’il pense qu’elle ne sera jamais aussi exacte que la physique. « La psychologie, dit-il, a pour objet Figure 4. Couverture de l’ouvrage de Ribot (1870) sur la les uniformités de succession ; les lois, soit primi- psychologie anglaise contemporaine (cliché de la Biblio- thèque de la Sorbonne) tives, soit dérivées, d’après lesquelles un état mental succède à un autre, est la cause d’un autre, ou, du moins, la cause de l’arrivée de l’autre. De ces lois, Après cette longue introduction critique, Ribot les unes sont générales, les autres plus spéciales. » insiste, notamment, sur la psychologie de John (Mill, 1843, p. 437). Parmi les lois spéciales, il citera Stuart Mill (1806-1873), celle d’Herbert Spencer les deux grandes lois de l’association des idées, la loi (1820-1903) et celle d’Alexander Bain (1818-1903). de similarité et la loi de contiguïté, déjà étudiées par Il souligne l’importance de la loi la plus générale son père James Mill (1829), auxquelles il ajoutera qui régit les phénomènes psychologiques : la loi la loi de l’intensité. Mill était en train de rédiger son d’association. « Par son caractère compréhensif, elle ouvrage sur le système de logique, en 1837, lorsqu’il est comparable à la loi d’attraction dans le monde découvrit, pour la première fois, les deux premiers physique. L’association a lieu soit entre des faits de volumes du Cours de philosophie positive de Comte même nature : association des sensations entre elles, (1830-1842), qui firent sur lui une énorme impres- des idées entre elles, des volitions entre elles, etc., sion. Mais, pour Mill, Comte a commis une erreur soit entre des faits de différente nature : association de méthode en plaçant dans la biologie l’étude de des sentiments avec des idées, des sensations avec la psychologie. Cette négation de la psychologie fut des volitions, etc. » (Ribot, 1870, p. 413). Cette école condamnée par Mill à maintes reprises (voir Comte, expérimentale avait pour prédécesseurs David Hume 1975, p. 348 ; Mill, 1865, p. 67). Mill essaiera, au (1711-1776) et David Hartley (1705-1757), les contraire, d’intercaler, entre la biologie et la soci- fondateurs de l’école associationniste anglaise (voir ologie, une science fondamentale que Comte a eu, Hartley, 1746, 1749 ; Hume, 1739). Ces philosophes selon lui, le tort d’omettre et qui comprenaient la furent, en effet, les premiers qui aient tenté d’expliquer psychologie et l’éthologie (science de formation par l’association des idées et l’habitude, la notion de du caractère). Pour ce qui touche aux questions cause et le principe de causalité, l’origine des idées psychologiques qui nous intéressent ici, les critiques dites rationnelles, des affections dites naturelles, des que Mill (1865) fit à Comte portèrent essentiellement principes moraux dits innés, enfin l’origine des actes sur : 1° la réduction de la psychologie à la physi- volontaires, auxquels on attribue le caractère de libre ologie et même à la « phrénologie » ; 2° l’absence arbitre. L’école tout expérimentale de Stuart Mill, de de la psychologie dans l’ordre des sciences ; 3° la Bain et de Spencer n’a fait que reprendre ces thèses constitution imparfaite de la sociologie en n’y faisant pour les développer de nouveau en les fondant sur pas intervenir la psychologie. des observations, des analyses, des explications qui lui appartenaient. Que presque tous les philosophes Mais la psychologie associationniste anglaise a de l’école expérimentale se soient rencontrés dans trouvé sa forme la plus systématique dans l’œuvre la théorie qui explique tout le mécanisme de l’esprit d’Alexander Bain (1818-1903), qui fut un intime humain par l’association, il n’y a rien à cela que de de J. S. Mill (Nicolas, Marchal, Isel, 2000). Trois naturel pour Ribot. La méthode inductive les condui- traits essentiels caractérisent cette psychologie, si

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l’on se réfère aux premières publications de Bain (1855, 1859), que J. S. Mill a saluées en écrivant : « Notre île a décidemment reconquis le sceptre de la psychologie. (…) C’est par nos compatriotes qu’est poursuivie avec le plus de persévérance et de bonheur l’étude de la psychologie. » (Mill, 1859b). D’abord, s’il soutient que la psychologie est une science du mental comme telle, il ne nie pas la dépendance du moral à l’égard du physique, bien qu’il ne la signale qu’à l’occasion, sans y insister. Ensuite, il suppose des données psychologiques élémentaires ; c’est par la combinaison de ces données qu’il essaie de rendre raison de tous les aspects complexes de la vie morale. Enfin, ce que cette psychologie prétend expliquer Figure 5. Portrait d’Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), le c’est la façon dont se constitue, à nouveau, en chaque philosophe favori de Ribot (collection personnelle homme le système de sa vie morale. En ce sens, Bain S. Nicolas) perpétue la pensée associationniste classique qui joue un rôle central dans sa psychologie : il soutenait que Au moment où Bain élaborait son œuvre, d’autres les pensées complexes, les émotions et les actions philosophes estimaient que cette psychologie pure et pouvaient être analysées dans leurs composantes les statique n’était pas toute la science mentale, parce plus simples. Si l’on compare les travaux de Bain à qu’elle laissait bien des problèmes irrésolus ou même ceux de ses prédécesseurs immédiats, on s’aperçoit qu’elle oubliait de les poser. Herbert Spencer (1820- rapidement que de grandes différences existent. 1903) fut le premier à rétablir les droits du temps Si l’on considère, par exemple, comme points de dans le domaine psychologique et à distribuer, dans comparaison, l’ouvrage classique de Thomas Brown la série des âges, les diverses formations mentales (1820) et celui de James Mill (1829), on s’aperçoit, (Becquemont, Mucchielli, 1998 ; Tort, 1996). Bien contrairement aux livres de Bain, que, première- que les sources de sa psychologie soient difficiles à ment, le style est plus scientifique, il n’est pas celui établir, on sait qu’il fut fortement attiré par la phré- d’un orateur dont le discours est embelli de longues nologie et qu’il a étudié attentivement l’œuvre de citations anglaises et latines de poètes (Brown) ; et, John Stuart Mill. En outre, ses conversations philo- deuxièmement, que la méthode n’est plus pleinement sophiques avec G. H. Lewes (Duncan, 1908, p. 542), introspective et spéculative, la référence aux données qui avait projeté d’écrire dès 1836 un traité sur la médicales et physiologiques étant importante et philosophie empirique (psychologie) en liaison avec actualisée (contrairement à Brown et Mill). Les la physiologie du cerveau, a dû stimuler l’intérêt nouveautés, que l’on peut percevoir dans l’œuvre de du jeune Spencer. La stratégie révolutionnaire de Bain, sont essentiellement de deux ordres : d’abord, Spencer (voir figure 5) fut d’étudier les phénomènes son insistance sur la valeur de la physiologie pour la de l’esprit du point de vue de leur évolution. C’est psychologie (il fournira d’ailleurs des données phys- en rendant compte, pour la Westminster Review, de iologiques importantes dans ses travaux) ; ensuite, la troisième édition des Principles of physiology, sa foi en l’application des méthodes quantitatives general and comparative de Carpenter (1851), que en psychologie, même s’il n’a jamais expérimenté Spencer repéra l’énoncé de la loi de von Baer (1828) lui-même. À l’époque où Bain écrit ses premiers et son application à la biologie animale, ainsi qu’à ouvrages, le cerveau et le système nerveux en général la biologie végétale (voir Carpenter, 1839, p. 170). faisaient l’objet de travaux importants en Angleterre Cette idée que le développement de tout organisme sur des bases anatomiques par William B. Carpenter consiste en un changement de l’homogène à l’hété- (1813-1885) et cliniques par Thomas Laycock rogène fut bientôt étendue aux phénomènes mentaux (1812-1876), alors que le mouvement phrénologique (Spencer, 1904). On en trouve la première formula- commençait à s’essouffler et que le mesmérisme et tion dans son article sur l’hypothèse du développe- l’hypnotisme était à la mode. Mais, c’est surtout la ment (Spencer, 1852). Avec les Principes de psycho- psychologie de Bain, fondateur de la revue Mind: A logie (The Principles of Psychology), que Spencer Quarterly Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, publiait en 1855, la théorie générale de l’évolution, considérée comme le premier journal en langue précédemment ébauchée dans les Manières et la anglaise ayant diffusé des travaux psychologiques mode (Manners and Fashion) (Spencer, 1854), où il de nature expérimentale, ainsi que la psychologie s’interrogeait sur l’origine des conventions sociales de Spencer, qui seront à l’origine du mouvement auxquelles les individus se soumettent sans protester, psychologique anglais de la fin du xixe siècle. était appliquée à la genèse de l’esprit dont il était

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prouvé qu’il évolue de la même manière naturelle que l’organisation corporelle. Comme Spencer adopte l’idée de Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck (1744-1829), selon laquelle l’évolution organique résulte d’une action exercée par le milieu extérieur, il la généra- lisera encore en l’étendant à la vie psychologique et sociale. Ce qui est vrai des aptitudes et des fonctions biologiques, utiles ou nuisibles, adaptées ou non à leur milieu, l’est aussi des aptitudes et des facultés psychologiques. L’action du milieu physique sur l’esprit entraîne son adaptation croissante et entraîne Figure 6. Couvertures des deux volumes de la traduction nécessairement le progrès intellectuel (Spencer, espagnole de l’ouvrage de Ribot sur la psychologie 1857) et la fixation des caractères acquis (hérédité). anglaise contemporaine (collection personnelle Spencer a essayé de renouveler la psychologie par la S. Nicolas) biologie évolutionniste avant même Charles Darwin (1809-1882), dont la première édition de son ouvrage peut pas manger. (…) Lorsque, en février 1870, principal sur l’origine des espèces date de 1859. Bien j’ai publié la psychologie anglaise, personne ne que Darwin ait développé ses idées psychologiques la connaissait en France. Tout le monde a crié à dans plusieurs écrits (Darwin, 1871, 1872, 1877) et l’innovation ou fait des réserves de toute espèce : ait influencé plusieurs penseurs éminents, dont son on l’a traitée en hétérodoxie absolue. Aujourd’hui cousin Francis Galton (1869) et son ami George J. je vois qu’elle entre dans le domaine commun, de Romanes (1882, 1883), qui a créé la psychologie votre propre aveu. » (lettre du 15 septembre 1879). comparative, c’est la psychologie de Spencer qui a L’introduction de l’ouvrage est cependant jugée eu le plus d’influence en psychologie et en neuro- plutôt hardie, subversive, positiviste d’allure par les logie à travers l’œuvre de John Hughlings Jackson universitaires français de son temps comme Caro, (1835-1911), qui a lui-même influencé la neurologie, Janet, Lachelier, etc., qui défendent une psychologie la psychiatrie et la psycholinguistique du xxe siècle. attachée à la philosophie spiritualiste (voir Lenoir, 1957, p. 5). Mais l’ouvrage est accueilli favorable- Ainsi, comme le montre Ribot (1870), à cette ment par la majorité des critiques (voir Vacherot, époque trois voies s’ouvraient à la psychologie en 1870). Ribot devient alors un personnage public, Angleterre : elle pouvait rester statique, analytique, qui gagne en renommée et que l’on considère, un descriptive, à la manière de celle de Bain ; elle peu hâtivement, comme un disciple de Taine (voir pouvait être dynamique, synthétique, génétique, à Lenoir, 1957, p. 6). Des traductions du livre parais- la manière de celle de Spencer ; elle pouvait être sent rapidement en Angleterre (1873), aux États- physiologique et pathologique à la manière de celle Unis (1874) et en Espagne (1877) (voir figure 6), de Henry Maudsley (1865-1918). C’est l’approche preuve de l’intérêt des éditeurs et du public pour traditionnelle qui prévalut en Angleterre jusqu’au le mouvement philosophique anglais de l’époque. début du xxe siècle avec ses représentants les plus Une seconde édition française, remaniée (Ribot, autorisés : James Ward (1843-1925), James Sully 1875), incluant un chapitre additionnel sur Hartley, (1842-1923) et George F. Stout (1860-1944), qui tiré de sa thèse latine (Ribot, 1872), sera par la suite ne se sont pas beaucoup préoccupés de l’évolution mise sur le marché par le nouvel éditeur Baillière. mentale et de la psychophysiologie. Ribot fut, en revanche, très attiré par la psychologie évolutionniste de Spencer et par la psychophysiologie de Maudsley. Dans la correspondance (déposée aux archives de la Sorbonne, sous la cote 341), qu’il a entretenue avec le philosophe Lionel Dauriac (1847-1924), Ribot a donné, en quelques lignes, un bon résumé de ses conceptions et de ses sentiments à l’époque : « Pour la nouvelle psychologie, toute hypothèse sur l’âme, la matière, le “phénomène à double face”, etc. tout cela n’est qu’un hors d’œuvre auquel elle n’attache aucune importance. (…) Le plus grand malheur qui puisse arriver à la psychologie, c’est d’être cultivée par la philosophie ; c’est-à-dire par des gens pour qui la meilleure part du gâteau est celle qu’on ne Figure 7. Ribot en 1872 (d’après Lamarque, 1928)

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Une thÈse de psychologie de l’université qu’après la lecture des manuscrits par objective sur la question de le responsable de l’unité d’enseignement à laquelle on l’hÉrÉditÉ psychologique (1873) pouvait rattacher les thèmes présentés par le candidat. Ribot a eu le mérite d’introduire, pour la première Or, en 1873, le principal responsable de la section fois à la Sorbonne, en 1873, une nouvelle manière de philosophie pour les questions psychologiques de concevoir la psychologie à travers la présenta- était Paul Janet (1823-1899, voir figure 8), l’oncle tion de ses thèses sur « Hartley » et « L’hérédité : de Pierre Janet, que l’on connaît en France pour ses étude psychologique sur ses phénomènes, ses lois, travaux dans le domaine de la psychologie clinique ses causes, ses conséquences » (Nicolas, 1999). et pathologique. Paul Janet était à l’époque un des Les difficultés qu’il rencontra et la lenteur de cette derniers représentants de l’école éclectique de Victor introduction en France reflètent le climat conser- Cousin, avec son collègue enseignant la philosophie vateur prévalant à l’époque dans l’Université. à la Sorbonne, Elme Caro (1826-1887). Collabora- Jusqu’en 1833, la majorité des thèses de doctorat teur et secrétaire particulier de Victor Cousin (1792- étaient d’insignifiantes compositions, dénuées de 1867) durant l’année 1845, après avoir obtenu la toute valeur le lendemain du jour de la soutenance. première place à l’agrégation de philosophie (1844), Elles devinrent, par la suite, des livres influents, où Janet n’en professera pas moins une philosophie l’obligation était faite de se livrer à l’examen appro- quelque peu différente de celle du maître, mais fondi d’une question importante. À cette époque, les n’apportera pas de conceptions nouvelles dans cette étudiants de la Sorbonne soutenaient deux thèses discipline. Nommé en 1864 professeur d’histoire de publiquement, l’une écrite en latin et l’autre écrite la philosophie à la Sorbonne, Paul Janet s’appliqua en français. Un changement interviendra au début à maintenir le règne des idées spiritualistes (Janet, des années 1870 dans les thèmes des thèses propo- 1864, 1865, 1867, 1872, 1897) tout en demeurant sées à la Sorbonne. C’est, en effet, au cours de cette ouvert à toutes les nouveautés. Ainsi, il encouragea période, avec l’affaiblissement théorique de l’école le rapprochement de la philosophie et des sciences, le éclectique de Victor Cousin, que les thèses cesse- développement de la psychologie expérimentale et le réveil de la spéculation métaphysique. C’est l’esprit ront d’être historiques et deviendront dogmatiques. de la doctrine de l’école éclectique, représenté à Jusque-là, en accord avec la doctrine éclectique de la fin du xixe siècle dans toute sa largeur par Paul Cousin, on avait pensé que les thèses de philoso- Janet, qui favorisera l’introduction de la psychologie phie devaient servir à l’histoire de la philosophie. expérimentale en France. Sa prééminence au sein de C’étaient des monographies savantes consacrées l’Université française lui a permis d’assurer un rôle surtout soit à quelque philosophe peu connu, soit à charnière important. L’acceptation, par Paul Janet, l’éclaircissement de quelques parties obscures des des thèses de Ribot, témoigne de l’ouverture d’esprit philosophes classiques. Deux grandes tendances de ce philosophe pour la nouvelle psychologie, bien nouvelles vont apparaître : l’idéalisme métaphysique que les conceptions antispiritualistes et antiméta- et la philosophie expérimentale. C’est Jules Lachelier physiques de Ribot, exposées dans la préface de sa (1832-1918), alors maître de conférences à l’École Psychologie anglaise contemporaine (Ribot, 1870) normale supérieure (il deviendra, par la suite, inspec- l’irritaient fortement. teur général de l’instruction publique), qui inaugura, en 1871, les travaux de la première école, avec une thèse traitant Du fondement de l’induction (Lache- lier, 1871). Ce développement de la métaphysique en France s’est, en fait, réalisé en contre-réaction aux idées positivistes et matérialistes, qui commen- çaient à envahir la philosophie française. C’est Ribot qui inaugura, en 1873, la seconde école, en traitant de « l’hérédité psychologique » (Ribot, 1873) et en s’appuyant largement sur les travaux des philosophes et psychologues anglais et allemands contemporains. Fabiani (1988) a établi une statistique intéressante, où il montre que seulement 6 % des thèses en philosophie étaient consacrées à la psychologie expérimen- tale de 1870 à 1889. D’après les textes de loi en vigueur à l’époque, le permis d’imprimer les thèses et, donc, l’accord pour Figure 8. Portrait de Paul Janet (1823-1899) (collection la soutenance de celles-ci, n’était octroyé par le doyen personnelle S. Nicolas)

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La thèse latine était considérée à l’époque des vibrations de parties médullaires infinitési- comme un exercice indispensable et passait plus males, qui consistent en ondulations analogues pour une épreuve de thème que pour un exercice aux oscillations du pendule. La vibration, qui philosophique. D’ailleurs, la disproportion, souvent produit la sensation, en se répétant laisse dans le considérable, dans le nombre de pages entre la cerveau une tendance à se reproduire sous forme thèse latine et la thèse française (pour Ribot, on a de vibrations beaucoup plus faibles (vibration- respectivement 76 p. et 551 p.) reflétait l’intérêt des cules), qui produisent les représentations (images candidats et l’importance des sujets traités. Voyons ou idées). C’est à partir de ces éléments que Hartley le contenu des deux thèses de Ribot publiées chez va construire toute sa psychologie. La théorie Ladrange. de l’association en constituera la clef de voûte, elle explique le mécanisme de l’esprit et tous les phénomènes psychologiques sans exception. C’est de l’association primitive des vibrations que vont dériver les sentiments, la mémoire, l’imagination, le langage, le jugement et la liberté. Si les succes- seurs de Hartley reformuleront cette embryologie physiologique nettement insuffisante, ils conserve- ront l’idée selon laquelle le monde de l’esprit s’explique par les sensations primitives et la loi de l’association. Ribot restera, néanmoins, un critique du philosophe anglais qui, à son goût, procède trop en logicien et non en scientifique puisqu’il ne s’est Figure 9. Couverture de la thèse latine de Ribot (1872) pas assez appuyé sur les faits, comme le préconise publiée chez Ladrange (collection personnelle S. Nicolas) la méthode des sciences naturelles. Comme dans la première édition de son ouvrage de 1870, sur Pour sa thèse latine, Ribot (1872) choisit de la psychologie anglaise, il n’avait pas présenté les présenter la philosophie de David Hartley (1705- conceptions de Hartley, il complétait ainsi son étude 1757), qu’il considérait comme le véritable promo- sur l’associationnisme britannique sous une forme teur et organisateur de la théorie associationniste linguistique peu usuelle (le latin) en présentant un anglaise, dont les deux principaux représentants à de ses précurseurs. Cependant, lorsqu’en 1879 son l’époque étaient Alexander Bain et John Stuart Mill ami Alfred Espinas (1844-1922) lui demande de (voir figure 9). En 1746, Hartley avait déjà exposé lui prêter l’ouvrage d’Hartley (1749), il lui répond ses idées sur l’association d’une manière sommaire (voir Lenoir, 1970, p. 166) : « Il est introuvable. En dans une dissertation latine, mais ce n’était là qu’un 1871, j’ai mis un an à le faire découvrir d’occasion germe, dont les « Observations » devaient fournir à Londres. J’ai payé 35 frs un misérable bouquin l’ample développement. Voici l’origine des spécu- sale. Entre nous c’est vieux et dépassé, sans intérêt. lations philosophiques de Hartley, telles qu’elles Cela valait les honneurs d’une thèse latine, rien de ont été présentées dans son principal ouvrage plus. » (Hartley, 1749) : « Mon dessein principal est d’expliquer, établir et appliquer les doctrines des Le choix du thème de recherche pour sa thèse Vibrations et de l’Association. La première de ces française dérive certainement de ses lectures des doctrines m’a été suggérée par les vues exposées psychologues britanniques. Il écrit ainsi dans son par Sir Isaac Newton sur la formation de la sensa- ouvrage sur la psychologie anglaise (Ribot, 1870) : tion et du mouvement à la fin des Principes et dans « Les études sur la transmission héréditaire, consi- les Questions annexées à l’Optique ; la seconde par dérées au point de vue psychologique, sont desti- ce que M. Locke et d’autres personnes ingénieuses nées à jouer un grand rôle, quand la science sera ont écrit depuis son temps touchant l’influence de entrée complètement dans la voie qu’elle ne fait que l’association sur nos opinions et nos affections, d’essayer. Nous avons vu M. Herbert Spencer et M. ainsi que touchant son utilité pour expliquer, d’une Lewes demander à l’hérédité une solution toute manière soignée et précise, les faits qu’on rapporte nouvelle sur l’origine des idées. Mais ceux qui communément au pouvoir de l’habitude d’une refuseraient de les suivre jusque-là et d’admettre façon générale et indéterminée. » Selon la théorie que l’hérédité puisse trancher une des questions purement mécanique des vibrations, les objets exté- les plus importantes et les plus controversées de rieurs, par leurs impressions sur nos sens, causent, la philosophie, ceux-là même seront pourtant bien d’abord dans les nerfs, ensuite dans le cerveau, obligés d’accorder qu’un grand nombre de faits psychologiques ont leur source dans la transmission

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héréditaire. Comme, il n’y a, je pense, aucun spiri- Veux-tu que je t’envoie les épreuves ? Elles sont tualiste qui veuille nier l’influence de l’organisme pleines de non-sens grotesques, mais peu importe. sur nos tendances, nos passions, nos idées, nos Je serai bien aise d’avoir tes critiques et ton avis. aptitudes, et comme l’organisme est hérité, il faut Il y aura environ 540 pages. » Le 21 novembre bien que l’influence de l’hérédité se fasse sentir, 1872 la thèse est entièrement imprimée sous forme au moins médiatement, sur notre constitution d’épreuves, elle paraîtra au début de l’année 1873 psychologique. L’expérience vulgaire a fait depuis (la thèse latine fut imprimée rapidement, dès le longtemps cette découverte ; il reste à la science second semestre 1872). à la préciser et à l’expliquer. Certaines monstru- osités de l’ordre moral, des dépravations précoces, des goûts bizarres, ne semblent explicables que par l’hérédité » (Ribot, 1870, p. 398-399). Avec Spencer, la théorie associationniste a atteint son plus haut degré comme doctrine et comme mode d’explication. Beaucoup plus systématique que Mill ou Bain, Spencer procède en biologiste en rattachant toujours les phénomènes mentaux aux phénomènes vitaux. Il établit ainsi un continuum entre les associations fortuites et les associations indissolubles. Figure 10. Couverture de la thèse française de Ribot Les premières présentent une faible liaison et ne (1873) publiée chez Ladrange (collection personnelle sont données dans l’expérience qu’une seule fois. S. Nicolas) Les secondes sont unies par des rapports fixes, immuables, sans exceptions connues, elles ont une L’objet que s’était proposé Ribot dans sa thèse force invincible parce qu’elles sont la conséquence française (voir figure 10) était l’application aux d’expériences enregistrées, non seulement dans opérations qui constituent la vie mentale de l’individu, mais aussi dans l’espèce, suivant la l’homme de la loi d’hérédité, déjà étudiée par les théorie évolutionniste. C’est parce qu’elles sont la physiologistes dans les fonctions qui constituent répétition de milliers et de millions d’expériences la vie physique. Pour se servir des expressions qu’elles ont cette stabilité, et c’est parce qu’elles mêmes de l’auteur, « l’hérédité est la loi biologique, sont inscrites dans le système nerveux qu’elles en vertu de laquelle tous les êtres doués de vie peuvent être léguées par transmission héréditaire. tendent à se répéter dans leurs descendants ; elle Spencer fait donc intervenir ici un nouveau facteur, est pour l’espèce ce que l’identité personnelle est l’hérédité psychologique, qu’étudiera Ribot en pour l’individu » (Ribot, 1873, p. 1). « Par elle, détails dans sa thèse. D’après la correspondance de au milieu des variations incessantes, il y a un fond ce dernier, on sait qu’il a commencé à travailler sur qui demeure ; par elle, la nature se copie et s’imite le thème de sa thèse française après avoir achevé son incessamment » (Ribot, 1873, p. 1). Si la question ouvrage La psychologie anglaise contemporaine. Il n’en était plus une dans l’ordre physiologique (voir écrit ainsi à Espinas (lettre du 17 juin 1870) : « Ma Lucas, 1847-50), elle n’était pas clairement résolue thèse ne marche pas (l’hérédité, tu sais). Penjon rit dans l’ordre psychologique. L’axiome qui domine de mon sujet et s’en tient les côtes. » (voir Lenoir, la thèse c’est que, dans l’ordre des pensées et des 1957, p. 6). Dans sa lettre du 22 mars 1871, il écrit volitions, l’hérédité est la règle, la non-hérédité à nouveau : « J’ai repris mon travail sur l’Hérédité. est l’exception. Quatre parties, très exactement J’en ai fait à peu près le quart. » (voir Lenoir, 1957, divisées, contiennent tous les éléments de cette p. 6). démonstration. Dans la première, Ribot expose et analyse les faits ; dans la seconde, il les répartit et C’est aux alentours de la mi-mai 1872 que Ribot les classe sous certaines lois ; dans la troisième, va déposer ses deux thèses à la Sorbonne (lettre à il recherche les causes que les faits manifestent ; Espinas du 15 mai 1872, voir Lenoir, 1957, p. 8). Le dans la quatrième, enfin, il étudie les conséquences permis d’imprimer lui sera donné le 9 juin 1872 par psychologiques, morales et sociales, des lois qu’il le vice-recteur de l’académie de Paris (A. Mourier) a établies. en suite de l’accord du doyen de la faculté des lettres de la Sorbonne (Patin), après lecture des textes La première partie de sa thèse est consacrée à la manuscrits par le responsable de l’enseignement, en réalité de l’hérédité psychologique. Ses analyses l’occurrence Paul Janet. Il annonce à Espinas (lettre bibliographiques le conduisent à montrer la réalité du 21 octobre 1872, voir Lenoir, 1957, p. 9) : « On de l’hérédité des facultés intellectuelles (sens, a imprimé actuellement 336 pages de l’Hérédité. mémoire, imagination, intelligence) et affectives

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(sentiments, émotions, passions, volonté), citant faux d’établir, comme l’a fait l’école de Descartes notamment les travaux de Galton, mais pas ceux de et de Locke, une ligne de démarcation entre la Darwin. Il montre également le jeu de l’hérédité dans psychologie (étude de la conscience) et la physi- les maladies mentales en se fondant sur les écrits des ologie (étude de l’inconscient), puisqu’il est impos- aliénistes (Esquirol, Moreau de Tours, Falret, Brierre sible de dire où finit la conscience et où commence de Boismont) ; les statistiques montrant le rôle de l’inconscient. Il n’y a « pas un seul phénomène l’hérédité au moins dans la moitié des cas de folie. psychique, simple ou complexe, humble ou élevé, L’appui sur la pathologie pour fonder son hypothèse normal ou morbide, qui ne puisse se produire sous de l’hérédité psychologique est la marque d’une la forme inconsciente. » (Ribot, 1873, p. 320). La méthode qu’il appliquera par la suite avec rigueur et conscience n’est donc pas inhérente aux fonctions bonheur. Dans la seconde partie de sa thèse, il pose psychiques : celles-ci s’accomplissent avec ou sans l’hérédité comme « une loi du monde moral ». « Si elle ; sans elle, elles s’appellent l’instinct ; avec de cette masse de faits empruntés à la psychologie elle, l’intelligence. Il faut donc renvoyer dos à dos animale et humaine, à la pathologie et à l’histoire, matérialistes et idéalistes : la matière et l’esprit, le nous n’avions l’espoir de voir surgir quelque règle mouvement et la pensée ne sont que des symboles certaine et fixe, ce ne serait plus qu’un amas de de l’Inconnaissable (Spencer). « Le partisan de matériaux sans valeur, un recueil d’anecdotes l’expérience déclare insoluble la question » (Ribot, curieuses peut-être, mais qui n’apporterait à l’esprit 1873, p. 350) posée et s’abstient systématiquement rien qui ressemble à la science vraie. (…) C’est le de « toute recherche transcendante ». S’appuyant privilège de la méthode expérimentale, qu’on entend sur les écrits de Wundt, inconnus en France, il accuser si souvent de se traîner terre à terre (…) de souligne : « Si l’on admet, dit Wundt, l’identité du nous montrer les lois dans les faits. » (Ribot, 1873, fait physique et du fait psychique, le premier sera p. 187). Ribot soutient que l’hérédité revêt deux soumis aux lois de la mécanique, le second aux lois formes : directe et indirecte ; directe, quand elle a de la logique, et l’on peut démontrer que ces deux lieu entre parents et enfants, indirecte quand elle a sortes de lois sont identiques ; que l’expérience lieu entre parents éloignés, quant au temps (hérédité interne saisit comme nécessité logique ce que en retour ou atavisme) et quant au degré de parenté l’expérience externe perçoit comme nécessité méca- (hérédité collatérale). Mais les lois d’hérédité nique (…) c’est que la nécessité logique et la néces- paraissent se contredire et entrent en conflit. Pour sité mécanique diffèrent, non quant à leur essence, pouvoir les concilier, il suppose que l’hérédité est mais simplement par la façon dont nous les consid- une propriété physique qui demeure dans un organ- érons. Ce qui est donné, par l’analyse psychologique, isme à l’état latent. C’est sur les écrits statistiques comme une continuité d’opérations logiques, nous de Galton (1869) traitant de l’hérédité du génie est donné, par l’analyse physiologique, comme qu’il va s’appuyer. Mais la loi d’hérédité a aussi ses une continuité d’effets mécaniques… Le mécan- exceptions. Elles sont nombreuses et ont des causes isme et la logique sont identiques. Toutes deux ne multiples. À vrai dire, l’hérédité est une tendance sont que des formes d’un contenu identique dans plutôt qu’une loi. La troisième partie de la thèse se son essence » (Ribot, 1873, p. 356, tiré de Wundt, rapporte aux causes de l’hérédité. Ribot cherche ici à 1863, Menschen und Therseele, 13e leçon, p. 200 expliquer philosophiquement la loi d’hérédité, à lui et 57e leçon p. 437). Après avoir établi les « lois » donner tout son sens et toute sa portée. « Le rapport de l’hérédité et en avoir cherché le fondement ou de causalité entre les deux hérédités physique et les « causes », Ribot, dans la quatrième partie de mentale n’est qu’un cas particulier des rapports du la thèse, en suit les applications et en développe les physique et du moral. » L’hérédité psychologique « conséquences ». Les conséquences de l’hérédité se trouve dès lors expliquée, comme étant l’effet sont de trois ordres : psychologiques, morales, constant de l’hérédité physiologique et le développe- sociales. Si l’hérédité ne crée pas l’intelligence, tout ment physique étant antérieur au développement au moins elle la développe. « L’intelligence a pour mental, on ne peut douter que le premier ne soit la condition, pour l’organe principal, le cerveau : le cause, le second l’effet. Ainsi, la plupart des opéra- cerveau s’accroît par l’exercice, cet accroissement tions de l’âme, sinon toutes, peuvent se produire sous est transmissible par l’hérédité. Il semble assez une double forme : l’une consciente, l’autre incon- naturel d’en conclure que toute modification, toute sciente. Allant du simple au composé, de l’action amélioration dans l’organe entraîne une modifica- réflexe à lacérébration inconsciente, il montre le rôle tion, une amélioration dans la fonction, et que par de l’inconscient que l’on retrouve encore à l’œuvre suite le progrès du cerveau entraîne le progrès de dans de nombreuses opérations psychologiques l’intelligence. » (Ribot, 1873, p. 448). Puisqu’elle (sentir, jouir, souffrir, aimer, se souvenir, juger, est un facteur psychologique, l’hérédité a des raisonner, vouloir, etc.). Par conséquent, il est conséquences morales. Elle s’oppose à la liberté ou

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à l’individualité ; par la liberté, nous sommes nous- Concernant la thèse latine, Ribot semble aussi mêmes ; par l’hérédité, nous sommes les autres, nous avoir accepté que la loi d’association n’explique pas incarnons et reproduisons la race. Notre caractère ne tout, qu’elle ne rend pas compte du travail spontané nous appartient pas tout entier ; il est un legs des de l’esprit, de l’activité propre à l’âme. Il pense que générations, il en porte la marque. Ainsi, l’hérédité la personnalité, le moi, n’est pas réductible à celle-ci. joue un rôle important dans la formation des habi- D’ailleurs, pour lui, l’association n’est qu’une tudes morales. Les instincts de l’humanité primitive, espèce d’habitude, qui est un principe général de la fixés par l’hérédité, sont plus profonds en nous que nature vivante et pensante déterminant l’association les acquisitions récentes de la civilisation. Celles-ci des idées et provoquant l’hérédité. Paul Janet, qui sont précaires et peuvent toujours être tenues en prendra acte des opinions de Ribot en ce qui touche échec par ceux-là. Des conséquences morales de l’existence du moi et de la personnalité, inexpli- l’hérédité se déduisent ses conséquences sociales : cables par l’association, en profitera pour attaquer les institutions, en effet, découlent des mœurs et la faiblesse de l’associationnisme britannique, en les consacrent plutôt qu’elles ne les fondent. En montrant la nécessité de prendre en compte une résumé, l’hérédité est une loi sociale et, comme telle, existence spirituelle indépendante de tout mécan- découle des lois morales et psychologiques, mais isme. Paul Janet défendra ainsi la thèse spiritualiste elle découle aussi, et avant tout, des lois naturelles contre la doctrine empiriste. Il semble que Ribot ou, plutôt, elle est une loi, d’abord biologique, et n’ait pas répondu à Janet sur ce point. Il préférait ensuite psychologique, morale et sociale. certainement laisser à Paul Janet la satisfaction d’une critique contre l’associationnisme plutôt que La soutenance des thèses de Ribot fut à maintes de défendre une doctrine, quitte à l’amender, qu’il fois reportée. Déjà, d’après sa correspondance avec savait être critiquable. Il était difficile de soutenir Espinas (lettre du 2 janvier 1873, voir Lenoir, 1957), devant un jury composé de spiritualistes que les il pensait soutenir au plus tôt fin février. Mais, dans sa phénomènes intellectuels dépendent d’une vibra- lettre au même, datée du 15 mars 1873 (Lenoir, 1957, tion de la substance nerveuse comme le concevait p. 10), il écrit : « Je ne passerai que vers le 25 mai. David Hartley. D’ailleurs, lors de la soutenance, Je crois t’avoir écrit qu’on fait de ma soutenance une Elme Caro fera apparaître l’impossibilité radicale affaire d’État. Lorquet m’a dit qu’on avait parlé de où l’associationnisme se trouve d’expliquer ni les me faire passer presque à huis clos, c’est-à-dire sans sentiments ni les émotions ni la volonté. annonces préalables. Ils craignent des manifesta- tions positivistes ! (cela est fantastique) et (ce qui est Concernant la thèse française, Ribot voulait plus sérieux) des clabaudages de journaux dans l’un démontrer que la psychologie doit être expérimentale ou l’autre sens. Caro appelle ma thèse “une provo- et descriptive, et c’est pour cela qu’il s’était confiné, cation en 600 pages”. Tout cela, comme tu penses, dès le départ, dans l’enceinte des faits, à l’instar de la est loin de me faire du bien au Ministère. » Ribot physiologie. Mais les objections que lui adressèrent soutint publiquement devant la faculté des lettres de Mézières et Caro porteront justement sur les listes la Sorbonne ses deux thèses, sur « Hartley » et sur nombreuses d’exemples d’hérédité qu’il rapporte « L’hérédité » le vendredi 13 juin 1873. Malgré les dans sa thèse. Ils y trouvent bien des cas douteux craintes de départ, la soutenance de Ribot s’est très qui, selon eux, ne prouvent rien ou presque rien. bien déroulée. Il écrit ainsi à son ami Alfred Espinas Janet lui reprochera aussi que ces faits auraient dû dans une lettre datée du 15 juin 1873 (Lenoir, 1957, être l’objet d’une critique plus approfondie et qu’au p. 10-11) : « La journée de vendredi s’est bien passée. lieu d’un grand nombre de preuves peu démonstra- La soutenance latine a été très bonne de l’avis de tous tives, il aurait mieux valu en apporter moins, mais (de 10 h 30 à 13 h 30). La soutenance française (de de plus rigoureuses. Caro, qui reconnaît la puis- 14 h 15 à 17 h 15) a été bonne pour la première heure ; sance de l’hérédité, trouve qu’on ne la démontre en ce moment je me suis senti si fatigué, que je n’ai qu’avec des exemples exceptionnels et trop rares à pu montrer le même nerf. J’ai eu plusieurs réparties son goût. Il pense qu’on est obligé de conclure que qui ont fait rire le public et ôté à Caro l’envie de plai- l’hérédité n’exerce pas dans le monde psychologique santer. La Faculté m’a d’ailleurs comblé d’éloges et une si grande part que Ribot veut bien le faire croire reçu à l’unanimité. La thèse française étranglée en et prend l’exemple du récent ouvrage écrit par le 3 heures n’a pas été discutée sérieusement. On s’en botaniste suisse Alphonse de Candolle (1873) qui est tenu à des querelles superficielles ; on n’est pas montre, contrairement à Galton (1869), l’influence entré dans le fond du débat. [Paul] Janet s’est perdu de l’éducation et de l’environnement (voir Fancher, de rêveries scolastiques sur le principe du divers. » 1983). Les influences héréditaires affaiblies et Cependant, on sait que des discussions intéressantes réduites par l’éducation et la personnalité finis- eurent lieu lors de la soutenance. sent par ne plus jouer qu’un rôle exceptionnel en

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psychologie, et Caro regrette que Ribot n’ait pas fait tion de l’hérédité des caractères acquis (lamarck- dans sa thèse une plus large part au contexte envi- isme) (voir Nicolas, 1999). Elle eut un profond ronnemental (milieu). Revenant ainsi à la thèse spiri- retentissement dans le monde universitaire et lettré tualiste, Caro affirme qu’il faut admettre l’existence et connut un grand succès dans le public. On peut d’une force personnelle (moi, volonté), qui déborde répertorier onze éditions de l’ouvrage en France, l’hérédité physiologique et psychologique. Paul plusieurs traductions (anglais, allemand, russe, Janet renchérira à ce propos en défendant la thèse polonais, danois, espagnol…) et pas moins de dix selon laquelle l’individu est la résultante de deux éditions aux États-Unis dans sa traduction anglaise impulsions, l’héréditaire et la personnelle. Pour lui, (1874). Pour la seconde édition française, qui parut rien n’autorise à prétendre que l’hérédité l’emporte en 1882, Ribot changera son titre, désormais ce sera dans le domaine intellectuel sur la personnalité ou, L’hérédité psychologique, et refondra complètement comme il le dit dans son langage philosophique, le son travail original, puisque l’importante troisième fatalisme sur la liberté. La proportion relative des partie, consacrée aux « causes », est supprimée, ainsi deux facteurs est variable d’une espèce à l’autre, que certains chapitres (par exemple, « l’hérédité de mais chez l’homme c’est la personnalité et, donc, l’imagination ») et sous-chapitres (« les Cagots » la liberté qui dominent et non pas l’hérédité et le dans l’hérédité du caractère national). La troisième déterminisme. Durant la soutenance, Ribot n’a pas édition est publiée en 1887, la quatrième en 1890, nié l’existence d’un principe supérieur aux sensa- la cinquième en 1897 avec une nouvelle préface tions ou aux impulsions mécaniques de l’hérédité, datée de juin 1893, la sixième en 1901, la septième mais il pense que ce principe ne peut pas être objet en 1902, la huitième en 1906, la neuvième en 1910, de science. Par ce semblant de compromis, il a la dixième en 1914 et la onzième en 1925, toutes ainsi satisfait ses juges, qui n’ont pas vu ou voulu semblables à la cinquième édition. Ce travail remar- voir dans cette thèse une attaque de la psychologie quable (Benichou, 1989 ; Faber, 1997 ; Nicolas, et de la métaphysique spiritualistes. En effet, il est 1999 ; Staum, 2011) constituera l’œuvre séminale méthodologiquement impossible de nier l’existence sur laquelle il s’appuiera par la suite. d’un principe supérieur si la science ne peut le véri- fier. En outre, il faut souligner que, dans la thèse, on Conclusion trouve de nombreux passages où Ribot s’en prend On trouve, dans les premiers textes de Ribot, des aux thèses spiritualistes, notamment dans le chapitre idées d’une réelle nouveauté pour les intellectuels consacré aux « causes », mais il semble évident que français de l’époque. Ce que propose Ribot c’est les deux parties ont soigneusement évité de discuter l’exposé de nouvelles orientations en psychologie, un des plus importants chapitres de cette thèse. alors que la philosophie classique avait verrouillé Courant juin et juillet 1873, après la date de les débats et largement ignoré l’apport des sciences la soutenance, la presse a publié divers articles, connexes. Il s’affirme ainsi, plus que Taine, comme d’ailleurs très favorables à la thèse de Ribot le chef de file d’une école nouvelle, privilégiant (Taine, 1894) (voir aussi Revue littéraire, National, la méthode expérimentale ou, plutôt, objective en Revue de l’instruction publique, Bien public). psychologie. Les psychologues anglais avaient Mais, à la fin de l’année, la question de l’hérédité tracé la voie, Ribot s’est appuyé sur leurs écrits psychologique souleva de nouvelles discussions et les a fait connaître. Mais, pour la majorité des dans la presse et à l’Académie des sciences (Caro, philosophes français, élevés dans le spiritualisme 1874), comme l’indique la correspondance de le plus strict, il s’agissait là d’une atteinte à leurs Ribot à Espinas. « Tu as dû voir dans le Journal croyances héritées de la philosophie de Victor officiel (3 décembre) et Le Temps (8 décembre) Cousin et de Théodore Jouffroy. Ribot a dans l’idée l’orage épouvantable que mon Hérédité a soulevé à que la psychologie doit rompre avec les questions l’Institut. Bersot m’en a fait un récit amusant. Tu as métaphysiques, qu’elle doit s’ouvrir à la science en lu aussi, je pense, l’article que Taine m’a consacré s’appropriant ses méthodes. Mais Ribot n’est pas dans les Débats. Les spiritualistes sont furieux » un positiviste au sens strict, car il ne se revendique (lettre du 9 décembre 1873 à Espinas ; voir Lenoir, pas, et loin s’en faut, de l’école d’Auguste Comte ; 1957, p. 12). La thèse sur l’hérédité fut le premier il ne veut pas rompre totalement avec la méthode travail véritablement original de Ribot (ses travaux introspective, condamnée injustement par le posi- antérieurs portaient plutôt sur l’actualité de la tivisme. Cette opposition avec, d’un côté, l’école psychologie anglaise). Dans ce livre, il a abordé positiviste et d’un autre côté, l’école spiritualiste diverses problématiques, qui ne semblent pas avoir apparaîtra en plein jour avec la publication de ses été soulevées lors de la soutenance, notamment les œuvres ultérieures que nous présenterons dans un rapports entre l’âme et le corps, ainsi que la ques- autre article.

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